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Quotes of the Day:
"We don't see things as they are. We see things as we are."
– Anais Nin
"Under democracy one party always devotes its chief energies to trying to prove that the other party is unfit to rule - and both commonly succeed, and are right."
– H.L. Mencken
"Everybody gets so much information all day long that they lose their common sense."
– Gertrude Stein
1. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) Releases 100-page Report on North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)
2. Kim Yo Jong's statement and inter-Korean relations
3. Six former POWs urge truth commission on anniversary
4. US, China Jets Briefly Face Off Near South Korea, Yonhap Says
5. Where is Kim Ju-ae? Succession question hangs over North Korea’s ruling congress
6. How North Korea built a new ‘Pyonghattan’ despite sanctions
7. Are Long-Term NATO– South Korea Defense Ties Possible? Transitioning From an arms exporter to a Trusted Defense Partner
8. Experts worry about nuclear quid pro quo in Russia-North Korea alliance against Ukraine
9. South Korea's Most Realistic Nuclear Sub Option
10. Defense minister lodges protest with USFK over U.S.-China aircraft standoff
11. National Assembly to process U.S. investment bill as planned: lawmakers
12.
Note: I will be overseas for the next month so my daily dispatches will be sent at different times.
1. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) Releases 100-page Report on North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)
Comment: I will miss this event because I will be in Korea. I strongly recommend all those who have an interest in Korea attend. This is a very important report authored by my good friend and mentor Bob Collins.
RSVP: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfiMlaFzubGxzOUyqFsauqTYmZgez-0w76K7BAbLbkkr_nX2Q/viewform
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) Releases 100-page Report on North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)
https://www.hrnk.org/event/hrnk-presents-our-latest-report-the-reconnaissance-general-bureau-the-kim-regimes-precious-treasured-sword-by-robert-collins/
Help HRNK spread the word!
HRNK, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit, relies on donations to support our programs and to provide website content and services free of charge without commercial advertising. Your support enables HRNK to continue our important work promoting human rights in North Korea.
Thank you!
RSVP Link
The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), a Washington D.C.-based non-governmental organization tasked to research and report on North Korean human rights, will launch its publication entitled Reconnaissance General Bureau–The Kim Regime’s “Precious Treasured Sword” on Monday, February 23, 2026, virtually, via Zoom, from 16:00 to 17:30 U.S. Eastern Time. The report was authored by Robert Collins, author of eight previous HRNK reports over the past fourteen years. Collins is a 37-year veteran of the Department of Defense and an expert on North Korea and Northeast Asian security issues and human rights. The report will be posted on HRNK’s website at 12:01 am U.S. Eastern Time on Monday, February 23, the day of the rollout.
HRNK Board member and American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Henry Wendt Chair Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt notes: “Bob Collins' research on the North Korean regime is absolutely indispensable for any serious student of the DPRK. Collins has an uncanny ability to use ‘open sources’ to discover crucial facts about North Korea's political and military systems that others—including Western intelligence services somehow have missed. For me, everything he writes is a must read.”
Collins argues that “the RGB is not only a military reconnaissance unit, but also a combat unit, a cyber warfare group, an espionage bureau, a criminal enterprise, a terrorist organization, and a revolutionary entity all organized under a single control and command network that directly reports to North Korea’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un.” According to Collins, the RGB is integral to the Kim family regime’s intent to “unify the Korean peninsula under its rule and subjugate South Korea and its citizens to the same crimes against humanity experienced by North Korean citizens.”
Survival remains the regime’s fundamental strategic objective. HRNK President and CEO Greg Scarlatoiu states: “The Kim family regime is not a political cartel. It is a political monopoly, facing no domestic opposition. The only competitor is ‘the other Korea,’ the free, democratic, modern, prosperous, economic and cultural powerhouse: South Korea. The North Korean regime understands that its long-term survival can’t be guaranteed if South Korea continues to exist and thrive. From its viewpoint, unification under its control is the only way to guarantee its long-term survival.”
To achieve that goal, the RGB has been the ultimate instrument of infiltration, subversion, and disruption of South Korea. Collins scrutinizes the RGB’s genesis, history, mission, tactics, and chain of control and command. He highlights how RGB operations have violated international human rights law as well as the fundamental human rights of South Koreans and citizens of other countries.
Collins thoroughly documents the RGB’s critical role in the surge in cyber theft pursuant to regime orders. Once operational in three warfighting domains, land, sea and air, the RGB has adapted to the 21st century, aggressively disrupting and exploiting the cyber domain and even exploring involvement in geospatial intelligence and analysis. While subjugation of the entire Korean Peninsula continues to be its fundamental strategic objective, the RGB has become a global threat. Moving forward, Collins’ report will serve as an essential, foundational source of information for those investigating the RGB’s clandestine operations and their criminal impact on the human rights of South Koreans and others.
The report, featuring the author and discussants Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt, LTG In Bum Chun and Dr. George Hutchinson will be presented via Zoom. HRNK President and CEO Greg Scarlatoiu will moderate. To RSVP, please access the link above. HRNK will share the program Zoom link with confirmed participants.
The event is open to the press and on-the-record.
2. Kim Yo Jong's statement and inter-Korean relations
As we analyze the results of the 9th Party Congress we should consider the assessment and analysis of my friend and CAPS colleague Ms. Jihyun Park, an escapee from north Korea. Her essay helps us to understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Voices Feb. 20, 2026 / 11:43 AM
Kim Yo Jong's statement and inter-Korean relations
By Jihyun Park
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/20/perspective-Kim-Yo-Jong-statement-repeated/5751771603132/
Kim Yo Jong (L), the Korean leaser's sister, expressed “high appreciation” Thursday for South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young’s expression of regret of a drone incursion into North Korean airspace the day before. But North Korea had sent the same message five days earlier, indicating to observers the North changed the date to reinforce its message. File Photo by the Pyongyang Press Corps/Pool/EPA
Feb. 20 (UPI) -- The author prefers to use the lowercase "n" to challenge the Kim family regime's legitimacy.
Kim Yo Jong, vice department head of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, issued a statement Thursday morning in which she expressed "high appreciation" for ROK Unification Minister Chung Dong-young's expression of regret and pledge to prevent future drone incursions into north Korean airspace.
"I highly appreciate that Jong Dong-young ... officially acknowledged the ROK-origin drone's provocative intrusion into our country's airspace on Feb. 18, expressing regret once again and willingness to prevent recurrence. Terrible consequences will ensue if such violations happen again. This is not a threat, but a clear warning."
Pyongyang had already issued a similar statement Feb. 13, but this time it was repeated with the date changed to Thursday.
Related
This shows that the north is deliberately reinforcing its message, independent of the actual timing of the incident or South Korea's official announcement.
The incident and the response: reading between the lines
On Wednesday, Chung held a press conference at the Seoul Government Complex, officially announcing:
• Measures and policy responses to prevent future drone intrusions
• Consideration of reinstating no-fly zones and reviewing the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement
• An official expression of regret for the incident
north Korea, however, reframed this entirely, presenting it as though South Korea had repeatedly acknowledged and apologized. This kind of framing is a textbook example of how Pyongyang uses language as a political and psychological tool.
Two key sentences from Kim Yo Jong's statement
1. "Terrible consequences will ensue if such violations happen again. This is not a threat, but a clear warning."
• Not just a threat, but a constitutional and political warning to South Korea
• A strategic message aimed at controlling South Korean actions by linking it to a promise to prevent recurrence
• A pre-emptive signal for the formalization of the two-state theory at the upcoming 9th Party Congress
2. "The border with a hostile state must be solid."
• A linguistic device aimed at fixing inter-Korean relations as state-to-state, not simply internal ethnic matters
• Reinforces north Korean sovereignty and lays the groundwork for institutionalizing the two-state theory
• Carries political, diplomatic and constitutional weight beyond a mere military warning
Two-state theory and the 9th Party Congress: signs of north Korea's strategy
Over the past few years, north Korea has been gradually framing inter-Korean relations from a two-state perspective.
Since 2023, Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong have repeatedly labeled South Korea as an "enemy state," solidifying the language that turns inter-Korean relations into a state-to-state, rather than kinship-based, framework.
north Korea's two-state rhetoric is more than diplomatic posturing. It redefines inter-Korean relations under international law as separate state relations and effectively limits the discussion of reunification.
The repeated emphasis on the border and warnings against recurrence in this statement can be read as a preparatory move for formalizing the two-state theory at the 9th Party Congress.
Officially, north Korea enshrined its nuclear capability in the constitution in 2022, but preparations and strategic messaging had been ongoing long before.
This pattern shows how north Korea prepares its objectives in advance and enforces them through both action and language.
north Korea labels South Korea as an enemy and emphasizes borders.
Yet, if South Korea respects the north's system, accepts its two-state claims and talks about reunification on that premise, this is not merely a strategic contradiction -- it verges on undermining its own constitution. Discussing reunification on a framework that negates the nation's identity only weakens the state from within.
Language and totalitarianism: the power to shape thought
South Korea still struggles to fully grasp these patterns.
Since last year, I've been analyzing and exposing the meaning and power of language coming out of authoritarian regimes worldwide.
Language is not just a tool for communication -- it is a core instrument that defines human rights and shapes thought.
Totalitarianism doesn't only arrive with guns and missiles. It comes through language that crushes our thinking, a subtle yet total form of control -- what we call indoctrination.
When a state dictates which words and expressions can be used and punishes deviation, it exerts one of the most insidious yet powerful forms of control. north Korea demonstrates this clearly.
The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protect Act is a prime example:
It standardizes language within the country, limits foreign words, colloquial expressions and private creativity and forces citizens to use only the words and expressions prescribed by the state.
The result is that even individual thought and freedom of mind are restricted.
Since language shapes thought, controlling it effectively conditions society to think and feel exactly as the state prescribes.
This is not a mere matter of grammar or cultural policy -- it is a central mechanism of political control.
The warning and border emphasis in Kim Yo Jong's statement should also be read in this light: It is not just a military message. It is a strategic tool using language, discourse, law and politics to shape how South Korea and the world perceive north Korea.
Conclusion: vigilance and understanding
Kim Yo Jong's statement is far more than a threat or an impassioned outburst. It frames South Korea's response, lays the groundwork for formalizing the two-state theory at the 9th Party Congress and uses language to control perceptions and reinforce constitutional and political authority.
Even though Chung made his repeated statement Wednesday to clarify South Korea's position, north Korea framed it entirely on its own terms.
If South Korean society fails to read these messages accurately and respond appropriately, Pyongyang will continue to seize the initiative in shaping the realities and discourse of the Korean Peninsula.
Jihyun Park, a British Korean Conservative politician and regular contributor to the Korea Regional Review, is a north Korean escapee who fled twice from the country -- in 1998, which resulted in a forced repatriation, and in 2008, which was successful. She is a senior fellow for human security at the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy.
3. Six former POWs urge truth commission on anniversary
Comment: We should never forget one of the most egregious human rights atrocities by the Kim family regime. Holding what some estimate to be 78,000 South Korean soldiers prisoners and never repatriated to the South during the Armistice process. South Korea needs to expose this truth about the north.
World News Feb. 19, 2026 / 9:56 PM / Updated Feb. 19, 2026 at 9:56 PM
Six former POWs urge truth commission on anniversary
By Asia Today and translated by UPI
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/19/pow-soldiers-called-for-truth-commission-to-investigate/5751771555794/
Kim Seong-tae, a former South Korean POW who later defected, speaks at a press conference in Seoul after winning a damages lawsuit against North Korea in 2023. File. Photo by Yonhap News Agency
Feb. 19 (Asia Today) -- Six surviving South Korean soldiers captured during the Korean War and later defected from North Korea called Thursday for the establishment of a government truth commission to investigate the fate of prisoners of war.
The appeal came on the 12th anniversary of the release of the 2014 report by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea.
In a joint statement, the former POWs urged the government to create a "South Korean POW Truth Commission" to determine facts and responsibility and to publish a comprehensive official report and roster.
They also asked the government to designate Nov. 26 - the date Lt. Cho Chang-ho returned in 1994 and was formally discharged - as "POW Remembrance Day," and Feb. 17, the date the COI report was released, as "North Korean Human Rights Promotion Day."
Related
The group called for the creation of a special medal for South Korean POWs similar to the U.S. Prisoner of War Medal and for the awarding of military decorations for valor.
"Since Lt. Cho's return in 1994, 80 South Korean POWs have come back, but only six remain alive in South Korea today," the statement said. "We ask the courts to render prudent judgments in POW-related lawsuits within our lifetime."
Former POWs who defected have won damages suits against North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and the North Korean government, but they have been unable to collect compensation because of enforcement difficulties.
Civic groups supporting the former POWs have urged the Supreme Court to swiftly rule on a pending asset seizure case so the elderly plaintiffs may receive compensation while they are still alive.
-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.
Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260219010005909
4. US, China Jets Briefly Face Off Near South Korea, Yonhap Says
Summary:
Bloomberg reports that US and Chinese fighter jets briefly faced off over waters near the Korean Peninsula, citing Yonhap. About 10 US fighters flew from an airbase in Pyeongtaek on Wednesday for drills over international waters off South Korea’s west coast. Yonhap said the US planes did not enter China’s air defense identification zone, but China scrambled aircraft as they neared it. China’s state-backed Global Times said the PLA monitored and responded. South Korea’s Defense Ministry said it could not confirm US operations and that South Korea’s military was not involved or informed in advance. USFK and China’s Foreign Ministry did not comment.
Comment: Routine training near an ADIZ can be used as strategic signaling, with each side shaping perceptions of resolve while keeping actions short of territorial airspace.
US, China Jets Briefly Face Off Near South Korea, Yonhap Says
Bloomberg · Soo-hyang Choi · February 19, 2026
By Soo-hyang Choi
February 19, 2026 at 9:23 PM EST
Updated on February 20, 2026 at 12:46 AM EST
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-20/us-china-jets-briefly-face-off-near-south-korea-yonhap-says?sref=hhjZtX76
US and Chinese fighter jets briefly faced off above waters near the Korean Peninsula this week, Yonhap News reported, marking a rare confrontation in that area between the two superpowers.
Around 10 US fighter jets on Wednesday departed an airbase in Pyeongtaek for drills above international waters off South Korea’s western coast, the news outlet reported citing military sources it didn’t identify. While the US planes didn’t enter China’s air defense identification zone, Beijing scrambled planes as they neared that region, according to the report.
“The Chinese People’s Liberation Army organized naval and air forces to monitor and effectively respond to the activities throughout the process, in accordance with laws and regulations,” the Chinese state-backed Global Times said Friday, citing sources it did not name.
An air defense identification zone is different from a country’s territorial air space. Instead, it’s an area in which aircraft are expected to identify themselves as they draw nearby.
US Forces Korea, which oversees some 28,500 American troops stationed in South Korea, didn’t immediately provide a comment. China’s Foreign Ministry didn’t reply to a request for comment made outside working hours. South Korea’s Defense Ministry said it could not confirm US military operations.
“US Forces Korea is maintaining a strong combined defense posture with our military,” the South Korean Defense Ministry said in a statement. South Korea’s military wasn’t involved in the latest training or aware of the flight details in advance, Yonhap reported.
It’s unusual for US fighter jets stationed in South Korea to conduct training without Seoul so close to China’s air defense identification zone, according to the report.
China has stepped up military aggression in the Indo-Pacific where Beijing has territorial disputes in the South China Sea and over self-ruled Taiwan. Tensions have flared in recent months between China and Japan, another key US ally in Asia, after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggested Tokyo could be legally justified to deploy its military in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
In December, Tokyo accused a Chinese fighter jet of using its weapons-targeting radar on Japanese fighters. Beijing said the Japanese jets were disrupting its air training.
The latest report also comes as the US signals a reduction in American support to deter North Korea from aggression, urging South Korea to take the primary role in countering Pyongyang.
On Thursday, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un kicked off a closely watched party congress, the first such event in five years, to lay out his key policy agenda.
Kim has said he would “clarify the next-stage plans for further bolstering the country’s nuclear war deterrent” at the gathering.
Bloomberg · Soo-hyang Choi · February 19, 2026
5. Where is Kim Ju-ae? Succession question hangs over North Korea’s ruling congress
Summary:
The article says north Korea’s ninth Workers’ Party congress opened in Pyongyang with Kim Jong-un expected to set priorities through the decade, including defense, the economy, and ideology. Analysts anticipate a dual-track doctrine that builds nuclear and conventional forces, shaped by lessons from Russia’s Ukraine war where nuclear weapons function mainly as deterrents. The congress may detail operational nuclear deployment, including ICBMs and MIRV-related work, and codify Kim’s shift to viewing inter-Korean relations as “two hostile states.” It may reiterate conditional dialogue with Washington only if denuclearization demands end. Attention also centers on the absence of Kim Ju-ae, fueling succession speculation.
Comment: I am sure Kim is enjoying our speculation as he continues to tease us with succession. But rer absence is itself information management, because the regime can sustain succession ambiguity while keeping focus on doctrine, force development, and legitimacy narratives. We are so easily distracted by the "shiny thing."
North Korea
This Week in AsiaPolitics
Where is Kim Ju-ae? Succession question hangs over North Korea’s ruling congress
With Kim Jong-un set to outline his end-of-decade vision, the notable absence of his teenage daughter raises fresh succession questions
Park Chan-kyong
Published: 8:00am, 21 Feb 2026Updated: 2:01pm, 21 Feb 2026
Park Chan-kyong
Published: 8:00am, 21 Feb 2026Updated: 2:01pm, 21 Feb 2026
North Korea’s ruling party congress, convened only once every five years, opened in Pyongyang this weekend with supreme leader Kim Jong-un poised to formalise a military doctrine with far-reaching implications for security on the Korean peninsula and beyond.
State media described the opening of the ninth congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea as unfolding “with splendour” in “the capital city of the revolution”, with 5,000 delegates and 2,000 observers in attendance.
The carefully choreographed event, which by historical precedent will run for between four and eight days, is expected to map out national priorities through the end of this decade – spanning defence, inter-Korean relations, economic management and ideological direction.
At the congress’ core is a dual-track military strategy Kim has been telegraphing for months. During a September inspection of weapons institutes, he announced plans to “simultaneously push forward the building of nuclear forces and conventional armed forces”.
Kim Jong-un (centre) presides over the opening of the ninth congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Friday. Photo: KCNA/Reuters
In January, standing at a large-calibre multiple rocket launcher test site, he declared he would unveil “the next step” in nuclear war deterrence at the congress itself.
In his opening address on Friday, Kim declared that North Korea had “irreversibly solidified” its status, in an apparent reference to its expanding nuclear arsenal, “bringing about a massive change in the global political order and relations affecting our country”.
“It will be interesting to see what details of this project are presented,” said Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU). “What kind of conventional weapons will be developed? And how will they be combined with nuclear weapons?”
Analysts say North Korea’s growing emphasis on conventional forces reflects a strategic conclusion Kim appears to have drawn from Russia’s war in Ukraine, where nuclear weapons have functioned mostly as deterrents.
Ahead of our party are heavy and urgent tasks
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un
“The takeaway from the war for North Korea is that nuclear weapons are, in effect, unusable on the battlefield,” said Koh Yu-hwan, emeritus professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University.
“While continuing to build up its nuclear arsenal, North Korea feels the need to bolster its conventional weaponry in the face of South Korea, which boasts one of the world’s largest conventional arms production capabilities.”
Pyongyang had initially pursued nuclear weapons to compensate for its conventional military inferiority, according to Oh Gyeong-seob, a senior research fellow at KINU.
“Its navy and air force are particularly outdated compared with the South, which is armed with modern fighter jets and warships,” he said. “The North needs conventional weapons that are usable in actual warfare.”
Rocket launchers seen in Pyongyang on Thursday at a ceremony held before the opening of the ruling party congress. Photo: KCNA/EPA
Analysts expect this weekend’s congress to detail plans for the operational deployment of nuclear weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, as North Korea presses ahead with efforts to master re-entry vehicle technology and develop multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles – a missile payload configuration that allows a single ballistic missile to deliver several nuclear warheads at once.
Beyond military hardware, the congress is expected to formally rewrite the ideological terms of Korean division itself.
Kim has previously redefined inter-Korean relations as those between “two hostile states” in a deliberate break from the long-standing formulation of a divided nation moving towards reunification.
Analysts expect Pyongyang to embed this shift in the party constitution, stripping out references to “two divided halves of the same nation”, reconciliation and exchanges.
US President Donald Trump with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un talk before a meeting in the demilitarised zone in 2019. Photo: AFP
On relations with Washington, North Korea is expected to reiterate its conditional openness to dialogue, but only if the United States abandons its demand for denuclearisation.
Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, has repeatedly insisted that recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status must come first.
Retired American diplomat Joseph Yun, a former US special representative for North Korea, said at a Washington seminar in January that Kim showed no signs of readiness to re-engage, pointing to deepening military cooperation with Moscow and closer alignment with Beijing – symbolised by the joint appearance of Kim, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing at a military parade in September.
Revenue from supplying troops and materiel for Russia’s war in Ukraine, along with cyber theft and other illicit activities, might have further reduced Kim’s incentives to return to the negotiating table, Yun added.
Strikingly, Kim’s opening address on Friday barely mentioned Seoul or Washington, pivoting instead to economic ambition.
“Ahead of our party are heavy and urgent tasks of advancing economic development and improving people’s livelihoods and transforming all aspects of social life in the country as quickly as possible,” he said.
The missing heir
On the ideological front, Kim reaffirmed loyalty to his grandfather Kim Il-sung and father Kim Jong-il, signalling that the congress may not formally enshrine a distinct “Kim Jong-un Thought” – at least not yet.
“This restraint suggests a continued emphasis on pragmatic governance, particularly economic management, rather than overt ideological innovation,” Yang said.
Still, the question of succession lingered – shaped, in part, by the notable absence.
Kim Jong-un and his daughter Ju-ae inspect a newly completed music shop in the Hwasong area of Pyongyang on Wednesday. Photo: KCNA/KNS/AFP
Kim Ju-ae, the supreme leader’s daughter believed to be around 13, did not appear at the opening session. Her presence would have been read as an unambiguous succession signal, according to analysts.
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service recently told lawmakers that Ju-ae appears to have entered a “successor designation” phase, referencing her high-profile appearances at military events and visits to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where the embalmed bodies of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il lie in state.
The agency believes the regime in Pyongyang has been increasingly highlighting the teenager’s No 2 position in the ceremonial hierarchy since late last year, according to Park Sun-won, a lawmaker of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea.
Park Chan-kyong
Park Chan-kyong is a journalist covering South Korean affairs for the South China Morning Post. He previously worked at the Agence France-Presse's Seoul bureau for 35 years. He studied political science at Korea University and economics at the Yonsei University Graduate School.
6. How North Korea built a new ‘Pyonghattan’ despite sanctions
Comment: 5 minute video at the link: https://www.scmp.com/video/asia/3343982/how-north-korea-built-new-pyonghattan-despite-sanctions?utm
This uses extensive propaganda footage from north Korea. The South China Morning Post only touches on support from Russia and the regime's illicit activities at the very last few seconds ofthe video. By the way, Wonsan is almost due east of Pyongyang, not to the north as the video inaccurately states.
How North Korea built a new ‘Pyonghattan’ despite sanctions
31 SHARES
Read more: https://sc.mp/35d720
North Korea’s capital is in the midst of a massive construction boom building a new city district some have called “Pyonghattan”. The redevelopment project, spearheaded by leader Kim Jong-un, includes two new 80-storey residential skyscrapers and promises to deliver 50,000 new housing units before the end of 2026. Outside Pyongyang, the Wonsan-Kalma beach resort opened with more than 50 beach-side hotels along 5km (3 miles) of coastline. Although these projects are intended to improve living standards, foreign tourism remains extremely limited.
February 20, 2026
7. Are Long-Term NATO– South Korea Defense Ties Possible? Transitioning From an arms exporter to a Trusted Defense Partner
Comment: Download the 36 page report by Dr. Chung Min Lee at this link from the Carnegie Endowment: https://assets.production.carnegie.fusionary.io/files/Lee-Nato South Korea.pdf
Are Long-Term NATO– South Korea Defense Ties Possible? Transitioning From an arms exporter to a Trusted Defense Partner
assets.production.carnegie.fusionary.io
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2
Sre Long-Term NaTO–South Korea Defense Ties Possible? Transitioning From an arms exporter to a Trusted Defense Partner
Chung Min Lee
February 2026
about the Carnegie endowment for International Peace
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© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.
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8. Experts worry about nuclear quid pro quo in Russia-North Korea alliance against Ukraine
Summary:
Defense News reports expert concern that Russia could repay north Korea’s frontline support in Ukraine with sensitive submarine-related know-how. Peter Roberts told a UK Parliament hearing that if Moscow runs out of other compensation, it may “leach” submarine expertise, once treated as “crown jewels.” The article cites South Korean intelligence claims that north Korea has suffered 6,000 casualties and supplied shells, missiles, and gear. It notes KCNA footage from Dec. 25, 2025 showing Kim inspecting an “8,700-ton” nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine at Sinpo. John Ford (CNS) calls the effort a crude but potentially deterrent “jank triad,” yet is skeptical Russia would transfer the most sensitive elements; cash may be the main payoff.
Comment: More than experts should be worried. Us lay people should be as well. Even limited Russian “iterative” technical help, short of blueprints, could accelerate north Korea’s sea-based deterrent by reducing trial-and-error, while still giving Moscow deniability.
For the intelligence analysts: What specific indicators would distinguish mere cash-for-arms exchange from a true transfer of submarine propulsion competence, and how quickly would those indicators appear?
Experts worry about nuclear quid pro quo in Russia-North Korea alliance against Ukraine
Defense News · Linus Höller
Feb 20, 2026, 05:58 AM
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/02/20/experts-worry-about-nuclear-quid-pro-quo-in-russia-north-korea-alliance-against-ukraine/
BERLIN — With North Korean soldiers and equipment playing a key role at Russia’s front line in Ukraine, some experts worry Moscow may be ready to return the favor by providing highly sensitive information on nuclear submarines to its newfound ally in Pyongyang.
Russia could trade away what Peter Roberts, associate fellow at the University of Exeter’s Centre for Public Understanding of Defence and Security, described as the “crown jewels of military knowledge,” if Moscow runs out of things to offer Pyongyang in exchange for Kim Jong Un’s support.
Roberts was speaking as an expert before the U.K. Parliament during a Feb. 10 hearing on undersea activity.
North Korea’s role in Russia’s war against Ukraine has become vital for the Kremlin. According to South Korean intelligence, the North has suffered 6,000 casualties fighting for Russia. It is also supplying millions of artillery shells, ballistic missiles, and various types of vehicles and gear.
“It used to be that to get North Korean weapons or North Korean soldiers to fight in Ukraine for [Putin] ... he would trade away ballistic missile technology and knowledge. Well, he has done that − it has sort of gone,” Roberts told British lawmakers. “You are now starting to see what is potentially the leaching and offering of submarine expertise to states like North Korea and Iran in exchange for key capabilities, whether that is mass drone manufacturing or engineers being put to the frontline in Ukraine.”
This would represent a significant step in the military ties between the two countries and signal a level of desperation among Russian policy elites. According to Roberts, “previously, nuclear submarine operating knowledge was something you never shared. It was kept within a strictly confined group of people. These were the crown jewels of military knowledge.”
On Dec. 25, 2025, North Korean state media broadcast images of Kim Jong Un inspecting an “8,700-ton nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine” at the Sinpo shipyard — the most detailed look yet at a program Kim has prioritized since at least 2021. Seoul-based analysts noted that the fully assembled exterior suggested reactor installation was likely complete, with one former South Korean submarine officer estimating the vessel could be ready for sea trials within months.
“They’ve definitely been pursuing this for some time,” John Ford, a research associate at the California-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said of North Korean ambitions to develop a submarine component to its nuclear deterrence.
In an interview with Defense News, he said the regime is building what he called a “jank triad” − far from advanced, but sufficient to make any enemy think twice about whether to attack a country with a nuclear second strike capability that may work “well enough.”
In nuclear deterrence parlance, a country has completed a triad when it can launch nuclear weapons from land, air and sea.
North Korea has on several occasions shocked observers when it attained complex technological goals on its own that analysts thought would take many more years to figure out, such as producing a nuclear bomb, miniaturizing it, placing it atop a missile, and making progress toward a functioning re-entry vehicle.
“For subs, there’s a lot that can go wrong,” said Ford. “You’re basically taking all that previous stuff, and then you’re amplifying it − now it needs to be underwater.”
“The actual skill of operating underwater is something that they just don’t have. And unless Russian navy submariners are doing ride-alongs and training them, which I don’t think would be happening − even then, it would take a really long time,” said Ford.
But there are signs that North Korea’s leadership is getting its fair share out of the support for Putin’s war efforts. For one, Russian experts have been making repeated trips to the DPRK, though, due to the secrecy of both countries, few details are known about what they do there.
And in September 2025, South Korea’s military said it had obtained intelligence suggesting Russia supplied North Korea with two to three nuclear submarine propulsion modules − reportedly salvaged from decommissioned Russian submarines − including a reactor, turbine, and cooling system. Seoul said at the time it was working to verify the information.
However, Ford said he remains “very skeptical” that Russia has handed over the most sensitive elements of its submarine expertise
“Nuclear weapons designs: impossible,” Ford said. “Propulsion? More possible, but still very unlikely.”
Countries, as a rule, don’t trade their most closely held military knowledge, Ford noted. Russia has particular reasons for caution: intelligence transferred to North Korea could leak to Seoul via human intelligence networks, meaning Moscow would effectively be giving South Korea a window into its own reactor designs.
And even if Russia shared some information on how nuclear submarine propulsion works, North Korea would still need to bridge the gap between theoretical knowledge and practical implementation, something Ford notes took the Soviet Union and the U.S. decades to master during the Cold War.
There are also institutional barriers. “The people in Russia who are responsible for holding and maintaining this information will object to it being shared,” Ford said − although Putin ultimately has the authority to override them.
There is a difference between handing over the blueprints and providing more iterative tech support, such as answering questions or confirming whether components are correctly placed, as Ford says happened in previous proliferation cases, such as tacit U.S. assistance while France was developing its own nuclear weapons.
And Russia likely has more leverage in the relationship than popular reporting suggests. The primary compensation North Korea is receiving from Russia remains cash, Ford argues, which Pyongyang − isolated by some of the harshest UN sanctions ever imposed − has long been chronically short on. The government channels it into domestic development, from manufacturing capacity to infrastructure. Technical assistance from Russia, if it exists, is secondary and likely more constrained than the most alarmist assessments imply, said Ford.
What is not in dispute is the regime’s ambition. Kim has made the nuclear submarine a stated political priority, visited the Sinpo shipyard repeatedly, and invoked the language of a “nuclear shield.” At the country’s Yongbyon nuclear research center, Center for Nonproliferation Studies analysts have flagged new construction that may be a submarine reactor testbed.
About Linus Höller
Linus Höller is Defense News' Europe correspondent and OSINT investigator. He reports on the arms deals, sanctions, and geopolitics shaping Europe and the world. He holds a master’s degrees in WMD nonproliferation, terrorism studies, and international relations, and works in four languages: English, German, Russian, and Spanish.
9. South Korea's Most Realistic Nuclear Sub Option
Summary:
Ju Hyung Kim argues South Korea’s SSN debate is about strategy, timelines, and constraints, not engineering pride. He says an indigenous nuclear submarine would collide with three hard barriers at once: domestic legal reform for military reactors, the cost and complexity of designing a naval reactor and nuclear shipyard infrastructure, and U.S. and IAEA nonproliferation politics. Seoul, unlike Australia under AUKUS or India with Russian tolerance, is unlikely to get approval for a South Korea designed reactor outside U.S. control. Therefore the most realistic path is acquiring or co-building U.S. Virginia-class submarines, especially Block IV, for mature production, manageable cost, and alliance integration.
Comment: I must leave this to naval and nuclear experts to assess.
South Korea's Most Realistic Nuclear Sub Option
realcleardefense.com · Ju Hyung Kim February 20, 2026
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/02/20/south_koreas_most_realistic_nuclear_sub_option_1166013.html
Why South Korea’s Most Realistic Nuclear Submarine Option Is the Virginia-Class Block IV
The recent debate in South Korea over acquiring a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) reflects a genuine strategic problem, rather than a technological ambition. As the Republic of Korea Navy faces longer patrol requirements, a deteriorating underwater balance vis-à-vis North Korea, and a growing probability of a simultaneous dual contingency involving China and North Korea, the limitations of existing conventional diesel submarines have become increasingly apparent. SSNs offer durability, speed, and operational flexibility that no conventional platform can replicate.
Nevertheless, the core issue that Seoul has faced is not whether SSNs would be useful. The question is whether they are realistically achievable given the existing legal, political, financial, and alliance constraints. When these constraints are examined without illusion, they lead to a conclusion: if South Korea is serious about fielding SSNs within a meaningful timeframe, acquiring or co-building Virginia-class submarines—specifically the Block IV configuration—would be the most realistic path.
Advocates for South Korea’s indigenous SSN often frame this debate as a purely technological capabilities issue. They argue that South Korea is already building advanced conventional submarines, operates civilian nuclear power plants, and owns a world-class shipbuilding industry. From this perspective, a domestically designed SSN seems a natural extension of existing strengths. However, such views overlook the structural obstacles that distinguish nuclear propulsion from every other category of defense development.
An indigenous SSN program would require South Korea to overcome three interlocking barriers simultaneously: domestic legal reform, indigenous development of a nuclear reactor, and authorization under the international non-proliferation regime. Any one of these would be difficult. Resolving all three issues at the same time is nearly impossible.
Originally, South Korea’s regulatory framework was not designed to accommodate mobile military nuclear reactors. Thus, an extensive revision of the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Safety Act provisions—including radiation exposure, waste transport, fuel handling, reactor construction, and operational authority oversight—would be inevitable. This is not merely a technological revision, but a politically sensitive shift that would inevitably trigger backlash from environmental groups, civil society organizations, and segments of the political class. Even if these conditions were fully resolved, the legislative process itself would likely be prolonged across multiple administrations, making continuity uncertain.
Technical challenges compound the problem. Developing a nuclear reactor for a submarine is not comparable to adapting civilian small modular reactor (SMR). It requires entirely different safety assumptions, shock-resistance standards, and operational lifecycles. Furthermore, the cost is enormous. The development of the KF-21 fighter illustrates this well: South Korea have allocated $3.4 billion in developing its engine. A naval nuclear reactor would require incomparably greater resources before a single submarine hull is even assembled. In addition, attempts to construct currently non-existent radiation-shielded dry docks in South Korean shipyards would likely invite political and environmental resistance.
Even if these domestic hurdles were surmounted, the international dimension remains decisive. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), naval nuclear propulsion occupies a very narrow legal space. Although it is not explicitly prohibited, it must be recognized as a non-proscribed military activity under the IAEA safeguards agreements. Such recognition is not automatic. It is a political matter that would heavily depend on the judgment of major powers, including the United States.
Australia, for example, secured such recognition after years of negotiation under AUKUS and agreed in exchange to operate submarines that use weapons-grade uranium fuel exclusively controlled by the supplier state. India’s nuclear-powered submarines operate under a completely different logic enabled by Russia’s willingness to accept proliferation risks. South Korea belongs to neither of these categories. South Korea—a non-nuclear state poised against a nuclear-armed North Korea—attempting to develop its own nuclear reactor, even if opting for low-enriched uranium, would likely invite intense scrutiny in Washington and significant resistance in the U.S. Congress. Simply put, it is very unlikely that the United States would approve a South Korea–designed nuclear reactor operated outside U.S. control.
In this context, the idea of building SSNs within the United States—particularly at the Philadelphia shipyard—deserves careful examination. To be sure, it is a politically appealing option. Nevertheless, it is extremely complex in terms of execution. The facilities in Philadelphia are inappropriate for SSN construction: they lack specialized submarine dry docks, nuclear-handling infrastructure, and the geographical isolation that characterizes existing U.S. nuclear shipyards. Unlike Newport News yard—which has built nuclear submarines since the 1950s and it is roughly 10 kilometers far from the city area—the Philadelphia shipyard is located barely seven kilometers from a dense urban core. If this yard were to be expanded to an extent capable of building SSNs, it would require massive investment, prolonged environmental reviews, and inevitable public opposition.
More importantly, the United States would not permit the fabrication of multiple nuclear reactor types there even if such expansion were achieved. Here, a single conclusion follows: SSNs constructed in U.S. facilities would necessitate the use of nuclear reactors designed by the United States, placed under U.S. safeguards, and subject to U.S. political constraints. There is no realistic pathway for South Korea to launch its own nuclear reactor program in parallel with an American production line.
This reality brings the debate to its logical endpoint. If South Korea is to acquire SSNs, it would be possible only through a platform the United States already trusts, the U.S. Congress has approved for allied transfer, and that is currently operated by the U.S. Navy. The Virginia-class submarine meets these requirements, and the Block IV configuration, in particular, offers the most realistic balance between capability and cost.
The Block IV version preserves credible vertical launch capacity while avoiding the cost burden of Block V’s Virginia Payload Module (VPM) and associated industrial pressures. In addition, it benefits from a mature production line, proven nuclear reactor endurance without refueling, and full compatibility with U.S. logistics, training, and maintenance systems. From Washington’s perspective, cooperation with South Korea on the Virginia-class submarine would align with the Australian precedent. From Seoul’s standpoint, it would enable the bypassing of years-long legal disputes, technological uncertainty, and political deadlock.
Opposition to this path would likely originate from industrial nationalism—the belief that strategic autonomy requires indigenous design ownership. However, such logic misunderstands the very essence of nuclear propulsion. Autonomy does not derive from nuclear blueprints; it derives from operational availability. An unrealized submarine does not provide deterrence. Instead, practical deterrence is created by a submarine that is stably deployed and integrated into allied operations that compound the complexity of an adversary’s strategic calculations.
South Korea has already demonstrated indigenous developments that make strategic sense; these include the production of conventional submarines, surface combatants, missiles, sensors, and combat systems. Nonetheless, nuclear propulsion is different. This category is shaped more by alliance politics and non-proliferation realities than by engineering ambition. If treated like another typical defense industrial project, failure is almost guaranteed.
Therefore, Seoul faces a stark choice: it can achieve nothing by pursuing an indigenous SSN program that is symbolically satisfying yet unrealistic, or it can acquire a credible nuclear-powered capability within the next decade by accepting the constraints of the international system. If Seoul’s objective is deterrence rather than industrial symbolism, the answer is clear. The Virginia-class Block IV is not merely an option; it is the most realistic path available to South Korea at this juncture.
Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, president of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.
10. Defense minister lodges protest with USFK over U.S.-China aircraft standoff
Comment: What does this foreshadow for "strategic flexibility?" Instead will we have "strategic friction?"
Defense minister lodges protest with USFK over U.S.-China aircraft standoff | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Jae-eun · February 21, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260221003700320?section=national/diplomacy
SEOUL, Feb. 21 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's defense minister has lodged a protest with the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) early this week over its brief standoff with Chinese fighter jets during a rare air exercise, military sources said Saturday.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back has delivered a complaint in a call with Gen. Xavier Brunson, the commander of the Combined Forces Command and the United States Forces Korea, immediately after he received a report of the incident on Wednesday, according to the sources.
Gen. Jin young-sung, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also lodged a complaint in a call with Gen. Brunson, they added.
On Wednesday, U.S. and Chinese fighter jets engaged in a rare standoff over the Yellow Sea during a training operation of the U.S. Air Force, which involved some 10 USFK F-16 fighter jets.
The F-16 jets reportedly flew to an area between the respective air defense identifications zones of South Korea and China, prompting the Chinese military to dispatch its own fighter jets to the scene, but no clash occurred.
The USFK had notified the South Korean military of its plan ahead of the exercise but apparently did not elaborate on the details, including the purpose of the drills, officials have said.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back checks the readiness of the military, in this file photo taken on Feb. 15, 2026, and provided by the Ministry of National Defense. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
fairydust@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Jae-eun · February 21, 2026
11. National Assembly to process U.S. investment bill as planned: lawmakers
Summary:
South Korea’s rival parties say the National Assembly will keep moving on a special bill tied to Seoul’s $350 billion investment pledges to the United States, despite a recent court ruling affecting POTUS’s sweeping tariffs. A PPP lawmaker leading the special committee said the ruling is not grounds to cancel South Korean investments and that lawmakers will proceed with a planned hearing and scrutinize the government’s position. The ruling Democratic Party likewise said the schedule stands and it will review the bill calmly. The minor Jinbo Party urged an immediate halt. The committee launched Feb. 12, stalled amid unrelated disputes, and aims for a March 5 plenary vote.
National Assembly to process U.S. investment bill as planned: lawmakers | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Jae-eun · February 21, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260221004100320?section=national/politics
SEOUL, Feb. 21 (Yonhap) -- Rival parties confirmed Saturday proceeding with remaining procedures to process the legislation on South Korea's investment pledges to the United States as planned, regardless of the recent ruling on President Donald Trump's sweeping tariffs.
"(The ruling) does not seem to constitute a requirement that can cancel South Korea's investments to the United States," said Rep. Kim Sang-hoon of the opposition People Power Party (PPP), who also heads a special committee on the legislation.
"We plan to carry out the hearing as planned and check the government's position" on the ruling, he added.
Lawmakers from the ruling Democratic Party (DP) also expressed intent to push forward with the legislation as scheduled, saying the agreement with Washington is still intact.
"No changes in schedule are expected on processing the special bill on South Korea's investment pledges to the U.S.," a key official from the DP said in a call with Yonhap News Agency. "We plan to calmly review the legislation"
The minor Jinbo Party, in contrast, called for an immediate halt to all procedures to process the investment bill.
Government officials and lawmakers attend the first meeting of the parliamentary special committee to fast-track legislation on South Korea's $350 billion investment pledge to the United States at the National Assembly, in this file photo taken on Feb. 12, 2026. (Yonhap)
Earlier this month, the National Assembly passed a resolution to form a parliamentary special committee to fast-track legislation on South Korea's $350 billion investment pledge to the U.S., following a trade deal reached between Seoul and Washington.
The move came after President Trump threatened to raise tariffs against South Korea back to 25 percent from the 15 percent level agreed earlier, citing delays in Seoul's legislature.
The committee opened its first meeting on Feb. 12 but was halted shortly after, as rival parties clashed over unrelated judicial reform bills approved a day earlier.
A hearing on the legislation is scheduled for next Tuesday. Rival parties plan to process the bill at a plenary session on March 5. The special committee will remain active until March 9.
fairydust@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kang Jae-eun · February 21, 2026
12. S. Korea to closely monitor additional U.S. measures following Supreme Court ruling on Trump's tariffs
Summary:
South Korea said it will closely track additional U.S. trade steps after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against POTUS’s emergency tariff basis under IEEPA. Cheong Wa Dae noted the U.S. “reciprocal” 15% tariffs are now invalid, but POTUS immediately signed an order imposing a new 10% “global tariff” on all countries starting Feb. 24 under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act. Seoul will watch follow-on moves and major-country responses as Washington signals other tools (Sections 201/301 and Section 338). Officials also reviewed progress on South Korea’s pending special bill to support its $350B U.S. investment pledge and will keep the legislative schedule on track.
(LEAD) S. Korea to closely monitor additional U.S. measures following Supreme Court ruling on Trump's tariffs | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · February 21, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260221005051315?section=national/politics
(ATTN: ADDS more details in paras 5-6, 9, 11; photo)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Feb. 21 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will closely monitor additional U.S. measures and the trade environment as U.S. President Donald Trump signed an order to impose a new 10 percent "global tariff" on all countries following the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling against his emergency tariffs, Cheong Wa Dae said Saturday.
Kim Yong-beom, the presidential chief of staff for policy, and National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac, presided over an interministerial meeting to discuss the government's response after the U.S. high court ruled Friday (U.S. time) against Trump's use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to justify the reciprocal tariffs and other duties.
In this file photo taken Dec. 29, 2025, Kim Yong-beom (L), the presidential chief of staff for policy, and Wi Sung-lac, South Korea's national security adviser, attend a meeting with President Lee Jae Myung at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul. (Yonhap)
In a swift response to the court decision, Trump signed an order the same day imposing a new 10 percent global tariff on all countries starting Feb. 24 under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act.
"Although the 15 percent reciprocal tariffs imposed by the U.S. have become invalid under the ruling, the U.S. administration has announced a 10 percent global tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act," presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said in a written briefing. "The government will closely monitor additional U.S. measures and responses by major countries."
The ruling came at a time when Seoul is under pressure to expedite the implementation of its trade deal with Washington. Trump threatened last month to raise "reciprocal" tariffs and auto, lumber and pharmaceutical duties on South Korea back to 25 percent from 15 percent, citing Seoul's lack of progress in legislating a special bill to support its investment pledge to the United States.
Under the deal finalized last October, Seoul agreed to invest a combined US$350 billion in the U.S. for cooperation in advanced industries and shipbuilding.
Regarding the refund of duties already paid, which was not clearly addressed in the ruling, the government will work closely with business groups and industry associations to ensure accurate information is delivered to Korean companies in a timely manner, she added.
"Although the U.S. court ruling has increased uncertainty in the global trade environment, the government plans to continue amicable negotiations based on the special Korea-U.S. alliance so as not to undermine the balance of interests and export conditions secured through bilateral trade agreements," Kang said.
Cheong Wa Dae (Yonhap)
Following the court decision, Trump announced plans to impose other tariff measures under different legal provisions, including Sections 122, 201 and 301 of the 1974 Trade Act and Section 338 of the 1930 Tariff Act, raising fresh uncertainty for South Korea's trade outlook.
At the meeting, the participants also reviewed the legislative process for a special bill on U.S. investment, currently pending in the National Assembly, and agreed to proceed with procedures without disruption.
Earlier this month, the National Assembly passed a resolution to form a parliamentary special committee to fast-track legislation on Seoul's investment pledge.
A hearing on the legislation is scheduled for Tuesday as rival parties plan to process the bill at a plenary session on March 5.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · February 21, 2026
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
https://apstrategy.org/
Executive Director, Korea Regional Review
https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/
Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal
https://smallwarsjournal.com/
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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