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Quotes of the Day:
"Anyone who has the power to make you believe absurdities has the power to make you commit atrocities."
- Voltaire
"Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored.'"
- Aldous Huxley
"I always read. You know how sharks have to keep swimming or they die? I'm like that. If I stop reading, I die."
-Patrick Rothfuss
1. U.S. deserves an A for effort to denuclearize N. Korea but needs to make first concession: U.S. experts
2. S. Korea, U.S., Japan hold trilateral missile defense drills in East Sea amid N.K. threats
3. N. Korea slams U.N. chief's 'unfair, unbalanced' stance on its missile launches
4. Prosecutors raid Gyeonggi provincial gov't offices over tycoon's cash transfers to N. Korea
5. Would North Korea Drop An ICBM off the Coast of Hawaii or California?
6. Korea, U.S., Japan hold 1st trilateral missile defense drills of 2023
7. North capable of 'normal-angle' ICBM launch: South DIA
8. North strives for autarky even as food shortages worsen
9. [Editorial] Security cooperation to normalization of ties
10. A North Korean Successor at the Korean People’s Army Parade?
11. Fears, questions about N. Korea's growing nuclear arsenal
12. Beyond U.S. Credibility Concerns: Factors Driving the Nuclear Weapons Debate in South Korea
13. N. Korea still boasts the world’s longest military service! This year, men are required to serve 8 years, while women volunteers are given 5 years
14. Are North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Tests as Safe as the Country Claims?
1. U.S. deserves an A for effort to denuclearize N. Korea but needs to make first concession: U.S. experts
Notice how no one describes the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime? I think anyone who chooses to comment on US or Korean policy and strategy toward north Korea should first describe the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. No effective policy or strategy can be developed without having a thorough understanding of those three things.
U.S. deserves an A for effort to denuclearize N. Korea but needs to make first concession: U.S. experts | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 22, 2023
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Feb. 21 (Yonhap) -- The United States is right in pursuing a complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula but needs to consider changing methods to achieve its objective, U.S. experts said Tuesday.
They argued the U.S. could, or should, consider removing sanctions on the impoverished North to induce dialogue.
"Let me start with U.S. policy objective. I've given that an A minus," Robert Gallucci said in a webinar, titled "A Mid-Term Report Card for Biden's North Korea Policy."
Gallucci, a former U.S. negotiator in denuclearization talks with North Korea, said there existed an ongoing debate in Washington over whether it would be wise for the U.S. to give up its objective of completely denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.
"I think the debate is appropriate and I am glad it's happening, but I think the correct answer is the one the administration came to," he told the webinar hosted by the Stimson Center, a nonprofit think tank based in Washington.
"Complete denuclearization is still the right goal," he added.
Robert Gallucci, a former U.S. nuclear negotiator, is seen speaking during a webinar hosted by the Stimson Center, a nonprofit think tank based in Washington, on Feb. 21, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)
U.S. policy or tactics for achieving its objective, however, has not worked, insisted Gallucci, currently a professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.
"If the strategy is pressure plus sanctions ... one of the things that comes out of this is that it doesn't work and it hasn't worked. That if the idea of pressure and sanctions together is to drive the North Koreans into negotiations and ultimately a bargain with the United States, it just hasn't been working," he said.
North Korea has stayed away from any denuclearization talks since 2019.
The Joe Biden administration has consistently offered to sit with the North Koreans since coming into office in early 2021, but Pyongyang has shown little, if any, interest in engaging with the U.S.
Robert Carlin, a research fellow at 38 North, argued the U.S. needs to do more to restart dialogue with the North than repeating that it has no hostile intent toward Pyongyang.
"There was a period in the first three months of 2022 when the Russians and the Chinese made a concerted effort, I think, to signal to the Americans that what was necessary was not this repetition of jingles, and jingles is the Chinese term they used to describe what we were doing, but we needed to take practical steps," said Carlin.
"Interestingly, the North Koreans picked that up and began to replay that, which to me meant they were saying, "Yes, let's see some meat on the table first"," he added.
Carlin is said to have visited North Korea more than 30 times as a policy adviser at the now-defunct Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, a project that was designed to build light water reactors in the energy-stricken North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang giving up its nuclear ambition.
Gallucci agreed that the U.S. needs to make the first move.
"They (North Koreans) think we are the stronger part of the two when they are speaking honestly, and they don't understand why we don't do what the stronger party is supposed to do, which is make the first concession," said Gallucci.
To this end, Gallucci said the U.S. may consider two things -- easing sanctions on North Korea and reducing joint military exercises with South Korea.
"There's a reason to have sanctions in place other than to motivate the North, and it's a demonstration of that serious concern about activity which we regard as illegitimate, even if we don't think the sanctions are going to have that kind of enormous impact, and it's going to change policy in the North," he said.
"So we can dial back some sanctions, I think, without catastrophic consequences and that would be substantive," he added.
Susan Thornton, former U.S. acting assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, is seen speaking during a webinar hosted by the Washington-based Stimson Center think tank on Feb. 21, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)
Susan Thornton, former U.S. acting assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, noted lifting sanctions might be worth a try.
"I am very pessimistic, but I am all for changing up the equation," she told the webinar.
"It has certainly been, I think, more than proven that the sanctions are not going to make any difference, especially since the North Koreans sealed off their own border and shut themselves off from the world," added Thornton. "So, trying to lift the sanction just to shock the world and show that sanctions can be lifted at some points would maybe, you know, be something to try."
Youtube
https://youtu.be/pLA6mBttckE
bdk@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 22, 2023
2. S. Korea, U.S., Japan hold trilateral missile defense drills in East Sea amid N.K. threats
I really do think we should be thanking Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong for all our improvements in defense and trilateral cooperation. We are getting stronger with each north Korean provocation.
Remember that in 1997 Hwang Jong Yop told his interviewers that the reason Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il never resumed hostilities was because they knew they could not win a war against the South as long as it had American support. Imagine now how that support has only grown strong and now the ROK is cooperating with Japan on defense and national security issues. Kim Jong Un must be blind not to see how his actions are actually making it harder for him to achieve his objectives. But he will change his behavior as he has only one playbook that is seven decades old.
(2nd LD) S. Korea, U.S., Japan hold trilateral missile defense drills in East Sea amid N.K. threats | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · February 22, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with U.S. military's release in paras 6-7)
SEOUL, Feb. 22 (Yonhap) -- South Korea, the United States and Japan held a trilateral missile defense exercise in the international waters of the East Sea on Wednesday, Seoul's military said, amid heightened tensions caused by North Korea's recent missile launches.
The exercise took place in waters east of South Korea's Ulleung Island, mobilizing three Aegis-equipped destroyers -- the South's Sejong the Great, the U.S.' USS Barry and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's JS Atago -- according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
The exercise, which lasted for some five hours from 9 a.m., focused on practicing procedures to detect, track and intercept computer-simulated targets, and share related information, it said.
Of the three destroyers, only the U.S. vessel was involved in the interception segment, while the rest joined other parts of the drills, such as the detection of virtual targets, a Seoul official told reporters on condition of anonymity.
"Through the maritime missile defense exercise this time, the South, the U.S. and Japan strengthened security cooperation and further solidified their response systems," the JCS said in a press release.
The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said the exercise enhances "the interoperability of our collective forces and demonstrates the strength of the trilateral relationship" with the South and Japan.
"This trilateral cooperation is reflective of our shared values and resolve against those who challenge regional stability," it said in a press release.
The drills followed the North's launch of a long-range ballistic missile last Saturday and of two short-range ballistic missiles on Monday.
Following Monday's launches, the JCS said it will ensure a firm readiness posture based on security cooperation with Washington and Tokyo -- a rare mention of Japan in its press message on a North Korean missile provocation.
The remarks signaled the South will push to improve security ties with Japan, which had soured amid historical and other feuds stemming largely from Tokyo's 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.
The three countries previously held trilateral missile defense drills in October last year.
South Korea, the United States and Japan conduct a trilateral missile defense exercise in the international waters of the East Sea on Feb. 22, 2023, in this photo released by Seoul's Joint Chiefs of Staff. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
On the same day, top Navy officers of the three countries gathered at the U.S. Seventh Fleet based in Yokosuka, Japan, to discuss cooperation to counter North Korean missile threats, according to the Navy here.
They are ROK (Republic of Korea) Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Kim Myung-soo, U.S. Seventh Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Karl Thomas and Japan's Self-Defense Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Akira Saito.
They condemned the North's recent missile launches, and discussed ways to hold three-way training against North Korean missile provocations and strengthen their sharing of information on maritime operations, the Navy said.
ROK (Republic of Korea) Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Kim Myung-soo (L), U.S. Seventh Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Karl Thomas (C) and Japan's Self-Defense Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Akira Saito pose for a photo as they meet aboard the USS Blue Ridge at the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan, on Feb. 22, 2023, in this photo released by the South's Navy. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · February 22, 2023
3. N. Korea slams U.N. chief's 'unfair, unbalanced' stance on its missile launches
Some hypocrisy from the Kim family regime?
N. Korea slams U.N. chief's 'unfair, unbalanced' stance on its missile launches | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 22, 2023
SEOUL, Feb. 22 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Wednesday denounced U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres for taking what it says is an "unfair and unbalanced" stance over its recent missile launches.
The North's foreign ministry issued a statement condemning Guterres for his latest criticism of the North's launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) over the weekend.
"I express strong protest at the U.N. chief taking an 'unfair and unbalanced' attitude, as he keeps silent about worrisome military activities by Washington and Seoul, while condemning the North's legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense as a provocation or threat," Kim Son-gyong, a vice foreign minister of the country, said in a statement carried by the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
North Korea said it fired a Hwasong-15 ICBM on Saturday in a "sudden" launching drill aimed at demonstrating its capability to conduct a "fatal nuclear counterattack."
Kim claimed that the North's missile firing was an "act of self-defense" against the allies' "threatening" military drills that have escalated tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
"If unwanted situations occur on the peninsula due to military actions by the U.S. and the South, we made clear that the U.N. chief cannot be free from heavy responsibility for such a circumstance, given that he has not done anything to restrain their provocative acts," the official added.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 19, 2023, shows the North's launch of a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile on a lofted angle the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 22, 2023
4. Prosecutors raid Gyeonggi provincial gov't offices over tycoon's cash transfers to N. Korea
I do not think people realize the amount of penetration and subversion by the United Front Department, the Cultural Engagement Bureau and the Reconnaissance General Bureau.
Prosecutors raid Gyeonggi provincial gov't offices over tycoon's cash transfers to N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 유청모 · February 22, 2023
SUWON, South Korea, Feb. 22 (Yonhap) -- Prosecutors raided the Gyeonggi provincial government offices Wednesday over a former vice governor's alleged involvement in a tycoon's suspected cash remittances to North Korea.
Investigators from the Suwon District Prosecutors Office in Suwon, 34 kilometers south of Seoul, searched the provincial government's southern and northern regional offices in Suwon and Uijeongbu, north of Seoul, respectively, to secure documents and materials suspected to be related to former Vice Gov. Lee Hwa-young and his former aides.
Prosecution officials prepare to enter an office of the Gyeonggi provincial government in Suwon, 34 kilometers south of Seoul, on Feb. 22, 2023, during a raid related to a former Ssangbangwool Group chairman's cash transfers to North Korea. (Yonhap)
Lee, known previously as a confidant of Lee Jae-myung, the embattled opposition leader, was arrested in September and indicted the following month for taking bribes from underwear maker Ssangbangwool Group between 2018 and 2022.
The former vice governor has been separately under investigation on suspicion that he asked former Ssangbangwool Chairman Kim Seong-tae to pay US$5 million to North Korea in 2019 to help promote the province's smart farm project in the North.
Indicting Kim on bribery, embezzlement and other charges early this month, prosecutors designated the former vice governor as an accomplice to the former chairman's foreign currency smuggling charge allegedly linked to the North Korean remittances.
Kim has reportedly told prosecutors that he delivered at least $8 million to North Korea in 2019 to help promote Gyeonggi Province's smart farm project and then Gyeonggi Gov. Lee Jae-myung's visit to the North.
In addition, Kim reportedly said that the cash remittances to the North were reported to Lee Jae-myung, now the chair of the main opposition Democratic Party, via Lee Hwa-young.
Both Lee Jae-myung and Lee Hwa-young have claimed they did not know about the alleged cash transfers by Kim.
ycm@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 유청모 · February 22, 2023
5. Would North Korea Drop An ICBM off the Coast of Hawaii or California?
Interesting speculation. But what would be the regime's objective - not merely to be in the news cycle. What does Kim think would come next? Would he realy be betting on the US begins distract in Ukraine, the South China Sea and with balloons?
After this excerpt, then what? (by both the north and the US of course)
Excerpt:
Want more evidence? Remember this statement: “For several years, so-called experts have been saying that our ICBMs reentry into the atmosphere has not been recognized or verified…it seems obvious that they will try to disparage our strategic weapon capabilities with such a logic that it cannot be proven by a lofted-angle launch alone, and that it can only be known by firing at a normal angle…I’ll give an easy answer to that. We can try it soon and once you see it, you’ll know.”
What if her brother decided to up the ante and start firing missiles into the Pacific to test U.S. resolve? What if, knowing that Team Biden is a little busy with Ukraine these days, fired his ICBMs right into the Pacific?
And to take this a step further, if he really wanted to start a crisis, why not fire one of those missiles so it lands outside of U.S. waters – like say off of Hawaii or California?
This is North Korea we are talking about – and they are always looking for ways to get back into the news cycle. This would certainly fit the bill.
Would North Korea Drop An ICBM off the Coast of Hawaii or California?
19fortyfive.com · by Harry Kazianis · February 21, 2023
Here is something I would never have thought back in 2017 and into 2018 during the height of the North Korea crisis: no one in Washington really cares about the Kim regime and its missiles anymore.
The reasons are easy to understand. Pyongyang won’t give up its missiles or nukes under any conditions and the Biden team won’t sacrifice the political capital needed to strike a compromise deal that Republicans and hawkish Democrats would attack the administration for.
Oh, and this is really important: we don’t have Donald Trump tweeting about big buttons or threatening nuclear war on North Korea anymore.
All of that put together means that the Biden national security squad just hopes North Korea won’t escalate tensions enough so they would have to do something about the Kims.
But, as they say, hope is not a strategy.
The Biden administration isn’t even practicing strategic patience like the Obama years at this point. I would call it giving up and accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state in a defacto sense and hoping no one calls them out on it.
The Next North Korea Crisis
But they will soon enough if North Korea decides to escalate tensions and test fire an ICBM so it lands just outside of the Exclusive Economic Zone of say Hawaii or Alaska. Here’s why I think that could be possible.
So far, North Korea’s ICBM testing dating back to 2017 has always been limited to lofted trajectory test fires that have the missiles landed in the Sea of Japan or East Sea. These particular missiles, designed to strike the U.S. homeland, have never flown over Japan and into the Pacific or near U.S. bases or territory.
However, these days, North Korea keeps threatening over and over to respond to recent U.S.-ROK military drills – no matter the fact that they are no threat to the Kim regime at all.
But this recent statement by Kim Yo Jong has me a little worried: “The frequency of using the Pacific as our firing range depends upon the U.S. forces’ action character.”
Now, to be fair, North Korea has dropped missiles into the Pacific before. But never a modern ICBM like the ones being tested since 2017 with a moratorium on testing those weapons until last year.
What if Kim Yo Jong is hinting that North Korea could start testing ICBMs at range and not just up in the air and down again – something they hinted at back on December 20 of last year?
Want more evidence? Remember this statement: “For several years, so-called experts have been saying that our ICBMs reentry into the atmosphere has not been recognized or verified…it seems obvious that they will try to disparage our strategic weapon capabilities with such a logic that it cannot be proven by a lofted-angle launch alone, and that it can only be known by firing at a normal angle…I’ll give an easy answer to that. We can try it soon and once you see it, you’ll know.”
What if her brother decided to up the ante and start firing missiles into the Pacific to test U.S. resolve? What if, knowing that Team Biden is a little busy with Ukraine these days, fired his ICBMs right into the Pacific?
And to take this a step further, if he really wanted to start a crisis, why not fire one of those missiles so it lands outside of U.S. waters – like say off of Hawaii or California?
This is North Korea we are talking about – and they are always looking for ways to get back into the news cycle. This would certainly fit the bill.
Harry J. Kazianis (@Grecianformula) is a Senior Editor for 19FortyFive and serves as President and CEO of Rogue States Project, a bipartisan national security think tank. He has held senior positions at the Center for the National Interest, the Heritage Foundation, the Potomac Foundation, and many other think tanks and academic institutions focused on defense issues. He served on the Russia task force for U.S. Presidential Candidate Senator Ted Cruz, and in a similar role in the John Hay Initiative. His ideas have been published in the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, CNN, CNBC, and many other outlets across the political spectrum. He holds a graduate degree in International Relations from Harvard University and is the author of the book The Tao of A2/AD, a study of Chinese military modernization. Kazianis also has a background in defense journalism, having served as Editor-In-Chief at The Diplomat and Executive Editor for the National Interest.
19fortyfive.com · by Harry Kazianis · February 21, 2023
6. Korea, U.S., Japan hold 1st trilateral missile defense drills of 2023
Paving the way and laying the groundwork for future integrated missile defense I hope.
Wednesday
February 22, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Korea, U.S., Japan hold 1st trilateral missile defense drills of 2023
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/22/national/defense/Korea-trilateral-South-Korea/20230222180407962.html
From right: the ROKS Sejong the Great, the USS Barry and the JS Atago participate in a trilateral missile defense exercise by South Korea, United States and Japan in the East Sea on Wednesday. [YONHAP]
South Korea, the United States and Japan held their first trilateral missile defense exercise of the year on Wednesday.
Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said the exercise took place in international waters east of South Korea’s Ulleung Island and involved three destroyers equipped with Aegis combat systems: ROKS Sejong the Great from South Korea, the USS Barry from the United States and the JS Atago from Japan.
The three countries practiced procedures to detect and track computer-simulated missile targets, as well as share information.
Only the USS Barry practiced intercepting missiles, a South Korean defense official told reporters on condition of anonymity.
In its press release, the JCS said the three countries “strengthened security cooperation and further shored up their response systems” through their joint missile defense exercise.
The previous trilateral missile defense exercise took place in October.
Wednesday’s exercise comes amid high tensions on the Korean Peninsula after Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un, warned that the Pyongyang would “watch every movement of the enemy and take corresponding and very powerful and overwhelming counteraction against its every move hostile to us” in a statement released by the state-controlled Korean Central News Agency.
Kim also said the North could turn the Pacific into its missile “firing range.”
The North launched a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile on Saturday and two short-range ballistic missiles on Monday. All three missiles landed in the East Sea.
South Korea and the United States are also scheduled to hold a table-top exercise at the Pentagon on Wednesday, where South Korean and U.S. government and military officials will discuss their response to hypothetical scenarios where North Korea uses nuclear weapons and missiles.
Deputy Defense Minister for Policy Heo Tae-keun will lead the South Korean contingent at the exercise, while the U.S. side will be led by Siddharth Mohandas, deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, and Richard Johnson, deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and countering weapons of mass destruction policy.
Defense officials in Seoul said the exercise will also involve discussions of crisis management and military response measures, as well as ways to strengthen the U.S. extended deterrence commitment to South Korea.
Extended deterrence refers to the U.S. pledge to use all of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend South Korea if it comes under attack.
Exercise participants are scheduled to visit the Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in Georgia on Thursday. The base is home to several of the U.S. Navy’s nuclear-powered submarines, which comprise a key component of U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities.
Table-top exercises by South Korea and the United States began in 2011, but took place only twice under the previous Moon Jae-in administration, which scaled back various joint exercises to avoid angering North Korea as it pursued inter-Korean rapprochement.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
7. North capable of 'normal-angle' ICBM launch: South DIA
Wednesday
February 22, 2023
dictionary + A - A
North capable of 'normal-angle' ICBM launch: South DIA
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/22/national/northKorea/South-Korea-North-Korea-ICBM/20230222171707565.html
Photos released by the North’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) Sunday show the launching of a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on Saturday. [NEWS1]
North Korea possesses full capabilities to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at a "normal angle" and plans to conduct a seventh nuclear test aimed at miniaturizing warheads, South Korean military intelligence said Wednesday.
While North Korea has yet to launch an ICBM at a normal angle, it has "already obtained all the capabilities to do so and is adjusting its timeline to put pressure on the United States," People Power Party (PPP) Rep. Yoo Sang-bum told reporters at the National Assembly after the briefing by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to the parliamentary Intelligence Committee.
North Korea has thus far conducted ICBM tests at lofted trajectories, with its long-range missiles landing close by in the East Sea. But according to the assessment, Pyongyang now has the capabilities to launch them at a normal angle, which would enable them to fly much further, possibly putting U.S. mainland in reach.
At a lifted trajectory, the missiles go up and come almost straight down. At a normal angle, they are fired at a lower angle and are able to fly much farther.
Yoo said that North Korea will develop a solid-propellant ICBM this year.
He added that the agency also said that the possibility of the North launching a military spy satellite "is very high."
Last December, North Korea said it plans to finish preparations for a reconnaissance satellite by April this year. This would violate UN Security Council resolutions, which prohibit North Korea from launching devices using ballistic missile technology.
North Korea is expected to conduct a seventh nuclear test as a means of completing its miniaturization of warheads, though a specific timeline was not confirmed by Seoul intelligence authorities.
"A seventh test is seen as essential to complete the miniaturization and reducing the weight of its nuclear bombs," Yoo said.
Yoo said the DIA reported to lawmakers that Tunnel No. 3 at the Punggye-ri nuclear test facility is ready "to the extent that small or large nuclear tests can be carried out" at any time, but that the status of Tunnel No. 4 has not yet been confirmed.
In response to North Korea's assertion that nuclear warheads can be mounted on multiple rocket launchers, the South's military reported it may actually be launched from a ballistic missile system.
On Saturday, North Korea launched a Hwasong-15 ICBM from Sunan airport in Pyongyang into the East Sea within Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) west of Hokkaido.
Launched at a high angle, the missile flew 989 kilometers (614 miles) for over an hour, peaking at an altitude of 5,769 kilometers, according to the North's state media.
This was the North's first ICBM test since its launching of the Hwasong-17 last November. The Hwasong-17, with a range of over 15,000 kilometers, could potentially put U.S. mainland in range when fired at a flatter trajectory.
On Monday, North Korea launched two short-range missiles and claimed they were fired from a 600 millimeter multiple rocket launchers from its army's long-range artillery unit.
In a statement carried by state media Monday, Kim Yo-jong, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's sister, defended North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities against naysayers and claimed that the regime "possessed satisfactory technology and capability" and will now "focus on increasing the quantity of their force."
Kim warned that the North could use the Pacific Ocean as its "firing range" depending upon "the U.S. forces' action."
On Wednesday, North Korea's Foreign Ministry denounced UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres for taking an "extremely unfair and imbalanced attitude" toward its recent missile launches, which it claimed were response to Seoul and Washington's joint military exercises.
North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Son-gyong in a statement carried by the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said the country's recent actions were a "countermeasure against the U.S., which has frequently introduced such evident strategic attack means as strategic bombers into the Korean peninsula and, together with south Korea, posed a serious threat to the security interests" of his country.
He said that the UN chief "cannot be free from heavy responsibility" if "unwanted situations occur on the peninsula."
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
8. North strives for autarky even as food shortages worsen
There can be no economic reform or reform of any kind as long as the Kim family regime remains in power.
The Korean people in the north will suffer as long as the regime remains in power.
But with the worsening conditions, this time it may be different than the famine of 1994-1996. There is no safety valve or relief mechanism for the people. Since the 1990s that has been the markets but Kim is now cracking down on them with severe restrictions that directly and indirectly impact market activity all for the purpose of keeping the population in check. Will there be blowback some day? And what happens then the regime can no longer provide resoruces to all military units?
Wednesday
February 22, 2023
dictionary + A - A
North strives for autarky even as food shortages worsen
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/22/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-food-insecurity/20230222171337544.html
A North Korean farm worker in South Hamgyong Province holds up manure in a photo released by Pyongyang's state-controlled newspaper Rodong Sinmun, which was accompanied by the caption, ″A handful of manure is a handful of rice.″ [NEWS1]
Pyongyang’s main state-controlled newspaper on Wednesday urged North Koreans to strive for “economic independence,” suggesting the regime has little intention of abandoning its autarkic economic policies despite mounting signs of food insecurity.
The Rodong Sinmun, a daily newspaper controlled by the North’s ruling Workers’ Party, warned that “aid from the imperialists is a trap that will open the door to looting and subjugation” in an editorial titled, “Economic independence is the material security of independent state construction.”
“Foreign aid is [the imperialists’] way of giving one and taking ten and hundred,” it argued.
The editorial also claimed foreign aid is “a bait used to curb and subjugate other countries’ economic development and undermine their economic prestige and interests,” warning that the aim of foreign aid is to precipitate the collapse of leader Kim Jong-un’s regime.
“It is a mistake to try to boost the economy by taking this poisoned candy,” the editorial said, adding that “if [North Korea] doesn’t stand on its own two feet economically, it will be forced to bow its head and kneel to others.”
In an implied acknowledgement of the regime’s ongoing economic struggles, the editorial said, “Pursuing independent development requires us to overcome countless challenges,” but argued the regime “has been able to endure military blackmail and high-intensity pressure and constantly elevate its national power on a strong foundation based on the independent national economy prepared by the entire people tightening their belts.”
North Korea has largely refused aid from international organizations over the past three years since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Food shipments from neighboring China have also fallen, with statistics from China’s customs office recording 130,383 tons in rice last year, compared to 500,000 tons of rice and 550,000 tons of fertilizer delivered by Beijing in 2021.
South Korea’s Rural Development Administration estimated that North Korea’s total food production last year fell to 4.51 million tons — a decrease of 180,000, or 3.8 percent, from the previous year, which the agency attributed to colder temperatures and heavy cloud cover that reduced sunlight in July, the prime rice growing season in the North.
A photo of North Korean farmers holding up manure that was released by the Rodong Sinmun on Wednesday was accompanied by the caption, “A handful of manure is a handful of rice,” which suggested the regime was encouraging the collection of more manure to boost agricultural productivity.
North Korea increased its budget for agricultural production by 14.7 percent at the most recent session of its rubber-stamp parliament held on Jan. 17 and 18.
Photos released by state media just before the legislative session showed a large procession of trucks carrying fertilizer lined up at Kim Il Sung Square in downtown Pyongyang.
Defectors have testified that the regime uses the fulfilment of human excrement quotas as one criterion when evaluating the political loyalty of individuals and organizations to make up for its lack of chemical fertilizers.
Defectors have also testified that North Koreans not only buy and sell human feces to fulfill their quotas, but also raid warehouses where night soil is stored before processing.
But it remains unclear if these measures are sufficient to stem food insecurity under the regime, which according to a recent report by the Stimson Center’s 38 North think tank has reached a level not seen since the famine of the mid-1990s.
An official from South Korea’s Unification Ministry told reporters recently that “North Korea’s food production has decreased, and changes to the food distribution policy by the authorities appear to have disrupted supplies.”
But the official did not clarify which areas of the North were particularly hard-hit by food shortages, saying only that the ministry was aware that deaths due to starvation had occurred in “certain regions.”
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
9. [Editorial] Security cooperation to normalization of ties
The Editorial board knows that trilateral security cooperation is in the national security interests of all three countries.
Excerpt:
As the Ukraine war continues, the world is headed to a global security crisis. China could invade Taiwan around 2027 and North Korea will certainly threaten the security of South Korea, Japan and the U.S. after completing its missile technology. We cannot rule out the possibility of a full-fledged standoff between democratic states and authoritarian states. The government must deal with a multi-faceted security crisis by mending ties with Japan first.
Wednesday
February 22, 2023
dictionary + A - A
[Editorial] Security cooperation to normalization of ties
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/22/opinion/editorials/joint-maritime-drill-exercise/20230222202238963.html
On Wednesday, South Korea, the United States and Japan conducted a joint missile defense exercise against North Korea on the East Sea. The drill was aimed at detecting, tracking and intercepting a North Korean ballistic missile like in a real battle. It was their second joint missile defense drill following an early one last October. After the North ratcheted up the level of missile provocations, defending against North Korean missiles has emerged as the most urgent security issue for the three countries.
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, our navy’s Sejong the Great-class destroyer first detected an imaginary firing of a missile from North Korea and delivered the information to another aegis-equipped U.S. destroyer nearby, which again relayed that information to Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force via a U.S. data link system. In the simulation, the U.S. warship successfully intercepted the North Korean missile with an SM-3 surface-to-air missile.
The drill carries great significance, as it signals a resumption of military cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo after a long diplomatic stalemate from the Moon Jae-in administration’s political exploitation of their relations. The Ministry of National Defense said the General Security of Military Information Agreement (Gsomia) with Japan has been nearly restored through the joint drill at sea.
The Seoul-Tokyo security cooperation should be expanded beyond normalization. Given North Korea’s possession of various types of ballistic missiles targeting South Korea, Japan and as far as the U.S. mainland, the bilateral security cooperation is important more than ever. As the U.S. bases in Japan can be targets of the North’s missile attacks, Japan can get entangled in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula.
After the joint maritime drill, Seoul and Tokyo need to further expand their military information sharing through the Gsomia. At the same time, both sides must resolve the wartime forced labor dispute fast. In a press conference after a meeting with his Japanese counterpart on the sidelines of the Munich Security Summit last week, Foreign Minister Park Jin said he urged Japan to “make a sincere political decision.” We hope Tokyo does its fair share in addressing the issue.
As the Ukraine war continues, the world is headed to a global security crisis. China could invade Taiwan around 2027 and North Korea will certainly threaten the security of South Korea, Japan and the U.S. after completing its missile technology. We cannot rule out the possibility of a full-fledged standoff between democratic states and authoritarian states. The government must deal with a multi-faceted security crisis by mending ties with Japan first.
10. A North Korean Successor at the Korean People’s Army Parade?
Yes, caution is required. But we cannot help ourselves as we love to gossip.
A North Korean Successor at the Korean People’s Army Parade?
Extreme caution is required when interpreting the public appearances of Kim’s daughter.
thediplomat.com · by ISOZAKI Atsuhito · February 21, 2023
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On February 8, North Korea held a military parade to mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army. The country’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un did not speak, but the parade was notable for showcasing a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and “tactical nuclear operation units,” boasting to domestic and international audiences that North Korea’s five-year plan for the development of defense science and weapon systems, adopted at the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in January 2021, is moving steadily forward.
Since October 2020, North Korea has held its military parades either late at night or early in the morning, with media reports following. The parades are designed to enhance national prestige, with an elaborate show conveying to a beleaguered population that despite all the country’s economic difficulties, North Korea is still delivering in the military sphere.
Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, first appeared as the “beloved daughter” in November 2022. At the time, Rodong Sinmun spoke of Kim’s determination to perpetuate the regime, so it was thought that he wanted to make the people aware of the need for a powerful military to protect the children of the next generation. Later, she was also described as a “precious daughter.”
At this latest edition of the military parade, Kim Ju Ae was introduced as “respected daughter,” denoting a clear rise in rank. The modifier “respected” is unusual, and is not even used for Kim Jong Un’s sister, Deputy Department Director Kim Yo Jong. It is important to note that Kim Ju Ae is thought to be still only about 10 years old, and to bear in mind that in North policy can change at any time, depending on the will of the supreme leader. As such, it is too early to conclude that Kim is positioning his daughter is his successor. However, there is no doubt that the North Korean people see her as a very important person.
At the military parade, Kim Ju Ae stood together with her father in the center of the tiered platform, using chairs decorated in a way reminiscent of European royal families. There was much for observers to note. For instance, the chair she sat in was taller and more magnificent than that of First Lady Ri Sol Ju. Moreover, Kim Ju Ae was seated in the center at the anniversary banquet held the day before, with Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju on either side of her.
It is hardly unusual for parents to have their children at their side, but if Kim Jong Un has more than one child, as is believed to be the case, it is unclear why his daughter is the only one to be making public appearances.
It is worth recalling that North Korea’s propaganda machine was already in full swing when it reported that Kim Jong-un was giving field guidance to military units in his mid-teens. Kim was just 24 years old when his father, Kim Jong Il, suddenly fell ill, but his early grooming as successor helping keep the family in power into the third generation. In that sense, if Kim does consider Kim Ju Ae to be his successor, then it is possible that he wants to take the time to entrench her position as “Empress” within North Korean society, which is marked by a deeply rooted, male-dominated Confucian culture.
What is concerning are the unconfirmed reports that she is Kim’s “second-born child.” The source for these reports is none other than the National Intelligence Service of South Korea, but there are many unanswered questions. For example, if the first-born child is confirmed to be a boy, why haven’t there even been any rumors, even about his name? Also, given reports that Kim actually has three children, then if his second-born child and daughter has been put in the limelight in order to keep his eldest child a secret, why hasn’t the third-born child been announced?
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Even the name “Ju Ae” comes from former NBA star Dennis Rodman, to whom Kim Jong Un is to have directly introduced a girl called “Ju Ae” in September 2013. Given that Rodman is not a Korean speaker, we should consider the possibility that he might have misheard.
In North Korea, it is considered taboo to talk about the family of the supreme leader, so asking the country’s dignitaries will invariably be unhelpful.
For example, in an interview conducted by Japan’s Kyodo News on September 10, 2009, when the topic of who would succeed Kim Jong Il was attracting growing attention, it was reported that Kim Yong Nam, then president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, had said, “The issue of continuing the tradition of the revolution is important, but this is not related to the succession issue and is not discussed at this time.” It is now clear that preparatory work was underway at the time, and that with its quote Pyongyang was deliberating misleading with propaganda.
A year earlier, in September 2008, when Kim Jong Il was absent from the 60th anniversary of the country’s founding, theories about a serious illness ran rampant. At the time, Kyodo News reported Kim Yong Nam as saying that there is “no problem” with Kim Jong Il’s health. Deciphering the propaganda from Pyongyang is fundamental to North Korean analysis, and it should go without saying that it is dangerous to simply accept regime statements at face value, even more so when they concern especially sensitive themes such as the succession issue. What will be helpful going forward will be to see what modifiers are attached to Kim’s daughter, how often she appears in public, and whether songs praising her are released.
ISOZAKI Atsuhito
ISOZAKI Atsuhito is a professor at Keio University.
thediplomat.com · by ISOZAKI Atsuhito · February 21, 2023
11. Fears, questions about N. Korea's growing nuclear arsenal
Fears, questions about N. Korea's growing nuclear arsenal
ABCNews.com · by ABC News
SEOUL, South Korea -- North Korea's latest missile launches are a demonstration of the country's avowed ability to use nuclear force against South Korea and the mainland U.S. How immediate is that threat?
North Korea claims its nuclear forces are capable of destroying its rivals, and often follows its provocative weapons tests with launch details. But many foreign experts call the North’s claims propaganda and suggest that the country is not yet capable of hitting the United States or its allies with a nuclear weapon.
There’s no question that North Korea has nuclear bombs, and that it has missiles that place the U.S. mainland, South Korea and Japan within striking distance. What’s not yet clear is whether the country has mastered the tricky engineering required to join the bombs and the missiles.
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ICBMs
North Korea has demonstrated that it has missiles that could fly far enough to reach deep into the continental U.S., but it's not clear whether they can survive reentering the Earth's atmosphere on arrival.
North Korea said it launched a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile on Saturday to verify the weapon’s reliability and the combat readiness of the country’s nuclear forces. It’s one of three kinds of ICBMs the country has developed, along with the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-17. All three are liquid-fueled, and North Korea has portrayed them all as nuclear-capable.
Launched almost straight up to avoid the territories of neighbors, the weapon reached a maximum altitude of about 5,770 kilometers (3,585 miles) and flew 990 kilometers (615 miles), according to North Korean state media. The reported flight details suggest the missile could travel 13,000 kilometers (8,080 miles) or beyond if launched on a normal trajectory.
“These days, North Korea has been disclosing information about its launches in a very detailed manner to try to let others believe what they’ve done is genuine,” analyst Shin Jong-woo at South Korea’s Defense and Security Forum said. “But I think that’s part of their propaganda.”
There are questions on whether North Korea has acquired the technology to shield warheads from the high-temperature, high-stress environment of atmospheric reentry.
A South Korean biennial defense document released last week said it’s not clear whether the missiles can survive reentry, because all of North Korea’s ICBM tests have so far been made on high angles.
Lee Choon Geun, an honorary research fellow at South Korea’s Science and Technology Policy Institute, said a normal trajectory would cause greater stress, as a warhead would spend a longer time passing through altitudes with high air density.
North Korean state media said the launch was made “suddenly” after a surprise order from leader Kim Jong Un.
“The Kim regime’s claims of short-notice launches are thus intended to demonstrate not only the development of strategic and tactical nuclear forces but also the operational capability to use them,” Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul, said.
In a military parade earlier this month, North Korea showcased around a dozen ICBMs, an unprecedented number that suggested progress in its efforts to mass-produce powerful weapons.
Among them were huge canister-sealed missiles that experts say were likely a version of a solid-fuel ICBM that North Korea has been trying to develop in recent years. Solid-fueled systems allow missiles to be mobile on the ground and make them faster to launch.
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WARHEADS
North Korea likely has dozens of nuclear warheads. The question is whether they are small enough to fit on a missile.
North Korea has so far performed six underground nuclear test explosions to manufacture warheads that it can place on missiles. Outside estimates of the number of North Korean nuclear warheads vary widely, ranging from 20-60 to up to about 115.
In a 2021 interview with 38 North, a North Korea-focused website, renowned nuclear physicist Siegfried Hecker, who has visited North Korea’s main Yongbyon nuclear complex numerous times, said that “20 to 60 is possible, with the most likely number being 45.”
Some experts argue that North Korea has likely already built miniaturized nuclear warheads to be mounted on missiles, citing the number of years the country has spent on its nuclear and missile programs. But others say North Korea is still years away from producing such warheads.
“After its sixth nuclear test, people accepted that North Korea really will have nuclear weapons. But they are still debating whether it has warhead miniaturization technology,” Shin, the analyst, said.
The North described its sixth nuclear test in 2017 as a detonation of a thermonuclear bomb built for ICBMs. It created a tremor that measured magnitude 6.3, and some studies put its estimated explosive yield at about 50 to 140 kilotons of TNT. In comparison, the pair of atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II — which killed a total of more than 210,000 people — yielded explosions equivalent to about 15 and 20 kilotons of TNT, respectively.
The biennial South Korean defense document said North Korea is estimated to have 70 kilograms (154 pounds) of weapons-grade plutonium. Some observers say that's enough for about 9-18 bombs. The document estimated that North Korea has “a considerable amount of” highly enriched uranium as well.
North Korea’s Yongbyon complex has facilities to produce both plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the two main ingredients to build nuclear weapons.
Plutonium plants are generally large and generate a lot of heat, making them easier to detect. But a uranium enrichment plant is more compact and can be easily hidden from satellite cameras. North Korea is believed to be running at least one additional covert uranium enrichment facility, in addition to one at its Yongbyon complex.
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SHORT-RANGE WEAPONS
Following the collapse of diplomacy with then-U.S. President Donald Trump in 2019, Kim sped up the development of short-range solid-fuel, nuclear-capable missiles designed to strike key targets in South Korea, including U.S. military bases there.
The so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons include what North Korea calls “super-large” 600-millimeter multiple rocket launchers that it tested Monday. South Korea describes the weapon as a short-range missile system.
North Korean state media said its new artillery system can carry nuclear warheads, and that four rockets would be enough to wipe out an enemy airfield. The statement drew quick outside doubts about whether the weapons are indeed nuclear-capable.
“The North Korean claim doesn’t make sense to some extent. ... Why do they need four tactical nuclear weapons to destroy just one airfield?” Shin, the analyst, said. “Also, which country would disclose such attack scenarios via state media?”
Other new North Korean short-range systems include missiles that were apparently modeled after the Russian Iskander mobile ballistic system or outwardly resemble the U.S. MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System. Launched from land vehicles, these missiles are designed to be maneuverable and fly at low altitudes, theoretically giving them a better chance of defeating South Korean and U.S. missile defense systems.
Whether North Korea has an ability to arm short-range missiles with nuclear warheads has not been independently confirmed.
While North Korea may be able to place simple nuclear warheads on some of its older missiles, including Scuds or Rodong missiles, it would likely require further technology advancements and nuclear tests to build smaller and more advanced warheads that can be installed on its newer tactical systems, said Lee, the expert.
North Korea also has an intermediate-range, nuclear-capable Hwasong-12 missile capable of reaching Guam, a major U.S. military hub in the Pacific. It has been developing a family of mid-range, solid-fuel Pukguksong missiles which are designed to be fired from submarines or land vehicles.
ABCNews.com · by ABC News
12. Beyond U.S. Credibility Concerns: Factors Driving the Nuclear Weapons Debate in South Korea
Beyond U.S. Credibility Concerns: Factors Driving the Nuclear Weapons Debate in South Korea - Korea Economic Institute of America
keia.org · by Troy Stangarone · February 17, 2023
Beyond U.S. Credibility Concerns: Factors Driving the Nuclear Weapons Debate in South Korea
Published February 17, 2023
Author: Jennifer Ahn
Category: South Korea
This piece is one of 12 contributions to KEI’s special project on South Korea’s nuclear armament debate that will run on The Peninsula blog over the next month. The project’s contributors include young, emerging, and mid-career voices, examining the debate from a historical, a domestic, and an international perspective. On Wednesday, March 15, KEI will host a conference featuring our various contributors’ work at our Washington, D.C. office and launch a compilation of all the pieces in a single, special KEI publication.
One of the most commonly discussed factors driving South Korea’s nuclear weapons debate is South Korean questioning of U.S. defense commitments. Commentators argue that given North Korea’s ability to threaten the United States with nuclear weapons, South Korean doubts over de-coupling and whether the United States would trade “Seoul for LA” have increased. However, a 2022 poll conducted by Seoul National University shows that 70.6 percent of surveyed South Koreans believe that the United States will come to the defense of South Korea, in contrast to the 26.3 percent who believe that the United States will abandon its security commitments in favor of national interests. Furthermore, support for the U.S.-South Korea alliance and confidence in U.S. defense pledges have not experienced any drastic reductions despite the increasing public favorability for nuclear weapons acquisition.
The current debate in South Korea can be viewed as a direct reflection of the emerging narrative that only South Korean actions, solutions, and independent capabilities can reliably resolve the North Korean threat and achieve stability on the peninsula. This idea reflects South Korean desires to have agency over their own security and is thus shaped by factors beyond U.S. credibility concerns, including: threat perceptions and policy options toward North Korea; perceived gaps in South Korean indigenous conventional capabilities; geopolitical developments shaping a new nuclear age; the weakening influence of normative restraints; and nationalist sentiment.
North Korea
There are two ways in which North Korea influences the South Korean public debate over nuclear weapons. First, advancements in North Korea’s military capabilities have altered the South Korean public’s threat perception toward North Korea. In 2022, North Korea test-launched cruise, ballistic, and submarine-launched missiles from diverse launch sites and delivery systems. South Korean experts note that North Korea has moved beyond the development phase of its nuclear weapons program and is now in a new operational and verification phase of prioritizing the diversification, miniaturization, and deployment of its weapons arsenal. Furthermore, the September 2022 North Korean nuclear law has codified the elements of preemption and offensive readiness, adding to the broader threat that North Korean nuclear weapons pose.
Nuclear proponents in South Korea argue that the nuclear doctrine should be viewed as a North Korean declaration of victory since the outlined conditions of nuclear first use allow North Korea to both utilize its nuclear weapons as a coercive tool and possess an “absolute advantage” in the arms race between the two Koreas. As North Korea works to reduce the inter-Korean power asymmetry through advancements in both conventional and nuclear capabilities, South Korean perceptions of its increasing vulnerability to a North Korean attack will continue to drive arguments for an indigenous nuclear weapons program.
Second, broader South Korean public sentiment that the denuclearization of North Korea is unfeasible has led to calls for a change in policy toward the north. South Korean assessments of prospects for denuclearization and hopes for successful dialogue are at their lowest point in decades. This has led to calls for the abandonment of a denuclearization-focused policy toward North Korea and a shift to a policy of nuclear balance, with experts even arguing that only nuclear balance can achieve mutual denuclearization.
The perceived unlikelihood of North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons program has contributed to the growing influence of arguments that the United States and South Korea must confront reality, acknowledge that past efforts to denuclearize North Korea have failed, and accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. With denuclearization no longer viewed as a realistic policy objective, especially in the short term, the South Korean public increasingly views strengthening South Korea’s defense posture and deterrence as its first defense priority, justifying arguments for a more aggressive approach to ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Gaps in Conventional Deterrence
The next factor relates to a South Korean belief that its conventional deterrence and defense capabilities are insufficient against the increasingly sophisticated nature of North Korea’s weapons program. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has revitalized the implementation of the “Three-Axis System” as South Korea’s primary response mechanism against North Korean attacks in order to bolster South Korea’s conventional deterrence.
However, gaps in the credibility and reliability of the three axes – Kill Chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) – have led to concerns over South Korea’s ability to effectively demonstrate its conventional deterrence. South Korean specialists note that holes in missile defense systems, recent malfunctions involving offensive strike capabilities, and insufficient missile stockpiles indicate the lacking and compromised nature of South Korea’s conventional deterrence. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to advance both its missile and nuclear capabilities, leading a number of South Korean analysts to conclude that conventional deterrence is insufficient in properly addressing North Korea’s conventional and nuclear threats.
South Korean perceptions of its lagging capabilities, particularly as North Korea accelerates its military modernization, will likely fuel arguments for investing in nuclear capabilities as a means to overcome gaps in conventional deterrence. While U.S. capabilities provide both conventional and nuclear deterrence, South Korean assessments of its ability to deter a North Korean attack primarily focus on its independent capabilities, reflecting a desire for a more self-reliant and autonomous defense posture in which South Korea does not entirely depend on an external actor for its defense and survival.
Perceptions of a New Nuclear Age
Geopolitical developments have shaped the so-called “new nuclear age” both on the Korean Peninsula and globally. This age has been driven by national insecurities, expanding nuclear uncertainties, and the enhanced geopolitical role of nuclear weapons. If North Korea’s prioritization of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities to strike the United States was reminiscent of the first nuclear age in which countries focused on developing strategic nuclear weapons, a new nuclear age informs North Korea’s current focus, which South Korean analysts note involves tactical nuclear weapons intended to directly target South Korea.
Furthermore, South Korean experts highlight the new era’s trilateral nuclear competition between the United States, China, and Russia as a factor that drives accelerated military modernization and increases the risk of nuclear consideration. In an age of unpredictable nuclear usage and weakening nuclear taboo, a growing number of South Koreans believe only the possession of nuclear weapons can properly prepare the country for the unpredictability and instability that will follow North Korean possession of both tactical nuclear weapons and ICBM capabilities.
This new nuclear age also stems from geopolitical developments involving Russia and China, North Korea’s closest allies. The war in Ukraine has led some in the South Korean public to argue that only the possession and presence of nuclear weapons can deter an invasion, believing that a nuclear-armed Ukraine would not have been invaded in the first place. The perceived similarities between South Korea and Ukraine both facing a nuclear neighbor who relies on nuclear threats to prevent U.S. involvement – despite the fact that South Korea is a U.S. treaty ally and Ukraine is not – have lent credence to South Korean arguments that it must develop a self-reliant defense strategy consisting of nuclear weapons. For South Korean analysts, the war has also indicated the difficulties of overpowering a nuclear-armed country with conventional capabilities and carrying out an all-out offensive under the threat of nuclear escalation.
In addition to the Ukraine factor, South Koreans are paying attention to China and a potential Taiwan contingency. There have been parallels drawn between Taiwan and South Korea as both being targeted by nuclear-armed countries with historical and revisionist aims toward reunification. In particular, nuclear proponents in South Korea have noted that Taiwan is a case study of whether deterrence can be successful without nuclear weapons. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would have serious implications for both North Korea’s revisionist ambitions on the Korean Peninsula and the strategic calculus of South Korea’s nuclear weapons debate.
Weakening Normative Restraints
The two primary normative elements that have traditionally constrained South Korean nuclearization are the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the NPT. However, the questioning of South Korea’s commitment to both agreements has weakened normative restraints and removed the taboo that previously labeled serious and high-level discussions of an indigenous nuclear weapons program as fringe or extremist.
Signed in 1992, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula outlines the commitment of both North and South Korea to not “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.” While calls to scrap the agreement have been present ever since North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006, South Korea has continued to uphold the principle of denuclearization outlined in the 1992 declaration as a valuable norm underlying the goal toward peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
However, South Korea’s commitment to the agreement has come under increased pressure as a greater number of voices, including Interim Chief of the ruling People Power Party Chung Jin-suk, have called for the scrapping of the agreement if North Korea were to conduct its seventh nuclear test. The belief that only South Korea is tied to the principle of denuclearization, despite North Korea’s blatant disregard for the agreement, continues to test the strength of this normative restraint.
Alongside the 1992 declaration, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has served as the main global agreement constraining South Korean nuclear armament. Any South Korean argument to develop nuclear weapons has been most strongly opposed by critics pointing to the likely consequences that would follow a unilateral South Korean decision to leave the NPT, including sanctions by the international community and potential damage to the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Although Seoul’s commitment to the NPT remains the greatest normative restraint, an increasing number of voices are calling for the country to exercise its right to withdraw.
Nuclear proponents argue that the sophisticated and offensive nature of North Korea’s nuclear program now explicitly threatens South Korea’s survival, meeting the conditions outlined by Article Ten of the NPT that allows the withdrawing country to avoid international sanctions. While the Yoon administration has thus far maintained the country’s commitment to the NPT and the principle of global nonproliferation, it is likely that supporters of a nuclear South Korea will continue to call for the government to invoke Article Ten to formally withdraw, testing the effectiveness and persuasion of the NPT to restrain South Korea’s nuclearization.
Nationalism
Lastly, nationalist sentiment has also contributed to the active and widespread nature of the debate, albeit to a lesser degree throughout this year. The argument that has most captured proponents is that North Korea holds South Korea “hostage” with its nuclear weapons. Hong Joon-pyo, mayor of Daegu and former leader of the conservative party, has even likened the South Korean people to “slaves under North Korea’s nuclear blackmail.” Thus, nuclear weapons are viewed as a necessary tool to weaken North Korea’s perceived advantage in military capabilities and ability to control South Korean actions through nuclear provocations or coercion.
While South Korean conventional capabilities exceed those of the north, supporters of nuclear acquisition argue that such capabilities do not have the same “political and psychological effects” as nuclear weapons. As North Korea continues to conduct provocations and South Korea believes its response options are narrowing, the argument for South Korea to possess nuclear weapons to achieve unquestionable superiority against North Korea will likely gain prominence within the mainstream debate.
Conclusion
The South Korean debate over nuclear weapons development has garnered unprecedented attention and activity in response to changing peninsular, regional, and global dynamics. This paper has provided a holistic overview of the factors underlying the nuclear debate across a wide range of sources and voices in South Korea. However, it is important to note that the debate to date reflects various public perspectives that might influence South Korea’s future policy direction rather than a government-driven policy decision on nuclear development, despite President Yoon’s comment on South Korea’s nuclear option.
How the United States and South Korea cooperate within the alliance to jointly respond to such sentiments will be crucial in determining how the South Korean public views the opportunities and costs associated with nuclearization.
Jennifer Ahn is Research Associate for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Photo from UNC-CFC-USFK’s photostream on flickr Creative Commons.
keia.org · by Troy Stangarone · February 17, 2023
13. N. Korea still boasts the world’s longest military service! This year, men are required to serve 8 years, while women volunteers are given 5 years
＜In-depth Investigation＞N. Korea still boasts the world’s longest military service! This year, men are required to serve 8 years, while women volunteers are given 5 years
asiapress.org
(FILE PHOTO): Soldiers rest on the ground during a military exercise. Taken by Shim Wui-chon in Haeju, South Hwanghae Province. (ASIAPRESS)
◆ Government encourages students to head into higher-education with offers of exemptions from military service
ASIAPRESS has recently learned that North Korea’s 2023 military service period for men aged 17 and older is eight years, five years for women, and 10 years for personnel in special branches of the military. A reporting partner in North Pyongan Province recently met with a member of the “Military Mobilization Department,” an agency under the Ministry of Defense’s Reserve Forces Division, which handles affairs related to the recruitment of new soldiers. (KANG Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)
North Korea’s military service period started to increase in the 2000s. In 2020, men, who are obligated to join the military, served 13 years, while women, who join the military as volunteers, served eight years according to an ASIAPRESS investigation. Following the mass famine of the late 1990s, the significant decrease in young people joining the military due to an increase in childhood deaths and the falling birthrate led the authorities to fill gaps in recruitment by extending the military service period and encouraging women to join the military.
The Kim Jong-un regime changed its policies regarding military service in 2021. In January of that year, at the Eighth Party Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the regime shortened the military service period for men to eight years and women to five years, a move that dramatically decreased the number of soldiers in military service. Soldiers who had passed their discharge dates were released from military service en masse and redeployed into the agriculture and mining industries, which had been suffering production issues due to lack of labor.
◆ Children of families suffering difficulties can receive exemptions from military service
The “Military Mobilization Department” conducts recruitment efforts at the country’s high schools every year. The Military Mobilization Department staff member who the reporting partner met with in January/February explained the characteristics of this year’s recruitment efforts toward soon-to-be high school graduates:
・The government is encouraging students to continue their education in universities and professional colleges, and those selected – male or female - to continue their studies are exempted from being targets of the Military Mobilization Department’s recruitment efforts.
・The government has ordered that soon-to-be high school graduates from families suffering difficulties are to be exempted from joining the military. Students who are single children or who have relatives who are elderly or unable to work due to illness can also be exempted from joining the military. Some parents or caregivers try as hard as possible to use these exemptions to ensure their children are not recruited into the military.
・Starting from March 1, recruiters begin interviews and physical examinations of candidates, and recruits are given their assignments starting in late March.
・Men are obligated to serve in the military, while woman can volunteer. “Military Mobilization Department” officials go to school classrooms and select female students from among those who want to serve.
Events for new recruits to the military take place across the entire country. This photo of a send-off event for new recruits in Chongjin was taken by Ri Jun in 2006. (ASIAPRESS)
◆ Parents think there’s no need to send children to the military if they can’t become party members
“According to the Military Mobilization Department official, life is hard these days so there are a lot of people who have only one child, which has led to a deep shortage in new recruits. Despite the situation being what it is, the upper leadership has instructed that everyone who can study (who is a capable student) should go into higher education,” the reporting partner told ASIAPRESS.
For a long time, most people in North Korea believed that men must go to the military and that it was only natural for college graduates to join the military, too. The biggest reason for this was due to the fact that the path to becoming a Workers’ Party member was only opened after service in the military. Nowadays, however, people’s thinking about the military is undergoing a sea change. The reporting partner gave this explanation:
“These days, there are a lot of parents who do whatever it takes to get their kids into university or professional colleges in order to avoid military service. Starting two years ago, there have been a lot of people who have failed to become party members even after they’ve finished their military service. That’s because the government has made it harder to become a party member. Parents believe that there’s no point in taking the risk of sending their children into the military if they won’t have any chance to become a party member in any case.”
◆ The sons of poor families go to the military
Ordinary North Korean soldiers suffer from severe food shortages. New recruits suffer from malnutrition so commonly it is considered a given. Parents who were worried about their sons or daughters sent in food to military bases or sent money to their children to allow them to buy snacks.
Perspectives toward military service changed after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, however. Given that urban dwellers began suffering from poverty due to the economic malaise caused by the pandemic, “there have been poor families who believe that sending (their children) to the military is better than suffering at home without food to eat.”
There are a lot of poor families in North Korea, even if they don’t meet the conditions set to exempt certain groups of people from military service. Families with money to spare can have their children avoid military service by sending them to higher-education institutions, but for the children of families without even enough food to put on the table, they are less likely to be able to avoid military service.
◆ Missile bases are popular among new recruits
There have also been changes in what kinds of military units new recruits want to be assigned to. Up until recently, the most popular units included the Ministry of State Security (the secret police), Ministry of Social Security (the national police agency), and the military police. People believed that they would be treated well at these agencies, and could expect to receive an income from bribes. This year, however, the most popular destination among recruits is reportedly missile bases.
“Missile bases treat their personnel really well, and there’s a lot of opportunities to take part in events featuring Kim Jong-un, meaning that missile base personnel can expect to receive gifts from the leadership. Families with money to spare give bribes to the Military Mobilization Department to ensure their children get stationed at these bases.”
Ultimately, bribes determine where a new recruit will be stationed, and assignments are handed down after the end of March.
※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.
asiapress.org
14. Are North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Tests as Safe as the Country Claims?
I would guess the answer is a "no."
Are North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Tests as Safe as the Country Claims?
The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · February 21, 2023
The country has conducted six underground nuclear tests, and a seventh may be on the way. Rights groups fear their environmental and health consequences.
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A satellite image of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in Kilju, a county in North Korea, in March 2022.Credit...Maxar Technologies, via Reuters
By
Feb. 21, 2023
SEOUL — North Korea has long maintained that all six of its nuclear weapons tests were conducted safely.
But on Tuesday, a Seoul-based human rights group warned that radioactive contamination may have spread through groundwater from the North’s Punggye-ri nuclear test site, potentially jeopardizing the health of people in North Korea and neighboring countries.
The Transitional Justice Working Group said in its report that radioactive materials could have affected tens of thousands of North Koreans living near Punggye-ri and spread to China, South Korea and Japan through mushrooms and other agricultural products smuggled out of the country.
North Korea has conducted six underground nuclear tests at Punggye-ri between 2006 and 2017. The country claims no harmful materials were released after the tests. But outside experts have raised fears of the possible escape of radioactive material into the environment.
When the North invited international journalists to Punggye-ri in 2018, it confiscated their radiation detectors.
North Korea’s Missile Tests
Card 1 of 5
An increase in activity. In recent months, North Korea has conducted several missile tests, hinting at an increasingly defiant attitude toward countries that oppose its growing military arsenal. Here’s what to know:
U.N. resolutions. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula started rising in 2017, when North Korea tested three intercontinental ballistic missiles and conducted a nuclear test. The United Nations imposed sanctions, and Pyongyang stopped testing nuclear and long-range missiles for a time.
Failed diplomacy. Former President Donald Trump met with Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, three times between 2018 and 2019, hoping to reach a deal on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. After the talks broke down, North Korea resumed missile testing.
An escalation. North Korea started a new round of testing in September 2021 after a six-month hiatus. It subsequently completed several tests, including the firing of multiple intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, that violated the 2017 U.N. resolutions.
New provocations. Mr. Kim has launched a record number of missiles and focused on developing new ones in 2022. The North Korean leader has said that a "neo-Cold War" is emerging and has vowed to expand his country’s nuclear capabilities against South Korea “exponentially.”
In 2015, South Korea’s food safety agency detected nine times the standard level of radioactive cesium isotopes in mushrooms that had been smuggled from North Korea and sold in South Korea disguised as Chinese produce.
Following the North’s last nuclear detonation in 2017, a series of small earthquakes was reported from near the testing site, raising fears of underground cave-ins and a possible contamination of groundwater.
North Korean defectors living in South Korea who once lived near the testing site have also reported observing strange illnesses in their North Korean neighborhoods. Such reports prompted South Korea to test 40 North Korean defectors who had been near the testing site in 2017 and 2018.
Nine of the defectors had symptoms that could be attributed to radiation exposure. But South Korean scientists said they could not establish a link between those symptoms and the nuclear test site because of a lack of data.
On Tuesday, the Transitional Justice Working Group urged South Korea to test all 160 North Koreans in the South who came from Kilju, a county that includes Punggye-ri, or all 881 escapees who lived in nine cities and counties near the testing site before fleeing to the South.
“North Korea’s nuclear tests threaten the right to life and the right to health of not only the North Korean people, but also of those in South Korea and other neighboring countries,” said Lee Younghwan, the group’s executive director.
The South’s Unification Ministry said on Tuesday that it was willing to consider reopening an investigation if North Korean defectors report symptoms of possible radioactive exposure and ask for medical assistance.
During the pandemic, the number of defectors from North Korea arriving in the South plummeted from 1,047 in 2019 to 67 last year.
The new warning about the testing site came amid signs that North Korea, one of the most isolated countries in the world, was preparing to resume nuclear weapons tests. In 2017, the chief of South Korea’s weather agency told lawmakers in Seoul that if North Korea detonated another powerful nuclear device at Punggye-ri, it could destabilize the mountain test site enough to leak radioactive materials.
Officials in Washington have warned for months that North Korea was ready to conduct another underground nuclear test. The apparent delay may be caused by technical difficulties amid food shortages in the North or pressure from China to avoid creating more regional instability, according to analysts.
In the past week, North Korea has vowed to take “persistent and strong” countermeasures against the joint military drills the United States and South Korea have planned for this spring. It launched an intercontinental ballistic missile on Saturday. Kim Yo-jong, the sister and spokeswoman for the North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, also warned Seoul and Washington of launching more missiles into the Pacific, threatening to use the ocean “as our firing range.”
The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · February 21, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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