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Quotes of the Day:
"A good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers."
– Plato
"Where is the Life we have lost in living? Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?"
– T. S. Eliot
"Wisdom is the right use of knowledge. To know is not to be wise. Many men know a great deal, and are all the greater fools for it. There is no fool so great a fool as a knowing fool. But to know how to use knowledge is to have wisdom."
– Charles Spurgeon
1. Trump Fires Top Pentagon Officers in Sweeping Overhaul
2. Dan Caine, Trump’s Joint Chiefs Pick, Had Unusual Path to Top Ranks
3. White House and Ukraine Close In on Deal for Mineral Rights
4. Washington’s Embrace of Putin Aims to Drive Wedge Between Moscow and Beijing
5. See How Xi and Putin Are Ramping Up Joint Military Drills
6. DoD Probationary Workforce Statement
7. Pentagon to fire 5,400 civilian employees in ‘initial’ purge
8. New ‘irregular triad’ gaining currency as operational concept to improve deterrence
9. There’s a story in each shard of the shattered USAID
10. Trump urges Musk to be 'more aggressive' in bid to shrink US government
11. Russia Wants to Erase Ukraine’s Future—and Its Past
12. Connecticut Asks Congress to ‘Rethink the Jones Act’
13. Warfare at the Speed of Thought: Balancing AI and Critical Thinking for the Military Leaders of Tomorrow
14. Donald Trump's Russia Gamble: Could It Work?
15. 5 Key Lessons from Three Years of the Ukraine War
16. Confirm Elbridge Colby Right Now
17. Why No One Is Winning in Ukraine
18. China’s Self-Defeating Strategy
19. Socom Laser-Focused on Winning, Readiness, Modernization
20. In Purge, Trump Fires Brown, Slife, Franchetti, and More
21. Lake says VOA won’t be ‘Trump TV’
1. Trump Fires Top Pentagon Officers in Sweeping Overhaul
All serve at the pleasure of the President.
But... wow...
Trump Fires Top Pentagon Officers in Sweeping Overhaul
Chairman of Joint Chiefs and top Navy admiral are among those ousted
By Nancy A. Youssef
Follow
Updated Feb. 22, 2025 6:58 am ET
Air Force Gen. CQ Brown Jr. was removed from his post as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff despite support among key members of Congress. Photo: Mark Schiefelbein/AP
WASHINGTON—The Trump administration fired the military’s highest-ranking officer, the admiral leading the Navy, and several other senior Pentagon leaders in a massive shake-up of the top ranks of the armed forces.
The firings began with an announcement by President Trump on Friday that he had removed the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. CQ Brown Jr., and was nominating a retired three-star general to succeed him.
Shortly after Trump’s Truth Social post, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said he was ousting Adm. Lisa Franchetti, the first woman to lead the Navy and to be on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Gen. James Slife, the vice chief of staff for the Air Force.
Hegseth also said he was planning to replace the top uniformed lawyers for the Army, Navy and Air Force.
The firings were an unprecedented move to replace top uniformed officers in several branches of the armed services by an administration that has accused the Pentagon of failing to focus on its core war-fighting mission.
The result was to remove the military’s highest ranking Black officer in Brown and top woman commander in Franchetti. Trump appointees have said diversity policies by the Biden administration had resulted in promoting unqualified officers.
While some firings at the Defense Department were anticipated, the moves caused shock waves in the armed forces and Congress and raise questions about Trump’s attempts to assert control over the Pentagon leadership after clashing with it repeatedly during his first term.
“I want to thank General Charles ‘CQ’ Brown for his over 40 years of service to our country, including as our current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is a fine gentleman and an outstanding leader, and I wish a great future for him and his family,” Trump wrote in the Truth Social post.
Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D., Conn.), a member of the Armed Services Committee, said in a post on X: “Purging these highly dedicated, decorated military leaders—based on politics, not merit—does immediate immense & lasting damage to the readiness of our armed forces & national defense.”
Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.) said, “President Trump, like every president, deserves to pick military advisers that he knows, trusts and has a relationship with.”
Trump gave no reason for replacing Brown, the second Black person to serve as the military’s highest-ranking officer and the president’s senior military adviser. Hegseth didn’t explain the firings of the other officers.
Brown was ousted despite support among key members of Congress and a seemingly positive meeting with Trump in mid-December, when the two sat next to each other for a while at the Army-Navy football game. Brown had been meeting regularly with Hegseth at the Pentagon.
On Friday, Brown was at the U.S.-Mexico border, where Trump has ordered a buildup of U.S. troops to counter illegal immigration. He learned about the decision shortly before the announcement, a Defense Department official said. Franchetti posted on social media that she was conducting meetings at the Pentagon on Friday and was surprised by the news.
Hegseth didn’t announce nominees to succeed Franchetti, Slife and the judge advocates general of the Army, Navy and Air Force, saying he would seek recommendations for their replacements. He didn’t say from whom he would seek nominees.
Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Dan Caine will be nominated to be the next chairman, Trump said. Caine must be confirmed by the Senate.
“General Caine is an accomplished pilot, national security expert, successful entrepreneur, and a ‘warfighter’ with significant interagency and special operations experience,” Trump said.
Graham said Trump and Caine “go way back to his first term where General Caine led the effort to destroy the ISIS caliphate. They have a longstanding relationship, and I’m confident General Caine will be the right person at the right time to take over as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs”
Brown, who has been in the job since late 2023, was replaced before the end of what is normally a four-year term.
His future as chairman had been uncertain since Trump’s election in November. The move to replace him is a sharp departure from past practice by most presidents, who replaced the chairman only after expiration of the term.
During his first term, Trump nominated Brown to lead the Air Force. The decision to promote him to chairman was made by President Joe Biden. Brown didn’t immediately release a statement after Trump’s post.
Brown, an F-16 jet fighter pilot, often described himself as an ordinary man serving in an extraordinary job. The Senate confirmed him in a 83-11 vote in 2023. Among the 11 Republicans who voted no were then-Sens. JD Vance, now vice president, and Marco Rubio, now Trump’s secretary of state. The Senate confirmed Franchetti in a 95-1 vote, with four not voting.
Brown’s promotion was delayed for weeks by Alabama Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R., Ala.), who vowed to not let the Senate expedite his confirmation until the Pentagon agreed to end its policy of allowing troop leave and travel funds for reproductive healthcare, including abortion.
Six days after Brown assumed the job, Hamas attacked Israel, killing 1,200, kidnapping 250 others and leading to a devastating war in Gaza that has reshaped the region.
Brown spent much of his career in the Asia-Pacific region and made the strategic competition with China a priority. He released a nearly five-minute video shortly after the 2020 murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police, sharing his feelings about the incident and his experience as a Black officer rising through the ranks.
That video drew the ire of Trump supporters, leading Hegseth before he was nominated to take the reins of the Defense Department to label Brown as an officer who benefited from diversity policies and who might have been unqualified for the job.
“We’ll never know, but always doubt—which on its face seems unfair to CQ,” Hegseth wrote. “But since he has made the race card one of his biggest calling cards, it really doesn’t much matter.”
In a November appearance on the “Shawn Ryan Show,” Hegseth said: “First of all, you’ve got to fire the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.”
“But any general that was involved—general, admiral, whatever—that was involved in any of the DEI woke s— has got to go,” he continued. “Either you’re in for warfighting, and that’s it. That’s the only litmus test we care about.” DEI refers to diversity, equity and inclusion.
Nonetheless, Hegseth said as he arrived at the Pentagon for his first official day on the job that he looked forward to working with Brown, who greeted him at the door.
Brown had fierce defenders, who described him as a strong leader who remained even- keeled in tough situations. He maintained his flying hours even while serving as chairman. Brown said he didn’t want to be judged for his race but simply to have the same opportunity to prove himself as everyone else.
Caine, commissioned in 1990 and a graduate of Virginia Military Institute, is an F-16 pilot, according to his Air Force biography, with 150 combat hours and two tours in Iraq. More important, he won over the president, who has described him as a supporter and a strong critic of the top military leadership.
Caine retired in 2024 and in his career served as the associate director of military affairs for the Central Intelligence Agency. Until the Senate acts on his nomination, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Christopher Grady, will serve in the position in an acting capacity.
Franchetti, a career surface officer, also was confirmed in 2023. She spent much of her career serving on destroyers and came to office when the Navy was beleaguered by low recruiting, program delays and challenges with shipbuilding and maintenance as the U.S. regarded China the biggest threat. Under her tenure, the Navy was able to close recruiting shortfalls.
But she, too, faced Hegseth’s wrath, who alleged in a book, “The War on Warriors,” that she had no combat experience and was promoted because of “optics.”
Write to Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com
Corrections & Amplifications
Air Force Gen. CQ Brown Jr. is the second Black officer to serve as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said he was the first. (Corrected on Feb. 21)
Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the February 22, 2025, print edition as 'Top Pentagon Officers Fired in Sweeping Overhaul'.
2. Dan Caine, Trump’s Joint Chiefs Pick, Had Unusual Path to Top Ranks
Our new Chairman.
Here is "Razin" Caine at the OSS Donovan Awards Dinner last October for the presentation of the colors. Listen to his speech.
Presentation of the Colors by Lt. Gen. Dan Caine, USAF
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SbxnwoS7lRg
Perhaps he will lead a revitalization of the spirit of the OSS.
Dan Caine, Trump’s Joint Chiefs Pick, Had Unusual Path to Top Ranks
The general made an impression in 2018 when he said, according to the president, that the Islamic State could be defeated in a week.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/21/us/politics/dan-caine-trump-joint-chiefs.html
Dan Caine, a retired Air Force lieutenant general, most recently served as an associate director for military affairs at the C.I.A. from 2021 to 2024.Credit...U.S. Air Force
By Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt
Reporting from Washington
Feb. 21, 2025
In President Trump’s telling, Dan Caine, the retired Air Force lieutenant general whom he wants to be his next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made an impression on him when the two men first met in 2018.
The general told the president that the Islamic State was not so tough and could be defeated in a week, not two years as senior advisers predicted, Mr. Trump recounted in 2019.
And at a Conservative Political Action Conference meeting last year, Mr. Trump said that General Caine put on a Make America Great Again hat while meeting with him in Iraq. (General Caine has told aides he has never put on a MAGA hat.)
On Friday, Mr. Trump said he would nominate General Caine after firing Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., a four-star fighter pilot known as C.Q.
“Today, I am honored to announce that I am nominating Air Force Lieutenant General Dan ‘Razin’ Caine to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Mr. Trump said in a message on Truth Social. “General Caine is an accomplished pilot, national security expert, successful entrepreneur, and a ‘warfighter’ with significant interagency and special operations experience.”
General Caine is a 1990 graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, where he received a degree in economics. He later got a master’s degree in air warfare at the American Military University.
An F-16 pilot with 150 combat flight hours, General Caine’s career took him on an unusual path for a future Air Force general.
He was a White House fellow at the Agriculture Department and a counterterrorism specialist on the White House’s Homeland Security Council under President George W. Bush. He served in several highly secretive intelligence and special operations assignments, some in the United States and some overseas.
According to his military biography, General Caine was a part-time member of the Air National Guard from 2009 to 2016 and “a serial entrepreneur and investor.”
He was also an associate director for military affairs at the C.I.A. from 2021 to 2024, serving as the principal liaison to the Pentagon and working with the military on several highly classified programs and operations, former colleagues said.
Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., a former head of the military’s Central Command, described General Caine in an email as an “exceptionally talented officer.” General McKenzie said he worked closely with the general in his C.I.A. assignment, and that he was “very effective in that job.”
While at the C.I.A. in 2023, General Caine offered a reflection about his time as the chief of weapons and tactics attached to the 121st Fighter Squadron at Andrews Air Force Base, in Washington’s Maryland suburbs, on Sept. 11, 2001. After the terrorist attacks, fighter jets were deployed over Washington for the first time.
“We jumped in the airplanes and started them up,” General Caine recalled in a reflection on Sept. 11 posted by the C.I.A. “As my plane came to life, the generators came online, and the radios were going ballistic. People on the emergency channels were saying, ‘Anybody around Washington, D.C., will be shot down.’ I remembered thinking to myself: ‘Wait. That’s me that will be shooting.’”
“The weapons were loaded on my airplane so we’d have the 20-millimeter gun and two heat-seeking missiles,” he continued. “I was airborne for about 7.5 to 8 hours that day.”
Mr. Trump’s recounting of the time he met General Caine has changed over time. In his first known public telling of the story, at the Conservative Political Action Conference in 2019, he said the two met during his visit to Iraq.
“I said, ‘What’s your name?’” Mr. Trump recalled. “‘Sir, my name is Razin.’”
“‘Raisin, like the fruit?’” Mr. Trump said he asked. “‘What’s your last name?’”
“‘Caine,’” Mr. Trump said was the officer’s response. “‘Razin Caine.’”
That was when Mr. Trump said the general then told him he could defeat the Islamic State in a week.
“‘One week?’” Mr. Trump said he asked incredulously. “‘I was told two years!’”
“‘We’re only hitting them from a temporary base in Syria, but if you gave us permission, we could hit them from the back, from the side, from all over, from the base you’re right on right now, sir,’” Mr. Trump quoted him as saying. “‘They won’t know what the hell hit them.’”
Mr. Trump also said that General Caine told him that his superiors came from Washington but did not listen to their commanders in the field, and that “you’re the first one to ask us our opinion.”
Five years later, Mr. Trump spoke about that interlude at another CPAC meeting. This time, Mr. Trump said General Caine promised that the Islamic State could be defeated in four weeks, not one.
The president also added a new detail, claiming that General Caine donned a MAGA hat, despite military guidelines that active-duty troops should not wear political paraphernalia.
“‘I love you, sir. I think you’re great, sir. I’ll kill for you, sir,’” Mr. Trump said General Caine said. “Then he puts on a Make America Great Again hat,” Mr. Trump said, laughing. “You’re not allowed to do that, but they did it.”
Helene Cooper is a Pentagon correspondent. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent. More about Helene Cooper
Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt
See more on: U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Donald Trump
3. White House and Ukraine Close In on Deal for Mineral Rights
What are the implications for the U.S. in that many of the minerals are located in areas occupied by Russia.
Excerpts:
Zelensky’s initial rejection of the deal proposed by Bessent had prompted escalating broadsides from Trump against the Ukrainian president. Trump called Zelensky a dictator after Zelensky suggested Trump was living in a bubble of Russian disinformation.
Trump’s Ukraine envoy, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, met with Zelensky in Kyiv Thursday, a meeting that Ukraine’s president said afterward “restores hope.”
“I gave instructions to work swiftly and very sensibly,” Zelensky said.
A person close to the government in Kyiv said Kellogg played “a big part” in finalizing terms of the deal by building trust with Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials over a three-day visit to the country’s capital.
...
Trump’s national security adviser, Mike Waltz, this week had called the proposed deal “an economic partnership” and “a historic opportunity to have the United States of America co-invest with Ukraine, invest in its economy, invest in its natural resources.”
Ukraine says it has Europe’s largest reserves of titanium, which is used to make alloys for aircraft and naval vessels, and lithium, a key material in batteries.
It also has deposits of rare earths, essential in certain high-tech industries, including defense and renewable energy. While potentially plentiful, the reserves would require massive investment to develop, even in peacetime, and many are located in areas occupied by Russia.
White House and Ukraine Close In on Deal for Mineral Rights
Agreement could help resolve tensions that flared up between Zelensky and Trump
https://www.wsj.com/world/white-house-and-ukraine-close-in-on-deal-for-mineral-rights-e924c672?mod=latest_headlines
By Alan Cullison
Follow, Alexander Ward
Follow and James Marson
Follow
Updated Feb. 21, 2025 6:36 pm ET
President Trump. Photo: nathan howard/Reuters
The U.S. and Ukraine are nearing a deal that would hand valuable mineral rights to the U.S., an agreement that the Trump administration has sought as compensation for military aid to fight off Russia’s invasion, people familiar with the matter said.
Ukraine had refused to sign such a deal earlier this week, sparking a war of words between President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and fears of a break in relations between Washington and Kyiv.
In an apparent nod to an impending deal, Zelensky said in a nightly video address Friday that teams of U.S. and Ukrainian negotiators were working on a draft agreement.
“This is an agreement that can strengthen our relations, and the key is to work out the details to ensure its effectiveness,” he said. “I look forward to the outcome—a just result.”
Zelensky was presented with a deal by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent in Kyiv last week, but refused to sign, saying the Ukrainian side needed to study it further and that a deal should contain some form of security guarantees for Ukraine. Ukrainian officials said that they had only a few hours to study it before it was presented to them.
An agreement could be signed as soon as Saturday, although it isn’t yet complete, people briefed on the talks said. The exact terms couldn’t be learned.
President Trump’s demands for mineral rights sparked fears that he could pull U.S. aid to Ukraine as it fights off Russia’s invasion. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ
Asked about the prospect of a deal on minerals with Ukraine, Trump told reporters in the Oval Office Friday: “I think they want it. They feel good about it.”
Zelensky’s initial rejection of the deal proposed by Bessent had prompted escalating broadsides from Trump against the Ukrainian president. Trump called Zelensky a dictator after Zelensky suggested Trump was living in a bubble of Russian disinformation.
Trump’s Ukraine envoy, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, met with Zelensky in Kyiv Thursday, a meeting that Ukraine’s president said afterward “restores hope.”
“I gave instructions to work swiftly and very sensibly,” Zelensky said.
A person close to the government in Kyiv said Kellogg played “a big part” in finalizing terms of the deal by building trust with Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials over a three-day visit to the country’s capital.
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky with the U.S. special envoy for Ukraine, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, during their meeting in Kyiv on Thursday. Photo: Evgeniy Maloletka/Associated Press
The feud had sparked concerns among U.S. allies that Trump could pull support from Ukraine, which has relied on U.S. military and financial aid to defend itself for three years against a Russian invasion.
Trump is seeking to quickly end to the war in Ukraine, where Russia has killed tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians and razed dozens of cities. Senior U.S. and Russian officials met in Saudi Arabia on Tuesday and agreed to appoint teams to negotiate a settlement to the war.
Zelensky complained that he hadn’t been involved and said Ukraine wouldn’t agree to a deal that it hadn’t taken part in negotiating.
Zelensky’s administration had itself floated the idea of Ukraine granting preferential access to its mineral resources last year, hoping that it would entice Trump to continue military support for Kyiv by offering the U.S. some economic benefit. During his presidential campaign, Trump repeatedly criticized the U.S. military aid as a waste of money.
Trump’s national security adviser, Mike Waltz, this week had called the proposed deal “an economic partnership” and “a historic opportunity to have the United States of America co-invest with Ukraine, invest in its economy, invest in its natural resources.”
Ukraine says it has Europe’s largest reserves of titanium, which is used to make alloys for aircraft and naval vessels, and lithium, a key material in batteries.
It also has deposits of rare earths, essential in certain high-tech industries, including defense and renewable energy. While potentially plentiful, the reserves would require massive investment to develop, even in peacetime, and many are located in areas occupied by Russia.
The minerals are also especially valuable to the U.S. because of heightened tensions with China and Russia, whose land masses now control a large portion of them.
Zelensky had called the initial proposal “unclear,” saying it had demanded a 50% share of a list of mineral deposits. He said Trump’s demand for $500 billion in minerals was excessive, saying that U.S. military and financial aid to Ukraine during the war had totaled about $100 billion.
Write to Alan Cullison at alan.cullison@wsj.com, Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com and James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com
Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the February 22, 2025, print edition as 'Ukraine, U.S. Near Minerals Agreement'.
4. Washington’s Embrace of Putin Aims to Drive Wedge Between Moscow and Beijing
Does it have to divide the West? Some may not like this because of our revulsion toward Putin. However, if this is part of a sophisticated (holistic) political warfare strategy (coordinated with our allies with a public information component that gives the appearance of division and private diplomatic action to ensure unity) that seeks to win in the gray zone of strategic competition by achieving US national security objectives and the security of the US and our allies, then we should consider the merits these actions from that perspective.
Washington’s Embrace of Putin Aims to Drive Wedge Between Moscow and Beijing
Unlike Nixon and Kissinger’s gambit in the 1970s, the strategy threatens to divide the West
https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-putin-russia-china-policy-e73aeea6?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin shared a toast in Moscow in 2023. Photo: Pavel Byrkin/Sputnik/AP
By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow
Feb. 21, 2025 7:00 pm ET
President Trump’s abrupt and enthusiastic embrace of Russia and its authoritarian leader, Vladimir Putin, is propelled in part by a strategic desire to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing, two powers that have long sought to end U.S. dominance of the international order.
Foreign-policy experts have dubbed the attempted maneuver a “reverse Nixon” after that president’s move in the early 1970s to reverse American policy and cozy up to Communist China in an effort to deepen a divide between Mao Zedong and the Soviet Union. The choice reset Cold War geopolitics and set the stage for China’s economic development.
Prying Russia and China apart now—the two autocracies declared in 2022 that they have a “no-limits” friendship—will be difficult. The two nations have deepened military and intelligence cooperation and aligned their foreign policies. China provides Russia with essential economic support, including computer chips and machine tools used in military industries.
By pivoting to support Russia and backing away from Ukraine, Washington is already alienating its allies in Europe, who are collectively the U.S.’s largest trading partner and top foreign investor. The sudden U-turn in American foreign policy could also spook partners in Asia that the U.S. would want on its side in any conflict with China.
On Wednesday, Trump echoed Russian propaganda and directed a stream of invective at Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, calling him a dictator and blaming Kyiv for starting the war that began when Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of his smaller neighbor in 2022.
That outburst, following a barbed speech delivered to European leaders by Vice President JD Vance in Munich earlier this month and other signs of waning U.S. support for Ukraine, have already caused the biggest rift in relations between the U.S. and its trans-Atlantic allies in several decades.
President Richard Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in Beijing in 1972. Photo: AP
When Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, reversed course on China policy in the early 1970s, they exploited an existing clash between Moscow and Beijing.
China and the Soviet Union, after all, had fought a border war in 1969 and had publicly accused each other of deviating from Communist teachings. Subsequent cooperation between Washington and Beijing helped erode the Soviet Union’s global sway.
What is happening now “is the reverse of the ‘reverse Nixon,’” said Evan Feigenbaum, a former senior State Department official now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think tank in Washington.
Trump is “attempting to split an entente between two powers that have ideological affinity and shared strategic interests,” he said. “And what it has done instead is to split the West, while Russia aligns with the U.S. and with China simultaneously.”
In addition to bringing Russia closer to China as Western sanctions inflicted economic pain, the war in Ukraine has solidified Moscow’s alliances with Iran and North Korea, which supply ammunition, drones, missiles and, in North Korea’s case, troops, to the Russian war effort.
U.S. officials cite the emergence of this new axis of autocracies as a strategic threat that the American military would be hard-pressed to handle simultaneously—and say that Trump’s urgent desire to end the war in Ukraine is driven by the need to weaken, if not break up, that common front of adversaries.
Ukrainian soldiers training last month in the Donetsk region. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ
Damage caused during a Russian drone strike near Kyiv. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ
“You have to think of this as a global fight,” said Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg. “We’re facing an issue that we didn’t face four years ago. Now you’ve got the four combined, and they’ve all got economic or military links.”
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in remarks after talks with senior Russian officials in Saudi Arabia this past week, highlighted “the incredible opportunities that exist to partner with the Russians geopolitically on issues of common interest.”
At these talks, the most senior-level encounter since 2022, U.S. and Russian negotiators discussed the possible economic benefits that would result from improved relations and the lifting of U.S. sanctions that have stunted the Russian economy—and forced it to rely even more on Beijing.
A briefing memo, prepared for the Kremlin by a think tank affiliated with the Russian government ahead of the talks and obtained by a Western government, suggested that Moscow propose ending cooperation with China on sensitive technological and military issues as part of a deal to end the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia.
Moscow could also offer to limit Chinese participation in infrastructure projects that would strengthen China’s strategic capabilities, the memo said. It also suggested a pledge by Russia to limit the resumption of natural-gas exports to Europe to undermine European competitiveness and to allow sales of American liquefied natural gas, as well as offers to grant U.S. companies rights to mineral deposits in occupied Ukraine.
Such terms are designed to appeal to Trump’s transactional approach to international affairs. But skeptics of the outreach to Russia argue that there is little Russia can actually do to help the U.S. contain China.
China already has most of the significant military technologies that Russia possesses. “That ship has sailed. The Chinese are far more advanced technologically in all kinds of sectors than the Russians are,” said Alina Polyakova, chief executive of the Center for European Policy Analysis, a think tank in Washington.
She warned that if Washington were to abandon Ukraine, it would legitimize “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine” and signal “to Beijing that they have a much more open hand when it comes to their own potential military aggression against Taiwan.”
The Amur River forms part of the border between Russia and China. Photo: WSJ
A Chinese vessel with containers on the Amur River. Photo: WSJ
In remarks at the Halifax Security Forum in November, U.S. Navy Adm. Samuel Paparo, the commander of the Indo-Pacific command, said Beijing and Moscow have a “transactional symbiosis,” and that “to think that we will be able to drive a wedge between them is a fantasy.”
There is another, more fundamental, dynamic at play that limits Putin’s room for maneuver: While Russia’s relationship with China is strategic and permanent, any rapprochement with Washington is inherently temporary, at least as long as the U.S. remains a democracy.
Trump, after all, will no longer be in the White House in four years, and Putin has to factor in the likelihood that the next U.S. administration might swing just as abruptly in the opposite direction. Even next year’s midterms could alter American policy.
“Russia knows that China is its giant neighbor, that the Communist Party of China will keep ruling it for as long as Russia can foresee—and that alienating China creates a mortal danger for Russia,” said Alexander Gabuev, an expert on Sino-Russian relations who heads the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.
Aircraft indentified as a Chinese navy helicopter conducting aerial reconnaissance over the South China Sea. Photo: jam sta rosa/AFP/Getty Images
Military personnel in Taiwan. Photo: ritchie b. tongo/EPA/Shutterstock
That doesn’t mean Putin won’t engage. Trump’s overtures offer the prospect of getting from Washington something his armies couldn’t achieve in three years of war: regime change in Kyiv and the return of Ukraine, and possibly other parts of Europe, to Moscow’s sphere of influence.
“I don’t see why Russia wouldn’t pocket all that Donald Trump brings it on a platter, undeservedly, while at the same time maintaining the tight bond with China,” said Thomas Gomart, director of the French Institute of International Relations, a Paris think tank that advises the government.
While China is watching Trump’s pivot to Russia with some apprehension, it is also cashing in a strategic windfall: Its two main goals in Europe, propping up the Putin regime and splitting the rest of Europe from the U.S.—objectives that were mutually exclusive until now—are suddenly within reach.
As Washington heaped scorn on Zelensky and European leaders, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke of the need to maintain international law and the charter of the United Nations. He recently described Ukraine as “a friend and a partner” as he met his Ukrainian counterpart.
A street in the frontline town of Pokrovsk, Ukraine. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ
SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS
What should be the response of the U.S. to the alliance between China and Russia? Join the conversation below.
Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com
5. See How Xi and Putin Are Ramping Up Joint Military Drills
See maps and graphics at the link. The GO/Weiji/Baduk board is in play.
Imagine playing Go in a multi-domain, multi-dimensional environment with 3 or more players. I play this game a lot against the computer and I never win.
Go is a strategic board game for two players where the objective is to control more territory on the board by placing stones on intersections, creating formations that surround empty spaces, and ultimately capturing more territory than your opponent by enclosing areas with your stones; players take turns placing stones, and a stone is captured when completely surrounded by the opponent's stones, with the winner being the player who controls the most territory at the end of the game.
Key points about Go:
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Board: Played on a square grid with 19 lines on each side, creating intersections where players place their stones.
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Stones: Black and white pieces representing each player.
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Movement: Stones are placed on intersections and cannot be moved once placed.
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Capturing: When a stone or group of stones is completely surrounded by the opponent's stones, it is captured and removed from the board.
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Winning: The player with the most territory (empty spaces surrounded by their stones) at the end of the game wins.
Important aspects of Go strategy:
Players strategically place stones to create large areas of territory by surrounding empty spaces.
Maintaining connections between your stones to prevent them from being captured individually.
Even if a space isn't fully surrounded, a player can still exert influence over it by placing stones near the borders.
Players must analyze the board to anticipate their opponent's moves and plan their own strategies.
See How Xi and Putin Are Ramping Up Joint Military Drills
China and Russia expand cooperation from Alaska to Taiwan in a challenge to the U.S. and its partners
https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-china-joint-drills-putin-xi-6617c09b?st=PjVpT7&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
By Austin Ramzy
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Updated Feb. 22, 2025 12:01 am ET
China–Russia joint military exercises by type, 2003–24*
KAZAKHSTAN
Med. Sea
South
China Sea
Arabian Sea
Multilateral
Multi-domain (multiple military branches)
Bilateral
Ground
Paramilitary
Naval
INDIAN OCEAN
Aerial patrol
International competitions
Computer simulation (virtual war games)
*As of July 2024
Source: China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Emma Brown/WSJ
HONG KONG—The militaries of China and Russia, America’s top two global adversaries, are working together as never before in their long partnership, probing the defenses of the U.S. and its allies.
The message to America from the growing partnership is that, if drawn into a military conflict, U.S. forces could find themselves confronting both countries.
Chinese-Russian joint patrols and military exercises have become more frequent and increasingly assertive, a review of recent activity shows—and the U.S. and its allies have been forced to respond more frequently as well, scrambling jet fighters and other assets to safeguard territory.
Beijing and Moscow have been displaying close cooperation near Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, nations that the U.S. has pledged to defend, and Taiwan, to which the U.S. sells weapons and provides training. Washington has maintained a policy of ambiguity as to whether it would defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion.
Alongside growing military ties between Russia and U.S. foe North Korea, the prospect of battling multiple enemies compounds the challenge for the U.S. as it prepares and develops strategy for a potential conflict in Asia.
Close to Alaska
A Chinese long-range bomber and a smaller Russian jet fighter are seen during a joint patrol. Photo: Russian Defense Ministry Press Service/AP
The point was made closer to home in July, when Russian and Chinese warplanes took off from a Russian air base and flew together past Alaska, prompting the U.S. and Canada to send jet fighters to intercept them. U.S. officials said it was the first time strategic bombers from Russia and China operated together near North America.
“The locations and assets involved in these exercises are becoming more expansive and aggressive,” said Jacob Stokes, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington think tank. “It’s projecting military force at a scale sufficient to target other powerful states, which is a major shift.”
Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin made a display of their partnership in the hours after President Trump took office last month, publicizing a video chat in which they called each other “old friend” and pledged to deepen China-Russia cooperation.
“Make no mistake, this is an escalation,” Republican Sen. Dan Sullivan of Alaska said in July of the flight of Chinese and Russian bombers past his state. The patrol showed the state was “on the front lines of the authoritarian aggression by the dictators in Russia and China who are increasingly working together.”
The flyby was followed in October by a joint patrol to the Arctic through the Bering Strait involving two Russian border-guard ships and two cutters of the Chinese coast guard, a force that has grown in strength and assertiveness.
Cruising past Alaska
Omsukchan
Chukchi Sea
RUSSIA
Egvekinot
Ugolnye Kopi
CAN.
Fairbanks
Nome
Alaska
(U.S.)
Bering
Sea
Uelen
RUSSIA
Anchorage
Naukan
Russian ship
Gulf of Alaska
Lavrentiya
10 miles
Bering Strait
Alaska
(U.S.)
Wales
Chinese ships
York
Port Clarence
Tracking data show one Russian and two Chinese coast guard ships pass through the Bering Strait on Oct. 1, 2024, on the countries’ first joint patrol to the Arctic.*
20 miles
20 km
*No tracking data was available for a second Russian ship that sailed with them.
Source: MarineTraffic
Emma Brown/WSJ
Closing in on Taiwan
The two powers made another joint display in December at a sensitive Asian hot spot. As China’s navy was massing for one of its largest shows of force around Taiwan in years, four Russian warships sailed past the self-ruled island. Three Russian corvettes took part—vessels designed to operate in shallow and coastal waters.
The corvettes, accompanied by a Russian fuel-supply ship, communicated with Chinese warships as they approached in what appeared to be a coordinated drill, a Taiwanese security official said.
Russian and Chinese ships were also spotted at the time in the waters surrounding Japan and South Korea, according to Taiwanese officials. In all, nearly 100 Chinese warships and vessels—involving several thousand personnel—were spotted across the region, Taiwan said. China considers the island democracy to be part of its territory with which it must be united someday, by force if necessary.
Despite these drills, Russia and China don’t show many signs of advanced military cooperation or integration—and they don’t have to, said Dmitry Gorenburg, an expert on the Russian military at CNA, a think tank in Washington.
“If they were to get involved in a war with the U.S. in the Pacific, which is what they’re practicing for,” he said, “it is much more likely they end up in separate sectors fighting separately with enough interaction and communication they don’t get in each other’s way.”
China and Russia say their military exercises don’t target other countries. But they have come uncomfortably close to American allies.
Circling Japan
Chinese-Russian joint patrols
RUSSIA
CHINA
HOKKAIDO
Sapporo
Oct. 18: The Japanese military says it spotted 10 Chinese and Russian warships and supply vessels traveling eastward.
N. KOREA
The ships sail between Hokkaido, the northernmost main island of Japan, and Honshu, the largest island, turning southeast on Oct. 21.
Sea of Japan
Oct. 14-17, 2021: The Chinese and Russian navies hold joint exercises in the Sea of Japan.
Seoul
S. KOREA
JAPAN
Tokyo
HONSHU
Busan
Kyoto
Nagoya
Osaka
Fukuoka
SHIKOKU
PACIFIC OCEAN
KYUSHU
Oct. 21: The ships sail through small islands about 250 miles south of Tokyo.
East China Sea
Oct. 21-22: The ships sail west, past Japan's southernmost main island of Kyushu and into the East China Sea.
Oct. 23: A helicopter is seen taking off and landing on a Chinese guided-missile destroyer in the East China Sea.
Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense
Emma Brown/WSJ
As Chinese and Russian ships carried out a series of joint exercises near Japan in September, a Russian patrol aircraft repeatedly entered Japanese airspace near Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan’s main islands. Japan sent jet fighters that fired warning flares at the Russian plane.
The rising threat from China has pushed the U.S. to deepen its military cooperation with Japan. Trump, after meeting with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba at the White House this month, said the U.S. was “totally committed to the security of Japan.”
The U.S. military maintains bases in Japan, as it does in South Korea, and collaborates with forces in Taiwan and the Philippines—security commitments over a broad geographical area that encompasses flashpoints from the Korean Peninsula to the South China Sea.
Increasing tempo
Number of China–Russia joint military exercises by type
10
Computer simulation (virtual war games)
Multi-domain (multiple military forces)
Ground
8
Paramilitary
Naval
One military
exercise
Aerial patrol
6
Intl. competitions
4
2
0
2003
’05
’10
’15
’20
’24
Note: 2024 data is through August 7
Source: China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Working together at an increasing tempo, Russia and China have now conducted more than 100 joint exercises since 2003, according to a database maintained by the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ China Power Project.
The geographical range of the cooperation has expanded, sending a message of broader reach and widening the range of potential conflict.
The October passage through the Bering Strait was the Chinese coast guard’s first joint patrol with Russia in Arctic waters. The U.S. Coast Guard, which monitored the ships by air, said it was the farthest north a Chinese cutter had been spotted. Russia and China are working together to dominate Arctic trade routes and expand their presence in the region.
China has also been broadening its maritime reach on its own. Three Chinese ships said Friday they would conduct live-fire exercises in waters between Australia and New Zealand, in drills that New Zealand Defense Minister Judith Collins said were the Chinese navy’s “most significant and sophisticated we have seen this far south.”
China and Russia conducted their first joint exercise in the South China Sea in September 2016, just two months after an international tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines against China’s claims over the disputed waters. Those drills were held more than 600 miles from the Philippines, off the southern Chinese city of Zhanjiang.
The partners have since made clear they would no longer keep at a distance.
In July, a patrol by Chinese and Russian naval ships sailed through the Balintang Channel, which separates two small Philippine archipelagoes.
Weeks earlier, Chinese and Philippines vessels had clashed near the Second Thomas Shoal, an escalation in China’s use of forceful tactics and intimidation in the South China Sea.
The U.S. has committed to help defend Philippine forces in the South China Sea, and the clashes there raise the potential of a conflict between China and the U.S. Naval and air force units from the U.S. and the Philippines regularly conduct joint exercises in the area.
Support for Moscow
Russian and Chinese warships at the port of Vladivostok in Eastern Russia during a joint naval exercise. Photo: Russian Navy Pacific Fleet/TASS/Zuma Press
For Russia, the collaboration with China has allowed Moscow to show it has international support at times when it is being censured by the West.
China joined Russian drills in the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 as Moscow was facing international condemnation following its annexation of Crimea. In the lead-up to Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia and China enjoyed a partnership that spanned diplomatic, economic, investment and military ties.
Moscow in turn has appeared to defer to China’s own territorial claims.
Five months after Moscow began the invasion, Chinese and Russian warships sailed in quick succession near the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. China claims the islands as its own and calls them the Diaoyu, sending ships there on almost daily patrols.
Ten Russian and Chinese warships had jointly sailed around three of Japan’s main islands for the first time in 2021, traveling through international waters during a four-day patrol that was closely monitored by Japanese security forces.
Analysts described the partial circumnavigation of Japan as a warning to Tokyo, with which Russia also has territorial disputes.
“It was all legal, they used international straits—but nonetheless it was symbolically significant,” said Gorenburg, the Russian military expert.
With Trump’s return to the White House, U.S. security commitments are being stress-tested. Trump this week began a reversal of U.S. policy toward Russia with regard to Ukraine—which like Taiwan has relied on U.S. support to fend off the territorial claims of its larger neighbor.
On Taiwan, Trump hasn’t declared any change to Washington’s policy of ambiguity.
The U.S. president, however, has demanded that allies spend more on their own defense, adding to concerns across Asia about how to confront threats from China—and, possibly, Russia as well.
Write to Austin Ramzy at austin.ramzy@wsj.com
6. DoD Probationary Workforce Statement
I was at a networking event for graduate students last evening who want to work in the national security field in the US government. They are all frustrated and worried. I told them that while the level of cuts is unprecedented, we have been through government cuts in the past. In this case the cuts will be deep and remove muscle and bone but eventually there will be at least a partial recovery (ideally we will have a leaner, more agile and efficient bureaucracy - oxymorons not withstanding). In a few years the government will need contractors to fill positions and then there will likely be too many contractors and there will be a push to return some positions (but unlikely and hopefully not all) to government service. What is the most grave strategic error this time is that they are cutting most all of the new employees which are needed to gain experience and expertise to fill the ranks in the future. They are cutting the seed corn (perhaps doing the easy wrong over the hard right) just to make DEEP cuts because they appear to be the path of least resistance. But the future of the professional civil service is at risk. So in a few years they will have to rehire entry level employees so those in school today might have greater opportunities in two or three years as future enlightened leadership determines that the professional civil service must be trained (and retained) professionally.
My question is will these 5,400 employees be cut from the Pentagon itself or from other DOD positions that are around the world in far flung places? Will this affect probationary employees who live overseas and will the government fund their return to CONUS if they were authorized moving compensation to travel overseas to the new position for which they were recently hired?
But this is a key excerpt. It should be about the position and not the individual and their performance. If the position and the type of work that is being performed is deemed not mission critical then it is difficult to justify continuing to have the position on the organization chart. But if they are going to use the justification that probationary employees have not met the standard of performance that is a very different message and it will be hard to justify that 5,400 probationary employees have all not met the standard.
As the Secretary made clear, it is simply not in the public interest to retain individuals whose contributions are not mission-critical. Taxpayers deserve to have us take a thorough look at our workforce top-to-bottom to see where we can eliminate redundancies.
As an example what will happen to very senior positions that were filled last year? For example, are the new Chancellor of the College of International Security Affairs at NDU and the President of Joint Special Operations University at risk of being let go because they were only hired in the last year. Why would we let two very senior and experienced and highly qualified people go and what would that do to the organizations? These are not some young people hired at the entry level of their careers but they might be on probation within the civil service rules.
DoD Probationary Workforce Statement
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4074278/dod-probationary-workforce-statement/
Feb. 21, 2025 |
As the Secretary announced yesterday, the Department of Defense is re-evaluating our probationary workforce, consistent with the President's initiative to reform the Federal workforce to maximize efficiency and productivity.
This re-evaluation of probationary employees is being done across government, not just at the Defense Department, but we believe in the goals of the program, and our leaders are carrying out that review carefully and smartly.
We anticipate reducing the Department's civilian workforce by 5-8% to produce efficiencies and refocus the Department on the President's priorities and restoring readiness in the force.
We expect approximately 5,400 probationary workers will be released beginning next week as part of this initial effort, after which we will implement a hiring freeze while we conduct a further analysis of our personnel needs, complying as always with all applicable laws.
As the Secretary made clear, it is simply not in the public interest to retain individuals whose contributions are not mission-critical. Taxpayers deserve to have us take a thorough look at our workforce top-to-bottom to see where we can eliminate redundancies.
As we take these important steps to reshape the workforce to meet the President's priorities, the Department will treat our workers with dignity and respect as it always does. Those who commit themselves to defending our nation deserve nothing less.
- Darin Selnick, Performing the Duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
7. Pentagon to fire 5,400 civilian employees in ‘initial’ purge
Pentagon to fire 5,400 civilian employees in ‘initial’ purge
The dismissals will begin next week, officials said, and could expand to include tens of thousands of other workers throughout the Defense Department.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/02/21/pentagon-job-cuts-trump-hegseth/
February 21, 2025 at 6:10 p.m. ESTYesterday at 6:10 p.m. EST
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is shown here on Feb. 14 at the Presidential Palace in Warsaw. (Sergei Gapon/AFP/Getty Images)
By Dan Lamothe
The Pentagon said Friday that it will fire about 5,400 civilian employees beginning next week in an “initial” purge of its workforce, as President Donald Trump’s hastily issued orders to shake up the Defense Department faced new scrutiny and officials scrambled to understand whether such actions could imperil national security.
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The announcement followed a day of uncertainty, as administration officials paused a plan to begin firings now while evaluating requests to retain thousands of other employees deemed essential. A senior Pentagon official, Darin Selnick, said in a statement late Friday that the Trump administration intends to cull its workforce by between 5 and 8 percent. With more than 900,000 civilian employees in the Defense Department, tens of thousands of people could be forced out eventually.
Echoing a pronouncement made earlier by Trump’s defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, Selnick said in his statement that “it is simply not in the public interest to retain individuals whose contributions are not mission-critical.”
“Taxpayers deserve to have us take a thorough look at our workforce top-to-bottom to see where we can eliminate redundancies,” Selnick added. The cuts are necessary, he said, “to produce efficiencies and refocus” the Pentagon on Trump’s national security priorities.
The firings are not expected to target U.S. troops. The Pentagon oversees about 1.3 million active-duty service members and nearly 800,000 more who are in the National Guard and reserves.
The cuts will come after Trump administration officials, coordinating with billionaire Elon Musk’s U.S. DOGE Service, have slashed thousands of employees elsewhere in the government as part of the president’s broad effort to dismantle the federal bureaucracy.
The Defense Department’s civilian worker purge is beginning with probationary employees, those who have one to three years of experience or who recently were promoted, according to officials familiar with the matter, who like some others spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the issue’s sensitivity. That pool of people numbers between 50,000 and 55,000, officials said.
After deliberations over the last day, the Pentagon has settled on firing about 10 percent of its probational employees, a defense official familiar with the effort said. A hiring freeze is expected to take hold next week, and administration officials plan to spend two to three months analyzing who else could be ousted, the official said.
Supervisors throughout the department, the federal government’s largest, have spent days requesting of the new administration that certain employees should be spared because the work they do is vital to national defense. An email obtained by The Washington Post indicates that Trump officials ultimately decided they need more time to sort through those many cases.
The message, sent Thursday night by Ruth Vetter, a lawyer in the Pentagon general counsel’s office, said that senior officials had informed human resources staff that “they should not initiate removals of probationary employees” on Friday because requests for exemptions citing mission criticality “are still under review.”
Vetter’s email, labeled “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL,” warned that an employee’s past performance “must be viewed through the current needs and best interest of the government, in light of the President’s directive to dramatically reduce the size of the federal workforce.”
Vetter referred questions to Pentagon spokesman John Ullyot, who did not respond to requests for comment.
Elon Musk joins President Donald Trump for a news conference in the Oval Office on Feb. 11. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)
Among the agency’s probationary employees are hundreds of teachers who work for the Department of Defense Education Activity, a school system that educates about 67,000 students — mostly the children of service members — at military installations around the globe. One person familiar with the matter said that DoDEA officials were attempting to save teachers from Trump’s purge of the federal workforce, but it was unclear if the effort would be successful. A DoDEA spokesman declined to comment.
At the Office of Naval Intelligence, which provides senior military officials with maritime threat assessments and related analysis, employees were called to a meeting Thursday at their headquarters in Suitland, Maryland, where they were told that all probationary workers would be terminated, said one intelligence analyst.
The analyst went to work Friday expecting to be out of a job, but was informed that no further instructions had been received. “Don’t get your hopes up too much,” he said he was told.
The analyst, an Air Force veteran, said about 60 people in his office could be fired, and voiced frustration that he and his colleagues are seen by DOGE officials as numbers on a spreadsheet.
“Work is next to impossible right now,” the analyst said. “Morale is through the floor.”
Coinciding with the civilian-worker purge, U.S. defense officials, acting on orders from Hegseth, have undertaken a sprawling effort to compile options for slashing about 8 percent from each armed service’s budget for each of the next five years. Doing so, Hegseth has said, could yield $50 billion in 2026 to be reinvested elsewhere in the Defense Department, including an expensive missile-defense shield that Trump has taken to calling “Iron Dome For America.”
After news of Hegseth’s directive alarmed lawmakers and defense officials, the former Fox News personality sought to blame the news media for causing confusion about the administration’s efforts and portrayed his plan as a “reorienting” of the Pentagon budget away from “woke, Biden-era nonlethal programs” to “instead spend that money on President Trump’s America First, peace-through-strength priorities for our national budget.”
“It’s not a cut,” Hegseth said in a nearly nine-minute video posted to social media on Thursday evening. “It’s refocusing and reinvesting existing funds into building a force to protect you, the American people.”
But independent budget analysts said it is highly unlikely that tens of billions of dollars per year can be targeted for reinvestment without slashing some major weapons programs and cutting the number troops in some of the services.
Travis Sharp, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, said the fiscal 2025 budget under President Joe Biden included $162 million for diversity, equity and inclusion programs and $3.6 billion to build resiliency at Defense Department installations to counter climate change. Even if all of that money is removed from the budget and reprogrammed, he said, it’s a “drop in the bucket” at getting to $50 billion.
To achieve such an ambitious goal, Sharp said, the Pentagon could retire older weapons programs, eliminate newer ones that remain in development, and shrink or shutter individual headquarters and agencies. Similar efforts have been undertaken before, Sharp said, including by Defense Secretary Robert Gates under President Barack Obama, but they still fell well short of Hegseth’s goals.
“What they’re attempting is unprecedented in recent history,” Sharp said.
Mackenzie Eaglen, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said it will take an “all of the above” approach to cut that deeply into existing defense budget to fund new efforts. She noted that in a memo to senior Pentagon officials on Tuesday, Hegseth “walled off” 17 key priorities identified by the Trump administration — including missile defense, submarines, one-way attack drones and border security. So other areas will be especially vulnerable.
“Look, the Defense Department reflects America,” she said. “The largest line item on the balance sheet of most corporations is labor. It’s people. There’s no workforce you can spare. They’re going to have to go after the defense civilian workforce as well as active-duty military end strength.”
Another option the Trump administration could pursue, especially if it seeks to slash billions of dollars in future years for new priorities, is the closure of some existing military bases, Eaglen said. Such efforts — commonly known as base realignment and closure — have been politically unpopular, but could be appealing to Musk, she predicted.
“There is a very compelling case for base closure,” Eaglen said. “If you kind of get into those weeds with people, you can make a rational business case. I actually think Congress could be compelled with a bully [defense secretary] and bully White House.”
Warren P. Strobel contributed to this report.
View the conversation 1064
By Dan Lamothe
Dan Lamothe joined The Washington Post in 2014 to cover the U.S. military. He has written about the Armed Forces for more than 15 years, traveling extensively, embedding with five branches of service and covering combat in Afghanistan.follow on X@danlamothe
8. New ‘irregular triad’ gaining currency as operational concept to improve deterrence
Are we overly focused on "deterrence?" We throw that word around so easily. We want to deter everything it seems. However, perhaps we should look at these "irregular" capabilities (two of which are not irregular in and of themselves but only in the manner of employment) and determine how we can effectively employ them in an offensive manner to achieve national security objectives. We tend to use deterrence as the default objective for everything we propose to do. And the longer we go without demonstrating effective offensive capabilities the more the concept of deterrence is likely to be eroded. If we want to be able to keep the sword sheathed most of the time we have to take it out and sharpen it every so often.
New ‘irregular triad’ gaining currency as operational concept to improve deterrence
defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · February 21, 2025
As officials and experts are calling for more integration of irregular warfare capabilities to defeat adversaries, a new modern “triad” concept for the U.S. military is being touted as a jumping-off point for deterrence.
The so-called cyber-special operations forces-space triad or “irregular triad,” is a partnership between the three disciplines to deliver capabilities and outcomes greater than the sum of its parts, leveraging the unique access and authorities of each contributor. While officials explained this fusion of capabilities came about in tabletop exercises years ago, the Army began putting it into practice with its relevant components and it’s now making its way to the joint four-star combatant commands.
The strategic environment for the U.S. military is significantly more complex now than it has been in years past, requiring more and different options to deter adversary activity around the globe.
“Some of our adversaries are demonstrating a degree of skill and effectiveness in their employment of irregular warfare that the United States has difficulty matching and the United States has difficulty dealing with,” Mike Nagata, corporate strategic advisor at CACI and a retired three-star general with decades of special operations experience, said Thursday during a panel at the Special Operations Symposium hosted by NDIA. “Many of our competitors and many of our adversaries are adopting modern, powerful digital technologies faster than the United States is. They are not hesitating to use it.”
Experts explained that America’s adversaries have sought to use unconventional, irregular and hybrid tactics as a means of combating the conventional strength of U.S. forces. Much of this is taking place below the threshold of armed conflict.
“Our adversaries, particularly the Chinese but really all of them, are pursuing irregular strategies … It’s a combination of political warfare, economic warfare and irregular warfare. They are pursuing strategies to achieve objectives without having to go to conventional conflict,” said Ken Tovo, president and CEO of DOL Enterprises and a retired three-star general. “Our challenge is, are we ready to play on that field? While we have talked about irregular warfare, and especially in this community for many years, the reality is there’s a lot of things that have actually inhibited our execution of effective irregular warfare strategies around the world to achieve our objectives.”
Current officials explained that the modern triad provides an existing operational concept that is operating currently and can act as a deterrent capability.
“The irregular triad that we’re talking about here is an operational concept,” said Lt. Gen. Richard Angle, commander of Allied Special Operations Forces Command at NATO and Special Operations Command Europe. “It brings together multi-domain capabilities. This concept can, in fact, enable deterrence, because that’s what we’re talking about.”
Officials explained that the three disciplines aren’t as siloed as they may seem, noting inherent integration currently exists.
For example, the Marine Corps and Navy cyber service components to U.S. Cyber Command are also their service components to Space Command. Additionally, Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command serves as the coordinating authority for cyber for U.S. Special Operations Command under Cybercom’s Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber enterprise. Similarly, 16th Air Force/Air Forces Cyber, a service cyber component to Cybercom, is the coordinating authority for cyber for U.S. Space Command under its Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber.
“The area that I’ve been most proud of is the fact that we have aggressively taken this from a conceptual discussion to one where we’re doing operational activities together and doing it routinely and how we are able to come together to bring our respective strengths,” Gen. Timothy Haugh, commander of Cybercom, said. “Overall, where we’ve come together has been driven by we can produce better outcomes together in those situations, particularly on really hard problems, and the fact that the initial investments we’ve made to do that have produced outcomes just reinforces the need for us to be able to collaborate in our planning and also in how we approach problems together. Because it gives different options to the secretary than we would have been able to do independently.”
Angle, who also has cyber experience having previously served as deputy commanding general for operations at Army Cyber Command, explained that through deterrence by denial, the triad can make it difficult for adversaries to achieve objectives below the threshold of war.
But, he said, it has to be employed more often if it is to be successful in the future for deterrence, or if deterrence should fail, for managing escalation and crises.
“You need to employ this capability now if you want options later. You can employ it now at low cost, at fairly low risk with potentially high payoffs. By doing so, you can actually lower the risk later because you’re now holding critical adversary capabilities at risk,” Angle said. “The conversation we have to have is here’s also the risk of not taking action. Because if you don’t employ these capabilities, you won’t hold that critical adversary capability at risk when the time comes. We are doing a lot of things inside of this triad, but we have to find a way to do more. We have to find a way to get to the point where we’re doing things and the adversary is reacting to what we’re doing and we’re not reacting to what they’re doing.”
For Haugh, while there have been positive discussions among the relevant stakeholders and good operational applications, he’d like to improve upon what opportunities exist for tighter linkage.
“Today, we have started to put the right pieces in place. Much of what we could also talk about is, when we miss opportunities, why do we miss them? In many of those cases, it’s about the kit that’s available to us at that moment and are we fully using the opportunity for us to be innovative from a technical solution standpoint that fits the timeline of the opportunity of placement and access and the ability to come together around a specific problem,” he said. “I think there’s some things we could talk about what we’re each doing in that area where we could be also more purposeful to be able to fully leverage our respective authorities and how we innovate and how we acquire.”
Written by Mark Pomerleau
Mark Pomerleau is a senior reporter for DefenseScoop, covering information warfare, cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, intelligence, influence, battlefield networks and data.
defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · February 21, 2025
9. There’s a story in each shard of the shattered USAID
I have driven by the USAID HQ in the Reagan building a number of times in the past few weeks. First I saw them removing the name from the cement over the top of the entrance (within a day of the announcement). Now the USAID symbol on the glass is covered by a tarp. It is easy to make symboic parallels.
David Ignatius pulls no punches in his OpED here.
Opinion
David Ignatius
There’s a story in each shard of the shattered USAID
At USAID, Trump’s commissars leave a trail of suffering in their wake.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/02/21/usaid-trump-freeze-marocco-foreign-aid/
February 21, 2025 at 1:02 p.m. ESTYesterday at 1:02 p.m. EST
6 min
A protest at the U.S. Capitol on Feb. 5 against the Trump administration's decision to virtually shut down USAID. (Drew Angerer/AFP/Getty Images)
Representatives of humanitarian organizations that are saving lives around the world were summoned on Feb. 13 to a “listening session” at the State Department with Peter Marocco, the Trump administration political official who took control of USAID this month and, to many of its supporters, appears bent on destroying it.
Marocco began the meeting by asking the several hundred people packing the Loy Henderson Auditorium to rise and say the Pledge of Allegiance, according to several people who were there. That doesn’t happen often at a Washington gathering. Then he described the political criteria that will now shape the distribution of foreign aid so that it will “deliver results for the American people.” For many in the audience well versed in the Trump administration’s “America First” codespeak, that sounded like a death sentence.
The next day, in a virtual meeting with more than 1,000 participants, Marocco said the U.S. Agency for International Development “has lost the confidence of the president, and we need to fix it,” according to one person who recorded the session. When farmers, veterans and business leaders protested, Marocco parried their criticisms.
Marocco’s job is what might be described in Russia or China as a commissar. His task is to impose the political ideology of the ruling party on an organization that, until Jan. 20, had imagined that it was outside politics. Not under President Donald Trump. USAID, which has long needed friendly reform, is now being treated as an enemy.
In a Feb. 10 affidavit responding to employee protests, Marocco described the freeze he has imposed on USAID. It was done, he said, to “gain control of an organization that included some employees who had refused to comply with lawful directives by the president and the secretary” of state. A Jan. 24 directive announcing the freeze had told employees that henceforth, there would be “one voice of American foreign policy.”
Marocco is part of a network of Trump loyalists sent to agencies across the government to distill that “one voice.” This network is one reason Trump has pounced so quickly and decisively at reorienting the executive branch so it serves the priorities of the White House, rather than longer-term bipartisan interests that endure from administration to administration.
The “spoils system” is the name historians use to describe this winner-take-all scheme by the party in power. It was dominant in America in the 19th century, but it led to such abuse and corruption that it was swept away in the civil service reforms championed by President Theodore Roosevelt. He believed that the purposes of government were larger and nobler than the political agenda of a political leader and his party. Over time, the civil service bureaucracy grew fat and sometimes lazy, but it needed reform, not a death sentence.
Marocco’s spending freeze has severely damaged USAID, according to the dozen sources I contacted — and many leaders of nongovernmental organizations told me it will probably never recover. The freeze in spending meant that many contractors weren’t paid for work done in December. They’ve had to dismiss staff, send away their patients and let food rot in storage.
The courts are now weighing the legality of the freeze orders, and it’s hard to predict just what will emerge when Marocco reaches his April deadline for relaunching the agency. Marocco has said the agency is making at least 21 payments totaling $250 million for work that was contracted before Inauguration Day. But for many organizations, it will come too late. The administration has promised waivers for humanitarian work, but those, too, have been slow.
Here’s the wreckage as of Feb. 14, as compiled by the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition.
At least 11,500 Americans and 54,575 foreigners have lost their jobs. Nearly $1 billion in payments for work already done has been frozen. Nearly $500 million in food is sitting in ports, ships and warehouses. In Syria, a country struggling to recover from chaos, food and other support for nearly 900,000 people has been suspended. In West Africa, 3.4 million people in 11 countries have lost drug treatment for deadly tropical diseases. At least 328,000 HIV-positive people in 25 countries aren’t getting lifesaving drugs.
U.S. security will suffer, not just needy foreigners, according to the coalition’s research. Foreign military financing for key regional partners such as Jordan and Taiwan has been frozen. Unpaid guards temporarily walked off their jobs securing the al-Hol and Roj camps in Syria that hold 10,000 Islamic State fighters and 40,000 families. A USAID counterterrorism program that had been training forces in Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Malaysia, Somalia and Yemen has also been halted.
What does it feel like for humanitarian workers to suddenly discover that the USAID commissar has cut the lifeline? Taylor Williamson, a public health veteran who since 2005 has worked in Tanzania, Congo, Rwanda, Ghana and Madagascar, described the impact: “In the space of a week, the entire infrastructure of foreign aid has vaporized. No drugs for people living with HIV are being delivered, no malaria drugs, no nets, no vaccines, no training for midwives. Nothing.”
Many aid workers have been reluctant to speak out for fear of reprisal. An exception has been the Catholic relief organizations that serve needy people around the world. The Jesuit Refugee Service, for example, said on Feb. 12 that more than 100,000 refugees in Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, South Africa, South Sudan and Uganda will be harmed by the USAID halt.
Caritas Internationalis, which coordinates Catholic relief services, was even blunter. Alistair Dutton, the group’s secretary general, said in a Feb. 10 statement from Rome: “Stopping USAID abruptly will kill millions of people and condemn hundreds of millions more to lives of dehumanizing poverty. This is an inhumane affront to people’s God-given human dignity, that will cause immense suffering.”
Why do these religious leaders speak out when so many in Congress have been silent? Perhaps it’s because they fear the judgment of a higher power than Trump and his commissars.
Watching Trump and his allies’ assault on USAID, I am reminded of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s unforgettable description in “The Great Gatsby” of Tom and Daisy Buchanan. “They were careless people, Tom and Daisy — they smashed up things and then retreated back into their money or their vast carelessness, or whatever it was that kept them together, and let other people clean up the mess they had made.”
But that isn’t quite right. This wasn’t carelessness. It was intentional. Trump’s team meant to cause this pain.
10. Trump urges Musk to be 'more aggressive' in bid to shrink US government
World
Trump urges Musk to be 'more aggressive' in bid to shrink US government
Elon Musk listens to US President Donald Trump speak in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC on Feb 11, 2025. (Photo: Reuters/Kevin Lamarque)
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/world/trump-urges-musk-doge-more-aggressive-shrink-us-government-layoff-4953821
22 Feb 2025 10:28PM
(Updated: 22 Feb 2025 11:23PM)
WASHINGTON: US President Donald Trump on Saturday (Feb 22) urged billionaire Elon Musk to be more aggressive in his efforts to shrink the federal government despite uproar over layoffs and deep spending cuts.
"Elon is doing a great job, but I would like to see him get more aggressive," Trump posted all in uppercase letters on his Truth Social platform. "Remember, we have a country to save, but ultimately, to make greater than ever before. MAGA!"
Trump has put the tech entrepreneur in charge of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), tasking him with slashing public spending and tackling waste and alleged corruption.
Musk - the world's richest person and Trump's biggest donor - has led the effort to fire swaths of the federal workforce, from scientists to park rangers.
In the latest cuts announced Friday, the US Defense Department will reduce its civilian workforce by at least 5 per cent starting next week.
Musk is the world's richest person and Trump's biggest donor.
Trump's administration has already begun firing many other federal workers who are on probationary status.
DOGE is a free-ranging entity run by Musk, though the cost-cutting spree has been met with pushback on several fronts and mixed court rulings.
A judge on Thursday denied a union bid to temporarily halt the firing of thousands of people.
11. Russia Wants to Erase Ukraine’s Future—and Its Past
Doing what "good communists" have always done.
Russia Wants to Erase Ukraine’s Future—and Its Past
The memory of Soviet-era famines, mass killings and other traumas makes Ukraine determined not to return to Russian rule
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russia-wants-to-erase-ukraines-futureand-its-past-f47fe98c?msockid=229cb3235036605f1027a75951af61b0
At a memorial service for a fallen soldier in Kyiv on Nov. 30, 2024, Ukrainians release smoke in the colors of their national flag. Photo: sergey dolzhenko/EPA/Shutterstock
By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow
Feb. 20, 2025 9:00 pm ET
Last July, Russian occupation authorities in the Ukrainian city of Luhansk used a crane and dump truck to remove a monument to the victims of the Holodomor, the state-engineered famine that the Kremlin unleashed in 1932-33 to subdue the restless Ukrainian countryside. The large granite cross in Luhansk had to go because “it insulted the patriotic feelings of the residents,” explained the Russian-appointed acting mayor, Yana Pashchenko. Dozens of monuments to the Holodomor, which killed at least 3.9 million Ukrainians, have been destroyed in Russian-occupied areas, along with many memorials to Ukrainian cultural figures executed by the Soviet regime.
The war that Russia is waging against Ukraine, and that President Trump says he’s determined to end by opening talks with the Kremlin, isn’t just about territorial gains or global power projection. It is, fundamentally, a struggle over historical memory. Three years after the Russian invasion began on Feb. 24, 2022, it is the generational trauma of their country’s suffering under Russian and Soviet rule that motivates Ukrainians to keep defying a much more powerful enemy, despite mounting casualties.
“We realize that, if we stop resisting, we will face extermination and genocide—just as it already happened in our past,” said Olena Styazhkina, a Ukrainian historian and writer.
A screenshot from a video posted by the Russian state news service RIA Novosti shows a memorial to victims of the Holodomor being removed from Luhansk, Ukraine, in July 2024.
In 1926, Soviet Ukraine was home to 29 million people. By 1953, when Joseph Stalin died, it had lost almost half that number to famine, war and mass killing. Almost every Ukrainian today is a descendant of the survivors of those dark decades.
The official Russian view of the Holodomor is that it was an unfortunate byproduct of Stalin’s otherwise justified industrialization policies. But the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament have both recognized it as an act of genocide, in which Soviet authorities confiscated food and seeds in Ukrainian villages, forcing the residents into starvation and frequent cannibalism.
Ukraine lost more than 10 million people in World War II, according to recent government estimates, including most of its Jewish population, exterminated in the Holocaust, and millions of soldiers who fought in the Red Army. Both the Nazi war machine and Soviet totalitarianism were unsparing.
A convoy of trucks carries grain from a collective farm near Kyiv, 1932. At least 3.9 million Ukrainians died in the Holodomor, a state-engineered famine in 1932-33. Photo: Universal Images Group/Getty Images
At a memorial ceremony in Lviv, Ukraine, in 2009, coffins hold the remains of Ukrainians killed by Soviet secret police and famine in 1945-46. Photo: YURIY DYACHYSHYN/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
When Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital, fell to the Germans in September 1941, the retreating Soviets booby-trapped the city center and turned much of it into a fireball, killing countless civilians alongside German officers. By the time the Soviets returned in October 1943, nearly half of Kyiv’s population was dead. As the rest of Europe engaged in post-war reconstruction, Ukraine—especially in its western regions—was ravaged by a bloody insurgency that lasted for another decade.
For centuries, the Russian Empire, and then the Soviet Union, controlled its Ukrainian subjects by hiding and distorting Ukraine’s history. The official narrative whitewashed or censored the atrocities of the past, portraying any Ukrainians who dared to support independence as traitors and criminals.
Stalin initially favored the brief Ukrainian cultural renaissance of the 1920s, but in the next decade the war on Ukrainian culture reached new heights. In the purges of the 1930s, most of Ukraine’s intelligentsia—novelists, theater directors, painters—were murdered, many at the Sandarmokh ravine in northern Russia, which became a mass killing site. Executioners were instructed to save ammunition by using one bullet per two Ukrainian heads, lining up victims back to back.
From left: members of a German death squad execute Jews in Kyiv in the Ukraine 1942; street fights in Kyiv, Ukraine. November 1943.
Universal Images Group/Getty Images. (2)
Many Russian writers of the period, such as poet Osip Mandelshtam, were also killed, while others, including Alexander Solzhenitsyn, spent many years in the Gulag. Still, their work gained worldwide fame, and even circulated underground in the Soviet Union. In Ukraine, the elimination was so complete that writers killed in the 1930s, such as Valerian Pidmohylnyi and Mykola Khvylovy, remained unknown and unread until the country became independent in 1991. Most of them have still not been published in English. Mykhailo Boychuk, perhaps the most important Ukrainian painter of his generation, was killed by the Soviets in 1937, and the vast majority of his works were destroyed. Today they are known only from grainy black-and-white photographs.
Speaking the truth about this history was a crime under Soviet rule, and Ukrainian intellectuals remained in prison well into the period of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika. Vasyl Stus, one of the most important Ukrainian poets, died in a Soviet prison camp in late 1985. Russian forces dismantled the monument to Stus in his hometown of Donetsk soon after occupying it in 2014.
Today, under President Vladimir Putin, Russia once again seeks to deny the Ukrainian people any separate culture or identity of its own. Russian propagandists openly talk about the need to eliminate educated Ukrainians, whom the Russian state news agency described in the first months of the war as carriers of the “virus of Ukrainian-ness.”
‘The Prophet Elijah,’ a 1913 painting by Ukrainian artist Mykhailo Boychuk, who was killed by the Soviets in 1937. Photo: Album/Fine Art Images
Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, now the head of Russia’s ruling party, wrote in December that the residents of Ukraine “must quell the pride of being different, abandon their opposition to a common Russian project, and exorcise the demons of political Ukrainian-ness.” If they don’t obey, he added, Ukraine will be wiped out.
The ruthless methods employed by Russian troops and secret police in occupied Ukrainian territory today—including abductions and extrajudicial executions—consciously mimic the horrors of the Stalin era, said Oleksandra Matviichuk, founder of the Centre for Civil Liberties, a nongovernment organization that investigates Russian war crimes.
“They are doing it once again because they were never punished for it the previous time,” said Matviichuk, whose group won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022. “The Nazi war criminals ended up on trial in Nuremberg, but those who ran the Soviet Gulag were neither prosecuted nor sentenced. There was impunity.”
Members of a Russian army unit named after Pavel Sudoplatov, a Soviet intelligence official who oversaw assassinations in the Stalin era, raise a cross in conquered Ukrainian territory, Dec. 20, 2024. Photo: Alexander Polegenko/TASS/Zuma Press
Not content with denying the Holodomor and other Soviet atrocities, Putin’s Russia is honoring their perpetrators, erecting monuments to Stalin and Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Soviet secret police. In Melitopol, the biggest city in occupied southern Ukraine, Russian authorities have named a street and a military unit after Pavel Sudoplatov, who oversaw assassination squads for Stalin, including the one that killed Leon Trotsky in Mexico in 1940. Meanwhile, independent Russian historians, including those who discovered the mass graves of Ukrainian intellectuals at Sandarmokh in 1997, have been thrown in prison.
Putin himself has highlighted the importance of rewriting Ukrainian history to fit the Russian imperial project. In July 2021, the Russian president published an essay titled “On the Historical Unity of the Russians and Ukrainians,” dismissing the notion of a separate Ukrainian identity. The treatise, riddled with inaccuracies, was read aloud to Russian soldiers to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine seven months later.
“The big war started with an essay on history, and the guy who wrote that essay is still running the show,” said Serhii Plokhy, director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard. “So the idea that this is all about territory and that you have to make a deal, somehow drawing the border in the right place…is based on not understanding what this war is about.”
People visit graves of fallen Ukrainian soldiers in Lviv on Defenders Day, a national holiday celebrated on Oct. 1, in 2024. Photo: yuriy dyachyshyn/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Yaroslav Trofimov is the chief foreign-affairs correspondent of The Wall Street Journal. His new novel “No Country for Love,” based on his family’s history in mid-20th century Ukraine, was published this month by Little, Brown.
Appeared in the February 22, 2025, print edition as 'Russia Wants to Erase Ukraine’s Future—And Its Past'.
12. Connecticut Asks Congress to ‘Rethink the Jones Act’
From my childhood state. My father worked at Electric Boat in Groton while I was growing up. Going to watch the launches of new submarines is a vivid childhood memory.
Connecticut Asks Congress to ‘Rethink the Jones Act’
The century-old law has driven up prices, jammed roads and shriveled the U.S. maritime industry.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/connecticut-asks-congress-to-rethink-the-jones-act-maritime-roads-prices-1aa2dff6?mod=itp_wsj,djemITP_h
By Bryce Chinault and Andrew Fowler
Feb. 21, 2025 4:37 pm ET
Connecticut Gov. Ned Lamont delivers his annual State of the State address in Hartford, Conn., Jan. 8. Photo: Ned Gerard/Associated Press
Hartford, Conn.
In his State of the State Address on Jan. 8, Connecticut Gov. Ned Lamont outlined policy priorities for the 2025 legislative session. While most of his speech focused on state-specific issues such as fiscal responsibility, healthcare, education and energy, he took a moment to call on the U.S. Congress to “rethink the Jones Act.” It wasn’t the first time Mr. Lamont raised concerns about this particular law. In 2022 he and other New England governors wrote to the Biden administration urging the suspension of the law, which they argued “effectively precludes” the delivery of U.S.-exported liquefied natural gas to New England.
Officially known as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, the Jones Act blocks foreign-flagged ships from transporting goods between U.S. ports. The law has historically had many detractors from both sides of the aisle. Republican Sen. John McCain was against it. Hawaii Democratic Rep. Ed Case has blamed the law for “artificially inflating the cost of shipping goods” to his state. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez called for a “one-year waiver from the Jones Act for Puerto Rico” after Hurricane Fiona hit the island in 2022.
These pages have long editorialized in favor of the Jones Act’s repeal. The most recent attempt to do so was introduced by Utah Republican Sen. Mike Lee in January 2024. But the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, then led by Democrats, took no action beyond reading the bill. Now the political landscape has shifted and Republicans control the committee. The time is right to revisit Mr. Lee’s bill.
The Jones Act has powerful supporters. Most of them represent constituencies that benefit financially in some way from the economic distortions the law creates. Groups such as the AFL-CIO, the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association and American Maritime Partnerships have spent heavily to preserve the Jones Act. Organizations like the Transportation Institute argue it is “critical” for national security and domestic economic stability, ensuring “reliable domestic water transportation service” and employment for hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens. Some Republicans, including Louisiana Sen. Bill Cassidy and Florida Rep. John Rutherford, support leaving the Jones Act alone.
President Trump has been coy, but in December he posted a link to a pro-Jones Act article on his Truth Social account. If he’s serious about bringing costs down for American consumers, he should call Mr. Lamont and listen to his pitch. Connecticut has no natural-gas reserves or production, and the state’s consumers pay some of the highest prices for energy in the nation. Almost all the LNG they use to cook and keep warm in the winter enters the state overland from New York.
In addition to driving up gasoline prices, the Jones Act increases the volume of heavy traffic on Connecticut highways by forcing goods to be delivered via long-haul vehicles. The law also makes replacing ferries—like those that cross Long Island Sound from Connecticut—difficult since new ships are required to be constructed in the U.S. American-built ships are “far less numerous and far less competitive than their international counterparts,” according to the Cato Institute.
Congress intended the Jones Act to bolster domestic shipbuilding. It hoped to spawn a ready supply of merchant mariners during war or national emergency. But by requiring every ship transporting goods between U.S. ports to be built, owned and largely crewed by U.S. citizens, the Jones Act limits competition. This has led to an aging fleet of U.S.-compliant ships, with fewer than 100 vessels left in operation, down from more than 250 in 1980. Contrary to the legislation’s original intent, there isn’t a single U.S.-flagged, U.S.-built LNG carrier sailing today. The country has few options for moving goods via maritime transport.
The U.S. is the world’s largest natural gas producer. But, according to a report by the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Jones Act means Americans “can’t realize many benefits arising from this incredible production.” Even progressive outlets like Vox and Slate concede that the law has stifled Puerto Rico’s long-term economic growth.
The Jones Act’s repeal would reduce energy and transportation costs—in Connecticut and every state. Mr. Trump has the power to strike a blow against inflation while restoring the American maritime industry to greatness. Smart Democrats like Mr. Lamont and other Northeast governors would likely support him.
Mr. Chinault is director of state government affairs at Abundance Institute. Mr. Fowler is communications specialist at Yankee Institute.
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Journal Editorial Report: The week's best and worst from Allysia Finley, Jason Riley, and Kim Strassel. Photo: Eduardo Munoz Alvarez/AP/Terrence Antonio James/Zuma Press/Chris O'Meara/AP
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Appeared in the February 22, 2025, print edition as 'Connecticut Asks Congress to ‘Rethink the Jones Act’'.
13. Warfare at the Speed of Thought: Balancing AI and Critical Thinking for the Military Leaders of Tomorrow
OODA loop chart at the link: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/warfare-at-the-speed-of-thought-balancing-ai-and-critical-thinking-for-the-military-leaders-of-tomorrow/
Excerpts:
For future military leaders, it is critical that education and training prioritize independent thinking and decisive action rather than an overreliance on AI-driven systems. Leaders must develop the confidence to question AI outputs, evaluate their accuracy, and consider multiple perspectives before making informed decisions, rather than blindly accepting computer-generated recommendations. AI struggles in unpredictable, high-stakes environments where training data is insufficient to cover every potential contingency. Future conflicts will demand leaders who can adapt in real time, assess emerging threats, and execute decisions based on experience, judgment, and battlefield awareness—not just what a computer system suggests. To maintain a strategic edge and operational superiority, military leaders must cultivate a disciplined decision-making process that integrates AI as a tool while ensuring that human intuition, adaptability, and ethical reasoning remain at the forefront of command decisions.
The rapid evolution of AI presents both a strategic advantage and a formidable challenge in shaping the next generation of military leaders. AI can enhance decision-making, optimize operations, and expand battlefield awareness, yet it must remain a force multiplier—not a replacement for human intellect. The true test of future leadership lies in striking the right balance: leveraging AI’s capabilities while preserving the independent thought, adaptability, and critical reasoning essential for command in today’s volatile geopolitical environment. In an era where peer adversaries are racing to develop their own AI-driven strategies, our leaders must be prepared to outthink, not just out-tech, the competition. AI should sharpen human cognition, not dull it—because the future of warfare will be won by those who can command both machine intelligence and the power of the human mind.
Warfare at the Speed of Thought: Balancing AI and Critical Thinking for the Military Leaders of Tomorrow - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Amanda Collazzo · February 21, 2025
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The rapid evolution of artificial intelligence is transforming how individuals acquire, process, and apply knowledge, enabling faster decision-making and policy development. AI-driven technologies enhance personalized learning, critical thinking, and problem-solving, particularly within strategic decision-making; however, it is crucial to address concerns of overreliance, overuse, diminished critical thinking skills, and ethical implications. AI should be the sidekick, not the superhero—sharp minds lead machines, not follow them. By evaluating the impact of generative AI on learning, we can identify both the advantages and challenges that technological advancements present for our future military leaders. We must define the balance between independent thought, creativity, and the integration of AI to help shape AI’s long-term role in developing leaders and enhancing decision-making for effective military operations.
Mortimer Adler once said that learning is “an interior transformation of a person’s mind and character, a transformation which can be effected only through his own activity.” This understanding emphasizes the idea that genuine learning is not a passive process—it requires deep engagement, critical thinking, and personal effort. In an era increasingly dominated by AI and digital tools, there is a growing concern that learners may become overly reliant on technology and decrease their intellectual capacity. When an individual’s cognitive engagement is primarily directed toward navigating a computer program—whether an AI-driven tutor, an adaptive learning platform, or a search engine—it is easy to mistake memorization for true understanding. The rapid availability of answers at one’s fingertips may create an illusion of proficiency when, in reality, the knowledge has not been fully internalized or critically understood.
AI makes it incredibly easy to avoid having to think. It can generate answers, construct briefs, draft outlines, and even assist in policy creation; however, AI is limited by its training data, relying solely on learned patterns rather than true reasoning. Once you experience the ability to no longer think, it becomes addicting, and an easier alternative than spending time in critical thought. The more that individuals depend on computers to do their thinking, the less they truly learn. Taking the easy route is tempting—after all, as Adler also noted, learning is painful. Humans naturally seek ways to conserve effort, reduce stress, and minimize energy expenditure—taking the path of least resistance. However, if we consistently choose convenience over critical thinking, we risk losing one of our most defining traits, one that sets us apart from other mammals—the ability to reason and make decisions.
AI is becoming increasingly embedded in daily life, transforming the way we work, communicate, and make decisions. From virtual assistants and personalized recommendations to smart home devices and automated customer service, AI streamlines everyday tasks and enhances convenience. As AI continues to evolve, its role in our livelihoods will only expand, making it an essential tool for productivity and innovation. Rather than resisting this technology, we should embrace it. AI has the potential to enhance and expand our knowledge, enabling more informed decision-making. It can accelerate processes, optimize efficiency, and analyze vast amounts of data, providing deeper understanding to dynamic situations.
An increasing reliance on AI during the critical years of cognitive development may shape the decision-making abilities of future leaders, equipping them with those powerful analytical tools while simultaneously risking the erosion of independent critical thinking and problem-solving skills. AI has the capability to surpass human intelligence as AI is constantly learning and advancing—however, human intelligence requires work and education from individuals and whole generations. Historically, leaders made decisions based on given information, previous experiences, and their interpretation of unfolding events, relying solely on knowledge, advisors, and real-world reports and exposure. In contrast, future leaders will have instant access to vast amounts of data, enabling them to make decisions more rapidly and with fewer logistical constraints. The challenge lies in processing vast amounts of data, determining what is truly relevant for decision-making, and applying human judgment to guide the process effectively.
While AI offers significant technological advantages, it also introduces potential risks that cannot be overlooked. One of the greatest concerns is the possibility of leaders becoming overly reliant on AI-driven analysis and recommendations, which could gradually erode their ability to think independently. AI operates based on patterns and historical data, but it lacks true intuition, contextual awareness, and the ability to account for unprecedented scenarios. If decision-makers lean too heavily on AI without developing their own critical thinking and problem-solving skills, they may struggle to adapt when AI fails or is unreliable due to limitations in contingency planning or gaps in its training data. In high-stakes environments with unpredictable variables, leaders must exercise sound judgment without solely depending on algorithmic outputs. True leadership goes beyond accessing information—it requires the ability to analyze, question, and integrate knowledge to make decisive and effective choices under pressure.
A prime example of deliberate decision-making is John Boyd’s OODA Loop (observe, orient, decide, act), a fundamental framework in military strategy. AI can enhance this process, accelerating decision cycles and refining situational awareness, reducing cognitive load, and improving battlefield effectiveness:
OODA Loop CycleHuman ExecutionAI EnhancementObserveGather and observe information from the environment.Collect and process massive data streams from multiple sources in real time.OrientAnalyze and interpret data.Analyze and contextualize data, improving situational awareness.DecideMake a choice based on what information is available.Provide decision-support tools, predictive modeling, and recommendations.ActImplement the decision and take action.Help refine execution strategies, optimize logistics, and strengthen operational effectiveness; enhance autonomous weapons and aircraft.
When an individual is heavily reliant on AI, the real challenge arises when it is unavailable, compromised, or unable to adapt to unforeseen contingencies. Future contested and degraded environments with rising peer adversaries may restrict access to AI-connected networks, reducing reliance on AI for decision-making, execution, and strategic planning, thereby demanding greater adaptability and independent problem-solving skills. In such moments, we must have leaders who can still work through complex problems, assess risks, and take decisive action—relying on their own cognitive abilities rather than an algorithm. This highlights the importance of restricting AI in educational settings to foster cognitive development, enabling individuals to enhance their ability to adapt to change and think dynamically in real time rather than relying on technology to do it for them.
Not Either/Or—but Both/And
As illustrated in the OODA Loop, AI can amplify human capabilities by rapidly collecting, analyzing, and disseminating vast amounts of data, significantly accelerating situational awareness and decision-making processes. With access to extensive information and human input, AI can support decision-making through predictive modeling and simulations—tasks that take humans significantly longer to complete. Additionally, AI can accelerate the decision cycle while executing with autonomous systems and weapons. Though the possibilities of AI are vast and impressive, it is crucial to remember that its role should not be to replace, but to complement human intelligence.
For future military leaders, it is critical that education and training prioritize independent thinking and decisive action rather than an overreliance on AI-driven systems. Leaders must develop the confidence to question AI outputs, evaluate their accuracy, and consider multiple perspectives before making informed decisions, rather than blindly accepting computer-generated recommendations. AI struggles in unpredictable, high-stakes environments where training data is insufficient to cover every potential contingency. Future conflicts will demand leaders who can adapt in real time, assess emerging threats, and execute decisions based on experience, judgment, and battlefield awareness—not just what a computer system suggests. To maintain a strategic edge and operational superiority, military leaders must cultivate a disciplined decision-making process that integrates AI as a tool while ensuring that human intuition, adaptability, and ethical reasoning remain at the forefront of command decisions.
The rapid evolution of AI presents both a strategic advantage and a formidable challenge in shaping the next generation of military leaders. AI can enhance decision-making, optimize operations, and expand battlefield awareness, yet it must remain a force multiplier—not a replacement for human intellect. The true test of future leadership lies in striking the right balance: leveraging AI’s capabilities while preserving the independent thought, adaptability, and critical reasoning essential for command in today’s volatile geopolitical environment. In an era where peer adversaries are racing to develop their own AI-driven strategies, our leaders must be prepared to outthink, not just out-tech, the competition. AI should sharpen human cognition, not dull it—because the future of warfare will be won by those who can command both machine intelligence and the power of the human mind.
Amanda “WANG” Collazzo is a US Air Force major pursuing a master of science in defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. She is an MQ-9 evaluator, pilot, and weapons officer, with experience in multiple overseas contingency operations. She has a master of science from the University of Louisville and two bachelors of arts from The Ohio State University.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Staff Sgt. Nicolas A. Cloward, US Army
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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Amanda Collazzo · February 21, 2025
14. Donald Trump's Russia Gamble: Could It Work?
Excerpts:
What was expected to be reaffirmation of the transatlantic alliance morphed instead into a display of how far apart the priorities of the United States and its allies have become.
In order to reverse this transatlantic drift, Europe must rearm posthaste to provide real exercised capabilities in NATO. Also, the U.S. and its European allies need to speak plainly about what each alliance member brings to the table and expects in turn going forward.
Regardless of how the US-Russia negotiation breaks in the end, the last couple of weeks will likely be remembered by historians as a sea change in transatlantic relations.
The question now is: What comes next?
19fortyfive.com · by Andrew A. Michta · February 21, 2025
The Munich Security Conference and the days that followed, including the senior level US-Russia meeting in Saudi Arabia, have witnessed massive turbulence in transatlantic relations on a level not seen since the end of the Second World War.
The bewilderment of the participants gathered at Munich about what J.D. Vance’s speech portended for the future U.S. trajectory was soon eclipsed by questions in Berlin, Paris, London and Warsaw about why Europeans were being excluded from the Riyadh talks.
Even more distressing to European politicians and commentators was the exclusion of Ukrainians from those talks – the very people who have the most to gain or lose in any forthcoming peace deal.
These shockwaves came on the heels of earlier comments by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth that Ukraine would not become a member of NATO, that it was unrealistic to expect that Ukraine would regain all of its territory, and that any potential peacekeeping force in Ukraine would not include US troops, nor would it be carried out under the NATO flag.
President Trump’s comments about his call with Putin and his sharp exchanges with President Zelensky further fueled the expressions of disbelief that pervaded conversations in Europe since Munich.
The U.S.-Russia Relations Sea Change
Amidst all of the confusion, one thing seems clear: what happened after Munich, and especially in Riyadh, represents a sea change in U.S. relations with Russia, all but nullifying the last three years of policy on Ukraine pursued by the Biden administration.
At the core, the Trump administration has realigned Washington’s relations with Moscow, in effect bringing Russia out of diplomatic isolation. Although ending the war in Ukraine is considered the key deliverable, these decisions are more about U.S.-Russia relations than about a workable endgame in the war.
The Trump administration appears determined to seek the perceived geopolitical advantage of taking the lead on its relations with Russia, while factoring in Europe’s weakness and its dependence on the United States when it comes to security.
The centerpiece seems to be to make a “Kissinger-in-reverse” play. In other words, the Trump administration could be attempting to peel Russia away from China. If this is the case, it assumes that Washington will be able to induce Moscow to loosen its relations with Beijing and hew more closely to the US in exchange for breaking out of isolation, the lifting of sanctions, and accepting its territorial gains in Ukraine.
The response from European capitals has been predictably confused, ranging from outrage to bewilderment. Ultimately, however, Europe remains too fractured to lead on Ukraine without the United States. Hence, it seems this part of the administration’s gambit is working, at least for now.
Kissinger-in-Riverse: Will It Work for Donald Trump?
However, it remains to be seen whether changing how the United States has traditionally engaged with Europe will allow the Trump administration to achieve its principal objective of leveraging relations with Moscow to counter Beijing.
Though the idea that Washington can somehow reposition Russia as an asset against China has been discussed repeatedly in multiple venues in DC, it doesn’t fully account for Putin’s principal objective of rebuilding the Russian empire and establishing a sphere of influence in Central Europe and the Baltic region. Hence, whether this gambit can work remains very much in doubt, with warranted skepticism about the outcome.
If anything, Moscow is likely to pocket the advantages such a reopening of relations with Washington has already granted it and then continue its revisionist trajectory in Europe and beyond. If anything, this seismic shift in U.S.-Russia relations presents Putin with an opportunity to re-negotiate the perimeters of his dependence of Xi, while at the same time retaining the principal advantage that his relationship with Beijing brings him in his historic confrontation with the West.
The Future of Ukraine
All of which leaves the question of the future of Ukraine up in the air. After three years of brutal full-scale war unlike anything Europe has seen since 1945, Ukraine finds itself at a moment when all the assumptions it has held have come up for revision.
Having experienced a dramatic shift in its relationship with Washington and with Europe bereft of military capabilities to backfill for declining U.S. support, Kyiv is struggling for alternatives, seeking to leverage its relations with regional powers, especially Turkey, to establish a negotiating position.
Here much will likely depend on how President Erdogan weighs his country’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis Russia and his key relationship with the United States against his larger plans for the Black Sea region.
Much like the current flux in the relationship between the United States and its European allies, Turkey’s moves going forward should be carefully watched as Ankara’s priorities will likely weigh more heavily on Ukraine’s situation than ever before. As for Ukraine, the greatest unknown is how the population will react to this sudden change, especially considering the horrific price it has paid over the past three years to defend its national sovereignty and independence against the Russian onslaught.
In hindsight, the 2025 Munich Security Conference will likely be remembered as one of those symbolic seminal moments when the long-held assumptions about power alignment are revised in anticipation of a systemic reset.
President of the United States Donald Trump speaking with supporters at a Make America Great Again campaign rally at International Air Response Hangar at Phoenix-Mesa Gateway Airport in Mesa, Arizona.
What was expected to be reaffirmation of the transatlantic alliance morphed instead into a display of how far apart the priorities of the United States and its allies have become.
In order to reverse this transatlantic drift, Europe must rearm posthaste to provide real exercised capabilities in NATO. Also, the U.S. and its European allies need to speak plainly about what each alliance member brings to the table and expects in turn going forward.
Regardless of how the US-Russia negotiation breaks in the end, the last couple of weeks will likely be remembered by historians as a sea change in transatlantic relations.
The question now is: What comes next?
About the Author: Dr. Andrew A. Michta
Dr. Andrew A. Michta is Senior Fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council of the United States. Views expressed here are his own. You can follow him on X: @andrewmichta.
19fortyfive.com · by Andrew A. Michta · February 21, 2025
15. 5 Key Lessons from Three Years of the Ukraine War
The five:
Drones, NATO, and Russia: What the Ukraine War Taught the World:
- Putin is a Permanent European Opponent
- Massed Conventional Military Power is Still Necessary
- ‘Never Again’ is a Piety
- ‘Europe’ is Still a Failure
- Drones
5 Key Lessons from Three Years of the Ukraine War
19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · February 22, 2025
Abstract and Key Points: As the Russia-Ukraine war reaches its third anniversary, five key lessons emerge. First, Russia has solidified its status as a long-term European adversary, with NATO’s deterrence efforts set to intensify. Second, large conventional forces remain essential, particularly for potential conflicts in Taiwan. Third, mass atrocities continue despite global outrage, revealing the limits of international resolve. Fourth, Europe’s fragmented military response underscores its failure to develop a unified defense strategy. Finally, drones have revolutionized modern warfare, making battlefields deadlier and further removing soldiers from direct combat. These lessons will shape future conflicts, especially in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
Drones, NATO, and Russia: What the Ukraine War Taught the World
The third anniversary of the beginning of the Ukraine War is a useful moment to step back and consider the larger lessons of the war.
The conflict itself has mostly bogged down. Russia has made some advances in the last year, but the costs have been enormous. It is winning only in the sense of a pyrrhic victory – that is, it is losing so much in order to take small increments of territory that the war jeopardizes other Russian strategic interests.
Russia is no longer, for example, a credible peer competitor with China, the US, or the European Union. After three years of unexpectedly hard conflict, it is too economically backward and militarily reduced.
Ukraine, though, is in trouble too. Its manpower and munitions shortages are well-known. And US President Donald Trump has aggressively signaled that he wants the war over as soon as possible. So a deal seems likely soon. Thus, now is an opportune moment to consider the war’s larger story for the future of conflict.
I see five particular lessons going forward:
Putin is a Permanent European Opponent
Russia’s open invasion of a smaller democracy provoked a generational shift in the rest of Europe. It pushed Russia from a prickly, difficult semi-partner into an openly admitted geopolitical opponent.
Russia’s relationship with the West and its partners will not be normalized until its current president, Vladimir Putin, is gone. Trump may like Putin and give him concessions when they meet, but there will be no trust.
Vladimir Putin observes strategic deterrence forces exercise in the Kremlin’s situation room.
European security will be focused on deterring Russia for a generation now – along lines similar to the Cold War, except even more balance-negative for Russia than last time. NATO’s combined economy is a staggering twenty-five times greater than Russia’s. This is the long-term cost to Russia of the war.
Massed Conventional Military Power is Still Necessary
Military history teaches again and again that nothing holds territory like infantry. Because western military doctrine focuses on defense rather than conquest, NATO states tend to have smaller armies than this lesson would suggest.
Nuclear weapons, air-sea battle, counter-insurgency, and so on compete with traditional armies for attention and resources. But sheer mass will come back in Europe as the long-term contest with Russia takes shape.
Tu-22M Bomber from Russia
And in East Asia, this is a critical take-away, because China’s primary regional goal is the taking of Taiwan. Should its army gain a foothold on Taiwan, a large force will be needed to combat it. The US, Taiwan, and Japan do not currently have the requite manpower for that mission.
‘Never Again’ is a Piety
Pundits, especially in the West, have said for years that mass killings like the killing fields of Cambodia or the genocide in Rwanda can never happen again. In Ukraine though, the Russian military has behaved appallingly, and world opinion has mostly just accepted it.
In fact, there has been a concerted disinformation effort to suggest Russian atrocities are not happening.
‘Europe’ is Still a Failure
After three years of war on its doorstep, there is still no integrated European military voice. It is true that European support for Ukraine exceeds American support. But given Europe’s proximity to Ukraine and the Russian threat, a rationalized pipeline of aid should have been developed much more rapidly.
Instead, European aid has only slowly overcome national fragmentation and continues to be low compared to Europe’s overall economic size.
When the US supported the mujahadeen against the Soviets in the 1980s, the CIA set up a fast-moving, well-finance arms and support pipeline in a few years. European NATO has struggled to meet that level of coordination and speed.
Leopard 2 Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Ukraine’s president is calling for a European army, and Trump is threatening to abandon Europe. But after so many ostensible turning points which were to motivate an integrated European defense posture, it is hard to imagine it will ever happen.
Drones
If mass’ role on the battlefield is surprisingly unchanged, then the biggest change is probably drones – everywhere. We have all seen drone strike footage on social media these last few years. But their ubiquity has been a shock.
Large, plane-like drones have been around for twenty years, enabling long-distance or over-the-horizon strike. By loitering over the battlefields of the war on terrorism, they provided data to facilitate US strikes from distant bases.
Switchblade drone that is used by Ukraine’s forces against Russia. Image Credit: Industry handout.
But the Ukraine war has added to that by filling the local battlespace with all sorts of small drones used at short-range. These are frequently armed and function like mini-gunships or mini-missiles.
This accelerates the long-term trend, dating back to World War I, of warfighters pulling further and further away from contact on the frontline to fight at a distance, because the battlefield becomes ever more dangerous.
Other lessons will become apparent after the war concludes, but these are the five mostly likely to shape European territorial defense and American strategy in East Asia in the coming decade.
About the Author: Dr. Robert E. Kelly
Dr. Robert E. Kelly is a professor of political science at Pusan National University. Kelly is also a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor. You can find him on X: @Robert_E_Kelly.
19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · February 22, 2025
16. Confirm Elbridge Colby Right Now
Yes, we must prepare for "great power confrontation with China, which is engaged in the largest conventional and nuclear weapons buildup on the planet." But we must not neglect unrestricted and political warfare with China in the gray zone of strategic competition. If we focus only on strategic conflict we cede the political warfare battlefield to China where it can achieve success, and win, without direct conflict. We must understand China's vision: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions through subversion. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve objectives, with the main objective being the unification of China (i.e., the recovery of Taiwan). We must not be a one trick pony.
The American Paradox: Strength and Vulnerability
While the United States has maintained its relative conventional and nuclear superiority, it has adopted a largely defensive and reactive stance in the gray zone. This approach stems from the assumption that forces optimized for high-intensity conflict can easily “scale down” to address asymmetric threats. However, this perspective has left America vulnerable to adversaries actively and offensively competing in this ambiguous space.
The “Dark Quad” of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – collectively described as the axis of upheaval, chaos, or tyranny – have been creating dilemmas and attempting to disrupt and undermine US national security strengths. In contrast, the US has struggled to develop an agile, flexible, and offensive capability for operations in the gray zone.
The US must work to maintain its conventional and nuclear military superiority because this offers the best chance of avoiding war. By doing so, it neutralizes these threats, allowing the US to make very modest investments in its national security apparatus to offensively and proactively compete and win in the gray zone.
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/01/seizing-the-initiative-in-the-gray-zone-the-case-for-a-us-office-of-strategic-disruption/
Excerpts:
In this, Bridge fully aligns with President Trump’s priorities for the DOD.
Bridge agrees with Secretary Pete Hegseth about the threats to America, and he’s written extensively about how America’s number one adversary is China. It’s because of this that Bridge believes the DOD must rebuild and reorient the U.S. military for great power confrontation with China, which is engaged in the largest conventional and nuclear weapons buildup on the planet.
President Trump has pledged to seal our border, take on the drug cartels, restore peace in Europe and the Middle East, and strengthen and modernize our military to make it the strongest and most powerful in the world. Bridge shares these priorities and is ready to execute this agenda.
In short, Bridge Colby is the single best person to implement President Trump’s and Secretary Hegseth’s policies within the DOD and ensure that American lives and resources are used judiciously against prioritized threats.
I have full confidence that the Senate will give Mr. Colby the hearing he deserves and, ultimately, confirm this once-in-a-generation talent.
Confirm Elbridge Colby Right Now
19fortyfive.com · by Robert Peters · February 21, 2025
Elbridge “Bridge” Colby hasn’t garnered as much media attention as Pete Hegseth or Tulsi Gabbard, but President Trump’s nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has attracted a surprising amount of controversy.
Yet there’s no question that Bridge Colby is qualified for the job as the Pentagon’s policy lead.
All told, he’s spent more than 20 years working in the Department of State, Department of Defense (DOD), and the intelligence community, as well as in various national security positions at different think tanks.
Bridge served in the first Trump administration as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development, where he was the lead author of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. He was also DOD’s primary representative for the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy.
After leaving the DOD, Bridge founded a think tank, the Marathon Initiative, and wrote The Strategy of Denial, a book-length treatment on how the United States must prioritize deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression from China, its primary foreign national security threat.
In short, Bridge is one of the leading defense strategists of his generation, and, in my mind, the most influential defense policy thinker in over 20 years.
Despite all this, some GOP senators have reportedly offered him a less-than-warm welcome. Specifically, some criticize Bridge for allegedly being a defeatist on Ukraine and ambivalent about the prospects of Iran getting a nuclear weapon.
I don’t speak for Bridge, but I have known him for well over a decade, and I don’t believe that either of these criticisms are valid.
On Ukraine, my understanding is that Bridge certainly wants Ukraine to win. But he also believes that, given the need for the U.S. to focus on China and the absence of a NATO-like security arrangement in the Western Pacific, most of the additional support for Ukraine should come from our European allies.
As far as the Middle East, Bridge has always been a staunch supporter of Israel. I cannot fathom a world in which Bridge is ambivalent about a nuclear-armed Iran. Such an outcome would contradict both American interests and the interests of our regional allies and partners.
If I know anything about Bridge, it’s that he seeks a Department of Defense that puts the interests of the American people first.
For far too long, the United States has employed the DOD—and the men and women of the U.S. military—for activities that don’t further American interests.
From peacekeeping operations in far-flung theaters, to nation-building among cultures riddled with ethno-sectarian and religious strife, to democracy-building in areas with no history of the rule of law, the DOD has spent much of the post-Cold War era expending resources and American lives in operations tangential to U.S. interests.
During the same period, the DOD has neglected to build the forces it needs in the quantities it needs to deter and (if necessary) defeat an aggressive, expansionistic China. America’s stockpiles of cruise missiles and integrated air and missile defenses are low. Our navy is undersized, and our pilots get too few flying hours.
If the US hopes to deter China and other threats, all this must change.
Bridge is clear-eyed about what needs to be done. He understands that to secure peace, the US must rebuild its military, husband its resources, and, most importantly, not throw away the lives of the men and women in uniform.
He understands that we must not only build ships, planes, and munitions, but that we must reinvest in the nuclear arsenal and build a missile defense system that will deter America’s adversaries from carrying out a strategic attack on the US or US troops.
In this, Bridge fully aligns with President Trump’s priorities for the DOD.
Bridge agrees with Secretary Pete Hegseth about the threats to America, and he’s written extensively about how America’s number one adversary is China. It’s because of this that Bridge believes the DOD must rebuild and reorient the U.S. military for great power confrontation with China, which is engaged in the largest conventional and nuclear weapons buildup on the planet.
President Trump has pledged to seal our border, take on the drug cartels, restore peace in Europe and the Middle East, and strengthen and modernize our military to make it the strongest and most powerful in the world. Bridge shares these priorities and is ready to execute this agenda.
In short, Bridge Colby is the single best person to implement President Trump’s and Secretary Hegseth’s policies within the DOD and ensure that American lives and resources are used judiciously against prioritized threats.
I have full confidence that the Senate will give Mr. Colby the hearing he deserves and, ultimately, confirm this once-in-a-generation talent.
About the Author: Robert Peters
Robert Peters is a Research Fellow for Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense in The Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for National Security.
19fortyfive.com · by Robert Peters · February 21, 2025
17. Why No One Is Winning in Ukraine
Conclusion:
The sacrifices of the Ukrainian people have more than earned them the right to live free of Russian subjugation and influence and to celebrate their history and culture. But achieving those aims will require continued American and European support in the year ahead. Ukraine has made impressive strides in developing its own defense industry, producing as much as 40 percent of its requirements. Yet that still leaves large holes its partners must fill. One hopes that Western political leaders will have the moral courage and intellectual capacity to honor Ukraine’s sacrifices by giving Kyiv what it needs to keep fighting—and to strengthen their own armed forces to resist ongoing authoritarian aggression.
Why No One Is Winning in Ukraine
Foreign Affairs · by More by Mick Ryan · February 21, 2025
Technological Change Has Produced a Surprising Stalemate
Mick Ryan
February 21, 2025
A Ukrainian soldier working a drone in the Zaporizhzhia region, Ukraine, February 2024 Stringer / Reuters
MICK RYAN is a retired Australian Army Major General and the Senior Fellow for Military Studies at the Lowy Institute in Sydney. He is also the author of The War for Ukraine: Strategy and Adaptation Under Fire.
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Very few people predicted that a long, high-intensity war in Europe was possible in the twenty-first century. But for three bloody years, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has delivered exactly that. Hundreds of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians have died in the fighting. Many more have been injured. Entire towns have been reduced to ruin or cut apart by trenches, in a grim callback to World War I.
Now, the war in Ukraine has reached an apparent stasis. Russia continues to take small parcels of territory along the eastern front, but only by incurring unsustainably high casualties. The two countries have achieved parity when it comes to their long-range strike capabilities. Both have become fully mobilized war nations, allowing Russia to bounce back from its initial failures and allowing Ukraine, a smaller country, to keep fighting on through grievous losses. In the immediate future, then, the frontlines are likely to remain relatively stagnant. There will be no major breakthroughs.
U.S. President Donald Trump, however, has promised to end the war, reaching out to Moscow and setting up negotiations between American and Russian officials. In theory, these talks could turn 2025 into a decisive year for conflict. But there is no reason to think that interventions by Washington’s new sheriff will prove transformative, especially given that Kyiv has been frozen out of the conversation. The Trump administration is already discovering that the complexities of this conflict will preclude quick solutions. Trump has acceded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demand that Ukraine be locked out of NATO and Russia granted a sphere of influence. But Putin has given nothing in return, retaining his maximalist demands about Ukrainian disarmament and subjugation. The result could lead Washington to walk away and resume support for Kyiv.
But regardless of the outcome of the negotiations, the war in Ukraine has already changed the nature of conflict around the world. It has proven that today, drones, AI, and other kinds of advanced technology are important arbiters of success on the ground and in the air. It has demonstrated that warring countries are accelerating the pace of their battlefield and strategic adaptation. And it has highlighted the tensions between soldiers and civilians—and the weaknesses in current theories of how the two interact in high-tech conflict. In doing all of this, the war has exposed the shortfalls of Western militaries.
There are few certainties about how the invasion will play out, especially given Trump’s desire to force a resolution. But Putin will almost certainly continue to try to seize or destroy as much of Ukraine as possible in advance of any peace deal. (With a buildup of Russian troops in Belarus, he is clearly preparing to threaten other European countries, too.) Ukraine, meanwhile, is contemplating whether it can fight on without American help. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently pegged those odds as “low.” Yet if the Putin-Trump deal is intolerable to the government and people of Ukraine, the country will have to.
ADAPT OR PERISH
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has changed much about how politicians, strategists, and civilian populations understand war. But one shift is especially obvious: autonomous and remotely operated vehicles have become a mandatory component of armies, navies, and air forces. Across the ground, maritime, and aerial domains, drones are being integrated into both the Russian and the Ukrainian militaries at remarkable speed. The number of aerial drones used in the war has expanded from hundreds to thousands to hundreds of thousands. Russia and Ukraine now each have the capacity to build millions of drones every year.
Both countries have been innovative in their use of drones. On the ground, each is pioneering new approaches to old missions by using drones for surveillance, logistical support, evacuating injured troops, laying and clearing mines, and, of course, launching attacks. But the Ukrainians have been extraordinarily creative. In the maritime domain, Ukraine defeated the Russian Black Sea Fleet with a variety of domestically designed semisubmersible, remotely operated vehicles. More recently, the country has pioneered coupling different drone systems for specific missions. In late 2024, Ukraine used maritime drones as launch pads for aerial drones to attack Russian oil rigs and surveillance systems in the Black Sea. In December, Ukraine paired ground and aerial systems in the battle for the village of Lyptsi, near Kharkiv, in which robotic weapons alone attacked and seized a fortified Russian defensive position for the first time, forcing the infantry manning it to retreat. And in January, the Ukrainians again launched aerial drones from maritime drones to attack Russian air defenses in occupied Kherson.
Unmanned vehicles will remain critical to how Ukraine keeps up with the Russians. In part through its use of drones, over the past three years Ukraine has built a long-range strike complex that now operates in parity with the Russian system. Kyiv is adapting and improving its strike capacity faster than Moscow is. As a result, Ukraine’s campaign against energy, military, and defense-industry targets is likely to hurt Russia more in 2025 than it has in the preceding three years. But in the future, both Ukraine and Russia are likely to more closely integrate humans and drones in military units. This will drive further innovation in human-drone tactics and will require new kinds of training for soldiers and military leaders.
The changes in Ukraine will affect every military institution in the coming decade.
The tentacles of technological insertions reach even further than drones. They have enabled the meshing of artificial intelligence, civil and military sensor networks, and the democratization of battlefield information. AI systems can help drones pick and confirm targets by combing through open-source sensors and intelligence analyses and then combining this information with military intelligence. These new technologies have also driven other, new ways of thinking about military tactics and structures. Just as drones will force the restructuring of existing military organizations and lead to the formation of new ones, AI will fundamentally change how officials make battlefield and strategic decisions. Although current algorithms must be improved to reduce hallucinations—when an AI delivers false or misleading information—and gain more trust from military commanders, AI systems are improving. The Israel Defense Forces have recently demonstrated the utility of AI support for target assessment, weapons selection, and speeding up human decision-making.
New technology has led to adaptation. AI, for example, has helped both Russia and Ukraine close the time between when an enemy target is detected and when it can be attacked. The Ukrainians initially led the way with closing this “detection-to-destruction gap,” but Russia has caught up. Such innovation is not in itself surprising: learning and adaptation has always been part of warfare. But the pace is quickening. Consider that it took years for the U.S. military to adapt to the physical and intellectual demands of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq a couple of decades ago but only months for Ukraine to develop its maritime drone strike fleet. Ukraine now updates some of its algorithms and drone communications software daily. And the learning and adaptation battle between Russia and Ukraine is continuing to accelerate as each side improves its ability to learn and share lessons between the battlefield and its national industrial bases. In doing so, these countries are underscoring an old truth: the military institutions that win wars are never the same organizations that begin them. Armed forces that can systemically and strategically adapt will have greater power in both war and peace.
The changes in Ukraine will affect every military institution in the coming decade. Western countries, in particular, will face a reckoning about their military postures. They do so just as Trump and his administration are calling old alliances into question, creating even more uncertainty and demanding a massive realignment of military structures in Europe and the Pacific.
CITIZEN SOLDIERS
Technology is essential to conflict. But war is not primarily a technological—or even really a military—undertaking. It is a human and societal endeavor. And just as drones have reshaped the battlefield, so have evolving civil-military dynamics. Modern technologies are now allowing private citizens to see many more aspects of the war than they could before, almost in real time. Commercial satellite imagery, for example, is now widely available. Through social media, citizens can review drone footage taken by soldiers of what’s happening on the battlefield on their cellphones, right after it was taken. A growing number of social media and other open-source analysts, using this easily accessible information, are adding their own evaluations of the war (admittedly of varying quality) to insights from news organizations, military institutions, and governments. As a result, ordinary people are now more exposed to and informed about war than ever before.
This increased exposure allows for even further citizen participation in war. Previously, noncombatants who wanted to participate mostly did so by raising war bonds. Now, private citizens are taking advantage of the Internet to directly raise funds or procure war material—including socks, first-aid kits, drones, and satellites—on an unprecedented scale. (There are entire nonprofits, for example, dedicated to raising money online for Ukrainian soldiers and units.) Citizens can also play an active role in reporting threats. Ukrainians, for instance, have created smartphone apps for reporting sightings of enemy units, drones, or missiles, and the information is then sent on to military forces.
Big-data warfare is, of course, a double-edged sword. Online information, artificial intelligence, social media, smart devices, and new analytical capabilities are making a once unimaginable amount of data available to each side’s adversaries, not only their supporters. That flood of information has, accordingly, permitted Russia and Ukraine to better target populations with propaganda. Kyiv, for example, has been messaging African and South Asian countries about the importance of their grain exports through the Black Sea, with the aim of decreasing support for Russia. Moscow has recently been seeking to dissuade those thinking about volunteering for Ukraine’s armed forces, including by spreading information about military corruption. Sometimes, this information also leads to societal trauma, with Russians and Ukrainians living far from the frontlines inundated with graphic and upsetting content about what’s happening to their forces.
There is certainly no shortage of such material. The scale of losses from the war in Ukraine is staggering. The conflict is a bitter and destructive struggle on the ground—to the point that it resembles the eastern front battles of World War II. In a February 2025 interview, Zelensky said that 45,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and nearly 400,000 wounded since 2022. British intelligence has reported that over 850,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded. The casualty rates, particularly on the Russian side, reached new heights in 2024, with Russia suffering more losses last year than in the previous two years combined.
The war in Ukraine has also reaffirmed the importance of good leadership.
Neither country can sustain high casualties forever. But each side has its own advantages in navigating the next phase of fighting. For Ukraine, it is ratios: the country is killing far more Russians than Russia is killing Ukrainians. As a result, Moscow’s advance is likely to slow in the coming months, even if Russia continues taking little tracts of land (a strategy that can be described as “bite and hold”). If Ukraine can further skew the casualty ratio in its favor, as it did over the course of 2024, Russia’s offensive may culminate. This, however, does not mean that Ukraine would be ready for any major offensives, given its manpower challenges. A period of continued stasis, possibly with lower casualties, might then prevail until one side or the other reconstitutes its offensive potential.
But Ukraine has far fewer people than Russia. Many of its residents have fled the country. It can therefore afford to lose fewer troops. Moscow is also simply more tolerant of casualties than Kyiv, shocking even Ukraine’s own military leadership. Ukrainians are willing to make great sacrifices. But unlike the Kremlin, Kyiv is bothered by the idea of losing thousands upon thousands of troops for the foreseeable future.
The enormous casualties also have important implications for the wider world. At the close of the Cold War, many people believed that the era of large conventional wars had come to an end. National security leaders across the world downsized their countries’ military forces, munition stocks, and production capacity.
The situation in Ukraine has shown that such optimism was misguided. As a result, other countries have to increase both the size of their militaries and their ability to provide for them. Western states will have to remember, in particular, how to mobilize for large-scale warfare. Since the end of the Cold War, these countries have relied almost exclusively on all-volunteer forces. But the war in Ukraine has shown that such models—although politically popular and financially easier—are insufficient. They yield too few recruits given the increased variety of external threats. An evolved model is required, one that retains a professional all-volunteer force but complements it with a much larger mobilization pool through new national service and reserve schemes.
READY OR NOT
To be sure, the war in Ukraine has not upended everything analysts know about war. In fact, some of the laws of conflict have remained stolidly consistent. The past three years, for instance, have demonstrated that the element of surprise remains an integral part of war. Ukraine’s offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv in 2022 proved successful, in large part, because they caught Moscow off-guard. The offensives also demonstrated that, for all the recent technological innovations, the modern battlefield remains far from transparent. Humans will always seek advantage over their enemies through surprise and by exploiting the resulting shock.
The war in Ukraine has also reaffirmed the importance of good leadership. Zelensky’s decision early in the war to remain in Kyiv and lead his country not only confounded Putin and many Western leaders; it unified the Ukrainian people and has provided solid, dependable leadership. Likewise, Ukrainian battlefield commanders, although not without failures, have been more competent and considerate of the lives of soldiers than have Russia’s. Such courage, audacity, and will in political leaders are essential to successful warfare.
Unfortunately, since the end of the Cold War, the political classes in both the United States and Europe have lost sight of how important excellent leadership is to military preparedness. They were, after all, nearly unified in deciding to downsize militaries and defense industrial complexes. Since the invasion of Ukraine, some of these politicians have called for course corrections. But much of the Western political class remains unwilling to speak openly about the profound security challenges posed by China and Russia. The risks that stem from this silence cannot be overstated. The development of excellent battlefield leaders is crucial to success in war, but the best tactical leaders in the world can accomplish nothing if their country has a bad strategy or no strategy—or otherwise lacks the will to fight for what it believes. Wars, after all, are demonstrations of human will, not just of tactical acumen.
Wars are mass tragedies, as tens of millions of Ukrainians can now attest. Yet out of the suffering and heartbreak of soldiers and civilians can arise many educational opportunities. Since Russia began its large-scale invasion, Europe has seen more violence, destruction, and calamity than it has since 1945. But the continent and its allies have also learned critical facts about war, strategy, leadership, civil defense, economics, and military affairs (which, of course, are equally available to their adversaries).
The sacrifices of the Ukrainian people have more than earned them the right to live free of Russian subjugation and influence and to celebrate their history and culture. But achieving those aims will require continued American and European support in the year ahead. Ukraine has made impressive strides in developing its own defense industry, producing as much as 40 percent of its requirements. Yet that still leaves large holes its partners must fill. One hopes that Western political leaders will have the moral courage and intellectual capacity to honor Ukraine’s sacrifices by giving Kyiv what it needs to keep fighting—and to strengthen their own armed forces to resist ongoing authoritarian aggression.
Why No One Is Winning in Ukraine
Foreign Affairs · by More by Mick Ryan · February 21, 2025
18. China’s Self-Defeating Strategy
An interesting thesis from Zack.
Conclusion:
The U.S. military needs leaders who are willing to acknowledge that reform is necessary and assume the accompanying political risks. After all, this is a unique opportunity. China has shifted to power projection at exactly the wrong technological moment. The United States need not abandon power projection entirely, but its force mix must adapt with the times. In this way, the U.S. military can swim with the tide, even as China swims against it.
China’s Self-Defeating Strategy
Foreign Affairs · by More by Zack Cooper · February 21, 2025
Power Projection Once Made Empires—Now It Can Undo Them
Zack Cooper
February 21, 2025
Chinese fighter jets in Zhuhai, China November 2024 Tingshu Wang / Reuters
ZACK COOPER is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a lecturer at Princeton University. He is the author of the forthcoming book Tides of Fortune: The Rise and Decline of Great Militaries (Yale University Press, 2025), from which this essay is adapted.
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China’s armed forces are changing quickly. Over the last 15 years, Beijing has devoted significant resources to developing a military that can project power abroad. It now has three aircraft carriers and a growing fleet of amphibious assault ships. In 2017, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti. Chinese ships have also docked at ports scattered around the Indo-Pacific, from Cambodia to Sri Lanka. These changes should not be surprising since Chinese officials have spoken publicly about how they see their country as a great power on the rise, one that must project power overseas.
The problem for Beijing is that power projection, in the form of a large blue-water navy and overseas bases, is increasingly expensive. Technological advances are remaking warfare, encouraging states to build cheaper and more expendable weapons that can limit the effectiveness of larger, costlier platforms. China is embracing power projection at exactly the wrong moment. It is effectively swimming against the technological tide. The United States must not make the same mistake. It should swim with—not against—the current, adjusting its mix of military forces to better accommodate the realities of warfare in the twenty-first century.
BAD TIMING
China’s rise has been one of the most rapid in global history. Until 15 years ago, however, its armed forces largely eschewed the traditional trappings of great powers. Rather than build a large blue-water navy and overseas bases, Beijing invested in weapons intended to stop adversaries from encroaching on Chinese territorial and maritime space. These capabilities—including long-range missiles and stationary mines—were intended to offset more advanced U.S. ships and aircraft. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, many U.S. experts feared that China’s numerous and relatively cheap missiles could threaten the United States’ more expensive ships, aircraft, and forward bases.
Today, however, the tables are turning. Beijing has shifted much of its spending toward power projection. A 2024 U.S. Defense Department report observed that China will “increase its focus on expanding power projection operations globally.” Chinese Admiral Wu Shengli, a key architect of the shift, explained in 2006 that China required “a powerful navy to protect fishing, resource development, and strategic passageways for energy.” Other motives behind this expansion include China’s preparations for invading Taiwan, its desire for prestigious weapons, and the inclinations of Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
But there is something even more fundamental at work: China is following the well-trodden path of most great powers. As they rise, peak, and decline, countries shift their national objectives, defense strategies, and military investments in predictable ways. Rising powers typically adopt power projection in pursuit of expansionist objectives. Peaking powers usually seek consolidation, often by fortifying defensive positions. And declining powers traditionally choose more limited objectives that they can accomplish with cheaper and more expendable military systems.
Beijing’s turn toward power projection is therefore the natural result of the Chinese Communist Party’s conviction that the country is now a leading power. As Xi asserted in 2019, “The Chinese nation has achieved a tremendous transformation: it has stood up, grown rich, and is becoming strong.” Xi has jettisoned the “active defense” strategy espoused by earlier generations of Chinese leaders, which called for China to remain defensive in orientation but able to launch offensive operations if necessary. Instead, Beijing has embraced new military capabilities designed to project power across the Indo-Pacific and around the world. Just like those of Germany or the United States in the 1890s, China’s leaders are determined to build a blue-water navy and operate globally. China now commands the world’s largest navy with the support of a widening array of overseas bases and access locations.
As they rise, peak, and decline, countries change their military strategies in predictable ways.
Unfortunately for China, Beijing has committed to power projection at the wrong time. Expendable systems, such as drones and missiles, are becoming increasingly effective despite their relatively low cost. Warfare is changing as governments prioritize the deployment of these cheaper weapons at scale. These systems can blunt the effectiveness of the large and expensive platforms, such as aircraft carriers, integral to power projection. Shifts in the conduct of war threaten to make power projection more difficult to achieve.
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that it is becoming more expensive to project power. On the modern battlefield, cheap drones and improvised explosive devices menace ground forces, uncrewed vessels and antiship missiles threaten surface ships, and sophisticated air defenses imperil aircraft. In short, technological advances have made control of territory, water, and airspace more difficult and more costly. Investments in power projection are therefore less cost-effective, making missions that require power projection riskier and more expensive.
To be sure, China’s embrace of power projection has rattled U.S. policymakers. Speaking on Fox News in 2024, Frank Kendall, the secretary of the U.S. Air Force, warned that the United States was in a race it could lose. “Our cushion is gone,” he said. “We are out of time.” The U.S. military has spent over a century perfecting the tools and craft of projecting power, only to see China match many of those capabilities and field them in larger numbers. Distracted by overseas wars, Washington has modernized its forces too slowly.
But the United States has an opportunity to turn the tide. China’s People’s Liberation Army requires expensive and vulnerable power-projection platforms, such as aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, if it is to cross the open ocean and conquer Taiwan by force. By contrast, the U.S. military’s main objectives are to deter adversaries from attacking U.S. territory or that of U.S. allies and partners. Maintaining the status quo is much easier than changing it. The United States and its allies can therefore adopt elements of China’s earlier strategy—Beijing’s prior focus on denying encroachment on its territory—to check the Chinese military’s attempts to project power. To do so, it must heed the recommendations of experts who have called for the United States to field smaller, cheaper, and more expendable systems in larger numbers.
IN THE MIX
Great powers do not overhaul their militaries overnight—nor should they. As Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of the Indo-Pacific Command, noted in 2024, the United States cannot just “quit on everything” related to power projection simply because “we’ve got some drones.” Rather, leaders must rebalance their strategies by adjusting the mix of military capabilities. To project power, the United States has focused for years on developing strong offensive control platforms, such as aircraft carriers. Now is the time to add more systems designed for defensive control and denial, such as the Replicator initiative announced in August 2023, an ambitious Defense Department program to cheaply produce drones and other expendable weapons in large numbers.
The result should be a strategy that combines three types of capabilities: expendable uncrewed systems, such as drones and missiles; stealthy penetrating platforms, such as B-21 bombers and Virginia-class submarines; and legacy power-projection forces, such as aircraft carriers. Any one of these capability types can satisfy only some of the U.S. military’s operational needs. But the combination of mass, stealth, and force projection can win the day. To illustrate this, imagine how a war with China in the Indo-Pacific might evolve if the U.S. military properly marshaled this mix of capabilities.
At the outset of a conflict, the United States and its allies would field large numbers of expendable systems that would hamper any Chinese advance. These shorter-range systems—missiles, drones, and mines—must be deployed from on or inside the first island chain (the string of islands from Japan to the Philippines that includes Taiwan) to threaten Chinese forces. Unfortunately, the U.S. and allied forces operating these systems will be at considerable risk in the early days of a conflict as they try to blunt the initial wave of Chinese attacks. But they will set the stage for U.S. follow-on forces.
While expendable systems complicate China’s initial attacks, stealthy long-range aircraft and nuclear-powered submarines would then be called on to strike Chinese positions. These weapons provide Washington’s greatest asymmetric advantages today, and they will be needed to penetrate China’s defensive bubble and hit critical targets. The United States has a relatively small number of these aircraft and submarines, so it will have to use them judiciously. But if deployed astutely, they could accomplish Paparo’s goal of turning “the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape … which buys … the time for the rest of everything.”
After expendable and stealthy systems have slowed China’s advance, legacy power projection systems will prove their value. Aircraft carriers, surface ships, and other traditional elements of the U.S. arsenal can corral China’s remaining ships and aircraft and threaten their supply lines. Washington can slowly constrict Beijing’s operational space before seeking to end the conflict on acceptable terms. Any of these three capabilities is insufficient on its own, but together they could produce a definitive victory.
POWER SHIFT
The Biden and Trump administrations have both signaled interest in adopting new capabilities such as those described above. But militaries often prepare to fight the last war rather than the next one. The U.S. military has spent decades building up the industries, concepts, and culture necessary to project power. Change will not be easy, but historical experience shows that it remains possible.
Leaders are usually slow to grasp changes in the relative power of states. Even when leaders recognize these shifts, they must still build consensus in political, military, and industrial circles to pursue new policies. Thus, revised defense policies almost always trail changes in relative power, not just by years but by decades. Unfortunately, the United States is not an outlier in this regard.
Despite the typically slow pace of change, leaders do accelerate defense reforms when they recognize a serious external threat. At moments of heightened concern, it is easier for leaders to cut through bureaucratic and political obstacles in pursuit of needed reforms. The first Trump administration prioritized the threat posed by China and helped shift the debate in Washington. But peacetime reforms are often too few and too late. Many great powers act only after a conflict has begun.
Strategic circumstances may set the stage, but individual leaders must still make the decisions. Overcoming the bureaucratic inertia that favors status quo policies requires sustained political commitment. It often takes new leaders with fresh ideas to execute fundamental changes to national militaries. Accordingly, the beliefs, personalities, and perceptions of individual leaders are hugely important when assessing any country’s potential for real defense reform.
The U.S. military needs leaders who are willing to acknowledge that reform is necessary and assume the accompanying political risks. After all, this is a unique opportunity. China has shifted to power projection at exactly the wrong technological moment. The United States need not abandon power projection entirely, but its force mix must adapt with the times. In this way, the U.S. military can swim with the tide, even as China swims against it.
ZACK COOPER is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a lecturer at Princeton University. He is the author of the forthcoming book Tides of Fortune: The Rise and Decline of Great Militaries (Yale University Press, 2025), from which this essay is adapted.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Zack Cooper · February 21, 2025
19. Socom Laser-Focused on Winning, Readiness, Modernization
Socom Laser-Focused on Winning, Readiness, Modernization
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4074192/socom-laser-focused-on-winning-readiness-modernization/
Feb. 21, 2025 | By David Vergun, DOD News |
Special Operations Command follows the defense secretary's top three priorities of warfighting to win, readiness of its people and lethality through modernization, said Army Gen. Bryan P. Fenton, Socom commander, speaking yesterday at the National Defense Industrial Association's 35th annual Special Operations Symposium in Washington.
The world's become a more volatile place, he said. There's been a greater demand signal for crisis response and a focus on preparing for great power competition.
"Over the last three years, the demand for special operations forces to assist combatant commands or functional commands and their campaigns has gone up by 35 to 40% and the demand just keeps going up," Fenton said.
Socom has a bias to action and a joint force focus, he said. "We cannot be complacent. We cannot let the nation down."
Reviving the warrior ethos and bolstering the profession of arms is paramount, Fenton said.
Special operations training is probably the most arduous in the Defense Department, he said.
"We don't train once and get it right on the range and walk off. We do it over and over and over. That's a really different mindset," the general said.
Special forces operators are versatile. They're technically proficient, fluent in languages, understand different cultures, innovative, problem solvers, unafraid, used to working in very arduous conditions, eager for challenges and value autonomy.
"They're a different breed of human," he said.
U.S. special operations has learned a lot from the war in Ukraine including unmanned vehicles, robots and other items needed to be built at speed, scale and at the right price point, Fenton said.
Ukraine has no navy, yet it sunk a portion of the Russian fleet with autonomous systems and it flies a thousand one-way strike drones daily against Russian forces.
The Defense Department needs to get to this production level, perhaps jointly with allies and partners, he pointed out, admitting that Socom can be impatient waiting for change.
Socom is delivering a bang for its buck, he said, noting that it makes up 3% of the joint force but has less than 2% of the budget. "We're tiny and lean and mean."
Lastly, Fenton said there's tremendous value in partnering with special operations forces allies, industry, academia and interagencies.
20. In Purge, Trump Fires Brown, Slife, Franchetti, and More
Why all the JAGs? Why Lt Gen Slife?
In Purge, Trump Fires Brown, Slife, Franchetti, and More
airandspaceforces.com · by Greg Hadley · February 22, 2025
Feb. 21, 2025 | By Chris Gordon
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President Donald Trump fired Air Force Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announcing his intent to nominate retired Air Force Lt. Gen. John “Dan” Caine to replace him in a social media post Feb. 21.
Caine is a highly unusual choice. U.S. Code states the “President may appoint an officer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only if the officer has served as (A) the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (B) the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, or the Chief of Space Operations; or (C) the commander of a unified or specified combatant command.”
Caine never served in those roles.
However, the law also states the those requirements can be waived “if the President determines such action is necessary in the national interest.” Congress must confirm any nomination.
Caine retired in December after a tour as Associate Director for Military Affairs at the CIA. Trump has repeatedly praised him in public going back to his first term in office.
Separately, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced he had been directed to replace:
- Air Force Vice Chief of Staff James C. “Jim” Slife
- Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti
- The Judge Advocates General for the Army, Navy, and Air Force
Additional firings are believed likely, some sources said.
“General Caine is an accomplished pilot, national security expert, successful entrepreneur, and a ‘warfighter’ with significant interagency and special operations experience,” Trump wrote on his social media site Truth Social. Trump blamed former President Joe Biden for not promoting Caine to a four-star general. Caine was the deputy commanding general for special operations for Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, the campaign against the Islamic State group, from 2018-2019 during Trump’s first term.
“During my first term, Razin was instrumental in the complete annihilation of the ISIS caliphate. It was done in record setting time, a matter of weeks,” Trump wrote, using Caine’s callsign.
A retired general can legally be recalled to Active service; Army Gen. Peter Schoomaker was recalled to become Army Chief of Staff in 2003, and Army Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor was recalled to Active Duty to become an advisor to President John F. Kennedy and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 1962, three years after retiring after a tour as Army Chief of Staff. Caine was an Air National Guardsman and served part time from 2009-2016.
Brown was appointed to a nominal four-year term as Chairman that began in October 2023. It is unclear how soon he might be asked to leave. The normal term would have ended in September 2027. The last Chairman to serve fewer than four years was Marine Gen. Peter Pace, who served just two years at a time when the Chairman was appointed to a two-year term, renewable up to four years. Pace had previously spent four years as Vice Chairman.
Trump wrote of Brown: “He is a fine gentleman and an outstanding leader, and I wish a great future for him and his family.”
Brown was the 22nd Air Force Chief of Staff and the 21st Chairman; he was only the second Airman to serve as Chairman in this century, the last one being Gen. Richard Myers, and the second African American Chairman after Army Gen. Colin Powell. Brown was nominated to become CSAF by Trump. Brown took the oath of office in the Oval Office in August 2020, with Trump watching.
Rumors have been swirling around the Pentagon for weeks but gained traction recently when specific names reportedly circulated among Republicans on Capitol Hill.
Prior to the firing, Brown had been visiting troops deployed to the U.S.-Mexico border Feb. 21. Announcing his trip on social media, he had written that he was looking forward to “observing [personnel] in action as they execute the mission of securing the border.”
Hegseth has publicly criticized Brown and Franchetti in the past.
“First of all, you’ve got to fire the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,” Hegseth said in November on the Shawn Ryan Show podcast, shortly before Trump picked him to lead the Pentagon. “But any general that was involved—general, admiral, whatever—that was involved in any of the DEI woke s— has got to go. Either you’re in for warfighting, and that’s it. That’s the only litmus test we care about.”
Hegseth also severely criticized Brown in his 2024 book, “The War on Warriors,” in which he alleged Brown “built his generalship dutifully pursuing the radical positions of left-wing politicians, who in turn rewarded him with promotions.” Hegseth wrote further, without elaboration, that Brown “has made the race card one of his biggest calling cards.”
Hegseth also vilified Franchetti, who he charged was chosen to be Chief of Naval Operations in 2023 largely because she is a woman.
Trump’s actions are unprecedented in their breadth, spanning the Chairman down to top military lawyers. It remains unclear whether Congress’ traditionally bipartisan armed services committees will raise objections. The Senate must confirm all nominations to general and flag officer positions.
“I am troubled by the nature of these dismissals. This appears to be part of a broader, premeditated campaign by President Trump and Secretary Hegseth to purge talented officers for politically charged reasons, which would undermine the professionalism of our military and send a chilling message through the ranks,” Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee said in a statement which praised the “brilliant careers” and “great courage, honor, and distinction” of the fired officers. “A professional, apolitical military that is subordinate to the civilian government and supportive of the Constitution rather than a political party is essential to the survival of our democracy.”
SASC Chairman Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) thanked Brown for his service and said he was “confident Secretary Hegseth and President Trump will select a qualified and capable successor.”
Trump had already fired one uniformed leader, Coast Guard Adm. Linda L. Fagan, within hours after taking office Jan. 20. The Coast Guard is a military service, but falls under the Department of Homeland Security.
In his statement, Hegseth wrote: “Under President Trump, we are putting in place new leadership that will focus our military on its core mission of deterring, fighting and winning wars.”
National Security
airandspaceforces.com · by Greg Hadley · February 22, 2025
21. Lake says VOA won’t be ‘Trump TV’
The paradox for Trump supporters who may not like this headline is that all Ms. Lake needs to do is let VOA do its job and it WILL be "Trump TV." Not in the sycophantic sense that is both desired by some and unwanted by others. It will be "Trump TV" because it will be the most respected media organization overseas that is objectively explaining US national policy. It will objectively explain US policy and all POTUS' actions and it will give voice to both supporters and detractors thus enhancing its legitimacy among foreign target audiences both for the context it provides as well as for being a true beacon of the ideal of a free press. The fact that a government funded organization can present all sides of the issues is an example of American values in the world. But Trump supporters need not worry because despite giving voice to opponents and criticism, the majority of effort will go into objectively explaining US national policy (POTUS' policy) and actions to foreign target audiences to ensure they understand POTUS' intent. Now I cannot speak for all of the journalists at VOA, but I can give a comprehensive assessment of journalists in the Korea service who I know have and will continue to objectively report on US national policy. I provide my daily "citizen's oversight" by reading and listening to their reports every day. VOA is one of the most important conduits of communication to Kim Jong Un because we know the regime elite listens to its broadcasts (and those of Radio Free Asia as well). And so do the Korean people in the north. VOA is a national treasure that should be supported as well as honored for the work that it does. I am happy to debate this with anyone who pays close attention to the work of VOA as I do.
Lake says VOA won’t be ‘Trump TV’
https://thehill.com/homenews/media/5157577-kari-lake-voice-of-america-trump/?utm
by Jared Gans - 02/21/25 12:21 PM ET
Kari Lake, President Trump’s choice to lead Voice of America (VOA), said the international state media broadcaster won’t be “Trump TV” under her watch.
Lake said at the Conservative Political Action Conference on Friday that VOA will focus on “accurate” and “honest” reporting but also won’t feature “Trump Derangement Syndrome,” a common refrain for Trump supporters criticizing mainstream media coverage of the president.
“It won’t become Trump TV, but it sure as hell will not be TDSTV. You can find all the ‘Trump Derangement Syndrome’ that you want over on CNN, MSNBC, CBS, ’60 Minutes,’ The Washington Post and The New York Times,” she said.
Lake previously served as a news anchor in Arizona before her unsuccessful runs for governor and Senate in the state. She has often spread misinformation, particularly on the COVID-19 pandemic and the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election, eliciting attacks from critics.
She refused to concede her defeat in the 2022 Arizona gubernatorial race to Gov. Katie Hobbs (D) and pursued fruitless legal challenges to the results for years. She also fell short of conceding her loss to Sen. Ruben Gallego (D) in November, though she hasn’t pursued legal challenges.
Lake said she feels “honored” that VOA has been “telling America’s story” for more than 80 years, though its coverage has sometimes been “incredible” and sometimes “pitiful.”
“We are fighting an information war, and there’s no better weapon than the truth, and I believe the VOA can be that weapon,” she said.
Some conservatives have accused VOA, along with other publicly funded media, of left-wing bias in its coverage. Lake said she understood some calls for shutting VOA down but believes it can be improved.
“But I believe it is worth trying to save,” she said. “With a relatively small budget, along with honest reporting, we can spread the values of freedom all over the world and prevent trillion-dollar wars.”
Voice of America was first formed in 1942 to oppose Nazi propaganda and receives funding from the government, broadcasting all around the world.
The president doesn’t directly appoint the head of VOA, but Trump has nominated conservative activist L. Brent Bozell III to lead the U.S. Agency for Global Media, which makes the decision. Bozell needs to be confirmed by the Senate to take his post and then could select Lake.
Tags Kari Lake misinformation Trump TV VOA Voice of America
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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