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Quotes of the Day:
"The ultimate relationship between justice and law will be an eternal subject for speculation and analysis. But it may be said that in a democratic society, law is the form which free men give to justice."
– Robert Kennedy
"Liberty means responsibility. That is why most men dread it."
– George Bernard Shaw
"When we lose the right to be different, we lose the privilege to be free."
– Charles Evans Hughes
1. Trump’s Ukraine Shift Unsettles U.S. Allies in Asia
2. South Korean lawmaker heads to Ukraine to study North Korean involvement in war
3. N. Korea threatens to use 'strategic means' in response to S. Korea-U.S. air drills
4. Top diplomat discusses bilateral, security issues with counterparts at G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting
5. Industry minister to visit U.S. as early as this week for talks on new tariff scheme
6. Korean biz lobby chief says more U.S. investment could be considered on incentives
7. The future of bureaucracy in the age of AI (A view from South Korea)
8. “I never saw a proclamation with president’s signature,” says former JCS martial law chief
9. IAEA chief calls for engagement with North Korea amid nuclear arsenal concerns
10. [Washington Talk] “China’s Nuclear Power Reinforcement is Critical to Korea’s National Interests… US Considers Redeployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons”
11. Exclusive: North Korea testing larger new recon drone, pushing deployment plan
12. North Korea confiscates dog fur-lined coats from civilians to clothe soldiers
13. Ukrainian 'witch drone' threatens to destroy 200 North Korean 'ju-jae-guns'
1. Trump’s Ukraine Shift Unsettles U.S. Allies in Asia
Excerpts:
In Munich, Singapore’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen described the change in America’s image “from liberator to great disrupter to a landlord seeking rent.”
“America’s primacy has become the overriding consideration,” said Ng, whose country has close ties with Washington and Beijing. “Not that it never was, but I think it has now become the polestar of foreign policy, even at the expense of bilateral ties or multilaterals.”
The change in U.S. policy toward Russia has stirred concerns about a shift in the American approach to North Korea.
As with Putin, Trump has repeatedly stressed his strong personal rapport with Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Kim and Trump held three face-to-face meetings in 2018 and 2019 that led to a temporary halt to Pyongyang’s major weapons testing but didn’t bring the recalcitrant state closer to denuclearization.
Kim has slammed the prospects of revived talks. Earlier this month, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry vowed to continue bolstering its nuclear force, calling the U.S.’s push on disarmament an “outdated and absurd plan.”
Seoul wants to remain involved in future Trump-Kim diplomacy on potential disarmament, but South Korean officials admit they could be sidelined.
“We have to be fully prepared for whatever scenarios we can imagine in dealing with the security threat from the North and other parts of the region,” South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul said recently, while also professing “no doubts” currently about America’s commitment to his country’s security.
Trump’s Ukraine Shift Unsettles U.S. Allies in Asia
Public confidence in Washington’s continued support against China and North Korea is tainted by private concerns over a potential grand bargain with Beijing
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/trumps-ukraine-shift-unsettles-u-s-allies-in-asia-ecb97120
President Trump met with India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi earlier this month. Photo: White House/Zuma Press
By Gabriele Steinhauser
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, Joyu Wang
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and Timothy W. Martin
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Updated Feb. 23, 2025 12:02 am ET
The Trump administration’s rush toward peace talks with Russia on the war in Ukraine has rattled some officials in Asia and raised concerns over the U.S. commitment to the region’s security.
Earlier this month, in a major about-face in U.S. foreign policy that came after a call between President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the administration agreed with Moscow to open direct peace talks.
Kyiv, which has relied heavily on U.S. military and financial support to fight the invasion by Moscow, wasn’t party to the initial U.S.-Russia talks. Ukraine’s European neighbors, whose security could be directly affected by any U.S. settlement with Russia, were also excluded.
The news reverberated among U.S. allies in Asia. In public, officials from Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan and South Korea, which rely on the U.S. for their defense, have expressed confidence that Washington will stand by them in case of aggression from China or North Korea. The U.S. has mutual defense pacts with Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and, as part of a wider agreement, Thailand.
But privately, some officials have expressed concern that Trump could pursue some kind of bargain with Chinese leader Xi Jinping over disputed territories in Asia or allow North Korea’s nuclear program to remain a threat.
A Philippine plane and a Chinese Navy helicopter fly close to each other over the disputed Scarborough Shoal. Photo: Ezra Acayan/Getty Images
U.S. Marines descend a hill following an exercise in the Philippines. Photo: Ted Aljibe/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Officials from America’s allies in the region have pointed to comments from U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who affirmed America’s commitment to confronting Beijing. He suggested that a pullback from Europe was necessary to devote more resources to Asia.
“The U.S. is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing trade-offs to ensure deterrence does not fail,” Hegseth told ministers from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other countries allied with Ukraine last week.
In the days after their confirmation, Hegseth and other administration officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, spoke with their counterparts in Asia before they called key allies in Europe. Trump has already welcomed to the White House the prime ministers of India, which shares a disputed border with China, and Japan, where the U.S. has roughly 60,000 military personnel stationed.
“The Trump administration’s support for Taiwan will remain very strong,” Joseph Wu, the head of Taiwan’s National Security Council, told a high-level security forum in Taipei on Thursday. Wu noted that key national security positions in the White House were held by longtime supporters of Taiwan.
President Trump has repeatedly stressed his strong personal rapport with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Photo: Kevin Lamarque/Reuters
Under a decades-old agreement, the U.S. is committed to providing for Taiwan’s defense. China claims the self-governing territory as its own. Intense Chinese military activity in recent years has raised fears Beijing could take the island by force.
Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo expressed optimism over U.S. support in comments at the Munich Security Conference earlier this month. “I believe that the message is that the United States’ commitment remains firm and that the Philippines-U. S. alliance is firm,” Manalo said.
The Philippines, along with other countries in Southeast Asia, has challenged Beijing’s increasingly aggressive claims over the South China Sea, one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, and has tied its security closely to the U.S.
Manila regularly holds joint military exercises and has allowed American forces access to more bases, where the Pentagon is spending tens of millions of dollars on bigger runways, new warehouses, fuel storage and barracks. During Trump’s first term, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo strengthened Washington’s commitment to a 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries.
U.S. Marines take part in joint drills in the Philippines. Photo: SeongJoon Cho/Bloomberg News
China’s military, coast guard and fishing militia have repeatedly skirmished with Philippine vessels and aircraft, most recently on Tuesday when a Chinese navy helicopter flew within 10 feet of a small aircraft carrying members of the Philippines coast guard and several journalists. The U.S. condemned the incident over the Scarborough Shoal, a reef China seized in 2012. The Philippines coast guard quickly shared the statement on social media.
Still, Julio S. Amador III, the chief executive of advisory firm Amador Research Services who worked for the office of the Philippine president in 2017 and 2018, said Washington’s recent moves on Ukraine had unsettled parts of his country’s security establishment. “Privately, conversations are happening that actually show concern,” he said.
Amador said that other countries in Southeast Asia that have been more cautious about aligning themselves with the U.S. may be experiencing a “kind of I-told-you-so moment.” He said the change in U.S. policy in Europe signals that Asian countries should take responsibility for their defense.
In Munich, Singapore’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen described the change in America’s image “from liberator to great disrupter to a landlord seeking rent.”
“America’s primacy has become the overriding consideration,” said Ng, whose country has close ties with Washington and Beijing. “Not that it never was, but I think it has now become the polestar of foreign policy, even at the expense of bilateral ties or multilaterals.”
The change in U.S. policy toward Russia has stirred concerns about a shift in the American approach to North Korea.
As with Putin, Trump has repeatedly stressed his strong personal rapport with Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Kim and Trump held three face-to-face meetings in 2018 and 2019 that led to a temporary halt to Pyongyang’s major weapons testing but didn’t bring the recalcitrant state closer to denuclearization.
Kim has slammed the prospects of revived talks. Earlier this month, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry vowed to continue bolstering its nuclear force, calling the U.S.’s push on disarmament an “outdated and absurd plan.”
Seoul wants to remain involved in future Trump-Kim diplomacy on potential disarmament, but South Korean officials admit they could be sidelined.
“We have to be fully prepared for whatever scenarios we can imagine in dealing with the security threat from the North and other parts of the region,” South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul said recently, while also professing “no doubts” currently about America’s commitment to his country’s security.
Japan is one of the Asian countries that relies on the U.S. for its defense. Photo: Stefani Reynolds/Bloomberg News
South Korea is home to the U.S.’s largest overseas military base, with some 28,500 personnel. Any drawdown in troops could accelerate calls inside the country for an indigenous nuclear program.
Asian countries are also grappling with the threat of more U.S. tariffs and several, including Thailand and Vietnam, have been hit by the administration’s freeze on foreign aid. Trump has called South Korea a “money machine” and said he wants Seoul to shoulder a bigger portion of the shared military costs for the U.S. troop presence. He accused Taiwan of taking away American semiconductor business, a claim that Wu, the NSC head, denied on Thursday.
Lynn Kuok, a fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Asia Policy Studies in Washington, said Trump may ultimately want an economic settlement with China and that his realignment on Ukraine should give America’s allies in the region second thoughts.
“If Washington is willing to cut a deal with Putin at Europe’s expense,” she said, “Asia can only ask whether it will do the same with Xi at Asia’s expense.”
Write to Gabriele Steinhauser at Gabriele.Steinhauser@wsj.com, Joyu Wang at joyu.wang@wsj.com and Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com
2. South Korean lawmaker heads to Ukraine to study North Korean involvement in war
Seems like a pretty clear litmus test for South Korean politics. If you are unable to support POWs from north Korea seeking asylum in the South or unable to condemn north Korea's contribution to Putin's War then it is not difficult to discern one's political leanings.
South Korean lawmaker heads to Ukraine to study North Korean involvement in war
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · February 23, 2025
On North Korean captives reportedly wanting to defect to Seoul, People Power Party expresses support; Democratic Party withholds stance
"I have just boarded the train to Kyiv, just me and my aide," People Power Party Rep. Yu Yong-weon said in a post on his Facebook on Sunday.
Rep. Yu Yong-weon of the People Power Party is heading to Ukraine's Kyiv to learn about North Korea's military presence in the war.
The first-time lawmaker said in a statement Sunday that he would be meeting with Ukrainian government and military officials to discuss North Korea's input in the war.
"I wish to listen to Ukrainian officials' first-hand accounts of how North Korean troops are fighting in the battles, gaining experience in modern warfare, and with their insights, possibly help our military come up with countermeasures," Yu said.
Yu added that he was not visiting as a representative of his party or the South Korean government, but as an individual lawmaker.
"I am visiting Ukraine as the first South Korean lawmaker since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, which gives me a sense of mission," he said.
Yu said through his visit he also wished to strengthen solidarity between Ukrainian and South Korean lawmakers, and discuss cooperation on postwar reconstruction.
Earlier this week, the People Power Party said North Korean captives in Ukraine should be extended government support for their defection to South Korea.
"If any of the North Korean soldiers who are held captive in Ukraine wish to repatriate to South Korea, our government should strive to make the necessary efforts," Rep. Kwon Young-se, the People Power Party's leader, said Thursday.
Kwon, who served as minister of inter-Korean affairs, said that if the North Korean captives are returned to North Korea, they would likely face death.
The Democratic Party of Korea, on the other hand, has refrained from commenting on where they stand on North Korean soldiers reportedly conveying their wish to defect to South Korea.
"I think the Democratic Party will get to speak about where we stand on their wishing to defect to South Korea in time," Rep. Kim Min-seok, the Democratic Party's supreme council, told a press conference Sunday.
At the same press conference, Kim touted "progress in inter-Korean relations" as one of Rep. Lee Jae-myung's feats as a leader of the party that has the majority in the Assembly.
Asked to elaborate, Kim said, "Even before Yoon's Dec. 3 declaration of martial law, we have said that inter-Korean relations should not be used for domestic politics. That has been our guiding principle."
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · February 23, 2025
3. N. Korea threatens to use 'strategic means' in response to S. Korea-U.S. air drills
Political warfare and blackmail diplomacy.
N. Korea threatens to use 'strategic means' in response to S. Korea-U.S. air drills | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 22, 2025
SEOUL, Feb. 22 (Yonhap) -- North Korea warned Saturday it will mobilize "strategic means" against what it called strategic threats from the United States and other adversaries, in response to a joint military exercise between South Korea and the U.S. involving a U.S. strategic bomber.
The chief of the press office at North Korea's defense ministry issued a statement after Seoul and Washington staged combined air drills, involving at least one B-1B bomber, on Thursday for the first time since the launch of the Trump administration.
"The DPRK will counter the strategic threat of the U.S. and other enemies with strategic means and continue its responsible military activities to control and manage the unstable security environment on the Korean Peninsula with powerful deterrence," the official was quoted as saying by the Korean Central News Agency.
DPRK stands for North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
North Korea claimed that since the Trump administration took office last month, the U.S. has been intensifying its military provocations threatening the security of the North.
North Korea's rapid and accelerating move to bolster its nuclear force is a "realistic requirement for coping with the military threat from the U.S. and its satellite countries which are getting more rampant recently," the official argued.
North Korea has long denounced a joint military exercise between South Korea and the U.S. as a rehearsal for invasion though the allies said such drills are defensive in nature. The North has used Seoul-Washington's military drills as a pretext for provocations.
South Korea and the United States conduct joint air drills on Feb. 20, 2025, in this photo provided by the South's defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 22, 2025
4. Top diplomat discusses bilateral, security issues with counterparts at G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting
Top diplomat discusses bilateral, security issues with counterparts at G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-02-23/national/diplomacy/Top-diplomat-discusses-bilateral-security-issues-with-counterparts-at-G20-Foreign-Ministers-Meeting/2248051?detailWord=
Published: 23 Feb. 2025, 16:30
Updated: 23 Feb. 2025, 16:45
- LIM JEONG-WON
- lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr
South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, right, and High Representative of the European Union (EU) Kaja Kallas shake hands during their meeting on the sidelines of the G20 foreign ministers' meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, on Feb. 22. [NEWS1]
South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul stressed the importance of strategic partnerships in a series of meetings with foreign ministers from European and African countries in a Group of 20 foreign ministerial meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, over Thursday and Friday, Seoul’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Saturday.
Cho also said in an interview with Yonhap News Agency on the sidelines of the G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Saturday that South Korea’s strategic value in the international community remains unchanged even under its current acting presidency amid ongoing political uncertainties regarding the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol.
Seoul's top envoy held bilateral talks with the foreign ministers of Spain, the European Union (EU), the Netherlands, Algeria and South Africa on Friday and discussed ways to strengthen substantive cooperation, according to the Foreign Ministry.
Cho evaluated the expanding and developing South Korea-EU relations in his bilateral talks with High Representative of the European Union (EU) Kaja Kallas, and Kallas said that she values cooperation with South Korea, a defense industry powerhouse.
Related Article
The two sides agreed to continue consultations to implement the Security and Defense Partnership and to continue efforts to cooperate in areas of practical cooperation such as the economy and science and technology.
Cho and the foreign ministers of the EU, the Netherlands and Spain also exchanged opinions on issues of common interest such as the war in Ukraine and the status of the armistice negotiations, U.S.-North Korea relations after the launch of the new U.S. administration, the situation on the Korean Peninsula and illegal military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.
In his first bilateral meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veltkamp, Cho assessed that the two countries are deepening their strategic partnership in various areas such as diplomacy, security and the economy.
Veltkamp evaluated that South Korea is stabilizing its domestic situation through democratic procedures and expressed hope that the partnership between the two countries will be further developed based on this.
The two ministers also agreed to continue consultations on the establishment of a "semiconductor alliance" by holding a foreign affairs and industry two-plus-two ministerial meeting as soon as possible.
Cho also said that he would like to activate major consultative bodies such as a strategic dialogue and economic joint committees with Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares Bueno to promote substantive cooperation, and that he hopes to discuss joint advancement plans with third countries such as those in Central and South America based on these.
South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul delivers remarks during a session of the foreign ministers' meeting of the Group of 20 nations in Johannesburg, South Africa, in this photo provided by the foreign ministry in Seoul on Feb. 22. [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]
Cho discussed ways to expand cooperation in areas such as trade, investment and defense in bilateral meetings with South African Foreign Minister Ronald Ozzy Lamola and Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf.
Cho also held meetings with the British and Australian foreign ministers the day before to discuss ways to strengthen cooperation and exchange positions on global issues.
Cho further addressed concerns regarding South Korea’s domestic political situation affecting its diplomacy during an interview with Yonhap News Agency in Johannesburg.
“South Korea has sufficient strategic value in the international community, and this remains unchanged even under an acting presidency,” said Cho.
He also stressed the importance of South Korea strengthening ties with other middle-power countries, citing growing global uncertainties following the launch of the second Donald Trump administration.
“We must now expand our sights beyond the four powers near the Korean Peninsula [of the United States, China, Japan and Russia], the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” said Cho, referring to the Netherlands, Australia and Canada and middle powers.
BY LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]
5. Industry minister to visit U.S. as early as this week for talks on new tariff scheme
(LEAD) Industry minister to visit U.S. as early as this week for talks on new tariff scheme | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · February 23, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with tariff plan, deputy trade minister's visit)
SEOUL, Feb. 23 (Yonhap) -- South Korean Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun will pay a visit to the United States as early as this week for discussions on new U.S. import tariff plans, a government official said Sunday.
The proposed visit comes as U.S. President Donald Trump announced plans to impose tariffs on imported goods starting in April.
"We are currently arranging with U.S. officials to lock the date for Ahn's visit," a senior government official said, adding the trip could take place as early as this week.
"We are swiftly moving to put forward our stance on the matter and have it reflected before the U.S. launches its trade policy in full swing," the official added.
Ahn is known to be arranging meetings with senior U.S. officials in charge of trade and commerce, including Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick and Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, and senior officials of the National Economic Council (NEC), among others.
During the visit, Ahn plans to stress South Korea's position as an important U.S. partner in manufacturing and high-tech industry, including steel, automotive and semiconductors, as part of efforts to minimize potential damage from the U.S. import tariff plan.
Earlier this month, Trump officially announced a 25 percent tariff on all steel and aluminum imports to the U.S., and ordered his administration to review "reciprocal" tariffs to match tariff rates that other countries impose on U.S. exports.
South Korea's Deputy Trade Minister Park Jong-won traveled to Washington last week for meetings with officials from the White House and the commerce department, as well as the office of the U.S. Trade Representative, in which he said he urged the U.S. to exclude South Korea from its new tariff plans.
Park earlier said he highlighted the mutually beneficial trade relations between the allies under their bilateral free trade agreement that has nearly removed all tariffs on goods traded between the countries since its implementation in 2013.
Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun gives an opening speech during minister-level talks with his Czech Republic counterpart on Feb. 17, 2025. (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · February 23, 2025
6. Korean biz lobby chief says more U.S. investment could be considered on incentives
(2nd LD) Korean biz lobby chief says more U.S. investment could be considered on incentives | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · February 23, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS more info in last 3 paras)
WASHINGTON, Feb. 23 (Yonhap) -- Chey Tae-won, chairman of SK Group who also serves as the head of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), has said the chips-to-battery conglomerate could consider making more investments in the United States should there be incentives to do so under the new Donald Trump administration.
Chey made the remark when asked if his group had more investment plans in the U.S. while meeting with reporters on the sidelines of a forum hosted by the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies, a think tank affiliated with the SK Group, in Washington on Friday.
"The Trump administration says it wants more production facilities in the United States, but we also need to have incentives," said the KCCI chief. "(The United States) says it would lower taxes but there is nothing (specific) as of yet. So we need to keep watching."
"We can then reflect it in our planning but nothing has come out yet."
SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won (C) speaks to reporters on the sidelines of the 2025 Trans-Pacific Dialogue hosted by the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies at a hotel in Washington on Feb. 21, 2025, in this pool photo. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
When asked about what those incentives could be, Chey said it would not necessarily have to be about money but noted that South Korea and the U.S. need to work together for mutual benefits.
Regarding the high cost of labor in the U.S. that could make it a less attractive destination for investment, Chey said discussions have yet to advance to that stage.
But he said the situation is different by industry, noting that it may be a better time now for the artificial intelligence (AI) sector to invest in the U.S. than other countries.
The remarks come after South Korean companies, including those under SK Group, invested a total of US$160 billion in the U.S. over the past eight years since the launch of the first Trump administration and through the Biden administration.
Chey said his group would also have to wait for the Trump administration's review of possible changes to subsidies given under the Inflation Reduction Act passed during the Biden administration.
"The new administration is now appointing new people, and they say they will make an announcement by at least April, so let's wait," he said.
During the two-day Trans-Pacific Dialogue that kicked off Friday in Washington, Chey called for cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan in the AI and energy sectors, describing it as a "necessity, not a choice," according to SK Group.
He proposed an industrial partnership between the three countries, saying they could create greater synergy in the global market if they join forces, especially for AI in the manufacturing sector, energy, shipbuilding, shipping and nuclear energy, it said.
Chey said competition for AI leadership will likely unfold in the manufacturing sector despite the current focus on the financial and services sectors, calling for efforts to quickly devise a strategy for cooperation between the three countries, according to the group.
SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won speaks during the Trans-Pacific Dialogue 2025 organized by the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies at a hotel in Washington on Feb. 21, 2025, in this photo provided by the company. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Meanwhile, Chey met with new U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick before his swearing-in ceremony on Friday, discussing ways to strengthen economic cooperation between the two countries and highlighting the scale of Korean investment in the U.S.
As the KCCI chief, Chey is leading an industrial delegation to Washington, where he is meeting with officials from the White House, the Department of the Treasury and Congress.
"We carefully prepared topics that would be of interest to the U.S., and our discussions were well received," Chey said. "We worked closely to identify key issues worth addressing, and I believe they appreciated all the points we presented."
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · February 23, 2025
7. The future of bureaucracy in the age of AI (A view from South Korea)
Excerpts:
A new era of government overhaul
Public sector reform was a major political issue during the Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan administrations, ushering in the era of neoliberalism. Concepts like efficiency, competition and performance evaluation, once exclusive to private corporations, were introduced into the public sector, fundamentally challenging the fortress of bureaucracy for the first time since the birth of the modern state.
Yet even then, these reforms only disrupted bureaucracies run by human beings — they did not herald a new age where nonhuman entities would take control.
Now, let’s turn our eyes to Korea in 2025.
Following President Yoon Suk Yeol’s declaration of martial law last year, the political landscape has grown so turbulent that predicting the near future seems impossible.
Beyond Korea’s internal chaos, the world is engaged in high-stakes battles over tariffs, trade and technological supremacy. Regardless of political motives, global powers are moving forward with government overhauls aimed at boosting national competitiveness.
The era of government monopolies and asymmetrical information flows between bureaucrats, citizens, businesses and consumers is coming to an end.
For Korea to navigate this new reality, it must urgently formulate a national strategy that transcends partisan divides and establish an implementation body to drive it forward.
The transformation of government, bureaucracy and state power is no longer a distant theoretical discussion — it is happening now.
Monday
February 24, 2025
The future of bureaucracy in the age of AI
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-02-24/opinion/columns/The-future-of-bureaucracy-in-the-age-of-AI---/2248066
Published: 24 Feb. 2025, 00:02
Choi Chang-yong
The author, a professor at Seoul National University's Graduate School of Public Administration, is an advisory board member of the JoongAng Ilbo Reset Korea campaign.
In the mid-1970s, about a decade after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in the United States, many political scientists studied what they called the “irreversible conditions of democracy.” Their research suggested that once free elections were established and a country reached a certain income level — specifically, a per capita GDP of $15,000 — democracy would become consolidated and irreversible.
Half a century later, however, in 2025, two nations once considered models of democracy — the United States and South Korea — find themselves facing deep democratic crises, despite their economic success and technological advancements.
Beyond the political turmoil, another major upheaval looms on the horizon — government reform and bureaucratic transformation. While trade wars and tariff policies dominated discussions during Donald Trump’s presidency, an even more profound shift in governance is unfolding.
Applicants head to testing sites to take the first round of exams to become grade 5 civil servants or diplomats in March 2023, in Gangnam District, southern Seoul. [THE MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT]
Shortly after Trump’s election, The Economist ran a cover story featuring Elon Musk with the headline “Disrupter-in-Chief,” predicting the radical restructuring of government under a newly established Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). The DOGE, a direct White House entity, was tasked with streamlining governance. Having dealt with extensive regulations in space exploration and Tesla’s operations, Musk had become convinced that government itself was an obstacle to growth.
Now, the Trump administration is poised to slash $2 trillion from the federal budget — which currently stands at $7 trillion — and is demanding justifications for the 90,000 pages of federal regulations that govern the country.
The Heritage Foundation’s "Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Project" (2023), affiliated with the "Project 2025" political initiative, laid out a blueprint for dismantling the administrative state. The Trump administration has pledged to abolish federal agencies that hinder decentralization and privatization and plans to reinstate "Schedule F," an executive order that would allow the president to dismiss career bureaucrats at will — effectively eroding civil service protections.
A key indicator of this aggressive reform agenda is the recent decision to shut down USAID, the United States Agency for International Development, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy for over 60 years. This move signals that government restructuring will be deep and far-reaching.
Meanwhile, Yuval Noah Harari has been issuing warnings about the future, particularly about how AI will reshape bureaucracy. With the rise of ChatGPT and other AI technologies, he argues that AI will soon replace human bureaucrats in their role as intermediaries between government and society.
Related Article
AI will collect policy data, analyze patterns and ultimately formulate more precise policies than humans. This will lead to the emergence of a “nonorganic digital bureaucracy," which could render traditional bureaucratic concepts like expertise, commitment, political neutrality and job security obsolete — mere relics to be studied in public administration textbooks.
A new era of government overhaul
Public sector reform was a major political issue during the Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan administrations, ushering in the era of neoliberalism. Concepts like efficiency, competition and performance evaluation, once exclusive to private corporations, were introduced into the public sector, fundamentally challenging the fortress of bureaucracy for the first time since the birth of the modern state.
Yet even then, these reforms only disrupted bureaucracies run by human beings — they did not herald a new age where nonhuman entities would take control.
Now, let’s turn our eyes to Korea in 2025.
Following President Yoon Suk Yeol’s declaration of martial law last year, the political landscape has grown so turbulent that predicting the near future seems impossible.
A Cabinet meeting takes place at the government complex in Jongno District, central Seoul, on Dec. 17, 2024 [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
Beyond Korea’s internal chaos, the world is engaged in high-stakes battles over tariffs, trade and technological supremacy. Regardless of political motives, global powers are moving forward with government overhauls aimed at boosting national competitiveness.
The era of government monopolies and asymmetrical information flows between bureaucrats, citizens, businesses and consumers is coming to an end.
For Korea to navigate this new reality, it must urgently formulate a national strategy that transcends partisan divides and establish an implementation body to drive it forward.
The transformation of government, bureaucracy and state power is no longer a distant theoretical discussion — it is happening now.
Translated using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
8. “I never saw a proclamation with president’s signature,” says former JCS martial law chief
I think people forget that Martial Law in the time of war is a critical action that is taken for the defense of Korea. I think some would be surprised to learn there is a Martial Law Division at the ROK JCS.
“I never saw a proclamation with president’s signature,” says former JCS martial law chief
donga.com
Posted February. 22, 2025 07:16,
Updated February. 22, 2025 07:16
“I never saw a proclamation with president’s signature,” says former JCS martial law chief. February. 22, 2025 07:16. by 조응형기자 yesbro@donga.com.
At the fourth hearing of the National Assembly’s Special Committee on the National Investigation into the Allegations of Insurrection through the Proclamation of Martial Law by the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration, held on Friday, testimony was given indicating procedural flaws in the drafting process of the martial law proclamation issued during the Dec 3 martial law.
Kwon Young-hwan, former chief of the Martial Law Division at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (Colonel), said at the National Assembly, “To draft a proclamation, a martial law declaration with the president’s signature must be in place. As the JCS Martial Law Division Chief at the time, responsible for support duties, the fact is that I never saw the first martial law proclamation (official notice) with the president’s signature.”
According to the JCS Martial Law Operations Manual’s ‘Procedures for Handling Martial Law Documents,’ the JCS Martial Law Division is supposed to receive the official notice, signed by the president, from the Ministry of National Defense. The division then coordinates with relevant departments such as the Ministry of Justice, obtains approval from the Martial Law Commander, and finally secures the president’s final authorization before issuing the notice. However, according to former Chief Kwon, these preliminary procedures were not properly followed when martial law was declared. He said, “I never saw the signed proclamation (official notice), but toward the end of the martial law period, I did see an unsigned copy from another source.”
한국어
donga.com
9. IAEA chief calls for engagement with North Korea amid nuclear arsenal concerns
I would like for these officials to include their description of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime whenever they call for engagement. Engagement can be useful if it is part of a political warfare strategy to counter the regime's political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy based on a through understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime (Yes I know I sound like I'm in charge of the Department of Redundancy Department but I cannot be redundant enough in emphasizing the absolute requirement for understanding the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime as the foundation for any engagement with the north.)
IAEA chief calls for engagement with North Korea amid nuclear arsenal concerns
He also urged for agency to establish presence in country as new DPRK sanctions monitoring body met for first time
https://www.nknews.org/2025/02/iaea-chief-calls-for-engagement-with-north-korea-amid-nuclear-arsenal-concerns/
Anton Sokolin February 21, 2025
Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency Rafael Grossi after collecting seawater samples near the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on Feb. 19, 2025 | Image: Grossi via X
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seeks to re-engage with North Korea and establish its presence in the country, the organization’s chief said in Tokyo on Thursday, expressing concerns over the DPRK’s de-facto possession of a nuclear arsenal.
Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi’s remarks came during a press conference after his talks with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and the agency’s collection of sea water samples near the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station following the release of treated water into the ocean.
The IAEA’s chief called the “existence of a very important nuclear weapons arsenal” in the DPRK a “factor of international concern,” noting that Pyongyang’s unwillingness to heed U.N. resolutions aimed at stemming its nuclear ambitions.
“They see themselves — between codes — as a nuclear weapon state, although we know in legal terms this is not acceptable for the international community, but it’s also a fact.”
Grossi stated that Ishiba informed him of his talks with U.S. President Donald Trump and the “validity of the concept of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” while conceding that the task currently remains out of reach.
Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency Rafael Grossi and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba on Feb. 20, 2025 | Image: Foreign ministry of Japan
To that end, the director general proposed reestablishing “some engagement, some presence by the IAEA” in North Korea, noting that the agency last accessed the country’s nuclear facilities in 2009.
“My impression is that there are areas like nuclear safety where we could try to establish some form of engagement,” Grossi said, highlighting the role of Japan and China in the process.
“I think this is a matter where all countries, especially those who sustain the nuclear nonproliferation regime, have a special responsibility and should help us re-engage, albeit gradually, with the DPRK in this regard.”
Grossi’s reconciliatory comments came some months after he accused Pyongyang of violating international sanctions by continuing to develop its nuclear program, specifically by commissioning a light-water reactor and enriching nuclear fuel at an undeclared facility.
His previous statement drew attention as DPRK leader Kim Jong Un visited the country’s second uranium enrichment base located at the Kangson complex near Pyongyang, as shown by NK Pro analysis.
The introduction of a new nuclear enrichment facility in addition to the disclosed Yongbyon nuclear complex likely indicates North Korea’s expanded capabilities in producing fissile material.
His remarks also come amid Pyongyang’s continuous insistence that its nuclear weapons are not a “bargaining chip” and denuclearization demands raised by the U.S., Japan and South Korea are “absurd.”
Meanwhile, a new U.S.-led sanctions monitoring body, which came into being after the dissolution of the U.N. Panel of Experts last year, held the first meeting of its Steering Committee in Washington on Wednesday, according to a ROK foreign ministry press release.
The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) uniting 11 countries, including the U.S., UK, South Korea and Japan, seeks to support U.N. sanctions on the DPRK by “publishing reports and information based on rigorous inquiry into relevant sanctions violations and evasion attempts as well as successful enforcement efforts.”
MSMT states reaffirmed their commitment to international peace and global nonproliferation, vowing to counter the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction and missile threats, while calling on other nations to join efforts against Pyongyang and U.N. sanctions violators.
The group has yet to publish its first report on the DPRK’s breaches of international sanctions, with little information on the new monitoring mechanism available, but it has already triggered a strong response from the DPRK.
In October, shortly after the MSMT’s inception, DPRK foreign minister Choe Son Hui called the group “unlawful and illegitimate,” while warning that the mechanism’s members will “pay a dear price” for taking part in the “smearing campaign against the DPRK.”
Edited by Alannah Hill
10. [Washington Talk] “China’s Nuclear Power Reinforcement is Critical to Korea’s National Interests… US Considers Redeployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons”
This is Google translation of the VOA report.
You can watch the VOA weekly show, "Washington Talk" at this link (in English). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dwUi9v0tYKc
[Washington Talk] “China’s Nuclear Power Reinforcement is Critical to Korea’s National Interests… US Considers Redeployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons”
2025.2.23
Ham Ji-ha
https://www.voakorea.com/a/7985136.html
The Dongfeng-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) appears at a military parade held in Beijing, China in 2019. (File photo)
U.S. military experts have warned that China and North Korea are building up “nuclear forces that can actually be used in war” beyond simple nuclear deterrence. They analyzed that China is not only increasing ICBMs aimed at the U.S. mainland, but also accelerating the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons that can directly strike the military bases and naval forces of U.S. allies. They pointed out that this expansion of China’s nuclear forces is highly likely to encourage further nuclear provocations by North Korea, which would be fatal to South Korea. Accordingly, they suggested that we need to comprehensively review our nuclear posture, including all options, such as the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, South Korea’s own nuclear armament, and NATO-style nuclear sharing. Reporter Ham Ji-ha summarized the conversation between Heritage Foundation researcher Robert Peters and former North Korea National Intelligence Service Director Marcus Galuskas, who appeared on VOA’s “Washington Talk” on the 22nd.
Host) As China rapidly expands its tactical and intermediate-range nuclear forces, concerns are growing about the possibility of Chinese nuclear coercion against the United States and its allies. How do you think China’s nuclear buildup will affect the nuclear balance in Northeast Asia, especially South Korea?
Robert Peters) It fundamentally changes the military balance in the region. It also changes the strategic stability of the region. In 1991, the United States completely withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons from East Asia, and over the past 20 years, North Korea has been building a small but increasingly larger, more diverse, and more powerful nuclear arsenal. China is not only building larger ICBMs that can reach North America, but it is also developing nuclear weapons that can operate at a theater range and have tunable yields. These nuclear weapons can target U.S. and allied bases from Japan to Australia, as well as U.S. Navy ships over the horizon. In other words, China is building a force that can wage a real nuclear war. It fundamentally changes not only how Americans think about security in the region, but also how our allies and partners in the region should think about China’s actions and intentions. It is completely changing the security environment in the region, and we have to accept that.
Host) China has already put pressure on Korea regarding the deployment of THAAD and the US-ROK-Japan security cooperation. Will China’s strengthening of nuclear power further deepen the strategic dilemma that Korea faces between the US and China?
(Former analyst Marcus Galuskas)
I don’t think South Korea is equidistant between the US and China. South Korea just calculates risks differently on these issues. But ultimately, China’s nuclear buildup poses a huge risk to stability in the region and significantly increases the likelihood of conflict. This includes the possibility that it will encourage North Korea to escalate its attacks on South Korea. It also includes the possibility of a Taiwanese war that would drag the Korean Peninsula into conflict. So anything that would cause China to risk conflict, like the nuclear buildup, would ultimately be incredibly damaging to South Korea’s national interests. Again, even if South Korea’s risk calculations are somewhat different from those of the US.
Host) You just said that China's nuclear expansion is emboldening North Korea. So what effect will China's nuclear buildup have on North Korea's nuclear strategy? Is there a possibility that North Korea will adopt a more aggressive nuclear posture? Following China?
(Former Analyst Galuskas) In some ways, it seems like China is following North Korea. For example, in terms of building a tactical nuclear capability. There is a synergy between the three nuclear-armed adversaries that the United States and its allies face. Russia is supporting North Korea, protecting it from sanctions, and providing resources and capabilities to increase the threat from North Korea. China, like Russia, is protecting North Korea from sanctions and essentially providing a safety net for North Korea. Ultimately, if North Korea is in a situation where its own actions lead to regime collapse, there is always the possibility that China will step in and save the regime from its own self-inflicted disaster, just as China did in 1950. So the more powerful and capable China becomes, the more likely North Korea is to perceive that its strategic situation is favorable and that it can take more risks. We have done a lot of analysis and exercise on this. The more powerful China becomes, the more likely North Korea is to accept the possibility of conflict.
Host) China's nuclear buildup is more of an opportunity than a threat to North Korea.
(Former analyst Galoskas) Of course.
Host) How will China's nuclear buildup affect the strategic calculations of the US-ROK and US-Japan alliances? And will this move by China lead to a strengthening or reevaluation of the US's extended deterrence of its alliances?
Peters) The United States will not reevaluate its extended deterrence against Japan and South Korea. That will remain the same. However, there may come a time when the United States says, “Given the expansion of nuclear forces not only in North Korea but also in China, do we need to change our nuclear force posture in the region?” In particular, I would like to refer to China’s force as a “nuclear warfare weapon.” Building a capability to threaten an enemy’s homeland is a very different matter than building a capability to directly destroy an enemy’s battle formation. That is, having a force designed to strike troop deployments, military bases, supply bases, and naval vessels is a completely different matter. The biggest difference that the United States is struggling with right now is not just that China is building up its conventional forces. China has the largest navy in the world, and it is developing fifth-generation fighters. It is building a lot of missiles that can hit Taiwan. We also need to pay attention to why China is building up its nuclear force so that it can directly destroy the battle formations of the United States and its allies. In that respect, the United States may have to ask, "Is it necessary to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons, which have not been deployed since the end of the Cold War, to East Asia?"
(Former Analyst Galuskas) The key here is the synergy of the ability to threaten the U.S. homeland with ICBMs, combined with the credible ability to conduct tactical nuclear strikes in the region. This applies to both China and North Korea. These two countries are working together. A lot of the discussion right now is about China’s ICBM buildup. But Peters’ argument is that China is building the ability to strike in the region, essentially building the ability to conduct nuclear warfare. This is enabled and supported by China’s near-equal stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons. So they work together. I think Peters is absolutely right to raise this issue.
Peters) Let me just say, what I worry about and what others worry about is, if there is a conventional war between the United States and the U.S.-led coalition and China or North Korea, and the enemy has low-yield tactical nuclear weapons with theater range, and the U.S.-led coalition doesn't have tactical nuclear weapons in the region, and the U.S.-led coalition is winning that conventional war, then the enemy in China or North Korea could think, 'I have low-yield tactical nuclear weapons with theater range. I can use these weapons to turn the tide of the conflict and win.' That's a very dangerous temptation, if you're in China or North Korea, especially if the United States doesn't have something in the region to respond to in a corresponding way. That's what's worrying.
Host) Do you agree with Researcher Peters' opinion that the United States should reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons into the region? Do you think that is the best option for the interests of both Korea and the United States?
(Former Analyst Galuskas) The key is capability. Whether it’s reintroducing nuclear gravity bombs from bombers or deploying cruise missiles with nuclear warheads from submarines, we have to analyze all the specific options. But the basic premise is absolutely valid. We have to have better response capabilities at the theater or tactical level. It depends on whether you’re talking about low-yield or whatever term you use. I think it’s a more open question of what the best options are, both in the short term and in the long term. Unfortunately, the exploration of these options has been inhibited. First, because of a reluctance to recognize how big a challenge this is. Second, because of the perception that introducing capabilities to balance our adversaries is destabilizing or dangerous. But in reality, that gap is the danger. I would argue that we haven’t even analyzed that. Partly because it’s been taboo to talk seriously about what capabilities we might reintroduce. We need to have that discussion now, among our allies and among the American people. These are capabilities that ultimately have to be developed with taxpayer money. I don’t know what the best answer is right now. Partly because we've been too afraid to prepare ourselves to find the answers.
Host) You said we need to explore various options. What about NATO-style nuclear sharing, which some Koreans want?
(Former Analyst Galuskas) I think that's an option that we have to consider. I think we have to look at a variety of options, including the possibility that South Korea could have its own nuclear weapons under its own sovereign control. So we have to look at all the possible capabilities and options, and the risks and benefits of each option. That way, we can make a truly informed decision.
Host) You said, “under the sovereign control of the country.” Are you implying that Korea possesses its own nuclear weapons?
(Former Analyst Galuskas) No, I didn't imply that. I mean, that's one of the possibilities that we need to look at right now, given how bad the situation is. It's one option that needs to be included in the discussion.
Host) How would you respond to the claim that redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would provide the enemy with a target to strike or cause instability in the region?
Peters) People who make that argument underestimate the threat that exists today. Even if the U.S. nuclear weapons were to be redeployed to the theater, there are only a limited number of key sites where they can be stored, primarily Air Force bases. And those key sites are already recognized as potential targets by adversaries. So those sites don't suddenly jump to the top of the list of targets just because they're stored there. Whether they're in the U.S. or in Korea, any site that can be used to deploy those weapons would already be attacked in the event of a conflict. So I don't think those sites are suddenly going to become new targets. And I think Director Galuskas is absolutely right about whether that would be destabilizing. If one side has these capabilities and continues to invest in them and mature them and deploys them, and the other side does nothing about it, then that gap in capability is what's destabilizing. So we have to analyze it. As Director Galuskas said, we need to analyze what are the pros and cons, the risks and rewards of going down this path or going down another path? Is it a NATO-style nuclear sharing system, or is it entirely under American control? Is there a possibility that one day the alliance will become a nuclear power? Again, Director Galuskas is right. We are too afraid to do that analysis to even know what the answers to those questions are.
Host) What do you think is the difference between deploying US strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula and deploying them on Guam? Some say there isn't much of a difference. Do you think there is a difference? In terms of deterring North Korea and China.
Researcher Peters) Is there a difference? Yes, I would say there is. There is a geographical difference. Guam is much further from the front lines than Korea. Given the nature of the threats in Northeast Asia, if you launch from Guam, the flight time to reach the target is much longer. Having the ability to operate nuclear forces in a place like Korea gives you a lot more options to threaten enemy targets. That's why Korea is an attractive option.
Host) What is the difference between permanently deploying tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and rotating them?
Peters) All of those options need to be explored within the United States and have those conversations with South Korea. They all have their pros and cons. If we had a rotational deployment, it would give us the ability to signal, "We're going to move these nuclear forces to the theater in response to this crisis that we've identified." But I think that having these nuclear weapons relatively permanently in South Korea would have a real deterrent effect. The way NATO operates. We've had nuclear weapons in certain bases in Europe for decades. And there are benefits to having a permanent nuclear presence.
Host) Bipin Narang, who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy in the Biden administration, said at the Munich Security Conference last week that deploying tactical nuclear weapons, the B-61, in South Korea would be very vulnerable, as they would have little survivability against a nuclear North Korea and would be the first target in a crisis or conflict. He also said that in the Indo-Pacific environment, extended deterrence is a much more survivable and effective deterrent because it is inherently invisible. What are your thoughts?
(Former Analyst Galuskas) Former Deputy Secretary of State Vipin Narang is a very brilliant thinker, and I respect his analysis. But the assumption that North Korea would strike the nuclear forces on the Korean Peninsula first in a war suggests that North Korea is willing to take a significant risk. That could lead to a nuclear retaliation. If North Korea were to strike the nuclear forces on the first day of a war, the United States could respond with nuclear weapons located outside the Korean Peninsula. So I don’t agree with that logic. But generally speaking, capabilities that are difficult for North Korea to track and attack can be very useful. That’s why I, and many experts, support submarine-launched cruise missiles that can carry nuclear warheads. There are many other options, including short-range ground-launched mobile nuclear forces. There are many nuclear capabilities. We should not preemptively rule out the option of deploying nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula until we have completed our analysis. In particular, we should not avoid deploying nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula just because North Korea poses a nuclear threat. Just because North Korea can strike them. If that’s the logic, everything becomes vulnerable. So should the US troops in Korea also be withdrawn? Because they will be targets on the first day of the war? That logic simply does not make sense. Again, I respect the analysis of the former Deputy Secretary and myself. However, I cannot help but disagree with the premise of that answer. To be fair, I may not have fully understood his point because I did not hear his remarks directly.
Host) According to a recent Atlantic Council survey of experts around the world, 40% of respondents predicted that South Korea will possess nuclear weapons within the next 10 years. This is the third highest figure, following Iran (73%) and Saudi Arabia (42%). Why do you think this has increased by 15 percentage points in just one year?
(Former Analyst Galuskas) First of all, thank you for citing the Atlantic Council's excellent forecasting work. They're a great team. I'm glad they brought this up and brought it to light. I think the reason that number is up is because of concerns that deterrence is collapsing on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities are continuing to grow virtually unchecked. Again, we haven't taken any more extreme or riskier measures to counter the growing threat from North Korea. So I'm not surprised by that number. I'm not sure that it necessarily reflects a real possibility. This is a survey that helps people understand and think about this issue. But I think that number is largely a response to the growth of North Korea's nuclear capabilities. That's a huge concern, particularly in South Korea, and it's a growing concern in the United States.
Host) Do you think it is realistically possible for Korea to arm itself with nuclear weapons? In addition to diplomatic and political difficulties, what are the technical obstacles that Korea must overcome?
Researcher Peters) There aren't many technological hurdles for Korea to overcome. Korea is one of the most technologically advanced societies on the planet. And if Korea wants to build nuclear weapons, they already have the technical know-how. What I'm saying is that it's understandable that a lot of Koreans want their own nuclear capability. What I'm saying is that it's understandable that Korea wants to have this capability, given the security environment, but if you're really interested in nonproliferation and want to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons states around the world, you have to seriously consider the means and methods that we used to persuade other countries not to pursue their own nuclear weapons. For example, we did that with Germany and Italy during the Cold War. Some of those are things like the nuclear weapons sharing agreements that we had with NATO during the Cold War. It's a deterrence issue, but it's also a guarantee issue. It's saying, 'You don't have to have nuclear weapons. We're here, we're present, we're showing our power.' So the US deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea may be an attempt to deter South Korea's attempts at independent nuclear armament.
(Former Analyst Galuskas) To add to what Peters just said, it’s important to keep in mind where the U.S. nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and the policy focus on the nuclear issue have been in recent years. Our analysis shows that the U.S. has been more responsive to the issue of ensuring the deterrence power of its allies than it has been to actually deterring its adversaries. That’s one of my concerns. In particular, simply put, the U.S. seems more concerned about theoretical nuclear weapons in South Korea than it is about actual nuclear weapons in North Korea and China. That’s not the right way to approach the issue. I agree with Peters that we need to provide assurance to our allies. But when we think about our nuclear posture in the Indo-Pacific, the first priority has to be how do we deter our adversaries, and then how do we provide assurance to our allies. But ultimately, the purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter our adversaries and to make sure that they are never used. Assurance is, I think, a secondary goal. But it’s still an important goal.
Host) According to a survey by the Atlantic Council, the possibility of Japan arming itself with nuclear weapons in the next 10 years is 28.6%, higher than Ukraine or Taiwan. Do you think Japan has the potential to develop nuclear weapons very quickly? If Korea were to arm itself with nuclear weapons, what impact would that have on Japan's security strategy?
Peters Researcher) Japan could decide very quickly whether to arm itself with nuclear weapons. Japan could probably acquire nuclear weapons in a very short period of time. If South Korea becomes a nuclear power, Japan would consider very seriously acquiring its own nuclear capability.
Moderator) In an Atlantic Council survey, 24.2% of respondents said that North Korea is likely to use nuclear weapons within the next 10 years. This is similar to the probability of Russia using nuclear weapons. In what scenarios do you think North Korea is likely to use nuclear weapons?
(Former analyst Galuskas) The most likely scenario for North Korea to actually use nuclear weapons on the battlefield is that I think they use their nuclear weapons virtually every day as a means of coercion and deterrence. But if they do launch a limited nuclear attack, the most likely reason would be if they get into a conflict. That conflict is likely to be a situation where they misjudge the alliance between South Korea and the United States. And then if they think they’re going to lose the war, as Peters mentioned, they’re going to use their nuclear weapons to try to end the war. They’re going to use them to secure their regime. I think that’s the most likely scenario.
Anchor) So, it is more likely that North Korea will use nuclear weapons when it is involved in a war, rather than to start one.
(Former analyst Galuskas) Yes, I think that is a possibility. Of course, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that North Korea will use nuclear weapons as the first strike in a war, but I think the most likely scenario is an escalation during a war. In other words, the most likely scenario is that North Korea will use nuclear weapons when it is in danger of defeat in a war already underway.
So far, you've heard a conversation between Robert Peters, a researcher at the Heritage Foundation, and Marcus Galuskas, a former National Intelligence Analyst for North Korea.
※ The above interview video can be viewed on the VOA Korean website and on 'Washington Talk' on YouTube and Facebook.
11. Exclusive: North Korea testing larger new recon drone, pushing deployment plan
Imagery at the link.
Exclusive: North Korea testing larger new recon drone, pushing deployment plan
NK Pro identifies apparent improved Global Hawk copycat UAV in satellite imagery as hanger construction accelerated
Colin Zwirko February 21, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/pro/exclusive-north-korea-testing-larger-new-recon-drone-pushing-deployment-plan/
Kim Jong Un directs flight tests of the Saetbyol-4 (SB-4) reconnaissance drone at Panghyon Airbase in 2023 | Image: KCTV (Jan. 14, 2024)
North Korea appears to be testing a larger version of its Global Hawk copycat reconnaissance drone, according to NK Pro analysis of satellite imagery, while accelerating deployment preparations with new drone hangar construction.
NK Pro is first to report on the apparent new and improved drone model, appearing outside old hangars at Panghyon Airbase in a Planet Labs high-resolution SkySat image taken on Jan. 22.
The aircraft appears similar in design to the Saetbyol-4 reconnaissance drone North Korea unveiled in 2023, but with a wingspan measuring around 40 meters (131 feet) — up to 5 meters longer than the Saetbyol-4.
The new, larger drone appears similar to the Saetbyol-4 reconnaissance drone tested at Panghyon in June 2023, but with a longer wingspan. Cycle between this and the next image in the gallery to compare the sizes of the two aircraft. | Images: Planet Labs, edited by NK Pro
The new, larger drone appears similar to the Saetbyol-4 reconnaissance drone tested at Panghyon in June 2023, but with a longer wingspan. Cycle between this and the next image in the gallery to compare the sizes of the two aircraft. | Images: Planet Labs, edited by NK Pro
North Korea’s larger new drone also sports a similar color scheme to many U.S. RQ-4B Global Hawk reconnaissance drones, like these at Andersen AFB Guam | Image: Google Earth (April 16, 2017), edited by NK Pro
In addition to the previously known aircraft mimicking the U.S.’s RQ-4A Global Hawk in design and now even in color scheme, the increase in size from around 35 to 40 meters also mirrors Washington’s transition to the upgraded RQ-4B with a 39.8-meter wingspan.
This upgrade improved the unmanned aerial vehicle’s (UAV) payload capacity while decreasing its range 800 nautical miles, from 9,500 to 8,700 — meaning North Korea’s upgrade could also have similar implications.
In another sign of efforts to speed up the timeline on deploying these aircraft, Planet Labs imagery shows that work to install roofing on seven new hangars at Panghyon Airbase began between Feb. 14 and 17, located near where the new drone was spotted.
One hangar was covered in red roofing by that time, and work started on a second between Feb. 19 and 20. Roof supports on the structures were installed on all seven hangars as of the Jan. 22 high-resolution image.
Efforts to install roofing on seven new hangars, likely intended to house North Korea’s new UAVs, has finally begun in the last week | Image: Planet Labs (Jan. 25, 2025), edited by NK Pro
Efforts to install roofing on seven new hangars, likely intended to house North Korea’s new UAVs, has finally begun in the last week | Image: Planet Labs (Feb. 17, 2025), edited by NK Pro
Efforts to install roofing on seven new hangars, likely intended to house North Korea’s new UAVs, has finally begun in the last week | Image: Planet Labs (Feb. 19, 2025), edited by NK Pro
Efforts to install roofing on seven new hangars, likely intended to house North Korea’s new UAVs, has finally begun in the last week | Image: Planet Labs (Feb. 20, 2025), edited by NK Pro
The hangar project launched last June but stalled after the basic framework of the structures was erected in August.
If utilizing vertical lifting doors, each hangar will likely be able to accommodate wingspans slightly over 40 meters, which would include both older and newer versions of the Saetbyol-4, as well as the Saetbyol-9 combat drone with its 20-meter wingspan (65-foot). The U.S. has similar-sized hangars for its Global Hawk drones.
The North’s smaller combat drone was first spotted in commercial satellite imagery outside the older hangars at Panghyon in Sept. 2022, while NK Pro was first to report on apparent flight testing of both UAV types at the airbase in June 2023.
Pyongyang officially unveiled both models at a military expo and parade a month later, but state media has been short on details ever since.
When DPRK Leader Kim Jong Un first announced combat and reconnaissance drone development plans at the Jan. 2021 party congress, he said designs were “completed” and “important research” was still being planned.
He didn’t specifically mention a deadline or target timeframe for deployment, but generally presented all weapons goals in the speech in the framework of a five-year plan through the end of 2025.
His direction to produce spy drones “capable of precisely reconnoitering up to 500 km deep into the front” suggests that once deployed, regular Saetbyol-4 operations could involve flights along the inter-Korean border but over DPRK territory.
Pyongyang frequently criticizes U.S. and South Korean reconnaissance flights from international airspace off North Korea’s east and west coasts, but could test Washington and Seoul with similar flights south of the maritime boundary.
However, North Korea has yet to thoroughly demonstrate the capabilities of both new drone models, only showing brief clips of them in flight and not claiming further testing beyond those apparently related to practicing military parade flyovers.
State media has instead focused attention in the last year on plans to mass produce a wide range of small suicide drones, with Kim Jong Un publicly attending two tests last year, one at Panghyon Airbase and another at Pyongyang International Airport.
Meanwhile, construction appears stalled on new production facilities at a nearby factory which could be involved in current suicide drone or larger drone manufacturing.
Edited by Alannah Hill
12. North Korea confiscates dog fur-lined coats from civilians to clothe soldiers
On the one hand I ask how can such a poor, backward and seemingly bankrupt country survive, let alone prevail? On the other hand, the resilience of the regime and the Korean people in the north is both amazing and frightening.
North Korea confiscates dog fur-lined coats from civilians to clothe soldiers
Under-supplied army units need winter gear, and the coats resemble military uniforms.
https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/02/23/north-korea-dog-fur-coat/
By Son Hyemin for RFA Korean
2025.02.23
Korean People's Internal Security Forces (KPISF) service personnel salute at statues of their late leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on Mansu Hill in Pyongyang, North Korea, Sunday, Feb.16, 2020, to commemorate the 78th birthday of Kim Jong Il. (Jon Chol Jin/AP)
North Korean authorities are confiscating winter coats lined with dog fur -- considered a luxury item -- from civilians and giving them to under-supplied soldiers, residents told Radio Free Asia.
The reasons for this campaign that began last month seem to be two-fold: To provide warm gear for army personnel in North Korea’s frigid winters, and to keep civilians from looking like they are wearing winter military uniforms.
“Social security agents have been stopping men wearing dog fur coats on the streets and confiscating them on the spot,” a resident in South Pyongan province, north of the capital Pyongyang, told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for personal safety.
“This is the first time they’ve done something like this,” he said. “They say it is because civilians cannot wear military uniforms.”
In fact, aside from their warmth, the coats’ similarity to military uniforms is one reason why they are popular with civilians, he said.
“It symbolizes authority,” the resident said.
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But few North Koreans can afford them. Only the wealthy can buy the specially-made coats. High quality dog fur-lined coats can cost up to 1 million won (US$50), more than the annual salary at most government-assigned jobs, the resident said.
“They are the best winter clothing because the entire inner layer is lined with dog skin and fur,” he said. “They are expensive and can only be purchased from a specialty clothing maker.”
Supply chain collapse
North Korea’s nearly 1-million strong military has been chronically under-supplied for decades.
Ever since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which provided aid to the country, North Korea’s economy has suffered, and the military has struggled to equip its own personnel.
A North Korean soldier wears a dog fur coat along the Yalu River in 2014. (KBS News)
In principle, North Korean soldiers should receive summer uniforms once a year and winter uniforms every two years, but supplies are erratic.
Things are so dire that last year the military began requiring soldiers to return their uniforms when they are discharged, so that they could be given to other soldiers.
With the military lacking adequate clothes and soldiers shivering in the cold, it’s a bad look for wealthy civilians to be out and about in their toasty dog fur-lined coats, the resident said.
“Only one in 50 men wear these dog fur-lined coats in the city of Unsan,” he said. “I’ve seen it worn by merchants who drive from place to place selling goods, and by the husbands of wealthy women.”
With men required to work for a pittance at government-assigned jobs, most families are really supported by the women, who run small businesses. Women who become successful and wealthy, or who were already born into wealth, can afford to splurge on an expensive coat for their husbands.
Not for the average soldier
In the northwestern province of North Pyongan, the dog fur-lined coats are now a rarity, a resident there told RFA on condition of anonymity.
Civilians “used to show off by wearing their dog-fur coats, but the authorities started confiscating them,” he said. “These kinds of coats are not supplied to the average soldier, but to officers and soldiers stationed at guard posts close to the border with South Korea.”
He said the authorities ask the civilians how they can wear such a luxury when there are soldiers guarding the front line that shiver in tattered second-hand uniforms.
“The soldiers have to participate in winter training,” he said, which means they have to “lie on their bellies on frozen ground, so these dog fur coats are essential to them.”
He said the agents confiscating the coats tell their owners that their clothing will go military units on the front.
“Some of these men protest against this, but they hold their tongues because they don’t want to be punished for speaking out.”
Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
13. Ukrainian 'witch drone' threatens to destroy 200 North Korean 'ju-jae-guns'
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
Ukrainian 'witch drone' threatens to destroy 200 North Korean 'ju-jae-guns'
https://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/c2e0bc15d55cd55cbc18b3c4c2e0bb34ae30b300bc31acfc/fpv-drone-m1989-atesh-ukraine-artillery-02212025154538.html
WASHINGTON-Kim Jin-guk kimj@rfa.org
2025.02.23
Baba Yaga drone of the 412th Nemesis Regiment of the Ukrainian Army
/Source: Ukrainian military
00:00 /16:33
( Host ) We will accurately grasp the current state of the military standoff on the Korean Peninsula and seek a path to peace. This is Kim Jin-guk, presenting 'Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula' from Washington D.C. We will connect with Lee Il-woo, Secretary General of the ' Independent Defense Network ' in Korea .
RKG-3 modified bomb dropped from Baba Yaga drone / Source: Ukrainian military
200 North Korean self-propelled guns deployed in Russian battlefield
( Anchor ) Recently, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced that North Korea provided Russia with over 200 long-range artillery pieces , and we have news that North Korean-supplied artillery weapons have been found not only in the Kursk region on the Russian mainland, but also in the Luhansk region on the eastern front, in the Ukraine that was taken away . Has the Russian military now begun to fully operate North Korean-made self-propelled artillery ?
( Lee Il-woo ) The first intelligence report that Russia had begun introducing artillery weapons, particularly long-range artillery, from North Korea was leaked by the anti-Russian partisan network ' Atest ' , which operates throughout Russia . They sent intelligence to the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Service in October of last year that a new type of self-propelled artillery, not included in the Russian military's structure, had arrived at the Higher Artillery Command School in the Saratov region of Russia , and that North Korean instructors were teaching the Russian military how to use it .
On November 14 , a North Korean self-propelled howitzer was identified passing through the Krasnoorsk railway station in the Siberian region , and on the 18th, a North Korean M1989 'Juche' self-propelled howitzer deployed in the Kursk region was exposed for the first time . Until then, Ukrainian intelligence had only reported that North Korea had supplied around 70 artillery weapons to Russia, including the Juche gun and 240mm multiple rocket launchers , but on February 11 , the South Korean Ministry of National Defense reported to the National Assembly that the total number of long-range artillery units supplied exceeded 200 .
Given the case of the Ukrainian military receiving Western weapons, the time needed to train the operation of a new weapon system is at least 2-3 months and up to a year . If training on the operation of North Korean weapons began in October and mass imports began in November, full-scale deployment could begin in January or February , two to three months later .
This type of self-propelled gun is classified as " heavy artillery " in the Russian military classification due to its large caliber and long range , and is usually deployed as a heavy artillery regiment or heavy artillery brigade . These units perform fire support missions for mobile units of division level or larger , and since the Russian-made 2S7 203mm self-propelled howitzers that have been playing this role have been so worn out that the North Korean-made 170mm Juche gun appears to be serving as a replacement for the 2S7 .
Why did the Russian military deploy self-propelled guns within the Ukrainian firing range ?
( Anchor ) The Ukrainian military has released a video claiming to have destroyed a North Korean self-propelled howitzer with a drone, which has become a hot topic. This self-propelled howitzer is clearly a long-range artillery , and the location where the Ukrainian military destroyed this self-propelled howitzer is reportedly not too far from the front line . Why on earth did Russia deploy this self-propelled howitzer so forward ?
( Lee Il-woo ) The first place where the Ukrainian military revealed that they had destroyed a North Korean self-propelled artillery was the Kupyask region, one of the fiercest battlegrounds on the Eastern Front. This is a place where long-term battles have been taking place , led by the 1st Guards Tank Army, which is classified as an elite force among the Russian ground forces. The area has many bush areas and large and small rivers, making it difficult for the Russian military to attack .
Ukrainian Army 412th Nemesis Regiment Baba Yaga drone destroys Russian Army's 'Thor' air defense system / Source: Ukrainian Army
Russia captured Kupyask in three days at the start of the war, but in the fall of 2022 , Ukraine succeeded in recapturing the city in ten days through high-speed maneuver warfare , and since the spring of 2023, Russia has been conducting a large-scale offensive for the second year, but it is an area where Russia is struggling, having advanced only about 10 km in two years .
The reason why Russia has not achieved much for two years despite its overwhelming superiority in military power is largely due to the terrain, as mentioned above . There are many large and small rivers here, including the Oskil River, so if even a few bridges are broken, it would be difficult to move troops in many places , and to the east of the city of Kupyask, a huge forest blocks the way like a wall, making it difficult for armored units to advance .
That's why there were a lot of victories here, mainly from artillery and drones. When the Russian army attacks with tanks and armored vehicles , the battle unfolds in two forms . When the Russian army moves along the road, avoiding the river and forest , the Ukrainian army lays mines on the road to stop the lead vehicle , and then pours mortar and drone attacks . When the Russian army charges into the forest, their mobility is reduced to the point where it is similar to a person walking , and these mobile units are good prey for artillery .
Because of this, Russia deployed a large number of artillery pieces in the area and tried to penetrate the route with firepower, but the Ukrainian army hunted them down with self-propelled guns provided by the United States and Europe . The Russian field guns have a shorter range and lower accuracy than the Western 155mm self-propelled guns, so Russia lost a lot of artillery pieces in the area .
However, as mentioned earlier, artillery is absolutely necessary to continue offensive operations in this area. If artillery fire does not destroy the Ukrainian trenches, minefields , and obstacles, it will be difficult for the Russian mobile forces to advance in this area where the terrain is already bad . That is why Russia has deployed self-propelled howitzers imported in large quantities from North Korea . The official specifications for North Korea’s 170mm self-propelled howitzers are over 50km , but the circular error of these artillery weapons increases in proportion to the range .
Circular error is the radius at which half of 10 shells will land . The lower the number, the higher the accuracy. However , the circular error of North Korean Juche guns fired from a distance of over 50 km is reported in kilometers, showing a poor accuracy .
The way Russia increases its accuracy is by firing from as close a distance as possible. This is because the shorter the range, the higher the circular error . That is why Russia seems to have taken a risk and deployed these self-propelled guns to a location less than 20 kilometers from the front line .
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Will Ukraine's ' Baba Yaga Drone ', with its full witch power , become a game changer ?
( Host ) Another thing to note is that the weapon that the Ukrainian military used to destroy the North Korean self-propelled artillery was a drone. The drone, also known as an FPV drone, is used for tactical purposes at close range and destroyed the North Korean self-propelled artillery . What does this mean ?
( Lee Il-woo ) As I mentioned earlier, artillery weapons are usually deployed tens of kilometers behind the front lines where ground forces fight by firing guns at close range. They are usually deployed 10 to 20 kilometers or even further behind , so the artillery-to-artillery firefight , or the battle where artillery captures enemy artillery, takes place near the maximum firing range of the weapon system .
For example , the range of Russian 122mm howitzers is about 17-21km , but the Ukrainian 155mm self-propelled howitzers that attack these howitzers fire shells from a distance of 30-40km or more . To take out these Ukrainian self-propelled howitzers, Russia uses 300mm multiple rocket launchers that can fly from a distance of 50-70km or more .
When conducting a firefight, the most effective force is an airborne fighter jet, but both Ukraine and Russia are currently in dire need of fighter jets, so firefighting has relied on large-caliber long-range artillery and multiple rocket launchers . While drones are very effective on the battlefield , the small FPV drones that are commonly used can only fly for about 30 minutes and have a radio transmission range of less than 10 km with their controllers , making it difficult for drone operators to engage enemy artillery unless they take risks and advance all the way to the front lines .
But this time, the Ukrainian military succeeded in destroying the Russian military's North Korean-made long-range artillery located in the rear using an FPV drone .
The unit that carried out the operation was the 412th Nemesis Regiment , which was established as a drone unit and recently expanded and reorganized to the size of an independent regiment . This unit operates various types of FPV drones , from small drones to large quadcopter drones , and since October of last year , it has been introducing the so-called "Baba Ga" bombing drone, which can fly up to 30 km , and has begun carrying out rear strike missions .
The Baba Yaga drone is named after a witch from Slavic folklore. This drone can fly at speeds of up to 80 km /h and can carry various bombs weighing up to 18 kg . The Ukrainian military uses it to drop mortar shells , grenades , and modified anti-tank mines by attaching them to the drone . Until now, this drone has been mainly used to attack Russian military trenches and vehicles on the front line , but since the end of last year, the flight range has been dramatically increased by modifying the battery and transmitter/receiver, and it has begun to be used to attack artillery and air defense weapons in the rear areas of the Russian army .
A video released by the Ukrainian military shows a Ukrainian drone dropping a mortar shell on a North Korean-made Juche gun during a nighttime operation . Since the gun has almost no armor , it is likely that a single mortar shell could have completely destroyed it .
This successful attack shows that Ukraine is now starting to conduct counter-fire warfare with FPV drones with extended flight ranges instead of field guns , and the appearance of these drones will force the Russian military to use North Korean-made Juche guns further back . This will lead to a decrease in the accuracy of artillery fire and will be the starting point of increasing distrust of North Korean artillery weapons .
Russia's 'dilemma' of embracing North Korea 's ' poor ' self -propelled artillery
( Host ) Aren't self-propelled guns much more maneuverable than towed guns because they can run on their own? The Juche guns that North Korea supplied to Russia are also called self-propelled howitzers in North Korean terms , or self-propelled guns. If they can quickly change position before a Ukrainian drone flies in, wouldn't their survivability be higher ?
( Lee Il-woo ) When it was first revealed that this main gun was being supplied to the Russian military, I pointed out that the gun had very poor accuracy, rate of fire , and reliability . Although this gun is a self-propelled howitzer , it has many fatal flaws that make it difficult to call it a self-propelled howitzer .
All cannons must be 'cooled' before firing. Cooling means aligning the cannon neatly towards the target , and the cooling process goes through the process of stopping, determining its coordinates and elevation ( i.e. how high it is from sea level) , and aligning the cannon's square and elevation angle towards the target . If you watch videos of artillery firing preparations, you can see a scene where they fix the cannon to the ground and diligently turn the lever next to the barrel to adjust the angle of the cannon , but with modern self-propelled howitzers, after stopping the vehicle, you just have to press a few buttons and the barrel will automatically turn towards the target and cool down automatically .
However, the North Korean Juche gun is not like that. This gun fires shells with high pressure, so the recoil is very large . On the other hand, the body is light and the suspension performance is poor, so before firing, you must lower the spade and firmly fix it to the ground . Of course, to fix it, you have to dig the ground with a shovel and pickaxe, lower the spade, cover it with dirt, and step on it .
After firing, it must be folded back up, the barrel must be lowered, and attached to the mounting bracket. With all these processes, it takes more than 15 minutes to fire a single shell . 15 minutes is similar to the heat dissipation speed of South Korea's Kh-179 towed howitzer, and it is difficult to call it a self-propelled howitzer .
In other words, North Korean self-propelled guns take too long to open and close, so their mobility is poor , and even if they detect an approaching drone, they cannot avoid it .
The Russian military, which has acquired a large number of these self-propelled guns, now has two options. Since they cannot avoid drones anyway, the first option is to go to the rear , 40-50km away from where Ukrainian drones cannot fly , and fire blind shells that will never hit the target. The second option is to come all the way to the front line and risk being exposed to drone attacks while shooting .
According to the North Korean military organization standard, at least 8 gun crew members are assigned to each Juche gun , but with nearly 200 of these guns being taken , the lives of over 1,600 Russian soldiers are now at risk .
( Host ) This was Lee Il-woo, Secretary General of the Korea Independent Defense Network. Now, with Kim Jin-guk from RFA in Washington , D.C.
Editor Lee Jin-seo, Web Editor Lee Gyeong-ha
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
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