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Quotes of the Day:
The third conclusion of the monograph is that there is a traditional American way of war which, in some respects, encourages a military style that is far from optimal as an approach to the challenges posed by irregular enemies. I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am not quite arguing that the American way of war, a style reflecting cultural influences, will thwart the ambitions for transformation, though there are grounds for anxiety in this regard. Also, I am certainly not claiming that a way of war is immutable. A way does evolve and may adapt, but it does so slowly. After all, it is deeply rooted in history, and there are good reasons why it is what it is. Also, let me emphasize, although I am concerned to point up its weaknesses, especially its strategic deficiencies, the American way of war has major characteristic strengths. Indeed, if it did not have such strengths, it would not have been adopted, and it would not have persisted. Not everyone will agree with each characteristic I have discerned in the American way; there is no authorized list. But this analysis rests on the strong conviction that there has been and is such a "way," and that its strength will be a problem, perhaps a severe problem, for the process of transformation and adaptation. Especially is the American way of war likely to be a problem, really a harassing condition, for a transformation that focuses significantly on the ability to conduct warfare against irregular enemies. In these concluding paragraphs, it is probably useful to provide a terse reminder of the leading characteristics of "the American way."
1. Apolitical 8. Large-scale2. Astrategic 9. Aggressive, offensive3. Ahistorical 10. Profoundly regular4. Problem-solving, optimistic 11. Impatient5. Culturally challenged 12. Logistically excellent6. Technology dependent 13. Highly sensitive to casualties7. Focused on firepower
Characteristics of the American Way."
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/i/irregular-enemies-essence-strategy.html
- Colin Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy – Can the American Way of War Adapt?
"However much you deny the truth, the truth goes on existing."
- George Orwell
"It doesn't matter how smart you are unless you stop and think."
- Thomas Sowell
1. 8th U.S.-ROK Deterrence Strategy Committee Table-Top Exercise – Joint Press Release
2. U.S., South Korea stage table-top nuclear drill focused on North Korea
3. N. Korea says it conducted 'strategic cruise missile' drills this week
4. N. Korea warns continued 'U.S. hostility' will be considered 'declaration of war'
5. Why Is S.Korea's Discussion of Nuclear Armament so Confused?
6. Nuclear U.S. Aircraft Carrier to Arrive in Busan Next Month
7. S. Korea to offer $130 mln in additional aid to Ukraine: ministry
8. 'Strategic cruise missile' launches demonstrate nuclear 'war posture': North Korea
9. Kim Jong Un orders military to take lead in farmwork, reforestation efforts this year
10. North Korean parents will be punished if their children watch foreign media even once
11. Reflecting the DPRK’s economic difficulties, special gift for Kim Jong-il’s birthday amounts to just five hours of electricity… “Kids just got sweets to eat”
12. North Korean Cruise Missiles Fly in Figure-Eight Patterns as U.S., Allies Hold Exercises
13. N. Korean foreign exchange rates rise amid continued hopes for restart of trade in March
14. Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking: Key Findings and Implications
15. Korea-U.S. cooperation key to overcoming 'polycrisis': Foreign Minister
16. [Editorial] Devise countermeasures for nuclear threats
1. 8th U.S.-ROK Deterrence Strategy Committee Table-Top Exercise – Joint Press Release
Note this is not the first of its kind, only the first of its kind during the Yoon administration.
8th U.S.-ROK Deterrence Strategy Committee Table-Top Exercise – Joint Press Release
defense.gov
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Immediate Release
Feb. 23, 2023 |×
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The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) conducted the 8th U.S-ROK Deterrence Strategy Committee Table-Top Exercise (DSC TTX), February 22, 2023 at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Following the TTX, the ROK and U.S. delegations visited the Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in Georgia, February 23, 2023.
During the 54th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, November 3, 2022, the ROK Minister of National Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense pledged to conduct a DSC TTX annually. This TTX is the first to be conducted during the administration of ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol.
Heo Taekeun, ROK Deputy Minister of Defense Policy, headed the ROK delegation and Dr. Siddharth Mohandas, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, and Richard C. Johnson, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy, headed the U.S. delegation as co-chairs.
ROK and U.S. defense officials, military officers, and diplomats participated in the TTX. Key personnel from the ROK included officials from the Ministry of National Defense (MND), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Korea Defense Intelligence Agency (KDIA) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The U.S. delegation included members from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and the Department of State. The participants held in-depth discussions on various approaches to the Alliance’s deterrence and response posture in the face of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) evolving nuclear and missile capabilities.
Given the DPRK’s recent aggressive nuclear policy and advancements in nuclear capabilities, the TTX scenario focused on the possibility of the DPRK’s use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. and ROK delegations focused their discussion on Alliance deterrence to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and potential options for responding to DPRK nuclear weapons use. Both sides discussed various options to demonstrate the Alliance’s strong response capabilities and resolve to respond appropriately to any DPRK nuclear use.
The U.S. side highlighted that 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states that any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime. Both sides affirmed that the Alliance stands ready to respond to the DPRK’s nuclear threats.
Participants highlighted that improvements in the ROK’s advanced conventional capabilities have strengthened deterrence. As such, the delegations discussed how best to leverage ROK non-nuclear capabilities to support nuclear deterrence against DPRK nuclear threats. Both sides concurred on the need to continue to strengthen extended deterrence, including through robust consultative mechanisms and crisis communication, as well as information-sharing, and joint planning and execution.
Both sides agreed that events such as the DSC TTX contribute to improving mutual understanding regarding the utilization and enhancement of Alliance capabilities. The delegations agreed on the importance of joint efforts to deter the DPRK’s nuclear use, and the crucial value in preparing potential response measures during armistice and reinforcing existing consultation mechanisms to execute those measures. The ROK and U.S. delegations agreed to report to the U.S.-Korea Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) and Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on the outcome of discussions conducted during the DSC TTX. Additionally, both sides agreed to reflect the strategic approaches discussed during the DSC TTX in the ongoing revisions of the Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) and to conduct follow-on TTXs involving political, military, and interagency participants in the near future to continue the joint planning and coordination process.
Following the DSC TTX, the U.S. and ROK delegations visited U.S. nuclear submarine training facilities located at Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in Georgia. Rear Admiral Thomas R. Buchanan, Commander of Submarine Group 10, explained the mission of Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBNs), and emphasized that SSBN forces operated by the U.S. are a key means of providing U.S. extended deterrence to Allies. The United States will continue to work with the ROK to ensure an effective mix of capabilities, concepts, deployments, exercises, and tailored options to deter and, if necessary, respond to coercion and aggression by the DPRK. The United States will continue to field flexible nuclear forces suited to deterring regional nuclear conflict, including the capability to forward deploy strategic bombers, dual-capable fighter aircraft, and nuclear weapons to the region.
The ROK and U.S. delegations highlighted that the joint site visit to an SSBN base, the first of its kind for the Alliance, is a positive demonstration of U.S. extended deterrence. The ROK and U.S. delegations emphasized that the 8th DSC TTX, conducted amidst continuing DPRK provocations, reaffirmed that U.S. commitments, including extended deterrence, to the ROK are ironclad and demonstrate strong Alliance coordination.
In light of the DPRK’s ongoing missile and nuclear development, the ROK and the United States will maintain close cooperation and continue a range of efforts to enhance extended deterrence.
South Korea partnerships Indo-Pacific
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2. U.S., South Korea stage table-top nuclear drill focused on North Korea
U.S., South Korea stage table-top nuclear drill focused on North Korea
Reuters · by Reuters
WASHINGTON, Feb 23 (Reuters) - U.S. and South Korean officials took part in a simulated "table-top" exercise that focused on the possibility of North Korea using a nuclear weapon, the Pentagon said on Thursday.
Nuclear-armed North Korea launched an unprecedented number of missiles last year, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. On Monday it launched two missiles into the Pacific Ocean.
U.S. and South Korean officials have also warned the North could be preparing for its first test of a nuclear device since 2017.
This was the 8th U.S. and South Korean deterrence strategy committee table-top exercise, known as DSC TTX, and the first edition since they agreed last year to hold the drills annually.
"Given the DPRK's recent aggressive nuclear policy and advancements in nuclear capabilities, the (table top) scenario focused on the possibility of the DPRK's use of nuclear weapons," a Pentagon statement said, using the acronym of the country's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"The U.S. and South Korea delegations focused their discussion on Alliance deterrence to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and potential options for responding to DPRK nuclear weapons use," the statement added, but did not say specifically what scenarios were played out.
Seoul's defense ministry said the allies reaffirmed their readiness for any North Korean nuclear threats, and agreed to continue reinforcing intelligence sharing, crisis consultation, joint planning and execution of extended deterrence.
"The U.S. side stressed that any use of nuclear weapons by North Korea against the United States or its allies and friends would be unacceptable and result in an end of its regime," the ministry said in a statement.
After the simulated exercise was carried out at the Pentagon on Wednesday, officials from both countries visited Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in Georgia.
"The delegations discussed how best to leverage (South Korea's) non-nuclear capabilities to support nuclear deterrence against DPRK nuclear threats," the statement added.
Since taking office in May, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has been pushing to bolster confidence in American extended deterrence - its military capability, especially nuclear forces, to deter attacks on its allies - as Pyongyang strives to secure its capacity to strike anywhere in the United States.
In November, Yoon warned of an unprecedented joint response with allies if North Korea goes ahead with a nuclear test.
Reporting by Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart in Washington and Hyonhee Shin in Seoul; Editing by Sandra Maler and Michael Perry
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Reuters
3. N. Korea says it conducted 'strategic cruise missile' drills this week
The regime must have wanted to give the members of the nuclear planning TTX something to talk about.
There doesn't seem to be the usual breathless reporting on this in the ROK press.
Note also the photo of the three Aegis destroyers from the ROK/Japan/US. Photos at the link: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230224000453325?section=nk/nk
(2nd LD) N. Korea says it conducted 'strategic cruise missile' drills this week | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · February 24, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with S. Korean military's response, other details in last 4 paras; ADDS photo)
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Feb. 24 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has conducted "strategic cruise missile" launching drills, with the "war posture" of the country's nuclear combat forces clearly demonstrated, its state media said Friday, as South Korea and the United States held joint military exercises this week.
A subunit of the North's strategic cruise missile unit fired four "Hwasal-2 strategic cruise missiles" from an area of the northeastern city of Kim Chaek in North Hamgyong Province toward the East Sea at dawn Thursday, according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
This photo, released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Feb. 24, 2023, shows the North staging "strategic cruise missile" launch drills in an area of the northeastern city of Kim Chaek the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
"The four strategic cruise missiles precisely hit the preset target on the East Sea of Korea after traveling the 2,000 kilometer-long elliptical and eight-shaped flight orbits for 10,208 seconds to 10,224 seconds," the KCNA said in an English-language report. "The drill reconfirmed the reliability of the weapon system and examined the rapid response posture of strategic cruise missile units that constitute one of major forces of the DPRK nuclear deterrent.
"The drill clearly demonstrated once again the war posture of the DPRK nuclear combat force bolstering up in every way its deadly nuclear counterattack capability against the hostile forces," it added.
DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
South Korea's military said it was analyzing various possibilities related to the North's claim of the launches.
"South Korean and U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance assets were closely monitoring the relevant area at the time (of the drills) the North claims," the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement. "An analysis is underway on various possibilities, including whether the North's claim is true or not."
Meanwhile, the allies held tabletop drills against North Korea's nuclear threats at the Pentagon on Wednesday (local time).
They also held a trilateral missile defense exercise, joined by Japan, in the international waters of the East Sea earlier this week in response to the North's recent firing of ballistic missiles, including a long-range one.
Youtube
https://youtu.be/GifkqZywh9U
Three Aegis-equipped destroyers -- South Korea's Sejong the Great (front), USS Barry (middle) and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's JS Atago (rear) -- sail in the international waters of the East Sea on Feb. 22, 2023, in this photo released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · February 24, 2023
4. N. Korea warns continued 'U.S. hostility' will be considered 'declaration of war'
Kim's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy continue to fail yet he doubles down with the standard rhetoric. How many times have we heard variations of these statements over the last 70 years? more than we can count.
(LEAD) N. Korea warns continued 'U.S. hostility' will be considered 'declaration of war' | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · February 24, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with more info; ADDS photo)
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, Feb. 24 (Yonhap) -- A North Korean foreign ministry official on Friday warned that Pyongyang will regard what it claims to be "hostile practices" from the United States as a "declaration of war" against the reclusive country.
Kwon Jong-gun, director-general for U.S. affairs at the ministry, also called on Washington to halt its deployment of strategic assets to Korea and combined drills with Seoul to prevent the "vicious cycle" of escalating military tension on the peninsula, in a statement carried by the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
"The U.S. should bear in mind that if it persists in its hostile and provocative practices against the DPRK despite the latter's repeated protest and warning, it can be regarded as a declaration of war against the DPRK," the KCNA said in the English-language report.
DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup (2nd from R) and his U.S. counterpart, Lloyd Austin (R), are briefed on B-1B and B-52 strategic bombers during a visit to Joint Base Andrews in Prince George's County, Maryland, on Nov. 3, 2022, in this photo provided by Seoul's defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
He condemned South Korea and the United States for staging a tabletop exercise (TTX) at the Pentagon on Wednesday, labeling it as a "nuclear war demonstration against the DPRK."
In a joint press release issued after the practice, the allies said it focused on potential options for responding to the North's nuclear weapons use and allied deterrence, given Pyongyang's "recent aggressive nuclear policy and advancements in nuclear capabilities."
It added the U.S. will "continue to field flexible nuclear forces suited to deterring regional nuclear conflict, including the capability to forward deploy strategic bombers, dual-capable fighter aircraft, and nuclear weapons to the region."
Kwon also denounced the visit of U.S. officials and the South Korean delegation to Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in Georgia, a southeastern coastal base home to key nuclear submarines.
"This clearly proves what phase their attempt to confront with the DPRK has reached," he said.
During the allies' annual defense ministerial talks in November last year, the two sides agreed to increase the frequency and intensity in the deployment of U.S. strategic assets to the peninsula. Militarily, strategic assets refer to such high-powered weapon systems as aircraft carriers, advanced stealth jets, strategic bombers and nuclear-powered submarines.
This undated file photo, provided by the U.S. Navy, shows a submarine operated by the armed service. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Kwon strongly criticized the U.N. Security Council for taking issue with the North's recent missile provocations at an emergency meeting earlier this week, claiming the tests are an exercise of its "right to self-defense.
"If the UNSC has a true intention to contribute to peace and security in the Korean peninsula, it will have to bitterly condemn the U.S. and South Korea for their moves of escalating military tension such as frequent deployment of strategic assets and large-scale joint military drills against the DPRK," he said, slamming the UNSC as merely a "tool" of the U.S to pressure the North.
He warned that the North will take "corresponding strong countermeasure" if the UNSC, "led by the U.S.," puts the issue of its "right to self-defense on the table again."
Youtube
https://youtu.be/CoCC0GTHN8M
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · February 24, 2023
5. Why Is S.Korea's Discussion of Nuclear Armament so Confused?
Yes, there is a lot of discussion and a lot of confusion. While we do not want proliferation of nuclear weapons we should recognize the positive aspect of the current situation. It should be clear that the Koreans in the South are talking about their commitment to the defense of the ROK. They are trying to figure out how to best do that. This is a good thing. What the alliance should try to do is channel this energy and commitment into developing other more practical defense capabilities that will contribute to both deterrence and warfighting.
Why Is S.Korea's Discussion of Nuclear Armament so Confused?
By Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia at CSIS and professor at Georgetown University
english.chosun.com
February 24, 2023 13:43
Victor Cha
Last month, President Yoon Suk-yeol made an off-the-cuff remark during a press briefing to the effect that if the North Korean nuclear and missile threat grew much worse, South Korea could consider building its own nuclear weapons.
He almost immediately conditioned the comment by reaffirming standing policy of retaining South Korea's status as a non-nuclear state and a supporter of the non-proliferation regime. But it was the first statement by a South Korean president raising the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons and received widespread attention in Washington.
Headlines used adjectives like "nightmare" and "disastrous" to characterize South Korea's nuclear ambitions. My point is not to agree or disagree with the proposition but to show that the conversation is riddled with confusion and mistrust.
Nuclear advocacy for South Korea used to be limited to the hard right, and its most visible proponent was Chung Mong-joon, the billionaire Hyundai scion, but now it has become more mainstream. As my CSIS colleague John Hamre said upon our return from a recent trip to South Korea, "This conversation used to take place late in the evening among experts after the third drink or so. Now it happens at breakfast."
Why has it become more mainstream at this particular time? After all, the Joe Biden administration in its "alliances-first" policies has worked hard to upgrade alliances and to shore up confidence in the American security commitment. But the war in Ukraine has made the world a much more uncertain place, even for countries like South Korea on the other side of the globe.
China's military assertiveness in the South China Sea, East and West Seas as well as its plans to build 1,500 nuclear warheads by the end of this decade is also worrying security experts. And North Korea's unstoppable nuclear development and missile testing, threats to use tactical nuclear weapons, and complete disinterest in diplomacy have worried South Koreans more than ever.
Many Asian countries are also concerned about the potential return in 2024 of an "America-first" president in the U.S. who might want to withdraw from security commitments in Asia. This last factor creates distrust among Asians not in Biden's intentions but in the U.S. political system's ability to produce consistent leaders.
The distrust among Americans about nuclear advocacy in South Korea stems from history. Many Americans still remember the clandestine efforts by strongman Park Chung-hee in the 1970s to seek reprocessing technology for fissile material for nuclear weapons. While that was a completely different time and place, it still haunts the non-proliferation community. There is a perceptual bias and lack of trust of South Korean nuclear ambitions.
Yoon could say one hundred times that Seoul's policy is not to pursue nuclear weapons and it will hardly register among non-proliferation experts. But the one time he mentions South Korea going nuclear, this becomes widely assumed to be the country's true intention.
This mistrust is compounded by the confused nature of the discussion. The media and experts cite widely the statistic that 71 percent of South Koreans want their country to acquire nuclear weapons. At almost every conference I attend, people cite this number, produced by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, as undisputed evidence of the nuclear domino falling in South Korea.
But this hardly makes sense. First, one would expect that if there is a high percentage of people who want nuclear weapons, then this must be because they are worried that the U.S. security commitment or nuclear umbrella is unreliable. But when asked whether they have confidence in the U.S.' will to fight for South Korea's defense, a vast majority or 61 percent answered in the affirmative. So, it is not lack of confidence in the alliance that is the source of nuclear advocacy.
Another possible explanation might be the belief that matching the North Koreans nuke for nuke might cause Pyongyang to moderate its ambitions. It might shy away from getting caught up in an arms race with a superior opponent. But when asked in the same survey whether they believed North Korea would denuclearize, an overwhelming 82 percent answered no.
A third possible explanation might have to do with prestige. The argument would be that as the sixth strongest military and the 10th largest economy in the world, South Korea is now a major world power that should be entitled to the most advanced and powerful weapons known to mankind. Yet when people are asked whether they appreciated the prestige element of nuclearization, 26 percent said no.
The point of this is not to dismiss the think tank's study which was important work done by respected scholars. Instead, it shows how fundamentally confused and unsubstantiated the discussion is. Before anyone jumps to the conclusion that South Korea will go nuclear, there needs to be more in-depth discussion and systematic polling of South Korean thinking on the issue.
In particular, it would be important to survey the opinions not just of the general public but of the strategic elites. My colleague at Georgetown University, Elizabeth Saunders, has written award-winning research showing that the best predictor of the foreign policy decisions of democratic leaders is not public opinion. Rather, it is the views of the strategic elites and their interaction with the political leadership that determines them.
If we are to reduce confusion, increase transparency, and reduce mistrust in the alliance regarding South Korea's nuclear choices, it is important to gather more data on how elites think about this issue.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
english.chosun.com
6. Nuclear U.S. Aircraft Carrier to Arrive in Busan Next Month
Take that Kim Jong Un. :-) (note sarcasm)
Note that this is planned and not a reaction to Kim's provocations. This Is about the alliance standard of maintaining a high level of readiness to support deterrence and a large part of that effort is ensuring interoperability of the combined military forces as well as bringing off peninsula assets to the Korean Theater on a regular basis.
Nuclear U.S. Aircraft Carrier to Arrive in Busan Next Month
english.chosun.com
February 24, 2023 11:38
A nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carrier with a full-load displacement of over 100,000 long tons is expected to dock in Busan next month as North Korea ramps up provocations.
The Nimitz-class carrier arrives as South Korea is conducting joint military drills with the U.S. and other allies in response to the North's latest launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile and short-range missiles earlier this month.
"We are in discussions with the U.S. about a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier docking late next month and staying here until early April," a military source said Thursday. "It will take part in a ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and various operations."
President Yoon Suk-yeol is expected to board the aircraft carrier and give a speech to "send a strong warning message against provocations," according to a government source.
A trilateral naval exercise with Japan is also on the cards. The South Korean military wants to boost cooperation with Australia and Japan as well as the U.S. to deal with North Korea's development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear-powered submarines.
A military source said, "An SLBM is extremely difficult to detect and cooperation and joint drills with our allies are necessary to thwart them."
Korea, U.S., Japan Stage Missile Defense Drill
S.Korea Sends Warning to North with Aerial Refueling Drill
Kim Jong-un's Sister Denies Technical Hitches in ICBM Launch
N.Korea Fires More Missiles as S.Korea, U.S. Stage Air Drill
Korea, U.S. to Stage Nuclear Tabletop Drill
U.S. Stealth Fighters Join Air Drills with S.Korea
Pentagon Releases Nuclear Arms Policy in Korean
U.S. to Send Top-Range Weapons to Korea More Often
S.Korea, U.S. Prepare for N.Korean WMD Attack
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
english.chosun.com
7. S. Korea to offer $130 mln in additional aid to Ukraine: ministry
S. Korea to offer $130 mln in additional aid to Ukraine: ministry | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · February 24, 2023
SEOUL, Feb. 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea plans to provide US$130 million in humanitarian assistance to Ukraine on the occasion of the first anniversary of Russia's invasion, Seoul's foreign ministry said Friday.
The government reaffirmed its position through the ministry's statement that the "sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine must be respected."
The latest aid package will include financial aid, humanitarian assistance in demining, aid in the construction of infrastructure, such as the restoration of power grid, as well as in reconstruction efforts through official development assistance (ODA) projects, according to the ministry.
Last year, South Korea provided Ukraine with a total of $100 million in humanitarian aid.
Youtube
https://youtu.be/g-FWopNPg9A
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin (R) speaks during a meeting with Ukrainian Ambassador Dmytro Ponomarenko at the foreign ministry in Seoul on Feb. 23, 2023, one day ahead of the one-year anniversary of the start of the Ukraine-Russia war. (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · February 24, 2023
8. 'Strategic cruise missile' launches demonstrate nuclear 'war posture': North Korea
No need to over react to this rhetoric. We must recognize, understand, expose, and attack regime strategy. We must act based on a thorough understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Friday
February 24, 2023
dictionary + A - A
'Strategic cruise missile' launches demonstrate nuclear 'war posture': North Korea
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/24/national/northKorea/North-Korea-strategic-cruise-missile-drills/20230224113153738.html
North Korea claims it launched four strategic cruise missiles from Kim Chaek City in North Hamgyong Province as part of a drill early Thursday, in an image provided by the North’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) Friday. [YONHAP]
North Korea claimed Friday it conducted a "strategic cruise missile" launch drill Thursday, demonstrating the "war posture" of its nuclear combat forces.
The state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Friday that a missile unit of the North Korean People's Army fired four "Hwasal-2" strategic cruise missiles from Kim Chaek City in North Hamgyong Province towards the East Sea early Thursday.
The KCNA's English-language report claimed that the four strategic cruise missiles "precisely hit" the preset target in the East Sea after flying 2,000 kilometers in "long elliptical and eight-shaped flight orbits" for 10,208 second to 10,224 seconds.
It added that the launching drill "successfully achieved its object."
The drill confirmed the "reliability" of the weapons system and "examined the rapid response posture of strategic cruise missile units that constitute one of major forces of the DPRK nuclear deterrent," the report added, referring to the acronym for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"The drill clearly demonstrated once again the war posture of the DPRK nuclear combat force bolstering up in every way its deadly nuclear counterattack capability against the hostile forces," it added.
South Korea's military said Friday it was analyzing "various possibilities" related to the North's claimed launches.
"South Korean and U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance assets were closely monitoring the relevant area at the time claimed by the North," said the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff in a statement, referring to Pyongyang's claims it conducted a strategic cruise missile drill. "An analysis is underway on various possibilities, including whether the North's claim is true or not."
This could mean that the North's strategic cruise missiles, which are difficult to track, were not detected by the allies' military reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
On Wednesday, Seoul and Washington conducted a tabletop exercise at the Pentagon to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.
Sabrina Singh, a Pentagon spokesperson, confirmed in a press briefing in Washington on Wednesday that the allies staged the eighth Deterrence Strategy Committee Table-Top Exercise (TTX) that day.
The U.S. Defense Department said that Heo Tae-keun, Seoul's deputy minister of defense policy, headed the South Korean delegation and Siddharth Mohandas, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, and Richard Johnson, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and countering weapons of mass destruction policy, co-chaired the U.S. delegation.
The Pentagon said that the TTX scenario focused on the possible use of nuclear weapons by the North, and that the two sides discussed various options to demonstrate the alliance's "strong response capabilities and resolve to respond appropriately to any DPRK nuclear use."
South Korea, the United States and Japan also held a trilateral missile defense exercise in the international waters of the East Sea Wednesday, mobilizing three Aegis-equipped destroyers, after the North's testing of two short-range ballistic missiles and a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the past week.
Later Friday, the North Korean Foreign Ministry warned the United States that “if it persists in its hostile and provocative practices,” it will be regarded as a “declaration of war against the DPRK.”
Kwon Jong-gun, director general of the Department of U.S. Affairs of the North’s Foreign Ministry, issued an English-language statement carried by the KCNA which described the UN Security Council as a “tool of the U.S. for putting pressure on the DPRK.” He warned that “corresponding strong countermeasure will be taken” if the council questions its right to “self-defense” again.
Kwon said that the only way to prevent the “vicious cycle of escalating military tension in the Korean peninsula and its surrounding area is for the U.S. to show a clear and practical stand such as abandonment of its commitment to deploying strategic assets in south Korea” and put a “halt to the combined drills against the DPRK under various codenames.”
He said that the United States and South Korea are “planning to visit a U.S. nuclear submarine base in the wake of staging a ‘drill for operating extended deterrence means,’” which he described as a “nuclear war demonstration against the DPRK.”
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
9. Kim Jong Un orders military to take lead in farmwork, reforestation efforts this year
Square this circle. Preparations for war versus farming and forestation. And of course the military requires food to do both.
But like some other countries the military is the "easy button" for Kim. (and then in north Korea the military is the best and nearly only functioning institute.)
Kim Jong Un orders military to take lead in farmwork, reforestation efforts this year
The North Korean leader appears determined to make active use of the military in agricultural and reforestation programs
dailynk.com
FILE PHOTO: North Korean soldiers are seen in Sakju County, North Pyongan Province. (Daily NK)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un recently ordered the Korean People’s Army (KPA) to take the initiative in farmwork and reforestation this year, Daily NK has learned.
Since soon after taking power in 2012, Kim has shown his commitment to resolving the food shortfall by pledging to take personal command of the reforestation campaign and by describing the farm sector as the “front line” for defending socialism. This year, he seems especially determined to make active use of the military in agricultural and reforestation programs.
“Kim’s order as commander in chief to deploy the Korean People’s Army to the reforestation campaign and the agricultural front to secure an ample supply of food this year was delivered to the general staff of relevant units throughout the military by the General Staff Department on Feb. 11,” a reporting partner inside the North Korean military told Daily NK on Wednesday, speaking on condition of anonymity.
North Korea’s General Staff Department is the senior military leadership of the country’s armed forces.
Daily NK’s reporting partner said that the General Staff Department’s instructions stated that “the supreme commander of the armed forces has ordered that the trusted and beloved personnel of the Korean People’s Army be deployed to the two front lines [the agriculture and reforestation fronts] as we seek to lay a rigorous foundation for 10,000 years of building a powerful socialist state in our own [North Korean] style.”
The General Staff Department also called on the Korean People’s Army to take the lead in the reforestation and agricultural fronts.
“When the people faced hunger and other difficulties during the grim revolutionary struggle against Japan and even during the grave days of the ‘Arduous March’ in the 1990s, the Korean People’s Army has always stood in the vanguard and forged a path forward,” the department stated in the order, adding that “the reforestation and agricultural fronts should provide an opportunity for maximizing the strength of unity between the people and the army.”
The North Korean military is currently engaged in wintertime drills that began on Dec. 1, 2022. The military exercises are set to continue until late March.
The General Staff Department emphasized that rearguard military corps, training centers and commands should assign some of their staff to agriculture and reforestation projects without neglecting routine guard duties and their operational and combat work in the wintertime exercises. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense has begun designating farms and reforestation areas to each military unit that is being mobilized for work, the reporting partner said.
Notably, the General Staff Department and the defense ministry asked the staff of each military unit to revitalize forests while embodying the fighting spirit through which North Koreans dedicate themselves to producing food to send to the front lines. They also emphasized that the KPA should take the lead in planning projects by which each unit can vigorously aid the agricultural front so that the North Korean people can achieve food self-sufficiency.
The reporting partner also told Daily NK that, in accordance with the order from the military’s commander in chief, the General Staff Department instructed military units to assign soldiers to the reforestation and agricultural campaigns starting in mid-March. The General Staff Department further said that performance reviews of the wintertime exercises should be pushed forward to early March and carried out over one week.
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of reporting partners who live inside North Korea. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
10. North Korean parents will be punished if their children watch foreign media even once
Information and influence can work.
Information is an existential threat to the Kim family regime.
This may indicate the regime is getting desperate because it is having a hard time preventing access to information.
We must also not "self - deter" because of the perceived moral hazard we create when we send information into the north. In talking to escapees, they say that Koreans in the north know the risks yet they still thirst for outside information. We need to support them with information.
Kim Jong Un fears the Korean people in the north armed with information more than he fears the combined ROK and US military force.
This should tell us something about necessary lines of effort for our strategy.
North Korean parents will be punished if their children watch foreign media even once
In the past, parents were punished for multiple offenses, but now they must keep a closer eye on their kids.
By Hyemin Son for RFA Korean
2023.02.23
rfa.org
North Korea has threatened to punish parents if their children are caught watching foreign media, suggestive dancing or talking like a South Korean, even if it is their child’s first offense, sources in the country told Radio Free Asia.
The threats, issued during weekly meetings of neighborhood watch units nationwide, increase pressure on parents to educate their children “properly” in socialist ideals and are the latest measure to prevent the spread of South Korean pop culture among the country’s youth.
Parents previously could be held responsible if their teens had repeated offenses, but now there will be no such leniency, a resident of South Pyongan province, north of the capital Pyongyang, told RFA’s Korean Service on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
“The host of the meeting emphasized parental responsibility, saying that education for children begins at home,” the source said. “If parents do not educate their children from moment to moment, they will dance and sing of capitalism and become anti-socialists.”
In 2020, North Korea introduced the Rejection of Reactionary Thought and Culture Act, which lays out punishments for various cultural offenses.
North Korean youths attend a dance party in celebration of the 110th birth anniversary of President Kim Il Sung, known as 'Day of the Sun,' in Pyongyang on April 15, 2022. Credit: AFP
One of the milder offenses is for speaking, writing or singing like a South Korean.
Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the Korean language itself has been divided into North and South, with the respective governments guiding standardization policies that have led to differences in spelling vocabulary, and what is deemed as standard pronunciation.
North Koreans who watch South Korean TV shows and movies have begun to pick up South Korean slang terms, and among North Korean youth, it has become trendy to speak in the accent of upper-class Seoulites.
Those caught in the act can face up to two years of hard labor in a prison camp.
The same law prescribes tougher punishments of up to 15 years of hard labor for those caught watching South Korean videos, with the possibility of the death penalty for people who distribute them.
This is the law that led authorities in October 2022 to execute two teenagers who were caught selling thumb drives containing South Korean movies and TV shows.
Parents whose children are caught in violation of the law will have to serve time in a disciplinary labor center, with the length of punishment depending on the nature of the offense, the South Pyongan source said.
If the teens are caught watching South Korean movies, they will have to go to a prison camp for five years, and their parents will go to the labor center for six months. If the offense was that they talked, danced, or sang “like a South Korean,” then they and their parents will serve three months in the labor center.
No fun allowed
Several other offenses to the law were detailed at a neighborhood watch unit in Ryongchon county, in the northeastern province of North Pyongan, a source there told RFA.
Kids will now be punished for wearing clothing with English phrases, gathering together in groups to play acoustic guitars and shaking their hips, or being a high school girl and wearing makeup, the second source said.
“Some of the parents here don't even know that their children are growing up crooked because they are so occupied with making money in their businesses in the marketplace, and neglect their children's education,” said the second source.
Side businesses are the only actual means of support for most North Koreans because salaries for government assigned jobs haven’t been enough to live on since the country’s economy collapsed following the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.
“Residents are criticizing the government for trying to control teenagers' emotions and thoughts by placing joint responsibility on their parents,” the second source said. “Besides that, it is important for parents to feed their families by doing business. They have to work hard to survive because the state doesn’t provide sufficient food rations.”
Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
rfa.org
11. Reflecting the DPRK’s economic difficulties, special gift for Kim Jong-il’s birthday amounts to just five hours of electricity… “Kids just got sweets to eat”
Another indicator of the level of suffering among the Korean people in the north.
＜Inside N. Korea＞Reflecting the DPRK’s economic difficulties, special gift for Kim Jong-il’s birthday amounts to just five hours of electricity… “Kids just got sweets to eat”
asiapress.org
A cookie set manufactured in North Korea, whose packaging says, “We envy no one in this world.” The cookie set was handed out to children to celebrate Kim Jong-il’s birthday in 2012. A lot of people who received the cookie sets turned around and sold them in the markets because they did not taste good. This picture was sent to ASIAPRESS in Japan. (ASIAPRESS)
◆ Nobody expects to get special gifts anymore
February 16 was Kim Jong-il’s birthday, called the Day of the Shining Star in North Korea. It is the biggest holiday in the country alongside the Day of the Sun, Kim Il-sung’s birthday on April 15.
In the past, the regime’s leadership provided special gifts such as rice and other foods, alcohol, cigarettes, and school uniforms and other supplies for students.
How did North Korea celebrate Kim Jong-il’s birthday given that the country’s economic troubles continue amid its overreaching COVID-19 policies and massive investments into missile development. A reporting partner in Yanggang Province gave the following report during the evening of February 16:
“Special rations for ordinary people amounted to just sweets for children. State-run food shops did, however, sell 7 grams of corn per household on February 12.”
※ State-run food stores sell food for holiday
“Today is a holiday so we got more than five hours of electricity. That’s how I’m able to recharge my cell phone. Electricity typically isn’t provided for more than two hours a day in February.
Different enterprises got different special gifts handed from the government. Some workplaces handed out half a bottle of soybean oil, while others handed out five kilograms of sailfin sandfish. Some trading companies gave out five kilograms of white rice. Nobody expects to get the kinds of special gifts they got in the past anymore.”
There are two kinds of special gifts handed out on special occasions: those handed out by government agencies to all citizens, and those handed out to individual laborers by agencies and state-run companies.
Starting some time ago, local governments - not the central government - began distributing special gifts for ordinary people. As a result, the gift amounts mentioned by the reporting partner in Yanggang Province may be different in other areas. Moreover, Pyongyangites receive special gifts from the central government every year. At this point in time, it is unclear what Pyongyangites received on the holiday. (KANG Ji-won)
※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.
asiapress.org
12. North Korean Cruise Missiles Fly in Figure-Eight Patterns as U.S., Allies Hold Exercises
Figure eights or crazy eights? The nKPA equivalent of the Russian "crazy Ivan" - a nod to the Hunt for Red October and my lame attempt at humor.
North Korean Cruise Missiles Fly in Figure-Eight Patterns as U.S., Allies Hold Exercises
Kim Jong Un’s regime has held a series of missile tests in response to military drills by the U.S. and its allies
https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-fires-cruise-missiles-as-u-s-allies-hold-exercises-18cacc02
By Dasl YoonFollow
Updated Feb. 23, 2023 9:46 pm ET
SEOUL—North Korea launched four cruise missiles, flying in figure-eight patterns and landing in the waters between the Korean Peninsula and Japan as military exercises raise tensions in the region.
North Korea fired four Hwasal-2 strategic cruise missiles from the North Hamgyong province, a northeastern region of North Korea, to demonstrate its nuclear counterattack capability, Pyongyang’s state media said on Friday.
The cruise missiles, which North Korea launched on Thursday, aren’t covered by United Nations Security Council resolutions that ban Pyongyang’s weapons activity, and they are typically considered part of regular military exercises rather than provocations.
The launches, nonetheless, come amid stepped up military activity in the region. On Wednesday, the U.S., South Korea and Japan conducted missile defense exercises, days after North Korea fired an intercontinental ballistic missile. The allies practiced real-time information sharing on detecting, tracking and intercepting ballistic missiles, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said.
At the Pentagon on Wednesday, the U.S. and South Korea held joint tabletop exercises, aimed at practicing responses to a hypothetical North Korean nuclear attack. Seoul’s defense officials then traveled to a U.S. naval base to observe nuclear submarines.
The annual tabletop exercises were launched in 2011 but only took place twice under former President Moon Jae-in who favored engagement with North Korea. President Yoon Suk Yeol’s administration plans to revive the annual exercises as Seoul and Washington expand joint military drills.
North Korea has responded to the exercises with a series of missile launches and heated rhetoric, with Kim Yo Jong, the sister of the North Korean leader, threatening to use the Pacific as a “firing range” in response to increased military activity by the U.S. and South Korea. Friday’s cruise missiles flew a distance of about 1,200 miles, state media said.
Earlier this week, South Korea’s Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that North Korea is preparing a timeline to launch an ICBM on a regular trajectory to maximize leverage on Washington, according to lawmakers who were briefed by the agency. North Korea has only tested ICBMs on lofted trajectories to avoid neighboring countries. At a military parade earlier this month, North Korea displayed almost a dozen ICBMs, in an apparent effort to show the country is mass producing weapons capable of striking the U.S.
On Wednesday, the State Department called U.N. member states to fully implement Security Council resolutions on North Korea and condemned its ballistic missile program. The U.S. is committed to engaging in dialogue with North Korea, but also committed to the defense of South Korea and Japan, State Department spokesman Ned Price said.
Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com
13. N. Korean foreign exchange rates rise amid continued hopes for restart of trade in March
The big question is will trade resume in March?
N. Korean foreign exchange rates rise amid continued hopes for restart of trade in March
The current exchange rate appears to have recovered to levels seen before the closure of the country's borders in January 2020
dailynk.com
FILE PHOTO: A view of Yanggang Province from the Chinese side of the China-North Korea border. (Daily NK)
A regular Daily NK survey of currency rates has found that North Korea’s foreign exchange rates continue to rise, but the rate of ascent has declined to a certain extent. Because hopes of expanded trade have been frustrated several times before, North Koreans are not rushing out to secure foreign exchange even when the government hands down orders regarding the expansion of trade.
According to Daily NK’s recent survey of North Korean currency rates and market prices, the US dollar was trading at KPW 8,400 in Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province as of Feb. 19.
As that figure represents a mere 0.2% increase from the previous survey on Feb. 5, when the dollar was trading at KPW 8,380, the rate does not appear to have changed significantly.
In Pyongyang as well, the dollar was trading at KPW 8,360, more or less what it was on Feb. 5, when it was trading at KPW 8,370.
The dollar regained the KPW 8,000 line in late July and has remained in the low-to-mid KPW 8,000s for seven months.
Compared to January 2020, just prior to North Korea’s closure of its border, when the dollar was trading between KPW 8,300 and 8,400, the current exchange rate appears to have recovered to levels seen before the closure of the country’s borders in January 2020.
YUAN CLIMBS FASTER THAN THE DOLLAR
In the case of yuan, the rate continues to climb faster than the dollar, but nevertheless, the Chinese currency has remained between KPW 1,100 and KPW 1,200 for three months since late November.
The yuan was trading at KWP 1,190 in Pyongyang as of Feb. 19, 2.5% higher than it was on Feb. 5 when it was trading at KPW 1,160, while in Sinuiju, it was trading at KPW 1,230, 2.5% higher than it was on Feb. 5, when it was trading at KPW 1,200.
In Hyesan, Yanggang Province, the yuan was trading at a similar level to Pyongyang and Sinuiju.
Despite the growing international strength of the dollar, the yuan is rising faster than the dollar amid government trade-related directives being handed down to Yanggang Province and North Hamgyong Province and preparations being made to reopen customs offices.
State-led trade led by major trading firms operating under powerful state agencies has usually been conducted in dollars through Nampo Port or Sinuiju. On the other hand, the small and medium-sized trading companies that conduct provincial-level trade are showing a preference for yuan.
CONTINUED HOPES FOR RESTART OF TRADE IN MARCH
With rising expectations of reopened trade repeatedly dashed over the last three years, trade-related directives from the North Korean authorities are not immediately translating into renewed trade, a reporting partner in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK recently, speaking on condition of anonymity.
In fact, North Korean authorities issued orders on Feb. 10 to provincial trading agencies calling for submissions of general plans for import and export activities and foreign currency acquisition.
The reporting partner said trade has failed to restart several times during the COVID period even after the authorities said it would.
“As long as the government issues no clear permissions [to resume] trade, orders to merely prepare [to restart trade] are not leading people to buy yuan,” he said.
However, trade officials involved in China-North Korea trade still hope that trade will expand from March.
A reporting partner in China, who also spoke on condition of anonymity, told Daily NK that trade between North Korea and China is currently flowing “smoothly.”
“When the two sessions [the meetings of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and National People’s Congress] are complete, trade will open up a bit more in Sinuiju, Yanggang Province, and North Hamgyong Province,” he claimed.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of reporting partners who live inside North Korea. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
14. Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking: Key Findings and Implications
Execution of economic policy by following the bankrupt ideology of juche is hardly a path to success.
These so-called "pivots" and shifts turned out to be not so pivotal because the regime cannot reform for fear of undermining regime legitimacy.
Excerpts:
North Korea’s stance on economic reform is significant, not just for its domestic repercussions, but also for how it links with the country’s foreign policy. This is a critical area that needs closer study. Some of the questions to ask include: How were Kim Jong Il’s July 2002 economic policy reforms connected to the North’s diplomatic initiatives starting in the early 2000s? Are there links between Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic initiatives in 2014 and 2015 and the introduction of his measures in agriculture, enterprise management, and banking during that period? Were there diplomatic opportunities missed that could have been exploited with a better understanding of the North’s economic policy developments?
Perhaps the most obvious area that should be researched more thoroughly would be the connection between Kim’s pivot to diplomacy in January 2018 and Pyongyang’s declaration of the “new strategic line” of “concentrating all efforts on socialist economic construction” three months later, in April.[6] One overall hypothesis to test might be whether Pyongyang has tried to improve its external security environment, which usually means improving relations with Washington, to provide better conditions for introducing new, reformist economic ideas. Should this particular situation present itself again, the question of whether there are specific diplomatic steps to take that go beyond the stale discussions of “carrots” or “incentives” that would be congruent with Pyongyang’s reform-oriented measures and utilize the momentum of North Korea’s own domestic economic policies should be more closely examined. If anything, our review of the journal articles on Pyongyang’s domestic reform measures and their impact on tourism, EDZs, and trade policy has reinforced the impression that there needs to be much closer consideration of the linkages between the North’s economic policy initiatives and its diplomacy. Identifying these domestic economic initiatives may help US policymakers to craft future policies that can both encourage and build on the momentum of these trends.
Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking: Key Findings and Implications
https://www.38north.org/2023/02/understanding-kim-jong-uns-economic-policymaking-key-findings-and-implications/
All good things must come to an end, they say, and this is a chance, at the end of the project “Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking,” to review what we tried to do, what we may have accomplished and the tremendous amount of work that remains to be done.
By reading and analyzing North Korea’s two premier economic journals—Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu and the Journal of Kim Il Sung University, also known as Hakpo—in depth, the project set out with the goal of shedding some light on how Pyongyang’s economic policy decisions are made and rolled out under Kim Jong Un from 2012-2020.
The breadth of this study was extensive, including Kim’s initiatives across the farming, enterprise and banking sectors, as well as tourism, economic development zones (EDZs) and foreign trade. It examined how these various reform-related initiatives were introduced and how sensitivities (and sometimes pushback) connected to reform initiatives were revealed. Across the board, a careful reading of the journals revealed the following: tensions between the traditional views of socialist principles and the more flexible, pro-reform interpretations; the challenges facing the regime as it pushes its reformist agenda; and both the extent to which the regime has been willing to go and its persistence over time to try to implement new ideas.
Key Findings
To wrap up this project, we are providing a summary below of five key findings from our research.
First, judging by articles in the journals, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) follows a particular pattern in rolling out new economic policies. New ideas do not simply appear out of the blue. The journals start by introducing the topics, signaling that Kim has issued some broad policy guidance that necessitated research on them. After studies have been conducted, new ideas have been tested in some units, viable plans have been identified and policy guidelines have been issued, the journals then go beyond general discussions and start explaining the new initiatives in more detail and advocating them with a range of arguments—some of which are highly abstruse, others more detailed and plainly stated—and, most importantly, how the new ideas can or should be operationalized.
Second, contrary to the widely accepted notion that all North Korean publications speak with one voice and toe the party line, the country’s two economic journals, particularly Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu, have served as a platform for internal discussions and often for differing views on new ideas and initiatives. It is inconceivable that dueling narratives on sensitive topics, such as economic reform, could be conducted without the concurrence, and more likely the backing, of various elements within the country’s leadership. Contending views may be more likely when a policy is still under discussion within the leadership, but there are times when these appear even after a top-level decision has clearly been made.
Third, the fundamental question of “economic management,” which is used in DPRK media as code for “reformist economic policies,” seems to boil down to finding the right balance between centralization (state and/or party control) and decentralization (greater decision-making for individual units). We continued to see contending narratives on this issue through the end of 2020, after which Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu was discontinued, thereby indicating that the Kim regime was still struggling at that time to find the right answer. Hakpo, since 2019, has published formal scholarly articles, a departure from the shorter essay-style writings it published through the end of 2018 that made this journal one of the two major platforms of economic policy discussions. Unless North Korea resumes the publication of Kyo’ngje Yo’ngu or changes the focus and format of Hakpo articles, it will be difficult to decipher the country’s intentions regarding the various economic policy issues. We will continue to have access to the North Korean party’s official economic policy through the dailies, but the dailies do not provide the behind-the-scenes discussions that inform decision-making or otherwise reflect Pyongyang’s dilemmas and challenges.
Fourth, North Korea’s push for tourism, EDZs, and foreign trade was not new when Kim Jong Un took power. What was different was how they became integrated into Kim’s broader push for new economic policies. It is hardly a coincidence that Kim called for promoting tourism and EDZs in the same speech where he formalized the concept of “economic management methods of our style.”[1] In many ways, the North’s external economic measures were shaped by and built on the North’s domestic reform initiatives that explored new boundaries, even to the extent of supporting ideas that traditionally were thought “risky” or “too capitalist.” For example, some journal articles on tourism and EDZs presented a variety of steps to rejuvenate the North Korean tourism industry and attract foreign investors, ranging from removing or easing legal barriers to allowing the principle of supply and demand to take its course in lieu of central planning.[2] In addition, multiple academic journals supported the diversification of trade, even with capitalist countries.[3]
Fifth, there is no indication that Pyongyang is completely retreating on Kim’s earlier push for reform. North Korean media continue to mention “improv[ing] economic management” and “steadily perfect[ing] the optimized methods of economic management” at the highest levels.[4] Nevertheless, there has clearly been a shift toward greater centralization in the past few years, and this shift has taken a toll on the North’s external economic policies as well.[5] This was exemplified most recently by Kim Jong Un’s report to a party plenary meeting in December 2022, which essentially repudiated the import of foreign technology, something that in the past was accepted and even endorsed. Whether the renewed emphasis on economic centralization is temporary or represents a strategic decision with long-range consequences, only time will tell.
Implications
North Korea’s stance on economic reform is significant, not just for its domestic repercussions, but also for how it links with the country’s foreign policy. This is a critical area that needs closer study. Some of the questions to ask include: How were Kim Jong Il’s July 2002 economic policy reforms connected to the North’s diplomatic initiatives starting in the early 2000s? Are there links between Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic initiatives in 2014 and 2015 and the introduction of his measures in agriculture, enterprise management, and banking during that period? Were there diplomatic opportunities missed that could have been exploited with a better understanding of the North’s economic policy developments?
Perhaps the most obvious area that should be researched more thoroughly would be the connection between Kim’s pivot to diplomacy in January 2018 and Pyongyang’s declaration of the “new strategic line” of “concentrating all efforts on socialist economic construction” three months later, in April.[6] One overall hypothesis to test might be whether Pyongyang has tried to improve its external security environment, which usually means improving relations with Washington, to provide better conditions for introducing new, reformist economic ideas. Should this particular situation present itself again, the question of whether there are specific diplomatic steps to take that go beyond the stale discussions of “carrots” or “incentives” that would be congruent with Pyongyang’s reform-oriented measures and utilize the momentum of North Korea’s own domestic economic policies should be more closely examined. If anything, our review of the journal articles on Pyongyang’s domestic reform measures and their impact on tourism, EDZs, and trade policy has reinforced the impression that there needs to be much closer consideration of the linkages between the North’s economic policy initiatives and its diplomacy. Identifying these domestic economic initiatives may help US policymakers to craft future policies that can both encourage and build on the momentum of these trends.
- [1]
- “경애하는 김정은동지께서 조선로동당 중앙위원회 2013년 3월전원회의에서 하신 보고,” Rodong Sinmun, April 2, 2013.
- [2]
-
For more, see Robert Carlin and Rachel Minyoung Lee, “Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking: Tourism as an Industry,” 38 North, July 26, 2022, https://www.38north.org/2022/07/understanding-kim-jong-uns-economic-policymaking-tourism-as-an-industry/; and Robert Carlin and Rachel Minyoung Lee, “Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking: Rolling Out Economic Development Zones,” 38 North, December 21, 2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/understanding-kim-jong-uns-economic-policymaking-rolling-out-economic-development-zones/.
- [3]
-
For more, see Robert Carlin and Rachel Minyoung Lee, “Understanding Kim Jong Un’s Economic Policymaking: Foreign Trade Narrative,” 38 North, February 6, 2023, https://www.38north.org/2023/02/understanding-kim-jong-uns-economic-policymaking-foreign-trade-narrative/.
- [4]
- Political News Team, “Report on 6th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of 8th WPK Central Committee,” Rodong Sinmun, January 1, 2023; and “On DPRK Cabinet’s Work for Last Year and Tasks for This Year,” Rodong Sinmun, January 19, 2023.
- [5]
- Ibid.
- [6]
- “3rd Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK Held in Presence of Kim Jong Un,” KCNA, April 21, 2018.
15. Korea-U.S. cooperation key to overcoming 'polycrisis': Foreign Minister
Excerpt:
"A polycrisis cannot be solved by the efforts of any single country alone as economic security issues stem from various areas such as the political, economic and technological and environmental fields," Park said in pre-recorded keynote remarks at a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank.
Friday
February 24, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Korea-U.S. cooperation key to overcoming 'polycrisis': Foreign Minister
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/24/national/diplomacy/foreign-minister-polycrisis-rokus/20230224110753560.html
Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin delivers keynote remarks through a pre-recorded video at a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank based in Washington, on Thursday. [SCREEN CAPTURE]
A polycrisis cannot be overcome by any single country, Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin declared Thursday, stressing the importance of cooperation between Korea and the United States.
The top Korean diplomat also underscored the importance of expanding U.S.-Korea cooperation to new areas such as biotechnology, quantum computing and artificial intelligence.
"A polycrisis cannot be solved by the efforts of any single country alone as economic security issues stem from various areas such as the political, economic and technological and environmental fields," Park said in pre-recorded keynote remarks at a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank.
"And without a doubt, in these turbulent times Korea's most important partner is the United States," he added.
Park explained a polycrisis refers to a "swarm of global emergencies," including rising inflation, Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine, that "form a global risk with compounding effects, such that the overall impact exceeds the sum of each part."
He said Seoul and Washington are working to further expand their bilateral alliance into an economic, security and technology alliance. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the Korea-U.S. alliance.
"We have always worked together, put our heads together and overcome new challenges at every stage over the last seven decades," said Park. "Korea and the United States have proved how durable and adaptive our partnership has been every day for the previous 70 years."
He listed critical, emerging technologies and supply chain resiliency as two key areas where U.S.-Korea economic cooperation is most important.
"First, promoting critical and emerging technologies is central to economic security," he said.
To that end, the Korean foreign ministry recently launched a new international technology rules and cooperation division to promote "bilateral and multilateral cooperation and work on building international norms related to cutting-edge and emerging technologies," according to Park.
"The two countries are in high gear to promote investments in both directions, develop clean technologies, secure reliable supply chains for critical minerals and ultimately create a mutually beneficial supply chain ecosystem," he said.
Yonhap
16. [Editorial] Devise countermeasures for nuclear threats
I believe the ROK/US Alliance is executing all of these recommendations and more.
Excerpt:
On the 70th anniversary of the South-U.S. alliance this year, the government must regularize their joint drills. The allies must devise effective ways for joint planning and execution of U.S. nuclear deterrence as early as possible to cope with increasing nuclear threats from North Korea as agreed to by the two defense ministers earlier. The government also must find ways to cooperate with the U.S. and Japan to counter the North Korea-China-Russia alliance.
Thursday
February 23, 2023
dictionary + A - A
[Editorial] Devise countermeasures for nuclear threats
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/23/opinion/editorials/Putin-Ukrain-war-North-Korea/20230223202725567.html
The Ukraine war enters the 365th day today after Russia invaded the country on February 24 a year ago. The United States, NATO and other democracies around the world formed a united front against Russia to help Ukraine. But the costly war drags on. We urge Moscow to end the unjustified war as early as possible.
We are particularly alerted by Russia shaking the global norms on nuclear weapons, as it certainly helps embolden North Korea to accelerate the development of nuclear weapons.
In the course of the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin persistently spoke and acted in an irresponsible manner. Whenever he faced disadvantages, he warned about the possibility of using nukes, as seen in his declaration of Russia’s breakaway from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start) in his speech to the nation on Tuesday. The New Start is a bilateral agreement in 2010 between the United States and Russia to cut the number of nuclear warheads and ICBMs, following an earlier one in 1991.
If nuclear powers kickstart another nuclear race led by Russia, the nonproliferation regime will collapse. A recent Pentagon report raised the likelihood that China will increase the number of its nuclear warheads from approximately 200 to more than 1,000 by 2030. Russia’s expansionism will certainly fuel an arms race in Europe, possibly starting with Germany.
As the Ukraine war dramatically changed international environments, it will make the goal of denuclearizing North Korea more difficult to achieve. The most urgent task for us is checking our military preparedness to meet the changed circumstances. The government must consolidate a sense of national security among citizens after being deceived by the North’s well-calculated peace offensive during the five years of the Moon Jae-in administration.
On the 70th anniversary of the South-U.S. alliance this year, the government must regularize their joint drills. The allies must devise effective ways for joint planning and execution of U.S. nuclear deterrence as early as possible to cope with increasing nuclear threats from North Korea as agreed to by the two defense ministers earlier. The government also must find ways to cooperate with the U.S. and Japan to counter the North Korea-China-Russia alliance.
Even when North Korea frequently test-fires ICBMs these days, China and Russia openly side with it. As a result, the UN Security Council cannot adopt any statement in the name of the council head, let alone any additional sanctions on North Korea. If the recalcitrant state across the border carries out its seventh nuclear test, our countermeasures will certainly run short. The government must squarely face the grim reality before it’s too late.
17.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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