Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

The third conclusion of the monograph is that there is a traditional American way of war which, in some respects, encourages a military style that is far from optimal as an approach to the challenges posed by irregular enemies. I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am not quite arguing that the American way of war, a style reflecting cultural influences, will thwart the ambitions for transformation, though there are grounds for anxiety in this regard. Also, I am certainly not claiming that a way of war is immutable. A way does evolve and may adapt, but it does so slowly. After all, it is deeply rooted in history, and there are good reasons why it is what it is. Also, let me emphasize, although I am concerned to point up its weaknesses, especially its strategic deficiencies, the American way of war has major characteristic strengths. Indeed, if it did not have such strengths, it would not have been adopted, and it would not have persisted. Not everyone will agree with each characteristic I have discerned in the American way; there is no authorized list. But this analysis rests on the strong conviction that there has been and is such a "way," and that its strength will be a problem, perhaps a severe problem, for the process of transformation and adaptation. Especially is the American way of war likely to be a problem, really a harassing condition, for a transformation that focuses significantly on the ability to conduct warfare against irregular enemies. In these concluding paragraphs, it is probably useful to provide a terse reminder of the leading characteristics of "the American way."

1. Apolitical 8. Large-scale2. Astrategic 9. Aggressive, offensive3. Ahistorical 10. Profoundly regular4. Problem-solving, optimistic 11. Impatient5. Culturally challenged 12. Logistically excellent6. Technology dependent 13. Highly sensitive to casualties7. Focused on firepower

Characteristics of the American Way."

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/i/irregular-enemies-essence-strategy.html

- Colin Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy – Can the American Way of War Adapt?

"However much you deny the truth, the truth goes on existing."

- George Orwell

"It doesn't matter how smart you are unless you stop and think."

- Thomas Sowell

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 23, 2023

2. This Is China’s 12-Point Blueprint for Bringing Peace to Ukraine

3. China Cease-Fire Proposal for Ukraine Falls Flat With US, Allies

4. Ukraine leader pledges push for victory on war anniversary

5. How Putin blundered into Ukraine — then doubled down

6. Disinformation Roulette: The Kremlin’s Year of Lies to Justify an Unjustifiable War

7. EXCLUSIVE: Seven Former NATO Supreme Allied Commanders Say U.S. ‘Must Do Everything We Can’ for a Ukrainian Victory

8. How the U.S. improvised a plan to deal with a Chinese balloon

9. Oral history: Leaders recall dismay, fury on first day of war in Ukraine

10. US vows to send more drones, aid to Ukraine on war’s anniversary

11. Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Marking One Year Since Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

12. Give Ukraine What It Wants – Russia Shouldn’t Get to Veto Western Military Aid

13. Ukraine leader pledges push for victory on war anniversary

14. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine

15. As Russia’s Military Stumbles in Ukraine, Chinese Strategists Are Taking Notes

16. U.S. looks to expand Taiwan military training -sources

17. How the Air Force flew its longest-distance night hostage rescue

18. Tanks might not reach Ukraine this year, US Army secretary says

19. What Pentagon leaders say they have learned from a year of battle in Ukraine

20. A Report Card on the War in Ukraine

21. A year into Ukraine, looking back at 5 prewar predictions

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 23, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2023

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for false flag operations in Chernihiv Oblast and Moldova ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to deliver boilerplate rhetoric in public events that present him opportunities to shape the Russian information space ahead of the year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Putin likely attempted to downplay recent surges of criticism regarding the integration of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR/LNR) into the Russian Armed Forces.
Putin seems more concerned with appealing to ultranationalist pro-war ideologues with meaningless gestures than with presenting any new approach to achieving the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine.
Putin likely continues to suffer from confirmation bias in his belief that Russia’s will to fight will outlast the West’s will to support Ukraine.
A Russian source attempted to preempt Western discussions of releasing classified information regarding China’s considerations to provide lethal aid to Russia.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) fulfilled Wagner Group’s complete artillery ammunition request on February 23 following immense support for Prigozhin in the Russian information space.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Svatove and Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian authorities announced that they completed the repair of the Kerch Strait Bridge road spans ahead of schedule.
Russian officials continue to offer incremental and insufficient benefits to support Russian military personnel and defense manufacturers.
Russian occupation officials continue efforts to militarize Ukrainian children through the installation of military-patriotic educational programs in occupied areas.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 23, 2023

Feb 23, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 23, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 23, 7 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for false flag operations on the Chernihiv Oblast international border and in Moldova ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian Northern Operational Command reported on February 23 that Russian forces are preparing possible false flag operations in the international border areas of Chernihiv Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Northern Operational Command stated that Ukrainian intelligence has already observed Russian convoys with unmarked military equipment and personnel dressed in uniforms resembling those worn by the Ukrainian military move to areas near the Chernihiv Oblast border. The Ukrainian Northern Operational Command stated that the purpose of these false flag operations would be to accuse Ukrainian forces of violating the territorial integrity of an unspecified country, very likely referring to Belarus. The Kremlin may be preparing false flag attacks to coerce Belarus into the war following Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's February 16 statement that Belarus would only enter the war if attacked by Ukraine.[2] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense also notably claimed on February 21 that Belarusian forces observed a buildup of Ukrainian forces at its borders.[3] ISW continues to assess that Belarusian or Russian attack on northern Ukrainian regions is highly unlikely, but Russia seeks to force Lukashenko’s hand or blame Ukraine for expanding the war to undermine support for Kyiv. Such a false flag operation could also aim to fix Ukrainian forces at the northern border in an effort to weaken Ukrainian defenses in eastern Ukraine and preparations for counter-offensive operations.

The Kremlin also appears to be setting information conditions to stage a false flag operation in occupied Transnistria, Moldova. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 23 that Ukrainian forces are planning to conduct an armed provocation against Transnistria in the near future.[4] The MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces would dress as Russian military personnel and stage an alleged Russian offensive from positions in Transnistria.[5] The Moldovan government denied the Russian MoD’s allegations.[6] The MoD likely sought to foster this false narrative to twist Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky‘s warning to Moldovan President Maia Sandu that the Kremlin was preparing provocations in Moldova and his offer to help Moldova if Russian forces in Transnistria threaten the territorial integrity of Ukraine.[7] The MoD’s dissemination of this false narrative does not indicate that Putin intends to attack Moldova—an undertaking for which he lacks military capability—although it points toward an escalation in his ongoing efforts to undermine the Moldovan state.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to deliver boilerplate rhetoric in public addresses that offered him opportunities he did not take to shape the Russian information space ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Putin marked Defenders of the Fatherland Day on February 23 with a video address in which he reiterated tired Kremlin talking points arguing that the Russian military is fighting neo-Nazism in Ukraine and protecting “our people in our historical lands.”[8] Putin delivered vague remarks that the Russian military is improving the training of its units and continuing to supply advanced equipment to its forces.[9] Putin also asserted that Russian industry is quickly increasing the production of a broad range of conventional weapons and preparing for the mass production of advanced models of military equipment, although ISW assesses that Russia continues to gradually prepare its defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war instead of engaging in wider rapid economic mobilization.[10] Putin’s speech did not offer specific goals or objectives for the war on Ukraine but instead continued generic rhetorical lines of effort aiming to prepare the Russian public for a protracted war in Ukraine. Putin’s refusal to use the public address to issue specific goals or policies ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine suggests that Putin remains uncertain of his ability to shape the Russian information space through a dramatic speech that represents a significant inflection in his rhetoric.[11]

Putin likely attempted to downplay recent surges of criticism regarding the integration of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR/LNR) into the Russian Armed Forces. Putin attended a wreath-laying ceremony to mark Defenders of the Fatherland Day, during which a Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Lieutenant Colonel Roman Cheremukhin asked him questions concerning the status of DNR and LNR militias and their inability to access state benefits for combat veterans.[12] Putin responded that the Russian government will include DNR and LNR militia personnel who served from 2014 onward to the list of those eligible for combat veteran benefits, in what was likely an orchestrated performance similar to past exchanges between Putin and servicemembers.[13] Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Andrey Turchak’s announcement that DNR and LNR personnel who fought in Ukraine since 2014 would receive the status of combat participant further suggests that the incident was staged.[14] The Kremlin is likely attempting to gain favor with the newly-integrated DNR and LNR militias – who have expressed concern over the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) imposing military command changes within their units – by offering them the prospect of having state benefits.

Putin seems more concerned with appealing to ultranationalist pro-war ideologues and tired rhetorical gestures than with presenting any new approach to achieving the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine. Putin’s only specific remark in his public address concerned the operation of the Borei-A nuclear-powered submarine and how it would allow the Russian Navy’s strategic nuclear forces to operate at 100 percent capacity.[15] Putin’s remarks concerning the Russian Navy‘s strategic nuclear forces were likely meant to support ongoing Russian information operations aimed at discouraging Western support to Ukraine by fueling hyperbolic concerns about nuclear escalation, as well as to display Russian military might to a domestic audience by highlighting capabilities that are not involved with Russian military failures in Ukraine.[16] Putin also engaged in a likely staged interaction with a representative from the Russian Orthodox Church in which he stated that he would do everything to address the concerns of the Orthodox clergy serving with Russian forces in Ukraine.[17] Putin’s appeals to nuclear armaments, DNR and LNR proxy forces, and Orthodoxy indicate that he is continuing to rely on rhetoric that he knows appeals to the Russian ultranationalist pro-war community.

Russian President Vladimir Putin likely continues to suffer from confirmation bias in his belief that Russia’s will to fight will outlast the West’s will to support Ukraine. The Financial Times (FT) cited unnamed officials close to the Kremlin stating that Putin assesses that “Russia is more committed to the war than the West is to Ukraine and [is] resilient enough to see out the economic pain.”[18] Unnamed Kremlin sources also told FT that Putin’s demands for loyalty over competence among elites is forcing them to refrain from being honest with him about the progress of the war, and noted that Putin gets information of “poor” quality as a result. Sources also revealed that most of Putin’s presidential administration and economic cabinet expressed that they do not support this war but use lies as a survival tactic, with only a small number of officials resigning since the start of the invasion. One longtime insider also observed that Putin is of “sound mind” and is “reasonable,” which supports ISW’s February 5 assessment that he is a highly calculated actor who places considerable emphasis on eliminating risks.[19] Insiders also revealed that Putin also withheld his plans to launch a full-scale invasion in February 2022 and his plans to occupy Crimea in 2014 from his closest advisors, with his circle of advisors recently tightening even more. The insider information indicates that Putin is prepared for Russia to suffer through a costly and exhausting protracted war under the conviction that the war will tire out Western support. Putin is also likely misinformed about the effectiveness of the Western equipment on the frontlines and its ability to impede his plans for a protracted war of attrition. The combination of Putin’s beliefs about Russian staying power and expectations of the collapse of Western will with the shrinking circle of advisors and the apparent unwillingness of insiders to contradict him likely create a strong confirmation bias in Putin’s observations of Western statements and outreach. Putin is likely to prioritize any indications of waning Western support or hesitancy over statements or indications of Western toughness or determination if this hypothesis is correct. Western leaders would do well to consider the likelihood that confirmation bias of this sort is shaping Putin’s perceptions in their own public and private statements and actions.

A Russian source attempted to preempt Western discussions about releasing classified information regarding China’s considerations to provide lethal aid to Russia. A prominent Russian milblogger responded to Chinese Foreign Minister Yi Wang’s denial that China intends to supply weapons to Russia and stated that China provides Russia the opportunity to purchase various types of ammunition, industrial drones, field medicine, and protective gear on a commercial basis.[20] The Russian milblogger claimed that Chinese-made equipment is abundantly available in Russia and is present throughout the front in Ukraine.[21] The milblogger is likely referring to commercially available dual-use technology from China, which ISW has observed various Russian volunteer groups purchase and send to the Russian military as part of crowdfunding efforts. ISW has not observed any evidence of Russian forces using lethal aid from China in Ukraine. US officials are reportedly considering releasing intelligence that they believe shows that China is weighing whether to supply weapons to support Russia’s war in Ukraine.[22] NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg stated on February 23 that NATO has seen signs that Chinese officials may be planning to send lethal aid to Russia.[23]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) fulfilled Wagner Group’s complete artillery ammunition request on February 23 following immense support for Prigozhin in the Russian information space.[24] Prigozhin thanked many unspecified figures for helping to solve Wagner’s ammunition shortage problems, including unspecified individuals in positions of power who “exerted pressure and made decisions” in favor of Wagner, and claimed these individuals helped save hundreds of Wagner personnel from dying in combat operations. Prigozhin likely aimed to further undermine the Russian MoD by thanking individuals rather than the MoD itself for providing Wagner with all its requested ammunition. Prigozhin’s February 23 resolution did not generate significant discussion within the information space, unlike Prigozhin’s escalation on February 22.[25] Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov stated on February 23 that the Russian military command is trying to oust Prigozhin from the information space after his continuous resistance to subordinate to the Russian MoD.[26] Prigozhin’s claims about Wagner receiving ammunition, if true, may suggest that the Kremlin fears Prigozhin’s influence over the information space and might have attempted to appease him before he exposed more inner workings of the Kremlin and the Russian MoD. The provision of ammunition to Wagner would also indicate that the Russian MoD continues to suffer significant resistance when attempting to subordinate and integrate irregular forces into its structure despite their reliance on the Russian MoD. It is also possible, however, that Prigozhin was pressured by the Kremlin or the MoD to make this statement defusing the informational crisis he had created.

Key Takeaways

The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for false flag operations in Chernihiv Oblast and Moldova ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to deliver boilerplate rhetoric in public events that present him opportunities to shape the Russian information space ahead of the year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Putin likely attempted to downplay recent surges of criticism regarding the integration of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR/LNR) into the Russian Armed Forces.
Putin seems more concerned with appealing to ultranationalist pro-war ideologues with meaningless gestures than with presenting any new approach to achieving the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine.
Putin likely continues to suffer from confirmation bias in his belief that Russia’s will to fight will outlast the West’s will to support Ukraine.
A Russian source attempted to preempt Western discussions of releasing classified information regarding China’s considerations to provide lethal aid to Russia.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) fulfilled Wagner Group’s complete artillery ammunition request on February 23 following immense support for Prigozhin in the Russian information space.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Svatove and Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian authorities announced that they completed the repair of the Kerch Strait Bridge road spans ahead of schedule.
Russian officials continue to offer incremental and insufficient benefits to support Russian military personnel and defense manufacturers.
Russian occupation officials continue efforts to militarize Ukrainian children through the installation of military-patriotic educational programs in occupied areas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1- Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Svatove on February 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Stelmakhivka (15km west of Svatove).[27] Geolocated footage published on February 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions north of Novovodiane (15km south of Svatove), indicating a limited Russian advance along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[28]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna on February 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces carried out unsuccessful offensive operations near Kreminna itself, Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and in the Serebrianske forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[29] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are prioritizing the Kreminna direction and that fighting along the frontline has largely died down due to Russian forces sustaining heavy losses.[30] A Russian milblogger posted footage on February 23 purportedly showing BARS-13 (Combat Army Reserve of the Country) commander “Artist” in Bilohorivka claiming that Russian forces continue to attempt to seize the settlement.[31] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces made unsuccessful efforts to attack Bilohorivka and advance on Zarichne (17km west of Kreminna) from Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[32] Geolocated footage published on February 23 reportedly shows a remote-controlled vehicle-borne IED reportedly constructed by the 35th Separate Guard Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) driving toward Ukrainian positions and failing to detonate near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna).[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and made tactical gains in the area on February 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops continue to assault Ukrainian positions in Bakhmut itself, northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (8km northwest), Dubovo-Vasylivka (5km northwest), Berkhivka (2km northwest), Maloiliinivka (on the northern tip of Bakhmut), and Yahidne (directly on the northwestern outskirts of Bakhmut); southwest of Bakhmut near Dylivka (16km southwest); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanviske (5km west).[34] Geolocated footage confirms that Russian forces have made incremental advances in the eastern, southern, and southwestern sectors of Bakhmut.[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) noted that ”volunteers of assault detachments” (the wording the Russian MoD uses to describe the Wagner Group without naming them explicitly) and elements of the 76th Guards Airborne Division are operating on this sector of the front.[36] ISW has observed reports that elements of the 106th Airborne Division are operating in the Bakhmut area and that elements of both the 106th and the 76th Airborne Divisions are operating near Kreminna in Luhansk Oblast.[37] These reports together indicate that neither division is deployed as an entire formation in either area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner troops are succeeding in pushing Ukrainian forces out of Berkhivka and now control the majority of the settlement, from which they are fighting towards Yahidne and the northwestern outskirts of Bakhmut.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops have also made advances within Bakhmut itself and in the Soledar area northeast of Bakhmut.[39] Milbloggers also remarked that Wagner has partially regained control over lost positions along the T0504 Kostyatynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway, thereby blocking the route and approaching the southeastern outskirts of Ivanivske.[40] Footage posted by Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin on February 23 and later geolocated shows him visiting Wagner troops in eastern Bakhmut within 500m of the current frontline, although Prigozhin claimed he was within 400m of the frontline.[41]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Avdiivka area north of Donetsk City on February 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted 43 unsuccessful attacks in this area over the past day, particularly near Avdiivka itself and northeast of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka (10km northeast of Avdiivka) and Kamianka (3km northeast).[42] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have made marginal advances north of Avdiivka in the Novobakhmutivka area.[43] The spokesperson for the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the Tavriisk direction Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi noted that Russian forces had increased their activity in the Avdiivka and Vuhledar directions. Dmytrashkivskyi remarked that Russian troops are attacking in assault groups of 10 to 15 people and in mechanized units of unspecified echelons likely at or below the battalion level.[44] This likely means that Russian forces are employing roughly squad-sized assault groups supported by company-sized mechanized units. A Russian milblogger posted footage of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 56th Separate SPETSNAZ Battalion striking Ukrainian positions near Avdiivka and claimed that the battalion is moving forward meter by meter.[45]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on February 23. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops continue attacking Ukrainian positions on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Nevelske and Vodyane; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka.[46] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have advanced to Pobieda, indicating that Russian troops have likely made additional gains south of Marinka in order to reach the Pobieda area.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian troops continue attacks along the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City and that DNR fighters are making territorial gains within Marinka itself.[48]

Russian forces continued ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City in the Vuhledar area on February 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attacked Russian positions near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) and Prechystivka (35km southwest of Donetsk City) and that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade in this area are refusing to fight due to recently failed operations.[49] Dmytrashkivsky noted that Russian forces have recently increased their activity in the Vuhledar area, and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) warned that Russian forces in this area may be preparing for yet another offensive on Vuhledar.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are fighting southeast of Vuhledar between Pavlivka and Mykilske.[51]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Novodanylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast on February 23.[52] Russian forces continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[53]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continue to reinforce their positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated that Russian forces are deploying new equipment near Kakhovka and Nova Kakhovka.[54]

Russian authorities announced that they completed the repair of the Kerch Strait Bridge road spans ahead of schedule on February 23.[55] Russian authorities previously announced that restoration work on the road spans should finish by March 2023.[56] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin announced on November 15, 2022, that Russian authorities will restore the damaged section of the Kerch Strait rail tracks by December 1, 2023.[57]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continue to deploy Soviet-era military equipment from storage to the front line in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers amplified images on February 23 showing Russian forces using BTR-50P armored personnel carriers, an amphibious armored vehicle that the Soviet Union produced in 1952, in an unspecified area of Ukraine.[58] ISW previously assessed that the observed absence of several tank units in Ukraine suggests that the Russian military continues to struggle to replace armored equipment, especially tanks, lost during previous failed offensive operations.[59] ISW also assesses that vast equipment losses are likely constraining the Russian military’s ability to conduct large-scale mechanized maneuver warfare, and the deployment of old Soviet armored vehicles from storage further suggests that Russian forces lack the necessary armored equipment needed for conducting modern mechanized assaults throughout Ukraine.[60]

Russian authorities reportedly found Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) commanders innocent of accusations alleging mistreatment of mobilized Russian personnel from the Republic of Tuva subordinated under their command. Russian outlet RBK stated on February 23 that the Russian military prosecutor's office conducted an investigation into accusations that DNR commanders beat and threatened the Tuvan mobilized personnel and failed to assign them to specific military units, following a publicized video from the Tuvan personnel voicing these complaints.[61] The Russian military prosecutor reportedly found no evidence corroborating the complaints, and the former Tuvan Republic Head Sholban Kara-ool reportedly met with the personnel and assessed that none of them showed signs of mistreatment.[62] The current Tuvan Republic Head Vladislav Khovalyg reportedly stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense agreed to transfer the mobilized personnel to the 55th Motorized Brigade of the 41st Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District.[63] ISW continues to assess that efforts to integrate DNR formations into the Russian Armed Forces will likely result in command-and-control issues and degraded combat effectiveness.

Russian officials continue to provide insufficient and performative benefits to support Russian military personnel and defense manufacturers. The Russian State Duma passed a law on February 22 on maintaining increased pensions for military pensioners who reentered military service.[64] Sakhalin Oblast Governor Oleg Kozhemyako stated on February 21 that workers in military-industrial complexes in Sakhalin Oblast will receive preferential housing rents.[65] Russian authorities in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai reportedly presented widows of servicemembers who died in Ukraine with sausages and food packages as social support and later deleted social media posts publicizing the measure.[66]

Russian sources claimed that Russian officials have reduced training periods for Russian healthcare workers in response to a lack of medical workers among Russian forces in Ukraine. A Russian news source stated on February 20 that Russian officials have shortened the training period for surgeons, anesthesiologists, traumatologists, and orthopedists by an unspecified amount of time to address shortages of medical workers in frontline areas.[67] The Russian news source stated that their sources in the Russian medical field claimed that the training program will produce incompetent doctors and that mobilization intensified medical staffing shortages throughout Russian medical institutions.[68]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to militarize Ukrainian children through the establishment of military-patriotic educational programs in occupied areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 23 that Russian-controlled schools in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, are planning to encourage children to take the Yunarmia oath and that schools in occupied areas also intend to form an “All-Russian Rescue Corps.”[69] The Russian Student Rescue Corps has historically galvanized youth to work with the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations and is likely being instituted in occupied areas to encourage youth to work in pseudo-law enforcement and emergency management capacities.[70] Programs such as Yunarmia and the Rescue Corps likely intend to strengthen social control of occupied areas by forcing youth into militarized social programs that advocate for pro-Russian sentiment.

Russian occupation officials continue to secure patronages with Russian regions. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo met with Head of the Sakha Republic on February 22 Aisen Nikolayev to discuss industrial and agricultural programs in Kherson Oblast.[71] Occupation officials continue to pursue such patronages to increase the economic integration of occupied areas and foster dependence of occupied regions on Russian federal subjects.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)

Belarus continues to provide its territory for the training of Russian troops. Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, stated on February 22 that Russian forces continue to train in Belarus, although the current Russian grouping in Belarus is not large enough to mount an offensive on Ukraine from Belarus.[72] Hromov noted that the current Russian grouping in Belarus is composed of newly formed and replenished units that previously suffered high losses and are training in Belarus to restore the combat capability of these units.[73] Hromov remarked that a significant portion of Russian forces who trained in Belarus have already deployed to Ukraine and that new units are arriving in Belarus to replace them.[74] Hromov’s statements support ISW’s assessment that Russia has likely committed most available forces to the frontline in Ukraine, including elements trained in Belarus.[75]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/23/rosiya-gotuye-provokacziyi-na-kordoni-chernigivskoyi-oblasti-ok-pivnich/

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-says-ukraine-army-groups-ma...

[3] https://t.me/modmilby/23226

[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/24367

[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/24367

[6] https://t.me/prima_sursa_md/461; https://romania.europalibera.org/a/rus...

[7] https://tsn dot ua/svit/za-yakoyi-umovi-ukrayina-mozhe-dopomogti-moldovi-z-pridnistrov-yam-vidpovid-zelenskogo-2269273.html

[8] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70575

[9] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70575

[10] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70575 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020923

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011823 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr...

[12] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70576

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010223

[14] https://t.me/turchak_andrey/1050 ;

[15] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70575

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[17] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70576

[18] https://www.ft.com/content/80002564-33e8-48fb-b734-44810afb7a49?accessTo...

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[20] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/78856 ; https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-...

[21] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/78856

[22] https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-considers-release-of-intelligence-on-ch...

[23] https://english.nv dot ua/nation/china-could-be-preparing-to-supply-russia-with-weapons-ukraine-war-news-50306454.html

[24] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/498

[25] https://t.me/kommunist/16017; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/78834; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[26] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/23/kerivnycztvo-rf-pragne-vstanovyty-kontrol-nad-pryvatnymy-vijskovymy-kompaniyamy-predstavnyk-genshtabu-zsu/

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CFJt8cHgbuia1ERaKwb...

[28] https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1628646322839461888; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1628737738450116609

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CFJt8cHgbuia1ERaKwb...

[30] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/8857

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/11061

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/11044

[33] https://twitter.com/HKaaman/status/1628799468840648704?s=20; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1628812241792368646?s=20; https://twitter.com/HKaaman/status/1628435340758339584?s=20

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CFJt8cHgbuia1ERaKwb...

[35] https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1628756766417616898; https://twitt... . https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1628737753037918211; https://twit... https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1628479502941560833

[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/24379

[37] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[38] https://t.me/rybar/43878; https://t.me/rybar/43900; https://t.me/wargo...

[39] https://t.me/rybar/43900; https://t.me/rybar/43878

[40] https://t.me/rybar/43878; https://t.me/readovkanews/53344

[41] https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1628743224847220737; https://twitte...

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CFJt8cHgbuia1ERaKwb...

[43] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1628737778904178690; https://twit... https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1628667086737408001

[44] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/23/na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-vorog-aktyvizuvavsya-ta-deshho-zminyv-taktyku-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/11059

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CFJt8cHgbuia1ERaKwb...

[47] https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1628802891669549059?s=20; https://twitter.com/rollowastaken/status/1628803423154970626?s=20; https://t.me/adbestias/6757

[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/11044; https://t.me/nm_dnr/9934; https://t.me/vl...

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02j2nQhZuoFMhtiNCqVD...

[50] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1628646653052829696; https://armyi... com.ua/2023/02/23/na-tavrijskomu-napryamku-vorog-aktyvizuvavsya-ta-deshho-zminyv-taktyku-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/9581; https://t.me/readovkanews/53344; https:/...

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/11044

[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/11044; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/p... https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/4376

[54] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid07uFacrMqvjJqQ5uSWTTon7...

[55] https://t.me/Aksenov82/2152; https://t.me/Aksenov82/2152;

[56] https://t.me/Aksenov82/2152; https://t.me/Aksenov82/2152;

[57] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/872561

[58] https://t.me/ChDambiev/22448 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/97299

[59] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021923

[60] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021523

[61] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/22/02/2023/63f634b59a7947707d3cb94e

[62] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/22/02/2023/63f634b59a7947707d3cb94e

[63] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/22/02/2023/63f634b59a7947707d3cb94e

[64] https://t.me/meduzalive/79141

[65] https://t.me/vmfareast/13153

[66] https://vk dot com/wall-176467668_8183; https://t.me/astrapress/21533 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/9192 ; https://vk dot com/public216665134?w=wall-216665134_118

[67] https://holod dot media/2023/02/20/war-impact-in-medicine/; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-feb-21-22

[68] https://holod dot media/2023/02/20/war-impact-in-medicine/; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-feb-21-22

[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CFJt8cHgbuia1ERaKwb...

[70] https://www.ulsu dot ru/ru/page/page_1326/

[71] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/441

[72] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/23/kerivnycztvo-bilorusi-prodovzhuvatyme-vykonuvaty-postavleni-pered-nym-vymogy-shhodo-pidgotovky-rosijskyh-pidrozdiliv/

[73] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/23/kerivnycztvo-bilorusi-prodovzhuvatyme-vykonuvaty-postavleni-pered-nym-vymogy-shhodo-pidgotovky-rosijskyh-pidrozdiliv/

[74] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/23/kerivnycztvo-bilorusi-prodovzhuvatyme-vykonuvaty-postavleni-pered-nym-vymogy-shhodo-pidgotovky-rosijskyh-pidrozdiliv/

[75] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021923

This Is China’s 12-Point Blueprint for Bringing Peace to Ukraine

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-24/here-s-china-s-12-point-proposal-on-how-to-end-russia-s-war-in-ukraine?sref=hhjZtX76

ByBloomberg News

February 24, 2023 at 2:17 AM EST

Note the relationship of this proposal to talking points on Taiwan.

China’s Foreign Ministry published a 12-point position paper on Friday laying out how it thinks peace can be restored to Ukraine.

The proposal is unlikely to find much favor in Kyiv, Washington or European capitals, largely because it avoids explaining how territory that Russia has seized would be handled.

Read: China’s Cease-Fire Proposal for Ukraine Gets Quick Dismissal

The document also resembles previous talking points Chinese diplomats have made, whether on the Ukraine issue, or on topics such as Taiwan. Here’s a look at what the proposal calls for:

1. “Respecting the sovereignty of all countries.”

CONTEXT: This is a common talking point used by Chinese diplomats, especially concerning Taiwan, the democratically run island Beijing has pledged to bring under its control. The Foreign Ministry has avoided questions on how Ukraine’s sovereignty can be protected. Kyiv has demanded a complete withdraw of Russian forces from all the territory Moscow has claimed from Ukraine since it invaded and annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014.

2. “Abandoning the Cold War mentality.”

CONTEXT: This is a line the ministry often uses to criticize the US. Beijing accuses the US — and by extension the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — of seeking to preserve their hegemony. China argues that its greater economic sway means it deserves a bigger role on the world stage, one the US has yet to accommodate.

3. “Ceasing hostilities.”

CONTEXT: The call for a cease-fire is anathema to the government in Kyiv while Russia holds Ukrainian land. Such a move would greatly benefit Moscow because it would freeze Russian troops in place in Ukraine.

4. “Resuming peace talks.”

CONTEXT: Beijing has told Moscow that it’s willing to organize any peace talks on Ukraine, but Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said Moscow won’t discuss Ukraine’s demands that it withdraw from occupied lands and pay reparations. Lavrov’s comments in December coincided with Russia raining scores of missiles on Ukrainian cities in one of its heaviest barrages of the war.

5. “Resolving the humanitarian crisis.”

CONTEXT: The war has killed tens of thousands of people and driven millions from their homes. China has said it “stands ready to contribute to overcoming the humanitarian crisis” to Ukraine, but its offer of an extra 10 million yuan ($1.4 million) in such help last year raised eyebrows compared to the billions of dollars provided by other major powers.

6. “Protecting civilians and prisoners of war.”

CONTEXT: Russian forces have been accused by Ukraine, NATO and international agencies of indiscriminately targeting civilians since the invasion began February 2022, while Moscow maintains that it’s hitting military targets with high precision.

7. “Keeping nuclear power plants safe.”

CONTEXT: China has consistently expressed concern over the safety of nuclear facilities in Ukraine, urging all sides to avoid man-made nuclear accidents. Russia and Ukraine have traded blame for sporadic shelling in the vicinity of Zaporizhzhia, Europe’s largest atomic plant.

8. “Reducing strategic risks.”

CONTEXT: China has repeatedly said it doesn’t want the situation in Ukraine to escalate. President Xi Jinping also told German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in November that China opposes the use of nuclear force in Europe, sending a clear message to Putin that such threats are a red line for China.

9. “Facilitating grain exports.”

CONTEXT: Disruption of Ukraine’s grain exports has worsened inflation around the world, though China has largely avoided that problem. A landmark deal to reopen some Ukrainian ports for vital food exports was reached last year, but Ukrainian traders and authorities say that Russia is purposefully slowing the pace of shipments.

10. “Stopping unilateral sanctions.”

CONTEXT: China has long opposed what it says are unilateral sanctions and “long arm jurisdiction,” complaints that are aimed at the US both for the punishments targeting Moscow and for those imposed on Beijing. Still, China recently added Lockheed Martin Corp. and a subsidiary of Raytheon Technologies Corp. to its list of “unreliable entities” over arms sales to Taiwan.

11. “Keeping industrial and supply chains stable.”

CONTEXT: China has raised the supply chain issue frequently in response to a US-led effort to deprive the Asian nation of advanced chip tech, partly to curb the advances its military can make. Beijing has recently lobbied France, Japan, the Netherlands and South Korea in an effort to counter Washington’s strategy.

12. “Promoting post-conflict reconstruction.”

CONTEXT: Rebuilding Ukraine after the war will be a gargantuan task, running over an estimated $1 trillion to fix infrastructure, industry, housing and more damaged in the war. Yet the position paper dedicates two sentences to the topic, saying “China stands ready to provide assistance and play a constructive role in this endeavor.”

— With assistance by Xiao Zibang and Lucille Liu

3. China Cease-Fire Proposal for Ukraine Falls Flat With US, Allies

China Cease-Fire Proposal for Ukraine Falls Flat With US, Allies

12-point blueprint would offer some reprieve for Russia
Position paper unlikely to win support from Kyiv, allies

ByBloomberg News

February 23, 2023 at 8:13 PM ESTUpdated onFebruary 24, 2023 at 5:27 AM EST

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-24/china-calls-for-cease-fire-as-war-in-ukraine-enters-second-year?sref=hhjZtX76

China called for a cease-fire between Russia and Ukraine in a position paper on ending the war that offered some reprieve to Moscow but was quickly dismissed by Kyiv’s allies as the conflict enters its second year.

Several of the 12 points outlined by China in the document issued Friday would, if carried out, offer clear benefits to Russian President Vladimir Putin. That includes a cease-fire, which would freeze Russian troops in place on Ukrainian territory, as well as a call to immediately end all sanctions not endorsed by the UN Security Council, where Russia holds veto power.

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, speaking on CNN, brushed off the Chinese proposal, saying it should have ended after the first bullet point, which calls for “respecting the sovereignty of all countries.”

“This war could end tomorrow, if Russia stopped attacking Ukraine and withdrew its forces,” he said.

Asked about the proposal, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, “China doesn’t have much credibility” in light of its failure to condemn Putin’s war.

But US and European officials worry that the Chinese proposal may get some traction in the global South, which has largely resisted calls to join sanctions against Russia.

The Chinese announcement came a day after the country abstained from a United Nations resolution calling for an end to the war. The measure passed 141-7, with 32 abstentions. The UN resolution included a demand for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine’s territory.

A damaged residential building follwoing Russian attacks, in Lyman, Ukraine.Photographer: Ihor Tkachov/AFP/Getty Images

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has vowed to continue fighting until Russian troops depart. Moscow has shown no sign of stopping its attacks and continues to claim portions of eastern Ukraine and Crimea as its territory after holding illegal referendums on annexation.

The Chinese initiative “is nothing that Ukraine could accept,” Latvian President Egils Levits said on Bloomberg Television.

The criticism was more muted from Ukraine, which has tried to avoid alienating Beijing since the start of the war.

“Of course Ukraine would like to see China on its side,” said Zhanna Leshchynska, Kyiv’s top diplomat in Beijing. “At the moment, we see that China is not supporting Ukrainian efforts,” but “we hope that they also urge the Russian Federation to stop the war and to withdraw its troops from the territory of Ukraine.”

There was no immediate official comment on the Chinese plan from Russia, which was observing a public holiday Friday.

Beijing has repeatedly defended a few of Russia’s justifications for going to war — most prominently to resist the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — while insisting it doesn’t support the invasion itself.

The Chinese initiative is a diplomatic boost for Russia, said Alexander Gabuev, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Russia can say publicly it’s not against it, thank its Chinese colleagues and that it’s ready to sit down at the negotiating table.”

“It’s clear no one would seriously agree to this but it will score political points for China and make the West look bloodthirsty and like obstacles to peace,” he said.

Days before releasing the proposal, China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, met with President Putin in Moscow and called ties between the nations “solid as a mountain.” Chinese President Xi Jinping, meanwhile, hasn’t spoken to Zelenskiy since the war started, despite speaking with Putin at least four times.

Much of China’s proposal on Friday reiterated long-held foreign policy positions in dealing with the US on issues like Taiwan.

‘Not a Peace Proposal’

“It’s not a peace proposal,” said Jorge Toledo, the European Union’s ambassador to China. “It’s a position paper.”

Wang Wenbin, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, hit back at the criticism on Friday, saying the proposal showed that “China is committed to peace talks.”

As the war drags on, there’s rising concern that China may be playing a more active role to help Moscow.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Thursday that Beijing probably approved of Chinese firms providing Russia non-lethal, “dual-use” support for its war in Ukraine, remarks that underscore growing US concern that Beijing may help arm Putin’s forces. China has rejected the allegations and accused the US of fanning the conflict by providing weapons to Ukraine.

— With assistance by Xiao Zibang, Colum Murphy, Rebecca Choong Wilkins and Jennifer Jacobs

4. Ukraine leader pledges push for victory on war anniversary

Ukraine leader pledges push for victory on war anniversary

AP · by JOHN LEICESTER and HANNA ARHIROVA · February 24, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Ukraine’s president pledged to push for victory in 2023 as he and other Ukrainians on Friday marked the somber anniversary of the Russian invasion that he called “the longest day of our lives.”

As morning broke on a day of commemorations and reflection, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy struck a tone of grim defiance and used the Feb. 24 anniversary to congratulate Ukrainians on their resilience in the face of Europe’s biggest and deadliest war since World War II. He said they had proven themselves to be invincible in what he called “a year of pain, sorrow, faith and unity.”

“We survived the first day of the full-scale war. We didn’t know what tomorrow would bring, but we clearly understood that for each tomorrow, you need to fight. And we fought,” he said in an early morning video address.

It was “the longest day of our lives. The hardest day of our modern history. We woke up early and haven’t fallen asleep since,” he said.

Ukrainians attended memorials, held vigils and other remembrances for their tens of thousands of dead — a toll growing all the time as fighting rages in eastern Ukraine in particular. Although Friday marked the anniversary of the full-scale invasion, combat between Russian-backed forces and Ukrainian troops has raged in the country’s east since 2014. New video from there shot with a drone for The Associated Press showed how the town of Marinka has been razed, along with others.

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Lining up in the capital, Kyiv, to buy anniversary commemorative postage stamps, Tetiana Klimkova said that a year into the invasion, she’s been unable to shake “the feeling that your heart is constantly falling, it is falling and hurting.”

Still, “this day has become a symbol for me that we have survived for a whole year and will continue to live,” she said. “On this day, our children and grandchildren will remember how strong Ukrainians are mentally, physically, and spiritually.”

But peace is nowhere in sight. China called for a cease-fire — an idea previously rejected by Ukraine for fear it would allow Russia to regroup militarily after bruising battlefield setbacks.

A 12-point paper issued Friday by China’s Foreign Ministry also urged the end of Western sanctions that are squeezing Russia’s economy.

That suggestion also looks like a non-starter, given that Western nations are working to further tighten the sanctions noose, not loosen it. The U.K. government imposed more sanctions Friday on firms supplying military equipment to Moscow and said it would bar exports to Russia of aircraft parts and other components.

Ukraine also is readying another military push to roll back Russian forces — with weaponry that has been pouring in from the West.

“Ukraine is entering a new period, with a new task — to win,” Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov said on Facebook.

“It will not be easy. But we will manage,” he said. “There is rage and a desire to avenge the fallen.”

Mercifully, air raid alarms didn’t sound overnight in Kyiv and the morning started quietly, allaying concerns that Russia might unleash another barrage of missiles to pile yet more sadness on Ukraine on the date of the anniversary.

Still, the government recommended that schools move classes online, and office employees were asked to work from home. And even as they rode Kyiv’s subway to work, bought coffee and got busy, Ukrainians were unavoidably haunted by thoughts of loss and memories of a year ago when missiles struck, Russian invaded Ukraine’s borders and a refugee exodus began. Back then, there were fears the country might fall within days or weeks.

Mykhailo Horbunov, a 68-year-old man trying to rebuild in Kyiv after having been forced to flee his Russian-occupied village in the south, said the invasion had been a watershed in his life. He lost his agricultural business, and Russian troops have been living in his house for six months. He described the war’s impact on him as “a collapse.”

The day was also particularly poignant for the parents of children born exactly a year ago as bombs began killing and maiming.

“It’s a tragedy for the whole country, for every Ukrainian,” said Alina Mustafaieva, who gave birth to daughter Yeva as the first explosions echoed across Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city.

“My family was lucky. We didn’t lose anyone or anything. But many did, and we have to share this loss together,” she said.

Tributes to Ukraine’s resilience flowed from overseas. The Eiffel Tower in Paris was among monuments illuminated in Ukraine’s colors — yellow and blue.

Zelenskyy got an early start to the day, firing off a tweet that promised: “We know that 2023 will be the year of our victory!”

He followed that up with his video address in which he pledged not to abandon Ukrainians living under Russian occupation.

Ukraine “has not forgotten about you, has not given up on you. One way or another, we will liberate all our lands,” he said.

A year on, casualty figures are horrific on both sides, although Moscow and Kyiv are keeping precise numbers under wraps. Western estimates suggest hundreds of thousands of killed and wounded. The failure of the Russian military to fill its initial objective of capturing Kyiv severely dented its reputation as a fighting force. Still, it has unleashed an unrelenting barrage of firepower on Ukraine over the past year. Ukrainian armed forces put the tally at roughly 5,000 missile strikes, 3,500 airstrikes and 1,000 drone strikes.

Economic repercussions have rippled across the globe. Diplomatic repercussions, too. Western nations are supporting Ukraine militarily, financially and politically. But China, India and countries in the global south have proven ambivalent about Western arguments that Ukraine is the front line of a fight for freedom and democracy.

___

Joanna Kozlowska in London, and Sophiko Megrelidze in Tbilisi, Georgia, contributed to this report.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · by JOHN LEICESTER and HANNA ARHIROVA · February 24, 2023

5. How Putin blundered into Ukraine — then doubled down

Excerpts:

The decision caught Lavrov completely by surprise. Just days earlier, the Russian president had polled his security council for their opinions on recognising two separatist statelets in the Donbas, an industrial border region in Ukraine, at an excruciatingly awkward televised session — but had left them none the wiser about his true intentions.

Keeping Lavrov in the dark was not unusual for Putin, who tended to concentrate his foreign policy decision-making among a handful of close confidants, even when it undermined Russia’s diplomatic efforts.

...

Under Putin’s invasion plan, Russia’s troops were to seize Kyiv within a matter of days in a brilliant, comparatively bloodless blitzkrieg.

Instead, the war has proved to be a quagmire of historic proportions for Russia. A year on, Putin’s invasion has claimed well over 200,000 dead and injured among Russia’s armed forces, according to US and European officials; depleted its stock of tanks, artillery and cruise missiles; and cut the country off from global financial markets and western supply chains.

Nor has the fighting in Ukraine brought Putin any closer to his vaguely defined goals of “demilitarising” and “de-Nazifying” Kyiv. Though Russia now controls 17 per cent of Ukraine’s internationally recognised territory, it has abandoned half of the land it seized in the war’s early weeks — including a humiliating retreat from Kherson, the only provincial capital under its control, just weeks after Putin attempted to annex it.

But as the war rumbles on with no end in sight, Putin has given no indication he intends to back down on his war efforts.

How Putin blundered into Ukraine — then doubled down

The decision to invade was taken after consulting only a tiny circle. The Russian leader has since become even more isolated

Financial Times · by Max Seddon · February 23, 2023

At about 1am on February 24 last year, Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, received a troubling phone call.

After spending months building up a more than 100,000-strong invasion force on the border with Ukraine, Vladimir Putin had given the go-ahead to invade.

The decision caught Lavrov completely by surprise. Just days earlier, the Russian president had polled his security council for their opinions on recognising two separatist statelets in the Donbas, an industrial border region in Ukraine, at an excruciatingly awkward televised session — but had left them none the wiser about his true intentions.

Keeping Lavrov in the dark was not unusual for Putin, who tended to concentrate his foreign policy decision-making among a handful of close confidants, even when it undermined Russia’s diplomatic efforts.

On this occasion, the phone call made Lavrov one of the very few people who had any knowledge of the plan ahead of time. The Kremlin’s senior leadership all found out about the invasion only when they saw Putin declare a “special military operation” on television that morning.

Putin meets in the Kremlin with Sergei Lavrov, his foreign minister who was among those the president appears not to have consulted before the initial invasion © Alexei Nikolsky/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images

Later that day, several dozen oligarchs gathered at the Kremlin for a meeting arranged only the day before, aware that the invasion would trigger western sanctions that could destroy their empires. “Everyone was completely losing it,” says a person who attended the event.

While they waited, one of the oligarchs spied Lavrov exiting another meeting and pressed him for an explanation about why Putin had decided to invade. Lavrov had no answer: the officials he was there to see in the Kremlin had known less about it than he did.

Stunned, the oligarch asked Lavrov how Putin could have planned such an enormous invasion in such a tiny circle — so much so that most of the senior officials at the Kremlin, Russia’s economic cabinet and its business elite had not believed it was even possible.

“He has three advisers,” Lavrov replied, according to the oligarch. “Ivan the Terrible. Peter the Great. And Catherine the Great.”

Under Putin’s invasion plan, Russia’s troops were to seize Kyiv within a matter of days in a brilliant, comparatively bloodless blitzkrieg.

Instead, the war has proved to be a quagmire of historic proportions for Russia. A year on, Putin’s invasion has claimed well over 200,000 dead and injured among Russia’s armed forces, according to US and European officials; depleted its stock of tanks, artillery and cruise missiles; and cut the country off from global financial markets and western supply chains.

Nor has the fighting in Ukraine brought Putin any closer to his vaguely defined goals of “demilitarising” and “de-Nazifying” Kyiv. Though Russia now controls 17 per cent of Ukraine’s internationally recognised territory, it has abandoned half of the land it seized in the war’s early weeks — including a humiliating retreat from Kherson, the only provincial capital under its control, just weeks after Putin attempted to annex it.

But as the war rumbles on with no end in sight, Putin has given no indication he intends to back down on his war efforts.

At his state-of-the-union address on Tuesday, Putin insisted the war was “about the very existence of our country” and said the west had forced him to invade Ukraine. “They’re the ones who started the war. We are using force to stop it,” he said.

Even as the huge cost of the invasion to Russia becomes apparent to him, Putin is more determined than ever to see it through, people who know him say.

Business representatives at the Kremlin on the day Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine last year. Many of Russia’s elite were in disbelief it could have been planned within such a small circle of people © EyePress via Reuters

“The idea was never for hundreds of thousands of people to die. It’s all gone horribly wrong,” a former senior Russian official says. With the initial plan in tatters, Putin is searching for new rationales to justify the war effort, insisting he had no choice but to pursue the invasion by any means necessary, current and former officials say.

“He tells people close to him, ‘It turns out we were completely unprepared. The army is a mess. Our industry is a mess. But it’s good that we found out about it this way, rather than when Nato invades us,’” the former official adds.

The Financial Times spoke to six longtime Putin confidants as well as people involved in Russia’s war effort, and current and former senior officials in the west and Ukraine for this account of how Putin blundered his way into the invasion — then doubled down rather than admit his mistake. All of them spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.

The people who know Putin describe a leader who has become even more isolated since the start of the war. “Stalin was a villain, but a good manager, because he couldn’t be lied to. But nobody can tell Putin the truth,” says one. “People who don’t trust anyone start trusting a very small number of people who lie to them.”

‘If you don’t agree with it, you can leave’

Last year was not the first time Putin had withheld plans of an invasion from close advisers. When Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, he did not inform his own security council — instead on one occasion gaming out the peninsula’s annexation with his defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, and three top security officials all night until 7am.

Initially, the advisers urged Putin against sending troops into Crimea, according to a former senior Russian official and a former senior US official. “Putin said, ‘This is a historic moment. If you don’t agree with it, you can leave,’” the former Russian official recalls.

When the west, fearful of escalating tensions to a point of no return and jeopardising Europe’s economic ties with Russia, responded with only a slap on the wrist, Putin was convinced he had made the right decision, according to several people who know the president.

In the years after the 2014 invasion, Putin’s inner circle began to shrink further as he became increasingly consumed with what he saw as growing western threats to Russia’s security, the people say. His isolation deepened when the Covid-19 pandemic began in 2020: for fear they could infect a germaphobic Putin, even top officials were forced to spend weeks at a time quarantining for a personal audience.

One of the few people to spend extended time with Putin was his friend Yuri Kovalchuk, a former physicist who in the 1990s owned a dacha adjoining the future president’s in the countryside outside St Petersburg.

The secretive Kovalchuk — a banker and media mogul who the US says manages Putin’s personal finances — almost never speaks in public and did not reply to a request for comment.

People who know him say he shares a passion for Russian imperial revanchism with his older brother Mikhail, a physicist whose conspiracy theory-laden rants about US plans to develop super-soldiers and “ethnic weapons” have, on occasion, popped up later in Putin’s speeches.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy with Ukrainian troops in Bucha, north-west of Kyiv. Putin became fixated on Ukraine after his relations soured with its energetic young president © Ronaldo Schemidt/AFP via Getty Images

During the height of the pandemic, Putin was largely cut off from comparatively liberal, western-minded confidants who had previously had his ear. Instead he spent the first few months in his residence at Valdai, a bucolic town on a lake in northern Russia, essentially on lockdown with the younger Kovalchuk, who inspired Putin to think of his historic mission to assert Russia’s greatness, much as Peter the Great had.

“He really believes all the stuff he says about sacrality and Peter the Great. He thinks he will be remembered like Peter,” a former senior official says.

Increasingly, Putin became fixated on Ukraine as his relations soured with its energetic young president Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

One of Zelenskyy’s early moves was to curb the influence of Viktor Medvedchuk, a close friend of Putin’s who headed the largest opposition party in parliament. Whereas former president Petro Poroshenko had used Medvedchuk as a crucial go-between with Moscow, Zelenskyy’s team sought other intermediaries in the belief that his influence on Putin had begun to wane.

But as Putin began drawing up plans for a possible invasion, Medvedchuk insisted that Ukrainians would greet Russia’s forces with open arms.

One part of the plan involved Viktor Yanukovych, a former president who has been in Russian exile since fleeing the 2014 revolution against him. He was to deliver a video message conferring legitimacy on Medvedchuk — and anointing him to rule Ukraine with Russia’s backing.

The vision was starkly at odds with political realities in Ukraine, where the pro-Russian minority that Medvedchuk represented was vastly outnumbered by those who despised him for his ties to Moscow. But it proved seductive for Putin, who authorised payments through Medvedchuk’s party to pay off local collaborators.

There was plenty of scepticism in Moscow. “If Medvedchuk says it’s raining, you need to look out of the window — it’ll be sunny,” says another former senior Russian official. “You have polls, you have the secret services — how can you do anything serious based on what Medvedchuk says?”

However, his assessment was backed up by the Federal Security Service, or FSB, the successor agency to the KGB, which assured Putin victory was certain — and paid large sums in bribes to officials in Ukraine in the hope that this would guarantee success.

“The FSB had built a whole system of telling the boss what he wanted to hear. There were huge budgets given out and corruption at every level,” a western intelligence official says. “You tell the right story up top and you skim off a bit for yourself.”

Dissenting voices in the SVR, Russia’s foreign intelligence agency, and Russia’s general staff attempted to raise doubts. At the security council meeting three days before the invasion, even Nikolai Patrushev, security council secretary and Putin’s longest-standing and most hawkish ally, suggested giving diplomacy another chance.

“He knew what a bad state the army was in and told Putin as much,” a person close to the Kremlin says.

But just as he had in 2014, Putin overruled them, insisting he was better informed.

“Putin was overconfident,” a former senior US official says. “He knows better than his advisers just the way Hitler knew better than his generals.”

The invasion began to unravel almost immediately after Putin set it into motion. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff, had drawn up a plan to seize the Hostomel airfield outside Kyiv, giving Russian elite paratrooper squadrons a platform from which to attack Zelenskyy’s government headquarters.

Some of Medvedchuk’s collaborators worked as spotters for the advancing Russian forces, painting markings on buildings and highways to direct the invaders to key locations. Others joined in the attack on the government quarter. In southern Ukraine, they helped Russia capture a large swath of territory including Kherson with little to no resistance.

Viktor Medvedchuk, left, a friend of Putin’s who led the largest opposition party in Ukraine’s parliament, had insisted Ukrainians would greet Russia’s forces with open arms © Serhii Nuzhnenko/Reuters

Most of Medvedchuk’s network, however, simply took the money and ran, refusing to join in the invasion — or went straight to Ukrainian authorities and warned them of the instructions they had been given, according to a senior Ukrainian official and former US and Russian officials.

Prewar predictions that Ukraine’s army would collapse had largely been based on the assumption Russia’s air force would quickly establish control of Ukraine’s skies.

Instead, amid widespread disarray among the invaders, Russia’s army shot down a number of its own aircraft in the early days of the invasion. As a result, it ran out of pilots with experience of combat operations involving ground forces who were also prepared to fly, according to two western officials and a Ukrainian official.

“It may not have been double digits, but it’s more than one or two” Russian aircraft shot down by friendly fire, says the former senior US official. “There was a lot of fratricide.”

He adds: “They may not have had pilots with combat experience who were willing to fly over Ukraine and risk their necks in that crazy environment.”

Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence, adds: “It happened. From artillery units, from tanks, and we even saw it from our intercepts of their conversations. They shot down their own helicopters and they shot down their own planes.”

On the ground, Russia’s advances came at the price of huge casualties and did not help it capture any major cities apart from Kherson. By the end of March, the invading forces were in such a poor state that they withdrew from most of central and north-eastern Ukraine, which it portrayed as a “gesture of goodwill”.

The brilliant plan had proved a failure.

“Russia screwed up,” says Skibitsky. “Gerasimov initially didn’t want to go in from all sides like he did. But the FSB and everyone else convinced him everyone was waiting for him to show up and there wouldn’t be any resistance.”

‘A unique war in world history’

As the consequences of his invasion became clear, Putin searched for a scapegoat to hold responsible for the intelligence blunders underpinning it. That person was Sergei Beseda, the head of the FSB’s fifth directorate, which is responsible for foreign operations and had laid the groundwork for the invasion by paying off Ukrainian collaborators, according to two western officials.

Initially, Beseda was placed under house arrest, according to the officials. His time in the doghouse, however, did not last long. Weeks later, US officials arrived for a meeting on bilateral issues with their Russian counterparts wondering, after news of Beseda’s detention leaked to the Russian media, whether he would turn up and how the Russians might explain where he was.

Instead, Beseda walked in and said, paraphrasing Mark Twain: “You know, the rumours of my demise are greatly exaggerated,” according to the former US official.

Beseda’s quick comeback demonstrated what advisers see as some of Putin’s biggest weaknesses. The Russian president prizes loyalty over competence; is obsessive about secrecy to a fault; and presides over a bureaucratic culture where his underlings tell him what he wants to hear, according to people who know him.

The steady drumbeat of propaganda around the war and Putin’s demands for loyalty from the elite have only increased the incentive for advisers to tell him what he wants to hear, the people say.

“He’s of sound mind. He’s reasonable. He’s not crazy. But nobody can be an expert on anything. They need to be honest with him and they are not,” another longtime Putin confidant says. “The management system is a huge problem. It creates big gaps in his knowledge and the quality of the information he gets is poor.”

For many in the elite, the stream of lies is a survival tactic: most of Putin’s presidential administration and economic cabinet have told friends they oppose the war but feel they are powerless to do anything about it. “It’s really a unique war in world history, when all the elite is against it,” says a former senior official.

A small number, including former climate special representative Anatoly Chubais, have quietly resigned. One former senior official who now heads a major state-run company went so far as to apply for an Israeli passport while still in his post, and started making plans to leave the country, according to two people close to him.

As the war continues to sputter, the scale of Russia’s miscalculation has begun to dawn on Putin, prompting him to seek out more information from people at lower levels, people who know him say. A cohort of ultranationalist bloggers who are critical of the military establishment have held at least two closed-door meetings with Putin since last summer; some were guests of honour at a ceremony to annex the four Ukrainian provinces in September.

Putin with his defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, left, and Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff. Gerasimov had initially drawn up a plan to seize an airfield near Kyiv, giving Russia a base from which to attack Zelenskyy © Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images

On occasion, Putin has used information from his informal channels to trip up senior officials in public. Last month, Denis Manturov, a deputy prime minister, told Putin the government had signed contracts with Russian aviation factories to produce new aircraft, one of the industries worst hit by the difficulty of procuring components under the sanctions. Putin replied: “I know the factories don’t have contracts, the directors told me. What are you playing the fool for? When will the contracts be ready? Here’s what I’m talking about: the factory directors say they don’t have contracts. And you’re telling me it’s all on paper.”

Putin’s newfound scepticism, however, is limited by his unwillingness to admit the invasion was a mistake in the first place, the people say. Some of the liberal officials who oppose the war have attempted to convince him to end it by pointing out the economic damage the sanctions are likely to wreak on Russia’s economy.

But Putin tells them “he has already factored in the discounts”, another former senior Russian official says. “He says, ‘We pay a huge price, I get it. We underestimated how difficult it could be.’ But how can you convince a crazy man? His brain will collapse if he realises it was a mistake,” the person adds. “He doesn’t trust anyone.”

Asked about the discrepancy between the defence ministry’s statements and complaints from fighters at the front about poor equipment in December, Putin paraphrased a character from his favourite TV show, the Soviet espionage drama Seventeen Moments of Spring: “You can’t trust anyone. Only me.” Then he chuckled.

Existential fight continues

Putin’s state-of-the-union address on Tuesday demonstrated his determination to “solve the tasks before us step by step” as he insisted Russia’s war would go on until a victorious end.

The remarks underscored how existential the fight has become for Putin as the threat he sees from a hostile west consumes him. Putin spent comparatively little time discussing Ukraine itself, instead focusing his ire on the US, which he accused of trying to “destroy” Russia and use “national traitors” to break it up.

The speech marked his first return to nuclear rhetoric since last autumn, when he made veiled warnings to “use all the means at our disposal” in defence of Russia’s conquests and suggested Russia could carry out a nuclear first strike.

Those threats worried western countries sufficiently that the US, UK, and France, Nato’s three nuclear powers, delivered a joint message to Russia vowing to retaliate with conventional weapons if Putin decided to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, according to the former US and Russian officials.

According to two people close to the Kremlin, Putin has already gamed out the possibility of using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine and has come to the conclusion that even a limited strike would do nothing to benefit Russia.

“He has no reason to press the button. What is the point of bombing Ukraine? You detonate a tactical nuke on Zaporizhzhia,” says a former Russian official, referring to the Ukrainian-held capital of a province Putin has claimed for Russia. “Everything is totally irradiated, you can’t go in there, and it’s supposedly Russia anyway, so what was the point?”

Instead, Putin said Russia would suspend its participation in New Start, the last remaining arms treaty with the US governing the countries’ nuclear arsenals. The suspension was the most concrete step Putin has taken on the escalation ladder since the war began: Jens Stoltenberg, Nato’s secretary-general, said “the whole arms control architecture has been dismantled.”

This time, however, Putin made no threats to actually use nuclear weapons — which analysts interpreted as a sign he had begun to realise Russia’s limitations.

“The war’s been going on for a year. Putin has been saying he’s fighting the west, not Ukraine, for a long time. You can’t just keep talking about it, you need to take steps to demonstrate something tangible,” says Abbas Gallyamov, a former Putin speechwriter. “Otherwise in his paradigm it’s going to look like the west is wiping the floor with Russia and [he] can’t say anything in response.”

Putin’s calculation, people close to the Kremlin say, is that Russia is more committed to the war than the west is to Ukraine, and resilient enough to see out the economic pain. Senior Republicans have openly questioned how long the US can go on supporting Ukraine to the same extent and the party retains a realistic chance of capturing the White House in 2024.

In ramping up military support for Ukraine, western officials are mindful anything less than a crushing defeat for Russia risks failing to deal with the problem.

“We need to ask ourselves: How do we want to this end up? Do we want to end up in a situation when Putin will survive and he will have more time?” says an EU foreign minister. “Something like the lull between the first and second world war.”

Putin attends a concert at Luzhniki Stadium for Russians involved in the invasion of Ukraine. He has adopted mobilisation rhetoric, urging society to unite behind the invasion © Sputnik/Maksim Blinov/Kremlin via Reuters

Putin, by contrast, is betting that he can see through that strategic turbulence, people who know him say. Instead of insisting that most Russians are unaffected by the war, as the Kremlin did in its early months when life largely went on as normal, Putin has adopted mobilisation rhetoric, urging all of society to unite behind the invasion.

The scenes at a patriotic rally on Wednesday underscored how far Putin had come down that road in just a few years. At Moscow’s Luzhniki Stadium, where the World Cup final was held five years ago, a soldier rapped about “the difficult hour we did not anticipate” alongside Russia’s military choir and the parents of people killed fighting for Russia made speeches to a huge flag-waving crowd. The rally’s hosts welcomed a group of children “saved” by the Russian army in Mariupol, a city in south-eastern Ukraine it razed to the ground last spring.

Then Putin appeared, shook hands with a select group of soldiers, and told Russians to take inspiration from them. “The motherland is our family,” Putin said. “The people standing up here are deciding to defend the most valuable and dear thing they have — our family. They are fighting heroically, courageously, bravely.”

Russian independent media reported that tens of thousands of state employees and students were paid small sums or forced to attend. The fact the Kremlin evidently did not think it could fill a stadium to support Putin without forcing people to go suggests officials know how difficult mobilising society around the war will be.

“Even in his own mind, he realises it’s not going to happen soon. It’s going to be a costly, lengthy process,” the former US official says. “He’s got, he thinks, the time — he’s 70 — and the resources, the oil and gas money to achieve it. And that’s what he’ll be remembered for: gathering the Russian lands the way Peter the Great did.”

But the alternative, one former senior Kremlin official says, may be too difficult for Putin to contemplate.

“It’s scary to think what happens if this ends in a disastrous defeat for Russia,” the former official says. “That means disastrous mistakes were made and the man behind it needs to exit this life, whether it’s via a bullet, cyanide, or something else. And if there’s no justice in this world, then nobody gets to have it,” he adds.

“It’s like when two chess players are playing. One of them is losing and bashes the other one over the head with the chessboard. Does that mean he won? No, it’s just an act of desperation.”

Additional reporting by Henry Foy in Brussels and Anastasia Stognei in Riga

6. Disinformation Roulette: The Kremlin’s Year of Lies to Justify an Unjustifiable War

From the Global Engagement Center (GEC).

Graphics at the link: https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/disinformation-roulette-the-kremlins-year-of-lies-to-justify-an-unjustifiable-war/

Excerpts:

All of Russia’s rhetorical contortions serve one goal — to mask Russia’s apparent effort to erase the sovereign, independent state of Ukraine from the map and subjugate its people . Buried in the lies are tell-tale signs pointing to the Kremlin’s true neo-imperial ambitions . Putin’s July 2021 missive declaring Russians and Ukrainians “one people ” and his February 2022 call-to-war speeches , filled with historical revisionism and disinformation denying Ukraine’s statehood and sovereign agency, gave the world a glimpse of his goals. The same lines are frequently repeated by the faces of Kremlin’s propaganda, such as Margarita Simonyan , who recently reiterated the fictitious claim that Ukraine was built by Russia and owes its might to Russia’s gifts . Putin’s vision to fulfill the imperial expansionist ambitions of Peter I and “return lost territories ,” and Kremlin officials’ unvarnished commentary reveal their actual intent. Kremlin officials indicated Moscow may also retaliate against so-called “Russophobia” and non-existent “genocide against Russians” in places other than Ukraine it considers its historic lands. Kremlin pundits have already speculated that Russia may need to “denazify” Kazakhstan , Moldova , and any other country allegedly harboring “Russophobia.” Leaving little doubt about his vision of the future, in a January 2023 speech Putin stated: “The goal, as I have said many times, is primarily to protect people and protect Russia itself from the threats that they are trying to create in our own historical lands adjacent to us. We cannot let this happen.”

No matter which narrative the Kremlin deploys at any given time in its losing game of disinformation roulette, Ukraine remains a sovereign, independent state recognized by the international community. Its brave people will remain steadfast in defense of their country and their democracy, and the United States will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.

Disinformation Roulette: The Kremlin’s Year of Lies to Justify an Unjustifiable War - United States Department of State

state.gov · by Global Engagement Center

Over the year of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin deployed a disinformation roulette of false narratives to deceive the world about the Kremlin’s neo-imperial intentions and attempt to justify an unjustifiable war. The Kremlin routinely changed its false claims to distract from its battlefield failures and political isolation. From NATO “encirclement” and “genocide against Donbas” to “denazification,” to “desatanization,” and “defending Russia’s sovereignty,” these false rhetorical contortions serve one goal — to mask Russia’s apparent effort to erase the sovereign, independent state of Ukraine from the map and subjugate its people.

Disinformation Roulette: The Kremlin’s Year of Lies to Justify an Unjustifiable War

“It is obvious that any missiles and artillery of Russia will not succeed in breaking our unity and knocking us off our path. And it should be equally obvious that Ukrainian unity cannot be broken by lies or intimidation, fake information or conspiracy theories.” – Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy , July 16, 2022

On February 24, 2022, millions in Ukraine awoke to a chorus of air raid sirens that had not been heard for 80 years . Russia had launched a full-scale invasion. Leading up to that fateful morning, and in the year since, Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem deployed an array of false narratives to deceive the world about the Kremlin’s neo-imperial intentions, portray its war of choice against Ukraine to the people of Russia as a necessary response to purported threats from the United States and NATO, and attempt to justify an unjustifiable war. The Kremlin routinely changed its false claims to distract from its battlefield failures and political isolation. This report will highlight five of the most salient false narratives deployed by Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem: 1) Russia was encircled by NATO before the February 2022 invasion; 2) Ukraine is committing genocide in the Donbas; 3) the Ukrainian government needs “denazification and demilitarization ;” 4) restoration of traditional values requires “desatanization” of Ukraine; and 5) Russia must fight in Ukraine to defend its sovereignty against the West.

False Narrative 1: NATO “encirclement” and Russia “is not the aggressor”

One of the earliest Kremlin-fabricated justifications for war is the false claim that NATO and “the West” are aggressors threatening Russia’s security. For months leading up to February 24, 2022, Russia demanded security guarantees including restrictions on countries’ joining NATO, a position which rejected Ukraine’s and other countries’ sovereign right to choose their own foreign policy. As Moscow amassed up to 190,000 troops on Ukraine’s border, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spread disinformation to cloud the Kremlin’s intentions, claiming Russia’s troops were not on the border with Ukraine while accusing the United States and allies of whipping up hysteria . President Putin falsely blamed NATO for the escalating tensions, claimed he was not planning an invasion , and accused the United States of using Ukraine as a “tool to contain Russia .” Aiming to deflect the blame, disinformation outlets linked to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU), and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) amplified the false claims, calling the warnings by the United States and NATO about the potential for a military offensive by Russia against Ukraine “western hysteria ” to “drag Ukraine into war .”

Over the year of war, the Kremlin shifted this disinformation narrative of Western efforts pushing for the war to one arguing that by helping Ukraine to defend itself, the United States and NATO are prolonging or escalating the war. Following a November 2022 NATO Ministerial Meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed the “global majority” understands the threats posed by NATO, blaming the Alliance for allegedly pushing Ukraine to continue the war. Disinformation outlets, such as the FSB-tasked News Front and state-run Sputnik , both cited alleged “experts” who argued that by pledging further aid to Ukraine, NATO was “pouring oil on fire.” The SVR-directed Strategic Culture Foundation and Oriental Review warned that Ukraine will try to “drag NATO into a war within Ukraine’s borders” and claimed to have proved that NATO provoked the conflict in Ukraine.

The Kremlin resurrects this disinformation narrative whenever Ukraine’s partners announce more military assistance to Ukraine. The latest twist accuses NATO of Russophobia after the United States and Germany agreed to provide modern M1 Abrams and Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov parroted this narrative in January 2023 claiming, “NATO with maniacal persistence … consistently crawled up to the Russian borders, at the same time zombifying our neighboring countries with Russophobic horror stories.”

Russia spreads disinformation portraying NATO as the aggressor to obfuscate the facts. Russia alone started this war, not Ukraine. Russia is the aggressor, not NATO. As U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated to the United Nations Security Council on September 22, 2022, “If Russia stops fighting, the war ends. If Ukraine stops fighting, Ukraine ends .”

False Narrative 2: “Ukrainian provocations” and “genocide against Donbas”

While Russia promoted the myth of NATO aggression, it simultaneously attempted to falsely portray Ukraine as planning military action against ethnic Russians in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. In January 2022, Russian Federation officials alleged Kyiv sent “half of its military personnel” to the Russian-occupied areas of Donbas and that Ukraine increased attacks on the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR/LNR). The Kremlin claimed Kyiv’s incursion into Russian-controlled Donbas was imminent, while Russia’s proxy authorities alleged Ukraine intended to use chemical weapons along the line of contact between Ukraine’s defending forces and the forces deployed in Ukraine by Russia and its proxies. The frequency of this false claim intensified following the U.S. revelation of the Kremlin’s plans to conduct a false flag operation in Russian-controlled Donbas to create a pretext for a further invasion. The United States pre-bunked this narrative on February 3 by exposing the Kremlin’s plot to use a video fabricated by Russian intelligence replete with staged graphic scenes of explosions, corpses, destroyed buildings and military equipment, and actors pretending to be mourners. Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem also falsely accused Ukraine of terrorism, alleging Ukraine was preparing a “chemical disaster ” and speculating Ukraine would conduct a “crushing strike ” on the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant.

President Putin transformed this disinformation narrative into a pretext for war. In a February 15 statement , he falsely claimed “genocide is taking place in Donbas.” Following Putin’s statement, Russia’s Investigative Committee opened a criminal case related to the allegations of “mass burials of civilians ” in Donbas. The Kremlin’s disinformation and propaganda apparatus continued promoting false narratives accusing Ukraine of “genocide,” including through the “Tragedy of Donbas ” website, which according to the Washington Post , is run by Russia’s military intelligence service. Russian government-backed influence actors have leveraged a network of websites and blogs targeting Ukraine, NATO, the European Union, and the United States to amplify disinformation including efforts to spread this narrative .

Putin’s February 21, 2022 televised address cemented this unfounded narrative as a justification for war. Purporting to recognize the Russian-controlled so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics as independent states, Russia ordered “peacekeeping” troops to deploy to Donbas. To demonize Ukraine in the eyes of the Russian public, Putin falsely accused Ukraine of committing “genocide” and discriminating against the Russian-speaking population in Donbas since 2014. He thus created a false pretext for the alleged necessity to “protect our own,” thinly masking his aggression as an operation to stop a non-existent “genocide.”

Independent media, counter-disinformation experts, and multilateral international human rights organizations have authoritatively debunked this narrative. The BBC’s fact-checking team pointed out “there is no evidence of genocide.” Polygraph.info discredited this claim by pointing out how Putin and other Russian Federation officials “had loosely used the term genocide” against Georgia during Russia’s 2008 invasion of the country. Polygraph.info further highlighted that “perhaps the closest incident [to genocide] was in 2014 by Russia’s forces in Slovyansk, where Ukraine’s forces who recaptured the city found a mass grave containing 20 bodies.” The Council of Europe , the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights , and the Expert Mission established under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism independently found there was no evidence that either ethnic Russians or Russian speakers are facing persecution at the hands of the Ukrainian authorities.

This narrative resurges whenever the Kremlin’s war of aggression runs into strategic setbacks. Narrative analysis of social media data on Telegram, conducted by the GEC, shows spikes in Russian-language conversation related to the “genocide in Donbas” around such setbacks. For example, the Kremlin dusted off this disinformation narrative in June 2022, a month marked by several strategic failures for Moscow. As the first High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) arrived in Ukraine and the EU granted Ukraine candidate status , the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced accountability efforts to “help identify, apprehend, and prosecute individuals involved in war crimes and atrocities” in Ukraine. The Russian Embassy in Washington fired back, repeating false Kremlin claims of Ukrainians allegedly carrying out a genocide against the Russian-speaking population.

The September start of Ukraine’s Kherson counter-offensive, the swift liberation of the Kharkiv region, and Russia’s subsequent mobilization announcements provided additional impetus for the Kremlin to resume this narrative. President Putin kicked off September with the disinformation-ridden remarks asserting that Russia was only trying to stop the “genocide ” allegedly perpetrated by Kyiv since 2014. In his September 30 speech announcing the purported annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya regions after the earlier sham referenda, Putin again falsely claimed “for eight long years, people in Donbas were subjected to genocide, shelling and blockades, subjected to a criminal policy to cultivate hatred for Russia and everything Russian” and accused Ukraine of “intending for Russian speakers within its borders the same fate as the ‘colonial’ West wants to inflict upon the entire world.”

The Kremlin purports to defend the Russian-speaking people of Ukraine against nonexistent “genocide.” Yet, for eight years Russia’s invading forces and its proxies have caused death and destruction in predominantly Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine. Millions have fled Russia’s occupation of areas in Ukraine’s east and south. The destruction in Russian-speaking Mariupol is catastrophic. By March 2022, the U.S. government assessed that members of Russia’s forces have committed war crimes by carrying out filtration operations and unlawfully deporting thousands of Ukraine’s civilians. By February 2023, leaning on the mounting evidence from Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine that have been liberated from Russia’s occupation, the U.S. government determined that members of Russia’s forces and Russian officials committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine, including torture of civilians in detention through beatings, electrocution, and mock executions; rape; and execution-style killings of Ukrainian men, women, and children.

Russia seeks to deny Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence and to suppress its history and culture. While Russia occupied Kherson, the city’s puppet authorities emptied libraries of Ukrainian literature and looted museums of cultural artifacts . Russia’s government has systematically and unlawfully deported at least 6,000 children from Ukraine to a network of facilities in Russia-occupied Crimea and across Russia, where they are “re-educated ” or put up for adoption across Russia. These children may never know they are from Ukraine . The Kremlin appears determined to deny Ukraine’s existence as a state, by attempting to erase its past — and its future .

False Narrative 3: “Denazification and Demilitarization”

President Putin invoked the Kremlin’s most persistent disinformation narrative in his pre-dawn February 24 speech launching the full-scale invasion . He said “the purpose of this operation is to protect people who for eight years now have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarize and ‘denazify’ Ukraine.” He leveled nonsensical accusations against the democratically elected government of Ukraine, calling them “a gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis who settled in Kyiv and took the entire Ukrainian people hostage.”

Accusing Ukraine’s Jewish President Zelenskyy of neo-Nazism is absurd. But Russia’s claims are as calculated as they are twisted. For years, the Kremlin has methodically equated so-called “Russophobia” and neo-Nazism. The Russian government has repeatedly resorted to antisemitism to spread disinformation about Moscow’s war in Ukraine. The Kremlin has long been in the business of instrumentalizing the history of the Second World War to marshal nationalist sentiment at home while furthering its geopolitical ambitions. In January 2023, Foreign Minister Lavrov extended the “Support for Ukraine = Russophobia = neo-Nazism” formula by falsely equating the West’s helping Ukraine defend itself against Russia to Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union. Lavrov invoked Hitler’s genocide of the Jews to solve the so-called Jewish question, accusing the West of conspiring “to finally solve the Russian question .”

This narrative emerged prominently as Russia took heavy losses on the battlefield early in the war. Putin’s May 9 speech marking the Allied victory in World War II amplified this narrative, distorting history to justify his brutal war against Ukraine. Putin falsely claimed his war of choice was a “sacred” and “patriotic” act akin to the Soviet fight against Nazi Germany —referred to in Russia as The Great Patriotic War — or to any war in which Russia “defended itself.” Repeating his standard propaganda talking points, Putin accused the West of “canceling” traditional values, falsifying history, and promoting Russophobia. The Kremlin repeatedly manipulates and distorts history to exploit the people of Russia’s sense of pride for their sacrifices in the victory over Nazism. The Kremlin also consistently casts Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity as a “fascist coup .” These distortions of history serve a strategic purpose: to evoke patriotism and rally support within Russia for Putin’s war against Ukraine.

While the “denazification ” narrative was the justification of choice for Putin’s February 24, 2022 speech, apparently it did not resonate with audiences in Russia for long. GEC analysis of Russian-language online conversation shows an uptick in volume of online conversation involving this narrative in late February immediately following the speech. By March 2022, Russian officials gradually decreased the use of this version of the narrative. Throughout March, Russia’s and Ukraine’s delegations engaged in several rounds of negotiations to establish humanitarian corridors to help evacuate civilians and reach a cease-fire. The decrease in invocation of the “denazification” narrative possibly signifies that negotiating with Ukrainian officials while trying to “denazify” them was too much cognitive dissonance even for the Kremlin to sell.

Yet the reprieve from “denazification” was short-lived. The narrative surged to its highest point among Russian-language posts on Telegram in late March and early April. As evidence of war crimes and mass graves began to emerge in Bucha following the withdrawal of Russia’s troops, the Kremlin’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem responded to the global outcry to the grim revelations by first denying its forces’ involvement, then challenging the veracity of the reports and renewing the “denazification” narrative. Falsely accusing Ukraine of employing tactics that Russia itself uses, Russia’s Ministry of Defense falsely claimed that “the photos and video footage from Bucha are another hoax, a staged production and provocation by the Kyiv regime for the Western media.” Russia’s Foreign Ministry falsely alleged that there were “signs of video fakes and other forgeries.” Russia’s embassies and media outlets around the world amplified the easily debunked conspiracies, including false claims Ukraine used fake corpses which “reanimated” after the cameras stopped rolling. Despite ample evidence from the New York Times , Bellingcat , and the BBC disproving Russia’s claims and demonstrating its involvement, the Kremlin’s disinformation machine continued to try to hide the truth. Russia’s state media outlet RIA Novosti attempted to deflect attention by publishing an article that argued for the “denazification of the majority of Ukraine’s population, ” through “re-education, ideological repression… and strict censorship: not only in the political sphere, but necessarily also in the sphere of culture and education.” The article further advocated for the erasure of Ukraine as a state, including through “de-Ukrainization,” claiming “a denazified country cannot be sovereign.”

The farcical nature of this narrative does not limit its utility to Russia’s disinformation ecosystem. When compared with the Kremlin’s other four false narratives addressed in this report, “denazification” was most frequently used by daily volume of posts and continues to maintain the highest level of engagement as measured by reactions and shares. Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem returns to the “denazification” narrative to deflect responsibility whenever Moscow suffers strategic setbacks.President Putin shamelessly wielded this narrative again in his January 27, 2023 message on International Holocaust Remembrance Day. He said “forgetting the lessons of history leads to the repetition of terrible tragedies. Evidence of this is the crimes against civilians, ethnic cleansing, and punitive actions organized by neo-Nazis in Ukraine.” He followed the same storyline in his February 1 address marking the 80th anniversary of the battle for Stalingrad in World War II, when he accused the West of Nazism , saying “Now we are seeing that unfortunately, the ideology of Nazism — this time in its modern guise — is again creating direct threats to our national security, and we are, time and again, forced to resist the aggression of the collective West.” His rhetorical escalations followed an announcement a few days earlier that Germany and the United States will deliver Leopard and M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine to aid in its self-defense against Russia’s brutal onslaught.

Evidence of the Kremlin’s crimes against Ukrainian civilians in Russian-occupied areas is mounting as quickly as the Kremlin’s egregious lies. As of late January 2023, Ukraine is investigating nearly 67,000 suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity — such as summary executions, rape, torture, kidnappings and forced deportations, indiscriminate bombings as well as targeted attacks on civilians and civilian objects. Independent inquiries, media organizations , the United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine , and Experts Missions under the Moscow Mechanism of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have all documented a pattern of members of Russia’s forces committing war crimes and other atrocities in Ukraine. These crimes against humanity did not occur in a vacuum. They are part of the Kremlin’s widespread and systematic attack against Ukraine’s civilian population. The Kremlin’s “denazification” disinformation narrative and methodical rhetorical dehumanization of the people of Ukraine have played a role in these unconscionable abuses. Survivors of Russia’s occupation of Bucha described Russia’s forces going door to door searching residential buildings as they “hunted for Nazis .” When Kherson city was liberated by Ukraine, witnesses recalled life under Russian occupation, “If the Russians hear you speak Ukrainian, they think you are a Nazi. They check social networks, tattoos, if you have Ukrainian symbols on your body, you are in trouble.”

False Narrative 4: Reframing the war from “denazification” to “desatanization.”

As the war reaches the one-year mark, the Kremlin’s attempts to justify its unjustifiable actions have extended to claims that it is fighting “Western Satanism.” Although Kremlin propagandists demonized Ukrainians as Satanists at least since April 2022, President Putin’s characterization of so-called Western values as “outright Satanism” in his September 30, 2022 speech propelled this accusation into an official narrative.

Putin’s Kremlin has appointed itself the guardian of “traditional values” against the depraved alien values it claims the West advances in Ukraine and supposedly tries to impose upon Russia. This narrative first emerged in April 2022, following the discovery of Russia’s atrocities in Bucha. As one of the most vocal proponents of the “Russkiy mir” (Russian world) concept, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill has preached that Russia is fighting in Ukraine for the “true independence” of the “Russian world” which he sees as the last bastion against the immoral, depraved West. This effort, he says, has “God’s truth ” on its side, and is holding back the “Antichrist ” against the “bogeyman” world power which opposes Russia. Kirill believes Ukraine belongs to the Russian Orthodox Church’s “canonical territory” despite the majority of Ukraine’s Orthodox believers reporting to belong to the independent autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine or being “simply Orthodox.” Kirill portrays the Kremlin’s actions as a “fratricidal” holy war that Russia must fight against those who want to turn Ukrainians from being “part of the holy united Rus” into a state “hostile to Russia.” The Kremlin’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem has amplified Patriarch Kirill’s message through its many pillars. Public figures on state propaganda outlets began portraying Russia as “the embodiment of forces of good,” speaking of a “metaphysical clash between forces of good and evil” and a “holy war” that Russia must win. Kremlin proxy disinformation sites such as FSB-tasked News Front and the U.S.-designated Tsargrad , an asset in the malign influence network of the U.S.-indicted Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev, went even further by describing Ukrainians as “Satanists.” Thus, the Kremlin added “holy crusade” to its list of false justifications for waging a brutal war and committing atrocities against the people of Ukraine.

The narrative resurfaced as Russia faced grinding setbacks on the battlefield through the summer and autumn. In July 2022, as the Russian government proposed expanding prohibitions on “propaganda” about “nontraditional sexual relations ” — a proposal Putin signed into law in December 2022 — prominent Kremlin figures portrayed Russia’s March 2022 exclusion from the Council of Europe as the failure of “efforts to impose foreign values and same-sex marriage” on Russia, even though the Council of Europe’s decision was based on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Military commanders from Russia’s Republic of Chechnya, run by U.S.-sanctioned strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, repeatedly proclaimed that Russia is fighting a holy war in Ukraine against the “army of the Antichrist” and “Satanic LGBT values.” In a September speech , President Putin attacked the West and its “dictatorship of Western elites” for “radical denial of moral norms, religion, and family,” labeling it “outright Satanism.” Putin implied Western countries conduct “monstrous experiments ” on children. Russia’s laws and the Kremlin’s rhetoric falsely associate LGBTQI+ persons with pedophilia.

Putin is not alone in his extreme remarks. Taking signals from the Kremlin, eccentric actor, former priest, and ardent Putin supporter, Ivan Okhlobystin screamed for “Holy War” during an October 1 rally at Red Square in support for Russia’s attempted annexation of four regions of Ukraine. Apparently stunning some in the audience, Okhlobystin shouted “Goyda!” (Гойда), an old Russian war cry purportedly used by Ivan the Terrible to call to his secret police . Okhlobystin continued his dramatic warning, “Fear, old world! Deprived of true beauty! True faith! True wisdom! Operated by madmen, perverts, Satanists! Be afraid, we are coming!” In late October, more Kremlin officials amplified statements calling for the “desatanization” of Ukraine, arguing the West was working through the promotion of Satanic cults to “reformat” Ukrainians’ minds against the traditional values embodied by Russia. Chechnya strongman Kadyrov urged Russia’s men to take up arms and wage “jihad ” against Ukrainian satanists, calling to “wipe cities off the face of the Earth ” in Ukraine. Credible reports indicate that Kadyrov’s Chechen fighters in Ukraine have committed atrocities .

As the momentum of Ukraine’s forces picked up with its Kharkiv and Kherson offensives, the “desatanization” narrative reemerged and intensified. As Russia continues to incur losses on the battlefield and in global public opinion, the Kremlin searches for a winning narrative, trying new ones, each one more absurd than the one before it. The Kremlin’s efforts to demonize Ukrainians as “Satanists” is simply a thinly veiled attempt to explain its losses to the people of Russia and justify more in advance. Seemingly irrelevant on the surface, the “desatanization” narrative dehumanizes the people of Ukraine and attempts to justify depravity and cruel atrocities against them.

False Narrative 5: “Defending Russia’s sovereignty” against the West

As Putin’s plans for sham referenda and a military mobilization collided with Ukraine’s counter-offensive in September 2022, the Kremlin rhetorically turned its war of choice into a war of necessity “to defend Russia’s sovereignty .” Only a year since the Kremlin presented its “security demands” to allegedly avoid conflict, it has come full circle, returning to the original disinformation narrative that the West is the real aggressor and wants to destroy Russia through a proxy war in Ukraine. Losing ground to Ukraine itself — a UN member state Putin dismissed as “not a real country” — is inconceivable.

As Ukraine’s forces liberated the Kharkiv region, the Kremlin’s central narrative became Russia fighting to defend its sovereignty against the West. On September 21, 2022 Putin falsely claimed the partial mobilization and the sham referenda were necessary to “protect the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Russia.” Minister of Defense Shoigu and Chairman of Russia’s State Duma Volodin echoed the narrative that the mobilization was necessary because Russia is fighting Ukraine as well as NATO and the “collective West.” As Ukraine liberated the city of Kherson from Russia’s brutal occupation and as thousands of men fled Russia to avoid mobilization , Putin again blamed Ukraine and the West for the war. In his November 15 speech, Putin falsely insisted the war resulted from Western efforts to destabilize Ukraine, accusing the West of aiming to weaken Russia and painting the war as a defensive measure against sabotage.

In his 2022 New Year’s Eve address to the nation, President Putin painted Russia’s “special military operation” as an existential struggle to secure Russia’s “sovereignty” and “true independence.” Flanked by allegedly Russian Armed Forces personnel, some of whom may have been actors , in a departure from his traditional Kremlin backdrop, he recycled disinformation narratives about the hypocrisy of the West. Putin claimed “Western elites” pretended to help resolve “the conflict in Donbas” and “encouraged neo-Nazis” to continue “terrorist action against peaceful civilians.” He then accused the West of “lying about peace while preparing for aggression” and “cynically using Ukraine as a means to weaken and divide Russia.” He further alleged the West unleashed “a full-blown sanctions war,” but Russia prevailed. Finally, he claimed this “struggle” serves as an example for other countries in their “quest for a just multipolar world order.” Beyond the familiar motifs, Putin appealed to patriotism, stating that defending the Motherland is a “sacred duty” and that “moral and historical truth” is on Russia’s side.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reinforced this narrative on January 18, 2023 as he assessed the results of Russia’s diplomacy in 2022. He said, “like Napoleon, who mobilized nearly all of Europe against the Russian Empire, and Hitler, who occupied the majority of European countries and hurled them at the Soviet Union, the United States has created a coalition of nearly all European member states of NATO and the EU and is using Ukraine to wage a proxy war against Russia with the old aim of finally solving the ‘Russian question,’ like Hitler, who sought a final solution to the ‘Jewish question.’” In late January 2023, following up on media inquiries after the aforementioned press conference, Lavrov reiterated this narrative , saying “it has long been clear to us that the very existence of Russia as one of the basic, backbone elements in the vast Eurasian space is a problem for our opponents.”

In a particularly far-fetched version of this narrative, the Kremlin cast international partnership and cooperation on biological threat reduction in Ukraine as a threat to Russia’s sovereignty and Russians as an ethnicity. The Kremlin’s disinformation machine has mounted a full-scale assault on truth in multilateral organizations attempting to portray peaceful research in Ukraine as biological weapons experiments that train migratory birds and diseased bats to threaten Russia. In July 2022, Russia’s state media and proxy outlets took the “U.S.-run biolabs” disinformation to the realm of science fiction when they featured Russian officials claiming Ukraine’s soldiers were subjected to experiments that “neutralized the last traces of human consciousness and turned them into the cruelest and deadliest monsters” and “U.S.-controlled cruel machines.” These statements followed accusations in March 2022 by Russia’s Ministry of Defense that the United States was developing in Ukraine “ethnic bioweapons ” to target ethnic Slavs, such as Russians. These outlandish ongoing claims seek to stoke conspiracy theories and portray Russia’s war against Ukraine as an existential “fight for sovereignty” against the West, while distracting attention from the poor performance of Russia’s forces.

Another preposterous strand of this disinformation narrative claims Ukrainians are brainwashed by the West. In a January 30, 2023 interview , Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov accused NATO of deliberately “zombifying” Russia’s neighboring countries “with Russophobic horror stories” and mounting actions “aimed at destroying our historical and cultural code.” Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan amplified this narrative, saying that while it is hard for Russians to swallow fighting “brotherly” Ukrainians, “They [the West] took away the bitterness of fighting with Ukrainians or even for Ukrainians. It is now clear that perhaps it was inevitable that we are fighting with the West.”

In attempting to justify Russia’s 2022 invasion, the Kremlin falsely claimed the West refused to negotiate even as Moscow walked away from negotiations . Attempting to justify continuing the war, the Kremlin falsely claims the West seeks to dismember Russia and destroy Russian culture. To help the people of Russia accept the lie that Moscow rightfully attacked its neighbors, whom many Russians consider a “brotherly” people, the Kremlin says the West has zombified Ukrainians. In this distorted version of reality, Russia can argue it is not fighting “brotherly” Ukrainians, it is fighting “zombified,” “neo-Nazi,” “Satanist” Ukrainians. To make Russia’s losses palatable, the Kremlin pretends it is not at war with Ukraine but nobly fights in Ukraine to “defend its sovereignty” against the incursion of the West.

Conclusion: “Our Historic Lands”

The courage and resilience of the people of Ukraine, their absolute commitment to defending their country’s independence and democracy, the unity of effort among the United States and our allies and partners in supporting Ukraine’s self-defense, and the global condemnation of Russia’s aggression, have pushed the Kremlin to continuously dance from one disinformation narrative to another in an attempt to justify its war to the people of Russia and the international community.

Russia’s lies do not change the truth. The Kremlin chose to start this war, and the Kremlin can choose to end it.

Ukraine is an independent state and member of the United Nations. It has the sovereign right to defend its territory and choose its foreign policy. Russia’s war against Ukraine began in 2014 when Russia’s forces seized Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and led, funded, and trained proxies to instigate and sustain conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Democratic Ukraine is not overrun by Nazis or Satanists — the Kremlin created these myths to stoke fervor among its own population. Ukrainian citizens of all ethnicities democratically elected a Jewish President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and the international community has recognized the legitimacy of his government. In the months before Russia launched its full-scale invasion, the United States and others joined Ukraine in good faith diplomacy to explore ways to address Russia’s claimed security concerns without compromising Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia chose war instead. Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, in blatant violation of UN Charter principles respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and refraining from the use of force. Russia brutally seized and occupied portions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson provinces, then held sham referenda and purported to annex them just as it claimed to have done Crimea in an attempt to realize the Kremlin’s predatory territorial ambitions.

All of Russia’s rhetorical contortions serve one goal — to mask Russia’s apparent effort to erase the sovereign, independent state of Ukraine from the map and subjugate its people . Buried in the lies are tell-tale signs pointing to the Kremlin’s true neo-imperial ambitions . Putin’s July 2021 missive declaring Russians and Ukrainians “one people ” and his February 2022 call-to-war speeches , filled with historical revisionism and disinformation denying Ukraine’s statehood and sovereign agency, gave the world a glimpse of his goals. The same lines are frequently repeated by the faces of Kremlin’s propaganda, such as Margarita Simonyan , who recently reiterated the fictitious claim that Ukraine was built by Russia and owes its might to Russia’s gifts . Putin’s vision to fulfill the imperial expansionist ambitions of Peter I and “return lost territories ,” and Kremlin officials’ unvarnished commentary reveal their actual intent. Kremlin officials indicated Moscow may also retaliate against so-called “Russophobia” and non-existent “genocide against Russians” in places other than Ukraine it considers its historic lands. Kremlin pundits have already speculated that Russia may need to “denazify” Kazakhstan , Moldova , and any other country allegedly harboring “Russophobia.” Leaving little doubt about his vision of the future, in a January 2023 speech Putin stated: “The goal, as I have said many times, is primarily to protect people and protect Russia itself from the threats that they are trying to create in our own historical lands adjacent to us. We cannot let this happen.”

No matter which narrative the Kremlin deploys at any given time in its losing game of disinformation roulette, Ukraine remains a sovereign, independent state recognized by the international community. Its brave people will remain steadfast in defense of their country and their democracy, and the United States will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.

state.gov · by Global Engagement Center

7. EXCLUSIVE: Seven Former NATO Supreme Allied Commanders Say U.S. ‘Must Do Everything We Can’ for a Ukrainian Victory

EXCLUSIVE: Seven Former NATO Supreme Allied Commanders Say U.S. ‘Must Do Everything We Can’ for a Ukrainian Victory

"Now is the time for America and its allies to dig deeper to get Ukraine what it needs to win."

By WESLEY K. CLARK, JOSEPH RALSTON, JAMES L. JONES, JAMES STAVRIDIS, PHILIP BREEDLOVE, CURTIS SCAPARROTTI and TOD WOLTERS

FEBRUARY 23, 2023 09:44 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Wesley K. Clark

This week the world marked the one-year anniversary of Russia’s all-out assault on the independence of Ukraine. In launching a brutal and unprovoked attack on Kyiv, Russian President Vladimir Putin intended to overthrow Ukraine’s democratically elected government and subvert the will of millions of its citizens. But in the days that followed, the Ukrainian people defied expectations, repelled Russia’s initial attempt at conquest, and mobilized to fight a longer war in defense of their country.

The tenacity of the Ukrainian people and their willingness to sacrifice for freedom has inspired the world. A broad coalition of nations led by the United States and its NATO allies have rallied to support Ukraine with weapons, military training, and economic assistance so it can withstand Russia’s unrelenting attacks on infrastructure and reclaim lost territory. One year later, Ukrainians are continuing to display bravery and grit in fighting back against Russia’s brutal occupation of Ukraine’s eastern provinces.

As former NATO Supreme Allied Commanders who led all U.S. forces in Europe, we know how essential U.S. and allied support has been to Ukraine’s battlefield successes. We also know how important this fight is to America’s own security interests. The world would be a far more dangerous place had Putin succeeded in toppling Ukraine’s government. Our NATO allies would be threatened and more vulnerable to Russian coercion, rather than feeling reinforced by America’s commitment to European security. It is highly likely that a successful Russian invasion would have emboldened China to act against Taiwan, a thriving democracy and vital U.S. economic partner. Instead, the Kremlin’s military failures are giving Beijing pause.

History teaches America that distant conflicts abroad can directly threaten us at home when we do not engage. Twice in the last century, the United States sent millions of troops to Europe to fight in wars that it had at first ignored against aggressors who had gone unchecked. We must not make that mistake again. We must do everything we can to hasten a Ukrainian victory against Russia. That is why President Joe Biden’s visit to Kyiv this week was so important, as are the strong statements of support for Ukraine from Republican and Democratic leaders in Congress.

Twelve months after the start of Putin’s military campaign, the war is at a critical juncture. Russia is mobilizing its forces to launch renewed offensives, and it is resorting to increasingly barbaric tactics to impose its will on Ukraine. In Ukraine’s east, the Russian military is leveling cities, committing mass executions, torturing civilians, and shipping hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men, women, and children to Russia against their will. The United States has rightfully called these actions crimes against humanity. There is no place in the civilized world for this depravity. We have a responsibility, rooted in our values and interests, to ensure that Russia cannot operate with such impunity.

The Ukrainian military is preparing for its own counteroffensives with the benefit of new Western weapons systems and training, including billions of dollars of U.S. equipment. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated remarkable capability in fighting against a much larger enemy force, and they can succeed in this war with continued strong support. But if that support waivers, they could fail—with disastrous consequences for Ukraine, the United States, and our allies and partners around the world. It is in our power to avoid that fate.

Now is the time for America and its allies to dig deeper to get Ukraine what it needs to win and succeed, and to demonstrate that America remains the leading force for freedom and justice around the world.

The authors each have served as NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Gen. Wesley K. Clark, USA, ret., served from 1997-2000. Gen. Joseph Ralston, USAF, ret., from 2000 to 2003. Gen. James L. Jones, USMC, ret., from 2003 to 2006. Adm. James Stavridis, USN ret., from 2009 to 2013. Gen. Phil Breedlove, USAF, ret., from 2103 to 2016. Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA ret., from 2016 to 2019. Gen. Tod Wolters, USAF, ret., from 2019 to 2022.

defenseone.com · by Wesley K. Clark

8. How the U.S. improvised a plan to deal with a Chinese balloon

Please go to the link to view this interactive article: https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2023/how-us-improvised-plan-deal-with-chinese-balloon/

How the U.S. improvised a plan to deal with a Chinese balloon

By William Neff, Leslie Shapiro and Dylan Moriarty

Feb. 23 at 3:58 p.m.

Pentagon military planners constantly plan and war game to anticipate various forms of enemy incursions or attacks on U.S. airspace. Even so, the arrival last month of a Chinese high-altitude balloon called for a measure of creativity, putting weapons to an unfamiliar test.

NOT THE ADVERSARY THEY EXPECTED

On Jan. 28, a new and unexpected threat floated into U.S. airspace over the Aleutian Islands, near mainland Alaska: a very-high altitude balloon. U.S. military planners assessed this was a Chinese surveillance balloon and were forced to improvise a response.

9. Oral history: Leaders recall dismay, fury on first day of war in Ukraine

Oral history: Leaders recall dismay, fury on first day of war in Ukraine

Political, military and intelligence officials describe their reaction to the Russian invasion and what they did that first day

The Washington Post · by Washington Post Staff · February 23, 2023

Shortly after 4 a.m. local time on Feb. 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. This oral history describes the first day of the war as recalled by Ukrainian, American and European leaders and senior political, military and intelligence officials.

Fears about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions had been mounting for months, and by the day before the war began, alarms were sounding loudly in Kyiv and Western capitals.

To report this story

Most of the interviews were conducted in the last month, but some, including with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, occurred over the summer. President Biden talked about the first day of the war during his visit to Kyiv. Multiple Russian military officials and lawmakers declined to be interviewed or did not respond to requests for interviews.

Interviews were conducted by Isabelle Khurshudyan and David L. Stern in Kyiv, Karen DeYoung, Shane Harris and Michael Birnbaum in Washington, Greg Miller in London, Emily Rauhala in Brussels and Souad Mekhennet in Berlin.

Kaja Kallas, prime minister of Estonia

I said to my ministers, ‘Please keep your phones on, because we’re going to have a government meeting, because the war is going to start.’ And I was going to bed and hoping that I will not get this call, I will not get this message.

Boris Johnson, former British prime minister

The chatter had been building up on the intelligence for a long time, and it had reached a crescendo on the last couple of days before the invasion, and we could literally hear the Russian units moving into position. We could tell … It’s a mixture of kind of incredulity really but also fatalism. There was just something about Putin’s tone the last time I’d talked to him … He’d already made up his mind.

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO secretary general

That evening, we knew what was going to happen. The only uncertainty was the exact hour. I had a dinner with some of my staff in my residence. We discussed and went through the last preparations. And then, actually, I went to bed. But it was a short night.

Antony Blinken, secretary of state

We had had a lengthy meeting in the Oval [Office] with the president that morning [on Ukraine]. In the category of walking and chewing gum at the same time, we actually had a [national security] principals meeting that afternoon on Iran. [Later,] we had a video gathering with senior national security officials … By that time, we were extremely confident it was happening then, in a matter of hours.

As the invasion began, Putin appeared on Russian television to announce the beginning of what he called a “special military operation.” Johnson was awakened by a call from one of his advisers. The British prime minister responded with an obscenity directed at Putin: “That f---ing c---.”

Boris Johnson

I was disgusted by Putin. I was disgusted by what he was doing. I was nauseated by his language, by his lies, by his aggression, by his condescension toward Ukraine. I thought the whole thing was repellent, arrogant, chauvinistic, wrong.

Ukraine's permanent representative to the United Nations, Sergiy Kyslytsya, walks to his seat during an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council in New York on Feb. 23, 2022. (Timothy A. Clary/AFP/Getty Images)

In New York, where it was still the evening of Feb. 23, an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council, requested by Ukraine, had begun even as Putin was preparing to speak.

Linda Thomas-Greenfield, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations

In the middle of the meeting, people started looking at their cellphones and pointing. I got a text message from the Ukrainian ambassador, who was on the other side of the room, and he told me the attack had started. I looked around the room, I saw everybody on their phones. I think [Russian Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya] only knew when he was shown a phone message by one of his staff. The room was kind of stunned. I use the word ‘electrified’ sometimes, but that’s not right. The room was stunned.

Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

We were all in the office [at the Pentagon], everyone was on pins and needles … the system is all cued up on the balls of its feet … Then of course the invasion happened. We pick up Russian forces with pre-assault fires, airborne troops, artillery and missile attacks. We pick up airstrikes, all the combined arms Russian military forces that start assaulting across the border on multiple axes.

Russian military tanks and armored vehicles advance in Donetsk, a region near Ukraine's border with Russia, on Feb. 24, 2022. (Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

In Ukraine, Interior Minister Denys Monastyrsky woke up to the ringing of his cellphone. The country’s border guard chief told him that Russian forces were swarming across the border in the northeast in an apparent drive to reach Kyiv. Monastyrsky called President Volodymyr Zelensky and said, “It has started.”

Volodymyr Zelensky, president of Ukraine

What I understood in that moment, when I was getting dressed, I thought about the rockets flying over my children, over all of our children. This means that there will be a huge number of deaths. It was clear.

David Arakhamia, member of the Ukrainian parliament and Zelensky adviser

To be honest, I hadn’t believed in the invasion scenario. … [Zelensky chief of staff Andriy] Yermak calls me sometime after 4 a.m. I was a little out of it at that hour. He just says, ‘It’s started. Get to the office.’ I didn’t even understand what had started … We had earlier come up with a response plan in the event of this. So that was activated and then we were moved down to this shelter. And that’s how I got stuck down there. I probably left that bunker for the first time a month later.

Oleksiy Danilov, secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council

All the necessary decisions were promptly taken. Monastyrsky was the first to be at the president’s office. I was the second to come at 5:11 a.m. It was in a calm mode … I was only surprised by the president’s white dress shirt.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky holds an emergency meeting with government leaders and representatives of the country's defense and economic sectors on Feb. 24, 2022. (AFP/Getty Images)

Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser

Normally in a crisis like this, there are a lot of hours spent just trying to come to grips with a crisis … trying to decide what you’re going to do about it. In this case, it was all done in advance … We actually had developed a written checklist of elements we would work through … the first 24 hours, 48 hours, 72 hours, 96 hours.

Mark A. Milley

Here’s what it wasn’t. It wasn’t chaotic. We’re the military, this is what we do when we’re in combat, in crises. We have procedures we follow … We had made decisions in the days and weeks leading up to the invasion … When they actually attacked, those plans went into action.

Antony Blinken

I was at home, it must have been something like 10:30 … and my deputy chief of staff, Tom Sullivan, called to say that Russia had launched its initial salvo of missiles … Most of us have everything we need at home to communicate. I have a secure room at home, phone, video links to everyone else … I talked to the national security adviser [Sullivan] at some point … My main conversation was with the secretary of defense and our joint conversation with the NATO secretary general.

Lloyd Austin, secretary of defense

Later on, I forget how long it was, Blinken, the chairman, the national security adviser and I are on the phone with the president, giving him a rundown of what’s transpired.

Smoke rises from a Defense Ministry facility in Kyiv on Feb. 24, 2022. (Valentyn Ogirenko/Reuters)

Johnson was among the first to speak with Zelensky.

Boris Johnson

What Zelensky is really saying to me is that the situation is absolutely appalling. Tanks are swarming toward Kyiv from several directions. He’s talking about the way the Ukrainians are fighting. The bravery they’re showing … His message is, ‘Give me help.’ His message is, ‘Give me the kit now.’ He has a purpose. His purpose is not just to say, ‘Oh, my God, I’m being attacked.’ His purpose is to say, ‘Johnson, we need military help now. Help us organize it.’

Zelensky also spoke with President Biden. During a conversation between Andriy Yermak, head of the office of Ukrainian president, and Sullivan, Yermak asked Sullivan if he could put Zelensky on the line to speak with Biden. Biden described the call during his visit to Kyiv to mark the first anniversary of the war.

President Biden

It was very late at night in Washington. … Russian planes were in the air. … And the world was about to change. I remember it vividly … I asked [Zelensky], ‘What is there, Mr. President? What can I do for you? How can I be of help?’ … [He] said, and I quote, ‘Gather the leaders of the world. Ask them to support Ukraine.’ … That dark night, one year ago, the world was literally … bracing for the fall of Kyiv … perhaps even the end of Ukraine.

Boris Johnson

I’m struck by [Zelensky’s] complete, his sort of sublime indifference to the suggestion that he might want to move his cabinet or his government to Lviv [in western Ukraine]. I’m saying to him whatever you do, do not get taken out by the Russians. You are the resistance. Ukraine’s fight needs to coalesce around you. Is there anything we can do [to assist in his protection or relocation], and he said, ‘We’re fine, we just need weapons.’

A man sweeps away broken glass after a Russian strike in Kyiv on Feb. 24, 2022. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)

In Kyiv, Bruno Kahl, the head of Germany’s intelligence service, was in a downtown hotel. He’d known the risk of war starting when he flew to the Ukrainian capital the previous day, he said, so he had sent his plane back to Germany as soon as he’d landed so it couldn’t be destroyed or seized by Russian forces.

Bruno Kahl, head of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND)

It wasn’t like it was a continuous bombardment, so to speak, but a few bombs had gone off during the night, a few bombs had fallen and otherwise it was relatively quiet … And it all seemed very, very calm, very collected. And I can still remember the weather. It was a cold, clear morning. I seem to remember that in the morning in Kyiv, I still had the impression that it smelled a bit like East Berlin just before reunification.

Jens Stoltenberg

We realized that this would change Europe, that this was one of the darkest days in Europe’s modern history and would cause a lot of suffering and death … Just the sheer size of the invasion made it obvious that this was going to cause a lot of suffering, death, damage. So it was anger, but also sadness — those are the two feelings that describe what I felt that morning.

William J. Burns, CIA director

You’re also seized with the human consequences of this, too. And the devastation that was being wrought by the Russians in Ukraine … I think all of us understood that this is likely to be a slog given Putin’s fixation on controlling Ukraine.

Mateusz Morawiecki, prime minister of Poland

I remember very well one moment when I spoke to one of my colleagues from the European Council, one of the other prime ministers with whom I spoke many times … He was very skeptical, not believing really, that Russia can make a full-scale invasion. And I asked him, ‘Do you believe me now?’ and he answered, ‘Yes, fully.’ … So this day was a turning point in the history of the world, in the history of Europe, for sure. So there were those hopes of, you know, awakening from the geopolitical slumber.

People pack up and escape Kyiv on Feb. 24, 2022. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)

Dmytro Kuleba, the Ukrainian foreign minister, learned the war had started during a flight from New York to Istanbul after visiting Washington and the United Nations. Ukrainian airspace was closed, and he then flew from Istanbul to Warsaw so he could get back home over land from Poland.

Dmytro Kuleba, Ukrainian foreign minister

There was a woman from Kyiv who was traveling with her husband … And in the middle of the flight, she approached me … She sat down and said, ‘Listen, we have three children with a babysitter in [Kyiv]. Me and my husband, we’re coming back from a business trip in Turkey. Please give us some advice. Do we stay in Warsaw and arrange for our children and babysitter to get to Poland? Or do we go to Kyiv?’ And that was a moment when you bear a lot of responsibility on your shoulder as a minister. … When she left, it suddenly struck me how this is just a drop, what I experienced. It would be less than a drop of the pain, suffering and difficult decisions that millions of Ukrainians are going to go through in this war.

Kahl and a contingent of BND personnel left Kyiv and drove to the Polish border.

Bruno Kahl

You noticed the hardship people were in, especially … just before the border. That was the most emotionally intense part, the last 20 kilometers before the border, where you noticed that people were afraid, they all wanted to get out, and no one felt safe anymore. And people put up with great material disadvantages. They simply left their cars at the side of the road and walked with the bare necessities. So that was very, very, very depressing.

Linda Thomas-Greenfield

We were working throughout the rest of the evening in getting the [U.N.] resolution [condemning Russia] into final form … We do all our work on WhatsApp … I was sending WhatsApp messages pretty much all through the evening to various members of the council, to my staff, to Washington and to the others as we started the process of putting the final touches on this draft. We did get the draft done and we were able to get 82 countries to co-sponsor … knowing, of course, that the Russians were going to veto it. We weren’t good with that … but what we wanted to do was prove that they were isolated.

Fleeing Ukrainian citizens exit a train that arrives in Przemysl, Poland, on Feb. 24, 2022. (Omar Marques/Getty Images)

Washington continued to work into the night.

Jake Sullivan

I believe I went home about 3 in the morning, during the day Ukraine time, basically to take a shower, change and come back.

Lloyd Austin

I don’t think I slept very much … the joint staff, my staff is calling to give me frequent updates … We have some of the best information, the best situational awareness, and sharing information with allies and reassuring them is key.

William J. Burns

Eventually [I slept]. It was more the next morning than that night.

David Arakhamia

At some point that first day, the president gathered us all together. There were a lot of us in that bunker — maybe 120 people including the security guards. He said, ‘Look, we’re staying. From tomorrow, it may be that we don’t have a chance to leave. Everyone has their own life and needs to make a decision for themselves. Choose to either stay or go somewhere safer.’ … The whole situation felt like a dream, so I went to another room and called my wife. I said that we can make a choice right now. … She answered me very clearly — maybe with some humor — that she’d rather tell our kids that I was a hero once than a deserter many times.

Volodymyr Zelensky

We had people lying in the corridors — there were people everywhere, snipers, different people. We basically lived here. We had no electricity, we walked with flashlights. And with these flashlights, we worked.

Vitali Klitschko, mayor of Kyiv

We were preparing for street fighting in Kyiv. Here [in city hall], we laid sandbags against all of the windows. … There were molotov cocktails covering the yard.

Hanna Maliar, Ukrainian deputy defense minister

There was no coffee or anything to help keep us alert because everyone was in this spirit of making quick decisions. And they were indeed happening very quickly. No one slept … Those first hours, we asked what information to give people and [Lt. Gen. Yevhen] Moisiuk told me to tell everyone, ‘Kill the occupiers!’ And that was it.

Oleksiy Danilov

I had a long conversation with [Zelensky that day] … I drew him my vision of how the events would unfold. I told him … that no one would help us now. Because they have no understanding of who we are. And our task is to survive the first two or three weeks, not to break down and to repulse the enemy. Then there will be gradual help. Then this help will increase, and then we will have partners with whom we will get a great victory. He listened to me very carefully and asked, ‘Do you think it will happen?’ I said, ‘Volodymyr Oleksandrovych, there is no other way.’

Zelensky addresses Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022. (Ukrainian Presidential Press Office/AP)

Early that morning Washington time, Biden and his national security team met in the White House Situation Room for a military briefing.

Lloyd Austin

It looks like it’s what we predicted. The main effort pointing toward Kyiv. There’s another large scale effort that’s south of that … headed to the north and west, and also looks like it could wind up in the Kyiv area. That’s unfolding about like we thought it would. We’re just trying to get a feel for how much the Ukrainians have left in terms of command and control; is the leadership in charge?

William J. Burns

We quickly began to see the tenaciousness of the Ukrainian resistance and the success they were having … and the way the Russian military was beginning to stumble … We began to see some things that surprised us a little bit.

Mark A. Milley

There were so many meetings, and the ambiance and the atmospherics were very similar … It’s intense. Hectic is not a word I’d use. It implies chaos and confusion, a lack of clarity. I would say it’s very intense. The seriousness of the moment was awesome anyway … the largest land war in Europe since 1945.

After the briefing, Biden met by video link with the Group of Seven and Stoltenberg.

Boris Johnson

It’s Joe [Biden] who is really determinative. I do my shtick. I make my arguments that Putin must fail and Ukraine must succeed … Joe picks that up and uses the phrase or something like it. He genuinely saw it very, very clearly. Putin had basically forfeited all right to be treated as somebody you could negotiate with. It was over and it was binary.

Zelensky attends an E.U. Leaders Summit on the Russia-Ukraine crisis via video conference in Brussels on Feb. 24, 2022. (Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

European Union leaders held an emergency meeting in Brussels. Zelensky spoke to them by video link.

Kaja Kallas

I could see around the room that there were people who were so genuinely shocked, with their physical being, that they couldn’t utter a word. And they were like, ‘We were naive. We should have listened to you,’ all those things … [Zelensky] was saying that ‘I’m in this room, and I don’t know if I’m going to be alive by this evening.’ And he was like, saying goodbye and that ‘We are being bombed, are being hunted. They want to kill me. Probably they’ll get to me.’ And that was so, that was very, what is the right word. Touching is maybe too soft. That was really going to your bones. … The connection was lost. And then it was like, ‘Is this it?’ I mean, very, very creepy.

Mateusz Morawiecki

There were moments during this day, and in particular in the evening, when I was very much anxious and fearful of Ukraine surrendering very quickly. I have to admit that I had those thoughts in my mind while going to bed … So I was full of those dark thoughts … And I didn’t sleep very well that night.

Boris Johnson

Honestly, I’m thinking the whole thing is utter tragedy. I’m thinking what could we have done to avert it. Is there something we missed, something we should have done with Putin. I’m thinking back over all the conversations I had with him. Did we show too much weakness. But I’m also thinking basically that he’s totally misread this and he’s made a massive mistake. I think pretty much from the get-go, even if he captures Kyiv, he’s not going to conquer the spirit of the Ukrainians. And in the end they’ll get him. That’s what I’m really thinking. Kyiv is still standing. Zelensky is still there.

People walk on a nearly empty street in Kyiv on Feb. 24, 2022. (Chris McGrath/Getty Images)

About this story

Editing by Peter Finn. Photo editing by Olivier Laurent. Project editing by Tara McCarty. Design editing by Joe Moore and Matthew Callahan. Design and development by Jake Crump. Copy editing by Susan Doyle.

Illustrations by Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; AFP, AP, EPA-EFE, Getty Images, Shutterstock, SIPA, SOPA and The Washington Post.

The Washington Post · by Washington Post Staff · February 23, 2023

10. US vows to send more drones, aid to Ukraine on war’s anniversary

US vows to send more drones, aid to Ukraine on war’s anniversary

Defense News · by Joe Gould · February 24, 2023

WASHINGTON ― The Pentagon announced Friday morning it would send more drones to Ukraine as part of a new $2 billion package to help in the country’s fight against Russia on the first anniversary of the invasion.

The new $2 billion in aid includes more ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, more ammunition for 155mm artillery and more munitions for unspecified laser-guided rocket systems. It also includes unspecified counter-drone and electronic warfare detection equipment.

The Pentagon plans to contract for the gear under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which allows the Biden administration to buy weapons from industry rather than draw from U.S. weapon supplies.

The funds would go toward the purchase of a new weapon for Ukraine: the Altius 600, a small drone with a range of 276 miles and endurance of more than 4 hours. The manufacturer, Anduril subsidiary Area-I, has said the system can operate as a loitering munition.

The other drones included are the fixed-wing, vertical takeoff and landing AeroVironment Jump 20 ― a surveillance drone that can fly for 14 hours and has a range of 185 kilometers ― and a system called K8, from CyberLux, a company that makes quadcopters.

Delayed kamikaze drone for Ukraine on track for next month: Pentagon

The Defense Department is moving closer to a contract for the Switchblade 600, which is still deemed a prototype.

The U.S. Army last year selected the Jump 20 unmanned aircraft system to be the first future tactical UAS as part of an effort to replace the runway-dependent Shadow drone.

The U.S. has declined to send Ukraine more sophisticated longer-range drones, such as the Grey Eagle and Reaper, which would give Ukraine a longer-distance strike capability. Some officials are concerned about Russia gaining access to such advanced technology if one were shot down.

Both Russia and Ukraine are reportedly using small, commercially available drones for surveillance and in some cases, to attack military targets.

In a statement to mark the one-year anniversary of the war, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said that under the Biden administration, the U.S. has committed more than $32 billion in ”game-changing” security assistance to Ukraine. America’s allies, he said, have committed $20 billion in security assistance to Ukraine.

“Difficult times may lie ahead, but let us remain clear-eyed about what is at stake in Ukraine,” Austin said. “And let us remain united in purpose and in action—and steadfast in our commitment to ensure that a world of rules and rights is not replaced by one of tyranny and turmoil.”

About Joe Gould

Joe Gould is the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He served previously as Congress reporter.

11. Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Marking One Year Since Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Marking One Year Since Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

defense.gov

Release

Immediate Release

Feb. 24, 2023 |×

One year ago today, Russia launched an unprovoked and indefensible invasion of its peaceful and democratic neighbor Ukraine—a cruel war of choice that has killed thousands of innocent Ukrainians, forced millions more from their homes, left countless Ukrainians wounded or traumatized, and inflicted tragedy and terror on a sovereign U.N. member state.

Today's solemn anniversary is an opportunity for all who believe in freedom, rules, and sovereignty to recommit ourselves to supporting Ukraine's brave defenders for the long haul—and to recall that the stakes of Russia's war stretch far beyond Ukraine.

The United States has rallied the world to support Ukraine and hold Russia accountable. Under President Biden's leadership, the United States has committed more than $32 billion in game-changing security assistance to Ukraine over the past year. This includes more than 1,600 Stinger anti-aircraft systems; more than 8,500 Javelin anti-armor systems; 232 howitzers and more than two million rounds of artillery ammunition; 38 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition; a Patriot air-defense battery; eight National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and other key air-defense capabilities; 109 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles; 31 Abrams tanks; and 90 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers. We have done all this with bipartisan backing in Congress and with the proud support of the American people.

The United States has also rallied nations of goodwill from around the planet to condemn Russia's aggression and rush urgently needed assistance to Ukraine. The engine of our efforts is the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, an extraordinary coalition of some 50 countries that I convene regularly to coordinate support to Ukraine's defenders. Our allies and partners in the Contact Group have committed more than $20 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, including hundreds of tanks, thousands of other armored vehicles, vital air-defense systems, hundreds of artillery systems, and other crucial capabilities.

In response to the most urgent danger to European security since the end of World War II, we have moved swiftly with our allies to further unify and strengthen NATO. The Alliance has bolstered its defenses on the Eastern Flank. Meanwhile, the United States has deployed or extended more than 20,000 additional U.S. forces to Europe and forward-stationed the first permanent U.S. forces on NATO's Eastern Flank. NATO is more united than ever, and the U.S. commitment to defend every inch of allied territory remains ironclad.

One year into a war of aggression waged by a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, our allies and partners worldwide stand united and resolute. Putin's reckless, illegal war is not just an all-out assault on Ukraine's sovereignty and a historic threat to European security. It is also a direct attack on the system of rules, institutions, and laws that the world built at such great cost after World War II—a system that rejects aggression and respects the rights of all countries, big and small.

Putin thought that Ukraine's defenses would collapse, that America's resolve would falter, and that the world would look the other way. He was wrong. One year later, Ukraine's brave defenders have not wavered, and neither has our commitment to support them for as long as it takes.

Despite the Kremlin's campaign of cruelty, the people of Ukraine have shown stunning bravery, skill, and fortitude. Today and every day, we stand by the courageous Ukrainians fighting to defend their country, and we mourn with those who have lost their loved ones in Moscow's monstrous and unnecessary war.

Difficult times may lie ahead, but let us remain clear-eyed about what is at stake in Ukraine. And let us remain united in purpose and in action—and steadfast in our commitment to ensure that a world of rules and rights is not replaced by one of tyranny and turmoil.

ukraine response NATO Defense Secretary Austin

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12. Give Ukraine What It Wants – Russia Shouldn’t Get to Veto Western Military Aid

See previous memo from 7 former NATO Commanders and now we have 2 former Ambassadors and 1 former diplomat here.

Excerpts:

With Moscow licking its wounds, Russia’s threat to Moldova via the separatist region of Transnistria would be greatly weakened. The Baltic states are already protected from Moscow by their membership in NATO, but a Russian loss would allow them to breathe easier. Indeed, because Ukraine is the key to Moscow’s long-term efforts to reestablish effective political control in its neighborhood, Putin’s defeat there would cause Russian pressure to collapse throughout the area. There is a reason why countries throughout the region, from Armenia to Tajikistan, are “talking back” to Moscow more as Russia’s woes in Ukraine have become evident.

Equally promising, a Ukrainian victory could help free Russia from the grip of Putin’s disastrous rule. If Moscow roundly loses the war, he may not survive. This is a scenario the West has fretted about, with some worried that the alternative to Putin could be worse. French President Emmanuel Macron, for example, has worried publicly about “humiliating” Putin, and numerous commentators, including Henry Kissinger, have spoken about how Russia must maintain a prominent place in the international security order. But these fears are misplaced. It is Russia, not the West, that is undermining the security framework that has served the world well. And it is hard to see the downsides in Putin’s departure, given the havoc he has wreaked. The last two decades have made clear that Russia’s president oversees a thoroughly corrupt, authoritarian state that is a danger to its own citizens, its neighbors, and all democratic countries.

Ukraine, then, must win completely. The stakes are enormous, and failure would prove costly to the entire world. Such a victory will not be easy; Putin remains dug in, committed to throwing Russian troops at his objectives no matter the human cost. But the Ukrainians can prevail—as long as NATO co

Give Ukraine What It Wants

Russia Shouldn’t Get to Veto Western Military Aid

By John Herbst, David J. Kramer, and William Taylor

February 24, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by John Herbst, David J. Kramer, and William Taylor · February 24, 2023

For Ukrainians, the past 12 months have been both a year from hell and a year of hope. They have lost thousands of their fellow citizens, seen millions more displaced, and watched as their country’s economy was devastated by Russia’s unprovoked invasion. But Ukrainians have demonstrated remarkable resilience and courage, successfully rallying to defend their independence under the inspiring leadership of President Volodymyr Zelensky. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin expected a swift victory, his forces encountered stiff resistance and suffered major losses. Russia’s massive casualties and plummeting morale mean that a Ukrainian victory—defined as driving all Russian troops off Ukrainian soil, Crimea included—is in sight.

Ukraine’s fighters are among the world’s finest. To finish the job, however, Kyiv will need more Western support. Ukrainians face an opponent with great quantitative advantages in soldiers, tanks, planes, missiles, and overall firepower. To break through Russian lines and cut the land bridge to Crimea, Ukraine needs more advanced weapons from the West, including rocket systems that can shoot missiles up to 185 miles, sufficient tanks, and Western-made aircraft.

The United States and some other NATO members are wary of providing these weapons to Ukraine, citing fears that additional assistance could lead to an escalation of the conflict—and even the potential use of nuclear weapons. But for all his tough talk, Putin has given no meaningful indication that Russia will go nuclear; quite the contrary. Kyiv and Western governments have repeatedly crossed Putin’s redlines, yet the Kremlin has never even put Russia’s arsenal on real alert.

Western leaders are also concerned that should they keep supplying Ukraine, they will deplete their own stockpiles and alarm their taxpayers with spiraling costs. But arming Ukraine is an efficient and essential way of preserving global peace and their own safety. If Putin succeeds in keeping any Ukrainian territory, it will set a very dangerous precedent: powerful states can forcibly take land from weaker ones. The defense expenditures for the United States and other NATO countries would have to rise to levels that dwarf the current assistance they provide to Ukraine. Ukrainians, then, are fighting not just to save themselves but also to protect fundamental international principles and the freedom of others. The smart and economical way to provide security in Europe is to defeat the Kremlin’s aggression, so the West must provide Ukraine with the required weapons.

ABJECT DISASTER

It is difficult to overstate just how poorly the war has gone for Russia. Instead of a quick victory, Russian forces were routed outside most major Ukrainian cities they tried to capture. According to the latest estimates, more than 200,000 Russian troops have been killed and wounded in action, including an estimated 40,000 members of the Wagner mercenary outfit run by the Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin. Hundreds of thousands of draft-age Russian men have fled the country since Putin launched a mobilization in the fall. And many of those drafted have deserted.

Putin has responded to Russia’s military struggles by frequently shuffling the generals in charge of the invasion. That is a sign that even the Kremlin recognizes that things have not gone according to plan. But these personnel changes have ultimately done little to improve results. Putin’s current war commander, for example, Valery Gerasimov, is the chief of staff of the Russian military, and he helped coordinate the original botched invasion. His predecessor, Sergey Surovikin, demoted by Putin despite his brutal methods, was perhaps the only Russian general to display tactical acumen, in ordering a controlled retreat in Kherson. Repeatedly shifting leaders is in character for Putin, who enjoys playing factions off one another. But the carousel has fostered dissension in the military’s ranks and between the military and Prigozhin’s forces, further undermining Russia’s battlefield performance. Moscow’s recent defeat outside the city of Vuhledar, for instance, where it lost scores of soldiers and armored vehicles, looks like a repeat of Russia’s failures on the road to Kyiv a year ago. The Kremlin is still making the same mistakes.

It isn’t just in Ukraine that Putin and his advisers have faced massive setbacks. The Kremlin’s assumptions about how the West would respond to the Russian invasion were also disastrously incorrect. Russia believed that the United States and Europe would not see eye to eye about the war and give Kyiv only minimal assistance. Instead, the West quickly united behind providing enormous amounts of support, arming the country with artillery and various weapons systems that enabled the Ukrainian military to seize the initiative from the invaders. The West also imposed aggressive sanctions and export controls on Russia, devastating the country’s military industrial complex. Russian arms production has now been so hampered by these restrictions (as well as by corruption) that Moscow is turning to Iran and North Korea for assistance—hardly a recipe for success.

Putin hoped he could get aid from China, issuing an ambitious joint statement with Chinese President Xi Jinping before the invasion promising a “no limits” partnership. He has gotten assistance. According to reporting by The Wall Street Journal, Beijing has provided some of the goods Russia needs for weapons production, including navigation equipment, jamming technology, and jet-fighter parts. But Putin has mostly been disappointed by Beijing’s offerings. U.S. officials recently expressed concern that Beijing might shift toward military assistance to Moscow, but so far, Putin has not gotten the weapons or help in overcoming sanctions, both of which he wanted. Instead, he has found himself selling hydrocarbons to China at bargain rates while receiving lectures from Xi about not threatening to use nuclear weapons. The Chinese do not even support Russia in United Nations votes; instead, they abstain.

For Russia, almost everything is trending in the wrong direction.

Indeed, for Russia, almost everything is trending in the wrong direction. Moscow is continuing to lose to Kyiv in most of the country even though it has hundreds of thousands of new troops. (The exact number of soldiers, however, is unclear, and Russia’s figures are probably inflated). Given that its forces lack the necessary supplies and effective leadership, Russia’s gains have been minor and come at an immense human cost. The United States and Europe are continuing to ramp up their military assistance to Kyiv. European countries—which paid Russia some $135 billion in the past year for fossil fuels, far more than they provided to Ukraine in assistance—are finally reducing their dependence on Russian energy, curtailing the income Moscow needs to finance its war. And NATO is likely to admit Finland and Sweden, two states that once walked a careful line between Moscow and Washington. Russia’s standing and influence are at their lowest level in decades.

Although Ukraine may have the upper hand in its war of survival, it cannot yet finish the job. Ukraine is being pounded around the eastern city of Bakhmut by massive waves of soldiers, and other cities are also being targeted by Russian forces seeking to drive Ukrainians into submission. Putin has not and cannot drive Ukraine to surrender, but both countries’ losses are mounting, and Putin does not care about Russia’s own immense human costs. That means the attacks will continue until the West sends longer-range weapons that can hit Russian logistical hubs conveniently located just beyond the range of Ukraine’s high-mobility artillery rocket systems. Ukraine could launch a drive that cuts off the land bridge to Crimea with its current weapons stock, but such efforts would be more likely to succeed if the country received more advanced weapons. Better supplies, in other words, would give Kyiv the edge needed to mount a campaign that could lead Russia’s war to collapse while reducing Ukrainian losses.

The West can help Kyiv by providing more modern heavy tanks, which will give Ukrainians the ability to break through Russian defenses—potentially delivering a shattering blow to Russia’s untrained, ill-equipped forces. Ukraine has said that it needs 300 or so tanks to make a difference, but so far, only 130 are on the way—and a good number of them are not set to arrive until next winter or later. NATO should work urgently to round out the totals with German-made Leopard tanks, of which NATO nations possess more than 2,000.

Ukraine also needs weapons the West has not agreed to provide. The country should receive U.S.-made surface-to-surface Army Tactical Missile Systems, which can shoot rockets up to 185 miles—enough to shut down the current bloody Russian offensive near Bakhmut and strike at Russian forces in Crimea. The West should also provide Ukraine with war planes, such as F-16s, which would allow Ukraine to launch an effective combined arms offensive. By cutting off Russia’s land bridge, which supplies Russian forces in Ukraine’s mainland south as well as in Crimea, these weapons would allow Ukraine to force Russian forces into retreating to Crimea. It would also make it very difficult for Putin to meet his military and civilian supply needs on the peninsula, especially if Ukraine destroyed the bridge from Russia to Crimea over the Kerch Strait. Putin has staked much of his legitimacy on taking the peninsula, so effectively cutting it off could cause a huge political problem for him at home.

HARDER BETTER FASTER STRONGER

The West is taking some steps to give Ukraine more advanced weaponry, including the tanks. The United Kingdom, for example, is now teaching Ukrainian pilots to fly its Typhoon fighter jets. London has even signaled that once the pilots are trained, it might simply give the necessary aircraft to Ukraine. Russia has repeatedly threatened to respond to such Western assistance by escalating the war, but by now, policymakers should be aware that these threats are hollow. Even as Ukraine and the West have passed the Kremlin’s various thresholds—inviting Finland and Sweden into NATO, providing heavy weapons to Ukraine, striking Crimea, taking back territory that Russia illegally annexed—Putin has failed to follow through on his warnings. His announcement Tuesday that Russia would suspend its commitment to the New START arms control agreement, for example, was more theater than substance, since according to the U.S. State Department, Russia was already was not in compliance with the accord. The only cost of the West’s delays has been to Ukrainians, who have died and suffered as the war continues.

The West needs to do more faster to tip the scales more decisively in Ukraine’s favor. NATO must drop its apprehension about triggering Putin and recognize that Ukraine has every right to use great force to stop the Kremlin’s invasion. That means Kyiv can continue its strikes on Russian bases in Crimea. For that matter, out of self-defense, it can hit Russian forces inside Belarus and Russia if those forces are lobbing attacks against Ukraine. Putin and his generals must understand that their troops have no sanctuary so long as they are engaged in hostilities against Ukrainians. The Russian military must be made to feel deeply uncomfortable—to the point where it is at risk of collapse.

But for Russian morale to truly tank, senior U.S. military officials, politicians, and outside analysts need to stop talking about negotiations with Russia. Such remarks are discouraging to Ukrainians and music to Russians’ ears, reinforcing the Kremlin’s belief that the West will suffer from Ukraine fatigue and eventually sue for peace. The United States and Europe must reassure Ukrainians that they remain firmly and unfailingly with them and disabuse Putin of hope that time is on Russia’s side. Biden’s visit to Kyiv Monday boosted Ukrainian morale and signaled to Moscow – and to any nervous Europeans -- that the United States is not abandoning Ukraine. But saying, as Biden has repeatedly, that the West will help Ukraine for “as long as it takes” is not enough. The West should help Ukraine win, period. That means making clear there will be no return to normal with Russia as long as its troops remain in Ukraine.

In fact, there can also be no return to normal until Russia answers for the horrible things it has done to Ukraine, especially in towns and cities such as Bucha and Mariupol. Before the West eases any sanctions, the Kremlin must return all the Ukrainians captured or exiled to Russia, such as the thousands of Ukrainian children it has deported and forced to live with Russian families. The West must also ensure there is justice for the victims of war crimes and atrocities and that Russia pays reparations to cover the costs of reconstruction. Much of these funds can and should come from the Russian foreign hard-currency reserves frozen by the West, which total roughly $300 billion.

FUTURE DIVIDENDS

Putin’s invasion is one of the greatest threats to international security since World War II. It almost caused a global food crisis last summer when Russia blocked Ukrainian ships loaded with agricultural exports. It has driven up energy prices. And it has brought large-scale interstate conquest back to the global stage, jeopardizing the norms of sovereignty that help maintain international peace. If Putin succeeds in keeping even part of Ukraine’s territory, Xi might think that he can get away with invading Taiwan. Putin could also set his sights on attacking another state in the region such as Moldova or seeding more generalized chaos around the world.

But if Russia is soundly defeated and if NATO retains its unity, Xi will think twice before attacking Taiwan. Putin would be less able to cause mayhem elsewhere, including in Syria and Africa. Within Europe, a Ukrainian win would weaken Putin’s ability to continue his support for Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s illegitimate regime and embolden democratic forces in Belarus: The Russian military would be so weakened that invading Belarus to prop up Lukashenko or some authoritarian substitute would be a struggle.

Although Ukraine may have the upper hand in its war of survival, it cannot yet finish the job.

With Moscow licking its wounds, Russia’s threat to Moldova via the separatist region of Transnistria would be greatly weakened. The Baltic states are already protected from Moscow by their membership in NATO, but a Russian loss would allow them to breathe easier. Indeed, because Ukraine is the key to Moscow’s long-term efforts to reestablish effective political control in its neighborhood, Putin’s defeat there would cause Russian pressure to collapse throughout the area. There is a reason why countries throughout the region, from Armenia to Tajikistan, are “talking back” to Moscow more as Russia’s woes in Ukraine have become evident.

Equally promising, a Ukrainian victory could help free Russia from the grip of Putin’s disastrous rule. If Moscow roundly loses the war, he may not survive. This is a scenario the West has fretted about, with some worried that the alternative to Putin could be worse. French President Emmanuel Macron, for example, has worried publicly about “humiliating” Putin, and numerous commentators, including Henry Kissinger, have spoken about how Russia must maintain a prominent place in the international security order. But these fears are misplaced. It is Russia, not the West, that is undermining the security framework that has served the world well. And it is hard to see the downsides in Putin’s departure, given the havoc he has wreaked. The last two decades have made clear that Russia’s president oversees a thoroughly corrupt, authoritarian state that is a danger to its own citizens, its neighbors, and all democratic countries.

Ukraine, then, must win completely. The stakes are enormous, and failure would prove costly to the entire world. Such a victory will not be easy; Putin remains dug in, committed to throwing Russian troops at his objectives no matter the human cost. But the Ukrainians can prevail—as long as NATO continues to support their struggle for freedom, democracy, and security.

JOHN HERBST is Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine.
DAVID J. KRAMER is Executive Director of the George W. Bush Institute and a former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the George W. Bush administration.
WILLIAM TAYLOR is a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine.

Foreign Affairs · by John Herbst, David J. Kramer, and William Taylor · February 24, 2023

13. Ukraine leader pledges push for victory on war anniversary

Ukraine leader pledges push for victory on war anniversary

AP · by JOHN LEICESTER and HANNA ARHIROVA · February 24, 2023

It was “the longest day of our lives. The hardest day of our modern history. We woke up early and haven’t fallen asleep since,” he said.

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But peace is nowhere in sight. China called for a cease-fire — an idea previously rejected by Ukraine for fear it would allow Russia to regroup militarily after bruising battlefield setbacks.

A 12-point paper issued Friday by China’s Foreign Ministry also urged the end of Western sanctions that are squeezing Russia’s economy.

Ukraine also is readying another military push to roll back Russian forces — with weaponry that has been pouring in from the West.

“Ukraine is entering a new period, with a new task — to win,” Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov said on Facebook.

“It will not be easy. But we will manage,” he said. “There is rage and a desire to avenge the fallen.”

The day was also particularly poignant for the parents of children born exactly a year ago as bombs began killing and maiming.

“My family was lucky. We didn’t lose anyone or anything. But many did, and we have to share this loss together,” she said.

Tributes to Ukraine’s resilience flowed from overseas. The Eiffel Tower in Paris was among monuments illuminated in Ukraine’s colors — yellow and blue.

Zelenskyy got an early start to the day, firing off a tweet that promised: “We know that 2023 will be the year of our victory!”

He followed that up with his video address in which he pledged not to abandon Ukrainians living under Russian occupation.

Ukraine “has not forgotten about you, has not given up on you. One way or another, we will liberate all our lands,” he said.

___

Joanna Kozlowska in London, and Sophiko Megrelidze in Tbilisi, Georgia, contributed to this report.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · by JOHN LEICESTER and HANNA ARHIROVA · February 24, 2023

14. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine

Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine

defense.gov

Release

Immediate Release

Feb. 24, 2023 |×

One year ago today, Russia launched an unprovoked and indefensible full-scale invasion of its peaceful and democratic neighbor Ukraine. One year on, the commitment of the United States, together with some 50 countries who have rallied to rush urgently needed assistance to Ukraine, has only strengthened.

Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) is announcing a new security assistance package to reaffirm the steadfast support of the United States for Ukraine's brave defenders and strengthen Ukraine's air defenses. This package, which totals $2 billion, is being provided under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) as part of our commitment to Ukraine's long-term security.

Specifically, the United States is committing additional Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and counter-UAS and electronic warfare detection equipment, as well as critical ammunition stocks for artillery and precision fires capabilities that will bolster Ukraine's ability to repel Russian aggression.

Capabilities in this security assistance package include:

• Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);

• Additional 155mm artillery rounds;

• Munitions for laser-guided rocket systems;

• CyberLux K8 UAS;

• Switchblade 600 UAS;

• Altius-600 UAS;

• Jump 20 UAS;

• Counter-UAS and electronic warfare detection equipment;

• Mine clearing equipment;

• Secure communications support equipment;

• Funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment.

Unlike Presidential Drawdown, USAI is an authority under which the United States procures capabilities rather than delivering equipment that is drawn down from DoD stocks. This announcement represents the beginning of a contracting process to provide additional capabilities to Ukraine's Armed Forces.

The United States will continue to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with capabilities to meet its immediate battlefield needs and longer-term security assistance requirements for as long as it takes.

15. As Russia’s Military Stumbles in Ukraine, Chinese Strategists Are Taking Notes

And we must anticipate how they are going to avoid those mistakes. What kind of concepts, doctrine, technology, and organizations should we anticipate the Chinese developing to avoid the same mistakes as Russia?

We must also assess how they assess US decision making and what adjustments they will make based

As Russia’s Military Stumbles in Ukraine, Chinese Strategists Are Taking Notes

China is drawing lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Chinese military sources can tell us exactly what the PLA is learning.

thediplomat.com · by Lyle Goldstein · February 24, 2023

In shaping patterns of future warfare, there is little doubt that militaries across the world will be seeking to absorb the key lessons of the Russia-Ukraine War, ranging from the employment of tanks to the use of anti-ship cruise missiles and the ubiquitous drones. For the Chinese military, these lessons might even assume a greater importance, since the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) both lacks major, recent combat experience, and has also leaned heavily on Russian weapons and doctrine for its rapid modernization over the last few decades.

Chinese media coverage of the war in Ukraine has been extensive. The close nature of the China-Russia “quasi-alliance” means that Chinese military analysts have not engaged in the ruthless critiques of Russian military performance that have been commonplace in the West. Yet, Chinese military analyses are still probing deeply for lessons to understand the shape of modern warfare. They have taken particular interest in the U.S. employment of novel weapons and strategies.

To fully grasp the scope and depth of these Chinese analyses it is important to take assessments from a full range of Chinese military media, which is more extensive than is often appreciated in the West. These articles are generally associated with research institutes that are directly involved in the Chinese military industrial complex.

This exclusive series for The Diplomat will represent the first systematic attempt by Western analysts to evaluate these Chinese assessments of the war in Ukraine across the full spectrum of warfare, including the land, sea, air and space, and information domains.

While China has been quite critical of U.S. and NATO policies in the Ukraine War, Beijing has so far not opted to send direct aid to the Kremlin’s military effort, but this could be changing. The U.S. government appears to believe that China is reassessing that position. Whether or not Beijing chooses a more direct role in supporting Russia, it is clear that Chinese strategists are working overtime to glean military lessons from this most acute occurrence of high intensity, inter-state warfare since World War II.

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Throughout the war in Ukraine, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has largely refrained from overt criticism of Russia’s poor military performance. However, a recent prominent article in the PLA Daily from January 12, 2023, on proposed Russian military reforms, reveals a rare degree of criticism of the Russian military performance in Ukraine. This newspaper is China’s leading official military periodical, and so may be considered authoritative. This article may also provide a glimpse into inter-service military politics in China.

After having seen the poor performance of Russia’s army over the past year, the PLA ground forces may be pushing for renewed investment and increased troop levels. In 2019, Dennis J. Blasko, a leading U.S. expert on the PLA, assessed that China’s ground forces were the “biggest loser” from Xi Jinping’s sweeping reforms of the armed forces, both “now and far into the future.” Indeed, Blasko revealed that the PLA saw a 55 percent reduction in ground troops from 1997 to 2018. During this period, a correspondingly greater emphasis has been put on the development of Chinese naval, air, space, and nuclear forces.

The PLA ground forces may be maneuvering to change this trend in light of PLA analysis of the Ukraine War. “The outcome of the land battlefield is still the key to the outcome of the war,” the article proclaims.

On a positive note, this signals that the PLA is not looking at the Russian invasion of Ukraine through rose-colored glasses. They may indeed acknowledge that a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan would be far from easy. It could also involve extremely high personnel and equipment losses, not to mention a risk to the prestige that the Chinese armed forces now enjoy both at home, and to some extent, abroad.

Rebuilding the Army

The article’s appraisal of Russian military performance in Ukraine is uncharacteristically blunt. The analysis concludes that Russia’s military, especially its ground forces, were too weak and their capabilities too limited to achieve their objectives. The core weaknesses of the Russian army are characterized as a lack of sufficient quantity of forces, especially with respect to manpower, and major deficiencies in joint combat capabilities.

The most glaring critique, according to this Chinese military assessment, is that the Battalion Tactical Group combat units have not been adequate to the task at hand. The report notes, “Deficiencies of the Russian battalion-level tactical groups have been exposed, such as their lacking the ability to be self-sustaining in combat and that they are too weak to be effective.”

Perhaps with an eye to a potential conflict over Taiwan, the report calls the brigade unit “unable to effectively fight protracted and high-intensity conflicts of attrition.” The proposed reform is “to transform from a brigade back to a division system.”

In addition to moving back to a division system, the report highlights the great degree to which Russia’s ground forces had been reduced in size prior to the war. It notes that the million-person army is now “barely able to perform homeland mobile defense and overseas garrison missions.”

This again could hint at possible PLA concerns that China’s ground forces may also be undermanned, when taking into account their own internal security mission, as well as a potential Taiwan contingency. In a move that could be connected with Russia’s manpower travails in Ukraine, China’s National People’s Congress recently enacted a new Reservists Law.

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This Chinese military analysis also notes that Russia will build up its airborne troops into two full assault divisions and marines up to five divisions. For China, both of these types of specialized forces would be key elements in a Taiwan scenario and would likely bear the brunt of initial fighting. To deal with the overall manpower shortage, Russia is taking corrective measures by “improving the military service recruitment system” and “perfecting the equipment and material reserves systems.”

Reinforcing the Importance of Combined Operations

In addition to manpower issues, the PLA Daily assessment recognizes that Russia has struggled with combined arms. “The Russian military has been unable to effectively execute combined warfare,” it states.

Western analysts have speculated on the absence of Russian airpower over the battlefield. The Chinese analysis criticizes the Russian Air Force with having “executed too few sorties,” and says that “the effectiveness of precision strikes was inadequate and coordination with the army was limited.” It is suggested that Russia’s proposed remedy will be to assign “mixed aviation division and army aviation brigades” to each army group to improve “integrated air-ground operations.”

Chinese strategists also have a great interest in the concept of information warfare. In this PLA analysis, it is also assessed that “the Russian army’s informatization combat capability is insufficient.” Since Russia has been unable to effectively execute information warfare, according to this understanding, “They have had to rely on traditional tactics of mechanized warfare.”

From their studies of U.S. forces deployed in the Balkans and the Middle East in the 1990s and 2000s, the PLA came to believe that future combat would be information-based, relying to a large extent on, “non-contact warfare” (非接触战争). In practice, this meant the utilization of long-range precision strikes from the periphery of conflict zones. The PLA questions the degree to which Russia has succeeded in pacifying Ukraine through long-range strikes.

To deal with Russia’s current inadequacies in information warfare, the Chinese analysis expects that three areas will be prioritized. These include the expanded use of automated command systems, with priority given to equipping combat units below the battalion level with command automation system terminals, and greater adoption of drones. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will be utilized at the squad and platoon levels to improve battlefield situational awareness, transmit real-time information, and to improve the “reconnaissance-strike loop” (侦察-打击回路效能).

The Russian Army is realizing the value in empowering the lowest levels of troops and commanders with ISR platforms to speed up target acquisition, reconnaissance, and attacks. Having already studied U.S. adoption of UAVs and drones, and with China’s massive domestic drone industry, this finding looks set to accelerate already the high level of drone use by PLA forces at all levels and within each of its service branches.

Playing the Nuclear Card

Notably, the article also pays close attention to Russia’s repeated nuclear warnings. The PLA analysis notes that while Russia lags in conventional military strength, it is relying on its nuclear deterrent to balance against the United States and NATO. Russia is identified as having pushed back against collective Western pressure by “conducting nuclear exercises, raising the level of nuclear force combat readiness, and warning that the third world war will be a nuclear war.”

While the point seems debatable, the article also credits Russia’s use of conventional hypersonic missiles as having a deterrent effect against NATO, saying, “the Kinzhal hypersonic missiles show determination and strength and deter NATO from direct military intervention.” This conclusion could reflect the PLA’s confidence in their own strategic rocket force’s potential ability to deter U.S. intervention in the Indo-Pacific. Like Russia, China has missiles that could be used for either conventional or nuclear strikes and are thus similarly “dual use” in nature.

Conclusion

China is sometimes surprisingly transparent. After mostly refraining from criticism of weak Russian military performance in Ukraine, this PLA Daily article provides a candid appraisal of Russian military failures. It suggests three conclusions. First, the PLA is closely observing and learning from Russian military lessons in Ukraine. Second, the PLA ground forces may be using these lessons to push for an increased profile within China’s inter-service struggle for resources and influence.

Finally, this analysis indicates that the PLA understands very clearly that the war in Ukraine has been no cakewalk for Russia – to put it mildly. Hopefully, the resulting skeptical view will be applied to a Taiwan contingency. The major lesson in Beijing could very plausibly be that high-intensity wars that look favorable on paper can easily bog down into long grueling wars of attrition, with major related risks of escalation.

It is too soon to say ultimately whether Chinese leaders simply see this as a series of military technical problems to be overcome or a warning that conflict should be avoided in the first place. We hope that it is the latter and not the former, but significant Chinese-language evidence indicates that Beijing strategists are working night and day to remedy gaps that the PLA thinks the Ukraine War has revealed.

GUEST AUTHOR

Lyle Goldstein

Lyle Goldstein is director of Asia Engagement for the Washington think tank Defense Priorities. He is also visiting professor at the Watson Institute for Public and International Affairs at Brown University.

GUEST AUTHOR

Nathan Waechter

Nathan Waechter is a Master of International Public Policy student at Johns Hopkins SAIS. He previously worked in quantitative market research. Nathan speaks fluent Mandarin and lived in China for close to a decade.

thediplomat.com · by Lyle Goldstein · February 24, 2023

16. U.S. looks to expand Taiwan military training -sources

Was this information meant to be released publicly? DO we think this is somehow going to deter China and Xi?

Of course it is probably impossible to keep any such training under wraps. Therefore we need to figure out how to best exploit the release or leak of information.

U.S. looks to expand Taiwan military training -sources

Reuters · by Reuters

WASHINGTON, Feb 23 (Reuters) - The United States is set to expand the number of troops helping train Taiwanese forces, two U.S. officials said on Thursday, at a time of heightened tensions between Washington and Beijing.

Reuters reported in 2021 that a small number of U.S. special operations forces have been rotating into Taiwan on a temporary basis to train their forces.

The officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the Pentagon was expected to increase that number in the coming months.

One of the officials said the exact number of increased troops was unclear, but the move was unrelated to recent tensions over the shootdown of a Chinese spy balloon which flew across the United States.

The balloon caused a political uproar in Washington and prompted Secretary of State Antony Blinken to cancel a trip to Beijing that both countries had hoped would steady their rocky relations.

"We don't have a comment on specific operations, engagements, or training, but I would highlight that our support for, and defense relationship with, Taiwan remains aligned against the current threat posed by the People's Republic of China," a Pentagon spokesman said.

Speaking to reporters in Taipei on Friday, Taiwan Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng said he "didn't know" the source of the information about expanded training. He added Taiwan and the United States had a lot of military interaction, and declined further comment.

The news was first reported by the Wall Street Journal.

Taiwan's official Central News Agency this week reported that a battalion of around 500 soldiers would go to the United States for training this year.

Chu indirectly confirmed that some soldiers would head to the United States for training that would be more tactical than in the past, but did not provide details of numbers.

China sees Taiwan as a wayward province and has not ruled out taking the island by force. Taiwan says it is an independent country and will defend its democracy and freedom.

The United States is Taiwan's largest supplier of weaponry and has long offered some degree of training on weapons systems, as well as detailed advice on ways to strengthen its military to guard against an invasion by China's Peoples Liberation Army.

Reporting by Idrees Ali; Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Taipei; Editing by Chizu Nomiyama and Jamie Freed

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

17. How the Air Force flew its longest-distance night hostage rescue

How the Air Force flew its longest-distance night hostage rescue

“If you’re not nervous, you’re lying … But you kind of push that down because you’re too busy focused on making this mission happen.”

BY DAVID ROZA | PUBLISHED FEB 23, 2023 10:56 AM EST

taskandpurpose.com · by David Roza · February 23, 2023

It was not until afterwards that the full impact of what Air Force Maj. Kyle Konkolics had just done finally sunk in.

“All the nerves came after the fact,” the CV-22 pilot recalled years later. “It’s like ‘oh my God, we just did that,’ and you think about all these crazy things that could have happened or did happen.”

On Oct. 31, 2020, Konkolics was one of several airmen who took off from Naval Station Rota, Spain to fly the longest-distance nighttime hostage rescue mission in U.S. military history. Konkolics, who received the Distinguished Flying Cross last month for his role in the mission, and three other CV-22 tiltrotor transports carried a team of Navy SEAL Team Six operators 2,000 miles into northern Nigeria, where the SEALs parachuted into the darkness to rescue an American named Philp Walton who had been kidnapped four days earlier by a group of armed men.

The long mission required aerial refueling from several MC-130J turboprop planes accompanying the CV-22s, and the MC-130Js in turn had to be refueled by KC-135s that accompanied the mission. An AC-130J gunship and a Navy P-8A patrol and reconnaissance also joined the mission, according to our colleagues at The War Zone.

The operation was successful, with the SEALs rescuing the hostage, killing all but one of the kidnappers and all the aircraft returning safely with no casualties. Last month, Konkolics and four other airmen received awards for their role in the mission, where they persevered through 11 hours of nonstop flying, multiple aerial refuelings, diplomatic delays, an unknown threat environment and, for one CV-22, a total loss of critical aircraft systems.

U.S. Air Force pilots with the 7th Special Operations Squadron fly a CV-22B Osprey during night time training, United Kingdom, Feb. 3, 2022. (Tech. Sgt. Westin Warburton/U.S. Air Force)

‘Time was of the essence’

One of the most impressive feats of the mission is how quickly it came together. The crews had just 48 hours to prepare for the complicated operation, which would see them fly over isolated areas without many friendly airfields nearby to land in case anything went wrong.

When asked to rate on a scale of one to 10 how unusual that kind of short-notice planning is for such a complicated mission, Konkolics responded that it was an “11,” but the quick turnaround was essential to act on the intelligence they had while it was still accurate.

“In the end, time was of the essence,” he said. “If we took too long we might have missed that target of opportunity.”

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The combination of long range and vertical lift is the raison d’être for the CV-22 Osprey, which can point its 38-foot diameter rotor blades forward like a conventional airplane or point them up like a helicopter in order to hover or land without a runway. Their adaptability makes CV-22s excellent special operations aircraft, but they are also known for being difficult to maintain. When all four birds took off from Rota, Spain, that alone was an achievement thanks to the hard work of the maintainers.

“I don’t think we give enough credit to our maintenance team,” said Tech Sgt. Robert Duck, a flight engineer aboard one of the Ospreys who received the Air Medal for his part in the mission.

“The CV-22 is quite a maintenance-intensive beast,” he said. “Those guys and gals really knocked it out of the park. Between that and getting four tails home, all in hours, really, is a huge feat.”

A U.S. Air Force flight engineer monitors the evening light in preparation for the nighttime tilt-rotor air-to-air refueling of a 352d Special Operations Wing CV-22B Osprey, United Kingdom, Aug. 2, 2022. (Tech. Sgt. Brigette Waltermire/U.S. Air National Guard)

‘If you’re not nervous, you’re lying’

Konkolics said he felt some nerves during the high-pressure mission, but the task at hand took precedence over those feelings.

“If you’re not nervous, you’re lying,” he said. “But you kind of push that down because you’re too busy focused on making this mission happen, doing the best you can do and doing what you were trained to do.”

Konkolics was once a CV-22 flight engineer like Duck before becoming a pilot in 2014. It takes years of training to safely operate a complicated aircraft like the Osprey or the MC-130J, and that training paid off throughout the mission. Though the flight itself came together quickly, the intense training allowed the crew to roll with unexpected punches — like not having enough air to breath because the Ospreys had to fly at a higher altitude than usual.

The Air Force would not say the specific altitude at which the crew flew or the specific reason the high altitude was necessary, but it meant that some of the crew and passengers in the CV-22’s unpressurized cabin started feeling symptoms of hypoxia.

Luckily, Duck had experienced hypoxia in a controlled environment in training, so he was able to recognize the symptoms in the form of euphoria and color loss in his vision.

“I noticed the symptoms within myself at first,” he said. “I asked the [SEAL] team lead next to me if he and his team were feeling okay and he said ‘well now that you mention it, we could use a little bit of oxygen.’”

The CV-22 has a system aboard for supplying supplemental oxygen through a mask, and Duck used it to make sure the 25 or so SEALs were feeling back to normal. Though the incident was mentioned in his Air Medal citation, Duck described it as “a very minor event,” and one which shows how the training at places like Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico prepares them for unexpected challenges.

“That training, in conjunction with the training we get at our operational unit, in this case the 7th Special Operations Squadron, that kind of sets the foundation for what we were doing out there,” he said. “You obviously can’t train for every scenario, but that training taught us how to think, so that when you have aircraft issues or fuel planning problems, you know how to think through those problems and get those solutions that both satisfies the safety of the crew and accomplishes the mission.”

U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Christopher Ensman, HC-130J Combat King II loadmaster assigned to the 26th Expeditionary Rescue Squadron, performs Helicopter Air-to-Air refueling procedures during low-light conditions within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, Nov. 7, 2022 (Tech. Sgt. Daniel Asselta/U.S. Air Force)

‘Nothing ever goes right’

The service members aboard the CV-22s needed air to breath, but the aircraft needed gas to fly. That was where the MC-130Js came into play.

As a loadmaster aboard one of the MC-130Js, Staff Sgt. Christin Springs oversaw the aerial refueling process between her aircraft and the Ospreys. Aerial refueling is a dangerous task even in daylight due to the proximity of fast-moving aircraft and the chance that the receiving aircraft might collide with the refueling drogue. The refuelings that occurred on this flight had to take place at night, again and again, over the course of a marathon mission. It was a team effort for Springs and her fellow crew members.

“We definitely leaned on each other for support” against fatigue, said the loadmaster, who received an Air Medal for her role in the mission. “But … with it being a real life mission, just the anticipation and the excitement around the entire thing definitely keeps you going for a long time.”

According to Spring’s medal citation, the airman also had to deal with “communication systems degradation” to get the refueling job done, though the Air Force would not say what specific form that degradation took. Like her colleagues, Springs credited her training for the successful night.

“Literally everything we do ties back into our training, just in case we haven’t said that 20,000 times,” she said. “Out of a week of flying here at Kirtland, we go through emergency procedures almost every day in real life.”

Part of that training is learning how to evaluate a problem and determine whether it is significant enough to end the mission, Springs explained. Envelope–pushing missions like the Nigeria rescue mission provide great real-world examples that can be used to help train students back home.

“With experiences like this mission, we can actually sit them down and say ‘this is a scenario where, if this fails and we have the question ‘is it worth it still going on? Sometimes it is still okay to keep going on with the mission, depending on what’s failing,’” she said.

One aircraft did have to call it quits mid-mission. According to his citation for the Distinguished Flying Cross, Senior Master Sgt. Christopher Reedy navigated his CV-22 crew “through the total loss of critical aircraft systems.”

The downed systems were responsible for communication, navigation, and cockpit flight displays. Reedy managed to regain partial use of one radio, through which he told the other CV-22s that his own aircraft could not continue the mission.

“Without the use of aircraft navigation or cockpit flight displays, Sergeant Reedy assisted in performing a non-standard aerial refueling and executing a night formation landing, guided by his wingman, into marginal weather and visibility conditions,” read Reedy’s citation. Tech Sgt. Thomas Morgan, a third CV-22B special missions aviator, also received the Air Medal in part for helping guide his malfunctioning wingman through the ordeal.

After landing at a remote operating base, Reedy transferred some equipment and a weapon to another CV-22, which then took off to continue the mission. Though the loss of critical systems sounds bad, Konkolics said the incident overall was nothing too crazy.

“At the end of the day they were able to safely recover to a friendly location and we were able to continue the mission,” he said. “Like Sgt. Duck said, nothing ever goes right, but this is why we get trained to do what we do so we can make it happen.”

From left to right: Tech. Sgt. Thomas Morgan, Tech Sgt. Robert Duck, Maj. Gen. Phillip Stewart, Senior Master Sgt. Christopher Reedy, Maj. Kyle Konkolics and Staff Sgt. Christin Springs pose during an award ceremony at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, Jan. 11, 2023. During the ceremony, members of the 58th Special Operations Wing were awarded The Distinguished Flying Cross or The Air Medal for their actions during a hostage rescue mission in 2020. (Airman 1st Class Spencer Kanar/U.S. Air Force)

‘You guys make it look so freakin’ easy’

Eventually, the rescue package arrived at a point above northern Nigeria where the SEALs parachuted to the surface, then “hiked about three miles until they came upon the captors’ small encampment in a copse of scrubland bushes and trees,” the New York Times reported in 2020. The CIA had located Walton beforehand, according to ABC News.

After the SEALs killed most of the captors and picked up the hostage, Konkolics and the remaining CV-22 pilots landed in unfamiliar terrain cluttered with trees, rocks and other obstacles to pick them up. Though it was unclear if the CV-22s then flew straight back to Rota or took a less direct route, they eventually returned having pulled off a complex mission with very little time to prepare in a major endorsement for the effectiveness of Air Force special operations.

“There’s not another military in the world that could have pulled that off,” then-Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller said about the mission during a 2020 visit to the 100th Aerial Refueling Wing, the unit to which the mission’s KC-135 tankers belonged, according to Military.com. “The problem … is you guys make it look so freakin’ easy, that the American public just automatically assumes like, ‘Oh, yeah, you know, you push the U.S. military button and everything’s going to go fine’ … That’s why it’s so important to come out here and listen to y’all.”

At the time of the mission, Konkolics and Duck were assigned to the 7th Special Operations Squadron based at Royal Air Force Station Mildenhall, United Kingdom, and now are assigned to the 71st Special Operations Squadron, a CV-22 training unit based at Kirtland. Springs was assigned to the 67th Special Operations Squadron, also based at Mildenhall, and is now assigned to the 415th Special Operations Squadron, an HC-130J and MC-130J training unit also based at Kirtland.

Konkolics pointed out that the success of the mission is particularly poignant when compared to an earlier long-distance rescue mission that did not go so well. Operation Eagle Claw, the 1980 attempt to rescue Americans taken hostage in Iran, was “an extremely complex operation,” that “depended on everything going to plan,” according to the Air Force. “Any deviation could cause the entire operation to unravel with possibly tragic consequences.”

Bad weather, mechanical problems and poor coordination among the aircraft involved led to the mission commander aborting the operation, the Air Force wrote. The failure became tragic when one of a RH-53 helicopter’s rotor blades hit a fuel-laden EC-130, killing five airmen and three Marines.

The failure of Eagle Claw “highlighted the necessity of joint planning and training” and led to the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command and Air Force Special Operations Command, the Air Force wrote, as well as the CV-22 itself. About 40 years later, the knowledge gained from that experience is still paying off.

“We learned a lot of what we did right” from that mission, “which was almost exactly like this,” Konkolics said.

The latest on Task & Purpose

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Want to write for Task & Purpose? Click here.

taskandpurpose.com · by David Roza · February 23, 2023

18. Tanks might not reach Ukraine this year, US Army secretary says

Uh oh...

Tanks might not reach Ukraine this year, US Army secretary says

Defense News · by Jen Judson · February 23, 2023

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army is weighing how to get M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, but they may not even arrive until next year, the service’s secretary said Thursday.

U.S. President Joe Biden announced in January he would send 31 General Dynamics Land Systems-made tanks to Ukraine, reversing course after Germany cleared the way for Europe to send its own main battle tanks.

While the capability is meant to strengthen Ukraine’s defenses against its Russian invaders for an anticipated onslaught this spring, Abrams tanks will likely not reach the country before then.

“We’re looking at what’s the fastest way we can get the tanks to the Ukrainians,” Christine Wormuth told reporters at a Thursday breakfast. “It’s not going to be a matter of weeks.”

“None of the options that we’re exploring are weeks or two months,” she continued. “There are longer timelines involved, but I think there are options that are less than two years, less than a year-and-a-half.”

It’s still to be determined, according to Wormuth, whether tanks could arrive by the end of the year.

“There are a variety of different ways” to produce the tanks, she said, from building them “from scratch” like the U.S. is doing for Poland, to drawing from U.S. inventory, many of which are refurbished older tanks.

The US has spent billions on equipment and training in Europe to deter Russia. Is it enough?

Amid the prospect of Russia invading Ukraine, top experts say the unfolding crisis will test the U.S. military’s ability to seamlessly and rapidly move American troops and heavy armor across the borders of multiple countries and could also magnify potential gaps in both strategy and capability.

By Jen Judson and Joe Gould

Wormuth noted that it’s not just delivering the Abrams tanks, but also support equipment like recovery vehicles, ammunition and a training package. “There’s a lot of details still that need to be worked out,” she said.

The Army will present the options to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who will then share them with Biden, who will make the final decision, according to Wormuth.

Last year, Poland and the U.S. reached an agreement for the country to acquire 250 upgraded M1A2 Abrams tanks to be delivered in the 2025-2026 time frame, and last month Poland’s defense minister signed another deal to buy a second batch totaling an additional 116. Poland is the first European ally to buy Abrams tanks.

“There are other [Foreign Military Sales] cases with other countries,” Wormuth said.

Other Abrams tank operators include Australia, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Taiwan, which began receiving its tanks in the summer of 2022.

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

19. What Pentagon leaders say they have learned from a year of battle in Ukraine

Notice not one lesson about resistance and little about in the human domain.

What Pentagon leaders say they have learned from a year of battle in Ukraine - Breaking Defense

While not disclosing everything, senior military leaders from virtually every service and specialty have spoken about how they're incorporating lessons from the Ukraine war, from the danger of cell phones to the importance of a quick-moving industrial base.

By BREAKING DEFENSE STAFF

on February 23, 2023 at 1:02 PM

breakingdefense.com · by Lee Ferran · February 23, 2023

A Ukrainian soldier launches a hand-held drone in 2015 (Petro Zadorzhnyy/AFP via Getty Images)

WASHINGTON — One year ago Russia invaded Ukraine, sparking a conflict that’s resulted in, by one US estimate, over 200,000 casualties. It also has provided key lessons about modern warfare that, until the last year, were largely academic in nature.

Watching two relatively advanced militaries face off provided a new window into war, a generation beyond the far more asymmetric nature of the War on Terror. And while the US military surely isn’t advertising everything it has learned, the last 12 months saw repeated public declarations from just about every service and specialty about how they’re incorporating what they’ve seen play out in eastern Europe.

The following is a selection of those lessons, curated by the Breaking Defense staff.

On Land: Tank Warfare, Stockpiles and cUAV

Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine came at a pivotal moment for the US Army, one where service leaders had been justifying soldiers’ potential role in the Indo-Pacific region. Instead, the past year of mostly land combat provided those Army leaders with the opportunity to better examine the complexities of a large-scale ground fight with modern weapons and tout the service’s crucial role to the joint fight. It also emphasized how important it was to be able to refill weapon stockpiles.

“We are very much looking every single day in real-time at what’s happening in Ukraine, what we’re seeing with the Russian military and trying to glean as many lessons learned as we can for what we think that means for the Army in the future,” Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth said in June.

During the early days of the conflict, images of Russian tanks trapped in Ukrainian mud littered the internet and prompted a key question: What role do tanks have on today’s battlefield?

“You don’t need armor if you don’t want to win,” Army Chief of Staff Gen James McConville told reporters during an Oct. 10 press conference when asked about lessons learned from the war and future of the M1 Abrams tanks. Tanks aren’t past their use — after all the US and European nations recently committed to supplying Western tanks to Kyiv to much fanfare — but McConville suggested the question is more complicated.

“You never want to present your adversary with one dilemma… if you just push tanks at them,” those can be defeated just like Russian tanks inside of Ukraine, he said. “That’s why you want infantry, you want armor, you want attack aviation, you want [long-range] fires [and] intelligence. All those systems working together.”

Yes, the tank is still relevant for now, but the Army is looking at its potential vulnerabilities, according to the Director of the Next Generation Combat Vehicles Cross Functional Team, Brig. Gen. Geoffrey Norman.

“Is it tank-on-tank direct fire engagements or is it top-attack from anti-tank guided missiles [or] artillery sensor fuse munitions?” he said in October. “We’re taking a hard look at that through the intelligence that’s coming from what’s happening…. How are we protected against that? What, if anything, do we need to do differently, both from the material standpoint, but also from a tactics and a doctrine standpoint.”

Such an examination is not relegated to combat vehicles, and the Army acquisition chief Douglas Bush told reporters on Jan. 25 the war will likely have a ripple effect across the service weapon requirements. Although he did not detail specific programs, he said the Army will “make adjustments” to rapid prototyping programs based on findings from the Ukrainian battlefield.

In addition to studying battlefield tactics and weapon requirements, Army leaders are also grappling with ways to refill their dwindling weapon stockpiles that have been tapped to support Kyiv. Part of this effort has been to ink new deals with industry and look for ways to shore up the supply chain, but industry questions linger over just how long this heightened demand will remain and whether it’s worth the long-term investment.

“If there’s a policy decision to retain more production capacity for munitions both conventional and precision, there’s gonna be a lot of work that needs to be done. [The Office of the Secretary of Defense] will need to lead it,” Bush said.

“In terms of looking across the whole industrial base and the different conflicts we might be faced with: How do we prepare to mobilize rather than just assuming industry can do it with a bunch of money?”

One area the Army is especially interested in emphasizing: defending against drones. The Ukraine conflict is among the first major conflicts to feature a ubiquity of small drones making outsized contributions. That’s a danger for the Army, Wormuth said this summer. McConville has equated drones to the improvised explosive devices that killed US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army is the leading counter-drone efforts for the Defense Department.

“Drones and other unmanned systems are going to pose significant challenges for us, again, part of why we’re looking at modernizing our air and missile defense system,” Wormuth said.

The Starlink logo is seen on a mobile device with a Ukrainian flag in the background in this illustration photo in Warsaw, Poland on 21 September, 2022. (Photo by STR/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

In Space: Criticality Of The Domain, Importance Of Proliferation

Space Force chief Gen. Chance Salzman on Jan. 13 said that the war in Ukraine has above all else highlighted the centrality of space assets to winning a war.

“[I] I think it would be fair to say that what we’re observing is the criticality of space in modern warfare,” he told the Space Force Association.

The service, he said, already is taking away a number of insights from the use of satellites in the Ukrainian theater. These include the fact that it is easy for an adversary to shut down a single satellite, but proliferated systems such as SpaceX’s thousands of Starlink internet satellites, are much more resilient in the face of attacks.

Another observation, he said, is that the ground systems for spacecraft also are very vulnerable to cyber attack.

Indeed, Viasat’s communication network in Ukraine suffered a cyber shutdown early in the conflict similar, and hacking attempts were made against Starlink to lesser effect. The Russians also have been routinely jamming GPS signals in the region.

In addition, Saltzman noted the outsized role commercial satellites have been playing — both for communications and remote sensing for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

Commercial remote sensing satellites, including those operated by Maxar, Planet, Capella and BlackSky, further have contributed to the war for “hearts and minds” in the US and worldwide. Images of the devastation caused by the invading Russian forces have played heavily into public support for Ukraine’s cause, as well as providing much needed intelligence to the embattled Kyiv government in a way that US spy satellites could not due to secrecy constraints.

That became evident in even the early days of the war. David Gauthier, the head of commercial operations for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, on April 6 explained that it was “actually surprising to see that information advantage on the battlefield is so far countering superior equipment and mass.”

He concluded: ““The power of information is winning.”

In The Air: Superiority Or Bust

Among the many surprising failures of the Russian military at the outset of their invasion was the Russian air force’s inability to controls the skies — the kind of the air dominance around which much of US warfighting strategy revolves. Despite having a much larger force in the air, one year later the Russian military does not appear close to having air dominance, even as it is struggling to replace losses to its air force.

“Everyone is learning from current events in Ukraine,” US Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown told the Aspen Security Forum in July. “From a military perspective, we’re also paying close attention to how Russian forces initially proceeded and how the Ukrainians reacted. And while it’s not a new lesson, we’re seeing clearly the value of air superiority and the reality that it’s not guaranteed.”

Brown emphasized that for 20 years of the US had been taking on relatively poorly equipped foes that “did not have air forces or air defenses, and those are capabilities the Air Force will have to deal with in the future.”

There have been air-to-air engagements, the likes of which gave rise to the likely apocryphal Ghost of Kyiv, but for the most part Ukraine has been fighting from a defensive position, emphasizing the value of ground-to-air defense systems.

Writing for the Atlantic Council in August, Lt. Col. Tyson Wetzel said Russia’s failures should teach the US and its allies to “put special focus” on destroying mobile air-defense systems during operations. Second, they should better integrate cyber operations to aid in disrupting enemy defenses. Third, they should understand the importance of counter-UAS strategies, as it’s become clear “relatively low-cost UASs and drones allow combatants to deploy large fleets of aircraft, contest air superiority, and conduct precision strike.”

In the meantime, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said there are several lessons he would “prefer” that China learn from the war as well.

Sukhoi Su-35S aircrafts perform during the International Military-Technical Forum “Army 2022” at Kubinka military training ground in Moscow, Russia on August 17, 2022. (Pavel Pavlov/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

Online: The Value Of Zero-Trust, Info-Sharing And The Spectrum

For Defense Department Chief Information Officer John Sherman, the conflict has put a spotlight on zero-trust implementation and getting rid of the “technical debt” the department has accrued over the past 20 years on its IT and weapon systems. It’s an area that the crisis has shown cannot be delayed, he told Breaking Defense in a Jan. 27 interview.

Sherman has targeted fiscal 2027 for department-wide zero trust implementation, and DoD in November released a zero trust strategy outlining what it’ll take to achieve “targeted” zero trust — a required minimal set of activities needed by FY27 — and more “advanced” capabilities.

Meanwhile, Russia’s attacks on military and civilian targets has “underscored how important it is to have interagency and intergovernmental connections,” Sherman said, like with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and Department, Homeland Security and the National Security Council.

“And then also, our alliance interoperability is imperative on our cyber defenses,” he said. “Of course, in this context, we’re talking about with NATO. Working closely with our NATO partners… to make sure as we’re deploying zero-trust, we’re sharing our lessons learned and that we’re driving towards common standards, and recognizing that not only the Russian threat but others such as our pacing challenge of China and others do represent very capable adversaries that we must be prepared to defend against.”

Sherman’s office also works hand-in-hand with the Defense Information Systems Agency, which has been vocal about the Ukraine war showing the need to bake in resilient information-sharing as it moves forwards with building out the Pentagon’s sprawling Joint All Domain Command and Control initiative.

Another “burgeoning” area that Sherman has been focused on is electromagnetic spectrum operations. The conflict in Ukraine has emphasized the need for more investments and working with the military services on doctrine.

“And one of the things I’ll add on this, not only as we look at overseas applications… but also training and conducting operations such as homeland security in the homeland as we prepare forces to go overseas or protect our own borders,” Sherman said.

“And that’s why as we look at spectrum domestically, we’re always in a balance between making sure our economic dominance here in the US has everything it needs for 5G and next-G application, but also working with the Congress, working with industry and of course the White House and others on making sure our forces, the joint force, can continue to train on air-, land- and sea-based radars that are so critical for spectrum operations in combat situations.”

Protecting the Defense Industrial Base from sophisticated cyber threat actors is another area that Sherman highlighted, saying he’s “very sympathetic to the challenges this presents to industry, particularly for small and medium businesses.”

Although the US is in a better position to defend itself now than it was just a few years ago, Sherman said it’s something he’ll never be completely satisfied with as long as he’s in his position as DoD CIO.

“But we are moving in the right direction to bolster what we need to do, but I’ll tell you, it’s something we’re never going to rest on…we’re gonna keep pressing along, and I’ll never be satisfied with where we are as long as I’m in this position,” he said.

Pro-Russian supporters wave flags as they welcome missile cruiser Moskva, a flagship of Russian Black Sea Fleet, entering Sevastopol bay on September 10, 2008. In the early days of the Ukraine conflict, the Moskva would be brutally damaged, a major blow to Russia’s naval power. (VASILY BATANOV/AFP via Getty Images)

In Maritime Environments: Agility Over Rigidness, Capability Over Capacity

Since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger has stressed the importance not to jump to conclusions, adding that he and others have made severe programmatic errors when they’ve tried to assess the early implications of active conflicts.

Whenever asked about Ukraine, however, one of the first things Berger mentions is how ubiquitous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets have become on a modern battlefield. So much so, the force is having to explain to its younger Marines how dangerous even having a cell phone turned on can be.

“They don’t ever think anything about pressing a button,” he told reporters in December. “This is what they do all day long. Now, we have to completely undo 18 years of communicating all day long and tell them that’s bad, that will get you killed. So, turn your cell phone off.”

Hand in hand with this new intensity of ISR comes the need to be more “agile” and “dispersed,” Berger has said, a notion that aligns with his keystone project, Force Design 2030.

For the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday said a chief lesson for his service has been the need to prioritize capability over capacity.

“If we want to talk just about capability and you want a force that can — that’s ineffective, take a look at the 125 [battalion tactical groups] in Vladimir Putin’s position around Ukraine,” Gilday told the Sea Air Space exposition last year. “That’s not the force that any of us want.”

The admiral’s remarks allude to his own arguments to Capitol Hill that, given the constrained defense budgets he is facing, the Navy must prioritize having highly capable ships rather than large quantities of them.

Gilday, and many other Pentagon leaders, have also remarked on the Ukrainian people’s “will to fight” and how much that has contributed to the country’s success in fending off a much larger invading force. Sgt. Maj. Troy Black, the most senior enlisted Marine, during a roundtable with Berger hinted at that as well, saying the US does not win conflicts through sheer quantity.

“What’s our nation’s greatest strategic advantage over any adversary? It’s the individual,” he said. “It’s not the equipment. We will never win in massive quantities of equipment against a peer adversary. We just don’t do that. It’s the quality of our people.”

Lee Ferran, Jaspreet Gill, Theresa Hitchens, Justin Katz and Ashley Roque all contributed to this report.

breakingdefense.com · by Lee Ferran · February 23, 2023

20. A Report Card on the War in Ukraine

Excerpts:

Of course, many factors that matter more than those in the Report Card are not easily measured. The Report Card identifies a number of these, such as morale, leadership, the will to fight, information warfare, and international support. We are hopeful that readers will suggest ways to assess these and other critical factors going forward. Since this is a work in progress, we intend to revise the Report Card as we receive feedback. Moreover, the Task Force will continue tracking these indicators in weekly updates on Harvard University’s Russia Matters website.

Despite the Report Card’s findings, Putin’s successes on the battlefield cannot obscure the fact that his war has been a colossal strategic failure. Instead of erasing Ukraine from the map, Putin has enlivened Ukrainians’ sense of identity and confidence that they can build a viable modern nation. Rather than ensuring that Ukraine would never join the European Union or NATO, he has made its membership in these institutions likelier than ever before. By reviving a vivid sense of fear in Europeans, he has condemned his country to a new and likely lengthy chapter of cold war with a reinvigorated trans-Atlantic alliance whose GDP is 20 times that of Russia. One year on, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is deservedly the most admired leader on the international stage and Putin the most despised.

Students of the U.S. War of Independence will remember the Battle of Bunker Hill. There, British soldiers occupying Boston succeeded in seizing the high ground. But their victory came at the cost of so many of their soldiers killed and severely wounded that they never undertook an initiative like that again. Let us hope that the West’s fortitude and Putin’s failure in this case reduces Russia’s appetite for subsequent attacks on its neighbors.

A Report Card on the War in Ukraine

If year two of the war were a carbon copy of the first, Russia would control almost one-third of Ukraine next February.

By Graham Allison, a professor of government at the Harvard Kennedy School.

Foreign Policy · by Graham Allison · February 23, 2023

By now, it is clear that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine has been a grave strategic error. As Napoleon Bonaparte’s former minister of police said of the French leader’s foolish execution of a rival duke, his actions could be described as “worse than a crime … a blunder.” Yet even as Putin’s war has undermined Russia on the geopolitical stage, we should not overlook the fact that Russia has succeeded in severely weakening Ukraine on the ground.

This week, the Belfer Russia-Ukraine War Task Force, which I lead, is releasing a Report Card summarizing where things stand on the battlefield at the end of the first year of Russia’s war. As the Report Card documents, when we measure key indicators including territorial gains and losses, deaths of combatants and civilians, destruction of infrastructure, and economic impact, the brute facts are hard to ignore.

At the battlefield level, if one can remember only three numbers, they are: one-fifth, one-third, and 40 percent.

Since invading Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, Russian troops have seized an additional 11 percent of Ukraine’s territory. When combined with land seized from Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, that means Russia now controls almost one-fifth of the country. The Ukrainian economy has been crushed, its GDP declining by more than one-third. Ukraine is now dependent on the United States and Western Europe not only for weekly deliveries of weapons and ammunition but also for monthly subsidies to pay its soldiers, officials, and pensioners. Forty percent of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been destroyed or occupied.

The Report Card includes a dozen further indicators that shed light on the outcomes and cost of one year of war in Ukraine. These include one of Kyiv’s most closely held secrets: Ukrainian casualties. Western press coverage of the war has offered little reporting on this issue, but reliable U.S. government estimates count more than 130,000 Ukrainian soldiers killed or severely wounded—approximately the same number Russia has lost from a population more than three times larger than Ukraine’s. In addition, Russian forces have killed more than 7,000 Ukrainian civilians, committed an array of atrocities, and forced nearly 1 in 3 Ukrainian citizens to flee their homes. Today, 8 million Ukrainians are international refugees.

Thus, as the Western press continues to highlight Ukraine’s successes, we should also recognize that if year two of the war were essentially a carbon copy of the first, in February 2024 Russia would control almost one-third of Ukraine.

The war is, of course, imposing huge costs on Russia as well. But so far, Putin has shown no hesitation in paying whatever it takes. Moreover, the most severe of these costs, including the loss of European markets for Russia’s oil and gas, will be felt over the longer term. In the meantime, Moscow has demonstrated impressive resilience in adapting to unprecedented comprehensive sanctions. Despite Western governments advertising these sanctions as strangling, Russian revenues from exports of oil and gas actually went up last year, not down. Contrary to forecasts of most Western commentators, Russia’s economy has not imploded. As the Report Card notes, according to the most recent data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Russia’s economy fell last year much less than had been forecast—by just 2.3 percent—and the IMF expects it to return to positive growth in 2023. And since the invasion, while the value of Ukraine’s currency has declined by 18 percent, the Russian ruble has appreciated by 14 percent.

This is not to say Russia has emerged as the clear victor on the ground. Since mid-November, fighting on the battlefield has been bogged down in what we call a “snailmate,” with the net change in territorial control favoring Russia by just 75 square miles. And as both Russia and Ukraine prepare new, major offensives for the near future, other developments seem to favor Ukraine, with one of the most important being the United States and European nations supplying Ukraine with increasingly lethal weapons—most recently, battle tanks.

Of course, many factors that matter more than those in the Report Card are not easily measured. The Report Card identifies a number of these, such as morale, leadership, the will to fight, information warfare, and international support. We are hopeful that readers will suggest ways to assess these and other critical factors going forward. Since this is a work in progress, we intend to revise the Report Card as we receive feedback. Moreover, the Task Force will continue tracking these indicators in weekly updates on Harvard University’s Russia Matters website.

Despite the Report Card’s findings, Putin’s successes on the battlefield cannot obscure the fact that his war has been a colossal strategic failure. Instead of erasing Ukraine from the map, Putin has enlivened Ukrainians’ sense of identity and confidence that they can build a viable modern nation. Rather than ensuring that Ukraine would never join the European Union or NATO, he has made its membership in these institutions likelier than ever before. By reviving a vivid sense of fear in Europeans, he has condemned his country to a new and likely lengthy chapter of cold war with a reinvigorated trans-Atlantic alliance whose GDP is 20 times that of Russia. One year on, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is deservedly the most admired leader on the international stage and Putin the most despised.

Students of the U.S. War of Independence will remember the Battle of Bunker Hill. There, British soldiers occupying Boston succeeded in seizing the high ground. But their victory came at the cost of so many of their soldiers killed and severely wounded that they never undertook an initiative like that again. Let us hope that the West’s fortitude and Putin’s failure in this case reduces Russia’s appetite for subsequent attacks on its neighbors.

Foreign Policy · by Graham Allison · February 23, 2023

21. A year into Ukraine, looking back at 5 prewar predictions

Notice how all the lessons are focused on the large scale combat operations aspect of the war and there is no substantive discussion of the irregular warfare aspect of the conflict (I recognize my bias). I am not criticizing any of these lessons. They are important. But the lessons analysis is not complete in any of these articles and discussions.

Excerpts:

1. Are tanks still viable on the modern battlefield? Answer: Yes

2. Is cyber a game-changer? Answer: No

3. Are helicopter operations viable when the adversary has strong air defenses? Answer: Maybe, but circumstances must be right, and casualties may still be high.

4. Is it still possible to launch an amphibious assault on a hostile shore? Answer: Not with traditional tactics, but maybe using different concepts.

5. Has the artillery come to dominate the modern battlefield? Answer: Under certain circumstances, yes.

The need for caution: There is an old military saying that first reports are always wrong. The same might be true of lessons learned. Ukraine has tightly controlled information, so it is difficult to judge what is happening on the battlefield and the effectiveness of weapons. Short videos and tweets are suggestive, but the plural of anecdote is not data.

Nevertheless, the shortage of crystal balls being what it is, a Russia-Ukraine war is proving to be the best insight available into the dynamics of the future battlefield. When the war ends and military analysts can walk the ground, make objective counts, and interview all the relevant players, then definitive insights can be drawn. Until that day, these interim assessments must suffice.

A year into Ukraine, looking back at 5 prewar predictions - Breaking Defense

breakingdefense.com · by Mark Cancian · February 22, 2023

A Ukrainian serviceman walks past destroyed Russian tanks not far from the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv on April 3, 2022. (SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images)

On Feb. 15 2022, as the world watched to see if Russia would invade Ukraine, Mark Cancian of CSIS wrote an article looking at some of the lessons that could be learned from such a conflict. A year later, he has returned to see what assessments came true, and which surprised him.

Last February, as war became imminent, I wrote an article for Breaking Defense that asked five questions that had been bouncing around the defense community for years — and which the looming conflict in Ukraine would potentially answer.

Are tanks obsolete? Is cyber a game changer? Are helicopter operations viable? Are amphibious assaults still possible? Will artillery dominate the modern battlefield? At the war’s one-year point, some answers are emerging. While some of these answers came as expected, others are surprising, even uncomfortable. All have major implications on how future conflicts — as well as the ongoing war in Ukraine — will be conducted.

1. Are tanks still viable on the modern battlefield? Answer: Yes

Analysts have been predicting the end of tanks since the introduction of long-range precision antitank missiles in the early 1970s. Events in the Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020 seemed to show that drones dominate tanks. The Marine Corps dumped all its tanks in 2021 and deemed its antitank weapons capable of handling any armored threats it might face.

Early operations in Ukraine seemed to support the notion that tanks were obsolete. Ukrainian teams with sophisticated antitank munitions like Javelin or NLOS destroyed hundreds of Russian armored vehicles. The Russian advance collapsed despite having overwhelming armored superiority.

However, later commentary assessed that the Russians had abandoned combined arms, expecting a rapid advance that would meet little resistance and quickly end the war. That strategic decision left their tanks highly vulnerable to infantry attack — less a referendum on heavy vehicles and more one of Russia’s misjudgments.

Tank losses have been high — the best open-source tracking shows Russia has lost 1,748, Ukraine 467 ― but both sides continue to use tanks extensively. The Russians continue to replace their tank losses, while Ukraine has stepped up its demands for tanks from NATO. From the perspective of the combatants, then, tanks still play a central role on the battlefield. The experience of upcoming offensives combined with postwar analysis may indicate whether this role has changed or been reduced. Nevertheless, the US Army has made its judgment: As Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville stated, “You don’t need armor if you don’t want to win.”

2. Is cyber a game-changer? Answer: No

What impact modern cyber capabilities would have in a major war has been a great unknown for military planners. Many proponents looked for a “cyber Pearl Harbor” that crippled an adversary at the start of the conflict. The recent book, 2034: a Novel of the Next World War by James Stavridis and Elliot Ackerman, envisioned Chinese cyber capabilities crippling the US Pacific Fleet and allowing its destruction.

But despite years of buildup around the cyber threat, thus far, cyber has had no discernible effect on military operations. Cyber attacks apparently degraded some command-and-control in the first days of the war but, as far as is known, have been unable to affect weapons and munitions performance or seriously degrade Ukraine’s ability to direct its forces. Even the most obvious and expected use of cyber attacks — the degradation of civilian infrastructure like the electrical grid — has come entirely from kinetic effects.

The problem with cyber weapons is that they are generally one-time use. When targets become aware of an attack, they close the vulnerability. Thus, Russian cyber attacks have tapered off over time. And while it is possible that Russia still has some unused capabilities, that seems unlikely since the Russian strategic situation has become desperate with no new capabilities becoming evident. That likely means they do not exist.

This does not mean that cyber has been irrelevant. Behind the scenes, there has been a pitched battle between Russian attacks and Ukrainian defense. Private companies have greatly aided these defenses, a novel situation where civilian organizations are, in effect, on the front line. What this does mean, however, is that effective defenses are possible, and the scariest cyber scenarios are unlikely to occur.

3. Are helicopter operations viable when the adversary has strong air defenses? Answer: Maybe, but circumstances must be right, and casualties may still be high.

Helicopters are integral to the operations of US military forces, with a total US inventory of about 4,500. However, helicopters are extremely vulnerable since they fly low and slow: In Vietnam, the United States lost 5,600 helicopters.

Russia’s major heliborne operation, the assault on Hostomel airfield outside Kyiv, failed in the first days of the war. Although the Russian units could land, Ukrainian counterattacks drove them off. While a later Russian ground/air mobile attack succeeded, many videos showed helicopters being shot down. Since then, there have been few reports about helicopter operations. For example, the heliborne SOF raids that the United States employed continuously during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars appear to be absent in this war. This absence suggests that it is too dangerous to operate helicopters over the front lines.

That does not mean the helicopters are useless. They have tremendous applications for medevac and transport of troops and equipment. In regional wars, where adversaries have weak air defenses, the heliborne assault may still have a role; a heliborne attack against adversaries with robust air defenses might still be successful if able to suppress air defenses and land at less defended spots.

Nevertheless, losses would be high during both transit and landing. Russian losses at Hostomel likely exceeded what the United States would be willing to accept in a similar operation. Postwar analysis may shed additional light on the role of helicopters going forward — and as the US Army is in the process of spending billions to revamp its helicopter fleets for modern combat, getting that analysis right will be crucial.

4. Is it still possible to launch an amphibious assault on a hostile shore? Answer: Not with traditional tactics, but maybe using different concepts.

In the modern era, the Marines have never faced a truly opposed landing, but the British have. In May 1982, the British landed on the Falkland Islands to drive out the Argentinian forces that had seized the islands the month before. The assault was a success, though with high casualties among the ships. Since then, the existence of antiship missiles has led many to question whether such assaults are still viable, in an era when surface ships are most vulnerable near coastlines. That belief was underscored by the sinking of the Moskva by antiship missiles early in the conflict.

The traditional Marine Corps landing with fleets of ships near a hostile shore is, therefore, not viable against well-armed adversaries. The Marine Corps has known this for some time and developed a variety of doctrinal adaptations, such as operational maneuver from the sea. With its V-22 tiltrotor aircraft, the Marine Corps can stay outside missile range, at least for the initial assaults.

The Marine Corps’ new concept, Force Design 2030, gives up entirely on opposed landings, opting for small units inserted by light amphibious warships. Whether this will succeed is hotly debated within Marine Corps circles. Expect proponents to point to the Ukraine experience as proof Force Design 2030 is on the right track while opponents argue that operational maneuver is still possible.

5. Has the artillery come to dominate the modern battlefield? Answer: Under certain circumstances, yes.

Artillery dominated World War I. As the French used to say, the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies. However, World War II gave tanks and aircraft the dominant role. Subsequent wars, particularly in the Middle East, continued to give armor and airpower the major role, while insurgencies focused on infantry. Artillery always had a role, but a supporting one.

Ukraine, in a surprise, has become a war heavily reliant on artillery. With fairly stable lines established, every day the two sides fire thousands, in some cases tens of thousands, of unguided artillery projectiles at each other. The frontlines look like World War I with infantry sheltering in trenches and massive artillery shell fire. Production of artillery projectiles has become a vital warfighting function. In an age of long-range precision strike, this has been a surprise.

The usefulness of precision munitions, such as Excalibur and GMLRS, has also been proven on the battlefield, although that was expected. Ukraine has successfully targeted Russian headquarters and supply depots, forcing the Russians, after substantial losses, to disperse. One suspects that artillery sniping goes on every day, though the data are not clear. However, these capabilities have not, by themselves, been a war winner. The Russians are still on the field and fighting effectively.

It is important to note that the primacy of artillery occurred when the frontlines stabilized. With the infantry dug in, maneuver became difficult. A stable front also meant that supply lines could be built to move thousands of shells every day. If the Russian or Ukrainian spring offensives break into the open, then armor and infantry will become relatively more important. Until that day, however, artillery rules as the king of battle.

The need for caution: There is an old military saying that first reports are always wrong. The same might be true of lessons learned. Ukraine has tightly controlled information, so it is difficult to judge what is happening on the battlefield and the effectiveness of weapons. Short videos and tweets are suggestive, but the plural of anecdote is not data.

Nevertheless, the shortage of crystal balls being what it is, a Russia-Ukraine war is proving to be the best insight available into the dynamics of the future battlefield. When the war ends and military analysts can walk the ground, make objective counts, and interview all the relevant players, then definitive insights can be drawn. Until that day, these interim assessments must suffice.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

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RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 23, 2023

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