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Quotes of the Day:
"History is full of people who, out of fear, or ignorance, or lust for power, have destroyed knowledge of immeasurable value which truly belongs to us all. We must not let it happen again."
– Carl Sagan
"The highest form of ignorance is when you reject something you don't know anything about."
– Wayne Dyer
"I have come to believe that a great teacher is a great artist and that there are as few as there are any other great artists. Teaching might even be the greatest of the arts since the medium is the human mind and spirit."
– John Steinbeck
1. Yoon's legal team calls for impeachment dismissal at final hearing
2. Yoon says he is sorry, thankful to nation at final impeachment hearing
3. Constitutional Court expected to rule on Yoon's impeachment in mid-March
4. Chronology of major events leading to final hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial
5. U.S. official for Korean Peninsula issues visiting S. Korea: sources
6. Only 31 pct of S. Koreans say unification is in their interest: poll
7. North Korea providing 50% of Russia's ammunition, Ukraine says
8. N. Korean markets fall silent as merchants and customers vanish
9. Nuclear Tensions And Unfinished War: The Korean Peninsula Dilemma
10. The Pentagon must cut $50B of waste — put this weapon on the chopping block
11. Kim Jong Un says army obedience top priority as troops fight in Russia’s war
12. N. Korea's smartphone "Samtaesung 8" revealed
13. DPRK supplying half of Russia’s munitions with more arms to come: Ukraine
14. Cruelty and Arrogance of South Korean Presidents on Display in Seoul Courtrooms
1. Yoon's legal team calls for impeachment dismissal at final hearing
Now the waiting for the decision begins.
(3rd LD) Yoon's legal team calls for impeachment dismissal at final hearing | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · February 25, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with arguments of Yoon's legal team; CHANGES headline)
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol's legal team called for the dismissal of his impeachment during final arguments before the Constitutional Court on Tuesday, saying the opposition party's unilateral actions necessitated his short-lived imposition of martial law.
Yoon was absent from the courtroom as the team of lawyers presented their final arguments on why the court should dismiss the National Assembly's impeachment of the president over his surprise declaration of martial law Dec. 3.
The final hearing of President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment trial is held at the Constitutional Court in Seoul on Feb. 25, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
He is expected to appear later in the proceeding to present his own final statement amid keen attention on how he will defend his action and whether he will issue an apology to the nation.
"The emergency martial law ended after two hours, and not a single citizen was injured in the process of declaring and lifting the decree," Chah Kee-whahn, one of the lawyers, said.
Lee Dong-chan, another lawyer, said the opposition party's policy obstructions, railroading of legislation and unilateral cuts of the government budget were to blame for the president's action.
"It cannot be denied that the state created by the opposition party is a state of national emergency," he said.
The National Assembly's legal team presented its final arguments earlier, demanding the court uphold the impeachment and remove Yoon from office.
A justice ministry convoy carrying President Yoon Suk Yeol heads to the Constitutional Court in Seoul on Feb. 25, 2025. (Yonhap)
"It became clear through evidence examination during the impeachment trial and the related investigation that (Yoon) violated the Constitution and laws through a series of insurrection actions," Song Doo-hwan, one of the National Assembly's lawyers, said.
"It is hard to imagine a graver reason than the reasons of unconstitutionality and illegality in this case in the past or in the future," he said.
Rep. Jung Chung-rai of the main opposition Democratic Party, the head of the Assembly's impeachment panel, spoke next to give his final statement.
Yoon is scheduled to speak after Jung.
The president is expected to use his statement to explain the circumstances that led to his surprise declaration of martial law Dec. 3 and assert the illegality of his investigation by the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) and the prosecution.
Also in focus is whether the president will issue an apology to the nation for the political turmoil caused by his martial law declaration and subsequent impeachment.
Police buses are parked outside the Constitutional Court in Seoul on Feb. 25, 2025. (Yonhap)
The National Assembly's impeachment motion against Yoon accuses the president of violating the Constitution and laws by declaring martial law in the absence of a national emergency and ignoring due procedures, such as holding a Cabinet meeting and notifying parliament.
Yoon has argued his declaration of martial law was an act of governance meant to send a warning to the opposition party over its repeated impeachments of government officials and attempts to cut the government budget.
Legal experts anticipate the court will deliver its verdict on whether to remove Yoon from office or reinstate him within two weeks after Tuesday's hearing, citing the precedents of former Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Park Geun-hye.
Supporters of President Yoon Suk Yeol hold a rally opposing his impeachment near the Constitutional Court in Seoul on Feb. 25, 2025. (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · February 25, 2025
2. Yoon says he is sorry, thankful to nation at final impeachment hearing
(4th LD) Yoon says he is sorry, thankful to nation at final impeachment hearing | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · February 25, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with Yoon's remarks; CHANGES headline)
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol said Tuesday he is sorry and thankful to the nation as he addressed the final hearing of his impeachment trial in connection with his short-lived imposition of martial law.
"I want to first say that I am sorry and thankful to the people," he said at the Constitutional Court, reflecting on the months since his surprise declaration of martial law Dec. 3.
"While feeling thankful, the reality of not being able to do my work in the time given to me by the people made me sorry and caused my heart to ache."
The final hearing of President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment trial is held at the Constitutional Court in Seoul on Feb. 25, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · February 25, 2025
3. Constitutional Court expected to rule on Yoon's impeachment in mid-March
And the waiting begins. I wonder if Las Vegas has any odds on the outcome?
(News Focus) Constitutional Court expected to rule on Yoon's impeachment in mid-March | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · February 25, 2025
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- The Constitutional Court is expected to decide whether to remove President Yoon Suk Yeol from office or reinstate him around mid-March as the court wrapped up hearings of his impeachment trial Tuesday over his failed martial law bid.
The court capped 11 rounds of trials 73 days after the National Assembly voted to impeach Yoon over his short-lived imposition of martial law on Dec. 3.
The final hearing of President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment trial is held at the Constitutional Court in Seoul on Feb. 25, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
Following the final arguments in Yoon's impeachment trial, the court's eight justices will deliberate on the case and cast a vote behind closed doors.
At least six justices must vote in favor of impeachment for the motion to be upheld. The nine-member court has one vacancy.
Legal experts expect a verdict to be delivered within two weeks, considering precedents of past presidential impeachment trials and the gravity of the case.
At the heart of the case is whether Yoon's martial law decree violated the Constitution and laws.
The impeachment motion accuses Yoon of violating the Constitution and laws by declaring martial law in the absence of a national emergency and ignoring due procedures, such as holding a Cabinet meeting and notifying parliament.
Yoon has argued his declaration of martial law was an act of governance meant to send a warning to the opposition party over its repeated impeachments of government officials and attempts to cut the government budget.
If Yoon, who was elected in May 2022 for a single, five-year term, is formally removed from office, a snap election will be held within 60 days. However, if the impeachment is dismissed, Yoon will immediately resume his duties.
Yoon said if he returns to office, he will dedicate the latter half of his term to revising constitutional amendments and political reforms to ensure "a well-functioning nation" for future generations.
"I will devote myself to swiftly gathering the will of the people and pushing forward constitutional amendments to create a Constitution and political structure that align well with the changes in our society," Yoon said in a final hearing, pledging efforts toward national unity.
If reinstated, Yoon said he would focus on foreign affairs while empowering the prime minister with greater authority over domestic matters to more effectively address international and domestic challenges.
Currently, Choi Sang-mok, deputy prime minister and finance minister, has taken the caretaker role after Prime Minister Han Duck-soo was impeached on Dec. 27.
Stakes are high as Yoon's botched martial law declaration has unleashed a prolonged period of political instability amid economic and security challenges at home and abroad.
Supporters of President Yoon Suk Yeol hold a rally in front of the Constitutional Court in Seoul on Feb. 25, 2025, where the final hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial is held. (Yonhap)
A majority of South Koreans approved of his impeachment in recent polls, but Yoon's staunch supporters have held rallies in front of the court for weeks to oppose his ouster.
Yoon is the third South Korean president in the past two decades to be impeached.
Late President Roh Moo-hyun was impeached for violating election law in 2004, but he was reinstated by the court. In 2017, the court unanimously ousted former President Park Geun-hye for corruption and abuse of power.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · February 25, 2025
4. Chronology of major events leading to final hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial
A useful timeline for those keeping track.
Chronology of major events leading to final hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · February 25, 2025
SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- The Constitutional Court will hold the final hearing of President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment trial Tuesday, which will present the final arguments of the legal teams of both Yoon and the National Assembly, serving as the prosecution in the case.
The following is a chronology of major events leading up to the final hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial.
President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) talks with his lawyer, Yun Gap-geun, during the 10th hearing of his impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court in Seoul on Feb. 20, 2025, over his short-lived imposition of martial law in December. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
Dec. 3, 2024 -- Yoon declares the imposition of martial law in his address to the nation.
Dec. 4, 2024 -- The National Assembly votes to demand Yoon lift martial law. Yoon announces the lifting of martial law.
Dec. 7, 2024 -- The National Assembly holds a vote on an impeachment motion against Yoon, but it is scrapped due to a lack of quorum.
Dec. 14, 2024 -- The National Assembly passes the second impeachment motion against Yoon.
Dec. 16, 2024 -- The Constitutional Court holds the first meeting of justices over Yoon's impeachment.
Dec. 27, 2024 -- The first preparatory hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial takes place to clarify the main disputes of the case.
Dec. 31, 2024 -- Acting President Choi Sang-mok appoints two justices to the Constitutional Court but holds off on the appointment of the third nominee.
Jan. 3, 2025 -- The second preparatory hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial takes place. The National Assembly's legal team requests the removal of the insurrection charge in the trial.
Jan. 14, 2025 -- The first formal hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial takes place but ends after just four minutes as Yoon fails to show.
Jan. 15, 2025 -- The Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials detains Yoon.
Jan. 16, 2025 -- The second hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial takes place. Former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun and four others selected as trial witnesses.
Jan. 18, 2025 -- Yoon appears for a court hearing on whether to issue a warrant for his formal arrest.
Jan. 19, 2025 -- The Seoul Western District Court issues a warrant for Yoon's arrest.
Jan. 21, 2025 -- The third hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial takes place. Yoon appears at the trial for the first time.
Jan. 23, 2025 -- The fourth hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial takes place. Former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun appears for witness questioning.
Jan. 26, 2025 -- Prosecutors indict Yoon on the charge of leading an insurrection.
Feb. 4, 2025 -- The fifth hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial takes place. Lt. Gen. Lee Jin-woo, former chief of the Capital Defense Command, and other officials allegedly involved in martial law operations appear for witness questioning.
Feb. 6, 2025 -- The sixth hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial takes place. Lt. Gen. Kwak Jong-keun, former head of the Army Special Warfare Command, and other officials appear for witness questioning.
Feb. 11, 2025 -- The seventh hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial takes place. Former Interior Minister Lee Sang-min, National Security Adviser Shin Won-sik and other officials appear for witness questioning.
Feb. 13, 2025 -- The eighth hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial takes place. National Intelligence Service Director Cho Tae-yong and other officials appear for witness questioning.
President Yoon Suk Yeol attends the eighth hearing of his impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court in Seoul, in this file photo from Feb. 13, 2025, over his short-lived imposition of martial law in December. (Yonhap)
Feb. 18, 2025 -- The ninth hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial takes place. The legal teams of Yoon and the National Assembly present their arguments of the case for two hours each.
Feb. 20, 2025 -- The tenth hearing of Yoon's impeachment trial takes place. Prime Minister Han Duck-soo and other officials appear for witness questioning. The Constitutional Court announces it will end the trial's oral arguments Feb. 25.
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · February 25, 2025
5. U.S. official for Korean Peninsula issues visiting S. Korea: sources
The new Korea team is taking shape. I am optimistic.
U.S. official for Korean Peninsula issues visiting S. Korea: sources | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · February 25, 2025
SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- A U.S. official responsible for issues related to the Korean Peninsula is currently visiting South Korea, diplomatic sources said Tuesday, in the first such known visit by a U.S. State Department official since the launch of the second Donald Trump administration.
Kevin Kim, deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, arrived in Seoul early this week and has met with key officials from South Korea's foreign ministry to discuss the bilateral alliance and North Korean issues, sources with knowledge of the matter said.
Kim's visit appears to be a working-level trip aimed at managing the U.S.-South Korea relations and sharpening Trump's North Korea policy, according to the sources.
Kim, a Korean descent, previously served as an aide to U.S. Sen. Bill Hagerty (R-TN) and worked at the State Department's office for the special representative for North Korea from 2018 to 2020 under Trump's first term.
At that time, Kim worked with then U.S. Special Representative Stephen Biegun, playing a role in U.S. diplomacy toward North Korea.
This image, captured from LinkedIn, shows U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kevin Kim. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · February 25, 202
6. Only 31 pct of S. Koreans say unification is in their interest: poll
Oh no. Note this was from nearly a year ago. I would like to see how they feel about the 8.15 Unification doctrine that was released in August after this poll.
But this is the key point: How does unification benefit the individual Korean person in the South?
Excerpts:
"Respondents have consistently maintained the view that the country as a whole and the North Korean people would benefit from unification, while they have little to gain," the institute assessed, pointing to growing public skepticism about unification.
I participated in a meeting with the former north Korean Ambassador to Kuwait yesterday. He shared a number of fascinating insights. While he strongly desires unification he says Kim Jong Un cannot be overthrown because of the security and the three chains of control of the military. He said there is no legal justification for unification because north and South are members of the UN. But he also said that he Koren people (to include those in the north) have a long history of rebellion (and he specifically mentioned the northeast provinces). He said information to undermine the legitimacy of the regime is critical. He told how he smuggled an SD card (with South Korean program) in his shoe when he returned to Pyongyang from Kuwait. He said the people need information to debunk regime myths - he specifically mentioned that the Korean people in the north should learn that Kim Jong Il was not born on Mt Baektu but in Russia, north of Vladivostok.
What I was not able to ask him about was about all the various scenarios for regime collapse or loss in war and is not the only realistic outcome then unification? (I could not dominate the conversation.)
Of the four paths to unification, war and regime collapse (with conflict) are the two most likely paths to unification unless the Korean people in the north cna create the internal conditions for change. At that point it will not matter that there is a north and South Korea in the UN. What happens when the regime no longer exists and the north ceases to function as a sovereign nation?
Only 31 pct of S. Koreans say unification is in their interest: poll | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 25, 2025
SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- Only 31 percent of South Koreans believe that unification with North Korea is in their interest, a poll showed Tuesday.
Far fewer than half of people in all age groups responded that unification of the two Koreas would benefit them, according to the poll conducted between April and May last year by the Korea Institute for National Unification on 1,001 adults aged 18 or older.
Of them, a total of 30.6 percent responded that unification would be either very or somewhat beneficial to them, while only 23.5 percent of those born after 1991, commonly known as millenials, said the same.
Of the total, however, 66.4 percent believed that unification would be either very or somewhat beneficial to the country, while 92.4 percent responded that it would be in the interest of the North Korean people.
Overall, 52.9 percent of the respondents said unification is necessary, which is nearly identical to the record low of 52.7 percent recorded for the same question a similar poll by the institute in 2019.
"Respondents have consistently maintained the view that the country as a whole and the North Korean people would benefit from unification, while they have little to gain," the institute assessed, pointing to growing public skepticism about unification.
The poll, conducted from April 18 to May 16 last year, has a 95 percent confidence level with a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percent.
In this file photo, tourists gaze toward North Korea from an observation point on a mountain in the border city of Paju, South Korea, on Oct. 20, 2024. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 25, 2025
7. North Korea providing 50% of Russia's ammunition, Ukraine says
North Korea providing 50% of Russia's ammunition, Ukraine says
North Korea's latest smartphone pairs dated hardware with enhanced storage and camera features
https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraines-military-spy-chief-says-n-korea-provides-50-russias-ammunition-2025-02-23/?utm
By Mun Dong Hui -February 24, 2025
By Reuters
February 23, 20259:19 AM ESTUpdated 2 days ago
KYIV, Feb 23 (Reuters) - North Korea is providing 50% of Russia's ammunition needs at the front in its war against Ukraine, Kyiv's military spy chief Kyrylo Budanov said on Sunday.
North Korea has deployed thousands of troops to support Russian forces, according to Ukrainian, U.S. and South Korean assessments, Pyongyang's first major involvement in a war since the 1950s.
Budanov told a press conference that North Korea had also begun large scale supplies of 170-mm self-propelled howitzers and 240-mm multiple rocket launch systems to Russia.
North Korea has already supplied Russia with ballistic missiles as well, and in 2025 it plans to send 148, he added.
In 2025, Russia plans to produce over 7 million artillery and mortar shells, Ukraine's foreign intelligence chief Oleh Ivashchenko added.
"Russia... understands that in general it produces way more than all European countries," he said.
As for long-range missiles, Ivashchenko said Russia is expected to produce around 3,000 this year.
Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with the Reuters Econ World newsletter. Sign up here.
Reporting by Max Hunder and Anastasiia Malenko, Yuliia Dysa Editing by Andrew Cawthorne
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
8. N. Korean markets fall silent as merchants and customers vanish
This is the problem for north Korea and the Korean people in north. It is the markets that saved the Korean people from the Arduous March of the great famine of 1994-1996. It is what provides the resilience of the Korean people in the north. However, Kim has determined that markets, and foreign currency and information from the outside are threats to the regime and he has used COVID to implement draconian population and resources control measures to really crack down on the markets. This is taking away the safety valve of the Korean people and without it I think we will see even more suffering among the korean people in the north. And with that we must observe for the inficaitos of instability.
I cannot emphasize how important it is for Korean analysts to be able to use the work of Bob Collins to understand the conditions that can lead to regime collapse.
Pattern of Collapse in North Korea
By Robert Collins
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/04/11/pattern-collapse-north-korea/
N. Korean markets fall silent as merchants and customers vanish - Daily NK English
Some merchants are abandoning their stalls, seeing little reason to pay market taxes when sales are so low
By Seon Hwa -February 24, 202
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · February 24, 2025
North Korean marketplaces are experiencing a significant decline in activity. Sources indicate both customer traffic and merchant presence have notably decreased.
Recent photos obtained by Daily NK from a marketplace in Sinuiju, North Pyongan province, reveal scattered merchants displaying food and industrial goods amid numerous empty stalls.
“These photos were taken around 3 p.m., shortly before the market’s opening time,” said a local source. “Usually, merchants would be jostling to enter with their goods. It’s unusual to see so few vendors.”
A marketplace in Sinuiju, North Pyongan province, North Korea. /Photo=Daily NK
The source explained that declining foot traffic stems from a combination of factors: “People lack money, and with street vendors setting up outside as evening approaches, the marketplace remains quiet. Once darkness falls, vendors line the roads and alleyways outside, so nobody bothers entering the market even though it’s open until 8 p.m.”
Some merchants are abandoning their stalls, seeing little reason to pay market taxes when sales are so low.
Even vendors selling popular items are struggling. “Soybean-based ‘artificial meat’ is a beloved side dish, but when even these vendors can’t make sales, imagine how other merchants are faring,” the source noted. “With business this poor, some are leaving to avoid paying market taxes.”
Another source from the province pointed to state construction projects as an additional deterrent: “The government is pushing construction work everywhere. If you’re caught walking around, you risk being drafted into construction sites – that’s another reason people avoid the marketplace.”
A marketplace in Sinuiju, North Pyongan province, North Korea. /Photo=Daily NK
These factors have transformed these once-bustling centers of North Korean economic activity into eerily quiet spaces.
The marketplace photos reveal a predominance of Chinese-made goods. Among them are “84” branded laundry soap, scrubbing pads, and various cosmetics and sundries – likely all Chinese imports rather than domestic products.
In one photo, a merchant wears a hat bearing the South Korean “FILA” logo, presumably unaware of its origin. The hat was likely either imported from China or locally produced without knowledge of the brand’s nationality.
A marketplace in Sinuiju, North Pyongan province, North Korea. /Photo=Daily NK
This reality stands in stark contrast to Kim Jong Un’s “20×10 regional development policy,” now in its second year. While state media regularly showcases new provincial factories and satisfied citizens examining locally made products, the abundance of Chinese goods in marketplaces undermines the government’s promises to strengthen the domestic economy through high-quality local manufacturing.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · February 24, 2025
9. Nuclear Tensions And Unfinished War: The Korean Peninsula Dilemma
Unification first, then denuclearisation; the path to unification is through human rights.
What happens on the Korean peninsula will have global effects, negative and positive (War, regime collapse with conflict, internal regime transformation, peaceful unification).
Excerpts:
The status of the Korean Peninsula continues to pose a significant challenge to global stability. Although reunification is unlikely in the short term, incremental steps toward peace are still viable. These steps can be sustained through balanced diplomacy, incentives, and multilateral cooperation. Addressing historical grievances fostering economic and humanitarian engagement institutionalizing and security agreements are essential for preventing escalation. Without compromises, the risk of renewed hostilities remains high as North Korea continues advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities. Strategic patience and flexible diplomacy will be crucial in fostering a long-term peninsula.
Nuclear Tensions And Unfinished War: The Korean Peninsula Dilemma – OpEd
eurasiareview.com · February 24, 2025
The Korean Peninsula remains one of the most geopolitical volatile flashpoints in the world locked in precarious a state of “war no peace”. Despite decades of engagement, intermittent diplomacy, and global efforts to stabilize the region, the fundamental issues of historical divisions, nuclear tensions, and geopolitical rivalries continue to obstruct long-term resolution.
The lack of a formal peace agreement after the Korean War, coupled with the deep-seated distrust between North and South Korea and the vested interests of major global powers, has led to a lasting stalemate. While complete reunification remains highly improbable in the near term, incremental trust-building, a legally binding peace framework, and increased regional collaboration offer viable pathways toward stability. Achieving lasting peace necessitates ongoing diplomatic efforts, strong incentives, and balanced multilateral cooperation to reduce risks and promote gradual reconciliation.
The current origin crisis on the Korean Peninsula dates back to the end of World War II when the peninsula was divided along the 38th parallel. The Korean War (1950-1953) solidified this division, resulting in an armistice rather than a formal peace treaty, leaving North and South Korea technically still at war.
The division was further entrenched and ideological political backing from global superpowers: the United States and its allies supported South Korea (Republic ROK Korea) while China and Russia backed North Korea (The democratic People’s Republic of Korea DPRK). This bipolar structure of international support reinforced mutual hostility and escalated military confrontations. The establishment of the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) symbolized the intractable divide underscored and the enduring dilemma of security.
The nuclearization of North Korea has exacerbated tensions over the past three decades. Since 1990’a North Korea has pursued nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent arguing that capabilities such are essential for regime survival. The U.S. and South Korea view denuclearization as a prerequisite for long-term stability. Diplomatic efforts including the Agreed Framework (1994) the Six-Party Talks (2003-2009) and the Singapore Summit (2018) have consistently collapsed due to issues related to verification mutual distrust and political shifting priorities. The failure of these agreements deepened skepticism over North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize the credibility of U.S. security guarantees.
A formal peace treaty remains a fundamental requirement resolving for the conflict. The replacement of the 1953 armistice with a legally binding agreement serves as a confidence-building measure offering for a foundation improved inter-Korean relations. However, such a treaty necessitates participation from multiple stakeholders including North and South Korea, China, the U.S., Russia, Japan, and the United Nations Command. North Korea’s security guarantees, which include the cessation of U.S.-ROK military drills and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula, conflict with South Korea’s commitment to irreversible denuclearization. Additionally, geopolitical rivalries between the U.S. and China complicate negotiations, as Beijing perceives a unified Korea aligned with the U.S. as a threat to its strategic interests.
Denuclearization remains the most contentious issue in the conflict. North Korean nuclear weapons are not merely tools but deterrence instruments also of domestic legitimacy. The Kim regime has consistently framed nuclear capability as essential for national leveraging security as it is a bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiation. Conversely, the U.S. and South Korea prioritize verifiable denuclearization before making substantial concessions, such as easing economic sanctions or reducing military presence. Previous agreements have failed due to compliance disputes and the absence of long-term enforcement mechanisms. The international community remains divided on the feasibility of denuclearization, with China and Russia advocating for a phased approach, while the U.S. maintains a policy of maximum pressure through sanctions and deterrence.
The security dilemma on the peninsula is further complicated by conflicting military strategies. North Korea insists on ending U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, viewing them as rehearsals for invasion. In contrast, South Korea and the U.S. argue that these drills are essential for defending against potential aggression. The presence of U.S. troops in South Korea numbering approximately 28500 a contentious issue that North Korea and China perceive as a strategic threat. While security assurances could be used as bargaining tools, North Korea’s historical pattern of reneging on agreements creates significant reluctance in Washington and Seoul to make unilateral concessions.
The question of reunification presents additional complexities. Although both Koreas claim sovereignty over the entire peninsula, practical pathways to reunification remain elusive. One proposed approach is a decentralized federal system that allows for governance; however, this poses challenges due to ideological disparities. A confederation model, similar to the “one country, two systems” framework, has also been suggested, but its political feasibility is limited by North Korea’s rigid control structure. The most likely scenario for peaceful coexistence between East and West occurred before Germany’s reunification in 1990. However, the economic disparity between North and South Korea presents formidable challenges, as the cost of integration would be immense, and North Korea’s regime shows little willingness to adopt systemic reforms.
The involvement of key global stakeholders further complicates the resolution process. North Korea’s reliance on China and Russia for diplomatic and economic support protects it from isolation, while South Korea’s dependence on the U.S. reinforces existing divisions. China views North Korea as a strategic buffer against U.S. military presence in the region and has historically opposed drastic measures that could destabilize Pyongyang. Meanwhile, the U.S. focus remains on non-proliferation but difficulties are faced balancing in deterrence with diplomatic engagement. Japan and regional actors remain concerned about North Korea’s issues and threats unresolved historically including the abduction of Japanese citizens from the Japanese by North Korean agents.
Trust Incremental-building measures offer a more realistic path forward. Humanitarian initiatives such as family reunions food and aid exchanges of prisoners of war and missing-in-action remains have historically facilitated dialogue between the two Koreas. Economic cooperation, as exemplified by the now-defunct Kaesong Industrial Complex, demonstrated potential for mutual economic benefits; however, its viability remains contingent on political conditions. Military confidence-measures building including hotline and restoration joint DMZ peace initiatives could serve as stepping stones toward reducing hostilities.
A broader peace framework could also play a crucial role. Multilateral negotiations such as Six-Party Talks involving the U.S., China, Russia, Japan and North and South Korea could lay the groundwork for phased-in denuclearization in exchange for guarantees of security. An agreement security encompassing Northeast Asia could institutionalize further stability ensuring that stakeholders have shared responsibilities in maintaining peace.
Despite these potential pathways, formidable several challenges persist. Deep-rooted mistrust shaped by history and a broken of agreements undermines confidence in diplomatic initiatives. Sanctions and economic constraints continue to hinder economic stability, making it difficult to structure effective growth negotiation incentives. Domestic political shifts in the U.S. and South Korea are affecting the consistency of their policies, with hardline approaches often replacing engagement strategies. Furthermore, the broader China-U.S. rivalry is impacting regional stability, as both countries prioritize their strategic interests over cooperation and collaborative solutions.
Recent developments further underscore the complexity of the issue. In 2024 North Korea strengthened its ties with Russia and engaged China in arms deals and deepening diplomatic coordination. South Korea under the administration of Yoon has aligned closely with the U.S. and Japan adopting a stance harder against North Korea. Meanwhile, the U.S. policy under the Biden administration has emphasized deterrence while also maintaining openness and dialogue regarding preconditions. These dynamics reflect an increasingly polarized landscape, complicating prospects for reconciliation.
The status of the Korean Peninsula continues to pose a significant challenge to global stability. Although reunification is unlikely in the short term, incremental steps toward peace are still viable. These steps can be sustained through balanced diplomacy, incentives, and multilateral cooperation. Addressing historical grievances fostering economic and humanitarian engagement institutionalizing and security agreements are essential for preventing escalation. Without compromises, the risk of renewed hostilities remains high as North Korea continues advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities. Strategic patience and flexible diplomacy will be crucial in fostering a long-term peninsula.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
- Kim, Samuel S. Korea and the Great Powers: A Geopolitical Perspective. Routledge, 2023.
- Smith, Sheila Miyoshi. North Korea’s Nuclear Gamble: Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Global Security. Oxford University Press, 2023.
- Park, Joon-Woo. The Korean Peninsula: History, Conflict, and the Future of Diplomacy. Cambridge University Press, 2023.
eurasiareview.com · February 24, 2025
10. The Pentagon must cut $50B of waste — put this weapon on the chopping block
RADM Mongtgomery is saying the quiet part out loud. He is making a point I think every crisis action planner has thought about but few are willing to say out loud – reference strategic bombers, deterrence, and north Korea. Many of us often voiced this among ourselves - but the strategic bombers looked good on the PowerPoint charts and showed that at least we were doing something - on the other hand strategic reassurance of our allies is an important consideration of course. And lastly while we could never measure appreciable effects (though sometimes non-action is an important effect - but can that be connected to our action or did the adversary already have plans for not further action?) It is what is in the mind of the target of deterrence that is most important and we may never know what the real effect on his strategic decision making was.
Excerpts:
The only way to find that kind of money is to cut weapons programs that no longer meet America’s needs. And the first item on the chopping block should be the Long-Range Standoff missile, which will cost at least $16 billion over the next 10 years.
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Let’s take these justifications individually.
First, the Trump administration’s urgent order to focus on top defense priorities means the Pentagon can’t afford weapons that only provide a “complementary” capability.
Second, there are plenty of ways to “signal” our intent, including bombers carrying conventional weapons, aircraft carriers and subs with SLBMs.
As a commander, I was told numerous times in my career to move nuclear-capable bombers around the strategic chessboard to “affect the adversary” — usually Kim Jong Il in North Korea.
But I never saw a measurable response to the nuclear bomber “signal,” and I suspect crazy does not respond to subtle shifts.
Finally, in today’s environment, a bomber’s ability to be recalled may be an outright liability, as spoofing and jamming of communication systems reach new heights.
Who would know who is really initiating that recall? Slim Pickens didn’t get the word in “Dr. Strangelove,” and that was 60 years ago.
The Pentagon must cut $50B of waste — put this weapon on the chopping block
By Mark Montgomery
Published Feb. 23, 2025, 6:18 a.m. ET
https://nypost.com/2025/02/23/opinion/the-pentagon-must-cut-50b-of-waste-axe-this-weapon-first/?utm
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced plans this week to move up to $50 billion of the Pentagon’s budget from “low-impact and low-priority programs” to ones that align with President Trump’s defense strategy — an excellent first step to get the department ready for the threats America faces from China and other adversaries.
But not even cutting every last DEI program and burdensome administrative process will yield anywhere close to $50 billion.
The only way to find that kind of money is to cut weapons programs that no longer meet America’s needs. And the first item on the chopping block should be the Long-Range Standoff missile, which will cost at least $16 billion over the next 10 years.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth speaks with reporters outside the Pentagon on Jan. 27, 2025.
AFP via Getty Images
The LRSO is a nuclear-capable, air-launched cruise missile intended to be carried by bombers like the B-52, the B-2 and the B-21. The US nuclear arsenal includes a triad of air, land and sea weapons, and the LRSO is part of the air component.
But we may no longer need air-based nuclear weapons at all.
The bedrock of our nuclear arsenal is the land-based arm of the triad, including intercontinental ballistic missiles.
They would deliver a massive retaliatory blow if we detect an inbound Chinese or Russian first strike, making ICBMs the backbone of the Mutually Assured Destruction strategy that has for decades prevented nuclear war.
We also still need the sea-based leg of the triad, which consists of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. No surprise attack could take out these subs, so they guarantee a devastating retaliation even if the enemy somehow destroys our ICBMs.
The sea leg provides what the Pentagon calls second-strike survivability.
So what does the air leg of the triad, including bombers with LRSOs, add to our defense?
Not much.
Even the air leg’s most charitable supporters say its role is to “complement land- and sea-based nuclear forces” and provide a “highly visible means to signal US intent.” Bombers are also different, boosters say, because of their “ability to be recalled.”
Let’s take these justifications individually.
First, the Trump administration’s urgent order to focus on top defense priorities means the Pentagon can’t afford weapons that only provide a “complementary” capability.
Second, there are plenty of ways to “signal” our intent, including bombers carrying conventional weapons, aircraft carriers and subs with SLBMs.
As a commander, I was told numerous times in my career to move nuclear-capable bombers around the strategic chessboard to “affect the adversary” — usually Kim Jong Il in North Korea.
But I never saw a measurable response to the nuclear bomber “signal,” and I suspect crazy does not respond to subtle shifts.
Finally, in today’s environment, a bomber’s ability to be recalled may be an outright liability, as spoofing and jamming of communication systems reach new heights.
Who would know who is really initiating that recall? Slim Pickens didn’t get the word in “Dr. Strangelove,” and that was 60 years ago.
Scrapping the LRSO would generate significant savings: The Congressional Budget Office estimated about $16 billion in development and procurement costs would be avoided over the next 10 years — even if the price of the missile never increases. If it did, there would be even greater savings.
Additionally, nixing the missile would save the Air Force hundreds of millions a year on maintenance and modernization of LRSOs, weapons storage (LRSOs are not kept in the outdoor shed) and crew training.
The opportunity for savings is even greater if the Air Force also gets rid of another component of the triad’s air leg, the gravity-dropped nuclear bomb.
The money saved should not leave the Air Force’s accounts, but should immediately be put to use building and modernizing the Air Force we need to fight China and Russia — transport aircraft, refueling aircraft, conventional munitions and, most importantly, as many B-21s as we can get our hands on.
Those bombers would help us fight and win a conventional campaign against China and Russia. And the better the odds of winning, the better the odds no one attacks us in the first place.
A last warning: Even if Trump and Hegseth get rid of every low-impact, low-priority program in the Pentagon, we still need to spend much more on defense.
The current US defense budget consumes 3% of America’s gross domestic product, nearly the lowest level since the 1930s.
Congress has plans to add up to $150 billion over the next 10 years. But to get defense spending up to 3.4% of GDP — the level at which Trump left it at the end of his first term — we’ll need to add at least $30 billion to $40 billion more each year to Congress’ planned outlay.
Killing the LRSO is just the first step toward the president’s goal of “peace through strength.”
Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is a senior director at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
11. Kim Jong Un says army obedience top priority as troops fight in Russia’s war
Loyalty and ideology purity over tactical proficiency.
Kim Jong Un says army obedience top priority as troops fight in Russia’s war
North Korean leader visits Kim Il Sung University of Politics to check soldier education but doesn’t mention deployment
https://www.nknews.org/2025/02/kim-jong-un-says-army-obedience-top-priority-as-troops-fight-in-russias-war/
Colin Zwirko February 25, 2025
Kim Jong Un wears a tall papakha (Cossack fur cap) while giving a speech at Kim Il Sung University of Politics on Feb. 24 | Image: KCNA (Feb. 25, 2025)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un delivered a speech on soldier obedience at a top military university on Monday, according to state media, alluding to problems that may be affecting troops fighting for Russia against Ukraine but without directly mentioning the deployment.
Kim visited Kim Il Sung University of Politics, located in northern Pyongyang, to celebrate the school’s 80th anniversary, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on Tuesday.
The university is in charge of “making the Korean People’s Army (KPA) ideologically elite,” the report said, producing “competent political workers who constantly imbue the entire army with the red idea of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK).”
Such service personnel are distributed throughout the military in roles as educators and enforcers of Kim Jong Un and the ruling WPK’s directives, teaching and policing soldier ideology and lifestyle rules at bases and on the battlefield in Russia.
Kim said soldiers must be taught total obedience, including to “sacrifice cheerfully if the country calls.”
Kim delivers a speech flanked mostly by CMC members and in front of statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il | Image: KCNA (Feb. 25, 2025) | Location coordinates: 39.10982° N, 125.74109° E
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The DPRK leader takes group photos with staff and students | Image: KCNA (Feb. 25, 2025)
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“Imbuing the army with ideology before arming it with military technology is the core of army building,” he added, suggesting soldiers are ineffective if not properly indoctrinated first.
“From the historical point of view and even looking at modern war, we can clearly see the limitation of the theory of prioritizing military technology while ignoring construction of an army’s ideological foundation.”
North Korea is currently engaged in a modern war, fighting in Russia since late last year to support the country’s invasion of Ukraine.
State media did not publish the full text of Kim’s speech and only offered a summary, which did not include any mention of the KPA’s current war experience.
Two North Korean soldiers captured by Ukraine told South Korean journalists this month about strong discipline among their units in Russia, even as they were misled and thrust into battle without prior warning.
One described lies by military ideological educators that South Korean soldiers were attacking them with drones, as part of apparent efforts to motivate troops.
He added that DPRK soldiers believed the propaganda and that orders by educators like the ones Kim met on Monday included avoiding capture by all means, even suicide.
Kim briefly mentioned the discovery of “some deviations” by military ideology educators in his speech, but KCNA didn’t specify the problems or whether they occurred in North Korea or on the Russian battlefield.
Students at the school learn about attack plans on the South Korean city of Sacheon | Image: KCNA (Feb. 25, 2025)
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Despite the omission, the speech sends a strong message to his generals involved in the Russia deployment to strengthen discipline and education of soldiers in the wake of the captures and interviews to international media.
The KCNA report included photos of Kim touring the university, taking group photos with thousands of students and staff and watching an outdoor soccer match.
Most members of the WPK Central Military Commission (CMC), the country’s exclusive group of military leadership chaired by Kim, joined the leader throughout the visit.
Notably, CMC member Ri Chang Ho, one of the generals reportedly leading troops in Russia, was absent. Ri Pyong Chol also did not appear in photos of the event after an apparent recent demotion.
One photo of a classroom showed soldiers looking at a map of the South Korean city of Sacheon under the title “Political work in mechanized infantry brigade offensive operations.” The city, located on the southern coast, hosts a large air force base.
State media reports on Kim visits to military institutions have frequently included such allusions to attack plans on the ROK in recent years, while completely hiding all references to North Korea’s active war in Europe.
Pyongyang has yet to officially acknowledge its role in the war, even as thousands of soldiers have reportedly died and questions remain over whether their families are notified or bodies repatriated.
Kim Jong Un last publicly visited Kim Il Sung University of Politics in March 2014, though state media only briefly described the visit as it related to him casting his vote in Supreme People’s Assembly elections.
He has made numerous ceremonial visits with speeches to other military establishments in the last year, including the Ministry of National Defense, Kim Jong Un National Defense University, the KPA 2nd Corps, the O Jin U Artillery Academy, the Academy of Defense Science, Kim Il Sung Military University, Kim Jong Il University of Military and Politics and the Seoul Ryu Kyong Su Guards 105th Tank Division headquarters.
Seung-Yeon Chung contributed reporting to this article. Edited by Alannah Hill
12. N. Korea's smartphone "Samtaesung 8" revealed
Have we gotten these smuggled out yet? Are we working on penetrating them? Can we develop software to provide to the Korean people to counter regime electronic surveillance?
N. Korea's smartphone "Samtaesung 8" revealed - Daily NK English
North Korea's latest smartphone pairs dated hardware with enhanced storage and camera features
By Mun Dong Hui -February 24, 2025
dailynk.com · by Mun Dong Hui · February 24, 2025
A new North Korean smartphone reveals both advances and limitations in the nation’s technology development. The Samtaesung 8, recently obtained and analyzed by Daily NK, combines dated processing power with significantly expanded storage capacity and improved cameras.
Released around 2023, the Samtaesung 8 uses a MediaTek (MEDIATEK, Inc.) Application Processor (AP), like most North Korean smartphones. The device features the MT6771V (8-core, 2.1GHz) processor from 2019, which is considered a mid-range processor. This older AP offers somewhat lower performance compared to other smartphones released around 2023.
The Samtaesung 8 comes with 8GB of RAM and 256GB of storage. For comparison, the ‘Pyongyang 2425’ smartphone, which Daily NK obtained in 2019, used the MT6771 processor (8-core, 2.0GHz) with 8GB RAM and 32GB storage. While the Samtaesung 8’s processor and RAM specifications are similar to the years-old Pyongyang 2425, its storage capacity has increased significantly. This may reflect consumer demand for more storage space as high-volume content becomes more prevalent in North Korea.
The Samtaesung 8 also features improved screen and camera capabilities compared to previous models. It sports a 6.5-inch FHD+ display (1080×2340, 480dpi) with slightly curved edges for a sophisticated look, though these curves don’t offer any special functionality.
Images of the Samtaesung 8 Cellphone
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Document showing specifications of the Samtaesung 8 cellphone.
The home screen of the Samtaesung 8 cellphone. The far left image shows the device's specifications, while the center and right-hand images show programs installed on the device.
The camera system includes a 64MP main camera, 8MP ultra-wide, 2MP macro, and 25MP front-facing camera. These specifications are well-suited for video calls, which became widely available with the introduction of 4G services.
The device runs on an Android 11-based operating system (released in 2020) and features a 4000mAh battery.
When checking the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number of the Samtaesung 8 on IMEI.info, it showed the manufacturer as Chinese company “SUGAR” and the model as “S60.” However, the S60 differs from the Samtaesung 8 in both design and specifications.
For context, when Daily NK previously checked the Pyongyang 2425’s IMEI, it showed the manufacturer as China’s GIONEE with model number “2417.” However, this model number didn’t exist in GIONEE’s product lineup, and no smartphone in their range matched the Pyongyang 2425’s design or specifications.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Mun Dong Hui · February 24, 2025
13. DPRK supplying half of Russia’s munitions with more arms to come: Ukraine
The great money maker for Kim Jong un.
14. Cruelty and Arrogance of South Korean Presidents on Display in Seoul Courtrooms
Cruelty and Arrogance of South Korean Presidents on Display in Seoul Courtrooms
DONALD KIRK
Published: Feb. 20, 2025 02:00 PM ETUpdated: Feb. 20, 2025 08:25 PM ET
nysun.com
SEOUL — The blind cruelty of one of South Korea’s former leftist presidents and the rash arrogance of its recently impeached conservative president have been on display in separate courtrooms here.
For cruelty, the decision of the South’s earlier president, Moon Jae-in, to send two North Korean fishermen back to their country after the North claimed they had murdered their 16 mates was evident in the verdict handed out to four one-time top officials in Mr. Moon’s government. More than five years after the two fishermen defected to the South in their boat, the four got prison sentences ranging between six and 10 months for surrendering them to the North Koreans.
A district court acknowledged that the decision to deport the fishermen “was made quickly based on their confessions” — after they were denied legal counsel or the chance to challenge their “confessions,” widely viewed as forced or bogus. Yet the ex-officials won’t go to jail, as the court suspended their sentences, meaning they’ll eventually be exonerated.
The district court implied that the case against the four ex-officials was motivated by the conservative government of President Yoon, Mr. Moon’s successor. Mr. Yoon was impeached by the national assembly in December for declaring martial law. The country’s constitutional court is almost finished reviewing his impeachment, after which the court is to decide whether to approve it and oust him as president. He still faces charges of “insurrection” in a lower court for his martial law decree, which Korea’s Democratic Party, or Minju — to which Mr. Moon belongs — voted down.
For arrogance, the refusal of Mr. Yoon to heed the advice of his prime minister, Han Duck-soo, not to impose martial law was spotlighted as the constitutional court weighed whether to approve his impeachment. Automatically named acting president after Mr. Yoon’s impeachment, Mr. Han lost that post when the assembly impeached him for balking at naming three justices to fill vacancies on the nine-member court. Needing six to oust the president, that court now has eight sitting members.
Mr. Han testified that he had “failed to convince” Mr. Yoon not to impose martial law. “I did not have prior knowledge of the president’s plans and did my best to persuade the president to reconsider,” he insisted. Mr. Han said he “had no part” in ordering troops to surround the assembly before the Minju rounded up the 200 votes needed for the assembly’s 300 members to impeach Mr. Yoon.
The cases of Mr. Yoon and the two North Korean fishermen, though very different, epitomize the deepening left/right fissure in Korean politics and society.
The four ex-officials who conspired to send the two fishermen back to sure torture and death in North Korea at the behest of Mr. Moon were serving as his chief of staff, security adviser, intelligence director, and unification minister.
Mr. Moon at the time still dreamed of achieving North-South Korean reconciliation. Yet after President Trump walked out of his second summit with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, at Hanoi in February 2019, Mr. Kim had no time for Mr. Moon. While Mr. Trump professed to have fallen “in love” with Mr. Kim at their first summit, in Singapore, the North Korean steadfastly refused to give up his nukes.
Mr. Moon and his aides blindly accepted North Korea’s claim that the two fishermen had axed 16 others on the same boat. That claim had to be false, as they could not possibly have killed all 16 muscular men on the boat and then escaped by sea with no signs of a fight.
The quick court case was not uncovered until a photographer happened to see an email. Five days after the fishermen defected, they were photographed being transferred into North Korean custody at the truce village of Panmunjom. One of them was seen kicking and screaming as South Korean guards handed them over.
“The case against them was nothing but a fake,” the leader of mass protests against Mr. Yoon’s impeachment, Reverend Jeon Kwan-hoon, said. He accused the constitutional court’s chief justice of ties to the Minju, while several thousand demonstrators waved Korean and American flags, hefting signs saying, “Stop the Steal” and “Make Korea Great Again.”
nysun.comDPRK supplying half of Russia’s munitions with more arms to come: Ukraine
Kyiv assessed North Korean missiles have shown significant improvements as Australia, New Zealand sanction Moscow
https://www.nknews.org/2025/02/dprk-supplying-half-of-russias-munitions-with-more-arms-to-come-ukraine/
Anton Sokolin February 24, 2025
Cadets of the O Jin U Artillery Academy fire shells at an island in a simulated attack drill | Image: KCNA (Oct. 6, 2024)
North Korea supplies half of the artillery munitions Russia uses against Ukraine and more weapons are on the way, according to an assessment from the chief of Kyiv’s intelligence.
Kyrylo Budanov, the head of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU), said during a press conference marking three years of the war on Sunday that North Korea “satisfies 50%” of all Russia’s “frontline ammunition needs,” adding that Russia is also substantially increasing production of its ammunition like guided aerial bombs and drones.
Ukraine’s top military spy reiterated his previous assessment that the DPRK has already provided 120 units each of 170mm Koksan self-propelled guns and 240-mm multiple rocket launch systems.
“Their instructors help train personnel to operate this equipment,” Budanov added.
Kyrylo Budanov, the head of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, speaking in a press conference on Feb. 23, 2025 | Image: Screengrab from footage by the Office of the President of Ukraine
He also noted that North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles have shown significant improvements in their accuracy since Russia started using them on the battlefield more than a year ago.
“Their initial use demonstrated low accuracy. After that, with the assistance of Russian specialists, modernization work was carried out. Now their accuracy has become fully acceptable for this type of weaponry.”
North Korea is “set to supply 148 such missiles” to Russia this year, according to Budanov, who had reportedly assessed that Moscow already received about the same amount of KN-23s from the DPRK last year.
Speaking of the DPRK troop deployment, he said that about 8,000 North Korean soldiers are “actively operating” in the Kursk region as of the moment after 4,000 of the “initial grouping of 11,800-12,000” were killed and wounded.
“Replacements are being prepared, but they have not yet arrived at the front,” the DIU chief said.
Kyiv now expects 1,500-2000 new North Korean servicemen to replenish “those North Korean military brigades that have lost combat effectiveness,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in a separate press conference the same day.
The president stressed that North Korean soldiers are getting hands-on experience participating in modern warfare, including in using drones and electronic warfare systems, which poses risks for Ukraine’s partners.
Andrii Sybiha, Ukraine’s foreign minister who joined Budanov during the press conference, added that Ukraine’s intelligence indicates North Korea is gaining significant military benefits in exchange for supporting Russia.
“This includes strengthening and improving missile technologies, assistance in expanding North Korea’s defense industry, and, of course, other steps related specifically to combat experience and the growing threats in the region,” Sybiha said.
He also warned that Russia-DPRK military ties pose broader security risks beyond Ukraine and could impact stability in the Indo-Pacific region, while calling for a “firm response” from the international community.
AUSSIES & KIWIS’ FIGHT BACK
In response to the ongoing cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, Australia and New Zealand slapped new sanctions on Russia, targeting its military relations with the DPRK.
Australia announced another round of sanctions targeting Russia and its ally North Korea on Monday, following a similar move by New Zealand.
The new measures include “targeted financial sanctions and travel bans on 70 persons and targeted financial sanctions on 79 entities,” according to a statement by Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.
Canberra’s sanctions also “target persons and entities involved in deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, including the deployment of North Korean troops to the battlefield.”
North Korea’s Missile General Bureau was among targeted entities, while the rest of DPRK designations focused on individuals.
These include Kim Yong Bok, deputy chief of the KPA General Staff who’s reportedly tasked with the DPRK troop deployment to Russia, Ri Chang Ho, chief of the Korean People’s Army Reconnaissance General Bureau, as well as Sin Kum Chol, who heads the DPRK’s “Main Operational Directorate,” according to Australia’s consolidated sanctions list.
Several ministers of Ukraine’s breakaway republics such as Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as occupied regions like Zaporizhzhia and Crimea were designated, along with a number of Belarusian officials and several military units and defense entities, like tank plants and military research centers.
New Zealand’s sanctions, introduced on Feb. 21, target the same North Korean individuals, in addition to Jang Chang Ha, who heads the Missile General Bureau, and Kang Sun Nam, the DPRK’s former defense chief.
The entities list includes the Missile General Bureau and Paekyangsan Shipping, which is “involved in the transport of military equipment from [the] DPRK to Russia,” according to Wellington’s new restrictions.
Similarly, New Zealand targeted TSMRBbank (CMRBank) and its Vice President Valery Nikulin for carrying out “financial activities in [the] Russian occupied territory of Ukraine and with the DPRK,” as well as Russian company Toplivo Bunkering Company and its director Aleksey Vorotnikov.
The bank was sanctioned by the U.S. last September, while the two companies were targeted by the UK in May 2024.
Edited by Alannah Hill
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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