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Quotes of the Day:
"You can discover what your enemy fears most by observing the means he uses to frighten you."
– Eric Hoffer
"Success usually comes to those who are too busy to be looking for it."
– Henry David Thoreau
"People in the long run are going to do more to promote peace than governments."
– Dwight D. Eisenhower
1. The Three Revolutions and the lessons from history
2. U.S., South Korea to start large-scale joint military drills March 9
3. N. Korean media glorify leader Kim as 'greatest man in world' after reelection as party chief
4. S. Korea keeps 'all possibilities' in mind on U.S.-N.K. dialogue during Trump's China visit: Seoul envoy
5. N. Korea discusses draft proposals of 5-yr policy goals at key congress
6. S. Korea, U.S. to stage annual military exercise next month, still in consultation over field training
7. US, South Korea to hold spring drills on countering North Korea from March 9
8. North Korea rolls out red carpet at military parade venue in final prep
9. North Korea scholar Andrei Lankov detained in Latvia before lecture
10.Trump makes no mention of North Korea in State of the Union speech
11. North Korea’s Party Congress continues meetings on next five-year plan
12. Korean Peninsula Update, February 25, 2026
13. Fault Lines Daily Summary - February 24, 2026 (Korea and Beyond)
14. N. Korea hails family that skipped 60th birthday feast as frugality model
15. Editorial: Unprecedented Public Discord in South Korea-US Military
1. The Three Revolutions and the lessons from history
Comment: Important insights from Ms Jihyun Park. Consider this essay as we read the analysis of the 9th Party Congress.
Voices Feb. 24, 2026 / 4:16 PM
The Three Revolutions and the lessons from history
Understanding North Korea's 9th Party Congress.
By Jihyun Park
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/24/perspective-9th-Congress-North-Korea/2141771958114/
Workers' Party of Korea members attend the opening of the 9th Congress of the WPK in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Thursday to review the party's work and outline new strategic goals for the country. Photo by Korean Central News Agency/EPA
Feb. 24 (UPI) -- The author prefers to use the lowercase "n" to challenge the Kim family regime's legitimacy.
On Friday, north Korea began its 9th Party Congress..
On Saturday, Rodong Sinmun published a notable article titled, "Party Congresses that Shine as Watersheds in Our Revolutionary History -- The 2nd Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea."
At first glance, it might seem like a historical sidebar. But the timing is deliberate. The article appeared the day after the Congress began, signaling that the 9th Congress should be read through the lens of revolutionary legitimacy and historical continuity.
Related
Why recall the 2nd Party Congress?
The 2nd Party Congress, held in March 1948, took place under extraordinary circumstances:
• Korea had not yet been formally divided.
• The northern region was under Soviet military occupation.
• A sovereign north Korean state did not yet exist; the Congress was organized by the party, not a national government.
In other words, this was not a governing assembly of a country. It was a political meeting designed to implement Soviet-style control over the northern half of the peninsula.
Yet, today, north Korea calls that Congress "a watershed in the revolutionary and construction process of our country."
The phrasing is deliberate. It emphasizes the party over the state, reminding all that in north Korea, the Party comes first. It labels the 2nd Congress as a socialist transition period, framing it as the first stage of state-building and ideological consolidation.
Historically, the 2nd Congress marked the end of the immediate post-liberation power struggle, preparation for state formation and the first steps toward a socialist system. The word "transition period" is key, It signals not just development, but structural change and a new order.
Signaling a new "transition" today
By invoking that "transition period," the 9th Party Congress hints that north Korea may be entering another structural shift. Possible implications include:
• Policy or ideological adjustments
• Constitutional revision
• Reinterpretation of inter-Korean relations
• Codifying the "two-state theory"
Transition periods, historically and today, are when the party emphasizes unity, leadership consolidation and discipline because the system is most vulnerable to internal turbulence. Reports suggest the party faced internal challenges during the Congress, which may explain the focus on historical continuity.
Linking history to the three revolutions
After invoking the 2nd Congress, the 9th Party Congress reaffirmed the Three Revolutions - ideological, technological, and cultural - first systematized under Kim Jong Il The message has been consistent for decades:
• Ideological revolution: absolute loyalty and revolutionary consciousness
• Technological revolution: modernization of production and industry
• Cultural revolution: transformation of education, norms, and social life
Ideology has always led the agenda. Economic or administrative shortcomings are never just technical. They are always interpreted as ideological.
The revival and reality of the three revolutions
Recently, NK News reported that north Korea held the 5th Conference of Frontrunners of the Three Revolutions in Pyongyang, only six years after the previous gathering. This underscores how the regime continues to emphasize the Three Revolutions as a tool for mobilizing the workforce and reinforcing ideological control.
While the Three Revolutions are framed as modernizing initiatives -- improving productivity, technology and culture -- observers note that their frequent revival may reflect a weakening of ideological control, forcing repeated mobilization to maintain loyalty.
Daily NK also reported that many activities of these teams often serve propaganda purposes more than real technological or cultural progress, highlighting the gap between official rhetoric and practical outcomes.
In short, the Three Revolutions are not just development campaigns. They are mechanisms for enforcing conformity, loyalty and social control, which explains their persistent prominence at every Party Congress.
Unanimity, control and historical framing
During the Congress, Kim Jong Un was confirmed as General Secretary, with unanimous approval of the Politburo and alternate members.
Unanimity in north Korea is not democracy. It is a performative signal of control, not collective agreement. Combined with the historical invocation of the 2nd Congress, it reinforces the lesson:
• Party authority is absolute
• Ideological conformity is paramount
• History is invoked to justify the present
The emphasis on the Three Revolutions, the unanimous leadership elections and the symbolic recall of a "watershed" Congress frames the 9th Congress not as experimentation or reform, but as continuity of authority.
Personal reflection
For anyone who has lived under this system, these patterns are familiar.
History is never neutral. It is a tool of political instruction.
When the Party recalls the 2nd Congress as a revolutionary watershed, it is not celebrating the past. It is shaping the present.
Unanimity is not political consensus. It is survival. And the Three Revolutions are the instruments through which control is maintained, generation after generation.
Conclusion
The 9th Party Congress spoke of development, modernization and ambitious five-year plans. Yet, the deeper, enduring message is clear: The Three Revolutions remain the foundation of governance in north Korea.
Among the Three Revolutions, ideological revolution always comes first. Every initiative in economic construction, technological advancement, or cultural improvement ultimately hinges on the consciousness and mindset of the people.
If production falls short, the problem is not technology, but ideology. If management fails, it is not the organizational structure, but the attitude of the people that is at fault.
In north Korea, revolution is about changing people, and revolutionizing and mobilizing the workforce is the state's core task. Full-scale development requires the people to act in unity, to follow strict discipline, to prioritize ideology above all else and to be cultivated as conscious, committed proletarians.
Although the discourse may appear to focus on economic growth, the true axis of policy remains ideological control. Five-year plans are formulated and executed, but the enduring foundation of governance is still the Three Revolutions.
Even if economic targets are missed, production falls below expectations, or the international environment shifts, the basic mode of governance remains unchanged.
The 9th Party Congress thus serves as a clear declaration: north Korea's political system continues to prioritize ideological conformity and party authority above all else, ensuring the continuity of its authoritarian, long-term rule.
Jihyun Park, a British Korean Conservative politician and regular contributor to the Korea Regional Review, is a north Korean escapee who fled twice from the country -- in 1998, which resulted in a forced repatriation, and in 2008, which was successful. She is a senior fellow for human security at the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy.
2. U.S., South Korea to start large-scale joint military drills March 9
Summary:
The United States and South Korea will conduct the annual Freedom Shield exercise March 9 to 19, featuring computer simulation command post drills and “Warrior Shield” field training. The allies said the exercise will incorporate realistic threats and lessons from recent conflicts to strengthen combined, joint, all-domain readiness and to support a conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control from Washington to Seoul. South Korea aims to complete the transition before POTROK’s term ends in 2030. Seoul is reportedly proposing reduced field training, which Washington has allegedly resisted. UN Command members will participate; the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission will observe.
Comment: Readiness to defend ROK and US national interests should be non-negotiable. Any reduction in readiness results in increased risk and supports Kim Jong Un's assessment that his political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy are creating friction within the alliance that he will seek to exploit to achieve his objectives.
World News Feb. 25, 2026 / 4:11 AM
U.S., South Korea to start large-scale joint military drills March 9
By Thomas Maresca
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/25/korea-Freedom-Shield-joint-military-exercise-March/7961772009775/
Colonel Jang Do-young (L), public affairs director of South Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Colonel Ryan Donald (R), public affairs director of U.S. Forces Korea, pose for a photo during a press briefing on the 2026 Freedom Shield military exercise at the Defense Ministry in Seoul on Wednesday. Pool Photo by Jung Yeon-je/EPA
SEOUL, Feb. 25 (UPI) -- The United States and South Korea will kick off a major joint military exercise next month, both countries announced Wednesday, as they prepare for the transfer of wartime operational control from Washington to Seoul.
The annual springtime Freedom Shield exercise will take place March 9 to 19 and will incorporate "realistic threats, including lessons learned from recent conflicts ... to further strengthen the Alliance's readiness and capabilities through combined, joint, all-domain operations," the militaries said in a joint statement.
"This exercise will also serve as an opportunity to support ongoing preparations for a conditions-based wartime operational transition, consistent with alliance agreement," the statement added.
South Korea is looking to complete the handover of wartime command from the United States before President Lee Jae Myung's five-year term ends in 2030.
Related
The exercise will feature computer simulation-based command post exercises as well as "Warrior Shield" field training, the allies said.
Freedom Shield comes as the Lee administration attempts to improve frayed relations with Pyongyang, which frequently condemns the allies' joint drills as rehearsals for an invasion.
Local media have reported that Seoul is proposing scaling down field training during this year's exercise -- a move that Washington has allegedly resisted.
At the summertime Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises in August, half of the 40 planned field training exercises were rescheduled to later in the year.
"Complex combined exercises often require additional coordination, looking at the scale and sequencing of these events," Col. Ryan Donald, public affairs director of U.S. Forces Korea, said at a press conference Wednesday. "The important thing to remember is Freedom Shield and Warrior Shield will go on this March as a major defensive-oriented exercise."
In addition to U.S. and South Korean forces, personnel from other member countries of the United Nations Command will join the exercise, while the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission will observe to monitor compliance with the Armistice Agreement.
"You'll see U.S., South Korean and United Nations Command member states participating in tough, realistic, demanding training -- and that is the real measure of the alliance," Donald said.
Col. Jang Do-young, public affairs director of South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the press conference that field training exercises were still being coordinated.
He added that March's Freedom Shield will not include scenarios directly related to a North Korean nuclear attack, but would include training for "deterrence of nuclear threats."
Last week, a South Korean lawmaker said that Pyongyang is planning to hold a large-scale military parade to show off its latest weapons at the conclusion of the ongoing Workers' Party Ninth Congress.
3. N. Korean media glorify leader Kim as 'greatest man in world' after reelection as party chief
Comment: Does anyone think they would do otherwise?
Just like the Japanese PM must be the envy of all democratic leaders for her recent election, I am sure Kim Jong Un is the envy of all authoritarian rulers around the world who wish they could have such a propaganda mouthpiece to glorify them.
N. Korean media glorify leader Kim as 'greatest man in world' after reelection as party chief | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 25, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260225002200315?section=nk/nk
SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- North Korean state media on Wednesday launched a glorification campaign for leader Kim Jong-un following his recent reelection to the highest party post, calling him the "greatest man in the world" and describing his leadership as tantamount to a "miracle."
"The entire people across the country were moved by endless excitement and exaltation" over Kim's reelection, said an article carried by the Rodong Sinmun, the most widely read newspaper published by the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK).
At the ongoing party congress, the first since 2021, Kim was reelected as general secretary of the WPK. The congress opened last Thursday to review policy results from the previous congress and set new goals for the next five years.
The newspaper article said "great things," unimaginable achievements even over several centuries, had been attained in the past five years, calling the feat tantamount to "a miracle."
The article lauded "the absolute defense capability," the "construction boom" and regional development as major feats under Kim's leadership.
The newspaper cited a newly constructed greenhouse farm in Sinuiju, a northwestern city ravaged by flooding in 2024, crediting Kim with "three miracles" -- the rescue of flood-affected residents, post-flood recovery and the construction of the greenhouse farm.
The article also emphasized Kim's "people-first" policy, glorifying him as a "great mother of all miracles for the people" and the "greatest men in the world" who, it said, has a strong and particular love for the people.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) attends the ninth congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on Feb. 22, 2026, in this photo from the Korean Central Television the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 25, 2026
4. S. Korea keeps 'all possibilities' in mind on U.S.-N.K. dialogue during Trump's China visit: Seoul envoy
Summary:
South Korea’s ambassador in Washington, Kang Kyung-wha, said Seoul is watching for a possible resumption of U.S. dialogue with north Korea during POTUS’ reported China visit from late next month to early April, keeping “all possibilities” in mind. She said Seoul is weighing factors including the Russia–Ukraine war, U.S.–China relations, and north Korea–China relations. Seoul’s top nuclear envoy, Jeong Yeon-doo, is traveling to Washington for four days to meet senior U.S. officials as north Korea holds its ninth Workers’ Party congress. Kang said U.S. policy is unchanged and Washington will coordinate closely with Seoul.
Comment: Seoul is bracing for surprise diplomacy routed through Beijing, so it is widening its aperture beyond the Peninsula and reading Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang as one moving system (or perhaps the CRInK(-)). Trade pressure is now sharing the same room as deterrence, and that gives Washington leverage but it also gives opponents a seam to widen if there is alliance friction.
(LEAD) S. Korea keeps 'all possibilities' in mind on U.S.-N.K. dialogue during Trump's China visit: Seoul envoy | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · February 25, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260225000251315
(ATTN: ADDS more info in paras 10-14; RECASTS 4th para)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is keeping a close watch on developments related to the possible resumption of dialogue between the United States and North Korea during President Donald Trump's planned visit to China, its top envoy in Washington said Tuesday, noting Seoul is keeping "all possibilities" in mind.
Ambassador Kang Kyung-wha made the remarks during a press meeting, as Trump reportedly plans to visit China from late next month to early April for talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, amid speculation that he could attempt to reengage with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un while in Asia.
"Regarding the possibility of North Korea-U.S. dialogue, we are paying close attention to related developments while keeping all possibilities in mind," Kang said.
"We are monitoring the situation, comprehensively taking into account various factors, including the developments in the Russia-Ukraine war, the relations between the U.S. and China and the relations between North Korea and China," she added.
South Korea's Ambassador to the United States Kang Kyung-wha speaks during a press meeting at the Korea Cultural Center in Washington on Feb. 24, 2026. (Yonhap)
Her remarks came as Seoul's top nuclear envoy, Jeong Yeon-doo, was set to arrive in Washington on Tuesday for a four-day visit for talks with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Allison Hooker and other Washington officials to discuss Korean Peninsula issues.
His visit coincides with the ninth congress of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party, a key political event where the North Korean leader is expected to put forward his regime's policy direction on diplomacy, defense and other key state issues.
The ambassador underscored that South Korea has been communicating with the U.S. National Security Council, the State Department and other agencies in Washington on a regular basis to discuss North Korea-related developments.
"The U.S. has consistently said that there is no change in its policy toward North Korea, and that it will closely communicate (with South Korea) before and after the fact to ensure that there won't be anything that will catch Seoul off guard," Kang said.
Touching on the Trump administration's imposition of a new global tariff, Kang said that her embassy will support efforts to ensure that related consultations between South Korea and the U.S. can take place in an amicable atmosphere.
On Tuesday, the Trump administration began implementing the new temporary 10 percent tariff under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act as part of efforts to replace the sweeping emergency duties that the Supreme Court struck down on Friday. It is expected to raise the rate to 15 percent as Trump has threatened to do so.
"As to the Supreme Court ruling, our government plans to respond in a way that best serves national interests," Kang said.
Along with the Section 122 measure, Washington also plans to conduct trade investigations under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer said are expected to cover "most major trading partners" and address areas of concern, including discrimination against U.S. tech firms and digital goods and services.
Last month, two investors in e-commerce giant Coupang Inc. petitioned the USTR Office to investigate the South Korean government's treatment of the U.S.-listed firm as Coupang has been under investigation over a massive data leak.
Some observers said that the USTR could open a Section 301 inquiry into issues related to South Korea, particularly its regulatory efforts concerning online tech firms.
Regarding tariff refund procedures following the supreme court ruling, the ambassador said that uncertainty remains.
"(We) will have close consultations with (South Korean) companies operating in the U.S. and economic organizations to ensure that correct information (on the refund matter) can be disseminated to Korean enterprises in a timely manner," she said.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · February 25, 2026
5. N. Korea discusses draft proposals of 5-yr policy goals at key congress
Summary:
KCNA reported that north Korea’s ongoing Workers’ Party congress held study and consultative meetings on draft five year plans and goals for major sectors, including national defense and foreign affairs, as well as the economy and party work. KCNA said discussions aimed to ensure scientific accuracy and innovative application of the strategy’s general goals and principles, and included “technical measures” to advance a self supporting economy, capital city construction, and regionally oriented development. Results were submitted to the committee drafting the congress decision, with final directions expected at the closing session. Seoul’s unification minister assessed the congress appears focused on living standards and expressed hope for renewed inter Korean channels and cooperation.
Comment: How many 5 year plans have ever met their goals?
(LEAD) N. Korea discusses draft proposals of 5-yr policy goals at key congress | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 25, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260225000451315?section=nk/nk
(ATTN: UPDATES with Seoul minister's remarks in last 3 paras, photo)
By Park Boram
SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's ongoing party congress discussed five-year plans and goals for key sectors, including national defense and foreign affairs, on the sixth day of the party gathering, state media reported Wednesday.
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, "Study and consultative meetings in various fields," including the economy and party work, were held the previous day at the congress of the Workers' Party of Korea.
Still, the North's state media made no mention of foreign policy as the first party congress in five years nears its conclusion after it opened last Thursday to review policy outcomes from the previous congress and set new goals for the next five years.
Once the new policy directions are finalized, the North is expected to unveil them in the closing session of the congress.
"The consultative meetings ... intensified the discussion on the orientation and plans of the work of different sectors and units," the KCNA said. "(They) discussed in detail the realistic proposals for achieving gradual and qualitative development.
"The discussion focused on ensuring the scientific accuracy and innovative nature in applying the general goal and principle of the five-year strategy," the KCNA also said.
The report said the meetings also discussed "technical measures" for each sector to propel the development of "the self-supporting national economy, the capital city construction and the regional development policy-oriented construction."
"The results of the collective discussion are submitted to the committee for drafting the decision of the Party Congress," it said.
Whether the North will issue a message in response to overtures from Washington and Seoul to resume talks remains a key point of attention, as the upcoming five-year plan is expected to outline policy directions on relations with the United States and South Korea.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) attends the ninth congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on Feb. 22, 2026, in this photo from the Korean Central Television the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Seoul's Unification Minister Chung Dong-young assessed that the North Korean party congress appears to be focusing on developing the economy and improving people's living standards rather than on military or foreign policy issues.
Such a phenomenon "bears a meaningful implication" for the situation on the Korean Peninsula, Chung said during a session of the ministry's advisory panel on inter-Korean unification.
The minister said he expects the two countries to reopen communication channels and resume cooperation to promote peace and mutual growth. "I hope the newly elected North Korean leadership will open a new era of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula."
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young speaks during a session of the ministry's advisory panel on unification on Feb. 25, 2026, in this photo provided by the ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 25, 2026
6. S. Korea, U.S. to stage annual military exercise next month, still in consultation over field training
Summary:
South Korea and the United States will hold the annual Freedom Shield exercise March 9 to 19, including the “Warrior Shield” field training component, to strengthen combined, joint, all-domain readiness and support preparations for a conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) within POTUS Lee Jae Myung’s term ending in 2030. About 18,000 troops are expected, similar to last year. In a rare step, the allies announced the exercise schedule while still consulting on the scope of field training, amid speculation of postponement and reports Seoul proposed minimizing field drills as it pursues dialogue with north Korea, while Washington voiced reservations.
Comment: Recall history. Up until 1993, the largest exercise in the free world was conducted at this exact time in Korea: Team Spirit. Why did we stop Team Spirit? A concession to reduce tensions. Did it work? I think the answer is obvious. Kim Jong Il was alleged to have stated after the Agreed Framework was concluded in October of 1994 that he had duped the US and gotten everything they wanted. He said the regime would never give up its pursuit of its treasured sword, nuclear weapons. Perhaps we should consider that as we consult on continued field training.
(2nd LD) S. Korea, U.S. to stage annual military exercise next month, still in consultation over field training| Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · February 25, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260225003752315
(ATTN: RECASTS, UPDATES throughout with briefing details)
By Kim Hyun-soo
SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- The militaries of South Korea and the United States said Wednesday they will stage their annual joint springtime exercise next month to strengthen their combined defense posture, but they have yet to agree on details of related field training in a rare move.
The Freedom Shield (FS) exercise is scheduled to take place from March 9-19, involving the field training exercise dubbed "Warrior Shield," according to the South's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).
The allies' militaries said the upcoming drills will help further strengthen the alliance's readiness and capabilities through combined, joint, all-domain operations.
"This exercise will also serve as an opportunity to support ongoing preparations for a condition-based wartime operational transition, consistent with alliance agreement," they said in a joint statement.
South Korea is seeking to achieve the "conditions-based" handover of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the U.S. within President Lee Jae Myung's five-year term that ends in 2030.
A JCS official explained some 18,000 troops are expected to take part in this year's FS exercise, a level on par with around 19,000 personnel last year.
But in a rare move, the allies announced the FS exercise plan without reaching an agreement over the scope of field training exercises that will be simultaneously carried out, only saying that they are still in consultation over Warrior Shield.
"The joint drills will be conducted as planned. The field training exercises during the FS period are being closely coordinated between South Korea and the U.S.," Capt. Jang Do-young, the JCS spokesperson said, stressing that the combined drills will be "spread out" to ensure a year-round readiness posture.
But the USFK stressed that the Freedom Shield and the Warrior Shield exercises will be carried out as planned next month.
"The important fact to remember is Freedom Shield and Warrior Shield will go on this March as a major defensive-oriented exercise," Col. Ryan Donald said.
This photo shows an RC-12X Guardrail taking off at the U.S. Army base Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, 60 kilometers south of Seoul, on March 10, 2025, as South Korea and the United States kick off their joint annual military exercise, the Freedom Shield. (Yonhap)
Wednesday's announcement took place amid speculations that it could be postponed due to failure on both sides to settle differences over details of the field training exercises.
Though the allies are still in consultation, the field training exercises are likely to be scaled down this year amid South Korea's efforts to mend ties with North Korea.
"We cannot disclose plans for field trainings, including scope or frequency, as South Korea and the U.S. are still under close coordination on the field training exercises," a JCS official said, adding they hope to finalize talks before the FS exercise kicks off next month.
South Korea had proposed a plan to minimize field training during the FS period this year, but the U.S. reportedly expressed reservations toward Seoul's offer as part of its assets have already arrived on the ground.
Since taking office in June, the Lee administration has taken a series of steps to resume dialogue with North Korea, suspending loudspeaker broadcasts along the border and proposing holding military talks to clarify the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) to lessen tensions.
The allies put off nearly half of some 40 on-field drills during last year's annual Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise last August until the year-end, in what appeared to be the Lee administration's reconciliatory overtures to Pyongyang.
South Korea is seeking to create conditions conducive to the resumption of possible dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump's summit talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping in April.
North Korea has long denounced the Seoul-Washington combined military exercise as rehearsals for invasion, though the allies have said the drills are defensive in nature.
The South Korean and U.S. militaries conduct major combined drills each year featuring computer simulation-based command post exercises, holding the FS exercise in March and the UFS exercise in August.
Based on an all-out war scenario, these drills, which also include on-field training, serve as grounds to assess whether conditions for transfer of wartime OPCON have been met.
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · February 25, 2026
7. US, South Korea to hold spring drills on countering North Korea from March 9
Summary:
The U.S. and South Korea will run the Freedom Shield spring exercise from March 9 to 19, with about 18,000 personnel and linked “Warrior Shield” training. The allies said training will proceed normally despite reports Seoul sought delay or scale-back to aid diplomacy. They framed the drills as supporting conditions-based wartime OPCON transfer, including verifying a future Combined Forces Command’s full operational capability through joint evaluations. The joint statement avoided naming north Korea, stressing the exercise is defensive and responds to regional threats. Officials said they will not simulate a north Korean nuclear attack, but will train to deter DPRK WMD, including nuclear weapons.
Comment: Note the various press interpretations of the press conference statements. Note the differences in statements from both spokesmen and how they are interpreted (specifically on OPCON transition and the FTX)
US, South Korea to hold spring drills on countering North Korea from March 9
Freedom Shield will run for 11 days and involve some 18K personnel, while featuring training on deterring DPRK nukes
Joon Ha Park February 25, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/us-south-korea-to-hold-spring-drills-on-countering-north-korea-from-march-9/
ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesperson Col. Jang Do-young and Col. Ryan Donald, public affairs chief for the Combined Forces Command, United Nations Command and U.S. Forces Korea, following a press conference on plans for Freedom Shield 2026 on Feb. 25, 2026 | Image: NK News
The U.S. and South Korea will hold large-scale springtime military drills on countering North Korean threats from March 9 to 19, the allies announced on Wednesday.
The announcement followed reports that Seoul was pushing to delay or scale back the annual Freedom Shield exercise to support diplomacy with Pyongyang, with the allies stating that training will be “carried out normally.”
During a joint briefing at Seoul’s Defense Ministry, the two sides also framed the annual Freedom Shield exercise as supporting “ongoing preparations” for the conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from Washington to Seoul.
“By incorporating realistic threats, including lessons learned from recent conflicts and challenging security environments, [the drill] will serve as an opportunity to further strengthen the alliance’s readiness and capabilities through combined, joint, all-domain operations,” the two sides said in their announcement.
The allies did not specify the number of field training exercises, but a ROK military official later stated that around 18,000 personnel will take part, calling this similar to previous years.
The last iteration of the springtime exercise was held in March 2025, before the start of the Lee Jae Myung administration. It featured 16 field training exercises, up from 10 in 2024, with 19,000 South Korean personnel participating.
Wednesday’s announcement for the multi-domain drills did not mention North Korea by name, instead emphasizing the exercise is “defensive in nature” and comes in response to “regional security threats.”
Asked by NK News if the drills included scenarios based around a North Korean nuclear attack, spokesmen for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said the drills won’t include such simulations but will feature training on nuclear threats.
“The exercise will focus on deterring the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction, which include nuclear weapons,” USFK spokesman Col. Ryan Donald said.
Under the previous U.S. and South Korean administrations, the allies agreed at a Security Consultative Meeting in Oct. 2024 to incorporate more realistic scenarios into future joint exercises, including potential responses to North Korean nuclear use.
Col. Donald also addressed concerns about the lack of DPRK mentions in the joint statement, observing that the 1953 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty does not name a specific adversary.
The omission of North Korea contrasts with last year’s announcement for the springtime drills, when Seoul’s JCS said the exercises would incorporate realistic scenarios reflecting changes in Pyongyang’s strategy and capabilities, including lessons from Russia-DPRK military cooperation.
Meanwhile, the allies announced that they will also conduct Warrior Shield joint training during the exercise period. The allies described it as “combined training linked to the exercise scenario and essential to the defense of the ROK to enhance training realism and combat readiness.”
Warrior Shield has been part of the allies’ joint field training for years. In 2023, several combined field training exercises, collectively called Warrior Shield FTX, were scheduled across the Korean Peninsula.
ROK President Lee Jae Myung (far right) salutes the troops alongside Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Jin Yong-sung, U.S. Forces Korea Commander Xavier Brunson and ROK Army Chief of Staff General Kim Gyu-ha. | Image: Blue House (Feb. 20, 2026)
OTHER DETAILS
The Freedom Shield exercise is expected to support preparations for the conditions-based transfer of OPCON from the U.S. to South Korea, the officials said.
JCS spokesperson Col. Jang Do-young told reporters Wednesday that the allies will “focus on verifying the future Combined Forces Command’s full operational capability and will conduct joint evaluations with U.S. forces.”
Under the terms of OPCON transfer, a South Korean four-star general would assume leadership of the Combined Forces Command from the United States. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has repeatedly called for a “self-reliant defense,” vowing to complete the long-delayed transfer by 2030.
The decision to carry out the annual drills normally comes after the U.S. and South Korean militaries rescheduled roughly half of their planned outdoor training during Aug. 2025 Ulchi Freedom Shield drills, citing extreme heat.
The delay drove speculation that the goal was to support diplomacy with Pyongyang, a notion dismissed by Seoul’s national security adviser.
U.S. and South Korean forces did not complete all the associated field training until late December.
The allies conduct large-scale, theater-level combined exercises twice a year to rehearse defensive operations in the event of full-scale conflict on the Korean Peninsula, typically holding Freedom Shield in March and Ulchi Freedom Shield in August.
The drills have consistently drawn condemnation from Pyongyang.
In March 2025, the Rodong Sinmun published a foreign ministry statement criticizing the exercises as an “aggressive and confrontational war rehearsal” that risked triggering armed conflict, even through an “accidental” gunshot.
North Korea also denounced the summertime Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises last year, with Defense Minister No Kwang Chol calling the allies “military warmongers” and warning of countermeasures. Leader Kim Jong Un branded the drills a provocation during an inspection of a new warship.
Statements by the leader’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, and a senior general threatened retaliation, with the DPRK military test-firing two upgraded surface-to-air missiles during the drills.
Edited by Bryan Betts
8. North Korea rolls out red carpet at military parade venue in final prep
Summary:
NK Pro analysis of Planet Labs satellite imagery indicates north Korea has begun final preparations at Kim Il Sung Square for a likely military parade tied to the conclusion of the Ninth Party Congress. As of noon Feb. 25, large seating areas were covered in red material consistent with red carpets, folding chairs, and benches seen before past parades; no such red areas appeared Feb. 23, and clouds obscured the square Feb. 24. Reviewing five parades since 2020, NK Pro found seating was installed no more than three days before an event, suggesting a parade could occur between Wednesday and Friday after the congress ends. Imagery also showed 49 marching blocks, implying over 14,000 soldiers.
Comment: Extensive imagery at the link.
North Korea rolls out red carpet at military parade venue in final prep
Red decorations and chairs set up in central Pyongyang, a task typically done within 3 days of parade
Colin Zwirko February 25, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-rolls-out-red-carpet-at-military-parade-venue-in-final-prep/
An aerial view of Kim Il Sung Square at the start of the Jan. 2021 post-congress military parade | Image: KCTV (Jan. 15, 2026)
North Korea has begun setting up central Pyongyang’s military parade venue for an event, according to NK Pro analysis of satellite imagery, suggesting a parade will take place in the coming days to celebrate the end of the ongoing Ninth Party Congress.
Planet Labs imagery shows seating areas at Kim Il Sung Square were covered in red as of noon on Wednesday, likely indicating red carpets, folding chairs and benches for parade attendees have been set up.
The red areas did not appear in an image taken on Monday, but it’s unclear exactly when the activity started as the square was obscured by clouds on Tuesday.
Large areas of Kim Il Sung Square were covered in red material just after noon on Feb. 25, likely carpets and seating | Image: Planet Labs (Feb. 25, 2026)
No clear image was taken on Feb. 24, but the image on Feb. 23 showed no red materials | Image: Planet Labs (Feb. 23, 2026)
This high-resolution image taken on the day of the July 2023 military parade show red carpets, benches and folding chairs in the same spots as the red material today | Image: Planet Labs (July 27, 2023)
NK Pro analysis of imagery around the dates of five military parades held at the same venue since 2020 shows the temporary seating areas have been set up a maximum of three days before the event. There was insufficient imagery for two other parades in that period.
Given that the chairs were set up on either Tuesday or Wednesday, precedent points to a parade between Wednesday and Friday, though a delay is also possible.
This week’s congress almost certainly must conclude first, however. The military parade celebrating the last congress in Jan. 2021 took place two days after it closed.
All eight of North Korea’s military and paramilitary parades since 2020 have taken place in the evening — after dark or around midnight.
This image from the Feb. 2023 military parade shows red carpets, folding chairs and benches set up in front of leader Kim Jong Un’s viewing stand at the front of the square | Image: KCTV (Feb. 9, 2023)
Red carpets lining the sides of the square are typically for rows of ceremonial cannons | Image: KCTV (April 26, 2022)
Red carpets, folding chairs and benches set up in front of the viewing stand for the July 2023 parade | Image: KCTV (July 28, 2023)
Red benches in front of the viewing stand before the April 2022 parade | Image: KCTV (April 26, 2022)
Red carpets, folding chairs and benches set up in front of the viewing stand for the July 2023 parade | Image: KCTV (July 28, 2023)
The Ninth Party Congress appeared close to finalizing the only remaining agenda on Tuesday and the event could wrap up on Wednesday, but state media implied sectoral discussions could continue for another day.
Soldiers have been preparing for the military parade since early November, shortly after a large-scale military parade on Oct. 10.
Imagery has shown troops and civilians making formations referencing the Ninth Party Congress, suggesting it will be held after the congress ends.
Planet Labs imagery showed 49 block formations of soldiers conducting marching practice as recently as Monday. As each block typically contains 288 soldiers, it appears over 14,000 soldiers will participate in the upcoming event.
It’s still unclear what kind of nuclear missiles and other weapon systems will roll through the square as part of the parade, if any. Pyongyang is likely to promote weapons it decided are top priorities at the congress.
49 block formations of soldiers appeared at the mock Kim Il Sung Square inside the Mirim military parade training complex at midday on Feb. 23 | Image: Planet Labs (Feb. 23, 2026), edited by NK Pro
9. North Korea scholar Andrei Lankov detained in Latvia before lecture
Summary:
Andrei Lankov, a Russian and Australian national and Korea specialist, was detained by Latvian police minutes before a public lecture in Riga and expelled to the Estonian border on Feb. 25. Authorities told him the foreign ministry had placed him on a list of undesirable people but gave no public explanation. Lankov, director at Korea Risk Group and frequent NK News contributor, said he suspects the action stems from his measured, sometimes positive, analysis of north Korea. Latvian officials have not commented. Lankov faces a lecture tour in Tallinn next. He previously faced a fine in Russia over ties to an “undesirable” organization.
North Korea scholar Andrei Lankov detained in Latvia before lecture
Russian and Australian national confirms he was deported, suggesting it's related to his views on DPRK issues
Anton Sokolin February 25, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/north-korea-scholar-andrei-lankov-detained-in-latvia-before-lecture/
Andrei Lankov in Estonia on Feb. 25, 2026 | Image: @a_lankov via Telegram
North Korea scholar Andrei Lankov was detained in Latvia and expelled from the country on Tuesday, just before the start of a public lecture in Riga.
Lankov, a Russian and Australian national, confirmed his detention to NK News.
“About thirty minutes before the event, police and immigration came and told me that the foreign ministry of Latvia included me on its list of undesirable people,” he said.
Lankov is a long-time contributor to NK News and serves as a director of Korea Risk Group, the parent company of NK News and NK Pro.
The scholar said police officers took him to an immigration office. He was then placed in a car that took him to the border with Estonia and expelled from the country.
While Latvian authorities haven’t clarified the reason for Lankov’s deportation, the scholar suggested it may be related to his views on North Korea.
“I believe they see my writing style as excessively objective and they see it as a problem,” he said. “I say positive things about North Korea sometimes, and when negative, not in a hysterical style.”
An advertisement for Andrei Lankov’s lecture on North Korean elites in Riga on Feb. 24, 2026 | Image: Screegrab from Afishamira.ru
Lankov clarified on his Telegram that he was “permanently expelled from Latvia,” with authorities failing to present any explanation of the reasons for this action to him and his lawyers.
The Russian Anti-War Committee later cited Lankov’s lawyer as stating that Latvia blacklisted him on Friday. It said the designation didn’t prevent him from entering the country.
“Overall everything is fairly clear. The authorities do not like the fact that I refuse to turn real-life situations into politically convenient caricatures,” he stated in a post.
Latvian authorities did not immediately respond to NK News’ request for comment.
A professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, Lankov announced a lecture tour in Europe several days ago on his Telegram channel. His next event is scheduled for Wednesday in the Estonian capital of Tallinn.
The Korea specialist previously faced a fine in Russia over his “activities” in an “undesirable organization.” While Russian authorities did not specify the organization, media reports suggested the fine pertained to Lankov’s work with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a U.S.-based think tank.
In his most recent column for NK News, Lankov wrote that North Korea’s position is now more secure thanks to Russian and Chinese support, suggesting the world must abandon the “long-obsolete pipe dream of denuclearization.”
Chad O’Carroll contributed reporting to this story. Edited by Bryan Betts
Updated at 11:25 p.m. KST on Feb. 25 with additional details
10. Trump makes no mention of North Korea in State of the Union speech
Summary:
POTUS made no mention of north Korea in his first State of the Union address since returning to office, despite earlier signals of interest in meeting Kim Jong Un. The 108-minute speech focused on economic achievements, border issues, and conflicts abroad, including a pledge that the U.S. will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. Mason Richey said the omission highlights that north Korea is not a current priority, in part because Pyongyang is not interested and prospects for a positive summit outcome are limited. Richey also said the White House’s December National Security Strategy made no mention of north Korea. South Korean officials are urged to plan scenarios rather than press talks now.
Comment: Was he expected to? Why would he make mention of it? I don't think this is news, except that news organizations make news out of it.
Trump makes no mention of North Korea in State of the Union speech
US president’s neglect of issue reflects limited chances of success from talks, expert says
Jooheon Kim February 25, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/trump-makes-no-mention-of-north-korea-in-state-of-the-union-speech/
President Donald Trump delivers his State of the Union address in Washington. | Image: Screenshot from the White House's official YouTube channel (Feb. 24, 2026)
President Donald Trump did not mention North Korea in his first State of the Union address since returning to office on Tuesday, despite previously signaling his interest in meeting Kim Jong Un to restart dialogue.
Trump’s speech to Congress focused on his administration’s economic achievements, domestic border issues and international conflicts, namely how the U.S. will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.
But the DPRK was absent from Trump’s 108-minute speech.
“I think that obviously just underlines how North Korea is not currently a priority for the Trump administration,” said Mason Richey, a professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. “One reason for that is North Korea is not interested. And another reason is probably the chances of something positive coming out of a meeting is very limited.”
The sentiment is also reflected in the White House’s latest National Security Strategy released December, Richey told NK News, which made no mention of North Korea for the first time since the post-Cold War era.
He noted that the DPRK may not be inclined to engage with the U.S., considering how Pyongyang has not yet released any statements directed at Washington during its ongoing Ninth Party Congress.
While State of the Union addresses typically focus on domestic issues, Trump mentioned Kim during his 2019 address, when he claimed the U.S. and North Korea would be in a “major war” that could have killed “millions” if he was not elected president.
“Much work remains to be done, but my relationship with Kim Jong Un is a good one,” Trump said at the time.
President Joe Biden did not mention North Korea in his State of the Union speech in 2022, marking the first time the annual congressional address had omitted any reference to the country or Korean War veterans since 2016. His remarks on foreign policy were primarily devoted to the Ukraine war.
Min Tae-eun, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, told NK News that Trump’s previous remarks were made during an era when the two sides appeared to be mending their relationship.
She emphasized that the U.S. is currently preoccupied with domestic matters, such as tariffs, suggesting that Seoul’s efforts to get Trump to advance North Korea talks are unlikely to bear fruit.
“South Korea would be better off preparing measures and considering various scenarios so it can act when the time is right, rather than raising the issue now,” she added.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has urged Trump to assume a role as a “peacemaker” in diplomacy with Pyongyang and likened himself as the “pacemaker” in potential talks.
The U.S. president did not meet his North Korean counterpart during a visit to the peninsula in October, but he said at the time that he would “come back soon” for talks with Kim Jong Un.
Richey said Trump could bring up the DPRK issue during his visit to China to meet Xi Jinping in late March to early April.
While Trump didn’t mention North Korea, he did award the Medal of Honor on Tuesday to E. Royce Williams, a former Navy captain who shot down four Soviet MiG-15s during the Korean War.
Edited by David Choi
11. North Korea’s Party Congress continues meetings on next five-year plan
Summary:
north Korea’s 9th Party Congress continued sector-level meetings on Tuesday, the sixth day, with KCNA indicating discussions may extend into Wednesday. KCNA said cadres intensified debate on sector plans tied to a new five-year strategy already presented, drawing on Kim Jong Un’s policy review speeches on days two and three, other officials’ speeches on day four, and Kim’s “concluding” speech on day five. State media did not report Kim present on day six. KCNA offered only broad themes, such as technical upgrading and modernization and long-term development plans, and said results are being submitted to a drafting committee. The congress began Feb. 19 and has already passed resolutions on revising party rules and electing a new central leadership body.
Comment: Day 7. Recall the saying: "Any problem can be made insoluble if enough meetings are held to discuss it."
North Korea’s Party Congress continues meetings on next five-year plan
Leader Kim Jong Un not reported present on day 6 as state media suggests sectoral meetings will carry over to day 7
Colin Zwirko February 25, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/north-koreas-party-congress-continues-meetings-on-next-five-year-plan/
A sectoral meeting at the Ninth Party Congress | Image: KCTV (Feb. 24, 2026)
North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress continued sector-level meetings on the sixth day of proceedings on Tuesday, according to state media, while suggesting these may carry into Wednesday amid questions over when the event will conclude.
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that party cadres “intensified the discussion on the orientation and plans of the work of different sectors and units,” including a new “five-year strategy” that was already “presented” earlier.
The discussions are based on Kim Jong Un’s “historic” policy review speeches given on days two and three, speeches by other officials on day four, and the leader’s “concluding” speech on day five. State media did not mention Kim’s presence at Tuesday’s meetings.
KCNA remained vague about specific topics, referring instead to broad plans on the “technical upgrading and modernization of major establishments of important significance,” as well as “scientific and reasonable plans guaranteeing the long-term development of different sectors and units, rather than immediate gains.”
“The results of the collective discussion [at the sectoral meetings] are being submitted to the committee for drafting the decision of the Party Congress,” KCNA added, pointing to continuing discussions.
The full congress could reconvene at the main venue to pass the resolution decided by the drafting committee later on Wednesday, or perhaps a day or two later, after wrapping up the sectoral meetings.
The current proceedings are part of the first of three official agenda items of the Ninth Party Congress, “reviewing of the work of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee.” The congress already passed resolutions on Sunday finalizing agendas two and three on revising party rules and electing a new central leadership body.
State media has not revealed a definite schedule for the event, which started on Feb. 19 at the April 25 House of Culture in Pyongyang.
Unlike during the Eighth Party Congress in Jan. 2021, Pyongyang has yet to reveal many details about Kim’s review and outlook, or the new five-year strategy. State media published such details before the sectoral meetings at the last congress.
Given Kim has already delivered his review and conclusion speeches at this congress, it’s unclear if and when state media will provide more detailed information about North Korea’s plans for foreign policy, weapons development and other important areas.
The change in format for this congress follows a shift to more secretive state media coverage of party plenums in recent years.
It’s possible KCNA could publish a detailed summary of the finalized resolution on the first agenda, or Kim could deliver another kind of speech on the final day, called something different than a “conclusion” (결론).
Party cadres split into at least 10 sectoral meetings starting on Monday. Photos and brief video footage released by state media on Tuesday showed top officials leading talks on heavy industry, light industry, the munitions industry, the military, foreign affairs, agriculture, construction, culture, law and party organizational matters.
Edited by Bryan Betts
12. Korean Peninsula Update, February 25, 2026
Korean Peninsula Update, February 25, 2026
Researchers
Korea Research Assistant
China Researcher
China Researcher
Toplines
The Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) opened the 9th Party Congress with a focus on economic development and external security on February 19. The removal of key senior officials from the Central Committee reflects WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un’s ongoing consolidation of power. Kim Jong Un delivered an opening speech, framing the past five years as successful despite challenges. Kim said that “hostile forces” grew more reckless in enforcing sanctions against North Korea, which hindered its economic development and threatened national security.[1] Kim also claimed that North Korea “irreversibly” strengthened its external-facing position and the geopolitical landscape created “favorable” conditions for its socialist system. Kim vowed to prioritize economic construction, improving livelihoods, and social transformation through his “new era” development policy and rural revolution program.[2]
Kim vowed to reorganize WPK leadership ostensibly to improve party competency. He criticized defeatism, irresponsibility, and immaturity in leadership ability among unspecified WPK officials. The WPK proceeded to elect 39 members to the executive board of the 9th Congress, replacing 23 members from the last congress. Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly Choe Ryong Hae, along with WPK secretaries Jo Yong Won, Ri Il Hwan, and Pak Jong Chun, retained their seats from the previous congress.[3] The reshuffle removed officials associated with inter-Korean affairs and unification policy, including former United Front Department Director Kim Yong Chol and Ri Son Kwon. North Korean state media reported that the participants reviewed work of the 8th Central Committee for the first three days of the congress and declared that the five-year plans set by the 8th Party Congress were successfully completed across all sectors. It added that the congress adopted revised rules to strengthen the authority and operational systems of WPK central leadership bodies but did not list the revisions.[4]
The 9th Party Congress on February 22 re-elected Kim Jong Un as the WPK General Secretary and elected members and alternate members of the 9th WPK Central Committee.[5] The new Central Committee —comprised of 139 full members and 111 alternate members — observed a replacement rate of 51.6 percent.[6] The WPK reappointed or promoted most full members. Approximately 76.6 percent of alternate members were newly elected.[7] The Kim regime appears to have targeted cabinet economic officials overseeing priority sectors, including coal, shipbuilding, fisheries, maritime transport, and chemicals, for replacement.[8] The 9th Central Committee did not re-elect senior figures, such as Choe Ryong Hae, Ri Pyong Chol, and Pak Jong Chun.[9]
Kim Jong Un appears to be using the 9th Party Congress to consolidate his authority independent of Kim Il Sung-era legacies and accelerating generational transition toward younger technocrats. Kim Jong Un has long relied on second-generation descendants of Kim Il Sung-era “revolutionary” figures to bolster his legitimacy.[10] Choe Ryong Hae, the son of former Korean People’s Army (KPA) Minister Choe Hyon who fought Japan alongside Kim Il Sung, served as a key stabilizing figure early in Kim’s rule. Choe’s removal — alongside other senior leaders — signals Kim Jong Un’s overall confidence in his governing base. ISW-CDOT previously assessed that Kim Jong Un systematically weakened Choe’s political network to manage the influence of competing factions.[11] The assessment is consistent with the active membership of Deputy Chief of the WPK Secretariat Jo Yong Won, considered Choe’s rival, in the 9th Central Committee. The high turnover among alternate members likely reflects efforts to elevate younger technocrats and accelerate the implementation of signature policy initiatives, such as the “12 major priority goals” over food, energy, and industrial material production and the “20×10 Regional Development Plan.”[12] North Korea has not yet clarified its policies regarding inter-Korean relations or the United States. The removal of Kim Yong Chol and Ri Song Kwon suggests continued adherence to a hostile two-state framework, however.
North Korea is likely trying to improve its ability to penetrate South Korea’s integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) network with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). That capability could enhance North Korea’s nuclear deterrent and provide the KPA with more vectors for precision fires in a wartime scenario. North Korea presented 50 600mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) capable of firing SRBMs during a February 18 ceremony to the KPA and Kim Jong Un.[13] Kim claimed in his speech at the ceremony that the missile platform used artificial intelligence (AI) and a “compound targeting system” to enhance accuracy and could carry a nuclear warhead.[14] North Korean state media claimed the system is an upgraded version of the 600mm MLRS system first tested in 2019.[15] The most recent variant features five launch tubes and a wheeled chassis, whereas the previous variant had six launch tubes on a tracked chassis.[16] A wheeled chassis likely improves the system’s road-based maneuverability over the tracked variant.
The most recent variant of the 600mm MLRS may provide the KPA with a precision-strike capability that is resilient against South Korea’s IAMD network. The KPA tested the system on January 27 firing two rockets at ranges of 340 km and 350 km, respectively.[17] The tests revealed the missile’s apogee to be 80 km, comparatively low for a ballistic missile.[18] A low missile apogee could allow the projectile to avoid South Korea‘s and the United States Forces Korea (USFK)’s long-range interceptors, designed to target ballistic missiles at higher altitudes.[19] North Korea has also demonstrated the capability to produce missiles with a quasi-ballistic trajectory, meaning they can alter their path during the missile’s flight and increase the difficulty of successful intercept.[20] South Korean military experts also speculated that North Korean state media’s emphasis on the missile’s autonomy indicated it was resistant to soft-kill methods like jamming.[21] ISW-CDOT cannot independently confirm whether the new missile system features these capabilities, however.
ISW-CDOT previously assessed that North Korea’s 2021–2025 defense modernization plan emphasized “miniaturization” of nuclear weapons with diversified launch platforms to enhance the survivability of its nuclear deterrent.[22] Deploying tactical nuclear weapons with these systems would help to achieve this goal due to the high mobility of the launch platform and the ability to disperse several launchers across a wide area.
It is unlikely that most of these systems will deploy nuclear warheads due to limitations in North Korean fissile material, indicating these systems will primarily contribute to conventional military operations.[23] The US think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggested that the missile system has a maximum range of 380 km.[24] This would allow the system to target most of the Korean Peninsula if launched close to the DMZ. The missile’s range and survivability, if accurate, would allow the KPA to strike targets of strategic or operational significance behind the frontline, such as South Korean political centers, logistics hubs, command and control (C2) nodes, or USFK basing infrastructure. It is not clear whether North Korea can produce munitions with the high precision needed to execute these missions effectively, however.
ISW-CDOT has reported that Kim showcases high-end military equipment to suggest that North Korea can defend itself independently.[25] Kim is likely using the new variant of the 600mm MLRS similarly, particularly ahead of the WPK’s 9th Party Congress, both to illustrate North Korean military proficiency and their ability to scale production of these systems.
Vice Department Director of the WPK Central Committee Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un, welcomed South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young’s acknowledgment of South Korean drone incursions.[26] The Lee Jae Myung administration is likely to push to formalize inter-Korean dialogue channels despite likely North Korean disinterest. Chung said on February 18 that the Ministry of Unification (MOU) would pursue a series of legal amendments to prevent the recurrence of civilian drone incursions into North Korea, including codifying penalties under the Aviation Safety Act and banning drone incursions under the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act.[27] Chung also announced plans for the MOU to restore the “9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement,” focusing on reinstating no-fly zones near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Pyongyang and Seoul established the 9.19 Military Agreement in 2018 to reduce military tensions. North Korea unilaterally terminated the agreement in 2023, and the South Korean government suspended it in 2024 in response to North Korea’s repeated violations of its terms.[28] North Korean state media reported on February 19 that Kim Yo Jong issued a response to the MOU measures, stating that she “highly regards” Chung for “expressing regret” and showing “willingness to prevent recurrence” of the drone incursions.[29] Kim warned, however, of “terrible consequences” if airspace violations continue and urged South Korea to adopt preventive steps.[30] The exchange came after South Korean nationals allegedly flew small commercial drones equipped with recording devices into various areas of North Korea from September 2025 to January 2026.[31]
A series of MOU statements and measures aimed at reducing unintended inter-Korean conflicts reflects the Lee administration’s broader efforts under the “peaceful coexistence” policy.[32] The policy prioritizes lowering military risks on the Korean Peninsula, consistent with Lee’s focus on economic stability over end-state goals such as unification. Lee’s approach also seeks to encourage North Korea’s return to dialogue by signaling a reversal from the Yoon administration’s pressure-focused policy. The MOU likely views exchanges as meaningful steps towards normalizing inter-Korean communications, which were severed in 2022.[33] The Lee administration is likely to accelerate efforts to convert the exchanges into a more formalized dialogue channel.
The likelihood of North Korea opening communications with the Lee administration remains low, however. Kim’s February 19 statement did not indicate any shift from North Korea’s hostile two-state framework, instead reiterating themes of North Korean sovereignty and the separation of the two Koreas.[34]
Key Takeaways
-
North Korean politics: The WPK opened the 9th Party Congress with a focus on economic development and external security. The WPK removed key figures from its Central Committee as part of Kim Jong Un’s ongoing consolidation of power.
-
North Korea military modernization: North Korea is likely trying to improve its ability to penetrate the South Korean IAMD with SRBMs. That capability could enhance its nuclear deterrent and provide it with more vectors for precision fire.
-
Inter-Korean relations: The WPK welcomed South Korea’s acknowledgment of recent civilian drone incursions along the DMZ. The Lee administration may respond by further pursuing inter-Korean dialogue, though Pyongyang remains unlikely to respond positively.
North Korean Domestic Politics
See toplines.
North Korean Military Developments
See toplines.
North Korean Foreign Relations
North Korea hosted a Lunar New Year gathering for People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ambassador Wang Yajun and other officials from the PRC Embassy in Pyongyang at the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Area on February 15.[35] North Korean Director of the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Area Administration Kim Yong-deok told the PRC officials that the site serves to promote tourism in North Korea and that Pyongyang looks forward to exchanges and cooperation with “relevant Chinese departments.”[36] Wang said that the site would attract more domestic and international tourists, “including those from China.”[37] Wang also expressed hopes that the resort area would help promote bilateral cooperation in tourism.[38] This marks the first visit by the PRC officials to the Wonsan-Kalma Tourist Area, a 2.5-mile-long beach resort opened in July 2025.[39]
North Korea closed its borders from 2019 to 2024 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. North Korea allowed Russian tourists in 2024 and began receiving visitors from the PRC, Australia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in February 2025, but the regime suspended non-Russian tourism after 14 days for unspecified reasons.[40] PRC tourism has not yet resumed. PRC tourism to North Korea reached its peak in 2018 with around 200,000 visitors.[41] Seoul-based media outlet NK News estimated that North Korea generated around 175 million US dollars in revenue through PRC tourism in 2019.[42]
North Korea’s decision to host PRC Embassy officials at its foreign tourism zone may indicate its intention to resume tourism and attract PRC tourists. North Korea also reportedly featured the Wonsan-Kalma Tourist Area in a 2026 calendar issued to PRC tourists in December 2025, months after halting foreign entry in February 2025, suggesting the suspension may be temporary.[43]
Potential tourism resumption for PRC nationals would provide North Korea with additional sources of foreign currency without being subject to international sanctions enforcement. North Korea has notably increased the trip cost from around 500 US dollars in 2020 to between 1,350 US dollars and 1,800 US dollars in 2025. North Korea may exceed its 2019 estimate of 175 million US dollars if PRC tourism recovers to pre-pandemic levels.[44] North Korea’s foreign currency reserves currently come from arms sales and troop deployments to Russia, cryptocurrency theft, and operations involving overseas IT workers.[45] North Korea’s high trade deficit with the PRC, however, approximately 24 to 31 billion US dollars and nearly six to eight percent of North Korea’s GDP, requires a significant volume of foreign currency injection.[46] Potential earnings from foreign tourism could partially offset trade deficits and strengthen the regime’s resilience against sanctions.
North Korean Influence Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Inter-Korean Relations
North Korea’s minor political parties, which have primarily functioned as inter-Korean communication channels, have disappeared from public view since 2024. This development aligns with North Korea’s broader effort to disband organizations associated with unification and South Korean affairs to consolidate its hostile two-state policy. North Korean state media did not report on the 80th founding anniversary of the Chondoist Chongu Party on February 8, in contrast to its coverage of the party’s 60th and 70th anniversaries.[47] The chairman of the Chondoist Chongdu Party has customarily delivered remarks at North Korea’s annual Gaecheonjeol holiday event, which celebrates the founding of Korea’s first kingdom. The director of the WPK National Heritage Protection Bureau assumed that role in 2024.[48] North Korean state media has also not mentioned the Korean Social Democratic Party since November 2023.[49]
North Korea established these minor parties in the 1940s to support its claim of operating under a multi-party system. They functioned less as political counterparts to the WPK and more as instruments of a united front strategy targeting South Korea, however. [50] The Chondoist Chongu Party played a central role in advancing North Korea’s unification proposal, known as “the Confederal Republic of Koryo” and in cultivating pro-confederal factions within South Korea.[51] The Korean Social Democratic Party has similarly conducted pro-unification activities, including cultivating relations with influence networks in South Korea.[52] Both parties historically served as counterparts to South Korean political parties, civil society groups, and religious organizations during inter-Korean exchanges.
The disappearance of these parties indicates that North Korea is unlikely to reverse its abandonment of unification or resume inter-Korean dialogue in the near term. WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un declared a hostile two-state framework in 2023 following the collapse of diplomacy with the United States during the Singapore and Hanoi summits and amid deteriorating inter-Korean relations under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. North Korea disbanded key state agencies responsible for inter-Korean and unification affairs between 2023 and 2025, including the WPK United Front Department, the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country, the National Reconciliation Council, the North Side Committee for Implementing the June 15 Joint Declaration, and the Korea-Asia Pacific Peace Committee.[53] ISW-CDOT cannot confirm whether North Korea has dissolved these minor parties; however, upcoming personnel appointments at the ongoing 9th Party Congress may clarify their status.
South Korean Domestic Politics
South Korean conservative candidates may struggle to attract moderate voters ahead of the June 3 local elections, as opposition People Power Party (PPP) leadership continues its pro-Yoon positioning. Ruling Democratic Party (DP) victories in key local races would benefit the Lee administration. South Korea’s Seoul Central District Court on February 19 sentenced former South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol to life in prison for leading an insurrection by declaring martial law. [54] The court ruled that Yoon aimed to paralyze the National Assembly by sending troops to block the site and arrest key politicians, acknowledging that Yoon “staged a riot by sending the military.”[55] Yoon, following the ruling, said on February 20 that the judiciary’s independence is questionable, making appeals meaningless.[56] Yoon declared martial law on December 3, 2024, citing the need to eradicate anti-state forces, referring to the then opposition-controlled National Assembly’s attempts to block state budget proposals and impeach Yoon government officials. The National Assembly lifted martial law six hours after Yoon’s declaration.
Leader of the PPP Jang Dong-hyuk said on February 20 that the ruling failed to provide sufficient grounds to overturn the PPP’s position that “martial law is not an insurrection.”[57] Jang instead likened the then-opposition DP’s actions to insurrection, claiming that the DP had effectively provoked Yoon to declare martial law by paralyzing the executive branch.[58] Jang’s statement did not appear to reflect the PPP’s official sentiment, as other PPP lawmakers issued statements calling for Jang to reverse his position or resign.[59]
Jang has relied on pro-Yoon supporters to maintain control of party leadership, which may complicate efforts to broaden the PPP’s appeal among moderates who largely accept the court’s ruling, ahead of the June 3 local elections.[60] PPP support hovered between 22 and 25 percent, compared with over 40 percent for the ruling Democratic Party (DP) in February.[61] A separate survey showed that about 44 percent of respondents preferred the DP to win more seats in the local elections, while 32 percent favored the PPP.[62] South Korea holds local elections every four years to elect provincial governors, mayors, county heads, local council members, and superintendents of education. Potential DP wins over Seoul and Busan mayor races, in particular, would support the Lee administration’s policy stability.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s approval ratings continued their consistent upward trend over the last four weeks. Realmeter announced that Lee’s approval rating reached 58.2 percent in the third week of February, a 1.7 percent increase.[63] Realmeter attributed this week’s ratings increase to the recent Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) boom and popular economic policies such as mortgage regulations for multi-homeowners.[64] The KOPSI index reached 5,931.86 points as of February 23, compared to 2,877.28 points on Lee’s June 4, 2025 inauguration day.[65] Realmeter further stated that people in their 40s and residents of the Seoul metropolitan area, who are highly sensitive to the real estate market, contributed to this increase.[66] Lee’s approval rating will likely keep climbing as long as the economic boom continues. Gallup did not conduct a survey this week due to the Lunar New Year holidays.
Counter-North Korean Coalition Building Efforts
An international anti-money laundering body warned the international community about North Korea’s illicit revenue-generating activities on February 13. Russia’s and the PRC’s obstruction of sanctions enforcement continues to enable North Korea to expand cryptocurrency-focused financial theft. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a multilateral standard-setting body for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, blacklisted North Korea, Iran, and Myanmar on February 13.[67] The FATF cited concerns over North Korea’s “continued failure” to address deficiencies related to money laundering, terrorist financing, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation financing.[68] The FATF recommended that all countries terminate correspondent banking relations with North Korean banks, close overseas subsidiaries or branches of North Korean financial institutions, and limit business relationships and financial transactions involving North Korean nationals.[69] The FATF highlighted North Korea’s use of front companies, shell entities, joint ventures, and opaque ownership structures to evade sanctions, adding that the termination of the UN 1718 Committee Panel of Experts (PoE) mandate has weakened the international community’s ability to gather information and assess North Korea’s illicit financing networks.[70] The PoE mandate expired in March 2024 after Russia vetoed its extension and the PRC abstained.[71]
The FATF’s call for enhanced due diligence comes amid weakening sanctions enforcement. Russia’s and PRC’s dismantling of the PoE undermined multilateral investigative capacity at a time when North Korea is actively exploiting under-regulated digital asset platforms. Reports indicate that North Korea stole a record-high 2.02 billion US dollars in cryptocurrency in 2025, a 51 percent increase from 2024, accounting for 76 percent of global cryptocurrency exchange compromises that year.[72] North Korea will likely continue to exploit the decentralized and pseudonymous nature of digital assets, combined with facilitators’ evolving obfuscation techniques that make financial tracing difficult, to launder funds and support its WMD programs. FATF’s recommendations would require coordinated multilateral investigation efforts and closer cooperation with private sector financial and blockchain firms. The United States, South Korea, and Japan have already expanded their collaboration to disrupt North Korean cryptocurrency theft and recover stolen assets.[73]
13. Fault Lines Daily Summary - February 24, 2026 (Korea and Beyond)
Fault Lines Daily Summary - February 24, 2026
Daily news and analysis tracking the cracks and shifts at the fault lines of global power — with Korea at the epicenter.
George Hutchinson
Feb 25, 2026
https://hutchinsong.substack.com/p/fault-lines-daily-summary-february-c58?utm
Surface Scan
The most consequential development over the past 48 hours is the redistribution—not reduction—of U.S. tariff pressure on South Korea, as legal constraints on one trade tool give way to alternative statutory authorities that preserve Washington’s leverage. At the same time, visible coordination strain in the U.S.–ROK alliance—from trilateral drills to DMZ airspace discussions—has unfolded in public view, even as Pyongyang uses its party congress to project continuity and centralized control. Regionally, China and Russia are reinforcing alignment with North Korea while economic and security competition intensifies between Beijing and Tokyo. Globally, Washington’s guarded engagement with China, renewed Iran escalation risks, and the institutionalization of the Ukraine war are tightening the broader operating environment around Seoul. Across trade, security, and diplomacy, South Korea is managing simultaneous pressures whose drivers increasingly originate beyond its direct control.
Epicenter
Summary:
• Seoul faces renewed U.S. tariff pressure despite court ruling blocking Trump’s original trade measures. The U.S. Supreme Court’s invalidation of Trump’s reciprocal tariffs has not stabilized South Korea’s trade outlook so much as pushed it into a more fluid and potentially more coercive phase, where legal constraints on one tool are offset by rapid activation of others. Trump has already pivoted to temporary global tariffs under Section 122 while warning of “much higher” duties for countries that “play games,” signaling that tariff leverage over allies will persist through alternative statutory authorities rather than retreat. New Section 301 investigations now loom as the primary enforcement channel—allowing targeted penalties tied to alleged non-tariff barriers, digital regulations, agricultural measures, or data policies—while existing Section 232 tariffs on autos and steel remain in place, ensuring Korea stays exposed even if some sectors appear relatively insulated. Seoul’s response has been cautious but forward-leaning: the government plans to proceed with pledged U.S. investments and maintain close consultations to preserve export conditions, while economic officials have launched round-the-clock monitoring and emergency coordination to guard against volatility if Washington escalates. Domestically, the tariff shock has triggered partisan friction over how to respond, reflecting widening concern about how much leverage Seoul retains as U.S. trade policy grows more discretionary. Analysts warn the court ruling removes one legal foundation but not the broader tariff strategy and may instead encourage more selective and unpredictable measures to sustain pressure and revenue. For Seoul, this marks a shift from negotiating against a single sweeping tariff doctrine to managing an evolving enforcement environment in which allies remain subject to continuing U.S. leverage and long-term resilience increasingly depends on technological competitiveness and economic strength.
Sources: Yonhap News Agency — (3rd LD) Trump warns of 'much higher' tariffs for countries that want to 'play games'; KBS World — S. Korea to Proceed with Pledged US Investments despite Ruling Against Trump’s Tariffs; Korea JoongAng Daily — Trump's Section 301 threat looms over Korea, but chips and autos seen largely insulated; Korea JoongAng Daily — Korea 'not making predictions' as Trump unsheathes new trade war weapon; The Korea Times — ED US top court's tariff ruling doesn't change much; UPI — Korean parties spar over response to U.S. tariffs; UPI — South Korea to monitor markets after U.S. tariff ruling; UPI — Column: Aftermath of Trump tariff ruling and Korea
• U.S.–ROK alliance shows mounting security coordination strain. Over the past 48 hours, South Korea’s effort to coordinate its security posture while easing inter-Korean tensions has run into visible friction points across the alliance, with multiple disputes unfolding simultaneously. Seoul effectively declined a U.S. proposal for trilateral air drills with Japan after the suggested timing overlapped with the Lunar New Year holiday and Japan’s Takeshima Day events, underscoring how Dokdo sovereignty sensitivities continue to shape alliance scheduling even as officials publicly deny any formal rift. At the operational level, coordination was jolted by a Yellow Sea episode in which U.S. Forces Korea aircraft conducting training were intercepted by Chinese fighters, prompting Seoul to protest that it had not been fully briefed in advance and leading to an unusual apology from the USFK commander—an episode that exposed procedural mistrust at a sensitive moment in U.S.–China signaling. Seoul and Washington are emphasizing that the large-scale Freedom Shield exercise will proceed in March and remain central to readiness and wartime transition planning, yet allied discussions over maneuver scope and timing are increasingly intertwined with Seoul’s parallel push to ease tensions with Pyongyang. That effort includes a proposal to restore a border-area no-fly zone linked to reviving elements of the 2018 inter-Korean military accord, but U.S. agreement has not yet been secured, reflecting concern in Washington about reconnaissance and deterrence gaps. Diplomatic process friction is also surfacing, with a planned U.S. delegation visit for security talks delayed for “scheduling” reasons even as a senior State Department aide travels to Seoul for consultations, underscoring that reassurance and strain are unfolding in tandem. The cumulative picture is sober: Seoul is simultaneously managing Japan-facing sovereignty optics over Dokdo, the timing and symbolism of trilateral military coordination, and the tone of Pyongyang-facing conciliation—dynamics that are drawing it more directly into intensifying U.S.–China competition and shifting North Korea deterrence calculations.
Sources: Korea JoongAng Daily — Creaks in Korea-U.S. ties spread from trade to security; Korea JoongAng Daily — Korea turns down U.S. offer of 3-way drills with Tokyo before Japan's celebratory event for Dokdo; Yonhap News Agency — USFK chief apologizes to S. Korea following air standoff with China: sources; Stars and Stripes — South Korea denies rift with allies over delayed trilateral exercise; KBS World — Joint Chiefs: S. Korea, US Coordinating Details of Freedom Shield Exercises; Korea JoongAng Daily — U.S. not yet on board with Korea's no-fly zone push as divergences stoke concerns over ties; Yonhap News Agency — Close aide to U.S. secretary of state visiting S. Korea; Yonhap News Agency — U.S. delegation's trip to Seoul being delayed due to 'scheduling' issues: senior official; The Korea Times — Korea denies delay in US security talks as tariff uncertainties resurface
• Coupang dispute raises risk of U.S. Section 301 action against Seoul. Washington’s expanding Section 301 scrutiny is increasingly intersecting with South Korea’s digital and platform regulations, placing Seoul’s tech governance framework under potential trade review just as U.S. tariff tools are being recalibrated. U.S. officials and lawmakers are examining whether Korean policies affecting U.S.-linked firms—including regulatory enforcement actions and digital market rules—could constitute discriminatory practices, and the ongoing investigation into Coupang has emerged as the most visible flashpoint. The Korean government’s probe into Coupang’s large-scale data leak has drawn sustained attention in Washington, where investors and lawmakers have questioned whether the company is being treated unfairly, prompting interim CEO Harold Rogers’ closed-door testimony before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee following a subpoena. While no Section 301 determination has been made, Korean officials and industry leaders now openly acknowledge that the testimony and investor petitions could serve as evidentiary inputs if the administration chooses to pursue formal action. Coupang has expressed regret that the matter escalated into a bilateral issue and has signaled a desire for “constructive resolution,” but the episode has already moved beyond corporate legal exposure into the realm of trade leverage. The sober implication is that a domestic regulatory enforcement case now sits within Washington’s evolving tariff toolkit, increasing Seoul’s exposure to possible trade retaliation should U.S. authorities conclude that Korean digital rules disadvantage American firms.
Sources: The Korea Herald — US Section 301 probe puts Korea’s digital rules in spotlight; Korea JoongAng Daily — Interim Coupang chief attends House hearing amid U.S. criticism of Korean gov't treatment; The Korea Times — Coupang expresses regret over situation that led to CEO's US testimony; Korea JoongAng Daily — Coupang cites commitment to 'constructive resolution' in Korea as interim CEO meets with U.S. House; The Korea Times — Coupang interim CEO testimony feared to become leverage for new US tariffs
• Kim uses party congress to project control and elevate sister to senior leadership role. While Seoul absorbs trade pressure and alliance coordination strain in public view, the regime in Pyongyang is using the Ninth Party Congress to project controlled messaging, consolidated authority, and a confident narrative of continuity. Kim Jong Un was re-elected to the top party post and used the congress to frame the next five-year phase as a planned “greater transformation.” The congress also signals a managed generational and personnel shift—removing or sidelining veteran figures while elevating a tighter ruling circle—most notably the promotion of Kim Yo-jong to a party department head role and her return to the Politburo as an alternate member, moves widely interpreted as positioning her for an expanded operational role in external affairs and hardline messaging. The formal choreography—which included a concluding speech, the first enlarged plenary meeting of the newly elected Central Committee, and the publicized leadership slate—projects an authoritarian system moving on a controlled schedule with tightly scripted messaging and further concentration of authority around the Kim family. The net effect is a regime narrative designed to appear purposeful and strategically unhurried—broadcasting internal cohesion and next-step direction as Seoul manages visible seams across trade, alliance coordination, and deterrence policy.
Sources: Reuters — North Korea's Kim pledges economic push as his sister is elevated at party congress; Reuters — North Korea's ruling party re-elects Kim Jong Un general secretary; KCNA Watch (Rodong Sinmun, EN) — Fifth-day Sitting of Ninth WPK Congress Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Important Concluding Speech; KCNA Watch (Rodong Sinmun, EN) — First Enlarged Plenary Meeting of Ninth Central Committee of WPK Held; The Dong-a Ilbo — Kim Jong Un tightens grip at party congress; Yonhap News Agency — N. Korea's Kim says no shifting environment can deter country's progress at party congress; KBS World — Kim Jong-un Says North Korea's Progress Will Not Be Impeded by Security Challenges; AP News — Kim reelected to top post of North Korea’s ruling party as it hails his nuclear buildup; Yonhap News Agency — (2nd LD) N. Korean leader's sister Kim Yo-jong promoted to party department head at congress; The Korea Herald — Kim Yo-jong likely to take bigger role in external affairs following party promotion, politburo return
Impact:
Alliance friction mounts as Pyongyang projects regime continuity. The U.S. Supreme Court ruling did not ease tariff pressure so much as redistribute it across alternative statutory tools, leaving South Korea exposed to a more selective and discretionary enforcement phase centered on Sections 122, 232, and especially 301. At the same time, visible coordination strain within the alliance—from trilateral drill timing to DMZ no-fly zone discussions and Yellow Sea tensions—introduces procedural friction into a relationship that underwrites Korea’s core deterrence posture. The Coupang episode further sharpens that exposure by showing how domestic regulatory enforcement can be reframed in Washington as a trade barrier issue, expanding the range of potential pressure points. Overlaying these developments is Pyongyang’s carefully staged party congress, projecting regime cohesion, leadership continuity, and forward economic and defense planning at a moment when Seoul’s trade and security posture appears more reactive than declarative. The perceptual asymmetry is notable: North Korea broadcasts centralized control and next-phase clarity, while Seoul manages simultaneous trade, alliance, and deterrence pressures in full public view. For South Korea’s leadership, the near-term imperative is disciplined execution with Washington—preserving economic stability and alliance coordination while preventing tactical frictions from hardening into structural strain.
Shifting Plates
Summary:
• Xi reaffirms China–North Korea ties following Kim’s reelection. Chinese President Xi Jinping congratulated Kim Jong Un on his reelection as general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and pledged to advance bilateral relations, describing ties as an “unwavering” strategic policy. Xi signaled readiness to deepen coordination and implement prior agreements, reinforcing Beijing’s intent to maintain close political and economic alignment with Pyongyang. The message underscores continued high-level support from China at a moment when North Korea is attempting to project internal cohesion and forward planning through its party congress.
Sources: The Korea Times — China’s Xi congratulates Kim on reelection to top party post, vows to advance ties
• Moscow casts Russia–North Korea partnership as joint global safeguard. Russian officials publicly framed cooperation with Pyongyang as jointly “safeguarding” the world from shared adversaries, reinforcing a narrative of strategic alignment amid deepening geopolitical confrontation with the West. The rhetoric reflects Moscow’s continued effort to present its relationship with North Korea as part of a broader anti-Western front rather than a narrow bilateral partnership.
Sources: Yonhap News Agency — Russia says Moscow, Pyongyang jointly ‘safeguarding’ world from enemy
• Seoul weighs NATO-linked Ukraine support amid Russian retaliation warnings. As the war in Ukraine marks its fourth year, South Korea is considering joining a NATO-led initiative to fund weapons support for Kyiv, a step that would deepen alignment with Western security partners. Russian officials have warned that participation could trigger retaliation, leaving Seoul balancing solidarity with Ukraine against the risk of further deterioration in ties with Moscow.
Sources: Korea JoongAng Daily — South Korea weighs NATO-led weapons funding initiative, Russian retaliation as Ukraine war marks fourth anniversary
• Russian Embassy in Seoul scales back public activities after controversy. Russia’s embassy removed a banner and canceled a planned external event following public backlash tied to the Ukraine war anniversary, signaling sensitivity to local opinion and the diplomatic climate in South Korea. The move highlights the increasingly constrained operating environment for Russian public diplomacy in Seoul as bilateral tensions persist.
Sources: Yonhap News Agency — (LEAD) Russian Embassy removes banner, cancels external event amid controversy
• China restricts exports to Japanese military-linked entities. Beijing imposed export controls on dozens of Japanese companies with ties to defense or dual-use sectors, citing security concerns and opposition to what it described as Japan’s “remilitarization.” The measures add economic pressure to an already tense China–Japan relationship and signal Beijing’s willingness to deploy trade tools in response to security developments.
Sources: AP News — China restricts exports to 40 Japanese entities with ties to military
• Seoul protests Japanese sovereignty event over Dokdo. South Korea lodged a formal protest against a Japanese event commemorating Takeshima Day, condemning Tokyo’s claims over the disputed Dokdo islets and summoning a Japanese diplomat to express its objection. The exchange underscores persistent historical and territorial tensions that continue to complicate Seoul–Tokyo relations even as both coordinate on broader regional security concerns.
Sources: Reuters — South Korea protests Japanese event over disputed islands
• Seoul and Brasília expand cooperation in strategic industries. South Korea and Brazil agreed to deepen business and investment ties across key sectors including critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, and infrastructure, signaling Seoul’s continued effort to diversify economic partnerships. The agreements reflect a broader push to secure supply chains and expand markets beyond traditional regional alignments.
Sources: The Korea Times — Korea, Brazil forge business ties in 3 strategic sectors
Impact:
Intensifying great-power dynamics and regional contestation are reframing Northeast Asian strategic alignments. Beijing’s warm congratulations and renewal of strategic cooperation with Pyongyang reinforce the deepening China–North Korea partnership at a moment when Moscow explicitly touts its alignment with Pyongyang as part of a shared global defense narrative. Seoul, by contrast, is cautiously navigating its own alignment choices—balancing potential support for NATO-linked Ukraine weapons funding against the risk of Russian retaliation—while managing enduring bilateral friction with Tokyo over Dokdo/Takeshima sovereignty. China’s widening export controls on Japanese defense-linked firms further highlight a sharpening economic front in Sino-Japanese competition that overlaps with security concerns. Meanwhile, Seoul’s outreach to Brazil and economic diplomacy in strategic sectors underscores Korea’s efforts to diversify partnerships amid trade and security pressures. Against this backdrop, North Korea’s party congress projections of internal cohesion and long-term economic and defense planning signal confidence in its alliances and strategic direction, even as Seoul faces simultaneous pressures in trade policy, alliance management, and great-power competition. The cumulative effect is a regional environment in which economic policy, security alignment, and diplomatic signaling are increasingly intertwined, shaping a more tightly contested strategic landscape around the Korean Peninsula.
Global Ripples
Summary:
• U.S.–China relations settle into guarded stability as tariff policy reshapes global trade incentives. A senior U.S. State Department official told Congress Washington seeks stable relations with China but does not trust Beijing, signaling a posture of managed engagement paired with strategic suspicion ahead of a potential Trump–Xi meeting. At the same time, analysis of Trump’s new 15% global tariff suggests a redistribution of trade pressure rather than a reduction: uniform duties may ease relative burdens on China while increasing exposure for allies such as South Korea. The emerging framework points to a U.S. trade strategy that maintains systemic competition with China while using broad tariff tools that can impose collateral costs across allied economies.
Sources: Reuters — US wants stable relations with China but does not trust it, US official says; Hankyoreh — Trump’s new 15% tariff poised to benefit China, hurt allies like South Korea
• Iran escalation risk prompts evacuation advisories as Washington weighs coercive options. South Korea’s embassy in Tehran advised Korean nationals to leave Iran when commercial flights are available, citing the possibility of rapid deterioration if tensions escalate. The warning follows renewed debate in Washington over how far the Trump administration is willing to go to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, with a strategy combining negotiation, military pressure, and ambiguity designed to compel compliance while preserving escalation options. The situation underscores the persistent volatility of the Gulf security environment and the potential for sudden disruption affecting foreign nationals and global energy markets.
Sources: Yonhap News Agency — S. Korean Embassy advises Korean nationals to leave Iran amid possible U.S. military strike; The Hill — All eyes on Iran: How far is Trump willing to go?
• Ukraine war enters fourth year with deeper institutional backing and wider international footprint. On the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the European Parliament reaffirmed sustained political and military support for Ukraine, calling for stronger sanctions, continued assistance, and security guarantees anchored in European coordination. Parallel reporting highlights the war’s expanding global manpower and political reach, with foreign fighters and external support networks drawing multiple countries—including North Korea—into its operational orbit as Russia seeks to offset domestic mobilization pressures. The conflict is thus becoming both more institutionalized in European policy and more internationalized on the ground, extending its strategic ripple effects well beyond the immediate theater.
Sources: European Parliament — Parliament stands firm with Ukraine four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion; The Independent — From Korea to Kenya: All the countries dragged into fighting the Ukraine-Russia war
Impact:
External shocks and strategic competition are tightening the global operating environment around South Korea. Washington’s effort to balance guarded engagement with China while deploying broad tariff tools risks redistributing economic pressure onto allies even as it targets strategic competitors. Simultaneously, renewed volatility in the Gulf—reflected in evacuation advisories and open debate over U.S. coercive options toward Iran—highlights the fragility of energy and security conditions that underpin global markets. The Ukraine war’s fourth year further demonstrates how major conflicts are becoming institutionalized and internationalized rather than resolved, pulling additional actors into their strategic orbit and reinforcing bloc dynamics. For Seoul, these developments mean that economic exposure, alliance coordination, and overseas security risks are increasingly shaped by decisions taken far beyond Northeast Asia. The cumulative effect is a global environment in which external shocks are more likely to propagate quickly across trade, energy, and security domains, requiring constant calibration rather than episodic response.
Convergence
Today’s fault lines point to a tightening strategic environment for South Korea. U.S. trade policy is evolving into a more selective and discretionary enforcement regime that keeps Seoul economically exposed while visible coordination issues—from drill scheduling to DMZ airspace discussions—continue to surface within the alliance. Simultaneously, China and Russia are signaling durable alignment with Pyongyang, while North Korea projects institutional cohesion and long-term planning through its party congress, reinforcing a perception gap between Seoul’s reactive posture and Pyongyang’s scripted continuity. Beyond Northeast Asia, volatility tied to Iran and the Ukraine war underscores how energy security, global supply chains, and bloc politics remain deeply interconnected with Korea’s domestic stability. The convergence is not crisis but accumulation: trade pressure, alliance coordination challenges, and deterrence concerns are all unfolding in parallel. For Seoul, the central task is disciplined calibration—maintaining economic resilience, reinforcing alliance execution, and preserving strategic flexibility in an environment where economic, security, and political shocks are increasingly converging.
14. N. Korea hails family that skipped 60th birthday feast as frugality model
Comment: The suffering and sacrifice of the Korean people in the north and the brutality of the regime.
N. Korea hails family that skipped 60th birthday feast as frugality model
dailynk.com · February 24, 2026
North Koreans now worry the state will crack down on even modest home gatherings
By Eun Seol - February 25, 2026
https://www.dailynk.com/english/n-korea-hails-family-that-skipped-60th-birthday-feast-as-frugality-model/
Portraits of KIm Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. (Michael Day, Flickr, Creative Commons)
North Korean authorities have held up a Hyesan family that skipped a traditional 60th birthday celebration in late January as a model of socialist frugality ahead of the Ninth Party Congress — but people say the family simply couldn’t afford the feast.
A source in Ryanggang province who requested anonymity for security reasons told Daily NK that city party officials learned of the family’s decision through the Socialist Women’s Union of Korea (SWUK) and praised them for “accurately understanding and practicing the party’s intentions.”
The source said authorities are pushing a frugality campaign ahead of the congress, scheduled for later this month. “The Supreme Leader (Kim Jong Un) is constantly shown visiting production sites across the country day and night for the people,” the source said. “The idea is for people to keep pace with this as well.”
Poverty repackaged as virtue
North Korean authorities have been telling residents that avoiding luxury and waste is integral to a proper socialist lifestyle, calling lavish weddings, first birthday parties and 60th birthday celebrations wasteful and urging people to keep such occasions simple given the state’s economic situation.
But traditional celebrations retain their social weight. Businesses that rent table settings for weddings and birthday feasts continue to thrive, and families still gather relatives and friends at home for 60th birthday meals. Skipping such an occasion carries real shame — it is widely regarded as a failure of filial duty.
That social reality is why people are scoffing at the party’s decision to hold the family up as a model.
“Both children were struggling financially and couldn’t afford a 60th birthday feast for their parents,” the source said. “When the parents said ‘we’re too busy making ends meet for a birthday party,’ the children were relieved.”
While the family escaped the shame that would normally accompany skipping the celebration, the optics have unsettled others. “No one gives up a 60th birthday party to support the Workers’ Party,” the source said. “Now people worry the state will crack down on inviting neighbors over for a meal, calling that luxury, too.”
Read in Korean
A Note to Readers
Daily NK operates networks of sources inside North Korea who document events in real-time and transmit information through secure channels. Unlike reporting based on state media, satellite imagery, or defector accounts from years past, our journalism comes directly from people currently living under the regime.
We verify reports through multiple independent sources and cross-reference details before publication. Our sources remain anonymous because contact with foreign media is treated as a capital offense in North Korea—discovery means imprisonment or execution.
This network-based approach allows Daily NK to report on developments other outlets cannot access: market trends, policy implementation, public sentiment, and daily realities that never appear in official narratives. Maintaining these secure communication channels and protecting source identities requires specialized protocols and constant vigilance.
Daily NK serves as a bridge between North Koreans and the outside world, documenting what’s happening inside one of the world’s most closed societies.
dailynk.com · February 24, 2026
15. Editorial: Unprecedented Public Discord in South Korea-US Military
Comment: Are we at an alliance inflection point? A perfect storm?
Editorial: Unprecedented Public Discord in South Korea-US Military
Training disputes, no-fly zone disagreements, and public clashes expose rift amid North Korea threats
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2026.02.26. 00:10
Updated 2026.02.26. 00:37https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/02/26/XC7HB7M6BJHD7I76MOYR73SQII/
Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs Director Jang Do-young (left) and USFK Public Affairs Director Ryan Donald shake hands after announcing the 2026 Freedom Shield (FS) exercise plan at the Ministry of National Defense in Yongsan-gu, Seoul on the 25th. Photo by Joint Press Corps
USFK issued a statement late on the 24th regarding unilateral training in the West Sea, stating, “We do not apologize for maintaining our readiness posture.” This came after reports emerged that the USFK commander had apologized to South Korean forces, and the Ministry of National Defense stated, “We understand some of this to be true.” In response, USFK refuted the claims in the middle of the night, asserting, “We have never apologized.” Initially, South Korean forces had protested that the US military did not properly inform them of the training details. However, USFK stated that they had notified the South Korean side in advance but “expressed regret that the South Korean military did not report the matter to their Minister of National Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a timely manner.” The two sides’ positions are completely at odds.
The USFK commander is also reported to have expressed concerns that South Korea’s restoration of the September 19 inter-Korean military agreement could “restrict its own readiness posture.” A high-ranking official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated regarding the establishment of a “no-fly zone” around the Military Demarcation Line, “The US has not yet agreed, and discussions are ongoing.” This implies that the US is effectively opposing the measure.
If the no-fly zone is reinstated, it will also apply to USFK. North Korea has deployed 1 million troops and the majority of its firepower near the Military Demarcation Line. If South Korea alone re-establishes the no-fly zone, its reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities will inevitably be weakened and restricted. USFK is currently opposing this and has effectively made this stance public. Kim Jong-un recently threatened by unveiling 50 nuclear-capable multiple rocket launchers the day after the South Korean government announced the restoration of the September 19 military agreement. In this situation, the US is shifting its focus toward countering China. If even South Korean forces restrict their own security vigilance, it could lead to issues in readiness posture. The differing views between South Korean and US forces on this matter are being exposed without any filtering.
On the 25th, South Korean and US military authorities announced the schedule for joint training but stated that the scale of the core “outdoor mobility training” is “still under discussion.” While the US military insists on proceeding as normal, South Korean forces are reportedly seeking to reduce or disperse the scale. Earlier this year, when the government attempted to enact a law allowing access to the Demilitarized Zone without UN Command approval, the UN Command objected, stating it “conflicts with the armistice agreement.” The UN Command commander also concurrently serves as the USFK commander.
In the past, there have been disagreements and conflicts between South Korean and US security authorities. Since such expressions could send the wrong signal to North Korea, both sides have resolved issues behind the scenes. There has never been a case like the current situation, where public rebuttals occur in the middle of the night and conflicts arise simultaneously. What exactly is happening?
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
https://apstrategy.org/
Executive Director, Korea Regional Review
https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/
Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal
https://smallwarsjournal.com/
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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