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Quotes of the Day:
"The saddest aspect of life right now is that science gathers knowledge faster than society gathers wisdom."
– Isaac Asimov
"An education isn't how much you have committed to memory, or even how much you know. It's being able to differentiate between what you do know and what you don't. It's knowing where to go to find out what you need to know; and it's knowing how to use the information you get."
– William Feather
"Take up one idea. Make that one idea your life - think of it, dream of it, live on that idea. Let the brain, muscles, nerves, every part of your body, be full of that idea, and just leave every other idea alone. This is the way to success."
– Swami Vivekananda
1. Time for decisive action to tackle North Korea issue
2. The real reasons why Kim Jong-un’s full-scale provocation is unlikely
3. Experts say concerns about new North Korea-Russia defense treaty are overblown
4. Size of N. Korea's rice paddies down 1.1% in 2023.
5. Pyongyang-Tokyo talks a two-edged sword
6. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Wigs, fake eyelashes emerge as a driver of exports abroad, but laborers work in very poor conditions
7. Russians are fleeing to South Korea to escape the war with Ukraine
8. N. Korean security agents demand large sums from remittance brokers
9. N. Korea hands out bonuses to some workers at the end of 2023
10. North Korean Hackers Targeting Developers with Malicious npm Packages
11. A dubious history undergirds claims that North Korea has resolved to go to war
12. By forsaking unification, North Korea also abandoned the South’s radical left
13. South Korea Unveils Corporate Value-Boosting Plan to Replicate Japan
1. Time for decisive action to tackle North Korea issue
Excerpts:
South Korea and the U.S. must now re-evaluate their security policies. Is the South Korean three-axis system for deterrence of North Korean nuclear weapons still viable? Is the Nuclear Consultative Group sufficient to counter the North Korean threat, or is it there to pacify South Korea? Should South Korea have its own nuclear capability, and would it solve its security concerns? These are just some of the questions for the nuclear debate.
North Korea must understand that there is no seam between the Republic of Korea and the United States alliance. In order to achieve this, South Korea must have a unified voice that is based on the understanding and support of its people. With this voice South Korea must dialogue with the United States and form a common understanding of the problem and an agreed path to a solution. This cooperation can not reach its full potential without Japan as a partner. Koreans and Japanese must realize the seriousness of the challenge they face for North Korea and its allies.
Finally, it is important that North Korea understands that South Korean patience has expired. Another direct provocation, such as an artillery attack or a drone incursion, would bring war and devastation to the Korean Peninsula.
In conclusion, the current developments on the Korean Peninsula and beyond demand a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the strategic dynamics at play. Only through a concerted international effort, grounded in a robust alliance and a clear-eyed assessment of the threats posed by North Korea, can stability be maintained and peace be pursued. The stakes are high, and the time for decisive action is now.
Time for decisive action to tackle North Korea issue
The Korea Times · February 26, 2024
By Chun In-bum
Chun In-bum
Reports from Europe and Ukraine say that more and more North Korea-made ammunition is being discovered on the battlefield. The shrapnel identified as rockets and missiles include the infamous KN-23 ballistic missile. Although it's hard to verify, it is also being reported that approximately 20 percent of the ammunition being fired againstUkraine is of North Korean origin.
To further elaborate on the situation's complexities, it's essential to understand the strategic calculations behind North Korea's recent maneuvers. The use of North Korea-made ammunition in conflict zones, particularly in Ukraine, underscores Pyongyang's intent to circumvent international sanctions and foster a revenue stream through arms sales. This not only aids the Kim regime in sustaining its economy but also in acquiring foreign technologies that could significantly advance its military capabilities. The partnership with Russia, seemingly strengthened in the face of geopolitical tensions, provides North Korea with a powerful ally capable of supporting its ambitions on the global stage.
Meanwhile, making threats has now become a policy for North Korea. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) no longer identifies South Koreans as Korean. This is significant because, despite a civil war and ideological differences, the North Korean leadership justified its claims to the South because it wanted to liberate the "people" from imperialism and capitalism.
At first glance, it seemed North Korea was relinquishing its desire to unify Korea on its own terms, but further statements seem to advocate that the South Koreans are no longer worthy of being considered Korean and are entities to be despised and marginalized. Kim Jong-un has designated the Republic of Korea as the DPRK's main enemy and charged his military to prepare to defend the nation and, in case of an emergency, be prepared to occupy and pacify the South.
The alarming shift in North Korea's policy toward South Korea, as articulated by Kim Jong-un, represents a dangerous escalation in rhetoric that could destabilize the already volatile situation on the Korean Peninsula. By renouncing the shared ethnic and cultural identity with South Koreans, Kim Jong-un is not only redefining the North's ideological stance but is also attempting to rally domestic support by creating an external enemy. This strategy, however, risks further isolating North Korea internationally and exacerbating tensions with both South Korea and its global allies.
Strengthened by an improved relationship with Russia, Kim Jong-un can now exercise more flexibility in its dealings with China. Exports of weapons will bring not only monetary revenue but also technology transfers from the Russians. It will also provide North Korea with valuable feedback on the actual employment of their weapons in battlefield conditions. This will bring important improvements to North Korean weapons that will make them more capable and more threatening to the free world.
Although the North is not capable of conducting a full-scale war at the moment, it seems logical that all this rhetoric is an attempt to prepare the North Korean military to do exactly that in the near future. Armed with nuclear weapons and on the verge of obtaining the capability to strike the continental United States, Kim will undoubtedly attempt to extort concessions from unsuspecting South Korean liberals and isolationists in America.
South Korea and the U.S. must now re-evaluate their security policies. Is the South Korean three-axis system for deterrence of North Korean nuclear weapons still viable? Is the Nuclear Consultative Group sufficient to counter the North Korean threat, or is it there to pacify South Korea? Should South Korea have its own nuclear capability, and would it solve its security concerns? These are just some of the questions for the nuclear debate.
North Korea must understand that there is no seam between the Republic of Korea and the United States alliance. In order to achieve this, South Korea must have a unified voice that is based on the understanding and support of its people. With this voice South Korea must dialogue with the United States and form a common understanding of the problem and an agreed path to a solution. This cooperation can not reach its full potential without Japan as a partner. Koreans and Japanese must realize the seriousness of the challenge they face for North Korea and its allies.
Finally, it is important that North Korea understands that South Korean patience has expired. Another direct provocation, such as an artillery attack or a drone incursion, would bring war and devastation to the Korean Peninsula.
In conclusion, the current developments on the Korean Peninsula and beyond demand a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the strategic dynamics at play. Only through a concerted international effort, grounded in a robust alliance and a clear-eyed assessment of the threats posed by North Korea, can stability be maintained and peace be pursued. The stakes are high, and the time for decisive action is now.
Chun In-bum (truechun@naver.com) served as a lieutenant general of the ROK Army and commander of Special Forces Korea.
The Korea Times · February 26, 2024
2. The real reasons why Kim Jong-un’s full-scale provocation is unlikely
Provocation is a misused and overused word. Today everything is a provocation. Worse, people describe ROK/US alliance actions as provocations as if the alliance could provoke north Korean action. The alliance does not conduct provocations, it conducts actions using instruments of national power to support national security interests. By calling alliance actions provocations we limit our actions.
The real reasons why Kim Jong-un’s full-scale provocation is unlikely
https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/02/13/G27RM642JNGOFHLPDXHDFY5H6I/
By Yu Yong-weon,
Park Su-hyeon
Published 2024.02.13. 15:02
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visiting Ministry of Defense with his daughter in celebration of the 76th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army on Feb. 8, 2024, as reported by North Korea's Korean Central Television (KCTV) the following day./KCTV
The recent actions of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, including labeling South Korea as the ‘principal enemy’ and discussing concepts like ‘territorial occupation’, alongside provocative acts such as testing hypersonic missiles, have heightened concerns over the Korean Peninsula’s potential for war.
These concerns have stemmed from a collaborative article published on ‘38 North’ on Jan. 11, authored by Robert L. Carlin, the former head of the Northeast Asia Division at the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Siegfried S. Hecker, the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which asserted that the situation on the Korean Peninsula is more dangerous than it has been since early June 1950. The article suggested that Kim Jong-un may be making strategic decisions reminiscent of his grandfather’s actions in 1950.
Following warnings from former U.S. government officials, the New York Times reported on Jan. 25 that Kim Jong-un could take “some form of lethal military action against South Korea in the coming months after having shifted to a policy of open hostility,” citing statements from multiple White House officials, exacerbating fears of conflict.
So, what is the likelihood of North Korea actually provoking a war? Beforehand, it’s important to distinguish between a full-scale conflict and localized provocations. A full-scale conflict, akin to the invasion movements observed in the Ukraine war, would inevitably exhibit pre-emptive indicators. This would involve unavoidable troop and equipment mobilizations, as well as the necessity of stockpiling ammunition and fuel beyond a certain threshold. However, according to intelligence gathered by South Korean and US authorities thus far, there have been no indications of such unusual activity.
In light of the heightened importance of ammunition underscored by the Ukraine conflict, reports also suggest that North Korea has exported over 5,000 containers and more than 2.3 million rounds of 152mm shells to Russia. Additionally, there are indications that new missile types such as the KN-23 have been exported to Russia. While South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik has made similar statements in media interviews, it remains inconceivable that a leader with sound judgment would initiate a full-scale conflict provocation in such a situation.
Moreover, it’s widely accepted that Kim Jong-un is advancing a fourth-generation succession, whether through Kim Ju-ae or someone else. There’s speculation that, for Kim Jong-un to ensure a seamless inheritance of North Korea to his offspring, he cannot risk provoking a full-scale conflict. If North Korea were to initiate such conflict, it’s anticipated that South Korean and U.S. forces would use a minimum of 1,000 missiles, alongside thousands of precision-guided bombs, to devastate Pyongyang and other key areas and targets, without even resorting to the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
It appears that a considerable consensus exists among both domestic and international government authorities and experts regarding the highly unlikely prospect of North Korea engaging in a full-scale conflict in the current situation. Sydney Seiler, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and former national intelligence officer for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council (NIC), remarked on Feb. 1 that “the types of indicators one would expect to see on the eve of a North Korea attack simply have not been observed.”
However, there are widespread concerns about the possibility of high-intensity localized provocations, similar to the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan (PCC-772) or the shelling incidents on Yeonpyeong Island, as well as what’s known as ‘strategic provocations,’ including test-launches of ICBMs or SLBMs and a seventh nuclear test.
While many experts are apprehensive about these possibilities, they believe that the chances of such high-intensity provocations, which would elicit a robust retaliatory response from the South Korean military, are currently low. Instead, many experts agree that there is a higher likelihood of low to medium-intensity localized provocations, such as shelling near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), gunfire near the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), or drone infiltrations.
3. Experts say concerns about new North Korea-Russia defense treaty are overblown
It is all about mutual support for each other and creating dilemmas for the ROK/US alliance.
Experts say concerns about new North Korea-Russia defense treaty are overblown
The Korea Times · February 26, 2024
Russia's President Vladimir Putin, right, and North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un attend a meeting at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in the Russian Far East, in this Sept. 13, 2023, file photo. Amid concerns over growing ties between the two countries, experts said on Monday that Moscow will likely tread carefully when it comes to signing a new defense treaty with Pyongyang. Reuters-Yonhap
Putin has little to gain by promising ‘automatic intervention’ in event of war
By Jung Min-ho
Concerns have been rising over how far Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow would go since North Korea’s state media called for reinforcing the partnership based on a “new legal foundation” last month.
Ahead of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s possible visit to the North Korean capital, some worry the foundation could mean the revival of a defense treaty between the two countries ― one under which one party must intervene militarily in support of the other in the event of a war.
After signing such a mutual defense treaty in 1961, the two countries had maintained it for 35 years until 1996, when it was abrogated after years of diplomatic efforts by South Korea.
Analysts contacted by The Korea Times on Monday said the chances of the two sides inking such a high-stakes deal are slim. Putin, they said, has much more to lose than gain by siding officially with Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s ill-famed leader.
“Putin, who desperately needs North Korea’s continuous support for his war in Ukraine, will likely offer something Kim would like if he visits Pyongyang. But I think it won’t be a defense treaty,” Chung Eun-sook, a Russia expert at the think tank Sejong Institute, said.
“Kim would seek stronger military ties with Russia and frame the current geopolitical situation as a new Cold War. But Russia knows that’s against its national interest in the long term. It just needs North Korea’s ammunition and shells.”
Despite plenty of evidence of having used North Korean weapons in its war efforts, Moscow has denied that it violated U.N. Security Council resolutions, which prohibit all forms of arms trade with Pyongyang.
This shows the Kremlin’s consistent diplomatic strategy of denial and suggests it is not keen to make its own admission of their hidden trade by signing a defense treaty, according to Cho Han-bum, an analyst at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), a state-funded think tank.
“Unlike the Cold War era, during which Russia was one of only two dominant countries in de facto two separate worlds, Russia now belongs to the single global supply chain system and cannot leave it,” Cho said. “The war has brought Russia and North Korea closer. Yet, the war is not going to last forever. When it ends, Russia will find North Korea much less useful.”
But as long as the war continues, North Korea will remain the Kremlin’s crucial partner. With the armed conflict showing no signs of abating, Putin could respond favorably to Kim’s calls to upgrade the current “friendship treaty,” Hyun Seung-soo, another analyst at the KINU, said.
“A likely scenario would be adding a clause with much room for interpretation to that treaty ― with stronger terms that can highlight Russia’s possible help for North Korea in the case of a war [with South Korea or the United States],” he said.
At a U.N. Security Council briefing on the Ukraine issue at U.N. headquarters in New York on Friday local time, Cho Tae-yul, South Korea’s foreign minister, expressed concerns over the North’s suspected military collaboration with Russia.
“If and when it turns out to be the case that North Korea receives in return, whether advanced military technology or oil shipments exceeding limits under Security Council resolutions, this would redound to North Korea’s ability to threaten security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond,” he said.
The Korea Times · February 26, 2024
4. Size of N. Korea's rice paddies down 1.1% in 2023
Size of N. Korea's rice paddies down 1.1% in 2023
The Korea Times · February 26, 2024
North Koreans harvest crops from their arable land in North Hwanghae Province, Oct. 7, 2022. Yonhap
The size of North Korea's rice paddies decreased 1.1 percent in 2023 from a year earlier, data showed Monday, amid lingering concerns over the North's chronic food shortages.
The North's rice paddies totaled 533,591 hectares last year, contracting from 539,679 hectares tallied in 2022, according to Statistics Korea.
The estimate is based on satellite images taken over the April-September period of 2023.
The figure is around 75 percent of the 707,872 hectares of rice paddies in South Korea.
South Hwanghae Province accounted for 26.3 percent of North Korea's total, trailed by North and South Pyongan provinces with 19.1 percent and 14.1 percent, respectively. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · February 26, 2024
5. Pyongyang-Tokyo talks a two-edged sword
Excerpt:
If South Korea maintains the South Korea-US alliance and trilateral cooperation, operates dialogue channels with the North, and communicates with China and Russia, the chances of a North Korea-Japan summit will increase. Chances will also increase that it will participate in distribution by taking advantage of diplomatic gains from the summit. On the contrary, if South Korea does not lead North Korean affairs, the chances of the summit will decrease, and South Korea's diplomatic weight will be even lower. Even if the summit proceeds, the South might face the humiliation of experiencing isolation at decisive diplomatic events.
[Wang Son-taek] Pyongyang-Tokyo talks a two-edged sword
koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · February 21, 2024
By Korea Herald
Published : Feb. 22, 2024 - 05:40
North Korea and Japan are not hiding signs that they recently had behind-the-scenes talks on a possible summit. While the so-called new Cold War structure is being discussed and worries about the potential war breaking are spreading, interest is increasing rapidly in whether the contact between North Korea and Japan could be a critical event that can change the dynamics of Northeast Asia.
It remains to be seen whether the two parties can hold a summit, as there are many obstacles. The most significant variable is North Korea's insistence that the nuclear and missile issues and the Japanese abduction issue be ruled out. Prime Minister Kishida can retain the event's meaning when discussing those issues.
On the contrary, Chairman Kim Jong-un will feel more comfortable not holding a meeting if the two issues are on the agenda. However, the most crucial variable in diplomatic negotiations is not the environment but the national necessity or the will of the supreme leader. If a leader has a strong will, they will overcome obstacles.
It is possible to solve the problem by creating a scenario that does not impose a political burden on either side by bringing up sensitive issues but not reaching a specific agreement. Kishida will be satisfied if he can claim that he raised essential issues with Kim while initiating a structural change in the relations with North Korea. Suppose the benefits of the summit with Japan are excellent and clear. In that case, Kim can also take a tactical card in which he regards the meeting as an opportunity to reaffirm his position on crucial issues.
If the summit is held, the Pyongyang-Tokyo contact will be considered a diplomatic victory for Kishida. Even if the summit does not produce concrete results, it will be a significant diplomatic event confirming Kishida's international presence. Even if the talks do not occur, there is nothing to lose in that communication with the North will increase understanding of North Korea's diplomatic strategy and Japan's diplomatic assets. In this regard, Kishida's moves are clever. North Korea will also expect to find a tiny hole that can weaken the solidarity of South Korea, the US, and Japan and will undermine the economic sanctions regime against North Korea.
In the case of the United States, the instability caused by military tensions in Northeast Asia will decrease. It will be evaluated that the US-led order will become more stable. South Korea can benefit from easing military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. China will also judge that North Korea's focus on diplomacy rather than military tensions is helpful for stability in Northeast Asia.
However, there are negative points to contact between North Korea and Japan. Significantly, the Republic of Korea has a few problems. The most sensitive part is that South Korea might be alienated from significant diplomatic activity in Northeast Asia, and its status is downgraded.
When the two sides are negotiating with the aim of a summit, South Korea should figure out what is going on between the neighbors. However, it has not been able to communicate with North Korea at all. Consultations with Japan also are not sufficient. South Korean government officials indirectly expressed dissatisfaction with the recent report of contacts, saying, "It should be helpful for denuclearization," reflecting the lack of communication with Japan.
The contact between them could lead to cracks in the cooperation and solidarity of the three countries of South Korea, the US, and Japan because the cooperation commitment signed at Camp David, Maryland, last year aimed to keep North Korea in check. If the trilateral cooperation system is broken, it will mean a hole in South Korea's security posture.
North Korea, which has changed its policy stance on the South toward a warring two-state relationship, will emphasize the framework of inter-Korean belligerence and deepen the separation of the two brother nations. The fixation of division will result in the reaffirmation that both Koreas are categorized as weak nations that must rely on the other powerful countries in terms of security issues.
South Korea is a country that should embrace not only positive factors but also significant risks that come from North Korean contacts, so it needs a high level of strategic response. One of the critical diplomatic guidelines is that a nation should maximize its strengths and minimize its weaknesses. The South should support the North Korea-Japan summit efforts, as the move would help ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. But at the same time, the South should not be sidelined from issues of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, it is painful to see that Japan lacks consultation with the South as it is making diplomatic contact with North Korea.
One of the best ways for the South not to be isolated from the North Korean issue is to talk directly with the North. Achieving dialogue with the North is not being dragged into the North's negotiating tactic but is a prerequisite for maintaining the initiative in the North Korean issue. South Korea should also always manage its relations with China and Russia positively. Everybody knows that China is an influential state in diplomatic matters related to North Korea, and Russia is a country that can provide emergency assistance to overcome difficult situations.
If South Korea maintains the South Korea-US alliance and trilateral cooperation, operates dialogue channels with the North, and communicates with China and Russia, the chances of a North Korea-Japan summit will increase. Chances will also increase that it will participate in distribution by taking advantage of diplomatic gains from the summit. On the contrary, if South Korea does not lead North Korean affairs, the chances of the summit will decrease, and South Korea's diplomatic weight will be even lower. Even if the summit proceeds, the South might face the humiliation of experiencing isolation at decisive diplomatic events.
Wang Son-taek
Wang Son-taek is a director for the Global Policy Center at the Hanpyeong Peace Institute. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are his own. -- Ed.
koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · February 21, 2024
6. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Wigs, fake eyelashes emerge as a driver of exports abroad, but laborers work in very poor conditions
I wonder how motivating signs are that say "let's head toward communism?"
Probably as motivating as ones that say "let's head toward suffering and death."
＜Inside N. Korea＞ Wigs, fake eyelashes emerge as a driver of exports abroad, but laborers work in very poor conditions
asiapress.org
A giant slogan reading 'Let's head towards communism' erected on the fringes of a farming community. Photograph taken from the Chinese side of the border across from Sakju County, North Pyongan Province, late September 2023 (ASIAPRESS)
In 2023, statistics regarding North Korea’s trade to China showed that forestry-based exports topped the list, surpassing minerals as the country's leading export. Drawing on information from North Korean reporting partners, ASIAPRESS looks behind the scenes of these changes to shed light on the working conditions of workers in North Korea's forestry product processing industry, which are often overshadowed by statistics and numbers. (JEON Sung-jun)
◆ Wigs and fake eyelashes emerge as a staple of North Korean exports
According to statistics from China’s General Administration of Customs, a total of 1,680 tons of wigs, beards, and eyelashes were imported from North Korea in 2023. Valued at about $163 million, or about 220 billion won ($163 million), these items consistently ranked first among North Korean exports throughout 2023, with the exception of January.
In recent years, these items have become so important that they have surpassed the total value of other exports, including minerals and basic chemicals, which were previously the top exports to the country. After mineral exports were banned by UN sanctions following North Korea's nuclear test and subsequent missile launches in 2017, the country's newfound export focus has been on manufactured goods such as wigs and eyelashes.
In December 2023, for example, the export value of wigs and eyelashes was $15.28 million. This is a staggering 1.6 times the total export value of all other items, which was $9.49 million. This pushed North Korea's exports to China in 2023 to $291.187 million, up from $213.147 million in 2018, the year before the pandemic.
Trends in trade between North Korea and China. Figures compiled based on data from the General Administration of Customs of China. (ASIAPRESS)
◆ Why wigs and fake eyelashes?
The sudden emergence of wigs and eyelashes as an important North Korean export is due to UN Security Council and US sanctions, which have been tightened since 2017. As North Korea has struggled to offset the impact of sanctions on its exports to the rest of the world, the country has moved to export non-sanctioned exports since 2018.
Following UN Security Council sanctions (UNSCRs 2356, 2371, 2375, and 2397) in response to North Korea's nuclear test and subsequent missile launches in 2017, most of the country's overseas workers were repatriated to North Korea and the number of banned items was expanded, causing the value of its exports to plummet to less than one-ninth of the previous year's value of about $1.73 billion in 2017. The North Korean authorities then began to scramble to acquire foreign currency.
China's demand for forestry products is what the North Korean authorities have been focusing on. According to ASIAPRESS’s North Korean reporting partners, the industry began to expand in North Korea in 2018. That's when a number of trading companies entered the wig and eyelash production business.
"It started in earnest in 2018, when trading companies recruited people, trained them for two weeks, and then gave them jobs. They mainly made wigs, hats and beadwork. It usually took three days to a week to make one wig, and they were paid two kilograms of rice in return, sometimes three to five kilograms, depending on the shape of the wig." (Yanggang Province reporting partner, January 2018)
What started as a small business in some trading companies along the border has recently become a national center. It is expanding to Gilju, Kimbuk, and Hamhung to cover the shortage of forest processing labor, according to a reporting partner in Hyesan.
Monthly trade volume between North Korea and China in 2023. Figures compiled based on data from the General Administration of Customs of China. (ASIAPRESS)
◆ People are being forced to engage in labor in difficult conditions
In the midst of these changes, working conditions for North Koreans in the forestry industry are very poor. In August 2023, a document sent by a reporting partner vividly captured the reality of North Koreans working in the forest products industry.
"Working day and night, day and night to earn food - under 12 volt LED lights, or candles when there is no light - has caused many people to suffer from rapidly deteriorating eyesight. For a while, we ran out of reading glasses in the market, and now we think people wearing glasses are 'wig makers.'"
In December 2023, a reporting partner said that as the government took full control of the industry, the treatment of workers has worsened because they are only able to survive on the wages and food provided by their companies.
"Before the pandemic, each trading company hired temporary or permanent workers and gave them 25 kilograms of rice, 1 liter of soybean oil, and 100 yuan a month."
But since the state has tightened its grip on trade, he says, the labor provided by forestry products processing companies has been limited to rice or corn from North Korea. There are no bonuses or incentives from the trading company, he explains.
Since forestry products are not subject to UN sanctions, this trend in North Korea's trade with the rest of the world is likely to continue. Behind the growing trade statistics, it also means that the suffering of North Koreans has increased.
※ ASIAPRESS communicates with reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.
asiapress.org
7.Russians are fleeing to South Korea to escape the war with Ukraine
Russians are fleeing to South Korea to escape the war with Ukraine
Business Insider · by Rebecca Rommen
Politics
People attend a candle light vigil held in solidarity with Ukrainian people, as Russia's invasion in Ukraine continues, near Russian Embassy in Seoul, South Korea, March 4, 2022.KIM HONG-JI
- South Korea experienced a five-fold surge in Russian asylum seekers in 2023.
- The majority of Russian applicants cite conscription avoidance of the war with Ukraine.
- Two Russians who had fled to evade the draft were stranded at Incheon International Airport for months.
South Korea is experiencing a dramatic surge in asylum seekers from Russia, per a recent government report cited in the Korea Herald.
In 2023, over 5,000 Russian nationals submitted refugee applications, a five-fold increase from the previous year's total of 1,038.
This surge nearly matches the total number of Russian asylum seekers recorded over 26 years, from 1994 to 2019.
This story is available exclusively to Business Insider subscribers. Become an Insider and start reading now.
Russian asylum seekers are fleeing Russia amid the war against Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin's military mobilization of 300,000 individuals in September 2022 pushed many Russian men to avoid conscription by seeking refuge abroad.
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Up to one million Russians had left the country, an Economist report stated in August 2023.
In February 2023, Politico reported that two Russian citizens who had fled to evade conscription had been stranded at Incheon International Airport near Seoul since October. The men were granted the opportunity to enter Korea, but the asylum-seeking process itself could take years, AFP reported at the time.
The view over the busy Gangnam district at dusk. Seoul, South Korea.Avalon / Getty
The influx of asylum seekers isn't limited to Russians alone. Last year, South Korea reported 18,838 refugee applications, marking a 63% increase from the previous year. Nationals from Kazakhstan (2,094), China (1,282), Malaysia (1,205), and India (1,189) also contributed to the surge.
Russian applicants accounted for 30.5% of the total appeals, Korea Bizwire reported.
The majority of asylum applications cited "political opinions" as the primary reason for seeking asylum, with 4,580 applicants objecting to conscription, 2,665 concerned about religious issues, 1,205 worried about their membership in specific social groups, 887 seeking to reunite with their families, and 719 citing racial factors.
Despite the surge in asylum applications, South Korea's approval rate for refugee status remains low despite the rise in applications. Out of 5,950 cases evaluated last year, only 1.7% (101 applicants) were granted refugee status.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation's average approval rate is 24.8%, making South Korea a particularly limiting country regarding asylum applications, per the Korea Herald.
Business Insider · by Rebecca Rommen
8. N. Korean security agents demand large sums from remittance brokers
On the one hand is regime corruption. On the other hand this shows that money (and information) can get to people inside north Korea.
N. Korean security agents demand large sums from remittance brokers
North Korean security agents often receive orders from their superiors to make cash payments
By Lee Chae Un - February 26, 2024
dailynk.com
N. Korean security agents demand large sums from remittance brokers - Daily NK English
A marker delineating the border between China and North Korea (Wikimedia Commons)
North Korean security agents in North Hamgyong Province demanded large sums of cash from remittance brokers ahead of recent holidays, including Lunar New Year and the birthday of late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, Daily NK has learned.
Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK last Wednesday that “security agents along the China-North Korea border in places like Hoeryong and Onsong County harassed local remittance brokers for large sums of holiday money.” He added that the remittance brokers “scraped together the money whether they had it or not.”
North Korean security agents often receive orders from their superiors to make cash payments. As a result, security agents extort money from people to put together the cash for their “tasks,” as well as money for their holiday-related expenses.
In the past, smugglers were the primary targets of extortion. But as smuggling came to a halt when North Korea closed its border in the wake of COVID-19, remittance brokers, who make their money moving cash illegally, became the prey of security agents. Remittance brokers are full of anxiety every holiday when security agents come knocking asking for money.
According to the source, security agents in Onsong County visited the homes of remittance brokers and openly demanded cash before the latest set of holidays earlier this month. As the security agents demanded at least RMB 1,000 each, the remittance brokers had to come up with RMB 3,000 to 5,000 per person.
The remittance brokers were severely stressed by the burden of putting together so much cash on such short notice. However, they bit the bullet and paid anyway because they were afraid of what would happen in the future if they did not. They also need to maintain good relations with security officials to keep making money.
“Because remittance agents make money when everyone else can’t, people risk their lives to do it,” the source said. “During the holidays, they spend more money than they make because of the security agents, but they put up with it and pay for the future.”
Harassment knows no bounds
In Hoeryong, too, security agents demanded more than RMB 1,000 or 1,500 from remittance brokers earlier this month. The security agents created an atmosphere in which brokers could not refuse and vindictively followed and watched brokers who refused.
One security agent demanded RMB 2,000 from a particular money transfer agent in Hoeryong. Since the two barely knew each other, the agent politely refused, saying he would “pay him next time.” The agent left, but not before telling the broker that he would “regret” saying no.
After that, the security agent followed the broker everywhere he went and prevented him from working. Unable to overcome the pressure, the broker eventually paid the RMB 2,000.
“Remittance brokers felt a huge burden this year because security agents demanded more money than ever before,” the source said. “However, brokers and security agents are inseparable, and the former know exactly what will happen to them if they fall out of favor with the latter, so brokers have no choice but to pay unreasonable amounts.
“The security agents should be catching spies, but are busy shaking people down instead. Even the security agents are having a hard time making ends meet because of the lack of government rations, and in the face of endless tasks from their superiors, they are constantly harassing people.”
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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dailynk.com
9. N. Korea hands out bonuses to some workers at the end of 2023
Excerpts:
Daily NK also understands that a company in Kangwon Province paid up to KPW 300,000 as a competitive bonus at the end of last year. There was also a factory in Yanggang Province that paid a one-time competition stipend of about KPW 100,000 per worker – more than 15 times the average monthly wage of KPW 3,000.
Since the average worker’s monthly wage is not enough to buy even a kilogram of rice on the market, North Koreans have no choice but to find other sources of income.
Middle- and upper-level managers in companies typically make money through illegal means, such as embezzling money intended for material purchases or other parts of the operating budget.
N. Korea hands out bonuses to some workers at the end of 2023
The stipends, which were limited in scope, were distributed to encourage workers to meet annual targets before the year-end review
By Seulkee Jang - February 26, 2024
dailynk.com
N. Korea hands out bonuses to some workers at the end of 2023 - Daily NK English
The interior of a factory in Pyongyang. (Rodong Sinmun)
Some factories and companies in North Korea paid workers “socialist competition assessment bonuses” late last year to encourage an increase in production, Daily NK has learned. Although some workers received wages ten times higher than usual, it turned out to be a temporary bonus.
Daily NK was told by several sources in South Pyongan, Yanggang, and Kangwon provinces that some companies and institutions in these provinces gave stipends to workers to encourage them to meet the company’s annual targets before the year-end review.
The North Korean authorities have conducted socialist competition evaluations to create competition among factories and regions in each sector, including agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry, with the ultimate goal of improving performance.
These socialist competition evaluations are often administered by relevant departments in regional party committees. However, last year’s competition stipends were reportedly paid not by the North Korean authorities, but by the companies themselves.
“A feature of the Marshal’s [Kim Jong Un] era is that workers who have helped increase productivity are to be encouraged not only verbally but also practically, with cash or material gifts. Before last year’s assessment, several companies rewarded workers with a ‘competition stipend,’” said a source in South Pyongan Province.
Some larger companies divided their workers into five or ten ranks according to their annual contributions and then paid them bonuses based on their rank, the source said. This, however, means that only some workers received bonuses.
Daily NK also understands that a company in Kangwon Province paid up to KPW 300,000 as a competitive bonus at the end of last year. There was also a factory in Yanggang Province that paid a one-time competition stipend of about KPW 100,000 per worker – more than 15 times the average monthly wage of KPW 3,000.
Since the average worker’s monthly wage is not enough to buy even a kilogram of rice on the market, North Koreans have no choice but to find other sources of income.
Middle- and upper-level managers in companies typically make money through illegal means, such as embezzling money intended for material purchases or other parts of the operating budget.
“People in low-level management positions in manufacturing can regularly earn about USD 100 a month and sometimes as much as USD 1,000. Since people can’t live on their standard wages alone, they are forced to find all kinds of ways to make money,” said a source in North Pyongan Province.
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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10. North Korean Hackers Targeting Developers with Malicious npm Packages
The all purpose sword continues to strike.
North Korean Hackers Targeting Developers with Malicious npm Packages
Feb 26, 2024The Hacker News
thehackernews.com
A set of fake npm packages discovered on the Node.js repository has been found to share ties with North Korean state-sponsored actors, new findings from Phylum show.
The packages are named execution-time-async, data-time-utils, login-time-utils, mongodb-connection-utils, and mongodb-execution-utils.
One of the packages in question, execution-time-async, masquerades as its legitimate counterpart execution-time, a library with more than 27,000 weekly downloads. Execution-time is a Node.js utility used to measure execution time in code.
It "actually installs several malicious scripts including a cryptocurrency and credential stealer," Phylum said, describing the campaign as a software supply chain attack targeting software developers. The package was downloaded 302 times since February 4, 2024, before being taken down.
In an interesting twist, the threat actors made efforts to conceal the obfuscated malicious code in a test file, which is designed to fetch next-stage payloads from a remote server, steal credentials from web browsers like Brave, Google Chrome, and Opera, and retrieve a Python script, which, in turn, downloads other scripts -
- ~/.n2/pay, which can run arbitrary commands, download and launch ~/.n2/bow and ~/.n2/adc, terminate Brave and Google Chrome, and even delete itself
- ~/.n2/bow, which is a Python-based browser password stealer
- ~/.n2/adc, which installs AnyDesk on Windows
Phylum said it identified comments in the source code ("/Users/ninoacuna/") that made it possible to track down a now-deleted GitHub profile with the same name ("Nino Acuna" or binaryExDev) containing a repository called File-Uploader.
Present within the repository were Python scripts referencing the same IP addresses (162.218.114[.]83 – subsequently changed to 45.61.169[.]99) used to fetch the aforementioned Python scripts.
It's suspected that the attack is a work in progress, as at least four more packages with identical features have made their way to the npm package repository, attracting a total of 325 downloads -
Connections to North Korean Actors Emerge
Phylum, which also analyzed the two GitHub accounts that binaryExDev follows, uncovered another repository known as mave-finance-org/auth-playground, which has been forked no less than a dozen times by other accounts.
While forking a repository in itself isn't unusual, an unusual aspect of some of these forked repositories were that they were renamed as "auth-demo" or "auth-challenge," raising the possibility that the original repository may have been shared as part of a coding test for a job interview.
The repository was later moved to banus-finance-org/auth-sandbox, Dexbanus-org/live-coding-sandbox, and mave-finance/next-assessment, indicating attempts to actively get around GitHub's takedown attempts. All these accounts have been removed.
What's more, the next-assessment package was found to contain a dependency "json-mock-config-server" that's not listed on the npm registry, but rather served directly from the domain npm.mave[.]finance.
It's worth noting that Banus claims to be a decentralized perpetual spot exchange based in Hong Kong, with the company even posting a job opportunity for a senior frontend developer on February 21, 2024. It's currently not clear if this is a genuine job opening or if it's an elaborate social engineering scheme.
The connections to North Korean threat actors come from the fact that the obfuscated JavaScript embedded in the npm package overlaps with another JavaScript-based malware dubbed BeaverTail that's propagated via npm packages. The campaign was codenamed Contagious Interview by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 in November 2023.
Contagious Interview is a little different from Operation Dream Job – which is linked to the Lazarus Group – in that it's mainly focused on targeting developers through fake identities in freelance job portals to trick them into installing rogue npm packages, Michael Sikorski, vice president and CTO of Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, told The Hacker News at the time.
One of the developers who fell victim to the campaign has since confirmed to Phylum that the repository is shared under the guise of a live coding interview, although they said they never installed it on their system.
"More than ever, it is important for both individual developers as well as software development organizations to remain vigilant against these attacks in open-source code," the company said.
Found this article interesting? This article is a contributed piece from one of our valued partners. Follow us on Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.
thehackernews.com
11. A dubious history undergirds claims that North Korea has resolved to go to war
It could be called revisionist history.
Excerpts:
The 30-year history of DPRK negotiations that Hecker and Carlin describe in their piece is, to say the least, disputable.
...
Hecker and Carlin were both involved in direct outreach to the North during the timeframe they write of, and perhaps understandably see those efforts in a laudatory light. In their view, had the politicians running the U.S. listened to them and followed through with corresponding policies, we might not be in our current position.
But any expert would be kidding themselves if they said their background doesn’t shape their analysis, as well as their predictions.
In the case of Hecker and Carlin, their view of the repeated failure of U.S. diplomacy with the DPRK has clearly shaped their tendency toward apocalyptic prognostications. They see a fundamental change in Pyongyang’s goals, whereas others see merely a shift in emphasis.
Recognizing this enables us to filter out what’s accurate in their analysis — that Hanoi was indeed a U.S. blunder and that Pyongyang likely does see the international winds shifting away from the liberal order — from the overstated conclusion they arrive at.
In this author’s view, greater attempts to engage the North would not have deterred its illicit weapons development or its hostile actions. They would also have left U.S. partners in East Asia unsure of its commitment to their security, and the rest of the world unclear about Washington’s commitment to enforcing the nonproliferation regime.
A dubious history undergirds claims that North Korea has resolved to go to war
Narrative that US failed to respond to DPRK efforts to normalize ties distorts the picture of Kim Jong Un’s intentions
https://www.nknews.org/2024/02/a-dubious-history-undergirds-claims-that-north-korea-has-resolved-to-go-to-war/?utm_source=pocket_saves
Rob York February 23, 2024
SHARE PRINT
Kim Jong Un and top missile and naval officials observe a missile test at Sondok Airbase. | Image: KCNA (Feb. 15, 2024)
Editor’s note: The following article is an opinion piece by Rob York, director for regional affairs at the Pacific Forum. Views expressed in opinion articles are exclusively the author’s own and do not represent those of NK News.
Just as strife over Gaza appeared to drown out other foreign policy dilemmas, the long-time North Korea watchers Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker raised new alarm over the possibility of conflict on the Korean Peninsula with perhaps the most dramatic headline possible.
There has been no shortage of commentary on their claims in the month since, with analysts both amplifying and critiquing Carlin and Hecker’s argument that Kim Jong Un has made a “strategic decision” to go to war.
The idea that North Korea might provoke conflict is not new and deserves consideration, but what has sometimes flown under the radar in analyses of Carlin and Hecker’s piece is the questionable historical narrative that undergirds their argument.
In essence, they suggest Kim’s decision is the result of America’s failure to respond to a three-decade effort by Pyongyang to normalize ties with the U.S., leading the DPRK leadership to abandon diplomacy and turn to extreme options.
There are numerous issues with this narrative, and recognizing these can help clarify what is useful in Carlin and Hecker’s argument — and what is hyperbole.
Kim Jong Un at the 19th Politburo meeting of the Eighth Central Committee | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Jan. 25, 2024)
A QUESTIONABLE HISTORY
The 30-year history of DPRK negotiations that Hecker and Carlin describe in their piece is, to say the least, disputable.
In it, they paint a picture of a regime that has, across three generations of leadership, prioritized normalized relations with the U.S. and been rebuffed despite numerous overtures. This, they say, was the North Korean regime’s strategy until it became clear that its diplomatic offensive during the Trump administration had failed.
But it’s far from clear that North Korea’s “central goal” has been to normalize ties with the U.S., especially if the authors mean that they prioritized this goal over all others.
The DPRK refused to honor agreements reached with the U.S. and its partners in Seoul, and sought to develop nuclear weapons in defiance of U.S. views on nonproliferation and through backhanded means.
The Bush administration engaged North Korea via the six-party talks and took the regime off the state sponsors of terrorism list in 2008. The Obama administration offered an outstretched hand to the North and other adversarial states.
The DPRK responded by stepping up nuclear and missile tests and abandoning the six-party talks entirely. Kim Jong Un, upon assuming power, did not view the U.S. as a bulwark against overreliance on China, but concentrated on eliminating domestic opposition and expanding his nuclear deterrent.
The central goal of the North Korean regime has not been normalized ties with the U.S. but a complete deterrent against threats to its power. Kim Jong Un only stepped out of his diplomatic isolation in 2018 when he was more confident in his nuclear and missile capacity, and when there was a relatively pliant government in office in Seoul.
Looking back at North Korea’s words toward Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, its current antipathy toward the right-leaning government in Seoul seems less the product of any particular actions by the Yoon administration than its overarching alignment with Washington.
Former U.S. President Trump and Kim Jong Un speak with reporters at the Joint Security Area | Image: Trump White House (June 30, 2019)
BUILT-IN BIASES
Hecker and Carlin were both involved in direct outreach to the North during the timeframe they write of, and perhaps understandably see those efforts in a laudatory light. In their view, had the politicians running the U.S. listened to them and followed through with corresponding policies, we might not be in our current position.
But any expert would be kidding themselves if they said their background doesn’t shape their analysis, as well as their predictions.
In the case of Hecker and Carlin, their view of the repeated failure of U.S. diplomacy with the DPRK has clearly shaped their tendency toward apocalyptic prognostications. They see a fundamental change in Pyongyang’s goals, whereas others see merely a shift in emphasis.
Recognizing this enables us to filter out what’s accurate in their analysis — that Hanoi was indeed a U.S. blunder and that Pyongyang likely does see the international winds shifting away from the liberal order — from the overstated conclusion they arrive at.
In this author’s view, greater attempts to engage the North would not have deterred its illicit weapons development or its hostile actions. They would also have left U.S. partners in East Asia unsure of its commitment to their security, and the rest of the world unclear about Washington’s commitment to enforcing the nonproliferation regime.
It’s simply not the case that North Korea is currently out of options. For one, the Biden administration has not closed the door on negotiations with North Korea, and leadership in Washington could change to a president more interested in engaging Pyongyang.
The DPRK also isn’t teetering on the edge of collapse in a way that would drive Kim Jong Un to commit regime suicide by starting a war.
Ultimately, Carlin and Hecker fail to provide a convincing explanation for why the North Korean leadership, which they credit with viewing the world “strategically and from a long-term perspective,” would prepare to make the mother of all short-term blunders by starting a war.
12. By forsaking unification, North Korea also abandoned the South’s radical left
It will be interesting to see what impact this may have on ROK elections and how it will affect the liberal party.
And how does this affect the work of the United Front Department and the Cultural Engagement Bureau and their subversion activities in the South?
By forsaking unification, North Korea also abandoned the South’s radical left
Policy change has stunned pro-DPRK groups in South Korea, which have long viewed regime as champion of national unity
https://www.nknews.org/2024/02/by-forsaking-unification-north-korea-also-abandoned-the-souths-radical-left/
Andrei Lankov February 26, 2024
GIFT THIS ARTICLESHARE PRINT
A North Korean propaganda display promoting reunification in April 2017 | Image: NK News (April 2017)
North Korea announced one of the most radical shifts in its official ideology in years at the beginning of 2024, with leader Kim Jong Un making clear that Pyongyang no longer aims to achieve peaceful unification with the South.
The slogan of “peaceful unification” has remained one of the key tenets of North Korea’s official ideology for decades. Thus, we can compare the policy announcement to a papal encyclical stating that the Catholic faithful abandon hope for the Second Coming of Jesus Christ.
Such an encyclical would provoke massive upheaval within the Catholic church, but unlike His Holiness, Kim Jong Un has a reliable secret police apparatus that will ensure North Koreans keep any doubts to themselves while pretending to believe what official media instructs.
However, there are individuals who Pyongyang cannot so easily control and who have taken its unification rhetoric very seriously. These are the members of South Korea’s radical nationalist left, often described as Jusapa (주사파), or the Juche idea supporters (주체사상파).
The regime’s sudden policy change has left these pro-North Korea groups in something like a state of shock, undermining their belief that Pyongyang is a champion for national unity. And as we’re already beginning to see, this is likely to make it harder for the DPRK to find comrades and collaborators in South Korea and beyond.
Members of the South Korean branch of the Pan-national Alliance for Korea’s Reunification hold a protest against the “ROK-U.S.-Japan military alliance” in 2022. | Image: Pan-national Alliance for Korea’s Reunification South Korea Headquarters
VOCAL CHAMPIONS
Back in the 1980s, these radicals (overwhelmingly student activists) sincerely believed that the North was a secular paradise, an ideal state for workers and peasants.
The South Korean radical activists of the 1980s were also inspired by Pyongyang’s unification rhetoric. These young radicals believed that the North Korean government truly represented the nation’s essence and was leading the fight for its eventual unification.
One might dismiss such views as irrational. But it should be remembered that in the early 1950s, many Western European intellectuals, including great minds like Jean-Paul Sartre and Pablo Picasso, sincerely believed that Stalin’s Russia was a country of universal freedom and prosperity, while Soviet refugees’ stories of the Gulag were nothing but CIA-funded propaganda.
It’s true that Jusapa has always been a minority with limited political influence. However, it’s important to remember that this radical milieu has produced some vocal and influential champions of the North Korean regime.
These individuals are taken seriously, respected and admired in broad circles of the moderate left, even if their ideology is seen as excessive. As is often the case with radicals, their influence is noticeable well beyond the narrow niche of hardcore ideologues.
Even South Korean left-leaning politicians who are not particularly radical themselves have justified their willingness to accommodate North Korean demands (often irrational) and bow to Pyongyang’s pressures by insisting that the DPRK is genuinely committed to eventual unification.
For example, as recently as December, Im Jong-seok, a former prominent student activist and chief of staff to the ROK president from 2017-19, talked about the need to invest heavily in North Korea to create the foundation for unification “in 30 years’ time.”
Thus, from Pyongyang’s perspective, its vociferous unification propaganda, while quite dishonest, still succeeded in creating leverage in dealing with the South. This often translated into a significant inflow of South Korean aid.
A North Korean man looks at a map of the Korean Peninsula in Sariwon. | Image: Eric Lafforgue (Sep. 10, 2008)
AWKWARD SILENCE
However, those days are now over. It’s interesting to observe how the recent actions and statements of North Korean leaders are reported in the South Korean left-leaning media. Essentially, Pyongyang’s U-turn led to a profound confusion: Left-wing journalists and public intellectuals don’t know what to say.
For decades, they have viewed North Korea as the major driving force for the country’s peaceful unification. But now, North Korean leaders themselves are stating, in no uncertain terms, that this is not the case. As a result, their disoriented supporters remain silent.
Such awkward silence can be seen not only on the far-left fringes of South Korean politics but also in such respected left-leaning and mildly nationalistic publications as Hankyoreh or The Kyunghyang Shinmun. These dailies have been remarkably reluctant to provide any analysis of the recent events and have largely limited themselves to reporting the North Korean leaders’ statements.
This reluctance to speak once again demonstrates that the influence of the Pyongyang-dominated unification discourse has spread well beyond the narrow domain of the left-nationalist firebrands.
To understand what is likely to happen to these people now, we should consider how Western European communist faithful responded when Soviet leaders began to speak about late Joseph Stalin in terms previously described as “CIA-sponsored slander.”
The core communist cadres who had invested heavily in the movement largely stayed with the party. However, the majority of supporters (especially the likes of sympathetic intellectuals like Sartre and Picasso) felt disillusioned and devastated and began to drift away from the movement.
In a sense, the Soviet leader’s 1956 admission of Stalin’s crimes killed the worldwide communist movement.
The same outcome is likely to North Korean sympathizers. Some hardliners will undoubtedly remain, but for the majority of the South Korean nationalist left, North Korea will lose much of its erstwhile appeal.
A similar impact will probably be felt in overseas ethnic Korean communities. Ethnic Koreans in Japan are of special importance since they have been uniquely influenced by North Korea since the 1950s.
North Korean sympathizers associated with the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, better known as Chongryon, already experienced a similar situation in the early 2000s when the DPRK government finally admitted its responsibility for the abduction of Japanese civilians.
Back then, the abduction issue dealt a massive blow to North Korean sympathizers and their groups, and Pyongyang’s reversal on unification policy will likely do so again.
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES?
From the North Korean viewpoint, its new policy makes sense in the long run despite alienating supporters outside the country: Rejecting unification will help to distance the DPRK populace from the South and could thus improve the regime’s internal stability.
Perhaps, the domestic advantages of such a move will outweigh all foreign policy problems it’s likely to create. After all, the U.N. Security Council resolutions make providing aid to and trading with North Korea almost impossible, so Pyongyang’s cheerleaders in South Korea, Japan or elsewhere have lost much of their value.
North Korea cannot leverage them to extract more economic concessions from the outside world. It’s also true that these sympathizers are a dwindling group.
Nonetheless, the recent statements from Kim and his officials have altered the ideological landscape in South Korea, as well as in the ethnic Korean communities overseas. From now on, it will be quite challenging for North Korean diplomats, merchants and spies to find supporters and collaborators.
Edited by Alannah Hill
13. South Korea Unveils Corporate Value-Boosting Plan to Replicate Japan
South Korea Unveils Corporate Value-Boosting Plan to Replicate Japan
By Youkyung Lee
February 25, 2024 at 7:30 PM EST
Updated on February 26, 2024 at 2:07 AM EST
South Korea’s much-hyped plan to push companies to improve valuations through better management practices disappointed investors with a lack of enforcement and concrete details.
Companies that prioritize shareholder returns will be given “bold incentives” and tax benefits under the the “Corporate Value-up Program,” the Financial Services Commission said in a statement Monday. The guidelines for the program will be finalized in June, the financial regulator said.
The nation will also introduce the “Korea Value-up Index” in the third quarter — similar to Japan’s JPX Prime 150 Index and composed of best-practicing companies — that will be used by pension funds and other institutional investors as a benchmark. New exchange-traded funds will be able to track the index, the FSC said.
While welcoming the initiatives as a step in the right direction, most investors said they would have liked to see forceful steps to address corporate practices that favor controlling stakeholders — often the founding families — over smaller shareholders. The benchmark Kospi Index closed down 0.8% as the government called for “self-driven efforts” by companies rather than mandating any change.
“The disappointment comes from the fact that companies are not required to take any actions in the short term,” said Seol Yongjin, an analyst at SK Securities Co. “Investors expected specific incentives to be announced today but now the government said those details will be disclosed later this year.”
Read more: Kospi Falls as ‘Value Up’ Plan Details Disappoint: Street Wrap
Korean stocks had rallied over the past month amid a drumbeat of government commentary on the reform measures, with President Yoon Suk Yeol determined to end the so called “Korea Discount” phenomenon of local shares. Firms with low valuation as measured by the price-to-book ratio had seen particularly strong gains.
Global investors had been keenly awaiting the valuation-boosting initiatives on bets that they will lead to better corporate governance practices in Asia’s fourth-largest economy. The hoped-for outcome was for a sustained market rally that’s similar to the one in Japan after Korea’s neighbor ushered in changes to improve management practices.
The Tokyo Stock Exchange’s decision to name companies with poor shareholder returns was the latest initiative in Japan’s years-long reform push, contributing to a rally that pushed the Nikkei 225 above its 1989 peak.
Foreigners, who were offloading Kospi shares early on Monday, turned buyers on a net basis in the afternoon. They have added 10.5 trillion won ($7.9 billion) this year — more than any other Asian emerging countries.
“There are no specific ways on how the government would make companies follow the measures to improve their corporate value so there is a selloff on disappointment,” says Ahn Youngjun, an analyst at Hana Securities.
Some market watchers, including Wongmo Kang at Exome Asset Management LLC in New York, were hoping the government would push companies to actively cancel treasury shares — whose outstanding volume tends to weigh on valuation.
The thorny issue of improving corporate governance at chaebols — or family controlled conglomerates — also wasn’t addressed in the statement, with FSC Vice Chairman Kim So-young saying “the issue is being discussed” without going into the details.
Yet some money managers remained optimistic that with the government taking the initiative, positive changes in corporate behavior will ensue and support the stock market over the long term.
“If Japan is any guide, let’s bear in mind that the governance reform started in the initial stage of the Abenomics with the Governance Code, and the revision of the Company Act,” said Frank Benzimra, head of Asia equity strategy at Societe Generale SA. “We cannot assume that meaningful changes would happen in days, weeks or months.”
Companies’ boards of directors should play a key role in preparing and implementing mid- to long-term improvement plans every year, the FSC said. They will be encouraged to voluntarily disclose their plans on their websites and on the Korea Exchange.
Korea Exchange also will publish major financial indicators of listed firms by sectors, including price-to-book ratio and return on equity. The exchange operator will establish a department and an advisory board to support the program.
The financial regulator also said it will revise the stewardship code to ensure that pension funds and others consider companies’ value-up efforts when making investment decisions.
“There is no compulsoriness in the measures,” said James Lim, senior research analyst at Dalton Investments. “There isn’t much discussion about revising the commercial laws to prevent controlling shareholders from hurting minority shareholders.”
— With assistance from John Cheng and Abhishek Vishnoi
(Updates with prices as of market close.)
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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