Quotes of the Day:

"The saddest aspect of life right now is that science gathers knowledge faster than society gathers wisdom."

– Isaac Asimov

"An education isn't how much you have committed to memory, or even how much you know. It's being able to differentiate between what you do know and what you don't. It's knowing where to go to find out what you need to know; and it's knowing how to use the information you get." 

– William Feather

"Take up one idea. Make that one idea your life - think of it, dream of it, live on that idea. Let the brain, muscles, nerves, every part of your body, be full of that idea, and just leave every other idea alone. This is the way to success." 

– Swami Vivekananda

1. Ukraine two years later: Memories and observations from my time on the ground

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 25, 2024

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 25, 2024

4. 31,000 Ukrainian troops killed since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, Zelenskyy says

5. Ukraine and NATO’s Washington Paradox

6. America must take the world’s new Axis of Evil much more seriously — or else

7. US admiral warns China could launch surprise attack from military drills

8. China Is Running Out of Lines to Cross in the Taiwan Strait

9. Special Operations News - February 26, 2024 | SOF News

10. Jedburgh Teams – Lessons For Unconventional Warfare

11. Russia has war plan to devastate UK 'without a single shot being fired'

12. Senate Aide Investigated Over Unofficial Actions in Ukraine

13. Supporting America’s Allies Puts America First

14. Taiwan Can’t Be the Excuse for Abandoning Ukraine

15. The Pentagon’s new recruitment policy is a disaster

16. Afghanistan's 'Angel of Death' is retiring from Air Force special ops

17. Special operator in secret unit and the terrorists with propane tanks

18. Who’s Afraid of Freedom? The Fight for Liberalism’s Future

19. John Wayne at His Writing Desk: Lessons from the Origins of the Army’s Professional Journals

1. Ukraine two years later: Memories and observations from my time on the ground

Colleen Denny and Spirit of America are doing incredible work in Ukraine and Spirit of America is doing important work in other critical locations around the world.

Note that SOA was anticipating the worst case prior to the invasion.

Keep in mind the SOA mission: Spirit of America’s mission is to engage citizens in preserving the promise of a free and better life. We do this by working alongside troops and diplomats to help them save and improve lives, promote values shared by Americans and our allies, strengthen relationships with allies, friends and partners, and demonstrate that the United States is a friend of those who seek a better life.

(Full disclosure, I am a member of the board of advisors for SOA).

Ukraine two years later: Memories and observations from my time on the ground

spiritofamerica.org · by Colleen Denny · February 24, 2024

Today is a grim milestone. Today marks two years since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. I write this message to you as I ride the train from Poland into Kyiv, on my 16th trip to Ukraine since February 24, 2022. As I head east across the rolling fields sprinkled with snow and dotted with tiny villages, I wanted to share a few memories and observations about my time on the ground over the past two years.

Months before the full-scale invasion, I was working with US Embassy Kyiv and US Special Operations Forces teams deployed to Ukraine, asking them the worst-case scenario question: If Russia invades, how can Spirit of America help?

On February 24, 2022 that worst-case scenario became reality. A US Special Operations Forces Team Leader called me and asked, “How quickly can you get here?” Within 96 hours, I landed in eastern Poland with fellow Spirit of America team member Terrell Chandler and began working side by side with the 40+ US Special Operations Forces soldiers who had been evacuated from Ukraine into Poland.

The early days felt uncertain, as we worked around the clock with our US military partners to begin triaging the innumerable lists of needs coming to us. I had hundreds of emails, WhatsApp messages, Signal messages, and text messages from US government personnel, Ukrainian military, and Ukrainian civil society leaders. I had desperate pleas from brave Ukrainian civilians who joined the military the morning their country was invaded, asking for medical supplies, tourniquets, body armor, anything as they were preparing to go to the front lines and defend their villages.

I remember Oleh, the first Ukrainian Special Operations Forces soldier I met face to face on the Polish-Ukrainian border as we delivered our first batch of assistance — gasoline, smart tablets, and tourniquets. I’ll never forget Oleh telling me, “Tell your Americans thank you, and that we just want to be free like they are. I want my kids to be free like American kids are free.” I don’t know what happened to Oleh. I hope he’s still out there fighting for that freedom.

And I remember driving through Bucha just days after it was liberated, where the world witnessed the horrors of Russian occupation — mass graves, torture, and quiet neighborhood streets scattered with the bodies of innocent Ukrainian civilians.

But I also remember the generous outpouring of support from regular Americans who were horrified at the Russian invasion, and who wanted to help Ukrainians defend their freedom and democracy. At Spirit of America, we witnessed everyday Americans see themselves in the everyday Ukrainians who were now defending their country. Because of these Americans, we were able to fly in four cargo planes full of lifesaving assistance. Within the first 90 days of the full-scale Russian invasion, we were able to deliver 9,156 bulletproof vests, 8,463 helmets, 20,500 first aid kits, 900 tourniquets, 100 advanced trauma kits, 33,000 ready-to-eat meals, 1,085 combat boots, 32 vehicles, 10 surveillance drones, communications gear such as phones and encrypted radios, and much more. I received so many messages like the one below from grateful Ukrainian soldiers. The message below is not just for me; it’s for all of you.

While so much has changed over the past two years, what has remained consistent is the Ukrainian will to fight. The sentiment that Oleh shared with me on March 2, 2022, has been repeated to me countless times by Ukrainians of all walks of life. I remain in awe of the steadfastness and bravery Ukrainians have shown the world, and inspired by their commitment to defend their country against tyranny.

The past two years have been a humbling experience, and have demonstrated that the citizen-service approach we brought to Ukraine can save lives and have real impacts. Words can’t express how grateful I am to all of you who have supported Spirit of America’s work in Ukraine. Our work now is more important than ever as we reach the 730th day of war.

In 2022, Ukraine caught everyone off guard and was underestimated by all. In 2023, Russia surprised everyone by continuing to disregard the value of life, to Ukrainians and to their own soldiers. Now, in 2024, we can help choose the fate of those fighting for their children to be free.

Thank you for standing up for justice, freedom, and democracy with me. United we can continue to save Ukrainian lives and help democracy win.

Sincerely,

Colleen Denny

Regional Director – Europe

Colleen graduated from the United States Coast Guard Academy in 2009 with a Bachelor of Science and a commissioning in the US Coast Guard. During her time in service, she served on three ships earning over five years of sea time and also served as a military aide-de-camp. She operated primarily in Central America, the Caribbean, and the Florida Straits conducting counter-narcotics missions, search and rescue missions, and delivering humanitarian aid and relief.

spiritofamerica.org · by Colleen Denny · February 24, 2024

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 25, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials and state media largely refrained from publicly discussing the two-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, likely in an effort to avoid addressing Russia’s failure to achieve its stated war aims at significant human costs.
• Russian officials and state-run and state-affiliated TV channels likely refrained from commenting on the two-year anniversary of the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion to avoid drawing attention to Russia’s failures to achieve its stated strategic goals in Ukraine and its more immediate goals of seizing all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, while also suffering high personnel losses.
• Ukrainian officials discussed Ukraine’s goals and priorities for 2024 on February 25 and highlighted the need for continued Ukrainian innovation and Western aid to accomplish Ukraine’s objectives.
• Drone footage posted on February 25 shows Russian forces committing apparent war crimes near Bakhmut.
• The Russian information space continues to be highly sensitive to the recent losses of A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft, suggesting that the issue of deploying and defending these aircraft is of great concern.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Russia has not received any long-range missiles from Iran as of February 25.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Krynky amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on February 25.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to recruit Ukrainian citizens in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military.
• Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on February 25 that Russia is holding over 28,000 Ukrainian citizens captive in Russian prisons.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 25, 2024

Feb 25, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 25, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 25, 2024, 4:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on February 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Click here to read ISW’s latest warning update on the possibility of Transnistria, a pro-Russian breakaway region of Moldova, calling for Russian annexation or taking other action to support Russian hybrid operations against Moldova.

Russian officials and state media largely refrained from publicly discussing the two-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, likely in an effort to avoid addressing Russia’s failure to achieve its stated war aims at significant human costs. Russian opposition outlet Agentstvo Novosti reported on February 25 that Russian state TV channels Rossiya 1 and Channel One (Perviy Kanal) and Gazprom Media-owned TV channel NTV did not mention the two-year anniversary of the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in broadcasts on February 24.[1] Agentstvo Novosti stated that Russian political commentator Mikhail Leontev noted in a February 24 broadcast of the “Vremya” program on Channel One that it was the two-year anniversary of the start of the war but did not offer further statements on the topic. ISW observed minimal discussion by Russian government officials on the two-year anniversary of the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24.

Russian officials and state-run and state-affiliated TV channels likely refrained from commenting on the two-year anniversary of the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion to avoid drawing attention to Russia’s failures to achieve its stated strategic goals in Ukraine and its more immediate goals of seizing all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, while also suffering high personnel losses. A recent Russian opinion poll indicated that Russian sentiments about the war in Ukraine have largely remained unchanged in recent months and that most Russians are largely apathetic to the war, though most do not support a second wave of mobilization.[2] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian government officials likely refrained from highlighting the second anniversary of Russia‘s full-scale invasion in an effort to maintain public apathy toward the war that, in part, allows Russian officials to continue the war without significant public backlash. ISW continues to assess that Putin is likely aware that a second mobilization wave would be widely unpopular and is concerned that such a measure would generate widespread discontent.[3] Putin may, however, become less concerned about public sentiment after his reelection in March 2024 and determine that Russian force generation requirements outweigh the risks of widespread domestic discontent.

Ukrainian officials discussed Ukraine’s goals and priorities for 2024 on February 25 and highlighted the need for continued Ukrainian innovation and Western aid to accomplish Ukraine’s objectives. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that Ukraine is doing everything “possible and impossible” to make a breakthrough along the frontline and that Ukraine has an undisclosed plan for 2024 that will not only bring “hope” but also yield tangible results.[4] Umerov and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi visited several Ukrainian command posts in the Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and other directions and noted the importance of protecting Ukrainian personnel from Russian drone and air strikes in certain areas of the front.[5] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Ukraine hopes to further reduce Russia’s advantage in battlefield artillery systems, currently estimated to be at a 6 to 1 advantage, ahead of future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[6] Zelensky warned that Ukraine could continue to lose territory meter by meter if Ukraine does not receive and produce additional artillery systems.[7] Ukrainian Deputy Commander-in-Chief Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi highlighted Ukraine’s newly-formed Unmanned Systems Force as an important next step in Ukraine’s war effort that is intended to improve Ukrainian efficiency, systematization, and analysis of drone use.[8] Sukharevskyi reiterated that Ukrainian forces are not trying to use drones to replace artillery systems, but rather as additional weapons to defeat the Russian military.[9] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukraine needs significant volumes of long-range weapons from Ukraine‘s Western allies, and Zelensky expressed confidence in Western provisions of long-range weapons.[10] Umerov noted that there is a critical difference between the allocation and provision of Western aid to Ukraine, and Budanov added that Russia and Ukraine are currently competing to see who will get the “upper hand” on the battlefield.[11] Several Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, highlighted plans to hold the first Ukrainian Peace Formula Summit in Switzerland this year and emphasized the importance of further developing Ukraine’s partnership with NATO in 2024.[12]

Drone footage posted on February 25 shows Russian forces committing apparent war crimes near Bakhmut. The footage shows Russian forces executing nine Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) who had just surrendered near Ivanivske (on the outskirts of Bakhmut).[13] The execution of POWs is a violation of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of POWs.[14] The February 25 footage is the fourth such instance of video evidence showing Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs in the past two weeks alone.[15]

The Russian information space continues to be highly sensitive to the recent losses of A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft, suggesting that the issue of deploying and defending these aircraft is of great concern. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukrainian forces prepared the operation to shoot down the A-50 for two weeks.[16] Budanov stated that Russia has six more A-50s left and cryptically suggested that another A-50 will “fall” and force Russia to stop sortieing the planes “round-the-clock." A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reported “to the top” (likely meaning to Russian high command) that a Ukrainian Patriot missile shot down the A-50, but the milblogger and others expressed doubt that this version of events was true and criticized the “systemic” problem of Russian personnel only thinking of themselves and their careers out of “self-preservation.”[17] Ukrainian media previously reported that sources in the Ukrainian GUR stated that Ukraine downed the A-50 with modified S-200 systems.[18] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the loss of a second Russian A-50 this winter is problematic as Russia already had a shortage of these aircraft before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[19] The milblogger claimed that Russia will not be able to modernize many A-50s into A-50Us for a number of unspecified technical and organizational reasons and offered possible alternatives, including creating inferior “ersatz” airborne and early warning control systems (AWACS) or purchasing similar aircraft from China.

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Russia has not received any long-range missiles from Iran as of February 25.[20] Reuters reported on February 21, citing alleged Iranian sources, that Iran provided Russia hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in early January 2024.[21] ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Russian forces using Iranian missiles in Ukraine but has frequently observed increased Russo-Iranian military cooperation over the backdrop of the war.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials and state media largely refrained from publicly discussing the two-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, likely in an effort to avoid addressing Russia’s failure to achieve its stated war aims at significant human costs.
• Russian officials and state-run and state-affiliated TV channels likely refrained from commenting on the two-year anniversary of the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion to avoid drawing attention to Russia’s failures to achieve its stated strategic goals in Ukraine and its more immediate goals of seizing all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, while also suffering high personnel losses.
• Ukrainian officials discussed Ukraine’s goals and priorities for 2024 on February 25 and highlighted the need for continued Ukrainian innovation and Western aid to accomplish Ukraine’s objectives.
• Drone footage posted on February 25 shows Russian forces committing apparent war crimes near Bakhmut.
• The Russian information space continues to be highly sensitive to the recent losses of A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft, suggesting that the issue of deploying and defending these aircraft is of great concern.
• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Russia has not received any long-range missiles from Iran as of February 25.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Krynky amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on February 25.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to recruit Ukrainian citizens in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military.
• Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on February 25 that Russia is holding over 28,000 Ukrainian citizens captive in Russian prisons.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on February 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kreminna near Yampolivka and Terny over the past week.[23] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[24] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor reported that Russian forces have to spend two or three days regrouping after each assault in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions due to personnel and equipment losses.[25] Elements of the Russian “GORB” detachment are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced near Bakhmut on February 25. Geolocated footage published on February 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[27] Positional engagements continued near Ivanivske; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, Niu York, and Pivdenne.[28] Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating south of Bakhmut.[29]

Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Avdiivka on February 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Lastochkyne (west of Avdiivka) and began clearing operations in the settlement, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[30] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lykhovyi stated that Ukrainian forces withdrew to the western outskirts of Lastochkyne, where they took up prepared defensive positions.[31] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces captured all of Sieverne (west of Avdiivka) and Stepove (northwest of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of recent advances in these areas.[32] Positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Berdychi, and Stepove; west of Avdiivka near Lastochkyne, Tonenke, and Sieverne; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[33] Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) reportedly continue operating in the Nevelske-Pervomaiske area, and elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating north of Avdiivka.[34]

Ukrainian forces reportedly regained some positions southwest of Donetsk City on February 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces regained some positions near Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City).[35] Positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka; and south of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[36] Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near Heorhiivka.[37]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Limited positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on February 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting south of Zolota Nyva and Novodonetske (both southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and near Hulyaipole (45km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[38] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have created a “strike force” in this direction but noted that the group has not yet entered active combat.[39] The alleged strike force may be referring to uncommitted tactical reserves in this area. Elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 29th CAA (EMD) are reportedly active in this area.[40]

Russian forces reportedly advanced within Robotyne amid continued localized offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking and advancing in eastern and northern Robotyne, and other Russian milbloggers claimed that heavy fighting is ongoing in and around the settlement.[41] A milblogger additionally claimed that Russian forces captured positions southwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), but ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of this claim.[42] Some milbloggers additionally noted that Ukrainian forces are trying to counterattack and push Russian troops back to the outskirts of Robotyne.[43] A Russian source also reported that Russian forces have become more active on the Kamyanske sector of the front (about 35km northwest of Robotyne) and that there are ongoing battles in this area.[44] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 7th and 76th Airborne (VDV) divisions are reportedly active in the Robotyne area.[45]

Geolocated footage posted on February 25 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced along Ostap Vyshnyi Street in Krynky.[46] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued positional engagements in Krynky despite Russian claims that Russian forces have entirely recaptured the settlement.[47] Elements of the 45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade and the newly formed 337th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in and near Krynky.[48]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched 18 Shahed-136/131 drones at Ukrainian rear areas on the night of February 24 to 25.[49] Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian air defense forces destroyed 16 of the Shaheds over Poltava, Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[50] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command also reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles over Odesa Oblast overnight on February 24-25.[51]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities continue efforts to recruit Ukrainian citizens in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military. The Ukrainian Presidential Representative in Crimea stated on February 25 that they confirmed that Ukraine has captured at least 41 Russian military personnel from occupied Crimea, most of whom are likely Ukrainian citizens whom Russian occupation authorities forcibly mobilized.[52] The Ukrainian Presidential Representative in Crimea also stated that Russian authorities have set up a mobile military recruitment point in central Simferopol and are “agitating” Crimeans to sign contracts with the Russian military. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor stated on February 25 that coal mining enterprises in occupied Luhansk Oblast have canceled mobilization exemptions for miners and that Russian medical commissions will begin medical examinations to determine whom to mobilize into the Russian military at the beginning of March 2024.[53] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also stated on February 25 that Russian authorities have mobilized miners in occupied Ukraine to fight for Russia.[54] The forced mobilization of residents of occupied areas of Crimea is likely a violation of international law—the Geneva Convention prevents an occupying power from forcing residents of the area it occupies to serve in the occupying power’s army.[55]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine continues efforts to bolster its defense industrial base (DIB) for 2024. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on February 25 that Ukraine has tripled its DIB production capacity and has increased the production of drones 100 times.[56] Ukrainian Minister for Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin reported on February 25 that Ukraine tripled its DIB in 2023 and will increase DIB output sixfold in 2024.[57] Kamyshin also noted that Ukraine had created its own long-range weapon that can hit targets at a range of 700km but did not offer additional specifications about the long-range weapon.[58]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on February 25 that Russia is currently holding over 28,000 Ukrainian citizens captive in Russian prisons.[59] Lubinets stated that the prisoners include three official representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) whom Russian authorities detained in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Lubinets stated that Ukraine is searching for new approaches to return the Ukrainian civilians, as international law prohibits exchanges of civilians for civilians. Lubinets stated that Qatari government officials said they were ready to try to negotiate the return of the civilian hostages during a recent meeting. The BBC’s Russian Service reported in January 2024 that Russian authorities have detained thousands of Ukrainian civilians in penal colonies and pre-trial detention centers in Russia and occupied Ukraine without charges, investigations, trials, access to lawyers, or designated release dates.[60]

Russian opposition media reported on February 25 that drunk soldiers of the Russian 81st “Medvedi” Volunteer Brigade broke into a cafe in occupied Chornomorske, Crimea and brutally assaulted and fired on residents following a verbal disagreement over the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[61] Surveillance footage shows the servicemen severely injuring several cafe patrons on the night of February 23 to 24, and Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) has opened a criminal case against the soldiers.[62] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that Russian authorities urged them to “keep the story quiet” when they reached out to identify the Russian servicemen involved.[63] The Russian 81st Volunteer Brigade is reportedly affiliated with the Russian “Redut” private military company (PMC) and Crimean occupation head Sergei Akseyonov’s ”Crimean People’s Militia.”[64]

Early voting for the March 15-17, 2024 Russian presidential election began in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on February 25.[65] Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo stated that early voting will occur in occupied Kherson Oblast from February 27-29 and March 1-3.[66] The Group of Seven (G7) issued a statement on February 24 stating that the G7 will not recognize Russian elections held in occupied Ukraine or their results.[67]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Ukrainian Coordination Center for Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on February 25 that Russia is conducting an information operation aimed at spreading domestic distrust in Ukrainian authorities by circulating a list on social media of Ukrainian POWs who Ukrainian authorities allegedly refuse to exchange.[68] The Ukrainian Coordination Center for Treatment of POWs stated that the lists include the names of Ukrainian POWs, but that Russian authorities have not offered these personnel for exchange. ISW has observed several milbloggers participating in this information operation.[69]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to resist the Kremlin’s efforts to integrate Belarus into the Union State framework. Lukashenko stated on February 25 that Russia and Belarus are more powerful as two independent states than one state and that Belarus will “never support” the idea of merging Russia and Belarus.[70]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 25, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-25-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces has continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis.
• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Yemen: The USS Mason intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile targeting US-flagged, owned, and operated oil tanker MV Torm Thor.

IRAN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 25, 2024

Feb 25, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, February 25, 2024

Andie Parry, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces has continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis.
• West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Yemen: The USS Mason intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile targeting US-flagged, owned, and operated oil tanker MV Torm Thor.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued clearing operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 25. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) targeted Palestinian fighters, destroyed rocket launch sites, and located weapons during clearing operations in Zaytoun.[1] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi held a situational assessment meeting in the northern Gaza Strip with the commanders of Southern Command and the 162nd Division.[2] Halevi stated that Israeli forces are returning to previously cleared areas in the northern Gaza Strip “based on better intelligence“ to ”deepen achievements“ against Hamas.[3]

Palestinian militias continued to operate in Gaza City on February 25. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired rockets at an Israeli position east of Jabalia’s eastern cemetery.[4] The IDF 143rd Division directed an airstrike on a Palestinian squad operating a drone in Shati in northwestern Gaza City.[5] The 162nd Division completed a second round of clearing operations in al Shati refugee camp on February 15.[6] PIJ directed sniper fire targeting Israeli forces operating near al Dawla roundabout in Zaytoun.[7] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, fired rockets at Israeli forces south of Zaytoun.[8]

The IDF has continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis. The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) has operated in Abasan al Kabira and Abasan al Saghira in recent days.[9] The brigade seized a long-range rocket and launcher in a "medical laboratory" in the Abasan area, likely the Algerian Specialized Hospital in Abasan al Kabira.[10] The IDF‘s acknowledgement of its activity in the Abasan al Kabira area is consistent with local Palestinian reports of IDF activity on February 19-20.[11] The IDF 7th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) detained Palestinian fighters hiding among and evacuating with civilians in western Khan Younis on February 25.[12] The brigade also killed several Palestinian fighters and seized weapons.[13] IDF 98th Division forces killed a Palestinian drone squad in Khan Younis.[14]

The IDF announced on February 25 that its 98th Division commando forces ceased operations at Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis.[15] Israeli forces detained over 200 individuals and seized weapons from the hospital.[16] The IDF said it brought multiple rounds of humanitarian aid and a generator to the hospital during its operations.[17] The IDF said it will continue to abide by international law when operating in hospitals in the Gaza Strip.[18]

Israeli media reported that the Israeli War Cabinet approved a measure allowing the direct flow of humanitarian aid into northern Gaza Strip on February 24. Channel 12 stated humanitarian aid will begin directly entering the northern Gaza Strip “in the next few days.”[19] Aid currently enters the Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom crossing at the southern end of the Gaza Strip and must travel near active fighting in Khan Younis and Zaytoun. Several humanitarian organizations have halted transporting aid to the northern Gaza Strip in the past week, citing security concerns.[20]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times in the West Bank on February 25.[21]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 24.[22]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The USS Mason intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile targeting US-flagged, owned, and operated oil tanker MV Torm Thor on February 24.[23] CENTCOM reported that neither the USS Mason nor the MV Torm Thor were damaged in the Houthi attack.[24]

The United States and United Kingdom conducted 18 airstrikes targeting Houthi underground missile storage facilities, one-way attack drones, radars, air defense systems, and a helicopter in Houthi-controlled Yemen on February 24.[25]

4. 31,000 Ukrainian troops killed since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, Zelenskyy says

31,000 Ukrainian troops killed since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, Zelenskyy says

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · February 25, 2024

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · February 25, 2024

5. Ukraine and NATO’s Washington Paradox

Excerpts:

Ukraine has returned to survival mode and defensive weapons are a necessity, but this will not end until someone wins. Sixty billion in US assistance will not accomplish that – but it would buy time for Ukraine to reset. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his generals need offensive weapons to win. There is tough sledding ahead – are the US, NATO and the European Union prepared to stay the course?

Right now, a weakened Ukraine is playing to the strength of Russia – allowing them to mass artillery against their static defenses and then assault them in mass with troop formations utilizing frontal assaults reminiscent of the first World War. Kremlin logic being Ukraine will run out of ammunition before Russia runs out of soldiers. They were right in Avdiivka, but Moscow lost upwards of 120,000 soldiers proving that theory from Oct. 9 to Feb. 20.

...

Putin relishes in the opportunities afforded to him. Washington is playing into his plan.

Regardless of calls for peace talks, Putin will not stop in Ukraine. He may pause but he will not stop. Notably, the Institute for the Study of War published on Feb. 22 that “Transnistria may organize a Referendum on Annexation to Russia to support Russian hybrid operations against Moldova.”

As the fictional character Andy Dufresne intoned to Red in the Shawshank Redemption, “Get busy living or get busy dying.” It is time for Washington to get into the business of living and right the course – to rebuild hope and confidence. Winning changes everything – yet Ukraine cannot win from a defensive position, only absorb the blows. Defend or win – that is the question.

Truth be told, the security of the U.S. southern border will not matter if Ukraine falls. America will be far less secure and Putin’s war against the West ever closer to London and their NATO allies.

Washington must get its priorities in order. The future of Europe and the free world is at stake in Ukraine.

Ukraine and NATO’s Washington Paradox

kyivpost.com · by Jonathan Sweet, Mark Toth · February 26, 2024

US Putin Biden

The US needs to aim beyond keeping Ukraine from falling to Russia, it needs to help Ukraine to achieve victory or democracies everywhere will be threatened.

by Jonathan Sweet, Mark Toth | February 26, 2024, 1:05 pm

A flag with the logo of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). JOHN THYS / AFP

Twenty-four months ago, the United States and their NATO partners valiantly rose to the occasion to support Ukraine in the defense of their country from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation.”

Yet the White House failed to offensively transition with Ukraine as Kyiv began recapturing occupied territory; rather, the Biden Administration remains stuck in the defend and ‘weaken Russia’ mode. There still is no plan to defeat Russia or a clearly articulated end state by the Biden Administration.

On Tuesday Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh reiterated that position when she told reporters, "we are going to continue to urge Congress to pass this urgent supplemental request so that we can deliver Ukraine the air defenses, artillery, and ammunition they need to defend themselves."

Ukraine has returned to survival mode and defensive weapons are a necessity, but this will not end until someone wins. Sixty billion in US assistance will not accomplish that – but it would buy time for Ukraine to reset. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his generals need offensive weapons to win. There is tough sledding ahead – are the US, NATO and the European Union prepared to stay the course?

Right now, a weakened Ukraine is playing to the strength of Russia – allowing them to mass artillery against their static defenses and then assault them in mass with troop formations utilizing frontal assaults reminiscent of the first World War. Kremlin logic being Ukraine will run out of ammunition before Russia runs out of soldiers. They were right in Avdiivka, but Moscow lost upwards of 120,000 soldiers proving that theory from Oct. 9 to Feb. 20.

Other Topics of Interest

Ukraine Needs Western Aid to Win War After Setbacks: Zelensky

In a rare acknowledgement of setbacks, Zelensky said 31,000 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in the war and that plans for summer's failed counteroffensive had been leaked to Russia.

Is Putin prepared to do the same in Krynky, Verbove, Robotyne, Synkivka and Ivanivka?

It is highly likely.

Ukraine has lost the initiative, and now their valiant soldiers await the next Russian assault on their defensive positions and hope they do not run out of ammunition as Washington falters. But as the late US Army General Gordon R. Sullivan once penned: Hope is not a method. Hope is trending south in Ukraine – they need a shot of adrenaline; Washington needs a shot of calcium to regain its backbone.

Confidence is waning in the absence of American leadership and resolve – and domestic disputes about the US southern border. Alarmingly, according to a recent European Union poll, only “one in ten Europeans believe that Ukraine can defeat Russia.” That perception is only compounded by articles proclaiming Ukraine can no longer win.

Absent now are the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles – and the ability to maneuver on the battlefield – that were once the strength of the Ukrainian military and a weakness the Russian defense had no answer for. But the time afforded to Russia last winter gave them the opportunity to dig in, seed minefields, and fortify their defensive positions in depth. Putin and his generals clearly were able to hit the reset button.

Ukraine’s static defense is a losing proposition – as we have seen in Avdiivka. Sooner or later, it will come down to ‘fix bayonets’ or withdraw to fight another day. Make no mistake about it, Putin’s military did not win the battle for Avdiivka, they simply occupied the town when the Ukrainians left.

Nearly 12 months earlier in Bakhmut, Ukraine had the ammunition and repelled the relentless assaults for Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group mercenaries – a much better trained and equipped force – for months with a regional defense force while the Ukrainian Army prepared for their spring counteroffensive.

The US has become a liability to Ukraine and its NATO allies – allegiance to political party has taken precedence over national and global security and promises made to “stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes.” Ukraine is running on empty – and allies are losing faith.

In the absence of American leadership, individual European countries – the United Kingdom, Germany, France and now Denmark – are establishing unilateral security guarantees while others are working to provide Ukraine funding and military assistance directly.

Unlike the US, Russia has a plan and an end state, and they are slowly making progress towards obtaining it. It is a threefold assault – targeting the Ukrainian military, the Ukrainian civilian population, and their hope.

Despite their losses, according to Ukraine's Military Intelligence Agency (HUR), Russia has over 450,000 soldiers deployed in Ukraine. The pick-up game of whoever the Kremlin can muster, put into uniform, and get to the front lines is accompanied by an assortment of Korean War vintage weapons. One word best describes the effort – mass. The intent – wear down the Ukrainian defenders, exhaust their ammunition supplies, remove hope, and keep moving forward whatever the cost. Russian barrier troops will ensure that happens.

And while they wear down the defenders on the front lines, Russia purchased 400 Iranian missiles “from the Fateh-110 family of short-range ballistic weapons … with ranges between 186 and 435 miles,” sending a clear message that they intend to continue striking civilian targets.

The cost of interdicting Putin’s newly acquired missiles with the Patriot Missile system would be about $1.6 billion – or $4 million per missile. And that does not include the cost of defending against ballistic missiles Russia has purchased from their other ‘arsenal of evil’ partner – North Korea – specifically the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) and Hwasong-11B (KN-24) short-range ballistic missiles.

On Jan. 4, National Security Council Coordinator John Kirby confirmed the purchase, telling reporters: “Our information indicates that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea recently provided Russia with ballistic missile launchers and several [dozen] ballistic missiles.” On Feb. 22, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that Russian troops had “launched over 20 North Korea-made missiles to attack Ukraine, killing at least 24 civilians and injuring over 100.”

Make no mistake about it, Putin intends on firing every one of those missiles – and buying more when they are exhausted.

Interdicting individual missiles in flight does not remove the threat though. Enabling Ukraine to strike the missile launchers, their crews, and the facilities where the missiles are stored would be a better course of action. Kyiv urgently needs precision deep strike capability to remove the threat – ATACMS, Taurus, jet fighters, etc., then the greenlight from the US and NATO to take them out in Russia.

As Peter Dickinson states in the Atlantic Council: “As long as Western leaders insist on restricting Ukraine’s ability to strike back at Russia, Ukrainian commanders will be forced to continue fighting with a shield but no sword.”

On Thursday, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made a positive step in that direction, stating “Ukraine has a right to use its Western-supplied weapons to defend itself against Russia, even if that includes striking targets within Russia's borders.” He went on to say, "According to international law, Ukraine has the right to self-defense. And it also includes strikes against legitimate military targets, Russian military targets outside of Ukraine…Ukraine has the right to do that to defend itself."

But will the US and Germany adopt that methodology? As long as Putin retains a nuclear capability, probably not. The White House remains unduly paralyzed by escalation fears. Knowing this, Putin is not shy in reminding the West of this capability either. On Thursday he took a short flight on a Tu-160M nuclear-capable strategic bomber to reinforce that message.

As the saying goes, “there is no I in team,” but Washington has managed to remove the M and E – making it about me, the political party. Carl von Clausewitz once stated, “war is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means.” Right now, in Washington – there is no act, nor instrument, and the repercussions are being felt in Ukraine.

Putin relishes in the opportunities afforded to him. Washington is playing into his plan.

Regardless of calls for peace talks, Putin will not stop in Ukraine. He may pause but he will not stop. Notably, the Institute for the Study of War published on Feb. 22 that “Transnistria may organize a Referendum on Annexation to Russia to support Russian hybrid operations against Moldova.”

As the fictional character Andy Dufresne intoned to Red in the Shawshank Redemption, “Get busy living or get busy dying.” It is time for Washington to get into the business of living and right the course – to rebuild hope and confidence. Winning changes everything – yet Ukraine cannot win from a defensive position, only absorb the blows. Defend or win – that is the question.

Truth be told, the security of the U.S. southern border will not matter if Ukraine falls. America will be far less secure and Putin’s war against the West ever closer to London and their NATO allies.

Washington must get its priorities in order. The future of Europe and the free world is at stake in Ukraine.

Jonathan Sweet

Army Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Sweet (@JESweet2022) served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. His background includes tours of duty with the 101st Airborne Division and the Intelligence and Security Command. He led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012-14.

Mark Toth

Mark Toth (@MCTothSTL) writes on national security and foreign policy. Previously an economist and entrepreneur, he has worked in banking, insurance, publishing and global commerce. A former board member of the World Trade Center, St. Louis, he has lived in U.S. diplomatic and military communities around the world.

6. America must take the world’s new Axis of Evil much more seriously — or else

Korea is only mentioned as an analogy - the Korean War. There is no mention of Korea as part of the new "Axis of Evil." (yes my bias is showing)

America must take the world’s new Axis of Evil much more seriously — or else

New York Post · by Social Links for Niall Ferguson View Author Archive Get author RSS feed · February 24, 2024

When war in Ukraine began, two years ago, I thought the best analogy might be with the Korean War.

You have to frame what we’re going through as the Cold War II, with Ukraine as the first hot war of the Second Cold War.

And just the same way as in 1950, so in 2022, the outbreak of the hot war made many people understand better the world that they were in.

It’s obvious that Russia would not have launched that offensive without Xi Jinping’s approval beforehand.

And without Chinese support Russia would not be able to sustain the war, for massive Chinese exports of microprocessors and other things are what keep the Russian war machine going.

Will the Ukraine invasion end as the Korean War did?

You had a year of extraordinarily kinetic war, and then two years of stalemate that left a country divided with an extremely dangerous border, and it’s still there as we today.

I’ve always felt that was a plausible outcome for Ukraine. It’s not by any means the worst-case scenario.

After all, South Korea ended up being a very prosperous country, despite everything.

And Ukraine might manage that.

But it’s going to be very hard for Ukraine to win this war now.

The United States has stopped supporting Ukraine financially, and Ukraine is running out of ammunition.

Ukrainian anti-aircraft gunners of the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade Kholodny Yar amidst Russian invasion. AFP via Getty Images

Ukraine the 1st domino

This is a war of attrition where President Volodymyr Zelensky needs men as well as shells, because the Russians have lots of them.

And that was always one of the asymmetries in this conflict.

So I expect the war to drag on through 2024.

New York Post’s print cover for Feb. 24, 2024 features Niall Ferguson’s column.

I don’t know whether Putin will oblige us by dying at some point soon, which was what Stalin did in 1953, making a Korean armistice possible.

If he doesn’t, I think the war will drag on.

Ukrainian servicemen are seen at a position near the village of Robotyne in Zaporizhzhia region. REUTERS

American politics is of course a factor.

We didn’t need Donald Trump to get re-elected for the aid to Ukraine to stop — it stopped already, and the election is a little more than eight months away.

I think it’s possible that the aid will restart, because congressional leadership does not want to leave Ukraine entirely relying on Europeans, which right now it is, so I think it’s not entirely over.

Trump’s re-election, which I give at this point 55% probability, would be a terrible blow for Ukraine, but not necessarily fatal.

Europeans understand that they now have to face the possibility of being on their own.

Ukrainian servicemen walk to a position near the front-line village of Robotyne in Zaporizhzhia region. REUTERS

All that fine talk of “strategic autonomy” which we used to hear from France’s President Macron will have to become a reality very swiftly.

The alternative, they now realize, is too dire to contemplate.

Because if Ukraine loses, after all the fine rhetoric of 2022, that puts Russia in an extremely threatening position for the whole of Europe.

Next comes Taiwan

If American aid to Ukraine does not resume, it wouldn’t be the first time that the United States said, “We’ll back you and your independence and your democracy for as long as it takes,” and then that turned out to be for as long as we felt like it — ask the South Vietnamese.

The United States has not done terribly well since the late 1960s in honoring this kind of commitment.

Think of Afghanistan.

The Biden administration’s track record is much worse than you think if all you read is The New York Times, because it failed utterly to deter the Taliban from very quickly restoring their hideous barbaric regime in 2021.

It failed to deter Putin from escalating his invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Ukrainian anti-aircraft gunners equip weapons from their positions in the direction of Bakhmut amid the Russian invasion. AFP via Getty Images

And it failed to deter Iran from unleashing its proxies against Israel in 2023.

My question for 2024 is: Who will they fail to deter this year?

Two years ago, all the experts on Russia said Putin was not going to launch a full-blown invasion of Ukraine.

I was one of the few people who said the war was coming.

I have a similar feeling today.

President Zelenskiy at the Potocki Palace in Lviv, Ukraine. via REUTERS

The experts say China is not ready to make a move on Taiwan until 2027.

Bill Burns, the director of Central Intelligence, said this a couple of times last year.

I just wonder about that, because Xi says — most recently in this New Year address — that unification of Taiwan with the mainland is still his priority.

I think the mistake many experts make is assuming that action means full-blown invasion.

That’s a really difficult thing to do across the Taiwan Strait, and I don’t think the People’s Liberation Army is remotely ready to do it.

Chinese President Xi Jinping attends Spring Festival celebrations with men in suits at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. AP

But they don’t need to.

They just need to blockade Taiwan, and it wouldn’t be a total surprise to me if some time this year China imposed some kind of economic blockade.

If I were advising Xi Jinping, I would say, “Do it, you will never have a better opportunity.”

There is another Cold War analogy that I find useful.

Cuba was an island just off the United States, which the Soviets tried to turn into a missile base.

John F. Kennedy imposed a blockade — he called it a quarantine, but it was a blockade — and the Soviets sent their naval force, and it was the closest we came to the World War III in the whole of the Cold War.

Russian President Vladimir Putin talks to Defence Minister Shoigu beside his limousine during a wreath laying ceremony at Unknown Soldier Tomb, Moscow. Getty Images

Cuban Missile redux

If there was a Taiwan crisis, it would be like the Cuban Missile Crisis, but with the roles reversed.

The Chinese would be the ones doing the blockading.

And we’d be Khrushchev, sending the naval force and risking World War III.

I hope I’m wrong about this.

I hope Bill Burns is right, and we don’t have to worry about this until 2027.

Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin attend a car plant presentation. REUTERS

But let’s put it this way: Our intelligence experts have been wrong in the past, and so I wouldn’t be entirely surprised if a Taiwan crisis happened this year.

In the Middle East, according to the sources I have, the Israeli Defense Forces are destroying Hamas.

Israel is not being given as much time as it would like.

The noises that come out of Washington are that it needs to get this done and then it needs to stop.

But I don’t think these noises are as yet being accompanied by anything that really would prevent Israel from finishing this war.

An Israeli armored personnel carrier (APC) and a D9 bulldozer on a dirt road near the Israel-Gaza border amid ongoing conflict. REUTERS

The problem is that there is another theater that can explode into life at any point, and that’s the Lebanese border with Israel, where Hezbollah has a vast arsenal of missiles and rockets at its disposal.

The IDF would certainly like to act preemptively against Hezbollah, but it’s not able to for political reasons, because that’s something Washington wouldn’t condone.

I think the critical question is not what happens in Gaza.

It’s what happens with Hezbollah and Lebanon that is crucial.

Right now, the US is extraordinarily reluctant to get into any kind of war with Iran.

Another administration might have taken Oct. 7 as the opportunity to impose major costs at Iran, and I think that would have been the correct thing to do.

Palestinians walk past destroyed houses in Jabalia refugee camp amid conflict between Israel and Hamas. REUTERS

Appeasing Tehran

This administration has been from the beginning inexplicably wedded to the idea that it could resuscitate the Iran nuclear deal.

So they have never really exerted serious pressure on Iran.

I worry a lot that this reluctance to confront the source of the trouble, which is Tehran, means that Iran’s proxies have a sense of impunity.

It’s not only Hamas and Hezbollah, there are other proxies — such as the Houthis — who are feeling, “This is our moment,” because there is no significant pressure on Iran itself.

A consequence of the Biden administration’s weak deterrence is that a real Axis of Evil, or at least an Axis of Ill Will, has formed.

Demonstrators gather to protest Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reported decision to recall Israeli representatives from cease-fire negotiations, in Jerusalem. AP

No two world leaders have met more frequently in the last decade than Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

And I assure you they’re not discussing the respective merits of Russian and Chinese cuisine.

They met immediately prior to the offensive against Ukraine, and at that meeting they declared that they had a “no-limits” partnership.

The fact that Iran is a major source of drones for the Russian air assault on Ukraine is further evidence.

There is coordination

So is the fact that the attacks on Israel were preceded by meetings in Tehran between Iranian government officials and the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah, not to mention Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but also by Chinese diplomatic intervention to bring about some kind of truce between the Saudis and the Iranians.

All of this I think is part of the jigsaw that you can put together without knowing the classified information.

On the basis of the open-source intelligence, it’s very clear that there is coordination, even although there is no ideological homogeneity between these regimes.

President Joe Biden delivers remarks during the National Governors Association Winter Meeting in the East Room of the White House. Shutterstock

China is still nominally a Marxist-Leninist communist regime, Russia is some kind of imperial-nostalgia tribute to Peter the Great, and Iran is an Islamist Shia theocracy, but they all want American predominance to end.

The Pax Americana, which has many defects, hasn’t been such bad international order that one would wish it to be replaced by a Chinese-Russian Greater Eurasian Co-prosperity Zone.

Yet the Pax Americana, which was about American economic might plus alliances, is more vulnerable today than at any time since the end of World War II.

One thing that’s interesting about Cold War II is that it seems to be going faster than Cold War I.

Our Korean War seemed to kick off before there was even consensus that we were in another cold war.

Donald Trump speaking at a “Get Out the Vote” rally in Rock Hill, South Carolina. AFP via Getty Images

Our Cuban Missile Crisis over Taiwan might be just around the corner, instead of nine years after the end of the Korean War.

And when it comes to the young people’s attitudes, we have somehow gone to 1968 already, because if you go back to 1968 there was an enormous revulsion against American power from within.

The ones chanting support for Ho Chi Minh on Harvard campus and now chanting in support of Hamas.

Useful idiots you will always find in abundance on that campus.

Consequence of losing

I do think it’s easier for Russia, Iran and China to mobilize anti-American sentiment or anti-Israeli sentiment through social media than was ever possible in the first Cold War.

That means I think that our task is harder.

Cold War II has a lot in common with Cold War I but economically the other side is much stronger that in was in Cold War I.

A Ukrainian flag, flowers, and candles placed for Alexei Navalny as people demonstrate against war and for Russian military withdrawal in front of the Russian embassy. REUTERS

Secondly, I think we are more divided and more capable of being divided and in that sense I think that there’s a decent chance we’ll lose Cold War II.

And that’s what people find really hard to visualize.

The reason people don’t worry is that they think, “We’re always going to win. It’s going to be fine. Don’t worry.”

And my response to that is, No, you have to contemplate the possibility of losing.

The United States did not inevitably win Cold War I.

It looked like it was losing for most of the 1970s.

By 1979, it really looked like it was in trouble.

And I think we just don’t get across to people what losing might be like and why it might be bad.

Ukrainians understand what losing is like because they saw the bodies in the streets of Bucha.

Israelis know what losing is like because they know that Oct. 7 was a dress rehearsal for Holocaust II.

But we don’t really know what losing would mean.

And young Americans absolutely have no concept.

In fact, young Americans are so complacent about freedom that they’re basically against it now, which is a bizarre turn of events.

We need a bit more of what it would actually be like if we lost.

Let’s just imagine that there is a Taiwan Crisis and they send two aircraft carrier groups, and the Chinese just sink both the carriers, and the US finds it has to sue for peace, and Taiwan is taken over, and Xi Jinping does the ticker-tape parade through Taipei.

What then?

What does that mean?

I think a lot of people haven’t really got anywhere close to thinking that through.

They don’t realize that ceasing to be number one, losing the Pax Americana, has massive costs.

These are the things people don’t spend enough time thinking about because they just complacently assume that all of this stuff is going on over there in Ukraine and Israel and Taiwan, but somehow we’ll be fine.

But the reality is we would not be fine, any more than we would have been fine if the Soviets had won the First Cold War.

Niall Ferguson is the Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and a senior faculty fellow of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. He is the author of sixteen books, including “Doom: The Politics of Catastrophe.”

New York Post · by Social Links for Niall Ferguson View Author Archive Get author RSS feed · February 24, 2024

7. US admiral warns China could launch surprise attack from military drills

Excerpt:

In spite of a range of domestic headwinds facing Beijing, from a cooling economy to corruption at the highest levels of its military, the Chinese authorities "are undaunted in their ambitions for their excessive claims or their desire to coerce—if not effect—through the use of force its ambitions, notably in the West Pacific but worldwide," Paparo said at a summit hosted by the Department of Defense's Defense Innovation Unit earlier this month.

US admiral warns China could launch surprise attack from military drills

Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · February 26, 2024

China's military is perilously close to being able to launch a surprise offensive against Taiwan, the commander of the U.S. Pacific fleet has warned.

Adm. Samuel Paparo, whom President Joe Biden has nominated as the next head of the Indo-Pacific Command, said the U.S. military will need to leverage innovations like machine learning and drone swarming technology to get a "stare instead of a blink" on China's military movements.

U.S. intelligence said last year Chinese leader Xi Jinping had ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Many U.S. analysts have said Chinese preparations for war with Taiwan would likely be obvious months, if not a years, before any attack. However, former senior CIA intelligence analyst John Culver warned the potential for a smaller-scale campaign against outlying islands just off the Chinese coast, like Kinmen, is often overlooked.

In spite of a range of domestic headwinds facing Beijing, from a cooling economy to corruption at the highest levels of its military, the Chinese authorities "are undaunted in their ambitions for their excessive claims or their desire to coerce—if not effect—through the use of force its ambitions, notably in the West Pacific but worldwide," Paparo said at a summit hosted by the Department of Defense's Defense Innovation Unit earlier this month.

This aerial photo taken on January 2, 2017, shows a Chinese navy formation, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, center, during military drills in the South China Sea. China's aircraft carrier buildup is part of Beijing's... This aerial photo taken on January 2, 2017, shows a Chinese navy formation, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, center, during military drills in the South China Sea. China's aircraft carrier buildup is part of Beijing's efforts to seek greater global power. AFP via Getty Images

This is "more acutely" the case for Taiwan and in the South China Sea, the admiral said.

China claims Taiwan as its territory despite the fact the Chinese Communist Party government in Beijing has never ruled on the island. In the South China Sea, Beijing's sweeping territorial claims have pitted China against an increasingly assertive Philippines, a U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty ally.

Paparo warned China's capacity to project force in nearby waters is fast approaching a juncture where the PLA could pivot from a large-scale exercise to a major offensive with little notice.

"Just in the last three years, step-level changes in the [Chinese military] force levels, the jointness of those force levels, the rehearsals that are apparent to the joint force and raising the threshold of warning to the point where soon we'll be at a point where a force sufficient to execute a profound military operation is in the field and operating under a fig leaf of exercise," he said.

He said this "erosion of strategic operational and tactical warning" is a call to action for Washington, which needs to adopt new tools to better predict China's moves, support American partners in the region, and "if so called by the commander-in-chief, answer to the readiness to defend Taiwan if the PRC (People's Republic of China) should decide to settle matters with the use of force."

Newsweek reached out to the U.S. Naval Institute and Chinese Foreign Ministry with written requests for comment.

Though the U.S., like most countries, does not recognize Taiwan officially, it maintains a de facto diplomatic presence there and is the island's largest arms supplier. Washington maintains a decades-long policy of "strategic ambiguity" on whether it would come to Taiwan's defense in the event of a Chinese attack.

The admiral said being able to field a large number of unmanned aircraft in waters where China currently has an offensive and sensory edge will be key to securing an effective American readiness posture in the future.

Low-cost drone "swarming" over an area over time provides the operating military with sensory "stare" compared with the "blink" provided by manned missions that would carry more risk. Moreover, pairing this data with machine learning could provide a clearer, AI-assisted picture of likely threats on the horizon.

"That ability to see and sense what our competitors are doing so we can be better prepared for aggression, I think is an important gap," Paparo said.

Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · February 26, 2024

8. China Is Running Out of Lines to Cross in the Taiwan Strait

Conclusion:

America’s strategic attention is being consumed by wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. But if the United States takes its eye off the perilous situation facing Taiwan, there soon may be no lines left for China to cross.

Opinion - The Risk of a China War Over Taiwan Is Rising - The New York Times

nytimes.com · by Ben Lewis · February 26, 2024

Guest Essay

China Is Running Out of Lines to Cross in the Taiwan Strait

Feb. 26, 2024

By Ben Lewis

Mr. Lewis is an independent defense analyst who tracks Chinese military activity.

In 2020, the balance of military power in the Taiwan Strait began a gradual but profound shift in China’s favor.

That August, Alex Azar, then the Health and Human Services secretary, became the highest-ranking U.S. cabinet official to visit Taiwan in more than four decades. Though he was there to talk about the pandemic, China’s People’s Liberation Army (P.L.A.) responded by carrying out large-scale military exercises around the self-governing island, sending aircraft over the median line of the Taiwan Strait for only the third time in more than 20 years. Since then, China has responded to such visits and other perceived provocations by flying more than 4,800 sorties, with growing numbers of aircraft flying in locations previously seen as off-limits and conducting dozens of increasingly complex air and naval military exercises around Taiwan.

The P.L.A.’s now-normalized presence around Taiwan raises the risk of an accidental confrontation. But over the longer term, it has also gradually created a dangerous sense of complacency in Taipei and Washington, while giving China the crucial operational practice it might one day need to seize the island.

As a military analyst specializing in China and Taiwan who has spent the last two years managing an open-source database tracking Chinese military activity, I am deeply concerned about the dangers that this activity poses. Alarm bells should be ringing, but neither Taiwan nor the United States have taken meaningful action to deter China, and Taiwan’s response has been inconsistent and lacks transparency, which may further embolden Beijing. A more robust approach is needed to deter China from escalating the situation.

In 2020, shortly after China began raising the pressure, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense started releasing daily reports on Chinese military activity inside the island’s Air Defense Identification Zone, a perimeter extending beyond Taiwan’s territorial waters and airspace that is monitored to provide early warning of approaching Chinese planes or missiles. In previous years, China rarely entered the zone. But in 2020, P.L.A. aircraft breached it nearly 400 times. Last year, that number exceeded 1,700.

Beijing has steadily pushed the envelope. P.L.A. forces also rarely crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, the halfway point between China and Taiwan. But in August 2022, after a visit to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi, then the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Chinese forces crossed the line 302 times that month, essentially erasing it as a functional boundary. Today, Chinese aircraft continue to cross the line almost daily, leaving Taiwan only minutes to assess China’s intentions in a dangerous guessing game that leaves the door open for miscalculation. Since last year, China also has essentially established a permanent naval presence around the island.

With no official contact between Beijing and Taipei for the past eight years, the chances of defusing an inadvertent clash are limited. An isolated confrontation could escalate into an attack by China or to a rapid deployment of the now well-drilled air and naval forces it has around Taiwan, cutting the island off from any U.S. help and dramatically reducing American military options.

This tense climate is straining Taiwan’s defenses. In early 2021, Taiwan stopped scrambling jets for every violation of the island’s Air Defense Identification Zone after spending almost nine percent of the previous year’s defense budget on monitoring Chinese aircraft.

This atmosphere also has sown policy confusion. In October 2022, after the incursions following Ms. Pelosi’s visit, Taiwan’s defense ministry announced that any P.L.A. aircraft that violate Taiwan’s territorial air and sea space — 12 nautical miles from the island’s shores — will be viewed as a “first strike,” likely meaning they would be shot down.

Since then, no incursions by P.L.A. aircraft have been publicly revealed, but China has tested Taiwan’s policy by sending at least 27 balloons into the island’s territorial airspace since the start of this year, forcing Taipei to choose between taking no action, which gives Beijing tacit permission to continue to violate the island’s airspace, or shooting down the balloons, which could provoke China. So far, Taiwan is not known to have taken any action against the balloons that have entered its airspace.

Taipei’s approach to sharing information about Chinese activities with the public has not been fully transparent, marked by unexplained changes in how much information it releases. Caution is understandable to avoid raising public alarm. But a lack of transparency also prevents the government from communicating the true situation to Taiwan’s people, which could lead to calls for a different policy.

Taiwanese made their desires clear last month when they chose Lai Ching-te, who is committed to the island’s sovereignty, as their next president. Mr. Lai’s victory presents a chance for his government to adopt a more transparent approach to Beijing’s military aggression similar to that of the Philippines, which has demonstrated that drawing attention to Chinese actions in the South China Sea can help build domestic, regional and international support for efforts to counter that aggression.

In Washington, there is bipartisan support for Taiwan, and President Biden has repeatedly stated that the United States would come to the island’s defense. The Taiwan Relations Act, which has governed American policy toward the island for four decades, explicitly states that any moves to determine Taiwan’s future by other than peaceful means would be of “grave concern.” But America has come up with no specific response to China’s recent military activity.

The United States must make clear to China that its military activities could spark a war and are no longer acceptable. Washington should also coordinate with Taipei on more effective ways to deter Chinese provocations, such as through increased information sharing, air patrol exercises and ensuring that the island is fully equipped and prepared to defend its sovereignty.

America’s strategic attention is being consumed by wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. But if the United States takes its eye off the perilous situation facing Taiwan, there soon may be no lines left for China to cross.

Ben Lewis(@officialben_l)is an independent defense analyst specializing in China and Taiwan military and security affairs. He is co-founder of PLATracker, a site that tracks Chinese military activity and development, and manages the site’s database on Chinese military activity around Taiwan.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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nytimes.com · by Ben Lewis · February 26, 2024

9. Special Operations News - February 26, 2024 | SOF News

Special Operations News - February 26, 2024 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · February 26, 2024

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: U.S. Army Soldier Pfc. David Hanson, from 3rd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 11th Airborne Division, recovers his parachute after jumping onto Donnelly Drop Zone as part of Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center 24-02 at Donnelly Training Area, Alaska, Feb 8, 2024. (U.S. Army Photo by Spc. Wyatt Moore / 28th Public Affairs Detachment)

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

‘Angel of Death’ Retiring from AFSOC. Colonel Allison Black is retiring from the Air Force. In the initial stages of OEF she was referred to by Afghan fighters as “the Angel of Death” for her radio calls from AC-130 gunships. “Afghanistan’s ‘Angel of Death’ is retiring from Air Force special ops”, Task & Purpose, February 23, 2024.

New Cdr for 1st SOW. With the retirement of Col Black (see para above) the 1st Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida has a new commander. “Welcome Col. Patrick Dierig; 1st SOW change of command ceremony”, 1st SOW Public Affairs, February 23, 2024.

Former 10th SFG(A) Doc Awarded Army Astronaut Device. Army Col. (Dr.) Frank Rubio has earned many awards and decorations throughout his long career. He has deployed to Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan . . . and spent a year in space. He set the U.S. record for the most days in space on a single spaceflight on the International Space Station. In addition to being a doctor (served with 10th Special Forces Group) and an astronaut, he also has been a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter pilot (600 combat flight hours). “Army Secretary Says Astronaut’s Army Values Inspire Others”, DOD, February 22, 2024.

Another List of Elite Units. At least once a month some journal or online blog publishes an article about the “Ten Most Elite Units in the World”. Typically, no list is the same as the other. Sometimes, the best units are sometimes left out while obscure units are included. Here is the latest ‘list’: “These Are 16 Most Dangerous Special Forces in the World 2024: Deathly Elite”, by Srdjan Ilic, Southwest Journal, February 20, 2024.

CV-22 Mishap Update. Air Force Special Operations Command has issued a press release providing an update on the November 29, 2023, aircraft ‘mishap’ in the waters off Yakushima, Japan that claimed the lives of eight servicemembers. Ongoing investigations found that a material failure that occurred is known but the cause of the failure has not been determined. “CV-22 Mishap Investigation Update”, AFSOC, February 20, 2024. Read an article on the same topic in Air & Space Forces Magazine, February 20, 2024.

Help Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel with spine injuries receive the healthcare options, education, and care they need.

26th MEU(SOC). The Marines of the 16th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) have been quite busy during their deployment the past several months. One of the units training events has been working with the Italian San Marco Brigade Marines. (DVIDS, 21 Feb 2024)

SOF and Cancer Screening. The President of the Globa SOF Foundation, Stu Bradin, notes that special operations veterans have a higher rate of cancer than the general population and that we should take some steps to detect it early rather than in its later stages. “Options for Screening for Cancer in SOF”, Global SOF Foundation, February 20, 2024.

SOCAFRICA Trains SNA Danab Forces. Somali National Army units received training in media, medical, and tactics during a recent event held in January 2024. “U.S. Special Operations Command hosts Knowledge Exchange with Somali and Kenyan Partners”, DVIDS, February 22, 2024. There have been recent news reports that the U.S. will begin construction of five bases in Somalia (map, NSI) for the Danab unit.

SOCNORTH and Arctic Edge. The Special Operations Command North, along with NORTHCOM and Marine Forces North, will be participating in an annual defense exercise that is designed to demonstrate that U.S. forces are engaged, postured and ready to defend U.S. interests in the Arctic security environment (map, NSI). The 3-week long multi-domain exercise is taking place in late February and early March. It will focus on operations in extreme cold and high-altitude environments.

SOF History

Merrill’s Marauders. On February 24, 1944, Merrill’s Marauders began a campaign in northern Burma. The mission of the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional) was to disrupt Japanese supply and communications lines.

Operation Bunghole – OSS in WWII. On February 27, 1944, a five-man team from the OSS parachuted into Malo Ticevo, Yugoslavia to establish a weather station. Operation Bunghole consisted of members of the OSS and USAAF specialists. Yugoslavia was occupied by the Germans at the time.

https://codenames.info/operation/bunghole-ii/

Corregidor Secured. On February 26, 1945, the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team (PRCT) secured the island fortress of Corregidor after two weeks of fighting. The 503rd had parachuted onto the island on February 16th. It was assisted by the 34th Infantry Regiment, a unit of the 24th Infantry Division that made a seaborne assault, as well as other smaller units.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Corregidor_(1945)

SR Mission in Desert Storm. On February 23, 1991, SOFDA 525 was inserted by helicopter at night and moved to a hide site to conduct a recon mission deep behind enemy lines in Iraq. On the next morning, the 24th, this 5th SFG(A) team would find itself fighting for survival against an overwhelming enemy force.

https://sof.news/history/sfoda-525/

MARSOC. On February 24, 2006, the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was officially activated at Camp Lejeune, N.C.

Conflict in Israel and Gaza

Israel’s Future Plans. On Friday, February 23, 2024, Israel released its proposed plan for the future of Gaza. The IDF will retain indefinite military control over the Gaza Strip (map, NSI) while allowing Gazans to govern aspects of civilian life. Israel will control buffer zones along Gaza’s borders with Israel and Egypt. The offensive against remaining Hamas elements in Rafa (map, NSI) is still yet to be conducted.

Humanitarian Crisis. An in-depth look at the situation for the Gazan civilians is presented by Tania Hary and Kevin Huggard, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institute, February 22, 2024, in “The Gaza Strip’s deepening humanitarian crisis”.

U.S. Involvement. The United States is working with Israel and other regional powers to get an agreement that results in the release of the remaining hostages and that produces an extended humanitarian ceasefire. Involved in the negotiations is CIA director Bill Burns, White House Middle East Coordinator Brett McGurk, and Ambassador David Satterfield.

• References:
• Map Gaza Strip (2005), and more maps of Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Israel.
• Israel-Hamas War: Insights from RAND

Ukraine Conflict

Two Years Ago – Invasion. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The objective of the Russians was to occupy the capital city of Kyiv and topple the Ukrainian government in three days. The conflict had been ongoing since 2014 when the Russians seized Crimea and created the regimes in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in eastern Ukraine. Although the Russians captured a considerably amount of territory in the first several months of the conflict, Ukraine has retaken more than half of that land back. The fight continues, two years later. However, Ukraine suffers from manpower shortages, lack of air defense systems, and a severe shortage of artillery ammunition. Until Western aid picks up, Ukraine will remain on the defensive and Russia will retain the momentum. Ukraine has been successful in the Black Sea (GIS Reports, 14 Feb 2024). Read an account of the first day of the invasion of Ukraine, SOF News, February 24, 2022.

Commentary on Ukraine. There is a lot of coverage about the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Some of the articles and reports are listed below:

• Ukraine and IW Lessons. Doug Livermore, a Special Forces officer, highlights “several critical lessons regarding irregular warfare and its broader implications for global security and stability.” He used the conflict in Ukraine to underscore the importance of hybrid warfare strategies. He applies these lessons to China, Africa, and the Middle East. “Two Years On: Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine and the Continuing Lessons for the Future of Irregular Warfare”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, February 20, 2024.
• The Russo-Ukrainian War: A Strategic Assessment Two Years into the Conflict, by Amos Fox, Land Warfare Paper 158, Association of the United States Army, February 2024, PDF, 23 pages. Abstract or PDF.
• Ukraine Two Years Later: Memories and Observations from My time on the Ground, Spirit of America, February 2024. The Regional Director – Europe of Spirit of America writes of her experiences in the effort to assist the fighting forces of Ukraine and being an enabler for U.S. SOF efforts in Ukraine. Read more in “Spirit of America – Helping Ukraine Win“, SOF News, May 3, 2022.

Resistance Behind the Lines. While the world is fixated on the grinding war of attrition on the front lines, Ukrainian intelligence operatives of the SBU and GUR have been busy conducting operations deep behind Russian lines and in Russia. “Tip of the Spear: Analyzing Ukrainian Intelligence Operations Behind Russian Lines”, Georgetown Security Studies Review, January 10, 2024.

• References:
• Interactive Map. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine by the Insitute for the Study of War and Critical Threats. On storymaps.arcgis.com See also https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html
• U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, Congressional Research Service, CRSIF12040, periodically updated, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040
• Ukraine Conflict, National Security Info. https://www.national-security.info/ukraine-conflict.html

National Security

IW Global Network. In February 2024 the Irregular Warfare Center introduced a new initiative entitled “IW Global Network”. This project has been established to address specific areas of interest, focusing primarily on confronting irregular challenges. The IW Global Network consists of several Functional Area Networks (FANs). These cover the topics of contested logistics, mission assurance, medical resilience, intelligence, information operations, and emerging technologies. Read more about it here at IW Global Network.

NDAA. The Congressional Research Service has updated a publication that provides an overview of the structure and organization of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). It also provides a description of the legislative process within the Senate and House of Representatives. Defense Primer: Navigating the NDAA, CRS IF10516, updated February 22, 2024, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10516

Emerging Military Technology. The Congressional Research Service has updated a publication that provides an overview of new technologies that are being incorporated into the U.S. defense forces. These include artificial intelligence, lethal autonomous weapons, hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, biotechnology, and quantum technology. Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS R46458, updated February 22, 2024, PDF, 43 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46458

Border Security:

• Report – Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role. The Congressional Research Service has published a document that provides the background, trafficking pathways, role of China, and Congressional legislation of the opioid crisis in the United States. Beginning in the mid-2010s, U.S. authorities identified the People’s Republic of China as a primary source of U.S.-bound illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues. CRS IF10890, updated February 20, 2024, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890
• Restricting Asylum. President Biden’s campaign for reelection is struggling with one of the foremost election issues – border security and the surge in border crossings. The White House is considering action that would prevent people from making asylum claims during border crossing surges. “Biden Mulling Plan That Could Restrict Asylum Claims at the Border”, The New York Times, February 31, 2024. (subscription) See also an article on this topic by Associated Press, February 21, 2024.
• Suspending Entry of Aliens. A recent Congressional Research Service report gets into legal aspects of border security and limiting the entry of aliens across U.S. borders. The report finds that the President has the authority “to suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens” whenever he finds that entry of aliens would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. Presidential Authority to Suspend Entry of Aliens Under 8 U.S. C 1182(f), CRS LSB10450, updated February 21, 2024, PDF, 23 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10458

Strategic Competition

Russia and Unconventional Activities. A recent report details “Russia’s unconventional military activities outside Ukraine, including efforts to prepare for destabilization in European countries, expeditionary operations in Africa to seize control of critical resources, and outreach to target audiences in the Middle East.” This special report is entitled The Threat from Russia’s Unconventional Warfare Beyond Ukraine, 2022-2024, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), February 2024, PDF, 38 pages. See Unconventional Warfare (NSI) for more references on UW.

Russia and ‘Offensive’ Resistance Operations. Russia, as well as the Soviet Union, has a long history of utilizing local collaborators to pursue political objectives in foreign nations. Dr. Jonathan White, a career Special Forces officer, writes on this topic in “Russian Offensive Resistance Operations”, Irregular Warfare Center, February 21, 2024.

Report – Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations, The Congressional Research Service has updated its publication about the country that lies across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. A recent U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet refers to Taiwan as “a key U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific.” This CRS report has info on the modern history of Taiwan, the recent elections, U.S. policy toward Taiwan, the country’s security, and more. CRS IF10275, updated February 23, 2024, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275

Battle for Taiwan and U.S. Big Tech. Leading technology companies of the United States have provided significant assistance to Ukraine over the past two years. This includes services like mapping, ISR, targeting, cyber security, and more. However, these same firms may not come to the aid of Taiwan (map NSI) in the same manner due to their business ties with mainland China. Which Ties Will Bind? Big Tech, Lessons from Ukraine, and Implications for Taiwan, Issue Brief, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown, February 2024, PDF, 76 pages. Read the report here.

Arrow Security & Training, LLC is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. AST offers a wide range of training and instruction courses and programs to include language and cultural services, training, role playing, and software and simulation. https://arrowsecuritytraining.com/

Middle East

Video – Inside Look at U.S. Navy Response to Houthi Red Sea Attacks, 60 Minutes, YouTube, February 18, 2024, 13 minutes. A good video describing how the U.S. Navy keeps the waterways open in the Red Sea and other surrounding waters. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRRJmOTCqqQ&t=1s

Houthi Threat. Dr. Can Kasapoglu provides his perspective on the Houthi threat. He states that Iran has successfully targeted global supply chains through its Yemeni proxy (Houthis). Up to this point, Operation Prosperity Guardian has not established a credible deterrence in the (NSI map) Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. “Assessing and Addressing the Houthi Threat”, Hudson Institute, January 2024.

Legal Status of U.S. in Syria. The United States has had a military presence and conducted operations in Syria (SOF News, 2022) since 2014. The primary reason for being there is so it can target Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) within Syrian territory (map) – as part of a broader counterterrorism campaign. It conducts this campaign unilaterally and in concert with the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) (SOF News, 2018) and other proxies. Many observers of the conflict question the legal status of the U.S. conducting operations in a country where it is not invited. However, there is a legal justification. See “Enduringly Unwilling and Unable: The Syrian Chapter of the Forever Wars Saga”, by Thea Charlotte Andersen, Articles of War, Lieber Institute West Point, February 23, 2024.

Tower 22, al Tanf, and SF. A small U.S. base in Jordan burst into the news in January 2024 when a terrorist drone exploded within its perimeter killing three and injuring over 40 U.S. servicemembers. “What is the U.S. Doing in a Disputed Triangle on the Jordan / Syria / Iraq Border?”, Stimon.org, February 20, 2024.

SOF News Book Shop

View our selection of books about special operations forces at the SOF News Book Shop.

Journals, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

InterPopulum: Journal of Irregular Warfare and Special Operations. The Spring 2024 issue has been posted online. There are a number of interesting articles for the IW practitioner. PDF, 117 pages.

• Jedburgh Teams – Lessons for Unconventional Warfare
• Secret War in Cuba: The Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1960-1961
• Limited Conflicts and Use of SOF in Global Competition
• 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) “Merrill’s Marauders”
• The Liberator’s Dilemma: The Paradox of American Leadership
• and . . . six reviews of books relating to SOF, intelligence, insurgency, and AI

CTC Sentinel. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has published its February 2024 issue containing articles about “Long-Range Stand-Off Terrorism”, an interview of Christopher Maier (ASD SO/LIC), and Somalia’s stalled offensive against al-Shabaab. PDF, 28 pages.

Upcoming Events

February 27-29, 2024

Special Air Warfare Symposium – Global SOF

Fort Walton Beach, FL

March 11-13, 2024

Irregular Warfare COI Symposium

Mclean, Virginia

April 12-14, 2024

Best Ranger Competition

April 24-25, 2024

12th Border Security & Intelligence Summit

Defense Strategies

May 6-10, 2024

SOF Week – Global SOF

Tampa, FL

sof.news · by SOF News · February 26, 2024

10. Jedburgh Teams – Lessons For Unconventional Warfare

Some important history that we can still learn from.

download the PDF at this link: https://interpopulum.org/jedburgh-teams-lessons-for-unconventional-warfare/#

Jedburgh Teams – Lessons For Unconventional Warfare

By

J. Paul de B. Taillon

Published

December 15, 2023

Download PDF

https://interpopulum.org/jedburgh-teams-lessons-for-unconventional-warfare/?

J. Paul de B. Taillon, Samuel Associates, Ottawa, Canada

ABSTRACT

This article provides an overview of the concept, development, deployment, and validation of the multinational Jedburgh concept that was conceived by Major General Sir Colin Gubbins, head of the Special Operations Executive (SOE). This concept consisted of inserting three-man teams into France who were specifically recruited, trained, and designed to assist resistance forces in the conduct of unconventional warfare in the wake of D-Day 6 June 1944. These teams provided communications, coordinated aerial resupply, equipment, and helped to, if needed, provide direction for the French resistance known as the Maquis. The success of these teams and their operations laid the foundation for the U.S. Army Special Forces, as well as provided important insights as to the criticality of incorporating language and culture within future similarly tasked military teams assisting and supporting irregular/unconventional operations.

 In no previous war, and in no other theater during this war, have resistance forces been so closely harnessed to the main military effort.

– General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1945)

When Great Britain entered the war on 3 September 1939, and the United States later 7 December 1941, both militaries were designed for conventional conflict and focused essentially on attritional warfare. Interestingly, both countries had substantial experience in what was respectively described as imperial policing and small wars. For the professional soldier prior to World War II, the type of operations that would theoretically take place in the enemy’s rear area now formally recognized as unconventional warfare (UW), was neither a focus of mainstream professional military thought nor a concept demanding any formal study.

Notwithstanding, these described “behind enemy lines” UW operations are presently captured under the umbrella of the term irregular warfare (IW), which embraces a spectrum of activities to include counterterrorism (CT), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN) and Stability Operations (SO). There were a number of proponents and practitioners who conducted UW during the world wars of the twentieth century.[1] The UW experience demonstrated the substantial advantages that these operations offered particularly in the forced dispersal of enemy troops, the requirement to secure and effectively protect the population centers, vital governmental, economic and military installations, as well as the lines of communication amongst others within the target country. For some military professionals, twentieth century UW campaigns highlighted the most effective force structure, as they are considered to be “relational-manoeuvring forces.” These effective guerrilla organizations were adept at ascertaining the enemy’s weaknesses or vulnerabilities and then adjusting their internal composition, enabling them to engage and attrit the enemy effectively.[2]

Britain’s Great War experience in the employment of the Arab revolt to assist conventional military operations during their Middle East campaign (1916-1918), under the auspices of Lieutenant Colonel T. E. Lawrence, whose guerrilla army of Arab tribesmen created havoc throughout Ottoman occupied territory in Arabia, was notable. As well, the Imperial German campaigns in East Africa (1914-1918), General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and his force of 14,000 Askaris held in check a military force of 300,000 consisting of Indian, British, Belgian, and Portuguese soldiers who were much-needed on other fronts set a standard not before realized in UW. Both officers epitomized the economy of effort in their respective application of guerrilla strategy. The UW concept was further explored and applied in World War II through a panoply of Allied Special Forces (SF) and special operations organizations developed to oversee UW in the form of raising and facilitating guerrilla organizations and to support and coordinate their operations.

This article focuses on the concept of supporting resistance groups, in this case the French Maquis, by multinational Jedburgh teams consisting of British, American, and French personnel who were to be deployed in the wake of D-Day on 6 June 1944 within the German rear echelon. The terms guerilla, resistance, resistance fighters, paramilitary, and Maquis will be used interchangeably.

Background

By mid-March 1943, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and its joint staff commenced planning for the strategic inevitability of an invasion of the European continent. At this time both, the United States and Russia were heavily involved in this global conflict and an invasion of occupied Europe was politically and militarily envisioned and being forcefully pressed. Understandably, the location of the invasion and the preparation for subsequent follow-on operations were in the nascent planning stages as it would take time to formulate, coordinate, and execute the myriad of preparations necessary for an opposed landing in Europe.

Predicated upon ongoing intelligence and low-level guerrilla operations being conducted from 1941 by the British in Europe, there were strong indications—indeed optimism—that an Allied force would encounter a friendly population actively interested in supporting their liberators. 

The Assessment Challenge

Contnued at this link: https://interpopulum.org/jedburgh-teams-lessons-for-unconventional-warfare/?

11. Russia has war plan to devastate UK 'without a single shot being fired'

Russia has war plan to devastate UK 'without a single shot being fired'

EXCLUSIVE: Russia's attempt at 'conventional' warfare in the UK would see them take out the military bases, electric power supply and internet without firing a single bullet, an expert has warned

NEWS

ByEwan GleadowNews Reporter

• 11:29, 25 FEB 2024

dailystar.co.uk · by Ewan Gleadow · February 25, 2024

A war in the UK would see not a single bullet fired according to an expert (Image: Getty Images)

Russia has a plan to devastate the United Kingdom and will not fire a single shot if they carry out their "conventional" war plan.

The UK could find itself fending off drones and other cyber attacks from Vladimir Putin's military, according to an expert who believes the country would be crippled by the onslaught of tech trouble.

Professor Anthony Glees warned Russia's plan would see the Kremlin head and his cronies "take out" the command centres across the UK, plunging the military efforts at home into turmoil and disarray.

Click here for the latest news and updates on Russian war plans.

Putin's 'conventional' plan for war in the UK would leave the country with a cyber crisis on its hands (stock) (Image: Getty Images/iStockphoto)

Read More

Speaking to the Daily Star, Professor Glees said: "We live in extremely dangerous times, and that means in a conventional war, we risk being attacked in conventional ways and that could well include Russia trying to take out the control and command and defence intelligence centres in the UK".

Not only does it put the top brass of the UK's military at risk but also "specific bits of our critical national infrastructure". Professor Glees warned it could leave our nuclear warheads fired without warning.

He added: "Our nuclear energy plants, but also the national grid [well-protected], mobile network centres, even our major banks all of which could be easily done in a devastating Blitz cyber attack, without a single shot being fired, let alone our Trident missiles being launched from somewhere in the North Atlantic Ocean."

Deserters of Putin's military were bumped off in Spain earlier this month (Image: Getty Images)

Worries over conventional warfare in the UK come as a Russian defector was found assassinated in Spain. Captain Maskim Kuzminov, 28, was found dead and riddled with bullet holes in an underground car park near Alicante, Spain, on February 13.

The pilot is believed to have fled the Russian military and was tracked by Putin's hired goons who bumped the defector off in the European country. Spanish police are now attempting to establish a link between the death and the Russian mafia.

There is also a possibility the Kremlin intelligence services were behind the hit after Kuzminov defected to Ukraine in August of last year. Ukraine gave him £393,000 after his defection from the military.

dailystar.co.uk · by Ewan Gleadow · February 25, 2024

12. Senate Aide Investigated Over Unofficial Actions in Ukraine

What was this guy thinking? He should know better. Is this the end of his 15 minuts of 

Senate Aide Investigated Over Unofficial Actions in Ukraine

Kyle Parker says he delivered sniper gear as part of his unabashed support for Ukraine. Investigators say there may be “counterintelligence issues.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/26/world/europe/ukraine-senate-aide-investigation.html

Ukrainian marines unloading ammunition at a training ground for recruits in the Zaporizhzhia region last July.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

By Lara Jakes, Justin Scheck and Thomas Gibbons-Neff

Feb. 26, 2024, 12:01 a.m. ET

A senior Capitol Hill staff member who is a longtime voice on Russia policy is under congressional investigation over his frequent trips to Ukraine’s war zones and providing what he said was $30,000 in sniper gear to its military, documents show.

The staff member, Kyle Parker, is the senior Senate adviser for the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, known as the Helsinki Commission. The commission is led by members of Congress and staffed by congressional aides. It is influential on matters of democracy and security and has been vocal in supporting Ukraine.

A confidential report by the commission’s director and general counsel, which The New York Times reviewed, said that the equipment transfer could make Mr. Parker an unregistered foreign agent. It said that Mr. Parker had traveled Ukraine’s front lines wearing camouflage and Ukrainian military insignia and had hired a Ukrainian official for a U.S. government fellowship over the objections of congressional ethics and security officials.

And it raised the possibility that he was “wittingly or unwittingly being targeted and exploited by a foreign intelligence service,” citing unspecified “counterintelligence issues” that should be referred to the F.B.I.

A representative for Mr. Parker said he had done nothing wrong. He said Mr. Parker was the target of a “campaign of retaliation” for making accusations of misconduct against the report’s authors.

Image

Representative Joe Wilson, right, the Helsinki Commission chairman, in Bucha, Ukraine, in May 2023.Credit...Andrew Kravchenko/Associated Press

The report so troubled the commission’s chairman, Representative Joe Wilson, Republican of South Carolina, that he recommended Mr. Parker be fired to protect national security, records show. He cited “serious alleged improper acts involving Ukrainian and other foreign individuals.”

“I urgently recommend you secure his immediate resignation or termination,” Mr. Wilson, a supporter of Ukraine, wrote in a Nov. 1 letter to the commission’s Democratic co-chairman, Senator Benjamin L. Cardin of Maryland. Mr. Parker’s representative said he had not been asked to resign, and had no plans to.

Mr. Parker remains on the commission pending what three U.S. officials described as a broad investigation into staff conduct, including the accusations in the report and accusations from Mr. Parker against the commission’s executive director, Steven Schrage, and counsel, Michael Geffroy, who wrote the report.

The investigation is being led by an outside law firm, said the officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the continuing inquiry. It is unclear whether Congress referred concerns to the F.B.I., as the report recommended.

The misconduct investigation has disrupted the Helsinki Commission at a perilous time for Ukraine and its relationship with Congress. The country has suffered setbacks in its war with Russia and is desperate for more money and weapons. Republicans are threatening to block $60 billion in additional aid.

In his letter, Mr. Wilson warned that scandal at the commission could jeopardize “future Ukraine aid.”

The Helsinki Commission is a key pro-Ukraine voice, both on Capitol Hill and in Europe. Mr. Parker is one of its longest-serving aides. He is known in foreign-policy circles as a driving force behind a 2012 human rights law, the Magnitsky Act, inspired by the death of the Russian anticorruption crusader Sergei L. Magnitsky.

The report raises the prospect that Mr. Parker’s strident support for Ukraine crossed ethical or legal lines and that he, a U.S. government employee, might have been functioning as an agent of Ukraine. Through his representative, Mr. Parker denied that.

Representatives for Mr. Cardin and Mr. Wilson referred questions to the Office of the House Employment Counsel, which did not respond to messages.

Mr. Parker is one of many Americans who poured into Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion. Some offered money and supplies or fought alongside Ukrainian soldiers. Others were dishonest, incompetent or preoccupied with internecine squabbles.

In lectures, podcasts and social media posts, Mr. Parker said he had traveled to Ukraine at least seven times since the invasion began in February 2022, including to combat zones, describing himself as “the most well-traveled American official in wartime Ukraine.”

Social media photographs from those trips show him wearing camouflage and the insignia of Ukrainian units. In one picture, he wears a provincial military administration’s patch. In another, he wears camouflage and a Ukrainian drone unit patch. In another, he says he is “plotting the liberation” of Luhansk with a Ukrainian official.

One video obtained by The Times shows him cutting up a Russian hat and urinating on it.

“Mr. Parker’s unofficial travel and media promoting himself as a foreign military interlocutor raise further legal and ethical concerns amid reported Ukrainian military corruption,” the report said.

Mr. Parker’s representative provided written answers to questions on behalf of Mr. Parker on the condition that he not be identified. He said that “American and Ukrainian security experts” had advised Mr. Parker to wear camouflage near the front and that he had never worn the insignia of the military units that he was accompanying.

He said the urination was “a personal expression of rage and grief” after witnessing evidence of Russian brutality.

Mr. Parker’s representative said these were not official trips. But Mr. Parker has publicly spoken as if they were. Some of those who traveled with him said they believed that he was on government business. The commission published a photograph of him in the besieged city of Kherson.

In an April 2023 lecture at the University of Maine, Mr. Parker said that, after the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv before Russia’s invasion, he was motivated to go to Ukraine to help advise American policymakers.

“We have almost no eyes on the ground, no presence,” he said, according to a recording by The Bangor Daily News, which covered the event and provided audio to The Times. “So, you know, I feel like that makes the travel even more important, to be able to say, ‘Hey, here’s what I’ve seen.’”

It is not illegal to visit Ukraine’s front lines, despite State Department warnings against doing so.

“I don’t answer to the State Department,” he added. “We’re an independent agency.”

He told congressional officials that least some of his travels were to persuade family he has in Ukraine to leave, according to two U.S. officials with direct knowledge of the inquiry. Mr. Parker’s representative said he had helped family evacuate.

Mr. Parker has said he drove to the front lines. American officials rarely go to the front, and only with heavy security.

William B. Taylor Jr., a former top U.S. envoy in Ukraine, said such expeditions were particularly risky. “If you’re in the government or have some propaganda value to the Russians,” he said, “the benefits have to be very, very high.”

As staff director when the war broke out in 2022, Mr. Parker said the commission was on “war footing” and no longer had to follow rules about reporting travel or contacting foreign officials, the report said. Mr. Parker’s representative denied this.

The report said Mr. Parker hired a Ukrainian Parliament aide as a commission fellow, despite “staff security, ethics and legal objections.”

The report did not name the aide. The Times identified him as Andrii Bondarenko, who said in messages that he had held an unpaid position for about a month in late 2022..

“The idea was to understand how Congress works,” he said. Mr. Bondarenko said he currently served in the Ukrainian military.

Mr. Parker’s lecture in Maine raised alarm at the commission.

The report relied on public accounts of the event, during which Mr. Parker described obtaining equipment for Ukrainian snipers.

In the recording, he said a relative in Ukraine had given him $30,000 raised by veterans and volunteers, which he had used to buy range finders from Amazon and ballistic wind gauges from a Philadelphia-area manufacturer.

He said he delivered them to Kharkiv on Easter weekend 2022 to “guys who are going to take it up with the snipers in the front.” Range fingers are specialized binoculars or monoculars. Wind gauges help calculate weather variables to line up shots.

Exporting such equipment is not necessarily restricted, though delivering sophisticated models could be. Mr. Parker said he followed export laws.

“You never go into wartime Ukraine with an empty suitcase,” he said.

Aishvarya Kavi and Rebecca Davis O’Brien contributed reporting.

Lara Jakes, based in Rome, reports on diplomatic and military efforts by the West to support Ukraine in its war with Russia. She has been a journalist for nearly 30 years. More about Lara Jakes

Justin Scheck is a London-based reporter for The Times. More about Justin Scheck

Thomas Gibbons-Neff is a Ukraine correspondent and a former Marine infantryman. More about Thomas Gibbons-Neff

13. Supporting America’s Allies Puts America First

Excerpts:

If a MAGA House member remains skeptical of these arguments, consider what Senator Roger Wicker, the highest-ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said last week regarding the Senate-passed legislation: “The United States’ economy also stands to gain as 75 percent of the bill’s funding will go to Americans, including $59 billion for weapons production.” Those investments will spur the U.S. economy, employ Americans, and supercharge American factories and innovation centers. That will increase American defense-production capacity and ensure our troops have the best weapons in the world and never confront a better-armed adversary.

There’s much to disagree on these days in Washington. But providing Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan with the weapons they need to fight our common adversaries, while at the same time improving our capacity to prevent and win future wars, is one policy everyone should be able to get behind.

Supporting America’s Allies Puts America First

There’s plenty for MAGA Republicans to like in recent Senate-passed legislation to aid Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan.

Bradley Bowman

CMPP Senior Director

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

CCTI Senior Director and Senior Fellow

fdd.org · by hhanes · February 23, 2024

With Ukraine fighting for its life, Israel battling terrorists seeking its destruction, and Taiwan eyeing a growing threat from the Chinese Communist Party, it remains unclear whether Congress will act to help these three beleaguered democracies this year or remain missing in action. MAGA members of the Republican caucus in the House of Representatives will likely play a key role in the outcome.

The U.S. Senate voted 70–29 last week to approve more than $95 billion in assistance to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. Twenty-two Republican senators supported the legislation. Despite this bipartisan vote, the bill’s future remains uncertain in the House. When the Senate-passed bill and a similar bill being floated in the House are examined through the lens of the MAGA worldview, it’s clear they are both a veritable ice-cream sundae, including lots to like.

MAGA Republicans emphasize the importance of putting Americans first. That’s exactly what the legislation would do.

Skeptics might push back against such an assertion by noting that the legislation would provide tens of billions of dollars in security assistance to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine. But that analysis fundamentally misses the point: By helping these three beleaguered democracies, we are actually helping ourselves — both our security and our economy.

The United States is confronting the most daunting array of national-security threats it’s faced in decades, including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as well as continued threats from terrorist organizations. To make matters worse, these adversaries are increasingly working together to undermine the United States and attack its core interests. That’s the bad news.

The good news is that Americans aren’t confronting these threats alone. The United States enjoys an unparalleled network of allies and partners to help. This isn’t about having friends D.C. bureaucrats can toast at cocktail parties in Brussels or Davos. Where the rubber meets the road, U.S. allies and partners help lighten the security burden Americans must carry against common enemies, prevent war, and inflict damage on our adversaries.

That’s certainly true with Israel, which is battling Hamas, an Iran-backed terrorist organization with a cozy relationship with the Kremlin. Hamas’s original charter makes clear that it is committed to the murder of Jews and the extermination of the State of Israel. The horrors of October 7 should put to rest any lingering questions about whether Hamas still harbors such goals.

Hamas is also very happy to kill Americans, as it did on that horrible day. That’s hardly surprising, as Hamas’s sick terrorist ideology is similar to that of al-Qaeda and ISIS. Indeed, Israel is fighting on the front lines in the battle between civilization and barbarism — and helping Israel in that fight helps America. In fact, the more we can help our Arab and Israeli partners in the Middle East take on terrorists there, the less likely those terrorists will once again kill Americans here, as they did on September 11, 2001.

The same logic applies to support for Ukraine.

Russia represents one of the two most serious military threats to the United States, and Vladimir Putin has never missed an opportunity to undermine and weaken the U.S.

Since February 24, 2022, when Putin launched the largest invasion in Europe since World War II, the United States has committed approximately $44 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. To put that number in perspective, it represents a relatively paltry 2.7 percent of what Washington spent on the Pentagon over the same period.

And what did Americans get for that investment?

For less than 3 percent of what we spent on the Pentagon, that U.S. security assistance helped Ukrainians destroy more than 7,700 Russian tanks and armored vehicles, 223 Russian fighter aircraft and helicopters, and at least 21 naval vessels — all without putting a single American service member in harm’s way.

This is not a so-called endless war for American troops; there are no U.S. troops fighting in Ukraine. This is passing a baseball bat over the back fence to your neighbor so they can defeat the home invader who is eyeing your home next — or at least bruise him so badly that he reconsiders his line of work.

By providing Ukraine with the means to weaken the Russian military and underscoring American political will to oppose aggression in Eastern Europe, Washington decreases the chances that Putin will attack a NATO state, which would almost certainly pull Americans into direct conflict with Russia and result in American casualties. So, by giving Ukraine weapons now, we are saving American lives later.

That’s not charity; that’s a wise and sustainable investment.

And what are the Europeans doing? A Pentagon official said last week that the United States is not even the top donor to Ukraine. In fact, the United States ranks 16th among nations when it comes to providing security assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of gross domestic product. Europeans are continuing to step up their support, but American weapons remain vital. That’s why risks will only grow if Congress continues to dither.

As for Taiwan, let’s be clear: Deterrence failed in both Ukraine and Israel, and now we are paying the price. If deterrence fails in Taiwan, the security, economic, and reputational harm to the United States could be devastating.

Investments made by the United States, combined with Taiwan’s increasing defense spending, will make Taiwan an unappealing candidate for consumption by the authoritarian predator in Beijing. Investments now in specific programs and munitions for the Indo-Pacific will improve U.S. military posture and capability there and will be much cheaper than a future war we could have deterred.

If a MAGA House member remains skeptical of these arguments, consider what Senator Roger Wicker, the highest-ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said last week regarding the Senate-passed legislation: “The United States’ economy also stands to gain as 75 percent of the bill’s funding will go to Americans, including $59 billion for weapons production.” Those investments will spur the U.S. economy, employ Americans, and supercharge American factories and innovation centers. That will increase American defense-production capacity and ensure our troops have the best weapons in the world and never confront a better-armed adversary.

There’s much to disagree on these days in Washington. But providing Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan with the weapons they need to fight our common adversaries, while at the same time improving our capacity to prevent and win future wars, is one policy everyone should be able to get behind.

Bradley Bowman is the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Mark Montgomery is a retired Navy rear admiral and the senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at FDD.

Read in National Review

fdd.org · by hhanes · February 23, 2024

14. Taiwan Can’t Be the Excuse for Abandoning Ukraine

Conclusion:

The question should never have been Ukraine or Taiwan, but both. If the defense budget is not large enough to tackle both crises or to match China’s military buildup, the response should not be surrender, but rather enhanced defense. Such spending may force tough choices on social service spending, but the status quo is not tenable. Failure to meet the challenge will only mean a greater cost down the road. Leadership is not appeasing partisan echo chambers, but rather reaching across the aisle to sway and prepare all Americans for the challenge that all must meet.

Taiwan Can’t Be the Excuse for Abandoning Ukraine

19fortyfive.com · by Michael Rubin · February 23, 2024

Summary: The article critiques America’s wavering commitment to its allies, highlighting the dangerous trend of strategic and political short-sightedness. It contrasts current political divisiveness with past bipartisan efforts to support global democracy, emphasizing the erosion of reliable American promises to allies. The narrative focuses on Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, defying the Alma-Ata Protocols and the Budapest Memorandum, to underscore the importance of U.S. support for sovereign states facing existential threats. It challenges the misconception of Ukrainian culpability for Russian aggression, stressing the broader implications of Russian and Chinese territorial ambitions. The piece argues against American isolationism and the false dichotomy of prioritizing China over Ukraine, advocating for a robust defense strategy that does not compromise on supporting global democratic values. It warns that failing to support Ukraine and Taiwan equally could embolden adversaries, undermining U.S. credibility and security in the long term.

Ukraine, Taiwan, and the Test of American Resolve

Abandoning allies and strategic attention deficit disorder is becoming an American characteristic. Part of the problem is the politicization of national security. Gone are the days when President Ronald Reagan and House Speaker Thomas “Tip” O’Neill could reach across the aisle to do what was right for the country and its allies in the fight against tyranny and terror. Point scoring now trumps principle and American promises have an expiration date of at most eight years.

On December 21, 1991, Russia signed the Alma-Ata Protocols in which all the states of the former Soviet Union with the exception of Georgia and the Baltic states agreed to recognize their existing borders. The Kremlin, therefore, not only agreed to accept that Crimea was Ukraine, but also Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine. Beyond simply invading Ukraine two years ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin exposed his hypocrisy by lecturing Armenia on the Protocols to justify Russian peacekeeper inaction upon Azerbaijan’s September 2023 ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh’s indigenous Armenian population.

In 1994, the United States was a signatory to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. In exchange for agreements by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to forfeit their legacy Soviet nuclear weapons, the United States and other signatories agreed to support them should they suffer threats to their sovereignty. Even if diplomats quibble over the Budapest Memorandum text and question “what the meaning of “is is,” there should be no question about forceful U.S. support for Ukraine as it faces an existential threat. Defending sovereign states against annihilation—not oil—historically explains the U.S. decision to go to war, be it in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Bosnia, or Kosovo. Indeed, the historical exceptionalism in Ukraine is that it neither needs nor demands U.S. troops. Rather, Ukrainians are willing to embrace the onus of the fight themselves; they simply want the ammunition to do it.

The notion that the Ukrainians are somehow responsible for Russian aggression is akin to blaming the victim of domestic violence for not warming a pot roast sufficiently or for a poorly placed doorknob. In his prescient Winter is Coming, former chess grandmaster and Russian oppositionist Garry Kasparov put to rest the notion that Putin was merely reacting to Western provocation. After all, as he noted, at the end of the Cold War the West neither demanded reparations for Russia’s ravishment of Eastern Europe nor its decimation of Ukraine. Forcing the forfeit of all legacy nuclear weapons from every former Soviet republic but Russia guaranteed Russia top dog status. Add into the mix billions of dollars in aid and loan guarantees and the idea that the West was not generous in victory is perverse.

Nor does what happens in Ukraine stay in Ukraine. Ideologically, Putin is an irredentist who believes in reconstituting the Russian empire and sphere of influence at its greatest extent. He seeks to blindfold Russians with a nationalist flag so that they do not see the fruits of his quarter-century dictatorship. The problem is every military adventure drains the treasury further, forcing a quicker return to military action. First, it was Georgia in 2008 and in 2014 and 2022, Ukraine. If the West does not draw the line, it is only a matter of time before Russians move into Moldova, northern Kazakhstan, and the Baltics, NATO or not. American isolationism does not bring peace; it simply guarantees that when the United States must fight the war, it will do so from a less advantageous position.

While many opponents to the Ukraine war couch their opposition in the false belief that aiding Ukraine diverts funds from the southern border or from their own wish list of domestic projects, some Republican internationalists – notably the Marathon Initiative’s Elbridge Colby – argue that Ukraine is an unhealthy distraction from the real threat: China.

The analogy between Russia and China is easy. Russia rejects Ukraine’s independence just as China does Taiwan’s. Americans can repeat the “One China” policy as a mantra, but even Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong acknowledged Taiwan was a different nation, deserving of independence. International law also favors Taiwan. Both Russia and China’s Communist leaders despise democracy.

Colby is right that China is a grave and growing threat that deserves U.S. focus, but he is wrong to believe that America has an either/or choice. The same isolationist forces that make excuses to stand down in the face of Russian aggression would do the same should the People’s Republic of China invade Taiwan. Indeed, the opposition to aiding Ukraine that now crystalizes in Washington two years after Russia’s invasion simply signals to Beijing that, should they launch their attack, they need only weather a response for two years before Americans lose interest.

Colby is also wrong that China would go big on Taiwan or go home. Russia embraced China’s roadmap for territorial conquest. Rather than go big, China salami-slices, taking small islands and making claims that have cumulative impact but do not individually rise to the threshold of war. Hence, Putin began with Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk before launching his drive two years ago for Kyiv itself. China would likely begin with Pratas Island and the Dongsha Atoll, Taiwanese islands far from the mainland. Beijing would test American mettle and, as with Russia’s attacks on Ukraine, unleash influence operations on social media, pay off think tanks and universities, to catalyze American domestic opposition.

Against the backdrop of the Syrian civil war and President Bashar al-Assad’s conventional and chemical bombardments of his civilian population, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov toured the Middle East. He repeatedly told American allies like President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt that, while Americans hector him on human rights and threat aid, Russia even stands by their allies no matter what they do domestically. China did likewise, cultivating Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman, then the target of progressive animus in the United States. When Iranian-backed militias targeted civilian airports and even the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, the Biden administration was silent for weeks, reinforcing the notion in the United Arab Emirates the United States was an unreliable ally. The White House may like to forget the abandonment of Afghanistan, but the rest of the world remembers. For Washington now to turn its back on Ukraine and Eastern Europe would be a blow from which the reputation of the United States would never recover.

The question should never have been Ukraine or Taiwan, but both. If the defense budget is not large enough to tackle both crises or to match China’s military buildup, the response should not be surrender, but rather enhanced defense. Such spending may force tough choices on social service spending, but the status quo is not tenable. Failure to meet the challenge will only mean a greater cost down the road. Leadership is not appeasing partisan echo chambers, but rather reaching across the aisle to sway and prepare all Americans for the challenge that all must meet.

About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Iran, Turkey, and the broader Middle East. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units.

19fortyfive.com · by Michael Rubin · February 23, 2024

15. The Pentagon’s new recruitment policy is a disaster

Wow.  

The Pentagon’s new recruitment policy is a disaster

BY OWEN WEST, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 02/24/24 4:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4486451-the-pentagons-new-recruitment-policy-is-a-disaster/?utm

Military recruiting is down sharply. More than half of adults under 30 years hold a negative view of the military. White progressives are least likely to volunteer. If the freefall is not arrested, a draft will be necessary.

Equally disturbing, the Department of Defense has undercut its own recruiting base. For 50 years, noncommissioned officers have tirelessly recruited our force, testing fitness and intellect firsthand. Recruiters were empowered to exercise judgment on the other bureaucratic requirements, including a 59-page health order, subject to a final group examination by military doctors inclined to let the determined volunteers serve.

The Pentagon has shifted judgment from our recruiters to an electronic screening system inaptly named “Military Health System Genesis,” instantly shrinking the recruiting pool. Genesis is an invasive magnifying glass that scours the cloud, highlighting doctor visits and prescriptions back to childhood. Understaffed health units — mostly civilians today — must investigate all the red flags. This is the equivalent of ordering a small police force to interrogate every speeding driver. The DoD additionally banned group physicals for fear of body-shaming. Instead of examining a dozen recruits in 15 minutes, doctors now take up to 90 minutes to complete individual interrogations.

The bureaucratic result was predictable. Genesis’s perverse incentive system has resulted in risk aversion among the health screeners, who demand that recruits spend time and money tracking down amplifying evidence, from retired doctors to fifth-grade prescriptions. The processing time for acceptances has doubled. Tens of thousands of other dispirited volunteers file appeals, drop out of the queue or are altogether disqualified. The armed services now override doctor refusals for one out of six recruits.

This is clear evidence that regulations have replaced commonsense. Genesis should be removed from the recruiting process before it does further damage.

The military never wanted Genesis. It was imposed to minimize the number of soldiers who lost duty time to preexisting conditions, which contributed to ballooning Veterans Affairs payments after service. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Congress dramatically expanded VA eligibility. 15 percent of WWII veterans received disability benefits; 43 percent of post-9/11 veterans receive payments, at higher disability ratings.

What changed? Troops who are injured in combat and training, or debilitated after long laborious careers, remain undercompensated. Those who briefly serve stateside and invoke preexisting traumas receive too much. This is a thorny differentiation problem that our generals have refused to tackle. Restricting upstream entry — and greatly increasing recruiting costs — to reduce downstream VA payments is self-defeating.

Our senior service leaders have been reluctant to complain — a $5 billion program will have that effect. Fortunately, Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) are investigating, asking, among other questions, whether all this red tape is causing some healthy applicants to drop out of the recruitment process altogether.

That depends on the definition of healthy. The DoD lists over 500 disqualifying conditions. For example, asthma has spiked over the last two decades and is the most common condition among Olympic athletes, with rates approaching 25 percent in cardiovascular sports. Clinging to caricatures of easily manageable conditions, the DoD disqualifies thousands who would serve at the highest physical levels.

Genesis is also biased against athletes. Teen athletes are injured at rates three to five times higher than their sedentary peers, triggering additional screening. 25 percent of special operations troops are injured each year; most have athletic backgrounds. Are they disqualified? The result of this perverse system is that an overweight high school dropout is accepted, while a top collegiate athlete with normal sports injuries is rejected before being examined.

Genesis goes well beyond eradicating the American tradition of permitting the impaired to get into the fight, as Audie Murphy and John F. Kennedy did. Had Genesis been back-tested on the all-volunteer force of the past three decades, tens of thousands who performed superbly in stressful physical levels would have been barred from entry.

The service chiefs and service secretaries must present a unified front and remove Genesis from the recruiting ecosystem. Health requirements must be replaced by a simple, modern standard based on performance. We no longer have the luxury of stapling restriction upon restriction to winnow a volunteer overflow. Finally, recruiters must be given back latitude to use their hard-earned experience to detect who will perform well. It’s time to get back to commonsense at the grassroots, which the military-industrial bureaucracy seeks to stifle.

Owen West is a former assistant secretary of defense for special operations and served two tours in Iraq with the Marines.

16. Afghanistan's 'Angel of Death' is retiring from Air Force special ops

Another amazing and great American.

Afghanistan's 'Angel of Death' is retiring from Air Force special ops

Col. Allison Black is retiring from the Air Force. Afghan fighters called her "the Angel of Death" for her radio calls from AC-130 gunships.

BY MATT WHITE | PUBLISHED FEB 23, 2024 3:51 PM EST

taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White · February 23, 2024

The woman whose call-for-fire transmissions over post-9/11 battlefields earned her the nickname “the Angel of Death” relinquished her final command in the Air Force Friday.

Col. Allison Black turned over command of the 1st Special Operations Wing at a change of command ceremony at Hurlburt Field, Florida on Friday and plans to retire later this year, according to the Air Force. Black’s 32-year career in the Air Force began as an enlisted survival instructor, teaching field skills and ground evasion tactics to aircrew, and finishes with command of the wing long at the hub of the service’s special operations forces.

But it was during the battle for Kunduz, Afghanistan in late 2001 that Black, then a 1st Lt., became “the Angel of Death” over the first battlefields after 9/11, carving a legacy in Air Force and special warfare history, along with a memorable milestone for women in modern combat.

Just weeks after 9/11, Black was on her first combat flight as a navigator on an AC-130 gunship, flying toward the Afghan city of Kunduz. In the darkness below was “Tiger 02,” the callsign for Special Forces ODA 595, a dozen Green Berets who would soon be known as “the horse soldiers.” As part of Task Force Dagger’s assault on the Taliban, the team fought its way across Afghanistan on horseback.

But as Black’s crew raced toward Kunduz, Tiger 02 was outnumbered by a determined Taliban force gathering in a nearby compound.

Birth of a nickname

Once overhead, Black talked with the team’s air controller, passing word on the landscape the gunship could see from the air and confirming targeting information.

“On one particular part of the mission, we saw a vehicle approaching our friendly location,” Black said in an interview for the Air Force. “My job on the AC-130 is to relay everything that we’re seeing through our sensors. I was likely the only female aviator talking on a radio, so if I screwed up, everybody was going to know it was me. So I was pretty pretty particular about what I was saying.”

Riding with Tiger 02 was a senior Afghan warlord, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a legendary combat leader who had fought on the side of Soviet troops against mujahideen forces in the 1980s and led the resistance to the Taliban in the years before 9/11.

But to hear a woman’s voice calling for targets from the team’s air controller was beyond his experience.

“He looked at our American Special Forces and said, ‘Is that a woman?’” Black said. “And they’re like, ‘As a matter of fact, it is.’ He’s like, ‘oh, America is so determined, they bring their women to kill Taliban.’ He couldn’t believe it.”

The truck on the road pulled into a compound, where Black’s crew saw close to 30 fighters. With approval from Tiger 02, the AC-130 fired 400 rounds of 40mm and 100 rounds of 105mm cannon fire into the compound. As the rounds impacted, at least 200 more fighters emerged from the buildings.

Riding with Dostum and the Green Berets was a former Taliban leader, Mohammed Fazal, who was actively speaking with the Taliban group on a separate radio frequency, a Special Forces soldier later told PBS’s Frontline.

“Dostum brings Fazal near the radio so that he can hear this female voice,” the soldier said in an anonymous interview with the program. “Fazal hears her voice as it’s being explained to him, through the translators, that we have the ‘angel of death’ overhead… and we possess the death ray.”

The death ray was the laser pointer the AC-130 crews used to pinpoint targets on which to train its guns — but the Afghan fighters believed the laser itself was the weapon.

And the “Angel of Death” was Black.

“If they don’t surrender now all of their troops will burn in hell,” the soldier recalled Dostum telling the Taliban leader. “Fazal jumped on the radio and his men were surrendering within minutes.”

“We got to disgrace the enemy and protect our friendly forces,” Black said.

In the weeks that followed, Black and her crew pounded Taliban targets as the horse soldiers and other Special Forces teams moved with Afghan allies toward Kabul. Eventually, ODA 595 pulled out of Afghanistan, returning to the AC-130’s base in Uzbekistan — the first time the flight crews and the soldiers had met face to face.

The soldiers handed Black an AK-47 — a gift for Dostum to the Angel of Death.

And her nickname, the soldiers told her, had already spread.

“General Dostum went to a burka unveiling ceremony for Afghan women,” Black said. “And he told them about American women on the battlefield, specifically me, and said America allows their women to do so many things. And if you continue to fight against the Taliban, you one day will have those same freedoms.”

2,000 hours of combat

Over the next two decades, Black racked up over 2,000 hours of combat missions, commanded a squadron of U-28 Draco special operations planes and served as senior leadership with Air Force Special Operations Command before assuming command of the 1st SOW at Hurlburt.

Black commanded the 1st SOW for 20 months, taking command of the unit in July 2022. She oversaw close to 4,600 personnel, and 80 aircraft across seven flying squadrons — two of AC-130J gunships, two that fly MC-130Js, two Draco squadrons and one MQ-9 Reaper drone unit.

In a change of command ceremony on Feb. 23, she relinquished command to Col. Patrick Dierig, the commander of the 479th Flying Training Group at Naval Air Station Pensacola.

As for the nickname she picked up at the start of her career, Black credits the team she flew with.

“That story started in 2001, just by me being a part of a great crew and my role just happened to be on the radios,” she told the Air Force. “I was just trying to do my job. But I realize the impact that’s had. I’ve had Afghan women who are now in the United States had heard that tale. And when we cut crossed passage shared the inspiration. Little did I think that a little piece of just doing a mission would make that kind of an impact.”

The latest on Task & Purpose

• The Air Force wants retirees to help fill gaps in the service
• Navy allows sailors to put hands in pockets as hell freezes over
• The Army’s next-gen combat helmet is now arriving with soldiers
• Navy now allows sailors to wear leggings under PT shorts
• Legendary Marine Scout Sniper Chuck Mawhinney dies at age 75

taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White · February 23, 2024

17. Special operator in secret unit and the terrorists with propane tanks

Another story from the author who was in the special operations unit with no name.

Special operator in secret unit and the terrorists with propane tanks

How special operator who served in elite U.S. unit so classified it doesn't have a name was supposed to be recovering from a gunshot wound when terrorists showed up to an embassy with trucks filled with propane tanks

By ADAM GAMAL and KELLY KENNEDY

PUBLISHED: 13:00 EST, 24 February 2024 | UPDATED: 11:02 EST, 25 February 2024

Daily Mail · by Adam Gamal · February 24, 2024

Adam Gamal was special operator in one of most classified units in the U.S. military.

It is so secret it didn't have a name, and is unofficially known as The Unit.

The 5ft Egyptian-American, whose real identity cannot be revealed, tracked senior Al Qaeda members around the world and gave coordinates to the Navy for missile strikes.

As he travelled the globe risking his life for the country he arrived in as a 20-year-old Muslim, he couldn't tell his wife he was doing.

Even when he was shot, he was barred from calling her as he lay in a grim East Africa hospital fearing he would never see her again.

His new book The Unit: My Life Fighting Terrorists as One of America’s Most Secret Military Operatives - is the first inside look at the highly-classified unit and serves as a message to the modern U.S. military.

The book had to be screened by the Pentagon and approved before publication. Parts of the final version are still redacted.

In it he describes how he was working at an embassy in Africa, just a few weeks after he took a bullet in the stomach, when terrorists showed up at the gates. Below is an extract.

I rested for a bit, and then I deployed again.

Somewhere easy, they said. Somewhere safe, they said.

I deployed as a basic communications guy. No heavy lifting. No shooting. No midnight raids.

I went to work in the morning, I did my thing, and I went home for the night. I worked at an embassy, and it was gorgeous.

Adam Gamal (left) and members of his team prepare their equipment in their quarters while deployed

There was some crazy counterintelligence going on against everyone who worked at the embassy, so there was some nonsense: I'd go to my hotel and find that all of my clothes had been rifled through and thrown on the floor. I was pretty sure I hadn't left them there.

'Hey,' I'd say, calling down to the front desk. 'Any idea why

The story of his life - The Unit: My Life Fighting Terrorists as One of America’s Most Secret Military Operatives - is the first inside look at the highly-classified unit and serves as a message to the modern U.S. military

'No, sir.'

'Somebody must have come to my room.'

'I will investigate and let you know, sir.'

'Somebody took my jacket.'

'Gosh, nobody saw anyone in your room, sir.'

There was the usual bulls***: on my first day, when I gave the Marine Corps gunny working the front gate my American diplomat passport, he asked if I had found it in the street.

'Man, check the picture,' I said. 'It's me.'

He finally let me in. Overall, though, it was a good gig. Good food. Interesting culture. Safe.

One morning, I walked to work just as I always did. I went through the front door, and then I hiked up to my floor.

Just as I made it to the third-floor office—about a minute and a half later—I heard an explosion.

It sounded like a grenade.

The guy with me, a civil engineer, immediately dropped to his knees and pulled out his rosary.

I realized he hadn't been trained to do anything different. In fact, he had been trained to do exactly what he did. Score one, Catholic Church.

'Please, God,' he said, 'make this a drill.'

'Dude,' I said. 'Get up. It's not a drill. A grenade just exploded.'

He wasn't my typical teammate—he was overweight, and, after he put away his rosary, his next instinct was to call his mother.

The elite team that is so clandestine it doesn’t have an official name - and is only known as The Unit or The Activity

On surveillance missions, operatives in The Unit would pose as tourists to track down members of Al Qaeda

'If you do that, it will be your last f***ing goodbye,' I said, hoping my language would shock him into action.

'But if you get your s*** together, you can give her a call after we're out of this, and you can tell her you're safe—and maybe brag about your bravery.'

I was calm, just as I had been trained to be. How could I defend the team? How could I calm the situation?

Of course, the painkillers still numbing my innards didn't hurt my sense of well-being.

Mostly, though, my adrenaline kicked in, and I didn't feel any of my usual gut pain.

The explosion reminded me of the explosions I had heard during selection. And I was definitely not dead.

Sweet. Next?

I locked the door—it was a vault door, like from a bank—to keep everyone inside safe.

We had a security destruction plan, which meant we had to destroy anything classified if it looked as if the embassy were going to be overrun—as in Argo.

We got everything ready. My coworker needed something to do, so I had him call it in to headquarters that we might implement the destruction plan.

I also had the safe ready with our communications equipment so I could zero it out. Before we did that, I wanted to find the defense attaché, who is usually the most senior guy at the embassy, to get the go-ahead.

And he may have had more information than my coworker and I did.

I found him low crawling under a desk.

'Sir, here's some body armor,' I said. 'Put it on, and let's go upstairs, and you can make the call back to headquarters in DC.'

He made some calls, and we put the destruction plan on hold for a bit.

It just so happened that someone had mailed a shipment of weapons, and they were in the mailroom. So that's what I needed to do next: I needed to open those boxes.

I didn't know if the terrorists had made it inside the embassy or if they would be waiting outside the vault after we unlocked the door.

The Marines didn't know what was going on—nobody knew what was going on.

We heard another explosion. We had to get out of there.

But I had another fear: If the Marines who worked for the embassy saw a brown man in civilian clothes burst out of the vault with an M4 semiautomatic weapon, what would they do?

They would shoot. If there were local terrorists outside the door, they would also shoot, because they would know I wasn't one of theirs.

We heard gunshots.

Man, this is bulls***! I came here to recover. I had to get out. I opened the door, and I ducked low, and I ran.

I'm not going to fucking die here. I made it to the first floor and ran toward one of the offices, looking for the other guy from my unit.

I didn't leave Africa to die in some damned glitzy embassy. I heard a female voice.

'Were you shot?' she said.

What the f***? The timing seems off for telling war stories, lady.

'Who's talking?' I asked. 'Where are you?' And then I saw her hiding under a desk. She also had done what she was trained to do. I don't know who the f*** came up with the idea that hiding under a desk can protect you from explosions.

S***, I thought, after her soft voice reminded me of home. My wife's going to see this on the news. She doesn't even know where I am, but she'll know.

She had been oddly upset when I hadn't immediately told her I got shot in Africa, and I did not need her to see 'American soldier killed in random-ass bullshit at a random-a** embassy.'

'Come with me,' I told the woman.

Gamal, with his face obscured to protect his identity, was part of an elite U.S. special operations team so secret it didn't have a name

Adam poses with his wife and daughter, he has never been able to share some the details of the sacrifices he made chasing down the world's most wanted terrorists

By then, we had a pretty raggedy crew, with my overweight coworker, the lady under the desk dressed for a day at the office, my military counterpart with his weapon, and one of the armed Marines we had encountered in the hallway.

As long as I was with my white-guy counterpart, I had cover. The two military guys and I rushed up to the roof with our M4s from the mailroom.

Then the Marine looked at me as if something had suddenly dawned on him, and he asked, 'How did you get such a highspeed weapon?'

I'm pretty sure he wasn't asking out of admiration.

'It's cool, man,' my counterpart said. 'We're both US Army Special Forces.'

'Thank God,' the Marine said. 'Are you guys senior to me?'

'We are,' my teammate said. You could see the relief on the guy's face—he was a young Marine, and it was probably obvious we were old enough to have some rank on him.

We looked over the wall. We could see what was going on on the ground, but they couldn't see us.

The local guards for the embassy were holding their ground—and we could see no one had made it inside.

'Hey!' the Marine yelled. 'I see somebody with a weapon!'

The Marines are very disciplined.

'Permission to fire, sir?' he asked.

'Man, don't f***ing fire at anybody,' said my counterpart, who was senior to me, as well. 'That dude's security.'

Brown guy. Local brown guy. Good guy.

'The terrorists are under us,' I said.

There was nothing we could do from the roof as we listened to the battle rage below us.

After a while, we heard another explosion—but this time, the jarring sounds of metal crashing and glass falling to the ground followed it.

A cloud of black smoke rose up from beneath us, and then we heard nothing.

The whole thing lasted about an hour, hour and a half. And then I called my wife.

'Hey,' I said. 'You're going to see something on the news. But this is me talking to you, so you know I'm okay.'

I didn't die. The attack came from another Islamic extremist group.

When we watched the embassy video later, we realized just how close we had all come to a massacre.

One minute and twenty eight seconds after I went through the front door, the terrorists drove up.

The guys in the car in front of the walk-in entrance jumped out and fired at everything moving.

They shot and killed a bystander walking past the door one minute and twenty-eight seconds after I had gone through it. If I had been a moment later . . .

Funny thing, in the not-ha-ha way, is that the terrorist appears to have had a moment of conscience.

The embassy had two doors: one for people to walk through and one for people to drive through.

The terrorists had two vehicles, one filled with propane tanks in front of the door people used to walk into the building.

I think that one was meant as a distraction. The second one was meant to drive through the motor-pool doors.

That second vehicle—it was a small pickup truck—would have to slam

the metal motor-pool doors to make it through. On either side of the doors stood big decorative pillars.

And just as the driver of the pickup truck got ready to slam the doors, an older lady started to cross the street in front of him.

The terrorist, who was on a mission to kill a bunch of innocent people at an embassy, didn't want to hit an old lady, so he slammed into one of the pillars rather than the metal doors.

But it was only momentary. He got out of the truck, and he had a detonator in his hand. He ran to the other vehicle—the one with the propane tanks—and he grabbed an AK-47 and started firing from behind the car.

The neighborhood had five or six embassies close to one another, and the Chinese embassy sat closest to ours.

One of their guys went to a window to see what was happening and got shot in the neck. The terrorists weren't targeting anyone—they were just shooting.

The guy in the window died.

The local guys who pulled security for our embassy reacted fast—we weren't in a country that is necessarily friendly to the United States, but those guys did their jobs well and properly protected diplomatic missions on their soil.

Local security killed the four terrorists and then hit the propane tanks in the car.

When the car exploded, it ensured the terrorists had breathed their last.

Afterward, the Marine offered his commendations.

Adam (right) and his boss prepare to go out on a mission. The location is classified and the details have never been revealed

Green Berets of the 3rd Special Forces Group get ready to complete a freefall over North Carolina

The Bronze Star Adam gave to his daughter for her services when he retired in 2006

'You guys did really well today,' he said.

'Thanks, man,' I said. 'Do you remember when you asked me if I had found my US passport in the street?'

His face fell.

'I'm really sorry,' he said.

I think he was. And maybe he didn't make assumptions about the next brown guy he saw.

That evening, the adrenaline disappeared. I felt drained. My body was still recovering from my injuries, and I was just done in a way I hadn't been on previous missions.

The next day, I walked to the office.

'Man, you're bad luck,' the guys from the Unit teased. 'Even when we send you to the nice places, all hell breaks loose.

The Unit: My Life Fighting Terrorists as One of America's Most Secret Military Operatives by Adam Gamal and Kelly Kennedy is available online and in most bookstores

Daily Mail · by Adam Gamal · February 24, 2024

18. Who’s Afraid of Freedom? The Fight for Liberalism’s Future

Excerpts:

Now, the British political philosopher John Gray and the Yale intellectual historian Samuel Moyn, two academics turned public intellectuals, have both weighed in on what they see as the self-inflicted decline of the liberal project. Although they agree that liberal democracy has, in some sense, failed, what they mean by liberalism and what they see as its prospects diverge sharply. In The New Leviathans, Gray contends that liberalism is a fundamentally erroneous creed built on dangerous myths and illusions. Rather than bringing freedom, it has led to unfettered government power that has brought much of the world to the brink of totalitarianism—not only in Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Xi Jinping’s China but also in advanced Western democracies.

By contrast, in Liberalism Against Itself, Moyn argues that liberal thought is fundamentally sound, based as it is on ideals that are both laudable and realizable. As Moyn sees it, the present crisis has been caused not by liberalism but by its betrayal, by none other than the architects of the liberal order themselves. Abandoning their core values and principles, he argues, liberalism’s champions have become timid and anxious—more concerned with fending off their enemies than winning new converts. Where Gray sees liberal states growing into ever more controlling monsters, Moyn finds them reduced and enfeebled, having presided over the tragic dismantling of the welfare state.

...

Even skeptics and critics must admit that Liberalism Against Itself is clearly written and argued. Moyn does not make the mistake of anchoring liberalism in the thought of an antiliberal such as Hobbes. Instead, he draws on the ideas of true liberals such as Constant and his younger contemporaries John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville. Moyn also brings to light something that is often left out of histories of liberalism, namely its moral optimism and what could even be called its moral agenda. A central purpose of nineteenth-century liberalism was to create the conditions that would allow people to grow intellectually and morally.

But Moyn picks and chooses the principles of early liberalism with which he agrees. He favors a socialistic form of liberalism, but there was another, libertarian form that he leaves out. It is something of a simplification to say that nineteenth-century liberals saw the state as a “device of human liberation.” Some of them, such as the British idealist philosopher T. H. Green and the French politician Léon Bourgeois, did, but others, such as the British philosopher and social scientist Herbert Spencer and the French economist Frédéric Bastiat, did not. These latter thinkers, who would be called “classical” or “orthodox” liberals, also believed in progress and emancipation and were optimistic about the future, but they had less confidence in the state.

The New Leviathans, unlike Liberalism Against Itself, is a sad book, one that suggests there is no way out of the present predicament. As Gray sees it, to try to save liberalism—or what he calls “the moth-eaten musical brocade of progressive hope”—would be pointless. Instead, Western democracies should simply lower their sights and “adjust.” Moyn rejects such fatalism. People have important choices to make about how they should live their lives and what kind of society they wish to live in. He thinks it is time to reinvent liberalism, not bury it.

Liberalism has faced multiple crises throughout its history. It was even born in crisis, the crisis of the French Revolution. It has faced formidable enemies before and has reinvented itself several times, as well. It can certainly do so again. Exactly how it should do so is up to a new generation of thinkers, policymakers, politicians, and, ultimately, voters themselves to decide. They are more likely to find success, however, if they aspire to a vision of liberalism in which a well-governed society does not come at the expense of individual liberty but rather serves to further it.

Who’s Afraid of Freedom?

The Fight for Liberalism’s Future

By Helena Rosenblatt

March/April 2024

Published on February 20, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by The Lost History of Liberalism: From Ancient Rome to the Twenty-First Century · February 20, 2024

It has become trite to say that liberalism is in crisis. As long ago as 1997, in an article in these pages, Fareed Zakaria warned of the rising threat of “illiberal democracy” around the world. Since then, countless essays, articles, and books have tried to explain the growing threats to the liberal world order posed by populism, authoritarianism, fundamentalism, and nationalism. Scholars have also devoted a great deal of thought to the human dislocations—be they economic, political, demographic, cultural, or environmental—that seem to have given rise to these threats.

In the last ten years or so, another theme has emerged. A small but vocal group of thinkers claim that the source of the crisis lies within liberalism itself. Often referred to as “postliberals,” those in this camp argue that liberal conceptions of the social and political order are fatally flawed. Liberalism, they say, is responsible for many of the ills that afflict the world today, including rampant globalization, the destruction of communal bonds, rising economic insecurity, environmental degradation, and other perceived defects of twenty-first-century society.

Now, the British political philosopher John Gray and the Yale intellectual historian Samuel Moyn, two academics turned public intellectuals, have both weighed in on what they see as the self-inflicted decline of the liberal project. Although they agree that liberal democracy has, in some sense, failed, what they mean by liberalism and what they see as its prospects diverge sharply. In The New Leviathans, Gray contends that liberalism is a fundamentally erroneous creed built on dangerous myths and illusions. Rather than bringing freedom, it has led to unfettered government power that has brought much of the world to the brink of totalitarianism—not only in Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Xi Jinping’s China but also in advanced Western democracies.

By contrast, in Liberalism Against Itself, Moyn argues that liberal thought is fundamentally sound, based as it is on ideals that are both laudable and realizable. As Moyn sees it, the present crisis has been caused not by liberalism but by its betrayal, by none other than the architects of the liberal order themselves. Abandoning their core values and principles, he argues, liberalism’s champions have become timid and anxious—more concerned with fending off their enemies than winning new converts. Where Gray sees liberal states growing into ever more controlling monsters, Moyn finds them reduced and enfeebled, having presided over the tragic dismantling of the welfare state.

THE NEW THOUGHT POLICE

The pessimism of The New Leviathans should not come as a surprise. Long known for his criticism of liberalism and gloomy forebodings, Gray posits that the contemporary liberal order was constructed around the delusion that “where markets spread, freedom would follow”—that market capitalism and liberal values were destined to triumph everywhere. Instead, he writes, these forces were simply a temporary “political experiment” that has “run its course” and left nothing but disaster in its wake. The future is bleak, he asserts. Societies will not be able to arrest climate change or prevent environmental destruction. New technologies will not save civilization. The English economist Thomas Malthus’s dire eighteenth-century predictions about overpopulation may yet be proved right. Western capitalism, Gray says, is “programmed to fail.”

Perhaps most disastrous of all, Gray argues, market forces, and the resulting connection between wealth and political leverage, are making our states more, not less, totalitarian. “Instead of China becoming more like the West,” he writes, “the West has become more like China.” Moreover, there is no reason to think that in the future, liberal governments will be any more successful than other forms of political order. Instead, he foresees “disparate regimes interacting with one another in a condition of global anarchy.”

For Gray, liberalism is based on faulty premises. Liberals flatter themselves when they assert that humans are better than animals. They are not. Humans persecute for pleasure. Liberal dreams of making the world a better place are just that: dreams, and hazardous ones at that. The idea of humanity, Gray writes, is a “dangerous fiction” that allows some people to be identified as less human than others and can provide a justification for eliminating them. The notion that history is a story of progress is another self-flattering illusion. He singles out the political theorist Francis Fukuyama and the cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker for special rebuke for their assumptions about society’s inexorable advancement.

Protesting a far-right campus speaker in Berkeley, California, September 2017

Justin Sullivan / Getty

But the liberal myth Gray most wants to shatter is that people in the West live in free societies. He acknowledges that for much of the modern period, liberal states set out to extend freedom and safeguard against tyranny. With the fall of the Soviet Union, however, these same states increasingly “cast off” traditional restraints on power in the pursuit of material progress, cultural conformity, and national security. “Like the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century,” he writes, liberal states today “have become engineers of souls.”

If governments have become totalitarian, so has society. Gray sees pervasive efforts in Western countries to control thought and language, and he is especially agitated by what he calls the “woke religion” on college campuses across the United States today. Indeed, his distress over “wokeism” seems to feed both his fear of totalitarianism and his penchant for hyperbole. The American university, he writes, has become “the model for an inquisitorial regime.” Wokeism and identity politics, he continues, are the products of “a lumpen intelligentsia that is economically superfluous” yet eager to become society’s guardians.

The New Leviathans is studded with occasional insights and curious bits of information. Gray writes that Putin admires an obscure nineteenth-century Russian thinker named Konstantin Leontyev, who revered feudalism and wanted the tsar to impose an “autocratic socialism” on Russia. Gray, in fact, devotes more than 70 pages to Russian or Bolshevik topics whose purpose, one surmises, is to remind us how random and full of horrors life is and to make clear that liberal society is headed toward totalitarianism. After all, tsarist Russia had its own “lumpen intelligentsia” that turned against the society that nurtured it, and look what happened there.

What any of this history really has to do with liberalism, however, is left unexplained. Gray also does not make clear what he means by liberalism. At the beginning of the book, he lists four key liberal principles he identified in 1986: that individuals have moral primacy over any social collectivity; that all people have equal moral worth; that moral values are universal for all humans and take precedence over specific cultural forms; and that all social and political arrangements can be improved. But Gray does not acknowledge that these principles can mean different things to different people at different times. Today, there are people who call themselves “classical liberals,” “social liberals,” “liberal socialists,” or just plain “liberals.” Although they may share a number of beliefs, the policies they support can vary radically. Which variety of liberalism is proto-totalitarian? For Gray, as for many other postliberals, liberalism seems to mean whatever he wants it to mean.

BAD AUTHORITY

Gray’s jaundiced view of the liberal tradition partly explains his odd use of the seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Each chapter of The New Leviathans begins with a quotation from Leviathan, Hobbes’s major treatise on state power, as if to provide the reader with a kernel of truth and an ominous warning about what is to come. Among liberals, Gray writes, Hobbes is “the only one, perhaps, still worth reading.” Hobbes is worth reading, it seems, because of his exceedingly dark view of human nature, a view Gray shares. Hobbes famously referred to the state of nature as a state of war, in which life was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” Men, he reasoned, would willingly submit to an absolute sovereign—they would form a social contract to give up their liberty in exchange for safety—to escape such an existence. In other words, government with unlimited power is necessary for society to flourish.

Through Hobbes’s eyes, Gray invites readers to see for themselves where the world is headed. He insists that no matter what liberals may say, they actually fear freedom and, to relieve them of its burdens, seek protection from the state. Supporters of liberalism will thus inevitably create a powerful state, one that will devolve into totalitarianism. By calling Hobbes the only liberal worth reading, Gray implies that liberals are really closet totalitarians—and know it.

But Gray is wrong here. Hobbes was no liberal. Although twentieth-century political philosophers often recognized Hobbes, along with John Locke a generation later, as one of the founding fathers of liberalism, this Anglocentric tradition ignores the actual language and ideas that both men used, as well as the stark differences in their conceptions of liberality. Notably, Leviathan was published over 150 years before there was anything called “liberalism”; and no self-identified liberal has ever recognized Hobbes as a founder, or even a member, of the liberal canon. Had Gray begun his book with a true early liberal thinker, he would have been obliged to tell a different story.

Liberals concerned themselves with threats posed not only by the state but also by society.

Consider the French Swiss political theorist Benjamin Constant (1767–1830). One of the first to identify as a liberal and be called one in his own lifetime, Constant rejected the concepts of the state of nature and the social contract as too abstract for practical use. He had an optimistic, although never naive, view of human nature. Like his fellow nineteenth-century liberals, he believed humans were capable of peaceful self-government in the best interest of all. These early thinkers fought to make Hobbesian authoritarianism impossible by establishing the rule of law and constitutionally limited government, with safeguards in place to protect individual freedoms. Although Gray recognizes this to a certain extent—and even admits that emerging democracies initially showed that “Hobbes was mistaken”—he blames liberalism for supposedly abandoning its original intentions by creating omnipotent states in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

By taking on nineteenth-century liberalism more directly, Gray would have seen that, from the very beginning, liberals concerned themselves with threats posed not only by an all-powerful state but also by society, whether through an unfair economy, an oppressive religion, or the many impediments to individual advancement and fulfillment, including stultifying social mores. Rather than fearing freedom, as Gray says, nineteenth-century liberals, as well as their successors, fought to secure and expand it. To blame liberalism for restricting individual rights and liberty makes no sense at all. But for Gray, not even Hobbes is pessimistic enough. “There is no final deliverance from the state of nature,” Gray writes. In the end, he topples the only liberal he thinks is still worth reading.

PARADISE LOST

Moyn agrees that there is a problem with liberalism, but the similarities with Gray’s account end there. A scholar best known for his iconoclastic history of human rights—arguing that the late-twentieth-century human rights movement largely failed—Moyn nevertheless believes that humans are not doomed and that liberalism is reparable. In Liberalism Against Itself, he argues that liberal thought in its original form is not the cause of the current crisis. In his telling, nineteenth-century liberals were optimists about human nature and believed in human beings’ ability to improve themselves and society. And until the mid-twentieth century, he writes, liberals were committed to “free and equal self-creation” and strove to establish the conditions for human flourishing. Over time, these conditions came to include universal suffrage and the welfare state, as well as individual empowerment and market freedom.

But then, in Moyn’s account, a group of Cold War liberals reconceived liberalism beyond recognition. Having experienced World War II and the extremes of Nazism and Stalinism, they embraced views of human nature that were much less hopeful. These thinkers worried that by embracing ideals of emancipation and continual improvement, liberalism could devolve into totalitarianism. As a result, Cold War liberals became “anxious” and “minimalist,” adopting a negative view of liberty in which freedom was defined as noninterference by the state. According to Moyn, they shrank their aspirations for human progress, and liberalism eventually “collapsed into neoliberalism and neoconservatism.”

Moyn devotes separate chapters to representative Cold War liberals, including the Oxford political theorist Isaiah Berlin, the Austrian British philosopher Karl Popper, the American historian of ideas Gertrude Himmelfarb, the German Jewish émigré political theorist Hannah Arendt, and the American literary critic Lionel Trilling. Along the way, he introduces others, including the libertarian Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek and the American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Moyn takes special interest in Judith Shklar, a political theorist who taught at Harvard through much of the Cold War and whose work shows how liberalism became downgraded, its ambitions diminished. Thus, in her 1957 book, After Utopia, she lamented a new liberal order that had abandoned many of its original Enlightenment precepts. Yet by the later decades of her career, she, too, viewed liberalism as, in Moyn’s words, “less a basis for the construction of a free community of equals and more as a means of harm reduction.”

“Cold War liberalism was a catastrophe,” Moyn writes. By overreacting to the Soviet threat, it failed to produce a liberal society “worthy of the name.” The world is living with the consequences. Even if these thinkers did not oppose the welfare state, Moyn argues, their rejection of liberal idealism set the stage for spiraling in equality and the assault on welfare in the generations that followed. Rather than challenging this tradition after the fall of communism, Moyn sees a new generation of writers and theorists extending Cold War liberalism to a range of new perceived threats to democracy, from Islamist extremism to the MAGA right to what he calls “‘woke’ tyranny.” This later generation, he writes, has continually failed to make clear the qualities that might give liberalism “enthusiastic backing” in the first place.

Notably, Moyn’s account of what happened to liberalism is diametrically opposed to Gray’s. In Moyn’s view, Cold War liberals and their contemporary successors have weakened the state, not, as Gray insists, made it grow. One is even tempted to read Moyn’s book as a response to Gray. Moyn disagrees with those who insist that liberalism is “poised on the precipice.” He believes that it is precisely this kind of catastrophism that has led people astray and made them afraid, fatalistic, and despondent when action is needed. It is such thinking that has caused liberalism to take a wrong turn.

CRISIS OR CATALYST?

Even skeptics and critics must admit that Liberalism Against Itself is clearly written and argued. Moyn does not make the mistake of anchoring liberalism in the thought of an antiliberal such as Hobbes. Instead, he draws on the ideas of true liberals such as Constant and his younger contemporaries John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville. Moyn also brings to light something that is often left out of histories of liberalism, namely its moral optimism and what could even be called its moral agenda. A central purpose of nineteenth-century liberalism was to create the conditions that would allow people to grow intellectually and morally.

But Moyn picks and chooses the principles of early liberalism with which he agrees. He favors a socialistic form of liberalism, but there was another, libertarian form that he leaves out. It is something of a simplification to say that nineteenth-century liberals saw the state as a “device of human liberation.” Some of them, such as the British idealist philosopher T. H. Green and the French politician Léon Bourgeois, did, but others, such as the British philosopher and social scientist Herbert Spencer and the French economist Frédéric Bastiat, did not. These latter thinkers, who would be called “classical” or “orthodox” liberals, also believed in progress and emancipation and were optimistic about the future, but they had less confidence in the state.

The New Leviathans, unlike Liberalism Against Itself, is a sad book, one that suggests there is no way out of the present predicament. As Gray sees it, to try to save liberalism—or what he calls “the moth-eaten musical brocade of progressive hope”—would be pointless. Instead, Western democracies should simply lower their sights and “adjust.” Moyn rejects such fatalism. People have important choices to make about how they should live their lives and what kind of society they wish to live in. He thinks it is time to reinvent liberalism, not bury it.

Liberalism has faced multiple crises throughout its history. It was even born in crisis, the crisis of the French Revolution. It has faced formidable enemies before and has reinvented itself several times, as well. It can certainly do so again. Exactly how it should do so is up to a new generation of thinkers, policymakers, politicians, and, ultimately, voters themselves to decide. They are more likely to find success, however, if they aspire to a vision of liberalism in which a well-governed society does not come at the expense of individual liberty but rather serves to further it.

• HELENA ROSENBLATT is Professor of History, Political Science, and French at the CUNY Graduate Center and the author of The Lost History of Liberalism: From Ancient Rome to the Twenty-First Century.

Foreign Affairs · by The Lost History of Liberalism: From Ancient Rome to the Twenty-First Century · February 20, 2024

19. John Wayne at His Writing Desk: Lessons from the Origins of the Army’s Professional Journals

Warriors should write.

John Wayne at His Writing Desk: Lessons from the Origins of the Army’s Professional Journals - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by J. P. Clark · February 26, 2024

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To meet the operational and institutional challenges ahead the Army needs to get thinking—and thinking means writing. Writing well forces the author to go beyond coffee-talk generalities and into professional-grade detail, while also explaining the full logic underlying an idea.

Yet as the founders of the Harding Project note, professional journals and bulletins—long the mainstays of Army professional discourse—have fallen in both output and engagement. This is a problem because even if everyone were writing, that work is only meaningful to the extent that it is shared, debated, refined, and acted upon. That is why, even in this age of countless outlets for individual expression, it is still necessary to have some common place for ideas to go. Millions of characters flying into the ether does little good. So while the world is more connected than ever in some senses, by the measure of the extent to which Army professionals are able to collectively think about hard problems, we have taken a step back.

The US Army has faced similar problems before; in the period between the Civil War and World War I, like challenges led to the development of the service’s professional journals. A look back to the four phases of professional writing during that period provides some lessons for how we might strengthen the profession today.

Echoes of Today

In the popular imagination, the Army of the late nineteenth century had only one mission—policing the frontier—and that required nothing more than hard riding and common sense. There are no scenes in Fort Apache of John Wayne writing for a professional journal, nor any sense that he should have.

In reality, the time was far more complex. The problems at the real Fort Apache would be familiar to veterans of Afghanistan. The complex internal dynamics of the Southwest Native American nations created a shifting mosaic of friendly, neutral, and hostile factions. The situation was further complicated by adversaries’ ability to exploit a porous border, across which was a sometimes helpful, sometimes antagonistic neighbor.

Moreover, the frontier was not the Army’s only mission. This was also the era depicted in the television series The Gilded Age, a time of intense technological and social change. In the last years of the nineteenth century, the Army actually devoted most of its resources to coast defense as artillerymen, engineers, and ordnance officers developed state-of-the-art optics and electrical systems, intricate hydraulic gun carriages, and advanced propellants and explosives to meet the challenge of defeating fast-moving, armored warships at great distances. Technology also indirectly created a mission for the Army through the profound societal disruptions of urbanization and economic upheaval during the Second Industrial Revolution. The regular Army and state militia were called upon so often during labor disputes that, as historian Edward Coffman notes, some officers argued that the Army should make urban constabulary duty its primary role.

In the decade after the Civil War, however, the Army lacked the means to systematically think about and devise solutions to these varied problems. Professional military education was limited to West Point and a few schools for junior engineers and artillerymen to learn purely technical skills. The field Army conducted virtually no training at anything larger than the company level. The greatest problem, however, was isolation. The regular Army’s roughly twenty-seven thousand personnel were scattered over more than a hundred different locations; most individuals served at posts garrisoned by just a handful of officers and one or two hundred soldiers. Exacerbating geographic dispersion were personnel policies that limited interchange among the various staff bureaus, corps, branches, and even regiments within a branch. Finally, the Army had no general staff to direct effort and no doctrine to provide a common tactical framework. In sum, even though the Army was small, it was exceptionally difficult to share best practices, debate important issues, and develop solutions.

The Military Service Institution in the 1870s: Top-down Generalists

In early 1878, a group of officers serving in the various units stationed around New York City and at West Point resolved to address the problem of the Army being “brought together only by war.” Without some mechanism for sharing ideas, isolated organizations would develop along diverging lines and generally lose knowledge of the other elements and larger whole. The group also believed that warfare had reached a state of complexity such that all of its elements could no longer be grasped by a single mind. This required intellectual cooperation as described by the West Point superintendent: “It is only by united and harmonious effort that the many may even approach to that degree of excellence which [ensures] success in war.”

The mechanism they devised to enable such united and harmonious effort was the Military Service Institution of the United States (MSI). The MSI was patterned mainly on a British equivalent that still exists today, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), though it was also inspired by the US Naval Institute and built upon an existing professional study group within the West Point faculty. In addition to its Journal of the Military Service Institution (JMSI), the MSI also supported a library and a museum of US Army artifacts.

The MSI benefitted from high-level support. Most of the founders and members of the MSI Executive Council were relatively senior veterans of the Civil War, while the MSI’s first president was the commander of all Army forces in the eastern United States, Major General Winfield Scott Hancock. With the permission of the secretary of war, Hancock provided the MSI office space within his headquarters on Governors Island. The superintendent at West Point provided the inaugural address, and the commanding general of the Army, William T. Sherman, wrote several letters commenting on military law that were published in the first few issues of the journal. With such backing from senior leaders, it was not surprising that within a year as many as one-fifth of the regular officers were members.

The JMSI helped focus intellectual energy through its annual essay contest, with all entrants writing on a topic selected by the MSI Executive Council. It is possible to plot the Army’s operational and institutional challenges by tracing the evolution of the essay contest questions over time. The stature of the first award committee members gives some indication of the contest’s prestige: a former secretary of war, a serving general officer, and Representative Joseph E. Johnston, a West Pointer and former Confederate commander. Surviving letters from some of the Army’s leading thinkers suggest that the competition truly motivated them.

The success of the MSI in fostering a vibrant professional culture is exemplified by the career of Arthur L. Wagner. According to historian T. R. Brereton, after several years of garrison duty Wagner was bored and close to resigning his commission. The twin opportunities of serving as a professor of military science at what is today the University of Florida and winning the 1884 MSI essay contest reinvigorated Wagner’s professional interest. He went on to make a number of critical contributions and rise to the rank of brigadier general before his premature death in 1905: introducing modern tactics instruction at the nascent Fort Leavenworth school; writing textbooks that taught many of the future senior commanders of World War I the basics of reconnaissance, security, attack, and defense; and overseeing the conduct of the Army’s first large-scale realistic field training exercise, at which he also conducted perhaps the first modern after action review.

Branch Associations in the 1880s: Bottom-up Specialists

The MSI remained a mainstay of US Army professionalism until World War I, though there were limitations to its generalist approach. In the first issue of the JMSI, the institution’s secretary urged readers to track developments in other branches: cavalrymen should read about coast defense mines and artillerymen should read about the saber in mounted operations. Yet specialists found they needed outlets within which they could speak to other specialists. The second phase of branch journals reflected this need; it was a bottom-up effort primarily driven by the faculty at branch schools.

It was not coincidental that the growth of professional journals occurred at the same time that the Army was significantly expanding the scale and scope of professional military education. Senior leaders like Sherman and Phil Sheridan were responsible for the growing the number of schools, reopening the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, for example, and founding new ones, such as one for engineers at Willets Point, New York and another for infantry and cavalry at Fort Leavenworth. The senior leaders, however, had a limited vision of professional education; they wanted the schools to do little more than teach basic technical and administrative skills for junior lieutenants.

The expansion in what was taught was due to a bottom-up effort driven by faculty members like Wagner and Emory Upton, who were not content to teach drill regulations and basic unit administration. Sometimes against explicit guidance from senior leaders, these mid-ranking officers pushed the boundaries to teach more advanced, staff college–like subjects. Indeed, Upton’s “art of war” course at Fort Monroe—going far beyond ballistics and the employment of guns, students also studied strategy, history, military law, and what today would be called combined arms tactics—was one inspiration for the founding of the Naval War College. The schools also pioneered the use of techniques such as wargaming, map exercises, and terrain walks.

As intellectual hot spots, schools became natural homes for branch journals and associations. The physical proximity of individuals engaged in thinking about common problems created the intellectual stimulus, the presence of libraries to conduct research provided the means, and, at least for the faculty, the need to create course content also gave some motivation. Cavalrymen at Fort Leavenworth led the way with the formation of an association in 1885—just seven years after the MSI—with the first issue of its journal appearing in 1888. Within a year, artillerymen at Fort Monroe were ready to follow suit, claiming that the occasional article in the JMSI was not sufficient, particularly as they often wanted to discuss highly technical issues that would be of little interest to the other branches.

The prospect of multiple journals potentially competing for authors and readers caused concern, at least among some. As revealed in letters contained within the US Military Academy Library Special Collections, Tasker H. Bliss, aide to the Army’s commanding general and himself a future chief of staff, warned the editor of the JMSI that something had to be done to co-opt the fledgling branch associations before they grew so large as to choke out the parent tree. The editor, however, disputed Bliss’s premise that there was a fixed lump of content and subscribers. He noted that the MSI’s Fort Leavenworth chapter had actually gained membership since the creation of the Cavalry Association, while overall article submissions to the JMSI remained robust. At least within the Army of the 1880s, there was a reinforcing cycle of intellectual energy and output that created more energy and output.

The Lyceum in the 1890s: Mandatory Writing

Though Bliss was incorrect in believing that the Army could not sustain more than a single journal, there were limits to the intellectual output, as demonstrated by the next stage in the development of professional writing—the officers’ lyceum.

The lyceum was the initiative of the Army’s top general, Commanding General John M. Schofield, who had been one of the early supporters of the MSI. Schofield’s ambitious plan was to expand professional writing across the entire officer corps through top-down direction. In 1891, he issued a general order that directed every post commander to establish a lyceum—what today we might call a study group—with two functions. The first was to prepare individuals for their promotion examinations through classroom review of regulations. The second, more ambitious function was to “to gradually bring the line of the Army to [a] high standard of professional acquirement” by having every lieutenant and captain write an essay on a topic of their choice but approved by the post commander. Due to the much slower promotion rates at the time—most officers were not promoted to major until their fifties—the essay requirement applied to all officers with about thirty years of service or less. Over the course of the year, all the officers at any given post would discuss their various essays within the lyceum.

The results were mixed. Supportive commanders with the intellect and temperament to mentor officers and facilitate discussion produced some successes. Even without such support, motivated officers did produce quality papers, some of which were then published in the JMSI or branch journals. Yet the historical evidence suggests that, on the whole, the lyceums fell far short of Schofield’s objectives. Many post commanders did not care or simply did not know how to create an atmosphere of inquiry; particularly at the smaller posts, there were not sufficient research resources available; and many individuals did not have the skills to conduct worthwhile independent research. The result, as described by one officer who would go on to write the standard American military history textbooks during the early twentieth century, was “a constipation of ideas in a flux of words.” The Army had not created the conditions for success.

The Infantry Association in the 1900s: Writing for Organizational Advantage

Not all of the branches organized their associations and journals at the same pace. The laggard was the infantry, which formed a society in 1893 but did not begin publishing a journal until 1904.

A lot happened in those intervening years. The United States became a global power with the Spanish-American War, which in turn led, directly or indirectly, to a significant expansion of the Army and accompanying influx of new officers; the development of the Army’s first comprehensive, tiered system of professional military education; and the creation of a general staff to manage it all. One unfortunate byproduct of these rapid expansions of people and organizations was fighting among the branches for force structure and power.

The Infantry Journal was a product of this period of intraservice rivalry. As opposed to the first two phases of associations and journals, which came respectively out of geographic concentrations of units and schools, the early editorial staff of the Infantry Journal mainly consisted of infantrymen assigned to the newly founded general staff. The rough modern equivalents would be if the MSI were founded at Fort Liberty, the early branch journals at places like Fort Sill, and the Infantry Journal coming from the Pentagon.

The Infantry Journal reflected this context. Like the other branch journals, most articles were on broad professional topics like techniques for training understrength units or translated extracts from the new Japanese tactical doctrine. The extensive editorial section, however, was openly combative; the same issue as the articles just mentioned also featured complaints about a general marginalization of the infantry and the long period since an infantryman had last served as the superintendent at West Point. The Infantry Journal grew so powerful that the Army’s chief of staff sent one of his aides to seek the editor’s support for pending legislation. Even more startling than the Army’s senior officer feeling compelled to win the support of a captain for the service’s position was that in this case the junior officer refused. There is some risk in allowing the flow of ideas, though it is difficult to argue that the Army was not far better for having a vibrant professional culture, even if this did cause some problems for senior leaders.

Implications and Questions for Today

As noted at the outset, there are many similarities between the problems of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era and what we face today. Therefore, it only makes sense that we can find lessons in their solutions as well, particularly in light of Army senior leaders’ emphasis on revitalizing professional writing and journals. Writing undeniably strengthens the profession by generating solutions, invigorating individuals, and building communities across space. Yet strangely, military writing seems to come in clusters, even though the work itself is mainly solitary and feeds into virtual communities independent of geography. This was the case in the nineteenth century but is also true today, even in the era of Microsoft Teams and Google Docs, as was noted in a recent Harding Project workshop. Personal connections matter in multiple ways: colleagues help generate and refine ideas while also providing encouragement and support to see a writing project through to completion. Schools will likely remain intellectual engines because faculty and students are daily wrestling with the problems of their functional communities and have many of the resources necessary to write. But as this brief history demonstrates, other locations and organizations can also become clusters of thought, so long as there is the right combination of leadership, enabling resources, and talent.

The past offers less of a guide in relation to the need to have common places for professional communities to share ideas. In the nineteenth century, the problem was how to sustainably staff and publish a journal. Publications require much work and resources, but those came through a combination of top-down support and bottom-up organization. Today, the bar to publishing in any one of a variety of formats—prose, audio, or video—is little more than a laptop or smartphone with a few apps. But the ease of publication is offset by the difficulty of reaching a significant portion of the professional community. We need “watering holes” where members of the community can all go for quality content that will persist longer than the refresh of a timeline or feed. In meeting this challenge today, we will have to find our own way.

The final lesson is that one size will not fit all. Even the nineteenth-century Army required multiple forums for professional discussion, each catering to a different set of issues and problems. Some dealt with broad issues of concern across the profession, others dealt with more specific topics of interest to only some subset of specialists. Today’s Army has even more specialties, some of which also are in conversation with like specialists in other services, academia, or business. At the same time, there is the opportunity for sharing ideas and tools in more formats: yes, articles, but also spreadsheets, code, interactive maps, podcasts, and video. The consistent factor, however, is that these discussions are fundamental to a strong profession, which, so long as the forums are oriented around communities confronting shared problems, will never have a lack of material in today’s world.

J. P. Clark is a retired US Army colonel, an associate professor of strategy at the US Army War College, and the editor-in-chief of its online journal, War Room. He is also the author of Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815–1917.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by J. P. Clark · February 26, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com