Quotes of the Day:

“You can sway 1000 men by appealing to their prejudices quicker than you can convince one-man by logic.”

– Robert A. Heinlein

"Every revolution evaporates and leaves behind only the slime of a new bureaucracy."

– Franz Kafka

"In our age there is no such thing as 'keeping out of politics.' All issues are political issues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophrenia."

– George Orwell

1.  The North Korean Human Rights Situation is a Litmus Test of Credibility

2. Peace in Ukraine must look like Korea, not Vichy

3. North Koreans ordered back into battle despite heavy losses

4. North Korea's Kim calls for building modern army to brace for war

5. Kim Jong Un says army must learn from ‘combat experience’ on modern battlefields

6. South Korean Government: “If North Korean POWs’ intention to ‘go to South Korea’ is confirmed, we will accept them”

7. No Substitute for Victory: How to Negotiate from a Position of Strength to End the Russo-Ukraine War

8.  Korean unification: A new nation rooted in the Korean Dream

9. South Korea Weighs The Pros And Cons Of Nuclear Armament

10. Ex-US general not convinced S. Korea will be more secure with nuclear arms

11. WW3 fears soar as North Korea issues terrifying nuke warning

12. Prosecutors demand 2-yr prison term for opposition leader in election law violation case

13. U.S. defense secretary reportedly exploring visit to S. Korea next month: sources

14. Captured N.K. soldiers' intention 'most important factor' for their defection to S. Korea: FM Cho

15. Deputy Pentagon chief nominee calls for efforts to stem growth of N. Korea's nuclear, missile arsenals

16. N. Korea's Kim stresses 'ideology-first' principle for military during university visit

17. N. Korean party delegation visits Moscow: KCNA

18. Editorial: Trump's shift on Ukraine and how it could impact on S.Korea's security

19. N. Korean officials forced to perform Kim Jong Il birthday shows, sparking criticism

20. North Korea in 2025: Between domestic control and global gambles

1.  The North Korean Human Rights Situation is a Litmus Test of Credibility

This is a Google translation of Greg Scarlatiou's weekly column with RFA.

Excerpts:

Of course, the downside of the 'Helsinki Process' approach to North Korea is that North Korea can abuse diplomatic dialogue by pretending to respect human rights obligations while being recognized as a nuclear state. In this situation, if North Korea does not comply with human rights obligations, it will become a litmus test to measure North Korea's will to solve security issues.

In addition to the multilateral environment, the United States also raised human rights issues bilaterally during nuclear negotiations with the Soviet Union. Both the Democratic Carter administration and the Republican Reagan administration rejected and refuted claims that raising human rights issues would jeopardize U.S.-Soviet relations and arms control. President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz constantly pressed Soviet leaders on the issue of rejectniks, making this a top priority until free emigration of Soviet Jews was permitted. To Reagan and Shultz, the Soviets’ addressing of human rights issues signaled their readiness to negotiate arms control.

If diplomatic talks with North Korea resume, the Soviet Union's Reagan-Shultz approach to human rights could serve as a relevant precedent and a litmus test for North Korea's willingness to negotiate a solution to its security problems.

[Scalatu] The North Korean Human Rights Situation is a Litmus Test of Credibility

https://www.rfa.org/korean/commentary/greg/trust-litmus-test-human-rights-02242025093854.html

Greg Scarlatoiu, Chairman, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

, 2025.02.25

A tourist watches a TV program about North Korea's political prison camps at the Unification Observatory.

/ AP

Greg Scarlatoiu, Chairman, Committee for Human Rights in North KoreaIn diplomatic talks with North Korea for nearly 35 years, human rights have been separated from, and out of competition with, denuclearization negotiations. This track record shows North Korea’s low diplomatic credibility. Improving North Korea’s human rights record could be a litmus test for North Korea’s credibility on other issues. In chemistry, a litmus test is used to measure the acidity of a solution. In politics, a question is used to measure a single metric to determine a person’s character. In short, if Chairman Kim Jong Un shows a willingness to improve North Korea’s human rights record, that could be the first step toward building trust. If he doesn’t, trust is impossible. After all, how can a government care about the lives of others if it doesn’t care about the lives of its own citizens? If it viciously violates the human rights of its own citizens, it may conclude that there is no way to prevent North Korea from waging war or proliferating missile technology and weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. 

In the case of North Korea, human rights can be a goodwill indicator and add a clear and achievable standard that increases credibility as part of a larger agreement. For example, North Korea is still estimated to have 200,000 people in political prison camps, but the authorities deny their existence. North Korea should identify the locations of the camps and allow access for the International Red Cross and UN agencies to provide humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable people in North Korea, including the prisoners.

In addition to addressing the management problem, the North Korean regime could demonstrate its commitment to respecting basic human rights by allowing access to information from the outside world. North Korea’s criminal code should be revised to no longer prohibit listening to South Korean and foreign broadcasts.  

Severing ties with regimes like Iran that are hostile to the United States and have been implicated in serious human rights abuses and international terrorism would signal a greater focus on relations with the United States, and perhaps on its own citizens, than on economic and trade relations with fellow aggressors.

While this is only a suggestion, the response of the Kim Jong-un regime can be measured and used as an indicator or benchmark to assess the credibility of North Korea’s commitment to a larger agreement with the United States. Several key human rights issues could be included in a larger discussion with North Korea. These issues could include political imprisonment, social discrimination based on loyalty (songbun system), modern slavery, human trafficking, and family reunions. The most pressing human rights issue is North Korea’s political prison camps and other illegal detention facilities where crimes against humanity are committed.

Most of North Korea’s human rights abuses stem from its system of collective guilt, a discriminatory social classification system based on loyalty to the government. A commitment to change or abolish the songbun system could be a major step forward in improving the lives of millions of North Koreans.

According to the 2023 Global Slavery Index, North Korea is estimated to have 2.696 million modern-day slaves out of a population of 25,778,815, making it the country with the highest prevalence of modern-day slavery in the world.  

Despite being a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), North Korea exploits children to provide the resources needed to maintain the regime’s power. Children are forced to participate in mass gymnastics performances and mass mobilizations, and are forced to do everything from road cleaning to railway construction.

Many women and children who escape North Korea are trafficked to China. If caught, they face forced repatriation and punishment.

Additionally, reunions of separated families, including Koreans with relatives in North Korea and Koreans living in the United States, require that North Korea either allow ongoing, sustainable, and unsupervised reunions of separated families or allow its citizens to travel to third countries for reunions.

Two cases in the past where human rights were part of U.S. foreign policy could serve as valuable precedents. They were part of multilateral and bilateral talks with the Soviet Union (USSR).

The Helsinki Accords of the European nation Finland during the Cold War were a multilateral approach to political, economic, human rights issues, and collective security in Europe. If a similar model were applied to North Korea, the goal could be to create a means for discussions with North Korea to cover a range of topics, including human rights, rather than being limited to denuclearization. 

Of course, the downside of the 'Helsinki Process' approach to North Korea is that North Korea can abuse diplomatic dialogue by pretending to respect human rights obligations while being recognized as a nuclear state. In this situation, if North Korea does not comply with human rights obligations, it will become a litmus test to measure North Korea's will to solve security issues.

In addition to the multilateral environment, the United States also raised human rights issues bilaterally during nuclear negotiations with the Soviet Union. Both the Democratic Carter administration and the Republican Reagan administration rejected and refuted claims that raising human rights issues would jeopardize U.S.-Soviet relations and arms control. President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz constantly pressed Soviet leaders on the issue of rejectniks, making this a top priority until free emigration of Soviet Jews was permitted. To Reagan and Shultz, the Soviets’ addressing of human rights issues signaled their readiness to negotiate arms control.

If diplomatic talks with North Korea resume, the Soviet Union's Reagan-Shultz approach to human rights could serve as a relevant precedent and a litmus test for North Korea's willingness to negotiate a solution to its security problems.

Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Editor Kim Sang-il

2. Peace in Ukraine must look like Korea, not Vichy

What a world we live in. Who would have thought that after seven decades of the Korean Armistice that some would be looking at that arrangement that has left the peninsula divided with 25 million Koreans in the north suffering human rights abuses and crimes against humanity on a scale not seen since WWII. That is not mentioned in the article below. Is that the legacy the peace advocates want to leave?

Peace in Ukraine must look like Korea, not Vichy

The only real peace for Ukraine is a fortified one — think Korea, not Vichy.

kyivindependent.com · by Nicu Popescu · February 25, 2025

Peace is an attractive, yet elusive, concept. It can mean different things to different people at different times. Ukraine is a case in point. The quest for peace could yield either of two fundamentally different outcomes: a Vichy-style capitulation, perhaps with an interim ceasefire that buys Russia more time to rearm and prepare its next attack, or a robust defense of a frozen front line, as one finds on the Korean Peninsula today.

The Kremlin’s vision for peace in Ukraine is clear. Russian forces would directly occupy swaths of illegally seized Ukrainian territory, and a compliant, helpless Ukrainian government (lacking any meaningful military capacity) would take orders from Moscow. Something quite similar happened in France during World War II, when the part of the country not under direct German occupation was run by General Philippe Pétain’s collaborationist government and took orders from Berlin.

Thus, for most of World War II — roughly between 1940 and 1944 — the situation on the ground in France was “peaceful.” The Vichy regime under Pétain regularly boasted that it had protected France, while blaming the Resistance — French guerrillas ("maquis") — and periodic Allied bombing raids for any disturbances to the “peace.” This option has been on offer for Ukraine since the first hours of Russia’s large-scale invasion. Yet having witnessed the executions, rapes, and other atrocities committed by Russian forces against civilians in Bucha and elsewhere, the Ukrainians have understandably refused to capitulate.

The alternative is the type of peace that kept Germany peaceful for decades after World War II, and kept the Korean Peninsula peaceful since the 1953 armistice. In each case, the peace was secured by accepting de facto borders, which were fortified with massive defensive military buildups, boots on the ground, and credible security guarantees. While West Germany enjoyed NATO membership after 1955, South Korea relied on a bilateral alliance with the United States. Even today, the U.S. keeps around 28,000 active-duty troops in South Korea and 50,000 in Germany.

Such backstops made the former wartime front line almost impregnable, allowing each rump state to consolidate, develop, and remain at peace. The equivalent of a West German or South Korean model for Ukraine today would require a freezing of the front line and either NATO accession or a deployment of tens of thousands of Western troops to its Ukrainian territory.

"Such backstops made the former wartime front line almost impregnable, allowing each rump state to consolidate, develop, and remain at peace."

The French government has pushed for this kind of solution since February 2024, and it now features prominently in discussions among European leaders. With the new U.S. administration demanding that Europe do more to ensure its own peace and security, at least a half-dozen European governments are said to be seriously considering it.

Of course, if Europeans dislike the first model (a Vichy-style peace) but prove unable to deliver a sufficient security guarantee, that will create the conditions for a third possible scenario: a bogus peace leading to another war. A temporary ceasefire — like the one that prevailed under the Minsk agreements after 2014 — would allow Russia to regroup, rearm, and attack again sooner rather than later. Not only might this cycle be repeated more than once; it also could implicate countries beyond Ukraine — such as the Baltics or Poland.

Thus, if Ukraine does not get enough support in the coming months and years, Europe will find itself confronting a dangerous new strategic reality, one that would challenge NATO solidarity and leave EU territory perpetually vulnerable. With enough prodding and hybrid warfare, Russia could test the limits of NATO’s mutual defense guarantee and either expose it as a dead letter or precipitate a direct military confrontation between nuclear powers. Such would be the consequences of a bogus peace.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C), U.S. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz (R) and U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff attend an interview after meeting with Russian officials in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on Feb. 18, 2025. (Evelyn Hockstein / AFP via Getty Images)

The immediate task for Europe, then, is not only to navigate U.S. President Donald Trump’s unilateral pursuit of a settlement with Russia that could offer Ukraine on a platter to Russia, but also to ensure that any deal does not increase the likelihood of an even wider war in the near future.

Many Europeans think that if Russia could not conquer Ukraine in 2022, Russia would not dare challenge NATO and the European Union. That is dangerously wishful thinking. Occupying most of Ukraine would not only allow Russia to expand its territory, but also allow it to unite Europe’s biggest and second-biggest armies, under Kremlin command.

Occupied territories bring in new people, defense production capacities, and resources — from rare-earth minerals to gas and nuclear power plants. Ukraine’s defense industrial capacity — which has been impressive in multiple areas, from sea drones to the shear capacity to produce equipment en masse — would be a welcome bonus for Russia as well, and it could be used against Europe. French President Emmanuel Macron already publicly warned that the combined armed forces of Russia and Ukraine would be unstoppable.

The bottom line is that avoiding a Ukrainian capitulation or a fake peace will require a European commitment to, at the very least, freezing the current frontline. Otherwise, vulnerable EU and NATO members could be the next targets. European public opinion must wake up to the reality that the only alternative is something that no one wants: a perpetual threat of war for much of Central and Northern Europe, with all the security and economic uncertainty that comes with it.

Editor’s Note: Copyright, Project Syndicate. This article was published by Project Syndicate on Feb. 21, 2025, and has been republished by the Kyiv Independent with permission.The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.

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The Kyiv IndependentEdward C. Chow

kyivindependent.com · by Nicu Popescu · February 25, 2025

3. North Koreans ordered back into battle despite heavy losses

I remain skeptical of the casualty reports or reports on how well the nKPA forces fight. Unless or until we have our own advisors/observers embedded with Ukrainian units to obtain ground truth I will remain skeptical. I also would like to have some of our intelligence professionals interview/interrogate captured north Korea soldiers.

But if they did have their asses handed to them by the Ukainians (which does seem to be likely given the preponderance of the reporting), it will be instructive to see if they can take lessons learned and adjust their their training to the actual battlefield conditions. And the big question is will they be able to take lessons learned back to the north and adapt their training to take advantage (of their still limited) combat experience. Yes, as they say north Korea is not Kursk but there are elements of the modern battlefield that are useful in any terrain such as the use of drones and electronic warfare among other modern capabilities. My question is whether the nKPA in the north can significantly benefit from their experiences in Russia/Ukraine and transfer that experience through modern training to the nKPA forces in the north for use against the South? Or is this simply a money making endeavor for Kim Jong Un? (and he is certainly making a lot of money by renting his forces to Putin)

North Koreans ordered back into battle despite heavy losses

Pyongyang is now Russia’s biggest arms supplier, says Ukraine, and Kim Jong-un’s troops have modified their tactics as they fight to reclaim Kursk

https://www.thetimes.com/world/asia/article/north-koreans-ordered-back-into-battle-despite-heavy-losses-x0fk5gxx9

Richard Lloyd Parry, Asia Editor

Tuesday February 25 2025, 3.05pm GMT, The Times

Private Ri, a North Korean soldier who was injured in his arm and jaw by a Ukrainian drone, recovers after being taken captive

TELEGRAM/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

North Korean troops have returned to battle against Ukraine but are operating in smaller units and with greater caution after suffering heavy casualties, according to soldiers on the front line.

A platoon commander interviewed on Ukraine’s military television channel confirmed what senior officers have also said: despite reportedly suffering as many as 4,000 deaths and injuries out of 12,000 troops, the Korean People’s Army is still fighting alongside Russian forces.

“Their tactics have changed, they’ve also reduced the number of troops in their assault groups,” said Stanislav Krasnov of Ukraine’s 95th Air Assault Brigade. He said that North Korean soldiers now operated in groups of 10 to 15 compared with groups of 50 previously.

North Korean troops after an assault on a Ukrainian position. Thousands have already been killed and injured

EYEPRESS NEWS/REX/SHUTTERSTOCK

He told Army TV that the North Koreans still fight in larger units than Russian troops: “[But] they move more cautiously now, as seen in aerial reconnaissance, unlike before when they boldly marched across fields as if they owned the place.”

The head of Ukrainian intelligence said that North Korea supplies half of the artillery shells used by Russia.

Last month Ukrainian intelligence was playing down Kim Jong-un’s contribution to the Russian invasion, claiming that half the shells supplied were duds. But Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov said North Korea had become President Putin’s biggest supplier of arms.

The aftermath of a Russian missile strike on Kyiv. Russia has fired dozens of North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles at Ukraine

UKRINFORM/NURPHOTO/GETTY IMAGES

He told a conference in Kyiv this week that 49 per cent of 122mm and 152mm artillery ammunition, as well as rockets for the 122mm MLRS systems, were supplied by North Korea.

He said the North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles had become much more accurate. “Their initial use demonstrated low accuracy,” he said. “After that, with the assistance of Russian specialists, modernisation work was carried out. Now their accuracy has become fully acceptable for this type of weaponry.”

He predicted that 148 more of the KN-23s would be supplied by North Korea this year — as well as 1,500 to 2,000 soldiers to replace the 4,000 who had been injured or killed.

Kim Jong-un has emerged as a key backer of President Putin

GAVRIIL GRIGOROV/POOL/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Two captured North Korean soldiers have spoken of the misery of the battle front in Kursk, where they are attempting to regain Russian territory lost to Ukraine.

“I’m the only one left [alive from my unit],” one of them told a South Korean journalist. “Some [of my comrades] blew themselves up [to avoid capture], leaving nothing but headless or half-torn bodies … In the dead of winter, with snow falling like this, they lay there… and the smell of blood still lingers with me.”

4. North Korea's Kim calls for building modern army to brace for war

Will his support for Putin's War help him develop a modern army? Or is "modern army" code for nuclear weapons and and advanced missiles?

But "bracing for war" is part of the regime's domestic propaganda that is externalizing the threat to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the Korean people in the north. This is another indicator that Kim fears he is facing internal instability threats. We must be observing for the indicators of internal instability as much as we observe for attack indicators.

North Korea's Kim calls for building modern army to brace for war

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-calls-building-modern-army-brace-war-2025-02-26/?mc_cid=ff79a50a8c

By Hyonhee Shin

February 26, 20253:15 AM ESTUpdated 5 hours ago

Item 1 of 4 North Korean leader Kim Jong Un watches a cadet practicing on the parallel bars during his visit to the Kang Kon Military Academy, in Pyongyang, North Korea, February 25, 2025, in this picture released by the Korean Central News Agency. KCNA via REUTERS

[1/4]North Korean leader Kim Jong Un watches a cadet practicing on the parallel bars during his visit to the Kang Kon Military Academy, in Pyongyang, North Korea, February 25, 2025, in this picture released by the Korean Central News Agency. KCNA via REUTERS Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

SEOUL, Feb 26 (Reuters) - North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for building a strong, modern army to cope with any war during a visit to a military academy, state media KCNA said on Wednesday.

Kim's trip to the Kang Kon Military Academy comes after North Korea has sent thousands of troops to Russia to support its war against Ukraine. This week Kim also visited the Kim Il Sung University of Politics, another elite cadre training institution, calling for military loyalty and sacrifice.

South Korea's intelligence agency has said Kim's previous inspections of military units and training might be part of preparations for an additional dispatch of soldiers to Russia.

During the latest visit to the military academy, Kim criticised the school's poor management and operation of educational facilities, saying it failed to meet the ruling party's pursuit of "modernity and advanced character" in building a powerful army, KCNA said.

He laid out tasks to refurbish the facilities and intensify education focusing on practice so that the students would learn about the "actual experiences of modern warfare", and to master advanced weapons and technical equipment, it said.

"The present international situation, in which the aggressive and bellicose nature of the imperialists is most openly expressed in history and war and bloodshed become commonplaces, requires the armed forces ... to perfectly cope with a war," Kim said, according to KCNA. South Korean officials have warned that North Korea could benefit from supplying weapons and troops to fight in Russia by gaining experience and insight from operating on a modern battlefield.

Kyiv has said North Korean forces have suffered heavy casualties in Russia, with more than 3,000 soldiers killed or wounded by early January this year.

Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with the Reuters Econ World newsletter. Sign up here.

Reporting by Hyonhee Shin Editing by Ed Davies and Lincoln Feast.

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

5. Kim Jong Un says army must learn from ‘combat experience’ on modern battlefields

Can the regime develop sufficiently "modern" training regimens to incorporate lessons learned from Putin's War? I am skeptical.

But Kim Jong Un is exactly right and I agree with him. It is not combat experience but whether or not you can turn that combat experience into training for the rest of the military.

One Day One of the war when they attack the South those with combat experience will have a slight advantage because they have "seen the elephant." But on Day Two both sides will have combat experience. And after Day Two it will be the best trained army that will be victorious. And the ROK and US combined forces will always have superior training when compared to the north Korean People's Army.

Kim Jong Un says army must learn from ‘combat experience’ on modern battlefields

North Korean leader hints at Ukraine war deployment during visit to school displaying posters on ‘exterminating’ South

https://www.nknews.org/2025/02/kim-jong-un-says-army-must-learn-from-combat-experience-on-modern-battlefields/

Colin Zwirko February 26, 2025

Kim Jong Un watches boot camp style training at the Kang Kon academy | Image: KCNA (Feb. 26, 2025)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called on the country’s military to learn from “real combat experience” in ongoing wars, according to state media on Wednesday, appearing to hint at the army’s troop deployment to Russia.

The comments came during his second visit to elite military schools in two days, this time touring the Kang Kon Military Academy on Tuesday, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported.

The school is responsible for “training junior commanding personnel” of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), and is the “parent body of military education institutions in the country and the most prestigious commanding officers training center.”

Kim “emphasized the need to strengthen practice-oriented military lessons in the military education sector, enabling all students to fully understand and master real combat experiences taking place on modern battlefields in our own way.”

He said cadets must be “well-versed in rapidly advancing weapons and combat technology equipment and to equip themselves with leadership capabilities suitable for modern warfare.”

The report did not explicitly mention the deployment of over 10,000 North Korean troops since late last year to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The DPRK leader watches military demonstrations at the Kang Kon academy | Image: KCNA (Feb. 26, 2025)

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It appears that DPRK authorities still have not disclosed the war to the public, but Kim’s demand on Tuesday for gaining real war experience to combat “the ever-growing aggression and belligerence of imperialism” helps prime the public to accept war casualties.

He also informed the public that “war and bloodshed have become everyday occurrences” in another line presenting participation in conflict as acceptable.

The rarity of the term “real combat experience” (실전경험) in state media further suggests relevance to North Korean soldiers fighting in Russia. NK News analysis of KCNA Watch archives show official outlets have used it sparingly and usually to condemn other countries for joining foreign wars.

For example, Kim Jong Un claimed in a speech last November that the U.S. was supporting Ukraine to gain combat experience, while KCNA used the term 20 years ago to criticize South Korea for joining the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

The similar term “actual war capability” (실전능력) appears frequently in state media and Kim Jong Un speeches, but usually refers to the benefits of military training.

Analysts and even the Ukrainian president have suggested that North Korea’s military is indeed gaining valuable combat experience fighting for Russia despite suffering thousands of deaths, including in modern warfare strategies involving suicide drones.

Kim previously hinted at, but didn’t explicitly admit, his troop deployment to Europe earlier this month when he said “our army and people will invariably support and encourage the just cause of the Russian army and people to defend their sovereignty, security and territorial integrity” in line with last year’s bilateral treaty.

CHECKING IN ON SOUTH KOREA ATTACK STRATEGIES

Like numerous other reports on Kim visits to military facilities in the last year, Wednesday’s KCNA dispatch suggested that South Korea and the U.S. are still the DPRK’s primary military targets, not Ukraine. 

For example, one propaganda poster displayed behind Kim in a shooting range viewing room at the Kang Kon academy read, “Let’s annihilate and exterminate every last bastard among the utterly treacherous puppet South Korean filth!”

The propaganda poster behind Kim on the left says “Let’s annihilate and exterminate every last bastard among the utterly treacherous puppet South Korean filth!” (전호무도한 괴뢰한국쓰레기들을 마지막 한놈까지 격멸소탕해버리자!) and the one on the right says “Let’s thoroughly prepare so we can ruthlessly smash the enemies to a pulp and completely pacify and wipe them out!” (적들을 무자비하게 죽탕쳐버리고 완전히 평정해치울수 있게 만반으로 준비하자!) | Image: KCNA (Feb. 26, 2025)

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Another featured an illustration of an artillery barrage and all of South Korean territory in flames below the slogan, “The puppet state is the absolute number one hostile nation, the unchanging main enemy!” A third poster stated, “Let’s thoroughly prepare so we can ruthlessly smash the enemies to a pulp and completely pacify and wipe them out!” 

The shooting range target room featured the KPA’s staple slogan “Destroy the U.S. Imperialist Aggressors, the sworn enemy of the Korean people!”

KCNA blurred wall displays in photos of Kim touring classrooms, but they appeared to feature maps, possibly of South Korean towns. Such displays are common, as students appeared studying attack plans on the southern ROK city of Sacheon during Kim’s visit to the Kim Il Sung University of Politics on Monday.

Another room featured scale models of bridges and blurred wall displays appearing to describe various bridge architecture, possibly referring to South Korean infrastructure targeted for attack or takeover.

The KCNA report only described the facilities Kim inspected as a tactics study room, command and management study room, military topography study room and an indoor shooting range.

Kim appeared visibly angry with the condition of classrooms and education displays in state TV footage of the tour, while the report said he discovered that the “party committee of the KPA and the policy-oriented guidance departments of the military education institutions have not fully fulfilled their responsibilities and roles.”

Kim lays a wreath at a statue of Kang Kon on campus | Image: KCNA (Feb. 26, 2025)

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State TV footage showed Kim holding a gun at the shooting range but didn’t exhibit his marksmanship like in the past, while it included longer clips of other soldiers conducting target practice.

Kim did not deliver a speech during his visit to the Kang Kon Military Academy like he did the previous day. 

But he did have hundreds of cadets gathered outside for a lengthy welcoming ceremony and large-scale group photos, while he also watched outdoor boot camp and martial arts training routines.

The report emphasized the school’s eponymous general Kang Kon and his role assisting first DPRK leader Kim Il Sung, and Kim Jong Un laid a wreath at a statue of Kang on campus.

It said Kang was “the first chief of the KPA General Staff” and a man who “dedicated his precious life to the sacred cause for the birth and remarkable development of the DPRK’s regular revolutionary armed forces.”

Edited by Bryan Betts

6. South Korean Government: “If North Korean POWs’ intention to ‘go to South Korea’ is confirmed, we will accept them”

​This isia Google translation of an RFA report.

This is an important message being broadcast into the north. The Korean people (and Korean soldiers) in the north need to hear this message. (and they will because if they do not hear it on a credit radio broadcast it will be transmitted via electronic media) Radio and television broadcasts into the north are very important whether received directly or indirectly.

South Korean Government: “If North Korean POWs’ intention to ‘go to South Korea’ is confirmed, we will accept them”

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/k022625dh1-02262025034303.html

Seoul-Hando hando@rfa.org

2025.02.26

Minister of Unification Kim Young-ho appears at a plenary session of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee on the 26th to report on his work.

 Capture the relay screen

00:00 /03:28

Anchor : South Korea's Unification Minister and Foreign Minister have reiterated their stance that if it is confirmed that North Korean prisoners of war captured by Ukrainian forces have the free will to return to South Korea, they will be accepted and protected . Han Do - hyung reports from Seoul .

Plenary session of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee held at the National Assembly of Korea on the 26th .

In response to a question from People Power Party lawmaker In Yo-han asking about the Ministry of Unification’s position on the issue of North Korean prisoners of war captured in Ukraine, Unification Minister Kim Young-ho stated , “ If it is confirmed that the North Korean prisoners of war have the free will to return to South Korea, the Ministry of Unification is fully prepared to accept and protect them . ”

The South Korean government previously stated that the basic principle is to accept all North Korean prisoners of war who wish to return to South Korea, and this is a reaffirmation of that position . These are the words of Minister Kim Young-ho .

[ Kim Young-ho, Minister of Unification ] I would like to tell you that since North Korean prisoners of war are our citizens according to the Constitution, if their free will is confirmed and they come to South Korea, the Ministry of Unification is fully prepared to accept and protect them .

Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yeol is receiving questions from People Power Party lawmaker Kim Ki-hyun. / Capture of broadcast screen

Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yeol also stated in response to a related question from People Power Party lawmaker Kim Ki-hyun , “ The individual’s intention is a prerequisite , ” and “ If the intention to defect is clear, we should naturally accept it in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and take necessary measures . ”

Minister Cho added , “ It is not 100% certain that North Korean prisoners of war will return to South Korea, ” adding, “ I believe it will gradually become clearer . ”

One of the two North Korean prisoners of war captured by the Ukrainian military in January said in an interview with South Korea's Chosun Ilbo published on the 19th that " 80 percent of them have made up their minds " and that " they plan to apply for refugee status and go to South Korea . "

Unification Minister : “ North Korean Market Prices and Exchange Rates Rise Rapidly … Residents Continue to Suffer ”

In addition, Minister Kim Young-ho diagnosed in his business report that day, “ This year, North Korea has declared its strongest strategy to respond to the U.S., emphasized the impossibility of denuclearization, and continued its nuclear and missile moves . At every major opportunity, it has emphasized its support for Russia and is seeking to expand exchanges and support between North Korea and Russia in various fields . ”

It also assessed that “ North Korea is striving to produce visible economic results in the final year of its five- year economic development plan this year, but key economic indicators have not yet recovered to the levels of 2016 before the full-scale implementation of sanctions . ”

Minister Kim added, “ Meanwhile, North Korean citizens continue to face difficulties, such as rapidly rising market prices and exchange rates . ”

Minister Cho Tae-yeol said in his business report, “ We have been maintaining close policy cooperation with allies, including the United States, regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, ” and “ We are not neglecting our efforts to continuously maintain cooperation between South Korea, the United States, and Japan . ”

The foreign ministers of South Korea, the United States, and Japan held a trilateral foreign ministers' meeting on the 15th (local time) on the occasion of the Munich Security Conference in Germany , and reaffirmed North Korea's position on " complete denuclearization . "

Regarding cooperation measures with the second Trump administration in the United States, Minister Cho stated, “ We will further expand and deepen Korea-U.S. economic cooperation by discovering strategic cooperation areas including cutting-edge technologies such as shipbuilding and energy . ”

Related Articles

South Korean political circles: “North Korean prisoners of war must be repatriated to South Korea”

US-ROK-Japan Foreign Ministers Reaffirm 'Complete Denuclearization of North Korea' at Munich Conference

Meanwhile, in response to a question from People Power Party lawmaker Kim Ki-hyun that South Korea should more actively consider its own nuclear armament and tactical nuclear redeployment plan, Minister Cho said, “ It is still a bit premature, ” but added that it is not “ off the table ,” that is, it is not off-topic .

Minister Cho then emphasized, “ This is a matter that requires the consent and support of our ally, the United States . ”

Minister Cho had previously stated his position at the Munich Security Conference in Germany on the 15th , saying, “ It is true that there is an increasing demand for independent nuclear deterrence from Korea and East Asian countries, and it is not an off-topic topic , but I think it is premature . ” These are Minister Cho Tae-yeol’s words .

[ South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae- yeol ] I have emphasized that while it is not currently “ on the table, ” it does not necessarily mean that it is “ off the table , ” but in any case, it is a matter that requires the consent, trust , and support of our ally, the United States .

This is Han Do-hyung from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul .

Editor Yang Seong-won

7. No Substitute for Victory: How to Negotiate from a Position of Strength to End the Russo-Ukraine War

​Again, it is amazing how after 7 decades Korea looms large in strategic thinking. There are so many lessons from Korea that remain applicable today.

As an aside it might be wise for members of the Trump administration to re-read C. Turner Joy's book (I am sure they all have). It is an important companion to the Art of the Deal (yin/yang)

Excerpts:

Time is the ultimate currency in war. Now is the time to quietly and quickly build the capabilities that Ukraine needs for a decisive counterattack to end this war.

During the Korean War, in May 1951, General James Van Fleet led the US 8th Army to a crushing victory over the Chinese in Korea. The Chinese had launched a massive offensive to capture Seoul. Van Fleet’s 8th Army broke the Chinese at the outskirts of Seoul. Before the Chinese could withdraw to defensive positions, Van Fleet launched a counterattack, which left the Chinese in chaos, with over one hundred thousand casualties, a third of their forces. He saw an opportunity to continue his counterattack deep into North Korea and annihilate Chinese forces in Korea. However, Washington, worrying about escalation and placing hope in negotiations, which China agreed to that June, denied Van Fleet’s request. The United States lost an opportunity to negotiate from a position of strength.

When negotiations did not produce a ceasefire, Washington allowed a limited attack, but Van Fleet recognized that China had exploited this delay to reorganize its forces and establish a defense in depth. He protested that during the thirty days of dithering, the situation on the ground had completely changed. In hoping for negotiations, the United States let victory slip from its grasp. The war dragged on for two more bloody years, with tens of thousands more American casualties, and resulted in a peninsula that is still divided.

The leader of the armistice negotiations, Admiral Turner Joy, wrote, “I feel certain the casualties the United Nations Command endured during the two long years of negotiations far exceed any that might have been expected from an offensive in the summer of 1951. The lesson is: Do not stop fighting until hostilities have ended, not if you want an armistice with the Communists on acceptable terms within a reasonable period of time.”

Korea demonstrated that even if we are talking, we should not stop fighting. Like Roosevelt with the Portsmouth Peace Conference, we have an opportunity to end Russian imperialism, but only if we remember that there is no substitute for victory.

No Substitute for Victory: How to Negotiate from a Position of Strength to End the Russo-Ukraine War - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Robert G. Rose · February 25, 2025

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When I was in NATO’s headquarters in Kabul, a belief emerged that negotiations with the Taliban would inevitably produce a lasting peace deal. That deal never emerged. The Taliban knew they had the momentum. They had completely undermined the state apparatus in rural Afghanistan. Negotiations just served as a tool for their final victory. We were negotiating from a position of weakness.

As we enter into negotiations to end the Russo-Ukraine War, we need to negotiate from a position of strength. With the appropriate support, Ukraine still has the opportunity to achieve a decisive victory. For too long, Ukraine’s supporters have provided enough for Ukraine to survive but not enough for it to win. As General Douglas MacArthur declared, “War’s very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there is no substitute for victory.”

Unless Vladimir Putin faces defeat, he will not be pressed into a reasonable peace. Any deal he would accept would serve only as a means for the eventual subjugation of Ukraine. He already violated the Minsk I and II agreements. Just as the Taliban used negotiations to secure their final victory, when Putin decides Russia’s grinding offensive has culminated, he can seek a ceasefire to solidify his lines, obtain sanctions relief, rebuild his forces, and then fabricate an excuse to launch a sequel to his special military operation. To achieve a lasting peace that puts to an end Russia’s attempts at imperial conquest, Putin needs to see that continuing the conflict with Ukraine will exhaust Russia and risk the collapse of his regime.

How Theodore Roosevelt Negotiated an End to Russian Expansion

Over a century ago, an American president successfully negotiated the end of centuries of Russian expansion in Asia. In 1905, Theodore Roosevelt orchestrated the Portsmouth Peace Conference to conclude the Russo-Japanese War.

Russia’s empire building in Asia concerned Roosevelt. In 1900, Russia had seized control of Manchuria. In 1904, at the outbreak of the war, he worried that “Russia’s course over the past three years has made it evident that if she wins she will organize northern China against us.” After Japan’s initial success at the Battle of Mukden in March 1904, Roosevelt wrote that he was “thoroughly . . . pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.”

At the onset of the war, Roosevelt had sought to mediate a deal. However, Japan declined his efforts and stated that they would regard “any attempt at mediation as unfriendly because . . . Russia is simply striving for delay and intends to take advantage of every delay to perfect her preparations.” Even after repeated setbacks and facing economic collapse, Russian military leaders wanted an opportunity to press on for victory and did not desire a lasting peace. The American ambassador to Russia reported that the tsar would not consider any peace discussions until Russia’s Baltic Fleet engaged the Japanese. He informed Roosevelt that the Russians were bluffing about their strength and were concerned with their domestic crises.

But then in May 1905, at the Battle of Tsushima, Japan annihilated the Russian Baltic Fleet. A few days later, the Japanese ambassador to the United States sent Roosevelt an overture to mediate peace. While Russia still had much more manpower and industrial capacity than Japan, it now recognized that acquiescing to Japan’s terms was preferable to exasperating its internal issues with greater mobilization. Meeting in Portsmouth, the negotiators only required the month of August to agree to a peace deal. Even though Japan did not obtain all its demands, it put a halt to Russia’s conquest of Asia.

Ukraine is Not Yet Lost

It may seem that the prospects of Ukraine achieving a decisive victory like Tsushima are remote. During the last year, Russia has made slow, relentless advances, but the terrain it has seized is strategically useless. Its progress has come at enormous costs that outstrip its capability to sustain its forces. Russian casualties have climbed to over 1,500 a day, which Russia’s strained military recruitment cannot sustain. Russia is starting to exhaust its stockpile of Soviet equipment. Putin continues this unsustainable push to present a picture of inevitable victory to scare the West into forcing Ukraine to accept a ceasefire before his economy collapses. He has created a mirage of military and economic strength to increase his negotiating position.

Much like the tsar’s bluff a century ago, Putin has crafted an elaborate facade of economic resiliency. Obscuring military spending by means such as state-mandated loans from private banks to defense contractors, which may represent a majority of Russian defense spending, he has distorted the Russian economy and risks a cascading credit crisis. Putin’s precarious facade could collapse at any moment.

As his offensive races against economic collapse to produce a parallel phantasm of military success, Russia’s army will eventually outstrip its sustainment capabilities and culminate. At that moment, Ukraine will have a fleeting opportunity for a decisive counterattack. Ukraine needs to be ready to seize that opportunity. To see how Ukraine could capitalize on Russia’s culmination, we can look to the Hundred Days Offensive during World War I.

The 1918 Spring Offensive: How to Exploit Culmination

In 1918, Germany and its allies faced economic exhaustion, while the battered British and French armies would eventually be reinforced by millions of fresh Americans. But, after Russia’s surrender, Germany had a window of advantage as it moved fifty divisions from the Eastern to the Western Front. On March 21, 1918, Germany opened fire with 4,000 artillery pieces on Britain’s southern front. Using infiltration tactics, it penetrated twelve miles on the first day and inflicted forty thousand casualties. Within a week, it had pushed forty miles, an incomprehensible distance on the Western Front, where advances were normally measured in yards.

“We were beaten,” British Field Marshall Douglas Haig reportedly said at the time, “and it would be better to make peace on any terms we could.” The Germans continued to advance, and by July, the French feared Germany would seize Paris and the British planned contingencies to retreat to the channel ports.

However, Germany had bled through its temporary numerical superiority, the Allies had gathered forces for a counterattack, and French General Ferdinand Foch had learned how to defeat the German tactics. On July 15, at Reims, the Germans culminated as they failed to break French lines. With their logistics overextended and far from the prepared defenses of the Hindenburg line, the Germans were vulnerable. With the forces he had harbored for just such an opportunity, Foch immediately launched a counterattack before the Germans could solidify their position. For the next one hundred days, the Allies relentlessly pushed the Germans until their army collapsed, and they sued for peace.

Foch identified an opportunity for victory and seized it. The Allies had planned an offensive in 1919, but he did not wait. Waiting would have allowed Germany to reestablish its defenses and mobilize a fresh class of conscripts.

The Opportunity for Victory will be Fleeting

Just as the Allies did in 1918, when Russia culminates and before it can reestablish the defensive lines it built in 2023, Ukraine needs to be ready to counterattack, break through weakly held Russian lines, and achieve a decisive victory by exploiting their penetration deep into Russia’s rear areas.

Ukraine was unable to break through Russia’s prepared defense in the 2023 counteroffensive. It is hard to find examples of armies penetrating enemy defenses when the enemy has sufficient density of troops and time to emplace minefields and dig multiple lines of entrenchments. However, in the Kharkiv and Kursk Offensives, when Russia had not established a defense in depth, Ukraine demonstrated how it could conduct campaigns using maneuver warfare. Russia will present Ukraine with a fleeting opportunity for such a counterattack when its offensive culminates. Like the Germans in 1918, far from the Hindenburg Line, the Russians will be vulnerably strung out in hasty defenses and not ensconced in the multiple layers of the Surovikin Line.

Ukraine needs to be ready to conduct a counterattack at a much larger scale than in Kharkiv or Kursk to decisively defeat Russia and force a peace deal on its terms. Fortunately, Ukrainian forces have the right mindset for such an attack. I have seen Ukrainian staffs studying modernized Soviet doctrine descended from Deep Battle, which revolved around achieving deep, rapid penetrations of enemy lines to prevent them from reestablishing an effective defense. The concepts are there. Ukraine just needs help realizing its full potential.

How to Support Victory

First, Ukraine needs equipment for such a counterattack. Recently, the West became too distracted by debates about high-end capabilities for Ukraine such as the F-16 or whether to allow strikes on Russian territory with ATACMS. There is no silver bullet technology to win this war. Ukraine needs mass. It has done phenomenal work to increase drone production. It has been addressing its manpower deficiencies. But to sustain a breakthrough, it needs artillery, infantry fighting vehicles, and tanks.

As the Germans spectacularly demonstrated against France in 1940, after infantry achieve an initial breakthrough, tanks maintain the momentum of an advance to exploit a breakthrough and achieve a decisive victory. In its unwillingness to provide tanks to Ukraine, the United States reveals its lack of commitment to Ukraine ending the war. Even though the United States has 3,700 Abrams tanks in storage, it has only provided thirty-one to Ukraine. In fact, Russia has been the lead contributor of tanks to Ukraine. The United States only announced it would provide Abrams to Ukraine on January 25, 2023, eleven months into the war. Of course, it would be months until Ukrainian forces received and trained on the Abrams, which provided ample time for Russia to prepare to defeat those few tanks. The United States has provided a more significant three hundred Bradley Fighting Vehicles from its stockpile of six thousand, but those three hundred would not even fully outfit three brigades. While many of those vehicles need maintenance, that should not be an obstacle. After all, Russia has been sending museum pieces into battle.

On a promising note, the United States increased artillery round production so that Ukraine is approaching parity with Russia, which will be essential for achieving a breakthrough. To prevent Russian operational reserves from counterattacking to seal a breakthrough, the United States should increase donations of Remote Anti-Armor Mine System rounds to allow Ukraine to create minefields deep behind Russian lines to fix reserves in place. Ukraine is already using drones to remotely emplace minefields in Russian rear areas, which have restricted Russian forces’ movement.

Advising for Victory

In addition to providing capabilities to allow Ukraine to win, the United States also needs to assist Ukraine with appropriate advising. The United States has already trained almost twenty thousand Ukrainians under the umbrella of the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine (SAG-U), while the European Union Military Assistance Mission has trained sixty thousand. While these efforts have assisted Ukraine in mobilizing additional recruits, training soldiers on new equipment, and teaching staff the NATO planning process, they have largely been uncoordinated. NATO is in the process of taking over SAG-U, which should standardize advising efforts.

I observed a Ukrainian brigade that had members whose members had separately learned Ukrainian, German, Canadian, and American planning processes. They admitted that they would revert to Ukrainian methods when they returned to the front, because that is what the rest of the army used, and it was more suited for rapid decisions for their smaller staffs.

Compared to other armies that I have advised, the Ukrainian staffs I observed proved committed and quick learners. After a couple of weeks of instruction, they understood the US Army’s Military Decision-Making Process as well as American staff officers. The Ukrainians just needed to understand the logic of a planning technique.

Unfortunately, these advising efforts have not prepared Ukraine to win. The US Army trains Ukrainian brigades on scenarios that do not replicate the problem set they will face. NATO’s new advising mission needs to align its training with a theory of victory. It should prepare Ukrainian forces to conduct a decisive counterattack.

Future advising efforts need to better understand Ukraine’s existing processes and techniques. Ukraine has a robust system for collecting battlefield lessons and publishing them, but few of the American soldiers training the Ukrainians were familiar with these products. This problem mostly stems from the United States using an ad hoc approach to its advising efforts.

One of the consistent critiques of our recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan was the constant turnover of troops, which precluded the development of deep expertise. The problem is exasperated with our efforts with Ukraine. SAG-U is largely filled with borrowed military manpower, which only serves SAG-U for a few months. Meanwhile, most units that conduct training for the Ukrainians conduct it as an additional duty. With no time to fully assess Ukrainian units and optimize training for the context that Ukrainian units will face, the training mostly regresses to teaching American techniques.

In reaction to its shortfalls in advising during its recent wars, the US Army established six brigades of specially trained advisors. Inexplicably, these advisors have done little work with Ukrainian forces, either inside or outside the country. If the United States desires to end this war, it needs to get serious about its advising effort and prioritize its advising experts to assist Ukraine by better assessing its requirements, understanding its theory of victory, and tailoring US security force assistance to help Ukraine achieve that victory. With Ukraine mobilizing additional brigades, now is the ideal time to prepare those brigades to conduct a counterattack just as Russia culminates.

Unfortunately, those brigades have so far performed poorly. The French-trained 155th Mechanized Brigade experienced “systemic shortcomings” according to Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi, the commander of Ukraine’s ground forces. Even though it was supposed to be a model brigade equipped with the latest weaponry, it reportedly had 1,700 soldiers desert before reaching the front. When it engaged Russian forces, it suffered heavy casualties. The brigade has been broken apart and Ukraine has launched investigations. Effectively placed advisors could have mitigated such a debacle. Advisors assess partners, provide an understanding of their shortcomings, and ensure problems are solved before a disaster. They provide the connective tissue so that security force assistance programs do not fail.

Establishing Divisions and Corps

In addition to assisting in training brigades, advisors should help Ukraine in establishing division and corps headquarters. In February 2025, the Ukrainian Army announced the formation of up to twenty corps headquarters to provide a more effective command structure for its brigades. As soon as Russia invaded, Ukraine was in survival mode, and it has remained so for the three years since, raising a multitude of expedient units without a unified command structure. The transition to a corps system is an important step forward.

Currently, Ukrainian brigades are the primary tactical echelon. They are subordinate to operational-tactical groups and operational-strategic groups, which are regional commands with makeshift structures and no organic units. They can have over a dozen brigades assigned to them—far too many units to effectively control. The shortfalls of the operational groups mean that the Ukrainian General Staff often micromanages fights instead of focusing on strategic planning to win the war.

Division headquarters will be essential to setting conditions for a breakthrough, coordinating between brigades to maintain an attack’s momentum and managing the deep fight to disrupt Russian attempts to organize counterattacks or new defensive lines. Ukraine must prioritize building cohesion within its divisions with dedicated brigades. Divisions need to build shared mental models of how they fight to act with the tempo necessary to conduct maneuver warfare. Ukraine has been too quick to break apart brigades to meet emergencies, which shatters cohesion and shared understanding between staffs and commanders. This is yet another consequence of the survival mode that has characterized key aspects of Ukraine’s war effort. Divisions should be flexibly organized under regionally aligned corps to react to battlefield circumstances. As the German Army organized its corps in World War I, Ukrainian corps should focus on sustaining the fight and consolidating logistics elements far from the vulnerable front.

To assist Ukraine in establishing divisions and corps, the US Army will need advisors who can tailor their approach to Ukraine’s needs and not force on them the US Army’s onerous battle rhythm and targeting process, which is optimized to win Warfighter simulations, not wars. The advisors will need to support Ukraine in establishing adaptable systems to facilitate the transition from the defense, to breakthrough, and finally to exploitation.

For example, Ukraine has decentralized its artillery architecture to provide responsiveness in the defense. To achieve a breakthrough, it will need to briefly concentrate its artillery under division control to suppress Russian troops along the depth of its defenses, and then it will have to return artillery to decentralized control to provide responsive fires to its battalions as they rapidly exploit gaps in the Russian defense and overrun enemy positions before Russian forces can reestablish a defense. This transition between centralization and decentralization of artillery was a major innovation of Germany during World War I and enabled its forces to maintain momentum during the Spring Offensive. For Ukraine, maintaining the tempo of its counterattack will be paramount.

Timing is Everything for Victory

Time is the ultimate currency in war. Now is the time to quietly and quickly build the capabilities that Ukraine needs for a decisive counterattack to end this war.

During the Korean War, in May 1951, General James Van Fleet led the US 8th Army to a crushing victory over the Chinese in Korea. The Chinese had launched a massive offensive to capture Seoul. Van Fleet’s 8th Army broke the Chinese at the outskirts of Seoul. Before the Chinese could withdraw to defensive positions, Van Fleet launched a counterattack, which left the Chinese in chaos, with over one hundred thousand casualties, a third of their forces. He saw an opportunity to continue his counterattack deep into North Korea and annihilate Chinese forces in Korea. However, Washington, worrying about escalation and placing hope in negotiations, which China agreed to that June, denied Van Fleet’s request. The United States lost an opportunity to negotiate from a position of strength.

When negotiations did not produce a ceasefire, Washington allowed a limited attack, but Van Fleet recognized that China had exploited this delay to reorganize its forces and establish a defense in depth. He protested that during the thirty days of dithering, the situation on the ground had completely changed. In hoping for negotiations, the United States let victory slip from its grasp. The war dragged on for two more bloody years, with tens of thousands more American casualties, and resulted in a peninsula that is still divided.

The leader of the armistice negotiations, Admiral Turner Joy, wrote, “I feel certain the casualties the United Nations Command endured during the two long years of negotiations far exceed any that might have been expected from an offensive in the summer of 1951. The lesson is: Do not stop fighting until hostilities have ended, not if you want an armistice with the Communists on acceptable terms within a reasonable period of time.”

Korea demonstrated that even if we are talking, we should not stop fighting. Like Roosevelt with the Portsmouth Peace Conference, we have an opportunity to end Russian imperialism, but only if we remember that there is no substitute for victory.

Major Robert G. Rose, US Army, is a LTG (Ret) James M. Dubik Writing Fellow. He commands Alpine Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade. He holds an undergraduate degree from the United States Military Academy and graduate degrees from Harvard University and, as a Gates Scholar, from Cambridge University.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: armyinform.com.ua

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Robert G. Rose · February 25, 2025

8. Korean unification: A new nation rooted in the Korean Dream

The 8.15 unification doctrine and the Korean Dream are complementary​ and the 8.15 Unification Doctrine expresses many of the concepts found in the Korean Dream.

​My 12 words: Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through human rights.  Hongik Ingan​ is one of the highest expressions of human rights.

Voices Feb. 20, 2025 / 9:45 AM

Korean unification: A new nation rooted in the Korean Dream

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/02/20/unification-dysfunction-north-korea-south-korea/3121740060728/?utm

By Youngjun Kim

Visitors look at North Korea through a magnified viewer at Aegibong Peace Ecopark observatory in Gimpo, South Korea, in February 2024. File Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI | License Photo

Feb. 20 (UPI) -- South Korea has long been heralded for its economic prowess and rapid modernization, emerging as a global leader in technology, trade and cultural exports.

However, the recent political turmoil around the impeachment of President Yoon has revealed deep-seated flaws in the nation's governance, economy and social fabric.

Similarly, North Korea continues to suffer under a totalitarian regime that stifles its people's potential and isolates the nation from global progress.

The dysfunction on both sides of the peninsula transcends mere political struggles, reflecting a fundamental crisis that threatens the long-term stability and prosperity of the Korean people.

Related

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• North Korea rejects 'absurd' U.S. call for denuclearization
• U.S., South Korea hold live-fire drills near tense border with North Korea

The ultimate solution to these challenges lies in the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, creating a new nation rooted in the vision of the Korean Dream, based on the Hongik Ingan ideal.

A new nation recognizing the source of human rights and freedom

A truly free and just society must acknowledge that the origin of human rights and freedom is God -- a transcendent being who grants dignity and liberty to all people. A unified Korea must be a nation that not only protects these rights, but also harmonizes the best of the East and the West.

By integrating Korea's rich cultural heritage of moral responsibility and collective harmony with Western traditions of individual freedom and democracy, this new nation can set an example for the world in building a just and prosperous nation.

A society divided and fractured

South Korea's current turmoil has exposed deep-rooted fragmentation within its society. Political discourse has devolved into a battleground of ideological extremes, where progressives and conservatives prioritize factional victories over the common good.

This division, arising from the Cold War framework, extends beyond politics, influencing social interactions, media narratives and corporate decision-making. It has led to a fractured nation, unable to forge a cohesive vision for the future. Meanwhile, North Korea remains isolated, exacerbating the disunity that prevents a shared national identity.

Institutional erosion and distrust

In this environment, the judiciary and prosecutorial systems, instead of serving as pillars of justice, have been weaponized to serve political and corporate interests. Successive administrations either have fallen victim to judicial crackdowns or used legal mechanisms to target opponents, creating an environment in which the rule of law is perceived as arbitrary and politically motivated.

This erosion of institutional integrity has diminished public trust in the nation's ability to uphold fairness and transparency. In North Korea, political oppression and the absence of rule of law further deepens the crisis, leaving its people without recourse to justice or political representation.

Economic inequality and structural corruption

While South Korea's economic rise is often praised, the dominance of chaebols (large family-controlled conglomerates) underscores the nation's deep structural inequality. These corporate giants, entrenched in political favoritism, stifle competition and perpetuate an economic hierarchy that marginalizes smaller businesses and entrepreneurs.

Corruption, cronyism and economic monopolization hinder innovation and social mobility, exacerbating inequality and social unrest. In North Korea, the state-controlled economy fosters extreme poverty and dependence on illicit activities for survival. The economic disparities between the two Koreas highlight the need for unification under a just economic system that empowers all citizens.

Reforming the financial and banking system

A unified Korea must reform its financial and banking systems to ensure that all citizens -- not just chaebols or political elites -- can access capital and opportunities. The current system, which concentrates financial power in a few large conglomerates, stifles creativity and economic mobility.

By decentralizing financial resources, encouraging entrepreneurship and enabling easy access to funding, a unified Korea can foster a thriving economy in which young people and small businesses drive innovation and growth. Contrary to concerns about the cost of unification, this new nation will attract private investment from around the world, creating unparalleled economic opportunities, especially for the younger generation.

Decline of the traditional family model

A well-functioning constitutional republic requires moral and ethical citizens, yet South Korea has seen a deterioration in its traditional family structure, which has historically served as the foundation for character development and social harmony.

The decline of the three-generational family model has weakened the cultivation of moral values, interpersonal relationships and a sense of responsibility across generations. As family bonds erode, so too does the ethical foundation upon which a stables society depends.

In North Korea, family structures have been severely damaged by state interference, forced separations and economic hardship. Reviving the traditional family model, in which all members can cultivate healthy character and relationships through a three-generational structure, must be a core foundation for a unified Korea.

An identity crisis: The need for a unifying national vision

The chaos in South Korea's political sphere and the oppression in North Korea are symptomatic of a larger crisis of identity. The Korean peninsula lacks a unified vision rooted in fundamental and universal principles that transcend partisan interests and ideological divides. The absence of a shared ethos has led to inconsistent policies, wavering approaches to inter-Korean relations and unpredictable domestic reforms.

Without a clear sense of national purpose, Korea remains vulnerable to internal discord and external pressures. Unification offers the opportunity to establish a new national ethos based on the Korean Dream --one that aspires to fulfill the Hongik Ingan ideal of benefiting all humanity by creating a just and moral society.

Conclusion: The path to true national renewal

South and North Korea stand at a critical juncture where superficial political reforms will not suffice. The Korean people must undergo a comprehensive renewal that addresses systemic weaknesses across all aspects -- political, economic and social --through the peaceful unification of the peninsula.

A new Korea must recognize that true freedom and human rights originate from God, ensuring a government that protects these rights while harmonizing the strengths of Eastern moral heritage and Western democratic values. Reviving the traditional family model, restoring moral values and creating a just economic system that empowers all citizens will be essential to building this new nation.

Far from being a financial burden, unification will attract private investment and generate unprecedented opportunities, especially for young people. By reforming the financial and banking systems, enabling broad access to capital and fostering a truly free and competitive economy, a unified Korea will unlock the full potential of its people.

By embracing the Korean Dream based on the Hongik Ingan ideal, a unified Korea can overcome its historical limitations and dysfunctions, paving the way for true and lasting peace and prosperity. Now is the time for the Korean people to reclaim their shared providential destiny and forge a new future through peaceful unification rooted in the Korean Dream.

Youngjun Kim is vice chairman of UPI. The views expressed in this article are his own and are not a statement of UPI's editorial views.

9. South Korea Weighs The Pros And Cons Of Nuclear Armament

​This would be the development of the ultimate in independent warfighting capabilities.

South Korea Weighs The Pros And Cons Of Nuclear Armament

February 22, 2025

By: Sang-Gil Park

The National Interest · February 22, 2025

Topic: Security

Blog Brand: Korea Watch

Region: Asia

Tags: Abandonment, Latency, Nuclear Weapons, South Korea, and Trump

February 22, 2025

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As U.S. allies fear President Trump may begin to cut age-old ties, South Korea comes back around to the idea of becoming a nuclear power for the sake of self-protection.

U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s recent speech at the Munich Security Conference raised concerns among NATO allies that the United States might abandon Europe. However, Europeans are not alone in their abandonment fears; many in South Korea share this anxiety, in part due to the first Trump administration’s focus on negotiating with North Korea and reducing the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula.

As a result, South Korea’s elite and public opinion have turned increasingly toward developing nuclear weapons. Developments in Europe could accelerate that.

Nuclear Weapons And South Korea: A History

In the past, South Korea first attempted self-nuclearization in response to the fears of abandonment prompted by former President Richard Nixon. In July 1969, Nixon announced his “Guam Doctrine,” stating that the U.S. would not intervene in the event of a North Korean attack on the South unless nuclear weapons were used.

Eight months later, in March 1971, Nixon withdrew 20,000 of 63,000 U.S. soldiers stationed on South Korean soil. This withdrawal stimulated President Park Chung-hee to pursue an independent national defense strategy that concentrated on developing nuclear weapons to deter a North Korean attack.

In July 1974, however, the U.S. became aware of South Korea’s nuclear weapons development plan and pressed Seoul to terminate the program. South Korea ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 1975 to placate the United States while working to expedite the acquisition of a Heavy Water Reactor from Canada and a reprocessing plant from France to produce the necessary fissile material.

Ultimately the U.S. and South Korea reached an agreement to end the contract with France, in January 1976. South Korea then halted its nuclear weapon development plan but shifted focus to completing the nuclear fuel cycle by adopting a concept of “pre-nuclear option policy.”

Shakey Support From Trump

Likewise, South Korea’s next self-nuclearization\ attempt could be triggered again by Trump’s exorbitant pressure on South Korea regarding cost-sharing for U.S. troops. U.S. strategist Hal Brands has noted that a potential withdrawal of U.S. troops is the most serious concern for South Korea, and it could lead to South Korea’s nuclear self-help, severely devastating the global non-proliferation regime.

Furthermore, many South Koreans are seriously concerned about a “Big Deal,” the possibility of Trump’s nuclear disarmament deal with Kim Jong-un, which may acknowledge North Korea as a de-facto nuclear-weapon state. Moreover, many South Koreans fear that Trump might nullify the Washington Declaration, a Biden-era effort to reaffirm U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and discard the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group and its guidelines.

Nevertheless, South Korea’s advocates of self-nuclearization view Trump’s return as a silver lining for securing nuclear latency: a new name for something quite like the past “pre-nuclear option policy.”

They argue that South Korea could secure nuclear latency by revising the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation agreement as a trade-off for increasing payments for U.S. ground troops in South Korea. Further claiming that developing South Korea’s enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, now limited under a bilateral civil nuclear cooperation framework agreement, will contribute to reducing reliance on Russian nuclear fuel and thus enhance energy security for the U.S. and its allies by adding South Korea as a nuclear fuel exporter.

Currently, Russia and China now own forty-four percent and fifteen percent of the world’s enriched uranium capacity, respectively.

History shows that South Korea formulated a self-nuclearization plan in the past but dropped the effort under U.S. pressure. Would the Trump administration respond with the same level of pressure that the U.S. applied in 1974 and 1975 if South Korea seeks nuclear latency in exchange for increasing its host nation’s support for U.S. troops?

Or Trump administration would instead encourage South Korea to secure nuclear latency if not nuclear weapons?

The global security landscape is facing a highly volatile moment with Trump’s return. Fears of political abandonment are amplified among the U.S. allies, leading some to consider nuclear armament more seriously. South Korea increasingly views this moment as an opportunity to secure nuclear latency, one step short of self-nuclearization.

Once South Korea completes a nuclear fuel cycle by securing rights of enrichment and reprocessing from the U.S., Seoul could in theory transfer the full package of nuclear technologies to emerging countries in the Global South, further widening pathways to a multipolar nuclear world.

Now is a critical time to prevent the potential fall of a new “nuclear domino” in Seoul.

Sang-Gil Park is an advisor at Lee & Ko Attorneys, where he specializes in the field of energy technology, including nuclear and hydrogen. His views do not represent those of his employers.

Image Credit: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Lake Dodson · February 22, 2025

10. Ex-US general not convinced S. Korea will be more secure with nuclear arms

​The mere possession of nuclear weapons is insufficient. You must develop a doctrine, a command and control system, multiple delivery systems (to include a potential second strike capability) and the demonstrated capability to employ them as well as the political will. Otherwise you will have no deterrent effect.

Ex-US general not convinced S. Korea will be more secure with nuclear arms

The Korea Times · February 25, 2025

This photo, taken on Sept. 26, 2023, shows Vincent Brooks, who led the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea from 2016-2018, speaking during a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Yonhap

A former U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) commander said Monday he is not convinced that South Korea will be more secure if it has its own nuclear arms, amid lingering voices calling for the Asian country to consider its own nuclear option to counter advancing North Korean threats.

Vincent Brooks, who led the 28,500-strong USFK from 2016-2018, made the remarks, underscoring that America's extended deterrence commitment is an approach to preventing the use of nuclear weapons as opposed to promoting the use of nuclear arms.

Extended deterrence means the United States' commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, to defend its ally.

"I am not convinced that South Korea will be more secure by having nuclear weapons," Brooks said.

He recalled a time decades ago when domestic turmoil emerged as Western European countries were debating their possession of nuclear arms and the positioning of U.S. nuclear weapons systems on their territories.

"Domestic terrorism groups began to attack government or actions and U.S. actions, and facilities in these locations. Security went down as a result of that," he said.

"I know that first-hand. South Korea needs to think through that, and not presume that because they can't be certain or because North Korea has them, and they now need to have a parallel capability as a matter of saving face, that that's going to increase their security."

The retired general claimed that Pyongyang's nuclear program has heightened the potential for the end of its regime.

"While they (North Korea) have certainly pursued a deterrent structure by having nuclear weapons and have had some success at that, the potential of the destruction of the regime is higher because of the nuclear weapons," he said.

"They might have been tolerable if they didn't have them. If they happened to use them, several administrations, including the current one, have made it very clear that regime is going to go away."

His remarks came amid questions over whether the Trump administration would keep the Nuclear Consultative Group, the allies' key nuclear deterrence body launched in 2023 as part of efforts to reinforce the credibility of the U.S.' extended deterrence.

In a recent report released by the Atlantic Council, a U.S.-headquartered think tank, more than 40 percent of strategists and foresight practitioners predicted that South Korea will have nuclear weapons within the next decade, while nearly a quarter of them expected North Korea to use nuclear arms within the next 10 years. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · February 25, 2025

11. WW3 fears soar as North Korea issues terrifying nuke warning

​Is there some hyperbole in the headline?

Political warfare: 

Drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance and subvert the legitimacy of the ROK government.

Blackmail Diplomacy:

Use increased tension, threats, and provocations to extort political and economic concessions.

But most importantly Kim Jong Un must externalize the threat to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the Korean people. Remember that Kim fears the Korean people armed with information more than he fears the combined ROK and US militaires. Despite regime rhetoric he knows that he is more likely to succumb to the Korean people in the north because he knows that the ROK and US will not invade the north unless he attacks first. And Kim feels threatened by internal instability now more than ever.

WW3 fears soar as North Korea issues terrifying nuke warning

North Korea said its "accelerated bolstering up" is a "realistic requirement for coping with the military threat of the US".

By Rebecca Robinson

22:29, Sat, Feb 22, 2025 | UPDATED: 22:31, Sat, Feb 22, 2025

Express · by Rebecca Robinson · February 22, 2025

North Korea issued a frightening warning aimed at the US. (Image: Getty)

North Korea has issued a stark nuclear weapons warning, saying it will "counter the enemies' strategic threat with our strategic means".

This alarming statement was released by the chief of the Information Office at the DPRK Ministry of National Defence on Friday.

The North Korean regime accused the US and its allies of escalating military provocations, referring to the presence of a B-1B strategic bomber over the Korean Peninsula on Thursday and the test-firing of a Minuteman 3 ICBM at the Vandenberg Space Force Base the previous day.

Pyongyang criticised the US's military posturing, claiming it shows the current administration's unchanging ambition for supremacy through maintaining and updating military capabilities capable of launching a nuclear attack without prior warning.

The statement read: "Such military muscle-flexing of the US clearly show the invariable supremacy ambition of the present US administration to gain an overwhelming edge of strength through the maintenance and updating of military capabilities capable of mounting a nuclear attack on any country and region of the world without prior warning."

North Korea accused the US of escalating military provocations. (Image: Getty)

"The DPRK's solution to the military threat and challenge to the security being posed by the US is clear and consistent.

"The DPRK will counter the strategic threat of the U.S. and other enemies with strategic means and continue its responsible military activities to control and manage the unstable security environment on the Korean peninsula with powerful deterrence."

North Korea said its "accelerated bolstering up" is a "realistic requirement for coping with the military threat of the US and its satellite countries".

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It added that the US's behaviour "proves why the DPRK armed forces' building up of the capability to fight a war with nuclear deterrence as a pivot is a just and inevitable option".

Despite the ongoing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the US military will continue to conduct exercises with its South Korean and Japanese counterparts.

The White House has reiterated Trump's commitment to achieving his denuclearization goal through a "mix of toughness and diplomacy."

Express · by Rebecca Robinson · February 22, 2025

12. Prosecutors demand 2-yr prison term for opposition leader in election law violation case

​A significant development. He would not be able to run for President.

Excerpt:

During the final hearing of his appellate trial in the day, the prosecution said Lee deserves "a heavy punishment for distorting voters' choices by telling a lie."

Here is a list of Lee's alleged crimes. Imagine if a South Korean President was in office who violated US laws?

Lee Jae-myung, a prominent South Korean politician, has been accused of or indicted for several crimes:

1. Violating election law by making false claims during the 2022 presidential campaign
2. Bribery charges related to an alleged scheme involving illegal transfer of funds to North Korea
3. Violating the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act
4. Violating the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act
5. Third-party bribery
6. Perjury (acquitted)

Regarding the alleged illegal transfer of funds to North Korea, this action would likely violate U.S. laws. The U.S. maintains strict sanctions against North Korea, prohibiting most financial transactions with the country. Specifically, Lee is accused of orchestrating the transfer of $8 million to North Korea between 2019 and 2020. This action would likely violate U.S. sanctions laws, including the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act and various Executive Orders that prohibit unauthorized financial transactions with North Korea.

It's important to note that Lee denies many of these charges and some cases are still ongoing or under appeal. The alleged crimes primarily violate South Korean laws, but the North Korea-related charges could potentially intersect with U.S. sanctions policies.

(2nd LD) Prosecutors demand 2-yr prison term for opposition leader in election law violation case | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · February 26, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS details of court's ruling date in para 5)

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, Feb. 26 (Yonhap) -- Prosecutors on Wednesday demanded a two-year prison term for opposition leader Lee Jae-myung on charges of lying as a presidential candidate during the 2022 election.

Lee of the Democratic Party (DP) is considered the presidential frontrunner in the event President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment is upheld, but confirmation of his lower court sentence of one year in prison, suspended for two years, would bar him from running in the next presidential election in 2027.

The opposition leader is accused of lying during a media interview in December 2021 that he did not know the late Kim Moon-ki, a former executive of Seongnam Development Corp., which was behind a corruption-ridden development project in Seongnam, south of Seoul, when Lee was the city's mayor.

During the final hearing of his appellate trial in the day, the prosecution said Lee deserves "a heavy punishment for distorting voters' choices by telling a lie."

The court said it plans to reach a verdict on March 26.

Lee Jae-myung (C), the leader of the main opposition Democratic Party, arrives at the Seoul High Court on Feb. 26, 2025, to attend the final hearing of his appellate trial on election law violation charges. (Yonhap)

Upon arrival at the Seoul High Court for the session, Lee told reporters: "The court will make the right judgment ... In the ways of the world, everything is bound to flow in the direction of common sense and principles."

Lee is also accused of lying during a parliamentary audit of the Gyeonggi provincial government in October 2021 that he was under pressure from the land ministry to rezone the former site of the Korea Food Research Institute in Seongnam. The site was later developed into apartment complexes by a private developer, and allegations were raised that Lee rezoned the land to give preferential treatment to the company.

In November, a lower court found him guilty of making false statements in violation of the Public Official Election Act and sentenced him to a suspended one-year prison term.

hague@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · February 26, 2025

13. U.S. defense secretary reportedly exploring visit to S. Korea next month: sources

​Good. I hope he will be well briefed and prepared for this visit and comes away with a solid understanding of the importance of the ROK/US alliance and how important it is to US national security and to the US winning in the Indo-Pacific. 

U.S. defense secretary reportedly exploring visit to S. Korea next month: sources | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · February 26, 2025

SEOUL, Feb. 26 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is reportedly exploring making a visit to South Korea next month, following the conclusion of a joint military exercise in mid-March, according to defense sources Wednesday.

According to the sources, Hegseth has reportedly conveyed his interest in visiting South Korea after the annual Freedom Shield military drills next month.

A Seoul official said, "We are currently in the stage of reviewing possibilities at the working level, and no official schedule discussions have taken place."

If realized, it would be the first Cabinet-level visit from Washington under the second Donald Trump administration to South Korea.

In the case of a visit, Hegseth could potentially visit one of South Korea's major shipyards, including HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. and Hanwha Ocean Co.

In a phone conversation with President Yoon Suk Yeol last November, then President-elect Trump acknowledged South Korea's advanced warship and shipbuilding capabilities, and emphasized the need for close cooperation in the sector.

Officials at the shipyards said they have no knowledge of any potential visit by the U.S. defense secretary.

In this file photo, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth speaks to reporters at a press conference at the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels on Feb. 13, 2025. (Yonhap)

odissy@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · February 26, 2025

​14. Captured N.K. soldiers' intention 'most important factor' for their defection to S. Korea: FM Cho

​This is how people and countries that believe in freedom and individual liberty talk and act.

This is an important theme and message for our alliance influence campaign.

Captured N.K. soldiers' intention 'most important factor' for their defection to S. Korea: FM Cho | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · February 26, 2025

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, Feb. 26 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's top diplomat said Wednesday that confirming the captured North Korean soldiers' intentions is the key factor before allowing them to defect to the South, reaffirming Seoul's willingness to bring them here.

Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul made the remarks after a North Korean soldier held by Ukraine said in an interview with a South Korean daily last week that he wants to go to South Korea and that he was about "80 percent sure" of it.

He was one of the two wounded North Korean soldiers captured by Ukrainian forces last month during combat in Russia's western Kursk border region. North Korea has sent around 11,000 troops in support of Moscow's war against Kyiv.

"If their intention to defect is clear, we must, of course, accept them as South Korean nationals and take necessary steps in accordance with the constitutional provisions," Cho said during a parliamentary session in response to a question by Rep. Kim Gi-hyeon of the ruling People Power Party.

"However, their personal intentions appear to be the most important factor," Cho said.

Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul speaks during a parliamentary session at the National Assembly in western Seoul on Feb. 26, 2025. (Yonhap)

Cho said the government has been working to confirm their intentions through "various contacts," without disclosing details.

"Since their decisions are not yet 100 percent certain, we believe it will gradually become clearer," he said.

Following the media report, the foreign ministry said the government is willing to provide protection and support if the North Korean soldiers express a desire to come to the South, in line with the principles and relevant laws regarding all North Korean individuals as its own.

On relations with the United States under the second Donald Trump administration, Cho reiterated the pledge to work with Washington in areas that strategically matter to both countries, including shipbuilding and artificial intelligence, to explore the potential for further economic cooperation.

Cho also revealed plans to visit Poland in early March for diplomatic talks on defense exports and other issues.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · February 26, 2025

15. Deputy Pentagon chief nominee calls for efforts to stem growth of N. Korea's nuclear, missile arsenals

​I would be happy to provide this to the DEPSECDEF when he is confirmed, I have a detailed draft national security decision memorandum and a draft campaign plan for consideration.

However, if he is like former DEPSECDEF Dr. Hamre when we briefed him on the original CONPLAN 5209 for north Korean instability and collapse in the 1990's he asked us "How much will this cost?" To which I replied I had no idea and I had never given it any thought. He replied that he was the DEPSECDEF and his portfolio was the budget so he needed to know the cost. Fortunately my boss intervened and said we would have to get back to him. Now when I run into Dr. Hamre at events in DC I remind him that I still owe him an answer.

Summary:

Strategic Assumption: North Korea will never negotiate away its nuclear capabilities while the Kim family regime remains in power.

President-elect Trump did something during his first term that no president had done: “He gave it a shot.” He met Kim and he offered him a future. But it was Kim Jong Un who failed to appreciate the opportunity he had. Now in his second term President Trump has the opportunity to implement new elements of policy and strategy that have never before been attempted. These include a human rights upfront approach that keeps human rights on all agendas, a sophisticated and holistic information campaign, and the support of the Korean people's pursuit of a free and unified Korea. There are few pundits who see the opportunities that both the 8.15 Unification Doctrine and Kim Jong Un with his new hostile policy toward the South are providing to the U.S. and ROK/U.S. alliance. It is time to recognize that the only path to denuclearization is through unification. Most importantly, the prevention of war and nuclear use, and the long term outcome on the Korean peninsula are important to the national security and national prosperity of the U.S.

Kim can change. Or Kim can be changed by the Korean people in the North.

Koreans must solve the Korea question (the unnatural division of the peninsula) (Para 60 of the Armistice).

Key Points:

––The United States has failed to achieve denuclearization in North Korea for four decades, and a new approach is needed that includes a new focus on human rights and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.

––South Korea unveiled the 8.15 Unification Doctrine in August 2024, emphasizing freedom, peace, and prosperity as core values for unification.

––Kim Jong Un's recent policy changes, including declaring South Korea as the "main enemy" and abandoning peaceful unification, present an opportunity for a new strategy.

––Foundation: Deterrence and Defense – prevent war; prepare for conflict and collapse.

–– Counter global illicit activities: proliferation to counterfeiting/money laundering to overseas slave labor to cyber attacks and more – an external strategic strangulation campaign.

––A human rights up front approach focusing on educating North Koreans about their universal human rights will empower them to create change.

––The right of self-determination for the Korean people is a fundamental justification for pursuing a free and unified Korea that requires transformation of the regime.

––Martial law crisis shows democracy prevents tyranny – Korea people in north and South will choose democracy over dictatorship.

––Four paths to unification: war, regime collapse, peaceful unification, and regime transformation. The U.S. (along with South Korea) should support regime transformation by the Korea people in the North as the optimal path to peaceful unification.

Bottomline: Unification first then denuclearization; the path to unification is through human rights.

(2nd LD) Deputy Pentagon chief nominee calls for efforts to stem growth of N. Korea's nuclear, missile arsenals | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 26, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS more info in paras 10-11; RECAST 12th para)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump's pick for deputy defense secretary highlighted the need Tuesday to stem the growth of North Korea's nuclear and missile arsenals, saying the recalcitrant regime poses a "clear" threat to security on the Korean Peninsula and around the world.

Stephen Feinberg made the remarks during a confirmation hearing at the Senate Armed Services Committee, saying Pyongyang remains "intensely" focused on expanding its "illicit" nuclear weapons program and improving its ballistic and cruise missile programs, while expanding its "malign" cyber activities.

"We must also seek to stem the growth of DPRK nuclear and missile arsenals," he said, noting the need to improve missile defense systems to counter North Korean threats. DPRK is short for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

He appeared to be asserting the need to make efforts to stop Pyongyang from further developing its menacing weapons programs, as the regime has been doubling down on those programs amid a deepening military alignment with Moscow.

Stephen Feinberg, President Donald Trump's choice to be deputy secretary of defense, appears before the Senate Armed Services Committee for his confirmation hearing on Capitol Hill in Washington on Feb. 25, 2025 in this photo released by the Associated Press. (Yonhap)

Feinberg shared Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's assessment that North Korea, China and Russia have "significantly" expanded and modernized their nuclear force capabilities.

"These improvements, which include advances in warheads, delivery systems, and command and control systems, pose an increasing threat to the United States and its allies," he said.

He also mentioned that the North's recent deployment of combat forces to Russia is "of concern," while pointing out that North Korea's longstanding chemical and biological weapons capabilities remain a threat.

The nominee took note of North Korean threats from the increasingly contested space domain.

"In addition to the PRC and Russia, both North Korea and Iran are expanding their space programs and advancing their ballistic missile capabilities," he said, pledging to play a role to counter hostile uses of space. PRC is short for China's official name, the People's Republic of China.

Touching on Chinese threats, Feinberg said that Beijing has developed capabilities for the specific purpose of being able to exercise military power in the Indo-Pacific region and deny the U.S. ability to project power into the region.

"If confirmed, I will work with urgency to strengthen our force posture in the Indo-Pacific region to deter PRC aggression," he said.

He singled out a sudden Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan by force as the "most threatening" scenario facing the Pentagon.

"A successful invasion of Taiwan could severely damage U.S. trade, alliances, and global influence," he warned.

"Xi Jinping's stated goal of annexing Taiwan, his directive to the Chinese military to be ready for such an operation by 2027, and China's significant and ongoing buildup of capabilities designed to hold the Joint Force at risk suggest that China poses a significant and growing threat across the near, medium, and long term," he added.

Feinberg is a co-founder of Cerberus Capital Management, a U.S. global investment fund. He previously chaired the Intelligence Oversight Board and the President's Intelligence Advisory Board during Trump's first term.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 26, 2025

16. N. Korea's Kim stresses 'ideology-first' principle for military during university visit

​But you cannot eat ideology and ideology does not make you shoot more accurately. But it is believed by Kim to be the key to his survival to prevent any kind of internal resistance (until the coherence and support of the military is lost after the three chains of control fail).

This is the problem when you demand loyalty at all costs and demonstrating personal loyalty to the Dear Leader is required both to advance (over merit) and and to survive. This system is eventually going to crack (and catastrophically). Soldiers really need loyalty to something greater themselves and greater than any human being. This is what has always made the American military great - it fights for a larger idea and ideal - the US Constitution and the man or woman on their left and right.

N. Korea's Kim stresses 'ideology-first' principle for military during university visit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 25, 2025

SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has visited a military and political university and emphasized the "ideology-first" principle and loyalty in building a powerful military, the North's state media reported Tuesday.

Kim visited the Kim Il Sung University of Politics the previous day and gave a speech to faculty and students, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, describing the university named after North Korea's founder and the leader's grandfather as the supreme military and political school of the armed forces.

"The Korean People's Army ... should surely become the strongest army in the world" and adhere to and strengthen "the political, ideological, spiritual and moral advantages," Kim said in the speech.

"Imbuing the army with ideology before arming it with military technology is the core of army building," the leader noted, citing "soldiers, weapons and ideology" as the "three elements of the armed forces.

The development of the Korean People's Army should prioritize strengthening its political, ideological and moral qualities before advancing military technology equipment, including nuclear armed forces, Kim also said.

Top-ranking military cadres accompanied Kim on his visit to the university, including Pak Jong-chon, vice chairman of the party's Central Military Commission, and Defense Minister No Kwang-chol, according to the KCNA.

Founded in 1945 in Pyongyang, the Kim Il Sung University of Politics trains political officers for the armed forces, while Kim Il Sung Military University educates field commanders.

This image, captured from the Rodong Sinmun daily, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) giving a speech during his visit to the Kim Il Sung University of Politics. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 25, 2025

17. N. Korean party delegation visits Moscow: KCNA

​Kim to Putin: What do you need?

Putin to Kim: How much will it cost me this time?

N. Korean party delegation visits Moscow: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 25, 2025

SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- A high-ranking delegation from North Korea's Workers' Party has arrived in Moscow for a visit at the invitation of Russia's ruling party, state media reported Tuesday.

The delegation, led by Ri Hi-yong, a member of the party's Central Committee Politburo, landed in Moscow the previous day at the invitation of Russia's United Russia Party, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

Andrey Klimov, a member of the presidium of the Russian party's Supreme Committee and deputy head of the party's foreign activities committee, along with other members of the party's leadership, greeted the delegation upon their arrival at an airport, the KCNA said without further information.

The visit came as the United States has begun negotiations to end Russia's war against Ukraine, for which North Korea dispatched thousands of troops to the Russian side.

Since forging a mutual defense treaty last year, Pyongyang and Moscow have strengthened bilateral cooperation in defense, economy, sports and various other fields.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) and Russian President Vladimir Putin walk side by side in a garden in Pyongyang following the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, in this file photo published by the Korean Central News Agency on June 20, 2024. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 25, 2025

18. Editorial: Trump's shift on Ukraine and how it could impact on S.Korea's security

​ Korea will want to prevent "Korea passing."

Conclusion:

This concept of NATO-style nuclear sharing was seen as a potential option for South Korea in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear threat. However, as distrust in Trump grows, there is now talk of nuclear sharing without U.S. involvement. Over the past 80 years, the U.S. has maintained global security alongside its allies in the fight against totalitarian threats. But under Trump’s administration, which focuses solely on U.S. interests, this international order is beginning to break down. It’s becoming clear that the world can no longer rely on the U.S., as it once did.

Editorial: Trump's shift on Ukraine and how it could impact on S.Korea's security

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/02/24/EAMNVCXFRFH4LAU4KZ5T4HUVK4/

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2025.02.24. 09:05

As the war in Ukraine marks its third anniversary, Ukraine submitted a UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion, only for the United States under Trump to oppose it, disputing the use of the term “invasion” and proposing an alternative framing of the conflict./Yinhap News

On Feb. 24th, Ukraine submitted a UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion as the war marked its third anniversary. However, the United States under Trump opposed the resolution, disputing the use of the word “invasion” and proposing an alternative draft that referred to the situation as a “conflict” between the two countries.

The world has witnessed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and three years ago, the UN, led by the U.S., strongly condemned Russia’s actions. Now, however, it is the U.S. itself, under Trump, that seems intent on shifting the blame for Russia’s war of aggression.

President Trump even went as far as saying that Ukraine should never have started the war. He reportedly demanded a 50% stake in Ukraine’s rare earth resources, and when Ukraine refused, threatened to cut off access to U.S. satellite communications, which are essential for military operations, including drone operations. Critics argue that this behavior mirrors a form of “predatory” diplomacy, using the suffering of other nations for personal gain. Trump has made similar threats against Greenland, Panama, Gaza, and Canada, in what seems like mafia-style tactics.

In Germany, the leader of the Christian Democratic Union a strong contender to become the next Chancellor, said there is a need to discuss nuclear sharing with Britain and France, both nuclear-armed European nations. Germany is already part of a nuclear sharing agreement with the U.S. Five NATO countries, including Germany and Italy, which host U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, have a say in the nuclear decision-making process and would use their own planes to carry out a nuclear strike. While the final authority on activating nuclear weapons remains with the U.S. president, the sharing agreement allows these countries to be part of the control process.

This concept of NATO-style nuclear sharing was seen as a potential option for South Korea in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear threat. However, as distrust in Trump grows, there is now talk of nuclear sharing without U.S. involvement. Over the past 80 years, the U.S. has maintained global security alongside its allies in the fight against totalitarian threats. But under Trump’s administration, which focuses solely on U.S. interests, this international order is beginning to break down. It’s becoming clear that the world can no longer rely on the U.S., as it once did.

​19. N. Korean officials forced to perform Kim Jong Il birthday shows, sparking criticism

​Kind of like those bosses who make employees perform skits at work social events.

N. Korean officials forced to perform Kim Jong Il birthday shows, sparking criticism - Daily NK English

When performances were held on Feb. 15, audiences comprised selected members from local organizations and enterprises

By Eun Seol - February 26, 2025

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · February 26, 2025

On Feb. 17, North Korea's Workers' Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun reported that the entire country grandly celebrated Kim Jong Il's birthday (Feb. 16), referred to as "February's Holiday," the nation's greatest celebration. /Photo=Rodong Sinmun·News1

North Korean party officials were required to perform in birthday shows marking Kim Jong Il’s birthday, a departure from tradition that has sparked discontent, Daily NK has learned.

“Artistic performances were held across cities and counties on Feb. 15 for the Day of the Shining Star,” a source in South Hamgyong Province told Daily NK recently, referring to Kim Jong Il’s Feb. 16 birthday, a major North Korean holiday.

The South Hamgyong provincial party committee directed local propaganda departments to organize “loyalty performances” by municipal and county officials, departing from the usual practice of relying on professional art troupes. Officials were tasked with “praising the deeds of General Kim Jong Il and exalting the greatness of the party.”

The new requirement forced officials to balance their regular duties with evening rehearsals for the birthday shows that often stretched late into the night. From late January through early February, propaganda departments held two rehearsals to ensure each unit had prepared performances.

The mandate sparked competition between party and government organizations, with some turning to professional entertainers for assistance. In Riwon County, tensions flared when both the party committee and people’s committee attempted to hire the same performer. “The people’s committee eventually backed down and found someone else, but their officials were quite upset about it,” the source said.

When the birthday shows were held on Feb. 15, audiences comprised selected members from local organizations and enterprises. However, many spectators were unimpressed by the officials’ displays. “People felt officials would have better served the public by focusing on their actual duties instead of proving their loyalty on stage,” the source said.

One observer reportedly expressed frustration about “officials wasting time on meaningless shows while people struggle to make ends meet,” while another complained about missing valuable trading time at the marketplace to attend the mandatory performance.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · February 26, 2025

20. North Korea in 2025: Between domestic control and global gambles

​A useful summary of some of the challenges.

North Korea in 2025: Between domestic control and global gambles - Daily NK English

A potential earlier-than-expected Ninth Party Congress could capitalize on the party's 80th anniversary momentum

By Gil-sup Kwak - February 26, 2025

dailynk.com · by Gil-sup Kwak · February 26, 2025

A view of the venue of a central report meeting commemorating the 100th birthday of Kang Kon. (Rodong Sinmun)

The tradition of North Korean leaders delivering major New Year speeches ended in 2020. Instead, Kim Jong Un now announces policy and budget decisions through two key meetings: the year-end plenary session of the Central Committee and the January meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA).

Following this pattern, the Eighth Central Committee’s 11th plenary session convened from December 23-27, while the 14th SPA held its 12th session from Jan. 22-23. Both bodies addressed seven agenda items. The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, a leading research center on North Korea, subsequently organized an academic conference on Feb. 4 titled “An Assessment of the North Korean Situation in 2024 and Projections for 2025.”

Key Developments from Recent Policy Meetings

In these meetings, North Korea characterized 2024 as a year of “confrontation between the bloc of autonomy and the bloc of hegemony.” The regime acknowledged facing “major obstacles” from flood damage, “hostile forces’ warmongering,” and sanctions, while highlighting achievements in its “people-first principle” and military development.

Looking ahead to 2025, North Korea emphasized three main points:

1. The year’s significance as the final year of the current five-year plan, coinciding with the 80th anniversary of Korea’s liberation and the Workers’ Party founding
2. Focus on education and regional economic development
3. An ultra-hardline strategy toward the United States, though specific details remain undisclosed

Notably, the SPA session, held after Donald Trump’s inauguration on Jan. 20, was primarily technical in nature. Kim Jong Un’s absence and the lack of discussion on foreign policy or defense matters suggests a deliberate approach to avoid sensitive topics.

Critical Factors Shaping 2025

Several internal and external factors will likely influence North Korea’s trajectory in 2025:

On the internal front, 2025 marks the final year of the five-year economic and military development plan, as well as the second year of both the “20×10 regional development policy” and “two hostile states” policy. The year also brings significant anniversaries, including 80 years since liberation from Japanese rule and the Party’s founding. Additionally, the regime will oversee the election of 15th SPA members while preparing for the Ninth Party Congress, expected in January 2026.

External factors that will shape the year include North Korea’s ongoing military involvement in Russia’s Ukraine war and the Trump administration’s approach to both North Korea and the Ukraine conflict. Any potential dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea could significantly impact various domains, from nuclear issues to politics, military affairs, and the economy.

Inter-Korean relations will likely remain minimal due to North Korea’s “two hostile states” principle, military commitments in Ukraine, and its response to political developments in South Korea, including President Yoon’s martial law declaration and impeachment.

Strategic Outlook

Kim Jong Un’s 2024 decisions—particularly the “two hostile states” principle, departure from traditional reunification policy, and Ukraine war involvement—represented significant risks. However, 2025 may present opportunities for these gambles to pay off.

North Korea’s likely strategies include:

1. Solidifying the “two hostile states” theory
2. Leveraging its Ukraine war involvement
3. Exploring dialogue with the United States while maintaining distance from South Korea

Denuclearization appears increasingly unlikely given recent developments. The regime has passed legislation declaring its nuclear weapon state status, issued orders to strengthen nuclear capabilities, and revealed uranium enrichment facilities. This stance is further reinforced by North Korea’s strategic alignment with China and Russia, its participation in the Ukraine war, and continued ICBM development and provocations.

Internal Focus and Domestic Priorities

Despite external relationships, Kim Jong Un’s primary focus remains domestic. Key priorities include:

• Countering South Korean influence
• Reinforcing socialist principles
• Mobilizing the population through anniversary celebrations and Party Congress preparation
• Addressing internal corruption and party discipline

Looking Ahead

North Korea appears to be positioning 2025 as a year for consolidation and adjustment, with 2026 marked for new initiatives. This approach encompasses:

• Nuclear and missile capability enhancement
• Military readiness improvement
• Implementation of the “people-first principle”
• National mobilization through revolutionary spirit
• Youth ideological education
• Legitimizing North Korea’s independent path
• Distinguishing Kim Jong Un’s leadership from his predecessors
• Increasing visibility of Kim Ju Ae and the ruling family

A potential earlier-than-expected Ninth Party Congress could capitalize on the party’s 80th anniversary momentum. However, major foreign policy shifts may wait until developments in the Ukraine conflict become clearer and Party Congress preparations advance.

The regime’s fundamental challenge remains internal: addressing changing social attitudes, particularly among younger North Koreans drawn to individualism and outside information. The “two hostile states” policy reflects this concern, attempting to sever psychological ties with South Korea.

For South Korea, the path forward requires maintaining a firm commitment to peaceful unification under liberal values while actively supporting North Korean human rights. This approach should include facilitating information flow to North Korean society and pursuing sustained international cooperation, all while working toward organic, bottom-up change within North Korea.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Gil-sup Kwak · February 26, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com