Note: This is the penultimate message from this address. To continue to receive my daily dispatches please go to the link below.

Please sign up for the KRR Newsletter here:

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/newsletter

Quotes of the Day:

"The secret of joy in work is contained in one word - excellence. To know how to do something well is to enjoy it." 

– Pearl Buck

"The philosophy of one century is the common sense of the next." 

– Henry Ward Beecher

“There are lessons to be learned from history – but generally those lessons are only known to those who read books, not to those who ban them.”

– Brian Dunning

1. N. Korea's Spy Agency a 'Complex Threat' Beyond Intelligence Role

2. Inside the Mind of a Veteran South Korean Diplomat

3. External Information Frees North Koreans from Regime Indoctrination

4. Bronze and Concrete: North Korea’s Cultural Footprint in Mozambique and China’s Stadium Diplomacy

5. Unification is the only way to achieve a second Miracle on the Han River.

6. US says it’s open to talks with North Korea, responding to Party Congress

7. South Korea expands espionage law to cover all foreign states

8. What we didn’t see at the Party Congress, from Kim Jong Un’s child to nuke power

9. North Korea holds post-congress military parade with no weapons procession

10. N. Korea's Kim visits family mausoleum with newly elected party officials after congress

11. South Korea, US Halve Freedom Shield Exercises

12. S. Korea conditionally approves Google's overseas transfer of high-precision map data

13. Editorial: Scaling Back Joint Drills While Pushing OPCON Transfer

14. Kim's dual-track strategy

1. N. Korea's Spy Agency a 'Complex Threat' Beyond Intelligence Role

Summary:

A new Committee for Human Rights in north Korea report argues the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) is more than an intelligence service. It is a single command that fuses special operations, espionage, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and cyber operations, and it reports up through the State Affairs Commission to Kim Jong Un. The author, Robert Collins, details a seven-bureau structure spanning infiltration, border reconnaissance, overseas operations, inter-Korean work, cyber, technical support, and logistics. The report estimates about 5,900 cyber personnel and ties Lazarus, Andariel, and Bluenoroff to the RGB, alleging large-scale crypto theft that helps fund weapons programs, while framing these activities as human-rights violations as well as security threats.

Comment: The RGB report can be downloaded here: https://www.hrnk.org/documentations/the-reconnaissance-general-bureau-the-kim-regimes-precious-treasured-sword/

This is another important contribution from Bob COllins that helps us to understand the nature, objectives, dn strategy of the Kim family regime.

The regime’s operational center of gravity may sit less in “spies” and more in a revenue-and-coercion engine where cybercrime bankrolls repression and strategic weapons, making financial disruption as decisive as military deterrence. By housing inter-Korean portfolios and cyber units under one roof, the RGB likely enables synchronized coercion, influence, and disruption during diplomacy, turning “talks” into another operational line of effort.

If the RGB is built to survive compartment loss, what nodes or dependencies still create meaningful leverage points for allied strategy without drifting into escalation?

How should South Korea and the United States measure success against the RGB: fewer infiltrations, reduced crypto revenue, degraded cyber capacity, or weakened political warfare effects?

World News Feb. 26, 2026 / 8:24 PM / Updated Feb. 26, 2026 at 8:24 PM

N. Korea's Spy Agency a 'Complex Threat' Beyond Intelligence Role

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/26/nkhr-report-cybercrime/5071772154835/

Greg Scarlatoiu, executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, speaks at an event hosted by the Washington chapter of the Korean American Union Society at the Washington Korean Community Center in Alexandria. File. Photo by Asia Today

Feb. 26 (Asia Today) -- North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau operates as a "complex threat entity" that merges military operations, cybercrime and terrorism under a single command structure reporting directly to leader Kim Jong Un, according to a new report from a Washington-based human rights organization.

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea released the report Sunday, titled Reconnaissance General Bureau: The Kim Regime's Precious Treasured Sword. It offers one of the most detailed public examinations to date of the agency's structure, financing and global reach.

The report was authored by Robert Collins, a former U.S. Army strategist with extensive Korea-related experience, including serving as chief of strategy at the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command - the joint military structure that oversees the defense of South Korea.

Collins argues that the RGB defies easy comparison to conventional intelligence agencies. Unlike South Korea's National Intelligence Service or the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which operate within defined mandates, the RGB consolidates military reconnaissance, special operations, cyberwarfare, espionage, psychological operations and operations targeting South Korea under one centralized chain of command.

The bureau reports to North Korea's State Affairs Commission and ultimately to Kim Jong Un, who the report says treats it as a core instrument of regime survival. Kim has personally referred to its cyber units as a "precious treasured sword," according to the report.

Seven Bureaus, One Command

Established in February 2009 through the merger of several intelligence and operations units, the RGB currently operates through six main bureaus and a seventh logistics unit.

The first bureau oversees agent training and infiltration missions. The second conducts military reconnaissance along the Demilitarized Zone and coastal areas. The third manages overseas intelligence and alleged international operations. The fourth handles inter-Korean dialogue and related policy support. The fifth directs cyber operations, including hacking and communications interception. The sixth provides technical support and electronic warfare capabilities, while the seventh handles rear services and logistics.

Taken together, the report assesses that the RGB maintains operational capacity across land, sea, air and cyberspace - a multi-domain reach that few comparable organizations possess.

Cyber Operations as a Revenue Engine

A substantial portion of the report is devoted to North Korea's cyber activities, which Collins describes as both strategically and financially central to the regime.

The report estimates that North Korea maintains approximately 5,900 cyber personnel and identifies hacking groups Lazarus, Andariel and Bluenoroff as operating under the RGB's organizational umbrella. These groups have been linked by U.S. and international authorities to some of the most significant state-sponsored cyberattacks in recent years.

Drawing on international assessments, the report alleges that North Korean-linked hackers stole approximately $1.7 billion in cryptocurrency in 2022 alone - funds it says are funneled into the country's nuclear and missile programs, helping Pyongyang sustain its weapons development despite sweeping international sanctions.

The report also raises concern about reported cooperation between North Korean operatives and foreign cybercriminal networks, suggesting the bureau's reach may extend further into the global criminal ecosystem than previously documented.

Human Rights in the Crosshairs

The report draws an explicit connection between the RGB's security operations and human rights, an angle that sets it apart from purely strategic assessments of the bureau.

It argues that cyber intrusions, surveillance and information disruption campaigns may violate international covenants protecting privacy and freedom of expression. It further contends that revenue generated through cybercrime - redirected to weapons programs rather than civilian welfare - could breach obligations under international agreements on economic and social rights.

The report also revisits a series of past incidents attributed to North Korean operatives, including armed infiltrations, bombings and assassinations, characterizing them as violations of the right to life and other fundamental protections under international law.

A Threat Beyond the Peninsula

In its conclusion, the report warns that the RGB can no longer be viewed solely as a regional security concern. The integration of its cyber capabilities with emerging technologies - including drones and advanced reconnaissance systems - could significantly complicate the security environment in coming years, the report said.

The committee said the study is intended as a reference for policymakers, researchers and security specialists seeking to understand the bureau's expanding operational scope.

No response from the North Korean government was immediately available. Pyongyang does not typically comment on reports issued by foreign organizations.

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260226010007781

2. Inside the Mind of a Veteran South Korean Diplomat

​Summary:

In a Stimson interview, Ambassador Chun Yungwoo argues the latest NSS and NDS raise quiet but serious alliance risk. He is troubled by what is missing: no explicit commitment to north Korea denuclearization and no clear reaffirmation of extended deterrence for South Korea. He also warns the documents imply Seoul can shoulder primary deterrence with reduced U.S. support, a signal that can misread in Pyongyang and Beijing. Ambassador Chun critiques a perceived tilt toward Taiwan and the First Island Chain over treaty allies. On OPCON, he backs earlier transfer to build Korean ownership, not pride, while urging hardwired consultation. He supports enrichment for energy security and latent deterrent value, but urges patience on reprocessing.

Comment:

Ambasador Chun’s core claim is that alliance credibility erodes less through a single decision than through omission and wording, because adversaries read doctrine as intent and allies read it as insurance. That makes strategic documents operational tools, not mere rhetoric.

His OPCON logic implies South Korea should accept some marginal inefficiency now to buy long-term command accountability, but only if the future combined command is built to force joint consent on the decisions that matter.

If extended deterrence is not explicitly stated, what substitute signals can restore credibility without cornering either capital into escalatory commitments?

Does earlier OPCON transition strengthen deterrence by increasing Korean ownership, or does it create a perception of U.S. disengagement that north Korea and China can exploit?

Inside the Mind of a Veteran South Korean Diplomat • Stimson Center

stimson.org ·· February 26, 2026

An interview featuring a veteran Korean diplomat's perspective on U.S. regional strategy, OPCON transfer, uranium enrichment, and spent fuel reprocessing

By  J. James Kim  •  Ambassador Chun Yungwoo

Korean Peninsula

• February 26, 2026
• 
  

https://www.stimson.org/2026/inside-the-mind-of-a-veteran-south-korean-diplomat/

One of South Korea’s most seasoned diplomats sits down to speak candidly about the US-ROK alliance and U.S. national security strategy. Ambassador Chun Yungwoo has seen the alliance from nearly every angle — as a Six-Party Talks negotiator, as National Security Advisor to a South Korean president, and as a close observer of Washington’s strategic thinking over decades. So, when he reads through the Trump administration’s new strategy document and says his “initial reaction was one of genuine concern,” that is not a throwaway line.

In this interview, he offers his perspective about the alliance and what challenges lie ahead for South Korea. He shares his views on OPCON transfer with a perspective that cuts against the conventional wisdom in Seoul. He presents a measured but clear-eyed take on uranium enrichment and what it means for South Korea’s strategic posture.

This is a conversation about the future of one of America’s most critical alliances told by someone who helped build it.

Ambassador Chun, this morning’s roundtable was one of the most engaging and, frankly, sobering conversations I’ve been a part of in a long time. The room was filled with a palpable sense of unease about where the alliance is headed. The meeting discussion was all off-the-record, so we’ll leave it there — but it’s clear the stakes feel very real right now. This leads me to ask — late last year and earlier this year, the Trump administration released its new National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS). For those who were not in the room, can you share your views of these documents? In your professional opinion, what do these documents mean for the US-ROK alliance and for South Korea?

Reading through the new NSS and NDS, my initial reaction was one of genuine concern. What struck me most was what was not in these documents. There is no mention of North Korea’s denuclearization and there is no reaffirmation of the extended deterrence commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK). I believe these are the core tenets of our alliance, and their absence in these documents was somewhat troubling to me.

There is also a passage suggesting that ROK is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with a more limited level of U.S. support. Now, I understand the direction this is pointing; greater burden-sharing and ROK’s self-reliance are legitimate goals. But one has to ask: Was it wise or even necessary to put that in writing in these documents? It risks sending the wrong signal to our adversary, creating misunderstanding both in Seoul and in Pyongyang, and potentially in Beijing as well.

What also concerns me is these documents’ overall strategic emphasis. It gives the impression of prioritizing the First Island Chain and the defense of Taiwan (non-treaty ally) over the defense of treaty allies like ROK and Japan. I understand why Taiwan may be important for the U.S… but the documents seem to be asking U.S. allies to build up their forces for the defense of the First Island Chain rather than for their own defense. That is a difficult ask.

On China, the strategic language has also shifted noticeably. The new documents frame the goal as achieving a “decent peace” through balance of power, deconfliction, and de-escalation. I thought this represents a retreat from the previous posture that characterized China as a strategic competitor requiring sustained competition and containment. To me, it smells of appeasement, and it suggests a willingness to concede a sphere of influence to Beijing. I think that is a significant departure.

Will this immediately upend the alliance? Perhaps not in the near term. But when ROK’s defense is no longer explicitly featured in America’s stated strategic priorities, the credibility of the extended deterrence commitment and the broader defense guarantee are inevitably called into question. That is a slow-building risk that we cannot take lightly.

What I find somewhat ironic, however, is that the administration in Seoul (which is actively pursuing strategic autonomy and an early return of wartime operational control) does not appear particularly alarmed by these shifts in American strategy. One wonders whether their comfort with greater distance from U.S. strategic commitments makes them less sensitive to these signals than they ought to be.

During the last Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Seoul, South Korea, and the United States announced that they will complete the second phase of OPCON transfer by the end of this year (2026). The view among many experts is that OPCON transfer will be completed before the end of President Lee’s term. What is your view on this matter? What risks should South Korea and the U.S. be aware of as they press ahead with OPCON?

Yes, President Lee Jae-myung appears intent on completing OPCON transfer before the end of his term. This will be a consequential decision, and I want to offer a perspective that may surprise some — because I support an early transfer, but for reasons quite different from those usually cited by some of my colleagues in Seoul.

Let me first be clear about what I do not believe. I do not think OPCON transfer is primarily a matter of military sovereignty or national pride. Some people in Korea tend to frame it this way, but that framing misses the point. In terms of pure operational control capability — command and control systems, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets, precision strike capability, strategic communications — ROK simply cannot match the United States. From a strictly military-operational standpoint, it would remain optimal for the United States to exercise wartime operational control.

So why do I support an early transfer? The reason is this: More than 70 years have passed since the Korean War ended. For over seven decades, ROK’s military has not held wartime command over its own forces in its own territory. I worry about what that prolonged dependency does to the soul and readiness of our military. If this continues indefinitely, we risk being stuck with Korean Armed Forces that lack genuine ownership of their own national defense — an institution that follows orders but does not feel the full weight of responsibility for defending its homeland. Restoring that sense of ownership and accountability matters more to me than optimizing operational efficiency.

Now, I take seriously the concern about potential gaps in deterrence through operational inefficiency during the early stage of transfer. But I believe this can be managed through thoughtful design and planning. The key is a robust consultation-and-consensus mechanism built into the command structure. When a Korean commander leads the Future Combined Forces Command, major operational decisions should require genuine deliberation with the U.S. deputy commander. Conversely, for air and maritime operations where U.S. commanders would lead, decisions should likewise require agreement with Korean deputies. If this is done properly, the actual conduct of operations need not look dramatically different from today’s arrangements — but it would address the legitimate desire of those who see this as a matter of Korean agency.

As for the concern that OPCON transfer would decouple the alliance — I think that fear is overstated. The decision to go to war or seek peace is not made by military commanders. It is made by the political leadership of both countries — the respective presidents and defense ministers. The Combined Forces Command exercises only military operational authority within the parameters set by those civilian leaders. Decoupling is a political phenomenon, not a military one, and it will not be caused or prevented by which general wears four stars in Seoul.

Let’s now turn our attention to another matter having to do with uranium enrichment and reprocessing, which has been an issue of contention between Seoul and Washington for some time. Currently, the U.S. and South Korea maintain a civil nuclear (123) agreement, which limits South Korea’s ability to enrich and reprocess spent fuel; but during the last summit, President Trump agreed to support South Korea’s pursuit of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing provided that they would be for peaceful purposes and consistent with existing laws. As I recall, you’ve worked on nuclear issues before. What do you think about this agreement?

On this agreement, I want to say first and most directly: I think it deserves credit. The agreement is a positive step, and it has been a long time coming.

Consider the basic energy security argument. ROK operates 25 nuclear power plants. We depend entirely on a small number of foreign enrichment companies for one hundred percent of our nuclear fuel supply. That is an extraordinary vulnerability for a country that is dependent on foreign sources for its energy. If those supplies are disrupted — for geopolitical, commercial, or logistical reasons — we face potential economic catastrophe. A country of our size and sophistication, with our level of dependence on nuclear energy, has a compelling case for developing its own enrichment capability. The energy security rationale alone is sufficient justification.

But there is also a security dimension that I think is underappreciated in public discussion. Even if we are talking purely about civil enrichment for peaceful purposes — and I want to be clear that is what this agreement addresses — the operation of a domestic enrichment facility does mean that ROK would have the latent technical capacity to produce weapons-grade material within a relatively short timeframe if circumstances ever demanded it. I am not suggesting we should pursue that path. But it is an objective reality that this capacity, even for civil use, reinforces deterrence and gives ROK a degree of strategic weight that complements America’s extended deterrence guarantee. That is not a trivial consideration.

On the reprocessing side — specifically pyroprocessing of spent fuel — I would counsel patience and realism. The economic and commercial viability of pyroprocessing has not yet been demonstrated at scale. We are still at the stage of needing a pilot plant, and that pilot plant’s results will have to prove the technology’s commercial case before any serious investment in full-scale reprocessing infrastructure makes sense. Beyond the technology, finding local governments in ROK willing to host reprocessing facilities — which carry real risks of radiation exposure — will itself be a lengthy political process. Reprocessing is a worthy long-term goal, but it remains a distant future prospect. We should not oversell it.

In sum, the enrichment agreement is a meaningful and welcome development. It addresses a genuine strategic and energy security need, and it reflects a maturing of the bilateral relationship on one of its most sensitive dimensions. I hope both governments will continue to advance this agenda with the care and deliberateness it deserves.

3. External Information Frees North Koreans from Regime Indoctrination

​Summary:

At a February 12 Potomac Forum in Annandale, Virginia, Hyunseung Lee (North Korean Young Leaders Assembly (NKYLA) founder) and Eunsook Jang (NKYLA alum) argued that small doses of outside information are eroding the regime’s indoctrination inside north Korea. Lee described the regime’s information blockade, bans on independent gatherings, and three-generation collective punishment that makes organized resistance nearly impossible. Jang said exposure to foreign media and images of due process and human dignity shattered propaganda claims and helped drive her defection. They warned Rodong Sinmun circulation in South Korea can normalize Pyongyang narratives and argued the regime’s aim remains unification by force.

Comment: External information functions like a slow weapon: it does not spark instant revolt, but it changes what people believe is possible, which is where regimes begin to bleed. Pyongyang’s fear is not facts alone but networked trust; hence the obsession with collective punishment and bans on association.

If information is the catalyst, what is the minimum “dose” that reliably converts private doubt into shared action? 

External Information Frees North Koreans from Regime Indoctrination - Global Peace Foundation

globalpeace.org · Eunsook Jang · February 23, 2026

https://globalpeace.org/external-information-frees-north-koreans-from-regime-indoctrination/

External Information Frees North Koreans from Regime Indoctrination

Eunsook Jang

February 23, 2026

Attendees of the Potomac Forum held on February 12 listen attentively to the lecture.

In February 2026, at the Potomac Forum held in Annandale, Virginia, Hyunseung Lee (Founder of North Korea Young Leaders Assembly (NKYLA), co-organized by Global Peace Foundation) and Eunsook Jang (NKYLA Alumni) delivered a lecture on North Korean human rights. Despite the regime’s systematic indoctrination, they testified that North Korean residents are gradually discovering the truth through small pieces of outside information—and that this awareness will ultimately become a catalyst for change in North Korea.

Lee explained the dynamics of change in North Korea and addressed why ordinary citizens are unable to stand up to the regime. He pointed to the regime’s strict information blockade—banning the internet, foreign media, and publications—as well as educational control, where citizens are exposed only to state-approved narratives and have no opportunity to encounter alternative perspectives. He further emphasized that independent organizations or gatherings are legally prohibited, and that collective punishment policies—including guilt by association across three generations—create a structure in which resistance is virtually impossible. In many cases, individuals are sent to prison camps without due process and never return. “If one person engages in anti-government activity, not only that individual but also grandparents, parents, and extended family members are punished,” he stressed, underscoring how the system makes resistance realistically unattainable.

In response, Jang shared that precisely because of this reality, exposure to outside information—particularly depictions of a free society governed by a legal system with defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges ensuring due process—was profoundly shocking to her. Through foreign media, she gradually came to recognize that the North Korean regime was fundamentally flawed. Contrary to state propaganda claiming that North Koreans are the happiest people in the world, she slowly realized that those living outside North Korea enjoyed far greater freedom and dignity. This realization became the most significant motivation behind her decision to defect. Just as small pieces of information accumulate and can ultimately lead to life-risking escapes, she concluded, the collective efforts of civil society and the leadership of North Korean defectors can help accelerate the realization of a unified Korean Peninsula.

Hyunseung Lee (left) and Eunsook Jang (right) respond to questions during the Q&A session at the Potomac Forum.

Lee also expressed concern over the recent circulation of North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun within South Korea, warning that the publication employs propaganda techniques reminiscent of Nazi-era agitation and that uncritical exposure to its messaging risks normalizing the regime’s narratives. In the same context, he addressed the theory of permanent division on the Korean Peninsula, criticizing the so-called “two-state theory” as an anti-national and ahistorical policy. He argued that despite differences in rhetoric or framing, North Korea’s fundamental objective of achieving unification through force has not changed.

Through the North Korean Young Leaders Assembly (NKYLA), Lee and Jang are working to elevate these issues to the policy level by engaging U.S. policymakers, United Nations officials, and think tank experts. Founded by Lee in 2023, NKYLA invites 10–12 North Korean defector youth to the United States each year to help cultivate them as future leaders preparing for unification. The initiative also advances meaningful policy and international efforts aimed at bringing genuine change to North Korea—for the sake of families who remain inside the country and for the broader Korean people.

Approximately 50 Korean-American community leaders residing in the greater Washington, D.C. area attended the forum. Even after the formal lecture concluded, more than ten participants actively raised questions, reflecting strong interest and continued discussion on the future of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula.

Sign up for our Newsletter

Sign up for our Newsletter

Keep up to date with upcoming events, recent activities, and announcements

Global Peace Foundation

About Us

Where We Work

What We Do

Media Room

Events

Donate

Careers

Contact

Washington, DC

9320 Annapolis Road,

Suite 100

Lanham, MD 20706

info@globalpeace.org

For media inquiries please contact: media@globalpeace.org

GPF is a 501(c)3 registered non-sectarian, non-partisan, nonprofit organization.

Charity ID: 26-4599860

Follow Us

• Follow
• Follow
• Follow
• Follow
• Follow

* indicates required

Email Address *

First Name *

Last Name *

Country of Residence *

globalpeace.org · Eunsook Jang · February 23, 2026

4. Bronze and Concrete: North Korea’s Cultural Footprint in Mozambique and China’s Stadium Diplomacy

Summary:

The piece argues that north Korea’s imprint in Mozambique is most visible in symbolic, cultural works, not big infrastructure. It centers on the 31-foot Samora Machel statue in Maputo, produced by Mansudae Overseas Projects, as a legacy of Cold War era “revolutionary solidarity” and Pyongyang’s bid for influence and votes against South Korea. In contrast, Mozambique’s flagship prestige infrastructure, the 42,000-seat Estádio Nacional do Zimpeto, reflects China’s stadium diplomacy, financed and built by Chinese actors. Under sanctions, north Korea shifted from monuments to smaller revenue schemes, including medical deployments and occasional illicit activity.

Comment: Something we often overlook is the Kim family regime's overseas activities to influence friends. In Africa, Pyongyang competes less with capital than with narrative and symbols, while Beijing competes with visible projects that buy access, goodwill, and agenda-setting power.

Bronze and Concrete: North Korea’s Cultural Footprint in Mozambique and China’s Stadium Diplomacy

nkhiddengulag.org

2/26/2026

By Samantha Clark, Former HRNK Research Intern

Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK President and CEO

https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/february-26th-2026

0 Comments

In the heart of Maputo, Mozambique’s capital, a 31-foot bronze statue of President Samora Machel stands watch over Independence Square. The monument, cast and erected by the North Korean state construction firm Mansudae Overseas Projects, is one of Pyongyang’s most visible legacies in southern Africa [International-Relations-2022]. For decades, North Korea’s leaders saw African liberation movements as both ideological allies and potential diplomatic votes in their long rivalry with South Korea. Mozambique, a Cold War battleground turned emerging economy, was one of those targets.

Yet while Pyongyang’s imprint in Maputo is undeniable, its role was primarily cultural and symbolic rather than in heavy infrastructure. The country’s marquee national stadium — the 42,000-seat Estádio Nacional do Zimpeto — was financed by Beijing and constructed by China’s Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group, a prominent example of China’s modern “stadium diplomacy” [news reports on Zimpeto].

Revolutionary solidarity and early ties

Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in 1975 under the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO party. Like other newly liberated African states, it attracted attention from Pyongyang. North Korea’s Africa policy in the 1970s and 80s was ambitious: Kim Il-sung aimed to promote Juche (self-reliance), offer training and weapons to liberation movements, and secure diplomatic recognition over Seoul [International-Relations-2022]. This “Third World solidarity” was also a Cold War tactic — the DPRK hoped to win votes in the Non-Aligned Movement and United Nations General Assembly, where South Korea was competing for legitimacy [International-Relations-2022].

After Mozambique’s independence, Pyongyang positioned itself quickly after independence as a friendly socialist partner. It exported ideology and gifts. Mansudae artists and engineers became cultural ambassadors: in Maputo they built the Samora Machel statue, echoing similar commissions across Africa such as Heroes’ Acre in Namibia and monuments in Zimbabwe [International-Relations-2022]. Against the background of such cultural and ideological exchanges, according to military proliferation expert Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. (Angelo State University), North Korea’s relationship with Mozambique has been centered on sanctions evasion, military exports and aid, and illegal fishing.

Mozambique’s unique political economy

To understand why North Korea’s role remained symbolic rather than structural, it helps to look at Mozambique’s internal development strategy. As Hye-lim Yoo notes, post-independence Mozambique faced extreme regional imbalance. The south, anchored by Maputo and closely tied to South Africa, dominated politics and industry; the mid and north, rich in land and resources, were poorly integrated [Yoo 2015]. When FRELIMO abandoned socialism after a devastating civil war with RENAMO and democratized in 1994, it still chose an urban, manufacturing-centered growth path rather than rural resource extraction [Yoo 2015]. This made the government eager for foreign partners in light manufacturing and prestige projects but less interested in North Korea’s now-limited capital and expertise.

Mozambique also pivoted diplomatically. Despite its Portuguese past, it joined the British Commonwealth in 1995, a remarkable shift showing openness to Western economic advice [Yoo 2015]. Western and Chinese investment soon outpaced Pyongyang’s small offers. North Korea lacked the capacity — or global financial access — to underwrite the kind of mega-projects Mozambique sought.

Stadiums and symbolism

As Mozambique looked for large-scale infrastructure, it turned to Beijing. The Estádio Nacional do Zimpeto — centerpiece of the 2011 All-Africa Games — was a Chinese state gift, worth about US$65 million, financed by China and built by Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group [news sources on Zimpeto]. This fits a pattern of “stadium diplomacy” China has practiced across Africa, using highly visible sports infrastructure as a soft-power tool.

North Korea’s built legacy in Mozambique is primarily the Samora Machel statue and other smaller civic or memorial works, not large stadiums [International-Relations-2022]. The distinction illustrates how, on the cultural exchange and architectural front, Pyongyang’s resources and reach have remained limited compared with China’s.

Adapting under sanctions: doctors and illicit revenue

Though big infrastructure faded, Pyongyang found other ways to keep ties alive and earn currency. One was the exportation of North Korean health workers. As late as the 2010s, Mozambique hosted dozens of DPRK doctors on government-to-government contracts [UN 2020 report cited in International-Relations-2022]. In 2019, six North Korean physicians were arrested in the northern city of Pemba for operating a private clinic with state equipment, illustrating how sanctions-era workers sometimes moved into gray-market activity [International-Relations-2022].

Another small but telling episode occurred in 2015, when Mozambican authorities stopped a North Korean diplomat with roughly $100,000 and 4.5 kilograms of rhino horn in a car tied to the DPRK embassy in Pretoria — a stark example of how Pyongyang’s Africa presence often turns to illicit trade when formal channels dry up [International-Relations-2022].

During the Kim Jong-un era, Mozambique pledged to suspend and terminate North Korean medical contracts to comply with UN Security Council resolutions banning DPRK labor abroad [UN Panel, International-Relations-2022]. Official exchanges dwindled.

Why the relationship still matters

Despite this apparent retreat, Mozambique remains part of the story of North Korea’s Africa strategy. Scholars of DPRK foreign policy note that Africa provided an early proving ground for Juche diplomacy and later a residual set of sympathetic states or quiet economic partners under sanctions [International-Relations-2022]. Mozambique’s “solidarity, cordiality and friendship,” language used in its 2020 UN sanctions report, shows a desire to maintain historic goodwill even as it implements compliance measures [UN report, International-Relations-2022].

For Mozambique, North Korea is a small, once-symbolic partner now overshadowed by China’s scale and Western finance. Yet the DPRK’s art diplomacy still shapes the urban landscape — the Machel statue remains a landmark and a tourist photo stop.

Concluding remarks

Mozambique illustrates both the reach and the limits of North Korea’s Africa policy. Pyongyang once courted FRELIMO with ideology and monuments but never commanded the resources to build infrastructure on par with China’s Zimpeto Stadium. As sanctions cut off formal revenue and Mozambique globalized, North Korea’s presence shifted from symbolic solidarity to marginal economic workarounds, such as medical labor and occasional illicit ventures.

Understanding this layered history helps clarify how different external powers have shaped Mozambique — and how Pyongyang’s African ambitions have shrunk from Kim Il-sung’s grand Cold War vision to Kim Jong-un’s sanctions-battered pragmatism.

Samantha Clark is an undergraduate at William & Mary studying Government and History. Her areas of focus are North Korean relations with Africa and the human rights consequences of authoritarian alliances. Recently, she was a research intern at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK).

References 

1) International Relations 2022. An Exploratory Analysis of North Korea’s Relationship with Africa. -STEPHEN McGLINCHEY

2) Hye-Lim Yoo. “Political Dynamics of Mozambican Economic Growth Strategy Without Natural Resources Development and Its Implications on Applying East Asian Developmental State Model to Africa.” Paper presented at Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Sheffield, UK, 2015.

3) UN Security Council. “Report on Implementation of UN Sanctions: Mozambique.” United Nations, 2020.

4) Xinhua News Agency. “China Hands Over Estádio Nacional do Zimpeto to Mozambique.” August 2011.

5) BBC Africa. “China Finances and Builds Mozambique’s New National Stadium.” August 2011.

6) Mansudae Overseas Projects. Company materials and reporting on North Korean monuments abroad.

7) UN Panel of Experts on DPRK. Reports on North Korean overseas labor and sanctions evasion, 2019–2021.

5. Unification is the only way to achieve a second Miracle on the Han River.

​Summary:

Moon Hyun-jin, Global Peace Foundation world chairman, argues that Korean unification is the only path to a “second Miracle on the Han River,” because a 25 million-person north Korea market could rebalance South Korea’s export-heavy economy and create new opportunity for youth. He criticizes north Korea’s “two-state” posture and urges a citizen-led “Korean Dream” unification vision, taught in schools and carried by a permanent Unification Committee rather than a shifting ministry. He cautions against a Trump-Kim meeting, saying Pyongyang will not denuclearize. He also calls the Unification Church a “criminal organization” and urges its disbandment.

Comment: This is a Google translation of a Donga Ilbo article.

The second miracle will be on both the Han and Taedong Rivers.

Dr.Moon is trying to reframe unification from a security burden into a growth strategy, betting that economic promise can overcome young voters’ cost skepticism. 

"Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights."

Unification is the only way to achieve a second Miracle on the Han River.

Moon Hyun-jin, Global Peace Foundation World Chairman, said, "Unification must be based on the Korean Dream… The criminal organization Unification Church must be disbanded."

Reporter Moon Young-hoon

yhmoon93@donga.com

Posted 2026-02-26 07:00:02

https://weekly.donga.com/society/article/all/11/6115666/1?utm

Moon Hyun-jin, the world president of the Global Peace Foundation (GPF), speaks on the need for private-sector-led unification and the "Unification Church crisis" on February 25th. (Photo by Park Hae-yoon)

"The South Korean economy currently relies on exports. If a new market like North Korea emerges, exports and domestic demand can be balanced. Unification is the only way for us to achieve another Miracle on the Han River,"

said Moon Hyun-jin, the International Chairman of the Global Peace Foundation (GPF). A history major at Columbia University, he founded GPF in 2010 and People for Unification in 2012, respectively, to spearhead civilian-led unification movements. In an interview conducted on February 25th, ahead of March 1st Independence Movement Day, Chairman Moon emphasized, "Korea is now at a historic turning point. Young people in the Republic of Korea must understand this." He also emphasized, "Citizen-led unification will create more opportunities for young people." The following is a Q&A with him.

How do you evaluate the current administration's North Korea policy?

North Korea currently abandons unification and advocates a two-state system. It views South Korea as its primary enemy. I believe this is North Korea's greatest mistake and the most significant event since liberation. Under these circumstances, it is wrong for our government to pursue a conciliatory policy toward North Korea. Recently, the world has seen a growing trend of nationalism. Our future will depend on which path South Korea chooses. We must face the fact that South Korea is currently at a turning point.

Unification policy should not change depending on the administration.

Do you think unification is possible? 

"The future of South Korea and North Korea is currently bleak. North Korea's economy, in particular, is relatively poor compared to other countries in the world. North Korea's elite are on the verge of defection, and Chairman Kim Jong-un is facing a crisis, unable to appoint a clear successor. Now is the time for the 'Korean Dream,' a dream of peaceful unification of the South and the North based on the Hongik Ingan spirit and contributing to world peace. Based on this, I propose three things necessary to achieve unification."

What are each of these?

"The Korean Dream should be viewed as a new vision for a unification movement driven by the power of citizens, and the government should embrace it. Furthermore, the Korean Dream should be taught in regular education. Finally, instead of a Ministry of Unification whose policies fluctuate depending on the administration, a Unification Committee should be established to implement a consistent unification policy."

Many young people have a negative view of unification.

They often talk about the cost of unification. However, their evidence is usually data released by the CIA some 30 years ago. Things are different now. Since German reunification in 1990, much time has passed, and the pros and cons of unification have become clear. Furthermore, unlike Germany, North and South Korea have extensive information about each other. Imagine adding the 25 million North Korean domestic market to South Korea's current capital. We could face a new economic turning point. Our economy currently relies on exports. With the creation of a new market like North Korea, exports and domestic demand could be balanced. This can be confirmed by looking at the growth achieved by coastal cities in China. In this way, unification will provide new opportunities not only for South Koreans but also for North Korean youth. I believe unification will bring about a second Miracle on the Han River.”

The 2025 Korean Dream Hangang River Festival took place on August 15th last year. Photo provided by the Hangang River Festival Organizing Committee.

“Great change comes from below.”

As a history major, what prompted you to jump into the civilian-led unification movement?

"Historically, great changes have begun from the bottom up. Just look at the development of democracy in South Korea. The democratization movement was also driven by citizens. When I first announced my unification movement, many people argued that unification should begin with dialogue between governments or leaders. However, I disagree. I seek to awaken the sense of calling and historical awareness for unification that resides in the hearts of Koreans."

What are your thoughts on the possibility of US President Donald Trump meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-un?

"It's difficult to accurately predict President Trump's thoughts, but I'd advise against it. The United States has nothing to gain. North Korea won't give up its nuclear weapons, and Chairman Kim will do anything to ensure his survival. The current international situation is increasingly isolating Chairman Kim. I believe China and Russia, which support North Korea, are also becoming internationally isolated. Unlike during his first term, the Trump administration isn't specifically mentioning North Korea. Now is the time for us to lead the way toward unification. It's an opportunity to build a new Korean Peninsula based on freedom and human rights, based on the Korean Dream. The United States will also see this as a good opportunity to build a great power that can be its ally, and insightful scholars in China and Russia will also support it. Unification is the most reasonable outcome for all."

"Despicable church leaders exploit families."

Unification Church leader Han Hak-ja leaves the Seoul Central District Court in Seocho-gu, Seoul, after completing a substantive review of his arrest warrant on September 22nd of last year. (News 1)

Meanwhile, in the interview, Chairman Moon also shared his opinion on the Unification Church, which has recently been facing a crisis due to allegations of collusion between politics and religion. Chairman Moon is the third son of former Unification Church founder Sun Myung Moon and President Hak Ja Han. President Han is currently under arrest and indictment, having been identified as the center of allegations of lobbying between government officials and the Unification Church during the Yoon Seok-yeol administration. Yoon Young-ho, former head of the Unification Church's global headquarters, and Won-ju Jeong, former chief of staff to President Han who assisted him for over a decade, are also on trial for violating the Political Funds Act and the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act. He opened by saying, "My mother (Hak Ja Han) and my siblings were exploited by despicable middle-level leaders." 

What do you think is the root cause of the Unification Church crisis?

"My father (Reverend Sun Myung Moon) had no intention of establishing a religious sect. He was not confined to traditional religions, and he dreamed of a higher ideal. While many religions emphasize that they alone guarantee salvation, my father emphasized universal truth, principles, and peace movements. In fact, in 1996, my father declared the end of the religious era and took down the church sign. I, as his designated successor, sought to continue his legacy. However, when he attempted to dismantle the church organization, the mid-level leaders began to oppose him. They believed that dismantling the organization would mean losing their privileges and authority. They were ambitious, despicable people with little ability. They exploited my mother and my siblings and divided us."

Reverend Hak Ja Han Moon was indicted on charges of collusion between politics and religion.

"My mother never even graduated from high school. After marriage, she was always protected by my father and the religious sect. If believing herself to be the Messiah is a sin, then it is. However, I don't believe her actions were intentional. She is simply another victim of the church leaders."

I understand she was involved in a legal battle with her siblings.

"I've never fought with my siblings. They sued me first, and I won every case. I believe my siblings, like my mother, were exploited by church leaders."

Is there a way to change the Unification Church?

"Disband it. I believe the Japanese courts will disband it. The Korean government should also disband the Unification Church, which has degenerated into a criminal organization. If that happens, the Unification Church itself will struggle to survive. I want to save my mother and uncover the truth. I will reform the Unification Church and transform it into an organization that can achieve my father's goals."

Reporter Moon Young-hoon

yhmoon93@donga.com

subscribe

Hello. I'm reporter Moon Young-hoon. I'll work hard to write.SK Square is the alternative to 1.1 million nix for institutional investors.

Hyundai Motor to Invest KRW 10 Trillion in New AI and Robotics Businesses in Saemangeum

6. US says it’s open to talks with North Korea, responding to Party Congress

​Summary:

Washington signaled it remains open to talks with north Korea “without preconditions,” after Pyongyang’s Ninth Party Congress messaging hinted it could engage if the United States drops demands centered on denuclearization and ends what it calls a hostile policy. South Korea’s vice foreign minister Jeong Yeon-doo relayed the U.S. stance after meetings in Washington, framing Seoul as a “pacemaker” for early DPRK U.S. dialogue. Analysts quoted in the reporting cautioned that POTUS is focused on other crises and is unpredictable, while Kim Jong Un continues to narrow Seoul’s role and depict inter-Korean ties as essentially severed.

Comment: But Kim Jong Un has a precondition: the US must take denuclearization off the table. As long as we say no preconditions Kim will not come to the table.

US says it’s open to talks with North Korea, responding to Party Congress

Washington reaffirms interest in dialogue without preconditions after Kim Jong Un leaves door open in speech

Jooheon Kim February 27, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/us-says-its-open-to-talks-with-north-korea-responding-to-party-congress/

Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un speak with reporters at the JSA | Image: Trump White House Archived via Flickr (June 30, 2019)

The U.S. has confirmed that it is open to dialogue with North Korea without preconditions, according to Seoul’s foreign ministry, after Kim Jong Un left the door open to talks if the U.S. doesn’t insist on denuclearization.

Washington “reaffirmed its openness to dialogue with North Korea without preconditions” and will “maintain close cooperation and continuous communication at all levels going forward” with South Korea, Vice Foreign Minister Jeong Yeon-doo said in the U.S. capital on Thursday.

Jeong’s remarks came after North Korea concluded its Ninth Party Congress this week, with state media reporting on Thursday that the country is prepared for “peaceful coexistence or eternal confrontation” depending on how the U.S. approaches its nuclear program.

“If the U.S. respects our country’s current status as stipulated in the Constitution of the DPRK and withdraws its hostile policy toward the DPRK, we have no reason not to get along with the U.S.,” Kim reportedly said.

“The future of U.S.-North Korea relations depends entirely on the U.S. attitude,” he added. “Whether peaceful coexistence or eternal confrontation, we are prepared for everything.”

Jeong relayed the U.S. position after meeting with Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Allison Hooker in Washington. He said he explained to his American counterparts that “North Korea’s message the previous day was within our expectations.”

“We will continue to support the early realization of North Korea-U.S. talks as a pacemaker,” he said, repeating a slogan that South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has used to describe Seoul’s role in bringing Pyongyang to the negotiating table. 

Jeffrey Robertson, an associate professor of diplomacy at Yonsei University, told NK News that the White House’s opinion does not carry significant meaning, as Washington is currently more focused on issues relating to Venezuela and Iran.

“The Trump administration will not be very interested in the Korean Peninsula for the next six months to a year if the Iran situation proceeds,” he said, referring to the ongoing negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program.

However, he cautioned that Trump is unpredictable and even North Korea would find it difficult to deal with him. 

Trump has frequently expressed willingness to meet Kim again since returning to office, looking to pick up where he left off in his first term.

But North Korea has rejected any role for South Korea in talks and insisted at the Party Congress that the peninsula is in a permanent state of separation.

“There is nothing left in our relationship with South Korea, except a cool-headed calculation and a strict response in line with our national interests,” Kim reportedly said.

Following Kim’s reported remarks, President Lee called for patience and said he would continue pursuing dialogue with Pyongyang for peaceful coexistence. 

Edited by David Choi

7. South Korea expands espionage law to cover all foreign states

​Summary:

South Korea’s National Assembly passed a Criminal Act revision that expands the espionage statute from acts benefiting an “enemy state” to acts benefiting any “foreign country” (and related entities). The change closes a long criticized gap where transfers of sensitive military or technology secrets to non north Korea targets were often charged under lesser offenses. Under the revised framework, leaking, transmitting, brokering, or assisting the disclosure of state secrets for a foreign government can draw multi year prison terms, with the intent to modernize counterintelligence for an era of broader great power espionage.

Comment: When will we see members of the CCP's United Front Work Department arrested?

World News Feb. 27, 2026 / 1:33 AM / Updated at 1:33 AM

South Korea expands espionage law to cover all foreign states

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/27/national-assembly-criminal-act-amendment-scope-of-espionage-law/1701772173675/

Kim Kyou-hyun (C), chief of the National Intelligence Service, alongside the agency's other senior officials, attends a parliamentary inspection of his agency by the intelligence committee of the National Assembly at the agency's headquarters in Seoul, South Korea. File. Photo by YONHAP / EPA

Feb. 26 (Asia Today) -- South Korea's National Assembly passed an amendment to the Criminal Act on Thursday, broadening the scope of the country's espionage law from "enemy states" to all "foreign countries," a move expected to reshape the role of the National Intelligence Service (NIS).

The revision to Article 98 establishes legal grounds to punish espionage activities conducted for any foreign government, not just North Korea. Under the amendment, individuals who detect, collect, leak, transmit or broker state secrets for foreign entities - or assist such acts - face at least three years in prison.

For more than seven decades since its enactment in 1953, the espionage statute applied only to acts benefiting North Korea. As a result, cases involving the alleged transfer of sensitive military or technological information to other countries were often prosecuted under lesser charges, drawing criticism that the legal framework was outdated amid rising global intelligence competition.

The expanded definition now allows espionage charges in cases involving allied or non-hostile nations, closing what officials and security experts described as a legal gap.

Related

• Jeong urges PPP to back Commercial Act revision
• Ruling, opposition parties brace for February showdown over key bills
• Jang urges court to resume President Lee trials

The change is drawing attention to the NIS, which transferred its counterespionage investigative authority to the police in 2024 as part of institutional reforms. Critics had argued that the agency's security role weakened following that shift.

With the amended law increasing the number of cases that could qualify as espionage, analysts say the NIS may regain prominence as a "gatekeeper," determining whether intelligence it gathers warrants formal police investigation. Unlike ordinary criminal cases focused on arrests, espionage investigations rely heavily on intelligence collection and verification.

At the same time, observers warn of possible friction between the NIS, which manages domestic and overseas intelligence networks, and the police, who retain investigative authority. The police in 2024 established a Security Analysis Division within their security investigation bureau to strengthen counterintelligence capabilities.

Bae Jeong-seok, a former NIS counterespionage bureau chief now at Sungkyunkwan University, said intelligence-led coordination will be critical.

"The essence of counterespionage lies in intelligence activities, which must be led by an intelligence agency," Bae said, adding that close cooperation between intelligence and investigative bodies will be increasingly important under the revised law.

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260226010008096

8. What we didn’t see at the Party Congress, from Kim Jong Un’s child to nuke power

​Summary:

north Korea’s Ninth Party Congress delivered the expected themes of continuity, but its real signal lay in what never appeared: no public succession grooming for Kim Jong Un’s daughter, no move to rename Kim as “president,” no clear timeline for reopening to broad foreign tourism, and no announced civilian nuclear power initiative despite outside speculation. The congress instead reaffirmed Kim’s general secretary role, deepened dynasty branding through rulebook and imagery, and kept the strategic focus on an “irreversible” nuclear weapons posture while maintaining hostile rhetoric toward South Korea and leaving formal constitutional moves to later institutions.

Comment: Pyongyang is choosing strategic ambiguity on succession to avoid factional politics and foreign targeting, while still consolidating inner-circle control through trusted family promotions. The regime is prioritizing internal stability and warfighting credibility over revenue plays like mass tourism or a “peaceful nuclear” façade that would invite sanctions scrutiny and verification pressure.

If continuity is the message, what risk does the regime believe a visible successor would create right now? If tourism and civilian nuclear power are withheld, what does that imply about the regime’s real timeline for economic opening versus military modernization?

Has any 5 year plan ever worked?

What we didn’t see at the Party Congress, from Kim Jong Un’s child to nuke power

Lack of announcements on succession, tourism opening and more underscored North Korea’s emphasis on continuity

Shreyas Reddy February 27, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/what-we-didnt-see-at-the-party-congress-from-kim-jong-uns-child-to-nuke-power/

Kim Jong Un (center), his daughter (left) and a nuclear power plant | Images: KCNA (Jan. 1 and Feb. 26, 2026) and Markus Distelrath via Pexels (Oct. 7th, 2019), edited by NK News

North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress came to a close on Wednesday, culminating in a series of foreign policy, economic and military announcements that largely met expectations. 

Yet for all the predictable outcomes centered on themes of continuity and consolidation, the congress was also notable for several widely anticipated developments that failed to materialize.

These range from a complete lack of new signals about the role of Kim Jong Un’s daughter in succession plans, to no announcements about naming Kim as president or reopening the country to foreign tourists.

NK News takes a look at some of the most talked-about scenarios that never came to pass, and explores what their absence says about the DPRK’s plans.

• READ MORE: Everything that happened at North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress

DESIGNATED SUCCESSOR

Ahead of the Ninth Congress, the subject of Kim Jong Un’s potential successor became a hot topic across the world.

Leading news outlets and influential social media accounts amplified South Korean intelligence’s claim that the leader’s daughter is on track to succeed him, and some even claimed Kim had already formally named her as his heir.

Some outlets went even further with unverified claims that the young girl, believed to be 13 years old, is already running North Korea’s missile program and locked in a bitter power struggle with her aunt Kim Yo Jong.

Ultimately, predictions that the daughter — believed to be named Ju Ae — would ascend to senior positions at the Ninth Congress as part of her leadership training did not materialize. She did not even attend any official events this week until a post-congress celebratory parade.

The young girl’s lack of official leadership posts should not come as a surprise, however, as she is still a few years short of the ruling party’s minimum membership age of 18 years. 

For now, it still appears Kim’s high-profile daughter, whose name has yet to be confirmed by state media, remains some years away from rising up the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) ranks and potentially being named North Korea’s next leader.

• READ MORE: Hype over Kim Jong Un naming his daughter as heir runs ahead of the facts

Kim Jong Un and his daughter watching the post-congress military parade together from the rostrum | Image: KCNA (Feb. 26, 2026)

While the North Korean leader did not designate his daughter as successor, he used the congress to reinforce the Kim dynasty’s grip on power in other ways by appointing his sister as a WPK department director.

Kim Yo Jong’s promotion has since revived speculation of her as a potential successor, but the move instead reflects the leader’s apparent push to consolidate power around himself by appointing close aides to senior positions as part of a broader generational shift in the party leadership.

Kim Yo Jong assisting Kim Jong Un at an inter-Korean summit in 2018 | Image: Joint Inter-Korean Summit Press Corps (Sept. 2018)

HELLO, MR. PRESIDENT

Another leadership-related prediction that didn’t pan out was that the party would confer the title of “president” on Kim, putting him on par with North Korea’s founding leader and “Eternal President” Kim Il Sung. 

Speculation about the current leader taking up a title reserved exclusively for his grandfather is not new, as media outlets previously misinterpreted a translation change to one of Kim’s many leadership positions as proof of a supposed ascension to the presidency in 2021.

Naming Kim president would appear to be a nominal change, but many North Korea watchers monitor these seemingly incremental developments for signs that Kim may seek to supplant his predecessors’ legacy and position himself as the DPRK’s foremost leader.

For now, however, he appears to be content with being reelected WPK general secretary, a title previously held by his father Kim Jong Il.

Senior Workers’ Party officials applaud Kim Jong Un’s reelection as general secretary. | Image: KCNA (Feb. 23, 2026)

While state propaganda has decreased its focus on former leaders in recent years, the congress showed that Kim will not erase their legacy just yet.

The current leader paid tribute to his predecessors at their mausoleum in Pyongyang on Thursday, and during the congress, he stressed the need to adhere to their leadership principles.

At the same time, Kim solidified his place alongside his grandfather and father by embedding his personal ideology in the WPK rulebook, while senior party officials again sported badges bearing Kim’s visage, similar to oft-used badges of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

North Korea’s current leader thus took one step closer toward a cult of personality rivaling those of his predecessors, but does not appear set to eclipse them completely just yet.

REOPENING BORDERS

Since 2020, North Korea has largely remained off-limits to external visitors other than Russians and the occasional diplomatic or business delegation, with the exception of a two-week reopening for tourists and the scaled-down Pyongyang International Marathon last year.

The Ninth Congress seemingly offered a ray of hope to those awaiting a reopening for foreign tourists, international organizations and NGOs, as a proposed five-year plan pledged to “develop tourism into a new industry which promotes the economic growth and civilization of the country.”

However, this does not necessarily mean welcoming foreigners back to the country, according to Rowan Beard, a tour manager at travel agency Young Pioneer Tours.

“Kim Jong Un’s remarks should primarily be read in the context of domestic tourism and internal economic development, rather than as a signal of any imminent reopening to international visitors — excluding the Russians,” he told NK News.

A North Korean man taking a photo of the Wonsan Kalma beach | Image: KCNA (July 16, 2025)

Beard added that Kim’s praise for recent projects such as the Wonsan Kalma seaside resort and the Onpho hot springs area suggests the emphasis is more on “stimulating domestic demand and catering to local visitors,” at least for now.

“As someone working on the front lines of tourism to North Korea, I would say that the prospects for an official reopening to foreign tourists — both Westerners and Chinese — in the coming months or even for the remainder of this year remain unlikely,” he said. 

CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Since North Korea and Russia pledged to cooperate on “peaceful nuclear energy” under their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement signed in 2024, the international community has harbored concerns that Pyongyang could unveil a civilian nuclear initiative.

The DPRK has been laying the groundwork for a civilian nuclear power program for decades, claiming it would be used for economic construction and improving people’s lives.

Kim Jong Un walking past rows of centrifuges at a uranium enrichment facility | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Sept. 13, 2024)

However, U.N. sanctions prohibit North Korea from pursuing nuclear development, even for purported civilian energy projects, over concerns that the regime could use the nuclear infrastructure for weapons development.

That said, North Korea and Russia are no strangers to international sanctions evasion, raising the possibility of Kim announcing a Moscow-backed civilian nuclear energy program at the Ninth Congress.

This did not occur, however, and Kim’s focus remained fixed on North Korea’s “irreversible” nuclear weapons program.

‘HOSTILE TWO STATES’

At the Ninth Congress, Kim reaffirmed his 2023 declaration that Pyongyang views the two Koreas as separate states, leaving no room for unification with the “most hostile entity” south of the border.

While the leader doubled down on his stance that South Koreans are no longer “fellow countrymen,” the congress report gave no indication that North Korea has formally changed its constitution to permanently divide the Korean Peninsula, as some predicted.

South Korean soldiers patrolling barbed wire fences along the inter-Korean border | Image: ROK Armed Forces (Nov. 22, 2012)

The formal change has seemed inevitable since Kim swore off any engagement with Seoul and purged all of Pyongyang’s South Korea-facing organizations, but North Korea has yet to report constitutional changes to cement it.

Rather than officially codifying a “hostile two-state” system, Kim focused on high-level policy rhetoric rejecting any possibility of inter-Korean engagement, irrespective of who’s in charge in Seoul.

As formal legislative changes are the purview of the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea’s rubber-stamp parliament, it remains possible that the regime may formalize the two-state system through a constitutional revision during an expected post-congress session.

Edited by Bryan Betts

9. North Korea holds post-congress military parade with no weapons procession

​Summary:

north Korea staged a post–Party Congress night parade in Pyongyang with more than 14,000 troops, flyovers, and a propaganda performance, but state media showed no follow-on weapons procession of missiles, tanks, or launchers. Kim Jong Un used the event to demand “absolute” loyalty and warn that any violation of sovereignty would trigger immediate, devastating retaliation, framing the parade as a tool to instill fear and signal readiness to win any battle through discipline and “overwhelming” capabilities. Formations included an “overseas operations” column carrying DPRK and Russian flags, highlighting deployments linked to the Ukraine war. Kim’s wife and daughter appeared prominently.

Comment: Some disappointed Korea watchers.

The choice to omit hardware suggests a messaging shift toward discipline, allied solidarity with Russia, and deterrent rhetoric, while concealing specific capabilities and preserving ambiguity after the congress.

North Korea holds post-congress military parade with no weapons procession

Kim Jong Un delivers speech warning enemies of ‘immediate’ retaliatory strikes if sovereignty violated

Colin Zwirko February 26, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/north-koreas-ninth-party-congress-ends-military-parade-held/

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il at a military parade in Pyongyang to celebrate the conclusion of the Ninth Party Congress | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Feb. 26, 2026)

North Korea held a military parade on Wednesday night featuring over 14,000 troops but no procession of nuclear missiles or other weapons, according to state media, following the conclusion of the Ninth Party Congress earlier in the day.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on Thursday that leader Kim Jong Un delivered a speech at the event warning enemies and stressing the importance of “absolute” loyalty and obedience among troops.

“Our military will immediately launch devastating retaliatory strikes against any military hostile act by any force that violates the sovereignty and security interests of our country,” he said.

He added that the parade is part of efforts to instill “fear” in enemy nations, and that the DPRK military firmly possesses a “will of annihilation that can preempt the enemy’s will to wage war.”

It has “overwhelming military and technical capabilities to win in any battle, and an iron military discipline through which the entire military moves as one.”

Kim also stated that broad achievements over the last five years “are still only the beginning compared to the welfare that our great state and our finest people deserve to enjoy,” suggesting the event should motivate the population to keep building the country’s socialist system.

Kim stood at the front of the rostrum at Kim Il Sung Square in central Pyongyang flanked by top military officials, including defense minister No Kwang Chol and Chief of Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Ri Yong Gil.

Block formations of troops march at the parade | Images: Rodong Sinmun (Feb. 26, 2026)

1

2

3

4

Kim Jong Un and his daughter watch the parade together from the rostrum. State media did not mention her directly, but state TV did zoom in on her during coverage of the event. | Image: KCNA (Feb. 26, 2026)

His young daughter, wife and other officials sat behind him, but his daughter also appeared at the front beside him at times.

Separate KCNA reports on the final day of the Party Congress offered more details on Kim’s current approach to relations with the U.S. and South Korea as well as weapons development plans.

Fifty block formations of troops goose stepped through Kim Il Sung Square after Kim’s speech at the parade, followed by aircraft flyovers and then a propaganda “performance.”

The groups included typical participants like each KPA corps, specialized army units and students from top military universities. 

It also featured “overseas operations unit columns and overseas engineering regiment columns,” with soldiers carrying DPRK and Russian flags to commemorate North Korea’s troop deployments for the war against Ukraine. Similar formations appeared at last October’s military parade.

Dozens of tanks, rocket and missile launchers typically drive through the square after the troop procession, but state media coverage of Wednesday night’s event indicated there was no such weapons shown.

NK Pro previously reported that soldiers began training for Wednesday’s parade in early November, just weeks after a much larger parade that featured a weapons procession.

The “overseas operations unit column” marches through the square with Russian and DPRK flags | Image: KCTV (Feb. 26, 2026)

1

2

Edited by Bryan Betts

Updated on Feb. 26 at 5:21 p.m. KST with additional details from state media

10. N. Korea's Kim visits family mausoleum with newly elected party officials after congress

​Summary:

north Korea’s Kim Jong Un visited the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun on Feb. 26 with newly elected Workers’ Party central leadership members, one day after the Ninth Party Congress ended. State media framed the visit as a loyalty ritual that binds the new leadership to the “fighting program” adopted at the congress and signals discipline and unity at the top. KCNA also reported that Kim posed for a group photo with congress participants at the April 25 House of Culture and urged them to act as a vanguard for national prosperity and people’s welfare. The state marked the congress with performances and receptions, while Kim reiterated conditional openness to U.S. dialogue and rejected South Korean outreach.

(LEAD) N. Korea's Kim visits family mausoleum with newly elected party officials after congress | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · February 27, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260227000551315?section=nk/nk

(ATTN: UPDATES with new photos)

SEOUL, Feb. 27 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has visited a mausoleum for his late grandfather and father with newly elected party officials after the country wrapped up a key party congress, state media reported Friday.

Kim visited the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun the previous day with newly elected members of the central leadership of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

North Korea concluded the weeklong ninth party congress Wednesday, the first since 2021, where it set new policy goals on diplomacy, defense, the economy and other areas for the next five years.

The KCNA said the members of the party central leadership "solemnly hardened their firm will to fulfill their heavy duty in the responsible journey for brilliantly carrying out the fighting program of the WPK."

North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un (C) and newly elected members of the central leadership of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea visit the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun on Feb. 26, 2026, after the country wrapped up its ninth party congress, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

In a separate dispatch, the KCNA said Kim held a photo session with participants in the party congress against the background of the April 25 House of Culture, the venue of the party event.

Kim expressed "belief and conviction that all the participants would play a vanguard role in the sacred struggle for the national prosperity and the well-being of the people to carry out the important policy-oriented tasks set forth by the party congress," according to the report.

While highlighting the results of the party congress, Kim appeared to be aiming to elicit the solidified unity of the new party central leadership and encourage party officials to achieve policy tasks unveiled at the country's biggest political event in five years.

North Korea, meanwhile, held an art performance and receptions to commemorate the party congress, attended by key senior party officials and delegates to the party event.

At the party congress, Kim left the door open to dialogue with the United States if Washington drops its hostile policy against Pyongyang but rejected South Korea's conciliatory gestures as "deceptive."

At a military parade held Wednesday night, the North's leader warned North Korea will carry out "terrible retaliatory attacks" against any force committing hostile military acts against the North.

North Korea holds an art performance at the Pyongyang Indoor Stadium on Feb. 26, 2026, to commemorate the ninth congress of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · February 27, 2026

11. South Korea, US Halve Freedom Shield Exercises

​Summary:

South Korea and the United States will run 22 live field training exercises during the March 9–19 Freedom Shield period, less than half of last year’s 51, with brigade level or higher events cut from 13 to six. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs and U.S. Forces Korea said the plan followed close alliance consultations. The reduction reflects Seoul’s preference to avoid provoking north Korea and to preserve conditions for dialogue, including an idea to distribute training across the year. Talks reportedly dragged because U.S. forces had already begun moving troops and equipment. Freedom Shield remains centered on computer-simulated command post drills, with about 18,000 troops participating overall. A related dispute over West Sea drills and command messaging was publicly denied by both sides.

Comment: The height of naivete. Kim Jong Un will not reduce tensions. He will just accept this feeble concession as another success for political warfare and blackmail diplomacy. And he is really pleased about the friction he is generating within the alliance.

I wonder if Kim's RGB operatives will be in the field counting them to verify the number FTXs for Kim. But we all know he doesn't care about the number. He only cares about the friction he can create.

We should remember one thing. Our exercises do not provoke north Korea. He only exploits them for political warfare purposes.

South Korea, US Halve Freedom Shield Exercises

Reduction reflects South Korea's effort to avoid provoking North Korea, with 22 field training exercises planned

By Kim Dong-ha

Published 2026.02.28. 00:52

https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/02/28/E46COQ54BNBTZDYXNIIH5JSICM/

South Korea and the US have decided to conduct 22 field training exercises (FTX) involving actual military personnel during the Freedom Shield, FS exercise period, which begins on March 9. This is less than half of last year’s figure, reflecting the government’s stance to avoid provoking North Korea, according to observations. The FS exercise is conducted every March to review the allied defense posture of the two countries in preparation for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.

A source from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) met with reporters on the 27th and said, “We plan to proceed with 22 field training exercises as scheduled during the FS exercise period.” A source from the US Forces Korea also said, “Consultations were conducted through close coordination between South Korea and the US.”

The 22 field training exercises to be conducted this time include six at the brigade level or higher, 10 at the battalion level, and six at the company level. During last March’s FS period, a total of 51 field training exercises were conducted. In the case of large-scale field training exercises at the brigade level or higher, the number decreased from 13 last year to six this year.

Earlier, the South Korean and US military authorities announced the FS exercise plan during a joint briefing on the 25th but did not disclose the scale and number of field training exercises as they failed to reach an agreement on the number of exercises. It is known that the South Korean government, which wants to create an atmosphere for dialogue with North Korea, proposed conducting field training exercises dispersed throughout the year. Accordingly, the South Korean side proposed further reducing the number of field training exercises during the FS period, but consultations were somewhat delayed as the US side, which had already begun moving troops and equipment, expressed reluctance. The result of this is the decision to conduct 22 field training exercises.

The FS exercise primarily consists of command post exercises (CPX) based on computer simulations, with field training exercises involving the deployment of actual troops and equipment conducted in parallel. This year, approximately 18,000 troops will participate, and the exercise will be held from March 9 to 19.

Meanwhile, a source from the US Forces Korea responded to this newspaper’s report that Commander of US Forces Korea Xavier Brunson’s criticism of the South Korean Ministry of National Defense regarding the West Sea aerial drill on the 24th was directed by the US Department of Defense (Ministry of Defense), saying, “It is completely untrue.” A source from the Ministry of National Defense said, “We are in close consultation on alliance issues between South Korea and the US at all times.”

12. S. Korea conditionally approves Google's overseas transfer of high-precision map data

​Summary:

South Korea conditionally approved Google’s request to transfer government-supplied 1:5,000 high-precision map data to overseas facilities, but only if it follows strict security rules. Conditions include masking sensitive sites, limiting exposure of precise coordinates, and processing raw data inside South Korea at a local partner’s data center, with only navigation-related outputs allowed to move abroad. Contour-line information and other sensitive elements are excluded from transfer. Google must also appoint a local responsible official to coordinate with the government and respond quickly to security incidents. The decision reverses Seoul’s earlier rejections in 2007 and 2016 and follows Google’s February 2025 filing and its pledge to blur or restrict sensitive location data.

Comment: Some good news. I can now upgrade from my 1:50,000 paper map to Google (note sarcasm)

(2nd LD) S. Korea conditionally approves Google's overseas transfer of high-precision map data | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Boram · February 27, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260227004752320?section=economy-finance/economy

(ATTN: ADDS more info in paras 4-8, 15-16, new photo)

SEOUL, Feb. 27 (Yonhap) -- The government on Friday decided to allow global tech giant Google to transfer government-supplied high-precision map data of South Korea to its overseas facilities, contingent on supplementary measures to address security concerns.

The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, which oversees national mapping policy, made the decision after holding a meeting with officials from foreign, defense and other related ministries.

"We approved the overseas transfer on condition that Google strictly comply with security guidelines," the ministry said, adding that the conditions include measures to mask sensitive facilities, restrict the exposure of precise coordinates and use local servers to process data.

Google's corporate logo at Google Korea's headquarters in Seoul (Yonhap)

Regarding data processing, in particular, the government called on Google to handle raw data at its Korean partner's data center located in the country while allowing only navigation service-related map data to be transferred overseas.

Sensitive data, including contour lines, are not subject to overseas transfer, the ministry added.

Google is also required to designate a local official responsible for communicating with the government to promptly respond to potential security incidents.

Google welcomed the government's decision, saying it will come up with concrete service implementation plans.

"We welcome today's decision and look forward to our ongoing collaboration with local officials to bring a fully functioning Google Maps to Korea," Cris Turner, vice president for government affairs and public policy at Google, said in a release.

This AFP file photo shows Google's corporate logo. (Yonhap)

The latest decision came after two previous rejections by the Seoul government in 2007 and 2016, citing security concerns.

The United States earlier cited restrictions on high-precision map data as a non-tariff trade barrier.

Google filed its latest request in February 2025, seeking approval for the transfer of 1:5,000-scale high-precision map data to its overseas data centers.

This time, Google expressed its willingness to accept South Korea's security requirements by removing coordinate data for the South Korean region from its maps and blurring the images of facilities deemed sensitive.

Google currently provides South Korean maps using publicly available 1:25,000-scale map data combined with aerial and satellite imagery.

The company has said government-supplied map data is essential to offering full-fledged mapping services, including vehicle navigation and driving directions, in South Korea, one of the world's most wired nations.

Under South Korean rules, companies are required to store detailed map data on servers located in the country.

Korean tech companies, such as Naver Corp. and Kakao Corp., provide more detailed navigation services than foreign providers.

This file photo taken July 7, 2025, shows a senior Google official speaking during the "Google for Korea" event in Seoul. (Yonhap)

brk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Boram · February 27, 2026

13. Editorial: Scaling Back Joint Drills While Pushing OPCON Transfer

​Summary:

A Chosun Ilbo editorial argues South Korea and the U.S. are cutting Freedom Shield field training to 22 events, about 40% of last year, at the same time Seoul is pushing early OPCON transfer. It says large-scale maneuver training is the core of combined readiness, and reducing it weakens deterrence and crisis performance. The piece warns this is occurring as U.S. strategy signals South Korea should carry more of the conventional defense burden, and as north Korea hardens its hostile stance and claims improved combat capability after Ukraine. The editorial concludes readiness must not be traded for political signaling or dialogue hopes.

Comment: First, the Lee government is prioritizing diplomatic “atmospherics” over measurable training proficiency, betting that restraint reduces friction with north Korea (again this is so naive). Second, the alliance is drifting toward a division of labor where U.S. forces weight China contingencies more heavily, which increases the downside of any South Korean readiness shortfall. Third, early OPCON transition, if pursued without expanded combined reps and validation, risks becoming a political milestone rather than an operationally credible transition.

Editorial: Scaling Back Joint Drills While Pushing OPCON Transfer

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2026.02.28. 00:00

Updated 2026.02.28. 02:14https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/02/28/C5ISMIEDIJCG5HPTBQXTKTNBGM/

Joint Chiefs of Staff Spokesperson Jang Do-young and USFK Spokesperson Ryan Donald hold a joint briefing on the Freedom Shield (FS) exercise plan at the Ministry of National Defense in Yongsan-gu, Seoul, on the afternoon of the 25th. /News1

South Korea and the U.S. have decided to reduce outdoor mobile training during next month’s “Freedom Shield (FS)” exercise to 40% of last year’s level. Under the Yoon Suk-yeol government last year, there were 51 outdoor mobile training sessions at the company level or higher, but this year only 22 will be conducted. Joint training between South Korea and the U.S. centers on mobile exercises, and this marks a significant reduction. The U.S. military reportedly advocated maintaining training at previous-year levels.

Training is as vital to the military as life itself. A military that reduces or neglects training cannot function properly in emergencies. The Trump administration’s New Defense Strategy (NDS), announced last month, explicitly stated, “South Korea must take primary responsibility for defending against North Korea’s conventional military threats.” This signals that U.S. forces in South Korea will focus on countering China rather than deterring North Korea. In such circumstances, the South Korean military must not reduce training.

Moreover, the Lee Jae Myung government is pushing to transfer wartime operational control (OPCON) during its term. Even officials in this administration would acknowledge that South Korea’s military capabilities are currently insufficient to assume OPCON. Commanding U.S. forces, which possess overwhelming capabilities compared to South Korea in emergencies, would require far more joint training than currently conducted. Yet the government has again scaled back joint exercises this year, following last year’s reductions—actions that contradict the goal of early OPCON transfer.

The government’s drastic reduction in training aims to avoid provoking North Korea for the sake of inter-Korean dialogue. However, Kim Jong-un has rejected conciliatory measures and expressed hostility. In his report at the 9th Party Congress, he stated, “We will permanently exclude South Korea, the most hostile entity, from the category of compatriots,” and added, “The possibility of South Korea’s complete collapse cannot be ruled out if it faces a nuclear attack.” He also labeled South Korea a “thoroughly hostile nation, a permanent enemy” and vowed to conduct various drills to master nuclear operations. North Korea’s combat capabilities are also assessed to have significantly improved through real combat experience in Ukraine.

Regardless of measures taken for inter-Korean dialogue, the government must ensure military readiness remains uncompromised by political considerations.

​14. Kim's dual-track strategy

​Summary:

Kim Jong Un’s Ninth Party Congress message pairs escalation with conditional outreach. He pledged to expand the nuclear stockpile and broaden deployment, framing nukes as the regime’s core security guarantee. He unveiled a five-year modernization agenda that emphasizes survivable second strike forces, including sea based nuclear capabilities, plus AI enabled unmanned systems, anti satellite tools, electronic warfare, and improved reconnaissance satellites. Toward South Korea he used stark “hostile state” language and hinted at punitive retaliation to coerce Seoul and strain the alliance. Toward the U.S. he offered talks only if Washington accepts north Korea’s nuclear status and drops “hostile policy,” seeking to reset negotiations and sideline Seoul, even as summit chatter involving POTUS grows.

ED Kim's dual-track strategy

Button Label

Listen

Text Size

Print

• Published Feb 26, 2026 2:03 pm KST

N. Korea expands nuclear ambitions, pressures Seoul, courts US

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/editorial/20260226/ed-kims-dual-track-strategy

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un presides over the first Political Bureau meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea at the party’s headquarters in Pyongyang, Wednesday, according to the Korean Central News Agency. Yonhap

At the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un delivered a message that was at once defiant and conditional — vowing to accelerate the expansion of his country’s nuclear arsenal while leaving the door ajar for renewed diplomacy with Washington.

According to the state-run Korean Central News Agency, Kim declared that North Korea would “redouble efforts to increase the number of nuclear weapons and expand the means and scope of their deployment.” He described the nation’s nuclear force as a “reliable guarantee” of its security and development, underscoring Pyongyang’s conviction that its strategic arsenal is the ultimate safeguard of the regime's survival.

Kim outlined an ambitious military modernization blueprint for the new five-year plan, including more advanced land- and submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile systems, artificial intelligence-enabled unmanned strike platforms, anti-satellite capabilities, powerful electronic warfare systems designed to paralyze enemy command structures and more sophisticated reconnaissance satellites. He placed particular emphasis on the nuclear armament of naval forces, highlighting efforts to strengthen second-strike capabilities and survivability.

On inter-Korean relations, Kim adopted a strikingly hostile tone. He branded South Korea as “the most hostile entity,” declared it permanently excluded from the category of compatriots and warned that any action deemed to undermine North Korea’s security could trigger retaliatory measures, even raising the specter of the South’s “complete collapse.” Such rhetoric suggests Pyongyang may be laying the groundwork for future provocations designed to pressure Seoul while sharpening divisions within its alliance with Washington.

Kim’s approach toward the United States was more calibrated. While reaffirming that North Korea’s nuclear status is “irreversible” and that it would maintain the “strongest possible” posture toward Washington, he added a conditional overture: If the United States recognizes North Korea’s constitutional status as a nuclear-armed state and withdraws its “hostile policy,” there would be “no reason” the two countries could not maintain good relations. The future of bilateral ties, he stressed, depends entirely on the U.S. attitude.

This dual-track strategy — nuclear expansion paired with conditional diplomacy — appears aimed at reshaping the negotiating framework itself. By insisting that denuclearization is off the table, Kim is seeking de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power and greater leverage in any future talks.

Diplomatic speculation has intensified accordingly. South Korea’s ambassador to the United States, Kang Kyung-hwa, recently suggested the possibility that Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump could meet again in Beijing, potentially in conjunction with a summit between Xi Jinping and Trump envisioned for April. Although no meeting has been confirmed, the prospect underscores the fluidity of high-level diplomacy.

Notably, Kim appears intent on bypassing Seoul in any renewed U.S.-North Korea engagement — a lesson arguably drawn from his experience with the previous South Korean administration under Moon Jae-in. During that period, inter-Korean rapprochement and summit diplomacy raised expectations but ultimately failed to deliver lasting security gains or sanctions relief for Pyongyang. Kim may believe that dealing directly with Washington while sidelining Seoul will maximize his leverage and minimize the constraints imposed by inter-Korean coordination.

Such a strategy, however, places a premium on alliance management. Before formalizing any prospective Trump-Kim summit, Washington must engage in close and substantive consultations with Seoul, ensuring that diplomacy rests on a solid foundation. A failure to do so could embolden Pyongyang’s efforts to drive a wedge between allies — a longstanding objective of North Korean strategy.

At the same time, stepped-up deterrence efforts are essential. As Pyongyang accelerates its nuclear and missile development and heightens rhetorical threats against the South, the United States and South Korea must reinforce combined defense readiness to counter potential provocations. Strengthened extended deterrence commitments, enhanced intelligence-sharing and visible joint preparedness can reduce the risk of miscalculation.

Ultimately, diplomacy and deterrence must proceed in tandem. A renewed summit, if it materializes, should not come at the expense of alliance cohesion or regional stability. By anchoring engagement in robust U.S.-South Korea coordination and maintaining credible deterrence against aggression, Washington and Seoul can better navigate Pyongyang’s evolving strategy — deterring conflict while preserving the possibility of meaningful progress toward lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com