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Quotes of the Day:

"The secret of joy in work is contained in one word - excellence. To know how to do something well is to enjoy it."

– Pearl Buck

"The philosophy of one century is the common sense of the next."

– Henry Ward Beecher

“There are lessons to be learned from history – but generally those lessons are only known to those who read books, not to those who ban them.”

– Brian Dunning

1. Second U.S. Aircraft Carrier Approaches Middle East as Nuclear Deal With Iran Remains Elusive

2. Exclusive | Altman Says OpenAI Is Working on Pentagon Deal Amid Anthropic Standoff

3. Exclusive | Government Agencies Raise Alarm About Use of Elon Musk’s Grok Chatbot

4. Paradigm Change in the 2025 National Security Strategy

5. SOF-ening the ICE: The Domestication of Special Warfare

6. The Connector Problem in Resistance Networks: Why Decentralization Fails in Practice

7. China This Week: Strategic Moves and Messaging

8. Is the Army about to shake up its Bradley replacement, XM30? Sources see major signs.

9. Senator puts hold on Trump’s pick for top uniformed cyber chief over lack of experience, 'vague' answers to surveillance questions

10. Ukraine is reshaping the armored battlefield. The US Army is trying to keep up.

11. What It Will Take to Change the Regime in Iran

12. China Is Winning by Waiting

13. Trump Officials Seek to Break Editorial ‘Firewall’ at U.S.-Funded News Agencies

14. Regime Change in Cuba Appeals to Trump but Carries Risks

15. iPhone is secure enough for classified NATO secrets right out of the box

16. The Pentagon’s battle with Anthropic is really a war over who controls AI

17. What the Defense Production Act Can and Can’t Do to Anthropic

18. Who's Setting the Rules for Military AI? Not Congress

19. Ex-Air Force pilot arrested for allegedly training Chinese military pilots without authorization

20. AI Is Being Misunderstood as a Breakthrough in Planning. It’s Not.

21. How the Army Should Run: Reforming Army Processes for Continuous Transformation

22. Army orders $186 million in Switchblade kamikaze drones, tank killers

23. SOCOM on the hunt for ‘acoustic rainbow’ tech for silencing drones

24. Philippines identifies US military plane that hit road barrier, injuring 5 crew members

25. Trump Will End Government Use of Anthropic’s AI Models

1. Second U.S. Aircraft Carrier Approaches Middle East as Nuclear Deal With Iran Remains Elusive

Summary:

The U.S. intensified preparations for a possible conflict with Iran after indirect nuclear and missile talks in Geneva ended without a breakthrough. The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford moved toward the Middle East, adding a second carrier presence, while the U.S. deployed F-22 fighters and aerial refueling tankers to Israel. U.S. embassies began drawing down nonessential staff and families, with additional evacuation steps in Israel and Lebanon. Other governments also took precautions. Secretary of State Marco Rubio plans to visit Israel as further U.S. Iran talks are expected in Vienna. The IAEA reported heightened concerns over Iran restricting inspector access and activity around Isfahan.

Second U.S. Aircraft Carrier Approaches Middle East as Nuclear Deal With Iran Remains Elusive

WSJ

U.S. F-22 fighters and aerial tankers are gathering in Israel, adding to the military buildup

By Robbie Gramer

, Laurence Norman

and Anat Peled

Updated Feb. 27, 2026 1:39 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/second-u-s-aircraft-carrier-approaches-middle-east-as-nuclear-deal-with-iran-remains-elusive-d369f748?mod=hp_lead_pos4

The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, as it left a port in Crete on Thursday. Costas Metaxakis/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The U.S. intensified military preparations for a possible war with Iran as the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford approached the Middle East on Friday, a day after talks between American and Iranian negotiators failed to achieve a breakthrough on Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs.

The Ford was sailing toward Israel, adding a second carrier to the armada of American naval and air power in the region. The U.S. has for the first time deployed high-end F-22 jet fighters to an air base in Israel for potential combat and moved aerial tankers to Israel’s main commercial airport near Tel Aviv.

The U.S., meanwhile, is withdrawing nonessential personnel and diplomats’ families from two of its embassies in the Middle East in preparation for possible retaliatory strikes by Tehran should war break out.

The U.S. ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, sent an email to embassy staff Friday telling them there was no need to panic but if they wanted to leave Israel, they “should do so TODAY,” according to a U.S. official. It follows orders for a partial evacuation of U.S. Embassy personnel in Lebanon on Feb. 23.

The timing of any military action against Iran remains unknown. Secretary of State Marco Rubio plans to visit Israel on Monday to brief Israeli leaders on the Iran talks.

Other countries are taking precautions in case of a war. The U.K. said on Friday it had temporarily withdrawn embassy staff from Iran because of the security situation. Canada and China advised their citizens to leave Iran immediately. Foreign embassies in Israel have made contingency plans for Iranian strikes, according to local diplomats. Australia instructed the dependents of diplomats in Israel and Lebanon to leave and offered voluntary evacuations for diplomats’ families in Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Earlier this month, WSJ’s Shelby Holliday explained the massive U.S. military presence in the Middle East. Illustration: Ryan Trefes

Senior Trump administration officials have said they are open to a diplomatic solution to avoid war with Tehran if it makes meaningful concessions to halt its nuclear program.

President Trump, who has threatened to take military action if a deal isn’t reached, said Friday that the U.S. and Iran weren’t close to an agreement.

“It would be wonderful if they’d negotiate really in good faith and good conscience but they are not getting there,” Trump told reporters at the White House. “We haven’t made a final decision.”

U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner led indirect negotiations with Iran in Geneva on Thursday that ended without any breakthroughs. The foreign minister of Oman, which has helped to mediate the Geneva talks, said the talks had made progress. The minister is due to visit Washington on Friday to meet with Vice President JD Vance, a U.S. official said.

Iranian and U.S. officials are supposed to meet in Vienna starting Monday for detailed discussions on possible sanctions relief for Tehran if there’s a deal—and on the precise steps Iran could take under a deal to limit its nuclear program.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said a fresh meeting with U.S. negotiators could follow later in the week. The White House didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

Vance said on Thursday that any U.S. military action wouldn’t lead to a drawn-out war. “The idea that we’re going to be in a Middle Eastern war for years with no end in sight—there is no chance that will happen,” he told the Washington Post in an interview.

Trump told reporters on Friday that, if he decides to strike, a prolonged conflict was “always a risk.”

The U.N.’s atomic agency on Friday expressed heightened concerns in its latest reports about Iran blocking its inspectors’ access to several sites connected to Iran’s nuclear activities.

The reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency, circulated to its member states and seen by The Wall Street Journal, come after U.S. officials have suggested Iran might be trying to reactivate its uranium-enrichment activities again, although they have provided no evidence of that.

Iran isn’t thought to be currently enriching. Satellite imagery suggests that Iran has been hardening entrances to its nuclear sites in case of attack. Iran’s main nuclear sites were heavily damaged in strikes by the U.S. and Israel during a short war last June.

The IAEA expressed particular concern about Iran’s activities around a tunnel complex at its Isfahan nuclear site, where the agency said near weapons-grade enriched uranium has been stored. Any effort to move the uranium could heighten the crisis, sparking fears that Tehran was seeking to hide it. The IAEA said it has asked Iran for an inventory of material now at the site.

The agency has said it thinks Iran’s fissile-material stockpiles remain at the sites that were hit by the U.S. and Israeli strikes last summer. The agency also expressed growing concern about a lack of information about and access to a different site in the Isfahan area where Iran previously said it planned to enrich uranium.

Robbie Gramer is a national security reporter at The Wall Street Journal in Washington. He previously worked at Politico, where he was a reporter and the lead author of the newsletter NatSec Daily. Robbie has reported from over two dozen countries across Europe, Asia, South America and the Middle East. He has reported from the halls of Congress, remote research stations in the Amazon rainforest and aboard Norwegian coast guard cutters high in the Arctic Circle. He was also the host of Foreign Policy magazine’s award-winning podcast, “After Hotel Rwanda,” about the kidnapping of a Rwandan human-rights activist and U.S.-led efforts to free him.

Before his career in journalism, Robbie was associate director of transatlantic security at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank. Robbie graduated from American University with a degree in international relations.

Laurence Norman is a reporter for The Wall Street Journal.

Anat Peled is a Tel Aviv-based reporter for The Wall Street Journal covering Israel and the Palestinian territories, with a focus on security, politics, and society.

She contributed to the Journal’s coverage of the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel and the war in Gaza, during which she spent days in morgues, flew with Israeli hostages to meet top officials in Doha and The Hague and interviewed injured Palestinian children at Gaza’s border. She has discussed her reporting on TV, including on "Amanpour & Company," which featured her investigation into Israel’s intelligence failure on Oct. 7.

Anat holds a master’s degree in modern European history from Oxford University, where she was a Rhodes Scholar, and a bachelor’s degree in history from Stanford University.

WSJ

2. Exclusive | Altman Says OpenAI Is Working on Pentagon Deal Amid Anthropic Standoff

Summary:

WSJ reports OpenAI CEO Sam Altman told staff the company is working with the Defense Department/War on a deal that could help resolve a stalemate between Anthropic and the Pentagon over battlefield AI use. OpenAI’s concept would permit its models to operate in classified environments while excluding uses it considers unacceptable, specifically domestic surveillance and autonomous offensive weapons. Altman said OpenAI supports Anthropic’s red lines in principle but argues the dispute is also about who controls consequential national security decisions, warning against precedents where private firms outweigh a democratically elected government. OpenAI proposes technical safeguards, cloud confinement, cleared researchers, and on-site partner personnel.

Comment: This appears to be an attempt to set the industry rulebook by offering the Pentagon a workable “yes, but” model, one that preserves credibility with civil-liberty limits while keeping Washington from forcing an “all lawful uses” standard.

If the core fight is control, not merely use, who should own enforcement authority for AI “red lines” in classified settings, the vendor through technical constraints, or the government through contract and law?

Exclusive | Altman Says OpenAI Is Working on Pentagon Deal Amid Anthropic Standoff

WSJ

Anthropic has spent weeks at odds with the Pentagon over the scope of how its Claude AI tools can be used

By Keach Hagey

Updated Feb. 27, 2026 9:58 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/openais-sam-altman-calls-for-de-escalation-in-anthropic-showdown-with-hegseth-03ecbac8?mod=hp_lead_pos1

OpenAI CEO Sam Altman Ruhani Kaur/Bloomberg News

OpenAI Chief Executive Sam Altman waded into the standoff between Anthropic and the Pentagon over the use of AI on the battlefield, telling his staff Thursday evening that the company was working on a deal that might help solve the impasse.

Altman in a memo to staff said that the company was working with the Defense Department to see if its models could be used in classified settings in a way that kept the same safety guardrails that have brought its rival Anthropic into a stalemate with the government. Altman said he hoped OpenAI could find a solution that could work for the rest of the industry.

No deal has been signed, and the talks could fall through, according to a person familiar with the matter.

OpenAI is pursuing a deal “that allows our models to be deployed in classified environments and that fits with our principles,” Altman wrote in a note to staff Thursday evening viewed by The Wall Street Journal. “We would ask for the contract to cover any use except those which are unlawful or unsuited to cloud deployments, such as domestic surveillance and autonomous offensive weapons.”

Altman said he hoped to help broker a peace between the two camps and avoid dangerous precedents for the industry.

“We would like to try to help de-escalate things,” he wrote.

Altman voiced his support for Anthropic’s position in principle, even as he acknowledged the government’s concerns about a private company having control over significant national-security issues.

“We have long believed that AI should not be used for mass surveillance or autonomous lethal weapons, and that humans should remain in the loop for high-stakes automated decisions. These are our main red lines,” he wrote.

“We believe this dispute isn’t about how AI will be used, but about control. We believe that a private US company cannot be more powerful than the democratically-elected US government, although companies can have lots of input and influence. Democracy is messy, but we are committed to it.”

OpenAI believes it can enforce its red lines practically by adding technical safeguards, like confining models to the cloud rather than so-called edge environments, which would create additional barriers to uses like autonomous weapons. It also hopes to ensure that researchers can obtain security clearances so they can help inform the government about the technology’s limitations and risks, the person said.

“We would also build technical safeguards and deploy personnel (FDEs) to partner with the government to ensure things are working correctly, and we would offer similar services to other allied nations,” Altman wrote. “If we are successful, perhaps this can be a path that can work for other AI labs, too.”

Earlier on Thursday evening, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei announced that the company had rejected the Defense Department’s demands that it make its technology available for “all lawful uses,” insisting that it be able to bar its use for mass domestic surveillance and autonomous weapons.

In a post on X, Emil Michael, the undersecretary of war for research and engineering, said that mass surveillance is already illegal under the Fourth Amendment and the department “won’t have any big tech company decide Americans’ civil liberties.”

News Corp, owner of The Wall Street Journal, has a content-licensing partnership with OpenAI.

Keach Hagey is a reporter at The Wall Street Journal covering the intersection of media, technology and power. Her reporting explores how institutions and individuals wield influence in the new information economy, with a current focus on artificial intelligence and OpenAI.

She is the author of "The Optimist: Sam Altman, OpenAI, and the Race to Invent the Future" (W. W. Norton, 2024) and "The King of Content: Sumner Redstone’s Battle for Viacom, CBS and Everlasting Control of His Media Empire" (Harper Business, 2018).

She was part of the team that broke the Facebook Files, a series that won a George Polk Award for Business Reporting, a Gerald Loeb Award for Beat Reporting and a Deadline Award for public service. Her investigation into the inner workings of Google’s advertising-technology business won recognition from the Society for Advancing Business Editing and Writing (Sabew).

Previously, she covered the television industry for the Journal, reporting on large media companies such as 21st Century Fox, Time Warner and Viacom. She led a team that won a Sabew award for its coverage of the power struggle inside Viacom.

Before joining the Journal, Keach covered media for Politico, the National in Abu Dhabi, CBS News and the Village Voice. She has a bachelor’s and a master’s in English literature from Stanford University. She lives in Irvington, N.Y.

WSJ

3. Exclusive | Government Agencies Raise Alarm About Use of Elon Musk’s Grok Chatbot

Summary:

WSJ reports multiple federal agencies warned about xAI’s Grok safety and reliability before the Pentagon approved it for use in classified settings. Officials at GSA and NSA raised concerns about security, susceptibility to manipulation, weak traceability of training data, limited red teaming, and risk of data poisoning. Grok was suspended for GSA staff use and kept off a federal testing sandbox despite pressure to feature xAI branding. The Pentagon’s move reflects politicized debates over AI vendors, with some senior officials viewing Anthropic as too safety-focused or “too woke,” while xAI accepted “all lawful uses” guidelines. A Pentagon responsible AI chief reportedly stepped down amid worries governance was being sidelined.

Comment: The government is trading assurance for speed, and the risk is not abstract: a model that is easier to manipulate is a soft entry point into classified workflows. The vendor fight is becoming a political warfare problem inside the bureaucracy, because labels like “too woke” and “free speech” are shaping procurement as much as performance and controls.

If classified adoption proceeds despite internal red flags, what mechanism forces accountability when safety governance loses the argument to urgency?

What will happen to those officials who are raising the alarm?

Exclusive | Government Agencies Raise Alarm About Use of Elon Musk’s Grok Chatbot

WSJ

Warnings about xAI’s safety and reliability preceded Pentagon decision to approve Grok for use in classified settings.

By Shalini Ramachandran

, Heather Somerville

and Amrith Ramkumar

Updated Feb. 27, 2026 11:34 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/elon-musk-xai-grok-security-safety-government-73ab4f6e?mod=hp_lead_pos2

Elon Musk’s absolutist stance on free speech, and the looser controls on Grok, have made it an attractive choice to the Pentagon. Jim Watson/AFP/Getty Images

Officials at multiple federal agencies have raised concerns about the safety and reliability of Elon Musk’s xAI artificial-intelligence tools in recent months, highlighting continuing disagreements within the U.S. government about which AI models to deploy, according to people familiar with the matter.

The warnings preceded the Pentagon’s decision this week to put xAI at the center of some of the nation’s most sensitive and secretive operations by agreeing to allow its chatbot Grok to be used in classified settings.

The Pentagon has given one of xAI’s rivals, Anthropic, a Friday deadline to agree to looser rules on its use by the U.S. military. Anthropic was the only developer approved for classified use before the deal between xAI and the military.

Throughout the government, agencies are racing to deploy AI for a host of purposes but the debate over which models to use has become increasingly political. Senior U.S. officials including at the White House view Anthropic’s outspoken stances on safety and ties to big Democratic donors as potentially making the company too “woke” to be a reliable provider, people familiar with the matter said. The looser controls on Grok, and Musk’s absolutist stance on free speech, have made it a more attractive choice to the Pentagon.

Other officials have questioned whether Grok’s looser controls present risks.

Ed Forst, the top official at the General Services Administration, a procurement arm of the federal government, in recent months sounded an alarm with White House officials about potential safety issues with Grok, people familiar with the matter said. Other GSA officials under him had also raised safety concerns about Grok, which they viewed as sycophantic and too susceptible to manipulation or corruption by faulty or biased data—creating a potential system risk.

At the time, in late December and early January, Grok was under fire for allowing sexualized editing of photos, including of children. Government officials saw the issue as representative of how Grok could be exploited by bad actors.

The matter reached Susie Wiles, the White House chief of staff, who called a senior xAI executive about the concerns, the people said. The executive told her that xAI was working on addressing the safety issues that made Grok over-compliant. Josh Gruenbaum, a senior GSA acquisitions official recruited through Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency, assured government officials that the government platform of Grok was separate from the public one. Wiles was satisfied, the people said.

The use of Anthropic’s Claude in the U.S. military’s operation to capture Venezuela’s former president intensified Anthropic’s dispute with the Pentagon. Federico Parra/AFP/Getty Images

Musk, who has said he is committed to preventing child exploitation, announced in January that the company would limit the image-generation and editing tools to paying customers. He and xAI didn’t respond to requests for comment.

In recent weeks, GSA officials were told to put xAI’s logo on a tool called USAi, which is essentially a sandbox for federal employees to experiment with different AI models. Grok hadn’t been made accessible through USAi largely due to safety concerns, and it remains off the platform, people familiar with the matter said.

The website shows xAI’s logo but only offers models from Anthropic, Google and Meta.

A team at the GSA studying AI has circulated a report to top agency officials that flags Grok’s safety problems, the people said. Grok has been suspended for use by GSA staffers for months. Demand from other agencies to use Grok has been anemic, people familiar with the matter said, except in a few cases where people wanted to use it to mimic a bad actor for defensive testing.

In a statement, Gruenbaum said the agency takes AI safety seriously. “We rigorously evaluate frontier AI models, including xAI, through a comprehensive internal review process. In this instance, we followed established procedures and maintain our determination to keep it on schedule,” he said.

Two weeks ago, Matthew Johnson, the Pentagon’s chief of responsible AI, stepped down in part over his concerns that safety and governance had become an afterthought amid the Defense Department’s intense push to expand AI capabilities, people familiar with the matter said.

Previously, Johnson’s team had circulated memos that had highlighted Grok’s safety issues and questioned whether it was aligned with government ethics and standards. Those notes had been sent up their chain of command at the Pentagon.

Reached for comment, Johnson pointed to a LinkedIn post announcing his departure where he said he was proud of his team of “true, quiet professionals, who had outsized impact and undersized recognition” in the DOD’s Responsible AI Division: “We were continually faced with impossible situations, but somehow always delivered through a combination of grit & repeated all-nighters.”

Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said in a statement that the department “is excited to have xAI, one of America’s national champion frontier AI companies onboard and looks forward to deploying Grok to its official AI platform GenAI.mil in the very near future.”

The National Security Agency, which oversees much of the country’s intelligence gathering and processing, conducted a classified review in November 2024 of large language models, including Grok. It determined Grok had particular security concerns that other models, including Anthropic’s Claude, didn’t, people familiar with the review said. Its conclusion served as a red flag that deterred some parts of the Pentagon from using Grok, the people said.

The use of Anthropic’s Claude in the U.S. military’s operation to capture former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro last month intensified its tense dispute with the Pentagon.

Anthropic’s usage guidelines prohibit Claude from being used to facilitate violence, develop weapons or conduct surveillance, and the company has refused to let the military use its models in all lawful scenarios. xAI has agreed to that language.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has given Anthropic until Friday to agree to the military’s request for more flexibility or he may bar the company from government work or take legal action to compel it to meet the demands.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Allison Robbert/AP

Many parts of the military have preferred Anthropic’s Claude for even unclassified work, people familiar with the work said.

xAI got a foothold in the Pentagon through a July contract from the AI office worth up to $200 million, which was also awarded to Google, OpenAI and Anthropic. Google and OpenAI have approval for use in unclassified settings but not classified activities.

OpenAI Chief Executive Sam Altman told staff Thursday that the company was working with the Defense Department to see if its models could be used in classified settings while maintaining the same safety guardrails Anthropic has, The Wall Street Journal reported. Employees at Google and OpenAI signed an online petition urging their companies to maintain the same red lines.

Until recently, the military has leaned on Claude over Grok because it is seen by many in the industry as a more reliable model, AI and security analysts said.

“I do not believe they are peers in performance right now across all of the capabilities that matter to a customer like the Department of War,” said Gregory Allen, a senior adviser focused on AI at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. He previously worked on the Defense Department’s AI strategy.

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During the Biden administration, the Chief Digital and AI Office, which is part of the Pentagon, declined to pursue any use of Grok, people familiar with the matter said. The concerns included that Grok made it difficult to track the data sources used to train the model, didn’t follow federal government standards for responsible AI, and had weak guardrails for safety. xAI didn’t sufficiently try to hack its own technology to identify and fix vulnerabilities, a process known in technology as red teaming, the people said.

People who have reviewed Grok in the government setting said that recent testing shows the chatbot is more susceptible than other models to “data poisoning,” in which manipulated, biased or inaccurate data corrupts the underlying data sets.

On the plus side, U.S. officials have determined Grok to be effective at imitating an adversarial actor, which is useful for example in war gaming, people familiar with the discussions said.

Last year, the Pentagon moved the Chief Digital and AI Office under the Research and Engineering Office, a move that was designed to accelerate AI adoption. Critics said the move stripped the office of much of its authority, particularly to enforce responsible AI standards, in favor of expediency.

Shalini Ramachandran is an investigative reporter at The Wall Street Journal. She has worked on investigations on a range of topics, including government accountability, environmental justice, corporate malfeasance, organized crime, workplace discrimination, worker safety and healthcare. She is interested in telling stories with broad impact in the public interest. She has deep experience handling confidential documents and working with whistleblowers.

Her investigation in 2023 revealing a large network of toxic lead cables left behind by phone companies triggered multiple federal-agency investigations and led to additional worker protections and some remediation. In 2025, she along with a team of reporters won the WERT Global Prize from Columbia University for stories on the toxic workplace culture at the World Economic Forum, a series that triggered investigations and the ouster of the founder. Her recent reporting has focused on the overprescription of psychotropic drugs in America.

Shalini was a key member of WSJ teams that: won a New York Press Club award and a Society of American Business Editors and Writers (Sabew) award for coverage of cable megamergers; were finalists for the 2019 and 2020 Gerald Loeb awards; and won the Newswomen's Club of New York's 2020 Nellie Bly award for an investigation uncovering failures that marred New York's response to the pandemic. Shalini helped conceive a newsroom project exploring the far-reaching ramifications of the Tulsa Race Massacre; it was a finalist for the 2022 Pulitzer Prize in Explanatory Journalism for "stories that vividly reconstructed the 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre and illuminated its enduring effects, describing how the destruction of Black wealth and property burdened future generations," according to the judges.

Prior to joining the investigations team in 2020, she covered corporate culture and the TV and broadband industry for more than seven years. Shalini went to Emory University in Atlanta and Oxford University in England and graduated with bachelor's and master's degrees in English. She joined the Journal as an intern in 2011.

Heather Somerville is a reporter at The Wall Street Journal in San Francisco covering technology and national security. Her articles explore the national-security implications of emerging technology, U.S. efforts to counter China's rise as a technology power, and the relationship between Silicon Valley and the U.S. defense complex.

Heather joined the Journal in 2019 to cover venture capital and technology companies. Before that, she wrote about venture capital and Silicon Valley startups for Reuters and the Mercury News. She was previously a reporter for the Fresno Bee and the Charlotte Observer and wrote about national security for outlets in Washington, D.C.

Amrith Ramkumar is a reporter for The Wall Street Journal in Washington covering tech and crypto policy. He previously covered clean energy and was a Journal markets reporter in New York who wrote about special-purpose acquisition companies, or SPACs, when SPAC mergers were a popular alternative to traditional initial public offerings. He also previously wrote about stocks and commodities, including battery metals such as lithium and cobalt.

Amrith joined the Journal as a markets intern after graduating from Duke in 2017.

WSJ

4. Paradigm Change in the 2025 National Security Strategy

Summary:

Dressler argues the 2025 NSS shifts U.S. strategy from military primacy to a whole-of-nation contest centered on protecting the homeland’s economy, territory, and way of life. China is framed as a mercantilist peer with supply-chain leverage, shown by rare earth and pharmaceutical choke points and POTUS’s reported Nvidia H200 chip export compromise tied to rare earth access. With deficit constraints prioritizing deterrence, Dressler urges civilian-led, economics-focused gray zone competition that builds alliances through reindustrialization and mutual benefit. He highlights IUU fishing as a focal friction point, using the Maritime SAFE Act and National Guard SPP to expand partnerships in the Asia-Indo-Pacific and Western Hemisphere while developing U.S. human and social capital via an expanded Guard.

Comment: China’s leverage is treated as a political warfare instrument that rides on trade and supply chains, so the proposed counter is to expose and exploit predation, especially at sea, where IUU fishing creates anger that can be organized into partnerships. The National Guard is cast as the bridging force between civilian capacity gaps and military jurisdiction limits, which implies a structural shift toward persistent, population-linked engagement as the enabling base for later stand-in forces.

Paradigm Change in the 2025 National Security Strategy

by Lawrence Dressler

02.27.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/27/paradigm-change/

U.S. Coast Guard Cmdr. Karl Mueller, right, Coast Guard advisor to South East Asia, speaks during an Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) exchange at Cam Ranh International Port, Vietnam, July 10, 2024. Coast Guardsmen and U.S. Navy Sailors, assigned to Coast Guard Legend-class cutter USCGC Waesche (WMSL 751), came together to discuss issues caused by IUUF with their Vietnamese partners, and how to counteract them. The Coast Guard has operated in the Indo-Pacific for more than 150 years, and the service is increasing efforts through targeted patrols with our national security cutters, fast response cutters and other activities in support of Coast Guard missions to enhance our partnership. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Elijah Murphy)

The essay “The Missing War: Why the 2025 NSS Needs a Political Warfare Strategy to Defeat the CRInK in the Gray Zone” by Col. David Maxwell advocates for a more explicit political strategy to confront China as was done in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. But China presents an economic challenge as our peer that the Soviet Union never did. Our economies and supply chains are interdependent, and China has weaponized rare earth and pharmaceutical choke points for negotiating leverage. As shown by President Trump’s recent compromise to allow the export of Nvidia H200 AI chips in exchange for China loosening restrictions on rare earth elements our economies are still too interdependent to fully duplicate the confrontation with the Soviets. The challenge now is to align our gray zone activities with the economic focus of the new National Security Strategy (NSS) to strengthen the homeland, both territorially and economically, increase support from our allies, and shift the focus to maritime domains and great-power competition in the Indo-Pacific and Western Hemisphere.

International Nemesis: China’s Mercantilist Challenge

The new NSS notes that prior to the first Trump administration American elites placed “hugely misguided and destructive bets on globalism and so-called ‘free trade’ that hollowed out the very middle class and industrial base on which American economic and military preeminence depend.” The 2017 NSS under the first Trump administration repudiated that delusion and identified the return of great power competition as our challenge going forward. The 2025 NSS under the second Trump administration changes the paradigm from a military centric competition to a broader contest “to protect this country, its people, its territory, its economy, and its way of life.” The NSS focuses on the elements of economic strength as “the bedrock of the American way of life, which promises and delivers widespread and broad-based prosperity, creates upward mobility, and rewards hard work. Our economy is also the bedrock of our global position and the necessary foundation of our military.” and the 2025 NSS provides “a roadmap to ensure that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history, and the home of freedom on earth.”

Winning Grey Zone Competition

With funding constraints imposed by government deficits and China challenging American militarily, defense funding will appropriately prioritize deterrence and limit resources available for gray zone conflict with China. The opportunity lies in a non-military approach, leveraging the NSS economic pillars of alliances and reindustrialization that provide material benefits to support the legitimacy of our alliances. China’s strength advantage in bilateral conflicts is best countered by leveraging her greatest weaknesses, the friction generated from her predatory economic actions and resulting geopolitical isolation. Opposing Chinese coercion needs to follow the NSS, with a civilian led, economics focused counter, not military. Our asymmetrical advantage is in the shared values of democracy, transparency, and the rule of law, which provide economic opportunity through a nation’s development of their own resources and in turn provides the legitimacy in the eyes of the host population that is the basis of our relationship. The recent agreement with Palau highlights the potential economic agreements have to benefit recipients, strengthen our partnerships, and block China. As noted by South Pacific expert Cleo Paskal, “if this’ block and build’ model of cooperation is replicated by the United States, we may see a new way of operating that has a chance of blocking some of the most corrosive aspects of Chinese illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive activities, while building real resilience.”

Common Ground Against China

Success in the grey zone conflict with China is best attained by focusing on areas of Chinese predation and leveraging the resulting friction. China subsidizes the world’s largest fishing fleet which is involved in activities defined as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and is tailor made for making allies with countries whose resources are abused by China. The Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement (SAFE) Act provides a whole-of-government approach to counter IUU fishing and related threats to maritime security through a broad civilian Interagency Working Group to expand our partnerships in priority regions that match the NSS Western Hemisphere and Indo Pacific focus. Leveraging that friction and winning the competition with China in the grey zone is a competition for allies, making the Army’s population centric capabilities and the National Guard outreach to allied nations through the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) paramount. The SPP conducts military-to-military engagements in support of defense security goals but also leverages whole-of-society relationships and capabilities to facilitate broader interagency and corollary engagements spanning military, government, economic and social spheres” and its expansion via the Maritime Safe Act will provide the foreign engagement needed. In the long run geopolitics will align with economic power with the non-aligned Global South and even allies swayed by economic self-interest. The State based structure of the National Guard provides the commercial link the NSS needs. Governors, Chambers of Commerce, educators, and employers provide the connections to meet the NSS economic mandate. Our support for economic freedom and democracy is the prerequisite for shared prosperity and the political legitimacy to underpin the alliances that America needs to best China.

Army National Guard: Personnel for the Grey Zone

To be successful American reindustrialization needs to fill a structural demand for 4-6 million jobs expected to be generated this decade but faces a shortfall of almost half in available trained candidates. There is bipartisan support for training and apprenticeship programs, especially when targeted toward lower income and disadvantaged students, but our education and apprenticeship programs are unable to reach the large pool of underemployed and unemployed needed to fill the gap. The impact of the deterioration of family and civil society is not amenable to funding solutions, and the resulting poverty of capacity and agency can only be addressed by changing the individual’s environment. An expansion of the National Guard to increase focus on building individual capacity through training and experience will provide the personnel capable of foreign outreach and the active-duty military highly trained applicants needed for successful deployment of stand-in forces thereafter. Lower-cost Army National Guard structure can partner with the Community College system and employers to train personnel with the skills needed for individual success, whether civilian or military, to address the shortage of skilled labor in the private sector. Most importantly, the National Guard is the only structure that can provide the social capital that is a prerequisite for the human capital that too many American’s lack and connect them to their community and employment to fulfill the NSS promise. The expansion of the National Guard with personnel utilized under the auspices of the MSA and SPP will bridge the gap of the civilian agencies lack of broad cohesion and mission capacity in implementing whole of government statecraft and the military’s lack of jurisdiction and institutional inability to transition beyond kinetic warfare.

Conclusion

Col. Maxwell’s argument for a stronger political warfare strategy is not wrong, but he is early. The omission of a named adversary and the imperative of supporting reindustrialization is a feature and not a bug of the NSS, and the new guidance on Irregular Warfare supports a broader program for this reason. The National Guard is uniquely positioned to combine the economic relationships providing legitimacy with the creation of the social and human capital needed to meet the NSS promise to the American people that “we want the restoration and reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health, without which long-term security is impossible. We want an America that cherishes its past glories and its heroes, and that looks forward to a new golden age. We want a people who are proud, happy, and optimistic that they will leave their country to the next generation better than they found it. We want a gainfully employed citizenry—with no one sitting on the sidelines—who take satisfaction from knowing that their work is essential to the prosperity of our nation and to the well-being of individuals and families.” Actions for now must be couched in the language of economics and mutual benefit until reshoring minimizes our supply chain exposure, but as described above will also provide a broader structure to implement Col. Maxwell’s call for more aggressive coordination and action in the future.

Tags: 2025 National Security Strategy, Army National Guard, China, Col. David Maxwell, CRInK, Economic Statecraft, Global South, Great Power Competition, Grey Zone Competition, Human Capital Development, INDO-PACIFIC, irregular warfare, IUU Fishing, Maritime SAFE Act, Mercantilism, political warfare, rare earth elements, Reindustrialization, Social Capital, SPP, State Partnership Program, Supply Chain Security, Trump Administration Policy, Western Hemisphere

About The Author

Lawrence Dressler
Larry Dressler is a Commercial Banking Officer in Hawaii looking to address the limitations in the academic and trade training pipeline to better support his Work-Based Learning project.

4. SOF-ening the ICE: The Domestication of Special Warfare

Summary:

Federal immigration agents are adopting SOF aesthetics, tactics, and “warrior” ideology without true SOF-level selection, training, or mission requirements, using elite visual signals as compensatory legitimacy for an insecure, rapidly expanded, and poorly prepared force. This mimetic militarization – material, operational, and cultural – erodes the police – military boundary, bypasses the spirit of Posse Comitatus, and risks creating an executive‑controlled paramilitary tool for domestic political enforcement. Empirically, such posturing does not improve officer safety, correlates with higher violence, civil unrest, and declining public trust, and threatens civil‑military relations, recruitment, and national defense unless Congress and DOD/W impose strict oversight, identification, and equipment controls.

SOF-ening the ICE: The Domestication of Special Warfare

by Grant Tocsin

02.27.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/27/sof-ening-the-ice/

Editor’s Note:

Small Wars Journal generally does not allow authors to publish anonymously or under a pseudonym. If an author is an authentic voice and can demonstrate to the editors that they have reason to fear retribution for publishing their opinions, then we have a process for granting rare exceptions. This article and the author have met that standard. We encourage a robust discourse on this issue and all issues of national and international security.

Abstract

Federal immigration agents have increasingly adopted Special Operations Forces (SOF) aesthetics and tactics, despite minimal operational justification. This article argues that this mimicry is a symptom of an ailing organization and that it dangerously accelerates police militarization in the United States. The militarization represents a cultural appropriation of the “warrior” persona, rather than “law enforcement”. The ultimate peril is that the boundary between police and the military is blurring, resulting in a violation in the spirit of Posse Comitatus. The consequences of this phenomenon are the increase of violence, as the nation tragically witnessed through the shootings in Minnesota; an erosion of civil-military relations and public trust; and the risk of an executive paramilitary unit. Our nation’s leaders must act now to restrict the Department of Homeland Security before the damage to national security or defense is too great.

Introduction: The Domestication of Special Warfare

Since early 2025, images of masked, heavily armed, and camouflaged Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents apprehending people across the United States have flooded social media and news outlets. This phenomenon has triggered a fierce political divide, which reached a tragic tipping point in January 2026, as just weeks apart from each other, federal immigration agents fatally shot two U.S. citizens, Renee Good and Alex Pretti.

As a Special Forces service member, I argue that the situation in Minnesota is an inevitable byproduct of federal agents adopting Special Operations Forces (SOF) aesthetics and tactics, not out of mission necessity, but rather organizational mimicry. By co-opting the image and techniques of SOF, the agency is attempting to project a deterrent signal domestically, citing it is for the sake of officer safety. Despite that, the tactic accelerates violence and police militarization in the United States because the federal agency is beginning to culturally identify itself as the military, a policy instrument. Ultimately, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is bypassing the spirit of the Posse Comitatus Act and creating a paramilitary force accountable only to executive policy rather than the rule of law. Paradoxically, this phenomenon decreases national security and defense.

Counterfeiting Competence

Camouflage and superior tactical equipment are functional requirements to maximize lethality and success during high-risk special operations missions, such as counterterrorism. During a raid, for instance, suppressors reduce visual and audible signatures and enable communication in a firefight. Plate carriers allow Special Operations Forces to carry enough equipment and ammunition for sustained combat operations where logistics support is strained, such as those found in Ukraine, rather than Minnesota. The reason is simple, when our service members go out the door, they face certain conflict.

In comparison, the immigration agency does conduct some high-risk operations that warrant the use of camouflage or tactical equipment, such as Operation Matador in 2017, which led to the arrest of various MS-13 gang members. However, unlike special operations, the ubiquity of tactical gear is disproportionate to the risk level that ICE activities typically entail. Statistics show that between April and June 2025, a mere six percent of arrests involved criminals with violent offenses. The data remained consistent throughout the year; of note, between October and November 2025, violent offenders accounted for only five percent of arrests. This evidence suggests that the exhibition of military paraphernalia is not an operational requirement. Suppressors provide no utility while arresting unarmed personnel in a three-bedroom house.

The distinction of SOF extends beyond the functionality of equipment. The Green Beret, for example, is a visual representation of the rigorous selection and difficult training each Green Beret has undergone. It is a receipt, paid for over two years through endless miles of rucking, countless hours of battle drill rehearsals, and weeks of survival training. The training was a relentless cycle of refinement—day after day and week after week—until we reached the proficiency necessary to conduct high-risk missions on behalf of the nation. This notion is codified as a Special Operations Force Truth: “Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced”. Qualified, trustworthy, and capable personnel must be refined in the forges of realistic training.

In sharp contrast, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) exhibits neither specialized selection nor significant training investment. For instance, in an effort to keep up with operational demands the agency has relaxed its barriers to entry, completely removing the age restriction. Even more concerning, the agency has adjusted its training program from its traditional 13-week training window to 47 days. This emphasis on quantity over quality has resulted in the induction of over 12,000 officers in just four months. Such a “high-throughput” model is antithetical to the SOF Truth, suggests dilution of standards, and results in a substandard force that is inadequately prepared for hazardous duties.

For SOF, the gear and equipment are a byproduct of the mission and the training. For the immigration agency, it’s a costume. They are faking the signal of differentiation and operational mastery through distinct uniforms and equipment without paying the associated costs in training and preparation. This reliance on aesthetics amounts to visual “cheap talk,” which is a sign of an organization in crisis, grasping for legitimacy.

Organizational Mimicry

Why would a federal law enforcement agency mimic a special operations organization? Sociologists suggest the answer lies in a phenomenon called mimetic isomorphism, or organizational mimicry. According to this theory, when an institution questions its own authority or can’t identify a clear path to success, it will mimic organizations that it views as “legitimate”. In this case, the immigration agency is borrowing the image of SOF, because it signals competence and credibility. As strategist Colin S. Gray notes, “special operations forces embody and express the qualitative excellence of the individual soldier that ensures across-the-board respect from any opponent.” The literal image of special forces communicates unrivaled competence and is intended to instill fear in potential foreign adversaries. ICE is attempting to hijack this precise message, “fear me”, and weaponize it against the domestic audience. The agency’s emulation of elite units is a cry for legitimacy.

ICE’s insecurity likely stems from a troubled workforce in flux. By lowering entry standards to meet aggressive force-generation targets—and failing to require prior law enforcement experience—the agency is flooding the field with an under-experienced and ill-trained cohort. Lacking the foundational maturity of traditional policing, these officers use the aesthetics of special operations as a compensatory mechanism. Moreover, there are reports that career immigration officers are in the throes of morale problems. These agents feel that they are no longer protecting the nation from dangerous criminals, are confronted by fellow citizens about their actions, and are stigmatized. The data concurs, as a majority of Americans don’t approve of the agency’s tactics. In which case, these agents mirror special forces to provide sanctuary and suppress criticism.

But what’s the harm? As my mother would say, “imitation is the sincerest form of flattery”. The problem is that law enforcement mimicking special operations effectively domesticates special warfare, which is extremely concerning, considering ongoing undercurrents of police militarization in America.

The Rise of Militarism: A Culture Change

Police militarization is not a novel premise, but it also goes beyond equipping police forces with assault rifles. The concept is more easily understood by viewing militarization across four distinct spectrums: material, organizational, operational, and cultural. For decades, police militarization has been visible through material, organizational, and operational indicators, such as the transfer of defense material through the 1033 program, and the creation and employment of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. But recent events, such as Operation Metro Surge, have exacerbated this trend.

While the physical representation of SOF represents a militarization in the material spectrum, it has expanded beyond that. There are also indicators that the DHS agents have undergone operational militarization as well, as noted in unique military tactic employments. For example, some news outlets report that the agency is using biometrics, location-based data, and even AI targeting software, domestically. If true, this development shares similarities with the AI & software tactics that an elite Israeli intelligence unit is employing for targeting in its current operations. Moreover, the Department of Homeland Security recently conducted a nighttime raid, complete with fast rope rappel on a building roof from a helicopter, in Illinois. This quintessential special operations insertion technique is usually used by units to quickly insert into a combat area too small for a helicopter to land, not an American suburb.

Through this incremental militarization of both material and operations, the real danger is that it ultimately accelerates within the cultural spectrum. For instance, by donning the visual distinction of SOF and employing their techniques, agents are now deliberately forgoing their traditional identity as “law enforcers” and adopting the “warrior” persona. In fact, the immigration agency’s recruitment ads are deliberately targeting individuals through the “warrior” ideology. This phenomenon represents a true adoption of militarism—a mindset that holds violence as the most effective method to resolve problems.

Now some law enforcement officials justify this posture and argue that militarization is an aid to officer safety through capability or deterrence. For example, officers are better able to respond to active shooters, and criminals will think twice before acting. However, the evidence proves otherwise:

First, data indicates there is no correlation between militarization and officer safety or crime deterrence. In fact, despite militarization efforts, the immigration agency recently claimed a 1000% rise in assaults on officers, indicating the opposite intended effect.

Second, the posture mimics an “escalate to de-escalate” tactic, which is criticized for increasing the risk of violence through mistrust. This exact phenomenon, perhaps exacerbated with reduced training standards, contributed to the fatal shootings of Renee Good and Alex Pretti. The situation escalated immediately to “lethal force” (when viewed through the lens of the force continuum) because the officers identified Renee and Alex as legitimate threats rather than citizens worthy of de-escalation techniques.

Third, research suggests a negative correlation between police militarization techniques and public support. This notion is corroborated by the sharp increase in demonstrations across the United States. Last year saw a 77% increase in demonstrations from 2024, and opposition to the immigration agency is cited as a main contributor.

The evidence is clear: by dressing for combat, agents are turning routine arrests into hostile confrontations. Mimicry is actively contributing to civil unrest and at times, violence.

Ultimately, the agency is beginning to self-identify as a military organization. As scholars warn, the peril of police militarization is the erosion of the boundaries between civil law enforcement and the armed forces, to the point where the military mindset of “close with and destroy the enemy” becomes misapplied to the American people, as we have tragically already seen in Minnesota.

The Cost of Domestic Special Warfare

While the immigration agency continues to adopt the image of elite military units, the rest of the nation pays the bill. The costs of this organizational mimicry extend far beyond the immediate risks of tactical escalation and have longer-lasting implications.

First, it undermines credibility and security. The use of face coverings and lack of identification sets a worrisome precedent because it removes the accountability of agents during arrests. This practice undermines the legitimacy of the American government, and even a former ICE Director believes that face masks are ruining the credibility of the organization. More seriously, the lack of identification also creates significant security vulnerabilities that criminals can exploit, by posing as officers. In fact, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recently requested ICE agents to begin identifying themselves during arrests, citing five criminal incidents in which perpetrators posed as federal agents to commit violent acts. When legitimate officers are not distinguishable, they inadvertently put the public at risk.

Second, it degrades civil-military relations. When law enforcement appears as the military, the average American cannot easily discern the difference. Citizens will see the visual signature of camouflage and associate unpopular actions as part of the military. This confusion could tarnish the military’s reputation as an apolitical entity. Moreover, research indicates a correlation between public trust in police and public trust in the military. This correlation is particularly significant given that, according to a recent poll, 60% of Americans view the immigration agency unfavorably. An erosion of public support to the military could translate into practical issues, such as lower military recruitment and retention rates; in turn, this could ultimately compromise the defense readiness of the nation.

Third, it creates civil unrest. In addition to the data stated above, counterinsurgency experiences in special operations have taught us that overt military presence can signal ‘occupation’ and that “the more force that is used, the less effective it can be”. This visual language results in unintended consequences; rather than encourage compliance, it alienates the populace and increases “anti-government” activities. If federal agents appear as military occupiers, they will be viewed as foreign, untrustworthy, and authoritarian; subsequently, this will reduce community cooperation, decrease policing efforts, and disrupt national stability. Moreover, American adversaries could exploit this dissent in psychological operations and further weaken civil trust in the nation.

Fourth, and potentially most disastrous, it violates the spirit of Posse Comitatus, the Act that provides a vital barrier that prevents the use of the U.S. military against its own citizens. This prohibition is important in a Clausewitzian sense because the military exists as a vector by which the state applies its monopoly on violence, e.g. war, to achieve political goals. Simply put, the Act protects the citizenry from being controlled through violence. When federal agents adopt special forces equipment and techniques, they begin to see themselves as the military and effectively bypass this Act. In turn, this repurposes the police from a civil entity that upholds the law into a political arm that enforces policy. By violating this Act, members of the Department of Homeland Security become a paramilitary for any sitting administration.

Conclusion

The adoption of special operations forces equipment and tactics by federal immigration agents is not an operational necessity—the evidence highlights that agents are adopting elite aesthetics to intimidate the citizenry, not to enhance mission effectiveness. In doing so, they instigate violence rather than prevent it, provoke resistance, and corrode the legitimacy that they seek.

We must reverse this course before it is too late. By militarizing federal agents and not providing oversight, we have created the catastrophic precedent that any elected leader can employ federal agents as a private military force domestically. It’s antithetical to the American identity, and it doesn’t stop there.

Legal scholar Ozan Varol warns in Stealth Authoritarianism that regimes conceal repressive measures under a legal mask to impose them without detection. Is Title 8 enforcement just the flavor of the week? Or is it more than that? As Varol states, “In the modern era, authoritarian wolves rarely appear as wolves. They are now clad, at least in part, in sheep’s clothing.”

But the agents aren’t just wearing sheep’s clothing; they are wearing ours. The SOF aesthetic provides cultural legitimacy from years of the Global War on Terror to weaponize against its citizenry. This is the domestication of counterinsurgency, a national version of “The Surge”. If the nation continues to view its citizenry through a rifle optic, the social contract will dissolve. The public becomes the enemy.

Twenty years of the Global War on Terror taught us that heavy-handed military presence alienates the population and fuels resistance. The difference this time is that it affects national security and national defense. When citizens cannot distinguish between the police and the military, both institutions lose legitimacy. Recruitment suffers. Readiness declines. Adversaries sow unrest and they gain an advantage.

To mitigate this, United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs must exercise its power to provide oversight on immigration agents. The fatal shooting of Renee Good and Alex Pretti should be enough to begin civil inquiries into the state of the agency and its operations. Next, the Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security must enforce fiscal discipline on the Department of Homeland Security, requiring that tactical equipment procurement be restricted to units with validated tactical requirements. Moreover, the Department of Homeland Security agents should adhere to and enforce the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s warning regarding the need for clear identification during arrests and regulate their agents’ uniforms. Finally, and potentially most importantly, the Department of Defense should commission its own targeted study to determine whether the extreme federal agent tactics are negatively affecting public trust in the armed forces and, subsequently, recruitment levels. If the data confirms a negative correlation, then the national strategy could be at risk. In such a case, the Department of Defense must confront Congress with the hard truth: Police militarization is a threat to national security and defense.

Tags: Department of Homeland Security, DHS, Domestic Military Operations, ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Law Enforcement, Militarization, Police Militarization, Posse Comitatus, Posse Comitatus Act, SOF, Special Operations Forces

About The Author

Grant Tocsin
Grant Tocsin (pseudonym) serves as an officer in the U.S. Army Special Forces and is currently a graduate student. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

5. The Connector Problem in Resistance Networks: Why Decentralization Fails in Practice

Summary:

Sedlák argues decentralized resistance networks often fail because connector roles, not combat cells, become unavoidable single points of failure. Functions like movement, logistics, finance, safe house management, communications, and external liaison concentrate dependencies, accumulate visibility, and saturate capacity under modern counter-network pressure. F3EAD-style cycles and pattern analysis compress exploitation timelines, enabling cascading compromise that outpaces network adaptation. The article details how couriers, safe house managers, and logistics coordinators become high-centrality “structural bridges” whose capture can unravel compartments. Mitigations like redundancy, rotation, and segmentation reduce some risks but create tradeoffs in detectability, coordination burden, latency, and operational effectiveness. The core claim is structural, not a tradecraft deficit.

Comment: The piece implies many resistance plans still teach “cellular” as a talisman, but modern counter-network operators do not need to crack the cells, they hunt the bridges, then they ride the cascade faster than leaders can think. External support can be a trap: liaison functions raise centrality even more, so aid that creates dependency without protection may speed collapse at the moment the network becomes most capable.

If connector loss is inevitable and structural, how should partner force development be designed from the start so a resistance can still operate, in degraded form, after connectors are systematically identified and removed?

The Connector Problem in Resistance Networks: Why Decentralization Fails in Practice

by Miro Sedlák

02.27.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/27/the-connector-problem/

Abstract

Decentralized resistance networks often fail due to vulnerabilities in connector roles rather than the compromise of combat cells. Movement, logistics, finance, safe house management, communications, and external liaison functions create unavoidable concentration points that accumulate visibility, saturate capacity, and enable cascading compromise under modern counter-network operations. This structural vulnerability has decisive implications for resistance preparation and partner force development.

Decentralized cellular organization remains the dominant design pattern for resistance networks operating under hostile surveillance regimes. The logic is straightforward: distributed combat cells operating with minimal interconnection reduce compromise risk by limiting what captured members can reveal. This approach draws legitimacy from historical resistance movements and remains embedded in resistance training curricula worldwide.

The design assumption is incomplete. Combat cells represent only one functional layer of resistance operations. Between tactical cells and strategic direction exists a suite of connector roles (couriers, logistics coordinators, safe house managers, communications technicians, financial intermediaries, and external liaisons) whose structural position makes them single points of failure regardless of cellular compartmentation.

These roles concentrate network dependencies in ways that decentralization cannot resolve. Modern counter-network operations, including but not limited to F3EAD-style targeting cycles (a rapid methodology that finds targets, strikes them, then immediately exploits intelligence from the strike to identify the next target), dramatically compress the interval between exploitation and follow-on action, often outpacing network adaptation cycles. Pattern analysis identifies connector signatures faster than networks can adapt.

In practice, resistance networks frequently collapse not through combat cell penetration, but through the sequential compromise of individuals occupying structurally critical positions.

This article examines why connector roles constitute a design problem rather than an operational variable, identifies characteristic failure modes, and extracts planning implications for resistance architects and partner force developers.

The analysis does not provide tactical guidance for counter-network operations, nor does it prescribe specific techniques. It simply examines recurring structural patterns observable across historical and contemporary cases to inform higher-level design considerations.

Connector Roles as a Design Problem

Connector roles exist because resistance networks require functions that cannot be distributed into isolated cells. A network that conducts operations across geographic space needs movement coordination. A network that employs weapons needs logistics chains. A network that coordinates timing needs communications infrastructure. These requirements generate functional positions whose network centrality—measured by betweenness in the graph-theoretic sense—remains high regardless of how thoroughly combat cells are compartmented.

Courier networks illustrate the dilemma. Compartmented cells cannot communicate directly without compromising cellular boundaries. Messages must transit through intermediaries who, by definition, maintain contact with multiple cells. Each message routed through a courier increases that individual’s exposure to surveillance and interrogation risk.

The courier’s knowledge of routes, schedules, and contact protocols makes them what network analysts term a structural bridge, a node whose removal partitions the graph. French Resistance courier networks repeatedly demonstrated this vulnerability, in which courier compromise frequently led to the unraveling of entire regional networks despite careful cellular compartmentation elsewhere.

Safe house management presents similar structural constraints. Combat cells require secure locations for meetings, storage, and temporary shelter. Safe house managers necessarily know locations, access protocols, and usage patterns across multiple cells. Geographic constraints limit the number of viable locations, particularly in urban environments with high surveillance density.

Each additional cell using a safe house network multiplies exposure without adding redundancy. The manager becomes a knowledge repository whose capture yields actionable intelligence on multiple network elements simultaneously.

Logistics roles concentrate dependency through resource bottlenecks. Weapons, explosives, communications equipment, medical supplies, and forged documents flow through limited procurement and distribution channels. Logistics coordinators who manage these flows develop comprehensive network knowledge as a byproduct of their function.

Unlike combat operators who know only their immediate cell, logistics personnel must understand demand patterns, distribution routes, and storage locations across the network. This operational knowledge makes them high-value targets for counter-network operations that prioritize degrading network sustainment over direct combat engagement.

This tradeoff persists in practice: distributing courier functions across more individuals can reduce individual exposure, but it also increases coordination complexity and message latency. Fragmenting logistics chains improves compartmentation but degrades efficiency and increases visibility through multiplied transactions. This tension persists between operational effectiveness and security, with connector roles sitting at the convergence point.

Common Failure Modes

Connector roles tend to fail through four overlapping mechanisms that compound rather than substitute for each other.

Accumulated visibility emerges from repeated exposure to surveillance. Unlike combat cell members who minimize public presence between operations, connectors generate pattern signatures through necessary movement and interaction. A courier making routine circuits develops predictable routes and schedules. A safe house manager exhibits residential anomalies (frequent short-term visitors, unusual supply deliveries, inconsistent cover employment). Logistics coordinators leave procurement trails and transportation patterns.

Each interaction adds a data point. Modern counter-network operations exploit these signatures through systematic pattern-of-life analysis, identifying structurally central actors faster than networks can adapt. The connector’s function requires consistency, but consistency enables identification, a dynamic that is well-documented in the literature on countering threat networks.

Task saturation occurs when connector roles exceed sustainable operational tempo. A courier network designed for limited message traffic between a few cells becomes overloaded as the network expands or operational pace increases. Individuals compensate by working longer hours, taking shortcuts in security procedures, or accepting higher risk thresholds. Historical analysis of resistance networks shows that operational expansion often preceded network collapse, not because combat operations failed, but because support infrastructure exceeded carrying capacity. Fatigue degrades tradecraft. Overload creates backlogs that force visible improvisation. Both generate compromise opportunities.

Authority bottlenecks develop when network knowledge becomes personalized rather than systematized. Effective connectors build extensive tacit knowledge: who can be trusted, which routes remain secure, what supplies are available, and when external support might arrive.

This knowledge cannot be easily transferred because it exists primarily in the connector’s judgment rather than in documented procedures. When a key connector is compromised, killed, or simply exhausted, the network loses not just a position but an irreplaceable repository of operational knowledge. Replacement personnel lack context and make errors. Network segments become isolated, waiting for coordination that no longer exists.

Cascading compromise represents the terminal failure mode. In practice, the capture of a courier can reveal multiple cells, safe houses, and logistics contacts. Follow-on operations against those revealed nodes often occur before the network can react. Each newly compromised node yields additional targets in an accelerating cycle.

The F3EAD methodology deliberately exploits this dynamic by compressing the interval between exploitation and next-target prosecution to prevent network adaptation. The connector’s structural centrality means its compromise opens multiple avenues of exploitation simultaneously. Networks designed around cellular compartmentation discover that compartments themselves were connected through dependencies they had not adequately mapped.

These failure modes interact. Accumulated visibility makes an initial compromise more likely. Task saturation reduces the connector’s ability to maintain security protocols. Authority bottlenecks prevent effective damage control once compromise begins. Cascading effects rapidly overwhelm response capacity. The confluence of these mechanisms explains why networks can appear operationally successful until experiencing a sudden catastrophic collapse.

Design Implications

The connector problem has implications that extend beyond tactical security measures into fundamental design choices. Resistance planners typically approach connector vulnerabilities as security problems soluble through better tradecraft: more careful route selection, improved communications discipline, and enhanced vetting procedures.

These measures matter, but they do not address the structural issue. A network that requires connectors will generate high-centrality nodes regardless of how carefully those individuals operate. The planning question is not how to eliminate connector vulnerability but how to design networks that remain functional when connectors are lost.

Redundancy provides partial mitigation but creates new problems. Duplicating courier networks, multiplying safe houses, or establishing parallel logistics chains reduces single-point failure risk but increases the network’s visible surface area and coordination burden.

Each additional connector creates another potential compromise vector. The network becomes more resilient to individual losses but more detectable overall. This represents a design tradeoff rather than a solution, requiring deliberate choice about which vulnerabilities to accept.

Role rotation offers theoretical appeal, but practical constraints limit its effectiveness. Frequent rotation of connectors prevents the accumulation of personalized authority and distributes risk across more individuals. Implementation requires either training many personnel for specialized roles—expanding the security perimeter—or accepting performance degradation as new personnel learn complex functions. Neither option eliminates the structural centrality of the role itself. Rotation may slow failure cascades, but does not prevent them.

Functional segmentation can reduce but not eliminate connector concentration. Separating courier, logistics, and safe house networks creates independence that limits cascading compromise. A captured courier cannot reveal logistics chains they do not know.

The trade-off is reduced operational effectiveness through decreased coordination and increased latency. Networks that cannot rapidly concentrate capabilities struggle to exploit fleeting opportunities or respond to emerging threats. Segmentation makes the network more survivable but less capable.

The most significant implication concerns network maturation timelines. New resistance networks can operate with minimal connector infrastructure because their operational scope remains limited. Early success drives expansion. Expansion necessitates more sophisticated connector networks to coordinate across larger areas and more complex operations. Sophistication concentrates knowledge and creates identifiable patterns. The network becomes effective precisely when it becomes most vulnerable.

Counter-network operations that deliberately allow early network development while preparing exploitation capabilities are designed to target networks at their point of maximum commitment and minimum adaptability, a dynamic extensively discussed in the literature on countering threat networks.

External support creates additional connector dependencies. Networks reliant on foreign assistance require liaison functions that connect internal operations to external supply chains and coordination mechanisms. These liaison roles exhibit even higher structural centrality than internal connectors because they bridge the network boundary. Their compromise provides hostile forces with insights into both internal network structure and external support architecture. Support relationships that create dependency without providing effective protection accelerate network vulnerability rather than reducing it.

Conclusion

The cellular model of resistance organization addresses one vulnerability (combat cell compromise) while creating another in the connector roles that enable network function. This is not a problem of inadequate security practices or insufficient training. It is a structural consequence of attempting to coordinate distributed operations under hostile surveillance.

Modern counter-network operations systematically understand and exploit this dynamic. The methodology is to identify connectors through pattern analysis, target them for exploitation, and prosecute follow-on operations faster than networks can adapt. Success requires neither penetrating combat cells nor breaking communications encryption. It requires identifying and removing the nodes that enable network coordination.

For resistance planners and partner force developers, this imposes difficult choices. Designing networks to minimize connector concentration reduces operational effectiveness. Accepting a connector concentration increases vulnerability to catastrophic failure. There is no obvious resolution because the tension is inherent in the problem.

The implication is that cellular thinking alone is insufficient for resistance preparation. Effective planning must explicitly address how networks will function when connectors are systematically targeted and sequentially removed. This requires designing for degraded operations from the outset rather than treating connector loss as an exception condition. It requires understanding that network decentralization creates coordination dependencies that become targeting opportunities.

Most fundamentally, it requires recognizing that the organizational structures that make networks effective are also the same structures that make them vulnerable. That relationship is not accidental but inherent to how resistance networks attempt to balance coordination and security. Resistance networks that ignore this dynamic tend to discover it only through operational failure.

Tags: Combat Cells, Connector Roles, Counter-network operations, resistance operations

About The Author

Miro Sedlák
Miro Sedlák is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Security and Defense at the Armed Forces Academy of General M.R. Štefánik in Slovakia. His research focuses on democratic resilience, civil–military relations, asymmetric conflict, and hybrid threats.

7. China This Week: Strategic Moves and Messaging

Summary:

Erika Lafrennie argues China used a “holiday-cycle calibration” week early in the 15th Five-Year Plan to tighten internal incentives while framing external rules, with signals described as procedural, not escalatory. Beijing launched a Party-wide “correct view of political achievement” campaign tied to study, inspection, rectification, and institutional revision, aimed at county and division leaders to formalize performance criteria and strengthen vertical control. Externally, China paired Europe-facing economic messaging during German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Beijing visit with Wang Yi’s UN Human Rights Council framing on sovereignty, non-interference, and development. Domestically, the State Council highlighted “silver economy” activation, fraud crackdowns, and supply-chain stability.

China This Week: Strategic Moves and Messaging

February 20 – February 26, 2026

Erika Lafrennie

Feb 27, 2026

https://www.xinanigans.com/p/china-weekly-2026-2-27?r=7i07&utm

A standing weekly operational intelligence brief tracking China’s governance-based competition.

Bottom Line: This was a holiday-cycle calibration week. During the opening stretch of the 15th FYP, Beijing paired internal incentive tightening with external rule framing. The signals were procedural rather than escalatory. Governance consolidation is visible before acceleration.

1. Party Launches Cadre-Wide “Correct View of Political Achievement” Campaign

The General Office of the Central Committee announced a Party-wide study and education campaign focused on establishing and practicing a “correct view of political achievement.” The effort targets county/division-level leading bodies and especially “top leaders,” and integrates study, inspection, rectification, and institutional revision. The campaign is explicitly tied to 15th FYP implementation, central inspection rectification, ecological oversight correction, and anti-formalism enforcement.

Why it matters:

This is incentive engineering at the cadre layer ahead of full 15th FYP execution. Political achievement criteria are being formalized, audited, and linked to long-term performance rather than short-term optics. The emphasis on abolishing or revising institutional provisions that do not align with the “correct” achievement view indicates system-wide recalibration of what counts as success.

Implications for US National Security:

Increased Vertical Coherence: Provincial and local experimentation space may narrow as performance metrics tighten.
Reduced Policy Volatility: Cadres are being signaled to prioritize durable, inspectable outcomes over headline-driven initiatives.
Inspection Infrastructure as Control: “Study–inspection–rectification–institution building” cycles institutionalize performance monitoring beyond anti-corruption campaigns.
FYP Alignment Discipline: Implementation slippage during early 15th FYP stages is being preemptively constrained.

2. Europe Governance Theater: De-Risking, Sovereignty, and Multilateral Rule Framing

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz visited Beijing amid ongoing European “de-risking” debates. Chinese narratives emphasized strategic partnership, supply-chain stability, opposition to “over-securitization” of trade, and reaffirmation of multilateralism and UN centrality. The joint language acknowledged German concerns about trade imbalances and export controls, while also reflecting Chinese objections to economic-security framing.

In parallel, Wang Yi addressed the UN Human Rights Council, advancing sovereign equality, non-interference as a “golden rule,” elevation of the right to development, and opposition to double standards under the banner of global human rights governance. These bilateral and multilateral engagements unfolded in parallel, reinforcing Beijing’s effort to shape Europe-facing governance constraints across both economic and institutional channels. Similar sovereignty and economic-security framing has appeared across recent UN, Geneva security, and EU-facing dialogues, suggesting continuity rather than a one-off message.

Why it matters:

Bilateral economic stabilization and multilateral norm-setting are operating in tandem. Europe remains a key arena where economic exposure and governance framing intersect. Beijing’s messaging positions economic interdependence as stabilizing and security framing as destabilizing, while embedding sovereignty language inside global institutional settings.

Implications for US National Security:

Sovereignty Language as Economic-Security Firewall: Sovereignty and trade language are being positioned to narrow the policy space for coordinated economic-security measures.
Trade–Security Boundary Management: China is actively contesting where economic policy ends and national security policy begins.
UN Platform Utilization: Sovereign equality and non-interference are being codified as normative shields in multilateral settings.
De-Risking Friction Points: European trade imbalance concerns coexist with industrial interdependence, producing structural tension rather than rupture.

3. State Council Implementation Signals: Silver Economy and FYP Activation

The State Council Executive Meeting emphasized silver-economy development, fraud crackdowns in elderly services, and regulatory adjustments aligned with 15th FYP rollout. Additional attention was directed toward supply-chain stability, consumption activation, and targeted economic risk management.

Why it matters:

Demographics are being integrated directly into early FYP economic activation strategy. Silver-economy build-out also creates potential bondable project space for local governments, linking demographic policy to the financing architecture that underpins FYP execution. The silver economy is positioned both as demand stimulus and as regulatory governance domain. Simultaneous fraud enforcement reflects administrative tightening around emerging growth sectors.

Implications for US National Security:

Demographic Adaptation Strategy: Aging population pressures are being addressed through sector activation rather than retrenchment.
Regulatory Preemption: New growth areas are being paired with early compliance enforcement.
Consumption Rebalancing Efforts: Internal demand stimulation remains central to economic stabilization.
Administrative Tempo Reset: Implementation layers are moving as holiday-cycle governance resumes.

Irregular Warfare Spotlight

No separate Irregular Warfare Spotlight this week. The signals above reflect calibration rather than distinct gray-zone maneuvering.

Chinese Vulnerabilities & US Counter-Opportunities

This week’s signals reflect consolidation rather than expansion.

Incentive tightening increases vertical coherence and narrows local adaptability under stress. Europe-facing governance framing seeks to stabilize economic ties while contesting security narratives, but structural trade imbalances and de-risking pressures remain unresolved. Demographic activation strategies depend on sustained regulatory trust and consumption confidence.

Maintenance weeks matter. They reveal the scaffolding that supports acceleration phases.

Know someone who should be tracking this? Please share.

8. Is the Army about to shake up its Bradley replacement, XM30? Sources see major signs.

Summary:

Army leaders approved moving the XM30 Bradley replacement toward Milestone B last June, but the decision was paused when Army Chief Gen. Randy George and Secretary Dan Driscoll declined to sign the final document, keeping open the option for a major rework. A new Request for Information seeking rapid delivery of tracked combat vehicles in the 40 to 80 ton range is viewed by sources as a backdoor way to pressure current competitors American Rheinmetall and GDLS, and to explore alternative or off the shelf options without disrupting prototype work. Eight prototypes are expected starting in July, but cost, schedule pressure, and broader ground vehicle cancellations are driving scrutiny.

Comment: It has been a long time but I still remember going through Bradley transition at Graf/Vilseck/Hohenfels in 1983. We have come a long way. And it looks like Bradley has proven itself in Ukraine.

Is the Army about to shake up its Bradley replacement, XM30? Sources see major signs. - Breaking Defense

breakingdefense.com · Ashley Roque · February 27, 2026

Sources told Breaking Defense a new RFI may be a backdoor effort to speed up, or potentially revamp entirely, the Bradley replacement competition.

By Ashley Roque and Carley Welch on February 27, 2026 11:25 am

https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/is-the-army-about-to-shake-up-the-xm30-bradley-replacement-sources-see-major-signs/

WASHINGTON — Last June, Army officials gathered behind closed doors to decide if their most recent attempt at replacing the Bradley Fighting Vehicle was ready to move into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase, known as Milestone B. The officials agreed and greenlit moving the program forward.

That is, until Army Chief Gen. Randy George and Secretary Dan Driscoll halted it, opting not to sign a document finalizing the decision, Breaking Defense has learned. The reason: a conscious decision to leave the door open to a major reworking of the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle program. And there are now signs the Army is starting to look into alternatives.

“The Army is not going to rubber-stamp a process that has consistently failed to deliver the capabilities our warfighters need at the speed of relevance or locks us into a specific design that decreases flexibility,” Army spokesperson Maj. Pete Nguyen told Breaking Defense today when asked about the decision not to sign off on the Milestone B approval. “Gen. George is fully aligned with [Defense] Secretary [Pete] Hegseth’s vision: we must break the cycle of slow, bureaucratic acquisition.

“We are actively assessing multiple, competing designs for the XM30 to foster a truly competitive environment,” Nguyen added. “We continue to look for partners who can deliver cutting-edge solutions now, not decades from now. This is a deliberate and necessary step to ensure we assess and select the best approach to deliver a world class vehicle today and into the future.”

The Milestone B pause, combined with a recent solicitation, is raising eyebrows among watchers of the XM30 about whether the Army is already considering its other options — potentially setting up a seventh go at replacing the Bradley, an effort that first began in the 1980s.

While the Request for Information (RFI) does not specifically mention the XM30 or the Bradley, three sources with knowledge of the program — two former defense officials and one current industry representative — told Breaking Defense on background that the solicitation may be a backdoor effort to speed up, or potentially revamp entirely, the competition.

The thinking, the sources agreed, is that the RFI is a way to look at other options for the program, including non-traditional and commercial vendors, while keeping current competitors American Rheinmetall and General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) on contract and moving forward with prototyping efforts.

John Ferrari, a retired Army Maj. Gen., told Breaking Defense that the RFI “likely” points to revamping the XM30. But even if it doesn’t lead down that path, he said, it should help put pressure on the two contractors to speed up the program.

“This RFI is showing the Army is very serious,” Ferrari, now with the American Enterprise Institute, said in an interview. “It’s laying the stakes to say that ‘if you’re not delivering fast enough, we may turn to nontraditional vendors.”’

Further, a former defense official said the Army has been weighing its options on how to proceed with the XM30 program for some time, and believes the RFI is a chance to find out about its options for the program without disrupting ongoing work.

“It is clearly aimed at we want to consider some alternatives for XM30 but we don’t want to spook the herd — meaning Rhemnetall and GD or congressional supporters — by saying, ‘Well, we’re trying to consider an alternative,” a former defense official said. “It sounds like the Army is revisiting what it might want under this [XM30] program and how that decision will affect schedule.”

Take Seven?

Starting in the 1980s, the Army has struggled to replace the venerable Bradley, with XM30 representing the sixth attempt. The effort started with the Armored Systems Modernization, then went into the early 2000s with the Future Combat System, then the Future Fighting Vehicle that never escaped the lab, followed by the Ground Combat Vehicle and eventually the ill-fated first Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) competition.

Then after revamping the OMFV program and hosting a new competition, the service first picked five teams to produce concept designs for the program in November 2022 before whittling the field down to Rheinmetall and GDLS in June 2023 and renaming it the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle.

The two companies were tasked with focusing on detailed design activities to mature their vehicle blueprint under Phase 3, before heading into Phase 4 where they build and test prototypes. A second Army spokesperson told Breaking Defense that the plan is for American Rheinmetall and GDLS to deliver eight prototype vehicles, which the service “anticipates” will start rolling out in July. Then the vehicles will undergo testing and be used in the service’s Transformation in Contact exercises.

Given that history, the Army community has been carefully watching for any signs that XM30 is in trouble or facing yet another reboot.

“At this point XM30 has made it further than any of its five predecessors,” the first ex-defense official said. “You have full up, system-level prototypes about to be delivered, but the Army can grab defeat from the jaws of victory.”

The RFI caught the attention of those looking for issues around the program.

The document asks industry for “innovative solutions for the rapid design, production, and delivery of ground combat vehicles.” It homes in on tracked vehicles with a weight at 40 to 80 tons and calls for speedy timeline with the possibility of acquiring 10 prototypes later this year with “continuous production” of up to 2,500 vehicles per year.

That rules out a replacement for the M2A2 Bradley, which, while a tracked combat vehicle, comes in at 33 tons, below the weight class listed in the RFI. The XM30, in comparison, scales towards 55 tons, squarely in the middle of the weight range. Sources did acknowledge that the RFI could have implications on other programs like the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, but all stated they still believed the XM30 is the target here, given the drama around the Milestone B decision.

Given that XM30 is nearing the prototype delivery stage, it may seem odd that the Army would be looking for alternatives this late in the game. But both former defense officials pointed to “pressures” on the program.

That first former defense official explained that the per unit price tag for XM30 has been a concern for service officials for some time, as the Army simultaneously looks at fielding the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA), long-rage fires platforms, new air defense weapons and a new network.

“There’s a lot of pressure on the Army’s overall budget,” the first former defense official said. “It’s not the development cost to the program. It’s the procurement cost when you go into production,” they added, noting that the RFI could be used to examine different cost cutting options.

In addition, recent cancellations to ground vehicle programs like the Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) and M10 Booker, and a push backed by Pentagon leadership to look at the commercial automotive sector, has put extra heat on the XM30.

Added the second former defense official, “The program is under significant pressure to accelerate. But to accelerate it, you have to have a critical, credible path for delivering faster than you would have.”

Possible Interests In The Commercial Sector

Army leaders have been eyeing just how new tech start-ups and the commercial automotive sector can help across the service’s portfolio. However, both former defense officials said they were skeptical that commercial vehicle companies would be interested in producing the limited number of combat vehicles under a program like the XM30 or meeting military requirements for things like armor or an enclosed powertrain.

“They have to be confident that the volume of production is sufficient to meet their commercial processes and tooling. …There may not be sufficient volume for those commercial companies to close their business case,” the second former defense official explained.

Placing the commercial sector aside, both former defense officials and the industry source said the RFI will also provide the Army with a window to taking a closer look at existing infantry vehicles.

The first former defense official pointed to four possible “concrete” options — South Korea’s AS21 Redback by Hanwha Aerospace, the CV90 infantry fighting vehicle designed by Swedish subsidiary BAE Systems Hägglunds, Poland’s Borsuk that is produced by Huta Stalowa Wola and Germany’s Lynx by Rheinmetall.

In the developmental category, all four sources also pointed to BAE’s push to outfit the Army’s AMPV with a new turret as a possible option too, though they noted it is not in production and would likely require more testing.

“If you went to buy off-the-shelf, which theoretically we could have done years ago, the requirements were such … that you have to compete and it’s still going to take you at least a year,” the first former defense official added.

“So the fastest way to capability at this point is you’re already getting prototypes delivered, and you’re going to test them … and then you make a decision to go into production,” they added.

The other outstanding question is whether the Army would look to shift its acquisition model for the XM30.

The industry official floated the options as extending the Middle Tier Acquisition pathway, transitioning to a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)-based contract or revamping everything and hosting a new competition where vendors each deliver 10 prototypes.

breakingdefense.com · Ashley Roque · February 27, 2026

9. Senator puts hold on Trump’s pick for top uniformed cyber chief over lack of experience, 'vague' answers to surveillance questions

Summary:

Sen. Ron Wyden said he will block POTUS’s nominee, Lt. Gen. Joshua Rudd, for the dual-hat post as NSA director and U.S. Cyber Command commander. Wyden argues Rudd lacks the cyber background needed for immediate readiness and criticized his testimony as offering only vague assurances about following the law, especially on NSA surveillance authorities inside the United States. Wyden’s hold would force a formal Senate vote rather than unanimous consent. Rudd, a special operations veteran and current deputy commander at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that cyber is tightly linked to elite operations and that he has integrated NSA and Cyber Command capabilities in past roles.

Comment: This is a fight over legitimacy as much as qualification: the senator is signaling that cyber command is now inseparable from domestic trust, and vague answers on surveillance are a strategic vulnerability.

If cyber leadership requires both operational integration and constitutional literacy, what standard of demonstrated expertise should the Senate demand before consent for a nominee's stewardship over NSA authorities?

Senator puts hold on Trump’s pick for top uniformed cyber chief over lack of experience, 'vague' answers to surveillance questions

defensescoop.com · dlawrence · February 27, 2026

Sen. Wyden’s office confirmed to DefenseScoop Friday that the lawmaker will vote against Lt. Gen. Rudd and put a hold on his nomination.

Drew F. Lawrence

February 27, 2026

https://defensescoop.com/2026/02/27/wyden-blocks-trump-nsa-cyber-command-nominee-gen-rudd/

A Democratic senator on the intelligence committee said in a letter this week he would block President Donald Trump’s pick for top uniformed cyber chief because his nominee “is not qualified for this job” and after what the lawmaker characterized as “vague assurances about following the law” from the general.

In correspondence addressed to the president and published in the Congressional Record Wednesday, Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., said he would block the confirmation of Lt. Gen. Joshua Rudd, who Trump nominated for the dual-hat role of National Security Agency director and U.S. Cyber Command commander.

Wyden’s office confirmed to DefenseScoop Friday that the lawmaker will vote against Rudd and put a hold on his nomination. His objection threatens to put Rudd’s nomination to a formal vote, instead of approval via unanimous consent.

Rudd, who has more than 30 years experience in the military — mostly in special operations — is currently the deputy commander for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and has no military cyber background, which Wyden cited as a reason for his objection.

“General Rudd, despite his service, does not have the background that would allow him to immediately step into this role,” Wyden wrote. “He is not qualified for this job. And, when it comes to the cybersecurity of this country, there is simply no time for on-the-job learning. The threat is just too urgent for that.”

Rudd has pointed to his work in special operations and joint task forces as having prepared him for the leadership role, noting that cyber has become “inextricably linked at the hip” with America’s most elite units.

“For decades, I have had the opportunity to be a leader, consumer, enabler, generator, and integrator of intelligence and operational capabilities of NSA and Cyber Command,” he told the Senate Armed Services Committee last month. “If confirmed, I’m prepared to lead these organizations as an integrated and essential team to rapidly deliver options and solutions to our nation’s toughest security challenges at this critical time in our history.”

The Record first reported Wyden’s letter and his objection Thursday.

Most of the lawmaker’s objections focused on what he described as Rudd’s unclear answers about NSA surveillance authorities in the United States. Wyden is known as a privacy hawk and he has accused the Trump administration of “trying to invalidate the Fourth Amendment” and putting constitutional rights “under attack.”

Rudd said that “if confirmed, I will absolutely commit to executing the foreign intelligence mission of the NSA in accordance with the authorities that has been given and within all applicable laws.”

The general’s responses to questions about those authorities were apparently insufficient for Wyden.

“I did everything in my power to allow him to demonstrate some understanding of the basic guardrails of NSA’s authorities and got nothing but vague assurances about following the law,” Wyden wrote.

The Defense Department and Cybercom did not respond to DefenseScoop’s requests for comment. The White House did not provide comment prior to publication.

Written by Drew F. Lawrence

Drew F. Lawrence is a Reporter at DefenseScoop, where he covers defense technology, systems, policy and personnel. A graduate of the George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs, he has also been published in Military.com, CNN, The Washington Post, Task & Purpose and The War Horse. In 2022, he was named among the top ten military veteran journalists, and has earned awards in podcasting and national defense reporting. Originally from Massachusetts, he is a proud New England sports fan and an Army veteran.

defensescoop.com · dlawrence · February 27, 2026

10. Ukraine is reshaping the armored battlefield. The US Army is trying to keep up.

Summary:

At Fort Stewart, Georgia, soldiers in the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team are experimenting with drones under the Army’s Transformation in Contact (TIC) initiative, reflecting lessons from Ukraine about surviving on a battlefield saturated with aerial surveillance. Junior operators train first on ordinary laptops using a commercially available simulator called Liftoff, then transition to real drone flights, including first-person-view flying with goggles. This bottom-up approach departs from the traditional model where new capabilities flow through formal schoolhouses before reaching units. Under TIC, brigades test drones, electronic warfare, and communications gear first, then feed operator lessons back to shape employment, fielding levels, and doctrine as acquisition catches up.

Comment: The Army is treating adaptation as a contact sport: it is letting junior soldiers write the first draft of doctrine because the drone fight is moving faster than the schoolhouse.I hope transforming in contact becomes the norm. It could be what makes us successful in America's Next First Battle.

Ukraine is reshaping the armored battlefield. The US Army is trying to keep up.

militarytimes.com · Eve Sampson · February 25, 2026

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/02/25/ukraine-is-reshaping-the-armored-battlefield-the-us-army-is-trying-to-keep-up/

FORT STEWART, Ga. — Spc. Lathan Thomley enlisted in the Army to become a cavalry scout. Now, he spends hours practicing on a laptop simulator before piloting drones over Fort Stewart’s training area.

Thomley is part of 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team’s Transformation in Contact initiative, or TIC, where junior soldiers on the ground are at the forefront of experimenting with new drone capabilities and helping to drive the direction of Army doctrine from the ground up.

In armored brigades built around tanks and heavy firepower, the approach reflects how lessons from Ukraine are pushing leaders to rethink how formations move and survive on a battlefield saturated with aerial surveillance.

Selected internally, soldiers at Fort Stewart say operators start on everyday computer simulation programs before transitioning to real flights.

“We really train on regular computers — it’s a little gaming app called Liftoff — and you fly drones on there,” Thomley said while demonstrating a small reconnaissance quadcopter’s capabilities on an unusually cool Georgia day. “From that, you learn how a drone moves and how you need to angle it to make it go a certain way.”

Liftoff is a commercially available drone flying simulator that allows all types of users to fly drones in first-person view. It can be purchased from Steam, a gaming platform that can be downloaded by soldiers and civilians alike.

First-person view lets a soldier watch and steer the drone as if they are flying on the front of it. Soldiers at Fort Stewart have been training to fly while wearing goggles, an immersive experience that can be disorienting and produce motion sickness.

“The controllers are inverted so it’s very confusing at first,” Thomley said.

If a user wants the drone to go up, they have to look down, and vice versa. Once a soldier masters flying in the simulation, they can practice piloting the real thing.

The approach marks a departure from the Army’s traditional training model, where new capabilities often move through formal schoolhouses and standardized programs before reaching operational units.

Under the TIC initiative, soldiers test technology first and shape how it is used before doctrine and acquisition catch up.

Selected brigades are given access to emerging innovations like drones, electronic warfare equipment and new communications devices.

Changes to drone capabilities within the brigade are informed through feedback from operators driving decisions about how equipment is used, how much equipment is fielded and how drones play into the armor-centric battle.

Unlike traditional weapons training, which follows a standardized Army progression, drone instruction is still evolving.

Thomley said he did not attend a formal drone school and that he volunteered to try out the brigade’s new capabilities when leadership presented the opportunity.

2ABCT, meanwhile, is part of the second TIC iteration, which is shifting the focus to Armor Brigade Combat Teams and division-level assets to apply lessons learned from Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The experimentation comes as Army leaders study how drones have drastically altered the battlefield overseas, where both sides use unmanned aerial vehicles to scout and strike.

“When you talk about looking at our adversaries across the world, everyone is watching the battles there in Ukraine,” said Col. Alexis Perez-Cruz, the brigade’s commander.

Perez-Cruz added that the Army — and the armor community — is consistently studying the conflict to see how new technology will change future wars, asking “How do we use our imagination to look at the future and be able to fight the way that we’re seeing it out there, and imagining how we will be able to fight in large-scale combat operations?”

For soldiers like Thomley, the shift is a new skill set layered onto a traditional cavalry mission — to spot and understand the battlefield before the enemy.

But instead of binoculars pressed into tired eyes peering out of a foxhole, that view increasingly comes from a camera mounted to a drone hovering hundreds of feet in the sky.

About Eve Sampson

Eve Sampson is a reporter and former Army officer. She has covered conflict across the world, writing for The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Associated Press.

11. What It Will Take to Change the Regime in Iran

Summary:

Behnam Ben Taleblu argues the Islamic Republic is weakened but not broken, despite June Israeli and U.S. strikes that destroyed uranium enrichment capacity and many air defenses, and despite major uprisings in December and January amid economic and environmental crises. He says POTUS is using gunboat diplomacy to seek a better nuclear deal, while considering decapitation or limited strikes, but that limited action will not topple an institutionalized regime built on multiple power pillars and a deep state. Taleblu urges the United States to “go big” with sustained airpower, covert preparation, and information operations to neutralize air defenses, missile forces, nuclear sites, and the domestic repression apparatus, then let Iranians finish regime change.

Excerpts:

When Trump was asked about what an acceptable “endgame” with Iran would be, he replied: “to win.” After decades of unabated anti-Americanism and hostility, it should be clear to all that winning means toppling the Islamic Republic. The regime is the arsonist behind many of the Middle East’s fires and a terror to its own citizens. Washington should employ sustained military force in order to break it and thus pave the way for Iranians to take back their country.

That doesn’t mean helping take down the Islamic Republic will be easy. The United States will run into significant challenges. It will encounter unknown variables, including the resilience of Iranian security services when facing American firepower and the Trump administration’s own risk tolerance once it encounters difficulty. But at this point, bold action is the only way to break the current dynamic. The United States has both the capacity and the capability to weaken the Iranian government while mitigating the resulting dangers. The Iranian people have the drive and determination needed to finish off the regime. Together, the two have everything they need to win and make a new Iran.

Comment: Who is orchestrating the entire campaign of activities to enable a resistance or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow the regime in Tehran and then deal with what comes next? Do we have the right people planning, orchestrating, and leading this campaign? Which takes precedence: the "big fight" or the unconventional campaign and how do we balance the two?

What It Will Take to Change the Regime in Iran

Foreign Affairs · More by Behnam Ben Taleblu · February 27, 2026

The U.S. Military Must Go Big—and Then Let Iranians Do the Rest

Behnam Ben Taleblu

February 27, 2026

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/what-it-will-take-change-regime-iran

U.S. Navy ships in the Arabian Sea, February 2026 Jesse Monford / U.S. Navy / Reuters

BEHNAM BEN TALEBLU is Senior Director of the Iran Program and a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

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The U.S. Military Must Go Big—and Then Let Iranians Do the Rest

Behnam Ben Taleblu

The Islamic Republic of Iran is, quite possibly, at its weakest point since its founding, in 1979. In June, Israeli and U.S. attacks destroyed its uranium enrichment capacity and many of its air defense systems. In December and January, the country experienced the most widespread domestic uprising since the birth of the Islamic Republic. Throughout, it has faced spiraling economic and environmental crises that it cannot fix. None of these events has knocked out the Islamic Republic. But there is no doubt it is down.

Now, U.S. President Donald Trump is threatening to attack the country. He has made it clear he has little tolerance for the regime’s efforts to rebuild its nuclear program or the extraordinarily brutal way it cracked down on protests. “If Iran violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue,” he said last month. “We are locked and loaded and ready to go.” The president has since amassed U.S. air and naval assets in the region, and he is considering a variety of strike options.

But that doesn’t mean major attacks are guaranteed. In fact, thus far, the administration’s decisions raise more questions than they answer about what Washington aims to achieve and how. Right now, Trump is practicing gunboat diplomacy, hoping that the threat of force will coerce the Islamic Republic into making a nuclear deal better than the one he left in 2018. If that fails, he is mulling decapitation operations or limited strikes in order to get the regime to bend.

It is easy to see why the Trump administration is prioritizing diplomacy and limited strikes. The Islamic Republic may be weak, but it is still lethal and capable of harming U.S. forces and civilian targets throughout its region. The president, meanwhile, has repeatedly proved reluctant to start a protracted military campaign. But the reality is that after decades of trying and failing to change Tehran’s behavior with sanctions, sabotage, and, more recently, one-off strikes, the time has come to go big. The regime is simply too ideological to be cowed by a few rounds of bombing. The Iranian people, meanwhile, have made it more than clear that they are ready to transform their country. The United States can and should help them by using its military power to neutralize the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities and degrade its repressive domestic apparatus.

Such measures could inspire the masses of Iranians who took to the streets in December and January to do so again. Just this week, Iran witnessed smaller-scale campus protests, showing that animosity against the regime very much remains. If regular protests resume, American military power could level the playing field between the street and the state, giving the country’s demonstrators a chance to succeed.

DEAL OR NO DEAL

The Trump administration may have threatened Iran with major military action. But there are reasons to think that, for now at least, it might have other ideas. For starters, the president’s comments on Iran this year have oscillated between threats of war and the imperative of a nuclear agreement. “Hopefully Iran will quickly ‘Come to the Table’ and negotiate a fair and equitable deal,” Trump wrote on Truth Social in late January. “I would rather have a Deal than not but, if we don’t make a Deal, it will be a very bad day for that Country,” he posted a month later. During the February 24 State of the Union address, Trump declared that although his “preference is to solve this problem through diplomacy,” he would “never allow the number one state sponsor of terror…to have a nuclear weapon.”

Tehran claims the two sides have made progress in their talks. But thus far, Iranian officials have, expectedly, refused to give up core elements of their nuclear program, so there is reason to think that Trump will be compelled to attack—even as the two countries continue to negotiate indirectly. If past is prologue, he will keep such action short and sharp. In his first term, for example, the president ordered the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, a prominent commander in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with a drone strike in January 2020. In June 2025, he directed the use of massive ordnance penetrator bombs against Iranian enrichment facilities. And the recent extraction of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro from Caracas by U.S. military forces took place in the span of one evening. Notably, Trump has cited the Maduro operation while threatening Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. “Like with Venezuela,” the president said in a Truth Social post describing Washington’s naval buildup around Iran, the U.S. military is “ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary.”

But a quick, one-and-done operation is extremely unlikely to down this regime, even if it succeeds in killing Khamenei. The Islamic Republic may have once been a sultanistic state built on the personal cult of its founding supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. But over the last three decades, Khamenei (Khomeini’s successor) has institutionalized his rule and his regime both by empowering loyalists throughout a considerably larger state bureaucracy and by supporting competing power centers. As a result, the Islamic Republic looks more like a series of pillars than it does a pyramid, with a powerful deep state made up of security officials with their own vested interests in maintaining the regime.

Seen in this light, many of the leaders and veterans of the IRGC are less Khamenei’s subordinates than his partners. Indeed, it is unclear to what extent the 86-year-old Khamenei is actually running the regime day-to-day. The Islamic Republic, for example, made remarkably quick military decisions during the June 12-day war with Israel, when Khamenei was likely in a bunker and, according to a New York Times report, not using electronic communications. It did so even after many senior IRGC officers were killed in just one night by Israeli attacks.

The Venezuela model, in other words, will not work in Iran. In fact, a singular and spectacular strike on Khamenei might have the opposite of its intended effect. Rather than fostering division and thus jeopardizing the regime, remaining officials would be more likely to close ranks, at least initially. They would keep the system running and try to seek revenge.

GOING BIG

To some analysts, the fact that limited strikes will fail is reason enough to think twice about employing the military. “Iran will not cave to major demands simply because of a bombing campaign,” wrote the former Iran White House adviser Nate Swanson in a cautionary Foreign Affairs piece. “An attack by the United States on Iran could result in unexpectedly deadly retaliation—and a much longer and potentially damaging conflict.” Unless Iran is bluffing, this analysis is correct. But it is not a compelling reason to avoid using the military. Iran is the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism, one of the most outright anti-American governments in the world, and the country with the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. Nearly a half century of experience has shown that the Islamic Republic will not meaningfully moderate any of this behavior or treat its citizens any better. Washington now has a historic opportunity to bring down the regime, and it cannot pass it up out of fear. Indeed, the fact that Iran would almost certainly escalate in response to a limited U.S. strike is all the more reason to go big from the beginning and avoid settling into the kind of gradual escalation that turns wars into quagmires. Washington cannot let Tehran dictate the pace or terms of the conflict.

None of this means that the United States needs to launch a massive ground invasion and single-handedly topple the regime. In fact, part of why Washington should strike now is that Iran’s own people are prepared to do much of the work themselves. For the past decade, while the United States has treated “regime change” as a pejorative term, unarmed Iranians have increasingly taken to the streets to seek systemic change in what has become a national uprising. Today, it is clear that Iranians are willing to make tremendous sacrifices to get rid of their leaders. That is why the regime had to kill at least 30,000 people, according to the estimates of human rights groups, to put down the most recent protests, and why some Iranians have nonetheless continued to demonstrate in the weeks since. Iranians therefore do not need U.S. troops to march into Tehran. What they need is for the American military to weaken the regime enough for them to succeed.

Trump can start by having the U.S. intelligence community carry out covert operations designed to pave the way for kinetic activity. Intelligence operatives, for instance, should surge secure communications technology, including satellite Internet devices, into the country so that Iranians can still have Internet access even if their government cuts off domestic service. The administration should also authorize information operations aimed at undermining the resolve and cohesion of Iran’s security forces. Finally, the administration should direct the intelligence community to identify and help Iranian security forces that are willing to defect.

A one-and-done operation is extremely unlikely to down the Islamic Republic.

Then, the United States can proceed with airstrikes. It should begin by suppressing and destroying the regime’s air defenses to gain aerial superiority. Doing so shouldn’t be all that complicated, given Israel’s success in knocking them out in past rounds of fighting. But there are platforms the Israelis did not suppress or destroy, and others that Iran has repaired. Afterward, Washington should move against the long pole in the tent of Tehran’s deterrence: its formidable ballistic missile arsenal. Iran can use these weapons to complicate the United States’ approach by inflicting damage on military assets, regional energy infrastructure, maritime shipping, and even on civilian targets in Israel. Rather than wait for Iran to launch large volleys of these projectiles in hopes of overwhelming U.S. and allied defenses, Washington must collapse the network of subterranean bases where medium- and short-range ballistic missiles are kept, which Iranian officials have long hailed as “missile cities.”

To be clear, the United States and, potentially, its partners will sustain losses from Iranian missiles. But by preemptively striking and destroying these bases, Washington can help limit the damage from any Iranian counterattack. If Tehran dispersed its mobile launchers after bringing them above ground, the United States should dedicate real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to identify their locations and strike them, as Israel did during its 12-day war. (Israeli estimates claim that the country’s attacks on these launchers reduced the regime’s firing capacity by at least 33 percent.) From there, the United States can handicap Iran’s future missile capacity by targeting production facilities, which open-source intelligence suggests are located in or near the cities of Khojir, Semnan, Shahroud, Parchin, and Isfahan.

Degrading Iran’s missile infrastructure will do more than make it easier for Washington to conduct the rest of its military campaign. It could also help ordinary Iranians. Drastic as it might seem, some regime supporters have floated using missiles against Iran’s own people. Likewise, if the Islamic Republic’s missile and nuclear infrastructure is destroyed and its contents entombed, the regime’s representatives will have less leverage when negotiating with U.S. officials or protesters over a political transition. For that reason, the United States would be wise to attack Iran’s remaining nuclear sites, especially as the regime is moving to harden or rebuild them.

PAVING THE WAY

Still, hitting Iran’s missile and nuclear program is unlikely to help Iranian demonstrators in the near term. To do that, Washington should also target the regime’s political institutions and security installations, both as a means of inspiring protesters and to make it harder for the Islamic Republic to coordinate and effectively suppress demonstrations.

Some American analysts might object to targeting Iran’s political institutions as a violation of the country’s sovereignty. But Iranians would likely welcome such a campaign. The country’s people are highly nationalistic, but they are nonetheless looking abroad for help in their fight against the regime. During the latest round of protests, for example, Iranians made English-language videos describing their plight. Others named streets in Trump’s honor, in hopes of getting the president’s attention. When Trump subsequently promised that help “is on the way,” he raised their expectations and likely fostered continued protests. As one demonstrator told The Wall Street Journal in a text message, “We’re all staring at the sky, hoping Trump will bomb us, just to destroy Khamenei and his regime.”

Trump failed Iranians then. But he can course correct now. He could begin to help them by striking state institutions that have ordered or supported the crackdown on Iranians such as the office of the supreme leader, the Ministry of Intelligence, the IRGC counterintelligence directorate, as well as institutions enabled the regime to shut off the Internet. Washington should also use overt and covert means to blind, impede, and militarily pick apart Iran’s wartime command-and-control structures—including those on the supreme national security council, the defense council, and the armed forces’ general staff. The United States could then move to targeting bases and command centers housing other parts of the IRGC, the Basij paramilitary (whose members patrol Iran’s streets and put down protests), and the so-called special units of the country’s law-enforcement forces, who do crowd suppression. Finally, if Washington determines that Iran’s proxy foreign militias are entering the country to slaughter protesters—as appeared to happen during the last round of protests—it should not hesitate to use force against them. These militias, after all, are already designated by the U.S. State Department as foreign terrorist organizations and already have the blood of Americans and U.S. allies on their hands.

Such actions will probably eliminate many key regime officials, including even Khamenei. In striking this wide variety of targets, the United States would show Iranians that it wants to change Iran for the better, not just limit the damage the regime can do to foreign adversaries. Washington should hit these sites even if key officials and leaders are not there. Doing so will still reduce the regime’s repressive capacity, impede continuity of government operations, and send a strong signal that can motivate the Iranian people.

Washington must fracture the Iranian regime.

As it carries out strikes, the United States will need to reduce the regime’s capabilities all across the country, not just in Tehran. That means U.S. officials should target every IRGC and Basij provincial command and battalion headquarters, as well as the command centers belonging to Iranian police forces. Doing so would inspire further protests while making it harder for the regime to suppress them. Nothing is likely to galvanize Iranian protesters more than seeing local security forces come under attack.

Finally, the United States must be prepared to use not just bombers and advanced fighter jets but lower- and slower-flying drones and aircraft, which could provide close air support to crowds squaring off against regime militants. Such attacks would help the United States take out mid- and lower-level commanders, drilling down on the chain of command of Iran’s security forces. It might also prompt these officials to retreat. As rank-and-file Iranian forces begin worrying about their survival, their instinct for self-preservation might kick in and override lingering loyalty to their units and commanders. Iran’s security services, in turn, might finally fracture.

This fracturing would be the key to how Iranians finish off the regime. As the Islamic Republic’s forces are sandwiched between U.S. airstrikes and popular pressure, they will have every incentive to either lay down their weapons or to flip and join with the protestors. In the latter case, they might bring their guns with them, transferring coercive power to the street. Both outcomes could embolden demonstrators to press their advantage. They might take over police stations and occupy government and municipal buildings. With the security forces out of their way or actively helping them, protesters could seize state television, radio, and other communications platforms and broadcast the end of the Islamic Republic. Such an outcome would have parallels to the 1979 revolution: the Islamic Republic celebrates February 11 as “Islamic Revolutionary Victory Day” because it is the day that when the Iranian armed forces declared their neutrality, effectively abandoning the existing government and handing the country over to its revolutionary masses.

The collapse of the Islamic Republic would, of course, be turbulent. Many analysts fear that Iran would simply get a new strongman, possibly someone who rises up from the ashes of the IRGC. But that is far from foreordained. Newly empowered protesters could use their new platforms to call for the country’s large civilian bureaucracy to keep working in order to maintain government functions. They might also bring in Iran’s exiled opposition leaders, who have been planning for and could help lead a transition. For Washington to eschew military options out of fear of instability would thus be to make the perfect the enemy of the good. The real source of destabilization in and around Iran, after all, is not the prospect of regime change. It is the Islamic Republic itself.

ONE WAY OUT

When Trump was asked about what an acceptable “endgame” with Iran would be, he replied: “to win.” After decades of unabated anti-Americanism and hostility, it should be clear to all that winning means toppling the Islamic Republic. The regime is the arsonist behind many of the Middle East’s fires and a terror to its own citizens. Washington should employ sustained military force in order to break it and thus pave the way for Iranians to take back their country.

That doesn’t mean helping take down the Islamic Republic will be easy. The United States will run into significant challenges. It will encounter unknown variables, including the resilience of Iranian security services when facing American firepower and the Trump administration’s own risk tolerance once it encounters difficulty. But at this point, bold action is the only way to break the current dynamic. The United States has both the capacity and the capability to weaken the Iranian government while mitigating the resulting dangers. The Iranian people have the drive and determination needed to finish off the regime. Together, the two have everything they need to win and make a new Iran.

Foreign Affairs · More by Behnam Ben Taleblu · February 27, 2026

12. China Is Winning by Waiting

Summary:

Kyle Chan argues China gains strategic advantage as U.S. soft power erodes under POTUS’ unpredictable, coercive approach to allies. While Beijing is transactional and uses carrots and sticks, it is predictable, making its redlines and responses easy to anticipate. The article says U.S. tariffs and threats against partners have pushed some allies to hedge toward China. Canada is highlighted: after paying costs for aligning with Washington against Beijing, Ottawa faced U.S. tariffs and annexation rhetoric, then Prime Minister Mark Carney visited China in January 2026 and pursued tariff cuts and visa-free travel, calling China more predictable. Chan notes similar China visits by France, South Korea, and the U.K. China leverages investment, market access, and supply-chain choke points, including rare earth processing dominance, while the United States risks forfeiting alliance-based influence.

Excerpts:

China offers the world predictability, not a more generous alternative to U.S. leadership. China can provide U.S. allies with investment, access to its markets, and help improving the competitiveness of certain industries, such as electric vehicle manufacturing. Beijing, for its part, is hoping to sell more Chinese products overseas and secure supplies of certain technologies, such as components for its semiconductor industry, while keeping other countries from meddling in what it regards as its internal affairs, including Taiwan. A lack of trust and shared values constrains the scope and depth of any partnership. But China and longtime U.S. allies could realistically forge new trade and supply chain networks that might leave out the United States.

Beijing is not scrambling to take advantage of Trump’s chaos because it does not need to. It can take the same tack it always has: cooperating when possible and retaliating when necessary, always with an eye to its own national interests. It is ultimately Trump who is doing the heavy lifting of shattering trust in the United States and pushing the world into China’s arms. The United States needs to work hard to regain the trust of its allies or risk forfeiting its most powerful advantage—soft power—over China.

Comment: China knows real "strategic patience." But we should understand the nature of the PRC/CCP, its objectives, and strategy. My assessment is that China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions through subversion. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve objectives, with the main objective being the unification of China (i.e., the recovery of Taiwan).

China Is Winning by Waiting

Foreign Affairs · More by Kyle Chan · February 27, 2026

How Beijing Turns Predictability Into Power

Kyle Chan

February 27, 2026

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-winning-waiting

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing, January 2026 Sean Kilpatrick / Pool / Reuters

KYLE CHAN is a Fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.

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How Beijing Turns Predictability Into Power

Kyle Chan

One of the greatest advantages the United States has over China has been its soft power—the ability to persuade other countries, particularly allies and partners, to go along with its wants without having to resort to coercion. For decades, other countries have made sacrifices on behalf of the United States because they believed they were better off working with Washington than Beijing in the long run. This was the ultimate win-win for the United States and its partners. Together, they prospered through collective defense, integrated markets, and coordinated action on common challenges, including dealing with China.

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to put an end to much of that cooperation. The United States, once the bedrock of the international system, is now a major source of geopolitical instability. Trump launched a global trade war, slapping tariffs indiscriminately on allies and adversaries alike and bullying longtime partners. He ordered the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, raising fears that sovereign rules no longer apply, and has repeatedly threatened to seize allied territories.

These moves have caused many U.S. partners and allies to turn to China as an alternative. But China is not rushing to exploit the rupture in the United States’ relationships. Its approach hasn’t changed since Trump began his second term. Beijing is doing what it always has: trying to bring other countries in line with its own interests by deploying carrots and sticks. In fact, China is nearly as transactional as the Trump administration is. What sets Beijing apart, however, is its predictability, which offers countries a clear picture of how they might work with China even if it is less appealing than what the United States could offer. If the United States continues its capricious behavior toward the rest of the world, China won’t need to do anything differently yet will still profit from the splintering of Washington’s network of allies and partners.

CONTINENTAL DRIFT

Canada, one of the United States’ closest allies, has long partnered with its neighbor to the south. Ottawa has repeatedly taken heat from Beijing for standing with the United States on issues related to China. In 2018, for instance, Canada arrested Meng Wanzhou, the chief financial officer of Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, and the daughter of its enigmatic founder, at the request of the United States under a mutual extradition treaty over alleged U.S. sanctions violations. The consequences for Canada were swift and severe. China retaliated by banning imports of Canadian pork and beef for months and Canadian canola for three years. China froze diplomatic relations with Canada, which had previously been on an upward trajectory. And most painfully, Chinese authorities detained two Canadian citizens, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, for nearly three years until Meng was allowed to return to China.

In 2024, Canada aligned itself again with Washington by joining the United States in applying a 100 percent tariff on Chinese electric vehicles. The Biden administration’s goal was to shield the North American auto industry from competition from Chinese companies. Canada took the brunt of Beijing’s retaliation, which included tariffs on $2.6 billion worth of Canadian exports, including crops, meat, and fish. Although Canada had its own reasons for detaining Meng and putting tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, it paid a high price for aligning with the United States on China.

When Trump was elected for a second time, it became clear to Ottawa that it would not be rewarded for its loyalty to the United States. As president-elect, Trump threatened to annex Canada and began derisively calling it the “51st state.” Once he took office, Trump slapped tariffs on Canadian goods and threatened to unravel deeply enmeshed North American supply chains built over decades of trust and economic partnership. Canadians were justifiably furious. In 2025, according to polling from the Pew Research Center, the share of Canadians with a favorable view of the United States fell to its lowest level since Pew surveys began collecting this measurement, in 2002. Canadians boycotted Kentucky bourbon and Florida orange juice. Many stopped traveling to the United States.

Leaders in Ottawa started pulling away from the United States, too. In January of this year, Mark Carney became the first Canadian prime minister to visit China in nearly a decade. While in Beijing, Carney announced that he had struck a deal with China to slash tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in exchange for lower tariffs on Canadian goods and visa-free travel for Canadians visiting China. Carney declared that Canada was “forging a new strategic partnership with China” and described Canada’s relationship with Beijing as “more predictable” than the one it has with Washington.

Canada is not alone in trying to improve ties with China. In December, French President Emmanuel Macron received a red-carpet welcome in China. In January, Lee Jae-myung became the first South Korean president to visit China in nearly seven years, and Keir Starmer became the first British prime minister to do so in eight years. These visits are not just symbolic. After years of making moves to “de-risk” from China, some U.S. allies are contemplating de-risking from the United States. They hope that China can help fill that gap.

COLD AND CALCULATING

But anyone expecting a charm offensive by Beijing will be sorely disappointed. During the first Trump administration, many observers wondered whether Beijing would seize the opportunity to step into the breach left by U.S. volatility in global affairs. In 2017, Chinese leader Xi Jinping played into those hopes by making a sweeping speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in defense of globalization and multilateral institutions.

Yet Xi’s speech was followed by years of China’s so-called wolf warrior diplomacy, a confrontational and nationalistic approach to foreign policy in which Chinese diplomats were quick to criticize and retaliate against perceived slights. In 2020, China punished Australia with tariffs and import bans for calling for an investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, China cut trade with Lithuania after the eastern European state allowed Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius; Beijing, regarding the island as part of its territory, saw this as an affront to its sovereignty. That same year, China sanctioned a set of European individuals and organizations, including five members of the European Parliament, in response to EU sanctions on Chinese officials and entities suspected of human rights abuses in Xinjiang. This led to the demise of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, a major trade deal aimed at mutually expanding market access and investment opportunities, which both sides had been negotiating for more than seven years.

China is nearly as transactional as the Trump administration is.

Beijing engages in a coldly rational form of geopolitics. It tries to use incentives to influence the behavior of other countries to its advantage. Although all great powers do this to some extent, China is more narrowly transactional than most. For decades, the United States underwrote a wide range of global public goods from which it also benefited, such as security guarantees through alliance networks and the expansion of international trade. China’s approach, in contrast, tends to be tightly coupled to its own core economic and territorial interests.

As China’s economy has developed, the benefits Beijing can offer have become more compelling. It can reward countries for behavior it wants to promote—such as endorsing its stance on Taiwan or staying quiet about repression in Xinjiang—with large-scale infrastructure projects backed by Chinese state financing. It can also encourage Chinese companies to set up factories in other countries. This creates local manufacturing jobs and helps countries build up their domestic industries, particularly in clean technology. Chinese firms have, for instance, set up plants for electric cars in Brazil and for batteries in Hungary. China can also leverage its position as the world’s second-largest importer to buy more goods, particularly agricultural products or raw materials, from countries that do its bidding.

China’s ability to coerce other countries has also grown in line with its increasing economic heft. Gone are the days when all China could do was ban imports or limit the flow of Chinese tourists to a country that had caused it offense. Now, it can use its chokehold over important supply chains to get what it wants. Beijing processes over 90 percent of the world’s rare-earth elements, which countries around the world need for advanced manufacturing. As Beijing and Washington were escalating a trade war with each other in 2025, China restricted the sale of rare-earth elements to the United States and much of the rest of the world, causing Trump to back down on his highest tariff demands. China has also wielded its supply of microchips to advance its interests. In September, the Dutch government seized control of Nexperia, a semiconductor manufacturer headquartered in the Netherlands, out of fear that its Chinese owner was undermining the company’s European operations. In reprisal, China cut Europe off from a supply of automotive chips, leading the Dutch government to reverse course.

A STEADY HAND

In many ways, Beijing’s approach to the world resembles Trump’s. Beijing is transactional, unsentimental, even ruthless, but also highly adaptable. It eschews lofty values for pragmatic dealmaking. The key difference is that unlike the United States under Trump, China is predictable. Beijing makes what it wants abundantly clear. Chinese officials repeat the same set of redlines on issues such as Taiwan ad nauseam. Rewards or punishments doled out by Beijing are usually linked to concrete behavior. Whenever a U.S. arms deal with Taipei is struck or a U.S. leader visits Taiwan, for example, Beijing answers with another round of military exercises around the island. Beijing has essentially trained the world to anticipate its reactions.

In contrast, when Trump blusters, his specific demands are often unclear, and he is liable to move the goalposts later. Consider the case of South Korea. Last October, it pledged to invest $350 billion in the United States as part of a wider trade agreement. In January, however, Seoul was blindsided with new U.S. tariffs because, in the eyes of the Trump administration, it had failed to make good on the deal fast enough.

China offers the world predictability, not a more generous alternative to U.S. leadership. China can provide U.S. allies with investment, access to its markets, and help improving the competitiveness of certain industries, such as electric vehicle manufacturing. Beijing, for its part, is hoping to sell more Chinese products overseas and secure supplies of certain technologies, such as components for its semiconductor industry, while keeping other countries from meddling in what it regards as its internal affairs, including Taiwan. A lack of trust and shared values constrains the scope and depth of any partnership. But China and longtime U.S. allies could realistically forge new trade and supply chain networks that might leave out the United States.

Beijing is not scrambling to take advantage of Trump’s chaos because it does not need to. It can take the same tack it always has: cooperating when possible and retaliating when necessary, always with an eye to its own national interests. It is ultimately Trump who is doing the heavy lifting of shattering trust in the United States and pushing the world into China’s arms. The United States needs to work hard to regain the trust of its allies or risk forfeiting its most powerful advantage—soft power—over China.

Foreign Affairs · More by Kyle Chan · February 27, 2026

13. Trump Officials Seek to Break Editorial ‘Firewall’ at U.S.-Funded News Agencies

Summary:

The Trump administration is seeking to weaken protections for editorial independence at U.S.-funded overseas broadcasters. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Middle East Broadcasting Networks received a draft funding agreement that would let political appointees veto hires for editors in chief, chief executives, and board members, and allow parts of operations to be shut down with two weeks’ notice. The draft removes prior language affirming the editorial “firewall” meant to prevent political interference. It instead requires coverage be consistent with U.S. national interests and allows funding termination for noncompliance with any term. Critics warn politicized content would damage credibility; USAGM head Kari Lake says the proposal is about taxpayer accountability, not editorial interference.

Comment: A sad day for what was once the most free press and a shining example to the world.

Trump Officials Seek to Break Editorial ‘Firewall’ at U.S.-Funded News Agencies

Two federally funded newsrooms received a draft funding agreement that could give President Trump’s appointees the power to veto their new hires for editors in chief and chief executives.

By Minho Kim

Reporting from Washington

Feb. 25, 2026

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/25/us/politics/trump-radio-free-europe.html?smid=nytcore-android-share

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Middle East Broadcasting Networks received a draft funding agreement that could give President Trump’s political appointees more control over their operations.Credit...Martin Divisek/EPA, via Shutterstock

The Trump administration is seeking to limit the safeguards protecting the editorial freedom of federally funded news groups that broadcast overseas, raising concerns that it could undermine an independent source of news in parts of the world with few of them.

Two of the organizations that President Trump tried but failed to shutter, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Middle East Broadcasting Networks, earlier this month received a draft funding agreement that could give Mr. Trump’s political appointees more control over their operations.

The administration could have the power to veto their new hires for editors in chief, chief executives and members of their boards, and could unilaterally shut down parts of their news operations with a two-week notice, according to a draft of the proposal reviewed by The New York Times and two people familiar with the matter.

The proposed agreement is the latest attempt by the Trump administration to severely shrink and influence the news content of media groups that receive federal dollars.

The administration’s push for a funding agreement that could give Mr. Trump’s deputies broad authority over personnel and programming decisions signals its interest in reshaping the news agencies into networks more friendly to Mr. Trump’s agenda, said Kate Wright, a media and communications professor at the University of Edinburgh.

“It is about strengthening control over those networks,” said Ms. Wright, who has studied how state-funded broadcasters can be captured by partisan politics. “This is deeply worrying for editorial freedom.”

The two news organizations declined to comment, citing the ongoing contract negotiations.

Kari Lake, who leads the federally funded news groups’ parent agency, the U.S. Agency for Global Media, rejected the idea that the administration was seeking to influence editorial decisions. She characterized the premise of this article as “fake news spin,” and said her agency’s proposed agreement was not “editorial interference,” but an attempt to ensure accountability of taxpayer dollars.

“Under this administration, U.S.A.G.M. answers to American taxpayers, and publicly funded outlets will serve our national interest,” Ms. Lake said in a statement. “Accountability is back, and much to the chagrin of globalists.”

Last March, Mr. Trump signed an executive order effectively dismantling the global media agency that oversees federally funded news groups. He called Voice of America, a federally funded news group created in 1942 to fight Nazi propaganda, “a total left wing disaster,” and put nearly all its 1,400 journalists and support staff on paid leave.

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Ms. Lake then terminated funding to other federally funded news groups without much explanation.

But courts have largely halted efforts to shut down the groups, and Congress has reauthorized funding for them, bucking Mr. Trump’s wishes. Members of Congress from both parties were concerned that closing U.S.-funded news groups would allow Russia and China to saturate audiences with disinformation.

Trump Administration: Live Updates

Updated

Feb. 27, 2026, 2:44 p.m. ET3 minutes ago

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Middle East Broadcasting Networks, which are private nonprofits, now have to sign a contract with the Trump administration to receive the money that Congress authorized.

The administration’s proposal stripped a section on editorial freedom that appeared in last year’s agreement, which said the administration “acknowledges and affirms” the safeguards “meant to preserve” journalistic independence.

The safeguards, known as the “firewall,” prohibit political appointees from meddling in the news organizations’ editorial decisions, an effort to ensure that foreign audiences trust their journalism and to dispel accusations that the U.S. government is funding propaganda.

Instead, the proposal would shift the burden of providing an objective news service from the government to the recipients. It states that “nothing herein shall be interpreted to cause” the news groups “to violate the highest standards of professional journalism,” while requiring their coverage to be “consistent with the national interests of the United States.” The document says that the administration can terminate funding for noncompliance with “any term” of the agreement.

Jamie Fly, a former chief executive of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, said that politicized content lacking balance would undermine the news groups’ credibility, hurting their mission to provide news suppressed by authoritarian governments.

“Propaganda is not effective and ultimately a waste of taxpayer dollars,” he said.

The administration’s attempt to weaken editorial independence at the press organizations comes after Voice of America ran stories that appeared to violate the law that mandates unbiased coverage.

In January, Voice of America’s Chinese news service published an article that praised Mr. Trump for his “deal-making skill” and “peace-through-strength diplomacy,” citing his dubious claim that he stopped eight wars. It did not feature voices countering the president.

The article also included a heavily edited image of Mr. Trump among what appeared to be clouds and the world map, with an American flag in the center.

“This is not journalism,” said Patsy Widakuswara, a former White House correspondent at Voice of America. “This is being the mouthpiece of an administration.”

Before the cuts, the federally funded news networks had more than 420 million weekly listeners and garnered widespread recognition, including awards for reporting on China’s human rights abuses of Uyghurs, the Russian military’s death toll from its invasion of Ukraine, and anti-government protests in Iran that began after a young woman was detained for not wearing a hijab and died in police custody.

Minho Kim reports on breaking news for The Times from Washington.

A version of this article appears in print on Feb. 27, 2026, Section B, Page 3 of the New York edition with the headline: Trump Officials Seek to Break Editorial ‘Firewall’ at Federally Funded News Organizations. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

14. Regime Change in Cuba Appeals to Trump but Carries Risks

Summary:

The article says POTUS is signaling interest in regime change in Cuba but appears to prefer a negotiated deal that avoids a sudden collapse and migration crisis. U.S. pressure has pushed Cuba’s economy toward crisis by cutting off oil supplies from Venezuela and Mexico and threatening tariffs on any country providing oil, leading Cuba to shorten work and school weeks and strain basic operations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has suggested change “doesn’t have to” happen overnight and has emphasized possible economic reforms before political freedom, while Cuba says it will negotiate on issues but not sovereignty or its constitution. Officials and analysts warn a power vacuum could spark violence and a seaborne refugee surge, recalling past migration crises.

Comment: Same question as Iran: Who is orchestrating the campaign of activities to enable a resistance or insurgency to coerce (perhaps with emphasis on coerce), disrupt, or overthrow the regime in Havana and then deal with what comes next? Do we have the right people planning, orchestrating, and leading this campaign? Do we understand the nature of unconventional warfare and all that entails?

Regime Change in Cuba Appeals to Trump but Carries Risks

The Trump administration is signaling a different approach, after demanding an end to Cuba’s communist leadership.

By Michael Crowley

Reporting from Washington

Feb. 26, 2026

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/26/us/politics/trump-cuba-regime-change.html

“Cuba does not kneel,” the country’s president, Miguel Díaz-Canel, center, told a state-run newspaper this month.Credit...Norlys Perez/Reuters

With a U.S. chokehold pushing Cuba’s economy toward potential collapse, President Trump is hoping to reach a deal with the island’s communist government to avoid chaos even if it means the leadership change long sought by many of his close allies has to wait.

Instead, Mr. Trump appears to be pursuing a version of his approach to Venezuela, whose leftist government remained in power after U.S. troops captured its president, Nicolás Maduro, in January.

On Wednesday, Cuban border guards shot and killed four Cuban nationals who departed from the United States as they approached the island’s coast in a boat. It is unclear whether the episode will affect the Trump administration’s plans.

After years of calling for Venezuela’s opposition leaders to take power, Mr. Trump has cooperated with Mr. Maduro’s successor to gain American access to the country’s oil, leaving questions about a political transition for later.

Similarly, Mr. Trump does not want a sudden power vacuum in Havana, according to a senior administration official and an associate of Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as well as Mr. Rubio’s own public remarks in recent weeks. Mr. Rubio has spoken about a potential deal with Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, the grandson of Fidel Castro’s brother, Raúl, according to two people familiar with the matter.

Mr. Rubio, who steers Mr. Trump’s Latin America policy, is a son of Cuban immigrants who has long called for the government’s downfall. But after a meeting with Caribbean leaders on Wednesday, Mr. Rubio sounded willing to wait.

“Cuba needs to change,” Mr. Rubio said. But, he added, “it doesn’t have to change all at once. It doesn’t have to change from one day to the next. Everyone is mature and realistic here.”

“We’re seeing that process play out, for example, in Venezuela,” he added.

Arguing that the island’s socialist economic model is unsustainable, Mr. Rubio signaled that the United States might settle for initial change in that area. “If they want to make those dramatic reforms that open the space for both economic — and eventually, political — freedom for the people of Cuba, obviously the United States would love to see that,” he said.

That approach might stand a better chance of success than U.S. demands for Cuba’s sudden political transformation. Cuba’s government says it is willing to negotiate with Mr. Trump on a range of issues. But Havana insists it will not discuss Cuba’s Constitution or matters of “sovereignty.”

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In contrast to his approach to Venezuela, however, Mr. Trump has not threatened Cuba with military action. And while few predicted the nighttime raid that captured Mr. Maduro, repeating such a daring operation would be extremely difficult.

“They’re not looking for overnight regime change,” said Ryan Berg, the director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The administration’s goal, he added, appears to be “a slow transition” from Cuba’s authoritarian dictatorship to democracy.

Image

A blackout in Havana last week. President Trump has thrown Cuba’s economy into a spiral by forcing its two main oil suppliers, Venezuela and Mexico, to cut off fuel shipments to the island. Credit...Yamil Lage/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

As Mr. Trump considered options for Venezuela, U.S. officials feared that abruptly installing an opposition government could trigger violence, chaos and a humanitarian crisis, as predicted by U.S. war games.

The same worries apply to Cuba, where economic collapse or a political vacuum could lead to violent anarchy and perhaps unleash a flood of seaborne refugees toward Florida. Past waves of Cuban refugees, in 1980 and the mid-1990s, caused political crises for Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton.

Asked on Wednesday about the potential for a humanitarian crisis and a new migration wave, Mr. Rubio acknowledged the concern. “As far as spillover effect, they’re not more concerned than we are,” he said. “We’re 90 miles away, and the U.S. has experienced mass migration from Cuba in the past.”

In an apparent effort to blunt the growing toll of U.S. pressure, the Trump administration said on Wednesday that it would allow the resale of Venezuelan oil to Cuba, so long as the transactions were made with Cuba’s private sector and did not benefit the island’s government.

Mr. Trump has thrown Cuba’s economy into a spiral by cutting off the island’s access to foreign oil. First, after capturing Mr. Maduro, Mr. Trump forced Venezuela — which had long been Cuba’s primary source of oil — to stop shipping crude to Havana.

Then, Mr. Trump issued an executive order on Jan. 29, threatening to impose tariffs on any country that sold or provided oil to the island, citing Cuba’s ties to Russia and China, links to terrorist groups and political repression. Mexico, Cuba’s last major supplier, has not sent any more oil.

Cuba has since reduced its work and school weeks and says it can no longer refuel foreign airliners. The crisis, analysts say, may be the gravest threat to the Cuban government’s survival since Fidel Castro’s communist revolution prevailed in 1959.

In Washington and South Florida, many Cuba hawks are eagerly anticipating the island’s long-awaited liberation. “Cuba’s day of freedom is closer than ever,” Representative María Elvira Salazar, a Miami-area Republican, recently wrote on social media. Her post featured an image of a bald eagle swooping toward a Cuban flag.

Image

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, has long described the island’s government as a “brutal dictatorship.”Credit...Demetrius Freeman for The New York Times

Mr. Rubio’s more measured rhetoric has surprised some analysts, after his many years of calling for an end to Cuba’s “brutal dictatorship.” So has his focus on economic reform, given his response when President Barack Obama relaxed U.S. trade sanctions on the island in 2015 as part of a larger effort to repair relations with Havana.

Mr. Rubio, then a Florida Republican senator, slammed what he called “the lie and the illusion that more commerce and access to money and goods will translate to political freedom for the Cuban people.” Mr. Rubio has since claimed vindication, noting that Mr. Obama’s outreach did little to change the nature of Cuban government or society. (Mr. Trump reversed Mr. Obama’s policies during his first term as president.)

In his recent conversation with an associate, Mr. Rubio also said the U.S. had struggled to identify a Cuban equivalent to Delcy Rodríguez of Venezuela, the former vice president who succeeded Mr. Maduro and has been cooperating with the Trump administration’s moves to control the country’s oil.

It is unclear whether he believes he has since found that person in Mr. Rodríguez Castro, a high-ranking state security official in his early 40s who goes by the nickname of “El Cangrejo,” or “The Crab.” Mr. Rubio’s conversations with Mr. Rodríguez Castro were reported earlier by Axios.

Image

Mr. Rubio has spoken about a potential deal with Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, the grandson of Fidel Castro’s brother, Raúl.Credit...Yamil Lage/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Mr. Rodríguez Castro’s grandfather, Raúl, officially assumed power in 2008 from his brother Fidel, who died in 2016. The country has been governed by President Miguel Díaz-Canel since 2018.

“The point is that within the Cuban system there are individuals who realize that the project is already ending and who may be interested in making a change that they see as necessary,” Mike Hammer, the top U.S. diplomat in Havana, was quoted telling the Spanish newspaper ABC on Feb. 22.

Cuba’s government did not respond to requests for comment about its contacts with the Trump administration.

Mr. Díaz-Canel has said he is open to dialogue with the United States “without pressure or preconditions.” But he is also a Castro family protégé who has vowed to defend their communist system. “Cuba does not kneel,” he told the state-run newspaper Granma earlier this month.

Several Cuba analysts doubted that Mr. Trump could find a willing partner in Havana similar to Ms. Rodríguez. After nearly 70 years in power, Cuba’s communist leadership has deeper, more hardened roots than Mr. Maduro’s regime, which traces its origins to the late 1990s.

“The search for a Cuban Delcy Rodríguez is a fool’s game,” said William LeoGrande, a professor at American University who specializes in Latin America. “If there’s going to be a deal it’s going to have to be between the United States and the current Cuban government — not some rump of the current government.”

Unlike Venezuela, Cuba’s repressive one-party dictatorship has left the country with no political opposition. “Everyone is in jail or in exile,” said María José Espinosa, a Cuban-born senior fellow at the progressive Center for International Policy.

Still, some Trump officials believe that Cuba’s leaders will be forced to make concessions to Mr. Trump. The alternative — an economic collapse and potential violent uprising — would be worse for them.

At a Feb. 18 press briefing, Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, was asked whether Mr. Trump would settle for anything less than regime change in Cuba. Ms. Leavitt said that it was in America’s “best interest to have Cuba be a truly free and prosperous democracy.”

“They are a regime that is falling,” she added. “Their country is collapsing and that’s why we believe it’s in their best interest to make very dramatic changes very soon.”

Jason Marczak, a Latin America expert at the Atlantic Council in Washington, agreed that engineering a transition away from Cuba’s communist government would be very difficult. “Most Cubans have never lived under anything other than a communist regime,” he said.

But he said that Mr. Trump and Mr. Rubio might be more willing to accept the risk of a chaotic transition in Cuba than they were in Venezuela. Whereas Mr. Trump wants a stable environment to protect Venezuela’s future oil production, from which he hopes the U.S. can profit, Cuba has an isolated economy with few exports; unrest there would have little economic impact beyond its shores.

Mass migration, Mr. Marczak added, can be mitigated with humanitarian aid — which the Trump administration has already begun sending to the island, working with the local Catholic church to circumvent Cuba’s government.

Such concerns are not new. At an earlier moment of economic crisis in Cuba, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate warned about the potential fallout from a government collapse.

“U.S. interests will be challenged in complex and possibly unprecedented ways,” the since-declassified document said.

Any change in power would likely mean “substantial and possibly protracted instability,” including violent retribution, it added, while predicting “large-scale emigration to the United States” and “demands for U.S. involvement” to clean up the mess.

The document is also a reminder that Cuba has defied countless predictions of its imminent collapse.

“There is a better than even chance Fidel Castro’s government will fall within the next few years,” the intelligence document concluded. That was in 1993.

Julian E. Barnes, Frances Robles and Anton Troianovski contributed reporting.

Michael Crowley covers the State Department and U.S. foreign policy for The Times. He has reported from nearly three dozen countries and often travels with the secretary of state.

15. iPhone is secure enough for classified NATO secrets right out of the box

Summary:

Apple says iPhone and iPad are the first consumer devices certified to meet NATO nations’ information assurance standards, allowing them to handle classified data up to NATO Restricted without special software or extra configuration. The claim applies to devices running iOS 26 and iPadOS 26 and builds on a prior German BSI audit that approved native iOS and iPadOS protections for classified German environments. Apple cites built-in security such as end-to-end encryption, Face ID, and Memory Integrity Enforcement, and argues the certification provides independent government validation of its security architecture.

Comment: Emphasis on "Apple says." But maybe it is right? I will leave it to the experts to assess.

iPhone is secure enough for classified NATO secrets right out of the box

cultofmac.com · Ed Hardy · February 26, 2026

https://www.cultofmac.com/news/iphone-nato-security

The iPhone and iPad are the first consumer devices to meet the information assurance standards set by NATO member nations. As a result, the devices can be used to handle classified information up to the NATO Restricted level without the need for specialized software or additional configuration, the company announced Thursday.

“Apple has built the most secure devices in the world for all its users, and those same protections are now uniquely certified under assurance requirements for NATO nations — unlike any other device in the industry,” said Ivan Krstić, Apple’s vice president of Security Engineering and Architecture.

iPhone and iPad meet NATO standards for classified information

Certification under NATO security standards should offer meaningful reassurance to everyday users, not just government agencies. Meeting the alliance’s strict information assurance requirements means the iPhone and iPad have been evaluated against rigorous criteria designed to protect highly sensitive data from sophisticated threats.

Devices considered secure enough to handle classified information at the NATO Restricted level should make consumers confident that their personal messages, photos, financial details and work documents are protected by the same robust safeguards.

While no system is completely immune from risk, this level of independent government validation underscores the strength of Apple’s security architecture.

Apple takes iPhone and iPad security seriously

Apple CEO Tim Cook said, “privacy is a fundamental human right” in 2021, and other executives have echoed that promise.

And the company backs up that promise. Apple says it builds security into its products from the ground up, embedding advanced protections across hardware, software and Apple silicon. iPhone and iPad include features such as end-to-end encryption, biometric authentication through Face ID and safeguards like Memory Integrity Enforcement.

Those protections have now been recognized as meeting strict government and international security standards, including requirements for handling restricted data.

Rigorously tested

iPhone and iPad previously received approval to handle classified German government data on devices using native iOS and iPadOS security measures. The evaluation was carried out by Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, or BSI).

Now, iPhone and iPad running iOS 26 and iPadOS 26 have gone a big step further — they are certified for such use in all NATO nations.

“Expanding on BSI’s rigorous audit of iOS and iPadOS platform and device security for use in classified German information environments, we are pleased to confirm the compliance under NATO nations’ assurance requirements,” said Claudia Plattner, BSI’s president.

This is a level of government certification no other consumer mobile device can match.

Ed Hardy

Ed Hardy has been writing full-time about tech for 25 years, and using it for much longer than that. His intro to Apple was a Macintosh Classic II (which he still has), but now he uses a 13-inch iPad Pro as his primary computer. He’s written for NotebookReview, TabletPCReview, and Brighthand, as well as other sites.

cultofmac.com · Ed Hardy · February 26, 2026

16. The Pentagon’s battle with Anthropic is really a war over who controls AI

Summary:

Vox argues the Pentagon’s dispute with Anthropic is fundamentally about control of AI in classified military use. Secretary of Defense/War Pete Hegseth gave Anthropic a Friday 5:01 pm deadline to accept “all lawful purposes” use of Claude, which would remove Anthropic’s ability to restrict or review specific applications. Anthropic says it cannot, citing red lines against mass domestic surveillance and fully autonomous weapons, while allowing other military uses with humans in the loop. The clash intensified after Claude was reportedly used via Palantir in a January operation to capture Venezuela’s leader Nicolás Maduro. Vox says the Pentagon could cancel Anthropic’s contract, invoke the Defense Production Act, or label it a supply chain risk, potentially crippling its business, unless Congress sets rules.

The Pentagon’s battle with Anthropic is really a war over who controls AI

Vox · Bryan Walsh · February 26, 2026

The most important AI story of the year (so far), explained.

by Bryan Walsh

Feb 27, 2026, 7:45 AM GMT+9

https://www.vox.com/politics/480750/anthropic-pentagon-artificial-intelligence-pete-hegseth-ai-weapons

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth sometimes appears as if he’s more interested in the optics of playing the part of a military leader than he is in actually being a military leader.

Maybe that’s why he has chosen a Hollywood-esque high noon — or, at least, late afternoon — showdown for his deepening dispute with the AI company Anthropic. Hegseth has given Anthropic until 5:01 pm on Friday to respond to his demands that the company give the US military full and unfettered access to its AI, or face consequences that could threaten its survival. Anthropic has so far refused, and on Thursday evening CEO Dario Amodei said in a statement that the company “cannot in good conscience accede to their request.”

What’s unfolding this week is the biggest confrontation between the US government and a tech company over AI ethics since Google employees rebelled against working with the Pentagon in 2018. But with AI far more advanced and far more essential to both the American economy and American defense than it was eight years ago, the stakes now are much greater — certainly for Anthropic itself, but also for the question of just who has final control over an existential technology. (Disclosure: Future Perfect is funded in part by the BEMC Foundation, whose major funder was also an early investor in Anthropic. They do not have any editorial input into our content.)

This has all raised plenty of questions, starting with:

What does the Pentagon actually want?

Anthropic is already a supplier for the Pentagon, having signed a $200 million contract in July to provide advanced AI for national security challenges, and its chatbot Claude was the first AI model that could be deployed on the government’s confidential networks. But the department now insists that Anthropic sign a contract allowing its Claude AI to be used for “all lawful purposes.”

That might sound fine — it has “lawful” in the words, after all — but what it means in practice is that Anthropic would have no say over individual use cases, no ability to review how Claude is being used in classified settings, and no right to restrict specific applications. It would be the military that would decide how to deploy Anthropic’s AI technology.

Okay, but if Anthropic is already supplying its AI to the military, why should the company get to decide how that AI is used? It’s not like the Pentagon has to call up Boeing before it uses one of its jets in a military strike.

Hmm, do you currently work at the Pentagon press department? As it happens, that’s precisely the analogy that Hegseth reportedly presented to Anthropic’s Amodei in a tense meeting on Tuesday.

So, why won’t Anthropic play ball?

It’s not being fully recalcitrant. Even beyond the $200 million Pentagon contract, Anthropic has already been deeply involved in government work, including in more direct military uses like missile defense. Anthropic has been one of the most outspoken proponents of the idea that the US is in a civilizational race with China over AI supremacy. While Anthropic has a (mostly if not entirely) deserved reputation as the most safety-minded of the major AI labs, they’re not a bunch of bleeding-heart softies.

Anthropic’s policies allow its models to be used as part of targeted military strikes, foreign surveillance, or even drone strikes when a human approves the final call. But it has maintained two specific “red lines” it won’t cross: fully autonomous weapons, meaning AI systems that select and engage targets without a human involved, and mass domestic surveillance of American citizens. Amodei said in his statement that “AI-driven mass surveillance presents serious, novel risks to our fundamental liberties,“ while frontier AI systems were “simply not reliable enough to power fully autonomous weapons.”

It’s not that Anthropic would never be involved in building lethal autonomous weapons. Just look at Ukraine — the realities of modern warfare have made it all but inevitable that such weapons and systems will be built. But Anthropic does not believe the models are capable of carrying this out effectively today.

So, what’s happening is that the Pentagon is demanding Anthropic allow it to use Claude for a use Anthropic says Claude can’t even do now?

Pretty much.

How did this all happen?Things started going sideways after the operation in early January that resulted in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. Claude, according to reporting by Axios, was deployed during the operation through a platform operated by the very military-friendly AI company Palantir. Soon after the operation, an Anthropic employee reportedly asked a Palantir counterpart how Claude might have been used in the operation, apparently in a way that indicated Anthropic might have a problem with it. Palantir then allegedly flagged the discussion for the Pentagon.

The Pentagon was already reportedly unhappy with Anthropic’s insistence on its red lines, and the company has not been included so far on the GenAI.mil platform the department built out in late 2025. At a speech in January, Hegseth pointedly said that “we will not employ AI models that won’t allow you to fight wars.”

That brings us to the Friday 5:01 pm showdown.

If Anthropic sticks to its guns, what can the Pentagon do?It could simply cancel the $200 million contract, which it would be in its rights to do. Hegseth isn’t wrong to say that suppliers as a rule do not dictate government policy. That would be a minor financial bummer for Anthropic, but the company is currently valued at $380 billion, so I think it would be okay. Other AI companies like xAI seem more than happy to take Anthropic’s place.

But Hegseth does not seem ready to take this relatively rational course of action. Instead, he’s talking as if he wants to make an example out of Anthropic and demonstrate that it is the Trump administration that will tell US AI companies how to act.

The Pentagon has threatened to use the Defense Production Act, a Cold War-era law that allows the president to compel companies to accept defense contracts. In the past that’s meant things like bolstering domestic production of critical supplies, as during the Covid pandemic, when President Trump invoked it to force additional ventilator production. But deliberately using it to target a domestic company over a policy dispute about AI safety rules — and essentially force Anthropic to train what some are calling a “War Claude” — would be unprecedented and certainly lead to drawn-out legal wrangling.

So, that’s not good for Anthropic, AI safety, and maybe even the rule of law. But even worse, for Anthropic at least, would be the last option: designating Anthropic a “supply chain risk.” This label — typically reserved for companies from adversary nations, like China’s Huawei — would prohibit every defense contractor from using Anthropic’s products. Since many of America’s largest corporations hold military contracts, this could effectively poison nearly all of Anthropic’s enterprise business and potentially torpedo a planned IPO. Axios has reported that the Pentagon has already started by asking Boeing and Lockheed Martin to assess their reliance on Claude.

Wait, I’m confused. So, essentially, the Pentagon is saying that Anthropic might be both a serious supply chain risk, but, also, it would like to compel the company to let it use Claude in just about any way it sees fit?

Yes, as Vox contributing editor and Argument staff writer Kelsey Piper put it: “It’s patently ridiculous to both claim that Claude poses a national security threat and also that it’s so necessary for wartime production you have to nationalize the company.”

So, what happens next?

Amodei has refused to back down, and much of the AI world is on his side. That includes competitors like Jeff Dean of Google and voices like Dean Ball, a former Trump AI adviser, who wrote on X that what the Pentagon is considering would represent “the strictest regulations of AI being considered by any government on Earth, and it all comes from an administration that bills itself (and legitimately has been) deeply anti-AI-regulation.” What seems clear is that, if the Pentagon successfully compels compliance — whether through the DPA, supply chain blacklisting, or commercial pressure — it will establish that no American AI company can maintain independent safety restrictions against government demands. Unless Congress does what it should do and passes laws constraining how the Pentagon uses lethal AI, we could be headed for a very dark future indeed — and one out of our control.

Update, February 26, 2026, 6:45 pm: This piece has been updated to include Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei’s statement.

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Vox · Bryan Walsh · February 26, 2026

17. What the Defense Production Act Can and Can’t Do to Anthropic

Summary:

Alan Rozenshtein explains that whether the Defense Production Act (DPA) can compel Anthropic depends on what the Pentagon is demanding, and the statute’s ambiguities cut both ways. The DPA clearly allows “priority” access to existing products, a common procurement tool, but the broader powers to compel contracting and allocate services are less tested and map awkwardly onto AI safety guardrails. He distinguishes two potential demands: forcing Anthropic to provide Claude without contractual usage restrictions, or compelling retraining to remove safety limits. The first is legally contestable; the second looks more like forcing a new product and could raise major-questions and First Amendment issues.

What the Defense Production Act Can and Can’t Do to Anthropic

lawfaremedia.org · Alan Z. Rozenshtein

Alan Z. Rozenshtein

Wednesday, February 25, 2026, 1:39 PM

The legal answer depends on what the government is actually demanding—and the statute's ambiguities cut both ways.

https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/what-the-defense-production-act-can-and-can't-do-to-anthropic

On Tuesday, Feb. 24, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth met with Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei and threatened to invoke the Defense Production Act (DPA) if Anthropic doesn't agree to the Pentagon’s terms by Friday. The DPA, Hegseth warned, would let the government compel Anthropic to provide its technology on the Pentagon's terms. Anthropic is resisting allowing its artificial intelligence (AI) to be used for autonomous weapons or mass surveillance—two red lines that the company has maintained since entering the defense market.

I argued last week that Congress—not the Pentagon or Anthropic—should set the rules for military AI. The DPA threat makes that case stronger. But first, it's worth understanding what the DPA can actually do here, because the answer depends entirely on what the government is demanding. The legal analysis is genuinely complicated: Different demands raise very different legal questions, and a statute whose core compulsion powers were designed for steel mills and tank factories maps awkwardly onto a dispute about AI safety guardrails.

The DPA and AI

The DPA is a Korean War-era statute that gives the president broad authority to direct private industry in the name of national defense. It has been extended many times since its enactment, most recently through September 2026.

The DPA already applies to AI. The Biden administration's since-rescinded Executive Order 14110, Section 4.2, invoked the DPA to require AI companies to report on training activities, red-team results, and model weights. But President Biden used Title VII, which contains the DPA's information-gathering authority. Based on the available reporting, Hegseth is likely threatening Title I—the statute's core compulsion power. That's an enormous escalation.

Biden's precedent cuts both ways for Anthropic. It makes it harder for the company to argue the DPA doesn't reach AI at all. But establishing that AI falls within the statute's scope doesn't mean every demand is lawful. The range of possible demands under Title I is enormous, and the legal analysis is different for each.

The statute, 50 U.S.C. § 4511(a), outlines the DPA's main compulsion authority, and it does two functionally different things. The first is queue-jumping: The president can "require that performance under contracts or orders ... which he deems necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense shall take priority over performance under any other contract or order." Applied to AI, this means the government jumps to the front of Anthropic's application programming interface queue—priority access to the same product everyone else gets, just first. This is the DPA's workhorse, used regularly for defense procurement, including software and IT services. This authority is well established and not at issue in the current dispute.

Section 4511(a)'s other authority—compelled contracting and allocation—goes much further. The DPA authorizes the president to "require acceptance and performance" of contracts by anyone he finds capable, and to "allocate materials, services, and facilities in such manner, upon such conditions, and to such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense." Together, the compelled-contracting and allocation powers let the government potentially force a company to accept new work and control the distribution of goods and services. During the Korean War, the government used it to ration aluminum, copper, and other critical materials between military and civilian production. During the coronavirus pandemic, both the Trump and Biden administrations used it to redirect medical supplies, vaccines, and test kits to domestic production.

But these broader authorities are largely untested. As James Baker, former chief judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and now a law professor at Syracuse University, has documented, the allocation power has barely been used since the Korean War, even though the broad language is "the sort ... executive branch lawyers sneak into legislation when no one is watching."

Two Demands, Two Legal Questions

The legal analysis depends on what the government actually demands, and two possibilities stand out. Anthropic's contract with the Pentagon includes usage-policy restrictions—contractual guardrails that prohibit applications such as autonomous weapons and mass surveillance. The Pentagon originally agreed to these terms. But in January, Hegseth's AI strategy memorandum directed that all Defense Department AI contracts incorporate standard "any lawful use" language within 180 days—a direct collision with Anthropic's restrictions. The government might now demand that Claude, Anthropic’s frontier AI model, be provided without those contractual guardrails, while leaving the model itself untouched. Or it might go further and demand that Anthropic retrain Claude to strip the safety restrictions out of the model entirely.

Two legal questions determine the strength of the government's position. The first is statutory: Does the DPA authorize the government to compel a company to provide a product it doesn't currently make, or only to redirect existing products on new terms? Baker notes that government agencies including the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Homeland Security have taken the broad view—companies can be forced to accept contracts for products that they don't ordinarily make.

But, as Baker notes, the text doesn't go that far. "If indeed acceptance of contracts for products a company does not ordinarily supply is intended to be required by the DPA," he writes, "it ought to be clearly stated in the law." It isn't. The major questions doctrine, used recently by the Supreme Court to strike down the core of the Trump administration's emergency tariffs, cuts the same way: Courts are skeptical when agencies claim vast authority from ambiguous statutory text.

To be sure, the DPA is an explicit economic-direction statute—Congress clearly authorized some kinds of compulsion. But the further a demand strays from priority access to existing products, the harder it becomes to defend under that doctrine. And the implementing regulation, 15 C.F.R. § 700.13(c), partially supports the narrower reading: by default (unless the Commerce Department directs otherwise), companies may reject rated orders for "an item not supplied or for a service not performed."

Whatever the answer to the first question, there is also a second one: For each specific demand, does the government ask for an existing product or a new one? If a demand just changes the terms of sale for an existing product, the government can draw on the allocation authority's sweeping language about conditions. If it amounts to demanding a new product, the government runs into the ambiguity Baker identified.

Claude Without Contractual Restrictions

The demand most likely at issue is that the government wants Claude without Anthropic's contractual usage-policy guardrails. Here the characterization question is genuinely contested, and each side's statutory argument flows from how it characterizes the demand.

The government would likely argue that dropping the contractual restrictions doesn't change the product. Claude is the same model with the same weights and the same capabilities—the government just wants different contractual terms. The government has two paths here. Under the priorities authority, it could argue that Claude-without-guardrails is the same product on different terms—and the implementing regulations do permit companies to reject rated orders when the buyer is "unwilling or unable to meet regularly established terms of sale or payment," unless the Commerce Department directs otherwise. Alternatively, the government could invoke the allocations authority, whose sweeping language lets the president allocate services "in such manner, upon such conditions, and to such an extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate" (emphasis added).

Anthropic would likely argue the opposite: that its usage restrictions are part of what Claude is as a commercial service, and that Claude-without-guardrails is a product it doesn't offer to anyone. On this view, the government is asking for a new product, and the statute doesn't clearly authorize that.

As Charlie Bullock, who has previously analyzed how the DPA applies to AI systems, observed, neither side's argument is "a slam dunk." But the sheer breadth of the DPA's allocation language arguably tilts in the government's direction.

Forced Retraining

The more extreme possibility would be the government compelling Anthropic to retrain Claude—to strip the safety guardrails baked into the model's training, not merely modify the access terms. Here the characterization question seems easier: a retrained model looks much more like a new product than dropping contractual restrictions does. Admittedly, the government has a textual argument in its favor: the DPA's definitions of "services" include “development … of a critical critical technology item,” and the government could frame retraining Claude as exactly that. Whether courts would accept that framing, especially in light of the major questions doctrine, is another matter.

The closest analogy is the FBI's attempts in 2015 and 2016 to compel Apple to write custom software to unlock iPhones. Those cases arose under the All Writs Act, not the DPA, and this distinction matters in that the All Writs Act is a gap-filling procedural statute; courts were skeptical precisely because it provided no substantive authority to compel production. The DPA is an express grant of compulsion power, which means the government's legal footing would be stronger here than the FBI's was. Still, the analogy is instructive: Even with a substantive statute, courts may balk at stretching compulsion authority to force a company to build something fundamentally at odds with its own product. Specifically, in one such case, a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of New York denied the government's request, concluding that the government was asking the court to "give it authority that Congress chose not to confer."

Forced retraining would also raise novel First Amendment questions. If model training decisions are editorial choices, then forcing Anthropic to strip its model's guardrails on autonomous weapons and mass surveillance compels the company to express values it rejects. This question is genuinely unsettled. Some have argued that AI companies exercise First Amendment rights when they train their models and determine their outputs; others have argued to the contrary. The Supreme Court in Moody v. NetChoice (2024) recognized that some algorithmic curation constitutes protected expression, but several justices expressed skepticism about how far that principle extends.

* * *

If Anthropic does resist a formal DPA order, the most likely path, as Bullock noted, would be to comply under protest (given the DPA provides for criminal penalties for noncompliance) and immediately seek a temporary restraining order—which courts can sometimes grant within days.

But Hegseth doesn't need to win in court—he just needs the threat to be credible enough to change behavior. All this legal uncertainty may itself be the point. As Baker notes, "Sometimes the availability of potential authority is sufficient leverage to achieve a result through consultation without invoking the law." Other leading AI companies reportedly have already agreed to the Pentagon's terms for unclassified work (and Elon Musk’s xAI for classified work), leaving Anthropic isolated.

The ironies of the government's positions are worth noting. Even Biden's far more modest DPA use—Title VII reporting requirements—drew sharp Republican criticism. Yet Hegseth now threatens Title I compulsion—orders of magnitude more coercive than the reporting requirements that Republicans called "overreach." And of course, it is difficult to square Hegseth's characterization of Anthropic as a "supply chain risk" with the premise of a DPA order: that Anthropic's technology is so essential to national defense that the government must compel access to it.

But the deeper problem continues to be that this fight is happening because Congress hasn't set substantive rules for military AI. If Congress had legislated guidelines on autonomous weapons and surveillance, Anthropic would likely be far more comfortable selling its systems to the military—and the DPA threat would have never arisen. The question of what values to embed in military AI is too important to be resolved by a Cold War-era production statute.

lawfaremedia.org · Alan Z. Rozenshtein

18. Who's Setting the Rules for Military AI? Not Congress

Summary:

Tony Johnson argues the Pentagon–Anthropic dispute exposes a constitutional governance gap: Congress has not set durable rules for military AI, leaving the executive branch and vendors to improvise. He says Secretary of Defense/War Pete Hegseth issued Anthropic a Friday deadline to drop Claude’s guardrails on mass domestic surveillance and fully autonomous weapons or lose a $200 million contract, while also threatening Defense Production Act compulsion and a “supply chain risk” designation that could blacklist the firm. Johnson concedes “lawful use” is a defensible starting principle and cites DoD/W’s 2020 AI ethics principles, but argues “lawful” depends on laws Congress has not written. He adds DoD/W’s reliance on a single classified-ready model amplifies coercive pressure and signals institutional improvisation, not governance.

Comment: When Congress stays quiet, deadlines replace doctrine, and the executive reaches for old tools to solve new problems, even when the fit is bad. The single-vendor claim is the pressure point. If Claude is the only classified-ready option, then the Pentagon’s leverage is also its liability, because dependency makes coercion feel necessary.

If “lawful use” is the standard but Congress has not defined the boundaries for autonomous weapons and surveillance, who is actually accountable when the military’s interpretation of “lawful” shifts with each administration?

Who's Setting the Rules for Military AI? Not Congress

reconnectingtherepublic.org · Tony Johnson

The Pentagon's showdown with Anthropic reveals a constitutional gap that only Congress can close.

Tony Johnson

Feb 26, 2026

https://www.reconnectingtherepublic.org/p/whos-setting-the-rules-for-military

The Governance Gap Is Operational

Author’s Note: An earlier version of my previous article, “Who Governs the Machines That Now Shape War?”, indicated that Claude was available on the Department of Defense’s GenAI.mil platform. According to DefenseScoop’s reporting on the December 9, 2025, launch, Google Cloud’s Gemini for Government was the first — and at launch, only — AI product deployed on GenAI.mil. The earlier piece has been corrected. Accuracy matters, especially when the subject is institutional accountability.

This week, the argument I’ve been making in this series stopped being an analysis and became breaking news.

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On Tuesday, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth gave Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei a Friday deadline: remove the guardrails on the Claude AI system — specifically, the company’s restrictions on mass domestic surveillance and fully autonomous weapons — or lose a $200 million Pentagon contract. Hegseth also threatened to invoke the Defense Production Act and designate Anthropic a supply chain risk, a designation that could effectively blacklist the company from work across the federal government. As of this writing, Anthropic has not budged.

If you want to understand why this matters beyond the contract dispute itself, stay with me. Because what’s happening isn’t really about Anthropic versus the Pentagon. It’s about who governs “the machines/AI” that now shape war — and what happens when the institution constitutionally responsible for answering that question has gone largely silent.

Lawful Use Is the Right Starting Point — But It’s Not the Finish Line

Let’s give credit where it’s due. The Pentagon’s core principle — that the military, having purchased a capability with taxpayer dollars, should be free to deploy it for any lawful purpose across its authorized missions — is defensible. It reflects the basic structure of civil-military authority in a constitutional democracy.

When DoD’s own AI Ethics Principles, adopted in 2020, call for AI systems that are lawful, ethical, governable, traceable, reliable, and equitable — the department is right to insist that those principles, not a vendor’s business preferences, govern how its tools are used.

Pentagon CTO Emil Michael said it plainly in a February 19 meeting with reporters: “You can’t have an AI company sell AI to the Department of War and don’t let it do Department of War things.” That’s a reasonable operational frustration. I’ve sat in rooms where that kind of friction is maddening.

But ‘lawful use’ is only as strong as the laws defining it. And here is where my argument must extend well beyond what most commentary has been willing to go.

Congress Hasn't Shown Up

The hard truth is that Congress has not written the rules. Not comprehensively, not durably, and not in time. The Biden administration’s 2024 National Security Memorandum on AI (previously available online but is now suddenly no longer available) and updated DoD directives on autonomous weapons exist, but they are executive instruments — reversible, narrow in scope, and not a substitute for statute.

There is no comprehensive legislative framework governing which AI applications the military can and cannot pursue, what companies must build into — or be forbidden from building into — systems sold to the government, or what transparency and reporting requirements give the public genuine visibility into how these tools are actually used.

That is a legislative gap. And it has consequences that are now playing out in public.

Lawfare published an analysis today making precisely this point: Congress — not the Pentagon, not Anthropic — should set the rules for military AI. As the piece notes, the Pentagon originally agreed to Anthropic’s contractual guardrails on autonomous weapons and mass surveillance. It is now threatening to use a Korean War-era statute — the Defense Production Act — to compel compliance. That is what happens when the institution responsible for writing durable rules declines to do so: the executive branch improvises, and private companies become the last line of accountability.

That is not a system. It is a series of workarounds waiting to fail.

The Single-Vendor Problem

There is a detail in this dispute that hasn’t gotten the attention it deserves. According to multiple reports, Claude is currently the only frontier AI model authorized for use on DoD’s classified networks. The department has no classified-ready backup. This matters enormously for the governance argument: the Pentagon’s aggressive posture — ultimatums, DPA threats, supply chain risk designations — is at least partly a function of its own failure to avoid single-vendor dependency, a condition it was already warned about in the late Biden administration’s AI directives.

A department that built its classified AI infrastructure around a single provider, accepted that provider’s usage restrictions as contractual terms, and now wants to retroactively rewrite those terms under threat of law is not demonstrating institutional strength. It is demonstrating institutional improvisation. And improvisation under pressure is not governance.

Convenient Vacuums

There is something else worth naming — even if it’s uncomfortable. Governance vacuums are sometimes convenient for those operating within them. Oversight creates friction. Reporting requirements generate work. Legislative mandates constrain operational flexibility. When Congress is not asking hard questions, the day-to-day work of deploying new capabilities can move faster and with fewer interruptions.

I understand that logic. I’ve lived inside institutions where it operates. And I am not suggesting that the career professionals working on military AI are acting in bad faith. Most are not. They are doing serious work under serious pressure, with inadequate guidance from the branch of government constitutionally responsible for providing it.

But ‘Congress isn’t watching’ is not a governance strategy. It is a condition that eventually produces exactly the kind of public rupture we are witnessing — where the absence of clear rules means every friction point becomes a crisis, and every crisis becomes a political confrontation, rather than a policy problem with a policy solution.

The pattern is not unique to AI. Defense contractors working in surveillance and data analytics have faced similar tensions — congressional scrutiny of lawful-use boundaries, civil liberties objections, and pushback from oversight committees. The Anthropic dispute isn’t a novelty in the recurring story about the civil-military-corporate relationship. What’s new is the speed, the stakes, and the absence of any statutory framework designed to handle it.

The Fox guarding the Henhouse

My argument in this series has been consistent: the question of who governs military AI cannot be answered by the Secretary of Defense alone. Not because the department lacks competence or good faith — but because the fox-and-henhouse problem is structural, not personal.

Institutions asked to govern themselves without external accountability tend, over time, to govern in their own interests. That is not a criticism. It is institutional physics.

Congress must act. Not to micromanage operations, but to establish the durable legal architecture that makes legitimate oversight possible: statutory definitions of prohibited AI applications in warfare, transparency and reporting requirements with meaningful enforcement mechanisms, and independent review processes with actual authority. The National Defense Authorization Act is one vehicle. There are others. The point is that the authority must be legislative — not merely executive — and it must be exercised, not merely delegated.

Until that happens, we will keep having the wrong argument — vendors versus the Pentagon, ethics versus operations, Friday deadlines and DPA threats — when the right argument is between the democratic institutions responsible for governing both.

The Republic's Next Move

Strategic literacy means being able to see the architecture beneath the headlines.

This week’s dispute is not, at its core, about Anthropic’s values or the Pentagon’s frustration. It is about whether the republic’s governing institutions are fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities in a domain that is moving faster than their oversight functions and habits.

The answer, for now, is no. But the answer can change — if citizens understand what’s at stake well enough to demand it.

That is why this work matters.

Be Intrepid — Tony

February 2026

A Republic aware of its fractures | An American committed to its repair.

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Sources & Further Reading

DefenseScoop, “DOD initiates large-scale rollout of commercial AI models and emerging agentic tools,” Dec. 9, 2025: https://defensescoop.com/2025/12/09/genai-mil-platform-dod-commercial-ai-models-agentic-tools-google-gemini/

DefenseScoop, “Pentagon CTO urges Anthropic to ‘cross the Rubicon’ on military AI use cases amid ethics dispute,” Feb. 19, 2026: https://defensescoop.com/2026/02/19/pentagon-anthropic-dispute-military-ai-hegseth-emil-michael/

CNN, “Pentagon threatens to make Anthropic a pariah if it refuses to drop AI guardrails,” Feb. 24, 2026: https://www.cnn.com/2026/02/24/tech/hegseth-anthropic-ai-military-amodei

TechCrunch, “Anthropic won’t budge as Pentagon escalates AI dispute,” Feb. 24, 2026: https://techcrunch.com/2026/02/24/anthropic-wont-budge-as-pentagon-escalates-ai-dispute/

Lawfare, “What the Defense Production Act Can and Can’t Do to Anthropic,” Feb. 26, 2026: https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/what-the-defense-production-act-can-and-can’t-do-to-anthropic

NBC News, “Tensions between the Pentagon and AI giant Anthropic reach a boiling point,” Feb. 20, 2026: https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/anthropic-ai-defense-war-venezuela-maduro-rcna259603

Department of Defense, AI Ethics Principles, Feb. 24, 2020: https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-adopts-ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/

The “disappeared”

White House, National Security Memorandum on AI, Oct. 24, 2024: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/10/24/memorandum-on-advancing-the-united-states-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence/

DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems (updated 2023): https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf

Congressional Research Service, AI and National Security: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45178

H.R. 2670, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2024, 118th Congress: https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2670

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reconnectingtherepublic.org · Tony Johnson

19. Ex-Air Force pilot arrested for allegedly training Chinese military pilots without authorization

Summary:

Federal prosecutors say Gerald Eddie Brown Jr., a former U.S. Air Force fighter pilot and simulator instructor, was arrested in Jeffersonville, Indiana, for allegedly training Chinese military pilots without required U.S. authorization. The Justice Department charged him with providing, and conspiring to provide, “defense services” to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force in violation of the Arms Export Control Act, which requires State Department licensing for such training. Investigators allege Brown began negotiating the work around August 2023 through intermediaries, traveled to China in December 2023, and conducted training and briefings there before returning to the United States earlier this month. Prosecutors link the effort to a network involving a Chinese national previously convicted in a hacking conspiracy.

Ex-Air Force pilot arrested for allegedly training Chinese military pilots without authorization

foxnews.com · Greg Wehner Fox News

Gerald Eddie Brown Jr allegedly violated Arms Export Control Act after 24-year Air Force career training American pilots on advanced combat aircraft

By Greg Wehner Fox News

Published February 25, 2026 9:06pm EST

https://www.foxnews.com/us/ex-air-force-pilot-arrested-allegedly-training-chinese-military-pilots-without-authorization

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A former U.S. Air Force fighter pilot who once trained American servicemembers on advanced combat aircraft, including the F-35, has been arrested and accused of illegally training Chinese military pilots, federal prosecutors said Wednesday.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) said Gerald Eddie Brown Jr., whose call sign is "Runner," was taken into custody in Jeffersonville, Ind., and charged with providing and conspiring to provide defense services to Chinese military pilots without authorization.

Prosecutors allege Brown violated the Arms Export Control Act, a federal law that regulates the export of U.S. defense articles, services and military technology and requires government approval before they can be shared with foreign governments or nationals.

"The United States Air Force trained Major Brown to be an elite fighter pilot and entrusted him with the defense of our Nation. He now stands charged with training Chinese military pilots," Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg said. "When U.S. persons – whether military or civilian – provide training to a foreign military, that activity is illegal unless they have a license from the State Department."

A former US Air Force fighter pilot is accused of illegally training Chinese military pilots without State Department approval, DOJ officials said. (Hu Shanmin/Xinhua via AP)

The DOJ alleges that since "at least in or around August 2023," Brown "willfully conspired" with foreign nationals and other U.S. persons to provide combat aircraft training to pilots in the Chinese Air Force, known as the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).

Prosecutors say the training required State Department approval under federal export regulations, and Brown did not have a license to provide it to a foreign military.

Brown served more than 24 years in the U.S. Air Force, according to the DOJ, leaving active duty in 1996 with the rank of major.

EX-ARMY SERGEANT SENTENCED FOR TRYING TO GIVE STATE SECRETS TO CHINA AFTER MENTAL HEALTH SPIRAL

A former US Air Force fighter pilot is accused of illegally training Chinese military pilots without State Department approval, DOJ officials said. (VCG/VCG via Getty Images)

During his career, he commanded units responsible for nuclear weapons delivery systems, led combat missions and worked as a fighter pilot and simulator instructor on aircraft including the F-4, F-15, F-16 and A-10. After leaving the military, Brown worked as a commercial cargo pilot and later as a contract simulator instructor training U.S. pilots to fly the A-10 and the F-35 Lightning II.

According to the complaint, Brown began negotiating a contract "in or around" August 2023 to train Chinese military pilots, working through a co-conspirator who dealt with Stephen Su Bin, a Chinese national previously convicted in the U.S. of conspiring to hack into the computer networks of major American defense contractors and steal sensitive military data.

Prosecutors say Brown made clear in those discussions that he intended to train Chinese pilots in combat aircraft operations. In a résumé, he listed his objective as "Instructor Fighter Pilot" and later wrote that, upon arriving in China, "Now…. I have the chance to fly and instruct fighter pilots again!"

MOST SHOCKING EXAMPLES OF CHINESE ESPIONAGE UNCOVERED BY THE US THIS YEAR: 'JUST THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG'

Saffrine Duggan speaks outside Downing Central Court in Sydney on May 24, 2024, where her husband Daniel Edmund Duggan appeared. Brown’s case follows similar charges against Duggan, who is accused of providing defense services to Chinese military pilots without authorization and is currently fighting extradition to the U.S. (Rick Rycroft/AP Photo)

According to the complaint, Brown traveled to China in December 2023 to begin training Chinese military pilots and remained there until returning to the United States earlier this month.

Prosecutors allege that after arriving in China, Brown spent hours answering questions about the U.S. Air Force and later delivered a presentation about himself to members of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force.

"As an Air Force Officer, Brown took an oath to defend our Nation against all enemies foreign and domestic, he broke that oath, and betrayed the country, jeopardizing the safety of our servicemembers and allies," U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Jeanine Ferris Pirro said. "We will hold Brown, and anyone conspiring against our Nation, accountable for their actions."

Brown’s case follows similar charges against former U.S. Marine Corps pilot Daniel Edmund Duggan, who is accused of providing defense services to Chinese military pilots without authorization and is currently pending extradition to the U.S.

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Prosecutors allege Duggan trained Chinese military pilots on aircraft carrier takeoff and landing procedures, skills considered highly sensitive to U.S. national defense. He is currently in Australia.

Brown, if convicted, faces significant federal prison time under export control laws designed to prevent U.S. military expertise from being transferred to foreign adversaries.

Greg Wehner is a breaking news reporter for Fox News Digital.

Story tips and ideas can be sent to Greg.Wehner@Fox.com and on Twitter @GregWehner.

foxnews.com · Greg Wehner Fox News

20. AI Is Being Misunderstood as a Breakthrough in Planning. It’s Not.

Summary:

Christopher Denzel argues that AI is being mistaken for a planning breakthrough when it is really a synthesis accelerant. It raises the floor by compressing routine staff work, but it also collapses the median by making polished, internally coherent plans cheap, which lets unresolved tradeoffs hide behind tidy structure. At the campaign level, the hard problem is not information. It is judgment under uncertainty: choosing priorities, accepting risk, and subordinating objectives. Denzel’s practical recommendation is to use AI to generate multiple plausible framings, then surface where each breaks, forcing commanders to decide rather than optimize.

Comment: AI will increase “briefable” volume, so headquarters may confuse tempo with progress. The real failure mode will be governance and accountability drift, not model error. Units that treat AI as a diagnostic tool for friction will outpace those that use it as an answer machine.

For planners using AI:

In your last plan, what did you explicitly choose to stop doing?

Where in your process is judgment auditable, so structure cannot launder indecision?

Perhaps there is only one truism: there are not silver bullets.

AI Is Being Misunderstood as a Breakthrough in Planning. It’s Not.

Christopher Denzel

February 26, 2026

https://warontherocks.com/2026/02/ai-is-being-misunderstood-as-a-breakthrough-in-planning-its-not/

In the age of AI, the scarcest resource in headquarters is no longer time. It is, rather, the willingness to say no.

Artificial intelligence is moving rapidly into military planning staffs because it compresses routine cognitive labor. AI excels at absorbing guidance, reorganizing complex material, and producing clear strategic language at speed. This feels like a qualitative advance, creating the impression that planning itself has become easier. But this impression misleads. The risk of AI-enabled planning is that it will produce plausible constructs that obscure where judgment is required, creating the illusion that analytic completeness can substitute for prioritization.

AI is seen as “raising the floor” by making it easier to produce adequate products. That is true. Yet AI also “collapses the median” by increasing the relative cost of real insight. As AI-enabled planning begin to inform real-world operations, the temptation is to treat complete answers as sufficient, without interrogating whether they represent the right answers to the hard questions of what to resource, what to defer, and what risk to accept.

This temptation confuses exhaustiveness with clarity. At the campaign level, these characteristics find themselves in tension. Failure rarely stems from insufficient information but instead from the failure to impose priority where competing objectives cannot all be satisfied. AI synthesizes brilliantly, but synthesis cannot resolve this tension.

The following observations reflect lessons from sustained use of large language models by myself and other planners at U.S. Forces Japan. During transformation campaign planning, AI was used not as an experiment but rather embedded directly into workflows for synthesis, reframing, drafting, and iteration. Used inside live planning cycles, the limits – and advantages – of AI emerged repeatedly.

AI changes campaign planning, but in a narrower way than often assumed. It raised the floor, collapsing the time and effort required to generate and revise internally coherent constructs. However, the same features that give AI its greatest potential in military planning also allow unresolved choices to hide behind orderly structure — collapsing the median.

AI’s value lies less in producing a strong theory of the campaign than in rapidly revealing which theories do not survive contact with competing demands and constraints. In practice, AI should be used to present commanders not with complete solutions but with multiple internally-consistent framings, with planners exposing where those frames break — forcing decisions about priority, risk, and subordination.

Operational Art Is Bounded by Judgment, Not Information

Operational art is governed by a constraint that no amount of analytic power can remove because the most consequential decisions in campaign design are made where causality is uncertain. Priority is not a question of quality or quantity of data — it is a question of judgment.

In a campaign, the problem is not understanding what should be done, but deciding what matters more when objectives compete, authorities overlap, resources are finite, and adversaries adapt. These judgments are consequential, yet cannot be proven correct in advance. A campaign design can only be judged plausible given assumptions that may or may not hold. Operational art, therefore, relies on causal reasoning under uncertainty, not on predictive models that promise a “correct answer.”

This is why additional information and more sophisticated synthesis do not reliably reduce uncertainty in such environments. As complexity grows, the marginal value of detail declines and the importance of focusing effort increases. Additional analysis cannot resolve which risks are acceptable, which objectives must prevail, or which failures can be absorbed. That judgment — the imposition of priority where demands cannot all be satisfied — is an inherent, and human, function of command.

This constraint applies regardless of the tool set in use. Campaign design has always employed analytic aids — intelligence preparation, modeling, red-teaming — but none displaced the requirement for accountable choice. Before AI, these processes were labor-intensive and iterative, limiting how quickly staffs could generate a coherent plan and forcing planners to dwell on complex issues. New technologies may accelerate synthesis and iteration, but they encounter a hard ceiling. Algorithms cannot decide what deserves priority and the speed they promise threatens to crowd out the time required for judgment. Treating those decisions as analytic outputs obscures where judgment must be exercised.

The Temptation of Treating AI as a “Planning Optimizer”

Organizations may be tempted to manage uncertainty through optimization – arranging objectives, tasks, and effects into plans that appear complete, balanced, and institutionally defensible. While this impulse predates AI, what changes is how easily this can now be indulged.

But optimization fails because it solves the wrong problem. At the campaign level, coherence and balance cannot substitute for a causal theory and exhaustiveness cannot replace judgment.

The optimizing mindset produces familiar artifacts: evenly weighted objectives, symmetrical lines of effort, comprehensive task lists, and balanced effects that appear to cover the problem space. AI excels at generating planning constructs that are structurally-sound and defensible. But that coherence is precisely the danger. By smoothing differences and averaging the focus of effort, optimization suppresses priority.

AI makes balanced, defensible plans cheap and plentiful — allowing unresolved priorities to hide behind competent structure. Optimization substitutes internal order for choice and symmetry for judgment. Perfunctory acknowledgment that “judgment cannot be automated” functions less as a constraint than as a permission structure. I’ve seen staffs proceed as if coherent AI-generated recommendations were an acceptable stand-in for decision. Absent observable consequences, that acknowledgement becomes performative rather than constraining. Staffs ought to manifest behavior changes in an auditable way, presenting AI-generated framings alongside analysis of where those framings fail, presenting commanders with not just a proposed course, but highlighting the limits and tradeoffs that require commander’s judgment.

An optimized plan places internal logic over external reality, allowing balance to substitute for focus. The result diffuses responsibility.

This failure is structural, not technical. It cannot be fixed with better data, tighter prompts, or additional iteration. Optimization assumes that importance is latent in the data and can be surfaced through better analysis. Campaign design operates under a different logic. Priority is not discovered in the data, but asserted by an authority. Algorithms cannot determine which objective should dominate, which lines of effort should be subordinate, or which risks are acceptable. Answers to those questions cannot be found in the data—they are a choice based on a commander’s judgment and accountability.

When AI Reveals the Limits of Structure

The dynamics described above become most visible where campaigns resist a single, coherent frame. This was evident during campaign planning at U.S. Forces Japan, where the mission set does not align cleanly with assumptions embedded in traditional operational design. U.S. Forces Japan operates at the intersection of military readiness, alliance management, policy execution, and diplomacy — often simultaneously. These responsibilities draw from different authorities, pursue different logics, and answer to different measures of success. They are related, but not contiguous.

Traditional planning struggles in such environments because it presumes that unity can be imposed through structure. Doctrinal constructs (objectives, lines of operation, decisive points, etc.) work best when a mission can be reduced to a dominant logic. In non-traditional missions, that reduction misleads. The problem is a mismatch between the framework being imposed and the underlying reality being described. AI will cleanly apply doctrine to a complex problem, smoothing out where the reality defies doctrinal categorization. When a machine does this, commanders and staffs may never be aware that a square peg has been algorithmically rendered “round” to fit the shape of the hole.

AI rendered this mismatch explicit in campaign planning at U.S. Forces Japan. There, the planning team largely worked on classified networks, using Maven Smart Systems, which provided Anthropic’s Claude Sonnet model. Planners also experimented with Ask Sage (which provided access to a variety of models, including those of OpenAI).

When applied to U.S. Forces Japan’s campaign design, large language models consistently produced analytically defensible but conceptually fragile frames defining the command’s roles, missions, and functions. Each frame cleanly organized tasks, clustered objectives, and generated plausible narratives, yet each failed in a different place, usually by subordinating one role while privileging another. No single construct could accommodate all roles simultaneously without distortion.

This was not a failure of prompting or data. Rather, it was a signal that the mission itself resisted singular explanation. These failures made the underlying reality unmistakable. The command’s mission was not only non-traditional, it was also non-contiguous — operating simultaneously at the policy, strategic, and tactical levels, each governed by distinct logics and supporting relationships.

That breakdown proved productive. Because reframing was cheap, planners could generate competing constructs, observe where each collapsed, and interrogate why. AI did not reveal a “correct” frame, but rather revealed the limits of each available one. Instead of planners providing the “best fit” frame or presenting leading frames as options to select from, planners recommended that the commander accept the structural inconsistency of three roles, each with distinct missions and functions. Paradoxically, by rejecting a single framing of the command’s purpose, the commander preserved concurrent, independent prioritization within each core role. This tension, in fact, clarified that U.S. Forces Japan’s function is not to resolve competing roles into a unified hierarchy, but to integrate a set of irreducible responsibilities into a single headquarters capable of providing unity of effort where unity of command is impossible.

This is where AI “raises the ceiling.” By rapidly producing competent framings, AI strips away false differentiation between plans that only appear distinct. What remains — where each construct breaks or distorts — is precisely where command judgment should be exercised. In that sense, AI raises the ceiling of planning not by deciding, but by making the need for command judgment easier to locate.

This dynamic is not unique to U.S. Forces Japan. It emerges wherever campaign responsibilities resist reduction to a single governing logic. Once optimization is set aside, AI’s practical effect in campaign design becomes clearer and more limited. AI does not resolve uncertainty or displace judgment. It collapses the cost of generating plausible ways of thinking about the problem. The danger comes when the standard for planning is lowered to plausibility—now available in an instant. A more responsible approach to AI-enabled planning instead adopts the harder method of using multiple plausible plans diagnostically to surface the tensions that spark real insight.

That acceleration alters the rhythm of planning. Instead of investing disproportionate effort in producing a single polished construct, staffs can explore multiple framings, discard weak ones early, and revisit assumptions more often. But this same speed creates risk. Coherent plans can appear “good enough” to brief before priority has been imposed. Absent deliberate intervention, accelerated tempo favors structure over decision, allowing unresolved choices to persist beneath orderly, balanced frameworks.

Campaigns do not succeed through balance but through deliberate imbalance — privileging some objectives, subordinating others, and accepting specific risks in service of a dominant purpose. Those judgments are not latent in data. They are imposed through a commander’s intent. Seen this way, AI’s symmetry bias becomes diagnostically useful. It exposes exactly where command judgment should intervene. AI can organize the problem and sharpen debate, but it cannot rank what should prevail. Imposing asymmetry on a resistant problem remains inseparable from command itself.

Judgment Requires Sacrifice

The most dangerous failures in AI-enabled planning will not look like technical breakdowns. Plans will remain coherent, language disciplined, and assumptions defensible — providing a comfortable structure that invites consensus, allowing responsibility to diffuse.

Once asymmetry is made explicit, familiar planning comforts become incompatible with how campaign design actually works. These are not transitional frictions or governance gaps, but structural tradeoffs that cannot be avoided.

The first tradeoff is exhaustiveness. Campaigns cannot be both exhaustive and adaptable. When reframing is cheap, the instinct is to keep adding tasks, effects, and lines of effort until the plan feels complete. And large language models will infinitely oblige requests to go deeper. But exhaustive constructs harden assumptions. In contrast, campaign plans should be expected to change.

The second tradeoff is symmetry. Balanced frameworks feel fair, but they defer the decisive act of choosing what should dominate when resources, time, or political capital tighten. Asymmetry requires subordination. Some objectives advance at the expense of others, and some risks are accepted explicitly rather than smoothed away. That imbalance cannot be achieved through refinement. It requires a visible decision to elevate one purpose and accept the degradation of another.

The third tradeoff is plausible deniability. Balanced and exhaustive plans mask hard choices about risks and priorities within structure. When everything is prioritized, nothing is. Imposed asymmetry does the opposite — it makes judgment legible. Declaring a dominant objective, an acceptable risk, a main effort, or a subordinate line of operations ties outcomes to decisions rather than process.

These losses may be mislabeled as process problems, but no refinement of governance, weighting schemes, or review cycles can substitute for the act of establishing clear priorities. Attempts to compensate in this way miss the point. What is being lost is not procedural comfort, but the ability to hide choice behind structure. The discomfort that follows is not evidence of failure. It is evidence that authority is being exercised.

If AI-enabled planning fails, it will not be because the technology was insufficient but because structure became cheap and easy, obscuring where tradeoffs should be made. When AI-generated coherence is allowed to stand in for decision, plans appear disciplined while the hard choices of command recede.

AI supercharges linear planning doctrine. If commanders and staffs stop here, judgment will be obscured behind an increasingly competent structure. But paradoxically, the acceleration AI unlocks in planning should cause commanders and staffs to slow down. Using AI to locate where judgment and priority is most needed takes time.

Christopher Denzel is a Marine Corps strategic and operational planner currently serving in the Strategic Plans Branch (J-56) at U.S. Forces Japan. His work focuses on strategy, campaigning, and command and control modernization in the Indo-Pacific, with extensive experience integrating planning, intelligence, and wargaming in joint and allied environments.

He is a graduate of the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies and the National Intelligence University, and has held operational planning billets across the joint force, including at U.S. Cyber Command and III Marine Expeditionary Force.

The views expressed are his own and do not represent the views or positions of U.S. Forces Japan, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Megan Hearst via DVIDS.

21. How the Army Should Run: Reforming Army Processes for Continuous Transformation

Summary:

General Mingus and Christina Bembenek argue the Army cannot achieve continuous transformation with a fifty-year-old “How the Army Runs” framework taught as static staff lore. They describe a new HTAR operational planning team charged to build an agile, integrated, outcome-driven process that links force design, force development, and force employment, and that leaders can grasp without a multiday course. Priorities include accelerating Total Army Analysis with shared data platforms and modern cloud-based simulation, reforming PPBE by programming to capabilities across full life-cycle costs, and shrinking and automating business systems. They propose using an LLM on Vantage, fed by current policies, to replace the obsolete 500-page book.

Comment: But I loved the late LTG Trefrey's "From the Preamble to Foxhole." Watching him sketch out the entire How the Army Works on the three walls of white board in a SAMS seminar classroom was simply amazing. Hopefully General Mingus can develop the 21st Century version. I hope he can become the next LTG Trefrey.

How the Army Should Run: Reforming Army Processes for Continuous Transformation - Modern War Institute

James Mingus and Christina Bembenek | 02.27.26

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/how-the-army-should-run-reforming-army-processes-for-continuous-transformation/

Editor’s note: This article is the sixth in an eight-part series led by retired General James Mingus, the thirty-ninth vice chief of staff of the Army, on transforming the Army to meet the challenges of tomorrow’s battlefield. You can read other articles in the series here.

Starting in 1997, every major at the Army’s Command and General Staff College received a multihour course on “How the Army Runs,” accompanied by a five-hundred- page tome. Within minutes of departing Ft. Leavenworth, nearly all officers had flushed that high-level, complicated staff knowledge from their brains, abandoned their copies of the book to a moving carton, and went back to leading troops—and then ten years later they arrived at the Pentagon and wished they had paid more attention.

But even if they had retained the book knowledge, the way the Army actually runs changes with constantly shifting policies and regulations. The basic framework for how the Army runs is over fifty years old, but the way we design, develop, and employ the force has changed—and the pace continues to accelerate. Continuous transformation requires streamlined, flexible, automated processes that allow the Army to design and build the force we need today, informed by experimentation in the field, as well as plan for the force required to stay ahead of rapidly advancing threats we cannot forecast. Getting this right is one of the most important tasks we can accomplish for our Army.

Figuring Out How the Army Should Run

This past year we stood up the How the Army Runs (HTAR) operational planning team (OPT), which includes military and civilian experts from across the Army staff as well as Transformation and Training Command, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. This team is charged with designing a process for the Army to execute agile, integrated, outcome-driven force design, force development, and force employment processes that enable continuous transformation and deliver war-winning capabilities. No small task, this will entail both process improvement and culture change across the Army. If the HTAR OPT succeeds, this new, streamlined, and adaptable process will provide leaders with better awareness and understanding of today’s decisions and their long-term impacts.

One of the greatest challenges is developing a process that is understandable without a multiday course. If a process is not simple or intuitive, individuals will be wed to the steps of the process instead of thinking of creative ways to adapt to the specific situation. Total Army Analysis (TAA), which was previously a multiyear process, must account for the force we need to fight tonight, while also accounting for threat tactics and technology that hasn’t even been developed yet. Our labs and analytic centers are key players in this effort, and we must better organize them to ensure they are properly aligned to priority efforts and, most importantly, utilize common data platforms that allow them to share data across all time horizons. Next Generation Constructive, a cloud-based wargaming simulation, which will replace the current twentieth-century technology, is a great candidate for a common platform to test new capabilities, like the PrSM (Precision Strike Missile) Increment 4, in both analytic simulations as well as Warfighter exercises, before we ever field it to the force.

Another complicated effort the HTAR OPT has tackled is PPBE (planning, programming, budgeting, and execution) reform. Rather than allocating funds separately for training, installations, and equipment across the Army as we’ve traditionally done in pegs (TT peg, II peg, EE peg), we will centrally program funds for capabilities to ensure we are capturing all the costs from acquisition to operations to sustainment. This prevents us from accelerating the fielding of a high-tech aircraft like Future Long Range Assault Aircraft, but not building the appropriate hangar to house it when it arrives.

Accelerating TAA and reforming PPBE requires that we centralize and manage expanding amounts of data. Fortunately, technology and business systems have evolved to enable us to analyze data at higher rates with more accuracy. Therefore, as we streamline how the Army runs, we will also slim down our defense business systems and ensure we automate better processes with more advanced technology. With Next Generation Command and Control as our communications backbone, we will also merge our administrative data with our warfighting systems, so that commanders have all the logistics and personnel data at their fingertips to make quick, informed decisions whether in the field or in the office.

Moving from Analog Stovepipes to Digital Lakes

The days of the five-hundred-page volume that calcified outdated processes are over. You can automate a bad process and do it faster but it doesn’t change the outcome. By the end of this year, majors at the Command and General Staff College will learn how the Army runs utilizing a large language model on Vantage, which will be continuously updated with the most current policies and processes. The model will not only answer their questions about how the Army runs today, but will also point the user to where the data/information lives and who to contact if they need more information. Sharing and operating with live data will be a major cultural change for those of us in the Pentagon, but the benefits in terms of speed, visibility, and accuracy outweigh any individual’s discomfort. As we move our disparate data sources into a single digital lake, it’s time for everyone to learn how to swim.

Retired General James Mingus served as the thirty-ninth vice chief of staff of the Army.

Colonel Christina Bembenek is a military intelligence officer and the director of the vice’s initiatives group.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

22. Army orders $186 million in Switchblade kamikaze drones, tank killers

Army orders $186 million in Switchblade kamikaze drones, tank killers

Defense News · Zita Fletcher · February 26, 2026

https://www.defensenews.com/news/your-military/2026/02/26/army-orders-186-million-in-switchblade-kamikaze-drones-tank-killers/?ut m

Kamikaze drones and armored-piercing drones popularly known as “tank killers” are coming to the U.S. Army in bulk thanks to a new $186 million delivery order with AeroVironment Inc.

Announced today, the autonomous systems manufacturer will provide two types of its Switchblade family of loitering munitions to the Army, including the Switchblade 600 Block 2 and the Switchblade 300 Block 20 variants.

Loitering munitions are Unmanned Aircraft Systems that represent a blend of FPV drones and guided missiles. Known as “kamikaze” or one-way attack drones, they can seek targets and hover for long periods before zeroing in and exploding on command.

The 600 Block 2 was developed by AV in collaboration with U.S. Special Operations Command and is designed for use in a variety of remote and hostile environments. It can be used at sea and features advanced Artificial Intelligence capabilities that allow it to detect and lock on targets faster.

Its sister system, the 300 Block 2, is a “tank killer” loitering munition that can seek targets at extended ranges beyond line of sight. According to AV, the Army has ordered it equipped with an Explosively Formed Penetrator payload for the first time — a warhead that packs extra punch against armor. The system, designed for small units, is small enough to be carried in a backpack.

Last October, soldiers of the Army’s 1st Cavalry Division tested the Switchblade 600 system at Fort Hood, Military Times reported.

“This delivery order reflects the Army’s confidence in the next evolution of the Switchblade family and its relevance to modern, contested battlefields,” Brian Young, Senior Vice President of Loitering Munitions at AV, said in a statement.

“As we continue to invest in expanding Switchblade manufacturing capacity and accelerating delivery timelines, we are continuing to meet the growing demand for these products from U.S. and allied forces.”

About Zita Ballinger Fletcher

Zita Ballinger Fletcher previously served as editor of Military History Quarterly and Vietnam magazines and as the historian of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. She holds an M.A. with distinction in military history.

23. SOCOM on the hunt for ‘acoustic rainbow’ tech for silencing drones

SOCOM on the hunt for ‘acoustic rainbow’ tech for silencing drones

militarytimes.com · Michael Peck · February 26, 2026

https://www.militarytimes.com/unmanned/2026/02/26/socom-on-the-hunt-for-acoustic-rainbow-tech-for-silencing-drones/?utm

“Acoustic rainbows” sound psychedelic. But the idea is no acid trip: By dispersing sound waves, noisy objects can actually be made silent.

That’s why U.S. Special Operations Command is seeking acoustic rainbow emitters, or ARE, for its drones, according to a SOCOM Small Business Innovation Research solicitation.

“The ARE would provide a means to redirect the acoustic signature of a UAS and change the frequencies of the acoustic signature,” notes the solicitation, which closes March 25.

Though tactical drones can be small and hard to spot, the noise of their propellers can warn potential targets and put the drone itself at risk to hostile fire. “Acoustic sensors are becoming more prolific on the battlefield,” SOCOM noted.

The project aims to attach acoustic rainbow emitters to Army Special Operations Forces tactical drones. The emitters “should redirect the acoustic signature of a UAS towards the atmosphere and away from the ground,” the solicitation said. In addition, they “should filter the frequency of the sound emitted towards the ground to levels inaudible to the human ear.”

The goal is to reduce a drone’s acoustic signature by at least 50%. The device should weigh no more than 1 kilogram for a Group 1 UAS (under 20 pounds) and 3 kilograms for a Group 2 drone (under 55 pounds). The ARE must also “be colored to maintain a low visual signature.”

SOCOM seems particularly interested in silent attack drones. The solicitation mentions “a low-cost sensor employed from a UAS during terminal attack or when directed from the operator.”

Phase I of the SBIR is a Technology Readiness Level 3 feasibility study to see whether the concept is viable. Phase II calls for a prototype.

Acoustic rainbows have generated much buzz in recent years. The concept is similar to rainbows in the sky, when sunlight passing through water droplets becomes separated into different wavelengths and thus colors.

“Although acoustic rainbows are less well-known, they follow the same principle, being the spatial decomposition of sound in free space where waves oscillating at different frequencies propagate in different directions,” explained a Physicsworld article.

Some animals, such as bats and even humans, have the ability to do this naturally, which helps them to localize sounds. But doing this artificially across a wide range of frequencies has been a problem.

However, Danish and Spanish researchers unveiled last year a 3D-printed acoustic rainbow emitter that splits broadband sound — which would normally radiate in all directions — into separate frequencies that can be individually redirected. The device works on the principle of “passive scattering, where the acoustic system is purely driven by interactions between the hard plastic surface and sound waves, requiring no electricity,” noted Phys.org.

About Michael Peck

Michael Peck is a correspondent for Defense News and a columnist for the Center for European Policy Analysis. He holds an M.A. in political science from Rutgers University. Find him on X at @Mipeck1. His email is mikedefense1@gmail.com.

24. Philippines identifies US military plane that hit road barrier, injuring 5 crew members

Philippines identifies US military plane that hit road barrier, injuring 5 crew members

Stars and Stripes · Seth Robson · February 26, 2026

https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2026-02-25/air-force-plane-crash-philippines-20878664.html

Troops watch a U.S. Air Force C-146A Wolfhound take off from an austere location on Luzon, Philippines, Jan. 27, 2026. (U.S. Air Force)

The Philippine military has identified the U.S. military aircraft that crashed during a Tuesday roadway exercise as an Air Force C-146 Wolfhound special operations plane, an incident that injured five crew members.

The short takeoff-and-landing aircraft struck a concrete barrier while attempting to depart from a roadway, The Associated Press reported Wednesday.

Two service members were treated at a local medical facility, according to an unsigned email Thursday from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

“One of the individuals has been discharged, while the other remains in medical care and is in stable condition,” the command said.

The Wolfhound crashed during a joint roadway landing exercise in Laoac, Pangasinan, according to a Wednesday report by the state-run Philippine News Agency, citing the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The area is slightly more than an hour’s drive north of Clark Air Base, a former Air Force installation that continues to host U.S. military training in the Philippines.

The exercise was coordinated with Philippine authorities to practice operations in cases where airports and runways are inaccessible, such as during typhoons or earthquakes, the AP reported.

INDOPACOM confirmed that an accident occurred during training in central Luzon but did not provide additional details. No civilians were injured, and the incident remains under investigation, the command said.

Photos posted Tuesday on Facebook by the Philippine Department of National Defense showed a Wolfhound conducting what was described as the “first highway landing operation in the Philippines and only the second in Asia.”

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro observed the highway landing in Pangasinan, according to the post.

Photos released last month by U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific showed a Wolfhound taking off from an austere location on Luzon on Jan. 27.

The Wolfhound is the military version of the Dornier 328 turboprop commuter aircraft and has been continuously deployed since October 2011, according to an Air Force fact sheet. Its primary mission is to provide Special Operations Command with flexible, responsive transport for small teams and cargo.

“Airlift missions are conducted by Air Force Special Operations Command aircrews to prepared and semi-prepared airfields around the world,” the fact sheet states.

The twin-engine, high-wing aircraft is capable of carrying passengers and cargo and conducting casualty evacuation missions, according to the Air Force.

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Seth Robson

Seth Robson is a Tokyo-based reporter who has been with Stars and Stripes since 2003. He has been stationed in Japan, South Korea and Germany, with frequent assignments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, Australia and the Philippines.

Stars and Stripes · Seth Robson · February 26, 2026

25. Trump Will End Government Use of Anthropic’s AI Models

Summary:

POTUS said the federal government will stop using Anthropic’s AI, widening a dispute that began with the Pentagon over Claude’s “guardrails.” He ordered agencies to halt use and set a six-month phaseout for the Defense Department and other offices already relying on Anthropic tools, while warning of civil and criminal consequences if the company does not cooperate during the transition. The move comes as the Pentagon pressed Anthropic to accept “all lawful purposes” use, which the company resisted, citing limits on fully autonomous weapons and mass domestic surveillance.

Trump Will End Government Use of Anthropic’s AI Models

WSJ

Move follows weeks of tension between Pentagon and Anthropic over AI guardrails

By Amrith Ramkumar

Updated Feb. 27, 2026 4:26 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/trump-will-end-government-use-of-anthropics-ai-models-ff3550d9?mod=hp_lead_pos1

Dario Amodei, CEO and co-founder of Anthropic. Yves Herman/Reuters

The federal government will stop working with the artificial intelligence company Anthropic, President Trump said, marking a dramatic escalation of the government’s clash with the company over its AI models.

“I am directing every federal agency in the United States government to immediately cease all use of Anthropic’s technology. We don’t need it, we don’t want it and will not do business with them again!” Trump said in a post on Truth Social.

The Department of Defense and other agencies using Anthropic’s Claude models will have a six-month phaseout period, he said, adding that there would be civil and criminal consequences if the company isn’t helpful during the transition.

The move comes shortly before a 5:01 p.m. deadline for Anthropic to let the military use its models in all lawful use cases, a concession the company has refused to make.

Trump and administration officials have attacked the company for being too “woke,” taking exception to its push for AI regulations and its links to organizations that are big Democratic donors.

Anthropic didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

Trump’s announcement appears to indicate that the administration is canceling Anthropic’s contract with the Pentagon, which is worth up to $200 million. The company had sought to have protections written into the deal against the use of its models for autonomous weapons and mass domestic surveillance. The military has said it should have final authority to decide how the technology can be used within the law.

Pentagon officials had threatened to invoke the Defense Production Act to force Anthropic to comply and to label it a supply-chain risk, impairing its ability to work with other government contractors.

Broadening the clash to include all federal agencies takes the Anthropic fight to a much larger scale than its spat with the Pentagon. The company’s Claude models are being used across the government to do everything from summarize documents to analyze data. Pausing those functions to swap in alternatives could set back the government’s AI and modernization efforts, AI experts have said.

Amrith joined the Journal as a markets intern after graduating from Duke in 2017.

WSJ

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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