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Quotes of the Day:
“Without some sense of historical continuity, Americans are likely to relearn the lessons of history each time they are faced with a low-intensity conflict.
But what is more dangerous is the fact that during the relearning process Americans may suffer casualties and develop policy directions that can only lead to defeat.”
- Sam C. Sarkesian 1984
“Your assumptions are your windows on the world. Scrub them off every once in a while, or the light won't come in.”
- Isaac Asimov
The democratic way is harder than the authoritarian way because, in seeking to protect and fulfill the individual, it demands of him understanding, judgment, and positive participation in the increasingly complex and exacting problems of the modern world. It demands that he exercise discrimination: that while pursuing through free inquiry the search for truth he knows when he should commit an act of faith; that he distinguish between the necessity for tolerance and the necessity for just suppression. A free society is vulnerable in that it is easy for people to lapse into excesses--the excesses of a permanently open mind wishfully waiting for evidence that evil design may become noble purpose, the excess of faith becoming prejudice, the excess of tolerance degenerating into indulgence of conspiracy and the excess of resorting to suppression when more moderate measures are not only more appropriate but more effective.
- NSC 68, April 7. 1950, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm
1. North Korea Again Launches Two Different Nuclear-Capable Missiles: Significant?
2. Unification ministry launches advisory committee to help build unification policy vision
3. A nuclear South Korea and the Indo-Pacific
4. 4 ex-ministerial officials indicted over alleged involvement in N.K. deportation case
5. South Korea and NATO: Seoul’s Strategic Calculus
6. N. Korean leader calls for 'radical change' in agricultural output within few years
7. Crisis of Credibility: The Need to Strengthen U.S. Extended Deterrence in Asia
8. S. Korea, U.S., Japan hold first economic security dialogue session
9. S. Korea designates Aug. 13 on lunar calendar as Separated Families Day
10. ‘King dollar’ fear returns after U.S inflation figure
11. Allies plan expanded exercise for 'extended deterrence'
12. S. Korea, US making 'practical' progress in strengthening US extended deterrence: Amb. Cho
13. Kim Jong-un purges: why North Korea is such a dangerous place to be successful in politics
14. What three young N. Koreans think about their country’s controls on foreign culture
15. US has no hostile intent but N. Korea continues to provoke: state dept.
16. Is TikTok helping a North Korean propaganda account go mega-viral?
17. S. Hamgyong Province warns young people not to earn money outside of assigned workplaces
1. North Korea Again Launches Two Different Nuclear-Capable Missiles: Significant?
Excellent analysis from Dr. Bechtol. He is right that the ROK must invest in ballistic missile defense and the ideal situation will be the ROK as part of a trilateral integrated missile defense construct.
North Korea Again Launches Two Different Nuclear-Capable Missiles: Significant?
19fortyfive.com · by Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. · February 27, 2023
Over the weekend of February 18th, North Korea conducted two more sets of important missile tests. On February 18th, North Korea launched what KCNA claimed was a Hwasong-15 (and early analysis tends to confirm that) on a lofted angle that if “leveled out” would have been sufficient to reach the continental United States.
The launch appeared to be successful, as a Japanese fighter pilot claims to have seen the re-entry vehicle that would carry a nuclear payload in an actual combat situation coming down on fire (which is normal) as it splashed into the ocean. This indicates the missile was able to successfully enter the earth’s atmosphere as it headed toward impact.
A couple of days later North Korea successfully launched projectiles it claimed were fired by a 600-millimeter multiple rocket launcher (MRL) from the country’s east coast. As this system launches guided weapons with the range of an SRBM, these are also classified as ballistic missiles. Both the Hwasong-15 and the 600-millimeter MRLs are systems the North Koreans claim are nuclear-capable.
It is key to note what we have learned from these latest launches. First, the North Koreans have successfully launched the Hwasong-15 several times. This speaks to the reliability of the system. Particularly for a system that would be used to launch a nuclear weapon, sustained reliability is important. The reliability of the highly publicized Hwasong-17 is a mixed bag at best – and thus we are also likely to see more tests of that system.
But it appears that the Hwasong-15, and any tweaks that the North Koreans continue to make to that system, will be a legitimate threat to nodes that Pyongyang plans to target. Some pundits have recently asked, “Why would they keep testing this system?” The reason is to make it as reliable as possible and to continue to advance its capabilities if necessary. As for the 600-millimeter MRL system that was tested, the same applies. New or recent systems simply must be tested when possible in order to maintain reliability and fix or improve on any glitches or design flaws that may occur.
While the points above are significant, the question still remains, what was the purpose of conducting these launches now? There are likely several reasons for this. One clear reason that this occurred now is that the North Koreans intended to demonstrate a “dual nuclear threat” to the ROK-US alliance. The Hwasong-15 presents a strategic threat designed to do one very important thing – target the United States. The 600-millimeter MRL system presents what Pyongyang has called a “tactical nuclear threat” to ROK and US forces on the Korean Peninsula. In other words, what the North Koreans mean by “tactical” is an on-Peninsula nuclear threat.
Another apparent reason for launching at least one of the systems (the Hwasong-15) now is to demonstrate the capabilities of this system to North Korea’s key proliferation partner, Iran.
The first stage of the Hwasong-15 appears to be the same or similar system to the 80-ton rocket booster that it has been confirmed the North Koreans have been developing for (and with) the Iranians. If the Iranians also want ICBM technology (and why would they not?) the Hwasong-15 would be the ideal system for them to acquire from the North Koreans. Since this is likely, continued demonstrations will be important as this would become an important system in Iran’s arsenal of ballistic missiles. It would also significantly exacerbate the Iranian military threat to Europe and of course, the United States.
The third reason for conducting these test launches now is an attempt by the North Koreans to split the ROK-US alliance. There is currently a debate on both sides of the Pacific about the role of extended deterrence within the alliance as it relates to the North Korean nuclear threat. As the threat continues to grow in capabilities, extended deterrence of course needs to be strengthened. But to generate debate and perhaps even talk of an arms race in East Asia only plays to North Korea’s hand. Any time there is disagreement within the alliance (whether perceived or real), this is to North Korea’s advantage. Pyongyang knows this, has always sought to use this to the advantage of the DPRK, and thus, when non-violent provocations such as those that occurred over the weekend of February 18th are noted, North Korea’s political reasons for carrying them out must always come under consideration.
Fortunately, there are various ways to counter North Korea’s recent actions and the ROK-US alliance is doing many of them. For example, Extended Deterrence can and is likely to be strengthened in ways that will further contribute to the defense of the ROK.
In addition, joint/combined exercises simulating nuclear scenarios can (and are) likely to be conducted regularly as part of training with ROK and American forces. One thing that South Korea has not done is join the US-led BMD system. This is a mistake. Seoul’s “Kill-Chain” system may be (or may not be) effective in taking out North Korea’s nuclear facilities and the missiles that would carry them (or at least some of them). But it does not protect one South Korean civilian.
Ballistic Missile Defense is vital for a nation-state that is literally more directly threatened by missiles and rockets than any other place on earth. While it is expensive, the ROK government needs to seriously consider expanding its own BMD, joining the US-led system, and significantly increasing the training and exercises that adding these capabilities will make necessary. To do so will exponentially increase the safety of the Korean people during war.
Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. (Ph.D. Union Institute), is an award-winning professor of political science at Angelo State University and a retired Marine. The author of five books on North Korea, he is also the current President of the International Council on Korean Studies. He specializes in North Korean military and counter-proliferation issues. Bechtol is a 19FortyFive contributing editor.
19fortyfive.com · by Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. · February 27, 2023
2. Unification ministry launches advisory committee to help build unification policy vision
Excellent news. This is a great initiative. The ROK must assume the moral high ground and focus on unification.
But not just policy. The MOU must develop an overarching strategy and conduct detailing planning across the interagency and coordinate international support.
I am so gratified to see this.
Excerpt:
The ministry has announced a plan to draw up a new policy blueprint for unification, tentatively named the "New Future Initiative on Unification," within the year to pave the groundwork for a peaceful unification based on freedom and democratic values.
Unification ministry launches advisory committee to help build unification policy vision | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 28, 2023
SEOUL, Feb. 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's unification ministry on Tuesday launched an advisory committee consisting of experts from academia and civic groups to lay out a new long-term vision on the Korean Peninsula's unification.
Consisting of 34 experts, the Unification Future Planning Committee will be tasked with helping the development of Seoul's unification policy and building related consensus at home and abroad, according to the ministry.
The ministry has announced a plan to draw up a new policy blueprint for unification, tentatively named the "New Future Initiative on Unification," within the year to pave the groundwork for a peaceful unification based on freedom and democratic values.
The committee, headed by professor Kim Young-ho of Sungshin Women's University, will have sub-panels on five areas, including the military, economic affairs and human rights, under its wing.
It will hold its inaugural meeting in mid-March, attended by Unification Minister Kwon Young-se, and plans to have regular quarterly sessions.
This undated image shows the logo of South Korea's unification ministry. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 28, 2023
3. A nuclear South Korea and the Indo-Pacific
A view from Australia that includes an analysis of Australia's strategic situation and a comparison with South Korea.
Excerpts:
"To get the bomb, Seoul would have to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Tray, dramatically weakening it. North Korea left the NPT in 2003 to pursue nuclear weapons, but for a liberal democracy to follow suit would be a heavy blow to the treaty’s perceived role as the inviolable centerpiece of nuclear non-proliferation. Might Tehran then seize its own opportunity, and would other states follow suit?
"After all, if Russia were to demonstrate the effectiveness of nuclear threats and North Korea acquired many tactical nuclear weapons without cost, that would reinforce the legitimacy of nuclear weapons in the eyes of some actors. How many states walking away from the NPT would deal it a death blow?" Davis posits.
Most concerning, South Korea's pursuit and implementation of a nuclear weapons capability would rapidly accelerate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other advanced capabilities throughout the Indo-Pacific, dramatically reshaping the geo-strategic environment and the major power players as established and existing powers jockey to build their own strategic arsenals to insure their own interests and sovereignty.
A nuclear South Korea and the Indo-Pacific
defenceconnect.com.au · by Stephen Kuper · February 23, 2023
KEY ENABLERS
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27 FEBRUARY 2023
By: Stephen Kuper
Amid rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula and more broadly across the Indo-Pacific many nations have responded with drastically increased defence capabilities — South Korea, a nation arguably right in the firing line of any regional conflagration, could be the latest nuclear power, posits ASPI’s Malcolm Davis, with some interesting impacts for the region.
Since the end of the Korean conflict, the two Koreas have maintained an often tenuous peace — defined by the promise of mutually assured destruction should hostilities bubble over, while this peace has typically been held together by conventional weapons, North Korea's first nuclear weapons test in 2006 turned the order on its head.
1
Meanwhile, as the US, Russia and China have sought to maintain the armistice for fear of conflict between the superpowers, the increasingly unpredictable North Korean regime, combined with the competing economic, political and strategic interests driven by China, has served to prompt a series of major strategic realignments in South Korea.
South Korea’s response has been driven by two distinctly different factors, namely: North Korea’s continued pursuit of reliable nuclear delivery systems and the conventional manpower and firepower of the North Korean Army, and rising power projection capabilities and willingness of China to assert its influence over a number of contested territories and strategically sensitive sea lines of communication in the South and East China Seas.
Accordingly, Korea has embarked on a series of acquisition and modernisation programs targeting each of the branches of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces playing a critical role in the nation’s response to its increasingly challenging geopolitical environment - however, to date, the South Korean Government has shied away from developing and fielding their own nuclear weapons, at least until now...
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This is shifting dynamic and the historic precedent that has directed South Korea's military planning and development is best explained by ASPI Senior Analyst, Dr Malcolm Davis, who said, "It has long been a concern that North Korea’s nuclear posturing would goad or frighten its neighbours into developing their own nuclear capability". These comments were given further context by comments recently made by South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, who stated, "It’s possible that the problem gets worse and our country will introduce tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own. If that’s the case, we can have our own nuclear weapons pretty quickly, given our scientific and technological capabilities."
While the President's office was quick to back peddle in some ways, saying, "I can assure you...that the Republic of Korea’s realistic and rational option is to fully respect the [nuclear non-proliferation] regime … I’m fully confident about the US’s extended deterrence," he said, regardless, raising major concerns about the continued relevance of the global nuclear proliferation order.
A nuclear Korean Peninsula to resolve the end of America's strategic umbrella?
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If the regional response to Australia's announcement of the AUKUS agreement and it's core priority of delivering a nuclear-powered submarine fleet is anything to go by, we can only anticipate that South Korea introducing a nuclear capability will elicit a similar response from the regional community, particularly from North Korea and China in particular as the regional power dynamics continue to evolve.
However, this chicken/egg situation is only serving to undermine the regional paradigm, as Davis explains, "The threat from North Korea is front and centre in driving Seoul down this path. Pyongyang is seeking to rapidly develop tactical nuclear weapons that can be used to threaten South Korea directly.
"Seoul can’t ignore that growing threat. A seventh North Korean nuclear test remains likely and Pyongyang continues to develop ballistic missiles that can deliver tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has called for ‘exponential’ expansion of his country’s nuclear capabilities," Davis explains, this predicament is further exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent impact on Europe's strategic paradigm, which Davis details, saying, "That threat is emerging against a background of Russian nuclear threats against NATO, which many believe undermine traditional norms that de-emphasise nuclear weapons."
At the core of these concerns is an apparent declining trust in the commitment to the US strategic umbrella, namely the extended deterrence capability of the US strategic nuclear arsenal in the era of great power competition - Davis unpacks this theory, stating, "uncertainties about how US extended nuclear deterrence guarantees are applied, and there are concerns in Seoul and Tokyo about the resilience of those guarantees in the face of threats from Moscow, and the prospect of such coercion by China in a future crisis over Taiwan. South Korea’s government is in effect asking whether the US will be prepared to risk trading Seattle or San Francisco for Seoul or Busan.
"Added to this is the potential for a return of Donald Trump as US president after 2024, which must resuscitate concerns in Seoul over whether Washington would continue to support the alliance even in the face of a growing nuclear threat from Pyongyang," Davis explains.
South Korea's high level of technological and industrial development and capacity position's the nation well to rapidly respond to any real or perceived decline in the US strategic umbrella, or its continuing commitment to strategic benevolence - with a tactical or strategic nuclear capability well within the nation's capacity to rapidly develop to secure its interests, however in doing so, South Korea would effectively destroy the global non-proliferation agenda.
"To get the bomb, Seoul would have to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Tray, dramatically weakening it. North Korea left the NPT in 2003 to pursue nuclear weapons, but for a liberal democracy to follow suit would be a heavy blow to the treaty’s perceived role as the inviolable centerpiece of nuclear non-proliferation. Might Tehran then seize its own opportunity, and would other states follow suit?
"After all, if Russia were to demonstrate the effectiveness of nuclear threats and North Korea acquired many tactical nuclear weapons without cost, that would reinforce the legitimacy of nuclear weapons in the eyes of some actors. How many states walking away from the NPT would deal it a death blow?" Davis posits.
Most concerning, South Korea's pursuit and implementation of a nuclear weapons capability would rapidly accelerate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other advanced capabilities throughout the Indo-Pacific, dramatically reshaping the geo-strategic environment and the major power players as established and existing powers jockey to build their own strategic arsenals to insure their own interests and sovereignty.
Could South Korea’s strategic situation soon be ours?
This declining trust in the US strategic umbrella, combined with the potential collapse of the broader non-proliferation frame work would have a significant impact on Australia's own strategic policy and doctrine development, because much like South Korea, Australia's economic, political and strategic security is dependent upon the continuing benevolence and stability of the United States as the world's strategic leader.
For Australia, this requires the recognition and understanding that the post-war era of economic prosperity and political and strategic stability is dependent upon a transactional relationship between the United States and smaller powers, whether they be traditional “great powers” like the United Kingdom, or middle powers like Australia, with this new era spelling trouble for the future.
This is perhaps best explained by US geostrategic analyst and author Peter Zeihan, who explains, “Today’s economic landscape isn’t so much dependent upon as it is eminently addicted to American strategic and tactical overwatch ... Globalisation was always dependent upon the Americans’ commitment to the global order and that order hasn’t served Americans’ strategic interests since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. Without the Americans riding herd on everyone, it is only a matter of time before something in East Asia or the Middle East or the Russian periphery (like, I don’t know, say, a war) breaks the global system beyond repair.”
This is particularly troubling for the US-led world, as an increasing number of countries begin to shift away from the dollar-backed trading system, driven by growing uptake by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) economic, quasi-security bloc that continues to expand its influence across the Middle East, Africa, South America and to a lesser extent, Southeast Asia, effectively undermining the economic balance of power much of the world has become dependent upon.
Such a shift in Australian doctrine requires a dramatic shift in thinking, relationship building and most importantly, policy making across domestic, industrial development and competitiveness, defence, and foreign affairs — with massive potential benefits for Australia’s economic prosperity, national security and resilience in the face of mounting geopolitical competition.
So what building blocks does Australia need to lay in order to provide a regional strategic umbrella? Well in this instance, success leaves clues, and thankfully, historical forebears have identified the key “hard power” factors that underpin a “strategic umbrella”, namely:
- Conventional military capabilities – including air, land and sea-based power projection capabilities;
- Strategic deterrence capabilities – including but not limited to a nuclear triad, strategic bomber and naval strategic force multipliers; and
- Economic power – focused on maintaining strategic industries with a focus on being globally competitive across manufacturing, resource and energy, innovation and research and development.
Let us know in the comments if you’d like us to take a closer look at each of these factors in the Australian context for how they can be leveraged to maximise Australia’s geopolitical impact, economic resilience and national security.
Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning
There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition. Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.
While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia, this is particularly well explained by Peter Zeihan, who explains: “A deglobalised world doesn’t simply have a different economic geography, it has thousands of different and separate geographies. Economically speaking, the whole was stronger for the inclusion of all its parts. It is where we have gotten our wealth and pace of improvement and speed. Now the parts will be weaker for their separation.”
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it., This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it., or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..
A nuclear South Korea and the Indo-Pacific
Stephen Kuper
Last Updated: 24 February 2023 Published: 27 February 2023
defenceconnect.com.au · by Stephen Kuper · February 23, 2023
4. 4 ex-ministerial officials indicted over alleged involvement in N.K. deportation case
4 ex-ministerial officials indicted over alleged involvement in N.K. deportation case | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 유청모 · February 28, 2023
SEOUL, Feb. 28 (Yonhap) -- Four ministerial-level figures of the previous Moon Jae-in government were indicted Tuesday over their alleged involvement in the forced repatriation of two North Korean fishermen in 2019, prosecution officials said.
The four are former national security adviser and foreign minister Chung Eui-yong; Noh Young-min, former presidential chief of staff; Suh Hoon, former chief of the National Intelligence Service (NIS); and former unification minister Kim Yeon-chul.
The Seoul Central District Prosecutors Office indicted them without detention on charges, including abuse of authority under the NIS law, in connection with the controversial deportation case, the officials said.
File photos of (from L) former national security adviser Chung Eui-yong; Noh Young-min, former presidential chief of staff; Suh Hoon, former chief of the National Intelligence Service; and former unification minister Kim Yeon-chul. (Yonnap)
In November 2019, the Moon government sent back the fishermen captured near the eastern inter-Korean sea border, saying the North Koreans confessed to killing 16 fellow crew members.
The four are suspected of forcing officials of the relevant government agencies to deport the fishermen despite their wishes to defect to South Korea.
They are also accused of obstructing the fishermen from exercising their rights to be tried here in accordance with South Korean laws and procedures.
In particular, Suh is additionally charged with deleting official records of the North Koreans' expression of a desire to defect to the South and fabricating documents related to their questioning by government officials.
ycm@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 유청모 · February 28, 2023
5. South Korea and NATO: Seoul’s Strategic Calculus
Excerpts:
Does South Korea have the capacity and will to “punch above its weight” in great power rivalry?
Willpower is key. Seoul may possess the capacity to punch above its weight; without willpower, however, it will not be able to take that bold step to swing and demonstrate its capability as a pivotal state. Concerns about North Korean retaliation and China’s coercion and unwillingness to support South Korean interests regarding the North Korean nuclear issue appear to loom largely over the Yoon administration’s decision-making. While Seoul’s concerns about the responses from its proximate neighbors are not trivial by any definition, its unwillingness to take an unequivocal stand on matters of global implication could undermine its image as a leading country.
Assess Washington’s expectations toward Seoul regarding South Korea’s relations with NATO.
Demonstrating solidarity against Russian aggression in Ukraine is not only helpful to the war; it also sends a resounding message to Seoul’s authoritarian neighbors – North Korea and China – that these acts of aggression will not be tolerated by the international community. As Seoul’s concerns about a growing North Korean nuclear threat and Chinese coercion rise, showing clear commitment to Ukraine will be an imperative to strengthening its own position against its not-so neighborly neighbors.
South Korea and NATO: Seoul’s Strategic Calculus
Insights from Soo Kim.
thediplomat.com · by Mercy A. Kuo · February 28, 2023
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The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Soo Kim, policy practice lead at LMI and former analyst at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, is the 356th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
Analyze Seoul’s response to NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg’s request for South Korea to provide military support to Ukraine.
South Korea is still sitting on the sidelines of the Russia-Ukraine war. While NATO wants Seoul to step up and provide direct military aid to Ukraine, the South Korean government is exercising restraint due to its sensitivities toward potential backlash from Russia, China, and North Korea.
Seoul’s support to Ukraine falls far short of what NATO and like-minded democratic countries would like to see. The Yoon administration has provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine, which, while a gracious gesture, fails to alleviate Ukraine’s true pain points in the war.
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The South Korea-Poland arms deal could be Seoul’s best and boldest effort yet to provide military assistance to Ukraine, via a third party. The international community applauds these gestures, but the roundabout nature of Seoul’s contributions casts doubts about its willingness to truly step up as a global pivotal state.
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Examine Seoul’s strategic calculus in more closely aligning with NATO while managing relations with China and North Korea.
Seoul, deep down, must know by now that persuading China to support its interests on North Korea is a lost cause. Maintaining “neutrality” does little to ultimately sway Beijing towards Seoul’s position vis-à-vis the Kim regime’s hostility and nuclear weapons threat. Perhaps Seoul is holding onto that very slim, almost remote chance of Beijing coming around to cooperate with Washington and Seoul over the North Korea issue. Beijing’s actions to date, however, give very little confidence in such prospects.
If anything, this ambiguity and hesitation to take a stand either way most likely undermines Seoul’s position and reliability to both NATO and the China-North Korea partnership.
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Evaluate President Yoon’s leadership skills in strategically positioning South Korea as geopolitical stakes are rising vis-à-vis U.S.-China tensions and Russia’s war on Ukraine.
Yoon has set out to make South Korea a “global pivotal state,” yet Seoul’s equivocal stance on consequential issues such as the Russia-Ukraine war casts doubts about the country’s readiness and capacity to truly live up to this ambition. There is recognition that South Korea, by virtue of its rapid economic development and growing prominence on the international stage, possesses the potential to make greater, more substantial contributions to global challenges. Seoul, however, does not appear to be fully maximizing this potential to further advance South Korea’s stature as a country capable of making tough decisions that may irk its adversaries – yet also strengthen Seoul’s international image, enhance relations with like-minded countries, and signal to its adversaries that Seoul cannot be pushed around.
Does South Korea have the capacity and will to “punch above its weight” in great power rivalry?
Willpower is key. Seoul may possess the capacity to punch above its weight; without willpower, however, it will not be able to take that bold step to swing and demonstrate its capability as a pivotal state. Concerns about North Korean retaliation and China’s coercion and unwillingness to support South Korean interests regarding the North Korean nuclear issue appear to loom largely over the Yoon administration’s decision-making. While Seoul’s concerns about the responses from its proximate neighbors are not trivial by any definition, its unwillingness to take an unequivocal stand on matters of global implication could undermine its image as a leading country.
Assess Washington’s expectations toward Seoul regarding South Korea’s relations with NATO.
Demonstrating solidarity against Russian aggression in Ukraine is not only helpful to the war; it also sends a resounding message to Seoul’s authoritarian neighbors – North Korea and China – that these acts of aggression will not be tolerated by the international community. As Seoul’s concerns about a growing North Korean nuclear threat and Chinese coercion rise, showing clear commitment to Ukraine will be an imperative to strengthening its own position against its not-so neighborly neighbors.
Mercy A. Kuo
Mercy Kuo is Executive Vice President at Pamir Consulting.
thediplomat.com · by Mercy A. Kuo · February 28, 2023
6. N. Korean leader calls for 'radical change' in agricultural output within few years
(LEAD) N. Korean leader calls for 'radical change' in agricultural output within few years | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · February 28, 2023
(ATTN: UDPATES with comments from Seoul official in paras 7-8)
SEOUL, Feb. 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has called for a "radical change" in agricultural production within a few years, attending the second-day session of a key party meeting, Pyongyang's state media said Tuesday.
The North's leader stressed the need to find ways for "stable and sustained development of agriculture" during the plenary meeting of the central committee of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) held the previous day, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The rare party meeting came as the North's food situation appears to be worsening amid deepening economic hardships caused by border lockdowns to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and global sanctions on its nuclear and missile programs.
The main purpose of the meeting is to find ways "with perfect feasibility for successfully attaining the grain production goal this year and bringing about a radical change in the agricultural production within a few years," Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA in an English-language dispatch.
The report did not elaborate on what specific measures should be taken to bring about the fundamental change in agricultural output.
Participants also discussed ways to establish disciplines of the national economic plan and improve state financial projects at the meeting, the KCNA said. It said they've decided to adopt a resolution after working on its draft, indicating it is expected to be adopted at the close of the meeting Tuesday.
An official at South Korea's unification ministry said Pyongyang "appears to be discussing a wide range of issues, including agendas related to food and agriculture, and economic issues."
In a rare move, officials from the agriculture sector were seen seated in the front row of the podium at the meeting, the ministry official added. The North's officials included Ri Chol-man, director of the WPK's agriculture department, and Ju Chol-gyu, chairman of the Cabinet's Agriculture Committee.
The North earlier said it is "very important and urgent" to establish the "correct strategy" for agricultural development.
The ministry earlier said the North's food crisis appears to be worsening, with more deaths from starvation being reported recently in "some regions."
Youtube
https://youtu.be/edYmiWSu-Ic
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 28, 2023, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un speaking at the second-day session of a plenary meeting of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) over agriculture the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · February 28, 2023
7. Crisis of Credibility: The Need to Strengthen U.S. Extended Deterrence in Asia
Conclusion:
The divergence between the U.S. and South Korea on extended deterrence mars what had been a near-complete alignment of policies following President Yoon’s inauguration. U.S. officials and Korea watchers in Washington had welcomed the change in South Korean administrations since Yoon brought pragmatic thinking on foreign and security policies. Yoon had declared that a strong alliance with the United States would be the basis for South Korea’s foreign relations with North Korea, Japan, and China.
The nuclear issue requires deft management by both sides. The U.S. must intensify trust-building efforts to assuage South Korean concerns. South Korea, in return, needs to manage public expectations about what is possible. If North Korea continues its provocative actions, President Yoon will face greater pressure to build an independent nuclear deterrent. Dissatisfaction with U.S. efforts to strengthen extended deterrence or any perceived wavering in America’s commitment to defend South Korea would intensify South Korean advocates’ calls for indigenous nuclear options.
If not handled well by both sides, the nuclear dispute risks causing tension in the alliance at a time when the two countries, along with other allies and partners in the Indo–Pacific region, need to be working closely together to address the growing North Korean and Chinese threats.
Crisis of Credibility: The Need to Strengthen U.S. Extended Deterrence in Asia
Bruce Klingner
Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center
Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia.
heritage.org · by Bruce Klingner
SUMMARY
Growing South Korean advocacy for independent nuclear options requires deft management by both the U.S. and South Korea. The U.S. must lean forward in augmenting trust-building measures to assuage South Korean concerns about the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea. Seoul, in return, needs to manage public expectations. If North Korea continues its provocative actions, President Yoon Suk Yeol will face greater pressure to build an independent nuclear deterrent. South Korean dissatisfaction with U.S. measures to strengthen extended deterrence, or any perceived wavering in America’s commitment to defend South Korea, would intensify South Korean advocates’ calls for indigenous nuclear options. This concern risks causing tension in the alliance at a time when the two countries, along with other allies and partners in the Indo–Pacific, must work closely together to address the growing North Korean and Chinese threats.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
North Korea’s escalating nuclear threat and Asian allies’ increasing doubts about the U.S. commitment to their defense risk destabilizing the Indo–Pacific.
South Korean advocacy for its own nuclear weapons is counter to U.S. objectives and may impede coordination to address the growing North Korean and Chinese threats.
The U.S. must strengthen its extended deterrence commitment to South Korea to avert regional nuclear proliferation and rifts in the bilateral alliance.
South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons, a topic long relegated to fringe advocacy, is now being discussed openly, including by its president. There are growing demands from the South Korean populace, the conservative media, and the ruling party for greater nuclear autonomy from Washington, redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that were removed in the 1990s, or a nuclear-sharing arrangement with Washington similar to the arrangements that some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have.
The recent upsurge in widespread mainstream debate over nuclear options is driven by a perfect storm of concerns driven by the deteriorating regional security environment, growing doubts of the reliability of the United States security guarantee, the vicissitudes of American policies, and South Korean national pride.
It is unclear if President Yoon Suk Yeol’s comments in January were missteps when discussing complex policy options, were playing to strong public support for nuclear options, or were deliberate attempts to pressure the U.S. to go beyond previous nuclear restrictions.
The South Korean government is not currently advocating either U.S. nuclear redeployment or an indigenous weapons program. Instead, Seoul is pushing for more tangible signs of U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea, greater involvement in U.S. planning for potential use of nuclear weapons in Korean contingencies, and a role in nuclear decision-making during a crisis. However, government support for that approach may be conditional on progress in talks with Washington and the extent of future North Korean provocations.
The United States has responded by taking steps to strengthen its extended deterrence policy which is comprised of nuclear weapons, conventional forces, and missile defense. Washington recently resumed large-scale combined military exercises and rotational deployment of U.S. nuclear-capable strategic assets after a four-year hiatus. Presidents Joe Biden and Yoon reactivated the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) to provide a venue for exploring additional reassurance measures.
The Biden and Yoon administrations should continue behind-the-scenes discussions while refraining from public statements that could complicate an agreement or exacerbate bilateral tensions. Washington seems willing to be more forthcoming in revising the highly sensitive nuclear relationship but retains clear red lines. Any agreement will need an energetic and sustained strategic messaging program to gain public support in South Korea.
Even if the Yoon administration is eventually satisfied with the results of bilateral discussions, U.S. efforts may be insufficient to overcome declining South Korean confidence in American credibility and to prevent strains in the bilateral relationship. South Korean political elements and the populace may remain resentful of perceived American constrictions on South Korean national security as compared to nuclear-sharing options available to U.S. allies in Europe.
Catalysts for Nuclear Advocacy
South Korea’s new nuclear advocacy is propelled by several factors: North Korea’s escalating nuclear and missile threats, increasing doubts about whether the U.S. would risk nuclear attacks on its cities by North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in defense of South Korea, concern that the 2024 U.S. presidential election could result in degradation or abandonment of the bilateral alliance, and injured national pride due to not being allowed the nuclear status of some U.S. allies in Europe.
North Korea’s Escalating Nuclear and Missile Threat. Pyongyang has steadily improved both the quality and quantity of its missile and nuclear arsenals in recent years.REF Pyongyang has unveiled tactical and strategic missile systems that pose an ever-greater risk to the United States and its allies. North Korea is producing a new generation of advanced mobile missiles that are more accurate, more mobile, and more difficult to detect and target than the previous generation and have an enhanced ability to evade allied missile defenses.
In September 2022, Pyongyang passed a new law that lowered the threshold for its use of nuclear weapons including pre-emptive strikes with strategic, tactical, and battlefield nuclear weapons. The regime declared that it would use nuclear weapons in response to even perceived preparations for a U.S. or South Korean nuclear or non-nuclear attack on regime leadership, nuclear command structure, or important strategic targets.REF On January 1, 2023, Kim Jong-un vowed to “exponentially” increase his stockpile of nuclear warheads.REF By 2027, Pyongyang could have 200 nuclear weapons.REF
Pyongyang has successfully tested several ICBMs capable of targeting the continental United States with nuclear weapons. The Hwasong-17 ICBM, which had its first successful test flight in 2022, will have three to four nuclear warheads and risks overwhelming America’s limited missile defenses of the homeland. During its February 2023 parade, North Korea revealed at least 11 of the multiple warhead missiles along with a new solid-fuel ICBM. The regime’s ability to hold numerous American cities at risk of attack by hydrogen bombs has aggravated allies’ concerns about U.S. capability, resolve, and willingness to defend their countries.
Growing Doubts About U.S. Reliability. South Koreans increasingly question the strength and commitment of the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee, wondering whether the U.S. would be “willing to trade San Francisco for Seoul” or would instead abandon its ally. Yet, the U.S. was willing to risk its cities in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, a far greater nuclear threat than North Korea, during the Cold War, in essence risking San Francisco, New York, and Washington, DC, for Bonn, Paris, and London.
It is also important to think of the circumstances under which a U.S. President would be faced with such a decision. At such a time, the U.S. would have suffered extensive military and civilian casualties on the Korean Peninsula. Faced with more casualties than Pearl Harbor, 9/11, and possibly the entire 1950–1953 Korean War combined, it is hard to imagine any U.S. President walking away, or the U.S. Congress or the American public allowing a U.S. leader to do so.
Potential U.S. Election Results. Widespread South Korean concerns about the reliability of the U.S. and fear of abandonment are widely cited as a major factor for recent escalating calls for an indigenous nuclear program by advocates, including former senior military officers, non-government experts, and academics. Current and former South Korean officials privately express concern that the 2024 U.S. presidential election could lead to an isolationist administration that downgrades America’s alliance commitments, perceives the military relationship in transactional terms, and again threatens to reduce or remove U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula while unilaterally terminating combined military exercises and rotational deployment of U.S. strategic assets.REF
National (Wounded) Pride. South Korean nuclear advocates point to French and British possession of nuclear weapons as justification for Seoul to have similar capabilities. These two countries, the advocates argue, also questioned the viability of the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee and the United States eventually accepted them as members of the nuclear club. Many South Koreans question why their nation is being treated less diffidently than European allies, or why India received exemptions from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) despite developing nuclear weapons.
South Korean nuclear advocates believe that Seoul should have responsibilities commensurate to that of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The NPG provides a forum in which NATO member countries can participate in the development of the Alliance’s nuclear policy and in decisions on its nuclear posture.REF The NPG does not, however, give European allies a role in U.S. nuclear targeting, operations planning, or any say in U.S. nuclear employment decision-making.
The United States currently has nuclear-sharing arrangements with Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, which have dual-capable aircraft (DCA) to deliver U.S. nuclear weapons. Each of these countries also hosts U.S. nuclear weapons, though Washington retains absolute control of the weapons nor do any of the five nations have input on nuclear targeting.
The U.S. has no similar arrangement with South Korea. The United States does not station nuclear weapons in South Korea, nor is there an NPG to allow South Korea to participate in nuclear policy, as exists in NATO.
A Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll showed that 26 percent of South Korean respondents ranked increasing South Korea’s prestige in the international community as the main reason for their support of nuclear weapons, similar in number to countering the North Korean threat (23 percent).REF
South Korean Presidential Statements Cause Controversy
In January 2023, President Yoon made a number of public nuclear-related statements that were at odds with his previous positions, U.S. policy, and the status of ongoing bilateral discussions. Yoon’s comments—subsequently walked back by his administration—triggered widespread media speculation of shifts in South Korean policy.
On January 2, Yoon appeared to deride U.S. extended deterrence as “the U.S. telling us not to worry because it will take care of everything. But now, it’s difficult to convince our people with just that.” He asserted that “we’re in talks with the U.S. about the concept of joint planning and joint exercises in terms of nuclear capabilities, and the U.S. is quite positive about it.” Yoon assessed that joint operation of nuclear forces would be “as good as nuclear sharing.”REF
President Biden, however, denied that a joint nuclear exercise was planned, since such exercises only occur between nuclear nations. The White House downplayed the misunderstanding but emphasized that Washington was looking at “enhanced information sharing, expanded contingencies and an eventual tabletop exercise” with Seoul.REF
Yoon has repeatedly claimed U.S. agreement to joint planning and joint execution of U.S. nuclear forces. However, during the November 2022 Security Consultative Meeting, the U.S. and South Korea agreed only to “strengthen the Alliance’s capabilities, information sharing, and consultation process, as well as joint planning and execution” without specifying that that applied to nuclear execution.REF The phrase was deliberately kept vague.
During a January 11 policy briefing, Yoon made his most explicit statement calling for the U.S. to return nuclear weapons to South Korea—the U.S. withdrew its arsenal in 1991—or for Seoul to develop its own weapons. Yoon remarked: “It’s possible that the [North Korean nuclear] problem gets worse and our country will introduce [U.S.] tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own. If that’s the case, we can have our own nuclear weapons pretty quickly, given our scientific and technological capabilities.”REF
Yoon added that South Korea’s current policy was not to build nuclear weapons and that for now South Korea remained committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and would deal with North Korea’s nuclear threat by strengthening its alliance with the United States.REF (Emphasis added.) The inherent conditionality of Yoon’s support for extended deterrence was also reflected in private discussions in Seoul.
After Yoon’s comments caused considerable angst among the South Korean public and U.S. government, the South Korean presidential office affirmed that there had been no change in South Korean policy.REF U.S. White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby responded that “the Republic of Korea has made clear that they are [sic] not seeking nuclear weapons” and that the two countries remained committed to strengthening extended deterrence capabilities.REF
Realizing the impact of his statements, Yoon backtracked on January 19 and reiterated that South Korea’s “realistic and rational option is to fully respect the NPT regime,” and that he is “fully confident about the U.S.’s extended deterrence.” He repeated that Seoul was planning “stronger joint planning and joint execution in operating the U.S. nuclear assets on the Korean Peninsula.”REF
Affirming the message, Minister of Unification Kwon Young-se commented on January 29 that discussing a South Korean nuclear program was “inappropriate,” as was questioning the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea. He warned of the economic consequences for South Korea if it breached the NPT. Kwon also downplayed redeploying U.S. nuclear weapons to South Korea since, regardless of “wherever the [U.S.] nuclear weapons are on the peninsula or anywhere nearby using such a weapon to punish [North Korea] won’t take much time.”REF
Foreign Minister Park Jin similarly affirmed that Seoul was seeking to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence to ease public concerns. Park emphasized that it was necessary to “establish a mechanism for a more tangible U.S. extended nuclear deterrence” by discussing implementation plans “in more detail [and] in close coordination with us.”REF
Yoon Has a History of Contradictory Nuclear Policy Remarks
Yoon Suk Yeol, as both candidate and president, has been inconsistent on South Korea’s nuclear policies, repeatedly jumping back and forth between both sides of the fence. In September 2021, during the presidential campaign, Yoon said he would demand that the United States redeploy its tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea and agree to a nuclear-sharing program, though he would not push for a South Korean nuclear armament.REF He subsequently said that he opposed redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and a nuclear-sharing agreement with the U.S.REF
After becoming president, Yoon commented in October 2022 that he was “weighing the option” of redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Later that month, senior Yoon administration officials reiterated that redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and a NATO-style nuclear-sharing agreement were off the table.
Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup, Unification Minister Kwon Young-se, and Foreign Minister Park Jin all indicated that the Yoon administration was not considering any of the nuclear options. Minister Kwon, a four-term National Assembly member, emphasized that South Korea’s “nuclear armament, the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear sharing arrangements do not represent the ruling party’s official stance.”REF
Discerning Yoon’s Motives. U.S. experts and officials debate whether President Yoon has simply repeatedly misspoken, is playing to domestic constituencies and public opinion, or is deliberately trying to pressure the United States to be more forthcoming in nuclear support to South Korea.
Yoon has a free-wheeling speaking style when giving unscripted remarks. He has often made comments that had to be subsequently corrected by South Korean officials. His impromptu informal press briefings were canceled after they repeatedly led to faux pas and caused problems for his administration.
Yoon is not well-versed in military or foreign policy issues, having spent his career as a prosecutor. Yoon may have overstated consensus in bilateral behind-the-scenes discussions or misused nuclear terms that have very precise meanings in the U.S. government lexicon. Some comments by the president during media interviews were in a vague hypothetical future context.
Yoon has also played to public opinion on other issues, which led to remarks that are at odds with stated South Korean policy. He could be seeking to send strong signals to North Korea and China while mollifying strong public demand that Seoul pursue a more independent nuclear course from Washington.
Yoon may also be deliberately taking provocative policy stances as an implicit threat to force the United States to accept greater South Korean involvement in U.S. nuclear planning, decision-making, or even delivery of U.S. nuclear weapons. He could also be laying the marker for future changes in South Korean policy if the security situation deteriorates further or Washington is not perceived as sufficiently strengthening extended deterrence.
Former South Korean officials, non-government experts, and the general public are far more adamant about advocating nuclear options than the Yoon administration, though private discussions in Seoul suggest a range of views within government.
A February 2022 survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs reported that 71 percent of South Korean respondents supported the development of a domestic nuclear weapons program.REF A Gallup Korea poll conducted in late 2022 showed that 76.6 percent of respondents favor South Korea developing nuclear weapons. Only 51.3 percent of those polled believed that the United States will demonstrate extended deterrence to defend Seoul in case of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.REF
Other polls, however, show reduced public support when additional information is provided, including potential costs and risks of U.S. redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons or of obtaining nuclear capabilities.REF
Yoon’s statements are unhelpful to ongoing bilateral discussions and relations with Washington. By playing to populist sentiments to pressure the U.S., Yoon is inciting the public to expect more than Washington may be willing to deliver. U.S. policymakers are faced with the dilemma of whether to dispute Yoon’s misstatements, which could reinforce national resentment against Washington for constraining its ally.
Consequences of a South Korean Nuclear Program
South Korea developing nuclear weapons could have devasting economic effects on its civilian nuclear industry and national economy. During the presidential campaign, Yoon had vowed to reverse predecessor Moon Jae-in’s policy to move away from nuclear energy in response to the 2011 nuclear disaster in Japan. Yoon instead promised to “reinvigorate the nuclear-energy industry by reactivating suspended atomic power plants and resuming building new ones.”REF
South Korean nuclear weapons would violate the NPT or require Seoul to withdraw from the agreement. Either action would require the NSG to curtail supply of fissile material to South Korea’s civilian nuclear energy program,REF which accounts for 30 percent of the country’s electricity. The NSG could also request the return of all previously provided fissile material. A weapons program would likely end South Korea’s export of civilian nuclear reactors. Seoul is nearing completion of a $20 billion civilian nuclear deal with the United Arab Emirates and recently signed an agreement for further nuclear cooperation.REF
South Korea imports all the uranium used for its civilian nuclear reactors and depends on other countries for enrichment services. It does not have a stockpile of uranium or weapons-grade plutonium nor fissile material enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Building nuclear weapons would require using existing civilian reactor fissile material and converting some of its reactors to produce weapons fuel, a process that could take at least two years to produce even a few bombs, let alone a credible nuclear deterrent.REF
An indigenous nuclear weapons program would violate the U.S.–South Korea bilateral nuclear cooperation agreementREF as well as the Atomic Energy ActREF and would strain relations with Washington. The U.S. provides its extended deterrence guarantee in return for South Korea not seeking its own nuclear weapons and remaining a signatory to the NPT.
To provide a viable deterrent against North Korea, Seoul would need to test a completed nuclear weapon to prove its design and fabrication and build a nuclear arsenal. The national government would likely face fierce resistance from local constituencies to hosting a nuclear test site. A nuclear test would also trigger the U.S. Glenn Amendment sanctions, which include prohibitions on foreign assistance; munitions sales and licenses; foreign military financing; government credits, guarantees, and financial assistance; U.S. support for multilateral financial assistance; private bank lending to the affected government; and exports of certain specific controlled goods and technology.
Nuclear weapons advocates have not yet addressed whether South Korean nuclear weapons would be integrated into the U.S.–South Korean Combined Forces Command (CFC) and Operations Plan 5015 (the allied strategic plan for a major conflict with North Korea). If so, South Korean nuclear weapons would still be subject to the National Command Authorities of both countries.
Seoul keeping its nuclear force separate from the integrated command structure would raise U.S. concerns about South Korea’s military concept of employment. South Korea developing nuclear weapons could lead to calls in Washington for the withdrawal of U.S. forces either due to anxiety of being drawn into South Korean escalatory actions or perceptions that Seoul could now go it alone since it no longer trusted the American commitment.
South Korean development of nuclear weapons mounted on offensive missiles that would be able to reach China would likely cause Beijing to retaliate with far more devastating economic sanctions than those imposed after Seoul’s 2016 decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system. South Korean manufacturers suffered at least $7.5 billion in economic losses, and the South Korean tourism industry may have suffered as much as $15 billion in losses. Seoul could declare that its nuclear weapons were directed only at North Korea, as it did with THAAD, but Beijing would likely interpret it as part of a U.S.-led anti-China coalition.
South Korean boldness in defying China to build nuclear weapons would be at odds with Seoul’s past and ongoing timidity in refraining from criticizing Beijing’s human rights violations and sovereignty transgressions in the East and South China Seas. In joint statements with the United States, South Korea was willing to criticize Chinese actions but, unlike Japan and Australia, refrained from identifying Beijing as the perpetrator.REF
Similarly, South Korea’s Indo–Pacific Strategy released in December 2022 contained only one reference to China, and that was a positive depiction. By contrast, Japan’s National Security and Defense Strategies released the same month harshly and repeatedly criticized China.
Finally, an indigenous nuclear program of sufficient size to be a deterrent to North Korea would divert an enormous amount of South Korea’s defense budget away from critical requirements to duplicate an existing capability that the U.S. currently provides. Those defense funds would be better spent augmenting conventional force requirements and the bilateral plan for the transition of wartime operational command.
Redeploying U.S. Nuclear Weapons Does Not Enhance Deterrence
The redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to South Korean soil is counter-productive to deterrence. The ground-based weapons removed in the 1990s no longer exist in the U.S. military inventory. Today’s tactical nuclear weapons are mounted on mobile air-based and sea-based platforms, making them difficult for North Korea to find and target. To place them in a static underground bunker would degrade deterrence and heighten the risk of a North Korean pre-emptive attack on such high-value targets. Pyongyang has more weapons that could target nuclear storage sites in South Korea than if they were deployed further away. The difference in delivery time would be negligible.
Some have suggested that, if tensions on the peninsula should rise, the missiles could always be moved back to their mobile-launch platforms. But South Korean or U.S. officials might deem doing so during a crisis as “too escalatory” and, therefore, prevent it, thus increasing risk to the population.
Deployment of U.S. offensive nuclear weapons would likely trigger greater South Korean domestic protests and Chinese economic retaliation than the deployment of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system.
Washington’s Extended Deterrence Reassurance. As a sign of its unwavering commitment to its South Korean ally, the United States has a mutual defense treaty, an extended deterrence guarantee, years of presidential and senior officials’ pledges to fulfill its obligations, an integrated bilateral CFC, rotational deployments of strategic nuclear-capable assets to the peninsula, and 28,500 sons and daughters in uniform stationed in harm’s way.
This year marks the 70th anniversary of the creation of the U.S.–South Korean alliance. Washington can point to the names of 36,000 Americans carved into the Wall of Remembrance at the Korean War Memorial in Washington, DC, and the alliance forged in blood during the crucible of war as tangible symbols of America’s pledge to defend South Korea. Similarly, South Korea helped America in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam.
In response to the recent growing South Korean doubts over the extended deterrence guarantee, the U.S. has taken additional steps of reassurance. During the 54th bilateral Security Consultative Meeting between the U.S. and South Korean military leaders in November 2022, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin affirmed that the United States is prepared to use “the full range of its defense capabilities,” including nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities and advanced non-nuclear capabilities, and that any nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners, including the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons, would result in the end of the Kim regime.REF
Secretary Austin highlighted the resumption of rotational deployments of U.S. nuclear-capable strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula, including the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier and B-52 bombers, for the first time in four years. Washington pledged to further enhance these deployments in a timely, coordinated, and routine manner.REF
In line with this pledge, the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) affirmed in October 2022 the modernization of the U.S. nuclear forces, tailored regional strategies, and enhanced consultative mechanisms. The NPR called for fielding flexible nuclear forces, including the capability to forward deploy strategic bombers, dual-capable fighter aircraft, and nuclear weapons to the region.REF
Secretary Austin and Minister of National Defense Lee pledged to further strengthen the alliance’s capabilities and readiness through information sharing, training, exercises, and consultation, as well as through joint planning and execution, to deter and respond to North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile threats.REF
The two military leaders agreed to review existing bilateral coordination mechanisms, such as the Korea–U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD), the recently resurrected Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), and the Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC) to further strengthen extended deterrence.
The two countries have been revising the Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) in response to North Korea’s growing nuclear weapons and missiles threats. To support this revision, the U.S. and South Korea will conduct tabletop exercises (TTX) in February and May 2023 to include a North Korean nuclear-use scenario. The results will be reflected in the new TDS to be completed by the end of the year. Defense Minister Lee assessed that South Korea will have a much larger say in how U.S. extended deterrence functions in the region than in the past.REF
The two TTX will examine specifics of U.S. strategy and strategic asset responses to the North Korean nuclear threat, imminent nuclear attack, and nuclear attack scenarios. The TTX in May will be held at the military-division level for the first time and “while the previous tabletop exercises were more of a strategic, policy-level framework, the one we are planning to hold in May will be far more concrete and substantive than the February programs.”REF
What Washington Should Do to Strengthen Extended Deterrence
The U.S. extended deterrence guarantee serves both to dissuade opponents and reassure allies. To be successful, it requires credible capabilities and unquestioned commitment, as well as convincing communication of that resolve. Effective reassurance requires unending and relentless effort, which can be undermined by either increased opponent threat or by declining allied confidence.
To augment deterrence against the growing North Korean threat and enhance reassurance to America’s allies, Washington must implement a comprehensive strategy of pragmatic nuclear policies, new nuclear coordination initiatives with its allies, robust military capabilities, and improved trilateral security coordination with Seoul and Tokyo. As part of this comprehensive strategy, Washington should:
Refuse to Abandon Denuclearization Policy. Eleven U.N. resolutions require North Korea to relinquish its weapons of mass destruction programs in a complete, verifiable, irreversible manner. U.S. renunciation of complete denuclearization as a policy objective, or formal recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state, would remove the legal authority for Washington and other nations to impose and enforce sanctions for Pyongyang’s violations of international agreements.
Such a policy shift would also undermine the NPT and contradict decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy as well as send a dangerous signal to other nuclear weapons aspirants that they can violate agreements and outlast international resolve to uphold them.
Were the U.S. to seek only to constrain rather than eliminate North Korean nuclear weapons, that would exacerbate allied concerns about the viability of the U.S. commitment to their defense, as would U.S. adoption of a “no first use” nuclear policy. Allies would worry that Washington might only seek to limit Pyongyang’s ICBMs that are capable of hitting the American homeland while allowing Pyongyang to retain hundreds of nuclear-capable short- and medium-range missiles. These concerns could increase calls in South Korea for an indigenous nuclear weapons program and greater reliance on pre-emption strategies.
Enhance Bilateral U.S.–South Korean Consultations on Nuclear Planning. While the U.S. has been forthcoming in bilateral discussions to allay South Korean concerns, Washington will need to be even more flexible to reassure its ally and to forestall Seoul from taking drastic measures. Seoul, however, must also understand the limits of what Washington is willing or able to do as well as the downsides of South Korean nuclearization.
Washington should discern which additional measures would enhance reassurance, pressing for detailed recommendations from South Korea. To date, Seoul has not articulated specific measures that would allay its concerns. U.S. officials should privately emphasize that South Korea abrogation of the NPT would have severe consequences, including for the alliance.
Initially, the U.S. will need to engage in nuclear education by providing more details on U.S. nuclear policy and strategy. Washington should also forthrightly describe the parameters and responsibilities of the NATO NPG, which are likely less than South Korea perceives them to be. The NPG does not engage in nuclear operations planning or nuclear targeting.
Establish a Bilateral Nuclear Planning Group. The U.S. and South Korea should create a bilateral mechanism to coordinate on extended deterrence policies, including nuclear planning, options, contingencies, combined exercises, and deployment of U.S. strategic assets. Washington should delineate procedures for including South Korea in crisis decision-making related to potential use of U.S. nuclear weapons.
While the U.S. could designate and empower an existing bilateral group as a nuclear consultative group, it seems that South Korea would perceive anything less than creating a new body with the NPG moniker—commensurate with the existing NATO entity—as insufficient.
Increasing South Korean involvement would be consistent with the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which pledged “stronger extended deterrence consultation emphasizing a cooperative approach between the United States and Allies in decision-making related to nuclear deterrence policy, strategic messaging, and activities that reinforce collective regional security.”REF
The U.S. is understandably reluctant to divulge information on highly sensitive nuclear topics. However, the U.S.–South Korean CFC is America’s most integrated command in the world and will someday be under the command of a South Korean general. It is subordinate to the Military Committee comprised of the National Command Authorities of both countries, including both presidents. The CFC has detailed operations and contingency plans, incorporating extensive South Korean forces, which presumably envisions North Korean nuclear weapons use and potential U.S. nuclear responses. Seoul should be aware of those scenarios.
Subsequently Multilateralize the U.S.–South Korea Nuclear Planning Group. Following creation of a bilateral NPG with South Korea, Washington should invite Australia and Japan to join as an additional means to incorporate U.S. allies in collectively addressing common threats to the Indo–Pacific region. Creating a new quadrilateral defense coordinating group would emphasize a cooperative approach between the U.S. and security partners in nuclear deterrence decision-making.
The U.S. might instead prefer initially to create a quadrilateral nuclear coordination group rather than a two-step process. However, given the far greater existing integration of U.S. and South Korean forces in the CFC, the more urgent requests from Seoul, and South Korean national pride, it would be better to first establish the bilateral group.
Augment the Size, Scope, Frequency, and Type of Combined U.S.–South Korean Military Exercises, Including U.S. Strategic Assets. Cancelling allied military exercises in 2018 led to a four-year degradation of allied deterrence and defense capabilities for no reciprocal North Korean military or diplomatic gestures. The resumption of combined exercises in 2022 was an important reversal to repair the damage. Washington and Seoul have committed to even higher training levels in 2023.
The U.S. and South Korea should consider a return to pre-2018 training levels a minimum requirement. Given the escalating growth in North Korean nuclear and missile forces, as well as the regime’s extensive conventional force provocations in late 2022, Washington should confer with Seoul on the parameters of a training regimen and deployment of U.S. strategic assets—including strategic bombers, dual-capable aircraft, and carrier strike groups—necessary to augment deterrence and reassure South Korea.
Fund the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) and Its Accompanying Warhead to Accelerate Development of the Program. Fielding the SLCM-N would allow the United States to send a nuclear capability directly to the Indo–Pacific theater of conflict, as it would be deployed on attack submarines or surface ships. Compared to the low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile, which is deployed on a strategic submarine far out at sea, the SLCM-N could be deployed directly to the region.REF As the United States does not currently base any nuclear weapons in the region, the SLCM-N would help to fill a gap in America’s nuclear deterrence capabilities and allied assurance commitments. Because it is sea-based, the SLCM-N can assure South Korea of the U.S. nuclear commitment without the need for basing nuclear weapons on the peninsula.
Last year, Congress rejected the Biden Administration’s decision to cancel the SLCM-N and provided funding to continue research and development for the program. Congress should now accelerate the program by funding it at the level necessary to move the program into development and field it by the end of the decade.REF The Administration should also be sure to clearly communicate to South Korea that this capability is underway, and that part of its reason for development is to improve extended deterrence.
Enhance Strategic Missile Defense of the American Homeland. If the United States can intercept North Korean missiles aimed at the homeland, it will not have to contemplate risking San Francisco to save Seoul. But North Korea’s growing ICBM force with potential multiple warheads, along with the ability to indigenously produce large transporter-erector-launchers for ICBMs, poses problems for American homeland missile defenses.
The United States currently has only about 44 ground-based interceptors. The Biden Administration currently plans to augment the force by fielding 20 of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), which will have advanced capabilities that can address North Korea’s advanced missiles more effectively. However, the Biden Administration should plan to purchase at least 64 NGIs so it can increase the capacity of the current force while replacing all the current ground-based interceptors with this advanced system. These improvements will enhance deterrence by decreasing North Korea’s confidence that its plan would succeed and will also thwart its efforts to decouple the United States from its allies.REF
Augment U.S. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense. Pyongyang’s expansion of tactical and submarine-launched missiles increases the threat to U.S. forces in the Indo–Pacific region that are critical for responding to contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. One way to improve regional missile defense is by building an advanced missile defense system on Guam to bolster the existing THAAD system on the island. Last year, Congress appropriated funds for the Guam Defense System, and the Defense Department began its development. Congress should continue to support this project with the goal of providing an initial capability on the island by 2024. Enhancing U.S. ability to defend the U.S. territory of Guam will further prevent North Korean efforts to decouple the United States from South Korea.
Coordinate Missile Defense with South Korea and Japan. At the November 2022 East Summit, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan agreed to share missile-warning data in real time to improve the identification, tracking, and targeting of North Korean missiles.REF This was a major political agreement that could lead to enhanced interoperability of allied missile defenses.
To date, South Korea has refrained from integrating its Korea Air and Missile Defense System with that of the U.S.–Japanese system due to lingering tensions with Tokyo over Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. Depending on the manner and scope of implementing the recent political agreement, it could enable quicker, more efficient allied tracking, targeting, and intercepting of North Korean ballistic missiles.
Minimize Public Disagreement with Seoul. Any U.S. differences with South Korea over nuclear policies should be conveyed in private discussions. It would be counter-productive to the alliance to strongly refute President Yoon’s misstatements or to publicly warn of the penalties if Seoul were to develop nuclear weapons. It is not in the U.S. interest to have a bilateral rift with South Korea when the two countries are in alignment on a wide array of foreign and security policies.
What South Korea Should Do to Enhance Its Defense
As part of a comprehensive strategy Seoul should:
Develop a Strategic Messaging Strategy. President Yoon should choose his words more carefully when discussing extended deterrence and nuclear policy as well as refrain from comment on ongoing bilateral discussions. Yoon’s misstatements inadvertently suggested major shifts in South Korean defense policy and required both Seoul and Washington to address the resulting controversy.
After conclusion of a bilateral nuclear coordination agreement, the Yoon administration will need to play an active role in convincing the South Korean populace that Washington sufficiently strengthened extended deterrence so that an indigenous nuclear program or redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons are unnecessary.
The Yoon administration should extensively engage with the National Assembly, media, non-government experts, and the public to explain the parameters of any new nuclear agreement. Seoul should also underscore the extent of existing alliance capabilities and coordination supporting South Korean national security, as well as the consequences of an indigenous South Korean nuclear program.
Upgrade Information Security. Before the U.S. shares extremely sensitive nuclear information, South Korea will need to improve its cybersecurity infrastructure, update its technology, and improve its practices. South Korea’s systems are perceived by U.S. officials as below NATO standards and more vulnerable to penetration.
In the past, North Korean cyberattacks have successfully targeted the U.S.–South Korean CFC, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Ministry of Defense, and the Defense Integrated Data Center where all South Korean defense information is stored.REF
Continue Enhancement of Missile Defenses. Seoul should continue deployment of its Cheongung II medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) and development of its long-range SAM (L-SAM) programs to augment existing Patriot and THAAD land-based missile defenses. The L-SAM successfully intercepted a ballistic missile for the first time in November 2022.REF Seoul should carry through on plans to deploy SM-6 missiles on its Aegis-equipped KDX-III destroyers to defend the country against North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
Strengthen Offensive Capabilities. Seoul should maintain ongoing efforts to procure additional advanced attack aircraft and develop missiles with larger payloads and ranges. President Yoon pledged to strengthen South Korean capabilities to implement the Kill Chain pre-emptive-attack strategy and the Massive Punishment and Retaliation strategy against North Korea. The Ministry of Defense announced plans to increase its inventory of land-, sea-, and air-based precision missiles, augment penetration and strike capabilities of special forces, and procure additional F-35 stealth fighter jets.REF
Affirm the Importance of Security Cooperation with Japan. President Yoon should continue his efforts to improve strained bilateral relations with Tokyo. Even absent resolution of contentious history issues, South Korea should expand military coordination with Japan to enable more effective responses to the North Korean military threat. In 2022, the U.S., South Korean, and Japanese navies conducted their first trilateral anti-submarine drills in five years as well as trilateral naval defense exercises to detect, track, and intercept North Korean ballistic missiles.
Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo should institute a “2+2+2” meeting of their defense and foreign ministers to address common security threats from North Korea and China. They should hold periodic trilateral meetings to facilitate greater coordination on foreign and security policies.
Seoul should also accept the necessity of Japan developing counter-strike capabilities to protect its territory and people. Being able to hold enemy targets at risk increases the price of any attack on Japan, thereby enhancing allied deterrence and regional stability while degrading an opponent’s attempts at coercion. A Japanese ability to “shoot the archer,” rather than intercepting all incoming arrows, would enhance allied capabilities to disrupt an opponent’s ability to conduct follow-on attacks and thereby reduce additional casualties and destruction.
Conclusion
The divergence between the U.S. and South Korea on extended deterrence mars what had been a near-complete alignment of policies following President Yoon’s inauguration. U.S. officials and Korea watchers in Washington had welcomed the change in South Korean administrations since Yoon brought pragmatic thinking on foreign and security policies. Yoon had declared that a strong alliance with the United States would be the basis for South Korea’s foreign relations with North Korea, Japan, and China.
The nuclear issue requires deft management by both sides. The U.S. must intensify trust-building efforts to assuage South Korean concerns. South Korea, in return, needs to manage public expectations about what is possible. If North Korea continues its provocative actions, President Yoon will face greater pressure to build an independent nuclear deterrent. Dissatisfaction with U.S. efforts to strengthen extended deterrence or any perceived wavering in America’s commitment to defend South Korea would intensify South Korean advocates’ calls for indigenous nuclear options.
If not handled well by both sides, the nuclear dispute risks causing tension in the alliance at a time when the two countries, along with other allies and partners in the Indo–Pacific region, need to be working closely together to address the growing North Korean and Chinese threats.
Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
heritage.org · by Bruce Klingner
8. S. Korea, U.S., Japan hold first economic security dialogue session
Trilateral cooperation improvising across the instruments of national power.
S. Korea, U.S., Japan hold first economic security dialogue session | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · February 28, 2023
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Feb. 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korea, the United States and Japan held the first session of their newly established economic security dialogue in Honolulu on Monday (local time), the presidential office said.
The dialogue, which was launched under an agreement between the three countries' leaders during a trilateral summit last November, was attended by Wang Yun-jong, presidential secretary for economic security, Tarun Chhabra, senior director for technology and national security on the White House National Security Council, and their counterpart from the Japanese prime minister's office, Yasuo Takamura, it said.
This combined photo taken Nov. 13, 2022, shows South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L), U.S. President Joe Biden (C) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida posing for a photo during their summit at a hotel in Phnom Penh. (Yonhap)
"This meeting was the first meeting where South Korea, the United States and Japan jointly discussed economic security issues, and the delegations from the three countries sought ways to enhance their mutual understanding and cooperate on areas of common interest in the economic security field," the presidential office said in a press release.
Specifically, the three sides discussed cooperation in emerging and core technologies, such as quantum, bio and space, and stabilizing semiconductor, battery and critical mineral supply chains, among other things, it said.
The presidential office noted South Korea and the U.S. launched a bilateral economic security dialogue last year, and that the trilateral channel takes the two countries' cooperation to a trilateral level and strengthens the basis for global cooperation.
The three-way channel is expected to strengthen the three countries' supply chain resilience and crisis response capabilities, and help promote and protect critical and new technologies, it added.
The schedule and agenda of the next session will be determined through future consultations.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · February 28, 2023
9. S. Korea designates Aug. 13 on lunar calendar as Separated Families Day
Another way to interpret this is that this could contribute to a human rights upfront approach. Kim Jong Un not only denies the human rights of the Korean people in the north but also the divided families of those living in the South. There is no reason for divided families except that Kim must be afraid of the information that families in the north will be exposed to.
S. Korea designates Aug. 13 on lunar calendar as Separated Families Day | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 28, 2023
SEOUL, Feb. 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has designated Aug. 13 on the lunar calendar as a commemorative day for families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War, Seoul's unification ministry said Tuesday.
The establishment of Separated Families Day came as the National Assembly on Monday approved a revised bill aimed at promoting inter-Korean exchanges over separated families, according to the ministry in charge of affairs related to the two Koreas.
The date was selected by reflecting separated families' wishes, as many of them voiced hope to reunite with their kin in the North on Aug. 13 on the lunar calendar, a day before the start of the annual Chuseok fall harvest holiday.
Chuseok, which falls on Aug. 15 on the lunar calendar, is one of the country's two biggest traditional holidays, when Koreans visit hometowns to meet their family members.
The designation will also help the government and municipalities to hold and promote commemorative events on the same day, the ministry said.
The issue of the separated families has taken on greater urgency as more elderly people have died without having a chance to meet their kin in the North amid the secretive regime's reluctance to hold family reunion events.
This file photo, taken Sept. 8, 2022, shows an official at the Korean Red Cross checking a collection of video messages by South Korean families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War. The video letters were produced for the delivery to separated families' kin in North Korea. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 28, 2023
10. ‘King dollar’ fear returns after U.S inflation figure
‘King dollar’ fear returns after U.S inflation figure
donga.com
Posted February. 28, 2023 07:55,
Updated February. 28, 2023 07:55
‘King dollar’ fear returns after U.S inflation figure. February. 28, 2023 07:55. abro@donga.com.
As concerns that the U.S. Federal Reserve System (Fed) will implement long-term austerity measures to lower inflation in the country, the fear of the ‘king dollar’ is returning. The won-dollar exchange rate rose 18 won from the previous trading date and exceeded 1,320 won per dollar.
The won-dollar exchange rate closed at 1,323.0 won per dollar on Monday in the Seoul foreign exchange market, 18.2 won higher than the previous trading date. This was the first time since December 7 that the exchange rate exceeded 1,320 won per dollar. The exchange rate rose to 1,323.5 won per dollar during trading hours on Monday.
What grew anxiety about the exchange rate was inflation metrics in the U.S. The personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index rose 5.4 percent in January compared to last year, according to the announcement on Friday (local time). Its increase rate reached a 40-year-high of seven percent in June last year and rose again in seven months. The Fed is more likely to tighten its austerity stance because the U.S. inflation metrics are above market expectations. Some in the market said the final interest rate of the U.S. will exceed 5.25 to 5.50 percent. While the Bank of Korea froze its base rate at 3.50 percent on Thursday, the gap between the two countries’ base rates can further widen.
The KOSPI closed at 2,402.64 points on Monday, 0.87 percent lower than the previous trading date. The stock exchange, which opened the day with 2,405.42 points, fell from the beginning and dropped to 2,383.76 points at one point during trading hours. It was the first time the KOSPI fell below the 2,400 mark since January 20.
With the won depreciating, there are concerns that foreign investment will leave South Korea. In the KOSPI market, individual traders net-purchased 675.5 billion won while foreign investors net-sold 324.8 billion won on Monday, dragging down the KOSPI index.
한국어
donga.com
11. Allies plan expanded exercise for 'extended deterrence'
Tuesday
February 28, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Allies plan expanded exercise for 'extended deterrence'
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/28/national/northKorea/Korean-ambassador-Cho-Taeyong-KoreaUS-North-Korea/20230228165506555.html
Korean Ambassador to U.S. Cho Tae-yong at a press conference held in Washington on Monday. [NEWS1]
Korea's ambassador to the U.S. said South Korea and the United States are currently working on a joint tabletop exercise (TTX) that goes beyond military maneuvers to embrace diplomacy, information and economics.
The expanded exercise reflects the alliance’s move toward “extended deterrence” against threats from North Korea.
Ambassador Cho Tae-yong told reporters in Washington on Monday that the two countries took part in the U.S. Defense Department’s 8th Deterrence Strategy Committee Table-Top Exercise (DSC TTX) at the Pentagon on Feb. 22.
The next day, the ambassador visited the U.S. nuclear submarine base in Kings Bay, Georgia, with a Korean delegation and their U.S. counterparts, the first visit of its kind.
Kings Bay is home to Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines that carry nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles.
“We plan to pursue a TTX in which several agencies from each country will participate in the near future,” Cho said.
“We have reaffirmed the commitment to extended deterrence that utilizes all defense capacities, including nuclear weapons, as pledged by President Joe Biden during the South Korea-U.S. Summit in May last year.”
He added, “The two sides are closely cooperating to strengthen the alliance’s executing power.”
Cho said South Korea strongly denounces North Korea’s launch of an Intercontinental ballistic missile on Feb. 18, calling it a “provocation.”
“It is deplorable that North Korea clings only to developing nuclear weapons and missiles despite its severe food shortages,” he said.
He stressed that North Korea’s “provocations” have only further isolated the regime from the international community while bringing South Korean and the U.S. closer together in their alliance.
South Korea on Feb. 10 announced its own independent sanctions against North Korea’s illicit cyber activities, which the South Korean government blames for funding Pyongyang’s weapons program.
However, the Korean ambassador said Seoul and Washington remain open to dialogue.
“We urge North Korea to end its provocations and return to denuclearization negotiations,” Cho said.
Regarding economic cooperation with the U.S., the ambassador said the South Korean government is closely monitoring the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, including the follow-up measures the U.S. government will announce in March.
“These are issues that affect our economy,” Cho said. “We are having close discussions with the U.S.”
The ambassador said the U.S. is welcoming President Yoon Suk Yeol’s visit to Washington in April.
He also said that South Korea and the U.S. agree that it is too early to determine whether the recent appearances of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s daughter Kim Ju-ae pertain to the nation’ leadership succession.
Since making her first official appearance in November, Kim’s daughter has appeared next to her father in several major events, including a military parade on Feb. 8.
Her most recent appearance was Saturday when she attended the groundbreaking ceremony of a major construction project in Pyongyang.
While Kim is reported to have three children, Ju-ae is the only child who has made public appearances
BY KIM HYOUNG-GU, LEE HO-JEONG [lee.hojeong@joongang.co.kr]
12. S. Korea, US making 'practical' progress in strengthening US extended deterrence: Amb. Cho
AMB Cho is really working hard to strengthen understanding of extended deterrence and support for the alliance.
S. Korea, US making 'practical' progress in strengthening US extended deterrence: Amb. Cho
The Korea Times · February 28, 2023
Korean Ambassador to the United States Cho Tae-yong /Korea Times photo by Choi Won-suk
South Korea and the United States are making "practical" progress in enhancing the implementation of U.S. extended deterrence, South Korean ambassador to the U.S. Cho Tae-yong said Monday.
Cho also said the allies will hold additional joint exercises to further strengthen the extended deterrence.
Extended deterrence refers to U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea, using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons.
"We have made practical progress in strengthening the implementation of extended deterrence," the South Korean diplomat said while meeting with reporters in Washington.
Seoul and Washington held the eighth Deterrence Security Committee Table-top Exercise last week in Washington, which the allies said focused on how to respond to any potential use of nuclear weapons by North Korea.
Cho said the countries will seek to hold follow-up exercises "in the very near future."
Efforts to strengthen the U.S. extended deterrence followed an unprecedented 69 North Korean ballistic missile tests last year, which marked a new record of ballistic missiles fired by the country in a single year.
Cho said Seoul strongly "condemns" North Korea's missile provocations, noting Pyongyang again fired an intercontinental ballistic missile earlier this month.
"It is deplorable that North Korea continues to focus on developing nuclear and missile capabilities despite serious food shortages it faces," he said.
"(We) have made it clear to North Korea through foreign ministerial talks of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, South Korea's unilateral sanctions and joint air defense drills of South Korea and the U.S. that its provocations only lead to more international sanctions and further isolation of the North in the international community," added Cho.
The ambassador also highlighted Seoul's commitment to engaging in dialogue with North Korea, saying, "The government will continue its unwavering efforts to create an environment where North Korea has no choice but to return to dialogue." (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · February 28, 2023
13. Kim Jong-un purges: why North Korea is such a dangerous place to be successful in politics
It is as simple as this, you demonstrate personal loyalty to Kim Jong Un or you suffer. You do not support your country or your family or the welfare of the Korean people or anything else ahead of Kim Jong Un.
Kim Jong-un purges: why North Korea is such a dangerous place to be successful in politics
theconversation.com · by Christoph Bluth
North Korea celebrated the 75th anniversary of the foundation of the Korean People’s Army in February. As it showed off 12 of its massive intercontinental ballistic missile in a military parade, expert Korea-watchers spotted there appear to have been some significant changes in the country’s military and political hierarchy.
Choe Ryong-hae, the chairman of the standing committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, was reportedly the only member of the politburo presidium not in attendance. But the Workers’ Party of Korea (North Korea’s sole and ruling political party) has reportedly recently replaced five of the 12 officials in the party secretariat and seven of the 17-member politburo. This is according to South Korea’s unification ministry, which exists to promote the reunification of the two countries.
Two officials whose careers are reportedly on the rise are Song Yong-gon (a member of the Worker’s Party central committee and previously the commander of the 9th Corps of the Korean People’s Army) and Choe Kil-ryong, until now commander of the 2nd Army Corps. The pair have been promoted as commanders of the new units for two classes of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The promotions appear to confirm Pyongyang’s focus on long-range missiles which have become central element in Pyongyang’s nuclear testing regime. In recent months, North Korea has tested two Hwasong-class missiles – intercontinental ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 15,000km, capable of reaching the continental United States.
The wider context of the reported purges is characterised by rising tension on the Korean peninsula. The Workers’ Party plenum in Pyongyang in December 2022 emphasised a hardline policy towards South Korea, including the possibility of preemptive nuclear strikes. South Korea’s president, Yoon Suk-yeol, has indicated that Seoul won’t hesitate to retaliate and could develop its own nuclear capability.
At the same time, the Kim regime is facing severe domestic crises due to its weak economy, exacerbated by the challenges of COVID and harsh international sanctions. Food insecurity in the North was recently described by a US thinktank as “at its worst since the country’s famine in the 1990s”.
Consolidating power
North Korea’s political system gives absolute power to the leader, which is both a strength and a vulnerability. Kim Jong-un, who came to power in 2011 shortly after the death of his father Kim Jong-il, has had to constantly struggle to prevent the emergence of alternative centres of power. Unlike his father, Kim had only a short time to prepare for leadership and was (and remains, at 39) quite young in a culture that reveres elders. His first few years were particularly dangerous for him.
At the third party conference in September 2010, Kim Jong-il replaced 78% of the politburo. This was seemingly to formally establish his third son as heir apparent and to put in place “guardians” for the young Kim such as his uncle Jang Song-thaek and senior military figure Vice-Marshal Ri Yong-ho.
Kim Jong-un, his uncle Jang Song-Thaek and other North Korean dignitaries march alongside the hearse carrying the body of the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, EPA/KCNA
Kim Jong-un replaced his father in December 2011 and, at the party conference the following April, 42% of the politburo was replaced, followed by another 13% removed at the 2013 party plenum. It was reported that some in the top leadership – including members of Kim’s own family – were scheming against him.
A dangerous family
These purges continued to create a climate of fear in Pyongyang. In 2012, the vice minister of the army, Kim Chol, was executed “for reportedly drinking and carousing during the official mourning period after Kim Jong-il’s death”.
A similar fate befell Ri Yong-ho, one of senior team which had guided Kim Jong-un as he was preparing for leadership and by then the chief of staff of the North Korean military. Ri was removed from his positions and is believed to have been executed amid rumours of disagreement over economic policy.
But the most prominent victim of the early consolidation of Kim’s rule was his uncle and former mentor. Jang Song-thaek was the second most powerful person in North Korea until his execution in 2013 (lurid reports of either being torn to pieces by dogs or executed by machine gun have never been confirmed).
Jang, who was accused of being part of a bureaucratic clique engaged in sedo (lust for power) may have become a real threat to Kim due to his close relations with the Chinese government and his efforts to consolidate control over key elements of the economy.
On February 13 2017, Kim Jong-un’s half-brother Kim Jong-nam was murdered in an assassination which made international headlines. He had been in exile for some time in Macau after falling from grace, which he claimed was due to his advocacy of political reform.
He was exposed to VX nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur International Airport by two women – one Indonesian and one Vietnamese – who claimed they had been were asked to play a prank and had no idea of the identity of their target. This was another sign of the intense power struggle within the Kim family itself.
Violent reshuffles
These fairly regular purges of North Korea’s elite are partly to fend off alleged coup plots, but studies of Pyongyang’s leadership show that they are also a key mechanism to maintain control over the bureaucracy, a system also effectively used by Kim Jong-il .
In an absolute dictatorship, it is an important mechanism to inoculate the leadership from responsibility for policy failure by blaming others. An absolute leader who demands complete allegiance and unquestioning loyalty from his population cannot be seen to accept responsibility for any of his government’s mistakes, especially when they result – as they have recently – in hardship for so many in the North.
For Kim Jong-un, as with his predecessors in the North Korean leadership, a purge is a political tool similar to a reshuffle in Downing Street. Expect to read of more while the “Respected Comrade” remains in power.
theconversation.com · by Christoph Bluth
14. What three young N. Koreans think about their country’s controls on foreign culture
Very useful insights on what may be happening inside north Korea and how some young Koreans in the north feel about it.
What three young N. Koreans think about their country’s controls on foreign culture
North Korea is thus intensifying crackdowns while enacting legislation to prevent foreign culture from entering the country, but what do North Korea’s youth think about this?
By Lee Chae Un - 2023.02.28 5:00pm
dailynk.com
FILE PHOTO: A woman in her 20s forcibly filmed for wearing foreign styles of clothing. (Daily NK)
Over the past several years, North Korea has been ramping up efforts to stop the import and distribution of foreign culture.
The country’s authorities have been harshly punishing people who watch or distribute illegal videos since the adoption of the law to eradicate “reactionary thought and culture” in December 2020 and conducting ideological crackdowns on young people since the adoption of the “Youth Education Guarantee Act” in September 2021.
In addition, North Korea adopted the “Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act” during the Eighth Meeting of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly this past January, launching a heavy crackdown on the use of South Korean speech and foreign words.
North Korea is thus intensifying crackdowns while enacting legislation to prevent foreign culture from entering the country, but what do North Korea’s youth think about this?
Daily NK recently interviewed three young North Koreans in their 30s — one in Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province (A); another in Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province (B); and one more in Hyesan, Yanggang Province (C) — about the recent adoption of the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act.
The following is a Q&A with the three young North Koreans.
Daily NK (DNK): North Korea recently adopted the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act. What was the reason for adopting the law?
Sinuiju (A): Recently, the authorities have been emphasizing the active use of noble, cultured Pyongyang Cultural Language, but the use of South Korean speech or foreign words, or the watching of illegal films like South Korean movies or TV shows, is nothing new. It’s no exaggeration to say that capitalist culture has taken deep root among the young. I think because even the state recognizes this, it has begun cracking down by making laws. To put it another way, we could say the state created justification for new forms of restrictions to control the people.
Chongjin (B): Nowadays, the authorities are conducting their propaganda campaign calling on not only young people but all of society to use our noble and beautiful Pyongyang Cultural Language more intensively than ever through every organization, along with TV. At the same time, they are intensifying crackdowns and restrictions on the use of South Korean speech and foreign words, as well as capitalist culture. The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act also aims to eliminate remnants of South Korean culture.
Hyesan (C): From the time I was a kid in kindergarten through high school all the way to when I entered society as an adult, I’ve had it drilled into my head to love and use our language, our noble and cultured language. Even after the adoption of the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act, the authorities have especially stressed the active protection and encouragement of Pyongyang Cultural Language along the same lines. Seeing how they had to even create a law to restrict language, doesn’t it mean that capitalist culture is really deep rooted in our country?
DNK: Will the law be effective? Have the attitudes of young people changed even a little since the law was enacted?
A: Just like if you spank somebody too much it no longer hurts, we’re used to it because we’ve been living with crackdowns and restrictions since birth. Because of this, I think it won’t matter even if they create laws and intensify restrictions. Still, if there is a change, it’s that we are being more careful. Now friends habitually speak in South Korean style when they gather. That habit won’t change overnight just because the authorities are cracking down on it.
B: People are just a bit more wary now. When you gather with your friends, if you don’t talk about South Korean films or use South Korean speech, you have nothing to say. Out of pride, you can’t say you couldn’t eat before you left because there’s no rice at home, and talking about politics is even more dangerous. If you say the wrong thing, you could destroy three generations of your family, so you don’t say a word. However, what you can do is talk about South Korean films or dramas or talk in South Korean style, even if you have to dodge crackdowns to do it. The nation is using all means and methods at its disposal to intensify crackdowns, but people are responding in kind, so I think the law won’t be very effective.
C: No matter how much they create new laws and strengthen punishments and intensify crackdowns and restrictions, people just pretend to comply and continue talking as they like and seeing what they like. In fact, if they try to bind the public’s people’s hands and feet, blindfold them and cover their ears, people just fill up with discontent.
DNK: Are the authorities actively cracking down on foreign culture?
A: Agents from anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior crackdown units are barging into people’s homes without knocking to inspect people’s possessions. My parents think these officials can enter any home any time they like, but young people like me fight with them. In fact, when agents barged into a friend’s house without knocking, he yelled at them and fought back, screaming, “You knock on even the bathroom door to see if anyone’s in there, so how can you enter a person’s home without knocking?” With the agents acting so unethically in the name of crackdowns, it’s causing a backlash. So young people complain that they don’t understand why the state is cracking down like this over films and speech.
B: Inspection officers are stopping passers-by to check their mobile phones, and they are even climbing over people’s front gates at night like thieves and standing in front of their doors listening for sounds of South Korean films. I was even scared out of my senses when I went outside in the middle of the night to use the outhouse and came face-to-face with an inspection officer who had snuck into the yard. When I yelled, he said he was an inspection officer and that he had jumped my gate because he heard strange sounds coming from my home and thought I was watching a South Korean film. He said it was his job and asked me to understand, without saying sorry. When inspection officers are acting in this way, who wouldn’t resist?
C: Inspection officers are entering people’s homes and inspecting their possessions closely, as if it were a search and seizure operation, and treating people like criminals. The inspection techniques are similar to years past, but perhaps I should say young people’s understanding has changed? In the past, if they told you to sit, you sat, and if they told you to stand, you stood, but now you fight with them. Now we’re so sick of the inspection officers that we mutter that if they randomly appear, we’ll fight rather than lay down and take it.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of reporting partners who live inside North Korea. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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15. US has no hostile intent but N. Korea continues to provoke: state dept.
The north will accept no verbal or written "security guarantees" short of the withdrawal of US troops. And of course once US troops are withdrawn Kim Jong Un believes be will be in a position to coerce the South with the threat of force and he believes that he will have a credible option to use force to achieve his objectives.
US has no hostile intent but N. Korea continues to provoke: state dept.
The Korea Times · February 28, 2023
State Department Press Secretary Ned Price is seen answering a question during a daily press briefing at the department in Washington on Feb. 27, in this captured image. Yonhap
The United States has no hostile intent toward North Korea, a state department spokesperson said Monday, adding that North Korea, on the other hand, continues to make provocations.
The remarks come after the North cited what it claimed to be U.S. hostility toward the country, while warning that U.S. provocations against the North will be considered a "declaration of war."
"It is the DPRK that time and again at an unprecedented rate has engaged in provocations, including multiple tests of ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) systems, other ballistic missiles and other provocative activities that have posed a threat to peace and security in the Indo-Pacific and, in some ways, even well beyond," State Department Press Secretary Ned Price told a daily press briefing.
"Even as we have pointed out the threat that we and our partners in the region face from these programs and these dangerous provocations, we have made very clear that we have no hostile intent towards the DPRK," he added.
DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.
North Korea staged 69 ballistic missile tests in 2022, marking a new record of ballistic missiles fired in a single year.
Pyongyang periodically accuses the U.S. of provoking North Korea by staging joint military exercises with South Korea and Japan, which it claims are rehearsals aimed at invading the North.
The state department spokesperson noted that the U.S. has offered to talk directly with the North for over a year.
"We have made very clear our willingness to engage in direct talks with the DPRK without preconditions to help bring about, to advance the prospects of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," said Price.
He added North Korea, "on the other hand, has only engaged in provocation after provocation and has rejected our diplomatic overtures time and again."
Price also reaffirmed the U.S.' continued commitment to finding diplomatic solutions, saying its "diplomatic overtures remain."
"We would like an opportunity to discuss these issues face to face if that's the preference, but we believe in diplomacy, even as we have made clear, in word and in deed, that we are going to stand by the security commitments that we have to our treaty allies ― to Japan, to the Republic of Korea, to our allies around the world," he said, referring to South Korea by its official name. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · February 28, 2023
16. Is TikTok helping a North Korean propaganda account go mega-viral?
Sigh...
Is TikTok helping a North Korean propaganda account go mega-viral?
Daily Dot · by Mikael Thalen · February 27, 2023
A TikTok account showcasing what is alleged to be everyday life in North Korea is growing rapidly in popularity, but also facing increased scrutiny from the app’s users.
The account, known simply as “Life in North Korea,” has managed to rack up over 200,000 followers and more than 3.4 million likes since uploading its first video on Feb. 9.
Of the 20 videos uploaded so far, 15 have garnered at least 1 million views. The account’s most popular video, which details the alleged account holder’s morning walk, has managed to accrue close to 30 million views in total.
“My daily morning walk in North Korea,” a text-to-speech voice says. “Very quiet and calming.”
Other videos showcase everything from the subway station in the rogue nation’s capital Pyongyang to its “beautiful cable cars.”
Yet the videos, which clearly attempt to portray North Korea as a serene paradise, are being met with skepticism and jabs by TikTok users. Regardless, users can’t seem to look away.
“If you were to make this video black and white you’d probably think it’s from the 60s,” one user said regarding a video on the country’s public transport system.
In another video showing the “rural lifestyle” of farmers, which is set to peaceful piano music, users likewise weighed in on the nation’s apparent poverty.
“Those cows are emaciated,” one user said.
“North Korea has entered the feudal era,” another said
@northkoreanlife Beautiful Countryside #foryou ##fyp##foryoupage##xyzbca##asia##korea##viral##communist ♬ nhạc nền – Nguyễn sin – An Bình Mart
One video, where the account appears to brag about the number of umbrellas being used on the street of Pyongyang, was ridiculed especially hard.
“North Korea has umbrellas? omg im moving there now,” a user joked.
“North Korea is the only country in which you can have an umbrella woah,” a second user wrote.
The bizarre nature of the videos has led many to accuse the account of being nothing more than propaganda aimed at ignoring the squalid state of affairs in the country and its myraid human rights abuses.
Given the ties between North Korea and China, the nation where the TikTok app was founded, it’s reasonable to ask whether the account has been artificially inflated by the platform. As reported by Forbes in January, documents and sources indicated that TikTok utilizes a “heating” button that can boost videos until they’ve reached a desired view count.
As noted by one user, the account has yet to follow any other on the platform.
“Obv a government acc, the acc not following anyone,” they wrote.
“Is that some kind of a strange government propaganda?” another said.
@northkoreanlife North Korea has many cars #fyp #foryou #xyzbca #viral #korea #cars #mercedes #audi #hyundai ♬ The Nights – Avicii
But not all users are concerned about the account’s goals and are instead glad they’ve been offered an inside look into the Hermit Kingdom.
“Yes, I think gov account, but it’s still a sneak peak inside,” a commenter stated. “Although warped, but still interesting to me.”
It remains unclear who exactly is running the account and whether they are associated with the North Korean government. Messages sent by the Daily Dot to the account went unanswered.
Given the state of the country and current geopolitical tensions, it’s unlikely the videos will improve the world’s view of North Korean anytime soon.
But whoever is running the account sure seems to be trying.
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Let me read it first
Daily Dot · by Mikael Thalen · February 27, 2023
17. S. Hamgyong Province warns young people not to earn money outside of assigned workplaces
Another "safety valve" that supports the resilience of the Korean people is being blocked by the regime. It appears that the regime is really trying to stop market activity and nascent capitalism because it is a threat.
S. Hamgyong Province warns young people not to earn money outside of assigned workplaces
“The provincial justice department is investigating the circumstances surrounding young people ashamed about how little they make in factories or engaging in organizational life," a reporting partner told Daily NK
dailynk.com
A view of Hamhung (Clay Gilliland, Flickr, Creative Commons)
South Hamgyong Province authorities recently distributed materials warning young people not to engage in money-making activities outside of their assigned workplaces, a Daily NK reporting partner in South Hamgyong Province said Monday, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Based on the reporting partner’s account, political organizations at agencies and enterprises in Hamhung received “notification and indoctrination materials” in mid-February that included a list of problem cases, including that of the resignation of a young man in his 20s — identified by his family name of Kim — who worked at a factory in Hamhung.
According to the materials, Kim joined the factory as an engineer after graduating university and worked hard for several years, producing results while sincerely taking part in technological innovation efforts. Recently, however, he resigned from the factory citing health reasons.
However, knowing he could not quit the company without a reason, Kim prepared for a year to resign, lying about being sick and submitting multiple fake diagnoses from doctors.
The unsuspecting company, with no way of knowing otherwise, accepted Kim’s resignation request.
After resigning from the factory, he joined a company that required only light levels of labor from its employees. His employment at the company was just on paper; in reality, he earned money fixing electronics from home.
In fact, North Korea assigns workers having difficulty in their workplaces due to disease or disability to workplaces requiring work that is not physically taxing.
However, Kim — who was not really eligible for light labor — joined the light labor workplace while illegally engaging in money-earning activities.
His misdeeds came to light when several former factory coworkers visited Kim’s home.
When rumors spread among factory workers that Kim was making money at home fixing TVs and transformers ostensibly working at the light labor workplace – and that “he looked healthier and was living better than ever” – the factory’s managers immediately complained to the factory’s party committee that Kim was unjustly pursuing his own self interests.
Kim’s matter then got reported all the way to the South Hamgyong Province party committee.
The provincial party committee concluded that Kim’s actions could have a negative impact on society, so it ordered that his personal information — including his name, age and address — be included in notification and indoctrination materials for distribution to political organizations at agencies and enterprises.
Daily NK’s reporting partner said the provincial party committee used Kim’s example as an opportunity to put people on guard against an increasing tendency by young people to “be ashamed of working in a place earning little money, rather than following the example of revolutionary elders who worked until their retirement with little desire for honors or remuneration under the spirit of dying at one’s post if need be.”
During his indoctrination process by the provincial justice department, Kim explained that despite working hard at the factory for years, his wife was supporting the family through money earned at a local market.
“I could no longer watch my pregnant wife doing business in the cold, so I joined a light labor workplace and was going to earn money fixing electronics at home just until my wife gave birth,” he said. The provincial justice department authorities did not buy his story, however.
In the end, Kim was redeployed to his original workplace, while the political and administrative directors of the light labor workplace that Kim had joined were also called in by the provincial justice department to write self-criticism letters.
Meanwhile, the provincial justice department is using the incident to re-examine the medical documents and personal documents of all factory workers designated for light labor workplaces to determine if there are other cases like Kim’s, according to the reporting partner.
“The provincial justice department is investigating the circumstances surrounding young people ashamed about how little they make in factories or engaging in organizational life, warning that it will hand out forced labor and other criminal punishments depending on the severity of the offense.”
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of reporting partners who live inside North Korea. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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