Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners
 
 

Quotes of the Day:


"Rudeness is the weak man's imitation of strength."
– Eric Hoffer

"As you grow older, you will discover that you have two hands, one for helping yourself, the other is for helping others." 
– Audrey Hepburn

"No man is worth his salt who is not ready at all times to risk his body, to risk his well-being, to risk his life, in a great cause." 
- Theodore Roosevelt



1. U.S. SOCKOR hosts multinational special operations forum

2. US, South Korea planning major military exercises amid tensions with North Korea

3. John Batchelor Show: #NORTHKOREA: Cuba shakes hands with Seoul.

4. Russia hails Pyongyang for supporting its war against Ukraine

5. Deterrents to a Hamas-style North Korea border raid

6. Illegal nighttime markets pop up in North Korea

7. South Korea-ASEAN Cooperation: Current Issues and Future Prospects

8. Defense chief, NATO's top commander agree to expand defense cooperation

9. White House refuses to comment on whether S. Korea should send artillery shells to Ukraine

10. Japan warns of malicious PyPi packages created by North Korean hackers

11. Possible radiation exposure suspected among some N. Korea defectors

12. North Korea's first spy satellite is 'alive', can manoeuvre, expert says

13. The Hereditary Dictatorships of North Korea, Cambodia Have Shared Soviet Roots

14. NIS: ‘N. Korea utilizes AI to spread false news ahead of S. Korean general elections’






1. U.S. SOCKOR hosts multinational special operations forum


I was fortunate to be invited to participate in this conference last week. It has come a long way since I was assigned to SOCKOR and conducted these conferences 20+ years ago. It was amazing to see the Korean and Japanese special operations officers' interaction. 


And who would think the military would be interested in Human Rights? But Ambassador Julie Turner engaged in an excellent discussion and of course one nexus of human rights and military operations is in information and influence operations and there was excellent discussion about this and all agreed that we could provide much more US government resources (to include the military) to work on these issues.


General Fenton and CSM Shorter zoomed in from Tampa and provided a very important update on SOCOM activities (prevent, prepare, prevail and preserve with the focus on People, Winning, and Transforming) 60% integrated deterrence, 20% crisis response, and 20% C-VEO. (it was great to see all the east coast speakers have to zoom in at night to attend the conference in the daytime in Korea as those in Korea always have to follow east coast time and therefore are always the ones zooming into VTCs in the middle of the night)


General LaCamera held an extended discussion with the participants and also candidly engaged on a wide range of issues. 


We also were able to spend a day visiting the new ROK Army Special Warfare command HQ in Ichon. What an incredible new facility. So much improved over the old HQ in Seongnam. 


Lastly, I was able to spend my last day at JSA/Panmunjom with the troops "in front of them all.". It was great to be around real soldiers again for a day.



U.S. SOCKOR hosts multinational special operations forum

https://www.dvidshub.net/news/464952/us-sockor-hosts-multinational-special-operations-forum


Photo By Pfc. Yeonung Kim | From left, Japanese, U.S., and Republic of Korea special operations personnel talk... read more

SOUTH KOREA

02.22.2024

Story by Maj. Christopher Mesnard 

Special Operations Command Korea  

 Subscribe13


A multinational array of special operations leaders converged on U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, near Pyeongtaek, Republic of Korea for a three-day, U.S. Special Operations Command Korea-hosted Component Commander’s Special Operations Forces (C2SOF) forum, from February 20-22, 2024.


Senior special operations personnel from the U.S., ROK, Japan, various United Nations Command Member States, and from around the Indo-Pacific region participated in the forum. Discussions focused on the need to collaboratively counter belligerent threats in the region, opportunities for combined training, lessons learned from recent and historic conflicts involving special operations forces, and the ability to share and meaningfully process data between different nations.


Gen. Bryan Fenton, Special Operations Command commander, and the Command Senior Enlisted Leader, Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter began the forum by providing remarks focused on the strategic environment from a U.S. special operations perspective. Both focused heavily on international relationships with multi-national SOF counterparts as a means for enabling four mutually beneficial priorities; preventing conflict, preparing for crisis events that happen outside of the control of international norms, prevailing in conflict if needed, and preserving the strategic focus of our Nations’ leadership.


“As we see it, one strand or theme holds true in enabling the competitive edge of special operations principles, and those are the teams, partners, and relationships we invest in now.” said Fenton. “Our ability to prevent adversary intent or prevail if needed is seeded on the idea of a deep bench for us to call upon.”


Fenton and Shorter both described the role of the regionally aligned theater special operations commands, like SOCKOR, in campaigning as a means for empowering policy makers with options to prevail at all levels or phases of competition.


“We see the TSOCs as our marquee organizations for SOF-enabled campaigning,” said Shorter. “We have to think well left of any potential crises, which means training and interoperability among nations with a mutual interest in the stability of our world order.”


Additionally, current ambassadors discussed a variety of topics, including the human rights situation in North Korea, the need to embrace a multinational diplomatic approach in the region, and their unique perspectives on the impact special operations forces play in enabling diplomatic and policy-based options. U.S. Ambassadors Julie Turner, Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues and Philip S. Goldberg Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, and British Ambassador to South Korea Colin Crooks Lieutenant of the Royal Victorian Order participated in the forum.


Amplifying the points about enabling a variety of national power options, Brig. Gen. Derek N. Lipson, SOCKOR commander, highlighted the unique access and placement the command has and its geographic location in relation to various strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region.


“We live in a complex environment, but it’s our intent to add clarity by enabling effective data collection and usage across our network of Allies and Partners with common interests in the region,” said Lipson. “Hosting this forum isn’t about us. It’s about advancing mutual defense priorities and ensuring that if deterrence fails, we’re prepared to win through a coalition of ready and able special operations personnel.”


Various speakers highlighted a reorientation of the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency focus that defined the community’s past 20 years, toward one that advances current National Security Strategy priorities. Lipson stated that SOCKOR will continue advancing it’s unique unconventional and irregular warfare capabilities that meet the needs of integrated deterrence, crisis response, counter terrorism, and counterinsurgency, while remaining sensitive to the diverse sociocultural considerations of the region.


During the forum’s closing remarks, Gen. Paul LaCamera, U.S. Forces Korea commander, reinforced the need to understand and address the threats presented by North Korea and understanding third-party intervention and influence.


“We’re hyper focused on upholding our commitments to the ROK-U.S. Alliance,” said LaCamera. “As a triple-hatted, combined command, our people must look at how we compete as a way to deter aggression while retaining our right to defend and prevail in a crisis.”


LaCamera also highlighted the need to better understand how North Korea is able to undermine various UN sanctions related to weapons proliferation and procurement. He credited the SOF community with their distinct role in the efforts and for their mission readiness in countering weapons of mass destruction across all phases of competition and their ability to advance strategy below the level of crisis.


The 2024 C2SOF forum continues a decades-long presence of U.S. special operations personnel on the Korean Peninsula and in the region—a theme highlighted throughout the event. What’s more, various speakers remarked on the positive multinational engagements throughout the forum, with an emphasis on enabling integrated deterrence through unique special operations relationships.



2.


One of the many things I learned on my recent trip to Korea is that within the UN Command we no longer call the nations "sending states," but instead call them member nations. A seemingly subtle but important change. The UN Command staff will also soon have 18 new officers front he ROK military assigned to it.


Excerpts:


Several countries from United Nations Command, a group formed to protect South Korea, will also support the exercises — including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, France, the U.K., Greece, Italy, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand.
U.S. military spokesperson Col. Isaac Taylor said at a press conference that the military exercises will “increase interoperability and enhance the combined operation capabilities of the alliance.”


US, South Korea planning major military exercises amid tensions with North Korea

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4493813-us-south-korea-planning-major-military-exercises-north/?utm

BY BRAD DRESS - 02/28/24 9:55 AM ET



A TV screen shows an image of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during a news program at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea, Tuesday, Jan. 16, 2024. (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)

The U.S. and South Korea will launch an 11-day military exercise on the Korean Peninsula beginning next week as tensions continue to rise with North Korea after Pyongyang abandoned reconciliation with Seoul and has re-militarized the border.

Freedom Shield 2024 is set to run from March 4-14, U.S. Forces Korea said this week, and the drills will involve virtual and field training across multiple domains, including land, sea, air, space and cyber.


The drills will also focus on countering nuclear capabilities, which comes after North Korea has ramped up missile tests and increased its arsenal of nuclear weapons in recent years.

Several countries from United Nations Command, a group formed to protect South Korea, will also support the exercises — including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, France, the U.K., Greece, Italy, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand.

U.S. military spokesperson Col. Isaac Taylor said at a press conference that the military exercises will “increase interoperability and enhance the combined operation capabilities of the alliance.”

The exercises are likely to infuriate North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un, who has reacted in the past to joint military drills with more aggression, including test-firing ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Kim, who has drawn closer to Russia during its war in Ukraine and supplied Moscow with artillery and weapons, has moved even further from any hopes of a peaceful agreement with South Korea.

In January, Kim declared North Korea would no longer seek peaceful unification with South Korea and ordered the tearing down of a statue symbolizing that goal. He also is seeking to define South Korea as its most hostile foreign adversary in the constitution.


The tensions have also risen at the border after Kim launched a spy satellite into space last year, which led to the abandoning of a 2018 military reduction agreement and no-fly zone at the border.

North Korea has since restored border guard posts at the border.

TAGS ISAAC TAYLOR KIM JONG UN MILITARY EXERCISES MISSILE TESTS NORTH KOREA NORTH KOREA PYONGYANG SEOUL SOUTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA U.S. FORCES KOREA UNITED STATES



3. John Batchelor Show: #NORTHKOREA: Cuba shakes hands with Seoul.


My latest interview.  In addition to discussion of the game of "Go" ( Korean name Baduk) between north and South, we also discussed nK support for Russia. I also recommended to John that he not use axis of resistance. We need to preserve the word resistance for those who resist tyranny and we should use something like the axis of totalitarians, dictators, or authoritarians. They should not be granted the status of resistors to the rules based international order. They are malign actors and should not be granted the respect the word "resistance" to a cause.


https://audioboom.com/posts/8465963-northkorea-cuba-shakes-hands-with-seoul-david-maxwell-vice-president-of-the-center-for-asia-p


#NORTHKOREA: Cuba shakes hands with Seoul. David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill

#NORTHKOREA: Cuba shakes hands with Seoul. David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill

https://www.voanews.com/a/seoul-s-diplomatic-ties-with-havana-seen-as-diplomatic-setback-for-pyongyang-/7496043.html

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/02/103_369441.html





4. Russia hails Pyongyang for supporting its war against Ukraine


The music of malign actors.


Russia hails Pyongyang for supporting its war against Ukraine

The move came a few days after Seoul said N Korea has sent over 3 million artillery shells to Russia.

By Taejun Kang for RFA

2024.02.29

Taipei, Taiwan

rfa.org

Russia has expressed its gratitude to North Korea again for supporting its aggression against Ukraine in a show of solidarity as fresh claims of arms trading between the two authoritarian regimes emerged.

“We are pleased that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is standing with us at the forefront of this struggle,” the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang said in a Facebook post on Feb. 29, to update developments in Ukraine.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is North Korea’s official name.

“The United States and its puppets are responsible for the bloodshed and destruction brought about by their policies of repression in Russia,” the embassy said, adding that “Russia will win and this will be a shared victory for all who adhere to the new world order."

North Korea has supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, calling it a “righteous struggle to defend its strategic security and interests.”

The message from the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang came a few days after Seoul said North Korea has sent some 6,700 containers carrying more than three million artillery shells to Russia since August last year.

North Korea and Russia have been accused of engaging in arms trading, with the Ukrainians alleging that Russian forces have used North Korean missiles to attack them – a claim that both Pyongyang and Moscow have denied.

South Korea’s defense minister Shin Won-sik told journalists on Tuesday that judging by the number of containers; he estimates that millions of rounds have been delivered to Russia, including more than three million 152mm artillery shells and more than half a million 122mm rocket launchers.

Shin noted that among the hundreds of munitions factories in North Korea, he estimates only about 30% are operational. However, those involved in Russian-related activities seem to be functioning at full capacity.

Separately, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service said in November last year that Moscow has likely offered Pyongyang technological advice for its satellite launch, as it has received more than 1 million artillery shells from North Korea since early August.

Edited by Elaine Chan and Mike Firn.

rfa.org




5. Deterrents to a Hamas-style North Korea border raid


A very interesting point:


Interestingly, this changing landscape is not actually disadvantageous for the ROK. In fact, while the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s attempt to revitalize the United Nations Command (UNC) must have been planned long before the Hamas attack, its plan to galvanize the long-quiescent structure has gathered international attention.
The UNC, much like NATO, functions not only as a collective defense mechanism but also to protect the increasing number of foreign nationals in Korea. No longer a pure battle command, the UNC has managed inter-border military and civilian issues over the last several decades under the 1953 Armistice.
On November 14, a ministerial-level conference in Seoul – with all 17 UN sending states, or countries that contributed combat troops or supporting personnel in the 1950 Korean War – reaffirmed the spirit of the 1953 Armistice and pledged that they would repel any future attack on the ROK.
The revitalization of the UNC appears an attractive countermeasure in the event of international-scale hostage abductions or casualties due to DPRK attacks. The UNC, a coherent entity with military and government representatives from around the world, can facilitate international negotiations as the sole conduit to prevent inter-agency and inter-country complications and confusions, drawing on its time-tested experience in dealing with civilian populations.



Deterrents to a Hamas-style North Korea border raid - Asia Times

Seoul’s bid to revitalize Korean War-era United Nations Command, a NATO-like defense mechanism, points to fast-shifting global security dynamics


By JAMES JB PARK

FEBRUARY 29, 2024

asiatimes.com · by James JB Park · February 29, 2024

The October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel was surprising in many aspects. The motorized paragliders, despite their slow speed, served as a wake-up call for countries dealing with potential border infiltration issues.

The graphic videos depicting hostages being abducted across the breached “smart fence” were certainly horrifying, particularly for the Republic of Korea (ROK): The Israeli fence is modeled after South Korea’s, with its cutting-edge sensors and closed-circuit TV situated in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

Yet, despite subsequent heated debates in National Assembly hearings, it seems the ROK is safe for now, for several reasons. These include distinct operational environments and recently upgraded defense and radar systems.

The geographical difference between the flat southern regions of Israel and the mountainous DMZ, which is laden with countless landmines and air-defense guns, makes a direct comparison unfeasible.

Also, the ROK does not experience a daily influx of workers crossing the border, a factor that enabled some working visa-holding Palestinians to turn into belligerents on October 7.

Lastly, the ROK’s indigenous TPS-880K multifunctional radar, recently fielded by LIG (a LG subsidiary), can detect very small drones and paramotors within a nine-mile range and a little more than a mile in altitude.

The radar can instantly issue C4 (command, control, comms, and computer) orders to varying types of air-defense guns, as well as the low-altitude combined anti-aircraft weapon (Bi-ho Hybrid) and ROK sentries, serving as the linchpin of the integration of the ROK’s DMZ weaponry.

While human error is always possible, as was evidenced by a North Korean drone that infiltrated Seoul last year, the integrated, automated defense system appears quite sufficient in addressing systematic invasions.

However, the conversation about border security has sparked further debates over the ROK military’s plan to partially revoke the September 19 Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), in which both countries agreed to “completely cease all hostile acts against each other” and implement military confidence-building measures in the air, land and sea domains.

To foster inter-Korean reconciliation, the 2018 CMA established no-fly zones around the DMZ, essentially halting aerial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities by the ROK-US alliance.

The CMA’s raison d’être, aimed at decreasing inter-border clashes, has lost its justification due to recent shifts in global security concerns wherein previously unthinkable military moves, like Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and subsequent drone warfare, have become the new norm.

This has required the alliance to reconsider and revoke the clause prohibiting DMZ ISR activities.

North Korea’s launching of its first reconnaissance satellite, condemned by the international community due to its use of illegal ballistic missile technology that threatens the “global nonproliferation regime,” has resulted in a game of brinkmanship, leading to the complete abandonment of the CMA on November 23.

In this volatile security landscape, the rapidly changing demographics of the ROK represent a wake-up call for both the ROK and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as the North is formally known.

With roughly 1.32 million foreign residents in the greater Seoul metropolitan area (GSMA) within 50 kilometers (30 miles) of the DMZ, an unprecedented challenge has emerged for both Koreas.

The involvement of numerous countries as prime stakeholders protecting the lives of their citizens transforms potential incidents involving hostages, or casualties in the GSMA, from a purely inter-Korean issue to an international crisis.

For the DPRK, the existence of diverse stakeholders offers strategic advantages, buying time and creating extra room to maneuver. The recent Hamas attack and international hostage abductions resulted in extremely complex multilateral negotiations involving the US, Israel, Hamas, Qatar and Egypt.

An established international entity, preferably a security-related one, would have facilitated the negotiation much more easily, but the lack thereof stalled subsequent hostage release deals.

Remember that old UN Command?

Interestingly, this changing landscape is not actually disadvantageous for the ROK. In fact, while the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s attempt to revitalize the United Nations Command (UNC) must have been planned long before the Hamas attack, its plan to galvanize the long-quiescent structure has gathered international attention.

A South Korean honor guard stands in front of boxes containing the remains of the UNC and ROK soldiers killed in North Korea in the 1950-53 Korean War during the mutual repatriation ceremony of soldiers’ remains in Seoul, South Korea on July 13, 2018. Image: Pool

The UNC, much like NATO, functions not only as a collective defense mechanism but also to protect the increasing number of foreign nationals in Korea. No longer a pure battle command, the UNC has managed inter-border military and civilian issues over the last several decades under the 1953 Armistice.

On November 14, a ministerial-level conference in Seoul – with all 17 UN sending states, or countries that contributed combat troops or supporting personnel in the 1950 Korean War – reaffirmed the spirit of the 1953 Armistice and pledged that they would repel any future attack on the ROK.

The revitalization of the UNC appears an attractive countermeasure in the event of international-scale hostage abductions or casualties due to DPRK attacks. The UNC, a coherent entity with military and government representatives from around the world, can facilitate international negotiations as the sole conduit to prevent inter-agency and inter-country complications and confusions, drawing on its time-tested experience in dealing with civilian populations.

Of course, some might argue that subtle and sensitive negotiations are not always suited for the military. They might also contend that civilian foreign service officers and personnel specializing in hostage negotiations would be more appropriate. However, such claims themselves further justify the revitalization of the UNC in regard to ramping up its manpower and inviting the presence of such specialists.


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This approach addresses legitimate concerns about the need for diplomatic and negotiation expertise within the UNC, ensuring a comprehensive and well-rounded approach to addressing complex international challenges.

The ROK, traditionally a very homogenous nation, is embracing rapid immigration and the presence of foreign laborers due to its birth rate crisis. Next year alone, a record number of approximately 160,000 new, legal foreign laborers will arrive, taking up positions at small local farms and factories, some of which are located within 30 miles of the DMZ.

With the presence of foreign nationals, including those represented by the UN sending states and the UN Command, any DPRK move that jeopardizes their safety would prompt the Yoon administration to reinforce the UNC with support from relevant member states.

Such a scenario goes against the DPRK’s best interests. Despite the traditional DPRK rhetoric calling for dismantling the UNC (given the UNC’s position outside of the UN’s direct purview), the current security circumstances do not favor any reckless actions from the DPRK.

The changing demographic landscape and increased international presence in South Korea make it imperative for the DPRK to tread cautiously.

James JB Park is a former staff member of the Korean Presidential Blue House and National Security Council. A reserve officer of the Republic of Korea Army, he is currently pursuing graduate studies at Columbia University in the United States.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the ROK government, the Presidential Blue House or the ROK military. This article was first published by Pacific Forum and is republished with permission.

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asiatimes.com · by James JB Park · February 29, 2024



6. Illegal nighttime markets pop up in North Korea



​Markets are the biggest contributor to the people's resilience. But note how the regime is trying to kill them.


Illegal nighttime markets pop up in North Korea

New laws forbid selling goods that merchants did not produce themselves, all but killing daytime commerce.

By Ahn Chang Gyu for RFA Korean

2024.02.28

rfa.org

Merchants in North Korea are flocking to illegal night markets to sell their goods because the government has introduced new laws that prohibit the sale of goods that they did not make themselves, residents in the country told Radio Free Asia.

It’s the latest effort by the government to eliminate the marketplace, where money and goods change hands without any government control.

Since the application of the new laws, the daytime outdoor markets are now empty, a resident of the northeastern province of North Hamgyong told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

“Markets are not as popular as they used to be due to market control by the authorities,” she said. “Instead, many night-time street vendors have appeared throughout downtown Chongjin this winter,” she said, referring to a city in the province.

North Korean marketplaces became widespread after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting end of aid from Moscow.

The centrally planned North Korean economy, designed with the government controlling all commerce, was unable to absorb the shock, which resulted in the 1994-1998 famine that killed hundreds of thousands of people, or possibly more than 2 million, or about 10% of the country by some estimates.

Inflation spiraled out of control and government-assigned jobs no longer paid a living wage, so people had to go into business for themselves to find a way to make ends meet. For many families, opening a stall in the open-air market became a means of survival.

The markets sold manufactured goods smuggled in from China or stolen from the military, or offered services provided by residents, and the government has almost no ability to tax transactions between buyer and seller, paid mostly in U.S. dollars or Chinese yuan.

Shut down

The markets thrived up until the COVID-19 pandemic, when nearly all commerce was shut down due to a closure of the border with China and a suspension of all trade.

Business had been returning, but the government began enacting policies to kill the marketplaces, including by paying salaries on cash cards that cannot be used outside of government-run stores.

When that did not work, authorities invoked the new laws, which seemingly allow sellers to deal only in homemade handcrafts. This has forced the real commerce to be done secretly at night.

“When it gets dark, everyone comes out to do business around the market and on crowded street corners,” the North Hamgyong resident said. “Although the night markets are secret and illegal, they attract more people than the regular market.”

The secret markets were reminiscent of the famine era of the 1990s, which North Koreans call the “Arduous March,” she said, as the markets were not legalized until 2003.

‘Grasshopper markets’

Prior to 2003, all marketplaces were secret and had to be mobile. When inspectors came around, sellers would quickly pack up their wares and move to another location. These types of markets were called “grasshopper markets,” because people would disperse quickly, like the insects.

“If you go to the night street market, you will find all kinds of goods, including clothes, shoes, other things you need and even sweets,” the North Hamgyong resident said, adding that the night markets have a large variety of foods that aren’t available in the daytime.

She said that one particular seller with a connection to rural farmers set up a stall with many different types of grain, including rice and corn. She sold out very quickly.

The new nighttime “grasshopper markets” have sprung up because the people are struggling to survive, and the new laws are working against them, another North Hamgyong resident said on condition of anonymity for safety reasons.

“There are many people who lost their businesses due to market control by the authorities,” he said. “They have no choice but to go to the night street market to make a living.”

Hard to stamp out

It does not only affect the sellers, he said.

“You won’t be able to buy things you need at a daytime market, so you have no choice but to go to the night street market,” the second resident said. “Night street markets are thriving, but they are so inconvenient.”

In addition to the time, the nighttime markets are also more disorganized, he said. When the daytime markets were legal, sellers would organize themselves into sections for clothes, shoes, food, kitchenware and other products for customer convenience.

In the night market the sellers just come together and sell whatever they have with no regard for what the next person is selling.

Crime in the night markets is also a problem, the second resident said.

“There are many thieves in the dark narrow alleys and street markets, so you can easily lose your wallet or purse,” he said. “The authorities’ market control is causing inconvenience to residents in so many ways.”

The second resident predicted that no matter how much the authorities try to control the markets, it will be difficult to completely eliminate street markets unless they resolve the problem of how people are supposed to make a living.

Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.


rfa.org


7. South Korea-ASEAN Cooperation: Current Issues and Future Prospects


Access the entire essay at the link below.


South Korea-ASEAN Cooperation: Current Issues and Future Prospects

https://www.keaf.org/en/book/EAF_Policy_Debates/South_Korea_ASEAN_Cooperation_Current_Issues_and_Future_Prospects?ckattempt=1

Summary

As the cooperative relationship between South Korea and ASEAN has steadily deepened over the past 35 years, interest in future cooperation is also increasing. The path forward depends on how South Korea manages its relations with ASEAN going forward. The government will pursue sustainable relations with ASEAN in which strategic cooperation and strengthened defense cooperation between the two sides are mutually beneficial. It is necessary to form a virtuous cycle of economic cooperation in which the growth of ASEAN, which still has great economic potential, leads to greater opportunities for South Korea. Businesses entering ASEAN should also base their strategies on building long-term foundations through localization and the establishment of a knowledge base for ASEAN, rather than short-term profit-oriented approaches.

In 2024, the relationship between South Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will mark its 35th anniversary. Relations between the two sides have developed rapidly through a combination of government policies, business ventures and private interests. Immediately after the Cold War, corporate investment in Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam, led to South Korea-ASEAN economic cooperation. ASEAN is now the second-largest recipient of Korean trade and investment. The Kim Dae Jung government's leading role in regional multilateral cooperation and the Moon Jae-in government's New Southern Policy have brought about rapid development of South Korea’s relationship with ASEAN, and Southeast Asia more generally. Private sector exchanges of individuals, academic exchanges, as well as cultural and artistic exchanges have greatly expanded the scope of these relations. There are more than 10 million mutual visitors between ASEAN and South Korea annually. About 650,000 ASEAN citizens live in South Korea, and about 300,000 Koreans live in ASEAN countries.

With the rapid development and deepening of cooperation between the two sides, interest in the sustainability and future of South Korea-ASEAN relations is intensifying. Will Korea-ASEAN cooperation be sustainable beyond the current short-term, economic-oriented relationship? For South Korea, is ASEAN worth it as a cooperation partner? If so, what is the ultimate goal of this relationship? These questions are closely linked. The answer is not predetermined, but depends on how South Korea and ASEAN continue to build relations and in what direction cooperation moves. With this in mind, let's examine some important points regarding cooperation between South Korea and ASEAN, with an eye to the future and what to pursue.

Strategic Cooperation for the Future Rather than Security in the Moment

Political and security cooperation always comes first when it comes to South Korea-ASEAN cooperation, while other areas for cooperation lag. These include security, defense, strategic cooperation, and South Korea-ASEAN cooperation within the context of regional multilateral cooperation. Seoul, which has long devoted all its energy to security on the Korean Peninsula, has only focused on how to use ASEAN for its security. Such cooperation deepens when both sides share a common security threat. However, South Korea and ASEAN do not fit this criteria. Seoul’s first security concern is the situation on the Korean Peninsula, while ASEAN has other concerns. The Korean Peninsula is not its most important security issue, although this doesn’t necessarily mean the topic is not of any interest. As a result, the two sides lack the structural conditions favorable to developing security cooperation.

South Korea should place more weight on strategic cooperation with ASEAN to tackle common long-term threats, rather than focusing primarily on security. Deepening strategic cooperation may strengthen trust, and strengthening strategic trust may naturally lead to security cooperation. One example of a long-term threat facing ASEAN is ongoing US-China competition. South Korea and ASEAN share the negative effects of US-China competition. They are both experiencing an unstable regional order brought about by that competition, the strategic dilemma of being pressured to choose between the US and China, as well as economic difficulties arising from the economic war between the great powers and its impact on supply chains.

If the sources of strategic uncertainty facing South Korea and ASEAN are the same, there are good reasons for cooperation to cope with and resolve the related issues. This was confirmed through ASEAN+3 regional cooperation to cope with the common economic crisis during the Kim Dae Jung government. South Korea and ASEAN, which are facing a common dilemma in US-China competition, should develop a cooperative relationship that both sides can rely on to support each other. They can establish a strategic network that helps both parties strengthen resilience in times of crisis. Furthermore, rather than letting an international order that reflects the interests of great powers dominate the region, the two should mutually conceptualize and spread a desirable regional order for small- and medium-sized countries. South Korea and ASEAN could play a role in rallying such countries to form a desirable regional order.

South Korea-ASEAN Defense Cooperation for Regional Peace



8. Defense chief, NATO's top commander agree to expand defense cooperation



Defense chief, NATO's top commander agree to expand defense cooperation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · February 29, 2024

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Feb. 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's defense chief on Thursday agreed with the top commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deepen military cooperation with the U.S.-led alliance, the defense ministry said.

Defense Minister Shin Won-sik held talks with Gen. Christopher Cavoli, commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in Seoul to discuss security situation on the Korean Peninsula and ways to bolster ties with NATO.


Gen. Christopher Cavoli (2nd from L), commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and Gen. Paul LaCamera (R), commander of U.S. Forces Korea, visit the War Memorial of Korea in Seoul on Feb. 28, 2024, in this photo provided by the memorial. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

During the talks, the two sides evaluated the evolving collaboration in military exercises, cybersecurity, and chemical, biological and radioactive capabilities, and agreed to further step up defense ties under the Individually Tailored Partnership Program, the ministry said in a release.

Signed in July 2023, the bilateral partnership outlines cooperation in 11 areas ranging from antiterrorism and nonproliferation to emerging technologies and cyber defense.

Cavoli underscored the importance of the defense cooperation between South Korea and NATO, and agreed to bolster cooperation between the two sides' military leadership, according to the ministry.

Shin stressed the importance of international coordination on issues on the Korean Peninsula, and asked for NATO's attention and support to deter provocations by North Korea, it said.

It marks the top NATO commander's first visit to South Korea, underscoring the nation's increasing role in the global security dynamics.

His visit comes at a time when South Korea is in the spotlight for its capacity to produce artillery and air defense systems coveted by Ukraine as its forces run low on ammunition and foreign aid hangs in balance amid the prolonged war with Russia.

Seoul and Washington officials have accused North Korea of supplying munitions and other supplies to Russia for its war in Ukraine, denouncing the arms transfer as violating the U.N. Security Council resolutions prohibiting weapons trade with Pyongyang.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · February 29, 2024



9. White House refuses to comment on whether S. Korea should send artillery shells to Ukraine


The ROK is a partner in the arsenal of democracy.


As an aside, of course the Ukrianians still have 152mm and 122mm artillery from the Soviet era. What if we worked through a third world country to purchase 152mm and 122mm artillery ammunition from north Korea and (by outbidding Russia) and then shipping that ammunition to Ukraine as well and then Ukraine can use north Korean ammunition against Russia while Russia runs out of ammunition. Yes of course it would be a sanctions violation and would provide funds to the evil Kim family regime (but it would only likely be a marginal increase over Russia's money). A little too far-fetched, I know. But let's be creative and use our imaginations.




(2nd LD) White House refuses to comment on whether S. Korea should send artillery shells to Ukraine | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · February 29, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS Seoul foreign ministry official's comments in paras 8-9)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON/SEOUL, Feb. 29 (Yonhap) -- The White House has declined to comment on whether South Korea should provide 155-mm artillery shells to help Ukraine defend against Russian attacks, saying it is a military decision for Seoul to speak to.

Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre made the remarks during a press briefing Wednesday, expressing America's gratitude for the Asian ally's continued support for the war-torn country.

"I am going to let South Korea speak to their own military decisions and their bilateral relations," she told a press briefing.

"We are grateful for their support to Ukraine obviously as they continue to defend against Russia's aggression. ... But I am not going to speak to their own military decision that is something for them to speak to," she added.


White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre addresses a press briefing at the White House in Washington on Feb. 28, 2024, in this photo released by the Associated Press. (Yonhap)

In response, Seoul's defense ministry said its policy stance against the provision of weapons to Ukraine remains unchanged.

"Related to the support for Ukraine, our existing stance has not changed in particular," defense ministry vice spokesperson Lee Kyung-ho said during a regular press briefing Thursday.

On Monday, Yuri Kim, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasian affairs, expressed hopes for South Korea to provide more defense material support to Ukraine, stressing the importance of air defense assistance.

When asked about the nature of the defense material support, a foreign ministry official in Seoul restated Thursday that the government will continue to provide support as it "comprehensively" takes into account the war and humanitarian situation in Ukraine.

"We have been providing humanitarian and financial support to Ukraine, including non-lethal security support ... and by non-lethal security support, you can think of the mine clearing equipment and pickup trucks that we have previously provided (Ukraine) with," the official said.

Seoul has maintained a stance to provide humanitarian and non-lethal defense assistance to Ukraine, such as protective suits, demining equipment and other military supplies.

But in December, The Washington Post reported that South Korea's "indirect" provision of 155-mm shells to Ukraine in 2023 has made it a larger supplier of ammunition for the war-ravaged country than all European countries combined.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · February 29, 2024




10. Japan warns of malicious PyPi packages created by North Korean hackers




Japan warns of malicious PyPi packages created by North Korean hackers


https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/japan-warns-of-malicious-pypi-packages-created-by-north-korean-hackers/amp/?utm

   


Japan's Computer Security Incident Response Team (JPCERT/CC) is warning that the notorious North Korean hacking group Lazarus has uploaded four malicious PyPI packages to infect developers with malware.

PyPI (Python Package Index) is a repository of open-source software packages that software developers can utilize in their Python projects to add additional functionality to their programs with minimal effort.

The lack of strict checks on the platform allows threat actors to upload malicious packages like information-stealing malware and backdoors that infect developers' computers with malware when added to their projects. 

This malware allows the hacking group to access the developer's network, where they conduct financial fraud or compromise software projects to conduct supply chain attacks.

Lazarus previously leveraged PyPI to distribute malware in August 2023, when the North Korean state-sponsored hackers submitted packages camouflaged as a VMware vSphere connector module.

Lazarus' new PyPi packages

Today, JPCERT/CC is warning that Lazarus has once again uploaded packages to PyPi that will install the 'Comebacker' malware loader.

The four new packages that JPCERT/CC attributes to Lazarus are:

The first two packages' names create a false link to the legitimate 'pycrypto' project (Python Cryptography Toolkit), a collection of secure hash functions and various encryption algorithms downloaded 9 million times every month.

None of the four packages are currently available on PyPI, as they were removed from the repository as recently as yesterday. 

However, download stats tracking platform PePy reports a total installation count of 3,252, so thousands of systems have been compromised by Lazarus malware.

The malicious packages share a similar file structure, containing a 'test.py' file that isn't really a Python script but an XOR-encoded DLL file executed by the '__init__.py' file, which is also included in the package.


Decoding and executing test.py (JPCERT/CC)

The execution of test.py triggers the decoding and creation of additional DLL files that falsely appear as database files, as shown in the following diagram.


Execution chain (JPCERT/CC)

The Japanese cybersecurity agency says that the final payload (IconCache.db), executed in memory, is a malware known as "Comebacker," first identified by Google analysts in January 2021, who reported that it was used against security researchers.

The Comebacker malware connects to the attacker's command and control (C2) server, sends an HTTP POST request with encoded strings, and waits for further Windows malware to be loaded in memory.

Based on various indicators, JPCERT/CC says this latest attack is another wave of the same campaign Phylum reported in November 2023 involving five crypto-themed npm packages.

Lazarus has a long history of breaching corporate networks to conduct financial fraud, usually to steal cryptocurrency.

Previous attacks attributed to Lazarus include the theft of $620 million worth of Ethereum from Axie Infinity's Ronin network bridge and other crypto thefts on Harmony Horizon, Alphapo, CoinsPaid, and Atomic Wallet.

In July, GitHub warned that Lazarus was targeting developers at blockchain, cryptocurrency, online gambling, and cybersecurity companies using malicious repositories.



11. Possible radiation exposure suspected among some N. Korea defectors



Also consider this in terms of unification. How many Korens in the north suffer from radiation exposure?  This will be a huge health problem in the unficiation process. All the workers in Yongbyon plus their family members are probably among some of the most exposed people in the world. Also those who live and work around the Punggye-ri test site. Think of all the uranium miners.


(LEAD) Possible radiation exposure suspected among some N. Korea defectors | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · February 29, 2024

(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES with details, image throughout)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Feb. 29 (Yonhap) -- Some North Korean defectors, who came from areas near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in North Korea, showed signs of suspected radiation exposure, while it is hard to confirm that nuclear tests affected them, the unification ministry said Thursday.

The ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs announced the result following a six-month test on 80 defectors who had lived in Kilju County and its nearby areas and fled to South Korea after North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006.

The North conducted all of its six nuclear tests at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, located in Kilju County in the country's northeastern province.


This undated image, captured from footage of Yonhap News TV, shows North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear testing site in its northeastern province. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

A chromosome aberration analysis, which offers a glimpse of an individual's lifetime accumulated radiation exposure, showed that 17 examinees -- including five from Kilju County -- reported figures higher than the minimum detection threshold of 0.25 Gray (Gy), the Korea Institute of Radiological and Medical Sciences said in a report compiled on behalf of the Korea Hana Foundation, a ministry-affiliated institution that supports defectors.

The report, however, noted that two of the 17 examinees were likely exposed to radiation after their entry to South Korea, citing an earlier test of the individuals conducted in 2016. The results of five examinees were not statistically significant, it added.

An official at the organization stressed that while nuclear tests could have affected the analysis, the results could also have been affected by factors like age, drinking habits and exposure to medical radiation or toxic substances, such as pesticides.

"We cannot specify the extent of how much individual factors influenced the results," the official said, adding that more evidence is needed to scientifically confirm a potential link between the results and the North's nuclear tests as the latest findings are within the range of results that could occur solely due to medical radiation.


This file photo taken May 24, 2018, shows Tunnel No. 4 at North Korea's only known nuclear test site Punggye-ri being blown up during the dismantlement of the site. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

A contamination analysis, including a urine test, showed that none of the examinees showed a significant level of radioactive contamination, the report said.

Despite limitations in conducting the test, such as being unable to secure the radiation score of the drinking water the examinees consumed in North Korea and the small number of examinees, the ministry said it plans to carry out the tests on all relevant defectors going forward.

"Apart from the fact that North Korea's nuclear tests are illegal and intolerable, the government will do its best to continuously monitor the health of defectors with radiation risks and ease their concerns," a ministry official told reporters.

The government carried out similar tests on 40 North Korean defectors in 2017 and 2018. While some showed signs of suspected radiation exposure in medical checkups, test results concluded that it was hard to confirm that the nuclear tests affected them.

In total, 796 North Koreans who used to live in areas near Punggye-ri have defected to South Korea since North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · February 29, 2024


12. North Korea's first spy satellite is 'alive', can manoeuvre, expert says


But is it transmitting any useful information?


North Korea's first spy satellite is 'alive', can manoeuvre, expert says

By Josh Smith

February 28, 20245:37 PM ESTUpdated 17 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/north-koreas-first-spy-satellite-is-alive-can-manoeuvre-expert-says-2024-02-28/?utm







[1/2]A rocket carrying a spy satellite Malligyong-1 is launched, as North Korean government claims, in a location given as North Gyeongsang Province, North Korea in this handout picture obtained by Reuters on November 21, 2023. KCNA via REUTERS/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab


SEOUL, Feb 28 (Reuters) - North Korea's first spy satellite is "alive", space experts said on Tuesday, after detecting changes in its orbit that suggested Pyongyang was successfully controlling the spacecraft - although its capabilities remain unknown.

After two fiery failures, North Korea successfully launched the Malligyong-1 satellite into orbit in November. Pyongyang's state media claimed it has photographed sensitive military and political sites in South Korea, the United States and elsewhere, but has not released any imagery. Independent radio trackers have not detected signals from the satellite.

"But now we can definitely say the satellite is alive," Marco Langbroek, a satellite expert at Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands, wrote in a blog post., opens new tab

From Feb. 19-24, the satellite conducted manoeuvres to raise its perigee, or the lowest point in its orbit, to 497 km from 488 km (308.8 miles from 303.2 miles), Langbroek said, citing data from the U.S.–led Combined Space Operations Center.

"The manoeuvre proves that Malligyong-1 is not dead, and that North-Korea has control over the satellite - something that was disputed," he said.

South Korea's Defence Ministry said it too had assessed that the satellite was in orbit, but said it would not comment further on individual analyses. On Monday, Defence Minister Shin Won-sik said the satellite was not showing any signs of performing other tasks or engaging in reconnaissance.





00:00


01:05

















"While we indeed currently cannot be sure whether the satellite does successfully take imagery, it at least performs orbital manoeuvres, so in that sense it is functional," Langbroek wrote of Shin's comments.

The orbit-raising manoeuvre was a surprise as the presence of an onboard propulsion system was unexpected and previous North Korean satellites never manoeuvred, he said.

"Having the capacity to raise the satellite's orbit is a big deal," Langbroek said.

That meant that as long as there was fuel in the satellite, North Korea could prolong the satellite's lifetime by raising its altitude when it got too low because of orbital decay, he concluded.

Harvard astronomer and orbital tracker Jonathan McDowell said the satellite appeared to be correcting its position in space as it moved to where it was shortly after launch, instead of making a hostile move toward another country's satellite - a capability for which he said the satellite was "much too small."

The United States, Russia and China, the world's top space powers, have in recent years launched satellites increasingly capable of manoeuvring and inspecting other orbital objects as space grows as a critical arena for communications, commerce and military activity.

But companies and countries often manoeuvre their satellites to improve the object's position in orbit. A variety of other reasons to manoeuvre include dodging other satellites or a piece of space debris or – depending on the satellites' capability – wading above a region of interest on Earth.

U.S. Space Command, which tracks all active objects in orbit and sometimes assesses their function, did not immediately comment on the North Korean satellite.

Nuclear-armed North Korea has vowed to launch three more spy satellites in 2024.

Reporting by Josh Smith; additional reporting by Joey Roulette in Washington, Editing by Gerry Doyle, Alex Richardson and Sandra Maler



13. The Hereditary Dictatorships of North Korea, Cambodia Have Shared Soviet Roots


Excerpt:


North Korea has never been constrained by international treaties in the same way as Cambodia. The civil war of 1950 to 1953 ended without a peace treaty ever being signed. Cambodia feels a need to pay lip service to the Paris Agreements, which largely accounts for the awkward juxtaposition of democratic window-dressing and dictatorial practice of which Chum Sounry’s comments are an example. North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric shows that it has no such need to justify itself to the outside world. Yet the roots and realities of the two regimes are the same.


The Hereditary Dictatorships of North Korea, Cambodia Have Shared Soviet Roots

thediplomat.com · by David Whitehouse

Both nations traveled a similar path from Soviet patronage to personalist autocracy.


By

February 27, 2024



Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, right, is greeted by Vice Minister of North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kung Sok Ung, left, at the Pyongyang airport, North Korea, on Monday June 4, 2012.

Credit: AP Photo/Kim Kwang Hyon

The responses to my article “US Sanctions and Rallying Around the Flag in North Korea and Cambodia,” published in The Diplomat on February 16 merit further elaboration.

The article was the result of a discussion between myself and the U.S. economist Steve Hanke over whether there should be any exceptions to his blanket position of opposing U.S. sanctions against foreign countries.

A spokesman for Cambodia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, Chum Sounry, wrote to The Diplomat, supporting Hanke’s stance on sanctions, but objecting to my classification of Cambodia alongside North Korea.

“The allegation that Cambodia’s power transmission operates solely on a hereditary basis is inaccurate and misleading,” Chum Sounry wrote. “The country’s Constitution clearly states that Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy with a multi-party system, separation of powers, and guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms. The transfer of power has regularly operated on a democratic basis.”

These claims are quickly dealt with. No one with any knowledge of Cambodia would accept them. There is not a single instance of a democratic transfer of power in Cambodian history, with the exception of the 1993 elections organized by the United Nations. The verdict of these elections was overturned by Hun Sen’s violent coup of 1997.

Hun Sen remained in power until handing over to his son Hun Manet in August 2023. Hun Manet’s younger brother Hun Many has just been appointed as a deputy prime minister. Democracy and hereditary power cannot be combined. They cannot co-exist beyond strained exercises in verbal gymnastics. The source of a ruler’s legitimacy may be democratic or it may be hereditary. It can’t be both.

Chum Sounry further states that the country’s 2023 election, in which the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party was banned from taking part, as in 2018, was “widely assessed as free and fair, credible, just, and inclusive by thousands of international and independent national observers.”

There is in fact no credible observer anywhere who has made such a judgement. The banning of the opposition was in itself enough to make free and fair elections impossible. The U.S., Japan, the European Union, and France all declined to send observers. Of course, “observers” may be found who are willing to come and state that black is white, and some of these were to be found in Cambodia in July 2023. This, however, simply represents a paid-for marketing exercise by the regime.

A reporter from government-aligned Phnom Penh Post newspaper contacted me for a comment on the Foreign Ministry’s statement, while helpfully pointing out that the newspaper wouldn’t be able to publish anything critical of the government. I sent along a comment which, of course, did not appear. But a few days later there was a response to my article in the Phnom Penh Post written by Seun Sam, a policy researcher at the Royal Academy of Cambodia. The response mentions unspecified “improvements” in human rights and democratization in Cambodia in recent years, which are used to try and put some distance between Cambodia and the North Korean regime.

No one doubts for a moment that Cambodia and North Korea are dictatorships. But understanding exactly what kind of dictatorships these regimes represent is more difficult. Many dictatorships rely on the military to ensure their survival. The military, however, has never been a main source of stability for the dictatorships in North Korea and Cambodia. These are personalist regimes based on the power of single individuals, which have since become hereditary dictatorships.

Historical context is the key to understanding how this was possible. North Korea’s path to personalist dictatorship is explained by Wonjun Song and Joseph Wright in their article “The North Korean Autocracy in Comparative Perspective,” published in the Journal of East Asian Studies in 2018.

The North Korean state was created by the Soviet Union after it defeated Japan during the Second World War. This meant that domestic supporters of the Communist regime never had to act collectively to establish their authority. Song and Wright find that this gave rise to a highly personalist regime in North Korea, which was reinforced by being able to draw on Chinese as well as Soviet support. Having multiple external backers meant that Kim Il-sung didn’t require the military to keep him in power. It also freed his hands to secure personal control over the military and the internal security apparatus without fear of repercussions.

The pattern was repeated in Cambodia, when a Vietnamese invasion brought the genocidal Pol Pot regime to an end in early 1979. The Soviet Union provided logistical support for the invasion, including airlifts and sealifts of material. It also supported Vietnam when China invaded Vietnam in response to the Cambodian invasion.

During the 1980s, Vietnam relied almost exclusively on the Soviet Union for economic and military support, according to research carried out for the U.S. military by Sally W. Stoecker in 1989. Stoecker found that a “large portion” of Soviet aid to Vietnam in the 1980s was used to support the occupation of Cambodia. By the end of the 1980s, a weakened Soviet Union was no longer able to provide this backing.

Vietnam pulled out of Cambodia in 1989, which made possible the Paris Peace Agreements on Cambodia, signed in 1991. The agreements lay down a system of liberal democracy which failed to take root because personalist control of Cambodia’s security apparatus had already been established by Hun Sen. As had been achieved decades earlier in North Korea, Hun Sen was able to pivot away from his original external backer and secure Chinese support, creating a free hand to dismantle any potential locus of domestic opposition.

North Korea has never been constrained by international treaties in the same way as Cambodia. The civil war of 1950 to 1953 ended without a peace treaty ever being signed. Cambodia feels a need to pay lip service to the Paris Agreements, which largely accounts for the awkward juxtaposition of democratic window-dressing and dictatorial practice of which Chum Sounry’s comments are an example. North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric shows that it has no such need to justify itself to the outside world. Yet the roots and realities of the two regimes are the same.



Guest Author

David Whitehouse

David Whitehouse, PhD, is a freelance journalist in Paris.

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thediplomat.com · by David Whitehouse



14. NIS: ‘N. Korea utilizes AI to spread false news ahead of S. Korean general elections’




NIS: ‘N. Korea utilizes AI to spread false news ahead of S. Korean general elections’

donga.com


Posted February. 29, 2024 07:46,

Updated February. 29, 2024 07:46

NIS: ‘N. Korea utilizes AI to spread false news ahead of S. Korean general elections’. February. 29, 2024 07:46. by Kyu-Jin Shin newjin@donga.com.

North Korea's spy agencies have opened a series of cyber operations bases in China and other foreign countries to continue its internet commenting activities, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service said. The NIS believes that Chinese commenting units are active on the South Korean internet, posting content that emphasizes Chinese chauvinism and fosters internal conflict with the South. There are 216 websites operated by Chinese media outlets that pose as South Korean media organizations. These websites are aimed at spreading pro-China and anti-U.S. content.


According to the NIS on Wednesday, North Korea's spy agencies, the Cultural Exchange Bureau and the General Directorate of Reconnaissance, continue to manipulate comments from overseas bases. Recently, circumstantial evidence has shown these agencies opened fake media outlets operated directly by themselves, which continue to post content that promotes South-South conflict. In particular, the NIS believes that "Willow 200man" and others are spreading false information by repeatedly introducing articles from pro-North Korean media, such as the Jajusibo news site. The NIS said they are distorting and disseminating the political and social situation in South Korea by highlighting anti-American and anti-government rallies and protests by introducing South Korean news articles. The intelligence agency also reportedly found Pyongyang is using artificial intelligence (AI) technology to prepare for the spread of fake news ahead of the April general elections in the South.


In November last year, the NIS revealed 38 "fake news agency websites" operated by Chinese public relations firms under the guise of South Korean media organizations. The NIS also identified an additional 178 similar websites, which have media names similar to those of South Korean media outlets and are publishing articles from domestic outlets without permission, or pretending to be members of the Korea Digital News Association.


"We are consulting with relevant organizations such as the Korea Communications Standards Commission to block fake media websites," the NIS said. "However, the legal basis for blocking them is not clear, so measures such as blocking them are not being taken immediately. The lack of legal and institutional mechanisms limits our response.”

한국어

donga.com














De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


 
 
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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