Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Rudeness is the weak man's imitation of strength."

– Eric Hoffer

"As you grow older, you will discover that you have two hands, one for helping yourself, the other is for helping others."

– Audrey Hepburn

"No man is worth his salt who is not ready at all times to risk his body, to risk his well-being, to risk his life, in a great cause."

- Theodore Roosevelt

1. Choreographing Influence: Expanding and Integrating Special Warfare

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2024

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 28, 2024

4. Hamas Is Losing Every Battle in Gaza. It Still Thinks It Could Win the War.

5. Russia seizes more villages in Ukraine, raising fears of growing momentum

6. Joint exercises, industry, and innovation would take a hit under full-year CR, defense officials say

7. Some U.S. military aid is still trickling into Ukraine via arms dealers, contracts suggest

8. How can the Pentagon arm Ukraine amid stalled aid package?

9. Putin warns West of risk of nuclear war, says Moscow can strike Western targets

10. The CIA’s Top Secret Chimera Program or “C Cell” to Its Paramilitary Operatives

11. Army has funneled $500M from forces in Europe and Africa to train Ukrainian troops, Wormuth says

12. China grows domestic bio weapons tech industry

13. A U.S. Hostage Rescue Operation in Gaza Should Not Be off the Table

14. Red Dragon Rising? Insights from a Decade of China Conflict Studies and Wargames

15. Myanmar Generals' nuclear dreams are Asian crime bosses’ hope to defend their last citadel

16. Retired Air Force general walks red carpet as host of ‘Defending Japan’ on History Channel

17. SOCOM grants contract for new jammer-proof BlackWave radio system

18. Sweden charges a man for mapping military installations

19. Train, Harden, Sustain: Maintaining the Army’s Lethality in the Nuclear Shadow

20. Dry Pipes, Liberated Water, and Struggles for Legitimacy: A Lesser-Known Story of the United States in Cuba

21. Ukrainian Civilians Are Pioneering the Art of Resistance

22. Army Force Structure Transformation

1. Choreographing Influence: Expanding and Integrating Special Warfare

Special Warfare. Yes.

Choreographing Influence: Expanding and Integrating Special Warfare

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Ajit Maan

February 27, 2024

Cyber-warfare specialists serving with the 175th Cyberspace Operations Group of the Maryland Air National Guard engage in weekend training at Warfield Air National Guard Base, Middle River, Md., on June 3, 2017. (U.S. Air Force photo by J.M. Eddins Jr.)

While the Pentagon’s front line Special Warfare Units are facing cuts, our near peer adversaries are advancing.

More reduction for funding for the non-kinetic activities of Special Warfare Units is on the table, but we, the undersigned, are advocating not only expanding SOF’s capability to conduct influence operations but we are arguing for reconfiguring, expanding, and creating more agility as a cost-effective alternative that capitalizes on SOF’s unique influence capabilities for engagement that promotes and projects the US values essential to achieving National Defense Strategy objectives at the tactical level.

Our adversaries and allies have recognized and embraced Narrative Warfare, which is the foundation of irregular warfare, and psychological operations, influence operations.

China and Russia are combining hard and soft power at the strategic and tactical levels. While China is rapidly building up its military capability and capacity, it also engages in psychological operations through its United Front Work Department and its blatant Three Warfares of influence (public opinion, psychological, and legal). Russia has combined its strength as a conventional military power with effective use of irregular warfare and influence operations. Despite its setbacks in Ukraine, Russia is learning and adapting its Special Operations for activities that are more about influence than kinetic activities.

It is not only our adversaries who prioritize the quantifiable measures of effect of Special Warfare as the best value for money; NATO and FVEY partners are also reorganizing around a prioritized tech-enhanced Special Operations model to spread and maintain influence globally. US case studies and data supporting Influence Operations and Unconventional Warfare activities are historically one of the best uses of defense dollars in Great Power Competition. Focusing on, and funding, lethality is not the best bang for our military buck. As Colin Gray puts it, “special operations forces (SOF) offer the prospect of a favorably disproportionate return on military investment. Moreover, SOF provide the possibility of a range of precisely conducted military activities more extensive than that reliably feasible for regular warriors conducting regular operations.”

Our influence capacities require a broader and more integrated system than the current PsyOp or Civil Affairs doctrines enable. Our influencers need a far broader scope of mission and one that fits more effectively into a reconfigured SOF mission in which the Green Berets would continue to bridge hyper-conventional units and expanded Special Warfare Units.

The United States is so focused on competing with conventional military and hard power that we are now considering undermining our own capacities in the influence arena.

The Department of Defense’s de-prioritizing of Special Warfare of the non-kinetic variety rests on a dangerous conflation: conceiving of great power competition as primarily conventional as opposed to the unconventionality of terrorism. China, Iran, Russia – like Al-Qaeda, ISIS – and other extremist groups – have very clearly been competing unconventionally, but with far greater resources than non-state actors.

Our adversaries tell their stories in ways that are compelling to broad and diverse audiences. And yet the United States of America has the natural advantage when it comes to a compelling foundational narrative that has historically had appeal to audiences world over.

If we can manage to leverage our strengths instead of submitting to our hard power biases, we can lead again.

Unfortunately, it appears that it is easier for US SOF to gain authorization, permissions, and resources to put a bullet in an adversary’s head than it is to put an idea in the mind of a vulnerable population. This needs to change.

The lessons learned in WWI and WWII led to the birth of Special Warfare units and forces who turned enemy conventional weakness into an Allied asymmetric advantage. The Cold War conditions in Korea, and then Vietnam became the formal genesis of US Army Special Forces.

Without a Special Warfare force, fully formed for efforts that current engagements require, including top-down efforts which have proven capable of mission success, we cannot match our adversaries on the playing field they intend to dominate.

Major defense contractors and our military services are focused on lethality. But our military can best defend our country by strengthening partnerships and alliances. Special Warfare is not about proliferation, but about human contact. They need our support.

While, of course, we must maintain our capacity to deter and ultimately to dominate in conventional warfare, if the strategies of our adversaries (both state and non-state) are successful, there will be no need for kinetic confrontation.

Access to, and a voice within, indigenous populations was the foundation of SOF when it was formed in the 1950s and when “special warfare” was reinvigorated during the Kennedy administration. In active combat zones SOF, and the Green Berets in particular, continue to be unique exemplars of core competencies in indigenous engagement which is one of the most vital and underserved roles in the NSS and Great Power Competition. Top-down approaches have had demonstrable oversights in operational capability.

Every aspect of the National Security Strategy requires influence, a core competency of the traditional SOF mission, in any focus area. Influence strategy cannot rely on messaging alone, but requires an understanding of indigenous narratives, involving indigenous narrators, and a sustained choreography of actions that back up narratives that support the NSS with mission success.

SOF, reconfigured for influence agility in support of National Defense Strategy requirements, must always be the “Tip-of-the-spear.” An expanded SOF mission, to prioritize Civil Affairs and Psychological and Informational Operations, would collectively work toward marginalizing Great Power Competition adversaries in the most productive and cost-effective manner.

All warfare since the end of the last century has been an amalgamation or integration of irregular and conventional warfare. Our adversaries have already adopted this reality with the advent of “hybrid warfare” which places equal (or even greater) priority on irregular and influence-related warfare – the wars in Ukraine and Gaza are integrated irregular-conventional wars in which the irregular component of the conflict is decisive and the conventional portion a shaping operation. Unfortunately, the United States has yet to fully integrate irregular and conventional warfare (along DOTMLPF-P lines) to the extent or level of our adversaries; more so, it continues to treat conventional forces as largely decisive and irregular forces as shaping – if anything, it has become clear that, in many ways, conventional forces must become more SOF-like rather than the other way around.

It would take a generation to retrain a specific force capable of filling the operational void that cuts would create. And that is unnecessary as SOF, CA, PSYOP,’s and IO are already available but not effectively woven into a singular force nor are they deliberately woven into integrated campaigns which they must be.

We should not only retain our current levels of funding but expand and unite our influence force capacities.

A more comprehensive understanding of, appreciation for and commitment to, the utility of Special Warfare and SOF is a crucial part of integrated whole of society treatments of the dilemmas at the heart of compound security competition. SOF’s critical relevancy in today’s and tomorrow’s full-spectrum/continuum civil-military interventionism requires, at the very least, “holding the line” on SOF budgeting and force structure at present. But the very least is not enough. If we intend to dominate and lead, we need to fund the forces that can accomplish the task.

Authors

Ajit Maan, Ph.D. Professor of Practice, Future Security Initiative,

Arizona State University

CEO, Narrative Strategies

Felicia Weston

Senior Mission Coordinator, United States Department of Defense

Combat Correspondent, USAF 2003-2012

Paul Cobaugh

Author, Contributor, Asia Power Watch & Homeland Security Today,

Expert at NATO COE on Terrorism, Lecturer at Asia Pacific Innovation Forum

Christopher Holshek

Colonel (Ret.), U.S. Army Civil Affairs

Senior Civil-Military Adviser

Narrative Strategies LLC

Jeff Kubiak, PhD

Professor of Practice, Future Security Initiative

Director, Future Security Education

Arizona State University

Thomas A. Drohan, PhD

Professor Emeritus of Military and Strategic Studies, USAF Academy

CEO, Combined Effects LLC

Brian L. Steed

Associate Professor of Military History

Senior Fellow, Narrative Strategies

Patrick James Christian, Ph.D. US Army SF Retired

Psychoanalytical Anthropologist

Valka-Mir Foundation

Colonel Chad M. Pillai

U.S. Army Strategist who has served a variety of Army, Joint, and Special Operations assignments to include as the former Deputy J5 at U.S. Special Operations Command – Central

Author of several articles on SOF and Special Warfare

Patricia DeGennaro

Senior Subject Matter Expert in support of SOCCENT

Former Professor of International Security New York University

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2024

Key Takeaways:

Pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria held the Seventh Congress of Transnistrian Deputies on February 28 and adopted a series of decisions that likely aim to provide the Kremlin with justifications for a wide range of possible escalatory actions against Moldova — actions the Kremlin can pursue both immediately and over the long-term.
The Kremlin has yet to signal an immediate route for escalation following the Congress of Transnistrian Deputies, although Russian President Vladimir Putin may respond to the Transnistrian requests during his speech to the Russian Federal Assembly on February 29.
The Kremlin can use the outcomes of the Congress of Transnistrian Deputies to justify a range of possible COAs that are not mutually exclusive.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted another strike on a Russian personnel concentration in occupied Donetsk Oblast, once again sparking ire amongst Russian milbloggers and re-surfacing concerns about Ukraine’s use of HIMARS systems.
Russia continues cracking down on actors it deems “foreign agents” to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the March 2024 presidential election.
A Financial Times (FT) investigation published on February 27, reportedly based on leaked classified Russian military documents from 2008-2014, outlines Russia’s purported criteria for the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Turkey and China appear to be pursuing their own negotiation platforms for a settlement in Ukraine, which the Kremlin will likely exploit to further its long-standing narratives regarding negotiations and the war.
Russian forces made confirmed advances near Svatove, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu inspected the Tula State University’s Military Training Center and several defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises in Tula Oblast on February 28.
Russian occupation authorities are using early voting for the Russian presidential election to cloak Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine in a veneer of fabricated legitimacy.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 28, 2024

Feb 28, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2024

Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 28, 2024, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on February 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria held the Seventh Congress of Transnistrian Deputies on February 28 and adopted a series of decisions that likely aim to provide the Kremlin with justifications for a wide range of possible escalatory actions against Moldova — actions the Kremlin can pursue both immediately and over the long-term.[1] The Congress of Transnistrian Deputies adopted seven decisions, including a request to the Russian State Duma and Federation Council for Russian “defense” of Transnistria in response to alleged increasing pressures from Moldova. Transnistrian officials specifically used “zashchita” (защита), a word that means both “defense” and “protection” in their request, likely to set conditions for the Kremlin to interpret “defense” in a military sense if it so chooses. Transnistrian officials invoked the obligations of the Russian “peacekeeping mission” in Transnistria and the roughly 220,000 Russian citizens they claim are residing in Transnistria in their request for Russian “defense.” Transnistrian officials likely aim for these appeals to serve as the basis for any potential Russian intervention in Transnistria and Moldova in the near or long term as they cohere with Russian justifications for previous interventions, most notably its invasions of Ukraine.[2] The Kremlin has increasingly promoted rhetoric about Russia’s ”compatriots abroad,” which include ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, to further justify its war in Ukraine and to likely set informational conditions for provocations in countries where Russian ”compatriots” live.[3] The Kremlin has also used the idea of protecting its “compatriots abroad” to justify the fact that Russian troops have occupied Transnistria since 1992, and Transnistrian officials likely made appeals concerning Transnistrian residents with Russian citizenship to set further informational conditions for the Kremlin to escalate Russian activities in Transnistria and Moldova.[4] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on February 14 that Russia is ”concerned” about Russian citizens in Transnistria and “will not allow them to become victims of another Western adventure.”[5]

The Congress of Transnistrian Deputies’ also specifically called for the United Nations (UN) and European Parliament to stop alleged Moldovan violations of Transnistrian rights and freedoms, for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to influence Moldova into an “adequate dialogue,” for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to prevent escalation on the Dniester River, and for the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) to ensure the rights of Transnistrian residents.[6] Transnistrian officials also called on participants to return to the 5+2 negotiation process for the Transnistrian conflict, which includes Russia, Ukraine, Transnistria, Moldova, and the OSCE as mediators and the European Union (EU) and US as observers. These appeals to multilateral organizations and negotiating formats aim to legitimize Transnistria as a sovereign entity separate from Moldova without pressing claims for its independence while also providing the Kremlin with prepared justifications for escalation and intervention in the name of fulfilling both Russia’s and others’ international obligations. The Congress of Transnistrian Deputies’ appeal to the Russian-led CIS notably could be interpreted as permitting the CIS to “prevent escalation” both in Moldova and Transnistria as it does not specify a side of the Dniester River. The appeals’ focus on protecting Transnistrian rights and freedoms likely aims to set conditions for the Kremlin to apply a similar narrative about preventing “discrimination” and “genocide” against “Russians” in Moldova as the Kremlin did ahead of and during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[7]

Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continue to set information conditions to use Transnistria and pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region Gagauzia to destabilize Moldova but have yet to indicate how and to what specific end they intend to leverage such information conditions.[8] These Transnistrian appeals notably do not call on Russian forces to take specific actions and are likely broadly scoped to give the Kremlin the widest set of possible courses of action (COA) for escalations and interventions aimed at destabilizing Moldova. These Transnistrian appeals are also not time delimited and allow the Kremlin to address various appeals whenever it deems necessary or expedient. The Transnistrian appeals set long-term justifications for the Kremlin to pursue escalations and interventions against Moldova regardless of the outcome of its war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin has yet to signal an immediate route for escalation following the Congress of Transnistrian Deputies, although Russian President Vladimir Putin may respond to the Transnistrian requests during his speech to the Russian Federal Assembly on February 29.[9] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reported on February 28 in response to the Transnistrian Congress of Deputies’ appeal that protecting the interests of Transnistrian residents and Russia’s “compatriots” is one of Russia’s priorities and promised to “carefully consider” the Transnistrian requests.[10] Russian State Duma Committee on the CIS Affairs First Deputy Chairperson Konstantin Zatulin stated that the Duma will consider Transnistria’s proposals in consultation with Putin and the Russian MFA as soon as the proposals arrive.[11] Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Chepa stated that Transnistrian appeals to Russia imply economic assistance and that there is currently no talk of Russia providing Transnistria military assistance.[12] Russia would be challenged to get concrete military assistance to Transnistria in any event because it is landlocked and bordered by Ukraine on one side and Moldova (and beyond that, Romania) on the other. Chepa added that the Transnistrian requests will contribute to “faster decision-making" on Russia’s part.[13] Russian Federation Council Committee on International Affairs First Deputy Chairperson Vladimir Dzhabarov stated that the Federation Council will consider providing humanitarian support to Transnistria but that the “political question” (likely referring to the political status of Transnistria) is “out of the equation for now.”[14]

The Kremlin can use the outcomes of the Congress of Transnistrian Deputies to justify a range of possible COAs that are not mutually exclusive. The most likely course of action (MLCOA) is that the Kremlin will use the Congress as a springboard to intensify hybrid operations aimed a destabilizing and further polarizing Moldova ahead of Moldova-European Union (EU) accession negotiations and the upcoming Moldovan presidential election in June and November 2024, respectively. The most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) is that the Kremlin may decide to formally annex Transnistria in the future in order to justify military intervention against Moldova in the long-term.

COA 1: The Kremlin may decide to not take any action immediately following the February 28 congress and allow the status quo between Transnistria and Moldova to continue. If Putin envisions a particular time frame for the development of Russian intervention in Moldova, and the Transnistrian authorities are attempting to expedite this timeframe with their requests, then Putin may decide that he is unwilling to exploit Transnistrian requests and refuse to take action or even acknowledge the requests in the immediate future. Putin may decide to engage with the requests at a later date, however.
COA 2: The Kremlin may place increased diplomatic pressure on Moldova to revoke its recent Customs Code that went into effect on January 1, 2024. Transnistrian officials have consistently identified Moldova’s new customs regulations as the crux of their recent complaints against Moldovan authorities and continue to identify the new customs regulations as part of Moldova’s “economic war” against Transnistria as a key issue, including during the February 28 congress.[15] The Kremlin may also choose to provide additional economic support to Transnistria through humanitarian aid, financial aid, or new trade agreements as part of its efforts to further pressure Moldova‘s economy and force Moldova to capitulate to Transnistrian demands to revoke Moldova‘s new Customs Code. Moldova’s changes to its Customs Code are essential in aligning Moldova with EU regulations as part of Moldova’s path towards EU membership.[16]
COA 3: The Kremlin may also attempt to send additional military assistance to Transnistrian forces in the future, although it is currently unclear how the Kremlin would hope to transport military equipment or personnel to Transnistria. If the Kremlin chooses to interpret “defense” in a military sense, Russia could send military assistance in the form of additional Russian “peacekeepers” or military equipment and weapons to Transnistria. It is unclear how Russia would transport this material to Transnistria given that Russia would likely have to fly the materiel through Ukrainian or Romanian (NATO) airspace or attempt a large-scale ground operation through Odesa Oblast, which Russian forces are highly unlikely to conduct as it would draw personnel away from their ongoing offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine and likely fail in any event.
MLCOA: The Kremlin may intensify hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing and further polarizing Moldovan politics and society ahead of June 2024 European Union (EU)-Moldova accession negotiations and the November 2024 Moldovan presidential election in order to undermine and delay Moldova’s future accession to the EU. ISW previously assessed that the EU’s December 14, 2023 announcement on launching membership talks with Moldova likely triggered the Kremlin’s preparations for a possible hybrid operation against Moldova and that the Kremlin will likely intensify information operations accusing the West of waging an anti-Russian hybrid war against Moldova and/or accusing Moldova of preparing to attack civilians in Transnistria.[17]
MDCOA: The Kremlin may decide to formally annex Transnistria in the future in order to justify military intervention against Moldova in the long-term. The Kremlin previously used similar justifications, particularly the protection of Russian citizens and “compatriots” abroad, to justify military intervention against Georgia and Ukraine.[18] ISW has not observed any clear indications of Russian military preparations to intervene in Transnistria or Moldova.[19] Russian military intervention would be challenging for Russia since Moldova (and Transnistria) is landlocked and only accessible through Romania or Ukraine. ISW previously assessed that the Russian forces currently in Transnistria could threaten the stability of Moldova, but ISW has observed no indicators that they are preparing to do so.[20]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted another strike on a Russian personnel concentration in occupied Donetsk Oblast, once again sparking ire amongst Russian milbloggers and re-surfacing concerns about Ukraine’s use of HIMARS systems. A Russian Telegram user who claims to be an employee of an unspecified branch of Russian special services reported that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike hit a gathering of personnel of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) during a military awards ceremony in Olenivka, Donetsk Oblast on the night of February 27.[21] The Russian source claimed that the strike killed 19, including the deputy brigade commander, a major, and a captain, and wounded 12, including brigade commander Colonel Mikhail Gudkov. The Russian source accused the Russian command of being aware of Ukrainian drone reconnaissance activity in the area but ignoring the available information ahead of the strike. Ukrainian forces have conducted two similar HIMARS strikes against Russian troop concentrations over the past week, targeting a training ground near occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast on February 20 and a training ground in occupied Podo-Kalynivka, Kherson Oblast on February 22.[22] One milblogger noted that “these are no longer isolated mistakes,” and suggested that Ukraine is deliberately striking such gatherings of Russian personnel in a “clinical” manner.[23] Russian milbloggers appear increasingly concerned that Ukrainian forces are able to exploit poor Russian operational security practices (such as large gatherings in near-rear areas under Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance) using well-timed and well-targeted HIMARS strikes, which continue to generate discontent in the Russian information space.

Russia continues cracking down on actors it deems “foreign agents” to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the March 2024 presidential election. The Russian State Duma adopted a law on February 28 banning Russians from advertising the content of individuals and organizations legally designated as “foreign agents” and from advertising their own content on platforms that these “foreign agents” own. ISW previously assessed that this law, if passed, would impact Russian opposition media’s ability to operate and reliably report in Russia, and at least one Russian opposition journalist has already suspended their work due to the new advertising ban.[24] Russian outlet RBK reported that large Russian advertising agencies are already including unilateral termination clauses in their advertising contracts in case the Kremlin designates a client as a foreign agent during the term of their contract.[25] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on February 28 that the Kremlin has more than doubled its criminal prosecutions of designated foreign agents for violating Russian censorship laws from 2022 to 2023, most commonly for allegedly spreading ”fake” information about the Russian military or promoting extremism.[26] Some Russian regional authorities are also increasing efforts to discourage violations of Russian censorship laws; the Krasnodar Krai Legislative Assembly is considering a bill that would deprive Russians convicted of spreading fake information, discrediting the Russian military, or promoting extremism of their ability to vote in Russian elections.[27]

A Financial Times (FT) investigation published on February 27, reportedly based on leaked classified Russian military documents from 2008-2014, outlines Russia’s purported criteria for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. FT reported that the documents show that Russia has war-gamed avenues for employing tactical weapons and alleged that the files show that Russia has a lower threshold for using nuclear weapons “if the desired result can’t be achieved through conventional means” than Russian officials have ever publicly admitted.[28] FT stated that the criteria for a nuclear response vary between “an enemy incursion on Russian territory” to more specific parameters, such as “the destruction of 20 percent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines.” FT noted that unspecified experts have confirmed that the documents remain relevant to Russian nuclear doctrine despite the fact that they are over a decade old. ISW cannot independently verify the legitimacy of the documents but has frequently observed that Russian actors invoke nuclear rhetoric and threats of nuclear weapons use to target the Western information space and instill concern aimed at weakening Western support to Ukraine.[29] It has long been established that Russian nuclear doctrine includes the option to use nuclear weapons in conventional wars at thresholds much lower than Western states.

Turkey and China appear to be pursuing their own negotiation platforms for a settlement in Ukraine, which the Kremlin will likely exploit to further its long-standing narratives regarding negotiations and the war. Chinese Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hiu will visit EU states, Ukraine, and Russia starting on March 2 to conduct a round of shuttle diplomacy regarding a political solution to the war in Ukraine.[30] Russia previously seized on China’s approach to a vaguely defined political peace plan for Ukraine to claim that China supports Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, as ISW previously reported.[31] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan similarly announced on February 28 that Ankara is prepared to provide another negotiations platform for Russia and Ukraine.[32] The Kremlin will likely weaponize these proposed platforms to further the narrative that Ukraine is the party refusing negotiations. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is not interested in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and has no interest in ending the war on anything but Russia’s articulated terms.[33]

Key Takeaways:

Pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria held the Seventh Congress of Transnistrian Deputies on February 28 and adopted a series of decisions that likely aim to provide the Kremlin with justifications for a wide range of possible escalatory actions against Moldova — actions the Kremlin can pursue both immediately and over the long-term.
The Kremlin has yet to signal an immediate route for escalation following the Congress of Transnistrian Deputies, although Russian President Vladimir Putin may respond to the Transnistrian requests during his speech to the Russian Federal Assembly on February 29.
The Kremlin can use the outcomes of the Congress of Transnistrian Deputies to justify a range of possible COAs that are not mutually exclusive.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted another strike on a Russian personnel concentration in occupied Donetsk Oblast, once again sparking ire amongst Russian milbloggers and re-surfacing concerns about Ukraine’s use of HIMARS systems.
Russia continues cracking down on actors it deems “foreign agents” to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the March 2024 presidential election.
A Financial Times (FT) investigation published on February 27, reportedly based on leaked classified Russian military documents from 2008-2014, outlines Russia’s purported criteria for the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Turkey and China appear to be pursuing their own negotiation platforms for a settlement in Ukraine, which the Kremlin will likely exploit to further its long-standing narratives regarding negotiations and the war.
Russian forces made confirmed advances near Svatove, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu inspected the Tula State University’s Military Training Center and several defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises in Tula Oblast on February 28.
Russian occupation authorities are using early voting for the Russian presidential election to cloak Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine in a veneer of fabricated legitimacy.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Svatove amid continued positional fighting on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on February 28. Geolocated footage published on February 28 shows that Russian forces advanced into Tabaivka (northwest of Svatove).[34] Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka and the Serebryanske forest area.[35] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA), Western Military District [WMD]) are attacking northeast of Kupyansk on the Synkivka-Petropavlivka line to bypass Synkivka from the west towards Kupyansk.[36] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment reinforced with elements of the 1st Tank Regiment (both of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, WMD) are attacking along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.[37] Mashovets also reported that Russian forces transferred “Storm” assault companies of the 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, WMD) to the Terny area.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Note: ISW is restructuring its coverage of the Donetsk Oblast axis to include activity in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. During the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, ISW assessed that Ukrainian activity in the border area was a supporting and related effort to Ukrainian activity in the south. As Russian forces have seized the battlefield initiative following the end of the counteroffensive, Russian troops appear to be trying to drive southwest of Donetsk City while simultaneously driving northeast from the Velyka Novosilka area on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border. This Russian effort appears to include settlements along the O0532 Marinka-Pobieda-Vuhledar route. ISW will further restructure the Donetsk Oblast axis if Russian operational objectives in this area appear to change in the future.

Russian forces reportedly made gains west of Bakhmut on February 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that there are reports that Russian forces advanced in Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut) and may have captured up to the entire settlement, although one milblogger claimed that these reports are false.[39] ISW has only observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating on Ivanivske’s eastern outskirts. Positional fighting continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Pivdenne and Niu York.[40] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet) and the Volunteer Corps are reportedly operating near Bohdanivka, elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Ivanivske, and elements of the 11th VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Ivanivske and Klishchiivka.[41]

Russian forces recently advanced west and northwest of Avdiivka and reportedly continued to advance in the area on February 28. Geolocated footage published on February 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Orlivka (west of Avdiivka).[42] Additional geolocated footage published on February 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced near windbreaks south of Stepove (northwest of Avdiivka).[43] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 28 that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces seized Stepove.[44] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lykhovyi stated on February 27 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Stepove after fierce battles overnight on February 26-27.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed on February 28 that Russian forces advanced on the southeastern outskirts of Orlivka and up to the center of the settlement, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating within Orlivka.[46] Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, and Berdychi; west of Avdiivka near Orlivka and Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[47] Elements of the Russian 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly attacking in the direction of Berdychi, and elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]), the 35th and 55th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 41st CAA, CMD), and the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly attacking along the frontline between Orlivka and Vodyane (southwest of Avdiivka).[48] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Pervomaiske and elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly deployed to rear Russian areas in the Avdiivka direction as a reserve force.[49]

Ukrainian officials continue to report that Ukrainian forces have stabilized a defensive line immediately west of Avdiivka. Lykhoviy stated on February 28 that Ukrainian forces have decided to establish a defensive line along the Tonenke-Orlivka-Berdychi line where terrain and several reservoirs are favorable for defensive operations.[50] Lykhovyi stated that Ukrainian forces have blocked Russian advances on the outskirts of Orlivka and stated on February 27 that Ukrainian forces stabilized their defensive lines along the Tonenke-Orlivka-Berdychi line.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on February 28. Geolocated footage published on February 28 indicates that elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (DNR 1st AC) with armored vehicle support recently advanced into the southern outskirts of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[52] The DNR People’s Militia claimed that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade were now attacking Ukrainian positions in the center of Krasnohorivka.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 200 meters deep near Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[54] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda.[55] Elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in eastern Novomykhailivka, elements of the 255th and 242nd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Pobieda, and elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating south of Novomykhailivka.[56]

Limited positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on February 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting near Vuhledar; south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryyutne and Malynivka.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to advance north of Pryyutne.[58] Another milblogger noted that Russian forces have become more active in the Velyka Novosilka area in recent days and characterized Russian actions here as a “slow offensive” against Ukrainian positions.[59] Elements of the Russian 68th AC (EMD), the 36th CAA (EMD), the 29th CAA (EMD), the 11th Air and Air Defense Forces Army (Russian Aerospace Forces and EMD), and the 14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade are reportedly operating near Vuhledar and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[60]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued localized offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 28 but did not make any confirmed gains in this area. Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continue to fight on the southern outskirts of Robotyne and reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Robotyne.[61] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 500 meters in this direction and recaptured positions between Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these purported Russian gains between Robotyne and Verbove.[62] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces resumed attacks northwest of Verbove but that Ukrainian forces still hold their positions here.[63] Elements of the Russian 70th and 71st motorized rifle regiments (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating between Robotyne and Verbove.[64]

Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and may have temporarily intensified attacks in the east bank of Kherson Oblast as of February 27. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that fighting continues in Krynky, where Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence.[65] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted attacks southwest of Krynky in the Pishchanivka-Pidstepne area in order to distract Russian forces from Krynky as Ukrainian forces drew additional reserves to the area.[66] Milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian troops are concentrated in the dacha area near the Antonivskyi roadway bridge.[67] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled an unsuccessful Ukrainian attempt to land on the Tendrivska Spit, a thin sandbar just south of the Kinburn Peninsula that juts into the northwestern Black Sea.[68]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted another missile and drone strike against Ukraine overnight on February 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 10 Shahed 136/131 drones from the Primorsko-Akhtarsk direction and an unspecified number of S-300 missiles in Donetsk Oblast.[69] Ukrainian forces intercepted all 10 Shahed drones over Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts.[70] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian force concentration in Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast.[71]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu inspected the Tula State University’s Military Training Center and several defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises in Tula Oblast on February 28.[72] Shoigu observed Russian cadets in the center’s new drone operation training program, and Tula State University’s Military Training Center head Oleg Kravchenko told Shoigu that the center has already trained over 400 drone specialists. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin established the drone training program. Shoigu also visited the Strela and Splav enterprises, which produce Yastreb-AV and Zoopark-1M reconnaissance radar systems, Aistenov radar stations, and shells. The Strela enterprise head told Shoigu that Strela doubled its production capacity in 2023, and the Splav enterprise head reported that Splav increased its production of shells fourfold in the past year. Shoigu later met with Dyumin and demanded that Tula Oblast DIB enterprises expedite their weapons delivery schedules and maintain a consistent supply of weapons to the Russian military throughout 2024.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev continued to echo Stalinist-rhetoric during a meeting of the Russian Military-Industrial Commission working group on February 28

Russian state-owned news outlet RIA Novosti reported that Medvedev read from a telegram in which Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin chastised Soviet DIB enterprises for failing to produce specific equipment that the Soviet military needed during the Second World War.[73] Medvedev may be concerned about perceived or actual failures in Russian DIB production at a critical time in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine’s European allies continue efforts to increase their production and provision of shells for Ukraine. European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen stated on February 28 that the European Union (EU) plans to double its annual ammunition production by 2025 and aims to produce more than two million artillery shells per year by the end of 2025.[74] Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo announced that Belgium will allocate 200 million euros (roughly $216.7 million) to fund a Czech initiative aimed at purchasing 800,000 shells outside of Europe and delivering these shells to Ukraine in the coming weeks.[75]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on February 28 that Ukrainian MoD Internal Audit Service representatives and US inspectors recently conducted two joint inspections of US-provided weapons.[76]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are using early voting for the Russian presidential election to cloak Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine in a veneer of fabricated legitimacy. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo announced on February 27 that early voting has begun in occupied Kherson Oblast and that the turnout was “higher than expected.”[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on February 28 that Russian authorities are bribing students at Russian universities to vote in the presidential election in occupied Ukraine.[78] The Resistance Center also reported that more than 10,000 Rosgvardia personnel arrived in occupied Ukraine to accompany civilians to polling stations and monitor polling stations, likely to compel citizens to vote for Russian President Vladimir Putin.[79]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov told UK outlet The Times on February 28 that Russia has developed an artificial intelligence (AI) tool to interfere in upcoming elections in the United Kingdom (UK) and the US at an “exponentially greater” scale than ever before.[80] Danilov stated that Russia has ”special units” dedicated to interfering in each country during upcoming elections and warned that Russia’s network of informants and agents around the world is so large that it is impossible to completely prevent Russian interference in Western elections. Danilov stated that AI has allowed Russia to substantially “ramp up” its disinformation campaigns and that Russian special services have been distributing an estimated 166 million disinformation posts about Ukraine on various media platforms per week for an unspecified period of time.

Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continue to criticize Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s perceived “anti-Russian rhetoric” and the decision to “essentially” freeze Armenia’s participation in the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) against the backdrop of deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.[81]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 28, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-28-2024

Key Takeaways:

Gaza City: Palestinian militias have claimed at least 92 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun, southeastern Gaza City, between February 19 and February 28. This high attack rate involving at least seven Palestinian militias using sophisticated military capabilities indicates that Palestinian fighters have retained military capacity in southern Gaza City despite two Israeli clearing operations there.
The militias likely infiltrated into previously cleared areas of southern Gaza City from the uncleared central Gaza Strip. The militias also likely reactivated dormant cells after the Israelis decreased the size of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) contingent in the northern Strip.
The attacks in Zaytoun are in response to the ongoing division-sized clearing operation targeting Zaytoun. The IDF 162nd Division continued its clearing operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 28.
Rafah: IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari said on February 27 that Israel seeks to ensure displaced Gazan civilians have access to food, aid, medicine, and hospital facilities in a separate, safer zone before conducting ground operations in Rafah.
Negotiations: Israeli negotiators are expected to leave Qatar on February 29 if there is no significant breakthrough in ceasefire talks, according to two Israeli sources familiar with the process.
Yemen: CENTCOM and an unspecified coalition warship shot down five Houthi one-way attack drones over the Red Sea on February 27.
Iraq-Russia: The Iraqi government may request a sanctions waiver to purchase spare parts for Russian-manufactured helicopters. A Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member cited by an independent Iraqi news outlet said that there is an “unannounced” effort to resolve the shortage of parts for Iraq’s Russian-made helicopters.

IRAN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 28, 2024

Feb 28, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, February 28, 2024

Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Rachel Friedman, Amin Soltani, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Palestinian militias have claimed at least 92 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun, southeastern Gaza City, between February 19 and February 28.[1] At least seven Palestinian militias conducted attacks on Israeli forces in Zaytoun on February 27 and 28.[2] Palestinian militias have targeted Israeli forces with rocket propelled grenades, mortars, explosively-formed penetrators (EFP), improvised explosive devices, small arms, and rockets in Zaytoun since February 19.[3] These attacks are in response to the ongoing division-sized clearing operation targeting Zaytoun.

This high attack rate involving at least seven Palestinian militias using sophisticated military capabilities indicates that Palestinian fighters have retained military capacity in southern Gaza City despite two Israeli clearing operations there. The militias likely infiltrated into previously cleared areas of southern Gaza City from the uncleared central Gaza Strip. The militias also likely reactivated dormant cells after the Israelis decreased the size of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) contingent in the northern Strip. The IDF said that Hamas’ Central and Gaza City Brigades transferred fighters between battalions through tunnel networks.[4] Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh insinuated on February 28 that Israeli clearing operations in Zaytoun had failed, noting that Hamas’ continued attacks in Zaytoun are “the [fiercest] battles” despite Israel‘s 80-day “occupation.”[5]

The IDF 162nd Division continued its clearing operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 28. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed Palestinian fighters and located weapons in Zaytoun.[6] The Israeli Air Force conducted airstrikes on a Hamas warehouse in Daraj, north of Zaytoun.[7]

Key Takeaways:

Gaza City: Palestinian militias have claimed at least 92 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun, southeastern Gaza City, between February 19 and February 28. This high attack rate involving at least seven Palestinian militias using sophisticated military capabilities indicates that Palestinian fighters have retained military capacity in southern Gaza City despite two Israeli clearing operations there.
The militias likely infiltrated into previously cleared areas of southern Gaza City from the uncleared central Gaza Strip. The militias also likely reactivated dormant cells after the Israelis decreased the size of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) contingent in the northern Strip.
The attacks in Zaytoun are in response to the ongoing division-sized clearing operation targeting Zaytoun. The IDF 162nd Division continued its clearing operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 28.
Rafah: IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari said on February 27 that Israel seeks to ensure displaced Gazan civilians have access to food, aid, medicine, and hospital facilities in a separate, safer zone before conducting ground operations in Rafah.
Negotiations: Israeli negotiators are expected to leave Qatar on February 29 if there is no significant breakthrough in ceasefire talks, according to two Israeli sources familiar with the process.
Yemen: CENTCOM and an unspecified coalition warship shot down five Houthi one-way attack drones over the Red Sea on February 27.
Iraq-Russia: The Iraqi government may request a sanctions waiver to purchase spare parts for Russian-manufactured helicopters. A Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member cited by an independent Iraqi news outlet said that there is an “unannounced” effort to resolve the shortage of parts for Iraq’s Russian-made helicopters.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF continued clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 28. The IDF 7th Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) raided militia positions and fired a missile targeting five Palestinian fighters in a vehicle in western Khan Younis.[8] The IDF 35th Paratrooper Brigade also fired sniper rifles at several Palestinian fighters operating in western Khan Younis.[9] The 98th Division directed an airstrike on Palestinian fighters attempting an ambush of Israeli fighters in Khan Younis.[10] Palestinian militias conducted at least five attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in central and western Khan Younis on February 28.[11]

The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) continued operations in eastern Khan Younis and directed airstrikes targeting two Palestinian fighters on February 28.[12] Hamas fighters pre-placed and detonated two EFPs targeting Israeli tanks operating in Abasan al Kabira on February 28.[13] Hamas and other Palestinian militias claimed small arms clashes with Israeli forces in Abasan al Kabira and north of the town.[14]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh gave a rare recorded public address at a conference in Beirut on February 28.[15] Haniyeh claimed that Hamas has displayed flexibility in negotiations but remains ready to continue fighting.[16] He also warned Israel against imposing additional restrictions for Muslims on access to the al Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan and called on Palestinian residents of Jerusalem and the West Bank to march on al Aqsa Mosque on the first day of Ramadan, which begins around March 10.[17] Some far-right Israeli ministers have proposed restricting access to the al Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan, but Israel has not announced a new policy.[18]

IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari said on February 27 that Israel seeks to ensure displaced Gazan civilians have access to food, aid, medicine, and hospital facilities in a separate, safer zone before conducting ground operations in Rafah.[19] Israel facilitated the airdrop of aid into Khan Younis and access to the northern Gaza Strip for 31 aid trucks on February 27.[20] Israel is reportedly still considering opening a direct aid crossing from Israel into the northern Gaza Strip to increase aid flows.[21]

Russian state media confirmed that Fatah and Hamas officials will meet in Moscow on February 29 to discuss the formation of a new Palestinian government.[22] Hamas has not independently confirmed its attendance. A senior Hamas delegation last traveled to Moscow in late October 2023 to meet with Russian and Iranian officials.[23] Some smaller political factions actively fighting Israeli forces in Gaza, like the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, criticized the meeting for excluding other Palestinian groups.[24] Fatah leaders gave unoptimistic statements to media organizations about the meeting.[25] The Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al Maliki said that he does not expect “miracles to happen” and added that the time is not right for a ”national coalition government” or a government that includes Hamas. Maliki cited the risk of an international boycott against any government including Hamas.[26] Russia has framed itself as a possible mediator between Israel and Hamas.[27]

Israeli negotiators are expected to leave Qatar on February 29 if there is no significant breakthrough in ceasefire talks, according to two Israeli sources familiar with the process.[28] Reuters reported on February 27 that the parties are discussing the latest ”Paris Proposal” that would require both Israel and the Palestinian militias to completely stop their military operations in the Gaza Strip. The latest proposal would also force Israel to pause aerial surveillance in the Strip for eight hours daily and reposition IDF units away from densely populated areas. The proposal would allow the gradual return of all displaced civilians except military aged males to the northern Gaza Strip.[29] Hamas would release 40 female, child, and elderly hostages in exchange for approximately 400 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel under the latest proposal.[30] Israel would also commit to bring in 500 humanitarian aid trucks per day, 200,000 tents, 60,000 caravans, fuel, and heavy machinery to rehabilitate hospitals and bakeries in the Gaza Strip.[31] Hamas representatives have reportedly not provided a full response to the proposal.[32] Hamas Political Bureau member Muhammad Nazal said on February 28 that ”there is no escaping the end of the war” but that Hamas does not have to agree to ”the first stage of the deal.”[33]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired a rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip targeting Kissufim in southern Israel on February 28.[34]

The IDF Gaza Division and Southern Command directed airstrikes in Central Gaza targeting eight “significant targets,” including a PIJ rocket launcher used to attack Ashkelon on February 27.[35]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank on February 28.[36]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 27.[37] Hamas’ military wing said that it fired 40 rockets targeting two Israeli positions in northern Israel.[38] The IDF said that only 15 of the rockets that Hamas fired crossed into Israeli territory. One of the rockets damaged a home in the area.[39]

Unspecified sources familiar with Lebanese Hezbollah decisionmaking told Reuters on February 27 that the group will stop attacks on northern Israel if Hamas agrees to a ceasefire.[40] Hamas is currently considering a proposal that would include a six-week truce with Israel.[41]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Iraqi government may request a sanctions waiver to purchase spare parts for Russian-manufactured helicopters.[42] A Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member cited by an independent Iraqi news outlet said that there is an “unannounced” effort to resolve the shortage of parts for Iraq’s Russian-made helicopters. The US Department of Defense Inspector General’s Q3 Report on Operation Inherent Resolve said that “sanctions related to the war in Ukraine have prevented the acquisition of new parts [for Russian-produced helicopters].”[43] The report added that most of Iraq’s Russian-manufactured helicopters are not airworthy due to ”maintenance constraints, outdated systems, and lack of available spare parts.”[44] Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev has discussed security cooperation with several senior Iraqi political and military officials in a series of meetings since late January 2024. CTP-ISW assessed on February 20 that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as Iraq’s security partner in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence in Iraq.[45]

An unspecified “judicial source” told Iraqi Kurdish media that Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court rejected a lawsuit on February 28 that attempted to invalidate Parliament Speaker nominee Shaalan al Karim’s candidacy.[46] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court stated that the lawsuit does not fall under the court’s jurisdiction. Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians filed a lawsuit on January 13 to invalidate Karim’s candidacy as part of their efforts to install their preferred candidate, Mahmoud al Mashhadani, as speaker.[47]

The Sistan and Baluchistan Province prosecutor said that two unspecified “terrorist operatives” attempted to conduct attacks targeting Iranian security officials in Bampur on February 28.[48] The two fighters attempted to target an Iranian security forces patrol near an Iranian checkpoint in Bampur. The fighters prematurely detonated their explosives, killing one fighter.[49]

This incident is part of an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023. Jaish al Adl—a Balochi, Salafi-jihadi group operating along the Iran-Pakistan border—has conducted at least five attacks targeting Iranian security personnel since December 2023.[50] The Iranian Law Enforcement Command killed a purportedly Jaish al Adl-affiliated individual in Bampur City on January 8.[51] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State separately conducted a terrorist attack in Kerman Province in early January 2024, killing over 90 individuals.[52]

The Iranian communications and information technology minister announced on February 28 that Russia will launch the Iranian Pars-1 satellite into orbit on February 29.[53] Iranian state media claimed that Russia will use its Soyuz space launch vehicle to launch the Pars-1 into low earth orbit.[54] Russia similarly launched a Kanopus-V satellite—alternatively referred to as the Khayyam in Iran—into orbit in August 2022 on Iran’s behalf.[55] The IRGC Aerospace Force Command and Iranian Space Organization separately launched multiple Iranian satellites into low-earth orbit between April 2020 and January 2024.[56] Iran can use satellites capable of collecting imagery to help enable targeting capabilities for attacks abroad.[57] Iranian state media reported in July 2020 that the IRGC used its satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region.[58]

CENTCOM and an unspecified coalition warship shot down five Houthi one-way attack drones over the Red Sea on February 27.[59] CENTCOM said that the drones presented an ”imminent” threat to vessels in the Red Sea.

The German frigate Hessen shot down two Houthi one-way attack drones over the Red Sea on February 27.[60] The Hessen identified a suspicious target over the Red Sea on February 26 but did not successfully intercept the target.[61] It is unclear if the Hessen is the unspecified coalition warship noted by CENTCOM.

A Houthi-controlled media outlet said that the United States and United Kingdom targeted Houthi sites on Labwan Island, off the coast of Hudaydah, on February 27.[62] Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom have confirmed the strikes.

4. Hamas Is Losing Every Battle in Gaza. It Still Thinks It Could Win the War.

The old adage guerrillas do not have to win, they just have to not lose.

Hamas Is Losing Every Battle in Gaza. It Still Thinks It Could Win the War.

On the run, Yahya Sinwar is betting the militant Islamists can achieve a political victory by surviving Israel’s onslaught

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-thinks-it-could-win-gaza-war-with-israel-6254a8c6?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Marcus WalkerFollow, Anat Peled and Summer SaidFollow

Feb. 29, 2024 12:00 am ET

Senior members of Hamas’s leadership in exile met in Doha, Qatar, earlier this month amid concerns that its fighters were getting mauled by an Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip. Enemy troops were killing dozens of militants each day as they methodically overran Hamas strongholds.

Then a courier arrived with a message from Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, saying, in effect: Don’t worry, we have the Israelis right where we want them.

Hamas’s fighters, the Al-Qassam Brigades, were doing fine, the upbeat message said. The militants were ready for Israel’s expected assault on Rafah, a city on Gaza’s southern edge. High civilian casualties would add to the worldwide pressure on Israel to stop the war, Sinwar’s message said, according to people informed about the meeting.

Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas chief in Gaza, appeared in public last April. PHOTO: MOHAMMED TALATENE/ZUMA PRESS

Hamas’s military wing in Gaza is waging an unequal fight with the strongest military in the Middle East—a war brought on by the U.S.-designated terrorist group’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel. But Sinwar, the mastermind of that attack and one of Israel’s prime targets, is playing a different game. His goal is for Hamas to emerge from the rubble of Gaza after the war, declare a historic victory by outlasting Israel’s firepower, and claim the leadership of the Palestinian national cause.

The militants, commanded day-to-day by Sinwar’s brother Mohammed, have changed their tactics since a short cease-fire in November. Hamas fighters are now trying to avoid large firefights and instead use small-scale ambushes—using tools ranging from rocket-propelled grenades to recorded voices of hostages to lure Israeli troops into traps.

The ambushes have little chance of holding territory against Israel’s armored maneuvers. But they’re tailored to Hamas’s limited capabilities, and to Sinwar’s war aim.

“It’s a very sound tactical logic,” said Eyal Berelovich, a civilian analyst for Israel’s armed forces and a military historian at Jerusalem’s Hebrew University. “Their strategic goal is to survive.”

Israeli bombardments have reduced large parts of Gaza to rubble, including this building in the Maghazi camp. PHOTO: ANAS BABA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Many in Israel’s military, from senior commanders to ordinary soldiers who spoke to The Wall Street Journal, worry that their accumulation of tactical wins on the battlefield might not add up to a lasting strategic victory. After nearly five months of intense fighting, Israel is still far from its declared war aim of eliminating Hamas as a significant military and political entity.

“Fighting the enemy is like a game of whack-a-mole,” said an Israeli reservist in Khan Younis with the 98th Division. He said many soldiers sense the lack of a plan and wonder what their efforts are for. “It will be very hard to destroy Hamas.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has promised a “total victory” that annihilates the radical Islamist group. Israel’s military defines its mission more cautiously: to reduce Hamas’s capabilities to a level where the group can never again launch an attack like Oct. 7.

But many in Israel’s military believe the government’s reluctance to flesh out a plan for who should govern Gaza after Hamas is leaving a political vacuum that could help Hamas to grow back.

Gaza’s civilians continue to bear the brunt of the war, with thousands killed by airstrikes and ground fire and many more desperate for food, medicine and safety. Around 30,000 residents of the enclave have been killed in Israel’s invasion, most of them women and children, according to Palestinian health authorities, whose numbers don’t otherwise distinguish between militants and civilians. Israeli officials privately say the total death count is roughly accurate but dispute the composition, saying over one-third of those killed were Hamas fighters.

Palestinians mourn dead relatives at a hospital morgue in Rafah last week. PHOTO: FATIMA SHBAIR/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Israeli soldiers carry the flag-draped casket of reservist Warrant Officer Yuval Nir, who was killed during Israel’s ground operation in the Gaza Strip. PHOTO: LEO CORREA/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Hamas leaders in Gaza have told Egyptian officials and the group’s political wing in exile that the Al-Qassam Brigades have lost at least 6,000 men killed, out of an estimated 30,000 fighters before the war. Israel says it has killed about 12,000 Hamas militants in Gaza so far, plus about another 1,000 during the fighting in Israel on Oct. 7.

U.S. and Egyptian intelligence officials believe the true losses are roughly in the middle between the Israeli and Hamas claims. Military analysts say Hamas can recruit new fighters to replace its rank-and-file soldiers, but that replacing experienced commanders is more difficult.

Israel has so far lost 242 soldiers killed in Gaza, in addition to over 300 killed on Oct. 7.

Degrading Hamas’s capabilities is a realistic goal for Israel’s military, said Hussein Ibish, a scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute, a think tank in Washington. But sustaining it would require fully occupying Gaza, which would give Hamas a target for a never-ending insurgency, he said. “Recent history shows that you can be an effective insurgency on a shoestring,” said Ibish. “Anyone can make an IED,” or homemade bomb, he said. “It’s easy to get a pistol. If you’re willing to die, you can kill soldiers.”

Palestinians inspect the site of an Israeli strike in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. PHOTO: IBRAHEEM ABU MUSTAFA/REUTERS

Which side achieves its broader goal depends in part on the war of narratives. Israelis see the war in Gaza as necessary self-defense after Hamas’s gruesome killing of about 1,200 people in southern Israel on Oct. 7, the bloodiest day in the country’s history.

But the deepening humanitarian crisis and the scale of destruction in Gaza have strained Israel’s relations with countries around the world, including with its closest ally, the U.S. President Biden recently called Israel’s use of firepower “over the top.”

The U.S. is pushing for a cease-fire and Biden on Monday expressed optimism about a deal to pause the fighting and release hostages, but Israel and Hamas warned that their negotiating positions remain far apart.

Israel is betting that its military can do enough physical damage to Hamas to win security for itself, outweighing the diplomatic cost of worldwide opprobrium.

Hamas is betting that it can evade the Israelis’ best efforts to crush it, allowing it to regenerate and claim a political victory.

“We brought the Palestinian cause to the forefront. We have changed the status quo,” Sinwar said in a message delivered to Egyptian officials soon after Oct. 7.

Yahya Sinwar speaks during a rally in Gaza last year. PHOTO: AHMED ZAKOT/ZUMA PRESS

Sinwar and other Hamas leaders initially hoped to trigger a wider war against Israel in the Middle East. But Hamas’s main allies Hezbollah and Iran didn’t want an all-out conflict, leaving Hamas to face Israel’s invasion of Gaza mostly alone.

Early on, Hamas often sought to attack Israeli troops with platoon-sized groups of up to 30 men, according to Israeli officers and military analysts.

In densely built neighborhoods of Gaza City, teams of Hamas fighters carried out coordinated attacks. One group would try to block an advancing Israeli unit. Another group would attack it from the flank. The militants would try to inflict casualties, then disappear into ruined buildings or the maze of tunnels beneath the enclave. But such actions led to heavy losses of Hamas fighters and commanders.

Hamas drew lessons during the November pause, said Israeli commanders and analysts. It shifted to hit-and-run attacks by tiny groups of two or three men, sometimes just one individual.

Russia seizes more villages in Ukraine, raising fears of growing momentum

The Washington Post · by David L. Stern · February 28, 2024

KYIV — After taking the strategic northeast Ukrainian town of Avdiivka two weeks ago, Russian forces have seized three more villages in the past few days, suggesting a growing momentum in their advance even as Western officials warn of the ammunition shortages Kyiv’s military is facing.

Russia’s Defense Ministry announced Wednesday that its troops had taken the village of Stepove, seven miles northwest of Avdiivka. Ukrainian officials said the previous day that Kyiv’s forces had pulled back from Stepove and the neighboring village of Sieverne.

Ukrainian forces also withdrew from the village of Lastochkyne “to organize defenses” along a new line of settlements, “aiming to prevent further enemy advancement to the west,” Dmytro Lykhoviy, a military spokesman, said Monday on Ukrainian television.

The villages had little strategic importance, and Stepove and Sieverne had populations of less than 100 people even before Russia’s invasion, two years ago. But the gains indicated that Russia was pushing its advantage after taking Avdiivka — its first major victory since seizing the eastern city of Bakhmut last May.

Ukraine’s situation was “undoubtedly a tough one,” made more acute since its military was “struggling with its ammunition and its stockpiles,” Adm. Sir Tony Radakin, the head of Britain’s armed forces, said at a conference in London on Tuesday.

“At a tactical level, you’re seeing some Russian success, gaining relatively small amounts of territory,” he said. “I think that’s a predicament that is likely to last at least for the next few months.”

House Republicans are blocking some $60 billion in U.S. military assistance to Ukraine, part of a larger package that includes aid to Israel and Taiwan. A meeting Tuesday between President Biden and congressional leaders failed to break the impasse.

U.S. officials attribute the loss of Avdiivka to the shortage in ammunition and warn that circumstances could become markedly worse if Congress does not approve the aid package.

“The situation is extremely serious right now,” State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said Tuesday. “We have seen Ukrainian front-line troops who don’t have the ammo they need to repel Russian aggression. They’re still fighting bravely. They still have armor and weapons and ammunition they can use, but they’re having to ration it now because the United States Congress has failed to act.”

Russian forces had “started taking some other towns and villages,” White House spokesman John Kirby said on Tuesday. “They’re on the move.”

“The situation is very dire,” he said, adding, however, that he was “not in a position to put a time stamp on it and say by such and such date [the Ukrainians] will lose the war.”

“But they are certainly beginning to lose territory — territory that they had clawed back from the Russians and now they have to give it back to the Russians because they can’t, they can’t fight them off,” Kirby said.

Serhiy Morgunov and Serhii Korolchuk contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by David L. Stern · February 28, 2024

6. Joint exercises, industry, and innovation would take a hit under full-year CR, defense officials say

Of course (my bias) I worry about the exercise program in Korea and its importance to readiness and deterrence.

Joint exercises, industry, and innovation would take a hit under full-year CR, defense officials say

Congress still hasn’t passed an FY24 budget. The chances of a historic full-year continuing resolution aren’t improving.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

Despite a measure reportedly agreed to Wednesday to temporarily fund the Department Defense at previous levels until March 22, Congress has still not passed a budget for fiscal year 2024—which began in October. That makes a full year continuing resolution more likely, which defense officials say would have terrible consequences.

Navy Undersecretary Erik Raven said the the Navy does have a plan for how to prioritize readiness if Congress and the President can only agree on a full-year CR. But the department would lose $12 billion in buying power, which would cause domino effects throughout its budget.

“We would need to move about $26 billion around in our budget. In order to do that, we would need reprogramming authority and about $13 billion. That's about twice what the entire department requests for the entire fiscal year. That's just for the Department of the Navy needs,” he told reporters Wednesday. “Even if we got that reprogramming authority, the process of getting reprogramming through Congress is a lengthy and sometimes challenging one. So our ability to make decisions in real time will be extremely challenged.”

The general public wouldn’t necessarily see the effects of a full-year CR right away, but it would harm the military’s ability to respond to crises like the continuing Houthi militia attacks on merchant and Navy vessels in the Red Sea. Responding to those attacks can require very expensive missiles, such as the SM-6. And the lack of a full budget would hurt the industrial base that is vital to their production, as well as jeopardizing the Navy’s ability to bring new submarines online on time.

“When looking in the future, SM-6 production, we sought to basically double the amount of money we're putting to SM-6, both to produce the interceptors, which are critical for looking at operations in the Red Sea. Those funds would not be available under a CR,” Raven said. “We have a major request in the supplemental that's pending for $3.4 billion investment into the submarine industrial base…to put industry on the right plan to produce one Columbia and two Virginia-class (submarines) a year. If that supplemental doesn't arrive, we'll simply have to delay all those investments.”

The Air Force has already seen big effects on new weapons development as a result of the continuing resolutions Congress has passed in late 2023.

“Just already under the six month CR that we've had, we've had significant impacts,” particularly in the things like munitions for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and funding for the development of attack drones to escort fighters and bombers, called the Collaborative Combat Aircraft, or CCA program, said Kristyn Jones, the acting Air Force undersecretary. What’s more, she said, Air Force efforts to make operations in the Pacific more nimble—and thus harder for China to target—by investing in more runways are also seeing a hit.

“Our Indo-Pacific security—a big focus for us is our agile combat employment that had about a 1500% increase from [fiscal year 20]23 to 24. So given the caps that we are under with the CR, we've only been able to make minor investments, and then minor changes to let's say, our airfields on Tinian, and not all of the equipment that we were hoping to buy under the operational imperatives planning,” she said.

The budget impasse is also hurting the Space Force’s ability to put new satellites into orbit for things like tracking highly-maneuverable hypersonic missiles.

“National security space launches dropped from 10 to three,” Jones said. “So there's just a number of impacts across the board, and in particular devastating to the Space Force.”

Army Undersecretary Gabe Camarillo said the continuing resolutions have hurt the Army’s ability to purchase equipment to intercept adversary drones.

“We know that we lost soldiers recently due to a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike. What we need are the ability to buy interceptors for counter UAS. I would just note in the [fiscal 20]24 base appropriation what we don't have is funding to buy 225 coyote interceptors,” he said.

Continuing resolutions are forcing tough tradeoffs between new tools to attract enlistees and funding current operations in places like Europe and the Middle East, Camarillo said.

“For example, in our military personnel accounts, we're going to have to make decisions [if] we face a year long CR, do we give re-enlistment bonuses for soldiers at the same time that we're trying to meet our entering targets? Or do we continue to fund operations and support in other areas? So I think those are some examples of some of the trades that we're going to begin to have to make.”

Congress failing to pass a new budget would also harm the Army’s ability to exercise with partners and allies, which are a critical part of the U.S. plan to deter China in the Pacific.

“A key part of our National Defense Strategy is building our relationships with our allies and partners. All of our exercises that we all perform…they build that coalition, they build trust with other militaries around the world. At the same time, they're critical opportunities for us to experiment with new warfighting capabilities, new tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is a critical aspect of how we modernize as well.”

Defense officials have long warned of the effects of continuing resolutions. In December, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in a letter that “A year-long CR would set us behind in meeting our pacing challenge highlighted in our National Defense Strategy—the People’s Republic of China (PRC). … Our ability to execute our strategy is contingent upon our ability to innovate and modernize to meet this challenge, which cannot happen under a CR.”

On Tuesday, Pentagon spokesperson Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder said, "The absence of an appropriation bill for the fiscal year severely hampers the department's ability to plan effectively. …We are already well into the fiscal year—now in our fifth month—and, unfortunately, find ourselves again under a third continuing resolution. The fact is that this uncertainty undermines our military readiness and jeopardizes critical modernization efforts."

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

7. Some U.S. military aid is still trickling into Ukraine via arms dealers, contracts suggest

Some U.S. military aid is still trickling into Ukraine via arms dealers, contracts suggest

Companies that have previously supplied Ukraine are now competing to provide “special ammunition” worth $624 million.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

At least some new military aid may be trickling into Ukraine via U.S. arms dealers despite House Republicans’ opposition to more funding for the beleaguered country.

In November, the Pentagon announced that five companies had won the right to compete for slices of a $490 million contract to provide “special ammunition and weapons” to the U.S. Army: Northrop Grumman, Global Military Products, Blane International, and Ultra Defense Corp—the latter added several weeks after the initial announcement.

On Feb. 7, the Army again picked Northrop and Global Military Products to compete for slices of a “special ammunition and weapons contract”—this one worth $133.9 million.

None of these awards mentions Ukraine, nor do they say that the materiel will be sent to a foreign military.

However, as previously reported by DefenseOne, Northrop Grumman and Global Military Products received a $522 million contract in January 2023 to supply Ukraine with 155mm artillery shells. That award was funded via the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, one of two ways that the U.S. has funded the acquisition of new weapons for Ukraine.

A week after the Pentagon announced its $490 million competition in November, it awarded the first slice: $121,173.80 to Global Military Products. The award data said the government was buying ammunition—under a category that includes artillery shells and unguided rockets—from Romania. That country is a key source of weapons to Ukraine, as seen in Ukrainian import documents, which also repeatedly note arms shipments from Global Military Products.

The other competitors also have strong connections to Ukraine. Ultra Defense Corp has sold Ukraine weapons since almost the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including howitzers that Ukraine later claimed were defective.

Blane International has had connections to Ukraine for at least two decades. Founder Milton Blane, who died in 2016, rose to prominence briefly because of his connections to Felix Sater, a Russian-American businessman who was a witness in Robert Mueller’s probe into Russian interference in the 2016 elections.

The company, which operates out of a home address in the suburbs of Atlanta, currently lists Tatiana Blane as its CEO, CFO, secretary, and agent. Defense One called the company’s listed phone number, asking to discuss the involvement of the company in the $490 million contract. The person who answered the phone declined to comment.

The Pentagon’s use of a company with such a limited profile may suggest that the firm is being used as a cutout to enable a third-party country to hide weapons transfers to Ukraine, said Mark Cancian, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Why funds are still available

In November, the Pentagon announced that it had committed all $18.9 billion available under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative—i.e., officials had decided what kinds of weapons and other aid to buy with the money. But more than one-third of the amount has not yet been awarded to the companies that will provide the materiel.

As of Jan. 15, 2023, the Pentagon has issued contracts for $12.3 billion of the total, according to a Pentagon press release. Shells account for the highest spending categories within USAI, with $1.7 billion spent on 155mm shells and $756 million on other forms of ammunition.

The unspent funds and continuing contracts to U.S. arms dealers suggest that, even as Ukraine experiences a severe lack of munitions, some U.S. military support is still flowing to the war torn country.

Cancian calculates that at least some U.S. military aid deliveries will continue until at least October 2024 due to production timelines.

Those deliveries, however, will not be enough to defend Ukraine adequately. Cancian wrote that Ukraine’s army, which is already severely short of munitions, will struggle to counter-attack Russian forces by early spring, and by early summer will struggle to hold back Russian forces.

Russia, absent further U.S. aid, would then likely break through Ukrainian defenses and make major territorial gains, possibly leading to the “complete collapse” of Ukraine’s government.

British think-tank RUSI previously reported that, at a minimum, Russia seeks to replace Ukraine’s head of state with one that Russia approves of, recognizes Russian control of the 18 percent of Ukrainian territory Russia already controls, plus the major, Ukrainian-held cities of Kharkiv and Odesa.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

8. How can the Pentagon arm Ukraine amid stalled aid package?

How can the Pentagon arm Ukraine amid stalled aid package?

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · February 28, 2024

The Pentagon is mulling workarounds to arm Ukraine as the country faces severe ammunition and artillery shortages amid recent Russian advances. But the department is limited in its ability to fill the gap given President Joe Biden’s funding request for additional Ukraine military aid remains stalled in Congress.

One stopgap option would transfer additional weapons from U.S. stocks without funding to replenish that equipment. Another option uses the Excess Defense Articles program to send U.S. equipment to third-party countries that then send older weapons to Kyiv.

The European Union is also stepping up its assistance. It passed $54 billion in economic support for Ukraine after Hungary dropped its opposition.

But none of these stopgap measures to staunch the bleeding come close to the influx of arms for Kyiv that Congress could unlock if it passes the $95 billion foreign aid bill for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan.

“The consequence of not doing so is likely Ukraine’s defeat,” Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., told Defense News last week after returning from a congressional delegation to Europe. “There is not a plan B there. There’s certainly more that Europe could do, but there are certain weapons systems that only the United States can provide and maintain. And there is a hard limit to the amount of resources Europe can put in if the United States chooses to leave the coalition.”

Ukrainian officials also attributed Russia’s recent conquest of Avdiivka to the lack of available weaponry when Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., led a congressional delegation to the war-torn country last week.

House Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., has refused to hold a vote on the foreign aid bill, which includes $48.3 billion in additional military assistance for Ukraine. The Senate passed the bill 70-29 earlier this month over objections from former President Donald Trump, the likely Republican presidential nominee.

Congress passed a cumulative $113 billion in military and economic aid for Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, but has not provided additional funding since December 2022.

Biden hosted congressional leaders at the White House on Tuesday, where he joined Democrats and outgoing Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., in pushing Johnson to pass the bill.

In the meantime, the Pentagon is weighing whether it should use roughly $4 billion left of drawdown authority to continue arming Ukraine from U.S. weapons stockpiles, even though it does not have the money to replenish those inventories without the foreign aid bill, CNN reported Wednesday.

The Pentagon did not directly address deliberations about transferring additional weapons without replenishment funding.

“The [Defense Department] continues to urge Congress to pass a supplemental to support Ukraine in its time of need and to replenish our stocks,” Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Garron Garn told Defense News in a statement.

The Pentagon used its last $1 billion in Ukraine replenishment funding to backfill U.S. stockpiles in December, with the White House noting that would be the last remaining assistance, absent congressional action.

“At issue here again is the question of impacting our own readiness, as a nation, and the responsibilities that we have,” Pentagon press secretary Gen. Patrick Ryder said last month. “While we do have that $4.2 billion in authority, we don’t have the funds available to replenish those stocks, should we expend that. And with no timeline in sight, we have to make those hard decisions.”

The remaining $4.2 billion in Ukraine transfer authority stems from an accounting error the Pentagon made last year. The error prompted Pentagon Inspector General Robert Storch to announce an audit of the valuation of weapons sent to Ukraine.

Excess Defense Articles

Another, more limited option involves third-party countries transferring Soviet-era equipment to Ukraine in exchange for more U.S. weapons through the Pentagon’s Excess Defense Articles program. The program also allows the U.S. to send equipment that helps countries transition away from Russian arms.

“The United States is providing security assistance to partners such as Ecuador and Zambia to help them transition off Russian equipment, but there’s more we can and must do,” the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, Jessica Lewis, said in December.

Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa said in January that the U.S. would send $200 million in refurbished weapons to help fight cartels in exchange for “scrap” equipment. But Noboa backtracked last week after Russia imposed a ban on Ecuadorian banana and clove imports.

“To our surprise, the United States has publicly stated that this equipment will be used in the armed conflict in Ukraine, and we do not want to be part of it,” Noboa said.

The Greek newspaper Kathimerini reported in January that the U.S. is providing Greece with equipment through the Excess Defense Articles program, including two C-130H aircraft, three Protector-class ships and 60 Bradley armored fighting vehicles.

“Greece has provided substantial military assistance to Ukraine, including Soviet-era BMP infantry fighting vehicles, artillery and small arms,” the U.S. State Department told Defense News. “We thank the government of Greece for its generosity and encourage additional donations, in the future.”

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which oversees the Excess Defense Articles program, has not updated the public list of transfers since 2020, despite a congressional requirement that it do so. As such, it’s unclear what other countries are receiving U.S. weapons through the program.

The agency told Defense News it expects to update the list within “several weeks” but did not explain why updates stopped in 2020.

Noah Robertson contributed to this report.

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

9. Putin warns West of risk of nuclear war, says Moscow can strike Western targets

Putin has our number. Our continued statements that we do not want to cause escalation because we do not want to risk nuclear war plays right into Putin's hands and now he is using nuclear threats to deter the US, NATO, and the West.

No surprise. No one fears nuclear weapons use more than the United States. Just listen to our political leaders.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-warns-west-risk-nuclear-war-says-moscow-can-strike-western-targets-2024-02-29/?utm

Putin warns West of risk of nuclear war, says Moscow can strike Western targets

By Vladimir Soldatkin and Andrew Osborn

February 29, 20246:15 AM ESTUpdated an hour ago

[1/2]Russian President Vladimir Putin delivers his annual address to the Federal Assembly, in Moscow, Russia, February 29, 2024. REUTERS/Evgenia Novozhenina Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

summary

Putin addresses political eliteWarns West against triggering a nuclear conflictSays Russia has initiative on Ukraine battlefieldPledges to beef up troop numbers on western border

MOSCOW, Feb 29 (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin told Western countries on Thursday they risked provoking a nuclear war if they sent troops to fight in Ukraine, warning that Moscow had the weapons to strike targets in the West.

The war in Ukraine has triggered the worst crisis in Moscow's relations with the West since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Putin has previously spoken of the dangers of a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, but his nuclear warning on Thursday was one of his most explicit.

Addressing lawmakers and other members of the country's elite, Putin, 71, repeated his accusation that the West was bent on weakening Russia, and he suggested Western leaders did not understand how dangerous their meddling could be in what he cast as Russia's own internal affairs.

He prefaced his nuclear warning with a specific reference to an idea, floated by French President Emmanuel Macron on Monday, of European NATO members sending ground troops to Ukraine - a suggestion that was quickly rejected by the United States, Germany, Britain and others.

"(Western nations) must realise that we also have weapons that can hit targets on their territory. All this really threatens a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons and the destruction of civilisation. Don't they get that?!" said Putin.

Speaking ahead of a March 15-17 presidential election when he is certain to be re-elected for another six-year term, he lauded what he said was Russia's vastly modernised nuclear arsenal, the largest in the world.

00:00

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"Strategic nuclear forces are in a state of full readiness," he said, noting that new-generation hypersonic nuclear weapons he first spoke about in 2018 had either been deployed or were at a stage where development and testing were being completed.

Visibly angry, Putin suggested Western politicians recall the fate of those like Nazi Germany's Adolf Hitler and France's Napoleon Bonaparte who had unsuccessfully invaded Russia in the past.

"But now the consequences will be far more tragic," said Putin. "They think it (war) is a cartoon," he said, accusing Western politicians of forgetting what real war meant because they had not faced the same security challenges as Russians had in the last three decades.

MORE TROOPS FOR WESTERN BORDER

Russian forces now had the initiative on the battlefield in Ukraine and were advancing in several places, Putin said. Russia must also boost the troops it has deployed along its western borders with the European Union after Finland and Sweden decided to join the NATO military alliance, he added.

The veteran Kremlin leader dismissed Western suggestions that Russian forces might go beyond Ukraine and attack European countries as "nonsense". He also said Moscow would not repeat the mistake of the Soviet Union and allow the West to "drag" it into an arms race that would eat up too much of its budget.

"Therefore, our task is to develop the defence-industrial complex in such a way as to increase the scientific, technological and industrial potential of the country," he said.

Putin said Moscow was open to discussions on nuclear strategic stability with the United States but suggested that Washington had no genuine interest in such talks and was more focused on making false claims about Moscow's alleged aims.

"Recently there have been more and more unsubstantiated accusations against Russia, for example that we are allegedly going to deploy nuclear weapons in space. Such innuendo... is a ploy to draw us into negotiations on their terms, which are favourable only to the United States," he said.

"...On the eve of the U.S. presidential election, they simply want to show their citizens and everyone else that they still rule the world."

Reporting by Vladimir Soldatkin, Andrew Osborn, Mark Trevelyan, Felix Light, Alexander Marrow, Filipp Lebedev, Olzhas Auyezov and Lucy Papachristou Writing by Andrew Osborn Editing by Gareth Jones

Andrew Osborn

Thomson Reuters

As Russia Chief Political Correspondent, and former Moscow bureau chief, Andrew helps lead coverage of the world's largest country, whose political, economic and social transformation under President Vladimir Putin he has reported on for much of the last two decades, along with its growing confrontation with the West and wars in Georgia and Ukraine. Andrew was part of a Wall Street Journal reporting team short-listed for a Pulitzer Prize for international reporting. He has also reported from Moscow for two British newspapers, The Telegraph and The Independent.

10. The CIA’s Top Secret Chimera Program or “C Cell” to Its Paramilitary Operatives

There are no secrets anymore.

As an aside, we should learn something from the "Special Operations Group". Since it is made up mostly of former uniformed military special operations personnel, I have long thought that its members have evolved the organization into what they envisioned would be the perfect special operations organization with the most flat C2 structure and responsive but discreet logistics support structure. Military special operations organizations could learn a lot from this one.

Excerpts:

The Special Operations Group under SAC is responsible for operations that include clandestine or covert operations with which the US government does not want to be overtly associated. As such, unit members, called Paramilitary Operations Officers and Specialized Skills Officers, do not typically wear uniforms.

The Latin motto of SAC is Tertia Optio, which means “Third Option,” as covert action represents an additional option within the realm of national security when diplomacy and military action are not feasible. Very little is known about the Ground branch, Political Action Group, and the Global Response Staff (GRS), made famous by the movie “13 Hours”.

In 2024, under top secret Executive Order 123444, another group was added to SAC. Few, even within the highest levels of the CIA, know about The Chimera Directive.

Its members (who call it C CELL) are comprised of the very best, mission-proven field operatives (…the Top Gun of clandestine operatives).

They work exclusively in pairs (psychologically profiled and matched) and are recruited from within the US Government’s black programs within the CIA, National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS), and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

The CIA’s Top Secret Chimera Program or “C Cell” to Its Paramilitary Operatives

sofrep.com

The CIA’s Top Secret Chimera Program or “C Cell” to Its Paramilitary Operatives | SOFREP

The CIA’s Top Secret Chimera Program or “C Cell” to Its Paramilitary Operatives

by Brandon Webb 18 hours ago

Cold Winds of Africa

Winter 2024 Benghazi, Libya

Omar (8) and Jamal (6) were as close as brothers can be. Omar always looked out for his younger brother. Their favorite game was hide and seek in their local neighborhood, Ras Abaydah.

This time Jamal was too good for him, he couldn’t find him anywhere. A stench hit his nostrils as he rounded the corner. Omar had never smelled something so bad, maybe the dead goat that him and Jamal found rotting a year ago came close. The smell of decaying flesh was hard to forget.

Where did he get to this time.

“I give Jamal, you win. Jamal!” he cried out.

Out came Jamal a few minutes later, laughing.

“I win, Omar; you’ll never guess what I found! Let me show you!”

“No, Jamal, mother will kill us if we’re not back for dinner. Show me tomorrow.”

“But Omar, please, it’s the best hiding spot if you can stand the smell.”

“Jamal, come, we have to go.”, he firmly said, tugging his younger brother by the arm.

“Ok, ok, enough, Omar.”

The boys started running back towards their home, but Jamal struggled to keep up.

“Omar, I can’t breathe.”

“Come on, Jamal, quit messing around.”Omar looked over his shoulder, and his little brother was collapsed on the dirt road.

“Jamal, please, stop joking.”

“Can’t breathe, my eyes hurt, Omar.” His brother softly gasped and grabbed his older brother’s hand, squeezed it weakly, and took his last breath.

A few months earlier…

The wind blew cold on the back of Kent’s neck, which was unusual for this time of year in Libya. He couldn’t help the feeling of foreboding, then thoughts of his wife Rachel flashed in his head. She was over seven months pregnant.

Rachel is going to kill me if the unit doesn’t have me home in time for the birth of our baby girl.

He pulled up his collar, took a sip from his hydration hose, and pushed the thoughts away.

Pushing things out of his head was a way of life since he joined the unit.

“You think you’re fucking cold now? Wait until ya fucks are in the field!” the Delta instructor whispered in his year all those years ago.

Captain Kent Collier passed the hand signal up for the breacher to blow the door.

Zzzzshhhp…whapp…Boom!

The plastic explosive blew the door inward. Without thinking, he instinctively passed the shoulder squeeze up the stack, signaling the deadly train was ready to enter.

The deadly entry team started to snake their way into the two-story masonry building in Benghazi. The ground floor was cleared within seconds, then the second story.

Nothing special here, looks like another half built lost dream but I guess that’s the point. Hiding in plain sight is often the best way.

“All clear, boss. Those intel guys fucked us again; it looks like.”, Remmer passed over comms to Collier.

“Copy, resweep and check for anything unusual, the lab should be here, intel was solid on this one Gents. Let’s make sure we missed nothing.”

“Roger that boss.”

“Hey Boss, think we got us a biggin here. Ya’ll need to check this out. In the kitchen past the main room to the right.”

“Copy Bama, on my way.”, Collier replied.

Captain Kent Collier moved through the smoke filled building to the kitchen where four members of the assault team, including Bama, stood, weapons lights pointing to the floor illuminating a steel hatch that was hidden under a rolling table.

“Team, on me in the kitchen.” he passed over the intersquad comms.

Fourteen, fifteen, all here.

“Listen up. Bama and Remmer, rear security. The rest of us are going down. Stack and go.”

They opened the hatch and tossed two flash bangs down the stairwell.

CRACK BOOM! CRACK BOOM!

The assault team made their way down the large metal stairs and saw what they came for.

The room was a massive underground laboratory that looked like the industrial meth lab in the series Breaking Bad. Glass tubes, industrial lighting, and clear lab rooms were stacked next to each other.

Then they saw what they came for on the center table. There was a stack of tubes containing deadly sarin gas, but something was off.

There was a small piece of paper on top.

Collier walked over to the table as his men stood guns at the ready, their lights illuminating the lab.

The note read, جِهَاد.

Kent had seen that Arabic phrase before; most had, and it sent another chill down his neck. He knew what this meant, and it was muy malo for his team.

“Everyone out now! Now!” he yelled.

Those were his last words, it was too late.

—

Note: SOFREP is working with a well known Hollywood producer to turn this story into a feature film and there’s more to come. As a SOFREP reader you are in a unique situation to help us develop this by adding your comments. So please load your magazines and go hot on the firing line in the comments below. The series will continue weekly with your feedback.

11. Army has funneled $500M from forces in Europe and Africa to train Ukrainian troops, Wormuth says

Army has funneled $500M from forces in Europe and Africa to train Ukrainian troops, Wormuth says

Stars and Stripes · by Matthew Adams · February 28, 2024

Army Secretary Christine Wormuth is pictured at the Pentagon on Thursday, Feb. 22, 2024. Wormuth said Tuesday, Feb. 27, 2024, that the Army has used approximately $500 million in funding for units in Europe and Africa to continue training Ukrainian forces. (Susan Walsh/AP)

WASHINGTON — The Army has used approximately $500 million in funding for units in Europe and Africa to continue training Ukrainian forces to fight off invading Russian troops, service Secretary Christine Wormuth said.

The Army also could look to make spending cuts to various programs such as training exercises and new barracks projects as Congress faces a government shutdown and struggles to approve more aid for Ukraine and pass a defense budget for fiscal 2024, she said.

“By … late spring, early summer, we would have to make some difficult choices about other exercises,” Wormuth told reporters Tuesday at a meeting of the Defense Writers Group. “There’s a whole host of NATO exercises, for example, that our forces participate in.”

She said the Army’s budget has remained stagnant for at least a couple of years. If the service can’t get an approved budget for roughly $185 billion for 2024 or supplemental aid for Ukraine, they are “going to probably have to cancel some things.”

The U.S. has provided more than $44 billion in aid to Ukraine since the Russian invasion in February 2022, which has entered its third year.

The Pentagon announced its last military aid package for Ukraine — worth $250 million — on Dec. 27. The U.S. has participated in two Ukraine Contact Defense Group meetings so far in 2024 but it has not been able to contribute any additional aid.

The White House’s request for $110 in supplemental funding, including about $60 billion for Ukraine to keep its troops supplied with enough weapons and munitions to beat back invading Russian forces, remains stalled on Capitol Hill.

The Democrat-controlled Senate managed to pass a $95 billion foreign aid package a few weeks ago, including $60 billion for Ukraine. In the House, where Republicans hold the majority, funding for more aid is at an impasse.

A group of eight House lawmakers, led by Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick, R-Pa., on Feb. 16 unveiled an alternative bill to the Senate’s foreign aid legislation. It includes more than $66 billion in defense-only funding for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan with provisions to address the U.S. southern border. The bill designates almost $48 billion for Ukraine aid.

The federal government has been operating on a temporary stopgap funding measure, known as a continuing resolution, since Oct. 1, the start of the fiscal year. It is unclear when Congress will pass a budget for fiscal 2024. A vote on extending the continuing resolution is needed before midnight Friday to avoid a partial government shutdown while the Defense Department funding is set to lapse on March 8.

However, congressional leaders on Wednesday reached a tentative deal to extend funding temporarily for one set of federal agencies through March 8 and for another set through March 22, according to The Associated Press.

Wormuth underscored that without funding the service cannot invest in the development of weapons or build new barracks, such as new living quarters planned for Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state.

“We won’t be able to build that barracks under a CR and we’ll probably have to build it at a higher price tag when we do get to build it because construction costs are going up,” the secretary said.

Matthew Adams

Matthew Adams covers the Defense Department at the Pentagon. His past reporting experience includes covering politics for The Dallas Morning News, Houston Chronicle and The News and Observer. He is based in Washington, D.C.

Stars and Stripes · by Matthew Adams · February 28, 2024

12. China grows domestic bio weapons tech industry

And two other stories from this week's Inside the Ring from Bill Gertz:

Pentagon studies high-tech strategic warfare

NORAD: Drifting balloon was not Chinese

China grows domestic bio weapons tech industry

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

Security personnel gather near the entrance of the Wuhan Institute of Virology during a visit by the World Health Organization team in Wuhan, China, Feb. 3, 2021. (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan, File) Security personnel gather near the entrance … more >

By - The Washington Times - Wednesday, February 28, 2024

NEWS AND ANALYSIS:

China is advancing its domestic, dual-use biological research capabilities with applications for the People’s Liberation Army germ warfare programs, according to an open-source intelligence report.

Recent virology studies “demonstrate that China is now able to operate its own dual-use virology research agenda on-shore and without international inputs or considerations,” according to a new report by the Chinese Communist Party Biothreats Initiative, a think tank.

“China now has robust domestic capabilities that potentially provide Beijing with a range of asymmetric options against perceived adversaries,” the report said.

The development of biological weapons by China has been overshadowed by many intelligence and strategic analysts who have instead focused on Beijing’s large conventional military buildup. China, however, remains overmatched militarily by the U.S. and its allies, and thus its biological arms development provides a major asymmetric advantage, the report said.

China is continuing high-risk pathogen research on SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, and the work is a major strategic worry, the report said. Studies published in China show Beijing is continuing work banned in the West on the virus that killed millions during the global pandemic.

So far, none of China’s recent SARS-CoV-2 research has been linked to a current vaccine, therapeutic, prophylactic or diagnostic, the report said, raising questions about the potential for using the virus for military purposes.

“The fact that this work continues, including in Wuhan itself, likely demonstrates that there is a broader strategic logic underpinning this continued high-risk pathogen research,” the report said.

China’s nanotechnology research is also linked to military capabilities that include weaponizing nanomedicine, tiny robots and autonomous weapons, the report said. These arms can include “nano-bioinformatics for biological warfare, nano-cyber biological weapons, covert assassination and targeted biological warfare,” the report said.

The capabilities “have the potential to fundamentally and irreversibly transform the nature of the next generation of dual-use research in China,” the report said. “The deliberate national prioritization of dual-use pathogen research and nanotechnology provides insight into where Beijing assesses its own unique strengths to lie and, possibly, where Beijing has assessed its adversaries to have weaknesses in their own systems.”

Previously, China required intensive and targeted international cooperation to obtain the technology and specialized knowledge needed for its virology and nanotechnology programs. Recent evidence suggests that is no longer the case, the report said.

On Jan. 4, the Beijing Advanced Innovation Center for Soft Matter Science and Engineering, part of the Beijing University of Chemical Technology, conducted a high-risk experiment with SARS-Cov-2, the virus that caused COVID-19. Researchers conducting the experiment stated that a new coronavirus isolate taken from a pangolin caused 100% mortality in humanized mice.

“The researchers then tried to take the ‘lethal’ tone out of their report with a new Jan. 24, 2024, version that attempted to justify their study as an approach for vaccine or drug development studies,” the report said.

The university stated in a 2021 overseas talent recruitment announcement that its work includes “treating industrial-academic fusion and military-civil fusion as key development opportunities.”

Last August, a team of scientists at the Wuhan Institute of Technology, the location U.S. intelligence says is one potential source of the COVID outbreak, stated in a journal article that their work created a new coronavirus with very high lethality in aged mice. The virus also had the potential to infect human beings.

Another Chinese institute, the Hefei Institute of Physical Science, part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, recently developed a “smart” DNA molecular nanorobot model for targeted drug delivery that has potential biological weapons uses.

“The ability of nanorobots to transport biological agents directly to target cells with such precision could also have dual-use applications, especially when considering the established linkages between [the Hefei Institute] and China’s People’s Liberation Army,” the report said.

Pentagon studies high-tech strategic warfare

As part of the strategy to leverage advanced technology, the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board is working to developing new strategic weapons and capabilities that will provide asymmetric advantages for continued U.S. military “operational dominance.”

The strategy is outlined in an executive summary made public in November by the board that provides a few clues to the mostly secret effort.

Board Chairman Eric Evans said in the summary that a task force on strategic options was converted into a new permanent DSB subcommittee devoted to new weapons and operational capabilities. The subcommittee will look at effective systems to strengthen the military’s ability to deter local conflicts involving allies and partners and to win those wars at the lowest cost if deterrence fails.

“The task force considered advanced undersea assets and operational concepts, new uses of space assets, development of new countermeasures for electronic warfare, employment of cyber weapons, and as well as other areas that involved the adversary’s use of countermeasures to undermine U.S. dominance in the air, space, sea and cyber domains,” Mr. Evans said.

A memorandum on strategic options dated Oct. 5 from Heidi Shyu, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, noted dramatic shifts in geopolitics and technology by U.S. adversaries, highlighting problems and vulnerabilities for U.S. military forces.

The new subcommittee is charged with developing ways to counter strategic threats using novel uses of space systems, cyber warfare tools, electronic warfare weapons and better logistics and supply systems, the memo stated.

One new area of focus is “the rapid collection and use of strategic counterintelligence,” Ms. Shyu said.

Strategic counterintelligence is the targeting of foreign intelligence services in China and Russia that play major roles in covertly achieving military objectives. One way of neutralizing those services is using strategic deception or developing clandestine recruitment inside the services — a strategy long advocated by some U.S. counterintelligence officials but largely opposed by intelligence agency bureaucrats who view counterintelligence as complicating their spy operations and networks.

Other areas of focus for the new DSB subcommittee include the Pentagon’s vaguely defined “region- and circumstance-specific integrated deterrence.” Advanced underwater warfare and anti-submarine warfare using drones and other high technology is also being studied.

Last, the board is also studying “escalation thresholds” and norms of behavior of enemies, along with deterring “coercive and malign activities” in what the military calls “gray zone warfare” — conflict below the level of actual fighting.

U.S. military commanders have said China is engaged in coercion in the South China Sea against the Philippines, in its military activities around Taiwan, and against Japan near the Senkaku Islands.

NORAD: Drifting balloon was not Chinese

A high-altitude balloon incursion last week was most likely a nonthreatening “hobby balloon” and not another Chinese surveillance aircraft, the military’s North American Aerospace Defense Command has concluded. NORAD monitors spotted the small balloon on Friday at a height of between 43,000 and 45,000 feet.

Two fighter jets were deployed to intercept the balloon over Utah, but the jets did not shoot it down, determining the balloon was “not maneuverable and did not present a threat to national security,” the command said in a statement Friday.

A day later, the balloon was identified by ground radar as a “likely hobby balloon” that floated out of U.S. airspace Saturday night or Sunday morning. John R. Cornelio, NORAD deputy director of public affairs and also a spokesman for the Northern Command, told Inside the Ring the balloon was not Chinese in origin.

Asked who manufactured the balloon, Mr. Cornelio said NORAD did not make that determination as part of its threat assessment.

“The likely hobby balloon had characteristics consistent with that purpose,” he said, adding that the balloon “did not present as a threat to national security and FAA determined the balloon posed no hazard to flight safety.”

“NORAD determined there was no indication that the balloon was maneuvering, or being controlled by a foreign or adversarial actor,” he said.

A year ago, a Chinese surveillance balloon caused an international furor when it flew over large parts of the continental United States — at first undetected — until it was spotted and eventually shot down off the U.S. Atlantic coast in February.

• Contact Bill Gertz on X @BillGertz.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

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13. A U.S. Hostage Rescue Operation in Gaza Should Not Be off the Table

Excerpts:

U.S. hostage rescues have a track record of success, including not only the Operation Jaque, but also the U.S. rescue mission that freed an American taken hostage in a boat off the coast of Somalia in 2009 and a subsequent rescue mission which freed two Americans from Somali pirate captivity in 2012.

These highly publicized missions are likely not the only successful U.S. hostage rescue missions in recent history, as other successful rescue efforts may have taken place but kept in secrecy to protect intelligence sources and methods, as well as military tactics, techniques, and procedures.

In the final analysis, the President has the authority and obligation to rescues American captives whose lives are in peril. He has the tools of U.S. national power at his disposal to reduce the risk associated with launching a rescue operation. If the Israeli government acquiesced, and if risks to the hostages and rescue force were sufficiently mitigated to an acceptable, the U.S. commander-in-chief should absolutely authorize a rescue attempt.

A U.S. Hostage Rescue Operation in Gaza Should Not Be off the Table

By Ray Palumbo & Jacob Olidort

February 29, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/02/29/a_us_hostage_rescue_operation_in_gaza_should_not_be_off_the_table_1015085.html?mc_cid=c12da8a459&mc_eid=70bf478f36

On February 12 it was announced that Israeli Defense Forces executed a daring raid to rescue two of their citizens held hostage in Gaza. Considering recently released accounts of the brutality of life as a hostage, estimates that perhaps more than a fifth of them are no longer alive, and the fact that 8 Americans are still being held by Hamas, the United States should not rule out staging its own rescue operation to save Americans. Time is of the essence.

Though there are several factors to consider before launching such an operation, the rescue of American citizens should be a policy priority for the U.S. government—regardless of where they are in the world. The President, as the commander-in-chief, has constitutional authority to wield several levers of national power, including using the military to conduct a rescue operation.

Hostage rescue operations are by their very nature highly complex and risky undertakings. Such operations not only present risks to the hostages and innocent civilian bystanders, they also endanger the rescue force and potentially expose sensitive tactics, techniques, and procedures that may be necessary for use in future operations. Consequently, the commander-in-chief and his national security team must carefully consider and simultaneously manipulate all levers of national power before authorizing a rescue attempt. These include closely coordinating the diplomatic, informational, economic, financial, intelligence, legal, and military levers of national power.

Diplomatically, in the case of Gaza, the United States must delicately coordinate not only with Israeli government leaders, but also with the leadership of other countries whose citizens are being held captive. Of the remaining hostages, reports indicate that thirteen are Thai citizens, three are British citizens, two are Italian citizens, four are Romanian citizens, four are Portuguese citizens and two are Mexican citizens. Such coordination would need to be discreet and likely short on details to minimize the possibility of leaks. Moreover, diplomacy does not end after the rescue is over. It must continue throughout the post mission phases, especially if the operation does not go as planned.

Successful rescue operations have precedent in recent history. During Operation Jaque in 2008, in which three American defense contractors and twelve Colombian military, police, and political officials were rescued from terrorist captivity in Colombia, U.S. officials were reported to have coordinated with Colombian authorities ahead of time and reportedly provided a transport plane and medical personnel to aid in the rescue effort.

The mere prospect of a U.S. hostage rescue operation – as a matter of national policy - may itself benefit hostage negotiation efforts in that it affords our diplomats leverage in future U.S. and Qatari-mediated negotiations.

From an informational standpoint, a successful rescue mission would have considerable strategic value by sending a clear message to four distinct audiences: Firstly, the Hamas captors themselves, who would learn that kidnapping Americans does not pay – and other adversaries and would-be abductors across the world would take note as well. Second, our close friends and allies would be encouraged by the display of U.S. resolve. Third, to countries across the region and around the world who are hedging their alignment between the United States on one hand and the burgeoning Russian-Iranian-Chinese axis on the other. Especially those key countries who are undecided in the face of growing skepticism about U.S. commitments. And finally, the hostages themselves, if only to keep the faith and hang on, and to any American citizen traveling around the globe, to simply know that your country will come for you if you are taken captive.

Economically and financially, a hostage rescue mission must be complemented by strong U.S. actions to conclusively discourage future hostage-taking. This can be done not only by freezing the assets of Hamas’s backers in Tehran, but also by targeting Iran and its own benefactors in Beijing and Moscow by enforcing already-on-the-books such as U.S. sanctions against Iranian oil shipments to China. To complement these financial ‘sticks,’ the U.S. can apply ‘carrots’ using economic levers to coax countries with leverage over Hamas into applying stronger pressure to release the remaining captives.

Another indispensable lever of U.S. national power that would need to be brought to bear for a successful hostage rescue mission is that of intelligence. All hostage rescue missions require comprehensive, precise, and timely intelligence to sufficiently reduce the risk to successful mission execution. This intelligence comes in many forms, including human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and more. Without exquisite tactical intelligence and impeccable operational security, decisionmakers cannot make informed judgments on a go or no-go call. Fortunately, the United States has by far the most robust and comprehensive intelligence collection capability in the world. Couple that with the intelligence of allies and partners like Israel, the United States will likely have a reasonably robust picture of the operational environment in Gaza.

To complement the hostage rescue mission, the United States could also bring legal instruments to bear to punish Hamas leaders for their participation in the October 7 attack and the kidnapping of hundreds of innocent people. This could include demanding that Hamas fugitives from U.S. justice, like Mousa Abu Marzook, who are living in other countries be extradited to the United States.

Finally, any successful U.S. hostages rescue mission in Gaza would, of course, require the involvement of the U.S. military. Not only does the United States have the finest military in the world, but it also has among the best-trained and most technically advanced hostage rescue force anywhere in the world.

U.S. hostage rescues have a track record of success, including not only the Operation Jaque, but also the U.S. rescue mission that freed an American taken hostage in a boat off the coast of Somalia in 2009 and a subsequent rescue mission which freed two Americans from Somali pirate captivity in 2012.

These highly publicized missions are likely not the only successful U.S. hostage rescue missions in recent history, as other successful rescue efforts may have taken place but kept in secrecy to protect intelligence sources and methods, as well as military tactics, techniques, and procedures.

In the final analysis, the President has the authority and obligation to rescues American captives whose lives are in peril. He has the tools of U.S. national power at his disposal to reduce the risk associated with launching a rescue operation. If the Israeli government acquiesced, and if risks to the hostages and rescue force were sufficiently mitigated to an acceptable, the U.S. commander-in-chief should absolutely authorize a rescue attempt.

LTG Ray Palumbo (U.S. Army, ret.) served 34 years in the US Army and was a participant in JINSA’s 2021 Generals and Admirals Program to Israel. He is a member of JINSA’s Gaza Assessment Policy Project and was Senior Mentor to its 2022 U.S. Military Leaders Program trip to Israel.

Dr. Jacob Olidort is Director of Research at the Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

14. Red Dragon Rising? Insights from a Decade of China Conflict Studies and Wargames

Long read.

Conclusions

The wargaming and other studies reviewed here show a positive general trend over time for China. However, this is not a constant trend, and early findings from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicate China might encounter more problems than previously thought.

In most cases, wargaming studies still show that a China and Taiwan conflict, featuring a United States intervention, would be close run and incredibly bloody for all sides. There would also be severe effects on the global economy. If the People’s Liberation Army replicates these studies, they should have some deterrent effect on China.

The outcome of these studies is very sensitive to small changes, and the war in Ukraine demonstrated new developments and uncertainty. Further analysis is needed. However, those running wargames possess limited resources, so studies that last longer and cover the interactions of more types of capabilities in detail would be difficult to conduct.

Instead, a greater range of smaller studies, which each interrogate more of the areas of uncertainty identified above, is recommended. These should include wargames on what follows an initial failed Chinese invasion, different Chinese military options (especially blockades), and the use of drones and capabilities like Starlink or OneWeb. These studies could then inform assumptions used by the larger, more comprehensive wargames that happen periodically.

These smaller studies should include the potential benefits and risks of including more allies, like Australia and the United Kingdom. While the first weeks are crucial to the outcome, prior experience indicated that the United Kingdom will likely have capable maritime and other assets deployed in the western Pacific at the onset,48 and the planned Global Response Force49 will give the United Kingdom further options to reinforce regional allies within that pivotal timeframe.

Red Dragon Rising? Insights from a Decade of China Conflict Studies and Wargames

cimsec.org · by Guest Author

By Robert Kitchen

Introduction

China and the United States see each other as the pacing challenge,1 with Taiwan the obvious potential flashpoint. Correspondingly, different governments and think tanks repeatedly featured the Taiwan conflict in wargames. However, results from these studies varied significantly, ranging from swift Taiwanese capitulation and pyrrhic United States victories to bloody Chinese failures. This review compares several studies, explaining differences in the objectives, outcomes, and implications. As such, it is the first review to collate findings from a broad sample of wargames held over eight years between 2016 and 2023. It identifies a clear, regressive trend in the United States and Taiwanese chances of victory over the period and crucial factors influencing the outcomes for the People’s Liberation Army, the Republic of China, the United States, and allied forces. It concludes with recommendations for future wargame iterations.

Scope

This review focuses on published United States military rather than economic or non-kinetic influence studies. These studies were unclassified or substantively reported in open sources and addressed a conflict in the Western Pacific, usually involving Taiwan and the United States. However, similar studies were undertaken in China, Japan, and Taiwan, which have established military wargaming capabilities.2 The United Kingdom also has wargaming and net assessment capabilities.3 While this paper looks at published studies, it also includes officially announced insights about classified ones.

For comparison purposes, this review groups studies into three discrete eras: before 2017, 2017 to before Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and those conducted afterward. The timeframes were chosen as they represent three distinct trends. Pre-2018, wargames tended to end favorably for the United States, Taiwan, and allies, albeit at great cost. Between 2018 and February 2022, outcomes grew increasingly pessimistic for the United States and Taiwan, with only one victory, four losses, and two stalemates. Finally, in the two games since February 22nd, 2022, the immediate insights from the larger Russian invasion of Ukraine have tilted the outcomes towards the defender.

Each era is divided into three sections. ‘Overview of studies’ briefly summarizes outcomes and recommendations. ‘Insights and analysis’ provide an overview of trends, differences, and future areas for study. ‘Conclusions’ provides a focus for future United Kingdom iterations.

Overview of studies

The studies table summarizes a range of twelve wargames across three distinct timeframes: three from pre-2018, seven from 2018 to February 2022, and two post-February 2022. Results are color-coded red when China can secure its objectives, yellow when objectives remain contested, and green when China cannot achieve its objectives against the Republic of China, the United States, and other opposition.

Table of studies and wargames.

Studies Before 2017

RAND war with China, 2016.4 This study concerns four general cases of the United States and China’s conventional conflict in the East Asia region, a brief or long duration, and severe versus limited. It examines how specific systems (i.e., aircraft, surface ships, submarines, missiles, command and control) compare against each other. In the 2015 war games, Chinese losses were greater than those of the United States; however, the United States’ losses could be much heavier in a 2025 war.

The report recommended the United States increase interoperability and planning with allies, in part to increase its deterrent posture but also because it recognized that existing weapon stockpiles were insufficient to sustain prolonged campaigns. RAND recommended that the United States improve its ability to sustain protracted conflict to bolster deterrence and invest in more survivable force platforms like submarines and counters for anti-access systems.

RAND Scorecard, 2017.5 This detailed study created a scorecard and periodically examined United States and Chinese military capabilities in ten operational areas. By the last iteration in 2017, the People’s Liberation Army was considered inferior to individual United States capabilities, but its proximity to operations mitigated shortfalls. Based upon then-current trajectories, the United States’ dominance progressively receded over the next fifteen years.

The report suggested that the United States procure bases to improve dispersed redundancy and increase the survivability of aircraft, submarines, and space assets. The report also recommended intensifying diplomatic efforts to secure access to Southeast Asian countries, prioritizing building strategic depth through alliances.

The China Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, 2017.6 Ian Easton’s book is still one of the best authorities on Taiwan’s military disposition. Many other studies cite its maps, especially vital beaches, and other assessments. Whilst not a net assessment, Easton lays out many building blocks for one. It also recounts the results of the Republic of China’s military wargames, which Taiwan could hold out in 2017 and 2018 simulations. The book uses primary sources to compellingly lay out the People’s Liberation Army and the Republic of China’s concept of operations, their assumptions, and the likely order of battle. It gives a good account of internal doubts within the People’s Liberation Army and the since lost bullishness of the Republic of China’s military. However, it is prescient regarding the trend in the military balance of power towards China.

The study’s recommendations advocate for the United States to support Taiwan. Still, it makes a compelling case that Taiwan’s position was defensible, and much could go wrong with an attempted invasion. Easton’s look at the captured lessons of the People’s Liberation Army indicates that chief of their concerns is the Republic of China’s long-range strike capabilities and projects to harden the Taiwanese islands, military facilities, and command and control capabilities. Therefore, long-range strike capabilities and infrastructure hardening need reinforcement. The book was relatively silent on preparations for operations other than the full-scale invasion of Taiwan. There were few, if any, lessons on countering People’s Liberation Army pressure campaigns through blockade, air incursions, or diplomatic isolation.

Studies from 2018 to pre-invasion of Ukraine

United States Marines wargame 2019.7 This United States Marine Corps wargame was set in Poland, South Korea, and Taiwan and forced the United States to react to simultaneous crises. Before the start of the game, the sides could invest in emergent capabilities such as artificial intelligence and quantum processing. The United States possessed insufficient forces and logistics to fight and win in all three conflicts simultaneously. Instead, the United States took a Europe-first approach, accepted risk regarding the Republic of China’s ground forces, and attempted to mitigate through naval and air assets. People’s Liberation Army forces were able to land in Taiwan but were unable to subdue the Republic of China and Japanese reinforcements. All theaters ended with local Russian or United States commanders seeking to employ nuclear weapons.

Reported classified Department of Defense (DOD) wargames, October 2020.8 One of the wargames of the series focused exclusively on the United States and People’s Liberation Army forces fighting over Taiwan. The United States Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented after the completion that the concentration of combat power for maximum efficiency and effect, and the United States military’s information dominance, is no longer guaranteed. After initial failures, the United States could reverse fortune by testing a new concept known as “expanded maneuver,” which involves the dispersal and disaggregation of combat power across all domains.9 The conclusion was the People’s Liberation Army benefited from extensive study of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures over the previous two decades and implemented changes that challenged the previous way of war. The Department of Defense is pushing the United States military to adopt the expanded maneuver concept by 2030.

RAND Corporation comments to the media in August and October 2020.10 A RAND Corporation representative asserted that, in wargames set in 2025 and beyond, the United States loses assets in theater very quickly and cannot project power into the battlespace to defeat an invasion. Using multiple airborne and amphibious assaults, the People’s Liberation Army could reinforce a successful lodgement before effective United States assistance arrived.

Another report notes the United States could improve its chances by relying on a new generation of long-range anti-ship missiles combined with space-based reconnaissance. Additionally, using artificial intelligence to locate enemy targets and unmanned undersea drones that can fire torpedoes at the People’s Liberation Army landing craft could further blunt an attack. These capabilities reportedly could be achieved with about five percent of the current Department of Defense’s budget.

Reported United States Air Force wargame, Autumn 2020.11 In this wargame, the United States Air Force repelled a Chinese invasion of Taiwan set in 2030. The Air Force succeeded by using drones as a sensing grid, cargo planes dropping guided munitions, and other novel technologies, but with a large loss of life and equipment. Taiwan also increased defense spending before the conflict, buying drones and electronic warfare equipment. This outcome marked an improvement to similar war games held in 2018 over the South China Sea and Taiwan in 2019. In both those wargames, it ended in catastrophic losses. United States improvements in 2020 effectively deterred the People’s Liberation Army player from launching an invasion. The United States Air Force reportedly needed more and newer tactical aircraft, greater numbers of drones and ‘loyal wingmen’ teamed with crewed aircraft, and more strategic bombers, tankers, and airlift to win a war after 2030.

Center for New American Security Slaughter in the East China Sea, 2020.12 This limited study explored China’s seizure of one of the Senkaku Islands and the Japanese efforts to reclaim them. The United States assisted Japan but with constrained rules of engagement. Both sides sought to contain the crisis, but the conflict escalated nevertheless, culminating with the United States and Japanese forces being unable to reclaim the islands.

Center for New American Security Poison Frog, 2021.13 This study explored the Chinese seizure of Taiwan’s outlying Pratas Islands, which China quickly seized. The United States and its allies found few ways to push China out, without using escalatory military options, while economic and information campaigns failed. Close cooperation between Taiwan, the United States, and Japan could isolate China but did not lead to a return to the status quo. The report recommended close cooperation, clear deterrence policies, and Japan’s involvement.

United States Army-backed wargame blog, 2021.14 This United States Army-supported article provides a detailed narrative generated through a commercially available wargame. Ultimately, Taiwanese forces surrendered within a month. The People’s Liberation Army was able to utilize its modern, flexible forces near Taiwan, while their anti-access, area denial capabilities created problems that the United States forces were unable to overcome.

Studies post the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine:

Center for New American Security Dangerous Straits, June 2022.15 This study is set in 2026 and conducted a strategic-operational war game over Taiwan. Despite the People’s Liberation Army’s objective to decapitate Taiwanese leadership and inhibit a United States response with preemptive strikes on Japan and Guam, it indicated no quick victory for either side. Neither side had the upper hand after the first week. The wargame showed that a People’s Liberation Army presence in northern Taiwan possessed very vulnerable lines of communication. It also highlighted rapid escalation, crossed red lines, attacks on the Chinese and United States homelands, and a demonstrative nuclear detonation.

The study recommended the Department of Defense invest in long-range precision-guided weapons, undersea capabilities, additional basing in the western Pacific, and joint planning with Japan and Australia. It also noted the requirement to plan for a protracted conflict, mitigate escalation risks, and support Taiwan’s military posture.

Center for Strategic International Studies The First Battle of the Next War, 2022.16 This study is an impressively detailed and wide-ranging assessment of a war game involving China, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. It examines conflict variations over twenty-four different iterations. It clearly details which factors increase or decrease Taiwan’s chances and is clear about assumptions and limitations. The study assessed that China was always able to get troops into Taiwan. People’s Liberation Army forces were so numerous and close that outright defeat at sea was impossible.

Conversely, the United States could not land any forces on Taiwan within the month the games were played. The studies found that the United States, Taiwanese, and Japanese forces prevailed if four key conditions held: Taiwan ground forces could hold out, Taiwan is properly supplied before a conflict, the United States could access bases in Japan, and the United States could rapidly strike the underway Chinese fleet. The study acknowledges that it is more optimistic regarding the chances for Taiwan and the United States, contrasting with some internal United States wargames (see above).

The study’s recommendations included clarifying war plans with Taiwan and Japan, expanding United States facilities near Taiwan, demonstrating a political willingness to incur heavy casualties, and preparing Taiwanese forces properly.

Insights and analysis

Trends over time. The reviewed wargame studies reveal a worsening trend for Taiwan and its defenders. The worrisome trend is especially pronounced for scenarios that take place in the period 2025-2030.17 Studies written before 2018 typically showed that the Republic of China and United States forces hold Taiwan at increasing cost. Studies after 2018 are more pessimistic, as the growing People’s Liberation Army capabilities and the inability of the United States to project sufficient power led to Taiwan’s defeat at worst or pyrrhic victories at best. However, this general trend is not uniform.18

The Russian invasion of Ukraine caused a reversal in this generally pessimistic trend. The latest studies reflect a greater uncertainty over the result of a Chinese invasion and the capabilities of its People’s Liberation Army. It became clearer that assessments need to model more factors, principally logistics, robust satellite-enabled communications, the introduction of greater numbers of uncrewed systems, and man-portable missiles. These factors all impeded Russia’s invasion. In recent studies, the changing character of warfare tended to favor a determined defender, which decreased China’s chances.

Whilst these newest studies are more optimistic for Taiwan, the identified general trend will worsen unless the United States enacts major improvements. Without massively increasing the number of missiles available and the ability to strike People’s Liberation Army transports, the Republic of China’s forces are overwhelmed. In most scenarios that assume the United States makes such changes, the coalition defeated a conventional amphibious invasion and maintained an autonomous and democratic Taiwan; however, no study resulted in the successful retaking of lost Taiwanese territory by allied forces. A successful defense of Taiwan would come at a high cost. Allied forces lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of service personnel while Taiwan’s economy is devastated. Such high losses would damage the United States’ global position for many years.19

Explaining differences between the studies. It is worth considering how these wargaming studies come to such a range of different results. Wargaming is a valuable tool for commanders, leaders, and managers. Well-executed wargames before and during hostilities delivered significant competitive advantages in numerous conflicts, although wargaming does not, and cannot, guarantee success.20 The United States, China, and Taiwan have all wargamed the issue of Taiwan extensively.21 But wargaming studies tend not to be done if the answer is self-evident and beyond doubt. For example, no wargame assumes Taiwanese forces are unwilling to fight as China could then accomplish its objectives quickly and consolidate control.

Therefore, distinct scenarios are used in the various studies above to seek insights in different situations. Conflicts may include various actors and involve basing from a range of countries. Involved parties would use different concepts of operations, like a deliberate full-scale invasion or limited attack on outlying islands, with different levels of strategic and tactical warning for defenders and reinforcers. One alternative approach involved letting a Chinese invasion run out to see how long Taiwan could hold on while assuming some best-case scenario conditions for the People’s Liberation Army. The scenario provided insight into the allowable delay for the United States to intervene before the Taiwanese capitulation. The answer was thirty-one days after the initial People’s Liberation Army landings.22

This review does not cover how to conduct a wargame. Conducting wargames is covered in places like the Ministry of Defense wargaming handbook and the methodology sections of some wargame studies.23 However, setting assumptions is critical to validation and fidelity.24 Many factors need to be assumed, whether significant, like which parties are involved, or insignificant, like the chances a missile can knock a ship out of action. But even a relatively simple assumption could be initially in error or become outdated during a conflict as sides adapt their tactics. For example, the effectiveness of depth charges in the Second World War25 or the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in the sensor-kill chain in Ukraine were instances where initial assumptions did align with reality.26

Unless bound by a common rulebook, studies will make different assumptions. These can account for variations in results. The First Battle of the Next War, 2022, specifically looks at how its study differs from classified Department of Defense wargames.27 It asserts differences come from rival values attributed to the probability of kill, different aims and objectives of the wargames, the focus on shorter time frames (when United States forces are less ready), and assuming Chinese capabilities are more potent for a worst-case scenario hedging effort. Differences are exacerbated by changes in force structure, capabilities, and the relative power balance between the People’s Liberation Army and its adversaries in proximity.

Besides tactical probability of kill metrics, assumptions need to be made about other factors. Some will be easier to make than others. For example, the order of battle of all sides is unlikely to change significantly in the short term. Still, the organizers also need to assume which forces would be saved for other contingency operations. For example, forces reserved by the United States for Europe or for China to commit to the Indian border. Weapon stockpiles, the will to fight, the effectiveness of forces, the concept of operations, allied support, availability of future weapon systems, strategic messaging, and tactical warnings must all be decided and agreed upon by the adjudicators and players. Moreover, as wargames look further into the future, more unknown variables come into play, all of which will affect the play’s fidelity and outcome.

Each of these factors and variables could prove pivotal in a closely balanced conflict, to say nothing of the usual frictions. Furthermore, any general conflict involving the United States and China would likely include all domains of warfare at a scale not seen since the mid-20th century, cover a vast area of the western Pacific, and comprise actors using a range of new and some unknown and classified capabilities. Therefore, modeling a future United States versus China conflict is, perhaps, wargaming’s most difficult challenge.

Sensitivity analysis: What factors increase the chance the United States, Taiwan, and allies will prevail?

“All models are wrong, but some are useful.” – Attributed to statistician George Box28

While many studies differ, combining their findings can give valuable insights into what factors may prove pivotal in a future conflict. The most compelling conclusions arise from sensitivity analysis, which attempts to understand how different assumptions affect the outcome.29 These studies’ usefulness comes from testing the effects of different assumptions, as they demonstrate what factors would most increase or decrease the United States and Taiwan’s chances of victory.

The Center for Strategic International Studies’ The First Battle of the Next War, 2022, is the single best example of the comparative analysis of sensitive variables and is worth looking at closely. The study ran twenty-five different games, testing several variables the study deemed most important.30 The Center of Strategic International Studies identifies four critical conditions for success: Taiwan’s people and military must effectively resist, Taiwan must have sufficient stockpiles at the start of the war, the United States must begin operations against China immediately, and the United States must be able to use its bases in Japan for combat operations.31 Without these conditions, allied missiles and United States submarines were insufficient to defeat an invasion.

The report discusses the effects of twenty-five variables. The most important variables benefitting the People’s Liberation Army invasion were an isolated and indecisive Taiwan, a neutral Japan, delayed entry of United States combat forces (as much as D+14), and few modern anti-ship cruise missiles available to counter-invasion forces. The most important factors that benefit Taiwan’s defense were the People’s Liberation Army not being as proficient in conducting amphibious operations or defending their ships from missiles, immediate combat operations from the Japanese Self Defence Forces, increased hardened aircraft shelters in Japan, and more airbases or airports to conduct operations from for the United States.

From reading the studies in this review, the author considers these variables the most likely to determine the outcome of a conflict involving China, Taiwan, and the United States. First and foremost, the role of Japan (and, to a lesser degree, other allies) will be fundamental to Taiwan’s survival for two reasons. First, it increases and disperses the number of bases the United States can operate from, and second, it increases the mass and number of allied forces opposing China. The availability of Japanese and other regional bases, like the Philippines, increases the survivability and ability to surge assets into the theater of operations. A few Chinese strikes could utterly disrupt United States operations with just Guam and the United States’ nearby aircraft carriers. Adding Japanese and possibly other allied forces to the defensive order of battle makes it easier to increase fire rates against Chinese aircraft, ships, and transports.

People’s Liberation Army Navy vulnerability, or the ability to absorb attrition, is the vital kinetic variable. The more long-range missiles the coalition possesses and can direct against People’s Liberation Army invasion elements, the greater Taiwan’s chances. “They need anti-ship cruise missiles, sea mines, mobile artillery, mobile air defenses, unmanned aerial vehicles… It comes down to sinking about 300 Chinese ships in about 48 hours”.32 However, projected production rates of missiles like the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LASRM) and maritime strike Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) are limited, and in many wargames, the allies quickly deplete these specific missiles. The time needed to transport these missiles to relevant bases or ships affects wargame outcomes. If Taiwan has access to significant stockpiles of material at the start of the conflict, especially missiles, this buys Taiwan more time to await United States intervention. Additionally, with China’s anti-access capabilities limiting the effect of allied short-range air attacks, submarines offer an effective way to attack Chinese amphibious shipping. If United States submarines can reliably enter, engage in, escape, rearm, and return to Chinese shipping channels, Chinese chances for success are significantly diminished.

In most wargames without external support, the Republic of China’s forces remain effective only for a few weeks. Delays in the response of the Taiwanese, United States, Japanese, and allied forces significantly increased China’s chances. Delaying factors include allied indecision and the success of Chinese deception activities. While strategic surprise may be difficult to obtain, tactical surprise, like mounting an assault from fake exercises, increases China’s chances.

Fundamentally, the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s success depends on two factors. First, China’s ability to project its anti-access capabilities further from its coast will make it increasingly difficult for the United States to deploy forces at sufficient ranges to affect the outcome of a conflict. The second factor is China’s ability to plan and execute an opposed amphibious assault. This is an important area of uncertainty identified in many studies where China’s inexperience could result in a disaster for them in numerous ways.33,34

Areas of most uncertainty that require further study

Wargaming on a Taiwan invasion inevitably has limitations. As noted earlier, the scope of this conflict could be vast. All operational domains and political, diplomatic, economic, and information effects are in play. Not all permutations of the assumptions nor the interdependent effects can be tested. For practical reasons, wargames tend to cover shorter periods than a conflict with the People’s Liberation Army might take. Furthermore, many developments in warfare were demonstrated in the Russia-Ukraine war, which wargames have only started to attempt to model.

Wargaming studies sometimes helpfully discuss what they do and do not model. For example, the RAND scorecard, which considers more aspects than most, does not consider ground combat or drones, and it does not model the effects of the threat of nuclear weapons.

At the strategic level, several variables have been marginalized or overlooked. Xi’s long rule and centralization of power follow the pattern of many other authoritarian leaders. A lack of robust internal challenge could lead to a greater chance of strategic misjudgments than wargames currently assume.35 One war game considered multiple crises simultaneously (Russia, China, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).36 The West’s rivals would likely seek to take advantage of crises if they could, either during or after a conflict. The effects of nuclear weapons deterrence were replicated by players imposing limits on themselves, like restricting attacks against mainland Chinese assets,37 but this was rare. None of the other studies directly calculated the effect of the use of nuclear weapons, and their use was considered beyond the scope. Xi and the People’s Liberation Army likely took note of the effects of Russia’s nuclear threats against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

While some wargames model how long it takes various actors to engage in conflict, few have enough players to test Chinese efforts to break up coalitions and their impact on a conflict. The permutations of those alliances and coalitions are also worthy of study; the United States, Japan, and Taiwan are well covered but are not the only variations. With enough notice and favorable dispositions, other capable actors could become directly involved, like forward-deployed submarines from allies. China fears a multi-front war, so more consideration to Indian contingencies could be given. The role of other regional actors in South and South East Asia should be considered as active participants or potential threats that China needs to reserve forces to counter. Further, the will to fight for Taiwan’s population (and China’s effectiveness in undermining it) beyond its leadership has rarely been considered in depth.38 Still, it would be a vital contributor to the assessment. Most studies assume attacks would be limited or not occur in the United States and Chinese homelands. Some do,39 but more study is warranted on how such attacks could escalate or be deterred.

Similarly, the role of People’s Liberation Army forces based outside China is not covered. The People’s Liberation Army currently has limited self-defense capabilities, and China’s main effort will be concentrated on Taiwan. But, in later time periods, People’s Liberation Army bases worldwide could complicate allied intervention.40 As many studies find the most critical period is relatively short, studies on the effectiveness of sanctions and blockades are rare. Studies that look at economic sanctions tend not to consider military action and vice versa.41 Despite numerous predictions of long-duration conflict, most wargames consider a shorter, tightly bound period. Should China fail to take Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party would be unwilling to give up its claim and accept the outcome. What China would do next is an important area for study.42 Barring state or party collapse, China would seek to rearm and re-contest the war. After and even during a period of conflict, the need to replenish stockpiles and material will be acute and could be wargamed.

Most studies assume China will deliberately mobilize military and civilian assets, like civilian sealift, that would be readily noticed unambiguously by the Taiwanese and other nations. China has a clear incentive to reduce the predictability of its efforts by staging more realistic-looking exercises to gain tactical, if not strategic, surprise. China’s normalization of increased activities, exercises, and incursions near Taiwan complicates allied decision-making.43 Furthermore, the invasion of Ukraine showed that not all allies perceived the warning signs and came to different conclusions regarding Russia’s intent.44 Some studies examined sensitivity analysis in the competing doctrines of the People’s Liberation Army and the Republic of China’s forces. However, the effects of the operational inexperience of the People’s Liberation Army and Taiwan should be better tested, especially on critical amphibious landings. Any conflict is unlikely to follow established and conditioned doctrine dogmatically. Besides mobilizing for a full-scale invasion, China could choose different coercive measures against Taiwan, including island seizures (salami slicing),45 maritime or air blockade, missile bombardment to destroy leadership or undermine will, or a surprise air assault.46 The United States’ concepts of operations will also change.47 Fighting in and around Ukraine has shown a significant increase in the use of drones for direct attacks and tactical reconnaissance. Wargames have not caught up with the increasing number and use of drones on battlefields, including at sea. While some studies note the growing role of larger drones in the air and maritime order of battles, more assessment of the role of drones in direct attacks and tactical reconnaissance, especially at long distances over the sea, will be needed. The robustness of drone data in electronic warfare must be examined. Reliable and resilient communication networks are required. China could quickly degrade Taiwanese command and control. However, China warily noted Ukraine’s ability to utilize massive proliferated low-earth orbit satellite constellations, like Starlink or OneWeb. Chinese losses would increase if Taiwan’s communications and computing networks were more robust.

United Kingdom (U.K.) military and civilian personnel from the Ministry of Defense (MoD) conducted a wargame on the High North as part of DSTL’s inaugural Influence Wargaming Conference on July 19th, 2021. With the Indo-Pacific and Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) of increasing importance to the U.K., the time is right for MoD to build on previous Taiwan/South China Sea wargames to develop its awareness and contingencies. Crown Copyright. Photographer: SAC Charlotte Hopkins, JIAG.

Conclusions

The wargaming and other studies reviewed here show a positive general trend over time for China. However, this is not a constant trend, and early findings from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicate China might encounter more problems than previously thought.

In most cases, wargaming studies still show that a China and Taiwan conflict, featuring a United States intervention, would be close run and incredibly bloody for all sides. There would also be severe effects on the global economy. If the People’s Liberation Army replicates these studies, they should have some deterrent effect on China.

The outcome of these studies is very sensitive to small changes, and the war in Ukraine demonstrated new developments and uncertainty. Further analysis is needed. However, those running wargames possess limited resources, so studies that last longer and cover the interactions of more types of capabilities in detail would be difficult to conduct.

Instead, a greater range of smaller studies, which each interrogate more of the areas of uncertainty identified above, is recommended. These should include wargames on what follows an initial failed Chinese invasion, different Chinese military options (especially blockades), and the use of drones and capabilities like Starlink or OneWeb. These studies could then inform assumptions used by the larger, more comprehensive wargames that happen periodically.

These smaller studies should include the potential benefits and risks of including more allies, like Australia and the United Kingdom. While the first weeks are crucial to the outcome, prior experience indicated that the United Kingdom will likely have capable maritime and other assets deployed in the western Pacific at the onset,48 and the planned Global Response Force49 will give the United Kingdom further options to reinforce regional allies within that pivotal timeframe.

Robert Kitchen is a First Sea Lord Fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre. He is also a U.K. Ministry of Defence Civil Servant with experience in U.K. Indo-Pacific policy and defense engagement. These views are his alone and do not represent those of the U.K. Ministry of Defence, Royal Navy Strategic Studies Center, or any other institution.

Endnotes

1. Jim Garamone, “Defense Official Says Indo-Pacific Is the Priority Theater; China Is DOD’s Pacing Challenge,” United States Department of Defense, March 9th, 2022. (Accessed August 23, 2023). https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2961183/defense-official-says-indo-pacific-is-the-priority-theater-china-is-dods-pacing/

2. For example, see: Tso-Juei Hei, “Taiwan Conducts Han Kuang 2022 Large-Scale Exercise,” Naval News, July 29th, 2022. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/07/taiwan-conducts-han-kuang-2022-large-scale-exercise/; & Joseph Yeh, “DEFENSE/Taiwan’s Han Kuang exercises to begin Monday with tabletop wargames,” Focus Taiwan, May 14th, 2023. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202305140007 & Elsa B Kania & Ian Burns McCaslin. “Learning Warfare from the Laboratory – China’s Progression in Wargaming and Opposing Force Training,” Institute for the Study of War, September, 2021. (Accessed, August 23rd, 2022). https://www.understandingwar.org/report/learning-warfare-laboratory-china%E2%80%99s-progression-wargaming-and-opposing-force-training. For a quick and easy breakdown of Taiwan’s Han Kuang exercises from 2000 – 2020, see Wikipedia entry: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Han_Kuang_Exercise#2020.

3. “Defence Wargaming Centre,” UK Ministry of Defence, April 23th, 2023. (Accessed August 23, 2023). https://www.gov.uk/guidance/defence-wargaming-centre; Press Release: “Announcement of new Director appointed to the Secretary of State’s Office for Net Assessment and Challenge (SONAC),” U.K. Ministry of Defence, May 6th, 2022. (Accessed August 23rd, 202). https://www.gov.uk/government/news/announcement-of-new-director-appointed-to-the-secretary-of-states-office-for-net-assessment-and-challenge-sonac

4. David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, & Cristina L. Garafola. “War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable,” RAND Corporation, 2016. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html

5. Eric Heginbotham, et al. “The United States-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017,” RAND Corporation, 2015. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html

6. Ian Easton. “The China Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia,” Project 2049 Institute, 2017.

7. James Lacey. “How does the next Great Power conflict play out? Lessons from a wargame,” War on the Rocks, April 22nd, 2019. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023).https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/how-does-the-next-great-power-conflict-play-out-lessons-from-a-wargame/.

8. Kyle Mizokami. “The United States Military ‘Failed Miserably’ in a Fake Battle Over Taiwan,” Popular Mechanics, August 2nd, 2021. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a37158827/us-military-failed-miserably-in-taiwan-invasion-wargame/.

9. David Vergun. “DOD Focuses on Aspirational Challenges in Future Warfighting,” United States Department of Defense, July 26th, 2021. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2707633/dod-focuses-on-aspirational-challenges-in-future-warfighting/; & Brett Tingley. “Joint Chiefs Seek A New Warfighting Paradigm After Devastating Losses In Classified Wargames,” The Drive, July 27th, 2021. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/41712/joint-chiefs-seek-a-new-warfighting-paradigm-after-devastating-losses-in-classified-wargames.

10. “Defending Taiwan is growing costlier and deadlier,” The Economist, October 8th, 2020. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023. https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/10/08/defending-taiwan-is-growing-costlier-and-deadlier; & Richard Bernstein. “The Scary War Game Over Taiwan That the United States Loses Again and Again,” RealClear Investigations (August 17, 2020). Accessed August 23, 2023:

https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2020/08/17/the_scary_war_game_over_taiwan_that_the_us_loses_again_and_again_124836.html.

11. Valerie Insinna. “A United States Air Force war game shows what the service needs to hold off — or win against — China in 2030,” DefenseNews, April 12th, 2021. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.defensenews.com/training-sim/2021/04/12/a-us-air-force-war-game-shows-what-the-service-needs-to-hold-off-or-win-against-china-in-2030/.

12. Chris Dougherty, Susanna V. Blume, Becca Wasser, and Dr. ED McGrady. “Slaughter in the East China Sea’, Center for a New American Security, August 7th, 2020. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.cnas.org/press/in-the-news/slaughter-in-the-east-china-sea. Original publication: Michael Peck. “Slauther in the East China Sea,” Foreign Policy,August 7th, 2020. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/07/slaughter-in-the-east-china-sea/.

13. Chris Dougherty, Jennie Matuschak and Ripley Hunter. “The Poison Frog Strategy,” Center for a New American Security, October 26th, 2021. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-poison-frog-strategy.

14. Ian Sullivan. “337: ‘No Option is Excluded’ — Using Wargaming to Envision a Chinese Assault on Taiwan,” Mad Scientist Laboratory, July 1st, 2021. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/337-no-option-is-excluded-using-wargaming-to-envision-a-chinese-assault-on-taiwan/

15. Stacie Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser and Chris Dougherty. “Dangerous Straits: Wargaming a Future Conflict over Taiwan,” Center for a New American Security, June 15th, 2022. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/dangerous-straits-wargaming-a-future-conflict-over-taiwans

16. Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, & Eric Heginbotham.”‘The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 9th, 2023. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan

17. See “Defending Taiwan is growing costlier and deadlier,” The Economist, October 8th, 2020; & Richard Bernstein, Op Cit.

18. Valerie Insinna, Op Cit.

19. Mercy A. Kuo & Mark Cancian. ”Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan: ‘Victory Is Not Enough,”, The Diplomat, January 31st, 2023. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/wargaming-a-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan-victory-is-not-enough/

20. Developments Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). MOD Wargaming Handbook, UK Ministry of Defence, August, 2017. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/641040/doctrine_uk_wargaming_handbook.pdf. For a view of the effectiveness of wargames during war, see Simon Parkin. “A Game of Birds and Wolves: The Secret Game that Won the War,” Sceptre: London, 2019. Parkin explores the work of the Western Approaches Tactical Unit; a small team of Royal Navy Reserve and Women’s Royal Navy Service personnel credited with devising the tactics, techniques, and procedures for anti-submarine operations during the Battle of the Atlantic.

21. Elsa B. Kania & Ian Burns McCaslin, Op Cit.

22. Max Stewart. “Island Blitz: A campaign analysis of a Taiwan takeover by the People’s Liberation Army,” Center for International Maritime Security, June 13th, 2023. https://cimsec.org/island-blitz-a-campaign-analysis-of-a-taiwan-takeover-by-the-pla/

23. See Chapter 2, MoD Wargaming Handbook, Op Cit.; & Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, & Eric Heginbotham, Op Cit.

24. Elizabeth Bartels. ”Getting the Most out of your Wargame: Practical Advice for Decision Makers,” War on the Rocks, November 19th, 2019. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/getting-the-most-out-of-your-wargame-practical-advice-for-decision-makers/.

25. Raymond H. Milkman. “Operations Research in World War II,” Proceedings, Vol 94/5/783, United States Naval Institute, May 1968. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1968/may/operations-research-world-war-ii.

26. David Hambling. “How Drones Are Making Ukrainian Artillery Lethally Accurate,” Forbes, May 12th, 2022. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2022/05/12/drones-give-ukrainian-artillery-lethal-accuracy/

27. Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, & Eric Heginbotham. Op Cit. p102.

28. George E. P. Box. “Science and Statistics,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 71 (356), 1976: 791-799. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080%2F01621459.1976.10480949.

29. Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, & Eric Heginbotham. Op Cit: 36.

30. See Annex A, Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. Op Cit.

31. Mercy A. Kuo & Mark Cancian. Op Cit.

32. Richard Bernstein. Op Cit.

33. Eric Heginbotham, et al. Op Cit: 21.

34. Chapters 4 and 5 in Ian Easton. Op Cit.

35. Hal Brands. “Putin Has Fallen Victim to the Dictator’s Disease,” American Enterprise Institute, April 7th, 2022. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.aei.org/op-eds/putin-has-fallen-victim-to-the-dictators-disease/.

36. James Lacey. Op Cit.

37. Stacie Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser & Chris Dougherty. Op Cit.

38. The Economist. Op Cit.

39. Stacie Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser and Chris Dougherty. Op Cit.

40. Cristina L. Garafola, Stephen Watts, Kristin J. Leuschner. “China’s Global Basing Ambitions: Defense Implications for United States,’ RAND Corporation, 2022. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1496-1.html.

41. Charlie Vest and Agatha Kratz. “Sanctioning China in a Taiwan crisis: Scenarios and risks,” Atlantic Council, June 21st, 2023. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/sanctioning-china-in-a-taiwan-crisis-scenarios-and-risks/.

42. E.g. see Executive Summary in Stacie Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser & Chris Dougherty. Op Cit.

43. Bonny Lin & Joel Wuthnow. “Pushing Back Against China’s New Normal in the Taiwan Strait,” War On The Rocks, August 16th, 2022. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023).https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/pushing-back-against-chinas-new-normal-in-the-taiwan-strait/

44. Patrick Wintour. “Why are Germany and France at odds with the Anglosphere over how to handle Russia?” The Guardian, January 26th, 2022. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/26/nato-allies-policy-russia-ukraine-analysis

45. Chris Dougherty, Jennie Matuschak & Ripley Hunter. Op Cit.

46. The Economist. Op Cit; & David Lague & Maryanne Murray. “T-Day:The Battle for Taiwan,” Reuters Investigates, November 5th, 2021. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-wargames/

47. Valerie Insinna. Op Cit.

48. Prime Minister’s Office. “Fact sheet: Trilateral Australia-UK-United States Partnership on Nuclear-Powered Submarines,” U.K. Government, March 13th, 2023. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus-13-march-2023/fact-sheet-trilateral-australia-uk-us-partnership-on-nuclear-powered-submarines; & Press Release: “H.M.S. Daring deployment to boost UK response to Philippines typhoon,” U.K. Ministry of Defense, November 12th, 2013. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hms-daring-deployment-to-boost-uk-response-to-philippines-typhoon

49. U.K. Ministry of Defense. “Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world,” HH Associates, 2023. (Accessed August 23rd, 2023). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171269/Defence_Command_Paper_2023_Defence_s_response_to_a_more_contested_and_volatile_world.pdf

Featured Image: Fighter jets attached to a brigade of the PLA Air Force Xi’an Flying College taxi on the runway in an Elephant Walk formation before taking off for a flight training exercise in early February 2024. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Cui Baoliang)

cimsec.org · by Guest Author

15. Myanmar Generals' nuclear dreams are Asian crime bosses’ hope to defend their last citadel

In 2011 in Kunming, China, I ran into 15 Koreans from the north waiting for a flight to Burma. I tried to chat them up but they were not interested in talking to me so I took their photos and waved goodbye to each one as they boarded their plane to Burma.

Excerpts:

Evidence began to emerge, around 2008, that the Generals ruling Myanmar, thought nuclear weapons might be needed to guarantee the state’s survival. Investigators in Japan discovered that North Korean businessman Li Gyeong Ho had evaded export controls to supply a magnetometer and cylindrical grinders to Myanmar. The equipment had applications in diverse fields but could have been used in missile control systems and uranium-enrichment centrifuges.

Two defectors interviewed by scholar David Ball in 2009 revealed the existence of two uranium-mining facilities at Thabeikkyin as well as a research facility and dedicated military support unit. The defectors claimed that the military was putting in place the elements of a full-scale nuclear weapons programme, using technologies from North Korea and Russia. Evidence in support of their claims proved thin, but alarms began to sound in world capitals.

...

Following the Second World War, scholar Eiko Maruko writes, the Yakuza worked with the Japanese government and the CIA to combat trade unions and the Left. The crime cartel—whose membership is estimated to have swelled to over 1,80,000 in the grim, post-Second World War years—was allowed to run Tokyo’s red-light district, extort money from businesses and extensively traffic methamphetamines.

The Yakuza soon expanded region-wide. In 1990, more than 200 yakuza and associates were believed to be active in Thailand, Kaplan notes, with interests in activities from drug trafficking to property and prostitution. The Yakuza has also been involved in customised trafficking for élite Asians, ranging from lemurs to endangered poisonous snakes.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, mafia organisations from Russia—collectively known as The Brotherhood—also embedded themselves in Southeast Asia. Ties with criminal groups in Siberia were established when Shanghai received large numbers of refugees from the Soviets in 1917-1919, some of them so-called “taxi girls” or upmarket sex workers. The Russian mafia is now deeply embedded in heroin trafficking out of Thailand as well as sex work and money laundering.

Macau also became an important centre for the cartels. Led by Triad-linked tycoon Stanley Ho, the gambling industry in Macau grew steadily after 1961, catering to affluent ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong and the wider diaspora. Though China has cracked down on illegal gambling, underground banking, and money laundering, former police officer Martin Pubrick writes, the island’s casinos continue to have significant Triad influence.

For the most part, though, the cartels have lost the patronage and political influence that helped build their empires: A world made up of modern nation-states does not need gangs to keep order. The nuclear dreams of Myanmar’s Generals might be Asian crime bosses’ last hope for a haven where they might escape Huang’s miserable end.

Myanmar Generals' nuclear dreams are Asian crime bosses’ hope to defend their last citadel

theprint.in · by Praveen Swami · February 25, 2024

The case of nuclear trafficking, though, isn’t just about generals and geopolitics. It is entwined with the story of centuries-old criminal brotherhoods and clans in Southeast Asia, who forged empires in the crucible of the colonial era using drugs, guns, sex, and political power.

The empire’s criminals

The foundations of the Great World had been laid two centuries before Sternberg’s visit. Through the 18th century, as British demand for tea and silk rose, every ship that sailed from India to Guangzhou carried silver bullion. Early in the next century, though, there was a shortage of silver. The East India Company needed a product to pay for its purchases. The answer was found in India-grown opium. Faced with a devastating addiction crisis, the Chinese sought to shut down the rising tide of opium—but were defeated in the First Opium War of 1842.

Liberal politician William Gladstone, later to become Prime Minister, assailed his nation for forcing China to accept the flow of opium: “A war more calculated to cover this country with permanent disgrace, I do not know.”

Tracing their roots to the Heaven and Earth Society, an order of Shaolin monks and martial arts masters whom legend holds fought off barbarian invaders, the Triad criminal brotherhoods thrived in the chaos unleashed after the Opium Wars. Engaged in rural banditry and rebellion, the Triads were soon recruited to help prop up imperial rule in Shanghai. In return for the toleration of their heroin production, gambling and sex work operations, they ensured violence stayed within manageable limits.

Lintner shows the deal built a Shanghai where “sin, crime, politics and business coexisted as a new system of government”. The city’s Green Gang, for example, served as enforcers for stretched colonial police. French police, scholar Lynn Pan observes, “recognised the world of Shanghai for what it was, a jungle of bums, adventurers, opportunists, and swindlers”. “To the French, there were worse sins to a police force than having as its Chinese head a man who, by virtue of his influence in the underworld, kept the level of crime from brimming over.”

The Green Gang and other Triads also played a central role in propping up General Chiang’s military regime, with Green Gang crime boss Du ‘Snake Eyes’ Yuesheng even taking charge of his intelligence services.

The narco-state in Burma

Following the communist revolution, the cartels evicted from Shanghai reestablished themselves across China’s southern border, helped by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Guomindang military commanders, operating along with local ethnic-Chinese warlords, funded their operations by trafficking opium. Figures like Olive Lang—a convent school-educated girl from Lashio, who went on to command her own militia—pioneered a chain of opium laboratories and trucking lines linking Burma (now Myanmar) with markets worldwide.

As they battled multiple ethnic insurgencies, the country’s Generals struck deals with warlords like Lang, giving protection to their opium operations in return for ending hostilities. Funds from the warlords flowed back too to the Generals and the élite around them. A narco-state had begun to form, turning Myanmar into the world’s largest producer of opium.

Evidence began to emerge, around 2008, that the Generals ruling Myanmar, thought nuclear weapons might be needed to guarantee the state’s survival. Investigators in Japan discovered that North Korean businessman Li Gyeong Ho had evaded export controls to supply a magnetometer and cylindrical grinders to Myanmar. The equipment had applications in diverse fields but could have been used in missile control systems and uranium-enrichment centrifuges.

Two defectors interviewed by scholar David Ball in 2009 revealed the existence of two uranium-mining facilities at Thabeikkyin as well as a research facility and dedicated military support unit. The defectors claimed that the military was putting in place the elements of a full-scale nuclear weapons programme, using technologies from North Korea and Russia. Evidence in support of their claims proved thin, but alarms began to sound in world capitals.

Following the election of a democratic government in 2012, Myanmar seemed to roll back its nuclear ambitions. In 2023, though, Burma and Russia’s state-owned Rosatom, signed an agreement to build a small, modular reactor. The reactor wouldn’t, in itself, produce enough material for a nuclear weapon. There’s no clear answer, though, on why a country mired in a crippling financial crisis is investing resources in a nuclear-energy programme when it has abundant coal and hydroelectric resources.

The Yakuza uranium-export plot isn’t evidence that a nuclear weapons programme is underway. There are more disturbing questions, though: Who held the stockpile of 2,000 kilograms of Thorium-232 and more than 100 kilograms of Uranium-308 that Ebisawa offered to sell? Where did he source the sample of weapons-grade Plutonium he supplied to undercover United States agents, posing as Iranian buyers? How did an insurgent group obtain access to this stockpile, which would take the resources of a state to maintain safely?

The globalisation of cartels

Late in 1953, the elderly man who’d spent his last years hunched over his broomstick, sweeping up the streets outside the Great World, finally passed away. For decades, that sweeper, Huang ‘Bigshot’ Jinrong, had run the Great World as well as a string of other gambling dens and brothels. As a leader of the Green Gang and the affiliated Big Eight cartel—and as a police chief of the French colonial section of the city—he’d battled the communists, breaking up trade unions, beating up protestors and arresting radicals.

The People’s Republic, which took power in 1949, Lintner writes, chose to punish Huang with humiliation, instead of a bullet through the head. Even as Huang’s life ended, though, the networks he ran were putting down new roots.

Thailand, from where Ebisawa trafficked narcotics shipped from Burma, emerged as the hub for the Southeast Asian cartels from the 1950s. Investigative journalist David Kaplan points to studies estimating that gambling, drugs, arms trafficking, prostitution, people trafficking, and diesel smuggling generated $8-13 billion, or up to 13 per cent of the country’s Gross National Product in 1998.

Following the Second World War, scholar Eiko Maruko writes, the Yakuza worked with the Japanese government and the CIA to combat trade unions and the Left. The crime cartel—whose membership is estimated to have swelled to over 1,80,000 in the grim, post-Second World War years—was allowed to run Tokyo’s red-light district, extort money from businesses and extensively traffic methamphetamines.

The Yakuza soon expanded region-wide. In 1990, more than 200 yakuza and associates were believed to be active in Thailand, Kaplan notes, with interests in activities from drug trafficking to property and prostitution. The Yakuza has also been involved in customised trafficking for élite Asians, ranging from lemurs to endangered poisonous snakes.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, mafia organisations from Russia—collectively known as The Brotherhood—also embedded themselves in Southeast Asia. Ties with criminal groups in Siberia were established when Shanghai received large numbers of refugees from the Soviets in 1917-1919, some of them so-called “taxi girls” or upmarket sex workers. The Russian mafia is now deeply embedded in heroin trafficking out of Thailand as well as sex work and money laundering.

Macau also became an important centre for the cartels. Led by Triad-linked tycoon Stanley Ho, the gambling industry in Macau grew steadily after 1961, catering to affluent ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong and the wider diaspora. Though China has cracked down on illegal gambling, underground banking, and money laundering, former police officer Martin Pubrick writes, the island’s casinos continue to have significant Triad influence.

For the most part, though, the cartels have lost the patronage and political influence that helped build their empires: A world made up of modern nation-states does not need gangs to keep order. The nuclear dreams of Myanmar’s Generals might be Asian crime bosses’ last hope for a haven where they might escape Huang’s miserable end.

Praveen Swami is contributing editor at ThePrint. He tweets @praveenswami. Views are personal.

(Edited by Humra Laeeq)

theprint.in · by Praveen Swami · February 25, 2024

16. Retired Air Force general walks red carpet as host of ‘Defending Japan’ on History Channel

Note also, the President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, Hee Eun Kim (my boss), also participated in this event.

Retired Air Force general walks red carpet as host of ‘Defending Japan’ on History Channel

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · February 28, 2024

Retired Air Force general Jerry Martinez speaks about his new show, "Defending Japan," during a screening at the New Sanno Hotel in Tokyo, Tuesday, Feb. 27, 2024. (Akifumi Ishikawa/Stars and Stripes)

TOKYO — A former commander of U.S. Forces Japan has a new gig as host of a History Channel program about the defense of America’s most powerful Indo-Pacific ally.

Jerry Martinez retired from the Air Force as a lieutenant general in February 2019 after a 33-year career that included a stint at the helm of USFJ in western Tokyo. He walked the red carpet Tuesday evening at the New Sanno Hotel to promote his new show: “Defending Japan.”

“We have to look at who Japan’s neighbors are — China, Russia and North Korea,” he told Stars and Stripes at the event. “There’s no other country in the world that has three neighbors right on their borders like that. This is a tough neighborhood.”

Retired Air Force general Jerry Martinez, second from right, attends a screening of his new show, "Defending Japan," at the New Sanno Hotel in Tokyo, Tuesday, Feb. 27, 2024. (Akifumi Ishikawa/Stars and Stripes)

Clips from the show, which kicked off its second season in December, played on big screens inside the hotel’s ballroom. Troops emerged from helicopters, fighter jets roared and missiles blasted skyward on screen while entertainment and defense industry insiders mingled over a buffet and drinks.

The show highlights the role played by U.S. and Japanese military personnel, their equipment, the defense industry, the Japanese government and its friends and allies as they work to secure the country from attack, Martinez said.

His involvement with “Defending Japan” started with an on-camera interview for the show’s first season while he was still with the Air Force. In 2019, he spoke at an award ceremony for the show in Hollywood. That led to an offer to host the second season.

The show includes scenes of Martinez walking the streets of Tokyo and talking about security challenges that Japan faces. Future episodes will involve visits to U.S. military bases and talking to personnel about the mission, he said.

“Defending Japan” is the brainchild of writer-director Dan Smith, a retired Air Force public affairs officer who has also worked as a journalist in Japan and in the United States. (Akifumi Ishikawa/Stars and Stripes)

“Defending Japan” is the brainchild of writer-director Dan Smith, a retired Air Force public affairs officer who has also worked as a journalist in Japan and in the United States.

The most memorable part of the series has been seeing other people’s reaction to the military and feedback from viewers, he said at the red carpet event.

The program’s makers have visited most of the U.S. military installations in Japan, other than Sasebo Naval Base. They’ve also been to numerous Japanese bases, Smith said.

They’ve spoken to U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines and Japanese troops and filmed during annual exercises in Japan such as Yama Sakura and Orient Shield and at the Cope North drills on Guam, he said.

They’ve also flown on all kinds of military aircraft from Marine Corps MV-22 Ospreys to Air Force C-130J Super Hercules and spent time on the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier and Japan’s JS Izumo helicopter destroyer, Smith said.

The show’s first season, which debuted in 2019, is available on streaming services such as Amazon, Hulu and U-Next.

"Defending Japan" co-writer John Flanagan speaks about the show during an event at the New Sanno Hotel in Tokyo, Tuesday, Feb. 27, 2024. (Akifumi Ishikawa/Stars and Stripes)

The new season is screening on History Channel Japan and will be available on streaming services in summer, said John Flanagan, who cowrote the series with Smith.

“We wanted to cover the serious security threats in a very factual way with no bias,” he said.

Japan’s security situation has become more severe since the first series, which was filmed before the coronavirus pandemic and the war in Ukraine, Flanagan said.

“China is more aggressive, and Japan has more allies now,” he said.

The most memorable part of the series so far involved three days of filming on the USS Ronald Reagan during a patrol in the Philippine Sea, he said.

“We saw just how massive and powerful that whole operation was,” he said.

“Defending Japan” isn’t only about military hardware, Flanagan added.

“We are highlighting the people.”

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · February 28, 2024

17. SOCOM grants contract for new jammer-proof BlackWave radio system

It is amazing what we learn from contract information.

SOCOM grants contract for new jammer-proof BlackWave radio system

The war in Ukraine has shown what the modern battlefield looks like, and the U.S. military is taking notes.

BY JOSHUA SKOVLUND | PUBLISHED FEB 28, 2024 9:01 AM EST

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · February 28, 2024

PDW, a defense contracting company dedicated to drone technology, was awarded a $6.9 million contract from the U.S. Special Operations Forces Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics office to deliver BlackWave, a next-generation radio system designed to function in congested and contested radio frequency environments.

The war in Ukraine has shown what the modern battlefield looks like, and the U.S. military is taking notes. Small unmanned drones have wreaked havoc on entrenched battlefields, and radio wave jammers are causing technological failures in critical systems.

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According to PDW, BlackWave is a secure digital link that can function in jammed and congested radio frequency environments. It passed the testing and challenges of the Joint Vulnerability Assessment Branch, called the Cyber Vulnerability Assessment, which is required for the BlackWave to be fielded by American forces.

“We believe BlackWave will be a game changer that contributes to a new era in radio development for American defense and small robotics,” said Trevor Smith, PDW’s CSO, in a statement provided to Task and Purpose.

Small drones on kamikaze missions have been a major concern since Russia invaded Ukraine. That’s led to a race to combat that threat using drone guns that use focused radio waves that jam a wide array of frequencies. The tech is being used on both sides, often making the difference between life and death for troops on the ground.

As the brutal war has trudged into its second year, Ukraine and Russia are both working toward solutions to make their drone warfare invincible to any sort of jamming. According to EurAsian Times, the Russians have acquired that capability.

Though America isn’t involved in direct combat in Ukraine, the U.S. military has been learning from the conflict and implementing training and now joins the jammer-proof drone and communications technology race.

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Joshua Skovlund

Joshua Skovlund is a staff writer for Task & Purpose and a former U.S. Army forward observer. He has been covering the military, veterans, and first responders for over three years, reporting on assignment from Ukraine during the opening salvo of the Russian invasion, multinational military exercises in Germany, and during the 2020 civil unrest in Minneapolis. His previous bylines include Coffee or Die Magazine and Outdoor Life. Contact the author here.

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · February 28, 2024

18. Sweden charges a man for mapping military installations

The old method of "Charlie" [acing off the base camp to direct mortar fire on the base camp in Vietnam.

Sweden charges a man for mapping military installations

https://apnews.com/article/sweden-military-installations-mapping-edddf6cfb39f0a5420bb742bf9735e50?utm

Updated 6:39 AM EST, February 28, 2024

STOCKHOLM (AP) — A man who allegedly mapped military installations in Sweden was charged Wednesday with unauthorized possession of secret information.

Prosecutor Mats Ljungqvist said the 66 year-old man, who was not identified, had been gathering information for “a long time” and said it seemed that he had “a systematic approach” to mapping the installations, adding it appears “almost professional.”

“It involves a large number of facilities that are important for Sweden’s ability to defend the country in the event of war. The disclosure of information can mean but for the security of the kingdom,” Ljungqvist said in a statement.

Last year, two people had been charged with the same offense. A fourth person was convicted and sentenced to eight months in prison in December.

Sweden is in the brink of joining NATO. On Monday, Hungary’s parliament ratified Sweden’s bid to join the alliance, ending more than 18 months of delays that frustrated the bloc as it sought to expand in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine.

19. Train, Harden, Sustain: Maintaining the Army’s Lethality in the Nuclear Shadow

Conclusion:

The return of nuclear weapons as a potential tool for warfare means the Army should train to operate in a nuclear environment. Russia’s willingness to threaten nuclear escalation during the war in Ukraine, coupled with NATO’s continued reliance on the Army’s brigade combat teams on its eastern front, suggests these troops may face the stark reality of combat operations in a nuclear setting. While the Army sidelined nuclear combat training following the Cold War, the force can quickly regain the initiative by overhauling its doctrine, revisiting hardening standards, and empowering leaders at lower echelons to exercise disciplined initiative. Failure to adapt to these evolving dynamics will diminish the force’s effectiveness and elevate the risk of nuclear escalation.

Train, Harden, Sustain: Maintaining the Army’s Lethality in the Nuclear Shadow - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Michael Losacco · February 29, 2024

On the morning of Nov. 1, 1951, within the confines of Area 7 at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site, soldiers from the U.S. Army’s 11th Airborne Division dug foxholes and positioned weapon systems in anticipation of the Atomic Energy Commission’s BUSTER-JANGLE nuclear tests. The Soviet Union had conducted its first nuclear test two years earlier, prompting the Army to confront the possibility of its troops encountering nuclear weapons on the battlefield. The exercise, known as “Desert Rock,” was an Army program aimed at studying soldiers’ psychological reactions to a nuclear detonation while also testing their ability to maneuver in a post-detonation environment. After the blast, troops moved in attack formation to seize an objective — at one point coming within 900 meters of ground zero. Despite of the dangers of subjecting servicemembers to radiological effects, such training was all too common at the height of the Cold War and only gradually declined as nuclear weapons became less prominent tools of war.

Now, however, nuclear weapons have surged back onto the global stage. Following the initiation of his “special military operation” in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin made nuclear threats part of his playbook in deterring the United States and NATO from intervening. Putin began by elevating Russia’s Strategic Missile Force alert level to “enhanced combat duty” and issued thinly veiled warnings of cataclysmic reprisals surpassing any in history against meddlesome nations. Additionally, he prepositioned nuclear weapons in Belarus while personally overseeing large-scale nuclear exercises.

Amid the crisis, NATO responded by increasing its troop levels in Europe. The U.S. Army established a new garrison in Poland and deployed an additional brigade combat team to the region in anticipation of aggression against the alliance. These brigade combat teams excel in conventional military operations. However, Russia’s demonstrated willingness to brandish nuclear weapons as a coercive tool and the persistent risk of NATO entering the conflict makes it increasingly likely that these forces will need to deploy, fight, and win in a nuclear environment.

During the Cold War, the Army trained its forces to fight on a nuclear battlefield — at one point reorganizing its force structure into Pentomic divisions to reduce the effects of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, as the Soviet threat receded and counterinsurgency missions in Afghanistan and Iraq took precedence, Army leaders deemphasized nuclear scenarios in training, creating a gap in nuclear battlefield proficiency.

The Army should now rediscover the lost art of nuclear battlefield operations and prepare its soldiers for the uniquely devastating effects of nuclear weapons. While detonating nuclear weapons during training exercises is not a credible solution, the Army should reconsider training objectives, bolster hardening standards, and innovate sustainment methods to enhance the Army’s resilience during nuclear attacks and contribute to the Department of Defense’s broader conventional nuclear integration effort. In doing so, the Army will be better positioned to achieve wartime objectives against nuclear-armed adversaries and mitigate the coercive potential of nuclear weapons.

Become a Member

Reevaluating Priorities

After the Soviet Union collapsed, U.S. conventional forces trained less for nuclear contingencies. Army leaders prioritized emerging threats, like terrorism and insurgency, and considered it unnecessary to train for nuclear contingencies. Field exercises, wargaming, and training centers lacked nuclear scenarios at the brigade and battalion levels. Similarly, the Army’s weapon and vehicle platforms, such as the M1A2 Abrams and Bradley Fighting Vehicle, increasingly relied on commercial off-the-shelf technology. This technology, like the semiconductors powering fire control systems and blue force trackers, is vulnerable to nuclear blast effects, such as electromagnetic pulses, rendering entire formations ineffective as their circuits fail.

A gap in nuclear battlefield proficiency is untimely. U.S. adversaries have invested in nuclear forces capable of delivering various systems, including lower-yield warheads, fractional orbital bombardment systems, and advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles. Specifically, Russia adheres to a nuclear doctrine that emphasizes the calibrated use of nuclear weapons. Russia views nuclear weapons as an intra-war deterrence tool that offsets American advantages in conventional capabilities and prevents “regional wars” from escalating to “large-scale wars.” Russia deploys the largest and most diverse nuclear arsenal in the world and fields an agile arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons that provide flexible employment options. In short, Russia sees increased utility in nuclear weapons and might brandish them in potential conflicts with the United States and NATO. Given Russia’s war with Ukraine and its aggressive stance toward those who intervene, such scenarios are increasingly plausible.

One Small Bomb

The Army’s mission is to deploy, fight, and win the nation’s wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance. Land dominance requires sustainment forces, power-projection nodes, and viable combat power. Sustainment units provide the fuel and maintenance necessary to maintain operational tempo. Seaports and airfields facilitate the flow of forces into an area of operation, serving as hubs for intra-theater resupply. Weapons and vehicles enable soldiers to neutralize the enemy and maneuver quickly across the battlefield. However, these components will confront unique challenges as the Army operates in theaters where nuclear threats loom large.

For instance, a single nuclear weapon carries enough explosive yield to obliterate most military formations and impede their advance on the battlefield. A sub-kiloton warhead’s blast overpressure and shockwave would tear through undispersed formations, disrupting communication networks and advanced sensors needed to target enemy troops. Critical land power-projection nodes, like the German ports at Bremerhaven and Hamburg, would also be destroyed.

At the tactical level, soldiers, unprepared due to a lack of nuclear training, would experience disarray as the psychological shock of witnessing fellow soldiers endure the immediate effects of thermal and gamma radiation takes hold. Junior leaders, whose pre-deployment training and education lacked nuclear exercises or training scenarios, would be unprepared to consolidate and reorganize their formations for subsequent objectives amid the chaos, rendering them ineffective.

Maintaining the Army’s Lethality in the Nuclear Shadow

To prepare for a nuclear contingency, the Army could consider four measures to improve its ability to shoot, move, and communicate in a nuclear environment. These include reevaluating vehicle hardening standards, prioritizing nuclear battlefield training, increasing operational redundancy through mission command, and pursuing an innovative approach to dispersed combat operations.

First, the Army could reexamine hardening standards and determine if vulnerabilities to high-altitude electromagnetic pulses exist. A limited nuclear attack may involve a nuclear detonation in the atmosphere that releases an electromagnetic pulse toward the Earth. Commercial off-the-shelf electronics enable the operation of all defense systems but are susceptible to such attacks because they sacrifice battlefield hardening standards for smaller size and faster processing speeds. This vulnerability exposes them to “single-event upset,” such as an electromagnetic pulse. An upset event could damage the digital fire control system and communication tools Army units rely on during combat operations, rendering them blind and incapable of communicating with their higher headquarters.

While the Army has maintained nuclear survivability as a critical performance parameter for its new equipment, it remains unclear if acquisition authorities prioritize it, as they can waive the requirement if necessary. An alternative approach could involve the U.S. Army Forces Command, in collaboration with the U.S. Army Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency, implementing a hardness surveillance and maintenance program for Army units deploying into combatant commands where an active nuclear threat exists (e.g., U.S. European Command). This program could identify vulnerabilities in commercial electronics within a platform’s central processing unit and determine where redundant measures are needed.

Second, brigade combat teams should prioritize nuclear battlefield training akin to other training events. While the Army has made significant strides in refocusing the force’s focus from counter-insurgency to near-peer threats, nuclear battlefield training remains absent from many of the active force’s training calendars. Moreover, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear training often lacks the requisite attention and supervision from commanders. A straightforward solution is for Army leaders to prioritize nuclear battlefield training in the same manner they prioritize gunnery and combined live-fire exercises. Planning for such events typically consumes most of a unit’s time and is routinely inspected by division and brigade leadership. Nuclear battlefield training warrants an equivalent level of attention. By emphasizing nuclear battlefield training and refraining from treating it as an afterthought, Army units can enhance their preparedness and mitigate risks to their operational tempo.

Third, the Army could increase operational redundancy by further empowering company-grade leaders through mission command. Mission command — an Army leadership model — fosters disciplined initiative among subordinates to empower agile and adaptive leaders in large-scale combat operations. Disciplined initiative and agile thinking are crucial leadership traits, particularly as nuclear strikes sever mechanized units from their higher headquarters and rear support.

While the Army excels at teaching mission command, there is room for improvement. Administrators at the Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence could make more prevalent seminars and maneuver exercises in its armor and infantry courses that prioritize nuclear contingencies and explain how nuclear battlefield proficiency contributes to regional and strategic deterrence. Such exercises could facilitate leaders’ familiarity with nuclear planning factors and develop the nuclear domain knowledge lacking in the current force. Furthermore, both the armor and infantry schoolhouse and active units could implement nuclear educational wargaming within their training programs. Wargames are cost-effective and durable, and soldiers can conduct them in unclassified environments, such as field exercises or company operations facilities. This form of “hip pocket training” would enable junior leaders and their subordinates to build upon their military education and exercise the tenets of mission command without the finality of nuclear combat.

Finally, the Army could contemplate an innovative approach to dispersed combat operations. One of the main constraints on ground combat operations is their rear-echelon sustainment requirements. Tanks and armored fighting vehicles consume large amounts of fuel and necessitate continuous preventative maintenance. These demands reduce dispersion during logistics package operations and limit the duration these units can operate independently from larger formations. Such sustainment and maintenance practices heighten the vulnerability of Army formations to a nuclear attack. Therefore, investigating methods for mechanized units to sustain operations when access to these support systems is restricted is of significant value.

One option could involve training soldiers on how to forage for fuel. Some systems, like the Abrams’ Honeywell AGT1500 engine, can operate on jet fuel, gasoline, diesel, and marine diesel — fuel options that might be plentiful in populated areas following a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse. Another option could entail cross-training Abrams and Bradley maintainers in various positions inside these vehicles. This effort could offer immediate maintenance support for troubleshooting faults and assist mechanized units in avoiding retrograding to rear areas for maintenance.

A Game of Chance

While prudent, these measures may not guarantee success on a nuclear battlefield. Nuclear weapons are uniquely devastating, and no level of preparedness can fully ready the force for nuclear employment. Nonetheless, if the Army prepares for nuclear war and is proficient at fighting through a potential nuclear attack, the Army has a plausible chance to continue fighting and contribute to the broader war effort. Furthermore, such proficiency may diminish the effect of nuclear weapons during a crisis. For instance, Russia might be less inclined to use a nuclear weapon if it doubts that would substantially impair U.S. conventional operations.

To be sure, such a strategy will encounter resistance from both civilian and military leaders. Specifically, opponents will argue that implementing these measures will be difficult and expensive. Indeed, efforts to survey and harden Army units deploying downrange will be costly. Studies indicate that retrofitting a system could cost over 10 percent of the platform’s base cost. However, cost-effective practices can be achieved through prudent design practices. For example, instead of hardening an entire platform, priority should be given to the most critical systems, like programable read-only memory and application-specific integrated circuits in the fire control systems, navigation aids, and engine functions. This approach could be augmented by integrating modern commercial off-the-shelf electronics that are already hardened. Recently, modern electronics have become susceptible to natural upset events in the United States, prompting commercial developers to incorporate their own hardening standards. The Army should focus on procuring components from these companies during the surveillance and hardening process to reduce costs further.

Second, some will argue that nuclear training requirements will detract from conventional readiness. Leaders inevitably must prioritize training on the assigned mission and will avoid training that diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of regular operations. Fortunately, Army leaders do not need to find more time on the training calendar to implement nuclear battlefield training. Much of the training is already incorporated into current training exercises — it is just poorly supervised and lacks spot-checking by leaders. Stronger emphasis from top-level leadership can instill the discipline necessary for such training requirements and alleviate any plausible constraints nuclear training might pose on other training objectives.

Conclusion

The return of nuclear weapons as a potential tool for warfare means the Army should train to operate in a nuclear environment. Russia’s willingness to threaten nuclear escalation during the war in Ukraine, coupled with NATO’s continued reliance on the Army’s brigade combat teams on its eastern front, suggests these troops may face the stark reality of combat operations in a nuclear setting. While the Army sidelined nuclear combat training following the Cold War, the force can quickly regain the initiative by overhauling its doctrine, revisiting hardening standards, and empowering leaders at lower echelons to exercise disciplined initiative. Failure to adapt to these evolving dynamics will diminish the force’s effectiveness and elevate the risk of nuclear escalation.

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Michael P. Losacco is an analyst at Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. and previously served as an armor officer in the U.S. Army. The views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Systems Planning and Analysis Inc., the Department of Defense, the U.S. armed services, or the U.S. government.

Image: Photo from the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Michael Losacco · February 29, 2024

20. Dry Pipes, Liberated Water, and Struggles for Legitimacy: A Lesser-Known Story of the United States in Cuba

Interesting history. I was not familiar with this.

Dry Pipes, Liberated Water, and Struggles for Legitimacy: A Lesser-Known Story of the United States in Cuba - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by J. Overton · February 29, 2024

Sixty years ago, the only US sea power platform in a communist country experienced a non-kinetic attack by a nation-state with the dual purposes of both influencing international opinion against its presence and making it uninhabitable. On February 6, 1964, just over a year after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Cuban President Fidel Castro announced that he would cut off the sole water source of the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay if the US did not release 36 Cuban fishermen who had been arrested for illegally fishing near Florida. During those very tense times of the Cold War, tactical issues between the US and Soviet-sponsored Cuba had the potential for global, apocalyptic implications. Fortunately, like the better-known Missile Crisis, this crisis too was peacefully resolved, or at least its more dire impacts and potential were mitigated. A struggle for legitimacy and influence, played out by irregular warfare (IW) veterans, this Guantanamo Bay water crisis deserves a revisit and a review for its diamond anniversary.

The installation now called Naval Station Guantanamo Bay was established in 1903 via treaty with the then-compliant government of Cuba. That compliance went away with the coming of the Castro revolution in 1959 and its attachment to the Soviet Union, but the treaty, and the base it facilitated, remained in place. The base’s center of gravity and critical vulnerability was and is potable water. In 1898, its freshwater well was the scene of the Battle of Cuzco Well, which wrested control of the area from the Spanish, and the U.S. Navy’s build-up and continued operations were possible only through train cars of water coming from off-base in the early days, and since the early 1940’s, a pipe delivering water from a nearby river outside the base perimeter.

When Cuban President Fidel Castro announced his plans to use that water as a hostage and marker for the return of those fishermen, held in a Florida jail, Rear Admiral John Bulkeley, base commander (and Medal of Honor recipient for his action evacuating General MacArthur from the Philippines) immediately put the base on water restrictions, requested water barge services from the US and Jamaica, and cancelled personnel inspections to save water on uniform laundering. Although Castro said he would allow water to flow on base one hour per day for humanitarian reasons, Bulkeley directed that the flow – which came into the base at the installation’s only accessible land corridor with the rest of Cuba – be completely secured.

At this stage, the objectives of each side, if not overtly stated, could be discerned by actions taken. The Cuban regime sought to highlight the continued, unwanted occupation of a part of their poor country by a belligerent superpower, have the Cuban fishermen returned from US custody, and negatively impact or even nullify the base as an operational platform. Maintaining the base’s presence and operations while not provoking a war, were the US’ goals. Both countries wanted to prove the legitimacy of their respective authority over the base, at least to that segment of the world able to take action on their opinions.

The crisis evolved quickly over the next ten days. On February 8, an inspection team from the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrived to survey the situation and the possibility of installing a desalinization plant to convert seawater. Two days later, a Navy tug towing water barges arrived from Jamaica with potable water. On February 12, 270 Cuban workers were fired as a result of a Presidential order to make the base more self-sufficient, and the next day, the Chief of Naval Personnel announced that no further dependents would be permitted to accompany military members to Guantanamo, in order to change the base into a “garrison force.” On February 14, fourteen international news media representatives arrived. Finally, the Cuban government asserted the Naval Base was “stealing” water from the pipe leading from Communist Cuba.

With that last public accusation, Bulkeley decided on an urgent, creative solution: he gathered the visiting newsmen, brought them to the spot where the water pipe came into the base, and had two Cuban workers cut open the water pipe. The U.S. Navy News Release from Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, dated February 27, 1964, read that the base commander ordered that the pipe be cut and sealed “…to let the world know that the United States was not receiving water from Communist Cuba.”

The installation would, for the next year, have its water delivered by tanker and then, in time, be serviced by a desalinization plant. It would also – as directed by the President – fire most of the remaining Cuban commuting workforce, replacing them eventually with US civilians, Sailors, contractors, and Jamaican nationals, becoming and remaining independent of Communist Cuba for water and workforce.

Bulkeley said he made the decision to sever the pipe himself, but President Lyndon Johnson said four days later that: “We believe it is far wiser to send an Admiral to cut the water off than to send a battalion of marines to turn it back on [meaning an invasion from the base into the neighboring area]. And we are making our base more secure now than it ever has been in its history.” The base newspaper from May, 1964, quoted “the old ancient mariner: ‘water, water, everywhere…nor any drop to drink.’ What he needed was a desalinization plant.”

Without historical and contemporary context – from the Spanish-American War to the Castro Revolution to the Cold War – this crisis could easily be interpreted as just a minor, bloodless, land-based competition over infrastructure solved by logistics. IW and maritime relevance are not, however, too far beneath the surface. Both belligerents – the government of Cuba and the tactical leadership of the naval base – had successful IW experiences in other wars. The Cuban regime had only a decade earlier been a decidedly non-state actor, a guerrilla group (and would continue in that role abroad), gaining experience and expertise in a violent struggle for legitimacy within Cuba which of course resulted in their overthrow of the existing Cuban government. Bulkeley, while a long-serving officer in the world’s largest Navy, had his early combat experience serving in small, outgunned vessels executing raids and extractions against more numerous and powerful enemies. Both belligerents used tactics associated with modern IW: each side portrayed itself as standing up to an unjust, stronger power, through non-kinetic means, and each attempted to disrupt its competitor’s warfighting advantage while reinforcing its own. Removing the base’s water supply from Castro’s control, and adding both water deliveries and a desalinization plant, made the base more effective than would have additional conventional armaments. As long as the struggle remained below the threshold and the base and its inhabitants served as a defacto tripwire, decreasing vulnerabilities was more effective than increasing capabilities.

By late summer, the base was being supplied with water from the still-under-construction plant and from water-carrying ships, but swimming pools were open. By December the plant was operating at full capacity, and the families evacuated in February were returning. Tactically, this “struggle” was “won” by the US. The Cubans too, could claim victory, or at least a return to a shared version of status quo ante bellum, as within the year their fishermen were released and returned home.

Six decades later, against the wishes and work of the opposing sides, both the US Naval Station and the Castro regime (without, of course, Fidel) remain in Cuba. Neither is particularly popular in the international community — the country is still an avowed communist state and occasional pariah, and the base has weathered all manner of foreign and domestic attempts at its removal, or at least cessation of some of its more notable missions. The competition and struggle for legitimacy and influence also remain, and fortunately, remain just that: a very, very long irregular war that has skillfully been kept from drifting into war’s more conventional form. It is not the most joyful anniversary, but those 60 years could have been much worse.

J. Overton is the editor of Seapower by Other Means: Naval Contributions to National Objectives Beyond Sea Control, Power Projection, and Traditional Service Missions (ISPK Seapower Series 2023), and co-editor (with Timothy Heck) of the (in-progress) essay collection Fighting Surrounded. He is a former Non-Resident Fellow with the Modern War Institute at West Point and US Coast Guard veteran.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Main image: View of the North East Gate at the U.S. Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (US Navy via Wikimedia)

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21. Ukrainian Civilians Are Pioneering the Art of Resistance

Long live the resistance. (Kyiv Calling - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xWQUkRKqp2E)

Everyone should have a copy of From Dictatorship to Democracy by Gene Sharp as it is the playbook for non-violent resistance. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/62b0eb7da51f3717911bb4e1/t/642f2c6a956bc34188310fbe/1680813163028/FDTD+%28English%29.pdf

Dr. Gene Sharp, who has been called “the Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare,” founded the Albert Einstein Institution (AEI) in 1983 to promote research, policy studies, and education on the strategic uses of nonviolent struggle in face of dictatorship, war, genocide, and oppression. He served as the Institution’s Senior Scholar from 1983 until his passing in 2018.

Read here what is and is not non-violent action: https://www.aeinstein.org/on-nonviolent-action

And peruse all the nonviolent techniques here: https://www.aeinstein.org/digital-library

198 Methods of Nonviolent Action

The Anti-Coup

Civilian-Based Defense

Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives

From Dictatorship to Democracy

Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power

How Nonviolent Struggle Works

Making Europe Unconquerable

Making the Abolition of War a Realistic Goal

National Security through Civilian-Based Defense

On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict

The Political Equivalent to War: Civilian-Based Defense

The Politics of Nonviolent Action

Power, Struggle and Defense

The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle

Self-Liberation Toolkit

Self Reliant Defense Without Bankruptcy or War

Social Power and Political Freedom

There Are Realistic Alternatives

Tyranny Could Not Quell Them!

Waging Nonviolent Struggle

The Monograph Series

Also the OSS Simple Sabotage Manual is useful. See this article: "For the Glorious Ukrainian Resistance" by Charles T. Pinck https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/glorious-ukrainian-resistance

Ukrainian Civilians Are Pioneering the Art of Resistance

Nonviolent tools are undercutting the Russian occupation.

FEBRUARY 28, 2024, 3:35 PM

By Nicholas Krohley, the founder of FrontLine Advisory.

Foreign Policy · by Nicholas Krohley

Military
Russia
Ukraine

Two grim milestones just passed for Ukraine: the two-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion and a decade since the seizure of Crimea. Ukrainians commemorated and grieved. They did so in the midst of mounting uncertainty over the trajectory of the war, the solidarity of their leadership, and the continuance of international support.

Beneath the headlines, however, Ukrainian resistance adapts and evolves. Among Ukrainians, cease-fires and territorial concessions remain broadly anathema. The question is not if resistance should continue, but how.

From the very beginning of Russia’s war, the Ukrainian people self-mobilized en masse. Their proactive agency has been fundamental to Ukraine’s ability to stave off Russian aggression, and it has been lauded as the gold standard in whole-of-society resistance. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, for example, volunteer organizations and civil society groups leapt into action, buying vital time for the military to regroup. In the years that followed, nongovernmental organizations and private interests were integral to sustaining Ukraine’s position in a so-called frozen conflict.

In 2022, as Russian armor surged across the border, ordinary civilians flooded the ranks of the Territorial Defense Forces. These units waged impromptu and ultimately successful localized campaigns to defend cities such as Sumy and Chernihiv, which were fundamental to the disruption of Russia’s invasion plan.

Ukrainian citizens stepped forward to take nonviolent action as well. At times, this occurred in coordination with government entities. Far more often, it was the result of independent initiative. Actions included large-scale street protests, the blocking of roads, and the protection of critical infrastructure. The broader endeavor was punctuated by exceptionally well-amplified face-to-face confrontations and social media campaigns.

Within government-held areas of Ukraine, civil society remains engaged. Key efforts include adapting of drones and other civilian technologies for military use, providing support for displaced families, and raising funds for veteran care. Behind Russian lines, meanwhile, resistance networks have blossomed as well. Some are engaged in sabotage and other guerrilla warfare tactics.

More prevalent, however, have been those engaged in nonviolent resistance. Independent civilian networks have grown dramatically in size and scope, despite limited media attention from the West and negligible external support.

What is their place in Ukraine’s resistance strategy, and how can their achievements inform broader debates over concepts such as “total defense” and the realities of whole-of-society resistance?

Two images shared by the Yellow Ribbon Group. The left shows a person's hand holding a yellow note that reads "Yalta is Ukraine" in Ukrainian. Beyond the hand, an old gray building with a Gothic Revival style of architecture stands against a cracked driveway. In the right photo, a blue and yellow poster affixed to a post reads “Berdiansk is a Ukrainian city” in Ukrainian.

Images from the Yellow Ribbon Group show a person holding a note that reads “Yalta is Ukraine” (left) and a sign that says “Berdiansk is a Ukrainian city” (right). Yellow Ribbon Group via Telegram

As Russia consolidated its hold over areas of southern and eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2022, Ukrainian resistance endured devastating initial setbacks behind the front lines. Most of the “stay behind” partisan groups established by the Ukrainian government were promptly betrayed by pro-Russian collaborators and annihilated. Surviving networks were thereafter culled by Russian intelligence agencies, using surveillance, torture, and collective punishment.

Russia’s occupying administration also enforced a brutal crackdown on civil disobedience and open protest. The result was an utter stifling of overt action. This, combined with Russia’s success in unraveling and destroying clandestine guerrilla networks, created profound unease within the Ukrainian government at the prospect of orchestrating resistance actions (particularly by civilians) behind enemy lines.

Instead, the preference shifted toward hit-and-run raids by Ukrainian special operations forces, launched from government-held terrain.

Despite the Ukrainian government’s uncertain, hands-off approach to civil resistance and the dangers posed under Russian occupation, nonviolent resistance has flourished. Critically, it has done so without the sort of government direction and support envisaged within the total defense paradigm that is increasingly popular within the NATO alliance, and without reliance upon “pre-existing ties and networks” similar to those that have been fundamental to classic resistance movements around the world.

Over the past two years, tens of thousands of Ukrainians have participated in nonviolent resistance activities. Women have been front and center, and new technologies have been pivotal to the scaling, de-risking, and amplification of the enterprise. The actions and outcomes of nonviolent civil resistance have focused overwhelmingly on target audiences within occupied Ukraine, however, and so they remain inadequately understood and appreciated.

Nonviolent resistance has been orchestrated by a decentralized amalgamation of independent groups that reach deep behind the front lines. Rather than building on existing social connections, they have coalesced digitally and anonymously in response to Russian aggression. Maintaining only occasional and informal communication with the Ukrainian government, they have pursued independently conceived courses of action in the furtherance of Ukraine’s national interests.

Smoke ascends over the northern Gaza Strip following an Israeli strike, as seen from Sderot, Israel, on Oct. 23, 2023.

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Two young Iranian girls, not wearing the mandatory hijab, visit a park in Tehran.

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One of the best-known groups, the Yellow Ribbon Group (YRG), provides an example of this paradigm in practice. The YRG, one of the only resistance groups to garner attention from Western media, originated in Kherson Oblast after the area’s conquest by Russia in the first days of the war. Cut off from Ukraine and unable to take up arms, young people came together to find ways to resist.

“We wanted to be a part of something,” recalls the YRG’s founder, who is not named here to protect their safety. The founder went on to say that they also wished to exert agency in the face of oppression.

Initial resistance activities were predominantly one-off actions by lone individuals. They ranged from tagging pro-Ukrainian graffiti to attaching Ukrainian flags to balloons in order to raise them into the sky. Photos of these actions circulated widely via Telegram channels and on social media, prompting a surge of interest from Luhansk to Crimea.

After Russia’s withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson in November 2022, the YRG expanded its work. Operating from the relative safety of government-held areas, members reached digitally across the front lines to support their fellow Ukrainians enduring occupation. The continued growth and security of practitioners were enabled thereafter by high-tech innovation.

This came in the form of a custom-developed secure messaging platform that allows the practitioners of nonviolent resistance in occupied areas to access an artificial intelligence-enabled chatbot, which provides access to a breadth of information and resources that are automatically customized in response to a user’s prompts.

Examples include instructions on how to print fliers, best practice recommendations for the conduct of certain actions, inspiration for messages and themes. (The latter are often related to current events, such as Elon Musk’s October 2023 assertion that there is no “significant insurgency” in occupied Ukraine, and that Ukraine should cede land for peace.)

Two photos shared by the Yellow Ribbon Group. The left shows a hand holding a yellow paper that reads “Elon we are here! Yalta is Ukraine” in English. Beyond the hand, a road curves along a seaside landscape and into the city of Yalta. The right photo shows a hand holding a white paper reading “Elon we are here. Makeevka is Ukraine. Yellow ribbon." An out-of-focus statue of a woman is visible beyond the note.

Images from the Yellow Ribbon Group show notes that read “Elon we are here! Yalta is Ukraine” (left) and “Elon we are here. Makeevka is Ukraine. Yellow ribbon.” Yellow Ribbon Group Telegram

Within this system, the YRG has established the digital backbone of a resistance network unlike any other in history: one with a single hub run via artificial intelligence (as opposed to an identifiable leadership team) and an unlimited series of anonymous, untraceable, individual spokes. The entire application can be deleted from the user’s phone at the push of a button, and full anonymity means that members of the network cannot be compromised by Russia.

YRG practitioners have also produced posters exposing the identities and activities of administrators within the occupation bureaucracy. At times, these efforts target high-profile public figures—such as the infamous pro-Russian politician and former Kherson Mayor Vladimir Saldo—but primary focus goes toward midlevel officials imported from Russia to prove that the resistance knows who they are. In a number of instances, these exposés have compelled the individuals in question to relocate, which in turn adds an additional burden on the occupation and heightens the sense of insecurity.

A satirical campaign poster with a headshot photo of a man in a suit and Russian text that reads “Vladimir Saldo, the last candidate left alive!”

A satirical campaign poster reads “Vladimir Saldo, the last candidate left alive!”Yellow Ribbon Group

In a pattern evident throughout the nonviolent resistance movement in occupied Ukraine, the more active that YRG becomes, the more that it grows in numbers. The structure of its digital platform is such that it can accommodate any and all new entrants, while its architecture mitigates any damage that might accrue through Russian penetration.

According to internal system metrics, the YRG’s platform has approximately 10,000 registered users, with an average of 3,000 active users within a given week. Sources within the YRG note that numbers fluctuate dramatically at any given moment, since users will delete the application on a regular basis when approaching checkpoints and other high-risk areas.

Another prominent nonviolent resistance network leveraging technology, anonymity, and female agency is the Angry Mavkas. The group is comprised exclusively of Ukrainian women, and it draws its name from a siren-like creature in Ukrainian folklore that lures men to their deaths.

Two images show depictions of Mavka, a character in Ukrainian folklore. She is depicted as a young woman with long brown hair, a white dress, and a crown of flowers. In the left image, she holds a torch in one hand and a burning Russian flag in the other while she wears an angry expression. In the right image, she stands with one foot on top of a bloodied and unconscious Russian soldier.

Two images show depictions of Mavka, a character in Ukrainian folklore that has been reclaimed by women in Russian-occupied regions of eastern Ukraine. Alya Shandra/Euromaidanpress via Telegram

The Mavkas began in Melitopol among a small group of women who wanted to push back against Russian aggression and sexual assault, which has been systemic under occupation. The Mavkas’ reputation spread quickly, and the group’s founders were inundated with requests from women and girls across the occupied territories to contribute to their cause.

As with the YRG, the Mavkas utilize their own anonymous communication platform to share resources and stories, coordinate activities, and present digital evidence of their actions. The result creates an interesting duality: It is a forum that provides Ukrainian women the opportunity to connect with one another and vent their fears and frustrations under occupation, but it is also a space of anonymous, digital strangers.

Discussions with participants in Ukraine’s nonviolent resistance movement emphasize the value of both the act of practicing resistance as well as the outcomes that it generates. Taking action has been a powerful means of asserting agency and “speaking freely” under occupation. Practitioners noted what they called the “self-imposed schizophrenia” that is required of Ukrainian patriots, wherein one must publicly acquiesce to Russian rule in order to survive. For example, accepting a Russian passport is now a precondition for access to basic medical care, pensions, and permission to leave one’s city in the occupied territories.

As Russian surveillance and counterintelligence capabilities grow increasingly robust, there is little opportunity for respite or self-expression. As such, public trust has been badly degraded in occupied territories—a further constraint to the practice of resistance via traditional social groups. In the view of a senior figure within the Mavkas, the ensuing “social atomization” evokes the communist era. In the words of another practitioner, “our lives have become compartmentalized.”

Trapped in a world where one must say and do things that run counter to one’s core beliefs, and where one cannot express true feelings outside of extremely narrow circles of trust, even the smallest acts of resistance imbue powerful psychological impacts for the practitioner—and also for their fellow Ukrainians enduring occupation, who witness the results.

The successes of the nonviolent resistance movement have catalyzed shifts in Russian messaging as well. Initially, Russian officials ignored such acts of resistance. As activity grew to the point that it could not be ignored, the Russians sought to dismiss and discredit the endeavor. According to sources in the YRG, nonviolent resistance is said by the Russians to be the work of “a duped, intellectually deficient few.” They say that the YRG has been cast as “a band of degenerates” and “while the Mavkas are alleged to be “a psyop [psychological operations] run from Kyiv” as well as tools of the U.S.

In contrast to the devastating early losses suffered within traditional partisan networks established and run by the Ukrainian government, the decentralized and anonymous digital networks established by civil society are thriving. The YRG and the Mavkas continue to expand while other groups are still emerging. The Combat Seagulls blend violent and nonviolent practices in Crimea, while Atesh (meaning “fire” in Crimean Tartar) is a network of saboteurs and informants drawn primarily from Tartars forcibly conscripted by Russia.

Resistance is growing in occupied Ukraine, both in scale and sophistication. Armed partisan networks are making their presence felt behind the front lines while nonviolent resistance groups continue to expand. Critically, the Ukrainian government is recognizing integrated resistance as a strategic lever.

This two-pronged approach to resistance—violent and nonviolent actions synchronized in support of a shared objective—offers a compelling paradigm. This is particularly true as nonviolent civil networks have shown the ability to move beyond small-scale symbolic actions and toward more ambitious campaigns.

In early 2023, for example, the Mavkas orchestrated the large-scale production of counterfeit 50-ruble notes, with a twist. With several details changed—only noticeable after close inspection—the notes were designed to grab the attention of Russians and others when left in public places, for example, at ATMs.

Monetary Resistance

A typical Russian ruble note is shown at left. A revised Ukrainian protest version is shown at right. Slide to compare the differences (detailed below):

1. The “Bank of Russia” logo is replaced with “Bank of angry Mavka.” 2. The serial number is replaced with the date of Prigozhin’s march on Moscow. 3. “Counterfeiters will be prosecuted” is changed to “The ruble is as worthless as Putin’s threats to Prigozhin.” 4.. The original scepter is now topped with the Ukrainian national emblem. 5. The Mavka’s head replaces the original. 6. “Banknote of Russia” is changed to “This is not Russia.” 7. The Mavka logo is tagged on the monument. 8. “Fifty rubles” is changed to “You are In Ukraine!”

Activists were able to print and disseminate bills in Crimea, Melitopol, and parts of Kherson. Entering broadly into circulation, the notes initiated a flurry of official condemnation from Russian authorities.

The second campaign, conducted by a partisan network that has not yet taken public credit, was launched during the elections conducted by Russian authorities across occupied Ukraine in September 2023. In the run-up to the vote, aspiring local politicians put up posters to advertise their candidacy.

In the midst of this activity, a partisan network produced realistic posters of its own for fictitious candidates in the occupied territories, complete with scannable QR codes similar to those used by the official politicians These QR codes led in different directions: Some links went to videos of Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny, others to resources describing human rights violations within Russia, and others to spoof voter registration websites. These resources were hosted on secure platforms that had been paid for with cryptocurrency, which the Russian government could neither hack nor trace.

On the contrary, this subtle but effective campaign not only disrupted the so-called elections in occupied Ukraine, but also exposed the futility of Russia’s attempt to use democracy as a weapon.

Russia reacted sharply, and in ways that subverted narratives with which they have sought to legitimize conquest and occupation. First, high-level figures from Russia’s Central Election Commission publicly and aggressively condemned the effort and Rostelcom, the Russian state-owned digital services provider, pressed the relevant hosting services to take the websites down. Second, Russian media entities such as the news agency TASS, the website “War on Fakes” (widely understood to be linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense), and the popular show Solovyov Live alleged that the campaign was the work of scammers or Ukrainian psyops units. The net effect was official acknowledgement of substantive local opposition within the occupied territories, and the amplification of Ukrainian resistance to audiences across Russia.

As Ukraine explores the potential of nonviolent resistance—potentially aligned with a wider campaign of guerrilla activity in the occupied territories—the government must find a way to harness civilian networks without subsuming them. Civil society under government control is no longer civil society, irrespective of the statist assumptions baked into total defense and resistance paradigms proffered within NATO. Leaders in Kyiv need only to look across their northern and eastern borders to witness the toxic fallout of an instrumentalized populace.

There is ample room to coordinate and support the work of civilian resistance networks. Critically, that effort relies on mutual trust: for practitioners to be supported and empowered, and for the government to establish constructive strategic dialogue with the networks in question.

Nonviolent resistance has been a spontaneous expression of national will. It has been the civilian counterpart to the formidable Ukrainian “will to fight” evident on the battlefield, and its potency comes from the legacy of a decadeslong progress through which civil society has stepped forward, time and again, to shape Ukraine’s political future.

In the wake of two somber anniversaries, facing an interminable war of national survival with uncertain support from abroad, the Ukrainian people remain Ukraine’s most potent strategic asset. Within the occupied territories, civil resistance is vital to subverting Russian propaganda and framing the terms of any future negotiations. On the global stage, the sustained commitment and sacrifice of the Ukrainian people remains the most potent argument for continued international support. Re-establishing their place as the face and voice of resistance—a status that they achieved to extraordinary effect during the initial moments of the full-scale invasion—offers Ukraine its best opportunity to endure the challenges to come.

Foreign Policy · by Nicholas Krohley

22. Army Force Structure Transformation

Access the 4 page paper at this link: https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2024/02/27/091989c9/army-white-paper-army-force-structure-transformation.pdf?utm_source=pocket_saves

Army Force Structure Transformation

Throughout its history, the Army has transformed to keep pace with technology, accomplish national strategic objectives, and defeat ever-evolving threats. For nearly twenty years the Army’s force structure reflected a focus on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations that dominated after the 9/11 attacks. The Army will continue to need capabilities related to these missions. But in light of the changing security environment and evolving character of war, the Army is refocusing on conducting large scale combat operations against technologically advanced military powers. To meet these requirements, the Army must generate new capabilities and re-balance its force structure.

Over the past year, the Army conducted a rigorous assessment of its force structure using a process known as Total Army Analysis. Following extensive consultations with Congress, Army leaders are moving forward with a significant force structure transformation that will build on the modernization and organizational shifts of recent years.

This transformation will enable the Army to bring in new capabilities to meet requirements under the National Defense Strategy. It will also allow the Army to narrow the gap between force structure, which was designed to accommodate 494,000 soldiers, and current Active Duty end strength, which is set by law at 445,000.

TAA decisions will bring down “authorized” troop levels to approximately 470,000 soldiers by FY2029. Guided by the results of the TAA process, the Army will shrink excess, largely unmanned “hollow” force structure and build new formations equipped with new capabilities needed for large scale combat operations. By bringing force structure and end strength into closer alignment, the Army will ensure its formations are filled at the appropriate level to maintain a high state of readiness. At the same time, the Army will continue to transform its recruiting efforts so that it can build back its end strength, which is needed to provide strategic flexibility, reduce strain on frequently deploying soldiers, and add new capabilities to the force.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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