Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"I never submitted the whole system of my opinions to the creed of any party of men whatever in religion, in philosophy, in politics, or in anything else where I was capable of thinking for myself. Such an addiction is the last degradation of a free and moral agent."
 -Thomas Jefferson, letter to Francis Hopkinson, March 13, 1789

"The one who plants trees, knowing that he will never sit in their shade, has at least started to understand the meaning of life."
Rabindranath Tagore

We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented.
- Elie Wiesel, 1986




1. US forces launch raid in Syria, civilians also reported dead
2.The Untold Story of the Ukraine Crisis
3. The Wagner Group Is Heading Closer to Ukraine: Who Are They?
4. Russia's Putin accuses the U.S. of trying to drag him into war
5. On Taiwan invasion, China taking notes from Putin
6. The West Has Responded to Russia’s Ultimatum. Is It Enough?
7. How Would the American Public Respond to a Russian Invasion of Ukraine?
8. Solid-Propellant Motor Test Proves Iran’s Continuing Missile Advancement
9. Germany helps Putin with its double standard on arms exports
10. Is the Future of the Persian Gulf Chinese?
11. FDD | Canada must hold Iran accountable for downing of Ukrainian airliner
12. Opinion | Europe Thinks Putin Is Planning Something Even Worse Than War
13. Biden to meet with 'Quad' leaders during trip to Asia amid rising tension with China
14. The World Shrugs and the Games Go On
15. How China views the Ukraine crisis
16. Russia and China's private internets are the ideal forts for cyberattacks
17. Russia-U.S. Standoff Over Ukraine Raises Questions About Endgame
18. China's biggest Lunar New Year release is another Korean War propaganda movie
19. A Blast from the Past? The Role of Maritime Sabotage in Strategic Competition
20. Biden defense nominations: A disappointing first year status report
21. Islamic State Leader Killed During U.S. Raid in Syria, Biden Says
22. Why Ukraine Matters to the U.S.
23. Handling a Hybrid War in Ukraine
24. The US Army's Best: Why You Have No Shot In Joining Green Berets




1. US forces launch raid in Syria, civilians also reported dead
A couple points.

A raid that turned into a 2 hour operation means there must have been significant resistance which of course increases the likelihood of civilian casualties. But note also the warnings to civilians - which of course also provided warning to the enemy and increased the likelihood of defenses being hardened and counter attacks being prepared.

Did the warning to civilians. provide warning to the target and defenders and did that warning actually contribute to civilian casualties because of a 2 hour firefight?

Excerpts:

The operation, which residents say lasted over two hours, jolted the sleepy village of Atmeh near the Turkish border — an area dotted with camps for internally displaced people from Syria’s civil war. The target of the raid was unclear.
...
Omar Saleh, a nearby resident, said the doors and windows of his house started to rattle to the sound of low-flying aircraft at 1:10 a.m. local time. He then heard a man, speaking Arabic with an Iraqi or Saudi accent through a loudspeaker, urging women to surrender or leave the area.

“This went on for 45 minutes. There was no response. Then the machine gun fire erupted,” Saleh said. He said the firing continued for two hours, as aircraft circled low over the area.

And as a colleague mentioned, we should not forget these thugs use civilians as shields.

US forces launch raid in Syria, civilians also reported dead
AP · by GHAITH ALSAYED, LOLITA C. BALDOR and BASSEM MROUE · February 3, 2022
ATMEH, Syria (AP) — U.S. special forces carried out what the Pentagon said was a large-scale counterterrorism raid in northwestern Syria early Thursday. First responders at the scene reported 13 people had been killed, including six children and four women.
The operation, which residents say lasted over two hours, jolted the sleepy village of Atmeh near the Turkish border — an area dotted with camps for internally displaced people from Syria’s civil war. The target of the raid was unclear.
“The mission was successful,” Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said in a brief statement. “There were no U.S. casualties. More information will be provided as it becomes available.”
A journalist on assignment for The Associated Press and several residents said they saw body parts scattered near the site of the raid, a house in Syria’s rebel-held Idlib province. Most residents spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals, and said the raid involved helicopters, explosions and machine-gun fire.
It was the largest raid in the province since the 2019 Trump-era U.S. assault that killed the Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
An Iraqi intelligence official in contact with the U.S.-led coalition said Thursday’s target was a high-ranking militant leader whose identity will be released by the White House later in the day. Information suggests he may be al-Baghdadi’s successor, the current IS leader known as Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, the official added. He spoke on condition of anonymity to divulge sensitive information.
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Idlib is broadly controlled by Turkey-backed fighters, but is also an al-Qaida stronghold and home to several of its top operatives. Other militants, including extremists from the rival IS group, have also found refuge in the region.
“The first moments were terrifying, no one knew what was happening,” said Jamil el-Deddo, a resident of a nearby refugee camp. “We were worried it could be Syrian aircraft, which brought back memories of barrel bombs that used to be dropped on us,” he added, referring to crude explosives-filled containers used by President Bashar Assad’s forces against opponents during the Syrian conflict.
The top floor of the two-story house, surrounded by olive trees, was almost totally destroyed in Thursday’s raid, with the ceiling and walls knocked out.
Blood could be seen on the walls and floor of the remaining structure, which contained a wrecked bedroom with a child’s wooden crib on the floor. On one damaged wall, a blue plastic swing for children was still hanging. The kitchen was blackened with fire damage.
The opposition-run Syrian Civil Defense, first responders also known as the White Helmets, said 13 people were killed in shelling and clashes that ensued after U.S. the commando raid. They included six children and four women, it said.
The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, an opposition war monitor, also said the strike killed 13 people, including four children and two women. Ahmad Rahhal, a citizen journalist who visited the site, reported seeing 12 bodies.
The Pentagon provided no details on who was the target of the raid, or if any combatants or civilians on the ground were killed or injured.
Residents and activists described witnessing a large ground assault, with U.S. forces using megaphones urging women and children to leave the area.
Omar Saleh, a nearby resident, said the doors and windows of his house started to rattle to the sound of low-flying aircraft at 1:10 a.m. local time. He then heard a man, speaking Arabic with an Iraqi or Saudi accent through a loudspeaker, urging women to surrender or leave the area.
“This went on for 45 minutes. There was no response. Then the machine gun fire erupted,” Saleh said. He said the firing continued for two hours, as aircraft circled low over the area.
Others reported hearing at least one major explosion during the operation. A U.S. official said that one of the helicopters in the raid suffered a mechanical problem and had to be blown up on the ground. The U.S. official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss details of the military operation.
The Observatory said troops for the U.S.-led coalition using helicopters landed in the area and attacked a house. It said the force clashed with fighters on the ground. Taher al-Omar, an Idlib-based activist, also said he witnessed clashes between fighters and the U.S. force.
The military operation got attention on social media, with tweets from the region describing helicopters firing around the building near Atmeh. Flight-tracking data also suggested that multiple drones were circling the city of Sarmada and the village of Salwah, just north of the raid’s location.
The U.S. has in the past used drones to kill top al-Qaida operatives in Idlib, which at one point was home to the group’s biggest concentration of leaders since the days of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. The fact that special forces landed on the ground suggest the target was believed to be of high value.
A similar attack in Pakistan, in 2011, killed bin Laden.
Thursday’s clandestine operation came as the Islamic State group was reasserting itself in Syria and Iraq, carrying out some of its biggest attacks since it was defeated in 2019. In recent weeks and months, the group has launched a series of operations in the region, including a 10-day assault late last month to seize a prison in northeastern Syria.
A U.S.-backed Kurdish-led force said more than 120 of their fighters and prison workers died in the effort to thwart the IS plot, whose goal appeared to free senior IS operatives from the prison. The prison houses at least 3,000 Islamic State group detainees.
The attempted prison break was the biggest military operation by the extremist group since IS was defeated and members scattered to havens in 2019. The U.S.-led coalition carried out airstrikes and deployed American personnel in Bradley Fighting Vehicles to the prison area to help the Kurdish forces.
At a news conference Monday, an SDF senior official Nowruz Ahmad said the prison assault was part of a broader plot that IS had been preparing for a long time, including attacks on other neighborhoods in northeastern Syria and on the al-Hol camp in the south, which houses thousands of families of IS members.
The U.S.-led coalition has targeted high-profile militants on several occasions in recent years, aiming to disrupt what U.S. officials say is a secretive cell known as the Khorasan group that is planning external attacks. A U.S. airstrike killed al-Qaida’s second in command, former bin Laden aide Abu al-Kheir al-Masri, in Syria in 2017.
___
Baldor reported from Washington, D.C. and Mroue from Beirut. Associated Press writers Zeina Karam in Beirut and Qassim Abdul-Zahra in Baghdad contributed reporting.
AP · by GHAITH ALSAYED, LOLITA C. BALDOR and BASSEM MROUE · February 3, 2022
2. The Untold Story of the Ukraine Crisis

Excerpts:
It is far from clear whether peace talks can bring Europe back from the brink of war, or what Putin might consider a face-saving compromise. Under the Kremlin’s pandemic protocols, the Russian leader has been more isolated during this crisis than at any point in his career. In early January, when he would normally celebrate Orthodox Christmas among the crowds at a Russian cathedral, the Kremlin issued footage of the President alone with a priest, solemnly holding a candle in the chapel of his private residence. “Very few people can speak to him now,” the Kremlin insider told me. “The world inside his head is only his own.”
In Kyiv, Putin’s friend is even more isolated. Stripped of its main TV channels and beset by criminal charges, Medvedchuk’s party has been sinking in the polls. Medvedchuk remains under house arrest, with a tracking device affixed to his ankle and police officers stationed outside his home. His daughter’s security was such a concern that he declined to say anything about her whereabouts. But one of his associates told me that Daria remains in Kyiv, surrounded by private security guards. The main concern, the associate said, is kidnapping. “But yes, she’s still here.”



The Untold Story of the Ukraine Crisis
TIME · by Simon Shuster/Kyiv
Great wars sometimes start over small offenses.
A murdered duke. An angered pope. The belief of a lonely king that his rivals aren’t playing fair. When historians study why armies began gathering in Europe during the plague of 2021, their interest might turn to a teenage girl, the goddaughter of Moscow’s isolated sovereign.
Her name is Daria, a young Ukrainian with a shy smile and big brown eyes. When she was born in 2004, her parents asked their friend Vladimir Putin, then a few years into his reign in Russia, to christen her in the Orthodox tradition they all share. The girl’s father, Viktor Medvedchuk, has been close to Putin for decades. They holiday together on the Black Sea. They conduct business. They obsess over the bonds between their countries and the Western forces they see pulling them apart.
“Our relationship has developed over 20 years,” Medvedchuk told me in a rare interview last spring in Kyiv, near the start of the current standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine. “I don’t want to say I exploit that relationship, but you could say it has been part of my political arsenal.”

Guillaume Binet—MYOP
Putin could say the same about Medvedchuk. The leading voice for Russian interests in Ukraine, Medvedchuk’s political party is the biggest opposition force in parliament, with millions of supporters. Over the past year, that party has come under attack. Medvedchuk was charged with treason in May and placed under house arrest in Kyiv. Just last month, the U.S. accused him and his allies of plotting to stage a coup with help from the Russian military.
Throughout his 21 years in power, Putin has seen Ukraine as a fraternal nation, tied to Russia by bonds of faith, family, politics, and a millennium of common history. He has spent the past seven years using every tool at his disposal, including coercion and outright invasion, to preserve those ties, as the Ukrainian people increasingly turn toward the West. Short of war, one of the best ways that Putin has to influence Ukraine is through Medvedchuk and his political party. So it should not be surprising that Russia’s military standoff with the West has escalated in step with the crackdown against his friend.

Medvedchuk, center, faces treason charges in Kyiv
Sputnik/AP
Last February, days after the Inauguration of President Joe Biden, America’s allies in Kyiv decided to get tough on Medvedchuk. The Ukrainian government started by taking his TV channels off the air, depriving Russia of its propaganda outlets in the country. The U.S. embassy in Kyiv applauded the move. About two weeks later, on Feb. 19, 2021, Ukraine announced that it had seized the assets of Medvedchuk’s family. Among the most important, it said, was a pipeline that brings Russian oil to Europe, enriching Medvedchuk and his family—including Putin’s goddaughter, Daria—and helping to bankroll Medvedchuk’s political party.
The first inkling of Putin’s response came less than two days later, at 7 a.m. on Feb. 21. In a little-noticed statement, the Russian Defense Ministry announced the deployment of 3,000 paratroopers to the border with Ukraine for “large-scale exercises,” training them to “seize enemy structures and hold them until the arrival of the main force.” Those soldiers were the first in a military buildup that has since grown to more than 100,000 Russian troops. In their scramble to respond, the U.S. and its allies have sent planeloads of weapons to Ukraine and thousands of troops to secure the eastern flank of the NATO alliance.
The resulting standoff has revived the tensions of the Cold War and pushed Europe to the brink of a major military conflict. In trying to discern Putin’s motives, observers have raised his strategic wish to humble the Americans, divide the Europeans, and restore Moscow’s influence over the lands it controlled before its empire crumbled in 1991. But the roots of the crisis have been overlooked. To understand Putin’s objectives, you have to understand both his personal and political ties to Ukraine, as well as his long-standing aim to bring the nation under his control. When Medvedchuk was placed under house arrest, the Russian leader called the attack on his proxies “an absolutely obvious purge of the political field,” one that threatened to turn Ukraine “into Russia’s antithesis, a kind of anti-Russia.”
Few people have a clearer vantage on Putin’s response than the alleged coup plotter, Medvedchuk. In the year before the crisis escalated, he met with Putin several times at his residence near Moscow, despite the pandemic protocols that have kept the Russian leader isolated from all but his top aides. The question that now fills headlines around the world—What does Putin want?—is not a matter of conjecture for his closest friend in Kyiv.
It took me a while to find Medvedchuk’s office amid the alleys of the city center. The address led to an old apartment block near the end of a steep slope, with no outward sign of its political significance. Behind the unmarked door, a handful of armed guards looked at me in silence. One proceeded to search my bag, demanding to know whether it contained a knife or “any kind of shiv.” Medvedchuk was more cordial. Dressed in a fitted blue suit, he had the look of a Ken doll’s father—stiff, tanned, and manicured, with an angular jaw. Upon entering the conference room, he strutted over to a thermostat and asked, “Are you warm enough?”
The story of his friendship with Putin, he said, goes back to the early years of Putin’s presidency. Medvedchuk was chief of staff to Putin’s counterpart in Kyiv, and they often met at official functions. At the time, Russia had all the influence it wanted in Ukraine. Its economy depended on Russia for cheap gas and cheaper loans, and its leaders had no intention of joining any Western alliances.
To strengthen their bond with the Russian leader, Medvedchuk and his wife, a famous news anchor in Ukraine, asked Putin to be the godfather of their newborn. They have stayed close ever since. In one interview on Russian state TV, Medvedchuk recalled how Putin doted on Daria, bringing her a bouquet of flowers and a teddy bear, when he visited the Medvedchuks at their villa in Crimea.

Medvedchuk on vacation with his daughter Daria
Courtesy of Viktor Medvedchuk
Their friendship only grew closer after 2014, when a revolution tore their countries apart. Protesters built an encampment on Kyiv’s central square that winter, demanding Ukrainian leaders fight corruption and integrate with the West. More than two months of clashes with police ended on a frigid February morning, when security forces opened fire on the demonstrators, killing dozens of them in the streets.
The regime collapsed the following day. Its leaders fled across the border to Russia, and as their political party fell apart, so did the machinery of Russian influence over its neighbor. “There is no legitimate authority in Ukraine now,” Putin fumed in a speech at the Kremlin that spring. “No one to talk to.” The revolution, he claimed, was nothing more than a U.S.-backed coup, and he responded by ordering his troops to invade. After swiftly taking over Crimea, Russian forces moved into the coal-mining heartland of eastern Ukraine, installing separatist puppet regimes in two of its biggest cities.
Read more: The Man Putin Fears
As Ukraine fought back in the east, its capital became a political battleground. The remnants of the pro-Russian establishment set out to build new parties in Ukraine, each vying for the old regime’s voters. “We knew Putin does not want chaos and war in Ukraine in the long term,” says an adviser to one of the Ukrainian oligarchs who funded these parties. “He wants a protectorate, a loyal government, like he had before.” Russia’s allies in Kyiv wanted the right to run for office, to buy up industries, and to control TV networks. As the Russian lawmaker Konstantin Zatulin explained it to me at the time: “This would be our compromise. Russia would have its own soloists in the great Ukrainian choir, and they would sing for us.” Under that arrangement, he added, “We would have no need to tear Ukraine apart.”
The U.S. was not open to that kind of deal, and the Obama Administration took a hard line against Russia’s operatives in Kyiv. Many of them were sanctioned right after Russia invaded in March 2014; Medvedchuk was at the top of the blacklist. Still, by the end of 2018, the pro-Russian parties achieved a breakthrough in Ukraine, forming an alliance called Opposition Platform—For Life. Backed by billionaires sympathetic to Moscow, they owned three television networks in Ukraine. And their party’s chairman was Putin’s old friend Medvedchuk.
During elections held the following year, Ukraine voted in a new President, an actor and comedian named Volodymyr Zelensky. His popularity derived from a hit sitcom called Servant of the People, in which he starred as a fictional President. Three months later, Zelensky’s political party won a majority in parliament. But Medvedchuk’s faction came in second place, making it the biggest opposition force in the country. “Millions of citizens voted for us,” Medvedchuk told me. “Putin gave a promise to protect them.”
Medvedchuk’s TV channels worked to weaken the new government. “They were eating into the electoral base, just destroying Zelensky,” says the President’s first national security adviser, Oleksandr Danyliuk. The networks were especially relentless in attacking the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its failure to secure vaccine supplies from Western allies. When Russia released its own vaccine in August 2020, Medvedchuk, his wife, and their daughter Daria were among the first to get it. They then flew to Moscow to talk to Putin. It was the first public meeting the Russian leader had with anyone—unmasked, on camera, and without social distancing—since the pandemic began. Their talks that day resulted in a deal for Russia to supply Ukraine with millions of doses of its vaccine, and to allow Ukrainian labs to produce it free of charge.
When Medvedchuk brought the offer to Kyiv, the government rejected it. So did the U.S. State Department, which accused Russia of using its vaccine as a tool of political influence. But as the death toll mounted in Ukraine—and no vaccine shipments arrived from the West—voters turned away from Zelensky in droves. By the fall of 2020, his approval ratings fell well below 40%, compared with over 70% a year earlier. In some polls taken that December, Medvedchuk’s party was in the lead.

Viktor Medvedchuk meeting Putin near Moscow in October 2020
Alexei Druzhinin—TASS/Getty Images
Zelensky grew especially concerned about the party’s television channels, which he condemned as messengers of Russian propaganda. When he decided to take those channels off the air last February, it was not only a defensive move, says Danyliuk, his former security adviser. It was also conceived as a welcome gift to the Biden Administration, which had made the fight against international corruption a pillar of its foreign policy. As Danyliuk put it, the decision to go after Putin’s friend “was calculated to fit in with the U.S. agenda.”
Throughout the ensuing military crisis, the U.S. has had no ambassador in Kyiv. The last one, Marie Yovanovitch, was fired in April 2019 after she ran afoul of President Trump’s campaign to extract political favors from Ukraine. Trump wanted the Ukrainians to investigate the Biden family, and he froze military aid to Kyiv as a means of pressure. The resulting scandal led to Trump’s first impeachment in the House, and it left the U.S. embassy in Kyiv hollowed out and demoralized.
“My chain of command went to sh-t,” says Suriya Jayanti, who was then a senior diplomat at the embassy. “We just disappeared.” That did not change, she says, after Biden took office last year. His top foreign policy staff was focused on confronting China, she says, and they tended to see Russia as a nuisance to be managed or ignored. “His team didn’t care about Russia,” Jayanti told me in Kyiv last fall, shortly before she resigned from government. “And they didn’t want to hear about Ukraine.” Only in recent days, nearly a year into the crisis, did Biden pick a new ambassador to Kyiv, who has not yet been installed.

Lon Tweeten/TIME
A senior U.S. official tells TIME that Ukraine has always been a top priority for the Administration: “There has been very extensive and almost constant focus on Ukraine from day one.” When the Zelensky government decided to go after Medvedchuk, the U.S. welcomed it as part of Ukraine’s struggle to “counter Russian malign influence,” the official said. The methods used in this struggle have been novel and controversial. Rather than working through the justice system, Zelensky has imposed sanctions against Ukrainian tycoons and politicians, freezing their assets by decree.
This strategy, which the government calls “de-oligarchization,” has targeted many of Zelensky’s domestic opponents and, in particular, their television channels. The U.S. has avoided criticizing the crackdown, not wanting to “micromanage” what Ukraine was doing, said the senior U.S. official. But in the case of Medvedchuk, the U.S. embassy cheered Zelensky on. “We support Ukraine’s efforts to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity through sanctions,” the embassy said in a tweet last February, the day after the sanctions froze Medvedchuk’s assets.
The party leader was furious. “This is political repression,” Medvedchuk told me. “All my bank accounts are frozen. I can’t manage my assets. I can’t even pay my utility bills.”
In April, as Russian forces assembled at the border, Zelensky traveled to the front lines to meet his troops, and invited me to come along. Military helicopters got us most of the way to the trenches, but the last few hundred paces required a hike through the mud with a handful of soldiers and bodyguards. One of them lugged a big machine gun, with boxes of shells latched to his belt.
The President spent the day talking to his troops, dining with them, and handing out medals. Considering the number of Russian tanks poised to invade from across the nearby border, he seemed remarkably upbeat. We spent the night near the garrison, and he arrived at the mess hall for breakfast in a track suit, fresh from a morning jog through the war zone.
On the flight back that day, we talked about Medvedchuk and his TV networks, and whether it seemed wise in hindsight to shut them down. Zelensky made no apologies. “I consider them devils,” the President told me. “Their narratives seek to disarm Ukraine of its statehood.” As the Kyiv skyline appeared through the window and the plane began to descend, Zelensky grew upset. “Al Capone killed a lot of people, but he got locked up over his taxes,” he told me. “I think these TV channels killed a lot of people through the information war.”
Some of his advisers, especially in the intelligence community, were less enthusiastic about the move against Medvedchuk. “At least he’s the devil we know,” one retired spy chief told me in Kyiv, agreeing to discuss the issue on condition of anonymity. Since Russia first started the war in 2014, Medvedchuk has served as one of the lead negotiators in numerous rounds of peace talks, often winning the release of prisoners of war. “He has direct access to Putin,” the spy chief told me. That kind of access is rare, he says, and it has made Medvedchuk an effective mediator.
Zelensky was not moved by such arguments. On May 12, about a month after our trip to the front lines, Ukrainian authorities issued an arrest warrant for Medvedchuk. Prosecutors alleged that he had profited from the Russian occupation of Crimea, and they charged him with treason. A court ordered him to remain under house arrest pending trial, cut off from his voters and prevented from attending sessions of parliament.
U.S. law enforcement went after his allies. Oleh Voloshyn, a prominent member of Medvedchuk’s party, was greeted by the FBI when he arrived in Washington last July. Two agents approached him at Dulles International Airport and asked to have a word in private, away from his wife and infant son, who were traveling with him. Voloshyn, who serves as Medvedchuk’s envoy in the West, spent the next three hours answering the agents’ questions. “They took my cell phone,” Voloshyn told me of the incident, which has not been previously reported. “And they took all the information from my cell phone.”

Voloshyn, whom the U.S. has accused of being part of a coup plot, at his office in Kyiv Jan. 29
Maxim Dondyuk for TIME
In a statement on Jan. 20, the U.S. government leveled an astonishing series of allegations against Voloshyn and Medvedchuk. It claimed that they are part of an ongoing Kremlin plot to install a puppet government in Ukraine, propped up by a Russian military occupation. “Russia has directed its intelligence services to recruit current and former Ukrainian government officials to prepare to take over the government of Ukraine and to control Ukraine’s critical infrastructure with an occupying Russian force,” said the statement from the U.S. Treasury Department, which imposed sanctions on Voloshyn and other alleged plotters.
When we spoke by phone the following day, Voloshyn had already pulled his money out of the bank and was preparing to leave Kyiv with his family. “Maybe Serbia,” he says of his destination. “Maybe Russia.” He told me he has no intention of taking power in Ukraine with help from the Russian military, and said the aim of his party was always to win power peacefully—either through elections or, as Voloshyn put it, a diplomatic “compromise” between the Russia and the West. “There is no third option,” he says. “Russia either gets the influence it wants by peaceful means, or it gets it by force.”
With Medvedchuk sidelined and his party in retreat, the Kremlin has no clear path to influence over Ukraine through politics, and that raises the temptation to use hard power, Voloshyn told me. “You have to understand,” he says. “There are hawks around Putin who want this crisis. They are ready to invade. They come to him and say, ‘Look at your Medvedchuk. Where is he now? Where is your peaceful solution? Sitting under house arrest? Should we wait until all pro-Russian forces are arrested?’”
Nearly 12 months since it began, the crisis in Ukraine has become far bigger and more dangerous than any political grudge. In early December, as over 100,000 Russian troops stood at the border with Ukraine, Biden held a call with Putin to defuse the tensions. According to the White House, the President offered to hear out all of Russia’s “strategic concerns,” opening the door to a far more sweeping set of talks. It was a breakthrough for Putin to get a U.S. President to engage with him on the future of the NATO alliance, which Putin has long described as the main threat to Russian security.
The response from Russian diplomats smacked of an old negotiating tactic: start high. They demanded a written guarantee from the U.S. that Ukraine would never join NATO. They also told the U.S. to withdraw its military forces from Eastern Europe, retreating to positions they held before Putin took power. As the lead Russian envoy put it ahead of talks in January, “NATO needs to pack up its stuff and get back to where it was in 1997.” Rather than defusing the standoff, Biden’s overture allowed Russia to air a long list of grievances against the West, unleashing what one Kremlin insider in Moscow described to me as “an enormous pile of pent-up tensions.”

A satellite image taken Dec. 23 shows a deployment of Russian troops at the Opuk training ground in Crimea
Maxar Tech/AFP/Getty Images
As the talks progressed through January, Russians came to believe they had the upper hand as long as they could keep up the military pressure on Ukraine. “It’s the perfect time to make some trades, to get sanctions removed, to talk about security concerns,” says the Kremlin insider, who agreed to discuss the negotiations on condition of anonymity. “The logic is simple,” the source adds. “If we don’t put a lot of fear into them, we will not get to a clear solution, because that’s just how the Western system works. It’s very hard for them to reach a consensus on something. All those moving parts, all those checks and balances, each one pulling in different directions. So the aim is to present a threat of such massive consequences that it forces everyone on that side to agree.”
The gambit appears to be failing. The U.S. has rejected Russia’s core demands out of hand, and prepared a raft of sanctions that would cut much of the Russian economy off from the rest of the world. “The gradualism of the past is out, and this time we’ll start at the top of the escalation ladder and stay there,” says a senior Administration official.
Biden has begun to warn Ukraine and other allies that a Russian invasion looks imminent. Over 8,500 U.S. troops were put on high alert in January, prepared to deploy to Eastern Europe alongside naval ships and warplanes. The State Department ordered nonessential staff and family members to leave the U.S. embassy in Kyiv, it said, out of “an abundance of caution.”

Ukrainian forces on a joint patrol Jan. 9 near the border with Belarus
Tyler Hicks—The New York Times/REDUX
It is far from clear whether peace talks can bring Europe back from the brink of war, or what Putin might consider a face-saving compromise. Under the Kremlin’s pandemic protocols, the Russian leader has been more isolated during this crisis than at any point in his career. In early January, when he would normally celebrate Orthodox Christmas among the crowds at a Russian cathedral, the Kremlin issued footage of the President alone with a priest, solemnly holding a candle in the chapel of his private residence. “Very few people can speak to him now,” the Kremlin insider told me. “The world inside his head is only his own.”
In Kyiv, Putin’s friend is even more isolated. Stripped of its main TV channels and beset by criminal charges, Medvedchuk’s party has been sinking in the polls. Medvedchuk remains under house arrest, with a tracking device affixed to his ankle and police officers stationed outside his home. His daughter’s security was such a concern that he declined to say anything about her whereabouts. But one of his associates told me that Daria remains in Kyiv, surrounded by private security guards. The main concern, the associate said, is kidnapping. “But yes, she’s still here.”
—With reporting by Leslie Dickstein and Simmone Shah/New York; and Brian Bennett, W.J. Hennigan, and Nik Popli/Washington
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TIME · by Simon Shuster/Kyiv




3. The Wagner Group Is Heading Closer to Ukraine: Who Are They?


Excerpts:

President Putin watches the Zapad 2021 joint strategic exercises of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.
“Let’s imagine that Ukraine is a member of NATO, is stuffed with weapons, … and begins an operation in the Crimea. Do we have to fight with the NATO bloc? Has anyone thought anything about it? It seems not,” he said.
However, the Russian leader conveniently brushed over the fact that Crimea was Ukrainian territory until 2014, when his forces invaded the peninsula.

The Wagner Group Is Heading Closer to Ukraine: Who Are They?
19fortyfive.com · by ByStavros Atlamazoglou · February 2, 2022
In what seems like an old play from the Russian hybrid warfare handbook, the Russian private military company Wagner Group is withdrawing its mercenaries from around the world close to Ukraine.
According to an article by The Daily Beast, Wagner Group has pulled out dozens of its paramilitary troops from the Central African Republic and is repositioning them to Eastern Europe.
Wagner Group in Ukraine?
As a private military company, Wagner Group has very close ties with the Kremlin and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The paramilitary organization was founded by a retired Russian military intelligence officer and is bankrolled by Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin.
The U.S. Department of Justice has indicted Prigozhin for his role in Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
“Usually when we hear that some have left we find out that they are just a handful—sometimes five or six people within a month. It’s the first time we are hearing that dozens have departed in a month. Yes, they share intelligence with us. But that’s where it often ends. We rarely know anything about their itenary [sic] or plans,” a military officer with the Central African Republic Army told The Daily Beast.
Were Wagner Group to be deploying into Eastern Ukraine or participating in a potential invasion of the rest of the country, it would be returning to the scene of the crime. The paramilitary group first made its name in 2014 during the invasion and annexation of Crimea.
“We have specifically been told by their supervisors that about 20 Russians departed this January for Eastern Europe. What we understand is that the Russians who’ve left, and those who will leave later on, are doing so as part of their assignment rotation policy and that they would be replaced in due course,” another CAR official told The Daily Beast.
Wagner Group recruits mainly former military personnel and deploys them in hot spots around the world in order to support or advance Russian foreign policy interests. Wagner Group provides direct action, combat advising, and foreign internal defense services to countries or forces that Moscow wants to bolster but without directly getting involved. The Wagner Group offers the Kremlin the necessary deniability to save face on the international stage but still pursue its goals.
“The West Is Not Listening”
Meanwhile, Putin offered a rare public view of the situation in Ukraine. The Russian president complained that the West isn’t listening to Russia’s demands. The Kremlin wants the U.S. and the West to agree to stop the expansion of NATO in countries that were once in the Russian sphere of influence.
“We’re told every country has the right to choose their own means of security. We agree with that. But it seems to me that the United States does not care that much about Ukrainian security — maybe they think about it somewhere in the background. But their main task is to restrict the development of Russia,” Putin said.
The Russian leader went further and asked what would happen if Ukraine was a member of NATO and sought to start military operations in the annexed Crimea.
President Putin watches the Zapad 2021 joint strategic exercises of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.
“Let’s imagine that Ukraine is a member of NATO, is stuffed with weapons, … and begins an operation in the Crimea. Do we have to fight with the NATO bloc? Has anyone thought anything about it? It seems not,” he said.
However, the Russian leader conveniently brushed over the fact that Crimea was Ukrainian territory until 2014, when his forces invaded the peninsula.
1945’s New Defense and National Security Columnist, Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.
19fortyfive.com · by ByStavros Atlamazoglou · February 2, 2022


4. Russia's Putin accuses the U.S. of trying to drag him into war



Putin's words seem to be echoing what we have been thinking about the Gerasimov doctrine.  

It might be useful to reread Charles K. Bartels' important 2016 article in Military Review: Getting Gerasimov Right. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art009.pdf

Bartels wrote:

In this vein of Western thinking, Gerasimov’s article is often interpreted as proposing a new Russian way of warfare that blends conventional and unconventional warfare with aspects of national power, often referred to as “hybrid warfare.” This article will attempt to put Gerasimov’s article, which was written for a Russian audience, in context for U.S. readers to explain some allusions that are sometimes missed or misunderstood.
...
No matter what reason the article was published, it is important to keep in mind that Gerasimov is simply explaining his view of the operational environment and the nature of future war, and not proposing a new Russian way of warfare or military doctrine, as this article was likely drafted well before the start of the Maidan protests.
...
For U.S. readers, Gerasimov’s linking of the Arab Spring and “color revolutions” (and in later comments, the Maidan Movement) with military capability development may seem odd. In order to put his comments in context, it is necessary to look at the Russian view of warfare and forced regime change as it has developed since the end of the Cold War.

In the Russian view, transgressions against the post-Cold War international order began with the partition of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, when Russia was at her weakest. 
...
However, Russia believes that the pattern of forced U.S.-sponsored regime change has been largely supplanted by a new method. Instead of an overt military invasion, the first volleys of a U.S. attack come from the installment of a political opposition through state propaganda (e.g., CNN, BBC), the Internet and social media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). After successfully instilling political dissent, separatism, and/or social strife, the legitimate government has increasing difficulty maintaining order. As the security situation deteriorates, separatist movements can be stoked and strengthened, and undeclared special operations, conventional, and private military forces (defense contractors) can be introduced to battle the government and cause further havoc. Once the legitimate government is forced to use increasingly aggressive methods to maintain order, the United States gains a pretext for the imposition of economic and political sanctions, and sometimes even military sanctions such as no-fly zones, to tie the hands of the besieged governments and promote further dissent (figure 2).

Eventually, as the government collapses and anarchy results, military forces under the guise of peacekeepers can then be employed to pacify the area, if desired, and a new government that is friendly to the United States and the West can be installed (figure 3).

This theory may sound far-fetched to U.S. ears but is a very common view throughout the former Soviet Union. This narrative also sheds some light on the Russian government’s hostility toward NGOs.6 Though there are usually no allegations of NGOs being directly or indirectly controlled by foreign governments, most Russian reporting on NGOs purports that they are simply being funded because they have an objective to influence a particular government in a given way, or to just cause general instability. An interesting aspect of these allegations is that the Central Intelligence Agency (a favored scapegoat for any Russian misfortune) is no longer typically mentioned; the usual culprits (in the new narrative) are the U.S. State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).7
...

Some analysts in the West, having read Gerasimov’s article and viewed current Russian operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, have created models for a new Russian way of warfare. Although these models may be useful analyzing past actions, not much stock should be put in them for predicting the nature of future Russian operations. In Gerasimov’s own words, “Each war represents an isolated case, requiring an understanding of its own particular logic, its own unique character.”10 He is saying that there is no model or formula for understanding the operational environment or the exercise of national power in every war scenario. Each instance of a problem will be looked upon as a unique situation that will require the marshalling of the state’s resources in whatever way is necessary.

Although Russia may respond similarly to two different situations, this is not an indicator of a specific formula for action, rather it just means the similarity of the situations required similar responses. At the tactical level, models and formulas are essential for determining the correlation of forces needed for victory, but at the operational and strategic levels, a much different approach is required (figure 5).


​If only we were as good as the Russian's accuse of of being.​



Russia's Putin accuses the U.S. of trying to drag him into war
NPR · by Steve Inskeep · February 2, 2022
Russian President Vladimir Putin has broken his silence on the Ukraine crisis, accusing the U.S. of trying to lay a trap for Russia. Diplomatic talks continue.
STEVE INSKEEP, HOST:
We got a glimpse yesterday of the world as it looks to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian leader spoke in public for the first time in weeks. He was at a news conference in Moscow, and he offered his distinctive spin on more than 100,000 troops he has massed near Ukraine. Putin described an invasion of Ukraine not as something he has made extensive preparations to do, but as a trap that the United States wants to lure him into.
He speaks here through an interpreter.
(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING)
PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN: (Through interpreter) Their main job is to deter the development of Russia, to hinder the development of Russia. And in this sense, Ukraine is just a tool. You can do it in various ways. You can drag us into some kind of military conflict, armed conflict, and by using their allies in Europe to impose these hard-line sanctions against us that the United States is talking about.
INSKEEP: The Russian leader also spoke of diplomatic solutions. Though he said, so far, the West is ignoring his real concerns. What's going on here? We begin in a place where people must listen especially closely - Kyiv, Ukraine - which is where we find NPR's Daniel Estrin.
Daniel, welcome.
DANIEL ESTRIN, BYLINE: Thank you very much.
INSKEEP: How did Putin's words sound when you heard them in Kyiv?
ESTRIN: Well, I saw a dartboard here with Putin's face on it yesterday, so that gives you a sense...
INSKEEP: Oh.
ESTRIN: ...Of what Ukrainians think of him. I asked one what he thought of Putin's words. And he told me, well, what Putin says doesn't really matter; we all know what he wants. And Putin said - repeated his positions yesterday. NATO's expansion to Eastern Europe is a threat. Putin repeated his demand that Ukraine never be allowed into NATO. And he laid out a new argument, which was that if Ukraine tries to recapture Crimea from Russia, then Russia might have to go to war with all of NATO. He accused the U.S. of wagging the dog.
INSKEEP: I guess we should remind people that Ukraine is not currently scheduled to go into NATO. The U.S. years ago said that they would like that. But NATO has made no move to admit them...
ESTRIN: That's right.
INSKEEP: ...For more than a decade. Now, there is a NATO leader - a NATO nation leader - who was in Ukraine - U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson. What did he have to say?
ESTRIN: He said this is the biggest show of hostility that Ukraine has faced in our lifetime. He said the 100,000 troops that Russia has on Ukraine's borders are far more than the 30,000 troops that captured Crimea in 2014. And he threatened sanctions the moment the first Russian soldier steps foot further into Ukraine.
INSKEEP: OK. So NATO is saying that. What kind of diplomacy is going on this week?
ESTRIN: Well, the bottom line is that diplomacy is continuing. There's a back and forth of proposals. The U.S. has delivered a written response to Russia's security demands. And now the Russians are preparing a formal response to the U.S. So Putin says he's continuing talks. He still wants dialogue.
INSKEEP: OK. We'll keep listening. NPR's Daniel Estrin in Kyiv - thank you so much.
ESTRIN: You're welcome.
NPR · by Steve Inskeep · February 2, 2022






5. On Taiwan invasion, China taking notes from Putin

Two words: political warfare.
On Taiwan invasion, China taking notes from Putin
China will not likely invade in 2022 but focus instead on operations that rattle confidence in American might and protection
asiatimes.com · by Grant Newsham · February 2, 2022
US Congress Representative Michael McCaul of Texas predicts a Chinese invasion of Taiwan after the Winter Olympics. Maybe. Maybe not. It’s probably easier to predict who will win the Super Bowl than to predict when, if and how China will make its move on Taiwan.
But, timing aside, McCaul is right: The threat is real.
The People’s Liberation Army has the hardware, weaponry, manpower and capability to launch an assault across the Taiwan Strait. Its brass have been planning for decades and just might think they can succeed.

The PLA might not do it the way American forces would, but the Chinese do a lot of things differently from the Americans. And they often do them very well. However, this writer thinks they won’t do it – at least not an all-out assault to seize Taiwan.
They may do something more modest that still humiliates the United States and rattles everybody’s confidence in American might and protection: something that, at the same time, demonstrates that China is the dominant military power in the region – not in the least because of its perceived willingness to use force.
If all that Beijing achieves in the short term is publicly neutering the US in the Pacific, it goes a long way towards moving it towards its next step of bringing Taiwan to heel and regional domination.
This is what Vladimir Putin is doing to President Biden and the Europeans. Embarrassing the Americans, exposing weaknesses and sowing doubt. And he is exploiting fissures in the NATO alliance that over time can be widened by using military threats, economic pressure and subversion – possibly leading to the fragmentation or diminution of NATO itself.
Beijing is no doubt taking notes.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a reception in Tianjin in 2018. Photo: AFP / Alexei Druzhinin / Sputnik
Thinking like Beijing
So, what are some of Beijing’s more “modest” options for Taiwan?
Maybe a move against one of Taiwan’s offshore islands? Or interfering with shipping and aircraft to or from Kinmen or Matsu or Pratas islands?
Or perhaps force Taiwan and/or other countries’ shipping in the South China Sea to submit to Chinese monitoring, inspection and approval before entering the South China Sea?
Xi Jinping no doubt has his people giving him even more options.
And they could be including in their calculations that if they make their move too fast and try to grab too much, it may force the Americans into a fight that will bleed the PLA and also put China’s overseas assets at risk.

US forces may have a hard time if a fight is around Taiwan, but they have the advantage beyond that – and can interdict (especially operating with partners) Chinese sea-lines of communication and the vital oil, food and trade that flows along them.
The PLA still doesn’t have global power projection capabilities, yet.
Another tripwire Beijing may try to avoid triggering is the United States’ economic “nuclear option.” The PRC is still vulnerable to being delinked from the US dollar system or a complete shut-off from technology imports – as probably would happen in the event of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.
All this to say, Beijing might be inclined to wait a while and let its political warfare efforts simmer – and thaw potential resistance. Political warfare means using China’s prodigious economic, diplomatic, political, psychological and implicit military pressure to establish influence in a nation.
Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, left, and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang watch Foreign Minister Jeremiah Manele sign their agreement with China State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on 9, 2019. Photo: AFP / Thomas Peter
There’s still political warfare
It is working well for Beijing so far. China has used political warfare to make inroads throughout the entire Pacific – the Solomon Islands, Tonga and Kiribati to name a few. And Southeast Asia is hedging its bets – with some nations already casting their lot with China.

Cambodia, for instance, is allegedly allowing the PRC to build a new naval base. Apart from being gains in their own right, this is allowing China to increasingly isolate Taiwan economically, diplomatically, politically, psychologically and militarily.
China recently dispatched a kinder, gentler ambassador to Australia. And if the Australian Labor Party wins this year’s election, even stalwart Australia might go softer on China.
The PRC is even locking up Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean. Across the region, pro-China leaders are winning elections and other nations are shifting into China’s camp. And Africa is looking pretty good from Beijing’s perspective, too.
The cumulative effect isn’t just a political warfare win against Taiwan, but against China’s biggest target, the United States. Beijing is lighting so many small fires that can distract and overwhelm the US response, and ultimately could erode US resistance.
The PRC is also helping things along by pumping the deadly drug fentanyl into the United States and killing well over 60,000 Americans a year – many of them of military age – and the Americans do nothing.
Thus, the plan might be to don’t do anything “too much” that would force the Americans to fight. But do just enough to humiliate and discredit them.
Hold your fire a bit and Wall Street and US businesses – that consider Taiwan at best a bargaining chip, and at worst a disposable irritant in the more important US-China relationship – will praise Beijing for showing restraint while insisting Washington do whatever it takes to avoid war with a “nuclear-armed PRC.”
The same American contingent will also argue that China’s help – on climate change/North Korea/fill-in-the-blank – demands that the US overlook Chinese moves against Taiwan – as long as they are “modest” and thus no “threat to American national interests.”
What could change Beijing
While this writer thinks the PRC will not invade Taiwan in 2022, there is one exception.
If in 2022 the US has serious domestic problems, such as widespread rioting, and appears chaotic, distracted and unable to put up a fight, Xi Jinping just might be tempted to take his chances against Taiwan.
And that is even more likely if the US military is short of funds and its leaders are more focused on routing out imaginary extremists, doing social engineering and fighting climate change than winning wars.
Indeed, read the news each day and it seems the Biden administration and America’s ruling elite are trying to give Xi a reason to go for broke.
Chinese President Xi Jinping reviews a military display by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy in the South China Sea on April 12, 2018. Photo: Xinhua
Beyond 2022
So that’s my take for 2022.
From 2023 onwards, however, I think China will assault Taiwan – because the United States is still chaotic and appears unable to defend Taiwan, or even its position in Asia. And if somehow the Americans get their wits about them and are strengthening their capabilities and alliances, Beijing just might see its window of opportunity closing.
Either way, the US and free nations can’t say what’s coming will be a “strategic surprise.” The test of how they respond will come soon enough.
As for the Super Bowl (February 13, 2022), it’s the Cincinnati Bengals by a touchdown.
Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine and a former diplomat and business executive who spent many years in Asia. He is a senior fellow with the Center for Security Policy. This article was originally published by JAPAN Forward. It is republished here with permission.
asiatimes.com · by Grant Newsham · February 2, 2022


6. The West Has Responded to Russia’s Ultimatum. Is It Enough?

Excerpts:
One question remains unanswered, however, and that is why countries that were Russia’s allies in World War II and during the Cold War, not to mention a whole host of nations that were once part of Russian territory, have all ended up as potential enemies.
In one respect, the Western responses are entirely in keeping with the spirit of Russia’s approach to Ukraine: we have created the crisis, and we will help to resolve it. In the West’s case, this refers to the supply of arms to Ukraine and withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, which is now once again up for discussion. This is enough to facilitate work on practical issues of national security. Whether it’s enough to burnish Putin’s historical pedestal remains to be seen.
The West Has Responded to Russia’s Ultimatum. Is It Enough? - The Moscow Times
In its negotiations with the West, Russia is behaving not like a country preparing to wage war, but like a country that, if necessary, can afford to do so.

Updated: one day ago
The Moscow Times · by Alexander Baunov · February 2, 2022
The West has provided Moscow with the written responses it had demanded to Russia’s draft agreement on European security. As expected, the responses rejected the main demands of an end to NATO expansion and retreat from Eastern Europe, but did offer some hope on secondary issues. Now the ball is in Russia’s court: will it appreciate the low-key but substantial concessions offered by the West, or refuse them, paving the way (or so the world expects) for a war with Ukraine?
In some ways, the two sides appear to be negotiating over different things. Russia is talking about its own security, while the West is focusing on Ukraine’s. This switch in focus looks to Russia like an attempt to turn the conversation away from the issue at hand toward less important details. Yet for the West, the security problems it has created for Russia didn’t even exist until very recently. One important consequence of Russia’s actions in articulating its demands is that the West has been forced, albeit unwillingly and cautiously, to recognize that there is even anything to discuss.
Previously, it was the West’s firm position that there could be no threat from market democracies, states governed by the rule of law, and open societies approaching Russia’s borders. If Russia is not a rogue state, what does it have to fear from this?
Now, as a result of the ultimatum issued by Russia as it massed its troops on the Ukrainian borders before Christmas — that NATO must pledge never to admit Ukraine into its ranks, and scale back its presence in Eastern Europe — cracks in this position have appeared. The West still believes that it does not pose a threat to anyone, but is now willing to concede that others may view its expansion toward Russia differently, and is prepared to enter discussions in order to prevent such misconceptions from creating very real problems.
So what is the source of Russia’s fears? The modern Western view of security is based on the principle that democracies and autocracies do not pose equal threats. Free market democracies supposedly cannot be a source of aggression or pose a threat of war because their politicians have to answer to voters, and voters do not want to fight and die for their government in an aggressive war, while autocrats can send their people off to die for the regime.
Autocrats, therefore, suspect — and not without reason — that until their countries become free market democracies, they will never be afforded equal security rights. The security of people living in autocracies is considered secondary to their freedom.
The question of whether Russia had any concerns for its own security was considered a bad joke: after all, not only was it stronger than its western neighbors, those neighbors were both richer and more advanced in terms of their legal and institutional development.
Accordingly, there could be no threat from such neighbors. Yet in the last two hundred years, Russia has been attacked by European armies three times — by countries that were wealthier and more developed, both at a domestic and sometimes institutional level. Soldiers from countries that see themselves as perfectly harmless, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, and Sweden, all waged war on the Russian army and civilians on Russian territory during the last world war, centuries after any Russian soldier had set foot on their land, if ever.
So if the generational trauma and fears of Poland, the Baltics, Czechia, and Ukraine can be seriously taken into account as part of their political motivation today, so can Russia’s.
The many months of speculation of an imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine are in sharp contrast to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s usual method of a swift, covert, and unexpected special operation. It looks, therefore, as though Russia wanted to use Western fears over Ukraine’s security to achieve its broader aims. As those fears grew, so did Russia’s ambitions. Now, with tensions reaching boiling point and the world watching, it’s hard for either side to back down.
But it’s also hard to keep an army mobilized and in field conditions indefinitely. The threat of the use of force is very effective in the short term, but loses value the longer it is drawn out. This explains the deadlines set by Russia in its negotiations with the West. If the West steps out of rhythm with Russia and stops reacting within the given timeframe, Moscow will have to take action to show that it is serious or run the risk of not being listened to next time. It looks like Russia is indeed prepared to take action, even if it is not necessarily the action anticipated right now by foreign observers.
Moscow’s goal is clear: it wants the world to listen to it and to realize that the country speaking is not the same as the one that once lost the Cold War. Russia has a new confidence that has inspired it to revert to the language of the Soviet superpower.
That confidence springs from several sources. The first is Russia’s modernized army and new weapons. Judging by some of Putin’s statements, he is confident that Russia has a temporary technological advantage in some types of weapons, and that the West knows it. Secondly, modern Russia is not the Soviet Union, and did not lose anything to anyone. Finally, the Soviet Union might have had its own military bloc behind it in the form of its Warsaw Pact allies, but Russia likely feels stronger than the Soviet Union ever did, thanks to its partnership with China. Beijing may not be Moscow’s formal military ally, but it’s a reliable source of support with elements of a second anti-Western front. China is also an alternative market and supplier, including of high-tech goods. These are all things that Russia lacked both during the Cold War and in the turbulent 1990s.
In its negotiations with the West, Russia is behaving not like a country preparing to wage war, but like a country that, if necessary, can afford to do so. The aim of the West, on the other hand, is to avoid war. Consequently, Russia can exploit Western fears of war—without actually using force.
Another important asset at Putin’s disposal is the resilience of the Russian people, most of whom remember worse times, though they would of course prefer not to see their return.
With the further sanctions it is threatening, the West is capable of worsening the current living standards of ordinary Russians, but so far, nothing it has proposed could make life harder for Russians than it was in the 1990s, when the West was considered a friend of their country. In other words, Russia is better prepared to be cut off from the SWIFT international payment system than Europe is to be cut off from Russian gas supplies.
Then there is the emotional involvement the Russian public feels concerning Ukraine. It’s not just the Russian government, but the Russian people too who are prepared to pay more to keep Ukraine from going over to the West than people in the West are prepared to pay to bring Ukraine over to their side. Russia is convinced that it is defending its vital interests in Ukraine, while the West believes it is defending its principles. All else being equal, vital interests are simply worth more.
Russian diplomats and ministers have made no secret of the fact that they are carrying out the orders of the commander in chief, Putin. What they haven’t clarified is what will happen if those orders are not carried out. It appears that, like army commanders and various fronts during a war, the diplomats have been given their own instructions, but only the headquarters knows what the master plan is — and there may be more than one.
The Kremlin is often crystal clear about its intentions, and highly evasive on the means to be used. Its aim of stopping NATO expansion, above all into Ukraine, is genuine. How that aim will be achieved depends on how circumstances develop. Putin, for his part, will make that decision not as a politician, but as someone preoccupied with his legacy and place in history.
After all, NATO’s expansion and advance toward Russia’s borders has been described as the main threat to Russia and the most dire consequence of the failed foreign policy of Putin’s predecessors. Yet the most sensitive stage of that expansion—into the Baltic countries — happened on Putin’s watch. It was also during Putin’s tenure that NATO pledged that Georgia and Ukraine would one day become members. For this reason, the president will do everything he possibly can to avoid becoming the Russian ruler who presided over that moment, too. Just like with that other dilemma Putin faces — whether to stay on or step down when his current term ends in 2024—a decision has not yet been made. As usual, there will be several different plans of action on his desk. What is certain is that he will pursue policies that leave both possibilities — of staying in power and of using military force—open to him.
One question remains unanswered, however, and that is why countries that were Russia’s allies in World War II and during the Cold War, not to mention a whole host of nations that were once part of Russian territory, have all ended up as potential enemies.
In one respect, the Western responses are entirely in keeping with the spirit of Russia’s approach to Ukraine: we have created the crisis, and we will help to resolve it. In the West’s case, this refers to the supply of arms to Ukraine and withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, which is now once again up for discussion. This is enough to facilitate work on practical issues of national security. Whether it’s enough to burnish Putin’s historical pedestal remains to be seen.
This article was first published by the Carnegie Moscow Center.
The Moscow Times · by Alexander Baunov · February 2, 2022



7. How Would the American Public Respond to a Russian Invasion of Ukraine?

A key task for the administration is explaining to the American people why Ukraine (and every other foreign policy and national security issue) are important to the American people.

One of the fundamental causes for the huge political divide in our country is the perceived elite versus the rest of America. This perceived divide can be mitigated somewhat if the professionals and political leaders in the beltway bubble sincerely consider the impact on the American public and do a better job of explaining policy to the people (and emphasizing why it is important to them). They cannot fall back on "just trust us" or "we know what is good for you."

Excerpts:

Overall, the available data indicate that the public is more supportive of a strong response to Russian aggression than inward-looking caricatures of the American people would suggest. This should enable Biden to rally much of the public behind him if he responds forcefully to a Russian invasion, which in turn may strengthen his ability to deter Russia from attacking Ukraine in the first place. At the same time, public support for a tough U.S. response does not necessarily translate into public backing for very costly forms of military intervention, and Biden should not assume that public attitudes will not change.



How Would the American Public Respond to a Russian Invasion of Ukraine? - War on the Rocks
JORDAN TAMA AND DINA SMELTZ
warontherocks.com · by Jordan Tama · February 3, 2022
President Joe Biden has said that Russia would experience “enormous consequences” if it invaded Ukraine, but that he has “no intention” of moving military forces into the country. Opinion polls suggest this might be more or less what the American people want. Across the political spectrum, a strong majority supports tougher sanctions, while only 27 percent of Americans favor going to war with Russia in response to an invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, opinion is evenly split on whether the United States should use troops in this situation, with roughly half the country in favor and half opposed.
Of course, public opinion should not be the sole basis for U.S decisions on how to respond if Russia does invade Ukraine. But public support is often a key ingredient of success in foreign policy crises, and so it behooves U.S. leaders to be attuned to what the public thinks and how its thinking might evolve as the crisis plays out. Americans broadly supported efforts to wind down military campaigns in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and do not necessarily want to launch a new one in Eastern Europe. As one foreign-policy analyst recently wrote, “With Russia and Ukraine now potentially on the verge of major war, again most Americans have little appetite for shedding blood on behalf of a putative partner.”
But this does not mean Americans are indifferent or want their leaders to be. Across the political spectrum, sizable percentages of Americans favor taking steps short of war to help defend Ukraine should it come under attack from Russia. At the same time, many Americans remain uncertain about how the United States should respond to Russian aggression, and public attitudes will likely shift as the confrontation plays out.
What Do Americans Want?
In July 2021, a Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that 50 percent of Americans favored the use of U.S. troops if Russia were to invade the rest of Ukraine, whereas 48 percent of Americans opposed deploying troops in this situation. In a sign of bipartisanship on the issue, the shares of support for deploying troops were similar across party lines (54 percent of Democrats, 51 percent of Republicans, and 46 percent of Independents in favor).
These levels of support are up considerably from previous years, as only 30 percent of Americans favored using U.S. troops if Russia invaded the rest of Ukraine following its annexation of Crimea in 2014. The uptick reflects growing alarm about Russian behavior in a variety of domains, from military adventurism to interference in U.S. elections. The Chicago Council found last year that 66 percent of Americans see Russia as an adversary or rival. Gallup polls have also found rising disapproval of Russia: The percentage of Americans with an unfavorable opinion of it rose from 45 percent to 77 percent between 2010 and 2021.
The significant public backing for military action does not seem grounded in perceptions of a direct military threat from Russia to the United States. While Gallup reported an increasing share of Americans describing Russia’s military power as a critical or important threat to the vital interests of the United States (from 75 percent in 2010 to 90 percent in 2021), a January 2021 Chicago Council survey found only 11 percent of Americans consider Russia to be the greatest threat to the United States. A Pew survey this January found that only a quarter of Americans consider the Russian military buildup around Ukraine to be a major threat to U.S. interests, with one-third of Americans considering it a minor threat.
Liberal Democrats were especially supportive of using troops in response to a Russian invasion of Ukraine in last summer’s Chicago Council survey (60 percent in favor versus 47 percent of moderate Democrats). This may seem surprising given that liberals typically prefer diplomatic, rather than military, approaches to international problems and have strongly favored withdrawing the U.S. military from post-9/11 wars. For instance, the same Chicago Council survey found that 70 percent of Americans favored the decision to withdraw U.S. combat forces from Afghanistan by Sept. 11, 2021.
The counterintuitive backing of liberal Democrats for a strong response to Russian aggression could be motivated by concern about authoritarian leaders undermining democracy in the context of Trumpism at home and democratic backsliding abroad. Last summer’s Chicago Council survey found that liberal Democrats supported the use of troops in response to hypothetical military aggression against democratic allies and partners by other authoritarian countries too. For instance, 58 percent of liberal Democrats backed using U.S. troops if China invaded Taiwan and 69 percent did if North Korea invaded South Korea — rates of support that exceeded the rates among moderate or conservative Democrats and were similar to the rates among Republicans, even though Republicans generally tend to be more hawkish than Democrats.
Overall, 52 percent of Americans now support using U.S. troops if China invades Taiwan, up from just 28 percent in 2015. As with the trend line concerning military responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine, this jump reflects increased concern in Washington and among the American public about Chinese behavior in areas including security, economics, and human rights. These public attitudes are also consistent with a broader phenomenon in which the public is more supportive of military action in response to aggression by another country than of military action to foster political change within another country.
Other surveys have also found that sizable portions of the American public favor strong steps in response to a Russian attack on Ukraine, though many Americans are unsure about how the United States should respond. An Economist-YouGov poll in December found that 64 percent of Democrats and 54 percent of Republicans place greater importance on the United States taking a strong stand so that Russia does not take over Ukraine by force than on maintaining good relations with Russia, whereas just 22 percent of Republicans and 14 percent of Democrats instead prioritize the latter goal. In a similar vein, the same survey found that 41 percent of Democrats and 37 percent of Republicans thought the United States should help protect Ukraine with military force if an armed conflict arose, while just 18 percent of Democrats and 23 percent of Republicans said the United States should not do so. However, four out of ten respondents to this question said they did not know enough about the topic to make a judgment on it, suggesting that the views of many Americans may evolve depending on how a conflict unfolds and what positions U.S. and other leaders take on it.
A YouGov-Charles Koch Institute survey in December found weaker support for defending Ukraine, finding that just 27 percent of Americans favored going to war with Russia in response to a Russian invasion of Ukraine, whereas 48 percent of Americans opposed doing so. These divergent results may have been influenced by the question wording’s direct emphasis on going to war with Russia and by preceding questions in the survey suggesting that the United States was bearing too much of the burden of Europe’s defense, which may have led some respondents to think that Europe should handle the problem. But the differing results highlight the rather malleable character of public attitudes on an issue about which many Americans do not have well-established or deeply entrenched views.
Polls Under Pressure
Collectively, these data provide valuable snapshots of American attitudes regarding potential military action in response to a Russian invasion, but they should be interpreted with a grain of salt. In the event of an actual Russian invasion, the views of Democratic and Republican members of the public — particularly those without strong pre-existing views — will likely shift depending on how aggressively Russia acts and how U.S. and other leaders respond.
When developing attitudes on foreign policy issues, the public takes cues both from the behavior of foreign governments and from the positions of domestic leaders. Certainly, a more intrusive Russian invasion of Ukraine would prompt greater public support for a forceful U.S. response than would a less intrusive one. But the statements of political leaders in the United States will also matter. For instance, if Biden opts not to intervene directly against Russia and Republican leaders charge that he is not doing enough to address the crisis, Democratic voters will probably become less supportive of intervention and Republican voters will probably become more supportive of it. Conversely, if Biden does intervene directly and Republican leaders accuse him of taking the United States into war unnecessarily, support for intervention may rise among Democratic voters and fall among Republican voters.
Following a Russian invasion, the debate over U.S. intervention would also shift from the hypothetical use of force to the grim reality of what taking up arms against Russia might actually entail. Survey questions about the hypothetical use of force do not typically go into detail about the precise character of intervention. In the context of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, this may mean leaving unsaid whether U.S. military action would involve, for instance, deploying troops to NATO allies bordering Ukraine, sending military advisers into Ukraine in support of Ukrainian troops, or sending combat troops to the front lines to fight against Russia.
Options short of direct military action against Russia are likely to garner more public support than steps that would bring the United States directly into war, given the former’s lower risks to U.S. troops. Such options include stepping up military aid to Ukraine and Eastern European allies, as well as imposing large-scale sanctions on Russia. The Chicago Council’s survey last summer found that only 41 percent of Americans favored selling arms and military equipment to Ukraine, a figure consistent with a general public hesitancy to sell weapons to other countries. But a 2018 Washington Post-ABC poll found that 74 percent of Democrats and 68 percent of Republicans thought the United States should impose tougher sanctions on Russia. As the crisis unfolds, public debate will likely pit military aid and sanctions against direct military action. The lesser risk and cost associated with the former options may make them increasingly appealing as alternatives that could impose heavy consequences on Russia without bringing the United States into war with a major military power.
Overall, the available data indicate that the public is more supportive of a strong response to Russian aggression than inward-looking caricatures of the American people would suggest. This should enable Biden to rally much of the public behind him if he responds forcefully to a Russian invasion, which in turn may strengthen his ability to deter Russia from attacking Ukraine in the first place. At the same time, public support for a tough U.S. response does not necessarily translate into public backing for very costly forms of military intervention, and Biden should not assume that public attitudes will not change.
Jordan Tama is an associate professor at the School of International Service at American University and a non-resident senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Dina Smeltz is a senior fellow of public opinion and foreign policy at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
warontherocks.com · by Jordan Tama · February 3, 2022


8. Solid-Propellant Motor Test Proves Iran’s Continuing Missile Advancement


Excerpts:
Less than a decade ago, the Islamic Republic went to great lengths to downplay that it was seeking such longer-range strike capabilities. But steady technical advancements in the missile space, as well as impressions about the lack of American resolve and the strength of Iran’s military deterrence appear to have made the regime somewhat more brazen. In fact, just in the past two years Iranian officials and Iranian media have publicly flirted with references to a potential ICBM option. Most damningly, an ultra-hardline Iranian newspaper used the successful Raafe motor test to run a headline touting, “5,000 kilometer missiles are more within reach than ever.”
Rather than dismiss such a headline as noise or hyperbole, Washington and the international community would be well advised to recognize the headline for what it is: a signal of things to come for Iran’s missile capabilities.

Solid-Propellant Motor Test Proves Iran’s Continuing Missile Advancement
Less than a decade ago, the Islamic Republic went to great lengths to downplay that it was seeking such longer-range strike capabilities. But steady technical advancements have made the regime somewhat more brazen.
The National Interest · by Behnam Ben Taleblu · February 2, 2022
One might be forgiven for missing a statement this January by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (IRGC-AF) commander Amir-Ali Hajizadeh heralding the successful test of a solid-propellant motor for a carrier rocket. After all, amid renewed attacks by Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria against U.S. positions, missile attacks by Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen against an American base in the United Arab Emirates, and marathon nuclear diplomacy in Vienna, technical news related to a new rocket motor might sound, at best, tangential to the current slate of security challenges related to the Islamic Republic.
Such a view would be misguided, however. Iran’s steady advancement in the field of solid-propellant now includes solid-propellant motors for space/satellite-launch vehicles (SLVs), accentuating the overall threat posed by the Islamic Republic. They are also an important indicator of Tehran’s evolving missile prowess and continuing interest in developing longer-range strike capabilities.
Initially misreported as the launch of an SLV, the latest revelation is proof that Iran’s new ultra-hardline president, Ebrahim Raisi, and his administration are kicking the country’s space program into high gear as promised. This likely means greater government and industry support to Iran’s space program and more frequent SLV tests, something Raisi believes generates “power and pride” and promotes deterrence. It also means that the technical advancements in the service of these tests will contribute to Iranian missile power.
Indeed, despite their differing approaches to Iran policy, both the Trump and Biden administrations have criticized Tehran’s space program and SLV launches due to the overlap in technologies that SLVs and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) inherently share. European powers have not been far behind in expressing similar concerns about Iranian SLVs. According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Iran’s development of larger, more-capable SLV boosters remains a concern for a future ICBM capability.” And as expressed by the State Department, “Iran’s civilian space launch vehicle program allows it to gain experience with various technologies necessary for development of an ICBM – including staging, ignition of upper-stage engines, and control of a multiple-stage missile throughout flight.”

India remains a prime example of a nation that was able to leverage its space program and foreign assistance to work towards an ICBM capability. Previous U.S. assessments about an ICBM capability in Iran were predicated on the assumption or possibility of foreign assistance. Such assessments must now take leaps in domestic production capacity into greater account.
The newly tested motor produced by Iran’s IRGC is dubbed the Raafe. Some outlets have estimated that the Raafe weighs 12.5 tons, is 9 meters long, and 1.25 meters in diameter. This diameter size is the same as many of Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles, like the Shahab-3 and its variants, the Ghadr and the Emad. The Shahab-3 engine, which is originally of North Korean origin, forms the basis for the first stage of Iran’s liquid-propellant SLVs like the Safir and Simorgh. The Simorgh was most recently launched in December 2021 and reportedly failed to put a satellite into orbit.
According to Hajizadeh, the Raafe was designed to power the first stage of an SLV and can allegedly generate up to 68 tons of thrust. Previously, Iran unveiled a smaller second-stage solid-propellant motor in 2020 called the Salman, which was used in combination with a liquid-propellant first-stage engine and a solid-propellant third-stage motor in the Qased SLV and was tested by the IRGC in April 2020. In January 2021, Iran reported it had tested another SLV featuring an unknown/unnamed solid-propellant motor in its Zuljanah SLV.
Despite their difference in size, the Salman and the Raafe share several critical similarities. First, both are developed by Iran’s IRGC rather than the “civilian” face of Iran’s space program, which is supported by sanctioned entities like the Iranian Space Agency, the Ministry of Defense, and its subsidiary, the Aerospace Industries Organization. This in turn affirms the theory of parallel space programs in Iran. Second, both the Raafe and Salman are produced using non-metallic composite motor casings which, although more challenging and costly to produce, result in an overall lighter rocket that can lift heavier payloads. Third, both motors employ thrust vectoring through flexible nozzles that can move mid-flight. A rocket controlled by thrust vectoring is ideal for a larger long-range strike weapon like an ICBM.
Fourth and most importantly, both the Salman and Raafe are solid-propellant motors which is overall more preferable for a military weapon. While missiles using liquid-propellant can be throttled to regulate the flow of fuel to the engine and improve steering, missiles featuring solid-propellant motors can be fueled and stored in advance of when they need to be moved and used. Solid-propellant systems are therefore more road-mobile and require considerably less preparation than their liquid-propellant counterparts prior to launch, making them less predisposed to detection and destruction by an adversary.
Iran has spent the past two decades making significant gains in the realm of solid-propellant ballistic missiles to include domestic motor production and testing, as well as propellant production. In this time, Iran has also developed and upgraded an entire class of single-stage, solid-propellant short-range ballistic missiles originating from the Fateh family. These variants include, but are not limited to, the Zulfiqar, which Iran employed in military operations against the Islamic State in Syria in 2017 and 2018; the Fateh-110B, which Iran used against Kurdish dissidents in Iraq in 2018; and the Fateh-313, which Iran employed alongside another missile against bases in Iraq housing American troops in 2020. Having proved their battlefield worth and demonstrating Iran’s embrace of solid-propellant systems, Hajizadeh elsewhere claimed that Iran is phasing out its older Scud-based Shahab platforms for the solid-propellant Zulfiqar.
A larger solid-propellant motor further bolsters Iran’s long-range strike ambitions by enabling the element of surprise. Iranian hardline media outlets heralded the Raafe as allowing the Islamic Republic to better catch its adversaries off-guard by requiring less preparation time before launch. Recall that when the IRGC first tested the Qased, it did so as a surprise launch and using a mobile launcher rather than a fixed launchpad. This was a significant source of concern for analysts who otherwise “disconnected the dots” between Iran’s SLV and missile programs. Traditionally, analysts have been able to use satellite imagery to see Iran preparing for the launch of its liquid-propellant SLVs days in advance.
Alluding to past motor developments when announcing the Raafe, Hajizadeh claimed that Iran could combine its efforts in this area to develop a full solid-propellant SLV and even test it next year. Such a development would mark a critical juncture in Iran’s SLV program and offer the regime the clearest path to date towards an ICBM capability that could one day target all of Europe or even the American homeland.
Working to prevent such a scenario might appear needless for those who believe Iranian officials when they claim Tehran is limited to a 2,000-kilometer range ban on its missiles per an order from the supreme leader. But a key lesson of the past four decades of Iran policy has been that taking the Islamic Republic’s word about its intentions is no way to deal with or thwart its evolving capabilities, be they missile, military, or nuclear. Others, particularly in the field of arms control and nonproliferation, understand the folly of merely trusting Iran to abide by this prohibition, and instead seek to enshrine this limit into a resurrected nuclear agreement or in a prospective missile deal with Iran. Such an agreement, however, would not be worth the paper it’s written on. Not only would trading away sanctions for this ban cement Iran’s existing ballistic missile arsenal—the biggest in the Middle East—but it would ignore how Iranian officials have caveated the ban over time. In 2018, for example, Hajizadeh claimed that Iran did not lack the capability to produce missiles over 2,000 kilometers, and that the limit was not set in stone. This was again reinforced by another IRGC commander in 2019.
What’s more, according to Hajizadeh’s deputy, the purported founder of Tehran’s ballistic missile program spent years before his death working with the IRGC on the country’s space program and solid-propellants to make sure Iran would not forsake range even as it appeared to conform to the 2,000-kilometer limit. Put differently, the space program is how Tehran is working to increase the range of its missiles.
Less than a decade ago, the Islamic Republic went to great lengths to downplay that it was seeking such longer-range strike capabilities. But steady technical advancements in the missile space, as well as impressions about the lack of American resolve and the strength of Iran’s military deterrence appear to have made the regime somewhat more brazen. In fact, just in the past two years Iranian officials and Iranian media have publicly flirted with references to a potential ICBM option. Most damningly, an ultra-hardline Iranian newspaper used the successful Raafe motor test to run a headline touting, “5,000 kilometer missiles are more within reach than ever.”
Rather than dismiss such a headline as noise or hyperbole, Washington and the international community would be well advised to recognize the headline for what it is: a signal of things to come for Iran’s missile capabilities.
Behnam Ben Taleblu is a Senior Fellow focusing on Iranian security and political issues at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the author of a forthcoming monograph on Iranian ballistic missiles. He contributes to FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP) and Iran Program.
Image: Reuters.
The National Interest · by Behnam Ben Taleblu · February 2, 2022


9. Germany helps Putin with its double standard on arms exports


Excerpts:
German weapons did not create or inflame tensions between those nations and Russia. Instead, the German arms strengthened their ability to deter aggression from their powerful neighbor.
That’s what makes Berlin’s rebuff of Ukraine so disappointing.
Some have suggested that Moscow’s economic and energy leverage over Germany helps explain Berlin’s decision. That may be the case. But Germany should show Putin that it won’t allow energy dependence to determine its foreign policy.
Predators such as Putin like nothing better than prey kept weak. Germany should not serve as the Kremlin’s accomplice in that effort. Berlin should reverse its current policy on arms exports to Ukraine and return to its impressive track record of helping threatened democracies deter aggression from authoritarian neighbors. That would help Ukraine, spur the Germany economy, and potentially help deter a major war in Europe.
Germany helps Putin with its double standard on arms exports
Defense News · by Bradley Bowman and Ryan Brobst · February 2, 2022
Even as the U.S. intelligence community warns that a Russian invasion of Ukraine could come this month, the German government has rebuffed Ukrainian requests for defensive weapons. While Kyiv requested urgently-needed ships and weapons, Berlin decided to send helmets.
German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht attempted to justify the decision by saying, “The German government is agreed that we do not send lethal weapons to crisis areas because we don’t want to fuel the situation.”
Actually, Germany has an admirable record of success in using arms sales to help threatened democracies deter aggression, ranging from South Korea to the Baltic states in Vladimir Putin’s crosshairs. Indeed, Berlin’s global arms exports hit a new record in 2021, and security assistance to threatened democracies was a large part of that.
Accordingly, Berlin should build on its past record, drop its double standard, and join the NATO effort to support Kyiv.
Ukraine certainly qualifies as a threatened democracy. Russia has dramatically increased its combat power on the Ukrainian border since late October, which now stands around 130,000 troops, according to Kyiv. Despite transparently cynical assertions to the contrary, Moscow’s clear message is that it may invade Ukraine (again) if the West does not accept Kremlin suzerainty over Kyiv.
Such concessions by Washington and Brussels would betray their fundamental security interests and democratic principles. This crisis is “entirely engineered by Russia and President Putin as an overt act of coercion against Ukraine,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said Friday.
Berlin’s decision to refuse Ukraine the weapons it needs to deter Russian aggression stands in stark contrast with the actions of many other NATO countries rushing vital armaments to Kyiv. Complementing diplomatic efforts to defuse the crisis, the United States, Estonia, the United Kingdom, and several other NATO countries have rushed arms to Ukraine, including Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, grenade-launchers, small arms, and other equipment.
These transfers will not bring Ukraine anywhere close to military parity with Russia and do not present an offensive threat to Russia — and Putin knows it. The transfers, however, can strengthen Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, making an invasion more costly for Russia and therefore potentially less likely.
Germany’s decision also stands in stark contrast to Berlin’s own previous policy. While Lambrecht’s statement that Germany does not “send lethal weapons to crisis areas” builds on the new German government’s policy to further restrict arms sales, Berlin has frequently used arms sales to help several threatened democracies deter aggression.
Consider a recent case: South Korea.
Germany has sold South Korea significant amounts of weaponry over the past decade, helping Seoul deter aggression from Kim Jong Un. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, South Korea was the top destination for German arms exports from 2013 to 2017, peaking in 2017, the year of heightened tension and fears of “Fire and Fury” on the Korean Peninsula. So much for not sending weapons to crisis zones.
Germany’s arms exports to South Korea included items cruise missiles and howitzer parts that helped maintain deterrence against nuclear-armed North Korea. The transfer of German weapons did not fuel the crisis, as Lambrecht’s theory would posit, but rather bolstered South Korea’s ability to defend itself, thereby increasing the costs of potential North Korean aggression. That is exactly what German weapons could do in Ukraine with respect to Russian aggression.
This same logic of deterrence explains why previous German governments supplied other European nations with the weapons they need to defend themselves. Since 2012, Germany has sold self-propelled howitzers and tanks to NATO members Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, and Norway as well as to non-NATO countries Finland and Sweden, all of which have been the targets of Russian threats or provocations.
German weapons did not create or inflame tensions between those nations and Russia. Instead, the German arms strengthened their ability to deter aggression from their powerful neighbor.
That’s what makes Berlin’s rebuff of Ukraine so disappointing.
Some have suggested that Moscow’s economic and energy leverage over Germany helps explain Berlin’s decision. That may be the case. But Germany should show Putin that it won’t allow energy dependence to determine its foreign policy.
Predators such as Putin like nothing better than prey kept weak. Germany should not serve as the Kremlin’s accomplice in that effort. Berlin should reverse its current policy on arms exports to Ukraine and return to its impressive track record of helping threatened democracies deter aggression from authoritarian neighbors. That would help Ukraine, spur the Germany economy, and potentially help deter a major war in Europe.
Bradley Bowman serves as senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Ryan Brobst is a research analyst.



10. Is the Future of the Persian Gulf Chinese?


We need to get over this pivot stuff. We are a global power with global interests and we cannot afford to cede influence in any region.

Conclusion:

American proponents of abandoning the Persian Gulf often cite the need to pivot to Asia. However, Washington’s retreat from the region may achieve the exact opposite of U.S. objectives, ultimately emboldening and empowering China.

Is the Future of the Persian Gulf Chinese?
American proponents of abandoning the Persian Gulf often cite the need to pivot to Asia. However, Washington’s regional retreat may achieve the exact opposite of U.S. objectives, ultimately emboldening and empowering China.
The National Interest · by Saeed Ghasseminejad · February 2, 2022
In early January, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and the Islamic Republic of Iran traveled to China in the span of a week to strengthen their ties with the Chinese Communist Party. China, the emerging global superpower, has become the number one trading partner for these nations, thereby deepening Beijing’s political influence in the Middle East.
Over the last decade, on average, China imported half of its oil from the region. In 2020, China imported $82.6 billion of oil from Persian Gulf countries. Unlike Western democracies, China is in no rush to divest from fossil fuels. As the demand for Persian Gulf oil fades in the West, Chinese imports play an even more critical role in the region’s economic life.
According to the World Bank, in 2000, trade between Saudi Arabia and the United States was $20.6 billion. Twenty years later, in 2020, it was $20.1 billion. By contrast, the trade between China and Saudi Arabia grew from $3.1 billion in 2000 to $67.1 billion in 2020.
The contrast becomes more evident in light of the disparities among American, Chinese, and Saudi Arabian imports and exports. U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia rose from $6.2 billion in 2000 to $11.1 billion in 2020, while its imports dropped from $14.4 billion in 2000 to $9 billion in 2020. China’s exports to and imports from Saudi Arabia have risen from under $2 billion each in 2000 to $28 billion in exports and $39 billion in imports in 2020.

The picture is clear: Chinese and Persian Gulf economies are becoming more integrated, while regional and U.S. economic interests are on diverging paths.
For decades, the United States backed the Arab monarchies in exchange for a stable flow of oil to Western democracies. Today, the United States is the largest oil producer, and Western democracies are planning to reduce their fossil fuel consumption. That old deal has lost its rationale.
China has exploited these developments to augment its own power. China now has a twenty-five-year cooperation pact with the Islamic Republic of Iran and is helping Saudi Arabia not just with its ambitious economic plans but also in developing its nascent nuclear program.
Additionally, the countries in the Persian Gulf may find China a better patron. The absolute monarchies, autocracies, theocracies, and enlightened despots of the region may find a kindred spirit in China and its communist party. At least for now, China does not lecture them on how to treat their citizens as long as they do not lecture China on how it treats its citizens, including the Muslim Uyghurs.
Compared to the United States, China’s autocratic political system allows it a more consistent foreign policy. The Biden administration has paused, if not reversed, the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran, removed the Houthis from the U.S. terrorism list, and increased pressure on Riyadh to end the war in Yemen. As a result, U.S. allies who strongly oppose these actions are diversifying their patrons—especially with China.
China wants to secure the flow of oil from the region. It seeks intelligence and political cooperation in the Middle East to provide a cover for Beijing’s persecution of Muslim minorities. And it aims to cultivate allies in its quest for global preeminence.
If the United States decides to keep retrenching in the Middle East, China will likely fill the gap. The region offers unrivaled energy resources and rising Chinese power there would grant Beijing more potential leverage over its rivals.
American proponents of abandoning the Persian Gulf often cite the need to pivot to Asia. However, Washington’s retreat from the region may achieve the exact opposite of U.S. objectives, ultimately emboldening and empowering China.
Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior advisor on Iran and financial economics at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), Follow Saeed on Twitter @SGhasseminejad. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
Image: Reuters.
The National Interest · by Saeed Ghasseminejad · February 2, 2022



11. FDD | Canada must hold Iran accountable for downing of Ukrainian airliner

Excerpts;
The RCMP must ramp up its efforts. Moreover, Ottawa should take action against the individuals and institutions liable for the shootdown of PS752. For example, Canada should designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization. It should impose global Magnitsky sanctions on the IRGC members who conducted or oversaw the downing. And it should seek the submission of the case to the International Criminal Court.
By taking these steps, Trudeau can demonstrate that his denunciations of Tehran constitute more than merely rhetoric. Iran must pay, one way or another.
FDD | Canada must hold Iran accountable for downing of Ukrainian airliner
fdd.org · by Tzvi Kahn Research Fellow · February 2, 2022
Canada has had enough. The same goes for Sweden, Britain, and Ukraine. The four countries recently announced that they would no longer negotiate for reparations from Iran for its downing of a Ukrainian airliner two years ago.
Tehran, they noted, “is now categorically rejecting any further negotiations.” Additional attempts at dialogue, they argued, are “futile.” As a result, they asserted in a joint statement, they will impose unspecified remedies pursuant to international law.
The decision by the four-member coalition, which calls itself the International Co-ordination and Response Group, is common sense. The clerical regime, after all, not only continues to spurn meaningful dialogue. It dismisses compelling evidence that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—the paramilitary force tasked with advancing Iran’s Islamist ideology—shot down the plane intentionally.
It is now clear that if Ottawa and its partners wish to achieve justice for the victims, they must impose harsher penalties on Iran. To date, however, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has tried to avoid antagonizing the Islamic Republic, limiting himself to tough rhetoric while abjuring tough policies. The actions he now takes—or fails to take—in response to Tehran’s rejection of negotiations will mark a key test of his resolve.
On Jan. 8, 2020, two Tor-M1 surface-to-air missiles struck Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752 minutes after it departed Tehran’s international airport, killing all 176 people on board, including 85 Canadian citizens and permanent residents, as well as dozens of Brits, Swedes, Ukrainians, and other nationals. Iran’s civil aviation authority subsequently blamed the tragedy on “human error,” maintaining that the plane “was misidentified as a hostile target by an air defence unit.”
But Tehran’s narrative lacks credibility. In fact, in a November 2021 report, the Association of Families of Flight PS752 Victims noted that Tehran’s “intentional act of keeping Iranian airspace open, the technical capabilities of the Tor-M1 surface-to-air missile system and Iran’s integrated air defence network in detecting hostile targets, the positioning of the Tor-M1 system near Tehran’s international airport, the systematic concealment of the root cause of the crash, the destruction of existing evidence, and Iran’s misleading reports, all indicate that the downing of Ukraine International Airlines flight 752 was deliberate.”
Ukraine has validated this allegation. “What happened on Jan. 8, 2020, was a terrorist act committed against a civilian aircraft,” Oleksiy Danilov, Ukraine’s National Defense and Security Council secretary, said earlier this year.
Canada’s justice system has made a similar determination. In May 2021, Ontario judge Edward Belobaba ruled that the shootdown was “intentional” and “an act of terrorism.” Last month, he awarded $107-million, plus interest, to the families of six victims. Unfortunately, Canada will likely prove unable to seize significant quantities of Iranian assets, since most reside in overseas accounts.
The burden now falls on the shoulders of the Trudeau government. Admittedly, the prime minister’s ability to change Iranian behaviour remains limited. Still, Canada can wage a diplomatic campaign that would increase Iran’s international isolation and further delegitimize the Islamist regime.
In its November report, the Association of Families of Flight PS752 Victims provides important recommendations that would help achieve these goals. For instance, the publication urges Canada to refer Iran to the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the UN agency that sets global aviation standards. ICAO manages the implementation of the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known as the Chicago Convention, which prohibits attacks on civilian aircraft. If an airline fails to comply with a Council decision, the convention requires other countries to bar the offending nation from using their airspace. Likewise, the offender would lose ICAO voting rights.
The report also calls upon the RCMP to launch a criminal investigation of the shootdown. For reasons that remain unclear, the RCMP—despite pleas by families of the victims—has not accepted an offer by Ukraine, the only country conducting a criminal probe of the shootdown, to participate in a joint inquiry. Instead, the RCMP has merely assisted Ukraine’s efforts, devoting more than 120 RCMP personnel to conduct interviews, among other steps.
But families of the victims have criticized the pace and transparency of the RCMP’s collaboration. Hamed Esmaeilion, a spokesperson for the association who lost his wife and nine-year-old daughter on flight PS752, said Ukrainian officials told him that “co-operation has not been great.” In fact, Esmaeilion said, the RCMP has yet to send Ukraine information about an interview with him from one year ago.
The RCMP must ramp up its efforts. Moreover, Ottawa should take action against the individuals and institutions liable for the shootdown of PS752. For example, Canada should designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization. It should impose global Magnitsky sanctions on the IRGC members who conducted or oversaw the downing. And it should seek the submission of the case to the International Criminal Court.
By taking these steps, Trudeau can demonstrate that his denunciations of Tehran constitute more than merely rhetoric. Iran must pay, one way or another.
Tzvi Kahn is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington, D.C.-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. Follow him on Twitter @TzviKahn.
fdd.org · by Tzvi Kahn Research Fellow · February 2, 2022



12. Opinion | Europe Thinks Putin Is Planning Something Even Worse Than War

Hmmm... what could be worse?

Excerpt:
The answer is surprising, even paradoxical. Europeans and Ukrainians are skeptical of a major Russian invasion in Ukraine not because they have a more benign view of Mr. Putin than their American counterparts. On the contrary, it’s because they see him as more malicious. War, they reason, is not the Kremlin’s game. Instead, it’s an extensive suite of tactics designed to destabilize the West. For Europe, the threat of war could turn out to be more destructive than war itself.



Opinion | Europe Thinks Putin Is Planning Something Even Worse Than War
The New York Times · by Ivan Krastev · February 3, 2022
Guest Essay

Feb. 3, 2022, 1:00 a.m. ET

Credit...Pool photo by Yuri Kochetkov

By
Mr. Krastev is a permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna and an expert on international politics.
VIENNA — In the final weeks of World War I, a German general sent a telegram to his Austrian allies summarizing the situation. It was, he wrote, “serious, but not catastrophic.” The reply came back: “Here the situation is catastrophic, but not serious.”
It’s a joke, of course. But it captures, in a nutshell, the disagreement between America and Europe about the situation in Ukraine. For the United States and President Biden, who on Wednesday formally approved a deployment of American troops to Eastern Europe, a Russian invasion led by President Vladimir Putin is a “distinct possibility.” For Europe, not so much. A senior German diplomat summed up the divergence. “The U.S. thinks Putin will do a full-blown war,” he said. “Europeans think he’s bluffing.”
Perhaps that’s to be expected. After all, full-scale war is generally as unimaginable for a Western European public as an alien invasion. The many decades of peace in Western Europe, combined with the continent’s deep dependence on Russia’s oil and gas, incline officials to assume aggressive Russian moves must be a ruse.
But the European tendency to accommodate Russia doesn’t explain why Ukrainian officials, after initial alarm, now seem to share the same view. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, last week played down the immediate threat of war, suggesting the situation was “dangerous, but ambiguous.” For a country menaced by 130,000 Russian troops at its border, it’s a striking assessment. What lies behind it?
The answer is surprising, even paradoxical. Europeans and Ukrainians are skeptical of a major Russian invasion in Ukraine not because they have a more benign view of Mr. Putin than their American counterparts. On the contrary, it’s because they see him as more malicious. War, they reason, is not the Kremlin’s game. Instead, it’s an extensive suite of tactics designed to destabilize the West. For Europe, the threat of war could turn out to be more destructive than war itself.
America and Europe aren’t divided on what Mr. Putin wants. For all the speculation about motives, that much is clear: The Kremlin wants a symbolic break from the 1990s, burying the post-Cold War order. That would take the form of a new European security architecture that recognizes Russia’s sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space and rejects the universality of Western values. Rather than the restoration of the Soviet Union, the goal is the recovery of what Mr. Putin regards as historic Russia.
In Washington and Brussels, the message has got through. There’s a general agreement on both sides of the Atlantic that the Kremlin, whatever it might do next, won’t stay still. Russia will not simply step back. But while Americans tend to believe that Mr. Putin needs a hot war in Ukraine to realize his grand ambitions, Europeans and presumably Ukrainians believe that a hybrid strategy — involving military presence on the border, weaponization of energy flows and cyberattacks — will serve him better.
That’s based on some sound reasoning. A Russian incursion into Ukraine could, in a perverse way, save the current European order. NATO would have no choice but to respond assertively, bringing in stiff sanctions and acting in decisive unity. By hardening the conflict, Mr. Putin could cohere his opponents. Holding back, by contrast, could have the opposite effect: The policy of maximum pressure, short of an invasion, may end up dividing and paralyzing NATO.
To see how that might play out, we need only look to Germany. Before the crisis, Germany was America’s closest ally in Europe, boasted a special relationship with Moscow and was the most important partner for Eastern and Central Europe. Today, some in Washington have questioned the country’s willingness to confront Russia, Berlin’s relationship with Moscow is fast deteriorating, and many Eastern Europeans are agitated by Germany’s apparent reluctance to come to their support. Germany’s difficulties are a hint of what could come if Mr. Putin continues his brinkmanship, without providing the certainty of an actual invasion.
Germany, crucially, has not changed — but the world in which it acts has. (The country is “like a train that stands still after the railway station has caught fire,” Bojan Pancevski, The Wall Street Journal’s Germany correspondent, told me.) Today, geopolitical strength is determined not by how much economic power you can wield but by how much pain you can endure. Your enemy, unlike during the Cold War, is not somebody behind an iron curtain but somebody with whom you trade, from whom you get gas and to whom you export high-tech goods. Soft power has given way to resilience.
That’s a problem for Europe. If Mr. Putin’s success will be determined by the ability of Western societies to steel themselves for the pressure of high energy prices, disinformation and political instability over a prolonged period, then he has good reason to be hopeful. As things stand, Europe is signally unprepared for these challenges. Remedying that, through investment in military capabilities, energy diversification and building social cohesion, should be the continent’s focus.
Europeans are right to believe that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not inevitable — and may even be correct that it’s not the most likely scenario. But we cannot deceive ourselves that we can skip the resilience test. “If you invite a bear to dance, it’s not you who decides when the dance is over,” the Russian proverb goes. “It’s the bear.”
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.
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The New York Times · by Ivan Krastev · February 3, 2022




13.  Biden to meet with 'Quad' leaders during trip to Asia amid rising tension with China


Biden to meet with 'Quad' leaders during trip to Asia amid rising tension with China
Biden's trip will mark his first visit to the region as president
foxnews.com · by Kyle Morris | Fox News
Sen. Marco Rubio blasts NBC for seeking to monetize the Olympic games hosted by China on 'The Ingraham Angle.'
NEWYou can now listen to Fox News articles!
President Biden is planning to make "several" stops, including a summit featuring leaders from the "Quad" alliance, during his trip to Asia this spring amid an increasingly contentious relationship between the U.S. and China.
Biden's trip, which will mark his first visit to the region as president, will include a "summit with three key regional allies in Japan," according to a report from Reuters. The summit will feature leaders from Australia, India and Japan in Tokyo.

President Joe Biden speaks to members of the media before boarding Air Force One at Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport in Minneapolis, Tuesday, Nov. 30, 2021. (AP Photo/Carolyn Kaster)
In a statement to the outlet, a senior administration official who was granted anonymity said Biden is seeking to "regularize our engagement through the Quad, which continues to operate at full speed."
"The President will also make several other stops on that trip," the official added, refusing to elaborate.
While the exact date for Biden's trip has yet to be finalized and made public, a person familiar with the matter told Reuters that the trip could take place in May.
Earlier this month, a readout from the White House stated Biden "welcomed" an invitation from Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan to "visit Japan for the next Quad Leaders Meeting in the first half of 2022."

Kishida makes opening remarks during the trilateral meeting in Tokyo, Wednesday, Aug. 24, 2016. (Katsumi Kasahara/Pool Photo via AP)
The official said the Biden administration is working to launch a Pacific Islands initiative "to coordinate our actions, drive resources, and raise our ambition in the region, including on climate, maritime, and transportation issues."
In addition, the official said the administration will "continue prioritizing our Indo-Pacific focus and will have more to come."
As the U.S. focuses its attention on the growing crisis in Ukraine, where more than 100,000 Russian troops have gathered at the border, China has been increasingly aggressive toward territory that it believes should belong to Beijing.
Earlier this week, FBI Director Christopher Wray said the threat coming from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is "more brazen" and "more damaging than ever before."
"There’s just no country that presents a broader threat to our ideas, innovation and economic security than China," Wray said Monday, speaking from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. "The Chinese government steals staggering volumes of information and causes deep, job-destroying damage across a wide range of industries."

President Biden meets with China's President Xi Jinping during a virtual summit from the Roosevelt Room of the White House in Washington, D.C., Nov. 15, 2021. (MANDEL NGAN/AFP via Getty Images)
China launched 39 aircraft, mostly fighter jets, near Taiwan Sunday — the largest show of force in months. The launch came the same day the U.S. Navy sailed two aircraft carriers along with a pair of amphibious assault ships alongside allies in the Philippine Sea.
Fox News reached out to the White House but did not receive an immediate response.
Fox News' Adam Shaw and Caitlin McFall contributed to this article.
foxnews.com · by Kyle Morris | Fox News



14. The World Shrugs and the Games Go On


Excerpts:
Decisionmakers in Beijing must be in the crosshairs, and all those Chinese companies complicit in Xi’s murderous campaign removed from global exchanges, their officials denied visas, their offices overseas closed. This cannot be done piecemeal, as the Biden administration crawls toward a patchwork of punishments for the facilitators of the Uyghur genocide. It must be coordinated with partners; it must be global.
There are some who will say that even the starkest sanctions will not deter Xi from his mission, and they may well be right. But morality dictates that the world must at least try, must at least raise these horrors at every meeting, must keep the story on the front page as much as possible. That is, unless “never again” is to have a corollary: Only sometimes.
The World Shrugs and the Games Go On
An Olympic boycott would not stop Xi Jinping’s genocide against the Uyghurs. But there are steps that we can take.
thedispatch.com · by Danielle Pletka
(Photograph by Bruce Bennett/Getty Images)
Last Thursday was Holocaust Remembrance Day. Pegged to the liberation of Auschwitz on January 27, 1945, the anniversary was duly commemorated around the world (with some predictable exceptions). In truth, however, it was a little odd—all those pious self-congratulatory vows of “never again” coming within days of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. It’s been 86 years since the Olympics were exploited by a genocidal tyrant bent on delivering greater glory to his own government. But at least at that moment Hitler was only planning the Final Solution to exterminate the Jews; he didn’t have active concentration camps as the Communist Party of China does in Xinjiang, bent on the extermination of its Muslim Uyghur population.
It's cathartic to decry the hypocrisy of self-professed lovers of human rights in the face of actual genocide. But the reality is that those who applaud the physical feats with one thumb up and denounce the genocide with the other thumb down are in good company: Indifference and inaction are the norms in the face of terrible crimes against humanity. Of course, there have always been good people who do their utmost to stand up, to use the powers of their government, or their organization, or their community to call attention to the nightmares afoot. But there has been a surprising consistency in the willingness of governments to look aside, to create meaningless bureaucracies like the United States’ “Atrocities Prevention Board,” or worse yet, to acknowledge the horrors with a shrug.
The first stories about Germany’s purification of the race actually related to the handicapped—mental and physical—and not Jews. In 1933, Hitler’s Germany introduced the “Law for the Prevention of Progeny with Hereditary Diseases,” which was much as it sounded. In 1939, the Nazis introduced the T4 program that began mass killing—eventually with poison gas—of Germans and Austrians with handicaps. The program served as an early model for the Final Solution, and by the end of the war, 275,000 of those deemed “unworthy of life”—which included the terminally ill, the elderly, and the disabled—were murdered.
Aside from pleas and arguments from the family members who realized their “lesser” brethren were being exterminated by the state, the most notable fact was how few protests there were. Several Lutheran and Catholic bishops stood tall, most prominently the bishop of Münster, Clemens August Graf von Galen, whose denunciations were dropped in leaflets across Germany by the British. But even the Vatican was, for the most part, remarkably silent despite documented awareness of the murders.
Regarding the Jews, it’s not as if the racial laws promulgated first in Hitler’s Germany and Austria, and then in Mussolini’s Italy, were secret. The stories made the New York Times—though rarely the front page. Even the next step—taking those undesirables and shipping them off to extermination camps, was well-known to the U.S. government by 1942, though the information was suppressed, and once verified, ignored. Indeed, the Roosevelt administration made an affirmation decision not to do something about Hitler’s camps. Perhaps it was a wise strategic decision, perhaps not. But certainly, there is no doubt it was made, and it was one of a legion of decisions to neither act on behalf of Europe’s Jews nor to provide haven for those who did manage to escape.
Think the story of the Jews is a complex one? How about Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge’s murder of up to 2 million Cambodians? The U.S. stood by, averse to more entanglements in Vietnam. The systematic murder of the Rohingya Muslims in Burma? The U.S. deplored the “ethnic cleansing” and slapped on some sanctions. What about the murder of more than 500,000 Syrians by the Assad regime with Iranian and Russian support? Yeah, the Biden administration is now in the process of rehabilitating Assad.
There is no shortage of stories of persecution, daily repudiations of the “never again” mantra. Tibetan Buddhists in China; the Bahai in Iran; Tigrayans in Ethiopia; and many, many more. But the challenge is not to create a list, or even to shame the hypocrites who trumpet their human rights virtue. The question, as it always has been, is what to do, understanding that the United States cannot do everything, cannot solve every problem. And so, we return to the concentration camps in Xinjiang.
The first step is exposure. Many organizations deserve praise for drawing back the curtain on Uyghur camps and slave labor, few more than the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The second is unrelenting pressure, and for that we can be thankful to reporters like Josh Rogin at the Washington Post. The third is Congress: The Biden White House has been without shame in ignoring the plight of the Uyghurs—labeling Beijing’s campaign a “genocide” but then refusing to act to try to stop or punish it, even with sanctions. Indeed, the White House had to be forced into action against Chinese officials and companies that exploit slave labor in Xinjiang. Had members of Congress been as supine as the Biden administration, there would likely be senior Biden administration officials at the Beijing Olympics. Instead, the president was forced to sign Sens. Marco Rubio and Jeff Merkley’s Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA).
Was the right answer to boycott the Olympics? The debate is lively and should not be dismissed, but we should not deceive ourselves into thinking that even a boycott would deter the wholesale elimination of a people. Embarrassing to Xi Jinping? You bet; but the cost is not so high it would cause him to rethink his campaign. Rather, it is the concept behind the UFLPA that has the best prospects for some success.
Companies that use forced labor must be isolated and tossed from markets. Goods that are procured from Xinjiang must be bought elsewhere. Officials complicit in the decisions must lose their ability to move around the world, their accounts frozen, their associates sanctioned.
Decisionmakers in Beijing must be in the crosshairs, and all those Chinese companies complicit in Xi’s murderous campaign removed from global exchanges, their officials denied visas, their offices overseas closed. This cannot be done piecemeal, as the Biden administration crawls toward a patchwork of punishments for the facilitators of the Uyghur genocide. It must be coordinated with partners; it must be global.
There are some who will say that even the starkest sanctions will not deter Xi from his mission, and they may well be right. But morality dictates that the world must at least try, must at least raise these horrors at every meeting, must keep the story on the front page as much as possible. That is, unless “never again” is to have a corollary: Only sometimes.
thedispatch.com · by Danielle Pletka

15. How China views the Ukraine crisis


Excerpts:
China’s leaders are realists and know that they can do little to influence the outcome of the current crisis in Ukraine even if they choose to intervene publicly. With Putin holding most of the cards in the ongoing standoff, China’s diplomatic support is unlikely to alter the strategic calculus of the principal protagonists in Washington, Brussels, or even Moscow. Its influence will increase dramatically only if Putin rolls the dice and invades Ukraine, because he will then need Chinese economic support to lessen the impact of Western sanctions.
But for now, all this is speculative as far as Xi is concerned. Although a superpower, China is temporarily reduced to being an onlooker, watching both anxiously and hopefully on the sidelines as the Ukraine crisis unfolds.
How China views the Ukraine crisis
China's actions are not only threatening the sovereignty of other nations but also the ecosystem
japantimes.co.jp · by Minxin Pei · February 2, 2022
CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – Beijing may be 6,500 kilometers (4,000 miles) from Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital, but the geopolitical stakes for China in the escalating crisis over Ukraine’s fate could not be higher.
If Russia invades Ukraine and precipitates a drawn-out conflict with the United States and its Western allies (though a direct military confrontation is unlikely), China obviously stands to benefit. America will need to divert strategic resources to confront Russia and its European allies will be even more reluctant to heed U.S. entreaties to join America’s anti-China coalition.
But if U.S. President Joe Biden defuses the crisis by acceding to some of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demands, China will likely end up worse off strategically. While Putin will reap the benefits of his coercive diplomacy, and Biden will avoid a potential quagmire in Eastern Europe, China will find itself the sole focus of America’s national security strategy. Worse still, after Putin has skillfully exploited the U.S. obsession with China to re-establish Russia’s sphere of influence, the strategic value of his China card may depreciate significantly.
For Putin, capitalizing on Biden’s fear of being dragged into a conflict with a secondary adversary (Russia) in order to extract critical security concessions is a risky but smart move. But ordering an invasion of Ukraine — and thus effectively volunteering to be America’s primary geopolitical adversary, at least in the short to medium term — is hardly in the Kremlin’s interest. Crippling Western sanctions and the high costs of fighting an insurgency in Ukraine would almost certainly weaken Russia significantly and make Putin himself both domestically unpopular and more dependent on Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Intriguingly, despite the high stakes for China in the Ukraine crisis, the Chinese government has been extremely careful about showing its hand. While the heightened tensions dominate Western media headlines, Ukraine receives scant coverage in the official Chinese press. Between Dec. 15 (when Putin and Xi held a virtual summit) and Jan. 24 this year, The People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China, carried only one article about the crisis — on the inconclusive talks in mid-January between Russia and the U.S. and its NATO allies. Editorials or commentaries voicing Chinese support for Russia also are notable by their absence.
Even more intriguingly, the summary of the Putin-Xi summit released by the Kremlin claimed that Xi supported Putin’s demand for Western security guarantees precluding NATO’s further eastward expansion, but the Chinese version, published by the official Xinhua news agency, contained no such reference. Instead of explicitly endorsing Putin’s position, Xi’s statement was vague and general pabulum about “providing firm mutual support on issues involving each other’s core interests.”
The pattern continued when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Jan. 27. Western media characterized Wang’s statement on Ukraine as an expression of support for Putin. In fact, Wang planted China’s diplomatic stake squarely on the sidelines, saying only that “Russia’s reasonable security concerns should be stressed and resolved.”
Chinese reticence on Ukraine suggests that Xi is carefully hedging his bets. To be sure, Putin’s aggressive diplomacy is serving Chinese interests, at least for now. Should he decide to invade Ukraine and divert U.S. strategic focus away from China, so much the better.
But, assuming that Xi does not know the Kremlin’s real intentions vis-a-vis Ukraine (it is doubtful that Putin has shared them with his Chinese counterpart), he is prudent not to show his own cards, either. Any expression of unequivocal Chinese support for Putin’s demands could leave China with little wiggle room. At worst, goading Putin down the path of war could be construed in some circles in Moscow as a diabolical Chinese plot to use Russia as a strategic pawn in the Sino-American cold war. Alternatively, should Putin choose to pocket face-saving gains in order to avoid a potential disaster, China would look foolish for having backed the Kremlin’s unattainable demands.
Strategic uncertainty aside, China’s rulers know that explicitly supporting Putin will almost certainly antagonize the European Union, which is now China’s second-largest trading partner. In Chinese policymakers’ strategic calculation, it is vital to prevent the U.S. from recruiting the EU into its anti-China coalition.
Ukraine’s independence and security are crucial to the EU and Chinese efforts to aid and abet Putin would trigger a European backlash. At a minimum, the EU could make China pay by restricting technology transfers and expressing more diplomatic support for Taiwan. In particular, the EU’s Eastern European members, which have fewer trade ties with China but are most threatened by Russia’s aggressive stance, are in a much stronger position than large member states to play the Taiwan card as retaliation against China. Few in the Chinese leadership are likely to consider this a risk worth taking.
China’s leaders are realists and know that they can do little to influence the outcome of the current crisis in Ukraine even if they choose to intervene publicly. With Putin holding most of the cards in the ongoing standoff, China’s diplomatic support is unlikely to alter the strategic calculus of the principal protagonists in Washington, Brussels, or even Moscow. Its influence will increase dramatically only if Putin rolls the dice and invades Ukraine, because he will then need Chinese economic support to lessen the impact of Western sanctions.
But for now, all this is speculative as far as Xi is concerned. Although a superpower, China is temporarily reduced to being an onlooker, watching both anxiously and hopefully on the sidelines as the Ukraine crisis unfolds.
Minxin Pei, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, is a nonresident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.: © Project Syndicate, 2022
In a time of both misinformation and too much information, quality journalism is more crucial than ever.


japantimes.co.jp · by Minxin Pei · February 2, 2022

16. Russia and China's private internets are the ideal forts for cyberattacks


The American people are much more dependent on the cyber domain than the Russian and Chinese populations..

Excerpts:

While Russia and China can flip a metaphorical switch, turn their internet off from the global network, and their citizens may carry on with minimal disruption, the reality for America will be much more dramatic, disruptive, and deadly.

Russia and China's private internets are the ideal forts for cyberattacks
The Hill · by Mike Rogers, opinion contributor · January 27, 2022

We are becoming more cyber vulnerable while Russia and China move to focus on offense and protect their own infrastructure.
Lost amid all the focus on China’s “Great Firewall” and Beijing’s efforts to censor what its citizens can see and say and secure its networks from attacks, is the fact that Russia is attempting to do the same, and that should give us significant pause. Why? Because it means the United States is becoming increasingly vulnerable to both Russia and China, while they are becoming less so.
In June and July of last year, Russia’s government disconnected its national internet from the global network to test its “sovereign internet” or Runet. The level of preparation needed and the cooperation necessary to disconnect the country’s networks from the global internet is significant. In 2019 Russia adopted a “sovereign internet” law aimed to ensure the country could still function if it was cut off from global networks, such as a crisis with the United States. Under this law, the country’s telecommunications companies were mandated to cooperate with the government and annually test this kind of disconnection.
Russian internet traffic must pass through nodes controlled by the government. Further, a Russian-specific owned and operated domain name system was established to ensure the continuity of the internet if external facing connections were severed. Unsurprisingly, the law and its implementation prompted concerns by civil society and free speech advocates who saw the move as an effort by the Kremlin to further control what was said and seen on the domestic internet.
This law, the test, and Russia’s efforts to develop a sovereign internet mask a much more sinister reality — Moscow could take the country offline and still attack the West’s cyberinfrastructure. In a conflict, the Kremlin could retreat behind its walls, deny the United States the ability to respond in cyberspace, and still use its cyber trebuchets and catapults to attack our large and increasing cyber vulnerabilities. This reality sends an extremely strong signal to the United States about Russia’s capabilities and just how vulnerable we are.
Think about what this means in a conflict with Beijing over Taiwan, or with Moscow over Ukraine, like we’re seeing now. Both governments could simply disconnect their internet and attack our nuclear power plants, our financial networks, our electrical grid, largely with impunity making it nearly impossible to attack theirs in response. The whole concept of mutually assured cyber destruction and cyber deterrence would be rendered moot.
Russia and China’s efforts to secure their cyberinfrastructures should give us serious pause. Our cyberinfrastructure is vast and unwieldy, a source of both strength and weakness. Our openness gives us all the amazing things we take for granted — booking travel online, communicating with loved ones, shopping and more — and has radically transformed the way we live, work and internet. It is set to do a whole lot more with the Internet of Things, 5G, and things still on the drawing board.
Yet that unwieldiness and fragmented nature leave our critical infrastructure extremely vulnerable to cyberattacks such as we saw with Colonial Pipeline. Disruptions to our electric grid, banking services, communication systems are all very real and very worrying possibilities. Imagine the chaos and economic interruption if a ransomware attack from Russia struck a major power company or one of the financial services providers.
Beijing and Moscow claim they are only protecting their infrastructure from Western interference or hacking, but the hacking — criminal and governmental — is going the other way, not into their countries, but from their countries. So why work to disconnect the national nets from the global internet? It’s not about defense, it’s all about offense. Moscow and Beijing want to ensure that they can attack without retaliation, and they are getting closer to that reality.
I’m not suggesting we adopt a sovereign American internet. This would stifle the creativity of Silicon Valley, strangle investment, and be counterproductive. What it does mean is that we must get very, very serious about our cyber infrastructure, our critical national infrastructure, and the intersection of the private networks and public authorities, and now. We are moving in the right direction, but far too slowly, and with far too little urgency. It’s time to wake up.
We need to incentivize the private sector to invest in better protection and require regular patching. We must disconnect those things that don’t need to be connected and ensure redundancy for those things that we can’t live without. We must plan for and prepare for managed degradation, not outright collapse, and right now we should expect the latter more than the former. The U.S. government should end its balkanized approach to defending American networks.
While Russia and China can flip a metaphorical switch, turn their internet off from the global network, and their citizens may carry on with minimal disruption, the reality for America will be much more dramatic, disruptive, and deadly.
Mike Rogers, a Michigan Republican, was chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 2011-15. He is a director at IronNet Cybersecurity.
The Hill · by Mike Rogers, opinion contributor · January 27, 2022

17. Russia-U.S. Standoff Over Ukraine Raises Questions About Endgame

Excerpt:

The flurry of diplomatic and military activity this week raises critical questions about Russia’s desired endgame and outcomes in Ukraine and the implications for “great power” competition going forward. Russian President Putin has already put forward the narrative of Western aggression and the intention to use the threat of conflict as a justification for punitive sanctions, creating the conditions for a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, it appears unlikely that the sanctions in and of themselves would be a deterrent, given that they would have been a predictable response to military action. The situation has already highlighted fissures among the P5 and also among NATO’s own members, with Germany’s restrained response and reluctance to send lethal aid to Ukraine raising some concerns, as well as among communities in Europe and the United States. Experts have warned of the risk of Russian cyber-attacks against this background of diplomatic tension. Furthermore, Russian disinformation campaigns could have broader and longer lasting impacts, including by fueling political polarization, anti-government sentiment, and a lack of trust in the liberal democratic order established in Europe. Non-NATO states have also entered into the equation, with U.S.-Qatar discussions on energy supplies underway this week, for example, and the role of other intergovernmental actors like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the “Normandy Four” format gaining prominence. Even if the threat of military action is averted, the fissures and risks emerging from the situation may have themselves been the desired endgame.

IntelBrief: Russia-U.S. Standoff Over Ukraine Raises Questions About Endgame - The Soufan Center
thesoufancenter.org · February 3, 2022
February 3, 2022
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AP Photo/Patrick Semansky
Bottom Line Up Front
  • The U.S. announced the deployment of 3,000 troops in Eastern Europe, following intense discussions on Tuesday between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
  • In a tense UN Security Council meeting on Monday during which Russia and the United States sparred on Ukraine, two vastly different narratives were put forward and fissures within the Council and NATO exposed.
  • Russia denied any provocations, accusing the West of propaganda, while Ukraine delivered a strong statement questioning the military buildup in the region but also calling for calm in an attempt to avoid overreaction.
  • The flurry of diplomatic and military activity this week raises critical questions about Russia’s desired endgame and outcomes in Ukraine and the implications for “great power” competition going forward.
The United States has announced a deployment of 3,000 troops to Eastern Europe, following a week of intense diplomatic activity amidst the military buildup on Ukraine’s borders with Russia and Belarus. A phone call between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on Tuesday did little to quell mounting tensions regarding the prospect of an escalation of conflict in Ukraine. During the private call, Blinken told his Russian counterpart that if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend war or regime change, then it was time to pull back troops and heavy weaponry and engage in serious, diplomatic discussions. Lavrov reiterated that Russia was simply moving troops within its own territory and denied any “escalation.” There was reportedly no “extensive” exchange regarding the buildup in Belarus, where U.S. estimates suggest up to 30,000 Russian troops may be deployed by mid-to-late February.
The call followed a tense United Nations Security Council meeting on Monday which included a briefing on the situation from Under Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, who stressed that any military intervention by one country in another would be a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Describing the Russian troop deployments near the Ukrainian border and in Belarus, she also noted that members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are reportedly deploying additional troops in its Eastern European member states, with 8,500 NATO troops on high alert. As expected, Russia and the United States sparred and put forward two contrasting narratives about Ukraine. U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield highlighted that the buildup of over 100,000 Russian troops along Ukraine’s border represented “the largest… mobilization of troops in Europe in decades” and that “Russian military and intelligence services are spreading disinformation through state-owned media and proxy sites. And they are attempting, without any factual basis, to paint Ukraine and Western countries as the aggressors to fabricate a pretext for attack.” She noted Russia had already invaded Crimea in 2014, and said, “If Russia further invades Ukraine, none of us will be able to say we didn’t see it coming.”
Russian Ambassador Vasilly Nebenzia denied any provocation, stating that his country’s troops have been deployed within its own territory on various occasions before and accusing the West of promoting anti-Russian propaganda to fuel a confrontation. He called the current crisis in Ukraine an entirely domestic one and challenged the statistics and numbers put forward by Western powers, particularly regarding the numbers of troops, while asserting that the United States had brought “pure Nazis” to power in Kyiv. Having opposed this Open Meeting and ultimately leaving the Council chamber before the Ukrainian statement for a meeting with the Secretary-General, Ambassador Nebenzia clearly reiterated the Russian view that any military action would be attributed to western aggression. In a subsequent statement, Ukrainian Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya stressed the sovereignty of his country and their right to determine foreign policy and alliances, and highlighted the buildup of Russian military and naval forces in the region.
Seasoned Council watchers have been resigned to expecting little substantial outcome on this issue given the near-certainty of a veto in the event any resolutions are tabled by members. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres was reportedly wary of this meeting for this very reason, and for the risk of further highlighting fissures among the permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as the “P5”—which could affect cooperation on other challenges on the Council’s agenda, a concern shared by some diplomats, UN officials, and experts. However, the meeting, called by the United States, which won a procedural vote to hold it in the first place (with 10 votes; China and Russia opposed, and Kenya, Gabon, and India abstained), also served as an opportunity to demonstrate consensus among a majority of Council members and to reaffirm support for NATO. Nonetheless, experts also worry that the starkly opposing views aired will fuel additional disinformation and propaganda campaigns that can serve the purpose of further polarizing public opinion, particularly in Europe, where civilians will bear the brunt of an invasion and cities confront risks to energy supplies.
The flurry of diplomatic and military activity this week raises critical questions about Russia’s desired endgame and outcomes in Ukraine and the implications for “great power” competition going forward. Russian President Putin has already put forward the narrative of Western aggression and the intention to use the threat of conflict as a justification for punitive sanctions, creating the conditions for a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, it appears unlikely that the sanctions in and of themselves would be a deterrent, given that they would have been a predictable response to military action. The situation has already highlighted fissures among the P5 and also among NATO’s own members, with Germany’s restrained response and reluctance to send lethal aid to Ukraine raising some concerns, as well as among communities in Europe and the United States. Experts have warned of the risk of Russian cyber-attacks against this background of diplomatic tension. Furthermore, Russian disinformation campaigns could have broader and longer lasting impacts, including by fueling political polarization, anti-government sentiment, and a lack of trust in the liberal democratic order established in Europe. Non-NATO states have also entered into the equation, with U.S.-Qatar discussions on energy supplies underway this week, for example, and the role of other intergovernmental actors like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the “Normandy Four” format gaining prominence. Even if the threat of military action is averted, the fissures and risks emerging from the situation may have themselves been the desired endgame.
thesoufancenter.org · February 3, 2022


18. China's biggest Lunar New Year release is another Korean War propaganda movie

We should realize the Chinese propaganda efforts that are also profitable. Profitable propaganda.

Excerpts:
This year's Lunar New Year holiday is concentrated with blockbusters. The sequel to the Battle at Lake Changjin will guarantee its performance," wrote Xia Qingying, chief analyst for tech, media and telecom at Guangzhou-based Wanlian Securities, in a report last week.
The original "Lake Changjin" film, commissioned by the propaganda office of the ruling Communist Party, was about the the brutal 1950 Battle of Chosin Reservoir in the Korean War. The Chinese side claims it as the most critical victory of the conflict, known in China as the "War to Resist American Aggression and Aid Korea." The Communist Party has ruled the People's Republic of China since 1949.
The sequel film continues the story of the battle.

China's biggest Lunar New Year release is another Korean War propaganda movie
ctvnews.ca · by Laura He · February 2, 2022
Laura He
CNN Digital
Published Wednesday, February 2, 2022 8:27AM EST
People walk past a poster of 'The Battle at Lake Changjin II' at a cinema on February 1, in Shanghai, China. The movie is also known as 'Water Gate Bridge.' (VCG/Getty Images/CNN)

The Chinese box office has raked in US$314 million so far during the Lunar New Year holiday, largely thanks to a patriotic war epic celebrating China's victory over the United States during a key battle during the Korean War.
"Water Gate Bridge" is the sequel to the 2021 Chinese blockbuster "The Battle at Lake Changjin," which glorifies the heroism of Chinese soldiers fighting American troops during the war. Both films were co-directed by top Chinese and Hong Kong filmmakers Chen Kaige, Tsui Hark and Dante Lam.
"Water Gate Bridge" has grossed $137 million in ticket sales since its release Tuesday, the first day of the major holiday period. It's one of the biggest holiday season releases in the last few years.
That box office haul comprises nearly half of the total revenue from ticket sales for the holiday period. Sales reached $237 million on Tuesday, with another $77 million as of Wednesday morning, according to data from Dengta Professional, a box office tracking app owned by Alibaba.
Analysts expect "Water Gate Bridge" to boost this year's Lunar New Year box office total to a new record, surpassing last year's $1.2 billion — itself a number that accounted for more than 16% of China's entire box office haul in 2021. The holiday period lasts a week.
"This year's Lunar New Year holiday is concentrated with blockbusters. The sequel to the Battle at Lake Changjin will guarantee its performance," wrote Xia Qingying, chief analyst for tech, media and telecom at Guangzhou-based Wanlian Securities, in a report last week.
The original "Lake Changjin" film, commissioned by the propaganda office of the ruling Communist Party, was about the the brutal 1950 Battle of Chosin Reservoir in the Korean War. The Chinese side claims it as the most critical victory of the conflict, known in China as the "War to Resist American Aggression and Aid Korea." The Communist Party has ruled the People's Republic of China since 1949.
The sequel film continues the story of the battle.
Beijing has been trying to contain a resurgence of COVID-19 outbreaks across the country, and as a result is urging the public to avoid traveling during Lunar New Year, which is the biggest holiday season of the year. That may be contributing to interest in moviegoing as an alternative to major travel plans.


19. A Blast from the Past? The Role of Maritime Sabotage in Strategic Competition

Excerpts:

Sabotage is not a new concept. From Courtenay’s coal torpedo to Lawrence of Arabia and his indigenous partners’ sabotage of the Hejaz railway, sabotage has been consistently employed throughout history, with varying degrees of success. Today, if conducted successfully, maritime sabotage may be a way the joint force can challenge adversaries in both day-to-day competition and in large-scale combat operations. Yet sabotage also entails additional risks. Practitioners, policymakers, and researchers must think through the conceptual and practical challenges surrounding how sabotage operations could be employed before such operations become necessary.

A Blast from the Past? The Role of Maritime Sabotage in Strategic Competition - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Alexander Powell · February 3, 2022
In 1863, a Confederate agent named Thomas Courtenay devised a new weapon designed to sabotage Union steamships. Covered in pitch and rolled in coal dust, the explosive device was designed to look like a piece of coal. Courtenay hoped that Union steamship crews would unwittingly toss the disguised explosive into a vessel’s furnace, damaging or destroying the ship. Despite the inventiveness of the so-called “coal torpedo,” however, its battlefield effectiveness during the Civil War remains inconclusive as Confederate records were deliberately destroyed at the end of the war.
Courtenay’s coal torpedo reflects the fact that state and nonstate actors alike have turned to sabotage operations throughout history with the aim of secretly disarming, obstructing, or destroying enemy war materiel or infrastructure. Often the forces conducting sabotage have been either intelligence organizations or what today we call special operations forces (SOF). During World War II, the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) conducted myriad sabotage operations spanning multiple theaters and domains. The OSS Maritime Unit, in particular, pioneered many tactics and techniques that would later become integral to modern naval special warfare. But despite this robust history, over the past twenty years the SOF community has primarily focused on conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations on land.
Today, as the US military shifts priorities from counterterrorism to strategic competition, SOF have begun to rebalance to focus on both countering violent extremist organizations and competing with peer and near-peer actors. In light of SOF’s history with sabotage and recent renewed interest in the subject (strategic sabotage was listed as a priority research topic for the Joint Special Operations University in 2020, for example), the time is ripe for an analytical examination of the subject. Maritime sabotage operations in particular deserve further study given the growing importance of maritime regions from the Indo-Pacific to the Black Sea.
Trends in Maritime Sabotage
In a recent report, the Center for Naval Analyses examined past instances of maritime sabotage to help inform policymakers, practitioners, and researchers. My coauthors and I built a dataset of unclassified instances of maritime sabotage to facilitate our analysis, then coded each event according to a set of variables.
Source: Center for Naval Analyses
Overall, our study identified three main trends. First, maritime sabotage operations that incurred third-party collateral damage often led to significant negative political consequences for the perpetrators. In both the CIA’s mining campaign in Nicaragua in 1984, for example, and the French sabotage of Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior the following year, the perpetrators faced withering political backlash. Incidentally, both of these sabotage operations occurred outside of large-scale combat operations, which may reflect the political danger associated with conducting sabotage operations outside of declared hostilities.
Second, and perhaps counterintuitively, losing the element of surprise did not seem to make a sabotage operation more likely to fail. Of the individual sabotage operations we examined in which the element of surprise was lost, approximately half still succeeded in achieving their desired tactical objectives. More broadly, our research suggests that maritime sabotage operations may be difficult to conceal, as exemplified by the high rate of force exposure. If true, this dynamic may give pause to policymakers wishing to employ maritime sabotage operations in sensitive environments.
Third, the more complex the maritime sabotage operation, the more likely it was to fail. We determined complexity by assessing the sabotage force (whether the operation was joint or combined), the equipment employed, and the relative ease or difficulty of the mission itself. The most complex sabotage operations tended to be associated with a greater rate of failure or led to significant unintended negative consequences (such as friendly casualties). For example, the attempted German sabotage campaign against the United States during World War II was extremely complicated, involving landing multiple teams of saboteurs by submarine at various points along the east coast. That operation failed when several of the saboteurs turned themselves in to American authorities and revealed the details of the plot in an attempt to avoid punishment after being compromised during the initial landing.
In addition to these three trends, our analysis enabled us to make several observations regarding the historical employment of maritime sabotage. World War II represents a high-water mark for maritime sabotage, with almost half of the identified instances in our dataset occurring during that conflict. Relatedly, most instances of maritime sabotage occurred during periods of large-scale combat operations. While this may be partly a function of our reliance on open-source information, it suggests that outside of declared hostilities, acts of maritime sabotage may be considered overly provocative.
Finally, in most maritime sabotage instances, the force employed was composed of SOF or similar personnel. The maritime sabotage operations we examined often involved the use of combat divers to emplace explosives. During the failed Operation Algeciras in 1982, for example, rogue Argentine paramilitary divers sought to attach mines to a British warship in port at Gibraltar under the cover of darkness. Although foiled by local police and British intelligence (and perhaps an observant rental car proprietor who picked up on some sloppy tradecraft), the aim was an attack that would divert British naval resources from the Falklands. While the operation was unsuccessful, it underscores that sabotage operations typically require skill sets and capabilities that are most commonly found among SOF and SOF-like entities.
Implications
As the joint force explores new approaches for countering adversaries across the competition continuum, researchers and practitioners should not neglect the role of maritime sabotage. Three questions in particular should be a priority for further analysis moving forward.
First, there is no current official US Department of Defense definition for sabotage, even as sabotage has become an area of renewed interest for the military. This lack of a definition may serve as a limiting factor to creatively developing and employing sabotage operations in the future. As the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms notes, common terminology “enables the joint force to organize, plan, train, and execute operations with a common language that is clearly articulated and universally understood.” For our analysis, we defined sabotage as a mission (conducted via an individual act or as part of a campaign) to secretly disarm, obstruct, or destroy enemy war materiel or infrastructure for military advantage. DoD should consider whether this definition is appropriate for wider adoption. Grappling with these definitional questions will help policymakers better understand how sabotage operations might be employed in rapidly evolving security environments.
Second, the majority of maritime sabotage operations occurred during declared hostilities. Yet the United States is not currently in a state of large-scale combat operations, but rather an environment of day-to-day competition. DoD should therefore consider what role sabotage may play both in today’s environment, characterized by competition below armed conflict, and during periods of outright hostilities. Specifically, outside of large-scale combat operations, what additional military or political benefits and risks might sabotage operations entail? What authorities does DoD have to conduct such operations? And what potential escalatory effects might they have? Answering these questions will better prepare policymakers for the possibility of conducting sabotage operations in new and evolving strategic environments.
Third, the past two decades have witnessed the introduction of two new domains—space and cyberspace—into the DoD lexicon and command structure. Our dataset, being historical in nature, did not identify or examine any instances of cross-domain sabotage involving these new domains. In the future, however, cross-domain activities like those at the nexus of maritime and cyberspace will present great challenges and opportunities for the joint force. US policymakers should consider how to leverage maritime assets in support of sabotage across domains.

Sabotage is not a new concept. From Courtenay’s coal torpedo to Lawrence of Arabia and his indigenous partners’ sabotage of the Hejaz railway, sabotage has been consistently employed throughout history, with varying degrees of success. Today, if conducted successfully, maritime sabotage may be a way the joint force can challenge adversaries in both day-to-day competition and in large-scale combat operations. Yet sabotage also entails additional risks. Practitioners, policymakers, and researchers must think through the conceptual and practical challenges surrounding how sabotage operations could be employed before such operations become necessary.
Alexander Powell is an expert on SOF, terrorist group tactics, and counterterrorism. He has worked extensively on security issues in Afghanistan and has deployed there numerous times to conduct assessments of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. In 2017 Mr. Powell deployed with the Special Operations Joint Task Force–Afghanistan to help stand up the command assessment cell. His research on SOF has encompassed issues ranging from the strategic down to the tactical levels. This piece draws on an October 2021 Center for Naval Analyses report entitled “Maritime Sabotage: Lessons Learned and Implications for Strategic Competition” by Alexander Powell, Elizabeth Yang, Annaleah Westerhaug, and Kaia Haney.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Russell Rhodes Jr., US Navy
mwi.usma.edu · by Alexander Powell · February 3, 2022


20. Biden defense nominations: A disappointing first year status report
Excerpts;
There are still currently eight nominees awaiting a committee hearing: four were received in late 2021 and another four in January. Of these only the Air Force general counsel position has been in committee longer than two months and that is likely an indication of some unresolved issue. After Tuesday’s committee votes, one remaining nominee, Brenda Fulton, who attracted some controversy in her October hearing is still waiting for a committee vote.
Altogether there are now 13 DoD nominees awaiting a floor vote and here the process has stagnated. This is not surprising if one looks to past precedent. Historically, there has been a honeymoon period for nominations.
Senior leaders like the secretary of defense and state are usually confirmed as close to the president’s inauguration as possible. Deputies and undersecretaries are nominated shortly thereafter and usually confirmed by early spring, with lesser officials working their way through the process by the summer of the first year of an administration.
By late summer the honeymoon period is over and things get harder as Senators begin putting serious holds (objecting to floor consideration) on lessor nominees to extract some kind of policy or legislative concession.
Biden defense nominations: A disappointing first year status report - Breaking Defense
The reality is these holds can easily be overcome if there was a willingness by Senate leadership to force what will likely be overwhelmingly bipartisan positive votes.
breakingdefense.com · by Bill Greenwalt · February 2, 2022
Numerous Defense Department positions have yet to be filled. (Graphic by Breaking Defense. Original photo by Saul Loeb-Pool/Getty Images)
One year into Joe Biden’s presidency and a striking number of vacancies remain in key Pentagon posts, as some nominees face partisan obstacles and others simply haven’t been named. In a new analysis based on new figures, AEI’s Bill Greenwalt provides a damning status report and warns that US security could be at risk.
Following the nominations process for political appointees at the Department of Defense has been similar to watching the fine intricacies of paint drying, with scarcely more than a couple dozen confirmed over the course of the last 12 months.
Then in a movement that might startle a sleeping sloth, Senate Majority Leader Schumer on January 20 filed cloture petitions on four Department of Defense nominations. For a brief moment in time, it looked like perhaps the long delays in filling national security positions in the Biden administration may at last be coming to an end.
Alas, even with three names coming out of the Senate Armed Services Committee late Tuesday, this optimism is probably misplaced.
The first full Senate votes this week were not for a DoD nominee but for federal judges, and it is likely more judges will jump the queue. Still at least for these four defense nominees, including Andrew Hunter, the Air Force acquisition nominee who has lingered in the Senate for almost seven months, things look a bit more promising. As for the rest of DoD appointments, I wouldn’t hold your breath.
The delays, while not without frustrating precedent, should have been anticipated by a president who spent his career on the Hill, and should be prioritized by a senate majority leader – and politically inclined lesser lawmakers – so that politics and bureaucracy don’t leave US security at risk, as they have with devastating consequences in the past.
Senate floor time is a scarce commodity in an election year and even with bipartisan support nominations still eat up a lot of time. Competing priorities include last year’s yet-to-be-completed appropriations process facing a looming February 18 shutdown deadline and a possible resurrected budget reconciliation package. Justice Stephen Breyer’s retirement announcement is further cause for gloom as it will likely suck all of the oxygen out of the Senate chamber. As the Senate often finds it hard to walk and chew gum at the same time, the Pentagon and other national security agencies should continue to plan to operate with a skeleton crew.
At one point there was agreement that this all mattered — that a less than full complement of political appointees had harmful consequences for national security. Being shorthanded puts a strain on the decision-making process and presents a danger that important things can be missed, especially in a crisis. One of the key observations and concerns of the 9/11 Commission was that the Bush administration lacked its full national security team at the time of the attacks and many of those in place had barely been on the job for a few weeks.
If only Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken had it so good. The Partnership for Public Service in its latest snapshot of political appointees found that a year into the Biden Administration only 55% of top national security positions were filled — a slightly lower rate than 57% on September 11, 2001. A careful read of the Partnership’s report finds that while things were bad in the Bush and Obama days, they have only gotten worse in the Trump and Biden administrations.
For those without a scorecard, here is the current status of defense nominations, according to a Hill staffer. There are a total of 61 civilian DOD positions that require Senate confirmation. Twenty-eight have been confirmed and are at their desks, or less than half of the required total. Of the remaining 33, there are 11 positions that have no nominee.
Three of those 11 are covered by what are known as intents to nominate, which means the executive branch still doesn’t have its act together to finish the paperwork to actually send up a nomination to the Senate. The most significant of these intended nominations is the Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, William LaPlante, announced two months ago and yet the Senate has not received an official nomination.
So there are 22 remaining DoD positions somewhere in the pipeline in the Senate. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) continues to operate as efficiently as it always has. Nominations sent to SASC are usually reported to the Senate floor within a six-to-eight-week window. Perhaps sensing some urgency and exasperation, the three nominees announced Tuesday – all at the assistant secretary level – were “immediately reported to the floor,” SASC said.
There are still currently eight nominees awaiting a committee hearing: four were received in late 2021 and another four in January. Of these only the Air Force general counsel position has been in committee longer than two months and that is likely an indication of some unresolved issue. After Tuesday’s committee votes, one remaining nominee, Brenda Fulton, who attracted some controversy in her October hearing is still waiting for a committee vote.
Altogether there are now 13 DoD nominees awaiting a floor vote and here the process has stagnated. This is not surprising if one looks to past precedent. Historically, there has been a honeymoon period for nominations.
Senior leaders like the secretary of defense and state are usually confirmed as close to the president’s inauguration as possible. Deputies and undersecretaries are nominated shortly thereafter and usually confirmed by early spring, with lesser officials working their way through the process by the summer of the first year of an administration.
By late summer the honeymoon period is over and things get harder as Senators begin putting serious holds (objecting to floor consideration) on lessor nominees to extract some kind of policy or legislative concession.
All of this happens like clockwork and it is not like the president nor his staff didn’t spend most of their careers on Capitol Hill and somehow missed this. The lesson is to have your act together and fill the nominations pipeline early. The Biden administration for whatever reasons did not do that. Some will push back that neither did the Trump administration, but to equate oneself as being as equally inept as its predecessor is probably not saying much.
If one is too slow in choosing candidates upfront then a strategy is needed to overcome later expected floor delays. The senate majority leader has the power to schedule and prioritize floor time and streamline the process for nominees that he and the administration care about. Most defense nominees have bipartisan support and once a vote is scheduled candidates are confirmed easily. It just takes time. As holds begin to be put on nominees, either deals need to be struck or cloture has to be filed to force debate on nominations. This did not happen over the last year as other matters dominated the Senate calendar.
Thus, the signal sent is that the administration or the majority leader have not cared enough about staffing the national security agencies to force floor consideration. Senator Josh Hawley’s quixotic and counterproductive holds on these nominations have served as a convenient excuse not to put any real effort into confirming national security nominations.
Still, the reality is these holds can easily be overcome if there was a willingness by Senate leadership to force what will likely be overwhelmingly bipartisan positive votes. That speaks volumes as far as priorities go.
Bill Greenwalt, long the top Republican acquisition policy expert on the SASC, rose to become deputy defense undersecretary for industrial policy. A member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, he’s now a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.


21. Islamic State Leader Killed During U.S. Raid in Syria, Biden Says

Excerpts:

Charles Lister, a Syria specialist at the Middle East Institute, said that based on conversations he had with individuals in the area and videos posted on social media the raid began about 1 a.m. local time when two or three helicopters landed in the Atmeh area—where there are several camps for internally displaced people—and surrounded a residential building. Using a loudspeaker, U.S. troops demanded that women and children vacate the building, he said.
The target of the raid would have to be a significant individual or individuals given the firepower that U.S. forces brought to the fight and the risks involved, he said.
The area of northwest Syria where the raid took place is nominally under the control of Turkey, but the de facto power is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a jihadist group and former al Qaeda affiliate that is now hostile to both al Qaeda and its rival, Islamic State. Al Qaeda has accused the jihadist group of helping facilitate U.S. drone strikes against its personnel, Mr. Lister said.
Islamic State Leader Killed During U.S. Raid in Syria, Biden Says
U.S. military forces in northwest Syria carried out a counterterrorism operation that killed Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, the president says
WSJ · by Gordon Lubold, Nancy A. Youssef and Warren P. Strobel
“Thanks to the skill and bravery of our Armed Forces, we have taken off the battlefield Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi—the leader of ISIS. All Americans have returned safely from the operation,” Mr. Biden said in a statement.
He said he would deliver remarks on the operation later Thursday morning.
The mission in northwest Syria along the Turkish border included Apache gunships, airstrikes and drones, according to U.S. officials and accounts on social media. There were also reports of civilian deaths, including women and children.
In his statement, Mr. Biden said the forces “successfully undertook a counterterrorism operation.” He didn’t provide any details or address reports of civilian deaths.
The special forces, in conjunction with other U.S. troops, raided a site in the Atmeh area in Syria’s Idlib province for more than two hours, reportedly resulting in several deaths and the destruction of some structures, according to witness accounts filtered through social media. U.S. troops exchanged fire with enemy forces on the ground, according to those social-media reports.
At least 13 people were killed, including six children and four women, as a result of bombings and clashes in connection with the U.S. raid, Syrian civil-defense group the White Helmets said on its Facebook page. It wasn’t immediately clear whether the people were killed during the raid or after.
“We were woken up at 1 a.m. by the sound of war planes and helicopters,” said Adnan Abo Mohammad, who lives not far from the site of the attack. “They were flying very low to the ground. Clashes went on till about 3 a.m.”
The reported site of the raid, a building, is about 15 miles from the Syrian village of Barisha where Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi died in October 2019 during a U.S.-led raid when he detonated himself with a suicide vest.

Emergency personnel sift through debris in the aftermath of the raid.
Photo: COURTESY OF MOHAMED AL-DAHER/Mohamed Al-Daher via REUTERS
Mr. Al-Qurayshi also is believed to have worn a suicide vest as U.S. troops approached, a U.S. defense official said. Unlike al-Baghdadi, the prominent founder of the terror group who spoke frequently to his followers, relatively little was known about his 45-year-old successor.
Thursday’s operation was in the planning stages for at least the past several days, U.S. officials said. Marine Gen. Frank McKenzie, the head of U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for military operations in the Middle East, was expected to appear in person at a conference in Washington on Thursday. The organization changed his participation earlier this week to virtual remarks, so he could remain at Central Command’s headquarters in Tampa, Fla., according to people familiar with the matter.
By late Wednesday, the general’s staff had pulled him out of the conference altogether, according to officials with the Middle East Institute think tank, where he was expected to appear.
Charles Lister, a Syria specialist at the Middle East Institute, said that based on conversations he had with individuals in the area and videos posted on social media the raid began about 1 a.m. local time when two or three helicopters landed in the Atmeh area—where there are several camps for internally displaced people—and surrounded a residential building. Using a loudspeaker, U.S. troops demanded that women and children vacate the building, he said.
The target of the raid would have to be a significant individual or individuals given the firepower that U.S. forces brought to the fight and the risks involved, he said.
The area of northwest Syria where the raid took place is nominally under the control of Turkey, but the de facto power is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a jihadist group and former al Qaeda affiliate that is now hostile to both al Qaeda and its rival, Islamic State. Al Qaeda has accused the jihadist group of helping facilitate U.S. drone strikes against its personnel, Mr. Lister said.
Experts said it is hard for the U.S. to ignore the region, given the groups that operate there.
“It is part of Syria in which extremist groups are mixed in with other elements of the opposition,” said Andrew Tabler, a former State Department official who is now with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, referring to the Syrian opposition. “It shows that no matter how much Syria is out of the headlines, the problems remain the same.”
The Atmeh area, Mr. Tabler said, includes a military base that had been used in the past by the Free Syrian Army and other groups opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It has rough terrain and is adjacent to the Turkish border.
The raid and reports of civilian casualties come less than a week after the Pentagon issued revised rules meant to reduce the number of innocent people killed when the U.S. military carries out such operations.
Last week, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin issued a new directive designed to limit civilian casualties as part of a comprehensive overhaul of the military’s policies and practices.
The U.S. military has come under increased scrutiny in recent months for not doing more to avoid killing civilians during operations. Last year, the Pentagon was forced to admit that an airstrike it carried out on a car in Kabul was a “tragic mistake” that killed 10 people, including seven children. But the Pentagon took no disciplinary action against the military officials involved in the errant attack, which the U.S. military initially defended as a “righteous” strike that killed people preparing to attack U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
“We can and will improve upon efforts to protect civilians,” Mr. Austin wrote in the directive issued last week. “The protection of innocent civilians in the conduct of our operations remains vital to the ultimate success of our operations, and as a significant strategic and moral imperative.”
—Nazih Osseiran in Beirut and Michael R. Gordon contributed to this article.
Write to Gordon Lubold at Gordon.Lubold@wsj.com, Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com and Warren P. Strobel at Warren.Strobel@wsj.com
WSJ · by Gordon Lubold, Nancy A. Youssef and Warren P. Strobel


22. Why Ukraine Matters to the U.S.


Excerpts:
But Mr. Hawley writes that deploying more American forces to Europe “can only detract from the U.S. military’s ability to ready and modernize forces to deter China in the Indo-Pacific.” China does pose a greater long-term threat than Russia and will require rebalancing American resources. But the Russian military remains formidable and its nuclear arsenal more so. Beijing isn’t ready to invade Taiwan within days as Russia now is with Ukraine.
Russia and China have been deepening cooperation, as the world saw at the United Nations Security Council on Monday. The idea that Mr. Putin can somehow be coaxed into helping the West contain China is a fantasy. He would pocket concessions on Ukraine and continue to threaten American interests in Europe while working with China to undermine U.S. interests around the world. After swallowing Ukraine, Russia would also be that much more powerful and closer to NATO’s eastern front.
Supporters of Mr. Biden’s retreat from Afghanistan adopted the mantra “good strategy, bad execution” when chaos followed. In reality, abandoning a modest commitment was bad strategy and an awful precedent that has encouraged bad actors like Mr. Putin. Doing the same in Europe would be even greater folly.



Why Ukraine Matters to the U.S.
Giving Putin what he wants won’t make the China challenge easier.
WSJ · by The Editorial Board

Sen. Josh Hawley speaks to reporters on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., Feb. 2.
Photo: ALEXANDER DRAGO/REUTERS

The Biden Administration announced Wednesday that it will soon deploy thousands of U.S. troops to shore up NATO’s eastern flank. It’s the right decision with more than 100,000 Russian troops along Ukraine’s borders.
A Pentagon spokesman said Wednesday that some 1,000 American troops based in Germany will soon shift to Romania and about 2,000 will leave the U.S. for Poland and Germany. “These are not permanent moves,” a Pentagon spokesman stressed Wednesday. “These forces are not going to fight in Ukraine.”

The move has aroused fears of a U.S. war with Russia, but the goal here is deterrence to prevent a war. A show of conventional force—combined with the threat of sanctions—is intended to reassure front-line NATO allies and avoid a broader conflict with Russia. This is necessary given that Vladimir Putin wants control over far more than Ukraine.
On this score it’s worth addressing the arguments by Sen. Josh Hawley, who is typical of some on the right who want the U.S. to appease Mr. Putin. In a Feb. 1 letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the Republican calls on the White House to withdraw support for Ukraine’s accession to NATO. There are reasonable disagreements about the merits of Kyiv joining the alliance—which wouldn’t happen for years anyway—but now would be an especially bad time to rule it out.
Mr. Putin is demanding that NATO halt expansion and roll back deployments in Central and Eastern Europe, which he believes Russia should dominate. But the alliance and its aspiring members have always decided who joins, not the Kremlin. Giving Mr. Putin veto power would show revanchist regimes that the mere threat of war can get the West to bend.
The Senator rightly calls out Europe for not spending enough on its own defense. We’ve been making that point for years, and Germany is a particular embarrassment. But President Trump made progress in coaxing Europe to do more, and Europe and Canada increased overall defense spending six years in a row through 2020.
Much of Europe has also taken the current crisis seriously. France has said it will send several hundred soldiers to Romania. Denmark, Spain and the Netherlands announced last month that they would send ships and fighter jets eastward. The U.K. and other NATO members have provided weapons to Ukraine, which Mr. Hawley says he supports.
But Mr. Hawley writes that deploying more American forces to Europe “can only detract from the U.S. military’s ability to ready and modernize forces to deter China in the Indo-Pacific.” China does pose a greater long-term threat than Russia and will require rebalancing American resources. But the Russian military remains formidable and its nuclear arsenal more so. Beijing isn’t ready to invade Taiwan within days as Russia now is with Ukraine.
Russia and China have been deepening cooperation, as the world saw at the United Nations Security Council on Monday. The idea that Mr. Putin can somehow be coaxed into helping the West contain China is a fantasy. He would pocket concessions on Ukraine and continue to threaten American interests in Europe while working with China to undermine U.S. interests around the world. After swallowing Ukraine, Russia would also be that much more powerful and closer to NATO’s eastern front.
Supporters of Mr. Biden’s retreat from Afghanistan adopted the mantra “good strategy, bad execution” when chaos followed. In reality, abandoning a modest commitment was bad strategy and an awful precedent that has encouraged bad actors like Mr. Putin. Doing the same in Europe would be even greater folly.
Copyright ©2022 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
WSJ · by The Editorial Board

23. Handling a Hybrid War in Ukraine

Yes. Including a resistance operation concept and unconventional deterrence in support of the overall strategy.

Conclusion:

But NATO can also respond with its own hybrid warfare. Releasing intelligence about Mr. Putin’s personal wealth accumulation is one place to start. Unlike Russian propaganda, news about the Putin regime’s corruption has the advantage of being true.


Handling a Hybrid War in Ukraine
Defense isn’t enough against Russian attacks short of an invasion.
WSJ · by The Editorial Board

By now Vladimir Putin must understand that an outright invasion of Ukraine would cause Russia economic pain, but the strongman may believe hybrid attacks could help him achieve his goals at a lower cost. The West can do more to disabuse him of the notion.

Hybrid attacks have already begun in Ukraine. Ukrainian security services have reported hundreds of fake bombing threats this year, prompting some schools to close. A cyber attack brought down several Ukrainian government websites this month, with a message on one hacked site warning “be afraid and expect worse.” Kyiv believes the attack was carried out by Russian ally Belarus, which complicates calculations about how to retaliate.
Taking down a few websites and calling in bomb threats are more annoyances than serious threats. But imagine a cyber attack that paralyzes the power grid or oil and gas network in Ukraine. Without firing a shot, Moscow could kill countless Ukrainians unable to heat their homes during the country’s brutal winter. Destabilizing the country’s nuclear-power infrastructure could be even more dangerous.
Hybrid attacks also aim to destabilize Ukraine’s fragile democracy. That could be as simple as supporting violence in legitimate protest movements or spreading disinformation to undermine confidence in the government. The U.K. Foreign Office said this month it has intelligence that Moscow is “looking to install a pro-Russian leader in Kyiv.”
Ukraine isn’t a NATO member, and Russia always denies involvement. But like a conventional invasion, unanswered hybrid attacks pose a threat to the alliance’s interests. Countries like China and Iran would be emboldened to step up hybrid operations. Mr. Putin could move on the Baltic states with hybrid attacks if his Ukraine gambit succeeds.
Last year Belarus began facilitating the transit of mostly Middle Eastern immigrants into the European Union through its border with Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, hoping to heighten divisions in the Continent. The U.S. has suffered serious cyberattacks from Russian hackers for years, and the Canadian government recently warned “critical infrastructure network defenders” to boost “their awareness of and protection against Russian state-sponsored cyber threats.”
NATO is scheduled to publish a new “strategic concept” this year. While the organization historically has focused on defending its members’ territorial integrity from conventional threats, hybrid warfare should play a critical role in the document. That means withstanding hybrid threats and deterring them with punishment.
While Mr. Biden and European leaders have tried to present a united front, they’ve still been responding to Mr. Putin’s aggression rather than taking the initiative. Conventional deterrence with ships, planes and troops for front-line NATO states is necessary.
But NATO can also respond with its own hybrid warfare. Releasing intelligence about Mr. Putin’s personal wealth accumulation is one place to start. Unlike Russian propaganda, news about the Putin regime’s corruption has the advantage of being true.
Copyright ©2022 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
WSJ · by The Editorial Board


24. The US Army's Best: Why You Have No Shot In Joining Green Berets

I think the title is misleading and does not fit with the article which is simply trying to explain the selection and training process. And of course claims such as Green Berets as the best do not help Green Berets and their relations with the rest of the military. It is wrong to say all the best of the military go to Special Forces or SOF. Of course many excellent soldiers gravitate to SF and SOF. However, all branches of the Army retain the very best by the choice of those who are the best. SF and SOF are simply looking to select the right personnel who will be their best in SF/SOF. Many who are the best wish to remain the best in the branch in which they serve.

In regards to selection I explain it this way.

We select for those who have the innate desire to live and work within foreign cultures for long durations. 

In addition to being physically fit, which is the foundation for being able to survive in austere environments for long duration, all SF soldiers must share these three traits: (1) the ability to lead a team; (2) the ability to work as an effective member of a team; (3) the ability to operate alone and independently. In short, a leader, a team player, and an independent operator who wants to live and work overseas in a foreing culture. It is hard to select for all three.


The US Army's Best: Why You Have No Shot In Joining Green Berets
19fortyfive.com · by ByBrent M. Eastwood · February 2, 2022
The Green Berets are among the elite of the US Army. Here is what it takes to join and why it’s so hard to make the cut: Traditionally, the main mission of Army Special Forces personnel is to work with and train indigenous forces. So not only do Green Berets become experts in land warfare and airborne operations, they must also have foreign language and cultural skills. Army Special Forces personnel also conduct direct actions that encompass raids, hostage rescue, reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, and counter-insurgency. This requires individual intelligence and integrity along with outstanding weapons proficiency, physical fitness, and tactical and technical skills.
Trainees Have to Be Selected First
The first step along the path to wearing the Green Beret is attending the two-week Special Operations Preparation Course. This is an indoctrination phase before a 24-day course called Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS).
Trainees are selected for further training based on displaying the potential that they can accomplish the various Special Forces missions.
One can attempt selection after serving at least three years in the regular Army or come in directly from Basic Combat Training and Infantry Advanced Individual Training, plus completing airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia.
Once assigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina for selection, Special Forces trainees must dominate a physical fitness test that includes push-ups, sit-ups, and a two-mile run. Candidates should be able to run 6-minute miles at a base training rate of 25-30 miles a week. Common injuries are shin splints and tendinitis of the knee.
Candidates must excel at carrying ruck sacks with heavy loads and be able to run with a 60-pound ruck four miles in less than 35 minutes.
Advanced land navigation skills with a compass and map are also required. Be ready to do physical training with logs as well. Candidates need to be able to swim in a uniform and boots.
Also, it pays to be proficient in cross-fit types of physical conditioning with kettlebells and other calisthenics.
Trainees must also pass psychological tests and be constantly assessed on how well they perform as teams.
The Q-course Is a Long Road
If selected, trainees still have a long way to go. Candidates are assigned to the Special Forces Qualification Course, also known as the “Q course,” or simply the “Q.” Q course lasts around 67-weeks. This is a monster school that tests various skills and physical prowess. The trainees eventually get their military occupational specialty (MOS), whether it be weapons, communications, engineering, intelligence, or combat medicine.
The first phase of the Q course is 6-weeks, and this is basic training for the Special Forces operators. The candidates receive instruction on Special Forces history, tactics, land navigation, and irregular and unconventional warfare. The nine-week second phase is when trainees get indoctrinated in working with teams so they eventually can be ready to join their 12-man ODA – operational detachment alpha. Next is the 16-week MOS training phase. The fourth phase is where candidates put all their training together in a four-week war game called Robin Sage against an opposing force.
Can Trainees Take the Pressure of Being Constantly Evaluated?
The main thing to take away from this training is that candidates are constantly being evaluated – even when they are in off-duty hours.
Do trainees have a bad attitude? Do they gossip about their team members or instructors? Do they complain? Can they show mental acuity when they are most fatigued? Do they react well to injuries and pain? Do they display intelligence at every juncture? Are they capable of leadership when times get tough? Do they have technical hands-on skills while understanding the bigger picture of unconventional warfare?
How well trainees pass these assessments determine whether they earn a Green Beret. Changes to training are constantly evolving depending on threats and scenarios required at the national command level. This means that more urban training may be required in the Q-course. Russian, Korean, Iranian, and Mandarin Chinese language and cultural skills could become more prominent. Many people forget that the traditional Special Forces mission is training indigenous fighters for unconventional warfare, so the Green Berets sometimes require brains over brawn. You may not have to be built like a professional football player if you have the smarts needed for irregular warfare.
1945’s new Defense and National Security Editor, Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer.
19fortyfive.com · by ByBrent M. Eastwood · February 2, 2022






V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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