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Quotes of the Day:
“This military model is extremely adaptable to any group. It has one simple requirement: before formulating a strategy or taking action, understand the structure of your group. You can always change it and redesign it to fit your purposes.”
- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies of War
“you can’t fool all the people all the time,” but you can fool enough of them to rule a large country.”
- Will Durant, The Lessons of History
And this I believe: that the free, exploring mind of the individual human is the most valuable thing in the world. And this I would fight for: the freedom of the mind to take any direction it wishes, undirected. And this I must fight against: any idea, religion, or government which limits or destroys the individual. This is what I am and what I am about.
- John Steinbeck, "East of Eden”
1. Yoon's state visit to U.S. under discussion: source |
2. N. Korea adopts law on protection of 'state secret'
3. Defector Thae Yong-ho: South Korea should have its own nukes
4. Ukraine War Drives Rapid Growth in South Korea’s Arms Exports
5. South Korea’s Nuclear Moment
6. [Q/A] ROK-US alliance evolves into global strategic partnership
7. South Korea still refuses to send arms to Ukraine
8. US-NK summit is unlikely in 2023: Korea Society
9. U.S. Stealth Fighters Join Air Drills with S.Korea
10.Britain's trade with N. Korea more than doubles last year: report
11. North Korea Accuses U.S. of Raising Tensions
12. North Korea students get frostbite after 'patriotic' subzero mountain march
13. North Korea likely to celebrate Feb. 8 Army Day anniversary with nighttime event
14. North Korea Still Owes Sweden for 1,000 Volvos Ordered in the 1970s
15. Seoul’s Nuclear Temptations and the U.S.-South Korean Alliance
1. Yoon's state visit to U.S. under discussion: source |
The logical time should be around July 27, 2023 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement but the Korean side wants a visit sooner rather than later
Excerpts:
If it materializes, it would be the first state visit to the United States by a South Korean president in 12 years. President Lee Myung-bak was the last president to pay such a visit to Washington in 2011.
The source said the allies are keeping other options open, such as an official visit or a working visit. April is seen as the most likely time for the trip.
Yoon's state visit to U.S. under discussion: source | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · February 3, 2023
SEOUL, Feb. 3 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States are in talks over a possible state visit to Washington by President Yoon Suk Yeol in the first half of the year, a diplomatic source said Friday.
If it materializes, it would be the first state visit to the United States by a South Korean president in 12 years. President Lee Myung-bak was the last president to pay such a visit to Washington in 2011.
The source said the allies are keeping other options open, such as an official visit or a working visit. April is seen as the most likely time for the trip.
A state visit is the highest form of a visit by a head of state, and is typically accompanied by an official welcome ceremony, an inspection of an honor guard, a state dinner and an address to Congress.
Yoon's visit would coincide with the 70th anniversary of the two countries' alliance at a time when his administration is seeking a closer alignment with Washington on both security and economic issues.
The presidential office said it has no details to reveal as of now, given that it is customary for the two countries to simultaneously announce a state visit and the need to consider the congressional calendar.
"The two countries are in talks over a U.S. visit, and nothing has been decided yet," a senior presidential official said.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) and U.S. President Joe Biden pose for a photo during their summit at a hotel in Phnom Penh, in this file photo taken Nov. 13, 2022. Yoon and Biden warned North Korea that their countries will respond with "overwhelming force using all available means" should it use nuclear weapons. (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · February 3, 2023
2. N. Korea adopts law on protection of 'state secret'
I wonder if the regime has an over classification problem or if they have officials taking classified documents home? (note sarcasm)
(LEAD) N. Korea adopts law on protection of 'state secret' | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · February 3, 2023
(ATTN: ADDS more info in paras 7, 10-15)
SEOUL, Feb. 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has adopted a new law aimed at safeguarding state secrets at a parliamentary meeting, its state media said Friday, amid apparent efforts to tighten internal discipline.
The plenary meeting of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), held in Pyongyang the previous day, also adopted other laws on the country's management of railways and the education of prodigies, according to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The objective of the law on the "protection of state secret" is to contribute to guaranteeing national safety and the development of the "socialist construction" by establishing system and order, the KCNA said. It did not provide details on what the "state secret" it was referring to or if it was only one secret or multiple ones.
Observers said the law appears aimed at tightening state control and discipline amid protracted economic challenges.
During the meeting, the North also adopted laws on loans and national symbols, and reviewed the execution of a law on improving living conditions for discharged officers.
The meeting "stressed the need for the socialist law-observance guidance committees at all levels to conduct effective education in law observance through the newly-adopted laws," the KCNA said in the English-language statement.
South Korea's unification ministry regards the move as reflecting the Kim Jong-un regime's efforts to "strengthen its overall social order."
The SPA is the highest organ of power under the North's constitution, although it rubber-stamps decisions by the ruling party.
Choe Ryong-hae, president of the Presidium of the SPA, presided over the meeting.
A plenary session of the standing committee of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly takes place at the Mansudae Assembly Hall in Pyongyang on Feb. 2, 2023, with Chairman Choe Ryong-hae (standing) presiding, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Meanwhile, the North's state-controlled media again urged full vigilance against the coronavirus pandemic.
The Rodong Sinmun, the North's main newspaper, stressed the need to place the top priority on making all-out efforts against COVID-19, pointing out that the virus continues to affect millions of people across the world.
"Officials should not regard this as merely something happening outside of their territory," the paper said, urging them to take thorough measures to disinfect their areas to prevent the spread of influenza and "malignant infectious diseases."
The North claimed victory against the coronavirus in August last year, just months after it reported its first case in May.
Earlier this week, the World Health Organization announced it has decided to continue to designate the COVID-19 crisis as a global health emergency.
Youtube
https://youtu.be/kTnicQXayAg
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · February 3, 2023
3. Defector Thae Yong-ho: South Korea should have its own nukes
I do not think Assemblyman Thae got the memo. President Yoon has dialed this back. However, with 76% of the population desiring South Korean nuclear weapons I am not surprised by this.
Defector Thae Yong-ho: South Korea should have its own nukes - UPI.com
By Thomas Maresca
upi.com
1/3
Thae Yong-ho, a high-ranking North Korean diplomat who defected and was elected to the South Korean parliament, said Thursday that Seoul should acquire its own nuclear arsenal. Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI
SEOUL, Feb. 2 (UPI) -- Thae Yong-ho, a high-profile North Korean defector who became a politician in South Korea, said Thursday that Seoul should acquire its own nuclear weapons despite Washington's policy of extended deterrence for its ally.
"Extended deterrence is not enough to prevent nuclear warfare on the Korean Peninsula," Thae told international media during a briefing in downtown Seoul. "Ultimately, I believe that South Korea should have its own nuclear capabilities."
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Thae served as the North Korean deputy ambassador to Britain before defecting in 2016. In 2020, he was elected to South Korea's parliament, the National Assembly, as a member of the conservative People Power Party.
His comments came days after U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited Seoul and reaffirmed that America "stands firm" in its extended deterrence commitment.
The commitment includes U.S. conventional, nuclear and missile-defense capabilities. However, questions about the reliability of the American nuclear umbrella have grown louder in Seoul amid a slew of North Korean provocations.
Earlier this month, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol -- also a member of the People Power Party -- floated the idea of Seoul looking to deploy American tactical nuclear weapons or even developing its own if the security situation deteriorated.
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Public support for homegrown nukes has also been on the rise, with 76% of respondents in a recent survey favoring the idea of South Korea arming itself.
Thae said the Kim Jong Un regime does not believe that the United States would come to the defense of South Korea if it knows Pyongyang has the ability to strike an American city with a long-range nuclear missile.
"If North Korea proves its capabilities to hit major U.S. cities like New York or L.A. with its nuclear warheads, maybe the U.S. will change its position on extended deterrence," Thae said. "The Kim Jong Un regime strongly believes that the U.S. will not give up Los Angeles to protect Seoul."
The former diplomat said Pyongyang will keep developing its missile and nuclear programs until it can clearly demonstrate its long-range strike capability. The secretive state launched a record number of ballistic missiles last year and analysts say it is poised to conduct its seventh nuclear test.
However, a nuclear-armed South Korea would change the equation and give Pyongyang reason to reconsider its aggressive strategy, Thae said.
"If South Korea has direct deterrence and acquires its own nuclear capabilities, North Korea would think differently," he said.
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North Korea on Thursday warned of the "toughest reaction" to expanded U.S.-South Korean military cooperation with "overwhelming nuclear force."
upi.com
4. Ukraine War Drives Rapid Growth in South Korea’s Arms Exports
A partner in the Arsenal of Democracy.
Ukraine War Drives Rapid Growth in South Korea’s Arms Exports
The country has been supplying the U.S. and its allies and is coming under pressure to aid Kyiv directly
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-war-drives-rapid-growth-in-south-koreas-arms-exports-11675345212?mod=flipboard
By Dasl YoonFollow
Feb. 2, 2023 9:00 am ET
SEOUL—The Ukraine war has fueled rapid growth in South Korea’s arms exports as countries supporting Kyiv turn to Seoul to replenish their supplies.
Now South Korea is facing increasing pressure to supply weapons directly to Ukraine.
Seoul has sent gas masks, bulletproof vests and medical supplies to Ukraine, but President Yoon Suk Yeol has declined to provide lethal aid directly to Kyiv, citing a law that prohibits the country from doing so during a conflict.
During a visit to Seoul on Monday, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg urged South Korea to reconsider, pointing to several other countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that had changed their policies to support Ukraine. Asked about the possibility on Tuesday, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup said he was aware of the need for the international effort and the government was paying close attention to the situation, but declined to comment further.
The attention is partly due to the unique position South Korea occupies among global arms suppliers. With an arms industry built for decades to counter the rising threat from North Korea, it has been the world’s fastest-growing arms exporter over the past five years, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
South Korea’s presence in the global defense industry has been expanding.
PHOTO: YONHAP/SHUTTERSTOCK
Its share of the global arms market is still small when compared with those of giants like the U.S. and Russia, but it rose to become the eighth-largest exporter, with 2.8% of global exports, over the five years ended in 2021, from 13th and 1% in the previous five years, according to the institute.
South Korea has set a goal of being in the top four by 2027. Its arms sales last year were more than double those of the year before—topping $17 billion by the end of November, up from $7.25 billion—according to the Defense Ministry.
The global appetite has risen as a result of the war. South Korea signed its largest military-export deal last year, to supply tanks and jet fighters to Poland, enabling Warsaw to replace many of the weapons it has sent to Kyiv. Poland has also bought artillery and ammunition from South Korea as it rushes to build up its defenses.
Many European countries are turning to South Korea because it can deliver the weapons faster than other allies, said Ramon Pacheco Pardo, the KF-VUB Korea chair at the Brussels School of Governance. At the end of the Cold War, military powers in Europe began reducing their capacity to mass produce conventional weapons such as tanks and artillery. South Korea’s defense industry, meanwhile, has been ramping up its capacity because of the threat from North Korea. Its defense companies have been setting up overseas manufacturing facilities for years, and they now have established production lines with quick turnaround times.
“NATO countries historically trade weapons amongst themselves, but currently it could take several years for countries like Germany or the U.K. to export weapons, which is where South Korea comes in,” Mr. Pacheco Pardo said. “To aid Ukraine the weapons are not needed next year, they’re needed now.”
Last year, the U.S. struck a confidential deal to purchase artillery shells from South Korea that were destined for Ukraine. Under the deal, Seoul would sell 100,000 rounds of 155 mm artillery ammunition to the U.S., which would then deliver it to Ukraine.
South Korean soldiers during basic training, and below, in a combined drill with the U.S. military.
PHOTO: YONHAP NEWS/ZUMA PRESS
PHOTO: CHUNG SUNG-JUN/GETTY IMAGES
South Korea’s role in supplying the U.S. and its allies hasn’t gone unnoticed by Russia. In October, President Vladimir Putin accused South Korea of sending arms and ammunition to Ukraine, warning it would ruin relations between Moscow and Seoul. Mr. Yoon denied that the country had done so.
South Korea has tried to strike a delicate balance with Russia since the war in Ukraine began, in an effort to avoid antagonizing a country that provides about a quarter of its crude oil imports and holds significant sway with North Korea. The U.S. has accused North Korea of supplying weapons to aid the Russian war effort, which Pyongyang has denied.
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Last March, after Seoul—under pressure from Washington—joined the international sanctions against Moscow, Russia designated South Korea an unfriendly nation. As a result of the sanctions enforcement, imports from Russia, including crude petroleum and refined petroleum products, were down about 10% from a year earlier as of November. Russia hasn’t publicly sought retribution against South Korea, but last month the speaker of Russia’s Parliament warned that countries supplying Ukraine with more-powerful weapons would trigger retaliation.
The demand for South Korean arms extends beyond Europe and the U.S. Last month Mr. Yoon traveled to the United Arab Emirates, where the two countries’ arms-procurement agencies reached an agreement to make joint investments in their arms industries. South Korea reached a $3.5 billion deal last year to sell its surface-to-air missile-defense system, called Cheongung II, to the U.A.E. The system is designed to intercept enemy aircraft and ballistic missiles.
Seoul’s presence in the global defense industry has been expanding on the back of massive arms sales to countries such as Indonesia, Australia and Egypt. Indonesia has purchased armored vehicles and jet fighters, while Egypt has bought hundreds of self-propelled howitzers to update its artillery systems. Australia purchased howitzers and ammunition-resupply vehicles in 2021.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, center, in the second row, visiting troops based in the United Arab Emirates.
PHOTO: YONHAP NEWS/ZUMA PRESS
South Korea’s constant state of military readiness has given it an edge. Because the country consistently mass produces weapons, the unit cost of production is cheaper than in many other countries, and because it conducts frequent military exercises involving shells and ammunition, its stockpile is regularly refilled, weapons analysts say.
“Constant military exercises have verified the quality of South Korea’s weapons while the prices are comparatively lower,” said Moon Seong-mook, a former general in South Korea’s military who now heads the Seoul-based Korea Research Institute for National Strategy.
South Korea stepped up investments in its own weapons systems after the U.S. reduced its military presence in the early 1990s. Under a plan to shift from a leading to supporting role on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. withdrew thousands of troops and withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons under a disarmament deal with the Soviet Union.
South Korea has largely built weapons and equipment to be compatible with U.S. gear, partially because of the technological know-how imparted by the U.S. and because the allies expect to fight side-by-side in any potential conflict with North Korea, defense industry experts said.
A prototype of South Korea’s KF-21 fighter.
PHOTO: YONHAP/POOL/SHUTTERSTOCK
South Korea’s arms industry has grown not only in capacity but also in capability. The homegrown KF-21 jet fighter, expected to replace the country’s aging fleet, achieved supersonic speeds for the first time last month. The military successfully test-fired submarine-launched ballistic missiles last year, becoming the world’s seventh country with the technology.
Hanwha Aerospace Co., which signed the deal with Poland for South Korea’s biggest-ever arms sale, will supply Warsaw with tanks, howitzers and jet fighters. The deal has brightened export prospects for the industry. After hovering around $3 billion between 2010 and 2020, South Korea’s annual arms exports surged past $7 billion in 2021, owing to Hanwha’s deal to export K-9 howitzers to Australia. The company now plans to establish a branch in Poland to expand defense exports to Europe.
“South Korea’s defense companies are set to see significant growth from overseas demand, especially as the war in Ukraine prolongs,” said Yang Uk, a military expert at Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a think tank in Seoul.
Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com
5. South Korea’s Nuclear Moment
And we must remember that Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy includes subverting both the South and the ROK/US Alliance.The nuclear issue contributes to that.
Excerpt:
Yoon recently spoke with his defense team and foreign ministers and emphasized that the government is not, at this time, actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program. However, the South Korean National Assembly did take proactive measures in late December to increase the 2023 defense budget by 4.4 percent to about $45 billion, and this rise in funding will improve South Korea’s ability to counter any drone attack from the North.
South Korea’s Nuclear Moment - The American Spectator | USA News and PoliticsThe American Spectator | USA News and Politics
spectator.org · by Alex Adkins · February 2, 2023
Asia
South Korea’s Nuclear Moment
According to the president, the legislature, and the people, Seoul is rapidly approaching a moment of crisis.
February 2, 2023, 1:22 PM
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol speaks at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 19, 2023 (World Economic Forum/YouTube)
South Korea is in the midst of a defining moment in its 75-year history. As President Yoon Suk-yeol pointed out in early January, North Korea’s increasing nuclear stockpile is a threat to South Korea’s national sovereignty. If Pyongyang continues this nuclear escalation, Seoul will have no choice but to pursue its own nuclear missile program.
Yoon recently spoke with his defense team and foreign ministers and emphasized that the government is not, at this time, actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program. However, the South Korean National Assembly did take proactive measures in late December to increase the 2023 defense budget by 4.4 percent to about $45 billion, and this rise in funding will improve South Korea’s ability to counter any drone attack from the North.
In addition, a solid pro-nuclear national consensus is beginning to take hold, as a 2022 Chicago Council on Global Affairs study revealed. According to that report, 71 percent of South Korean citizens want the country to begin stockpiling its own nuclear weapons.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given South Koreans insight into what is possible when you share a border with a nuclear-armed, dictator-ruled country.
South Korea does have the technology to develop a large bomb, but it would be ideal for Seoul policymakers if the United States aided in nuclear deterrence, especially as, since the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953, South Korea has been supported by a U.S. military presence in the form of about 28,000 troops and enough “nuclear-armed submarines, heavy bombers, and stealth fighters … to deter an attack.”
However, recent world events make the South Korean–U.S. alliance uncertain, with Koreans questioning the extent to which the U.S. would be willing to come to their aid. The Biden administration has adopted former President Barack Obama’s approach of withdrawing from the world stage, as is demonstrated by its abandonment of allies in Afghanistan. Many point to this withdrawal as a primary reason for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s guarantee to ramp up nuclear testing. South Koreans have every right to be skeptical of the U.S.’s commitment to provide security against the Northern threat.
This attitude is reflected in an early January article from South Korea’s oldest daily newspaper, The Chosun Ilbo, which boldly claims that “the North Korean nuclear program has become too menacing to entrust the fate of the nation to the U.S. alone.” The piece goes on to endorse the creation of a nuclear program, asking, “[W]hat choice does Seoul have when the North continues to develop more powerful nukes, China keeps looking the other way, and the U.S.'[s] focus is elsewhere”?
And North Korea has indeed continued to build its nuclear arsenal. In 2022, the country recorded 100 missile tests. Moreover, back in November, it tested a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a weapon that is liquid-fuel based, can carry numerous warheads, and could reach the intercontinental U.S.
The attention to detail and acceleration of tests shows how dangerous Kim’s regime has become. All its ICBMs are designed based on the five-year plan created in January 2021 at the Eighth Party Congress, which stipulated that ICBMs should be capable of launching from both land and sea. Soon, we may also see the activation of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle technologies. With these, North Korea would be able to disrupt U.S. defense systems.
International reports also indicate that Pyongyang will unveil a seventh nuclear test later this year, making it evident that North Korea is heading at full speed toward its goal of being operational to launch at will.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given South Koreans insight into what is possible when you share a border with a nuclear-armed, dictator-ruled country. Unfortunately, the U.S. and the West have not given as much attention to the Indo-Pacific region as they have to the war in Ukraine. A North Korean invasion of the South is not imminent, but destabilizing the South Korean–U.S. relationship and shifting the balance of power in North Korea’s favor will devastate international relations.
To avoid further escalation, the U.S. will need to follow the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, which, in the Nuclear Posture Review, makes clear that the United States will need to work closely with South Korea and Japan “to ensure an effective mix of capabilities, concepts, deployments, exercises, and tailored options to deter and, if necessary to respond to coercion and aggression.” Only by joining forces with allies, not withdrawing, will the U.S. defeat its Chinese, Russian, and North Korean enemies.
For now, South Korea is protected by the U.S.’s nuclear armory and tied to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a global alliance intended to reduce the number of globally produced atomic weapons. However, all options must remain on the table when dealing with the powerful North Korean regime.
Alex Adkins is a graduate of Benedictine University who has written for American Thinker, the Federalist, and the Western Journal.
spectator.org · by Alex Adkins · February 2, 2023
6. [Q/A] ROK-US alliance evolves into global strategic partnership
We should expect this from the Global Pivotal State.
[Q/A] ROK-US alliance evolves into global strategic partnership
The Korea Times · by 2023-02-02 17:27 | Foreign Affairs · February 2, 2023
Foreign Minister Park Jin speaks during an interview with The Korea Times at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul, Tuesday. Korea Times photo by Choi Won-suk
Foreign minister expects stronger bilateral ties to promote China's responsible role
By Kang Seung-woo
This year marks the 70th anniversary of the ROK-U.S. alliance and Foreign Minister Park Jin believes that the evolving bilateral alliance is now in top form. The ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.
"South Korea and the United States share a long history of cooperation based on shared values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, which helped the alliance endure for 70 years," Park said in an interview with The Korea Times, Tuesday.
"Celebrating the 70th anniversary, I think the ROK-U.S. alliance should now go beyond solely focusing on bilateral relations between South Korea and the U.S., contributing to the freedom, peace and prosperity of the world on a regional and global level."
He added: "I think that the alliance is now at a very important historical turning point."
His assessment of the alliance being at an all-time high is evidenced by visits by U.S. President Joe Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris and then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the third-highest ranking U.S. official, all of which were made last year.
His remarks came as South Korea and the U.S. have been upgrading their security-focused alliance into a global comprehensive strategic alliance, under which the two countries will jointly respond to various challenges to uphold the rules-based order, as agreed between President Yoon Suk Yeol and Biden during their summit last May 21.
Park, 66, said the two countries are seeking to form an "alliance in action" regarding issues of North Korea's nuclear threats and other security matters in the Indo-Pacific.
Foreign Minister Park Jin speaks during an interview with The Korea Times at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul, Tuesday. Korea Times photo by Choi Won-suk
"Last year, we unveiled the details of the Indo-Pacific strategy, which focuses on fostering a rules-based international order ranging from stabilizing global supply chains to maintaining peace and stability in the region," the minister said.
"In the era of the digital economy, South Korea will be no longer a rule follower, but a rule maker in shaping a new order with like-minded countries."
The Indo-Pacific strategy is regarded in some circles as signaling Seoul's alignment with Washington amid an intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. But the foreign minister said China is a country that South Korea needs to strategically communicate with in terms of North Korea's nuclear issue.
"China is our biggest trading partner and it is the country that can play a constructive role in easing North Korean nuclear threats," Park said.
"However, what is important is that China should develop a relationship with South Korea based on mutual respect. In addition, since a mature partnership between the two countries is based on China's respect for international norms and rules, we are clearly communicating this message to China and I think China is well aware of it."
As for Japan, Park said both Seoul and Tokyo share the idea that the continuation of the current stalemate serves neither countries' interests.
Relations between the neighboring countries have plummeted to the worst level in years over the issue of Japanese companies compensating surviving South Korean victims of wartime forced labor. Since Yoon took office last May, the South Korean government has made efforts to get ties back on track.
"As South Korea is working hard to resolve the pending issue, the Japanese side also needs to show sincere responses," Park said.
Foreign Minister Park Jin explains South Korea's initiative for a global pivotal state (GPS) during a New Year's greetings event for the diplomatic corps at Yeongbingwan, the guesthouse of Cheong Wa Dae, the former presidential office, in Seoul, Tuesday. The GPS initiative envisions a heightened role in advancing freedom, peace, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Below are excerpts from the interview with Foreign Minister Park Jin.
Q: What is your assessment of the South Korea-U.S. alliance on the occasion of its 70th anniversary this year?
A: The ROK-U.S. alliance is recognized as one of the most successful alliances in the history of the world. Looking back on the past 70 years, the two countries have maintained and strengthened the alliance ― despite the turbulent international situation ― to reach its best state ever, as evidenced by a series of visits by the top three U.S. officials ― the president, the vice president and the house speaker ― which was unprecedented compared with the past. Beyond protecting the security of the Korean Peninsula, the alliance is evolving in the face of political crises and challenges of the 21st century.
Marking the second year in office, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration has set sights on substantially developing the global comprehensive strategic alliance and to this end, President Yoon's successful visit to the U.S. would be of the utmost importance.
Q: How will South Korea expand its economic alliance with the U.S. without provoking its biggest trading partner, China?
A: Now is the era of economic security in which the boundary between security and economy has been blurred. In this situation, I think it is very natural for the ROK-U.S. alliance, which is leading core and high-tech industries while sharing values, to evolve into an economic and technological alliance.
[INTERVIEW] 'Extended deterrence is best option to ensure peace on Korean Peninsula'
This evolution of the bilateral alliance and the development of Korea-China relations do not contradict each other, something that the U.S. agrees with as well.
South Korea and China reached a consensus on developing a healthier and more mature relationship on the occasion of the South Korea-China summit in Bali last November. Furthermore, in order to respond to the severe situation on the Korean Peninsula and the complex challenges of the 21st century, China's active cooperation should be encouraged. I believe that a strong South Korea-U.S. alliance serves as a foundation for promoting China's responsible role and for building healthy South Korea-China relations.
The South Korean government will expand and strengthen the level of cooperation in the South Korea-U.S. alliance. As for China, we will cooperate with the country on global issues such as peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, climate change, public health and supply chains in accordance with the spirit of hwaibudong, seeking harmonious coexistence while respecting differences.
Q: South Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy seeks to achieve a positive relationship with China based on the principles of inclusion and reciprocity, while the U.S. and Japan describe China as the greatest strategic challenge. Amid the growing importance of trilateral cooperation, should South Korea speak with one voice?
A: Since the launch of the Yoon administration in May 2022, three-way cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan has been strengthened and it is not intended to exclude or contain any country. There is no difference in opinion on the need to continue communication and necessary cooperation with China. It is in this context that the United States immediately sent a message of welcome to our Indo-Pacific Strategy emphasizing three principles of cooperation ― inclusiveness, trust and reciprocity. The same is true of the joint statement from the South Korea-U.S.-Japan summit held in November last year, which stated that the leaders pursue a free and open Indo-Pacific, that is inclusive, resilient, and secure.
At the same time, the three countries maintain a clear position that they oppose any attempt to change the status quo unilaterally through economic coercion or force.
Q: Do you think that the U.S. should do more to provide nuclear security assurances to South Korea?
A: A strong South Korea-U.S. alliance has effectively deterred North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, and the U.S. has consistently confirmed its firm extended deterrence commitment to South Korea on various occasions, including summits.
As a preliminary measure for the proper provision of the U.S. nuclear deterrence in case of emergency, including the deployment of strategic assets, the two countries are in discussion to enhance the effectiveness of extended deterrence in various fields such as information sharing, consultation process, joint planning and joint execution.
Q: Some critics say the Biden administration is not interested in the North Korean nuclear issue. What is your assessment of the U.S.' North Korean policy?
A: I do not agree with such an assessment. Since President Yoon and President Biden agreed that the North Korea nuclear threat merits their utmost attention (in May 2022), the two countries have continued watertight cooperation on the issue, shown through actions, not words. In other words, we need to create an "Alliance in Action."
Elements of the "Alliance in Action" include the announcement of the Audacious Initiative under close coordination between South Korea and the U.S., the announcement of autonomous sanctions on North Korea between South Korea and the U.S. (October and December 2022) and the launch of the South Korea-U.S. working group on North Korea's cyber threats.
Since taking office, I have had face-to-face discussions with State Secretary Tony Blinken in Asia and Europe, and have been in close discussions on the North Korean nuclear issue through numerous phone calls.
This U.S. visit will also serve as a good opportunity to reaffirm the common goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea and to strengthen cooperation between the two countries.
Q: Is there any plan to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table?
A: North Korea has not responded to offers for talks by South Korea and the U.S. while continuing its nuclear and missile provocations.
Therefore, I believe that the policy direction is to create conditions in which North Korea has no choice but to return to denuclearization negotiations through a holistic approach of deterrence, dissuasion and diplomacy.
While thoroughly preparing for any possible provocation by North Korea based on the firm ROK-U.S. combined defense posture, cooperation with the international community will be strengthened so that an unprecedentedly strong response can be made to North Korea's serious provocation, such as a nuclear test. In addition, the two countries will continue to encourage China, which has influence over North Korea, towards playing a constructive role in ending North Korea's provocations and returning to dialogue.
Q: What is the South Korean government's plan for the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act that excludes Korean carmakers from tax credits?
A: The government is in negotiations with the U.S. side to reflect our requests on the proposed guidance on battery minerals and components that is expected to come in March. It is encouraging that the U.S. confirmed that leased vehicles are eligible for tax credits, allowing South Korean electric vehicles to receive benefits. I believe this was part of an effort to address the discriminatory elements in the IRA in consideration of its ally South Korea.
Q: As the South Korean government stresses the importance of trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, Seoul is making efforts to improve ties with Tokyo. However, some argue that South Korea is too obsessed with bettering Korea-Japan relations. What is your opinion?
A: I cannot agree with the claim. As for the issue of wartime forced labor, a major sticking point in the bilateral relations, many of the elderly victims passed away and its fallout negatively affects various areas, including Japan's export regulations on South Korea. In that sense, the government feels the need to come up with a reasonable solution as soon as possible.
On the other hand, we have lost opportunities for strategic cooperation to respond to Korean Peninsula, regional and global issues due to the frayed ties. Under the rapidly changing international situation, it is a very important task to improve relations with Japan, a neighboring country that shares universal values, and to build a future-oriented partnership.
Since its inauguration, the government has made efforts to restore trust between the two countries and create a favorable environment and momentum for resolving pending issues and improving relations. As a result, active high-level exchanges took place between the two countries, including two summits and a foreign minister's visit to Japan, which provided a turning point for resolving pending issues and improving relations.
Q: In the wake of China's decision to suspend issuing short-term visas for South Koreans, there is speculation that it is the result of accumulated dissatisfaction with the Yoon administration's pro-U.S. foreign policy. What is your opinion?
A: We have been stably managing and developing bilateral relations under the consensus of developing a healthier and more mature Korea-China relationship based on mutual respect, mutual benefit, and common interests.
However, I know that many countries have implemented quarantine measures out of concern about the spread of Coronavirus before and after China eased its "zero-COVID" restrictions.
The government actively explained its position to China that our quarantine measures were based on scientific grounds, while emphasizing that there should be no entry restrictions based on factors other than COVID-19 quarantine.
The Korea Times · by 2023-02-02 17:27 | Foreign Affairs · February 2, 2023
7. South Korea still refuses to send arms to Ukraine
But President Yoon did not tell the Secretary General "no" according to some reports I read.
Excerpts:
In such circumstances, South Korea’s legalistic distinction between arming Ukraine and its allies looks moot. In reality, says Jang Won-joon of the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, a government think-tank, South Korea’s view is that once its arms have been shipped, “it’s none of our business” where they end up.
Mr Yoon’s aim to grow the defence industry at least looks to be on track. He wants to make South Korea, in 2021 the eighth-biggest arms exporter, the fourth-biggest after America, France and Russia. But it is a shame his country’s weak-kneed Ukraine stance is costing it an obvious opportunity to align his mercantile and global leadership ambitions. In its sometimes tortuous effort to occupy a space between America, its essential security partner, and China, its most important economic one, South Korea tries to manage two irreconcilable forces. This is almost the opposite case. In its Ukraine policy, it is failing to capitalise on the conjoined commercial and geopolitical opportunity that the war has handed it.
South Korea still refuses to send arms to Ukraine
The country’s president has global ambitions and parochial opponents
The Economist
When Yoon Suk-yeol talked up the need for South Korea and nato to protect “universal values” at the alliance’s meeting in June 2022, he might not have imagined how soon his words would come back to bite him. But so they have. On a visit to Seoul on January 30th Jens Stoltenberg pushed South Korea’s president to help meet Ukraine’s urgent need for ammunition. It was time, according to nato’s secretary general, for Mr Yoon to “step up”.
Since the invasion of Ukraine last February, South Korea has supplied it with non-lethal aid including gas masks and medical supplies. And under Mr Yoon, who took office last May, it has robustly condemned Russia’s aggression. In a recent interview Mr Yoon called it “unlawful and illegitimate”. He also suggested allowing the war to grind on might embolden his country’s vicious neighbour, North Korea, into thinking “the international community would fail to respond to an act of invasion with the appropriate sanctions”. Such statements are consistent with Mr Yoon’s stated ambition, as Mr Stoltenberg might have reminded him, to make his country a more assertive global leader and defender of the rules-based order. Yet, despite having one of the world’s biggest and fastest-growing defence industries, South Korea still refuses to send Ukraine arms.
The country’s law and political sentiment are both against it. Under its Foreign Trade Act, South Korea is forbidden to export arms except for “peaceful purpose[s]”. It has not scrupulously adhered to that. It has signed arms deals with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, both of which have sent weapons to the civil war in Yemen. Moreover, as Mr Stoltenberg reminded Mr Yoon publicly, plenty of other countries, including Norway, Germany and Sweden, have scrapped such self-imposed restrictions in order to ship arms to Ukraine. Yet even if Mr Yoon wanted to follow their example, he appears unable to do so.
South Korea’s parliament would have to change the law. And it is controlled by an opposition leader, Lee Jae-myung, hostile to Mr Yoon and at best lukewarm towards Ukraine. Mr Lee initially accused its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, of being partly to blame for the war. And though Mr Lee claims to have revised that view, he is in no mood to let Mr Yoon bend the rules or claim a major foreign-policy shift. Mr Lee accuses the president of launching a vendetta against him in the form of two separate corruption probes in which the opposition leader has been implicated.
Such inward-looking politics underline how hard it will be for Mr Yoon to make South Korea the agenda-setting “global pivot state” he has envisaged it as. In a poll last year, only 15% of respondents were in favour of supplying the Ukrainians with arms. And even in the country’s small foreign-policy elite, there is only moderate enthusiasm for doing so. Many fear enraging Russia, which is believed to have important influence with North Korea. Such wariness was evident last November after the Biden administration was reported to be negotiating with South Korea to buy artillery shells in order to send them to Ukraine. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, had previously warned South Korea that sending weapons to Ukraine would “destroy our relations”. Mr Yoon’s government quickly insisted that America would be the shells’ end user.
This ambiguous position is straining not only Mr Yoon’s hope of global leadership but also credulity. South Korea’s defence companies, which are known for producing lots of high-quality weapons rapidly at competitive prices, are booming on the back of the global demand for arms that the war has unleashed. The country’s defence exports increased from nearly $7.3bn in 2021 to $17bn in 2022. And a lot of them are going to countries arming Ukraine, ostensibly to allow them to replenish their depleted stocks. A recent deal with Poland, worth a reported 20trn won ($16.4bn), allowed the Poles to replace the howitzers they gave Ukraine last year.
In such circumstances, South Korea’s legalistic distinction between arming Ukraine and its allies looks moot. In reality, says Jang Won-joon of the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, a government think-tank, South Korea’s view is that once its arms have been shipped, “it’s none of our business” where they end up.
Mr Yoon’s aim to grow the defence industry at least looks to be on track. He wants to make South Korea, in 2021 the eighth-biggest arms exporter, the fourth-biggest after America, France and Russia. But it is a shame his country’s weak-kneed Ukraine stance is costing it an obvious opportunity to align his mercantile and global leadership ambitions. In its sometimes tortuous effort to occupy a space between America, its essential security partner, and China, its most important economic one, South Korea tries to manage two irreconcilable forces. This is almost the opposite case. In its Ukraine policy, it is failing to capitalise on the conjoined commercial and geopolitical opportunity that the war has handed it. ■
The Economist
8. US-NK summit is unlikely in 2023: Korea Society
One of the results from the summitry of the previous administration is that Kim is very unlikely to agree to a summit without serious concessions provided up front. Other than the cancellation of exercises in 2018 and some scaling back Kim really did not receive anything from the US except for some perceived enhancement of legitimacy for the being the first to conduct a meeting with the US president. He is unlikely to agree to a meeting with significant concessions.
And from a US perspective , we are unlikely to agree to a summit with comprehensive working level talks to hash out a substantive agreement that would be worthy of a presidential meeting with Kim.
[INTERVIEW] US-NK summit is unlikely in 2023: Korea Society
The Korea Times · February 2, 2023
The motorcade of U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin passes protesters rallying against his meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup, outside the defense ministry in Seoul, Jan. 31. AP-YonhapThis is the second in a series of interviews with security experts at leading think tanks in Washington and former U.S. officials on the implications of the escalating arms race in Northeast Asia and South Korea's growing nuclear ambitions. ― ED.
Opening up new defense cost-sharing talks isn't necessary
By Kim Yoo-chul
Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine has had various impacts on the Korean Peninsula, with expanded takeaways for the alliance between Washington and Seoul.
The war in Europe has validated the significance of focusing on greater military readiness before actual threats are materialized rather than after. It has also reminded many South Koreans of the strategic importance of the Washington-Seoul alliance.
While chances are very low that South Korea could find itself in a similar situation to what's happening in Ukraine now, the country's conservative ruling party doesn't underestimate the increased public support for Seoul to develop its own nuclear arsenal to deter Pyongyang.
The Yoon Suk Yeol administration is sending messages to the right-wing support bases that the government is positioned to manage such concerns through strengthening extended deterrence with the United States. Rather than going nuclear, this includes more positioning of strategic U.S. assets, such as striker groups close to the peninsula, the redeployment tactical nuclear weapons and introducing a nuclear-sharing plan as well.
Korea Society CEO and President Thomas J. Byrne
Despite growing calls for South Korea to acquire its own nuclear weapons amid North Korea's growing nuclear threats, Yoon confirmed Seoul's commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), under which it is banned from developing its own nuclear weapons.
But amid the advancement of North Korea's nuclear programs and lingering questions regarding the reliability of Washington's extended deterrence, politicians here are pursuing nuclear-sharing arrangements with the country's biggest ally.
The Korea Society President and CEO Thomas J. Byrne told The Korea Times that he doesn't think that nuclear sharing, similar to the U.S. arrangement with NATO, is on the table for South Korea, as NATO-style nuclear sharing doesn't necessarily mean the co-hosting of nuclear weapons.
"But the allies have communicated that they will conduct tabletop drills that explore what North Korea's nuclear threat could mean in practical terms and how the allies can best respond. It's important to remember that nuclear sharing in the NATO context is not the actual co-hosting of nuclear weapons, but rather sharing the mission and responsibilities," Byrne said. The Korea Society is a New York-based nonpartisan think tank.
During his recent visit here, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said he prefers the idea of extended deterrence, which means U.S. nuclear deterrence covers NATO member nations as well as partners that don't possess their own nuclear weapons. He didn't elaborate.
Within the same context, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin vowed more positioning of Washington's strategic military assets such as F-22 and F-35 stealth jets and other airstrike groups during his meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup in Seoul.
Lloyd went on to say that this posture is a part of the U.S.' commitment to improved nuclear deterrence to counter North Korea's nuclear threats, in recognition that more South Koreans remain positive about the country possessing its own nuclear weapons.
A participant holds a banner during a rally denouncing Russia's invasion of Ukraine, near the Russian Embassy in Seoul, Jan. 29. AP-Yonhap
Foreign Minister Park Jin is set to meet U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Washington, Feb. 4 (KST), before Blinken's planned visit to China. Ways on how to deter North Korean nuclear threats through the trilateral alliance between Seoul, Washington and Tokyo will be included at the meeting, according to security and intelligence officials in Seoul.
Regarding an escalation of North Korea's military provocations and South Korean officials' repeated warnings since early last year that the North has completed the preparations necessary for its seventh nuclear test, the top executive only responded, "The best diplomatic and strategic outcome would be denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and nuclear weapon non-proliferation regionally and globally."
Biden unlikely to meet North Korea's Kim in 2023
Because North Korea is situated with favorable conditions for its weapons advancements amid the U.S.' focus on the war in Ukraine, Russia and technology crackdown efforts against China, it's unlikely that the North will return to diplomacy anytime soon, said U.S. officials.
This means that there are high chances for Pyongyang to use today's economic difficulties brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic and efforts to level up its capability advancements to boost loyalty and morale among citizens in Pyongyang, considered as Kim Jong-un's key political base.
Following this assessment, Byrne said given the current geopolitical conditions, it's not a desirable scenario for the U.S. to pursue a summit this year between President Joe Biden and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
"Although conditions are tense at the moment, we should remember how 2018's PyeongChang Olympics were preceded by 2017's North Korea's provocative intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) launches and President Trump's fire-and-fury threat. However, the preeminence of nuclear weapons over economic development policies in North Korea, the prevailing regional and geopolitical conditions?do not seem conducive for 2023 as a summit year like in 2018," Byrne responded.
An H2A rocket lifts off from Tanegashima Space Center in Kagoshima, southern Japan, Jan. 26. Japan on Thursday successfully launched the rocket carrying a government intelligence-gathering satellite on a mission to watch movements at military sites in North Korea and to improve natural disaster response, as part of Tokyo's efforts to build up its military capability citing growing threats in East Asia. AP-Yonhap
Regarding the feasibility of initiating arms control discussions as a measure to entice North Korea back to negotiations, Byrne said a return to talks would be a welcome development, but stressed the ball is in Pyongyang's court.
"The Biden administration has stated it is ready to do so at any time without preconditions. Given the stated policies of Seoul and Washington alike, it only seems possible that arms control talks can be conducted if North Korea's denuclearization is specified as the end goal," he said.
A focus on disarmament in the North is still at the core of Washington's policy. While some U.S. officials and experts have suggested prioritizing reducing risks and achieving "small gains" while remaining committed to disarmament, official U.S. policy continues to resist adjustment.
He said there's no need for South Korea to renew its defense cost-sharing agreement with the U.S. as the deal is effective through 2025. The Special Measures Agreement (SMA) asks Seoul to adjust its share of the defense cost burden based on increases in defense spending between 2022 and 2025. These costs are expected to rise by 6.1 percent, annually.
"The SMA reached between Seoul and Washington in 2021 for the sharing of expenditures incident to the maintenance of the U.S. Armed Forces in South Korea resolved a contentious, long renegotiation process and is effective through 2025," Byrne said. "The provisions of this agreement seem the best way to keep the goal of a strong and mutual commitment to the Republic of Korea-United States of America alliance, rather than open up a new negotiation with new provisions."
The Korea Times · February 2, 2023
9. U.S. Stealth Fighters Join Air Drills with S.Korea
This is the new normal - routine training to sustain readiness and support deterrence. I suspect this was planned and not a reaction to anything done or said by north Korea. We have announced multiple combined exercises this year. Sustained readiness training, regardless of what the north does, is the new normal.
Strength and resolve.
U.S. Stealth Fighters Join Air Drills with S.Korea
english.chosun.com
February 03, 2023 09:37
South Korea and the U.S. staged air drills in the West Sea with strategic bombers and stealth fighter jets on Wednesday after the two countries' defense chiefs met in Seoul.
The Defense Ministry on Thursday said, "The combined air drills show the U.S.' will and capability to provide strong and credible extended deterrence against the nuclear and missile threat from North Korea."
Two B-1B strategic bombers and a dozen F-22 and F35B stealth fighter jets and aerial refueling aircraft from the U.S. as well as South Korea's F35A stealth fighters took part in the drills.
Until recently, most drills with U.S. strategic bombers were conducted over the East Sea to avoid provoking China, so holding them in the West Sea and publicizing the fact marks a departure.
"Seoul and Washington want to warn Beijing against trying to claim the West Sea as its own sphere of activities through a drastic increase in its naval and air force operations there over the past few years," a military source said.
Fighter jets fly in formation over the West Sea during a joint aerial drill by South Korea and the U.S. on Wednesday.
The U.S. is keen to reassure South Korea as doubts here grow over the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, giving rise to calls for Seoul to acquire its own nuclear weapons. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in a press conference with Defense Minister Lee Song-sup on Tuesday pledged to deploy top-range weaponry here more often.
Video footage and pictures released by military authorities show two B-1Bs from the U.S. mainland escorted by two F-22s from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa and two F-35As from the South Korean Air Force. After the drills, the B-1Bs flew to Guam for another maneuver rather than returning directly to the U.S.
North Korea threatened to retaliate. A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said Pyongyang will "take the toughest reaction" in response to any military action by the U.S. under the principle of "nuke for nuke and an all-out confrontation." The statement added that Austin's pledge would end up turning the Korean Peninsula into a "huge war arsenal and a more critical war zone."
But the White House was unmoved. "We reject the notion that our joint exercises with partners in the region serve as any sort of provocation," it said. "We have made clear we have no hostile intent toward [North Korea] and seek serious and sustained diplomacy to address the full range of issues of concern to both countries and the region."
Pentagon Releases Nuclear Arms Policy in Korean
U.S. to Send Top-Range Weapons to Korea More Often
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
english.chosun.com
10. Britain's trade with N. Korea more than doubles last year: report
Interesting. So how was it getting into the north with the Chinese border closed? Was most of it shipped through north Korean ports or shipped on Korean vessels that shipped from UK ports?
And yes we should be curious about what kinds of services are being provided.
Exports of services accounted for nearly 100 percent of Britain's outbound shipments to North Korea, but the report did not specify what types of services were provided.
Britain's trade with N. Korea more than doubles last year: report | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 3, 2023
SEOUL, Feb. 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's trade with Britain more than doubled on-year over the one-year period ending in September last year despite the COVID-19 pandemic, a report showed Friday.
The value of Britain's transactions of goods and services with the North came to 104 million pounds (US$127 million) in the cited period, up 116.7 percent from a year earlier, according to the report from the Department for International Trade.
Britain's exports to the North jumped 174.1 percent on-year to 74 million pounds in the October 2021 to September 2022 period. Its imports from the North rose 43 percent to 30 million pounds, it said.
Exports of services accounted for nearly 100 percent of Britain's outbound shipments to North Korea, but the report did not specify what types of services were provided.
As of end-September, North Korea was Britain's 149th-largest trading partner, with the two-way trade accounting for less than 0.1 percent of Britain's total trade.
This image, captured from a report uploaded on the website of Britain's Department for International Trade, shows Britain's trade with North Korea. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · February 3, 2023
11. North Korea Accuses U.S. of Raising Tensions
I think we can assess that the SECDEF's visit and the recent activities of the alliance is having an effect on the regime.
The military improvements in equipment and readiness training is putting fear into the heart of Kim Jong Un.
North Korea Accuses U.S. of Raising Tensions
Pyongyang points to promises by the U.S. defense chief to expand drills with South Korea
https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-accuses-u-s-of-raising-tensions-11675328831
By Dasl YoonFollow
Feb. 2, 2023 4:07 am ET
SEOUL—North Korea said the U.S. had pushed tensions on the Korean Peninsula to an “extreme red line,” responding to recent promises by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to expand joint military drills with South Korea and enhance nuclear deterrence.
North Korea said it isn’t interested in any contact or dialogue with the U.S. as long as Washington pursues what Pyongyang describes as a hostile and confrontational policy. The U.S. actions threatened to turn the Korean Peninsula into a “huge war arsenal,” Pyongyang’s Foreign Ministry said Thursday, adding that it would respond to military moves by the U.S. with “overwhelming nuclear force.”
The remarks followed a visit by Mr. Austin to Seoul, where he met with his South Korean counterpart and President Yoon Suk Yeol. The U.S. defense chief sought to reassure Seoul of Washington’s commitment to extended deterrence against North Korea. Mr. Austin promised to expand the scale and length of joint military exercises and deploy additional jet fighters to the country. Washington and Seoul military officials plan to meet in February to discuss and run through scenarios, including a potential nuclear attack from North Korea.
The White House rejected North Korea’s claim that military exercises with South Korea bear hostile intent, calling them routine exercises. The U.S. is willing to meet with North Korean representatives at a time and place convenient for them, a White House National Security Council spokesperson said.
South Korea’s unification ministry called on North Korea to refrain from provocative acts and return to dialogue.
On Thursday, the U.S. and South Korea staged combined air drills involving strategic bombers and stealth fighters, according to Seoul’s Defense Ministry. North Korea has frequently cited Washington’s military drills with its allies as indications of a hostile policy toward Pyongyang that justify its missile tests as countermeasures.
Last year North Korea conducted a record number of missile tests and vowed to exponentially increase its nuclear arsenal and develop a new intercontinental ballistic-missile system this year. Washington and Seoul officials have said Pyongyang stands ready to conduct its first nuclear test since 2017.
The U.S. and South Korea have expanded military drills in response to North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile threat. Some of the missiles fired last year triggered air-raid alerts and shelter warnings in Japan and South Korea. Following a North Korean drone incursion in December, Mr. Yoon ordered officials to retaliate against Pyongyang.
Last year, the Biden administration repeatedly offered to hold talks with North Korea. Pyongyang has rejected the offers. The Yoon administration has offered Covid-19 assistance and humanitarian aid if North Korea takes concrete steps toward denuclearization.
On Wednesday, South Korea’s Foreign Minister Park Jin met with United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres in New York, calling for the U.N.’s attention to North Korea’s provocations and discussing concerns about a possible nuclear test. Mr. Guterres said any resumption of nuclear testing by Pyongyang would deal a devastating blow to international security, and vowed to support efforts to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com
Appeared in the February 3, 2023, print edition as 'North Korea Blames Washington for Increasing Tensions'.
12. North Korea students get frostbite after 'patriotic' subzero mountain march
"I love a parade" said no student or soldier from north Korea. But why are students going on "forced marches?" Must be part of the Guerrilla ethos which is described here in Adrian Buzo's book, Guerrilla Dynasty. We need to understand this.
“In the course of this struggle against factional opponents, for the first time Kim began to emphasize nationalism as a means of rallying the population to the enormous sacrifices needed for post-war recovery. This was a nationalism that first took shape in the environment of the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement and developed into a creed through the destruction of both the non-Communist nationalist forces and much of the leftist intellectual tradition of the domestic Communists. Kim’s nationalism did not draw inspiration from Korean history, nor did it dwell on past cultural achievements, for the serious study of history and traditional culture soon effectively ceased in the DPRK. Rather, DPRK nationalism drew inspiration from the Spartan outlook of the former Manchurian guerrillas. It was a harsh nationalism that dwelt on past wrongs and promises of retribution for “national traitors” and their foreign backers. DPRK nationalism stressed the “purity” of all things Korean against the “contamination” of foreign ideas, and inculcated in the population a sense of fear and animosity toward the outside world. Above all, DPRK nationalism stressed that the guerrilla ethos was not only the supreme, but also the only legitimate basis on which to reconstitute a reunified Korea.” (p. 27) (Guerrilla Dynasty, by Adrian Buzo)
North Korea students get frostbite after 'patriotic' subzero mountain march
Students in North Korea have been injuring themselves and bribing officials so they can swerve going on a government tour of Mount Paektu - the country's national emblem and official birthplace of Kim Jong-Il
Mirror · by Ryan Fahey · February 2, 2023
North Korean students were left with frostbite after a 'patriotic' trip turned out to be a forced march up a mountain in subzero temperatures.
Youngsters are now injuring themselves and bribing officials in a bid to avoid taking the government tour of Mount Paektu.
Paektu is North Korea's national emblem and the official birthplace of Kim Jong-il, the current leader's father.
A visit is meant to instil “Paektu revolutionary spirit” in the young, but now the regime is struggling to fill places on its tours.
Many fear injury, with a tour in mid-January causing “large numbers of frostbite cases” according to South Korea-based newspaper Daily NK.
And to make matters worse, students must shoulder the cost themselves, shelling out for uniforms, food, and any medical treatment they end up needing.
North Korean students on the "patriotic" trip (
Image:
Credit: Pen News)
Pyongyang used to cover the cost of the visit, but was strapped for cash after Covid, according to Radio Free Asia.
One youth in the eastern city of Hamhung reportedly threw themselves down the stairs after landing a place on a Paektu tour, deciding they’d rather take a trip to the hospital.
“Last year, about 60% of the people recommended by various organisations refused to participate, citing family or health issues,” a source told Daily NK.
The trip is supposed to instill “Paektu revolutionary spirit” (
Image:
Credit: Pen News)
“This year, even more people are avoiding the tours.
“It’s tough enough to make a living, so there’s no reason to use their own money to climb Mount Paektu, where the average temperature plummets to minus 40.”
Youths who make the trip complain that they’re “tortured by cold weather” but get no sympathy.
They’re reportedly told that “for young people, struggle is priceless” and that “young people grow up when their noses and feet freeze”.
The youngsters, who often say they're being "tortured by cold weather" don't get any sympathy (
Image:
Credit: Pen News)
North Korean propaganda has often emphasised how arduous the Paektu pilgrimage is, releasing photos of visitors struggling through the snow spurred on by patriotic fervour.
The whole trip takes about 10 days, Radio Free Asia reports.
Pyongyang has repeatedly revealed its concern about a lack of patriotism in its younger generation over recent years.
Daily NK’s source said people used to panic if they missed their Paektu tour, but they agreed that “young people think differently nowadays”.
The whole trip takes around 10 days (
Image:
Credit: Pen News)
Greg Scarlatoiu, director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, said the news could point to a growing lack of faith in the regime.
He said: “Kim Jong-il's birthday is February 16, and Kim Jong-un's is January 8.
“Thus, the winter trips to Mount Paektu – the holy mountain of all Koreans, which the Kim family regime claims as its own – are critical to maintaining the Kim family cult.
“While clamping down on all religious beliefs, especially Christianity, the Kim family regime has created its own quasi-religious personality cult.
Kim's family has created its own quasi-religious cult (
Image:
Credit: Pen News)
“The trip to Mount Paektu is the equivalent of Hajj in Muslim culture or a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and ‘Bethany beyond the Jordan’ for Christians.
“If young people are indeed bailing out of these trips, this may indicate that North Koreans are losing their faith in the Kim family genesis myth, and all other elements of the personality cult.”
Mount Paektu is actually a volcano, and is crowned with a large crater lake called Heaven Lake.
It’s the highest peak in North Korea, and sits on its northern border with China, but is revered in South Korea too.
The regime asserts that it is Kim Jong-il’s birthplace, and maintains a humble log cabin there where it says he was born.
According to propaganda, on the night of his birth, two rainbows appeared above the dwelling and a new star shone in the sky.
But Soviet records suggest he was really born in Russian exile in 1941, and given the name Yuri Irsenovich Kim.
Mirror · by Ryan Fahey · February 2, 2023
13. North Korea likely to celebrate Feb. 8 Army Day anniversary with nighttime event
So they can march in the parade when it may be the coldest.
North Korea likely to celebrate Feb. 8 Army Day anniversary with nighttime event
The Korea Times · February 3, 2023
In this photo carried by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency on April 26, 2022, North Korean soldiers stage a military parade to celebrate the 90th anniversary of Military Foundation Day at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang on April 25, 2022.
By Nam Hyun-woo
North Korea is anticipated to hold a nighttime military parade to celebrate its Feb. 8 Army Day anniversary, according to multiple reports showing satellite images of Pyongyang preparing for the event.
According to 38 North and NK News, signs of North Korean military parade practicing were observed at North Korea's Mirim Parade Training Ground and Pyongyang Sunan International Airport.
Citing Jan. 27 satellite images, 38 North reported that there were several military trucks and troop formations on the parade ground.
A Jan. 28 satellite image revealed by NK News shows objects assumed to be large screens, projectors and light towers around Pyongyang's Kim Il-sung Square.
Firework mortar tubes were being installed, indicating that the regime is preparing fireworks for the military parade during the upcoming 75th anniversary of its Army Day on Feb. 8.
Reportedly, the South Korean military is also observing those signs, assuming that the parade could be held at night.
The North has been exploiting nighttime events to showcase its new weapons in recent years, in what appears to be a bid to improve the visual effect of parades.
After holding a nighttime military parade to celebrate the 75th anniversary of its Party Foundation Day, on Oct. 10, 2020, the North staged a nighttime parade on Jan. 14, 2021, to mark its 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of (North) Korea.
On Sept. 9, 2021, the regime held a night parade to celebrate the 73rd anniversary of foundation day and commemorated the 90th anniversary of its Military Foundation Day with a nighttime parade on April 25, last year.
With the North preparing another military parade, despite its COVID-19 lockdown, attention is growing on whether the regime will showcase new weaponry.
During the Oct. 10, 2020, parade, the North revealed the Hwasong-17, which was the largest inter-continental missile that the North has developed to date. During last year's parade, North Korea unveiled a new type of submarine-launched ballistic missile.
The Korea Times · February 3, 2023
14. North Korea Still Owes Sweden for 1,000 Volvos Ordered in the 1970s
An old story but illustrative of the nature of the Kim family regime.
North Korea Still Owes Sweden for 1,000 Volvos Ordered in the 1970s
gizmodo.com.au · by Zachariah Kelly · February 3, 2023
Back in the 1970s, North Korea ordered 1,000 vehicles from Swedish automaker Volvo. To this day, the isolated state still hasn’t paid up for them, and it’s become known as the greatest car theft in history.
This is one of those viral history stories that comes back every now and then, similar to Russia’s white Coca-Cola. This time around, much of the virality can be traced to this tweet from @historyinmemes.
In the 1970s, North Korea ordered 1,000 Volvo cars from Sweden. The cars were shipped & delivered but North Korea just didn't bother paying & ignored the invoice. Till this day the bill remains unpaid making it the largest car theft in history. pic.twitter.com/SYbubt8due
— Historic Vids (@historyinmemes) February 1, 2023
And it seems to hold up. Back in 2017, NPR covered the story by offering an explainer on the deal and the car involved, the Volvo 144. This was a sedan without much flare to it, the kind of car that you’d imagine if you were just thinking of ‘car’. There was also some heavy mining machinery involved in the deal, with Sweden sending over about $70 million worth of products. In 1975, Sweden became the first country to establish an embassy in North Korea.
The cars were driving on North Korean roads during the 80s, as recounted by a Washington Post reporter who went to the nation at the time. So few cars populated North Korean highways that single cars often had the roads to themselves.
Anyway, as goods and products from the west began to be imported to North Korea, it became clear to the Swedish embassy that the numbers weren’t adding up. Deadlines passed and mass trade was halted.
This brings us to today. According to Auto Evolution, Sweden reminds North Korea twice every year of the payments owed to the country, however, payments from Sweden to Volvo have long been finalised. Apparently, North Korea owes $US314 million, or $443,700,212 in Aussie Dollars.
And Sweden’s been pretty tongue-in-cheek about it, to be honest. The below tweet is from the official Swedish embassy in North Korea back in 2016.
Still going strong. One of the Volvo's from yr 1974 still unpaid for by DPRK. Running as taxi in Chongjin w almost half million km on odo! pic.twitter.com/2FaMpnPow7
— Sweden in Pyongyang (@SwedenDPRK) October 21, 2016
Will North Korea ever pay off the debt? Probably not. Is this an exceptionally weird bit of history? Totally.
Gizmodo Australia has reached out to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to get clarification on the debt and we will update this story when we get a response.
gizmodo.com.au · by Zachariah Kelly · February 3, 2023
15.
Plan to construct new memorial center for ex-president faces backlash
The Korea Times · February 3, 2023
Visitors commemorate former President Park Chung-hee in his birthplace located in Gumi City, North Gyeongsang Province, in 2019. Korea Times fileBy Lee Yeon-woo
The southeastern city of Gumi, North Gyeongsang Province has become embroiled in criticism for its plan to build another memorial center for former President Park Chung-hee at a cost of 100 billion won ($ 81.94 million).
Given that the industrial city has already invested 120 billion won in various projects such as establishing an archive and a park to commemorate the Gumi-born former president, critics have accused the new plan of being a waste of taxpayers' money.
Earlier this week, the city devised a plan to prepare a "dignified" place where people can honor Park and his philosophy.
"To match his status, we will create a new memorial as a tourist attraction which can represent Korea, by connecting the nearby Saemaeul Movement-themed park, the presidential museum, and the birthplace," Gumi City Mayor Kim Jang-ho said.
His birthplace, which has been memorialized, attracts around 200,000 visitors annually and has received 4.25 million visitors to date, Kim said.
The city further explained that there are safety concerns over the existing memorial site, which is confined and on a slope.
President Yoon Suk Yeol also commented that the memorial site is "too small" after visiting Gumi City on Wednesday. He requested that the mayor and local congressmen seek ways to improve it.
President Yoon Suk Yeol bows in respect to former President Park Chung-hee at his birthplace located in Gumi City, North Gyeongsang Province, Wednesday. Courtesy of the presidential office
Park Chung-hee is a controversial figure in Korea's modern history. Park is praised, mostly by conservatives, for having led the extraordinary surge in the Korean economy during the 1960s and 1970s. However, liberals criticize him as a dictator who suppressed democracy for almost two decades. He is also the father of the former impeached President Park Geun-Hye.
Politics aside, Gumi City's financial situation has been called into question.
The city has 206.5 billion won of debt as of 2021, the highest debt among all the cities in North Gyeongsang Province.
Civic organizations in Gumi City strongly oppose the decisions. They said the mayor should cancel the plan and focus more on policies that can stabilize the livelihood of the public and recover the economy.
"Gumi City already poured more than 100 billion won into building a memorial place, a museum, and a theme park," the Gumi headquarters of People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy said. "Some of the facilities are operated by North Gyeongsang Province local government, as the city has failed to secure a budget and develop content."
"People are suffering from the continuous fare hikes in gas, oil, and electricity. We are frustrated as the mayor is bent on honoring Park while the number of jobs is declining as most companies are transferring to the capital," a representative of the Gumi YMCA said.
"If you want to truly honor him, you should emulate his spirit. Establishing his statue, displaying his artifacts, and constructing a memorial place doesn't make people's lives better," it added.
As the controversy intensifies, Gumi City explained that it has "responsibilities to prepare a dignified memorial place as a city which has produced Park," and that it "will raise funds later not only at the central and local government's expense but also from voluntary donations."
The city added that the detailed construction plans have not yet been confirmed. "We are selecting a service company (which will take charge of construction). After that, we will start to discuss the details," an official from the city told The Korea Times.
The Korea Times · February 3, 2023
15. Seoul’s Nuclear Temptations and the U.S.-South Korean Alliance
This is an important article. However it lacks one important consideration. This alliance friction is what Kim Jong Un is trying to generate though his subversion line of effort as part of his political warfare campaign. Anything the weakens the alliance is a benefit to Kim Jong Un. I recommend that pundits acknowledge this when they write articles along this line especially when they are talking about such concepts "as trading "San Francisco for Seoul."
This article does a good job of outlining much of north Korea's nuclear and military strategy but it does not address the political warfare strategy. We must recognize all the north Korean strategies, understand them, EXPOSE them and attack them (and its political warfare strategy must be attacked with a superior political warfare strategy from the alliance).
Conclusion:
As the Biden and Yoon administrations continue to engage on extended deterrence, they should prioritize these essential matters to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation. To facilitate a unified and effective allied approach, the Biden administration should be clear — without precipitating a greater crisis in the alliance — that Seoul’s contemplation of nuclear proliferation as a bargaining tactic is ultimately unproductive and detrimental to allied security. Separately, the administration should privately communicate to Seoul that a South Korea that chooses to abrogate its non-proliferation commitments and pursue nuclear weapons could not be certain that U.S. extended deterrence assurances would persist. There remains little certainty about how successive U.S. administrations may view a nuclear-armed South Korea, which could be accommodated into a regional U.S. strategy to, for instance, counter China. Many in Seoul recall the precedent-setting U.S. civil nuclear agreement with India, which appeared to exhibit that non-proliferation principles could be subdued in pursuit of perceived geopolitical gain. But for now, the United States should not lose site of the essential role that non-proliferation has and continues to have for U.S. interests in Asia and elsewhere. The answers to improved allied security on the Korean Peninsula are unlikely to be found with nuclear weapons.
Seoul’s Nuclear Temptations and the U.S.-South Korean Alliance - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Ankit Panda · February 3, 2023
Amid drastic negative changes to its security environment and fundamental questions about the long-term reliability of the United States, South Korea is drawn — as it once was in the 1970s — to nuclear weapons. On Jan. 11, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, a conservative who has been outspoken about North Korea’s nuclear threats, voiced the possibility that Seoul could “acquire our own nuke.” Alluding to his country’s advanced scientific prowess, delivery systems, and long-acknowledged nuclear latency, Yoon noted that, should such a decision be made, Seoul’s advanced “science and technology” would ensure that the time required to build such a capability would be short. Yoon’s words have made global headlines and jolted alliance hands in Washington.
Yoon’s remarks, while concerning, do not represent the result of a considered policy planning process or indicate that a decision to procure nuclear weapons will be soon made in South Korea. Instead, the South Korean president alluded to the possibility of pursuing nuclear weapons in a wide-ranging set of remarks to South Korean foreign and defense officials. According to one unofficial translation of a released Korean transcript, Yoon premised the possibility of nuclear weapons acquisition on a conditional: “if problems become more serious,
[South Korea] could deploy tactical nuclear weapons here, or we could acquire our own nuke as well.” He concluded this section of his remarks by reverting to the status quo, noting that the “realistically possible” option, “for now,” was the alliance with the United States. In the days since his remarks went public, Yoon has tried to manage perceptions: for instance, Yoon publicly noted that South Korea’s “realistic and rational option is to fully respect the [Non-Proliferation Treaty] regime” and that he remained “fully confident about the U.S.’s extended deterrence.”
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South Korea faces difficult choices amid an objectively worsening threat environment, but a drastic shift away from the status quo of robust conventional deterrence backstopped by U.S. nuclear guarantees in pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent will not solve South Korea’s security challenges. Beyond the normative, economic, and other costs Seoul would face for abrogating its non-proliferation commitments, it is far from clear that South Korean nuclear weapons will help solve tensions with North Korea. As anxieties remain high, Washington and Seoul should refocus their efforts on adapting their military plans to a shifting North Korean threat while exploring new forms of trust-building within the existing alliance structure. This will require coordinating views on what North Korean behaviors can be deterred and through what means and working together to assuage South Korean concern about U.S. security guarantees.
Inter-Korean Crises and Proliferation Concerns
Given how rare publicly expressed statements of nuclear weapons acquisition intent are by U.S. extended deterrence recipients in the post-Cold War era, Yoon’s comments are unlikely to be ignored in Washington. The comments represent an expression of a view that is deeply held by many in South Korea, including among officials within the current government. Many prominent advisors in the Yoon administration served in the Lee Myung-bak administration, including during the turbulent years of 2008 to 2010, when Pyongyang became exceptionally risk acceptant. Inter-Korean tensions crescendoed with the twin crises of 2010, when North Korea sunk the ROKS Cheonan, a South Korean Navy corvette, and later shelled Yeonpyeong Island across the Northern Limit Line. Between civilians and military, 50 South Koreans lost their lives. South Korea was prepared for war, but the Obama administration discouraged disproportionate escalation by Seoul in the pursuit of vengeance, fearing uncontrollable consequences. These experiences have informed the approach of some in the Yoon administration today who are determined to never allow for a 2010-style crisis to repeat itself and see nuclear weapons as an instrumental component of deterring a range of undesirable actions by North Korea.
2010 was a dramatic reminder that the kind of risk-acceptant behavior North Korea exhibited in the post-Korean War period under Kim Il Sung — as seen in prominent crises throughout the 1960s and 1970s — was not a relic of the past. In the pre-democracy period, South Korea, under Park Chung-hee, considered developing nuclear weapons once and was coerced away from that path and into the then-nascent non-proliferation regime by the United States. Since Kim Jong Un’s assumption of power in the final days of 2011, the Korean Peninsula has been spared serious skirmishes, but as the final days of 2022 demonstrate, Pyongyang continues to surprise with behavior that could precipitate unintentional escalation. Kim Jong Un, meanwhile, continues to oversee a massive project of quantitative nuclear force expansion and qualitative modernization. Seoul’s threat perceptions are well-placed and should not be dismissed: In fact, insofar as a state’s security environment can drive an interest in nuclear weapons acquisition, the South Korean case should not be a surprise.
Do Nuclear Weapons Solve South Korea’s Security Dilemma?
It is far from clear that nuclear proliferation will help Seoul solve the security problems it perceives today. As Yoon himself has noted since his published remarks on nuclear weapons acquisition, the United States and South Korea can continue to rely on their alliance and even primarily on non-nuclear capabilities to effectively deter North Korean nuclear use in the service of large-scale territorial revisionism on the Korean Peninsula. What nuclear weapons — American or South Korean — won’t do is solve the general nuisance that Pyongyang has been and remains for South Korea.
“Provocations,” the preferred South Korean term for any number of North Korean actions that Seoul finds disagreeable, will not be coerced away by manifesting nuclear weapons — either American or South Korean — more clearly on the Korean Peninsula. As nuclear-armed India has discovered with its own territorially contiguous, nuclear-armed neighbor Pakistan, nuclear weapons are lousy solutions to subconventional threats and even limited territorial aggression. (Israel’s covert nuclear arsenal, similarly, has hardly solved the problem of limited and subconventional war.) Policymakers in Seoul are understandably searching for solutions that can drastically improve their security in the face of decisively negative trendlines concerning North Korea’s capabilities, but nuclear weapons are unlikely to provide answers. On the Korean Peninsula, South Korea and the United States should remain focused on the overarching task of deterring large-scale war and, most importantly, nuclear use. To do this, the alliance must take stock of the full array of capabilities already available — nuclear and conventional — and adapt to the reality of North Korea’s nuclear threat through updating their plans, procedures, and strategies. Washington and Seoul must also develop a shared vision of what exactly the alliance seeks to deter: For instance, missile tests and other shows of force in peacetime may be objectionable — but ultimately undeterrable.
U.S. Nuclear Options for Korea
In his remarks, right before Yoon mooted proliferation, he raised the prospect of the United States redeploying tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. Yoon’s push for the return of these weapons is not surprising. It was a campaign pledge when Yoon was a candidate for the presidency. However, cabinet-level officials in his administration, including Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup, subsequently appeared to rule out this option in unequivocal terms. The United States removed its last tactical nuclear weapon from South Korea in December 1991 as part of a broader global nuclear drawdown pursuant to the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives between U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Incidentally, the departure of these weapons took place days before the two Koreas first agreed to jointly pursue “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Today, the demand for nuclear reassurance in South Korea is greater than ever — borne of a growing belief in Seoul that only nuclear weapons can deter North Korea’s nuclear use.
Unlike in 1991, the array of so-called “tactical” nuclear capabilities available to the United States today for putative forward deployment are limited to fighter and bomber-delivered variable-yield B61 (initially, mod 3 and mod 4, and eventually mod 12) gravity bombs. These weapons could be redeployed should a political decision be made in Washington to meet Seoul’s demands. The military utility of these weapons on the Korean Peninsula, however, is questionable. If forward-based on the Peninsula, as some in Seoul seek, B61s would almost certainly be fighter-delivered by F-15E or F-16C/D aircraft. (Once available, the B61 mod 12 will be deployable on certified F-35A fighters.) In a crisis, North Korea would have strong incentives to prioritize airfields hosting these aircraft and associated B61 infrastructure for preemptive strikes. Pyongyang has indicated that it views airfields that host advanced aerial capabilities, including South Korean Air Force F-35As, as prime targets for preemptive strikes. The promptness with which North Korea could release precise, solid propellant ballistic missiles against these airfields would be substantial: The time for these aircraft to receive B61s and take off would be greater. These problems remain even if the United States were to adopt a nuclear-sharing style arrangement where South Korean pilots and aircraft could be certified to deliver the B61.
There are other complications for B61 deployment. Seoul would need to find suitable bases to host U.S.-made Weapons Storage and Security System vaults, which would ensure that these weapons would be safely and securely stored. The placement of these vaults may encounter fierce local political opposition in South Korea, further stressing the alliance: The reaction to the deployment of the THAAD battery in Seongju is telling. Even if weapons are not deployed today, these vaults could be built and B61s could be rotated in during a crisis. This, however, would be perceived as a highly escalatory action by North Korea, which could see incentives to preempt storage sites and airfields prior to the arrival of these weapons. There are few certified aircraft that can transport B61 gravity bombs and it would be likely that, even if transport were undeclared, open-source techniques could identify potential delivery of these weapons in a crisis, potentially precipitating North Korean escalation. (Potential North Korean human intelligence assets in South Korea could similarly surveil deliveries.)
If B61s are to have any role in this ongoing reassurance debate within the alliance, it would be to serve, as former Obama administration official Elaine Bunn memorably put it, a “wedding ring” of reassurance. In effect, once deployed, the nuclear bombs could serve as a symbolic show of commitment to Seoul’s defense — even if at best their military use would be limited and, at worse, actively destabilizing. This is the least compelling rationale for nuclear weapons deployment and the balance of evidence does not suggest that on-Peninsula B61s will be a panacea to the problems posed by North Korea. The “wedding ring” rationale helps explain why U.S. B61s, having been deployed in Europe, are unlikely to be removed, lest their departure be seen as a sign of American infidelity.
B61s ultimately receive disproportionate attention in ongoing debates in Seoul. While the United States maintains a smaller array of lower-yield capabilities — what some might consider “tactical” — than it did at the height of the Cold War it does have other options to address Seoul’s demands for credible nuclear reassurance. One other air-deliverable weapon is the AGM-86 air-launched cruise missile, which includes a primary-only 5 kiloton yield option. These can be carried and launched by B-52H strategic bombers from stand-off ranges at any target in North Korea. As a subsonic delivery system launched from a subsonic bomber, with warheads stored away from South Korea, the air-launched cruise missile would lack promptness in a crisis, however.
A potentially attractive option on the nuclear reassurance menu — one that U.S. officials appear to underemphasize in ongoing extended deterrence consultations — is the submarine-launched, low-yield Trident D5 missile. This capability was introduced by the Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review for reasons nominally having nothing to do with North Korea and has been deployed on Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines since at least February 2020. These missiles would be capable of delivering a low-yield (assumed between 5-10 kiloton) nuclear warhead to any site in North Korea with exceptional promptness. It is reasonable to assume that at least one U.S. Ohio-class submarine is within striking range of North Korea at all times — 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and 365 days a year. In some cases, an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine positioned favorably in the Pacific Ocean would be able to strike North Korea with a D5 missile in approximately 20 minutes. This is comparable to the time-to-target the United States enjoyed with certain tactical nuclear weapons that were deployed to the Korean Peninsula between 1958 and 1991 but no longer exist in the U.S. arsenal.
This option is undesirable for a variety of reasons unrelated to South Korea, specifically. For instance, Trident D5 launches could raise the risk of inadvertent nuclear war with Russia, which may be unable to discriminate a low-yield Trident from one carrying a higher-yield nuclear warhead. Depending on the position of a given Ohio-class submarine, a North Korea-bound missile may need to overfly Russian territory. Russian early warning systems may also interpret a North Korea-bound missile as bound for its own territory, prompting Moscow to consider firing back at targets in the United States or Europe (especially during a time of crisis in Ukraine). Secondly, as the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear triad and America’s secure second-strike capability, Washington may be reluctant to employ Trident D5 missiles in all but the most extreme circumstances. Ultimately, both the air-launched cruise missile and the W76-2 warhead — neither of which would require any changes on on-Peninsula alliance posture — present useful options that may be worth consulting on more specifically in upcoming alliance dialogues if they can usefully demonstrate to Seoul that U.S. nuclear extended deterrence capabilities remain robust despite the ongoing shifts to North Korea’s posture.
‘San Francisco for Seoul’ to ‘Seoul for Seosan’
In the immediate hours after North Korea’s first flight-test of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile in 2017, analysts on both sides of the alliance began contending with a familiar alliance management problem from the Cold War: the “decoupling” problem. Just as Europeans — particularly the French — doubted that the United States would “be ready to trade New York for Paris,” so too would South Koreans and Japanese doubt whether the United States would, rhetorically speaking, trade San Francisco for Seoul, or Tampa for Tokyo. French President Charles De Gaulle wasn’t convinced, leading in part to France’s sustained pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent as the Soviet Union produced ICBMs. With Yoon’s remarks and growing South Korean interest in nuclear weapons, history may not be repeating itself, but there may be something of a rhyme.
The “decoupling” problem hasn’t gone away since 2017 and is commonly voiced by proponents of an independent South Korean deterrent. Cold War analogies, however, as always, are inexact: The United States, in part, coped with the decoupling challenge by forward-deploying nuclear weapons to central Europe, seeking to offset NATO’s conventional inferiority to the Soviet Union’s quantitatively superior conventional strength. On the Korean Peninsula today, it is North Korea that is asymmetrically reliant on early nuclear weapons to use to offset its conventional inferiority. Nevertheless, North Korea continues to test and improve its intercontinental ballistic missiles. Pyongyang concluded its unprecedented year of missile testing in 2022 with a cliffhanger, testing a large-diameter solid propellant engine, suggesting that more responsive and survivable long-range missiles under Kim Jong Un’s control may not be too far off. The United States and South Korea are, in part, addressing and managing this problem in the course of their consultations through mechanisms like the reconvened Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultative Group. The allies are additionally updating their war plans to acknowledge the nuclear dimensions of North Korea’s capabilities that can be brought to bear in a war.
North Korea’s development of tactical nuclear weapons, however, may put a new spin on how the allies — and South Korean military planners and leaders, in particular — think about the consequences of nuclear use by Pyongyang. In 2017, North Korea’s limited inventory of nuclear warheads, relatively imprecise array of nuclear-capable delivery systems, and poorly tested long-range missiles meant that the contours of nuclear use were somewhat constrained. Pyongyang would have resorted to initial nuclear use against regional targets that would enable a large-scale conventional attack on its territory — think ports, airfields, and command and control sites — to degrade the alliance’s ability to wage war. To encourage war termination on favorable terms to Kim and to dissuade further escalation by the United States, Pyongyang would have likely maintained its intercontinental range missiles in reserve, threatening their use only if the United States indicated that it would continue to wage war.
This basic strategy hasn’t changed for North Korea, but developments since 2017 have certainly fleshed out the credibility of what Pyongyang is threatening to do. The allies continue to cope with North Korea’s nuclear threats by threatening a regime-ending response, all while Kim threatens to “exponentially” expand the size of his nuclear warhead stockpile. The credibility of a regime-ending response hinges on the ability of the allies to comprehensively strike and disarm any North Korean nuclear systems that could be employed past the point of initial first use — all the more important now that North Korea has formally adopted a fail-deadly “dead hand” that’ll see all available nuclear weapons released in the event of Kim’s untimely death at the hands of South Korean or American ordnance. The growing survivability, diversity, and responsiveness of North Korea’s forces all but ensures that the allies could not, to a high degree of confidence, assure such a comprehensive strike would be successful and thus risk massive escalation after what may be a limited act of nuclear first-use by North Korea.
Where South Korea then might once have worried about whether the United States would trade “Seoul for San Francisco,” its decision-makers may now need to contend with whether they themselves would be ready to trade “Seoul for Seosan” (the latter being a conveniently alliterative South Korean airbase that hosts F-35As that may be the subject of a nuclear first strike). North Korea’s pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons and their potential use would force a terrible decision on any South Korean president: the prospect that choosing to proceed with a regime-ending campaign after North Korea’s initial nuclear use could lead to escalation against South Korean urban centers, including Seoul. The bar for a successful counterforce campaign remains high and it is more than likely that the totality of the two allies ‘conventional firepower, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, alongside America’s nuclear options, could not assure a sufficiently high probability of success in a disarming strike. The allies could, at best, limit some damage, but still suffer from North Korea’s nuclear use. Seeking assured invulnerability to North Korean nuclear attack is a mirage.
The bad news here is that Kim Jong Un may have more reason today than he’s ever had to believe that North Korean nuclear first use may not be a regime-ending event. Insofar as there is any “good” news, it’s that the severity of the decoupling problem may be attenuated by the incentives that now exist for Seoul and Washington begin thinking about managing and limiting, to the extent possible, nuclear escalation with North Korea — including past the point of North Korean nuclear first use. The alliance’s declared policy remains credible should North Korea massively escalate against a range of targets, including cities, in South Korea and Japan, but the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons may give Kim Jong Un greater belief that his nuclear use against military targets can precipitate early war termination by forcing the allies into a corner. Moreover, should North Korea massively employ tactical nuclear weapons against military targets, it is overwhelmingly likely that U.S. troops, their dependents, and other U.S. citizens residing in South Korea would perish, drawing the United States into the conflict, raising the prospect of nuclear exchange with North Korea. The most attractive solution to these problems is to avoid the prospect of a conventional crisis escalating to the point where North Korea could view nuclear weapons use as desirable to accomplish tactical ends on the battlefield (by preempting stealth fighters or other on-Peninsula strike assets). Importantly, neither U.S. nor South Korean nuclear weapons can solve this problem.
The ‘Nuclear Planning’ Boondoggle
Short of nuclear proliferation and U.S. nuclear weapons redeployment, a growing demand from many South Korean defense experts and strategists these days is that the United States open the door to Seoul’s participation in “nuclear planning” processes. After all, if NATO has a Nuclear Planning Group, why shouldn’t the U.S.-South Korea alliance? This sounds like a reasonable ask to many in Seoul: Some proponents of the idea see U.S. reluctance to discuss nuclear planning as evidence that South Korea is a junior ally compared to what’s perceived as a substantially more mature transatlantic alliance.
Washington’s reluctance has less to do with rank-ordering its allies and more to do with what’s meant by “nuclear planning.” What remains poorly understood — and somewhat poorly communicated by the United States — is that the NATO Nuclear Planning Group doesn’t really do what is traditionally understood to constitute “nuclear planning” despite its name. The group “provides a forum for consultation, collective decision-making, and political control over all aspects of NATO’s nuclear mission, including nuclear sharing,” per NATO. With the exception of nuclear sharing, which is bespoke to NATO and pre-dates the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the rest of what the Nuclear Planning Group does is largely addressed in existing consultative mechanisms between the United States and South Korea.
“Nuclear planning,” in the traditional sense, is more granular and sensitive than what even the Nuclear Planning Group does in the NATO context. This is largely what is sought today by South Korean officials and experts seeking to deepen the nature of consultations between Washington and Seoul. Planning, understood strictly, encompasses everything from targeting to operational considerations. In the United States, U.S. Strategic Command undertakes nuclear planning, which is carried out pursuant to the policy objectives and employment guidance set out by the president of the United States. These plans ensure that, in a crisis, a “menu” of nuclear options is available to the president of the United States. Allies do not participate in this process: Instead, at fora like the Nuclear Planning Group and the various bilateral consultative mechanisms that exist in the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliances, their views can be considered as part of the policy process that can inform nuclear planning by the U.S. military.
NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement does mean that some nuclear planning, in the traditional sense, is carried out by parts of the alliance. This concerns the United States, the United Kingdom, and the five NATO states that host nuclear-certified dual-capable aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. (France, despite being a nuclear-armed NATO state, does not participate in the Nuclear Planning Group and related NATO nuclear processes.) This component is handled by NATO military staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and is sensitive to the political decisions on nuclear policy taken at the Nuclear Planning Group. This is partly a necessity of NATO’s nuclear mission: Without planning, the countries with dual-capable aircraft, in particular, would be unable to effectively carry out strike operations with nuclear assets should deterrence fail.
Many in Seoul and Washington might reasonably disagree about whether nuclear sharing or even planning would meet the alliance’s demands to deter North Korea. What needs to be clear, however, is that the United States is not unduly restricting Seoul from the types of nuclear policy consultations that are currently available to its NATO allies. To the contrary, NATO states may see something to desire in the relatively integrated nature of U.S. consultations on extended deterrence matters in East Asia compared to what might be interpreted as a somewhat dated, siloed process within the transatlantic alliance on nuclear matters, crystallized in the role played by organs like the Nuclear Planning Group. As far as extended deterrence consultations are concerned, the grass may be greener on the other side.
The Bottom Line: Political Solidarity and Trust
The most unfortunate short-term consequence of Yoon publicly mooting nuclear armament is what it does to trust and solidarity within the U.S.-South Korea alliance. These are ultimately the fundamental building blocks of any strong alliance, which relies on shared interests. Under the Trump administration, the United States took a sledgehammer to solidarity and trust by insisting on an extortionary approach to host nation support payments and unilaterally terminating military exercises without consultation. In addition to Seoul’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis North Korea, the experience under the Trump administration raised fundamental questions about the long-term reliability of the United States. Recognizing this, the Biden administration has sought to restore trust in the United States — not just in Seoul, but in allied capitals around the world.
After mooting the nuclear armament option, Yoon proceeded to note that “for now” the allies would proceed with various extended deterrence consultations. This phrase — “for now” — is familiar to any American who has recently discussed these matters in Seoul and speaks to how many pro-nuclear armament South Koreans are bargaining with the United States. Underlying this phraseology is the implication that Washington had better take Seoul’s demands seriously or else there’ll be no other option left but proliferation. In addition to bargaining with the United States, Yoon’s publicized comments have also made clear to pro-nuclear conservatives in South Korea that their preferred course of action is part of the policy decision-making space. Hard-bargaining, including through public signals, has risks — and not just with the United States.
North Korea, too, will take note of what this moment may imply about the resolve of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Seoul’s increasingly public demands for new forms of nuclear reassurance from the United States implicitly reveal that South Korean policymakers bear doubts about what their conventional deterrent capabilities — including the three-axis system — can reasonably accomplish. A rational Kim can still be deterred through conventional means should Seoul and Washington continue to demonstrate that he cannot accomplish objectives averse to the alliance’s interests without suffering costs disproportionate to the benefits he might seek.
Imposing those costs does not require the effects of nuclear weapons, particularly given the North Korean leadership’s disregard for large-scale, unacceptable damage against military targets outside of the Kim regime’s survival itself. For better or worse, the regime’s survival, following massive nuclear use, can be threatened with conventional means alone and North Korean conventional aggression can be repelled by the superior capabilities of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. The Yoon administration’s deterrence messaging is veering off course from these fundamentals with a destabilizing focus on preemptive strikes, decapitation plans, and disproportionate retaliation. Most importantly, Seoul and Washington should rediscover the parallel pillar to deterring effectively: assurance. Just as Kim should understand the costs he might face, so too should he be assured that if he doesn’t transgress the alliance’s red lines, he won’t incur those costs. Incentivizing North Korean restraint and deterring escalation will require the alliance to leverage the full array of tools available, including those beyond military capabilities alone.
As the Biden and Yoon administrations continue to engage on extended deterrence, they should prioritize these essential matters to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation. To facilitate a unified and effective allied approach, the Biden administration should be clear — without precipitating a greater crisis in the alliance — that Seoul’s contemplation of nuclear proliferation as a bargaining tactic is ultimately unproductive and detrimental to allied security. Separately, the administration should privately communicate to Seoul that a South Korea that chooses to abrogate its non-proliferation commitments and pursue nuclear weapons could not be certain that U.S. extended deterrence assurances would persist. There remains little certainty about how successive U.S. administrations may view a nuclear-armed South Korea, which could be accommodated into a regional U.S. strategy to, for instance, counter China. Many in Seoul recall the precedent-setting U.S. civil nuclear agreement with India, which appeared to exhibit that non-proliferation principles could be subdued in pursuit of perceived geopolitical gain. But for now, the United States should not lose site of the essential role that non-proliferation has and continues to have for U.S. interests in Asia and elsewhere. The answers to improved allied security on the Korean Peninsula are unlikely to be found with nuclear weapons.
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Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is the author of Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (Oxford/Hurst, 2020). Follow him on Twitter at @nktpnd.
Image: The White House
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Ankit Panda · February 3, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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