Quotes of the Day:

“And this I believe: that the free, exploring mind of the individual human is the most valuable thing in the world. And this I would fight for: the freedom of the mind to take any direction it wishes, undirected. 

And this is what I must fight against any idea, religion, or government which limits or destroys the individual. This is what I am and what I am about.” 

- John Steinbeck, East of Eden

 “Success is stumbling from failure to failure with no loss of enthusiasm period.” 

- Winston Churchill

"The real problem of humanity is the following: We have paleolithic emotions, medieval institutions, and god-like technology.”

- biologist Edward. O. Wilson

1. Ready, FIRE, Aim: Great Power Competition without Combat Aviation Advisors

2. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: March

3. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 1, 2023

4. Opinion | China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism

5. ‘Havana syndrome’ not caused by energy weapon or foreign adversary, intelligence review finds

6. ​Explainer: 2023 Indo-Pacific Summits

7. House’s first China Committee hearing highlights Taiwan defenses

8. US Cyber Command developing own intelligence hub

9. Tips for generals: how to navigate politics without partisanship

10. The Wagner Group’s Growing Shadow in the Sahel: What Does It Mean for Counterterrorism in the Region?

11. U.S. Special Forces launch counter-terrorism drills with African armies

12. Adopt a talent recruitment solution to spark a movement at the DoD

13. Why mortars are increasingly important on the modern battlefield

14. Ret. Gen. Spalding: 'Woke regime' teaming up with 'enemies' of US

15. Rethinking Assumptions About China

16. Mad Scientist Laboratory blog post 436. Non-Kinetic War

17. Clausewitz’s Analysis Resonates to This Day

18. Russia's struggles in Ukraine are showing US special operators that they'll need to fight without their 'tethers' to win future wars

19. In an Epic Battle of Tanks, Russia Was Routed, Repeating Earlier Mistakes

20. FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces National Cybersecurity Strategy

21. Biden National Cyber Strategy Seeks to Hold Software Firms Liable for Insecurity

22. How the U.S. National Cyber Strategy Reaches Beyond Government Agencies

23. Russia Using Western Satellites to Hone Attacks in Ukraine

24. Xi’s Communist Party wants even more centralized control

25. Five key takeaways from US House hearing on China

26. From Balloons to Nukes, We Must Stop Inflating the China Threat

27. China Trumps U.S. in Key Technology Research, Report Says

28. Analysis: Xi wants China's security apparatus under his direct grip

29. BlackSky details building of China's secret naval base in Cambodia

30. DOD Inspector Sees No Signs Ukraine Is Diverting Weapons—But Promises More Scrutiny

1. Ready, FIRE, Aim: Great Power Competition without Combat Aviation Advisors

I have received a number of comments from former AFSOC personnel over the last year lamenting this decision.

Wed, 03/01/2023 - 6:11pm

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ready-fire-aim-great-power-competition-without-combat-aviation-advisors

Ready, FIRE, Aim: Great Power Competition without Combat Aviation Advisors

By Ioannis Koskinas

In late 2022, the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) quietly divested the combat aviation advisor (CAA) capability, the only unit in the Air Force specifically trained, organized, and equipped for irregular warfare (IW). Within a few months, AFSOC converted the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) from one uniquely suited for building partner capacity, security force assistance, and aviation foreign internal defense (AvFID) to another one of the multiple AFSOC squadrons flying the MC-130J airlift aircraft. For nearly 30 years, the 6th SOS was the Air Force’s only organization dedicated to IW and AvFID. But, contrary to the 2022 Defense Department Special Operations Vision and Strategy that aimed to bolster integrated deterrence by advancing partnerships and enhancing relationship with allies, partners, and the interagency, AFSOC scrapped the Air Force’s only IW capability. This has diminished U.S. Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) capacity to meet its national security objectives. Since August 2022, new commanders have taken the reins at USSOCOM and at AFSOC. This paper hopes that they take stock of the unforced error made by their predecessors and reinstitute the CAA mission in the Air Force and USSOCOM’s kit bags of asymmetric air power advantages.

In the aftermath of Operation Eagle Claw and the failure to rescue the 52 hostages held in the U.S. embassy in Teheran, Iran, the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated the creation of the USSOCOM. Throughout emerging terrorist actions overseas during the 1980s & 90s, USSOCOM expanded its capabilities in an attempt to balance resources between their counter-terrorism (CT) and irregular warfare (IW) missions and units. However, the post-Vietnam institutional neglect by the Services that led to the Eagle Claw disaster and Congressional intervention forcing the creation of USSOCOM meant that the majority of resources and command emphasis were allocated to the “no-fail” CT mission. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, USSOCOM’s CT emphasis grew tremendously. In a notable exception, however, in 1994, the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) stood up the 6th SOS and created the combat aviation advisor (CAA) capability. These uniquely trained Air Commandos, like their Special Forces brethren, worked by, with, and through partners and allies to create deep relationships, integrate partner forces into multinational operations, and develop the capabilities of those partners’ air forces to help their nations resist aggression and subversion.

Building partner capacity to resist hybrid threats is at the heart of the IW mission set. USSOCOM’s Vision and Strategy uses strong language describing the need to “cultivate strong relationships with the [U.S.’s] global network of allies and partners to … illuminate irregular threats, foster partners’ resilience, and create dilemmas for our adversaries.” The primer also suggests that, in order to “protect and advance our national interests, SOF must adapt [its] formations, concepts, and capabilities, while strengthening our critical relationships with allies and partners,” and that “SOF will pursue agreements, partnerships – such as increased foreign internal defense, security assistance….” It is hard to imagine how USSOCOM will achieve these goals in the air domain without the specialized CAA capabilities that AFSOC recently divested.

Between the 6th SOS’s creation in 1994 and its demise in 2022, AFSOC only produced 900 qualified CAAs. There are many reasons for this lack of growth. A number of former CAAs related how during the three decades of the squadron’s existence, AFSOC requirements for the 6th SOS focused overly on the airplanes rather than the humans required to man the unit and deliver the unique air advising capability. This can be explained if one understands that the way the Air Force manages manpower for its flying squadrons is based on the number of fully qualified aircrews required to operate the unit’s assigned aircraft, called crew ratio. A crew ratio of one means the squadron is manned at one aircrew per primary assigned aircraft. In most squadrons, the crew ratio is about 1.5, providing the squadron extra humans to serve in overhead billets and allow for a full complement of personnel on station when sending people to training, and accounting for leave and other absences. The Air Force had a difficult time coming to grips with the idea that this specialized mission focused on specially selected, trained, and sustained CAAs that were not tied to the specific aircraft assigned.

During its nearly 30-year history, the 6th SOS struggled to get mission need statements approved, in no small part because of arguments at both USSOCOM and AFSOC over which airplanes the unit should operate. As such, even though the 6th SOS mission was to advise and assist partner nations’ aircrews and support personnel, AFSOC struggled to come to grips with the notion that the 6th SOS would have to operate off-the-shelf, inexpensive, low-tech airplanes, analogous to partner nations’ aircraft. The reality is, the air and aviation forces found in those nations most susceptible to Chinese, Russian, or Iranian subversion and hybrid threats are also those least able to procure, operate, and maintain advanced technology aircraft. As early as 1991, the program element manager at USSOCOM who was leading the creation of what became the 6th SOS told me that he struggled to make the case that the squadron needed to procure or lease aircraft tailored to the missions its aircrews and support teams would be asked to conduct. 

This was an anathema to many at AFSOC and USSOCOM, with some accusing the 6th SOS designers of attempting to create a "flying club,” an accusation that was not without merit. Despite warning signs coming from USSOCOM that AFSOC needed to tone down their demands for assigning non-standard aircraft to the unit and instead focus on the human capabilities necessary for working by, with, and through partner nation air forces, the rhetoric continued. It was as if the “means” (aircraft) had become the “ends.” In 1993, USSOCOM signed the operational concept authorizing the creation of the 6th SOS, but with the caveat it would have no assigned aircraft. USSOCOM did insert a line item in its budget giving the unit $1.4 million per year to enable aircrews to stay current by renting, leasing, or paying for flying time on civilian and military aircraft. For reasons not appropriate for this article, most of that money never reached the squadron and CAAs in the early days ended up taking creative, but also risky, measures to regain flying currency before stepping into partner nations’ aircraft.

The stories that 6th SOS operators could recount about the growth opportunities lost over the years go far beyond the scope of this article. Suffice to say that most CAA personnel I spoke to mark 2018-2019 as the last opportunity for realizing the unit’s true potential. After years of falling short of meeting the Geographical Combatant Commanders’ requirements to build partner aviation capacity, by 2018 it seemed as if AFSOC was going to double the CAA enterprise. Finding a new home at Duke Field, under the newly created 492nd Special Operations Wing, which included another non-standard aviation unit the 524th SOS (intra-theater specialized mobility support, flying the C-146A Wolfhound). Highlighting the importance of this mission in Congressional testimony, the AFSOC commander at the time, Lt Gen Brad Webb, called the 6th SOS CAAs “the vanguard of AFSOC's irregular warfare force.” According to AFSOC plans, the command was trying to grow the unit by roughly an additional 180 CAAs, doubling the size of the squadron. The increasing requirements for qualified CAAs from the theater special operations commands suggested the need for a second and likely a third CAA squadron, to better align the CAAs regionally, much like the Army’s Special Forces Groups are regionally aligned. Unfortunately, General Webb’s vision never came to fruition. Four years later, the unit furled its guidon and AFSOC divested the CAA capabilities that had proven so successful irregular conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Jordan, Colombia, and elsewhere.

Like all other large military organizations, USSOCOM and AFSOC exist in a resource challenged environment with competing priorities. Looking ahead, however, it is hard to consider how the U.S. military is going to deter peer and near-peer adversaries engaging in strategic competition, that is irregular and hybrid conflicts short of war, without building aviation partners’ capacities. When SOF counts on allies and partners to fight shoulder to shoulder in pursuit of our shared common goals and objectives, developing specialized aviation capabilities was a key and proven capability that USSOCOM had to offering. Additionally, one cannot ignore the critical role CAAs played in assessing and providing an accurate picture of partner air and aviation forces’ capabilities, developing nuanced understandings of far-flung and austere operational environments, and building trust relationships through shared experiences, cultural acumen, and professional respect—intangible assets Combatant Commanders will need in the next, most likely theater of conflict.

USSOCOM and AFSOC have both gained new commanders in the last six months. I respectfully suggest that both commanders revisit the CAA construct and immediately reverse course, before the capability becomes a distant memory and SOF has to reinvent the CAA “wheel,” at greater cost.

About the Author(s)

Ioannis “Gianni” Koskinas

Ioannis “Gianni” Koskinas is a senior fellow with the International Security Program at New America, where he focuses on foreign policy issues with a functional focus on Irregular Warfare, and regional orientation towards the Middle East and Central Asia. He is the CEO of the Hoplite Group.

2. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: March

Access the tracker here: https://www.fdd.org/policy-tracker/2023/03/01/biden-administration-foreign-policy-tracker-march/

March 1, 2023 | FDD Tracker: February 1-28, 2023

Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: March

David Adesnik

Senior Fellow and Director of Research

John Hardie

Russia Program Deputy Director

Trend Overview

By David Adesnik and John Hardie

Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch.

President Joe Biden made a surprise visit to Kyiv, where he vowed to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” Yet Biden is still hesitating to give Ukraine the weapons it needs to prevail on the battlefield, such as the Army Tactical Missile System. Meanwhile, NATO leaders are signaling they want Kyiv to enter negotiations with Moscow, even as Russian atrocities continue.

A mix of bold rhetoric and indecision also characterized Biden’s response to the appearance of a Chinese surveillance balloon over the continental United States. The administration claimed the balloon posed “no risk” yet sent an F-22 fighter jet to shoot it down. The president insisted the incident did no damage to the U.S.-China relationship, while Secretary of State Antony Blinken called it a “violation of our sovereignty” that must “never happen again.”

U.S. policy toward Iran reflects similar confusion. The administration speaks of solidarity with protesters who have spent five months marching for human rights while the regime responds with torture and executions. Yet the White House refuses to abandon hope of reviving some version of the 2015 nuclear deal, even as United Nations inspectors report Iran has enriched uranium to 84 percent purity, just shy of weapons-grade.

Check back with us next month to see if the administration has found a way to resolve these contradictions.

Trending Very Positive

Trending Positive

Trending Neutral

Trending Negative

Trending Very Negative

Defense

Cyber

China

Europe

Indo-Pacific

Korea

Russia

Gulf

International Organizations

Iran

Israel

Latin America

Sunni Jihadism

Syria

Turkey

Lebanon

Nonproliferation and Biodefense

3. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 1, 2023

Maps Graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2023

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin may leverage an amendment to Russia’s Criminal Code increasing punishments for "discrediting" the war in Ukraine to promote further self-censorship measures among the critical ultranationalist community, prompting pushback from Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and prominent milbloggers.
• A New York Times (NYT) investigation into catastrophic Russian losses during the recent Russian offensive near Vuhledar indicates the Russian military remains unable to rapidly fix the endemic challenges posed by severe personnel and equipment losses.
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a package of 16 documents that may facilitate Russian sanctions evasion by channeling Chinese aid to Russia through Belarus.
• US officials continue to report that Ukrainian forces are properly using Western-provided weapons in Ukraine.
• Russian and occupation authorities may be attempting to further limit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) presence at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to compel the de facto recognition of Russian ownership of the plant.
• Politico reported that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is seemingly reconsidering Serbia’s close ties to Russia during the war in Ukraine, spurred in part by ongoing Wagner Group recruitment and subversion efforts in Serbia.
• Russian forces are fortifying positions on the international border in Belgorod Oblast.
• Russian forces advanced within Bakhmut and continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.
• Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continue defensive operations in southern Ukraine.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to struggle with the administrative management of occupied areas.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 1, 2023

Mar 1, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark

March 1, 6:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The Kremlin may leverage an amendment to Russia’s Criminal Code increasing punishments for "discrediting" the war in Ukraine to promote further self-censorship among the critical ultranationalist community, prompting pushback from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and prominent milbloggers. Chairman of the Russian State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin announced on March 1 that the Duma could ratify amendments to the Russian Criminal Code introducing harsher punishments for discrediting participants of the Russian "special military operation," including "volunteers," as soon as March 14.[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) labels irregular armed formations fighting in Ukraine—specifically the Wagner Group—as volunteers. Volodin stated punishments would include a fine of up to five million rubles (about $66,450), five years of correctional or forced labor, or a sentence of 15 years in prison.[2] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously stated on February 28 that Russia must "identify and stop illegal activities of those who are trying to weaken [Russian] society" and identify those who "use separatism, nationalism, neo-Nazism as a weapon."[3] Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has long called on the Kremlin to punish anyone who spoke poorly of Wagner under the guise of ensuring that all participants of the war are protected under existing laws against discrediting the Russian Armed Forces. However, Prigozhin released a suggested adjustment to the amendments in response to Volodin’s statement, arguing the amendment should not punish criticism of senior Russian MoD and Wagner Group commanders.[4] Prigozhin argued constructive criticism "is necessary" to ensure Russian commanders use their powers "transparently and responsibly." Prigozhin may be concerned that the Kremlin could use the expanded amendment to crack down on or, at minimum, promote self-censorship practices among ultranationalist milblogger communities who regularly criticize senior Russian commanders, and likely seeks to balance his desired protection of the Wagner Group with retaining the freedom for himself and friendly milbloggers to criticize the Russian military.

ISW assessed on February 26 that Putin has allowed the ultranationalist community to expand its influence at the expense of the Russian MoD so the Kremlin can leverage the community’s pre-established networks to recruit volunteers.[5] The Kremlin likely seeks to mitigate further pushback from the pro-war ultranationalist community, which continues to look up to Putin as the facilitator of the war despite their criticisms of the conduct of the war. The State Duma will likely pass these amendments on March 14, given Volodin’s announcement. The Kremlin could use these amendments to promote self-censorship among select milbloggers whose constituencies are no longer needed for its force generation or crowdfunding campaigns, or whose criticisms have exceeded the Kremlin’s tolerance for open criticism. It is unclear to what extent such measures would scare Russian milbloggers into self-censorship, however. Former Russian officer (and avid critic of Putin) Igor Girkin mocked Volodin’s announcement, stating that he will start apologizing for his previous critiques of Russia’s military failures and sarcastically retracting his criticism.[6] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, however, celebrated the amendments, noting that Putin is attempting to prevent divisions in society to improve the war effort.[7]

A New York Times (NYT) investigation into catastrophic Russian losses during the recent Russian offensive near Vuhledar indicates that the Russian military remains unable to rapidly fix the endemic challenges posed by severe personnel and equipment losses. NYT reported on March 1 that Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continued to make serious mistakes and advance tank columns into Ukrainian ambushes in the recent three-week Russian offensive near Vuhledar, which Ukrainian sources characterized as the largest tank battle of the war to date.[8] NYT reported that Russian forces lost at least 130 tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) during the three-week offensive, forcing them to resort in the last week to frontal infantry attacks.[9] Ukrainian troops outlined their tactics to NYT, stating they lured Russian forces into kill zones before immobilizing Russian columns and channeling them into mine-laden road shoulders, before destroying them with artillery - including HIMARS, typically used against static, rear area targets.[10]  The Russian elements deployed to the Vuhledar area, primarily the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, are mainly staffed with poorly trained mobilized personnel who suffered massive losses in this area in October 2022 and again in February 2023. ISW previously reported on Russian losses near Vuhledar and assessed that they are emblematic of the Russian military‘s inability to learn from its failures.[11] The NYT investigation supports ISW’s assessment that the continued recreation and reinforcement of Russian military failures will impede the Russian military’s ability to conduct effective offensive operations.[12]

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a package of 16 documents on March 1 that may facilitate Russian sanctions evasion by channeling Chinese aid to Russia through Belarus. The documents include a strategy for joint Belarusian-Chinese industrial development, a document on Belarusian-Chinese scientific and technical cooperation for 2023-2024, and a memorandum of understanding on joint projects using Chinese government loans.[13] Lukashenko stated that Belarus is interested in deepening cooperation with China on technological development, including the creation of joint ventures, the modernization of Belarusian enterprises with modern Chinese technologies, and trade in goods and services.[14] Lukashenko stated that Belarusian manufacturers are interested in studying the "competencies and technologies of Chinese companies in the formation of a component base, the production of engines, transmissions, axles, other components, and assemblies."[15] ISW previously assessed that China may clandestinely transfer military or dual-use equipment to Russia via Belarus.[16] 

Lukashenko likely additionally intends these agreements to support his longstanding effort to cultivate Chinese economic influence in Belarus to hedge against Russian integration pressure, although these measures will at most delay Russia’s ongoing campaign to secure full economic control of Belarus. Several of the documents also concern Chinese-Belarusian trade and economic cooperation.[17] Lukashenko previously expressed support to expand China’s economic presence in Belarus in February 2021 when Lukashenko intensified his efforts to delay Russia’s absorption of Belarus through the Union State.[18]

Russian occupation authorities may be attempting to further constrain the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) presence at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to compel the de facto recognition of Russian ownership of the plant. The IAEA announced on February 10 that it delayed a planned rotation of personnel to the IAEA mission at the ZNPP due to security concerns.[19] IAEA General Director Rafael Grossi stated on February 20 that the situation remains unstable and on February 28 that 20 detonations occurred near the ZNPP, briefly disconnecting a backup powerline to the ZNPP and underscoring the ZNPP’s "fragile external power situation."[20] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on February 22 that the UN Department for Safety and Security indefinitely postponed the IAEA personnel rotation without proper cause, claiming that Russia is committed to ensuring the safe passage of IAEA personnel to the ZNPP.[21] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on March 1 that Western intelligence agencies disrupted the routine rotation of the IAEA mission in order to accuse Russia of creating obstacles for the IAEA.[22] Russian and occupation officials have previously criticized the IAEA’s presence at the ZNPP, such as Rogov accusing the IAEA in January of playing a political role at the ZNPP to support Ukraine.[23] Russian and occupation authorities likely intend to use either the possibly trapped IAEA personnel or a reduced IAEA presence at the plant to coerce international recognition of Russian ownership over the plant. Russian and occupation authorities may also be attempting to deter a possible future Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine by escalating threats to the ZNPP.

Politico reported that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is seemingly reconsidering Serbia’s close ties with Russia, spurred in part by ongoing Wagner Group recruitment and subversion efforts in Serbia and demonstrating the international economic and informational costs imposed on Putin by his invasion of Ukraine. Politico reported on March 1 that Vučić seeks to appeal to both Russia and western institutions by continuing Serbia’s European Union membership bid while refusing to impose sanctions against Russia, but Vučić said that Serbia must make "difficult choices" soon.[24] Vučić condemned the Wagner Group and stated that Serbian authorities will arrest all Serbians who have fought for the Wagner Group in Ukraine. Vučić characterized attendees of a Wagner-backed protest in Belgrade as anti-Serbian and paid off by unspecified foreign actors. Vučić greenlit on February 17 a US-led plan to normalize relations with Kosovo, which Serbia does not officially recognize, and stated that Serbia will remain on the path to EU membership. Politico noted that polls in Serbia suggest that more Serbians support Russia than Western states, suggesting Vučić would struggle to completely divest from ties with Russia - which he likely does not intend to do. A Russian milblogger amplified the Politico article and criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin for turning Russia into a "pariah state" from which even "traditional fraternal states distance themselves."[25]

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin may leverage an amendment to Russia’s Criminal Code increasing punishments for "discrediting" the war in Ukraine to promote further self-censorship measures among the critical ultranationalist community, prompting pushback from Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and prominent milbloggers.
• A New York Times (NYT) investigation into catastrophic Russian losses during the recent Russian offensive near Vuhledar indicates the Russian military remains unable to rapidly fix the endemic challenges posed by severe personnel and equipment losses.
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a package of 16 documents that may facilitate Russian sanctions evasion by channeling Chinese aid to Russia through Belarus.
• US officials continue to report that Ukrainian forces are properly using Western-provided weapons in Ukraine.
• Russian and occupation authorities may be attempting to further limit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) presence at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to compel the de facto recognition of Russian ownership of the plant.
• Politico reported that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is seemingly reconsidering Serbia’s close ties to Russia during the war in Ukraine, spurred in part by ongoing Wagner Group recruitment and subversion efforts in Serbia.
• Russian forces are fortifying positions on the international border in Belgorod Oblast.
• Russian forces advanced within Bakhmut and continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.
• Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continue defensive operations in southern Ukraine.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to struggle with the administrative management of occupied areas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces are fortifying positions on the international border in Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 1 that Russian forces deployed engineering equipment and are installing anti-tank mines in Novostroivka Vtoraya and Gorkovskii, Belgorod Oblast—approximately 47km northwest of Kharkiv City.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff did not observe Russian forces forming offensive groups in the northern Kharkiv Oblast direction, and such fortifications further indicate that Russian forces are not preparing for renewed offensive operations in the area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Novoselivske (approximately 14km northwest of Svatove) and Tymkivka (about 20km east of Kupyansk).[27] Russian state news outlet Anna News reported that artillery units of the 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 144th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (20th Guards Combined Arms Army) continue to operate on the Svatove-Kreminna line and are supporting Russian assaults against Ukrainian positions.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults northwest of Kreminna against Makiivka, Nevske, and Chervonopopivka, and south of Kreminna in Bilohorivka, Shypylivka, and Fedorivka.[29] A Russian news aggregator also claimed that fighting is ongoing in the Makiivka-Balka Zhuravka area.[30] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled all Russian assaults on Yampolivka, Terny, Nevske, and Makiivka—all within 20km west or northwest of Kreminna.[31] Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Akhmat special forces, elements of the Luhansk People’s Republic’s 4th Brigade of the 2nd Army Corps, and Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) stormed Ukrainian fortifications in the Kreminna area.[32] A Russian milblogger noted that Ukrainian and Russian forces are fighting for dominant heights in the Kreminna forest area and noted that similar localized battles are ongoing in the Svatove area.[33]

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in Kadiivka, Luhansk Oblast.[34] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Russian forces intensified their use of kamikaze drones in the Luhansk direction.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut on March 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops continue to advance in the Bakhmut direction and attacked Bakhmut itself; north of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest), Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest), and Bohdanivka (8km northwest); west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west), Chasiv Yar (10km west), and Khromove (3km west); and southwest of Bakhmut near Bila Hora (15km southwest).[36] Geolocated footage posted on March 1 confirms that Russian forces made advances on the southern outskirts of Bakhmut.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters have consolidated control of the outskirts of Yahidne (1km northwest of Bakhmut) and are moving southwest towards Khromove, though Ukrainian forces retain access to the Khromove-Bakhmut route.[38] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner troops have advanced within Bakhmut near the meat processing plant and up to the bank of the Bakhmutivka River, which runs through eastern Bakhmut.[39] Russian sources continue to claim that Russian troops are attacking Ukrainian positions along the T0504 Kostiatynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway near Ivanivske and that Ukrainian troops are withdrawing from Chasiv Yar.[40] While some Russian sources claim that the situation in Bakhmut is worsening for Ukrainian troops, Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Ukraine is transferring large numbers of reserves to the area.[41]

Ukrainian officials continue to emphasize that Ukrainian troops have the option to conduct a controlled withdrawal from Bakhmut if they see fit. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Rodnyanskyi stated on February 28 that Ukrainian forces can strategically pull back from positions in Bakhmut if needed, but that a Ukrainian withdrawal from Bakhmut would not mean that Russian forces would be able to quickly take Bakhmut.[42] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously stated on February 20 that Ukraine will continue to hold Bakhmut, but "not at any cost."[43] ISW has previously assessed that the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut is a strategically sound operation that will continue to force Russian troops to expend manpower and equipment on costly assaults.[44] Ukrainian officials continue to signal their willingness to strategically delay Russian forces by defending Bakhmut but appear to be assuring the United States and Western partners that they maintain the possibility of a controlled withdrawal if the Ukrainian command deems it necessary.

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on March 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive actions north of Donetsk City near Avdiivka and Kamianka; on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka and Pobieda.[45] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continue fighting in the Adviivka area near Novobakhmutivka (12km north of Avdiivka) and are trying to break through Ukrainian defenses in Avdiivka from the Opytne-Spartak line to the south.[46] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that fighting is ongoing within Marinka and that Russian troops have made unspecified gains on the southern and northern outskirts of Marinka.[47]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on March 1. A Wagner Group-affiliated source posted footage of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade operating near Vuhledar and claimed that naval infantry elements are trying to gain a foothold near the mine area by Vuhledar to launch further offensives against the settlement.[48] Another Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly of the aftermath of an incident where a Russian tank hit a mine near Vuhledar and its crew crawled into a shell crater to hide from Ukrainian fire.[49] The milblogger claimed that scouts of the 5th Separate Guards Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) and infantry of the 37th Motor Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) evacuated the wounded tankers.[50] The same milblogger also posted footage of BARS-23 (Russian Combat Reserve) fighters in the Vuhledar area.[51]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continue defensive operations in southern Ukraine. Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated on March 1 that Russian forces are forming secondary defensive lines in Kherson Oblast in case Russian forces need to withdraw further to the rear in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 1 that Russian forces remain on the defensive in southern Ukraine but are attempting to set conditions for future offensive operations, as ISW noted on February 28.[53] Images published on February 28 show new Russian trenches and concrete defenses in an unspecified area of Zaporizhia Oblast.[54]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian rear areas in southern Ukraine on March 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare systems downed 10 Ukrainian UAVs during a large UAV attack against Crimea.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces downed eight of the drones near Yevpatoria (at the intersection of the R25, T0111, and T0108 highways) and Saky (20km southeast of Yevpatoria along the R25).[56] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Melitopol airbase in Zaporizhia Oblast on March 1, and have conducted over a dozen strikes against the airfield since Russian forces first occupied the airbase.[57]

Russian forces continued to conduct routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv Oblasts on March 1.[58]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials continue to claim that Russian defense manufacturers are increasing production amidst ongoing indications that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is unable to meet Russia’s long-term economic and military goals. Russian United Shipbuilding Corporation Head Alexey Rakhmanov claimed on February 27 that the company plans to reduce submarine construction time by eight to thirteen months and will complete construction of nuclear submarines due in 2028 a year early.[59] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on February 27 cutting plans to construct at least three nuclear reactor-equipped Lider class icebreakers by 2035 to produce only one such icebreaker.[60] The war in Ukraine has significantly degraded the Russian military’s stock of conventional military equipment, particularly armored vehicles, and the need to replenish these stocks will likely consume the majority of Russia‘s DIB and limit Russia’s ability to produce systems aimed at longer-term strategic goals, such as nuclear-powered icebreakers.

Russian mobilized personnel continue to publicly criticize Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) commanders. Mobilized personnel of the 4th company of the 1641st Regiment from Tyumen Oblast directed a video complaint at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) military prosecutor’s office on February 28, stating that DNR commanders transferred them to the frontline without preparation or proper information as to what unit they were subordinated to.[61] Several groups of mobilized personnel have recently released public criticism of DNR commanders and accused them of mistreatment and poor command.[62] ISW assesses that the Russian MoD is likely attempting to integrate some DNR formations into the Russian Armed Forces by subordinating mobilized personnel under these formations, which will likely continue to produce command and control issues.[63]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to build out military infrastructure in Chechnya to strengthen his parallel military structures. Kadyrov stated that he met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov and discussed the construction of military facilities in Chechnya and the deployment of new Russian military units to Chechnya.[64] Kadyrov claimed that Russian officials are currently constructing a 50-hectare military base in Sernovodsk, Chechnya, that is slated for completion by the end of March 2023 and will house newly formed units of the Russian Armed Forces.[65] Kadyrov will likely continue to use Russian military infrastructure in Chechnya to support his parallel military structures, which he deploys to frontline areas in Ukraine to curry favor with the Kremlin and retain in Chechnya itself to maintain his power.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to struggle with the administrative management of occupied areas. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on February 28 that Russian President Vladimir Putin issued guidance on increasing checkpoint capacity to facilitate easy movement between occupied Donetsk Oblast and Rostov Oblast, Russia.[66] Pushilin called for checkpoint throughput to double by April 2023, stating that all three checkpoints will increase their capacity with additional equipment, expanded roads, and additional lanes.[67] Pushilin also noted that there are plans to construct a new checkpoint connecting Ulyanivske, Donetsk Oblast, to Shramko, Rostov Oblast, by an unspecified date.[68] Pushilin’s discussion on improving checkpoints between occupied Donetsk Oblast and Russia suggests that Russian occupation authorities may have not yet identified how to administratively regulate between the Russian mainland and occupied territories, the latter of which should, in theory, be subjected to the same traffic and customs laws as Russia.

Russian occupation authorities continue to coerce residents of occupied areas to apply for Russian passports by tying the provision of social benefits to Russian citizenship. Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo stated on March 1 that residents in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts can obtain Russian passports under a simplified procedure within a period of no more than ten days.[69] Saldo announced that all 70,000 residents of occupied Kherson Oblast who have received Russian passports as of March 1 will be entitled to social payments according to Russian law, including pension and social programs, family payments, and maternity capital for families with children born after 2007.[70] Saldo claimed that the number of residents of occupied Kherson Oblast with Russian passports will rise to 150,000 in the next two or three months due to the simplified passport issuance procedure, noting that the Russian Internal Ministry has also increased the number of employees working on passport issuance.[71] Saldo announced the goal of issuing 2,000-3,000 passports per day in occupied Kherson Oblast and called for all passportization measures to be completed by the September Russian regional elections.[72]

Russian forces continue to arrest Ukrainian civilians in occupied territories to serve as bargaining chips in prisoner-of-war (PoW) exchanges with Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on February 27 that 40 percent of all Ukrainian PoWs are civilians, including women, students, the elderly, railway workers, and janitors.[73] Budanov stated that Russia captured 90 percent of all PoWs during the first days of the war and currently has more PoWs than Ukraine because of their arrests of civilians. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also observed that the number of Ukrainian officer PoWs has decreased throughout the war because of Russia’s inability to conduct operational encirclements of critical parts of Ukrainian territory.[74]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/readovkanews/53794

[2] https://t.me/readovkanews/53794

[3] https://realnoevremya dot ru/news/274568-vladimir-putin-prizval-vyyavlyat-teh-kto-pytaetsya-raskolot-obschestvo; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7272; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/20541

[4] https://t.me/grey_zone/17495; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/533; ... ru/obschestvo/16875539; https://t.me/strelkovii/4090; https://t.me/milinfolive/97513; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/56746  

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[6] https://t.me/strelkovii/4092; https://t.me/strelkovii/4093; https://t....

[7] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7272

[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tanks.htm...

[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tanks.htm...

[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tanks.htm...

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021323; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021123

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021323

[13] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-i-si-tszinpin-prinjali-zajavlenie-ob-osnovnyh-printsipah-razvitija-obraztsovyh-otnoshenij-553126-2023/; https://aif dot by/politiks/aleksandr_lukashenko_i_si_czinpin_podpisali_celyy_ryad_dokumentov

[14] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/peregovory-s-predsedatelya-knr-si-czinpinom

[15] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/peregovory-s-predsedatelya-knr-si-czinpinom

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[17] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-i-si-tszinpin-prinjali-zajavlenie-ob-osnovnyh-printsipah-razvitija-obraztsovyh-otnoshenij-553126-2023/; https://aif dot by/politiks/aleksandr_lukashenko_i_si_czinpin_podpisali_celyy_ryad_dokumentov

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-for... https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[19] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-146-iaea-director-g...

[20]  https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-147-iaea-director-g...

[21] https://interax dot ru/world/887336

[22] https://ria dot ru/20230301/magate-1855011593.html; https://t.me/vrogov/7924

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[24] https://www.politico.eu/article/serbia-aleksandar-vucic-europe-russia-ch...

[25] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/20550

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P8sbU4VtovKwKEXGmq...

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/24496

[28] https://t.me/anna_news/46975

[29] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=855340605565813

[30] https://t.me/readovkanews/53790

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/11166

[32] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3397

[33] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10663; https://t.me/romagolovanov/10566

[34] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/8996 https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/9563; https:...

[35] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/8996 https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/9557

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P8sbU4VtovKwKEXGmq...

[37] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1630908538233970689 ; https://tw...

[38] https://t.me/rybar/44088; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/79382; https://t.m...

[39] https://t.me/rybar/44088; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/79382; https://t.m...

[40] https://t.me/rybar/44088; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/22778; htt...

[41] https://t.me/readovkanews/53818; https://twitter.com/wartranslated/stat...

[42] https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-02-28-2...

[43] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022023

[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021423

[45] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=855340605565813; https://www.facebook...

[46] https://t.me/readovkanews/53790; https://t.me/wargonzo/11166

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/11166

[48] https://t.me/grey_zone/17488

[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/79399; https://t.me/zhivoff/8311

[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/79399; https://t.me/zhivoff/8311

[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/79377

[52] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/03/01/dlya-chogo-okupanty-oblashtovuyut-novi-pozycziyi-u-svoyemu-glybokomu-tylu-na-livoberezhzhi-hersonshhyny/

[53] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=855340605565813; https://www.facebook... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[54] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1630635796481884165?s=20

[55] https://t.me/mod_russia/24497

[56] https://t.me/rybar/44104

[57] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/spetstribunal-rf-mozhna-stvoriti-zavtra-bulo-1677684490.html; https://t.me/hueviyherson/35679

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02P8sbU4VtovKwKEXGmq... https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/2702

[59] https://ria dot ru/20230227/rakhmanov-1854528981.html

[60] https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2023/03/moscow-lowers-ambitions-nuclea... http://static.kremlin dot ru/media/events/files/ru/vzuAP2g7SDX1vxddR5G6V6AfwhGAVrtQ.pdf

[61] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/9436

[62] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1629747521365966850;%C2%A0https://...

[63] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022023

[64] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3396

[65] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3396

[66] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3220

[67] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3220

[68] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3220

[69] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/500; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/501

[70] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/500

[71] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/500

[72] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/500; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/501

[73] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/03/01/kyrylo-budanov-ponad-40-tyh-kogo-rosiya-utrymuye-v-zaruchnykah-czyvilni-lyudy/; https://koordshtab dot gov.ua/archive/1086; https://ukrainian.voanews.com/a/6980458.html

[74] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7274

File Attachments: 

DraftUkraineCoTMarch1,2023.png

Donetsk Battle Map Draft March 1,2023.png

Zaporizhia Battle Map Draft March 1,2023.png

Kherson-Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft March 1,2023.png

Kharkiv Battle Map Draft March 1,2023.png

4. Opinion | China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism

Nick Eberstadt is the smartest man I know on this topic (and many other topics as well).

Excerpt:

Much of East Asia is beset by super-low fertility — not just China but also Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. But in China, it is occurring under a totalitarian regime exhorting its subjects to provide more issue for the empire.

The timing of China’s birth collapse matters: The downward spiral commenced immediately after the Chinese Communist Party suspended decades of coercive birth-control policy.

...

The dictatorship has brought this demographic defiance upon itself. Xi calls his vaunted vision for the future the “China Dream.” #Lastgeneration is a reminder that the Chinese people increasingly seem to regard it as a nightmare.

Opinion | China’s collapsing birth and marriage rates reflect a people’s deep pessimism

The Washington Post · by Nicholas Eberstadt · February 28, 2023

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

China is in the midst of a quiet but stunning nationwide collapse of birthrates. This is the deeper, still largely overlooked, significance of the country’s 2022 population decline, announced by Chinese authorities last month.

As recently as 2019, demographers at the U.S. Census Bureau and the United Nations were not expecting China’s population to start dropping until the early 2030s. But they did not anticipate today’s wholesale plunge in childbearing.

Considerable attention has been devoted to likely consequences of China’s coming depopulation: economic, political, strategic. But the causes of last year’s population drop deserve much closer examination.

China’s nosedive in childbearing is a silent alarm. It signals deep disaffection with the bleak future the regime is engineering for its subjects. In this land without democracy, the birth collapse can be read as a landslide vote of no confidence in President Xi Jinping’s rule.

Official Chinese government statistics are far from perfect (Premier Li Keqiang once called China’s economic numbers “man-made”), but they offer a serviceable approximation of recent birth trends.

According to the data, births in China have fallen steeply and steadily since 2016, year after year. In 2022, China had only about half as many births as just six years earlier (9.6 million vs. 17.9 million). That sea change in childbearing predated the coronavirus pandemic, and it appears to be part of broader shock, for marriage in China is also in free fall.

Since 2013 — the year Xi completed his ascent to power — the rate of first marriages in China has fallen by well over half. Headlong flights from both childbearing and marriage are taking place in China today.

Of course, fertility levels, and marriage rates, are dropping all around the world. But these declines tend to be gradual, occurring across decades. China has been hit by seismic demographic jolts. Birth shocks of this order almost never occur under stable modern governments during peacetime. Swift and sharp fertility crashes instead usually reflect catastrophe: famine, war or other shattering upheavals.

What does it take to drive down a country’s birth totals by almost 50 percent in the space of just a few years? Estimates from the U.N. Population Division to consider:

• During China’s Mao-era famine, in which tens of millions perished, birth levels fell by nearly 40 percent between 1957 (the last year before the Great Leap Forward) and 1961 (the depths of the starvation).
• During the chaos of the Soviet collapse, Russian Federation birth levels fell by nearly 40 percent between 1988 (the year before the Berlin Wall fell) and 1994 (when male life expectancy fell to a gruesome 57 years).
• In Yugoslavia’s hellish breakup and ethnic cleansing, birth levels in Bosnia fell by about 40 percent between 1990 (the last year before Yugoslavia’s breakup) and 1995.
• Even Pol Pot, architect of auto-genocide in Cambodia, could not quite manage to force that nation’s birth total down by half during the Khmer Rouge nightmare: According the UNPD, birth levels in Cambodia dropped by 48 percent between 1973 and 1977.

Yet China — amid social order and economic health, not apocalyptic upheaval — has just experienced its own harrowing birth plunge. Why?

The answer most likely lies in the dispirited outlook of the Chinese populace itself. Absent disaster, one of the most powerful predictor of fertility levels the world over — across countries, ethnicities and time — turns out to be the number of children that women (also men) happen to want. More than any other factor, human agency matters in national birth patterns, a truth that should come as no surprise.

So, yes, China’s birth decline since 2016 can be explained — but only by a revolutionary, wildfire change in national mood. It would take a sudden, pervasive and desperately pessimistic turn of mind.

In 2016, before the plunge, Chinese fertility was already well below the replacement rate of around 2.1 children per woman, the level needed for population stability. The UNPD reckons that the 2016 rate was 1.77, or 19 percent below the stability target.

The subsequent six-year Chinese birth swoon has dragged fertility down to an extraordinarily low level: If the 2022 birth tally is accurate, nationwide fertility would now be less than half the replacement rate. Even if the collapse is arrested and fertility remains at that level, each new generation in China will be less than half as large as the one before it.

Much of East Asia is beset by super-low fertility — not just China but also Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. But in China, it is occurring under a totalitarian regime exhorting its subjects to provide more issue for the empire.

The timing of China’s birth collapse matters: The downward spiral commenced immediately after the Chinese Communist Party suspended decades of coercive birth-control policy.

In 2015, Beijing’s population planners finally concluded that the consequences of their awful “one child policy” were inimical to state interests. So it was time to set population policy in reverse.

Note that the regime still claims authority over family size: “the birth of a baby,” in the words of the government-run publication People’s Daily, remains “a state affair.” But now Beijing wants more babies from its subjects. A dictatorship may use bayonets to depress birthrates — but it is much trickier to deploy police state tactics to force birthrates up.

Beijing has not yet figured out how to command the people to feel optimism about their personal futures — or thrill at the prospect of bringing more babies into a dystopian world of ubiquitous facial recognition technology, draconian censorship and the new high-tech panopticon known as the “social credit system.”

Instead, we see millions of young people joining spontaneous movements expressing alienation from work — tang ping (lying flat) — and from Chinese society itself — bai lan (let it rot). The Xi regime doesn’t know what to do about this new form of internalized civil disobedience.

Last year, during one of the regime’s innumerable, drastic pandemic lockdowns, a video went viral in China before authorities could memory hole it.

In the video, faceless hazmat-clad health police try to bully a young man out of his apartment and off to a quarantine camp, even though he has tested negative for the coronavirus. He refuses to leave.

“Don’t you understand,” they warn, “if you don’t comply, bad things can happen to your family for three generations.”

“Sorry” he replies mildly. “We are the last generation. Thank you.”

That moment prompted the spread in China of a despairing social media hashtag: #Lastgeneration.

The dictatorship has brought this demographic defiance upon itself. Xi calls his vaunted vision for the future the “China Dream.” #Lastgeneration is a reminder that the Chinese people increasingly seem to regard it as a nightmare.

The Washington Post · by Nicholas Eberstadt · February 28, 2023

5. ‘Havana syndrome’ not caused by energy weapon or foreign adversary, intelligence review finds

Are they borrowing from the Agent Orange and Gulf War Syndrome playbooks? deny responsibility until the evidence is overwhelming?

‘Havana syndrome’ not caused by energy weapon or foreign adversary, intelligence review finds

After a years-long assessment, five U.S. intelligence agencies conclude it is ‘very unlikely’ an enemy wielding a secret weapon was behind the mysterious ailment

By Shane Harris and John Hudson

Updated March 1, 2023 at 12:51 p.m. EST|Published March 1, 2023 at 11:29 a.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Shane Harris · March 1, 2023

The mysterious ailment known as “Havana syndrome” did not result from the actions of a foreign adversary, according to an intelligence report that shatters a long-disputed theory that hundreds of U.S. personnel were targeted and sickened by a clandestine enemy wielding energy waves as a weapon.

The new intelligence assessment caps a years-long effort by the CIA and several other U.S. intelligence agencies to explain why career diplomats, intelligence officers and others serving in U.S. missions around the world experienced what they described as strange and painful acoustic sensations. The effects of this mysterious trauma shortened careers, racked up large medical bills and in some cases caused severe physical and emotional suffering.

Many of the afflicted personnel say they were the victims of a deliberate attack — possibly at the hands of Russia or another adversarial government — a claim that the report contradicts in nearly every respect, according to two intelligence officials who are familiar with the assessment and described it to The Washington Post.

Seven intelligence agencies participated in the review of approximately 1,000 cases of “anomalous health incidents,” the term the government uses to describe a constellation of physical symptoms including ringing in the ears followed by pressure in the head and nausea, headaches and acute discomfort.

Five of those agencies determined it was “very unlikely” that a foreign adversary was responsible for the symptoms, either as the result of purposeful actions — such as a directed energy weapon — or as the byproduct of some other activity, including electronic surveillance that unintentionally could have made people sick, the officials said. They spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the findings of the assessment, which had not yet been made public.

One agency, which the officials did not name, determined that it was “unlikely” that a foreign actor was at fault, a slightly less emphatic finding that did not appreciably change the consensus. One agency abstained in its conclusion regarding a foreign actor. But when asked, no agency dissented from the conclusion that a foreign actor did not cause the symptoms, one of the intelligence officials said.

The symptoms were first reported at the U.S. Embassy in Havana in 2016.

The officials said that as analysts examined clusters of reported cases, including at U.S. embassies, they found no pattern or common set of conditions that could link individual cases. They also found no evidence, including forensic information or geolocation data, that would suggest an adversary had used a form of directed energy such as radio waves or ultrasonic beams. In some cases, there was no “direct line of sight” to affected personnel working at U.S. facilities, further casting doubt on the possibility that a hypothetical energy weapon could have been the culprit, one of the officials said.

One of the officials said that even in geographic locations where U.S. intelligence effectively had total ability to monitor the environment for signs of malicious interference, analysts found no evidence of an adversary targeting personnel.

“There was nothing,” the official said. This person added that there was no intelligence that foreign leaders, including in Russia, had any knowledge of or had authorized an attack on U.S. personnel that could explain the symptoms.

The second official, who described a frustrating “mystery” as to why longtime colleagues had become ill, said analysts spent months churning data, looking for patterns and inventing new analytic methodologies, only to come up with no plausible explanation.

Both officials said the intelligence community remained open to new ideas and evidence. For instance, if information emerged that a foreign adversary had made progress developing the technology for an energy weapon, that might cause analysts to adjust their assessments.

But they essentially foreclosed the possibility that Russia or another adversarial government or nonstate actor was behind the mysterious syndrome.

“One always wants to be humble,” one official said. “And we looked at what [additional information] we would need” to change the conclusions. The official added that some work on finding a source for the health conditions continues, notably at the Defense Department, and that intelligence agencies were prepared to lend their support to that effort.

The intelligence assessment also examined whether an adversary possessed a device capable of using energy to cause the reported symptoms. Of the seven agencies, five determined that it was “very unlikely,” while the other two said it was “unlikely.”

Over the years, government agencies including the State Department and FBI were unable to substantiate the use of an energy weapon.

But the new assessment is at odds with the view of an independent panel of experts, which last year found that an external energy source plausibly could explain the symptoms. The panel, which was convened by the intelligence community, suggested that a foreign power could have harnessed “pulsed electromagnetic energy” that made people sick.

The expert panel’s findings also were consistent with earlier conclusions of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, which found that “directed, pulsed radio frequency energy appears to be the most plausible mechanism in explaining these cases.”

David Relman, who headed the National Academies investigation and co-chaired the intelligence community experts panel, and had not reviewed the final intelligence assessment, said the energy weapon hypothesis remains viable.

“There are multiple possible explanations for the apparent discrepancy between the failure to identify a malefactor and the plausibility of directed energy as a mechanism. One should not necessarily discount the latter,” Relman told The Post.

The new intelligence report may represent the official word on the strange health ailment, but it probably won’t be the last word on the matter.

Some current and former officials whose conditions remained unexplained say that the CIA and other intelligence agencies did not sufficiently investigate the possibility that an energy weapon was used against them. They argue that analysts could have done more to find correlations between, say, the travel histories of suspected Russian intelligence operatives and the times and places where symptoms were reported.

Intelligence officials counter that analysts looked closely at that possibility and devoted extraordinary resources to the search for a possible cause. A dedicated group staffed by seasoned analysts and led by a senior CIA officer was set up to study the issue. People involved in the analysis have described it as the most complex and difficult challenge of their careers. In the end, they found no pattern to connect reported cases to a potential cause.

The CIA and other agencies also devoted more resources to providing medical care for afflicted personnel, a move that some sufferers applauded, saying that in the first years that symptoms were reported, they were treated skeptically by their managers and medical experts.

A senior official said on Wednesday that the Biden administration would continue to ensure personnel receive medical care and that it would process requests under a law that compensates government employees who experienced symptoms and in some cases had to stop working. Some individuals will be eligible for payments in the six-figure range.

“Nothing is more important than the health and wellbeing of our workforce,” Maher Bitar, the senior director for intelligence programs on the National Security Council, said in a statement.

“Since the start of the Biden-Harris Administration, we have focused on ensuring that our colleagues have access to the care and support they need. … Our commitment to the health and safety of U.S. Government personnel remains unwavering,” said Bitar, who is the interagency coordinator for the response to anomalous health incidents.

Early in the Biden administration, officials encouraged government employees who thought they were experiencing symptoms associated with the health incidents to come forward. That, the intelligence officials acknowledged, led to a flood of reported cases, most of which were attributed to other factors, such as preexisting medical conditions.

The final report’s conclusions are in keeping with an earlier interim assessment by the same group of agencies, which found that the health incidents probably were not the work of another country mounting a global attack.

“We assess it is unlikely that a foreign actor, including Russia, is conducting a sustained, worldwide campaign harming U.S. personnel with a weapon or mechanism,” a senior CIA official said at the time.

Intelligence analysts had reviewed cases that were reported on every continent except Antarctica. The vast majority of them were attributed to preexisting medical conditions or environmental or other factors, the official said.

The earlier, interim assessment had left open the possibility that a few dozen individuals whose symptoms remained unexplained, which the official called “the toughest cases,” might have been targeted in isolated attacks. “Our work is continuing, and we are not done yet,” the official said at the time.

Many of those afflicted were serving in U.S. embassies or diplomatic facilities or were traveling overseas when they fell ill. Children of U.S. government personnel also have reported symptoms.

But in the end, the final intelligence report found that medical experts could not attribute the symptoms to an external cause separate from a preexisting condition or environmental factors, including conditions such as clogged air ducts in office buildings that could cause headaches, the officials aid.

Over time, the state of medical understanding about the condition has evolved in ways that point away from a foreign adversary’s involvement, the officials said.

State Department personnel serving in U.S. embassies are among those who have reported symptoms over the years. Despite the new conclusions, Secretary of State Antony Blinken remains of the view that something happened to those employees who have reported significant ailments, and he is committed to making sure they are cared for, said a person familiar with Blinken’s thinking who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a divisive topic within the department.

Blinken has long doubted that personnel are suffering from mass hysteria or some psychogenic event, officials have said. Previous investigations, notably by the FBI, had raised the possibility that the symptoms had a psychological origin, not a physical one, outraging many sufferers who felt their pain had been marginalized and their claims not taken seriously by medical personnel. Experts have emphasized that even if the illnesses were psychogenic, that doesn’t mean sufferers are imagining their symptoms.

“Those who have been affected have real stories to tell — their pain is real,” Blinken wrote to all U.S. diplomats when the CIA previewed its interim findings. “There is no doubt in my mind about that.” Blinken called the symptoms described by people he met with as “gut wrenching.”

The independent experts panel also cast doubt on a psychological cause. “Psychosocial factors alone cannot account for the core characteristics, although they may cause some other incidents or contribute to long-term symptoms,” they wrote.

Some proponents of the hypothesis that a foreign actor is to blame and who were familiar with the new report’s findings said they felt frustrated and weren’t ready to abandon the possibility that a foreign government, probably Russia, was at work. They have pointed out that the drop in recent reported symptoms has coincided with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin’s resources were spread too thin to continue a possible campaign against U.S. personnel.

“The timing is deeply suspicious,” a State Department official said.

There have been no accounts of Russia introducing a new type of energy weapon on the battlefield in Ukraine.

At the height of public concern about Havana syndrome, U.S. officials who questioned or were even neutral on the possible cause faced significant scrutiny.

The CIA recalled its top officer in Vienna in 2021 after he was accused of not taking claims seriously enough, among other criticisms.

Also that year, the State Department’s top official overseeing cases, Ambassador Pamela Spratlen, left her position after six months amid calls for her resignation. Spratlen had held a teleconference with sufferers who asked about the FBI study that determined that the symptoms were psychogenic. Spratlen declined to say whether she believed the FBI study was accurate, angering diplomats who say their symptoms are the result of an attack, said people familiar with the matter.

Devlin Barrett contributed reporting.

The Washington Post · by Shane Harris · March 1, 2023

6. ​Explainer: 2023 Indo-Pacific Summits

A handy "explainer" from Australia to keep track of Summit in the Asia-Pacific (INDOPACIFIC) region.

https://perthusasia.edu.au/getattachment/4a9ff19e-0cef-4538-a0c0-258b73e53450/PU-265-Explnr_Summits_WEB.pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU

​Explainer: 2023 Indo-Pacific Summits

​

In a region as diverse, complex and interconnected as the Indo-Pacific, regular and structured communication between countries is vital to getting things done. One of the formal mechanisms for facilitating this sort of communication is through summits that bring countries together to discuss shared challenges and goals. We are pleased to publish this guide as part of the Perth USAsia Centre's ‘explainer series’. The guide is free to use and share but attribution to the Perth USAsia Centre is required. For enquiries about our other educational resources please email us.

7. House’s first China Committee hearing highlights Taiwan defenses

House’s first China Committee hearing highlights Taiwan defenses

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · March 1, 2023

WASHINGTON — Lawmakers made the case for arming Taiwan when the House select committee on China convened its first hearing on Tuesday.

Committee Chairman Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., and ranking member Raja Krishnamoorthi, D-Ill., both featured Taiwan prominently in their opening questions to the four witnesses that included two national security advisers to former President Donald Trump: H.R. McMaster and Matthew Pottinger.

McMaster noted the $19 billion backlog in State Department-approved arms sales for Taiwan and said “hard power matters and what matters much more than pledges of more defense sales, for example, are real capabilities on the ground and integrated, in this case, with the Taiwanese armed forces.”

“What’s really important is the need for us to recognize that we need to build our defense capabilities,” McMaster added.

Gallagher, who has likened U.S.-China competition to “a new Cold War,” has vowed to “arm Taiwan to the teeth” to deter a Chinese invasion. Beijing views Taiwan — one of the world’s leading supplier of semiconductors — as a breakaway province and has vowed to retake by force if necessary. The Wisconsin Republican aims to use the committee to explain what Congress considers to be some of the biggest threats from China to the American public.

Defense News first reported on the Taiwan arms sale backlog last year, which is in large part due to supply chain issues and constrained production capabilities. However, bureaucratic hold-ups within the U.S. foreign military sales process can also play a role in backlogs.

For his part, Khrisnamoorthi referenced a recent war game from the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank that found China would fail to retake Taiwan if they tried to do so today because of capability gaps. (That same war game also found the U.S. defense industrial base is not prepared for a battle over Taiwan as it would run out of long-range, precision guided munitions in less than one week.)

“The People’s Liberation Army has been receiving massive amounts of investment that increased by double digits in many years precisely to try to fill gaps that they would need to fill in order to successfully invade Taiwan,” said Pottinger. “It includes things like amphibious lift: more ships that can carry tanks and equipment. It includes more missiles to add to the already thousands of missiles that are pointed at Taiwan.”

Rep. Neal Dunn, R-Fla., made it a point to note that a Chinese frigate design closely resembled Austal USA’s littoral combat ship, which is best by numerous problems. (Dunn’s district includes the Panama City-based Eastern Shipbuilding, which recently lost a Coast Guard cutter contract to Austal’s shipyard in Alabama.)

“There are a lot of weapons systems that the People’s Liberation Army has designed and fielded that look a lot like our designs and our capabilities,” McMaster said as a general response, noting that he was unfamiliar with the specific littoral combat ship situation. “And that is because we have been lax in the area of counter-espionage and in enterprise hardening.”

The wide-ranging hearing featured 13 Republican and 11 Democratic lawmakers also weighing in on everything from Chinese human rights abuses to the loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs to banning TikTok.

Lawmakers and the witnesses leaned into the multimedia format of the hearing with videos depicting China’s human rights abuses, Chinese Communist Party ideology and graphics depicting the loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs and growing trade deficits with Beijing.

Two protesters from the anti-war group Code Pink interrupted McMaster’s opening remarks, calling for “collaboration not competition” and accusing the committee of “saber rattling” before Capitol police officers removed them.

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

8. US Cyber Command developing own intelligence hub

Excerpts:

“Congress asked us: Do we need a center that is focused on all-source intelligence to support Cyber Command, in the cyber domain?” Frost said. “And the answer was a resounding yes.”

The prospective Cyber Intelligence Center was previously teased by CYBERCOM’s director of intelligence, Brig. Gen. Matteo Martemucci. He told the Armed Forces Communications & Electronics Association International’s Signal magazine in November that an in-depth review of assets highlighted a need for a hub dedicated to analyzing cyber expertise and exploits abroad.

It would complement the slate of well-established centers and intel-collecting practices with products that are sought-after but still not available, Martemucci said at the time.

US Cyber Command developing own intelligence hub

c4isrnet.com · by Colin Demarest · March 1, 2023

FALLS CHURCH, Va. — U.S. Cyber Command, tasked with defending Department of Defense IT networks and coordinating cyberspace operations, is developing its own intelligence hub, after years of relying on other information-gathering sources.

The endeavor, still in its infancy, is meant to buttress data collection and augment CYBERCOM’s understanding of foreign capabilities in the ever-expanding cyber realm.

“We know everything about a T-72 tank, all the way to every nut and bolt in there, for the Army,” Col. Candice Frost, the leader of the Joint Intelligence Operations Center at CYBERCOM, said at a Feb. 28 event hosted by Billington Cybersecurity in Virginia. “But we don’t have that for networks, with respect to an all-source capability.”

“Congress asked us: Do we need a center that is focused on all-source intelligence to support Cyber Command, in the cyber domain?” Frost said. “And the answer was a resounding yes.”

The prospective Cyber Intelligence Center was previously teased by CYBERCOM’s director of intelligence, Brig. Gen. Matteo Martemucci. He told the Armed Forces Communications & Electronics Association International’s Signal magazine in November that an in-depth review of assets highlighted a need for a hub dedicated to analyzing cyber expertise and exploits abroad.

It would complement the slate of well-established centers and intel-collecting practices with products that are sought-after but still not available, Martemucci said at the time.

Cyber as a discipline and general interest area has exploded in recent years. Paralyzing ransomware attacks, as was seen with Colonial Pipeline, and the bloody Russia-Ukraine war have pushed discussions about digital destruction to the popular fore.

Frost in her remarks acknowledged the work already done by the National Ground Intelligence Center, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center and others, which feed the U.S. defense colossus scientific and technical information about faraway forces.

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“We are reducing the size of NMEC,” the chief of staff said, “and we want what’s left of it to be really hyper-focused on strategic competition.”

While existing centers already consider cyber, more is needed, according to Frost.

“We’ve got great partners with the National Security Agency, and they’re very focused on signals intelligence. That’s a huge part of what we look at. But across the spectrum, a combatant command really needs all-source intelligence,” she said. “We have found, unfortunately, that the foundational layer in cybersecurity just wasn’t there.”

The Cyber Intelligence Center would be primarily staffed through the Defense Intelligence Agency, which produces, analyzes and disseminates military intelligence for combat and noncombat missions.

DIA’s workforce is a mix of military members and Defense Department civilians.

“Personnel-wise, we’re building right now. We’re building the plane in-flight,” Frost said. “We’ll eventually get there. Where it will be, how big it will be, all of those things, that’s kind of the negotiation process that we’re in right now.”

Exactly when such a center will come to fruition isn’t clear. Frost joked it might happen when her high-school-aged children graduate college — or when they retire.

“Things take time in the government,” she said. “But we are forward-leaning.”

About Colin Demarest

Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

9. Tips for generals: how to navigate politics without partisanship

Excerpts:

“The institution looked at it as a senior military leader engaging in a partisan spat on social media with a major media figure,” which would necessitate imposing new guidelines on Army-wide social media behavior, Schake said.

But the need for those guidelines has been growing for some time.

“We’re in an environment where things that people say — including things that the [chief of staff] and I say — can be taken totally out of context,” Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said in October. “I think it just demonstrates that difficulty, frankly, of being in the public arena and not being accused of taking a partisan side.”

But that shouldn’t mean ducking out of political conversations altogether, offered Heidi Urben, a Georgetown security studies professor and retired Army colonel.

“There’s danger in the military construing nonpartisan as seeking out a mythical equidistant point between the two parties ― that doesn’t exist, first of all,” she said. “And trying to occupy ground that is deemed to be inoffensive to either party. Because when one party moves to an extreme, that equidistant point moves along with it.”

Nonpartisan, she added, doesn’t necessarily mean bipartisan and agreeable to both sides ― it means not favoring one or the other.

Tips for generals: how to navigate politics without partisanship

militarytimes.com · by Meghann Myers · March 1, 2023

With Washington’s partisan politics growing arguably fiercer, military leaders have to figure out how to defend their policies and people without appearing to take a side, a group of longtime D.C. policy hands said Tuesday.

“It is impossible to be a leader of an organization and not be a political actor,” American Enterprise Institute’s Kori Schake said, at the Center for Security Studies conference Tuesday at Georgetown University.

Military leaders have to be able to build coalitions, advocate for their causes, and know “when to hide behind your civilian superiors and when to step forward and take a hard question for them,” said Schake, AEI’s director of foreign and defense policy. “That’s political activity. That’s not scary. And in fact we should want our military leaders to have that.”

The debate over how to navigate politics while serving in uniform stems from an uncomfortable new reality that senior officers frequently find themselves in the crosshairs of competing political factions.

Witness how the military has gotten dragged into a number of partisan fights over the past few years, from Trump’s infamous walk across Lafayette Square with Pentagon leadership to the saga of now-retired Maj. Gen. Pat Donahoe and his attempt to stand up to Tucker Carlson’s misogynistic takes on women in the military.

The awkward and cringeworthy public moments, especially when top officers are used as political punching bags in open hearings, seems to have dented the public’s trust in the military, according to last year’s Reagan National Defense Survey. Respondents pointed to the perceived politicization of the organization as a reason for their declining confidence, from over 70% down to around 40% in recent years.

Partisan feelings also factored in, with conservative-leaning respondents citing so-called “woke” policies like renaming of Army posts to remove Confederate-era monikers, while more liberal participants were concerned about infiltration by right-wing extremists.

Schake offered some quick but likely controversial fixes to tamp down on rising politicization, such as suggesting that Congress ban outlets like MSNBC or Fox News from playing on TV’s in communal spaces on military installations.

And she said Congress could get its own house in order, by ceasing the practice of treating uniformed leaders as stand-ins for the White House. She suggested congressional committee leaders could block or exclude fellow lawmakers’ inflammatory political questions of military leaders in open hearings.

And the leaders themselves could be more savvy. Schake felt that Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should have deferred to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin last year when asked whether critical race theory was being taught at the military academies.

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Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has had enough.

Bishop Garrison, who headed up DoD’s diversity, equity and inclusion efforts in the first 18 months of the Biden administration, countered that there can be a time and place to wade in.

“When something like CRT, critical race theory, is lobbed out there and used clearly in a partisan manner to have some type of divisive effect, I think it is important from a leadership perspective for our most senior leaders, when it is addressed to them, to engage in these types of conversations,” Garrison said. “We can argue on the edges about whether he went too far ... but I think actually the engagement itself in that manner, on that stage, is important for us right now.”

It’s also important for leadership to stand up for its people when they’re attacked, Schake said, even if the discussion is hyperpartisan.

The Army found itself in a public relations quagmire last year when it investigated the commander of Fort Benning, Ga., now retired Maj. Gen. Pat Donahoe, for some of his social media activity.

Donahoe had tweeted his objection to comments by Fox News host Tucker Carlson, who had railed against the Air Force’s fielding a maternity flight suit.

“So we’ve got new hairstyles and maternity flight suits,” Carlson said, also referring to recently updated Army and Air Force hair regulations authorizing braids and ponytails. “Pregnant women are going to fight our wars. It’s a mockery of the U.S. military.”

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Senior leaders dunk on Tucker Carlson’s misogynistic comments about maternity flight suits

Leadership was so incensed by Carlson's comments that the Pentagon issued its own statement.

Donahoe avoided any disciplinary action, and many in the military community rallied behind his defense of women in uniform, but the Army’s lesson learned was that soldiers should avoid publicly engaging America’s ongoing “the culture war”.

“The institution looked at it as a senior military leader engaging in a partisan spat on social media with a major media figure,” which would necessitate imposing new guidelines on Army-wide social media behavior, Schake said.

But the need for those guidelines has been growing for some time.

“We’re in an environment where things that people say — including things that the [chief of staff] and I say — can be taken totally out of context,” Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said in October. “I think it just demonstrates that difficulty, frankly, of being in the public arena and not being accused of taking a partisan side.”

But that shouldn’t mean ducking out of political conversations altogether, offered Heidi Urben, a Georgetown security studies professor and retired Army colonel.

“There’s danger in the military construing nonpartisan as seeking out a mythical equidistant point between the two parties ― that doesn’t exist, first of all,” she said. “And trying to occupy ground that is deemed to be inoffensive to either party. Because when one party moves to an extreme, that equidistant point moves along with it.”

Nonpartisan, she added, doesn’t necessarily mean bipartisan and agreeable to both sides ― it means not favoring one or the other.

About Meghann Myers

Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members.

10. The Wagner Group’s Growing Shadow in the Sahel: What Does It Mean for Counterterrorism in the Region?

The Wagner Group’s Growing Shadow in the Sahel: What Does It Mean for Counterterrorism in the Region? - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Broderick McDonald, Guy Fiennes · March 2, 2023

In January 2023, the leader of Burkina Faso’s junta, Ibrahim Traoré, asked French counterterrorism forces to withdraw from the country within a month amid rising anti-French sentiment in the Sahel. By doing so Traoré exercised the country’s sovereign right to determine which, if any, foreign presence is welcome. However, many analysts argue Burkina Faso is likely to replace the military support of French forces with Russia’s notorious Wagner Group in the coming months. While Traoré denied this, it is widely believed that high-level meetings between Wagner and senior officials in Burkina Faso will culminate in collaboration despite Western concerns and probable high-cost repercussions.

The use of Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group would be a dangerous mistake for Burkina Faso’s government, and would threaten broader efforts to contain the rising Salafi-jihadist threat in West Africa. The introduction of Wagner mercenaries with a history of grievous human rights abuses will not improve the situation—it will inflame it.

While long-term solutions cannot come from Russian mercenaries, the prolonged French military presence has also failed to bring peace and stability to the region. Tainted by a long colonial legacy in North Africa and limited success in the Sahel crisis since 2013, the French have been facing a wave of rejection and anti-French sentiment from both civilians and governments in the Sahel countries as they have struggled to contain the Salafi-jihadist rebels operating there. Just last year, Mali’s ruling junta replaced French military support with the Wagner Group, which was seen as more flexible and potentially more effective than the French. With France’s withdrawal from Burkina Faso and Traoré’s legitimacy dependent on improving the security situation, many fear that the new military regime will follow the Malian model and resort to the Wagner Group as a primary security partner. But with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and the al-Qaeda-affiliated JMIN surging across West Africa, the deployment of Wagner mercenaries in Burkina Faso would exacerbate the conflict in three provocative ways.

First, the brutal methods of the Wagner Group have been on full display in Ukraine, where its contract soldiers carry out indiscriminate attacks with no regard for civilian life to make minor advances. In neighboring Mali, which has already welcomed Wagner forces, data published by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project reveals that civilian deaths skyrocketed as the group targeted Fulani tribes and herders seen as sympathetic to the militant Islamists. Such indiscriminate targeting further deepens ethnic divisions and pushes local communities to seek protection and closer ties with extremist groups. The dire consequences are clear in the Malian case: in the year following Wagner’s arrival in December 2021, civilian targeting by rebel groups increased fourfold. The brutal tactics of the Wagner Group are not only morally wrong, they are counterproductive. If Burkina Faso follows the path of Mali in relying on Wagner mercenaries, it will only further inflame the conflict.

Second, Traoré’s government has severely damaged bilateral relations with France and despite its efforts to patch relations up, this development is likely to affect the aid and foreign direct investment the country receives from European partners in the future, especially as it pivots to greater reliance on Moscow. Decreased aid funding from France and the international community will only make the insurgency worse in the medium to long term as the country has fewer and fewer economic resources, a key driver of extremism and conflict. Already, the country is experiencing economic challenges and any reduction in aid and international funding will severely exacerbate this.

Lastly, the presence of foreign mercenaries will reduce pressure on Traoré to implement promised elections during 2024, ultimately diminishing chances for democracy to provide the government of Burkina Faso with some degree of legitimacy among Burkinabes. Partnership with the Wagner Group and Moscow rather than Western states will also reduce pressure on the regime to respect democratic norms such as press freedom and political dissent; not only is this an undesirable outcome in itself, but it will also make the regime less palatable and contribute to pushing dissidents to extremism if nonviolent opposition is made to seem incapable of achieving political goals. This democratic deficit will only further stoke discontent and continue to fuel the conflict, especially if—as we argue is likely—the incumbent regime fails to live up to its promise of improving the security situation in the long term.

Advocates of the Wagner option would assert that effectively countering the insurgent threat requires an approach that is tough on terrorism, and that the Wagner Group will infringe less on Burkina Faso’s sovereignty as a private military company compared to erstwhile colonial masters. Such advocates are destined to be disappointed on both counts. Heavy-handed counterinsurgency efforts usually backfire by pushing local communities into the arms of militant groups, and Wagner’s sledgehammer approach will engender the same result in Burkina Faso. Finally, while the Wagner Group does not officially condition aid in the same way as Western states, it does acquire commercial assets, access to natural resources, and privileged access to strategic infrastructure and bases. The more the incumbent regime relies on Wagner to remain in power, the more leverage the organization—and by extension, Moscow—will have to pressure the state and infringe on its sovereignty.

Wagner’s track record makes clear that its involvement in Burkina Faso would severely worsen the conflict rather than solve it, despite apparent short-term military gains (which would be accompanied by an explosion in civilian casualties). However, we should not underestimate Wagner. The group has managed to insert itself into Mali, expanding Moscow’s geopolitical influence in the region and producing slick propaganda to promote itself and its anti-Western narrative. Rather than employing Russian mercenaries or an overload of French military forces, which are tainted by colonial legacy and viewed as ineffective, sustainable peace in Burkina Faso requires multilateral cooperation—including other African states—with a steadfast commitment to respect for human rights and an openness to negotiate with ethnic and militant leaders. Western states who are involved militarily in the Sahel crisis should be especially careful not to come across as paternalistic and to avoid neocolonial optics—a mistake French President Emmanuel Macron made on more than one occasion. They should also be conscious of Wagner’s misinformation tactics and Russian anti-Western propaganda and should take determined measures both to counter it and avoid playing into its narrative. At the same time, the United States and European states should be careful not to treat Burkina Faso as a theater of great power competition but to understand that stability, security, and effective governance in the country are worthy objectives in their own right.

Regardless of the spike in political instability and conflict in diverse locations around the world, Burkina Faso remains crucial to international security. If Salafi-jihadist groups continue to expand and govern territory in the Sahel, they will secure yet another safe haven from which to plan attacks abroad and inspire similar ventures globally. Enduring insecurity contributes to new waves of migration and threatens the spread of violence and extremist networks into neighboring countries. As West Africa increasingly becomes the main locus for global militant Islamist movements outside the Middle East, taking constructive steps toward sustainable peace in Burkina Faso is more important than ever.

Broderick McDonald is an associate fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and a postgraduate researcher at the University of Oxford.

Guy Fiennes is an OSINT analyst and a resettlement support worker at Asylum Welcome.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Daniel Tiveau, CIFOR

mwi.usma.edu · by Broderick McDonald, Guy Fiennes · March 2, 2023

11. U.S. Special Forces launch counter-terrorism drills with African armies

U.S. Special Forces launch counter-terrorism drills with African armies

Reuters · by Cooper Inveen

DABOYA, Ghana, March 1 (Reuters) - The United States began its annual counter-terrorism training program for African forces in Ghana on Wednesday, aiming to strengthen border defences in the fight against Islamist insurgents who are spreading south into new territories.

The program, known as Flintlock, started at a military base in the dusty northern town of Daboya where U.S. and European trainers drilled soldiers from across Africa on first aid and firing drills in the baking heat.

"Flintlock intends to strengthen the ability of key partner nations in the region to counter violent extremist organizations, collaborate across borders, and provide security for their people," U.S. Africa Command said in a statement.

The training comes at a critical time for West Africa, where groups linked to Islamic State and al Qaeda continue to carry out routine attacks on civilians and the military despite costly interventions from international forces.

What began as a Mali-based insurgency in 2012 has since ballooned into a regional network of competing Islamist groups that operate across large areas of landlocked Niger and Burkina Faso and which in recent years have spread into coastal countries including Benin, Togo and Ivory Coast.

The violence has killed thousands and displaced millions.

So far Ghana, whose rural north borders Burkina Faso, has been spared the violence, but security experts say organised crime is rife, and poor, remote communities could be vulnerable to recruitment, as they have been in neighbouring countries.

Daboya itself is less than 100 miles (160 km) from Burkina Faso.

"Partners should take advantage of this window, because counter-terrorism efforts in West Africa have been largely ineffective once the overt phase of the insurgency (e.g. local recruitment) is underway," said Aneliese Bernard, director of Strategic Stabilization Advisors, a U.S.-based risk advisory group.

Efforts at cross border coordination in West Africa have been complicated by military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea since 2020 that led to some temporary sanctions and border closures.

Frictions with juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso led France to withdraw thousands of troops from those countries over the past year, in what some analysts said could be a boost to Islamist groups.

Writing and additional reporting by Edward McAllister, Editing by William Maclean

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Cooper Inveen

12. Adopt a talent recruitment solution to spark a movement at the DoD

Adopt a talent recruitment solution to spark a movement at the DoD

Defense News · by Karen DaPonte Thornton · March 1, 2023

Former congressman and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry observed in a recent Defense News op-ed that the Pentagon needs a culture change to pursue creative initiatives and gain advantage over our adversaries. “[A] culture of innovation is fundamental to acquiring, adopting and scaling new technologies,” he wrote. His assessment is correct, but the passive construction hides the real challenge — or opportunity.

While stakeholders focus on policy and process reforms, the needed change requires an investment in the professionals who do the acquiring, adopting and scaling. A pipeline to attract motivated, mission-focused individuals with the promise of an enriching workplace where they can develop their talents as creative, thinking beings is the first step toward building an adaptive, collaborative community of acquisition professionals.

Congress provided just such a solution when it authorized the Defense Civilian Training Corps, or DCTC, to target critical skill gaps and prepare college students for public service in Department of Defense occupations relating to acquisition, digital technologies, critical technologies, science, engineering, finance and others as determined by the secretary of defense.

The fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act encouraged the DoD to leverage the interdisciplinary network of universities in a partnership known as the Acquisition Innovation Research Center, or AIRC, to develop and deploy a civilian leadership curriculum with internship opportunities. DCTC is comparable to the Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps, but is focused on creating a digitally literate acquisition workforce capable of collaborating across disciplines and with industry on emerging technology initiatives.

Congress further encouraged AIRC to partner with the National Security Innovation Network and the head of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office, which run popular hackathons and AI competitions at colleges nationwide.

After decades of failing to act systematically on workforce recommendations from acquisition reform commissions, the DoD has reached an inflection point in talent and trust. As of FY21, over 17% of the acquisition workforce was eligible to retire, with another 27% eligible within 10 years. Now, following COVID-19, federal workforce attrition rates are rising, especially for workers over 60 years old. Meanwhile, the workforce is at the center of concentric circles of mistrust — inflexible management structures stifle innovative thinking, industry perceives acquisition professionals as bureaucratic automatons, and effective communication is lacking between the DoD and Congress.

Despite the general mistrust of government, most Americans have a positive view of government employees’ commitment to serving others. Herein lies the opportunity.

A DCTC that meets its full potential will provide a sustainable pipeline for a curious, interdisciplinary workforce to replace retiring federal acquisition professionals and permeate the defense ecosystem. The DCTC curriculum will develop professionals with portable skills and a holistic approach to career development across organizations. Internships and post-graduation employment will encourage DCTC students to follow developmental opportunities in government, industry and nonprofits, bringing their skills to each role as a strategic asset and leader. As they transition from each opportunity, they will also share their dedication to national security, innovation and service. Each DCTC cohort will build trust from the inside, out.

As a talent solution for both government and industry, DCTC can restore confidence across the defense ecosystem and the American public. The current crisis of confidence arises from a culture that gives DoD contractors and prospective vendors every impression of an adversarial rather than supportive relationship.

The complex bureaucracy, opaque process, fear of noncompliance and ambiguous requirements statements make the DoD a very difficult client.

In 2017, Uber sought the guidance of Harvard Business School professor Frances Frei to heal its toxic culture. Professor Frei diagnosed that the leadership had lost its focus on people and offered a road map to restore humanity to the organizational culture, starting with trust. According to Professor Frei and Anne Morriss, the executive founder of the Leadership Consortium: “People tend to trust you when they believe they are interacting with the real you (authenticity), when they have faith in your judgment and competence (logic), and when they feel that you care about them (empathy).”

Viewed through their triangle of trust:

• The DCTC curriculum provides the competence.
• The internships and portability build the empathy.
• And the graduating cohorts form a community of authentic professionals working together to promote a more open and innovative culture across the defense ecosystem.

DCTC’s success as a pipeline will depend on retention results. The DoD must build partnerships with universities, professional associations (such as the National Contract Management Association and the National Defense Industrial Association), civilian and uniformed alumni, and the industrial base to shore up the triangle of trust. A community where graduates can learn, improve and serve throughout their careers will reflect to the public the possibility of a government career that provides hope, promise and meaning.

The workforce crisis is an opportunity for radical creativity. DCTC is the change movement that the DoD needs to meet today’s complex range of adversarial threats.

Karen DaPonte Thornton is a member of the adjunct faculty at George Washington University’s law school, where she previously served as director of the Government Procurement Law Program. She was also a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee from 2020 to 2022.

13. Why mortars are increasingly important on the modern battlefield

​I will always have a soft spot for the 4.2 inch mortar. (four deuce)

Why mortars are increasingly important on the modern battlefield

'Large caliber mortars supporting the tank infantry team in the crucible of ground combat will often be the margin of victory or defeat in the evolving large-scale combat fight.'

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED MAR 1, 2023 3:05 PM EST

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · March 1, 2023

The U.S. military would certainly need plenty of howitzers, multiple-launch rocket systems, and anti-ship missiles to fight China or Russia, but infantry units will increasingly need next-generation mobile mortar systems going forward to provide quick and reliable indirect fire during the next big war.

Mortars “are more important today than ever for the men and women in the close fight,” said retired Army. Maj. Gen. Patrick Donahoe. “As the ranges of our artillery systems increase and the battlefield becomes deeper, the tank infantry team in that last mile of combat and in the final hundred yards will be more dependent, not less, on mortars for their indirect fire support.”

Currently, the U.S. military operates the M1064, a self-propelled mortar system, but it consists of a mortar tube inside the open chassis of an M113 armored personnel carrier, leaving the crew vulnerable to enemy fire, said Donahoe, former commander of the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia. The mortar vehicle must also stop to allow the crew to fire.

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Going forward, U.S. troops need self-propelled breech-loading mortars that can be accurately fired while on the move, Donahoe told Task & Purpose.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown that war will continue to be a slugfest between ground forces no matter how advanced military technology becomes. More than ever, infantry units will need mortar systems for close combat with enemy forces, said Donahoe.

“Large caliber mortars supporting the tank infantry team in the crucible of ground combat will often be the margin of victory or defeat in the evolving large-scale combat fight,” Donahoe said.

Spectators gather to watch the Patria Nemo 120-mm mortar turret demonstration Sept. 11, 2019, at Red Cloud Range on post. (Patrick A. Albright/U.S. Army)

Toward that end, the Army is looking into the feasibility of installing a turreted mortar on Stryker armored personnel carriers, according to an Army news release from February 2021. The new mortar, or NEMO, is made by Patria Land Oy, a Finnish company. NEMO is a breech-loaded 120mm smoothbore mortar that can provide both direct and indirect fire.

Because NEMO is loaded from the breech, U.S. service members would be able to fire the weapon from inside a vehicle, where they would be protected, the Army news release says. Breech-loaded mortars can also fire at lower elevations than muzzle-loaded mortar tubes, which must be pointed nearly straight up so that rounds have enough kinetic energy to go off when they strike the firing pin.

Patria Land Oy has produced a 120mm Mortar Future Indirect Fire Turret for the Army, a company spokesman told Task & Purpose. Under its agreement with the Army, the company is also expected to produce a 120mm Extended Range Mortar system by 2026, the Army news release says.

For dismounted troops, mortars serve as portable artillery systems that are essential for close combat, allowing infantry units to provide indirect fire without having to call in air or artillery strikes, said retired Marine Col. Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington, D.C.

“The infantry really like mortars because they don’t have to coordinate with anyone else; they don’t have to call an air control center; they don’t have to call the artillery fire direction center; they can just fire the missions themselves,” Cancian told Task & Purpose. “When things are moving quickly and communications are breaking down, that is very valuable.”

Because mortars don’t have a recoil system, they are lighter than howitzers and thus easier to transport than other forms of artillery, he said.

“This makes them suitable for infantry units,” Cancian said. “Although shorter ranged than howitzers, they can cover the area directly in front of an infantry unit.”

A soldier fires a 120mm mortar on Fort Bragg, North Carolina, June 2, 2021. (Spc. Jacob Ward/U.S. Army)

As the Defense Department looks to a future in which U.S. troops may have to fight in “megacities” that have millions of inhabitants, mortar systems will become more important for street-to-street fighting.

Indeed, the second battle of Fallujah in November and December 2004 demonstrated just how effective mortars can be in urban combat, said retired Army Col. Gian Gentile, a senior historian with the RAND Corporation.

“Each of the two Army mechanized battalions that fought with the two respective Marine infantry regiments in the assault had a platoon of tracked 120mm mortars,” Gentile told Task & Purpose. “They were in high demand, especially by Marine infantry, because of their high angle fire which provided more accuracy in an urban environment, and, because of the size of each round being 120mm they had a lot of explosive effects on enemy positions inside of buildings.”

U.S. military experiments since then have focused on extending the range and accuracy of mortar systems, said Sunil Nair, an analyst with Janes, an open-source defense intelligence provider.

To wit, the U.S.-led Combined Special Ops Joint Task Force-Levant On Feb. 20 tweeted pictures of coalition troops in Syria firing illumination rounds from a XM905 Advanced Mortar Protection System, which has been in service since 2011.

The XM905 features a muzzle-loaded 120mm mortar mounted on an electrically operated turntable that can traverse 360 degrees, Nair told Task & Purpose. The system also includes technology to soften the weapon’s recoil, improving its accuracy.

Not all U.S. military experiments with advanced mortar systems have panned out, though. In 2018, the soldiers tested the Automated Direct Indirect-fire Mortar, which consisted of an 81mm mortar mounted on a powered base that could traverse 360 degrees, all of which was placed in the back of an M1152A1 Humvee.

But so far, the ADIM has proven to be too costly to the field, in part due to its soft recoil system, which slides the barrel forward before firing to help counteract the recoil, as our colleagues at The War Zone reported in 2018.

Regardless of whether U.S. troops face Russian or Chinese forces in future wars, infantry soldiers and Marines will need mortar systems that allow them to fire accurately and quickly change position. Ground combat will always be intimate and ugly, and the need for quick and reliable firepower will only grow in the future.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · March 1, 2023

14. Ret. Gen. Spalding: 'Woke regime' teaming up with 'enemies' of US

I try to steer clear of these terrible partisan divides but I can't help myself on this one.

Actually both the woke and the anti-woke factions in our country are playing right into the political warfare strategies of our enemies. They are laughing at how we are dividing ourselves. There is a culture war and our foreign adversaries are winning it.

Think about these words from the 2017 NSS:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Those who continue to support "wokeness" and "anti-wokeness" in support of their partisan agendas are not being good citizens.

We need to wake up and understand the political warfare being conducted against us by our adversaries and how those taking up both sides on the woke controversy are supporting our enemies' political warfare strategies.

Ret. Gen. Spalding: 'Woke regime' teaming up with 'enemies' of US

americanmilitarynews.com · by Justin Cooper · March 1, 2023

A retired Air Force general described America’s cultural divide as “America’s enemies + the woke regime vs America” in a tweet recently as issues of “wokeness” play an increasing role in U.S. politics.

In a tweet on Feb. 20, retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Robert Spalding said, “This is not America vs America. This is America’s enemies + the woke regime vs America.”

This is not America vs America. This is America’s enemies + the woke regime vs America https://t.co/hfoccnGt5g

— General Spalding (@robert_spalding) February 20, 2023

Spalding made the comment in reply to podcaster Michele Tafoya, who posted an excerpt from a recent essay, ““Woke Revolutionaries Versus Americanists,” on how Republican politicians should combat “woke tyranny.”

READ MORE: Rubio, Roy release ‘Woke Military’ investigative report

The excerpt posted by Tafoya explains that “we are in a war” between “Americanists” and “woke revolutionaries,” which is more grave than a “normal policy dispute” between “conservatives” and “progressives.”

The January essay was addressed to Rep. Jim Banks (R-IN), who recently founded what he calls the Anti-Woke Caucus. In his announcement of the Anti-Woke Caucus, Banks said he plans to “regularly host meetings with anti-woke legislators and subject-matter experts.”

“My goal is to help myself and other Republicans better understand the long tentacles of the wokeness regime, the laws, regulations, and funding sources which support it, and explore legislative responses,” he wrote.

READ MORE: Military’s ‘woke’ training documents made public

Spalding has been retired from the Air Force since at least 2019 after serving for more than 25 years, according to biographical details on his book’s Amazon page. During that time, he earned seven medals and awards and became a leading expert on China, according to his Air Force biography.

He was a distinguished graduate of Mandarin Chinese language training, and later served as chief China strategist for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following that, he was assigned as the Defense Department’s representative at the U.S. embassy in Beijing.

He has written two books on China: “War Without Rules: China’s Playbook for Global Dominion” and “Stealth War: How China Took Over While America’s Elite Slept.”

americanmilitarynews.com · by Justin Cooper · March 1, 2023

15. Rethinking Assumptions About China

Most plans seem to fail due to erroneous assumptions or that were not adjusted when assumptions were discovered to be false. We must continuously challenge our assumptions.

I am reminded of this recent quote I shared: “Your assumptions are your windows on the world. Scrub them off every once in a while, or the light won't come in.” - Isaac Asimov

Excerpts:

While there are reasons for China to doubt an American nuclear response, there are operational and strategic advantages for the PRC to employ nuclear weapons. It is possible that Chinese leadership believes that a war for Taiwan is a vital national interest that they cannot lose. Otherwise, the Chinese Communist Party fears regime stability is at stake. It is also possible that they welcome a scenario in which the United States comes to the aid of an ally, only to be defeated by China—particularly if that defeat is capped with a nuclear detonation that goes unanswered by Washington. There is no greater or more visible signal of China’s preeminence in the Pacific.

To be sure, in this scenario, China accepts risk by using nuclear weapons to stave off defeat against an American coalition in the Pacific, but Beijing may deem nuclear use less risky than defeat by the Americans. This is particularly true if Chinese leaders convince themselves that the risks of nuclear employment are manageable, unlikely to manifest, or acceptable given the stakes.

Admittedly, both the assumptions and scenario posited above are speculative, but not far from the reality of current knowledge about Chinese thinking. With the United States largely focused on the Ukraine war, it is important to keep an eye on China and prepare for a war that might come. And should it come, long-held assumptions about the efficacy of military power, alliance cohesiveness, and the efficacy our integrated deterrent posture may be tested or even shattered. 

Given the stakes in a Sino-American conflict, particularly one that includes nuclear employment, we must begin testing such assumptions now. Waiting until it happens is too late.

Rethinking Assumptions About China

By Robert Peters

March 02, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/02/rethinking_assumptions_about_china_884763.html

If the war in Ukraine is teaching the United States anything, it is that great powers can unexpectedly suffer battlefield defeat because expectations and assumptions about their military prowess are outdated. The United States and China may be reaching a similar point where an innovative China outperforms an historically superior United States on a future battlefield, shattering a host of assumptions in the process.

Some widely held American assumptions include a belief that the Chinese leadership is conflict adverse and fears a war with the United States. Given recent military exercises and statements by Xi Jinping at last October’s 20th National Congress, such assumptions are no longer valid—if they ever were.

A second assumption suggests the United States and its regional allies enjoy overwhelming conventional superiority in the Western Pacific. This is unlikely to be true, given China’s expansion of its naval forces, it’s fourth and fifth generation fighters, and the world’s largest and most diverse missile force. While the United States might well assemble a formidable coalition to confront Chinese aggression, China’s rapid military expansion means that it would be touch and go for either side in a conflict.

China still may formally maintain a nuclear “no first use” policy—since the time of Mao—however, the expansion of its arsenal, to include a potential nuclear first strike capability, raises the question of whether this long held policy remains credible. Many believe it is not. 

Since its birth, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has maintained a “minimum deterrent,” which required a small nuclear force to strike cities and other high value targets. In recent years, China has expanded and modernized its nuclear forces, to include those with theater utility. Indeed, the DF-21, DF-26, and an air-launched ballistic missile are designed specifically for regional missions. Due to America’s lack of theater range nuclear weapons in Asia (outside of Reagan-era nuclear tipped air launched cruise missiles) China enjoys nuclear dominance at the theater level in the Pacific.

The final size and shape of China’s desired nuclear force is unknown. It is, however, clear that Beijing seeks a diverse and sophisticated arsenal that matches or exceeds the United States’. This may well include improved and expanded theater nuclear options intended to provide flexible options during a conflict. Such weapons also complement their conventional forces that are designed to deny the United States access to the first and second island chains.

Defense policymakers should accept that the current Chinese nuclear expansion may be part of a nuclear coercion campaign, designed to cast a credible nuclear shadow over any conflict in which China participates. Such an expansion would complicate American decision-making should a crisis or conflict erupt.

It is possible that during the acute stresses of a military conflict and during the fog of war, Chinese leaders may believe that the United States will not respond to nuclear use in a meaningful way—particularly if said nuclear employment is against a military target. Such an assumption may or may not be true, but Chinese leadership will perceive their decision as a rational choice to employ nuclear weapons against a superior nuclear armed adversary. In particular, they are likely to believe that if used against a military target with little to no civilian effect, there is less of a chance of a retaliatory nuclear response. If China no longer maintains a “no first use” policy, it is fair to question whether Beijing fears that a conventional conflict with the United States will escalate to nuclear use and whether they believe China loses such a conflict. 

Given Chinese statements, its expansion of its strategic and conventional capabilities, and its incursions into Taiwanese air space, it is prudent to consider updating our assumptions about the Chinese decision calculus when it comes to a potential conflict with an American led coalition. Indeed, we should consider the possibility that China views nuclear employment as a rational (though not to say certain or likely) course of action in a high stakes conflict with the United States. Therefore, the American defense community cannot continue to assume that China will not use nuclear weapons, even if such an employment carries significant risk of escalation. 

Indeed, Chinese leadership may accept those risks given the pressures they face to win a conflict with the United States. If old assumptions about the Chinese arsenal is inferior to the United States’ and that China maintains a no first use policy are no longer valid, what are some alternate assumptions we should consider? Any of the following are plausible:

1. Chinese believes that Washington fears war with China more than Beijing fears war with the United States.
2. China does not seek a confrontation with the United States, but it may not fear a conflict.
3. Beijing believes that any American-led coalition to defend Taiwan will be brittle and easily fragmented by exploiting the fears of a broader conflict across the Western Pacific.
4. China believes the United States’ civil society is not willing to fight a major war over Taiwan and will exert political pressure on the president to limit support to Taiwan.

Testing these assumptions, short of actual conflict, is not possible. However, it is possible to posit a plausible scenario to understand how a war may break out and how each side may behave in a conflict. Imagine a scenario where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) begins initial efforts at an invasion of Taiwan during which time the United States and other free nations provide large amounts of lethal aid to Taiwan. Once a full-scale invasion begins, the United States, Japan, and Australia publicly declare they will oppose the invasion with military force. 

In this scenario, the PRC miscalculates American and coalition will and strength. The PLA’s initial attempt to land significant amount of ground forces on Taiwan fails. In China, internal pressures to win and terminate the conflict quickly, whatever the costs, mount. In such an eventuality, China believes that employing a nuclear weapon is the best way to snatch victory for the jaws of defeat—by demonstrating capability and, more importantly, will.

China likely believes that the United States is hesitant to engage in a limited nuclear exchange far from home, where the stakes are asymmetrical and more important to the PRC. Further, Beijing likely believes Washington’s fear of a limited nuclear war escalating into a general nuclear exchange will deter the President from continuing the fight after first nuclear employment. Given China’s superiority in theater range nuclear systems, this is a reasonable, if not necessarily correct, assumption.

The context of a nuclear employment will matter. Because the United States does not extend its nuclear umbrella over Taiwan, China likely believes that it can employ a nuclear weapon on Taiwanese soil without a high risk of American nuclear response.

Further, Chinese leadership likely doubts that the United States will attack targets on mainland China with nuclear weapons. Beijing believes that the Chinese mainland is a sanctuary and that the United States will not dare strike it in response to a Chinese nuclear strike on a target in the Pacific—for fear of triggering reciprocal strikes by the Chinese on the American mainland. 

If China uses a nuclear weapon against a Japanese ship engaged in combat operations, for example, there is certain to be a vigorous debate within the American political system whether to respond in kind. Some will argue that the United States should respond with non-nuclear capabilities while others argue a nuclear response is required to deter follow on nuclear strikes. At the same time, American political leaders will discuss the nuclear endgame. If the United States responds with a nuclear weapon, how does a war remain limited and how does it end? The intensity and length of such a debate is likely to be significant and would therefore impact allied and partner perceptions. The debate itself may give the PLA breathing room to retake the initiative and achieve its objectives.

While there are reasons for China to doubt an American nuclear response, there are operational and strategic advantages for the PRC to employ nuclear weapons. It is possible that Chinese leadership believes that a war for Taiwan is a vital national interest that they cannot lose. Otherwise, the Chinese Communist Party fears regime stability is at stake. It is also possible that they welcome a scenario in which the United States comes to the aid of an ally, only to be defeated by China—particularly if that defeat is capped with a nuclear detonation that goes unanswered by Washington. There is no greater or more visible signal of China’s preeminence in the Pacific.

To be sure, in this scenario, China accepts risk by using nuclear weapons to stave off defeat against an American coalition in the Pacific, but Beijing may deem nuclear use less risky than defeat by the Americans. This is particularly true if Chinese leaders convince themselves that the risks of nuclear employment are manageable, unlikely to manifest, or acceptable given the stakes.

Admittedly, both the assumptions and scenario posited above are speculative, but not far from the reality of current knowledge about Chinese thinking. With the United States largely focused on the Ukraine war, it is important to keep an eye on China and prepare for a war that might come. And should it come, long-held assumptions about the efficacy of military power, alliance cohesiveness, and the efficacy our integrated deterrent posture may be tested or even shattered. 

Given the stakes in a Sino-American conflict, particularly one that includes nuclear employment, we must begin testing such assumptions now. Waiting until it happens is too late.

Bob Peters is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He previously spent a career at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, National Defense University, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

16. Mad Scientist Laboratory blog post 436. Non-Kinetic War

Some great insights here though this article will need to be read a few times. It provides a wealth of valuable resources in the links. I am saving this one in my files for future reference.

MARCH 2, 2023 BY USER

436. Non-Kinetic War

https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/436-non-kinetic-war/

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist welcomes back returning guest blogger COL Stefan J. Banach (USA-Ret.) with today’s post, exploring how the evolution and synthesis of technologies and culture have converged to realize new, disparate societies of global netizens. This convergence enables our adversaries to target each of us, transforming our homes and offices into a new non-kinetic war battle space. COL Banach codifies this brave new world of non-kinetic war and proposes a whole-of-nation way ahead for fighting and winning this unfamiliar warfare. “Control of the global non-kinetic terrain is the decisive operation, as it affects all things in the physical kinetic battle space” — Read on!]

This paper provides insights into the undermining of democracy, repression, and coercion that is noted in the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), through the lens of non-kinetic war. It also proposes a method for the development of doctrine and a strategy to counter non-kinetic war threats.  The recommendation is that the U.S. Army problem frame include non-kinetic war, kinetic war, and counter insurgency operations. The rationale is based on the change in the character of war over the past 40 years, and the directed task noted below in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Decades of global entanglement, assured connectivity, persistent technical surveillance, and the effects of converging technologies have set the conditions for non-kinetic systems warfare on a global scale.

The aforementioned dynamics have reframed long standing epistemological norms that guide our thinking and understanding. The theory of cognition and knowledge has significantly changed for humans who are connected via the World Wide Web (WWW). People are exposed to new data, knowledge structures, and technology capabilities, which have made sense-making difficult today. These phenomena have also altered human ontology – our theory of being and the essence of things as we once perceived them. Technological advancements have created a multitude of traceable and targetable individual virtual avatars and a deceptive sense of being. Human identity and our DNA are increasingly becoming both biological and digital, out of necessity, and as a result of converging systems.1  Digital disintermediation has dethroned hierarchical governance, as people can obtain required information and make decisions without institutional approval.2  The degradation of data veracity and efficacy has irreversibly changed the theory of values and truth through the proliferation of misinformation, disinformation, and “fake news” that is promulgated by humans and bot virtual armies by nation state and non-nation state entities to achieve economic, political or ideological objectives.3  These variables, and many more, are having a profound impact on U.S. Army readiness and the ability to recruit and sustain an all-volunteer force.

From a system thinking perspective, Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) and Information Advantage (IA) are supporting constructs that fit within the strategic non-kinetic war rubric. The precis of the U.S. Army’s MDO concepts presents a technical solution to a complex adaptive system of problems, which have not been fully framed and named. The current MDO and IA concepts are a good start, but do not capture the order of magnitude strategic non-kinetic war threats that are confronting the US and the world today. Controlling the global non-kinetic terrain is the decisive operation, as it affects all things in physical space. Expanding the cognitive aperture to frame and name non-kinetic war would be a positive step forward towards maintaining a competitive advantage in the global security environment, as directed in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).

The United States is engaged in a global non-kinetic war that has not been framed or named. Non-kinetic war is a strategic form of maneuver that is dividing populations and disrupting cultures, around the world in a historic manner. This non-physical approach to war produces opaque affects that are not known to the targeted entity initially, and potentially will go unnoticed for months and even years. We have witnessed instances of this new type of war against U.S. Government agencies during repeated hacks of the Office of Personnel Management.4  These types of attacks also occurred in corporate America involving the Solar Winds and the Colonial Pipeline companies.5

Threat entities to the United States are using non-kinetic relational dialectic strategies to divide populations.  Relational Dialectics Theory (RDT) is an interpersonal communication theory about relationships that highlights the tensions, struggles, and interplay between social groups, political parties, and religions, et al. The theory, proposed by Leslie Baxter and Barbara Montgomery, defines communication patterns between relationship partners as the result of endemic dialectical tensions.6  Non-kinetic war heuristics provide adversaries to the United States with a new means to exploit dialectical relational tensions to divide our country. Semiotic exploitation maneuvers have further attacked the signs and symbols of nation-states around the world, to sow discord among various cultures, governments, and economic classes in a given society. Nation state and non-nation state entities have adopted and weaponized a new body of theory. These entities are indirectly attacking the West, and specifically the United States, using non-kinetic instruments of war whereby war is not perceived as war. All of this is intentional, repressive, and represents a risk to the United States, if it is left unchecked.

The U.S. military is standing astride an historic warfare fault-line. A new form of global power has surfaced and is disrupting the previous kinetic warfighting schema. New language is required to describe the emergent security phenomena that is increasing in pervasiveness and power. Leadership and personal mastery over modern war, contemporary mental models, learning archetypes, process systems, and the ability to create a relevant shared vision within compressed timelines is now a challenge and liability for leaders.7

New threat non-kinetic war innovations are being masked with legacy language, mental models, physical warfighting systems, and doctrine, from a previous warfighting paradigm.

The U.S. Army, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the U.S. Government writ large are struggling to see non-kinetic war through a new lens.  Historically, the “Great Captains of War” have routinely missed the new war. We saw this happen with the French in 1940, the U.S. Military in 2003 in Iraq, and we are seeing it happen now with non-kinetic war. The 9/11 Commission Report’s significant finding was, “The most important failure was the lack of imagination.”8

In times of exponential change, one must change exponentially. An anticipatory leadership ilk, and a healthy professional skepticism, are required to expand the operational art, discover a new range of theory, and to identify the emergence of new types of war. Imagining new forms of non-kinetic maneuver and seeing the patterns for the weaponization of new technologies against cultures and armies in novel ways, are critical modern war leadership imperatives.

Non-kinetic war is a byproduct of the convergence, which is the evolution and the synthesis of technology, education, economic, finance, social, governance, and other foundational cultural systems. This convergence has produced a new reality that is not recognized by many people, to include U.S. Army service members. The momentum and exponential power of the convergence has transformed connected citizens into a new species: the global netizen.9  Millions of human beings today have unwittingly become netizens, through algorithmic warfare attacks, attention distraction techniques, pervasive change technologies, and bot-driven reflexive control operations by nation-state and non-nation state actors. Taken together, these trends have created a state of liminality and non-kinetic war blindness for many of the global commons.

Technology Transformation. This transformation is explained by Paul Virilio who opined that, “Every new technology carries its own negativity, which is invented at the same time as the technical progress.” For example, when the train was invented, the train wreck was also created. When the airplane was invented, the plane crash was also created, etc. That is the case for the convergence of technologies, which were created and used across an array of systems throughout the four industrial revolutions since 1765. When we created the WWW and the new palette of technologies that we have at our fingertips today, we also weaponized global learning system, invented non-kinetic war, conceived the new global netizen life form, and created the “Instrumentarian” – a new species of power that Shoshan Zuboff notes in her book, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism.

The convergence also ushered in a Revolution in Human Affairs, where Soldiers and Civilians are now both combatants in non-kinetic war. We saw this with Elon Musk maneuvering satellites over the Ukraine, a sovereign nation state, which was engaged in war with Russia, a nuclear capable nation-state.10  The group Anonymous attacked the Russian communication systems, and hacktivists attacked the Belarus train station to slow the Russian deployment of its forces prior to the start of the Ukraine War. Today, our homes, offices, and all places in between are non-kinetic war battle space. The principal non-kinetic weapon systems are carried in our hands, on our wrists, or sit on our desks. How should U.S, Army leaders adjust behavior to see this new front that draws its power from the decisive non-kinetic terrain?

Non-Kinetic War Learning Systems. The learning system is the weapon system. A military’s learning system, for time immemorial, has been the primary and most important weapon system in war. Learning faster than our adversaries is critical. Controlling what our adversaries learn, when they learn it, and how they learn it is now possible and can lead to the perception of a multi-reality environment. That is what we are witnessing today. The activity of non-kinetic war has weaponized the global learning system. The global learning system is the aggregation of a multitude of capabilities that people use every day to communicate, live, prosper, and to wage war. The principal objective of non-kinetic war is to deny the productive range of learning to a given adversary or culture, to degrade decision-making competencies.

The global learning system has been weaponized with the advent of the: World Wide Web, cyber, social media, artificial intelligence, machine learning, robotics, nanotechnologies, electronic warfare, signals intelligence, space operations, behavioral science, synthetic bio-medical developments, attention distraction heuristics, and pervasive change technologies. Going forward, this group of technology capabilities, and theory, will be referred to as the “Technology Palette.”

DoD and Joint Force learning system growth and alignment are critical to achieving success on current and future battlefields. The DoD and the Joint Force currently use a process operating system, as the foundation for learning, and to maintain and sustain a competitive advantage. Theoretically, and practically, this is unsustainable as processes are not created for complex adaptive problem situations, which is the problem typology that is most prevalent today. Processes are optimized for technical problem solving and management.11  The process operating system represents only 33% of the learning system capability that is required to win a war today. In other words, the DoD and the Joint Force lack 67% of the operating system capabilities, which are required to drive the learning that is necessary to win the Nation’s wars. The DoD and the Joint Force require a big data operating system and a design operating system, in conjunction with a new updated process operating system, to remain relevant.

The U.S. military requires the three operating systems noted above, and new non-kinetic principles of war and warfighting functions, to ensure survivability on a battlefield. The longstanding hierarchical learning system and its attendant decision-making zeitgeist is collapsing before our eyes, given exponential technological change.12  Developing a leadership acumen in the U.S. Army which is capable of leading adaptive work and learning across enterprise boundaries is important, in terms of naming and framing non-kinetic war heuristics.13  The need for big data-enabled decision-making capabilities and autonomous leadership has never been greater within the DoD to increase anti-fragility across the force.

Anti-Fragility.  Nassim Taleb suggests that achieving an elevated level of Anti-Fragility, the ability to gain strength from disorder, is an essential leadership and cultural imperative.14  Anti-Fragility will be required, as we move on from a big data paradigm to a quantum sensing, communication, encryption, decryption, and computing reality in the 2030s. When realized, these technological advancements will assist in ushering in a post-human era that will fundamentally change every aspect of our lives.15  Societal ruptures will occur throughout the world, as a new world order emerges.16  Is the U.S. military prepared for the systemic shock that will accompany the radical change in technological power, and a quantum-driven world?17  The realpolitik of the United States and the West writ large, would do well to embrace this looming reality now by making the required investments to secure our future.

Asymmetry. The U.S. military should be prepared to fight any and all forms of war that emerge in the global security milieu. Non-kinetic war and counter-insurgency operations (COIN) have been the dominant and new conventional war over the past 32 years. Kinetic war has become the new irregular war given its intermittent use over the same timeframe. This is not a binary issue. The point is that the US has traversed a warfare inflection point over the past three decades, which has flipped the global warfare script. United States expenditures for defense do not align with this global warfare paradigm shift. The DoD is projected to receive approximately 817 billion dollars in its 2024 budget. The overwhelming majority of the DoD budget will be spent on kinetic warfighting capabilities.

Non-kinetic war is low cost in terms of human life and funding. It can be fought, and won, at pennies on the dollar. This opens the door for a multitude of small nation state entities, terror organizations, and civilian corporations to wield disproportionate power in the global security environment. Non-kinetic war also produces multiplicative strategic effects, at exponential virtual speed, and can create enduring systemic shock across continents, as we have seen with the coup d’états on the African continent. Pervasive global reach, unrelenting virtual munitions by way of IT robot (bot) armies, and decentralized indirect attacks underpin non-kinetic war. Controlling information efficacy, momentum, speed, volume, and achieving time-space compression, are new elements of the operational art that could degrade adversary cognition and decision space.

Synthetic Force Protection. All technology devices emit targetable signatures that form virtual avatars for both man and machine. The digital emissions allow for the transmission of locations and behavior patterns that are manipulated in every way imaginable for private sector profit, and military advantage. Multiple levels of synthetic protective measures are required to cloak a growing number of virtual avatars that compromise the netizen and the service members’ location, and activities in non-kinetic battlespace, that includes CONUS activities. Various levels of synthetic body armor are required to ensure survivability of man and machine on a modern battle that includes traditional kinetic battlefields, as well as, our homes, offices, and all points in between.

Every netizen, U.S. service member, and warfighting system are engaged in an unrelenting non-kinetic war that leverages all connected segments of technology for exploitation. Each of these entities, require synthetic immunity akin to the three levels of biological immunity in the form of a new Synthetic Threat Intrusion Defense System (STIDS).  For example, Synthetic Innate Immunity could be a universal baseline capability that all DoD service members receive upon entry into the military for all their personal and military devices. Synthetic Adaptive Immunity could be a set of capabilities that are drawn from a host entity over time, to keep pace with technology advancements. Synthetic Barrowed Immunity packages could be dynamically generated protective technologies that are tailored to a specific threat capability or region of the world. These synthetic enhancements are required to protect every connected human being and machine in non-kinetic battlespace, to prevent loses in the kinetic battle space. Synthetic Stealth by way of IP “Frequency Hopping” and spoofing technologies will increase life expectancies in modern war. Synthetic Sensing, the corollary to the five biological senses, could also be created to ensure survivability on a modern battlefield. The creation of Joint Non-Kinetic Maneuver Training Centers, the corollary to the kinetic NTC/JRTC training centers, could immeasurably enhance the readiness of the U.S. Army and Joint Force.

Cognition. The threat environment has changed. U.S. service members cannot think as fast as the machines which are targeting them today. Technology has changed significantly. However, the human brain has not changed enough to address the increased cognitive demands inherent in non-kinetic war. Decision-making at the individual level will require synthetic assistance to ensure survivability on a kinetic battlefield. The fusion of biological and machine intelligence is required to sustain human life on a non-kinetic and kinetic battlefield.18  Left unchecked, this non-kinetic battlespace problem will increase in complexity and will lead to survivability being measured in minutes and seconds while engaged in kinetic combat.

The Non-Kinetic War Frame.  The non-kinetic war phenomena is far more powerful than the four Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) combined effects, which have occurred over the past 124 years.19  Non-kinetic war consists of the following 21 forms of warfare: Virtual Warfare, Cognitive Warfare, Information Warfare, Psychological Warfare, Cyber Warfare, China’s “Lawfare,” Irregular Warfare, Political Warfare, Economic Warfare, Financial Warfare, Culture Warfare, Social Warfare, Digital Warfare, Space Warfare, Systems Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, Hyper Warfare, Gray Zone Warfare, Electronic Warfare, Multi-Reality Warfare, and Quantum Warfare.20 None of these forms of warfare can be dismissed, as they are all valid threats to the American way of war. All of these forms of warfare present the U.S. Army with a complex system of problems that require adaptive work. These warfare systems also present a number of asymmetric opportunities that the U.S. military has yet to realize. Embracing the recommendations in this essay could change that fact.

This arrangement of warfare systems highlights the need to address technical problem-solving processes and technical work. It also requires the development of a complex adaptive problem-solving culture, new mental models, and the development of an adaptive work acumen across Army, Joint Service, and Inter-agency boundaries—to synthesize these 21 forms of warfare and the attendant technologies into a new strategic form of maneuver that can win wars now. This adaptive work could begin with the recognition of the Four Elements of Non-Kinetic War which are the backbone for Six Non-Kinetic Principles of War, and Five Non-Kinetic Warfighting Functions. Controlling these three new constructs are the start to defeating non-kinetic war maneuver strategies.

Four Elements of Non-Kinetic War:  Technological structures, technological capabilities, the flow of data, and the timing for when data appears in the virtual environment are the four elements of non-kinetic war. These elements form the backbone of the global learning system that includes technology, education, economic, social, finance, governance, and a multitude of other systems.

Six Non-Kinetic Principles of War:  Non-kinetic war is underpinned by six new principles that includes the global entanglement of all the systems that are used today. The global entanglement phenomenon enables assured connectivity with the global commons. This sets the conditions for persistent technical surveillance of all netizens and pervasive systems warfare on a global scale. Virtual colonization and social control are the final two principles which underpin non-kinetic war.

Five Non-Kinetic Warfighting Functions: Includes the infiltration of individual, organizational, corporate, or nation-state governance systems. After the system infiltration is complete, there is an orientation period in a “Perch” posture. After being orientated, the threat actor then makes adaptations to what the compromised system presents and then proceeds with data extraction and data exploitation for continued surveillance, profit, or positional advantage in the global commercial marketplace or in the security environment.

The Strategic Imperative. There is a need to create the corollary to the Manhattan Project to overcome our Non-Kinetic War challenge.21 This opportunity would require a broad range of strategic sponsors, U.S. Government agencies, Joint and Army Headquarters, and civilian subject matter experts, who could comprise an enterprise-wide design team to address the adaptive work and complex system of problems inherent in the ongoing global non-kinetic war. Forming an inclusive whole-of-nation design team that is capable synthesizing the 21 forms of non-kinetic warfare and the 4th Industrial Revolution technology palette that underpins non-kinetic war is critical.

The U.S. Army masterfully synthesized the Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Aviation, Intelligence, Air Defense, Engineer, and Command & Control Systems into an unmatched kinetic combined arms maneuver construct in the 20th Century. The United States needs to do the same for non-kinetic war and shape our future where we can win through the synthesis of 4th Industrial Revolution technology palette. The new non-kinetic way of war strategy will cut across existing barriers and will be significantly different than any archetypes used in the past. This task requires strategic sponsorship, adaptive leadership, innovation, and imagination to take the next step in the right direction — to win the Nation’s wars and ensure the preservation of our Republic.

U.S. Army Mission Essential Non-Kinetic War End State Tasks.

1. The corollary doctrinal schema for what is seen in kinetic war needs to be created for non-kinetic war.
2. Synthesis of the 4th Industrial Revolution technology palette is required to create a new non-kinetic strategic maneuver strategy.
3. Control of the global non-kinetic terrain is the decisive operation, as it affects all things in the physical kinetic battle space.
4. Identify a broad range of political sponsors, U.S. Government agencies, Joint and Army Headquarters, civilian Subject Matter Experts to form an enterprise design team to address the adaptive work and complex system of problems inherent in the ongoing global non-kinetic war.

Winning. Redefining what “Winning” a war means to the American people is critical. Holistically addressing kinetic war, counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, and non-kinetic war as the current U.S. Army war problem frame is the starting point to winning wars. Had the U.S. Army conducted an enterprise-wide After-Action Review (AAR) after the losses sustained in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, U.S. leaders may have acknowledged all three types of war that should comprise the U.S. war problem frame. As in the past, the U.S. Army has experienced changes in the character of war. Non-kinetic war impacts kinetic war and COIN operations every day. Of note, the United States is actively engaged in a global COIN war on six of the seven continents in the world, to include North America. The US is also engaged in a global non-kinetic war.  The non-kinetic war knowledge gap that exists today between U.S. law enforcement and DoD technology subject matters relative to a conventional U.S. Army service member presents tremendous risk to the force and to the mission. This capability gap should be addressed by teaching the range of theory inherent in the technology palate that is addressed in this paper using the Civilian Education System (CES) and in Professional Military Education (PME).

Codifying and communicating success Limits of Tolerance within specific Zones of Acceptability over time, when engaged in each of the three forms of war noted above, is critical to defining and understanding what “Winning” means. Activities which occur in the non-kinetic battle space that necessitate reprisal in the kinetic battle space or in a COIN operation requires further clarification for the American people. The inability of the U.S. Government to strategically communicate an all-inclusive U.S. war problem frame to U.S. citizens due to national security reasons is eroding the will of the American people. It is also impacting the ability to mobilize an increasingly compromised U.S. national industrial base. This is the end game of the threat non-kinetic war strategy. Sun Tzu’s idiom, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting,” is now feasible by way of non-kinetic war. Are adversaries to the U.S. military on the cusp of winning, without firing a kinetic munition?

Risk of Not Acting. The non-kinetic threat that is before the United States requires a new logic, form, functions, culture, laws, and authorities to sustain a U.S. Constitution-driven American way of life. Non-kinetic war goes well beyond the boundaries of the U.S. Army and the DoD, and our adversaries are aware of that. Threats to the United States have kept the world’s most powerful military off the non-kinetic battlefield through the use of the “lawfare” practice of block and diversion, which presents conflict with U.S. laws, authorities, and military regulations. The risk of not acting on this recommendation is the loss of our freedom as ascribed in the United States Constitution.

If you enjoyed this post, check out COL Stefan J. Banach‘s previous posts and podcasts:

The Light on the Hill: America and Non-Terrestrial War, its associated podcast, and its companion essay The “Convergence” and Non-Terrestrial War

Global Entanglement and Multi-Reality Warfare, and associated podcast

Virtual War – A Revolution in Human Affairs (Parts I and II)

… as well as the following related content:

The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict, along with its source document

Speed, Scope, and Convergence Trends

Sub-threshold Maneuver and the Flanking of U.S. National Security and Is Ours a Nation at War? U.S. National Security in an Evolved — and Evolving — Operational Environment, by Dr. Russell Glenn

Hybrid Threats and Liminal Warfare and associated podcast, with Dr. David Kilcullen

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1), by Kate Kilgore

China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, by Ian Sullivan

Information Advantage Contribution to Operational Success, by CW4 Charles Davis

The Exploitation of our Biases through Improved Technology, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Raechel Melling

A House Divided: Microtargeting and the next Great American Threat, by 1LT Carlin Keally

The Erosion of National Will – Implications for the Future Strategist, by Dr. Nick Marsella

Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far… and Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events

About the Author:  COL Stefan Banach (USA-Ret.) served with distinction in the U.S. Army from 1983 to 2010. He is a Distinguished Member of the 75th Ranger Regiment and served in that special operations organization for nine years, culminating with command of the 3rd Ranger Battalion from 2001-2003. He led U.S. Army Rangers during a historic night combat parachute assault into Afghanistan on October 19, 2001, as the “spearhead” for the Global War on Terror. Steve subsequently led U.S. Army Rangers in a second combat parachute assault into Al Anbar Province in western Iraq in 2003. He also served as the Director, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS); Director, Army Management Staff College; and is now the TRADOC G2 Non-Kinetic War Design Officer. He also earned a certificate in Leadership in Crisis: Preparation and Performance, from the JFK School of Government at Harvard University. 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

1 Eric Schimdt, The New Digital Age, John Murray Publisher, Paperback 2014, Page 40.

2 Peter W. Singer and Emerson T. Brookings, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, 2018, Eamon Dolan Book, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Page 55.

3 Peter W. Singer and Emerson T. Brookings, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, Page 34.

4 Office of Personnel Management Hacks, 2015, OPM announced two separate but related cybersecurity incidents.

5 Solar Winds and the Colonial Pipeline companies. Congressional Bipartisan Cyber Reporting Bill. The hack of IT management firm SolarWinds, which resulted in the compromise of hundreds of federal agencies and private companies, and the May 2021 ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline, which halted pipeline operations temporarily and resulted in fuel shortages along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States, as well as a recent onslaught of ransomware attacks affecting thousands of public and private entities.

6 Leslie Baxter, 2014 University of Oklahoma Relational Dialectics Theory (RDT) Seminar. In person RDT dialogue with Dr. Baxter post-seminar.

7 Peter Senge, 5th Discipline, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1022948013380, June 1998, Abstract.

8 The 9/11 Commission Report. Published July 22, 2004

9 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/netizen

10 Elon Musk, News about Elon Musk Star Link Satellites To Ukraine, bing.com/news, 2022

11 Ronald Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers, Harvard University Press, 2000, Page 100.

12 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power, 2019, Page 35.

13 Ronald Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers, Page 115.

14 Nassim Taleb, Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder, 2014, Page 10

15 Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, Penguin Books, Page 194.

16 Steven Johnson, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software, 2001. Page 14.

17 Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, Page 15 – “the merger of Technology and Human Intelligence.

18 Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, Page 16.

19 Anthony Cordesman, The Real Revolution in Military Affairs, https://www.csis.org/analysis/real-revolution-military-affairs, 2014

20 Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/winning-without-fighting-chinese-legal-warfare, 2012

21 Manhattan Project, https://www.history.com/…/the-manhattan-project, 2017

17. Clausewitz’s Analysis Resonates to This Day

I always find Clausewitz useful and relevant (and timeless).

I have not seen this new translated text.

Conclusion:

Like Clausewitz at the turn of the nineteenth century, we should be willing to listen to the lessons of wars that might initially seem foreign or quaint.

Clausewitz’s Analysis Resonates to This Day

A recently translated text by Clausewitz coincidentally describes an eighteenth-century Russian war in Ukraine and Crimea, which can impart lessons for contemporary students of strategy.

by Alexander S. Burns

The National Interest · by Alexander S. Burns · March 1, 2023

The nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote On War, which remains a leading work of military theory down the present. However, he wrote far more: to date, parts of his writings have yet to be translated into English, even if scholars are working to change that. One of his untranslated works is a short history of a Russian war in Ukraine. Clausewitz’s analysis of this eighteenth-century war gives lessons that strategists studying the current conflict in Ukraine would do well to heed. His commentary draws parallels between eighteenth-century Russian practices and the present, and allows us to see continuities in Russia’s aims.

Why Cabinet Wars Matter

But can reading an analysis of a limited conflict fought by men in laced coats and powdered wigs really inform our view of war in the twenty-first century? It can, and it should. Why?

First, Western and Russian commentators like Franz-Stefan Gady, James Lacey, and Valery Alekseev have claimed that Kabinettskriege, or cabinet wars, can provide a window into warfare in the 2010s and 2020s. Lacey has argued:

In any future great power war, it might be helpful to think of objectives such as Taiwan or the Baltics as small territories that are in one camp but are coveted by another great power, like provinces in an 18th-century cabinet war. One side is willing to fight to keep the province (state) within its sphere, while the other side is willing to fight to take it. Neither great state, however, is willing to see itself destroyed or its internal political order overthrown to attain its objective.

Second, these wars are worth studying because they left a significant formative impact on Clausewitz and his most famous book. There are almost as many references to eighteenth-century commanders like Frederick the Great, Daun, and Lacy in On War as there are to Napoleon himself. While acknowledging that the French Revolution had radically changed warfare, Clausewitz still believed the military past could inform future doctrine.

Third, understanding this history matters, as I have argued elsewhere, because Russian president Vladimir Putin is obsessed with it. He views his war as an imperial project, where he is reenacting the conquests of Russian leaders like Peter and Catherine the Great.

So What Does Clausewitz Tell Us?

Years before he would write On War, a younger Clausewitz examined the Russo-Turkish War of 1736–1739 and sketched out a brief description of the four-year-long conflict. At first glance, Clausewitz’s interest in this war might seem odd: why would a Prussian officer concern himself with an Eastern European war that ended over sixty years earlier? In fact, many Prussian officers, including Clausewitz’s principal source of information on the war, Christoph Hermann von Manstein, served alongside the Russians in this war as advisors and volunteers. Wilhelm August von Steuben, the father of the “American” Baron von Steuben, was one of them.

In this war, the Russian Empire, ruler Empress Anna and her ministers, sought, as Putin would 278 years later, to conquer and occupy the Crimean Peninsula. The local inhabitants of Crimea, the Tatars, received military support from a great power of the time, the Ottoman Empire. Much like the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this war began with vast Russian overconfidence: the Russian commander, Field Marshall Burkhard Christoph von Münnich, asserted that Azov and Crimea would fall in the first year, and that by 1739, that even Constantinople would be under Russian control. What actually followed was four years of indecisive conflict, with repeated Russian invasions, setbacks, withdrawals, and new invasions. By the time the dust settled in 1739, neither side had achieved their goals, and the Russians’ Austrian allies were forced to cede major territorial concessions.

Clausewitz turned to this conflict while studying at the Berlin Kriegsakademie. Sometime around 1801, connected to his studies, Clausewitz wrote a short history of the war. Historian Peter Paret has argued that this text was merely an exercise in narrative history writing, “little more than [an] outline.” Although the narrative is short and follows the major events of the conflict, Clausewitz does provide a number of interpretations, particularly of the first two years of the war. These interpretations, combined with Clausewitz’s brief comments on this conflict in On War, provide notable parallels to the current conflict.

Much like Western observers trying to discern Putin’s motives, Clausewitz was unsure of the true Russian goals in the war. He asserts, “It is uncertain whether the Empress Anna… wanted to conquer Crimea, or just to devastate it… the latter made but little political sense.” Despite this judgment, Clausewitz returns to the theme of devastation again and again in the text, showing that the various Russian armies, put the enemy territory, “under fire and sword,” “destroy[ed] these areas,” waged, “a campaign of raiding,” and “devastate[d] the peninsula.” Clausewitz eventually concluded that these measures were essentially “preventative… namely as a means of distracting and hindering the [Crimeans] so they could not,” take more decisive military action. Modern Russian tactics, such as the strike campaign against the Ukrainian power grid, have confused modern commentators, but experts such as Justin Bronk and Michael Kofman assert they have a similar goal: depleting Ukraine’s stocks of air defense missiles. In other words, in both the 1730s and 2020s, Russia has used devastation against civilian targets to cause chaos, diluting the effectiveness of their enemy’s military response.

Clausewitz was also surprised by the lack of logistical readiness on the part of the eighteenth-century Russian army. He noted that in their first campaign the Russians, “suffered from a lack of water,” that they, were “weakened by disease,” and that, “provisions for the whole campaign were not carried along.” The following year of 1737, they suffered 24,000 losses, “mostly caused by disease and the lack of supplies.” In 1738, “Lack of food, many diseases, [and] massive losses of [pack] animals…caused this campaign to end without results.” In a section specifically analyzing logistical shortfalls, Clausewitz asserted:

There was never a lack of fodder for animals because of the nature of the terrain, but there was often a lack of food. The army was forced to steal herds of sheep from the Tatars, subsisting from the local area. Firewood and water were most wanted.

Clausewitz showed that in three of the four years of conflict, logistical problems handicapped the Russian effort, and made lasting gains unattainable. Once again, there are parallels to the present. Experts on the current war in Ukraine argue that Russia has been significantly hindered by its logistical shortcomings. Indeed, some noted this before the war. Though Münnich and the Russians eventually overcame this logistical failure, it cost the Russians manpower in the opening campaigns of the war.

Clausewitz was critical of the heavy losses the Russians suffered for comparatively little gain. In the first year, he asserted that Russian losses were, “quite expensive for the campaign,” and in the following year, notes that the 50,000 Russian losses were, “far too much for the conquest of a fortress that had to be evacuated… in the next year.” He concluded that the Russians callously succeeded, “at the cost of many thousands of their own men,” and that such losses, “seem[ed] cruel.” It is possible that the Russians lost as many as 200,000 men in this conflict. When adjusted for changes in the Russian population between the eighteenth century and the present, that is equivalent to over 2 million in today’s population. In the eighteenth century, large losses had little impact on the Russian strategy. Russia ended the war when their allies, the Austrians, stopped fighting, and even gained a small amount of territory. Today, journalists seem explicitly focused on the body count, which may or may not impact the immediate duration of the war.

Finally, Clausewitz noted the importance of the “Ukraine Line” in the 1736 war, providing Russian forces a fortified border to withdraw behind, rearm, and reconstitute. In this period, the Russian state constructed extensive fortified positions to protect its southern border. These included the Belgorod and Izium lines of the late seventeenth century and the modernized Ukraine Line of 1731. To man this border, the Russians created a secondary army of 30,000 reservists or Ukrainian Land Militia (ukrainskiy landmilitskiy). These men defended a line of fortified positions that measured just under 300 kilometers. The threat of raids from Crimea convinced men to serve in this force. Important fortified positions on the line include placenames that are well-known today: Izium and Bakhmut. Clausewitz noted that each fall, Russian troops would return to their defensive lines, but each spring, they would launch a new invasion with more manpower than they had the previous year. Today, nuclear deterrence provides the Russian forces with a modern “Ukraine Line.” With the threat of atomic weapons, Russian forces are able to withdraw from campaigns that are failing, reconstitute, and redeploy to other portions of Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have noted that there are more Russian forces currently deployed than were massed last year at the start of the invasion.

History Lessons

For all of the failings of the Russian war in 1736–1739, historians disagree about the war’s legacy. My own mentor, Christopher Duffy, focused on the heavy losses incurred for little gains in this war. In contrast, the leading scholar of this war, Brian L. Davies, has concerningly noted that the Russian army learned much from the failures of the initial campaigns and modernized their doctrines during wartime, overcoming their logistical problems. For Davies, this was a war where Russians could take heavy losses, rebuild their forces, and remain dangerous in the post-war environment.

Clausewitz’s short treatise on a seemingly obscure conflict in eighteenth-century Russian history imparts lessons for strategists today. First, even in ages that focus on the rules of engagement and laws of war, enemy forces might target civilians in order to distract their opponents and shape the situation to their advantage. Second, logistical problems can hinder a force more than enemy action. Third, the center of gravity may not be military casualties; heavy enemy losses do not always equate victory. Fourth, creating a situation where your home territory is defended from attack enables withdrawal, reconstitution, and redeployment.

Like Clausewitz at the turn of the nineteenth century, we should be willing to listen to the lessons of wars that might initially seem foreign or quaint.

Alexander S. Burns is a visiting assistant professor at the Franciscan University of Steubenville, studying the American Continental army’s connection to European militaries. His edited volume, The Changing Face of Old Regime Warfare: Essays in Honour of Christopher Duffy, was published in 2022. You can follow him @KKriegeBlog.

Image: Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg/The David Rumsey Map Collection​.

The National Interest · by Alexander S. Burns · March 1, 2023

18. Russia's struggles in Ukraine are showing US special operators that they'll need to fight without their 'tethers' to win future wars

Russia's struggles in Ukraine are showing US special operators that they'll need to fight without their 'tethers' to win future wars

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou Feb 28, 2023, 6:03 PM

Ukrainian, Romanian, and US Army Special Forces soldiers conduct close-quarters-battle training in Romania in May 2021.

Romanian army/Capt. Roxana Davidovits

• The challenges of waging modern warfare are on vivid display in Russia's attack on Ukraine.
• A less-visible aspect has been the need for a robust logistical network to sustain frontline forces.
• For US special operators, the war is a reminder that such a network won't always be available.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has brought renewed attention to the challenges of a large-scale, conventional nation-on-nation conflict.

After a year of the fighting, the world has learned a lot about what it takes to wage modern war. Ukraine thwarted Russia's initial attack and, with extensive Western support, has driven Russia's forces back. Russia continues to struggle to achieve its objectives despite reducing its ambitions after the first few months of the war. So far, Moscow has lost an estimated 200,000 troops.

Access to heavy weapons and ample ammunition as well as a will to fight among troops have been important elements in each side's performance, as has the ability to set up an effective logistics enterprise.

According to US special-operations leaders in Europe, Russia's logistical struggles in Ukraine have shown that in a major war, US commandos will need to live without the logistical "tethers" they've relied on in past conflicts.

Logistics and Ukraine

Ukrainian soldiers reload a Grad multiple-launch rocket vehicle in the Donetsk in November.

Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

During an event hosted by the New America think tank in September, US Air Force Maj. Gen. Steven Edwards, the commander of Special Operations Command Europe, outlined some of lessons SOCEUR had learned from Ukraine.

Edwards said that one of his command's biggest hurdles to being more effective in Ukraine had been finding ways to support Ukrainian forces remotely, as US troops were withdrawn from the country shortly before Russia attacked.

"Trying to get equipment and resourcing in to our partners has proved to be very, very difficult," Edwards said, pointing to the logistics required "to actually move it from one country inside Ukraine."

One of the major logistical hurdles Ukrainian forces face is getting the right munitions and spare parts to the front. Over the past year, scores of Western nations have sent Ukraine billions of dollars in military gear and other assistance.

Ukrainian troops now use an array of weapons that require different ammunition and have different maintenance needs, so the Ukrainian military's logisticians have had to be very organized and maintain good situational awareness of what equipment is needed and where and when it is needed.

For example, sending Western-made 155 mm ammunition to a unit that has 152 mm howitzers, which for decades was Ukraine's standard howitzer caliber, would be a waste of time and resources.

Logistics and special operators

Ukrainian, Romanian, and US Army Special Forces soldiers conduct close-quarters-battle training in Romania in May 2021.

Romanian army/Capt. Roxana Davidovits

At the same New America event, Michael Repass, who commanded SOCEUR before retiring from the US Army as a major general, also highlighted the importance of logistics not only for special-operations forces but also for militaries facing bigger, better-armed opponents.

"We know that logistics matters. It's very interesting to see SOF guys talking about how important logistics are," Repass said. "Stockpiling material to defend your nation has become an imperative for small nations in conflict with big states."

Indeed, Russia's struggles in Ukraine are showing US commandos that in a conflict with a near-peer force like Russia or China, they will need to live without the stockpiles and short supply lines they were accustomed to during the wars that followed the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the US.

For US special-operations units, logistical demands in a conflict "would largely depend on the unit and the mission," a US Army Special Forces soldier in a National Guard unit told Insider.

US special-operations forces "are designed to operate deep behind enemy lines in often austere environments with little to no support for outside," the Green Beret, who was granted anonymity to discuss prospective operations, said, adding: "We are trained and mentally prepared to fight without much logistical support."

Ukrainian troops train to clear a trench with guidance from US soldiers at a training center in Yavoriv, Ukraine, in June 2017.

US Army/Sgt. Anthony Jones

Getting supplies to US special operators in the Indo-Pacific region would be more challenging the closer they got to China because of the weaponry China developed to deny its rivals access to parts of the region, such as the South China Sea. The US Army is the service responsible for logistics across the Indo-Pacific area of operations.

"Again, depending on the unit and the mission, we will require some sort of logistical support eventually," the Green Beret added. "That's where our relationships with the conventional military and any partner forces will be key."

US Special Operations Command is trying to address the challenge of getting supplies to the front lines by pursuing what one official described as "untethered logistics."

The command is considering new technology and other means that would allow it to push supplies to special operators in remote environments or enable those troops to produce what they need where they are. Some of the technology in the works involves 3D printing, which could allow frontline commandos to produce much-needed ammunition and spare parts on their own.

Military logistics may not be as sexy as some of the weapons and operations on display in Ukraine, but the war there has shown they're as important to battlefield success as ever.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. He is working toward a master's degree in strategy and cybersecurity at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.

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Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou Feb 28, 2023, 6:03 PM

19. In an Epic Battle of Tanks, Russia Was Routed, Repeating Earlier Mistakes

Photos at the link: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tanks.html?utm_source=pocket_saves

In an Epic Battle of Tanks, Russia Was Routed, Repeating Earlier Mistakes

The New York Times · by Andrew E. Kramer · March 2, 2023

A three-week fight in the town of Vuhledar in southern Ukraine produced what Ukrainian officials say was the biggest tank battle of the war so far, and a stinging setback for the Russians.

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Ukraine’s 72nd Brigade near Vuhledar, in the Donetsk region of Ukraine, on Saturday.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

By

March 1, 2023

KURAKHOVE, Ukraine — Before driving into battle in their mud-spattered war machine, a T-64 tank, the three-man Ukrainian crew performs a ritual.

The commander, Pvt. Dmytro Hrebenok, recites the Lord’s Prayer. Then, the men walk around the tank, patting its chunky green armor.

“We say, ‘Please, don’t let us down in battle,’” said Sgt. Artyom Knignitsky, the mechanic. “‘Bring us in and bring us out.’”

Their respect for their tank is understandable. Perhaps no weapon symbolizes the ferocious violence of war more than the main battle tank. Tanks have loomed over the conflict in Ukraine in recent months — militarily and diplomatically — as both sides prepared for offensives. Russia pulled reserves of tanks from Cold War-era storage, and Ukraine prodded Western governments to supply American Abrams and German Leopard 2 tanks.

The sophisticated Western tanks are expected on the battlefield in the next several months. The new Russian armor turned up earlier — and in its first wide-scale deployment was decimated.

A three-week battle on a plain near the coal-mining town of Vuhledar in southern Ukraine produced what Ukrainian officials say was the biggest tank battle of the war so far, and a stinging setback for the Russians.

The brigade’s tank crew storing their vehicle near the front line.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

In the extended battle, both sides sent tanks into the fray, rumbling over dirt roads and maneuvering around tree lines, with the Russians thrusting forward in columns and the Ukrainians maneuvering defensively, firing from a distance or from hiding places as Russian columns came into their sights.

When it was over, not only had Russia failed to capture Vuhledar, but it also had made the same mistake that cost Moscow hundreds of tanks earlier in the war: advancing columns into ambushes.

Blown up on mines, hit with artillery or obliterated by anti-tank missiles, the charred hulks of Russian armored vehicles now litter farm fields all about Vuhledar, according to Ukrainian military drone footage. Ukraine’s military said Russia had lost at least 130 tanks and armored personnel carriers in the battle. That figure could not be independently verified. Ukraine does not disclose how many weapons it loses.

The State of the War

• Russia’s New Offensive: The Russian military is relying on tens of thousands of inexperienced conscripts to carry out its latest maneuver, which has barely budged over the last month.
• Deploying High-Powered Aides: President Biden has dispatched Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a concerted diplomatic push to show support for Ukraine.
• A War of Words: Russia and the West have been arguing for months about which side is more willing to negotiate ending the war in Ukraine peacefully.

“We studied the roads they used, then hid and waited” to shoot in ambushes, Sergeant Knignitsky said.

Lack of expertise also bedeviled the Russians. Many of their most elite units had been left in shambles from earlier fighting. Their spots were filled with newly conscripted soldiers, unschooled in Ukraine’s tactics for ambushing columns. In one indication that Russia is running short of experienced tank commanders, Ukrainian soldiers said they captured a medic who had been reassigned to operate a tank.

The Russian army has focused on, and even mythologized, tank warfare for decades for its redolence of Russian victories over the Nazis in World War II. Factories in the Ural Mountains have churned out tanks by the thousands. In Vuhledar, by last week Russia had lost so many machines to sustain armored assaults that they had changed tactics and resorted only to infantry attacks, Ukrainian commanders said.

A photo released by the Ukrainian Army last month showed damaged Russian tanks in a field near Vuhledar.Credit...Ukrainian Armed Forces, via Associated Press

The depth of the Russian defeat was underscored by Russian military bloggers, who have emerged as an influential pro-war voice in the country. Often critical of the military, they have posted angry screeds about the failures of repeated tank assaults, blaming generals for misguided tactics with a storied Russian weapon.

Grey Zone, a Telegram channel affiliated with the Wagner mercenary group, posted on Monday that “relatives of the dead are inclined almost to murder and blood revenge against the general” in charge of the assaults near Vuhledar.

In a detailed interview last week in an abandoned house near the front, Lt. Vladislav Bayak, the deputy commander of Ukraine’s 1st Mechanized Battalion of the 72nd brigade, described how Ukrainian soldiers were able to inflict such heavy losses in what commanders said was the biggest tank battle of the war so far.

Ambushes have been Ukraine’s signature tactic against Russian armored columns since the early days of the war. Working from a bunker in Vuhledar, Lieutenant Bayak spotted the first column of about 15 tanks and armored personnel carriers approaching on a video feed from a drone.

“We were ready,” he said. “We knew something like this would happen.”

Firing a howitzer at Russian targets.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

They had prepared a kill zone farther along a dirt road that the tanks were rumbling down. The commander needed only to give an order over the radio — “To battle!” — Lieutenant Bayak said.

Anti-tank teams hiding in tree lines along the fields, and armed with American infrared-guided Javelins and Ukrainian laser-guided Stugna-P missiles, powered up their weapons. Farther away, artillery batteries were ready. The dirt road had been left free of mines, while the fields all about were seeded with them, so as to entice the Russians to advance while preventing tanks from turning around once the trap was sprung.

The column of tanks becomes most vulnerable, Lieutenant Bayak said, after the shooting starts and drivers panic and try to turn around — by driving onto the mine-laden shoulder of the road. Blown-up vehicles then act as impediments, slowing or stalling the column. At that point, Ukrainian artillery opens fire, blowing up more armor and killing soldiers who clamber out of disabled machines. A scene of chaos and explosions ensues, the lieutenant said.

Russian commanders have sent armored columns forward for a lack of other options against Ukraine’s well-fortified positions, however costly the tactic, he said.

Over about three weeks of the tank battle, repeated Russian armored assaults floundered. In one instance, Ukrainian commanders called in a strike by HIMARS guided rockets; they are usually used on stationary targets like ammunition depots or barracks, but also proved effective against a stationary tank column.

Ukrainian soldiers on an artillery crew wait for an order to fire at Russian positions.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

The Ukrainians also fired with American M777 and French Caesar howitzers, as well as other Western-provided weaponry such as the Javelins.

The Ukrainian tank crew that prayed before each battle nicknamed their tank The Wanderer, for its wandering movements around the battlefield. Between missions it remained hidden in trees under a camouflage net, beside a road churned into a panorama of mud by passing tanks, five miles or so from the front line.

During the battle for Vuhledar, Private Hrebenok, the commander, was ordered to drive forward from that spot on dangerous missions, three or four times per day.

Private Hrebenok, only 20 years old, had no formal training in tank combat when the war started. But in the frantic first days of the war he was assigned to a tank, and has fought continuously in them since, picking up tricks along the way.

Training still looms as a problem. Ukraine, too, is losing skilled soldiers and replacing them with green recruits. And many Ukrainian tank crewmen are being trained on Western tanks in countries like Germany and Britain.

“All my knowledge I gained in the field,” he said. The Russian tank crews, he said, are in contrast mostly new recruits without the benefit of any combat to season them.

Driving an armored personnel carrier near the front line outside Vuhledar.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

In ambushes, the crew hides the tank within range of a road that Russian tanks or armored personnel carriers might travel down. Then it waits quietly. As they sit and prepare for ambush, they must keep the engine warm, because restarting it would take too long. Idling would be noisy. Instead, they burn a small kerosene heater beside the motor.

Once, while they were waiting, a Russian armored personnel carrier passed through their sight and they fired but narrowly missed, damaging but not destroying the machine.

In the last major engagement, a week ago, the order came in during the gray pre-dawn to prepare an ambush for a column of 16 Russian tanks and armored vehicles advancing toward the Ukrainian lines. The crew said their prayer, patted their tank and drove forward.

“We hid the tank in a tree line and waited for them,” Private Hrebenok said. “It’s always scary but we need to destroy them.”

In this instance, they stopped about three miles short of the ambush site, just out of range of return fire, and shot in coordination with a drone pilot who called in coordinates on a radio for targets they could not see directly.

The Russian column stalled on mines and, Private Hrebenok said, The Wanderer opened fire. The Russian tank crews had little chance once they were in the kill zone, he said.

“We destroyed a lot of Russian equipment,” he said. “What they did wrong was come to Ukraine.”

Maria Varenikova contributed reporting.

The New York Times · by Andrew E. Kramer · March 2, 2023

20. FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces National Cybersecurity Strategy

Access the 39 page strategy here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf

FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces National Cybersecurity Strategy | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · March 2, 2023

Read the full strategy here

Today, the Biden-Harris Administration released the National Cybersecurity Strategy to secure the full benefits of a safe and secure digital ecosystem for all Americans. In this decisive decade, the United States will reimagine cyberspace as a tool to achieve our goals in a way that reflects our values: economic security and prosperity; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; trust in our democracy and democratic institutions; and an equitable and diverse society. To realize this vision, we must make fundamental shifts in how the United States allocates roles, responsibilities, and resources in cyberspace.

1. We must rebalance the responsibility to defend cyberspace by shifting the burden for cybersecurity away from individuals, small businesses, and local governments, and onto the organizations that are most capable and best-positioned to reduce risks for all of us.
2. We must realign incentives to favor long-term investments by striking a careful balance between defending ourselves against urgent threats today and simultaneously strategically planning for and investing in a resilient future.

The Strategy recognizes that government must use all tools of national power in a coordinated manner to protect our national security, public safety, and economic prosperity.

VISION

Our rapidly evolving world demands a more intentional, more coordinated, and more well-resourced approach to cyber defense. We face a complex threat environment, with state and non-state actors developing and executing novel campaigns to threaten our interests. At the same time, next-generation technologies are reaching maturity at an accelerating pace, creating new pathways for innovation while increasing digital interdependencies.

This Strategy sets out a path to address these threats and secure the promise of our digital future. Its implementation will protect our investments in rebuilding America’s infrastructure, developing our clean energy sector, and re-shoring America’s technology and manufacturing base. Together with our allies and partners, the United States will make our digital ecosystem:

• Defensible, where cyber defense is overwhelmingly easier, cheaper, and more effective;
• Resilient, where cyber incidents and errors have little widespread or lasting impact; and,
• Values-aligned, where our most cherished values shape—and are in turn reinforced by— our digital world.

The Administration has already taken steps to secure cyberspace and our digital ecosystem, including the National Security Strategy, Executive Order 14028 (Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity), National Security Memorandum 5 (Improving Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Control Systems), M-22-09 (Moving the U.S. Government Toward Zero-Trust Cybersecurity Principles), and National Security Memorandum 10 (Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems). Expanding on these efforts, the Strategy recognizes that cyberspace does not exist for its own end but as a tool to pursue our highest aspirations.

APPROACH

This Strategy seeks to build and enhance collaboration around five pillars:

1. Defend Critical Infrastructure – We will give the American people confidence in the availability and resilience of our critical infrastructure and the essential services it provides, including by:

• Expanding the use of minimum cybersecurity requirements in critical sectors to ensure national security and public safety and harmonizing regulations to reduce the burden of compliance;
• Enabling public-private collaboration at the speed and scale necessary to defend critical infrastructure and essential services; and,
• Defending and modernizing Federal networks and updating Federal incident response policy

2. Disrupt and Dismantle Threat Actors – Using all instruments of national power, we will make malicious cyber actors incapable of threatening the national security or public safety of the United States, including by:

• Strategically employing all tools of national power to disrupt adversaries;
• Engaging the private sector in disruption activities through scalable mechanisms; and,
• Addressing the ransomware threat through a comprehensive Federal approach and in lockstep with our international partners.

3. Shape Market Forces to Drive Security and Resilience – We will place responsibility on those within our digital ecosystem that are best positioned to reduce risk and shift the consequences of poor cybersecurity away from the most vulnerable in order to make our digital ecosystem more trustworthy, including by:

• Promoting privacy and the security of personal data;
• Shifting liability for software products and services to promote secure development practices; and,
• Ensuring that Federal grant programs promote investments in new infrastructure that are secure and resilient.

4. Invest in a Resilient Future – Through strategic investments and coordinated, collaborative action, the United States will continue to lead the world in the innovation of secure and resilient next-generation technologies and infrastructure, including by:

• Reducing systemic technical vulnerabilities in the foundation of the Internet and across the digital ecosystem while making it more resilient against transnational digital repression;
• Prioritizing cybersecurity R&D for next-generation technologies such as postquantum encryption, digital identity solutions, and clean energy infrastructure; and,
• Developing a diverse and robust national cyber workforce

5. Forge International Partnerships to Pursue Shared Goals – The United States seeks a world where responsible state behavior in cyberspace is expected and reinforced and where irresponsible behavior is isolating and costly, including by:

• Leveraging international coalitions and partnerships among like-minded nations to counter threats to our digital ecosystem through joint preparedness, response, and cost imposition;
• Increasing the capacity of our partners to defend themselves against cyber threats, both in peacetime and in crisis; and,
• Working with our allies and partners to make secure, reliable, and trustworthy global supply chains for information and communications technology and operational technology products and services.

Coordinated by the Office of the National Cyber Director, the Administration’s implementation of this Strategy is already underway.

###

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · March 2, 2023

21. Biden National Cyber Strategy Seeks to Hold Software Firms Liable for Insecurity

Biden National Cyber Strategy Seeks to Hold Software Firms Liable for Insecurity

Markets have imposed ‘inadequate costs’ on companies that build vulnerable technology, it says

By Dustin VolzFollow

March 2, 2023 5:00 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-national-cyber-strategy-seeks-to-hold-software-firms-liable-for-insecurity-67c592d6

WASHINGTON—The Biden administration said it would pursue laws to establish liability for software companies that sell technology that lacks cybersecurity protections, concluding that market forces alone aren’t sufficient to guard consumers and the nation.

Free markets and a reliance on voluntary security frameworks have imposed “inadequate costs” on companies that offer insecure products or services, according to a national cybersecurity strategy released Thursday. It says the administration would work with Congress and the private sector to create liability for software vendors, sketching out in broad terms what such legislation should entail.

“We must begin to shift the liability onto those entities that fail to take reasonable precautions to secure their software while recognizing that even the most advanced software security programs cannot prevent all vulnerabilities,” says the 35-page strategy, an interagency product that was written by the office of the national cyber director, which is part of the executive office of the president. Thursday’s strategy also advocates developing a more expansive framework of cybersecurity regulations to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure—a categorization that includes energy operators, hospitals and banks, among others.

Any legislation supported by the administration should prevent software makers from avoiding liability by contract and create higher standards for software in specific high-risk situations, the strategy says. The administration would work to develop an evolving safe harbor framework—borrowing from current best practices for secure software—to shield companies from liability, it adds.

Such a push on software liability, if successful, would pivot national cybersecurity policy in the U.S. after several Democratic and Republican administrations favored an approach that largely relied on software vendors and other businesses to voluntarily manage their own cybersecurity. President Biden, in a signed cover letter, said the strategy “takes on the systemic challenge that too much of the responsibility for cybersecurity has fallen on individual users and small organizations.”

Major software companies “can and should shoulder a bigger share of the cyber risk,” Kemba Walden, acting national cyber director, said during a media briefing. Hacks of widely used software can be devastating and far reaching, officials and experts have said, such as an alleged Chinese cyberattack on Microsoft email software in 2021 that rendered hundreds of thousands of mostly small businesses and organizations vulnerable to intrusion.

Chris Inglis, who was the U.S. government’s first national cyber director, oversaw the strategy plan.

PHOTO: STEVEN SAPHORE/SHUTTERSTOCK

For more than a decade lawmakers in both parties have sought to create certain cybersecurity requirements on companies, but legislative efforts have typically crumbled in the face of opposition from business interests, which often argued such requirements would be onerous and costly, as well as stifle innovation.

“Makers of enterprise software take seriously their responsibilities to customers and the public, and continuously work to evolve the security of their products to meet new threats,” Victoria Espinel, president of BSA | The Software Alliance, a Washington-based trade group, said in a statement about the strategy. Ms. Espinel said the document offered a “thoughtful path” for industry and government collaboration.

A senior administration official said the liability push was a “long-term process” that could take many years to develop with lawmakers and industry. “We don’t anticipate this is something where we are going to see a new law on the books within the next year,” the official said.

The strategy, signed by President Biden, is the culmination of a monthslong bureaucratic process that involved more than 20 government agencies. It was overseen by Chris Inglis, a former deputy director of the National Security Agency, who stepped down last month as the U.S. government’s first national cyber director. The position was created by Congress to better coordinate cybersecurity work across the federal government, but some current and former officials have said the office has struggled to find a clear mission amid a government crowded with senior cybersecurity officials.

The strategy offers a sober assessment of mounting security risks associated with the accelerating integration of digital and physical realities into every facet of daily life, business and commerce that has defined the 21st century—a trend it says has made the problem of insecure technology an urgent national priority.

In addition to making a forceful call for expanded liability, the plan reiterates several top priorities that have frequently been listed by various senior cybersecurity officials in recent years, such as urging more collaboration and threat-intelligence sharing with the private sector, forging international partnerships to develop cyber norms, and modernizing federal technology. While much of it is consistent with the goals of past administrations, the focus on liability and mandates on critical infrastructure largely depart from President Biden’s predecessors.

Voluntary approaches to critical infrastructure cybersecurity have yielded meaningful improvements, the strategy said, but “the lack of mandatory requirements has resulted in inadequate and inconsistent outcomes.”

It noted previous mandates imposed by the Biden administration on pipeline operators and rail and aviation systems, and said the government would use existing authorities to set necessary new requirements in critical sectors, and where gaps exist to do so it would seek legislation from Congress. A senior administration official said similar regulations on other sectors would be announced soon, including an update on existing standards for drinking-water systems.

The strategy also emphasizes the need for persistent use of offensive cyber capabilities, such as those housed at the U.S. Cyber Command, to disrupt and dismantle cyber threats to the U.S. The strategy’s language effectively endorses steps taken during the Trump administration to allow the military to be more active with offensive cyber weapons. Mr. Biden’s strategy replaces one issued by former President Donald Trump in 2018.

Write to Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com

​22. How the U.S. National Cyber Strategy Reaches Beyond Government Agencies

How the U.S. National Cyber Strategy Reaches Beyond Government Agencies

Significant shifts in government policy emphasize private-sector responsibility for cybersecurity

By James Rundle

March 2, 2023 5:00 am ET | WSJ PRO

HTTPS://WWW.WSJ.COM/ARTICLES/HOW-THE-U-S-NATIONAL-CYBER-STRATEGY-REACHES-BEYOND-GOVERNMENT-AGENCIES-EF83AC74

The Biden administration released its long-awaited national cybersecurity strategy Thursday, setting out in broad terms how the U.S. government should approach cybercrime, its own defenses, and the private sector’s responsibility for security over the next several years.

The White House says an updated strategy, cohesive across federal agencies, is necessary due to the growing importance of digital services, spurred in part by stay-at-home orders during the coronavirus pandemic. At the same time, the White House says, malicious cyber activity has evolved from a criminal nuisance to a threat to national security, conducted by criminal gangs and nation-states. 

“I think it’s an impressive piece of work that says some things that have needed to be said for quite a while about critical infrastructure and software security,” said Jeff Greene, the senior director for cybersecurity programs at The Aspen Group, a nonprofit policy and research organization. Until July, Mr. Greene was the chief for cyber response and policy at the National Security Council.

What is the National Cybersecurity Strategy?

Overseen in part by former National Cyber Director Chris Inglis, who retired in February, the 35-page document contains recommendations on a broad swath of cyber policy, from international collaboration on tackling cybercrime to securing internet-connected devices.

The new strategy replaces a document issued in 2018 by the Trump administration.

Some elements of the strategy, including that the federal government should assess the need for a government backstop for cyber insurers, are speculative. Others specify direct action, such as plans for regulations in critical-infrastructure sectors such as healthcare, financial services and water that define minimum cybersecurity standards.

“The president’s strategy fundamentally reimagines America’s cyber-social contract,” said Kemba Walden, the acting national cyber director, during a call with reporters Wednesday. “It will rebalance the responsibility for managing cyber risk onto those who are most able to bear it,” she said. 

What does the strategy cover?

This strategy goes further than those issued by previous administrations and takes a more prescriptive approach to cyber rules.

The White House outlined five key areas for action: 

• Improving cyber defenses at critical infrastructure operators
• Disrupting hackers and criminal gangs
• Enhancing the security of technology sold to companies
• Funding public investments to support cyber upgrades
• Working internationally to combat cybercrime

Whereas the federal government has tended to focus on specific sectors in recent years, such as oil and gas pipelines in the wake of the Colonial Pipeline Co. ransomware attack in May 2021, or federal agencies after the attack on SolarWinds Corp. disclosed in December 2020, this document has a much broader scope. 

Anne Neuberger, deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology.

PHOTO: LEIGH VOGEL — POOL VIA CNP/ZUMA PRESS

“We recognize that we need to move from a public-private partnership, information-sharing approach to implementing minimum mandates,” said Anne Neuberger, deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, on the same call as Ms. Walden.

“Information-sharing and public-private partnerships are inadequate for the threats we face when we look at critical infrastructure,” Ms. Neuberger said. 

Who does it affect?

While the strategy calls for federal agencies to improve their defenses through the implementation of more advanced security, there are also provisions and suggestions for grants for state and local governments and private companies, particularly critical infrastructure operators and technology suppliers.

A key thread throughout the document is the need for greater responsibility from the private sector—particularly larger and better-resourced companies—to ensure data and systems are protected from hackers. The strategy calls for greater liability for companies that fail to build minimum security standards into their products.

Companies with more resources should be asked to do more, Ms. Walden said. “Today, across the public and private sectors, we tend to devolve responsibility for cyber risk downwards. We ask individuals, small businesses and local governments to shoulder a significant burden for defending us all,” she said. “This isn’t just unfair, it’s ineffective.”

The strategy calls for laws to govern how personal data is collected and protected, and says that national guidelines should be developed by bodies such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology, an arm of the Commerce Department. 

What are the next steps?

The Office of the National Cyber Director said it would work with the Office of Management and Budget to publish a plan for putting the strategy into effect and report annually to the president and lawmakers on its progress. Both agencies will issue annual guidance to federal departments and agencies on cybersecurity budgets and work with Congress for additional funding requirements, such as grants. Areas that require changes to existing policies will be led by the NSC, the strategy says.

The implementation plan has been developed in tandem with the strategy, a senior administration official said Wednesday evening. Some elements have been put into motion already. 

“We anticipate that we will have a public snapshot of the implementation plan out in the coming months,” the official said.

Write to James Rundle at james.rundle@wsj.com

23. Russia Using Western Satellites to Hone Attacks in Ukraine

A reminder:

This matter brings to mind a saying attributed to Socialist Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin: the last capitalist we hang shall be the one who sold us the rope

Excerpts:

As many as ten companies are suspected of selling satellite images to Russia which are then used to attack critical infrastructure sites in Ukraine, sources with knowledge of the issue confirmed to Kyiv Post.

Such sales would be in violation of current United States and European Union sanctions against Russia.

Included among those suspected of trading with Russia and its proxies are companies from the USA, South Korea, the European Union, Israel and China.

Russia Using Western Satellites to Hone Attacks in Ukraine

kyivpost.com

Ukrainian officials tell the Kyiv Post that certain European and US companies may be involved in providing satellite images to Russia which are then used to target Ukraine's critical infrastructure.

by Jason Jay Smart | March 2, 2023, 11:39 am |

A rescuer looks at a residential building damaged by a missile attack in the village of Kluhyno-Bashkyrivka, Kharkiv region on Dec. 2, 2022. PHOTO: AFP

As many as ten companies are suspected of selling satellite images to Russia which are then used to attack critical infrastructure sites in Ukraine, sources with knowledge of the issue confirmed to Kyiv Post.

Such sales would be in violation of current United States and European Union sanctions against Russia.

Included among those suspected of trading with Russia and its proxies are companies from the USA, South Korea, the European Union, Israel and China.

During a recent session of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives, Daniel J. Kritenbrink the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, revealed that a Chinese company had sold satellite images to the Wagner Group organization.

One senior Ukrainian official told the Kyiv Post that he had reviewed the intelligence relating to the issue and confirmed that Russia had partnered with foreign companies: "Yes, of course this is happening”. In his view it is because there is little if any oversight of the purchase and sale of satellite imagery for commercial purposes in these countries.

A pro-Ukraine activist told the Kyiv Post that he had disseminated information about this illicit practice to a number of European lawmakers, in the hope that they would take action. His view is that all companies potentially involved in this activity must be fully investigated and criminally prosecuted if found to be in violation of the law. The activist continued that it was imperative that there was a major overhaul of current legislation and that there was more stringent regulation of the satellite industry.

A European Union Member of Parliament, in a former Warsaw Pact country, confirmed that he had received information relating to the use of foreign satellites in this way and that he and his colleagues were keen to investigate the claims and to take the necessary steps to put an end to this practice through the introduction of some form of regulation.

Another Ukrainian official told the Kyiv Post that it was likely that Russia was using front companies, some even located in Ukraine, to purchase the images. These companies would present themselves as a genuine organization, such as the “Ukrainian Geological Research Group”, to avoid suspicion. The source indicated that it was clear that if such a company might "routinely order photos of an object such as an energy station”. Then, if immediately following a missile attack on the energy station, the “Research” company stopped ordering photos of that location, then it is obvious that the photos were ordered to facilitate the missile strike.

At the same time as there has been a surge in calls to provide Ukraine with more air defense technology, something that President Biden promised during his recent trip to Ukraine, an official in Kyiv told the Kyiv Post that in spite of the fact that the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had been contacted for assistance it had yet to take any concrete steps to investigate and prosecute those involved in the dirty business.

The FBI declined the Kyiv Post's request for comment.

Jason Jay Smart

Jason Jay Smart, Ph.D., is a political adviser who has lived and worked in Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Latin America. Due to his work with the democratic opposition to Pres. Vladimir Putin, Smart was persona non grata, for life, by Russia in 2010. His websites can be found at www.JasonJaySmart.com / www.AmericanPoliticalServices.com / fb.com/jasonjaysmart / Twitter: @OfficeJJSmart

24. Xi’s Communist Party wants even more centralized control

​Excerpts:​

The Beijing Youth Daily said in a commentary on February 28 that streamlining the State Council and changing government functions are two main themes of the coming reform, which nominally aims to build a modern socialist country and advance the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation.

It said the Party had reformed its organization five times and the State Council had changed its structure eight times over the past four decades. It noted the State Council had gradually reduced the number of its ministries and departments from about 100 in 1982 to 26 in 2018.

It also said some new bodies, such as the State Administration for Market Regulation, the National Healthcare Security Administration and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, were formed in 2018 to handle the problems unresolved by individual departments.​

Xi’s Communist Party wants even more centralized control

Leader thinks Party should operate like ‘a body controls an arm, which controls a finger’ – meaning less power for ‘last mile’ frontline officers

asiatimes.com · by Jeff Pao · March 2, 2023

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has proposed to restructure the government’s organization. The 20th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee closed its three-day second plenary session on Tuesday with big plans to change the government’s structure Xinhua reported.

The proposal, known as the Party and State Institutional Reform Plan, nominally aims to boost efficiency to achieve high-quality growth while ensuring social stability and must ultimately be approved by the National People’s Congress (NPC).

But is that all it’s about? A deeper read shows that the plan seeks to establish more state control and centralization, long-favored themes of President Xi Jinping.

When Xi said in his speech at the plenary that the Party must strengthen its leadership in government departments and ensure that they will fully implement its proposed reform, close observers could hark back to an article he published in July 2020 that called for strengthening the party’s establishment.

In that article, he said that the CCP had already set up more than 3,200 party committees, 145,000 working groups and 4.68 million grass-roots party organizations in China.

Controlling the fingers

“No other political party in the world has such an advantage as ours,” Xi wrote then. He wrote that such an advantage can only be fully leveraged if the party has strong executive power and a compact organization, operating the way “a body controls an arm, which controls a finger.”

He said the central government’s orders must not be blocked by frontline officers, or the so-called “last mile.”

In Xi Jinping’s view, things haven’t changed all that much since the Han Dynasty. Image: history.com

The concept of “a body controlling a finger” was raised by Chinese political theorist Jia Yi, who was born in 200 BC during the Han Dynasty. Jia said the central government should centralize the country’s political and economic power and have absolute control over feudal lords.

Xi’s 2020 article written in the Jia tradition was not a one-off. Xuexi Shibao (Study Times), a journal of the Central Party School, published an article in October 2021 praising Jia’s theory.

The NPC’s annual meeting will start on March 5. While the proposal’s details have not been announced, Xinhua said the Party will coordinate and lead all departments in central and local governments to improve their governance and make decisions in a scientific way to solve the problems the country is facing.

“At present, the world’s major changes unseen in a century are accelerating, the world has entered a new period of turmoil and change,” Xi said in his speech during the second plenary session.

“Our country’s development has entered a period in which strategic opportunities, risks and challenges coexist, while uncertainties and unpredictable factors are increasing,” he said.

He said China’s contraction in demand, supply shocks and weakening growth expectations have slowed the country’s economic recovery while the society is facing a lot of deep-seated conflicts. He said that because unexpected events may happen at any time, all party members must stay vigilant and prepare for struggle.

Civilian population control has been a pressing issue for the Party in recent times.

Last November, thousands of angry protesters rallied on streets in different cities across the city, holding white papers and calling for the cancellation of China’s Covid rules.

The protests forced Beijing to loosen its anti-epidemic rules in December, but the sudden change of policy resulted in a sharp increase in Covid deaths.

Chinese demonstrators hold up blank sheets of paper during a protest in Beijing on November 28, 2022. Image: Screengrab / CNN

In 2021 and 2022, homebuyers and suppliers held many rounds of protests in front of the headquarters of Evergrande Group in Shenzhen as they became victims of the heavily-indebted property firm’s financial problems.

The Beijing Youth Daily said in a commentary on February 28 that streamlining the State Council and changing government functions are two main themes of the coming reform, which nominally aims to build a modern socialist country and advance the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation.

It said the Party had reformed its organization five times and the State Council had changed its structure eight times over the past four decades. It noted the State Council had gradually reduced the number of its ministries and departments from about 100 in 1982 to 26 in 2018.

It also said some new bodies, such as the State Administration for Market Regulation, the National Healthcare Security Administration and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, were formed in 2018 to handle the problems unresolved by individual departments.

Read: Hints of a great recentralization of power in China

Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

asiatimes.com · by Jeff Pao · March 2, 2023

25. Five key takeaways from US House hearing on China

Excerpts:

1. The days of engagement are over

2. Reframing the debate

3. Confronting China’s leaders, not its people

4. Reshaping policy on three fronts

Taiwan

Economic competitiveness

Human rights

5. A boilerplate response from Beijing

Five key takeaways from US House hearing on China​

Inaugural meeting of new China-related select committee points toward more hawkish policies ahead​

asiatimes.com · by Michael Beckley · March 2, 2023

In a rare show of bipartisanship, Republican and Democratic House members put on a united front as they probed how to respond to the perceived growing threat of China.

The inaugural hearing of the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party comes at a delicate time – amid concerns in the US over Chinese espionage and tensions over Taiwan and China’s position on the Ukraine war.

Michael Beckley, an expert on US-China relations at Tufts University, was among those watching on as witnesses gave evidence during the committee’s prime-time session. Here are his takeaways from what was discussed.

1. The days of engagement are over

What was abundantly clear from the lawmakers was the message that the era of engagement with China is long past its sell-by date.

Engagement had been the policy of successive governments from Nixon’s landmark visit to China in 1972 onward. But there was a general acceptance among committee members that the policy is outdated and that it is time to adopt if not outright containment then certainly a more competitive policy.

This would include “selective decoupling” – that is, the disentangling – of technology and economic interests, along with a more robust stance on confronting China’s military and providing a barrier to Chinese conquest in East Asia.

This proposed hardening of the US policy is driven by internal developments in China as well as any perceived external threat. President Xi Jinping is viewed as having installed himself as “dictator for life” and created an Orwellian internal control system, complete with concentration camps and hundreds of millions of security cameras all over the country; this is a regime that is only becoming more authoritarian as the years go by.

Chinese President Xi Jinping on a large screen during a cultural performance as part of the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China on June 28, 2021. Photo: AFP / Noel Celis

It has dispelled any idea that with its economic opening China would also become a more open society.

And the committee appears to want to set a course for the long term, not just for the near future. The general idea is US policy over the next 10 years could determine the relationship between the US and China for the next century.

Representative Mike Gallagher, the panel’s Republican chair, said as much in his opening comments: “This is an existential struggle over what life will look like in the 21st century – and the most fundamental freedoms are at stake.”

2. Reframing the debate

As Gallagher’s remarks suggest, the panel implied that US issues with China do not boil down to just disagreement over a few issues. Rather, it was framed as a battle between two very different visions of society.

The committee is clearly modeled on the January 6 House panel – for example, by airing hearings in prime time and with dramatic testimony from witnesses. The idea seems to be that the issue is of such importance that to pursue it successfully the U.S. public needs to be educated, invested and mobilized.

To that end, the inaugural session had testimony from an activist jailed for two years for supporting pro-democracy movements. The point was to get across the idea that the way of life that the US is trying to promote – both at home and abroad – is antithetical to that of the Chinese Communist Party.

President Joe Biden has similarly framed his administration’s policy around the idea that this is an epic struggle between democracy and autocracy. Indeed, in some ways Biden has been more hawkish than previous presidents on China. In terms of tightening economic restrictions on China and stressing US concerns over China’s human rights record, Biden has picked up the baton from his predecessors and run with it.

But the panel was keen to stress this as a bipartisan push for a more hawkish policy. And this is important. It gives the panel’s recommendations more heft, especially as the US heads into the 2024 presidential race, during which both parties will be looking to stress how tough they are on the US’s adversaries.

3. Confronting China’s leaders, not its people

Although framed as a battle between democracy and autocracy, the panel appears conscious that the debate shouldn’t be framed as a clash of Western and Asian civilizations.

With anti-Asian sentiment having risen during the Covid-19 pandemic, US lawmakers are walking a fine line here – they will need to focus any criticism on Chinese leaders rather than its people.

Gallagher made this point, noting: “We must constantly distinguish between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people themselves, who have always been the party’s primary victims.”

China’s ‘zero-Covid’ exit has raised economic hopes that will only be met through more domestic consumption. Image: Screengrab / HBO

This balancing act may be more difficult in future hearings when issues of Chinese students at US universities, immigration and cooperation with China on certain scientific issues come up. That is when they will need to weigh concerns over Chinese espionage against not coming across as anti-Chinese visitors and immigrants.

4. Reshaping policy on three fronts

Although this first hearing was very much a table-setter, there were three broad policy recommendations implicit in the testimony:

• Taiwan – The panel heard evidence suggesting that the U.S. needs to mobilize for the potential of a hot war with China over the island of Taiwan, the status of which is contested. Former National Security Adviser H R McMaster told the panel that in regards to China, the next two years would be a particularly “dangerous” period. He suggested that US capabilities to deter an invasion of Taiwan were not adequate. Meanwhile, there were mentions of a backlog in weapon sales to Taiwan. And as the war in Ukraine has underscored, there is an imperative to get weapons on the ground before any shooting starts.
• Economic competitiveness – The panel heard evidence from the U.S. National Association of Manufacturers pointing out how China had stacked global trade in its favor through unfair subsidies and corporate espionage. To improve America’s competitiveness, the panel could look at recommending the expansion of export controls or tax reforms to make US products more competitive. The US is also eyeing a strategic decoupling with China on the economic front, which is encouraging US businesses to divest from Chinese operations and restricting Chinese businesses operating in the US, such as the social media platform TikTok.
• Human rights – The committee made it clear that human rights should be front and center in US’ China policy going forward. The hearing repeatedly stressed that this was not just an economic and security disagreement but a clash of values.

5. A boilerplate response from Beijing

China’s response to the committee’s inaugural hearing was standard.

In a statement, the foreign ministry in Beijing said it rejected Washington’s attempt to engage in what it called a “Cold War” mindset. Chinese media also tried to make it sound as if anti-China policy is driven by special interests, including defense contractors and members of the Taiwanese diaspora.

The narrative that the US is warmongering was aided by the interjection of two protesters from the Code Pink activist group, who held up a sign during the hearing stating that “China is not our enemy.”

Michael Beckley is Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

asiatimes.com · by Michael Beckley · March 2, 2023

​26. From Balloons to Nukes, We Must Stop Inflating the China Threat

​inflating the threat or dealing with the world as it really is and not as we would wish it to be? Does anyone really want a Cold War? Why would we want a Cold War? But are China's actions creating a Cold War environment? Or is it the US (as I think this author argues) that is creating the Cold War conditions?

A reminder from the Joint Concept for Competing from the Joint Staff. Do we accept this premise?

China, in particular, has rapidly become more assertive; it is the only competitor capable of mounting a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system. In 1999, Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui wrote the “new principles of war are…using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.” Accordingly, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not seek to defeat the United States in a direct military confrontation. The PRC intends to deter U.S. intervention militarily and present the United States with a fait accompli that compels the United States to accept a strategic outcome that results in a PRC regional sphere of influence and an international system more favorable to PRC national interests and authoritarian preferences. https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/joint-concept-competing

My thesis: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.

From Balloons to Nukes, We Must Stop Inflating the China Threat

We are better off talking to Beijing than getting tangled up in a new arms race.

BY TOM Z. COLLINA

POLICY DIRECTOR, PLOUGHSHARES FUND

MARCH 1, 2023 11:05 AM ET

defenseone.com · by Tom Z. Collina

Washington has an uncanny ability to make mountains out of molehills, exaggerate threats, and weaponize any situation into a crisis. It’s as if the Washington political scene thinks there are not enough problems in the world, so it needs to create some new ones. And the number one target for crisis creation right now, both on spy balloons and nuclear weapons, is China.

Take the recent spy balloon imbroglio. Yes, China launched a spy balloon that wound up crossing the United States, and no, we should not believe Beijing’s cover story that this was an innocent weather balloon. But that does not necessarily mean, as Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., implied, that this was a Chinese plan to embarrass the United States: “It’s not just the balloon,” Rubio said. “It’s the message to try to send the world that America, ‘We can do whatever we want, and America can’t stop us.’”

Well, maybe China can’t do whatever it wants. According to weather analysis from the Washington Post, it appears that Beijing never intended the balloon to cross the United States at all. Weather models indicate that an unexpected cold front may have pushed the balloon north, away from its planned path, suggesting “that the ensuing international crisis that has ratcheted up tensions between Washington and Beijing may have been at least partly the result of a mistake,” the Post writes. CIA Director William Burns said that as to “when and what the Chinese leadership knew about the trajectory of this balloon, I honestly can’t say.”

And according to the New York Times, U.S. officials insist the Chinese balloon “did not retrieve any information that Chinese satellites and other intelligence assets cannot already collect.”

Unfortunately, it appears that the political brouhaha over the spy balloon led the Biden administration to overreact. Biden may have been justified in shooting down the balloon off the Carolina coast on Feb. 4, but it made little sense to cancel Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China that was planned for soon after. Ironically, that meeting was intended to reduce tensions between Washington and Beijing.

Then the Biden administration proceeded to shoot down three more unidentified objects over the next three days. Biden’s policy of “shoot first and ask questions later” looks overly aggressive now that it appears that these presumed balloons might not have been from China or posed any threat. As the president later said, the intelligence community’s current assessment is that these objects were most likely balloons tied to private companies, recreation, or research institutions. Efforts to recover the debris from two of these incidents have been abandoned.

Balloon threats are not the only ones getting inflated lately. In early February, the Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. Strategic Command found that China now has more launchers (not missiles or nuclear warheads) for intercontinental ballistic missiles than the United States. Rep. Mike Rogers, R–Ala., the new chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, rushed to falsely claim that China is “rapidly approaching parity with the United States” in nuclear forces. “We cannot allow that to happen. The time for us to adjust our force posture and increase capabilities to meet this threat is now,” Rogers said. This is simply not true.

Yes, China is building several hundred new underground missile launchers, known as silos. But even if these launchers are complete (which is not clear, see here), most of them are empty; they are holes in the ground, containing neither missiles nor nuclear warheads. Moreover, the United States has many more nuclear warheads on ICBMs, submarines, and bombers than Beijing.

Bottom line: the United States today has well over ten times more nuclear weapons than China. It’s true (and concerning) that Beijing is building up, but even if you believe worst-case predictions, China’s nuclear arsenal will remain just a fraction of the size of the U.S. arsenal a decade from now. Increasing the U.S. arsenal in response is not only unneeded but counterproductive: it could provoke Beijing (and Moscow) to build up more.

In both the balloon and nuclear sagas, we are better off talking to Beijing to deflate tensions than getting tangled up in a new arms race. We need to better understand what China was trying to do with its errant balloon and why it is building up its nuclear force. But by jumping from concern to panic we create a toxic political environment that makes diplomacy impossible and conflict more likely. The Biden administration has yet to reschedule the cancelled meeting with China and the relationship has continued to go south as the two nations trade accusations about their spy networks. Washington and Beijing need more transparency, not less.

President Biden has rightly said he is “not looking for a new Cold War,” yet that is exactly what some hawks in Congress seem to want. But just as with the U.S.-Soviet cold war, an arms race with Beijing is not good for U.S. national security or the American people—and is not inevitable. We must create a more rational debate about real vs. imagined threats from China before we make our own worst fears come true.

defenseone.com · by Tom Z. Collina

27. China Trumps U.S. in Key Technology Research, Report Says

Some strategic competition:

China Trumps U.S. in Key Technology Research, Report Says

Australian think tank finds Chinese researchers beating Americans in 37 of 44 critical areas

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-trumps-u-s-in-key-technology-research-report-says-adbb56bc

By James T. AreddyFollow

March 2, 2023

Chinese researchers lead their American counterparts in the study of dozens of critical technologies, according to a new report that proposes Beijing is dominant in some scientific pursuits and positioned to develop key future breakthroughs.

The report, published Thursday by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, puts Chinese researchers ahead of Americans in 37 of 44 technologies examined, across the sectors of defense, space, robotics, energy, environment, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, advanced materials and quantum technology.

“In the long term, China’s leading research position means that it has set itself up to excel not just in current technological development in almost all sectors, but in future technologies that don’t yet exist,” ASPI concludes. No other nation is close to China and the U.S. in the research race, according to the Canberra-based think tank, which is primarily funded by Australia’s government. The report put India and the U.K. distantly behind them in most sectors, followed by South Korea and Germany.

The report says China’s research interest and performance in military and space sectors are particularly notable, including in the field of hypersonics—the technology of an advanced missile China tested last year that appeared to surprise the U.S. defense community. Chinese researchers generated more than 48% of the high-impact research papers on advanced aircraft engines, including hypersonics, and China is home to seven of the world’s top 10 research institutions focused on such study, according to the report. One of them, Beijing’s Chinese Academy of Sciences, ranks first or second in most sectors graded.

The findings are the latest indication China is reaping the results of a relentless effort to overtake the U.S. at the cutting edge of engineering, science and technology, an effort that leader Xi Jinping has kicked into overdrive during his decade in power. 

The word “research” appeared a dozen times in a major policy address Mr. Xi delivered last October. It pledged more financing for advanced-technology development and improved working conditions for researchers, even as officials in Beijing identify often-wasted spending and a lag behind American capabilities in technological achievements.

China first overtook the U.S. in annual patent filings in 2011, and in 2021 its count was well over twice the U.S.’s, at 1.58 million, according to the World Intellectual Property Organization, a United Nations agency. 

In the wake of such trends, other evidence indicates academics internationally increasingly recognize quality in Chinese research. It appeared more often than U.S. research in the top 1% most-cited scientific publications between 2018 and 2020—a first—according to a tally published last year by the Japanese government-funded​​ National Institute of Science and Technology Policy.

Also, more China-born, U.S.-trained scientists are returning to China, The Wall Street Journal has reported. More than 1,400 Chinese scientists dropped their U.S. academic or corporate affiliation for a Chinese one in 2021, in part because of China’s growing strength in cutting-edge research.  The ASPI report says a fifth of the research-paper authors in the report studied at one time in at least one of five Western countries that include the U.S.

At a special House committee meeting on Tuesday, Washington lawmakers displayed discomfort about China’s centrality in global supply chains in advanced industries, including its 85% share of both global battery manufacturing and refining capacity for rare-earth minerals. The U.S. Defense Department is concerned about dependency on China for some technologies its contractors use, and about the fusion of Beijing’s military and civilian industries to produce dual-use technology—items that have both commercial and military applications.

U.S. vs. China: The Race to Develop the Most Advanced Chips

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U.S. vs. China: The Race to Develop the Most Advanced Chips

Play video: U.S. vs. China: The Race to Develop the Most Advanced Chips

After working for years to catch up on U.S. technology, China has developed a chip that can rival Nvidia’s powerful A100. WSJ unpacks the processors’ design and capability as the two superpowers race for dominance in artificial intelligence. Illustration: Sharon Shi

In response to competition from China, the Biden administration this week rolled out a $53 billion federal subsidy program, dubbed Chips, that is meant to encourage the domestic production of semiconductors. President Biden said in his State of the Union address last month that the U.S. is investing in American innovation and industries that will define the future “and that China’s government is intent on dominating.”

For its report, ASPI said, it measured scientific and technological capability, or what it calls “high-impact research.” It said the conclusions are based on 2.2 million research citations published in leading academic papers between 2018 and 2022.

Although the report’s findings show China building a lead in critical technologies, they come with a major caveat: It is difficult to turn research breakthroughs into manufacturing success. For example, despite ample evidence China is determined to spend big to master technologies like jet engines, its engineers have struggled for decades to produce them, so its commercial- and military-aviation sectors mostly rely on foreign suppliers. 

It is similar for China in semiconductors, a sector the ASPI report says remains a U.S. mainstay for its design and development of advanced chips. The U.S. is also ahead in high-performance computing, as well as quantum computing and medical countermeasures like vaccines, the report said.

But in a range of technologies, China has a lead large enough that it could pose a monopoly risk, the report said: tiny nanoscale materials and coatings that can give manufactured products new properties, advanced communications like 5G, battery-related technologies needed for machines like electric vehicles, biology that can be synthetically manufactured to boost food production and photonic sensors that offer new ways to manipulate light.

Write to James T. Areddy at James.Areddy@wsj.com

28. Analysis: Xi wants China's security apparatus under his direct grip

Of course. What dictator would not?

Analysis: Xi wants China's security apparatus under his direct grip

Leader hurries to consolidate command following 'white paper' and 'white hair' movements

https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-Xi-wants-China-s-security-apparatus-under-his-direct-grip

KATSUJI NAKAZAWA, Nikkei senior staff writer

MARCH 2, 2023 04:00 JS

Katsuji Nakazawa is a Tokyo-based senior staff and editorial writer at Nikkei. He spent seven years in China as a correspondent and later as China bureau chief. He was the 2014 recipient of the Vaughn-Ueda International Journalist prize.

It has been 10 years since Zhou Yongkang, the former Politburo Standing Committee member and boss of China's internal security apparatus, was purged.

So enormous was his influence at one point that even the country's top leader, then-President Hu Jintao, was unable to directly intervene in public security and police matters.

Now there are signs that the domestic security domain will be strengthened in a significant way, under Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.

Clues were laid in a communique issued Tuesday after a three-day session of the party's leadership -- known as the second plenary session of the party's 20th Central Committee.

Zhou Yongkang, the former boss of China's internal security apparatus © Reuters

It talked of "a plan for the reform of Party and state institutions," without giving specifics. It only said that the plan will be deliberated in accordance with due legal procedures at the upcoming annual session of the National People's Congress, China's parliament, which begins on Sunday.

Earlier at a separate meeting, Xi had said the reform would focus on resolving difficult issues that are serious and of social concern. He hinted at a sweeping overhaul of party and state organizations.

Some party sources have expressed concern, worrying that China is at risk of becoming a suffocating police state like the former Soviet Union. The crux of the matter is the possibility of creating a new police and state security organization placed under the direct command of Xi, the "core" of the party's Central Committee.

"There is a plan to beef up organizations related to state security and public security under a completely non-traditional framework," one source said, without giving details. "The number of personnel could double if rural areas are included. The goal is to establish such a structure by 2027, when the next national congress of the Communist Party will be held."

Another source noted that while all eyes are on what kind of economic stimulus measures will come out of the National People's Congress, the truly important element, politically, is the massive reform of party and state institutions.

"China could become a country like the former Soviet Union within the next four or five years," the source said.

A person walks by a giant screen in Beijing broadcasting news of Xi talking during the second plenary session of the party’s 20th Central Committee on Feb. 28. © Kyodo

Recently, Hong Kong-based Chinese-language newspaper Ming Pao reported that China's Ministry of Public Security, which supervises the police, and its Ministry of State Security, in charge of hunting down spies, will be separated from the State Council -- China's government -- and placed under the party as a new organization called the Central Internal Affairs Committee.

In China, law enforcement is not limited to formal public security and police organizations run by the central government. There are also units established by local governments in charge of managing public order. Removing unlicensed stalls from streets is one example of what these units do.

At large-scale events, such as the party's national congress or the National People's Congress, temporary administrative staffers appear, wearing jackets and armbands with "volunteer" printed on them.

Formal public security and police organizations are said to have more than 2 million members. But local law-enforcement organizations have even more.

In the 10 years of Xi's rule, the power of the central government has been gradually curtailed. Organizations and functions under the State Council have been shrunk, while there has been a proliferation of "small groups" under the direct control of the party's Central Committee.

In the eras of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, there was an effort to separate the party and government. Now, this trend has been unequivocally reversed.

The State Council Information Office, in charge of government public relations, still exists but has been integrated with the party's Publicity Department, in effect. It operates under the party organization.

In a report he delivered at the party's 19th national congress in 2017, Xi declared that the party would manage all organizations and groups within the country. The State Council has since seen its powers further reduced, with Premier Li Keqiang's influence lost.

If the new internal security organization is established, it will be placed under the direct control of Xi.

The problem is that the organization could wield more powers than necessary out of maximum consideration to Xi.

People gather for a vigil and hold white sheets of paper in protest over the zero-COVID policy in Beijing on Nov. 27, 2022. (Photo retouched for security reasons)  © Reuters

Lying behind the recent series of rapid developments is a sense of crisis Xi and the party's Central Committee have over the "white paper" and "white hair" movements.

The white paper movement, which demanded the immediate abolition of the strict zero-COVID policy, erupted in November, with some protesters even publicly calling for Xi to resign.

Many of those who were at the forefront of the movement in various parts of the country, holding up blank sheets of paper and shouting slogans, were young women. It is a new trend.

They and other participants in the movement from the end of last year to the beginning of this year were summoned by public security authorities for questioning.

But the authorities are scratching their heads over how to deal with the movement as it took an organic shape with no clear organizers.

Adding fuel to the difficult problem of social unrest was the white hair movement, which quickly sprouted in February. It is a massive demonstration, primarily by middle-aged and older retirees, against reduced benefits due to the reform of the medical insurance system.

An image posted on Twitter purportedly shows a scene from a demonstration in Wuhan, Hubei province, China, on Feb. 8. (Kyodo). © Kyodo

Wuhan, Hubei Province, was locked down for a long period after the novel coronavirus case was first discovered there more than three years ago.

In February, on-and-off demonstrations by those who retired from local companies took place in the provincial capital. According to local residents, those who shared videos of the demonstrations on social media and some of the protesters were detained.

Both movements are closely related. The reduction of medical benefits, for example, is a consequence of the failed zero-COVID policy.

For nearly three years, the policy was strictly imposed for political reasons, with huge amounts of government funds poured into conducting free PCR tests for all Chinese on a daily basis.

Meanwhile, government revenue sank due to an economic downturn amid sluggish consumption.

The finances of the central and local governments have deteriorated to such an extent that they cannot easily be restored.

If civil actions similar to the white movements spring up in the future, they could pose serious and unprecedented threats to the communist regime.

The strengthening of the security apparatus and the creation of a new party-run security organization are the result of such fears; they are defensive reactions.

Li Qiang speaks at the annual Central Economic Work Conference in Beijing in December 2022. © Xinhua/Kyodo

Xi has cemented his grip on the party by waging a fierce anti-corruption campaign over the past decade. In one sense, he has achieved great success. But this campaign has targeted only party members, which now count nearly 100 million.

Those who played an active role in the white paper and white hair movements are, however, among the remaining 1.3 billion ordinary folks who have no direct relationship with the party. The methods that worked in the anti-corruption campaign do not work.

Li Qiang, a close aide to Xi, is set to become China's new premier at the upcoming National People's Congress.

It is believed that Li's first job so far has been to compile policies toward significantly boosting the economy, something that attracts global attention.

But in reality, his most important political mission is likely to be reducing the powers of the State Council, China's government, and transferring more government powers to the party's Central Committee.

Li will hold his inaugural news conference when the annual session of the National People's Congress closes in mid-March. What message will he send to Chinese people and the rest of the world?

29. BlackSky details building of China's secret naval base in Cambodia

Another form of strategic competition?

I recall a conference speaker a few years ago describing the citizenship laws in Cambodia. Apparently you obtain Cambodian citizenship rather quickly. Allegedly a large number of Chinese citizens (members of the CCP) were moving to Cambodia obtaining citizenship and then influencing elections or running for office to influence local and national decision making. Is that how "secret bases" are authorized and built?

https://www.naval-technology.com/news/blacksky-details-building-of-chinas-secret-naval-base-in-cambodia/

BlackSky details building of China's secret naval base in Cambodia

BlackSky geospatial satellite imagery intelligence discovers construction to accommodate aircraft carriers at suspect base in Cambodia.

Andrew Salerno-Garthwaite

Satelite imagery from BlackSky displayed at DGI London, annotated to show the submerged foundation of a large pier construction project at the Ream naval base off the coast of Cambodia. Photo courtesy of BlackSky.

The construction of a secret naval staging facility for Chinese military vessels off the coast of Cambodia was detailed at the DGI London conference on 28 February by geospatial intelligence company BlackSky​.​

This will be only the second staging facility China has outside of its territory and poses a challenge to Cambodia's neighbours in the region. In addition, such a facility would allow China further power projection in any future crisis over Taiwan.

On 22 February Radio Free Asia published satellite imagery describing the scale of development that had occurred at the port of Ream from 1 July 2022 until 28 January 2023, outlining new construction and massive land clearance. Radio Free Asia also detailed the construction of two new piers, highlighting that "they seem to be temporary ones to ferry in construction materials and equipment and not naval piers for warships". 

However, analysts familiar with the site contradict this claim, stating that there has been further construction to extend one of these piers in recent months. The capability provided by this pier is in excess of the specifications needed for ferrying construction materials, and instead meets requirements to service China's warships. 

Satellite imagery from BlackSky shows the pier extending into waters deep enough to service aircraft carriers, with columns deployed to a length sufficient to moor these vessels.

Reports began to emerge last year that China was leasing a pier on the island of Ream off the coast of Sihanoukville, but the allegations were firmly denied by Phnom Penh, which responded by saying granting access to the base would be in volition of Cambodia's constitution.

In July 2022 the Wall Street Journal published the account of US officials who had seen an early draft of a deal between Cambodia and China that would allow China to use the base for thirty years, storing weapons, posting military personnel and berthing warships. 

BlackSky's geospatial intelligence

BlackSky's network of 14 satellites captured the scene as a part of its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, which provide users with the capability to automatically task satellites based on all-source intelligence cues.

"We started monitoring this facility, at first at a low frequency, maybe once a week, once every couple of weeks. Then as we started to understand the pace of activity at this facility was picking up, we picked up the rate we were doing collection and analytics," said BlackSky CEO Brian O'Toole, speaking at the conference.

"And then that started getting us some interesting insights relating to the pace of construction and ultimately to start to deliver information about how fast this is moving along and potentially when this facility is going to come online."

The BlackSky satellite constellation has been engineered to provide ISR capabilities with end users operating any device, serving as an intelligence provider to deployed troops in active environments. Using mobile technology, frontline operators can request and receive detailed satellite imagery within an hour of the requisition, well ahead of an industry standard that can see individual tickets take several days to complete.

The same system was tasked with monitoring the movements of vessels around Ream, revealing a flurry of activity through the port in recent months. 

BlackSky's tip-and-cue enabling functions allow a user to set a specific 'tip' – for example the arrival or departure of a ship from a location – to 'cue' the collection of satellite imagery in the area. The size of the constellation allows the simultaneous capturing of images across the portion of the world monitored through BlackSky's constellation inclined orbit.

30. DOD Inspector Sees No Signs Ukraine Is Diverting Weapons—But Promises More Scrutiny

DOD Inspector Sees No Signs Ukraine Is Diverting Weapons—But Promises More Scrutiny

As lawmakers worry about the possibility of stolen arms, incoming IG says 20 audits are underway or planned.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

The Defense Department is increasing its scrutiny of U.S. arms and other aid flowing to Ukraine, the department’s incoming inspector general told lawmakers on Tuesday.

Robert Storch, who spent years working to uncover corruption in Ukraine long before Volodymyr Zelenskyy became president, told the Hosue Armed Services Committee that the country’s top leaders have promised to remain tightly focused on the issue of corruption. Still, Storch said, “We're in the trust-but-verify business.”

His office has 20 audits going on or planned, and is also working with other inspectors general and the Government Accountability Office to monitor weapons shipments and make sure that they’re getting to the right place.

“We're also working with our partners to make sure that there aren't any gaps with regard to the different types of assistance that are being provided,” he said.

During Tuesday’s hearing, lawmakers looked for reassurances that Ukraine was living up to its commitments and not allowing low-level officials to steal and resell weapons. Several described Ukraine as—at least historically—corrupt, a perception that former President Donald Trump has used in rationalizing his own efforts to coerce Ukraine to perform political favors in exchange for congressionally authorized aid.

Said Storch, “You know, I've worked the Ukraine issue now for about nine years and in our engagements over that entire period, corruption was the No. 1 issue we raised with Ukrainian officials. And I think there have been improvements over time, especially in the defense sector.”

Ukraine achieved its worst score on Transparency International’s corruption index back in 2013 under Putin-ally Viktor Yanukovych. Zelenskyy’s government has installed measures to provide transparent record-keeping to satisfy international partners, donors, and lenders,. Those efforts include a five-year action plan to tackle corruption and the launching of an online procurement tracker to let anyone monitor how Ukraine aid is being spent. These efforts have been reflected in an improved corruption index score.

Recently, Zelensky fired several top military officials on corruption charges, a sign that, despite these efforts, corruption continues in the country but also that the government is willing to take public actions to curb it.

In some ways, the Defense Department inspector general will find it harder to conduct end-use monitoring in Ukraine than in Afghanistan, where there were far more U.S. officials.

Defense undersecretary for policy Colin Kahl told lawmakers on Tuesday that Ukrainians were working to make sure that they could continue to give the U.S. data on inventories and transfer logs.

“We have provided them handheld scanners. That data gets transmitted directly back to us so that we can keep custody. We have shared NATO-standard inventory and logistics software. We also have access to that data. And then, of course, we do have a presence at the embassy. We have an office of defense cooperation and they have done six different site visits out from Kyiv,” Kahl said. “It's a dangerous place and we don't have outposts across the country. They have seen no signs of diversion or that the Ukrainians are not following procedures.”

Storch told lawmakers that he had seen no evidence that Ukraine has put weapons into the wrong hands.

“We have not substantiated any such instances,” he said.

But even if Ukraine is living up to its commitments, the Defense Department must work harder to make sure monitoring is effective, he said, repeating a point that the inspector’s office made in two management advisories last year. Storch said that he had since seen some improvement in the Defense Department’s record-keeping procedures in Ukraine.

The issue of weapons diversion now comes as many lawmakers debate how much continued aid for Ukraine is appropriate, especially in light of another recent inspector general report highlighting how political corruption hurt U.S. efforts in Afghanistan to build up partner forces there.

Storch pointed out that the two countries were highly dissimilar.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com