Quotes of the Day:

"War is what happens when language fails."

– Margaret Atwood

"You'll worry less about what people think about you when you realize how seldom they do."

– David Foster Wallace

"Poetry is the lens we use to interrogate the history we stand on and the future we stand for."

– Amanda Gorman

1. North Korea's psychological operations target the South

2. Alliance partners: With cultural understanding comes mutual respect

3. The End Of The Miracle That Is South Korea

4. Korea Reunification Isn’t Coming—And Great-Power Politics Is Why

5. [Column] How North Korea’s upcoming party congress could change history

6. North Korea rehearses parade as party congress nears, report says

7. Contemporary warfare in Ukraine: Is Seoul asleep at the wheel?

8. S. Korean missionary arrested in Russia

9. N. Korea's Kim calls for 'epochal progress' in rural areas ahead of key party congress

10. Kim Jong Un admits to ‘empty’ promises on rural development, vows change

11. Medvedev says Russia can learn from North Korea’s success under sanctions

12. Epstein was ‘very’ interested in North Korea business prospects, emails show

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1. North Korea's psychological operations target the South

Summary:

The article argues that north Korean psychological operations are centralized under the Kim regime and ultimately controlled by the Korean Workers’ Party, with major roles for the Propaganda and Agitation Department and the General Political Bureau. While much PSYOP indoctrinates the north Korean public, the external focus targets South Korea’s military and society to sow confusion, fear, and distrust, and targets the United States and Japan to a lesser degree. Tools include DMZ loudspeakers, billboards, and leaflets delivered by balloons, rockets, and drones. The KPA’s GPB Enemy Attack Bureau (204th Liaison Station, 563rd Unit) conducts broadcasts, disinformation, clandestine activity, and wartime population control, but operations are constrained by poor equipment, electricity, and economic weakness; they remain relentless and disciplined.

Comment: My good friend and mentor Bob Collins provides insights we rarely encounter about north Korea. The Kim family regime is relentless with its propaganda. Yet the ROK/US alliance barely conducts any information and influence activities. Why will it be easier to get permission to conduct a kinetic strike in wartime than to get permission to put an idea between the ears of an nKPA soldier now? 

My thoughts are below on why we should be conducting aggressive information warfare against north Korea now. We should be turning the Army's Information Warfare branch loose on north Korea and the nKPA right now. north Korea is the perfect laboratory for practicing information warfare.

A Psychological Operations Strategy for the Korean Peninsula from Lessons Learned in Ukraine

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/a-psychological-operations-strategy-for-the-korean-peninsula-from-lessons-learned-in-ukraine/

Freedom: Information, human rights and the future of a unified Korea

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/10/21/perspective-north-Korea-human-rights/2851761076216/

Voices Feb. 2, 2026 / 12:24 PM

North Korea's psychological operations target the South

By Robert Collins

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/02/perspective-north-korea-psychological-operations/3851770050541/

North Korean soldiers look toward the South side while U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield visits the truce village of Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone dividing the two Koreas in April 2024. Photo by Yonhap/EPA

Feb. 2 (UPI) -- North Korean psychological operations are centralized by the Kim regime, though specific functions are spread across political, military and intelligence agencies.

The focus of these efforts primarily targets the North and South Korean societies, as well as targeting the United States and Japan to a lesser degree.

Though the principal efforts of the Kim regime in psychological operations, or PSYOP, are designed to ideologically inculcate the North Korean people, this article focuses on the Kim regime's view of its external enemies.

Though there is no centralized "PSYOP Command" in North Korea, the Kim regime's Korean Workers' Party ultimately controls all such messaging. The party's Propaganda and Agitation Department plays a very significant role politically, and the General Political Bureau plays a dominant role militarily.

Related

• Kim Jong Un's war narrative
• What North Koreans want to know most: How does the world see us?
• N. Korea accuses S. Korea of drone incursions, warns Seoul 'pay price'

Under this leadership, the North's PSYOP wartime objectives target the South Korean military specifically, and the South's society in general, by sowing confusion, fear and distrust.

However, justifying the Kim regime by celebrating the Supreme Leader (Kim Jong Un, and currently, to a lesser degree, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il) is an ever-present theme of the North's PSYOP messages targeting its real and/or perceived enemies.

The tools employed to project these messages include loudspeaker broadcasts across the Demilitarized Zone and signs and billboards, as well as leaflet launches via balloons, light artillery rockets and even drones in recent years.

According to the Supreme Leader's strategy for unifying the fatherland, the GPB Enemy Attack Bureau operates inside the Korean People's Army and attacks North Korea's enemies operationally and strategically through psychological warfare compelling enemy soldiers and civilians to flee approaching North Korean forces.

This bureau, also known as the 204th Liaison Station, is designed to make rapid adjustments to the battlefield situation. During wartime, the focus is on enemy disruption and during armistice the focus is on propaganda and agitation of the South Korean population.

The 204th employs disinformation to target South Korean society leaders, college students and the general population to cause confusion in South Korean social discourse and to persuade pro-North Korean elements in the South.

The Enemy Attack Bureau also maintains a print shop that can produce propaganda leaflets for dispersal on the battlefield.

The mission set focuses on disruption of enemy army's cohesion through anti-South Korea broadcasting, leaflets and psychological warfare. It works closely with the Reconnaissance General Bureau to obtain target data. Personnel are trained at Ma Dong-hui Military College (formerly Apnokgang College) in Pyongyang.

The Enemy Attack Bureau, sometimes referred to as the Enemy Operations Department, is also administratively known as the 563rd Unit. The 563rd was formerly operationally controlled by the Korean Workers' Party Unification Front Department -- redesignated the KWP Central Committee 10th Bureau in 2024 or 2025 -- during peacetime.

It conducts clandestine operations against South Korean soldiers, as well as kidnapping and propaganda broadcasts along the DMZ, and it distributes leaflets and other printed materials. During wartime, it conducts operations against populations in territories occupied by the Korean People's Army, vetting reactionaries and seeking out supporters.

The 563rd is composed of:

• Two technical battalions, each with three companies

• Technical company controlled by corps-level political department and distributes leaflets

• Enemy Operations Broadcast Bureau controlled in peacetime by the corps political department and in wartime assigned to the division political department's Enemy Operations Section

• Broadcast position maintains 108 positions in forward division areas of operations

• Other assigned units include the Chilsong Trade Company and other foreign currency earning companies.

• Enemy Operations Teams conduct direct media and face-to-face operations.

Anti-South Korean Psychological Operations are conducted through a range of missions. Speaker broadcasts come from frontline broadcast positions. Direct media and face-to-face operations are under the control of the division-level General Political Bureau political department.

From 108 positions in forward-deployed divisions, the Korean People's Army PSYOP includes deification messages about Kim Il-song and Kim Jong-il, anti-South slander and anti-government agitation. There are 25 types of messages, broadcast nine to 14 times a day. But old equipment and inadequate electricity supply severely retard the North's operations.

Leaflet operations are conducted by the corps-level technical companies under the control of the Corps General Political Bureau political department. North Korea has 11 sites at various locations that launch propaganda leaflets that can reach forward South Korean areas and the capital region.

Leaflet messages are anti-South Korean government and pro-Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong-iI and Kim Il-sung. But North Korea's economy has seriously debilitated these operations.

Along the DMZ, North Korea has put up about 500 billboards with messages such as "South Korea is a colony of .U.S imperialism," "oppose military service and harsh treatment," "the South Korean Army is a sacrificial target for American imperialism" and other anti-South messages.

They also have messages about North Korea's free education and healthcare, Juche ideology and false-front peace messages with anti-war and anti-nuke themes.

The Panmunjom Political Department's Enemy Operations Unit has two anti-South teams at the Joint Security Area that collect on South Korean soldiers and try to recruit them. Each team is led by a lieutenant colonel who approaches South Korean officers, a deputy team leader who approaches the South's non-commissioned officers and five to seven team members who approach the South's enlisted men.

The teams use an operations plan that is more focused on a collective vice individual plan. However, there is very little evidence of success in this area.

Finally, compared to Western PSYOP effectiveness, North Korea's psychological operations are not sophisticated; however, they are relentless, disciplined and deeply embedded in the party-state's power structure.

Robert M. Collins completed 37 years of service as a soldier and U.S. Department of the Army civilian employee. He served 31 years in various assignments with the U.S. military in Korea, including several liaison positions with the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. Collins' final assignment was as chief of strategy, ROK-US Combined Forces Command, serving the four-star American commander as a political analyst for planning on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian security issues. Collins is a senior adviser for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, where he conducts interviews with North Korean escapees in South Korea to gather information on the North Korean population and the human rights situation there.

2. Alliance partners: With cultural understanding comes mutual respect

Comment: My essay on the new allied strategic doctrine in the NDS - CBMLS - "critical but more limited support" and why we should not use "model ally" to describe our blood ally, Korea.

Voices Feb. 2, 2026 / 3:07 PM

Alliance partners: With cultural understanding comes mutual respect

By David Maxwell

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2026/02/02/perspective-national-defense-strategy-US-korea/4481770061097/

South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back (L) shakes hands with Elbridge Colby, U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy, during their meeting at the defense ministry in Seoul in January. Photo by ROK Ministry of Defense/EPA

Feb. 2 (UPI) -- The author prefers to use the lowercase "n" to challenge the Kim family regime's legitimacy.

I will offer two observations about Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby's remarks at the Sejong Institute in Seoul. One concerns fear. The other concerns words. Both matter in war and peace. In a combined fight, what we say can steady an ally or unnerve one. It can also feed the enemy.

The drawdown fear is real

Reporting on the new National Defense Strategy as it applies to Korea has repeatedly raised the possibility of a reduction of U.S. forces on the peninsula. This fear of withdrawal is real in Seoul. It is persistent. It survives official reassurance. The idea of moving thousands of American troops has circulated for months. It keeps drawdown narratives alive even when the policy remains unchanged.

Even if Colby's intent is not to "leave Korea," language can still function as pre-authorization. Words prepare the ground. They condition expectations. In alliance politics, they shape belief long before steel moves. And belief is part of deterrence. If the alliance looks uncertain, the enemy becomes adventurous.

The new U.S. strategic doctrine toward allies apparently is "CBMLS" -- "critical but more limited support." This phrase appears nine times in the National Defense Strategy.

Kim Jong Un's political warfare wants this condition

This is not an academic concern. Kim Jong Un seeks to divide the ROK/U.S. alliance to drive U.S. forces from the peninsula. It is the condition Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy seeks to create.

north Korean leaders will interpret public discussion that normalizes force reductions as success. They will exploit it. They must. Their internal standing depends on showing progress against the alliance and against U.S. resolve. If they cannot show results, they lose influence with Kim Jong Un, and in that system, loss of influence is dangerous.

Publicly framing any type of force reduction as healthy, modern or alliance enhancing will be read very differently in Pyongyang than in Washington. In the north, it becomes proof that pressure works. It becomes proof that time is on their side. That interpretation then cycles back into their propaganda and agitation machine. It reinforces the story they tell their elites and their people.

Our national defense strategists often overlook this. They focus on force packages and capabilities. They forget the enemy also measures intent, cohesion and will. In Special Forces terms, we are fighting for perception as much as position.

One sentence that helps deterrence

As my good friend and mentor Bob Collins and I have discussed, a single sentence could help mitigate some of this risk. It is simple. It is clear. It is deterrence language. "U.S. firepower, on-peninsula, offshore and U.S.-based, will defend the Republic of Korea against any threat."

That sentence matters. It signals continuity. It complicates enemy calculations. It steadies allies who are listening for ambiguity. It is especially important due to the gap that will be created between the new doctrine "CBMLS" implemented now and when the revised defense plans are written, approved, resources and rehearsed.

This is not empty rhetoric. Firepower is the hard fact Kim fears. After fear of the Korean people in the north, one thing Kim fears most is allied firepower, especially American airpower. north Korea's own propaganda reminds every citizen how the U.S. Air Force flattened the country during the war. That memory is alive in the system. It is taught. It is rehearsed. It is used to justify repression. But it also reveals a vulnerability. They fear what they cannot stop.

The other Issue: "model ally"

Now, I am going to be blunt. Some will misread this as DEI. It is not. This is about cultural awareness, cultural understanding and cultural respect. Our Korean allies are too professional to say this in public. So, I will.

Words have meaning. Words carry history. In Asia, and especially among educated policy elites, "model ally" does not sound neutral. It echoes a loaded phrase that has traveled for decades in American political culture: "model minority." or "model immigrant." That echo matters, even if unintended.

The model immigrant label was never a compliment. It was a disciplining tool. It praised obedience, productivity and quiet success, while denying individuality and political agency. It was also used to divide, to hold up one group as acceptable and to shame others. It was conditional approval. You are valued if you behave.

Asian allies have long historical memories of hierarchy imposed from outside. Colonial administration, protectorate status and great-power tutelage are not abstractions. Language that sounds evaluative, paternal or conditional triggers those memories quickly.

South Korea, in particular, fought hard to escape the image of a client state. It sees itself as a sovereign middle power with agency, not a student earning grades. Being told it is a "model" can feel less like respect and more like being ranked.

Intent is not impact

Defenders will say, correctly, that Colby meant to praise South Korea's defense spending, seriousness and realism. Intent, however, is not impact. Impact is what allies and adversaries absorb. In a region attuned to status, dignity and sovereignty, praise that sounds conditional can undermine the assurance it seeks to provide.

It reinforces the idea that U.S. commitment is transactional and revocable, dependent on continued "good behavior." That perception weakens deterrence, because deterrence rests on belief under stress, not on compliments during armistice.

This is why European allies may shrug at such phrasing while Asian allies bristle. Yet, they will rarely say so publicly. They are disciplined. They are careful. They do not want to inject friction. But silence does not mean the phrase lands well.

The counterargument, and the line we must hold

There is a counterargument worth taking seriously. The United States faces real strain. China is the pacing challenge. Resources are finite. Capable allies should do more. South Korea can. It should. A stronger South Korean defense posture can strengthen deterrence and widen options across the Asia-Indo-Pacific.

But, how we ask matters as much as what we ask. Increased responsibility must come with increased voice. If South Korea is truly a top-tier partner, then treat it like one. Consult early. Plan together. Speak with respect that recognizes sovereignty and sacrifice.

Why this matters right now

As I survey Korean press coverage since the National Defense Strategy release and especially since Colby's visit, the repetition is striking. By my estimation, roughly 60% to 75% of articles mention the "model ally" phrase. Few criticize it directly. But repetition still shapes perception. It normalizes an evaluative frame. It encourages the public to ask what the grading rubric is and who holds the pen.

Alliances endure not because they are efficient, but because they are trusted. In Asia, trust is built on dignity. Cultural understanding is not softness. It is combat power in alliance form. Mutual respect strengthens deterrence. Misread words weaken it.

If we want alliance partners who stand firm in crisis, we must speak as if crisis is possible. Because it is.

David Maxwell, executive director of the Korea Regional Review, is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he works on a free and unified Korea. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.

3. The End Of The Miracle That Is South Korea

Summary:

The author, a former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice (2019–2021) who immigrated from South Korea, argues that South Korea is losing the rule-of-law “guardrails” that protect democracy. He claims an “unprecedented” mix of internal and external threats, including alleged election manipulation, judicial pressure, and foreign influence from north Korea and the Chinese Communist Party. He alleges indicators of computerized manipulation and falsified ballots in the June 3, 2025 presidential election, says oversight bodies declined to debate his team’s findings, and cites incidents involving protesters and an arrested former communications regulator. He frames cyber-enabled interference as relevant to the U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and raises allegations tied to organ harvesting.

Comment: A brutal critique of South Korea. It pains me to read this. I think it is important to understand how China and north Korea are attempting to subvert South Korea as well as drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance.  

But I fear assessments such as this can damage the ROK/US alliance. If you accept all these allegations as true what should we expect the US action should be? Counterintuitively, assessments such as this actually support north Korea's political warfare and China's unrestricted warfare strategies they are executing against South Korea. This provides ammunition to those in the US who would rather withdraw US forces in South Korea and it can cause a break within the ROK/US alliance. This could contribute to the perfect storm for the alliance because it supports those in the US who want to move beyond the new US strategic doctrine in the NDS - CBMLS "critical but more limited support" to the next phase which will be elimination of support altogether and the withdrawal of US forces. Likewise these criticisms support those with anti-American sentiment in South Korea who also want a withdrawal of US forces. Again, is this a perfect storm?

We need to ask and answer the fundamental question: How important is the ROK/US alliance to US national security? And then we need to act accordingly. (My assessment is that it is vitally important and that we cannot successfully defend our interests in the Asia-Indo-Pacific without the alliance).

"The cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy!" 

– Henry Louis Mencken

The End Of The Miracle That Is South Korea

The Daily Caller

This content was produced via a partnership with KCPAC. The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Daily Caller.

https://dailycaller.com/2026/02/01/morse-tan-south-korea-election-fraud-china-trump-communism/

Missing Guardrails in South Korea

During President Donald Trump’s first term, I served as Ambassador at Large for the U.S. State Department’s Office of Global Criminal Justice. The very existence of my position is a testament to the goodness and greatness of the United States of America. In 1970s, my family gratefully immigrated from South Korea to America, where the rule of law stands as the guardian of democracy and the provides the foundations for a constitutional republic. As ambassador, I was involved in the indictment, sanctioning, capture and/or conviction of mass atrocity criminals in places such as Sri Lanka, Rwanda, the Balkans and Lebanon.

Without the rule of law, even well-designed systems risk collapse into disorder and authoritarianism. As I write, South Korea faces an unprecedented convergence of internal and external threats to its democracy, including alleged election manipulation, judicial pressure and foreign influence from North Korea and the Chinese Communist Party.

This article describes the current risks to the rule of law, national sovereignty and civil liberties, and emphasizes the crucial role of unified, nonviolent resistance in safeguarding democratic institutions. Drawing on historical precedent and my personal observation, I argue that sustained civic engagement, strategic action and the courage of judges, officials and the actions of South Korean citizens are essential to restoring freedom and accountability. Ultimately, the preservation of democracy in South Korea is both a national imperative and will be a beacon for the rest of the world. (RELATED: Why South Korea’s Election Integrity Should Matter To America)

For several months now, I have been warning that South Korea, which has long been regarded as a model of democratic development in Asia, now faces a deepening crisis that threatens its constitutional integrity and the will of its people. In short, South Korea as we know it is about to be lost.

I speak with the confidence of experience with international legal matters during my period as Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice from 2019-2021. To use a simple analogy, the rule of law acts like guardrails on a mountain road: essential constraints that prevent a society from plunging into chaos. Without those guardrails, disasters happen — people fall, get injured, even killed. In a democracy, those guardrails are laws that protect the people’s democratic rights through free and fair elections. When such protections are eroded, democratic systems begin to fail. The rule of law is not merely a concept — it is the structure that allows democracy to function and flourish.

Election Fraud: June 3rd 2025 Presidential Election

As leader of an international election monitoring team, we found indications of possible computerized manipulation, falsified ballots and coordinated interference during recent elections, including the recent presidential election in South Korea, held on June 3rd 2025. Our team produced reports now available at www.election-fraud.com documenting alleged irregularities.

When I was in South Korea covering the June election, I invited South Korea’s National Election Commission (NEC) and the Association of World Election Bodies (AWEB) to publicly debate these issues during our investigation. We asked them to bring their best evidence and reasoning; we would bring ours. But no one responded. And since then, no one has refuted our findings. This absence of transparent engagement from these national bodies undermined my confidence in South Korea’s democratic process and raises serious questions about institutional accountability. (RELATED: The Red Shadow Destroying South Korea)

But there were other events that caused me great alarm. I became concerned over the treatment of individuals protesting these alleged election irregularities. In one instance, a video appeared to show police throwing down a demonstrator protesting electoral fraud in front of a moving vehicle outside the National Election Commission. Supporters said he was seriously injured. This appeared to symbolize how truth and justice were being thrown to the ground. It seems those who stand for democracy are attacked instead of being heard.

In another case, Lee Jin-sook, the former chair of the Korean Communications Council, was arrested and on being detained she is reported to have raised her handcuffed wrists and declared: “This is war!”

To me this was a deeply symbolic moment — a war on democracy, a war on the rule of law and a war against justice.

Geopolitical Concerns and Foreign Interference

It is important to see Korea’s democratic crisis within a broader geopolitical struggle. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) advocates an aggressive doctrine of “unrestricted warfare,” whereby China has deployed multiple forms of nonmilitary aggression — including cyber operations and institutional infiltration — to influence and destabilize democratic societies.

I have witnessed these tactics of “marching through institutions” for decades, working to reshape media, education and government structures in ways that favor communization. South Korea is rapidly approaching a tipping point caused by this systematic degradation of democracy. I believe that we should urgently consider the current position.

“The question now is whether a free and fair democracy that upholds the rule of law will prevail — or whether a communist-aligned dictatorship will take hold.”

These threatening developments carry direct implications for the U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) Mutual Defense Treaty. Under Article 3 of this treaty, both nations are bound to coordinate in response to attacks (potentially including cyberattacks) on the other. If evidence of foreign-directed election interference is substantiated, it could represent not only an internal constitutional crisis but also a breach of mutual defense commitments. The use of cyber tools and electronic manipulation by external actors constitutes an attack on democracy itself. This is not only a Korean issue — it is a full-scale attack on the whole democratic world. On Dec. 1, 2025, President Trump rightfully highlighted another commentator calling out election fraud allegations in over a 100 countries. The post specifically named South Korea, where the Association of World Election Bodies has previously involved itself in election management globally with USAID support. (RELATED: A Holy War Declared: The Grave Threat To South Korea’s Constitutional Liberty)

Human Rights Violations

This first part concludes with a very significant travesty of justice for all of us. If we look beyond institutions and treaties, it is even more important that we count the human cost of authoritarian expansion. There are alleged cases of South Koreans being linked to Chinese organ harvesting. These cases need to be chased down thoroughly and transparently and the alleged perpetrators brought to justice. We should not turn a blind eye to these accusations in any shape or form. It is a possible metastasis of the widespread practice of organ harvesting through murder prevalent inside of China.

In the second article, I further explore the dire direction of South Korea, but also how it can be reversed.

Morse Tan is a former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice.

The Daily Caller

4. Korea Reunification Isn’t Coming—And Great-Power Politics Is Why

Summary:

Korea’s division is no longer a temporary wound awaiting history’s cure. It has become a stabilizing structure in a harsher system. Deterrence froze the armistice line, but great-power competition now reinforces it. China prefers a predictable buffer to the risks of collapse or a U.S.-aligned unified Korea. Russia accepts the status quo as a fixed frontier. The old faith that markets and norms would dissolve borders has failed. Geography and spheres of influence rule again. Even regime change in north Korea would not alter the external logic that sustains division. Unification is blocked less by Koreans than by the strategic interests surrounding them.

Comment: So much to disagree with here. A lot of "old think." Unfortunately it is thinking like this that will prevent sufficient effort by policy makers and strategists to find that acceptable durable political arrangement that will sustain, protect, and advance US and ROK/US alliance interests. It also leaves 26 million Koreans in the north imprisoned in the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. Nor does it factor in an understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime which can only be countered by the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. The status quo cannot last forever and it behooves us to plan for what comes next. And when the time comes (due to war, regime collapse, or internal change within north Korea), what will China and Russia be willing to do to prevent unification? Are they really willing to go to war to prevent Korean unification? 

But ultimately, isn't this for the Korean people to decide what they want?

Korea Reunification Isn’t Coming—And Great-Power Politics Is Why

19fortyfive.com · ByAndrew Latham

Korea’s Division Isn’t a Glitch Anymore. It’s a Feature of the New Order

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/02/korea-reunification-isnt-coming-and-great-power-politics-is-why/

The division of Korea was always understood to be temporary. In its early decades, that presumption was based on the armistice itself, which called for a ceasefire to suspend conflict, not resolve it. Later, after the Cold War, it rested on another belief: that growing globalization and the universalization of liberal political and economic norms would erase the intra-Korean border, as they had erased Soviet-style regimes in Eastern Europe. For decades, this expectation, mostly unspoken but always there, was plausible.

That is no longer the case. In this new era of multipolar great-power competition, even the illusion of eventual reunification of the peninsula is unrealistic. The division of Korea can no longer be treated like a temporary “bug” in yesterday’s international order, one that would eventually be worked out. It has now morphed into something quite different: a defining “feature” of today’s international order, one that will not be worked out while this order persists.

From Ceasefire to Border

The armistice produced a line that hardened quickly. What began as a temporary demarcation evolved into one of the world’s most militarized borders, separating political systems that moved in opposite directions.

South of the line, an initially authoritarian state liberalized and consolidated as a democratic polity anchored in a US-led order. North of it, a Leninist system survived the Cold War and deepened into a closed and coercive state.

Deterrence proved sufficient to manage the risks generated by that separation, and military planning adjusted early to the expectation that the line would hold. Crises returned the peninsula to global attention from time to time, yet they rarely altered its underlying structure.

But operational acceptance did not translate into conceptual closure. The border functioned as a boundary in practice, while policy discourse continued to treat it as provisional. The map was managed. The meaning of the map remained unsettled.

The Post–Cold War Assumption

After the Cold War, confidence in convergence filled the gap between reality and expectations. Economic integration and the inexorable diffusion of liberal norms were widely assumed to work against the persistence of both North Korea and the intra-Korean divide. Unification remained an implicit strategic vision and goal, grounded in the belief that North Korea would eventually follow a path similar to that taken by former Soviet client states in Europe.

The border was acknowledged as a present fact and planned for accordingly, yet it was rarely treated as a durable endpoint. It was understood as a feature of a transitional moment whose logic would dissolve as history unfolded.

This assumption mattered because it shaped patience and justified restraint. Korea could be managed indefinitely while awaiting a future shaped by forces presumed to be universal. That future did not arrive.

A System That No Longer Promises Convergence

The international environment that sustained those expectations has narrowed. Economic integration no longer carries the political effects once assumed, and liberal convergence has ceased to function as a default trajectory. Geography has reasserted itself as an organizing principle.

Major powers now structure security around proximity, control over adjacent space, and risk management near their borders.

Spheres of influence operate more as patterns of behavior than as proclamations. States limit rival penetration where stakes are highest, accept arrangements that appear unattractive when alternatives carry greater danger, and privilege predictability once competition intensifies. Within such a system, endurance becomes preferable to revision.

This shift did not create Korea’s division, but it changed the incentives surrounding it. The border now sits within an order that rewards persistence and penalizes attempts at transformation.

China and the Logic of Reinforcement

China’s role illustrates the change with particular clarity. In earlier decades, Beijing often viewed North Korea as a liability whose actions complicated broader regional goals. Strategic rivalry with the United States has reordered that calculus.

Instability north of the Yalu threatens strategic depth, while reform carries the risk of collapse, and collapse carries the risk of geopolitical reconfiguration. A unified peninsula aligned with Washington would alter the regional balance in ways Beijing is unwilling to accept.

Division offers predictability by constraining uncertainty along China’s perimeter. The result is not ideological affinity with Pyongyang, but a structural preference for an arrangement that reduces risk. Stability on the peninsula has aligned with China’s core security interests, hardening the division in ways diplomacy alone cannot undo.

Russia as Confirmation

Russia plays a secondary role, yet its behavior reinforces the same logic. Cooperation with North Korea reflects acceptance rather than authorship of the peninsula’s fixity. Moscow lacks the leverage to shape outcomes independently, though it does not need to. Its alignment signals that the division is no longer treated as an aberration within the international system, but as an acceptable frontier within a competitive order.

From Provisional Line to Managed Frontier

Korea’s division is not unresolved in any operational sense. What has changed is how it functions within the system. The border now operates as a managed frontier between competing spheres rather than as unfinished business awaiting correction. A frontier of this kind is rarely calm. It demands constant attention and carries persistent risk.

What distinguishes it is that revision is viewed as more destabilizing than persistence, which renders change itself the greater danger.

That logic now governs the peninsula. Division persists less because diplomacy failed than because altering it would unsettle a balance that the surrounding powers have strong incentives to preserve.

Closing the Horizon

What ultimately matters is not whether North Korea can reform, but whether the international system would permit such a transformation to alter the peninsula’s political geometry.

For decades, unification rested on the expectation that internal change in the North would naturally translate into external convergence with the South. That expectation is simply not sustainable in a world structured around competing spheres of influence. Not even the fall of the Kim dynasty in Pyongyang would dissolve the strategic logic that now governs the peninsula.

In a world of spheres of influence, borders that separate rival security spaces are not rolled up by economic exchange or social diffusion. They are managed, reinforced, and defended because they serve stabilizing functions for the surrounding powers.

The inter-Korean border now does exactly that. It preserves a balance that none of the principal actors has a strong incentive to disrupt. The barrier to reunification is therefore no longer primarily ideological or domestic. It is structural and geopolitical.

This is why the longstanding belief that North Korea would eventually follow the path of Eastern Europe can no longer be sustained. Those regimes disappeared within an order that rewarded liberalization and that recognized only one sphere of influence—the United States’ global liberal sphere of influence.

Korea now sits within an order that does the opposite. The forces that once made reunification seem inevitable have been displaced by dynamics that actively work against it.

The Korean Peninsula was divided by war and frozen by an armistice, but it is now held in place by the logic of great-power competition. That reality does not make the division just, benign, or permanent in any moral sense. It does make it durable.

A strategy that continues to treat reunification as history’s default outcome mistakes memory for momentum and aspiration for structure. The world that once promised convergence has given way to one that enforces frontiers, and Korea stands as one of its clearest examples.

About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham

Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.

19fortyfive.com · ByAndrew Latham

5. [Column] How North Korea’s upcoming party congress could change history

​Summary:

The coming Workers’ Party congress may formalize a hard truth. north Korea no longer treats division as temporary. It frames the peninsula as two hostile states and seeks peaceful coexistence only with the United States as a fellow nuclear power. Moscow and Beijing now tolerate, even reinforce, this posture. Sanctions no longer drive Pyongyang’s strategy; self-reliance does. Seoul’s overtures under President Lee Jae Myung collide with Pyongyang’s belief that absorption remains the South’s end state. The congress could lock this logic into law. History may not turn. It may simply harden.

​Comment: We should not be afraid of this outcome - "this hardening of history." Kim Jong Un will be giving up the moral high ground. Yes he calls South the enemy and does not seek peaceful unification. We should not be misled. What this analysis fails to recognize is that Kim has not and will not give up the number one strategic aim of the regime -to dominate the entire peninsula to ensure regime survival. He is not, and never has been, willing to negotiate a peaceful transition of a unified Korea unless it results in his domination of the entire peninsula. The regime remains an existential threat to the South and a global threat due to its significant malign activities around the world, to include cyber threats and proliferation of weapons, missiles and someday perhaps nuclear weapons. 

It is time to recognize that there are only three paths to a secure, stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant Korean peninsula and that is through the pursuit of free and unified Korea with liberty, freedome, free market principles, the rule of law, and human rights for all. Two paths unfortunately are war and regime collapse. The third is to help the Korean people in the north create the condition for political change that will result in leadership that seeks peaceful unification. 

This is all the more reason South Korea for the US, with US and internal support to implement these fourteen words:

Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights. 

[Column] How North Korea’s upcoming party congress could change history

english.hani.co.kr

There are fears that the DPRK could cement its rhetoric of the two Koreas being “two hostile states” in law at the convention

Posted on : 2026-02-01 10:18 KST Modified on : 2026-02-01 10:18 KST

https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/1242691.html

A flag created by the Hankyoreh Foundation for Reunification and Culture, embodying the relationship between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) as one between two countries oriented toward integration. The foundation plans to use this flag while cheering on the teams from both Koreas at the AFC Women’s Asian Cup in Australia this year. (Hankyoreh Foundation for Reunification and Culture)

There is much speculation about what path the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — as North Korea refers to itself* — will embark on at the upcoming congress of its ruling Workers’ Party of Korea.

The most recent party congress, held in January 2021, was a landmark event that heralded major, fundamental changes for the country. One of the biggest shifts has been North Korea moving from a poor and isolated power developing nuclear weapons to a nuclear power that is overcoming its poverty and isolation.

Regardless of whether its status as a nuclear power is acknowledged by the outside world, it’s no secret that North Korea has greatly improved its nuclear arsenal. In addition, Pyongyang has ended a chill in relations with Beijing and is bolstering cooperation with Moscow to such a degree that even the term “strategic alliance” seems to be selling their relationship short.

In regard to both the economy at large and people’s standard of living, it seems clear that North Korea is blowing past its goals both in growth and grain production while steadily progressing on its regional development plans. In short, the DPRK of today is something new entirely.

There’s also been a dramatic change in the DPRK’s relations with the US. After 1990, Pyongyang’s ultimate objective was to forge a new relationship with Washington. Kim Jong-un had hoped to achieve that through the “uncanny power” (his words) of his relationship with US President Donald Trump, which was symbolized by their three in-person meetings and 20-some-odd letters.

But since 2019, Kim has abandoned those efforts and moved rapidly in a new direction. That’s why the 2021 party congress declared its chief posture to be long-term conflict with the US.

After raising Kim’s hopes only to dash them, Trump is back in the White House and sending overtures to Kim with every chance he gets. That has aroused considerable curiosity about how the DPRK’s stance toward the US might shift in the upcoming party congress — a once-in-five-year party convention.

The change in inter-Korean relations has been devastating. Three inter-Korean summits in 2018 had kindled high hopes about a breakthrough in the relationship. But those hopes have been snuffed out since 2019, when the relationship plunged into icy waters.

In late 2023, Kim maintained that South Korea has always pursued “unification by absorption” regardless of whether conservatives or liberals were in power. He has rejected the ideal of a shared Korean identity and the dream of reunification, adopting in their place a narrative of two hostile states.

Along the way, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol — who sought to goad North Korea into a possible war with drone incursions — has been impeached and removed from office, paving the way for a new administration.

South Korea’s new leader, President Lee Jae Myung, has been making various overtures with the hope that the North will come around, but so far those have proven inadequate. North Korea is firmly convinced that South Korea’s basic hostility toward the North will outlast any change of government.

That has prompted concerns that the DPRK’s “two hostile states” narrative will be explicitly adopted in the party congress.

Changes in the DPRK’s relations with Russia and China have been shocking.

After a period of prolonged chill, Pyongyang-Beijing thawed to the point of six summits being held between March 2018 and June 2019, and amicable relations seemed to be on the verge of being restored. But the breakdown of the Korean Peninsula peace process sent DPRK-China relations back into icy territory when Pyongyang declared nuclear arms to be the foundation of the state and enacted a nuclear-use doctrine, which was later incorporated into its constitution.

China visibly bristled at the DPRK’s demands to be acknowledged as a nuclear weapons state, which clashed with its own position. That’s when the DPRK turned to Russia, whose invasion of Ukraine had lengthened into a war of attrition. Pyongyang offered thousands of troops to fight on Moscow’s behalf; in return, Russia recognized it as a nuclear state.

This turn of the tables allowed the DPRK to effectively secure a tacit toleration of its nuclear status from China. This was demonstrated by Russia declaring the “impossibility” of the DPRK’s denuclearization on its behalf and by China keeping its mouth shut on the subject.

Based on such results, the upcoming 9th WPK Congress is likely to focus on foreign policies that bolster the cooperation and coordination Pyongyang has established with Moscow and Beijing.

What will be most interesting to see is what sort of policy line the DPRK adopts regarding South Korea and the US during the party congress. The prospects aren’t great. But there is a faint chance for change in its attitude toward the US.

During a speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly on Sept. 21, 2025, Kim Jong-un said, “If the United States, freeing itself from its absurd pursuit of [another country’s] denuclearization and recognizing the reality, wants genuine peaceful coexistence with us, there is no reason for us not to come face to face with it.”

“Personally, I still have a good memory of the current US President Trump,” he said.

As indicated by such remarks, the DPRK appeared to be open to contact with the US around the time of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit held in South Korea. But Pyongyang’s condition was that the US give up its demands for the DPRK’s denuclearization, which Washington didn’t accept, so the meeting never happened.

Considering all this, the upcoming party congress is likely to announce that the DPRK is “prepared” to engage in both conflict and dialogue with the US in a gesture that is supposed to betray a willingness to hold another summit with the US.

We also need to pay attention to what will happen in terms of sanctions, which are the biggest obstacle to relations between the DPRK and the US.

Many authorities, both within the ROK and beyond, believe that the DPRK will demand that sanctions be eased or lifted, but such analyses are based on an outdated version of the DPRK. In 2018-19, the more desperately Kim wished for sanctions to be eased, the harder a stance Trump adopted.

Defining this problem as one pertaining to the dignity of his country, Kim resolved at the 8th WPK Congress in 2021 to use sanctions as an opportunity to achieve self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

During another speech he made in September 2025, he asked the rhetorical question, “For what should we turn to ‘denuclearization’? To avoid sanctions?” to which he answered a thunderous “Never. Never ever.”

He went on to say that the sanctions have “taught us a lesson on how to get stronger, and developed tolerance and resistance in us so that we will not yield to any pressure.”

“There will be no negotiations, and never at that, with our enemy states to exchange something with them, obsessed with trying to get free from their sanctions,” Kim declared.

Trump sang a different tune. As he embarked on his tour to Japan and South Korea on Oct. 27, 2025, he noted sanctions as a possible topic up for discussion.

“Well, we have sanctions,” Trump said. “That’s pretty big to start off with. I would say that’s about as big as you get.”

Through such comments, Trump attempted to leverage the agenda of sanctions to pull off a last-minute meeting with Kim. The different stances taken by the two countries when it comes to sanctions show that, if a DPRK-US summit materializes, Trump will either be the first to raise the issue or that the issue itself will not be discussed with much earnestness. This underscores the need for observers to shift their thinking about the problem of sanctions.

Considering this context, the DPRK’s core policy stance toward the US that will be outlined in the upcoming 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea will focus on “peaceful coexistence” between nuclear powers. The US has a precedent of initially adopting hard-line approaches toward the nuclear armament of hostile nations like the Soviet Union and China, only to later choose peace.

Recently, some within US government circles have begun arguing for a shift to arms control and peaceful coexistence, considering the total denuclearization of the DPRK no longer feasible. However, acknowledging the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state will be no easy feat, even for Trump. If he keeps stubbornly calling for denuclearization, any chance of a summit between the two countries will go out the window.

Another option that exists between the two choices is to turn a blind eye: the US could ignore the DPRK’s demand to be recognized as a nuclear power while setting aside demands for the country’s denuclearization. Instead, it could focus on other agendas while putting the freeze on nuclear weapons on the table.

The other agenda in question is an official end to the Korean War. During the October 2025 summit between South Korea and the US, Trump commented, “I will say this, the Korean Peninsula — I know you are officially at war, but we will see what we can do to get that all straightened out.” Before the very first North Korea-US summit in June 2018, Trump mentioned the need to end the state of war, calling the Korean War “the longest war,” noting it had gone on for almost 70 years.

As someone who has boasted about ending eight conflicts worldwide since taking office last year, it stands to reason that he would be keenly interested in ending the Korean War. This need to end the war also intersects with Kim’s call for peaceful coexistence, as the most viable way to end the Korean War and pursue peaceful coexistence lies in signing a peace treaty.

As such, there is a possibility of changes to the relationship between the DPRK and the US, with the party congress being one opportunity for such change. What, then, lies on the horizon for inter-Korea relations?

The Lee administration has successfully eased tensions on the border after pushing to halt the floating of trash-filled leaflets across the border and stopping loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts. The administration has also upheld three core principles for its policy toward Pyongyang so as to achieve the goal of peaceful coexistence: respect for the DPRK’s system, scrapping plans for unification by absorption, and ceasing hostile acts.

However, the DPRK has not changed its stance on fundamental issues, nor has it changed its stance on such issues. Despite saying that peace is needed when approaching its age-old enemy, the US, it is leaving almost no room for such peaceful coexistence with South Korea. Why is this the case?

We must understand their logic if we are to have any hope in coming up with a prudent response. Even since the Lee administration launched, the DPRK has been finding fault with the territorial clause of the South Korean Constitution.

“In the first Constitution of the ROK fabricated and promulgated in July 1948, Syngman Rhee stipulated that ‘the territory of the ROK covers the Korean peninsula and its attached islands,’ thus codifying its inborn nature which is the most hostile to our state,” Kim said in his September 2025 speech. “Through [its] government has changed more than 10 times and the Constitution has undergone revision nine times in the ROK so far, nothing has changed in the territory-related article of the Constitution.”

Kim harshly criticized Seoul for being “subordinate” in its alliance with the US and continued to denounce the Lee administration’s plan for a massive increase in defense spending, saying that the plan “far surpass[ed] that of the Yoon Suk-yeol regime, that earned notoriety for its confrontational fanaticism against the DPRK.”

“We will enshrine in a national law that we and the ROK are two states sharing the border, which are heterogeneous from each other and which can by no means become one,” declared Kim.

If the DPRK continues to pursue this policy, the decisions of the 9th Congress of the WPK and the country’s revised constitution will explicitly define the relations between the two countries as being hostile.

This is where we can clearly see the discord between the DPRK and the Lee administration. While many believe that the Yoon administration ruined the friendly relations between the two Koreas cultivated by the Moon Jae-in administration, Pyongyang believes that, no matter which administration is in power, Seoul harbors a hostility toward its northern counterpart. Unless this perception is corrected, we cannot rule out the possibility that the two Koreas will never participate in dialogue during Lee’s term.

What should happen next? I believe that the Lee administration must take concrete steps to properly implement the “peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas” it has been advocating for. A key step for this is to relinquish the claim to jurisdiction over the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. It will be necessary to address the territorial clause when conducting discussions over amending the Constitution.

If this is a mid-to-long-term task that requires national consensus and bipartisan cooperation, it is vital to identify what steps can be taken immediately. Abolishing the “Chungmu plan,” an operation that has existed in paper since 1991 as a response to a sudden change in the DPRK that would prompt unification through absorption, is one such step. Another step would include the exclusion of wartime occupation and unification operations against the DPRK from the ROK-US Combined Forces Command’s operational plans and military exercises.

It is also worth considering whether the Lee administration’s principle of ruling out unification through absorption and its decision to expand and strengthen the Marines, which focuses on landing operations, to form a four-pronged military structure, can be considered a wise pairing. The government also ought to ponder its denial of any attempts at unification through absorption while continuing to call the DPRK “North Korea” (bukhan), which implies that the country is still part of Korea (hanguk).

I believe that going in this direction effectively counters the DPRK’s “hostile two-states” theory while aligning with our belief in the South that the two countries can coexist in peace. South Korea’s Chungmu plan and the US-South Korea alliance’s doctrine of forceful unification in times of crisis showcased confidence that stemmed from the advent of the unipolar system of the US in the 1990s and South Korea’s decisive victory over which system would rule over which in the Korean Peninsula.

Yet the world has changed so dramatically, simply saying that it has completely transformed would be an understatement. But how much longer must we cling to the outdated notion that we have a historical claim to North Korea? It’s a question I ask because only once we let go of this obsession will we be able to pave the way for a grand transformation of South Korea before we tackle inter-Korean relations.

By Cheong Wook-Sik, director of the Hankyoreh Peace Institute and director of the Peace Network

*For more on why the author uses the term DPRK for North Korea, see:https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/1137832.html

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

english.hani.co.kr

6. North Korea rehearses parade as party congress nears, report says

​Summary:

Satellite imagery analysis cited by 38 North suggests north Korean troops are rehearsing large marching formations at the Mirim Parade Training Ground, likely for a parade tied to the long-anticipated Ninth Party Congress. The drills reportedly include emblem shapes linked to the Workers’ Party. The congress, held every five years, is expected to set policy lines through 2031, though Pyongyang has not announced a date. South Korean officials and the NIS expect early to mid-February. Seoul’s JCS also sees signs of preparations around Mirim Airfield and Kim Il Sung Square, but says the event may be civilian.

​Comment: I think of the soldiers rehearsing and practicing in the frigid cold for days. What will Kim show us in terms of military equipment? Will we see anything new?

World News Feb. 3, 2026 / 2:37 AM

North Korea rehearses parade as party congress nears, report says

By Thomas Maresca

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/03/North-Korea-rehearsing-military-parade-party-congress-38-north/9691770103632/

North Korean soldiers are rehearsing for a possible parade ahead of the country's upcoming Ninth Party Congress, according to an analysis of satellite imagery by 38 North released Monday. This file photo shows an October military parade in Pyongyang's Kim Il Sung Square. File Photo by KCNA/EPA

SEOUL, Feb. 3 (UPI) -- Hundreds of North Korean soldiers were seen practicing marching formations in preparation for a possible military parade ahead of the country's long-anticipated Ninth Party Congress, according to a new report.

Recent commercial satellite imagery shows large formations of troops conducting drills at the Mirim Parade Training Ground in east Pyongyang, analysts at the Stimson Center-based 38 North said in an assessment published Monday.

The activity is "likely in preparation for a parade to mark the upcoming Ninth Party Congress," the report said.

Imagery shows soldiers arranging themselves into shapes resembling the hammer, sickle and brush, the emblem of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea.

Related

• North Korea's Kim pushes regional development ahead of key party congress
• North Korea claims successful test of upgraded large-caliber rocket system
• North Korea fires short-range ballistic missiles toward East Sea

The party congress, held every five years, is where North Korea sets its domestic and foreign policy agenda. Leader Kim Jong Un is expected to unveil a new plan guiding political, economic and military priorities through 2031, the 38 North report noted.

While the official date for the Ninth Party Congress has not been announced, South Korean government officials and the National Intelligence Service have said they expect it to take place in early to mid-February.

Seoul's Joint Chiefs of Staff said Tuesday it has detected signs of parade preparations at the Mirim Airfield and Kim Il Sung Square, where similar events have been held in the past.

"It's not yet clear whether a military parade will take place," JCS spokesman Col. Lee Sung-jun said in a press briefing. "As I understand, preparations are currently being made as a civilian event."

The apparent parade preparations come amid a string of public appearances by Kim Jong Un that underscore the regime's push to demonstrate progress ahead of the congress.

Last week, Kim attended the groundbreaking ceremony for a regional development project in Unnyul County, part of a broader effort to modernize local industry and infrastructure. He has also intensified on-site inspections, recently dismissing a vice premier over construction delays at a major machinery plant.

A report by the state-funded Korea Institute for National Unification said the firing suggests the regime may be under mounting pressure to show tangible economic results, as sanctions and chronic shortages continue to constrain growth.

Military signaling has remained prominent as well. In late January, Kim oversaw the test-firing of an upgraded large-caliber multiple rocket launcher system and said plans to further bolster the country's nuclear deterrent would be detailed at the congress.

Against that backdrop, 38 North said the timing of the congress could be influenced by whether Pyongyang plans additional public events ahead of the gathering.

"If there are more economic projects to showcase or weapons to test before the Party Congress commences, the event could take longer to open," the report said.

7. Contemporary warfare in Ukraine: Is Seoul asleep at the wheel?

​Summary:

Mason Richey argues Seoul is not learning fast enough from Ukraine’s battlefield, where drones and cyberwarfare have become decisive. Ukraine’s survival, he writes, rests in part on rapid adaptation, partner support, and mass production, not just bravery. Drones now range from long endurance platforms to cheap one way attack systems and micro drones that make the front line transparent and punish any lapse in concealment, while also grinding soldiers psychologically. Cyberwarfare runs through every phase, hitting forces, infrastructure, banks, and media to erode will. He warns north Korea gains advantage via Russia and battlefield exposure, while South Korea lags in engagement.

Comment: Learning and adapting, yes. But also anticipating. I am not sure whether he or I can judge how well Korea is adapting (but I will try to discern as much when I go to Korea to observe Freedom Shield 26 in a couple of weeks). But I don't want the ROK military to adapt to fight the way the war is being fought in Ukraine. I want them to adapt to anticipate how adversaries (specifically how north Korea will adapt will fight the next war. 

Contemporary warfare in Ukraine: Is Seoul asleep at the wheel?

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By Mason Richey

• Published Feb 3, 2026 1:55 pm KST
• Updated Feb 3, 2026 6:28 pm KST
• 
  

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20260203/contemporary-warfare-in-ukraine-is-seoul-asleep-at-the-wheel

This month marks the fourth year of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. This tragedy has caused immense suffering and loss of life, but Ukraine still exists as a sovereign state, as its people have defended themselves courageously and capably. Indeed, what was expected to be a quick victory for Moscow has become a quagmire for Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose forces have been decimated in a meat grinder.

In fact, the Russian military has now been fighting against Ukraine for longer than the Soviet Red Army fought Germany during World War II, yet with only modest gains. How has Kyiv achieved this, aside from the desperate tenacity, bravery and warfighting skill that Ukrainians have demonstrated? There are many factors, including assistance in air defense, intelligence, communications, weaponry and ammunition provided by the US and European partners, but an important one has been their quick adaptation to two modern battlefield realities: drones and cyberwarfare.

The advent of full-scale drone warfare during the Russia-Ukraine war has been a dynamic process, changing and evolving as the two adversaries learn from experience. Ukraine has succeeded in defending itself against much larger Russian forces in part because it has learned lessons effectively. Some of these lessons are especially relevant for the Korean Peninsula.

First, drones are flexible, diverse, evolving and omnipresent. The initial stars of drone warfare were medium-altitude long-endurance drones such as the Bayraktar TB2 that destroyed tank columns early on, but these became vulnerable to air defenses and were transitioned to reconnaissance tasks. Over time, their role was replaced by one-way attack drones and loitering munitions, effectively inexpensive cruise missiles for long-range strikes. The majority of these may be shot down, neutralized or otherwise destroyed, but the ability to deploy large numbers of them at low cost means they are still devastating. These drones are complemented by micro-drones for reconnaissance or attack at much shorter ranges. These drones expose infantry, provide targeting data for artillery and enhance battlefield awareness for other military units. At some points in the war, more than 10,000 of these drones have been used per day. Drones have also been employed in sea warfare and for land-based logistical tasks such as supplying troops.

Second, the sheer volume of use on the contemporary battlefield means that production capacity is critical. The ability of industry to produce mass numbers of drones is as essential as producing mass numbers of tanks, artillery rounds or other matèriel. However, production has to be accompanied by innovation in order to defeat air defense, electromagnetic and other measures used to neutralize drones. This will likely be accelerated and exacerbated by increasing use of artificial intelligence in drone warfare.

Third, drones have a profound psychological impact on soldiers in the battlefield. They are exposed like never before, as the front line has become transparent to a depth of 10-20 kilometers. From the line of contact to rear areas, no location is truly safe. This increases the cognitive stress on infantry especially, provoking fear, paranoia and mental fatigue that impact combat ability.

As for cyberwarfare, the important lesson is that contemporary war is now inseparable from cyberspace. From the lead-up to and early days of Russia’s attack in 2022 to the present, cyberwarfare has been part of every stage and domain of the conflict. Ukraine reports constant exposure to cyberattacks against military targets, critical infrastructure and civilian institutions, encompassing everything from water and power to banking and media. This is intended to sap the will to fight, so mitigating effects and quick recovery is important. As with drone warfare, the cyber dimension of conflict is also a cat-and-mouse game, with offense and defense in a race to outsmart each other.

What does all this mean for Korea, where topography makes drone warfare likely in conflict, and where the South is highly networked and reliant on the internet? North Korea has an epistemic advantage over South Korea by virtue of its alliance with Russia and its soldiers’ experience in the war. Pyongyang has been able to learn about modern drone and cyber warfare indirectly from Russia and directly through battlefield experience. South Korea should increase its engagement with Ukraine and others assisting the country, including the U.S. and European states, in order to catch up.

As of late 2025, South Korea was still worrisomely behind in its efforts to consistently observe and learn from the Ukrainian battlefield. Indeed, knowledgeable Ukrainian contacts have told me that South Korea is far down the list of states talking with Ukraine about its experience with drones and cyber warfare. If this does not improve, such negligence would be dangerous national defense malpractice.

Mason Richey is a professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and president of the Korea International Studies Association.

8. S. Korean missionary arrested in Russia

​Summary:

A South Korean missionary, surnamed Park, was detained in Khabarovsk in late January while conducting religious work; her facility was reportedly closed. Seoul’s embassy and Vladivostok consulate are verifying conditions and circumstances. A Korean consul met her and confirmed her health, while requesting humane treatment, due process, and regular access. A similar Vladivostok case from January 2024 remains unresolved.

Comments" Koreans are gutsy. They are willing to conduct missionary work in "denied areas." Will she be exploited for political purposes by Putin? Will there be linkage to the two Korean POWs in Ukraine? 

S. Korean missionary arrested in Russia | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · February 3, 2026

SEOUL, Feb. 3 (Yonhap) -- A South Korean missionary was detained in Russia recently, according to officials and local media Tuesday, marking another case involving the detention of a Korean national engaged in religious activities in Russia.

According to sources in the Korean community in Russia and local media reports, the female missionary, surnamed Park, was arrested and detained by local authorities late last month while working in Khabarovsk. The religious facility she operated was reportedly shut down.

South Korea's embassy in Russia and its consulate general in Vladivostok said they are checking Park's condition, the circumstances of her detention and other details.

According to an official at the Seoul foreign ministry, a consul was dispatched to Khabarovsk after learning of the case and held a meeting with Park earlier in the day to confirm her health condition.

The official added that South Korean authorities have requested humane treatment, a prompt and fair investigation, and regular consular access for Park, while providing assistance to her family in South Korea.

In January 2024, another South Korean missionary was arrested in Vladivostok on charges of espionage and remains in Russian custody without being offered a trial.

This undated file photo shows the Seoul foreign ministry. (Yonhap)

odissy@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · February 3, 2026

9. N. Korea's Kim calls for 'epochal progress' in rural areas ahead of key party congress

​Summary:

Kim Jong Un visited the new Samgwang dairy and livestock farm in North Phyongan and demanded “epochal progress” in the party’s rural revolution and regional development. KCNA sold the site as modern, scientific, and near “world level,” with butter, cheese, milk powder, and yogurt meant for children and the public. The timing signals a pre congress showcase as north Korea prepares its next five year line on economy, diplomacy, and defense.

Comment: Did the Propaganda and Agitation Department learn a new word: "epochal?" But I love the phrase "near world level." Close but not quite there yet.

On a more serious note: Is this showcase output, or staged proof meant to steady legitimacy before the congress? If milk for children is the signal, what does the regime hide about shortages elsewhere?

N. Korea's Kim calls for 'epochal progress' in rural areas ahead of key party congress | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 3, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260203001300315?section=nk/nk

SEOUL, Feb. 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has called for an "epochal progress" in the development of rural areas, the North's state media reported Tuesday, as Pyongyang appeared to gear up for a key ruling party congress.

Kim made the remarks as he attended the inauguration ceremony for a new dairy farm in the North's western region, with the party congress, once in five years, likely to take place this month, although no date has been announced yet.

While inspecting the dairy farm, Kim said, "More epochal progress will be made in the implementation of the party's program for the rural revolution in the new era and policy of regional development," according to the North's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Kim stressed the country's rural revolution policy aimed at developing the specialty of the stockbreeding industry as he attended the inauguration ceremony of the Samgwang Stockbreeding Farm in Unjon, North Phyongan Province, the previous day, the KCNA reported.

The KCNA said the ruling party instructed the construction of a modern dairy farm years ago as part of its goal to help improve people's living standards, describing the Samgwang farm as having reached a high level of sophistication.

"Samgwang-ri clearly indicates the prospect of the socialist rural development," the KCNA quoted Kim as saying. Kim also specified tasks for "turning the livestock farming of the country into a modern one of world level," it said.

"The farm should steadily usher in a new phase of the development of stockbreeding and make uninterrupted innovations and progress, regarding it as a priority task to bolster up the scientific and technological capabilities in the production, management and operation," the KCNA also quoted Kim as saying.

At the farm, the leader sampled dairy products and praised it for producing around 10 kinds of dairy items, including butter, cheese, milk powder and yogurt. He said he feels "great pride to think that such good milk products would be supplied to the children and people."

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (sitting) attends the inauguration ceremony for the Samgwang Stockbreeding Farm in Unjon, North Phyongan Province, on Feb. 2, 2026, in this image from the Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (sitting) attends the inauguration ceremony for the Samgwang Stockbreeding Farm in Unjon, North Phyongan Province, on Feb. 2, 2026, in this image from the Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Photos released by the KCNA showed production included raclette, cheddar and mozzarella, suggesting Kim's particular interest in cheese varieties, having studied in Switzerland.

The latest outing, which follows Kim's back-to-back visits to regional development sites, appears to be part of efforts to emphasize the country's economic development achievements ahead of a key party congress.

The North is expected to convene the first congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in five years later this month to formulate the country's economic, diplomatic and defense policies for the next five years.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspects cheese stocked on shelves during the inauguration ceremony for the Samgwang Stockbreeding Farm in Unjon, North Phyongan Province, on Feb. 2, 2026, in this image from the Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 3, 2026

10. Kim Jong Un admits to ‘empty’ promises on rural development, vows change

​Summary:

Kim Jong Un opened the Samgwang livestock and dairy farm and gave an unusual confession. He said rural policy has been “empty rhetoric,” and he owned negligence since 2011, while blaming six decades of family rule for a weak agricultural and livestock base. He promised steady meat and dairy for children, then for all residents, and hinted at a rebuilt public distribution system. He called for less showy, stop start investment and a real push to narrow the Pyongyang countryside gap. He offered a five part modernization plan, from breeding stock to disease control and digital management.

Comment: I am quite surprised. I did not expect this. Seems like a pretty incredible admission or "confession." Blaming the regime and himself? I am shocked. He must be employing new PSYOP techniques. (i.e., truth and accountability?)

Kim Jong Un admits to ‘empty’ promises on rural development, vows change

At new dairy farm opening, North Korean leader lays out regime’s failures and his plans to provide meat and milk

Colin Zwirko February 3, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/kim-jong-un-admits-to-empty-promises-on-rural-development-vows-change/

Kim Jong Un tours cow barns at the Samgwang farm | Image: KCNA (Feb. 3, 2026)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un opened a new dairy farm in the rural northwest on Monday, according to state media, delivering a lengthy speech on his past failures and promising he has started working to deliver “tangible” results on the regime’s “rural revolution” project.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Tuesday that Kim and an entourage of dozens of officials attended the opening of the Samgwang Stockbreeding Farm (삼광축산농장) in a remote area of Unjon County in North Phyongan Province.

The farm reportedly includes indoor facilities for raising grass-fed cows and goats, producing animal feed, and processing and packaging milk, milk powder, butter, cheese and yogurt products. New duplexes and apartments were also built across the area as part of the farm project.

Kim announced in his speech that the party “must set a goal to ensure that not only infants but also elementary and middle school students, as well as all residents” are “always supplied” with processed meat and dairy products once his vision for a national livestock industry is established. 

This appears to be another reference to eventually reestablishing a public distribution system (PDS). He set a policy to provide dairy products to young schoolchildren at an unknown number of state institutions at a June 2021 party plenum, where he also opened up about a “food crisis” afflicting the country and promised grain distribution.  

Kim no longer talks about a food crisis when opening relevant facilities, like the country’s largest greenhouse farm in recent days, but state media frequently says there is an ongoing “food problem” that the party is seeking to solve.

Aerial views of the main village of Samgwang-ri and livestock farm facilities | Image: KCNA (Feb. 3, 2026)

Kim Jong Un tours cow barns at the Samgwang farm | Image: KCNA (Feb. 3, 2026)

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At the new Samgwang farm on Monday, Kim said the rural area experienced “centuries of backwardness,” as he has previously said in reference to many other areas of the country.

He added that North Korea has generally “failed to establish effective measures to continuously increase agricultural production,” and that “with the current backward level and weak foundation, [the livestock industry] cannot satisfy qualitative and quantitative demand.”

The country’s failing economic conditions have largely been due to “empty rhetoric” and slogans from his regime that haven’t led to action, he said, admitting negligence since coming to power in late 2011, as well as the 65 years of failed policies by his family’s dictatorship.

Even Sepho County — frequently showcased as an example of successful livestock farm development in propaganda since 2017 — is not up to standards, the leader stated. 

But the new Samgwang livestock farm now serves as “a model entity, a blueprint, that provides a glimpse into the future of modern agriculture and livestock farming.”

Going forward, Kim said he doesn’t want Samgwang to be seen as just a “propaganda piece or tour site,” but rather as a “new starting point and innovative standard that will chart the future development direction of our rural areas and livestock farming.”

Officials working in his regime must “reduce the urban-rural gap” and “urbanize” rural areas by changing the current “sporadic, temporary, and ostentatious manner of investment and support” for rural areas.

Kim Jong Un tours cow milking facilities at the Samgwang farm | Image: KCNA (Feb. 3, 2026)

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Kim began opening up about his regime’s economic failures and a “wealth gap” between Pyongyang and the rest of the country in early 2024, claiming to make a major pivot with the “20×10” rural development project requiring construction of factories, hospitals and recreation centers in all 200-plus cities and counties by the end of 2033. 

A large group of officials in the Party Central Committee were invited to tour the Samgwang facilities this week to “make this ideology tangible and real,” Kim said in his speech, following similar invitations in recent years to his inspections of both economic and military sites.

He added that the largest problems facing the country’s livestock farms is the lack of modern technology, proper animal feed production and a national breeding system to spread innovation.

The DPRK leader stressed that the industry must follow a new “five-point link in the development of stockbreeding”: 1) high-quality breeding stock, 2) stable and sufficient feed supply, 3) scientific livestock care and management, 4) strict disease prevention and veterinary control and 5) digital and intelligent production management.

New indoor livestock facilities must also utilize “waste purification and recycling technology to prevent environmental pollution,” he said.

The new policy on improving livestock farms began with instructions at the Dec. 2021 party plenum, according to Kim.

A dairy product factory at the Samgwang livestock farm | Image: KCNA (Feb. 3, 2026)

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NK News analysis of Planet Labs satellite imagery shows construction of the farm project began in mid-2020 around a reservoir to the west of the main new village area. New homes were built across Samgwang-ri at the same time, before construction of the main village, public buildings and feed and dairy product factories between 2022 and 2024.

Kim previously presented the Kwangchon Chicken Farm in 2024 as a parallel model for fixing broken systems and expanding poultry farms across the country.

This satellite image shows the location and distribution of new livestock farm facilities in Samgwang-ri of Unjon County | Image: Planet Labs (Dec. 21, 2025), edited by NK News

Edited by David Choi

11. Medvedev says Russia can learn from North Korea’s success under sanctions

​Summary:

Dmitry Dmitry Medvedev says Russia can learn from north Korea’s survival under sanctions. He points to what he calls rapid mobilization of economic potential, and a defense industry built “under a total blockade.” He praises north Korea as an ally “in deeds,” thanking its soldiers for fighting alongside Russian forces and highlighting additional support, from ammunition to demining and construction teams. He argues the DPRK is becoming more prosperous and claims Kim Jong Un is personally driving improvements in health and education while prioritizing defense.

Comment: Lessons: Global illicit activities, cyber enabled economic warfare, proliferation of weapons, missiles, training, and capabilities to conflict zones around the world. And support from the CRInK. 

But I guess this means that Medvedev wants to sentence the Russian people to the same level of suffering and sacrifice for Putin as the Korean people in the north are subjected to to ensure KJU's survival.

Medvedev says Russia can learn from North Korea’s success under sanctions

Former president says DPRK is becoming more prosperous, while praising its support for invasion of Ukraine

Jooheon Kim February 3, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/medvedev-says-russia-can-learn-from-north-koreas-success-under-sanctions/

Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev | Image: United Russia

Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said his country could learn from North Korea’s ability to survive under international sanctions despite limited economic resources, while praising Pyongyang’s support for the invasion of Ukraine.

“You said what we can learn? Perhaps, first and foremost, how to organize the rapid and effective mobilization of a country’s economic potential,” Medvedev said in an interview on Monday.

Now serving as deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, the former president said the DPRK has succeeded in building a strong defense industry “under a total blockade,” adding that this has enabled the country to ensure its national defense.  

“This commands profound respect,” he added. 

Medvedev further described Pyongyang as an ally “in deeds,” emphasizing that Moscow would always remember the heroic dedication of DPRK soldiers.

“I can’t help but say once again that we are grateful and appreciative of the contribution the Koreans made, fighting shoulder to shoulder with our soldiers,” he said. 

Since Oct. 2024, North Korea has dispatched thousands of soldiers to Russia to aid combat operations in Kursk. 

Pyongyang has also sent landmine disposal specialists and military construction personnel to assist with demining and reconstruction efforts, while providing substantial quantities of arms and ammunition for Russia’s war effort.

Medvedev most recently traveled to Pyongyang in October, where he met Kim Jong Un and attended a military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea. At the time, senior officials from Russia’s defense, foreign and natural resources ministries visited Pyongyang, along with regional governors.

In Monday’s interview, Medvedev referred to his visit to argue that the DPRK is “changing” and becoming more prosperous, assessing that Kim is personally involved in improving health care and education while also “constantly thinking” about the country’s defense.

Cho Han-bum, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), told NK News that Medvedev’s praise for North Korea didn’t come as a surprise given Russia’s reliance on Pyongyang.

“From Russia’s perspective, they will need manpower for postwar reconstruction,” he said. “Since the war is not likely to end cleanly, military and logistical support from North Korea will continue to be necessary.” 

Cho added that cooperation with Moscow is also important for Pyongyang, particularly “given the deterioration of relations with China,” leaving Russia as the only viable partner.

Russia is reported to have provided military and technical support in exchange for Pyongyang’s assistance, and it has repeatedly backed North Korea’s positions at international forums, including the U.N.

Edited by Bryan Betts

12. Epstein was ‘very’ interested in North Korea business prospects, emails show

​Summary:

Emails in newly released U.S. Department of Justice files suggest Jeffrey Epstein tracked north Korea closely and flirted with the idea of doing business there, despite sanctions risk. He received newsletters and links, then wrote he was “very” interested when a contact raised “N Korea.” The correspondence hints at Moscow meetings, big-money mining and infrastructure talk, and backchannel fantasies about getting access to “No. 1.” One thread even frames POTUS as a negotiator whose “word” might matter to Pyongyang. The record is fragmentary, but the intent looks clear.

Comment: I have avoided getting my hands dirty posting anything about the vile Epstein saga. But since he seemed to have some interest in north Korea, I guess I have to report that. 

Epstein was ‘very’ interested in North Korea business prospects, emails show

New files show convicted sex offender exchanged news about the DPRK and discussed the regime

David Choi February 3, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/epstein-was-very-interested-in-north-korea-business-prospects-emails-show/

Image: Florida Department of Corrections, edited by NK News

The convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein said he was “very” interested in North Korean affairs and corresponded with political operatives interested in launching business ventures in Pyongyang, according to new files released by the Department of Justice.

The more than 3 million partially redacted files published on Friday, part of the department’s investigation into the disgraced New York financier who died in 2019, show that Epstein received several newsletters and links to news articles about developments in the DPRK.

In an email chain with then-New York Times financial reporter Landon Thomas Jr., Epstein discussed the political pulse of the United States on Jan. 29, 2017, nine days after President Donald Trump was first inaugurated.

Trump is someone who “is seen to be keeping his word,” which is a personality trait “important with [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and North Korea,” Epstein wrote to Thomas.

North Korea “has not fired their missile that he promised wouldn’t happen,” Epstein continued. “Obama was never able to effectuate that.”

Despite Epstein’s assessment, the DPRK fired its Pukguksong-2 ballistic missile roughly two weeks after his email. Pyongyang’s previous missile test before that was a launch of a Hwasong-10 mid-range missile on Oct. 19, 2016, less than a month before the U.S. presidential election.

Trump and Kim Jong Un traded barbs at the onset of the presidency, before the two leaders later held summit meetings and established a brief detente. Trump described Kim as a “madman” and threatened Pyongyang with “fire and fury,” while the North Korean leader labeled the president as a “dotard.”

“That being said,” Epstein added in the email, “Donald is fucking crazy I told you that.”

An email between Epstein and an individual named David Stern | Image: U.S. Department of Justice, edited by NK News

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NORTH KOREA’S ‘PRIME REAL ESTATE’

Some of Epstein’s emails discussed the notion of a business venture in North Korea, an improbable idea given the regime’s closed nature and later international sanctions.

These emails included correspondence with Olivier Colom, a former French diplomat and aide to former French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

Colom, whose email address is redacted, is identifiable based on the contents of the released emails. In his correspondence with Epstein on Oct. 13, 2013, Colom references his work with Sarkozy, and a boilerplate liability notice embedded in the email refers to a financial firm he worked for at the time.

In a short email sent Dec. 6, 2013, Colom asked Epstein if he is “interested in N Korea.”

Epstein replied with one word: “Very.”

“I have something for you then,” Colom wrote back. “Huge. Ultra confidential. Come to Moscow with me in January?”

“I like the idea,” Epstein said, adding that he wanted to visit Mongolia after its president, Tsakhia Elbegdorj, visited Pyongyang about one month earlier.

Colom responded, “We need to talk,” and that $10 billion related to mining and infrastructure was “at stake.”

The two went on to discuss plans for a future meeting; however, it is unclear from the emails whether it materialized.

In a separate email on June 12, 2018, an individual identified as David Stern asked Epstein for advice on visiting North Korea to see “No.1,” ostensibly in reference to Kim Jong Un. 

“Via US channels seems best,” Stern wrote. “How?”

Epstein replied: “Not sure about sanctions.”

Stern sent another email two days later requesting Epstein to “ask Bannon to get me to North Korea.”

Steve Bannon, a conservative political strategist, served as a White House aide during the first seven months of Trump’s first term.

“I want to buy prime real estate,” Stern wrote. “I have the money.”

Stern’s exact identity is unclear, including any relation to the late former NBA commissioner of the same name. Text messages illustrate his connection to the finance industry and intimate contact with Epstein, as evidenced by their sharing of salacious photos and jokes. Stern talked about his travel experiences around the world, including at a North Korean restaurant in Beijing that purportedly served steamed dog legs.

An text message between Epstein and an individual named David Stern | Image: U.S. Department of Justice, edited by NK News

Trump famously floated the possibility of building hotels and condos along North Korean beaches during his high-profile diplomacy with Kim in 2018-2019, making U.S. private investment part of his pitch for a denuclearization deal.

Following a summit with Kim in 2018, Chung-in Moon, then a special adviser to South Korea’s president, said North Korea wanted to become a “normal country” through foreign investments.

“They want American investment coming to North Korea,” he said during a CNN International interview at the time. “They welcome American sponsors and multilateral consortiums coming into North Korea.

However, the DPRK has given no indication of opening its border to wider foreign investment outside of key allies like China and Russia. Inter-Korean cooperation projects initially intended to boost economic growth, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, have also fallen to the wayside, with Pyongyang now denouncing the South as an “enemy state.”

Sanctions pose another obstacle to foreign investment in the country. The U.S. has long accused Pyongyang of funding its illicit weapons programs through a wide-ranging network of businesses, and U.N. Security Council sanctions severely restrict commercial cooperation with the DPRK.

Edited by Bryan Betts

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com