​Quotes of the Day:

"The liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure, when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them."

– Patrick Henry

"Information is the oil of the 21st century, and analytics is the combustion engine."

– Peter Sondergaard

"I'd rather entrust the government of the United States to the first 400 people listed in the Boston telephone directory than to the faculty of Harvard University."

– William F. Buckley, Jr.

1. North Korea, Nuclear Threats & the Fight for a Unification

2. North Korea welcomes Trump back with 'strategic' cruise missile test: What's next?

3. Should South Korea Pursue Nuclear Weapons?

4. Japan Is Getting SM-6 Interceptors to Stop Chinese and North Korean Missiles

5. Unprepared in the City: Operational Planning for Urban Environments

6. Ukraine war latest: Kyiv denies reports that North Korean soldiers have not been seen in Kursk Oblast for weeks

7. U.S. expert estimates N.K. casualty rate in Russia's war against Ukraine at up to 50 pct

8. 70 pct of experts doubt tangible results even if U.S., N. Korea resume talks: survey

9. Foreign, trade, defense ministries block access to DeepSeek amid data collection concerns

10. A Secret to Longer Marriages in South Korea: Lots of Shows About Divorce

11. Elite N. Korean IT teams infiltrate global freelance platforms

12. N. Korean leadership seminar orders new focus on Kim's teachings

13. Assembly Speaker Woo reassures China on S. Korea's political stability, invites Xi to APEC Summit

14. S. Korea, Japan to hold joint lighting event next week for 60th anniv. of diplomatic ties

15. Editorial: South Korea should strengthen ties in U.S.-Japan-South Korea AI alliance

16. Yoon, former defense minister refuse on-site parliamentary hearing over martial law bid

17. Special Envoy Grenell's diplomatic rampage... Interested in contact with North Korea

18. North Korea leaves South’s territory blank on revised map

1. North Korea, Nuclear Threats & the Fight for a Unification

My latest discussion on north Korea, its threats, and unification with University of South Florida Professor, Dr. Robert Burrell. 

Note that this was recorded in November prior to the political turmoil in South Korea and just after the US Presidential election.

A one hour video is at the link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vwRGjz_5jfM

North Korea, Nuclear Threats & the Fight for a Unification

Global and National Security Institute

3.48K subscribers

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Feb 4, 2025

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, global illicit activities, and growing ties with Russia continue to shape international security. As tensions rise, the push for a free and unified Korea has never been more urgent. David Maxwell, a national security expert from the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and the Global Peace Foundation, explains a strategic approach combining deterrence, engagement, and human rights could redefine the future of the Korean Peninsula. How should the U.S. and its allies respond to these evolving threats?

Don’t miss this crucial conversation on the future of Korea, U.S. strategy, and global security.

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GNSI is a nonpartisan institution whose mission is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national, and global levels.

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2. North Korea welcomes Trump back with 'strategic' cruise missile test: What's next?

​All part of Kim Jong Un's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.

Excerpts:

One of the interesting tidbits in Pyongyang’s news story is that “the test-fire had no negative impact on the security of the neighboring countries.” According to Savelsberg, the North Koreans “seem to fly them in circles or figure-8 patterns, in order not to overfly any of their neighbors.”

That may be a clear indicator of how much North Korea wants to remind the world of its weapons without sparking serious reactions to its actions.

Yonhap, South Korea’s semi-official news agency, said the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a text message to reporters saying that, “Detailed specifications are currently being closely analyzed by the intelligence authorities of South Korea and the United States.” No statements or comments have been made by US Indo-Pacific Command since the launch. Breaking Defense requested comment.

North Korea welcomes Trump back with 'strategic' cruise missile test: What's next? - Breaking Defense

North Korea's most recent cruise missile test sends two signals: both a show of capability, and a "welcome back" for Donald Trump, experts said.

breakingdefense.com · by Colin Clark · February 4, 2025

A Yonhap news TV broadcast shows test-firing of a sea-based (underwater) ground-to-ground strategic cruise guided missile in North Korea. (Photo by Kim Jae-Hwan/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)

SYDNEY — North Korea’s test launch of a “strategic” underwater-launched cruise missile within a week of President Donald Trump’s inauguration brought back into the spotlight a key geopolitical relationship from Trump’s first term: How he will approach North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

The American president’s relationship with Kim was a source of soundbites and drama between 2017 and 2021. It was the origin of “fury and fire” as a nuclear crisis between the two countries escalated in 2017. It was also the core of Trump’s 2019 meeting at the DMZ, when Trump became the first US leader to step foot into North Korean territory. And this last week, Trump said he would reach back out to Kim, saying of the dictator, “He liked me.”

But while that relationship warmed over Trump’s term, North Korea has a tendency to want to make sure it’s seen on the world stage with proverbial fireworks — or as close to proverbial as one can get when it involves missile launches. Which means the Jan. 25 launch, which was “succesfu” according to the Korean Central News Agency, could very well have been timed to catch the attention of the newly-sworn-in American leader.

Experts seem to agree that Kim is in a much stronger position than he was when Trump was first elected in 2016, a reality that will impact how Washington and Pyongyang interact in the coming years. Meanwhile, they say, the American president is much more likely to press ahead on ending the war in Ukraine, pursuing Chinese tariffs and domestic priorities before pressing ahead with efforts to reshape relations with Kim.

Start with the situation in North Korea itself. Kim has repositioned his country over the least year, scrapping all cooperation with the South and declaring his country was on a war footing.

“Kim has already signaled a change in state policy vis a vis South Korea, to turn away from any sort of reunification and instead to prepare the DPRK military for war. So his military build up will continue, including investing in advanced missile capabilities,” Malcolm Davis, an expert on the Indo-Pacific at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in Canberra said in an email, “These include a range of delivery systems for tactical and strategic nuclear forces, including hypersonic weapons, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.”

What has long been the unachieved goal of the West — North Korea abandoning nuclear weapons and allowing inspections of its facilities to prove it — is unlikely to happen, both Davis and Leonid Petrov, a North Korea expert at the Australian National University in Canberra, told Breaking Defense.

“From Donald Trump’s point of view, he’s not going to gain anything by denuclearizing North Korea. North Korea is not posing any plausible threat to US territory,” Petrov said. “Yes, it can create trouble to South Korea, to Japan, to US bases in the Pacific, but that’s probably it. I don’t think North Korea is actually a threat, any threat to the US homeland.”

The CIA’s former deputy division chief for Korea, Bruce Klingner, said last week that there are conflicting signals coming from the Trump administration towards Pyongyang in its early days. “Everyone has to be prepared for a wide variety of course changes and high speed changes. And we’ll just have to wait and see on some of these,” the Heritage Foundation expert said during an event sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Michael Allen, a former National Security aide to George W. Bush and managing director of Beacon Global Strategies, noted on the CSIS panel that Trump’s comment about talking to Kim was in reaction to a question. “I don’t hear him proactively raising this issue,” he said.

Allen added that Trump “may have made the assessment that a deal is just not possible.” He said he didn’t know if talks with North Korea are “going to be a big thrust of what President Trump wants to be able to do, because I think a lot of people look at this and they say, this is a huge problem.”

Part of that problem is how to manage US and allied relations with the isolated leader.

“As for how Trump and US allies ‘manage Kim’ — I don’t think they do. Trump may be tempted to do a summit, but he’ll get nothing out of it, and probably come under pressure to make concessions,” Davis said. He noted that South Korea, under disgraced leader Yoon Suk Yeol had discussed the need for nuclear weapons. Now that he appears likely be removed from office and the opposition opposes nuclear weapons and favors engagements with Pyongyang, Davis says the situation grows even more complicated for Trump.

But perhaps the biggest change in Kim’s posture is not an internal shift, but a new powerful friend: Russian strongman Vladimir Putin.

Petrov pointed to the fact that “things have changed dramatically,” since Trump stepped briefly into Kim’s country, thanks to Putin serving as Kim’s new “benefactor … Putin gives them money and technology and protection.”

Of course, it’s not been free. Kim has sent at least 11,000 North Korean troops to help Russia in its war against Ukraine. In return, Kim is getting billions of dollars in advanced weapons, food and oil from Russia.

“He already has secured his regime through Russia’s commitment to secure it, and North Korea will get enough technology and recognition and sanctions can be diverted through Russian border and the Chinese border,” Petrov said.

For his part, Kim followed the missile test up with a Jan. 29 visit to a nuclear weapons facility, which he praised for “epochal successes” in producing material for nuclear weapons and “strengthening the nuclear shield of the country,” the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said. Kim said 2025 will be “a watershed year” for improving his nuclear forces.

North Korean Technical Capabilities

So, about that missile…

Perhaps the most important question is whether this cruise missile can carry a nuclear warhead. North Korea has claimed it has a warhead that is small enough to fit onto the weapon, but like so many things about North Korea, no one is really sure.

“The DPRK has shown several purported nuclear weapons. In 2016 and 2017 they showed two designs in relation to ballistic missiles. It is unclear whether these were real, but in any case they were too large to fit inside a cruise missile. However, more recently, in March 2023, they unveiled the much smaller ‘Hwasan-31’ nuclear warhead. This would fit inside a cruise missile,” Ralph Savelsberg, a missile expert with the Netherlands Defence Academy said, adding that he “cannot assess whether these are real, though.”

The KCNA announcement of the launch, published in English late on Jan. 26, included alleged details of the test, which it says Kim watched.

“Based on the press statement, the missile flew 1,500 km,” Savelsberg said. “If that is its range, when launched from the DPRK, that would put all of Japan, including Okinawa, in range. If it can indeed be launched from a submarine, depending on the range of the submarine, it could threaten Guam. They claim to have launched a nuclear submarine in September 2023 and that could theoretically even threaten Hawaii or the US West Coast.”

In some ways a smaller missile like this poses a more difficult threat to the US, South Korea, Japan and other countries in range because cruise missiles are “difficult to defend against. They don’t fly as fast as a ballistic missile, but they are small and fly at low altitudes, which makes them difficult to detect. Furthermore, they can fly an unpredictable path and thus attack from a direction which you might not anticipate,” Savelsberg said.

One of the interesting tidbits in Pyongyang’s news story is that “the test-fire had no negative impact on the security of the neighboring countries.” According to Savelsberg, the North Koreans “seem to fly them in circles or figure-8 patterns, in order not to overfly any of their neighbors.”

That may be a clear indicator of how much North Korea wants to remind the world of its weapons without sparking serious reactions to its actions.

Yonhap, South Korea’s semi-official news agency, said the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a text message to reporters saying that, “Detailed specifications are currently being closely analyzed by the intelligence authorities of South Korea and the United States.” No statements or comments have been made by US Indo-Pacific Command since the launch. Breaking Defense requested comment.

breakingdefense.com · by Colin Clark · February 4, 2025

3. Should South Korea Pursue Nuclear Weapons?

​Wise words from Dr. Yu. I would only add as I always do that that Kim Jong Un welcomes this debate because it can be in support of his political warfare strategy to drive a wedge in the ROK /US alliance, South Korea should have the nuclear debate but they must do so with the understanding of how it can be exploited by the Kim family regime.

Excerpts:

Rather than rushing toward nuclear development, South Korea must take a deliberate and cautious approach, considering all available options for strengthening its security. Conventional military enhancements, reinforced alliances, and diplomatic engagement provide credible alternatives that may achieve deterrence without the profound risks associated with nuclear proliferation. In the end, the decision must be guided by a comprehensive and pragmatic assessment of South Korea’s long-term security interests, ensuring that any course of action maximizes stability and minimizes unintended consequences.

Should South Korea Pursue Nuclear Weapons?

By Jihoon Yu

February 05, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/02/05/should_south_korea_pursue_nuclear_weapons_1089359.html?mc_cid=6d2b7cbe67

Should South Korea Pursue Nuclear Weapons? A Deliberate and Cautious Approach

The ongoing debate over whether South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons is an extraordinarily complex and sensitive issue, with arguments on both sides rooted in national security concerns, regional stability, and international diplomatic dynamics. While some advocate for nuclear armament as a necessary response to North Korea’s growing nuclear threat, others warn of the significant economic, diplomatic, and strategic risks involved. Given the profound consequences of such a decision, South Korea must approach this issue with the utmost caution, carefully weighing all potential benefits and drawbacks before taking any steps toward nuclearization.

Security Concerns and the Case for Nuclear Deterrence

One of the key motivations behind South Korea’s potential pursuit of nuclear weapons is the escalating security threat posed by North Korea. Since its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has continued to expand and refine its nuclear arsenal, now possessing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of striking targets far beyond the Korean Peninsula. Some argue that an independent nuclear capability would provide South Korea with a more credible deterrent, reducing its reliance on the United States and ensuring a more autonomous national defense posture.

Beyond North Korea, broader regional security challenges also factor into the discussion. China’s growing military presence in the Indo-Pacific and Japan’s increasing defense spending contribute to a shifting strategic landscape. In such an environment, some believe that a nuclear-armed South Korea could serve as a counterbalance, deterring potential aggression from various regional actors.

However, developing nuclear weapons is not a simple solution, and there are significant challenges in ensuring their effectiveness. For deterrence to be credible, South Korea would need not only nuclear weapons but also reliable delivery systems, secure command-and-control structures, and a clear strategic doctrine—elements that require substantial time and resources to develop.

The Role of the U.S. Alliance and Extended Deterrence

South Korea has long relied on the United States for security guarantees, with the U.S. nuclear umbrella serving as a cornerstone of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Some argue that doubts about Washington’s commitment—particularly in light of shifting U.S. foreign policy priorities—make independent nuclear capabilities a necessary safeguard. If South Korea perceives a weakening of U.S. extended deterrence, calls for nuclear armament may grow stronger.

At the same time, acquiring nuclear weapons could strain or even jeopardize the U.S.-South Korea alliance. The United States has consistently opposed nuclear proliferation among its allies, and any move by South Korea to develop its own nuclear arsenal could lead to tensions or even reduced security cooperation. This creates a dilemma: while nuclear weapons might provide a sense of self-reliance, they could also come at the cost of losing key strategic partnerships that currently provide a strong deterrence framework.

Economic and Diplomatic Implications

Beyond security concerns, the economic and diplomatic consequences of nuclear development must be considered. As a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), South Korea would face international backlash if it were to break its commitments. Economic sanctions, trade restrictions, and potential diplomatic isolation could follow, severely impacting the country’s global standing and economic stability.

Moreover, South Korea’s economic success is deeply tied to international trade and investment. Any move toward nuclear armament could disrupt relations with key economic partners, including the United States, the European Union, and even China. This economic fallout could outweigh the perceived security benefits of possessing nuclear weapons.

Potential for Regional Arms Race and Instability

A South Korean nuclear weapons program could also trigger a broader regional arms race, with Japan potentially feeling compelled to follow suit. Such developments could heighten tensions in East Asia and increase the risk of miscalculation or unintended conflict. Additionally, China and Russia may view a nuclear-armed South Korea as a threat, leading to further military buildups and strategic realignments.

There is also the risk of escalating tensions with North Korea. While nuclear weapons are often seen as a means of deterrence, they could also provoke more aggressive responses from Pyongyang, leading to heightened instability rather than increased security. In the worst-case scenario, miscalculations or crises could result in conflict, rather than preventing it.

Exploring Alternatives to Nuclear Armament

Given the significant risks and uncertainties associated with nuclear weapons, South Korea must carefully explore alternative ways to enhance its security. Strengthening conventional military capabilities remains a viable option, as South Korea already possesses one of the most advanced militaries in the world. Continued investment in missile defense systems, cyber capabilities, and precision-strike weapons could serve as an effective deterrent against potential threats.

Another approach is to reinforce extended deterrence through deeper cooperation with the United States. This could include more frequent deployment of U.S. strategic assets in the region, expanded intelligence-sharing, and potential discussions on enhanced nuclear-sharing arrangements. Strengthening trilateral security cooperation with Japan and the U.S. could further solidify deterrence without requiring South Korea to develop its own nuclear arsenal.

Diplomatic engagement should also remain a core pillar of South Korea’s security strategy. While negotiations with North Korea have proven challenging, maintaining open channels of communication and pursuing regional confidence-building measures can help reduce tensions and create a more stable security environment.

Conclusion: A Decision Requiring Caution and Deliberation

The question of South Korea’s nuclear armament is not one that can be answered with a simple “yes” or “no.” While security threats—particularly from North Korea—are undeniable, the broader implications of developing nuclear weapons must be carefully assessed. Economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, potential damage to alliances, and the risk of a regional arms race all present serious concerns that cannot be overlooked.

Rather than rushing toward nuclear development, South Korea must take a deliberate and cautious approach, considering all available options for strengthening its security. Conventional military enhancements, reinforced alliances, and diplomatic engagement provide credible alternatives that may achieve deterrence without the profound risks associated with nuclear proliferation. In the end, the decision must be guided by a comprehensive and pragmatic assessment of South Korea’s long-term security interests, ensuring that any course of action maximizes stability and minimizes unintended consequences.

Jihoon Yu is a research fellow and the director of external cooperation at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. Jihoon was the member of Task Force for South Korea’s light aircraft carrier project and Jangbogo-III submarine project. He is the main author of the ROK Navy’s Navy Vision 2045. His area of expertise includes the ROK-US alliance, the ROK-Europe security cooperation, inter-Korean relations, national security, maritime security, and maritime strategy. He earned his MA in National Security Affairs from the US Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in Political Science from Syracuse University.

4. Japan Is Getting SM-6 Interceptors to Stop Chinese and North Korean Missiles

Japan Is Getting SM-6 Interceptors to Stop Chinese and North Korean Missiles

19fortyfive.com · by Michael Peck · February 4, 2025

In another sign of how crucial missile defense has become in the Pacific, Japan’s navy is getting U.S. SM-6 surface-to-air missiles.

The SM-6 is a potent air defense weapon that can be employed against ballistic missiles as well as aircraft. The Japanese home islands have been under threat of North Korean ballistic missile attack for years, including nuclear-tipped missiles. Should Japan dispatch its navy to defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion, or maintain Japan’s sovereignty over disputed islands in the East China Sea, then Japanese warships would face a deadly array of Chinese weapons, including anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.

The $900 million SM-6 sale was approved last month by the State Department’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, before going to Congress for final approval. The deal includes up to 150 SM-6 Block I missiles, MK 21 Mod 3 Vertical Launch System canisters, and spare parts.

“The proposed sale will improve Japan’s capability to meet current and future threats by allowing the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) to deploy the latest Standard Missile capabilities from their current and future AEGIS Weapon System (AWS) equipped surface combatants,” DSCA concluded. “The proposed sale will further enhance Japan’s capability to protect Japan and local allied land forces and will significantly improve Japan’s contribution to integrated air missile defense in the Indo-Pacific region.”

Japan is building up a fleet of ships equipped with the American-made Aegis air and missile defense system, a sophisticated array of weapons, sensors and datalinks that dates back to the 1970s. The Ministry of Defense recently ordered two more destroyers, which will increase Japan’s Aegis fleet to 10 vessels.

These vessels would be compatible with the U.S. Navy’s Aegis fleet. The U.S. Navy procured 121 Aegis-equipped Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers from 1978 to 2024.

Aegis has evolved to become far more than a fleet air defense system. Its anti-ballistic missile capabilities have made it an integral part of national missile defense systems for the U.S. and its allies, working in tandem with land-based interceptors such as the PAC-3 Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD). There is even a land-based version – called Aegis Ashore – which has already been deployed to Poland as part of NATO’s missile defense network.

The cutting edge of Aegis is the SM-6 missile, first deployed in 2013 as an extended-range version of the SM-2. The SM-6 has an estimated range of 150 to 200 miles, versus 90 miles for the SM-2. While the SM-2 is still in widespread use as an interceptor against aircraft and anti-ship missiles, the SM-6 goes further with longer range and an onboard radar – based on that found in the AIM-120 air-to-air missile – which allows the SM-6 to hit targets beyond the detection range of shipboard radars.

“The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region,” DSCA assured Congress. Broadly speaking, that’s true. Adding 150 Japanese anti-missile interceptors won’t increase the massive superiority of America and its Pacific allies over North Korea, nor substantially diminish the threat from more than 3,000 Chinese ballistic missiles.

Israel’s missile defenses – aided by the U.S., Britain and other nations – scored impressive successes against two mass Iranian missile and drone attacks last year, with Israel claiming a 99 percent interception rate in the April 2024 strike. Achieving similar success in the skies over Taiwan or Japan would be more difficult. China would probably launch a larger strike, using more sophisticated missiles, than Iran.

However, the SM-6 sale does suggest that a multinational missile defense coalition is shaping up in the Pacific. Japan’s Aegis-equipped ships, operating alongside their American counterparts, could shield Taiwan and Japan against Chinese or North Korean attack. Meanwhile, the U.S. has offered to sell 100 Patriot PAC-3 missiles to Taiwan.

USS Savannah (LCS 28) conducts a live-fire demonstration in the Eastern Pacific Ocean utilizing a containerized launching system that fired an SM-6 missile from the ship at a designated target. The exercise demonstrated the modularity and lethality of Littoral Combat Ships and the ability to successfully integrate a containerized weapons system to engage a surface target. The exercise will inform continued testing, evaluation and integration of containerized weapons systems on afloat platforms.

This may not be sufficient to deter China should Beijing follow through on its vows to unify Taiwan with China, by force if necessary. Nor dissuade North Korea from attacking Japan, should North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his regime feel sufficiently provoked for whatever reason.

But the chance that some of their missiles would be intercepted might give an attacker pause.

About the Author: Michael Peck

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Business Insider, Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn

19fortyfive.com · by Michael Peck · February 4, 2025

5. Unprepared in the City: Operational Planning for Urban Environments

​Excerpts:

Preparing for urban conflict at echelons above brigade is urgent. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be inherently urban almost from the start. A Russian invasion of the Baltics would likely have a large urban component almost immediately as the Russians could reach capital cities in a matter of days. A North Korean attack on South Korea would have a significant urban component because of the proximity of Seoul to the border. The US military must accept that odds are high that the next large-scale conflict will have a heavily urban character within days of beginning. There will not be time to make up then for the lack of preparation today. This can be partly addressed now—at low cost—by training echelons above brigade staffs how to campaign in urban areas.

​Seoul will be a black hole of urban combat for north Korea - what goes into Seoul will be absorbed and will never come out. north Korean forces need to bypass Seoul and rapidly get across the Han River and make it to Pusan before the ROK can mobilize and the US can deploy reinforcements (1950 all over again). To get bogged down with troops in Seoul in the initial fight means the nKPA will not be able to conduct its military objectives. But there will be plenty of urban combat throughout the entire Korean peninsula just not in Seoul in the initial fight - but Seoul is likely to be initially rubbled by artillery, rocket, and missile fire from the north.

Unprepared in the City: Operational Planning for Urban Environments - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Brandon Schwartz · February 5, 2025

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On February 24, 2022, Russian forces air assaulted into the Antonov Airport near Kyiv while a large ground force attacked from the north. In the end, the air assault failed but Russian troops pushed their way to Irpin, a suburb of Kyiv. There they clashed in a monthlong battle with Ukrainian forces, grinding the city to a pulp. Since then, the Russians and Ukrainians have fought in numerous large-scale urban battles, including in Bakhmut, Mariupol, Izium, Kharkiv, and Toretsk.

A year and a half after Russia’s invasion and about 1,200 miles south, Israel responded to Hamas’s surprise attack on October 7, 2023, by deploying three divisions into the heavily urbanized terrain of the Gaza territory, battling upwards of thirty thousand enemy fighters. The campaign in Gaza gained worldwide notoriety for its urban complications and remained a multidivision mission for over half a year.

These two conflicts, in Ukraine and Gaza, teach an inconvenient lesson—that large scale combat operations (LSCO) and urban environments are linked. Together, they demonstrate the urgent necessity for the US Army to prepare for conflict in urban environments. In particular, echelons above brigade commands must learn to plan for urban operations at the operational level of warfare. Having planned real-world urban LSCO in a theater army, I can attest to the scarcity of practical, readily available resources for planners at echelons above brigade. Doctrine is limited to primarily tactical matters, captured mostly in one joint publication and three Army techniques publications. As for education, the 40th Infantry Division ran an urban operations planner course, which has an uncertain future, that focused on brigade and division staffs. However, with relatively small cohorts, no direct connection to corps and theater army, and a more tactical how-to focus rather than operational campaigning, the course did not fill all gaps in the force. Until doctrine and education catch up to the requirement, planners will rely on simple guides like this to help understand how to plan for urban conflicts as part of LSCO campaigns.

The Future Fight is Urban

To embrace planning, echelons above brigade commands must first reject the myth that US forces would never fight LSCO in the urban environment. There are numerous reasons to fight in urban areas. First, cities can be intrinsically valuable. Cities contain dense populations of people, attract economic resources, and often have cultural or political significance. Global megatrends indicate continuing population growth over the next few decades with people concentrating in urban areas. This means an increasing number of these areas in the future operating environment.

Another reason to fight in urban areas is that the aspects of a city that make it intrinsically valuable may also make it militarily valuable. Consequently, US forces may need to operate in urban areas to deny critical capabilities from the enemy or to protect or recapture them on behalf of a partner nation. As a personal example, this is the category related to my urban LSCO planning experience. The combatant commander directed the theater army to develop plans for imposing costs to the enemy through the land domain. Our team developed multiple options that generally fell into one of two types. One type sought to directly deny resources to the enemy. The other sought to be close enough to those resources to indirectly deny them using land-based effects. Regardless, the most valuable resources in all options were in cities and required urban planning.

A third reason US forces may fight in urban areas is simply because that is where the enemy chooses to operate. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army today believes that American risk aversion to high-casualty situations makes drawing them into cities an ideal way to erode will, regardless of each city’s value. The Battle of Ortona in 1943 provides an example of this phenomenon. Ortona possessed zero strategic and little operational value to either Axis or Allied forces. However, the Germans defended Ortona almost solely because it provided the opportunity to attrit Canadian forces. The Canadians completed their attack simply because it provided the opportunity to attrit the Germans.

Finally, US forces may need to conduct urban operations to secure lines of communication to enable other operations. A significant reason for the US seizure of the German city of Aachen in 1944 was to secure the Aachen Corridor to the vital Ruhr industrial region. Bypassing urban areas when attacking Kyiv disrupted Russian lines of communication and significantly contributed to the Russian attack’s logistical culmination. As a result, the Russians abandoned the concept of bypassing cities when they contained important rail or road nodes.

Planning for Operations in Urban Environments

Once over the myth that urban areas can always be avoided, commands then encounter the challenge of how to actually plan large-scale operations. Urban environments significantly impact how Army forces conduct operations, which requires unique planning considerations.

Operational Approach

The first major planning factor is developing an urban campaign operational approach. The starting point for all urban campaign decisions is identifying how a city fits into the overarching strategic objectives. This context is essential for the commander to establish acceptable levels of destruction to the city, a determination that influences all subsequent decisions.

Offensive campaigns are different from defensive ones. As the attacker, US forces will exert more control over the amount of precombat destruction that occurs in a city (i.e., preparatory fires). Therefore, commands may be more precise when establishing acceptable levels of destruction. Some of the other important considerations for urban operational approaches include end state and conditions, phasing and transitions, tempo, operational reach, and culmination. While those are all aspects of operational art, they are uniquely impacted in urban environments by the commander’s acceptance of destruction. As a result, there are a handful of urban campaign approaches commanders can select from: destroy, assault, infiltrate, isolate and besiege, bypass, or raid.

Defensive urban campaigns have their own unique operational approach considerations. As the defender, US forces exert more control over the amount of destruction inflicted during combat. For example, defenders usually choose which bridges to destroy or buildings to rubble to create obstacles. Commanders must also decide whether they plan to conduct a long-term or short-term defense. The anticipated length of the defense informs nearly all subsequent decisions. Other key considerations for defensive campaign planning include enemy capabilities and objectives, strategically or culturally significant terrain, natural terrain, alterable terrain, civilian population, and the role of civilians in the defense. Based on historical examples, commanders generally employ one of the following types of defensive operational approaches: preemptive withdrawal, fortress of last resort, city as a fortress, envelop and counterattack, zonal defense, defense in depth, point defense, delay, and denial of control.

Operational Framework

The second major planning factor is the operational framework. Planners must consider that the application of the operational framework is complicated by urban environments, thereby increasing the difficulties of controlling subordinate formations. One challenging aspect of urban operations is that units will often have noncontiguous areas of operation. This presents challenges to identifying and delineating between deep, close, and rear areas by echelon, especially as boundaries based on terrain landmarks may be quickly destroyed. Another challenge is mutual support. Supporting range in urban environments can vary drastically over time and space. Also, supporting distance considerations are impacted by rapid change in the landscape, which can quickly isolate units.

The areas within the operational framework are challenging as well. In the close area, the most obvious and significant issue is that units will often be in a 360-degree fight along multiple axes. Consequently, the close area is much more expansive in urban than in other environments for an Army force, despite occupying a relatively small portion of a map. Planners at echelons above brigade need to adjust their correlation of forces and means (known as COFMs) for all operations. In the case of attacks, many historical cases indicate at least six to one.

The deep area also presents challenges. In particular, isolating large cities can be problematic. Large city perimeters increase security requirements, often beyond the capacity of available Army forces. Many large cities also have significant maritime features. As a result, urban deep areas at echelons above brigade are unusually joint-dependent and require close coordination with the other services.

Finally, in the rear area in urban operations, commanders at echelons above brigade must decide how to conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). Cities often provide excellent access to transportation facilities, such as ports and rail networks. However, those facilities are often within range of many of the enemy’s offensive capabilities. Yet conducting RSOI beyond the city may add significant maneuver distance, require fighting through previously cleared terrain due to enemy infiltration, and expose forces to enemy interdiction efforts.

Time

The third major planning factor is time. Commanders should expect to devote additional time for planning urban operations for two major reasons: intelligence and operational planning teams. First, intelligence preparation for a city should be lengthy and extensive. As noted by the Mosul Study Group, “Extensive and unceasing . . . intelligence preparation of the battlefield [is] essential to understand this ever-changing complex terrain.” The intelligence function benefits from developing on-the-ground knowledge in urban environments to collect and analyze human intelligence, which takes time. Planners should consider that the urban terrain limits the effectiveness of imagery intelligence while the congested urban electromagnetic spectrum reduces the effectiveness of signals intelligence. This will likely impact the selection of named areas of interest and priority information requirements.

Second, city-specific operational planning teams (OPTs) require additional time to complete their work. Each city, even within the same geographic area, is unique. Commanders need specialized planning teams to manage the planning process for operations in a city. These OPTs benefit from additional time to sift through the complexity of a city to best develop courses of action for the commander. Additionally, OPTs have a capacity limitation. Many of the planners involved in other efforts related to conducting operations in the operational environment will be dual-hatted in the city-specific OPT.

Enablers

The fourth major planning factor is enablers. The numerous adverse impacts of urban operations drive the requirement for additional capabilities.

Beginning with protection, combat engineers are an especially valuable asset in urban operations. They conduct breaching, route clearance, rubble clearance, and obstacle reduction to enable movement and maneuver and support the commander’s tempo of operations. Depending on the situation, urban operations may create significant demand for gap-crossing capability, especially multirole bridging companies. Additional military police capabilities will be essential because of the presence of internally displaced persons and the likelihood of holding detainees. Another consideration is for explosive ordnance disposal units. The presence of unexploded ordnance, the use of mines, and the likelihood, demonstrated by history, of encountering booby traps in urban areas will likely exceed normal capacity.

Sustainers will face increased requirements in multiple classes of supply. The presence of civilians, historically measured at about 10 percent of preconflict urban populations, will increase requirements for food, water, and medicine. US forces have legal obligations to the civil population, as well as enemy prisoners of war, that cannot be avoided and will drive increased sustainment demand. Urban operations also tend to increase demand on repair parts, particularly tires, and ammunition. Planners should consider the possibility of additional ground medical evacuation capability and surgical support in urban areas. There may also be increased demand for port-opening and -operating capabilities, depending on the mission. Urban areas also usually contain key infrastructure that can be dangerous and require technical expertise to safely operate, such as oil and gas refineries. This may require contracting technical expertise to provide support during operations.

Another consideration worth noting deals with the information dimension. Public affairs and combat camera units can be especially helpful during urban operations. Urban operations often generate civilian casualties, which is exploited by the enemy, such as Hamas did in Gaza during Israel’s ground campaign after the October 7 attacks. Effective and aggressive public affairs can mitigate this challenge. Commanders may also need additional civil affairs capabilities to assist with developing a civilian common operational picture and to lead stability-related efforts.

Finally, urban plans benefit from emphasis on special operations capabilities. Special operations forces (SOF) can assist with challenges associated with intelligence preparation of the operational environment, especially with developing vital human intelligence sources. SOF is also the key in defensive campaigns, particularly in developing civilian defense augmentation or a long-term resistance in enemy-occupied areas. Finally, SOF can assist with isolating portions of cities, conducting counter-SOF operations, and executing sabotage in enemy-controlled areas.

Preparing for urban conflict at echelons above brigade is urgent. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be inherently urban almost from the start. A Russian invasion of the Baltics would likely have a large urban component almost immediately as the Russians could reach capital cities in a matter of days. A North Korean attack on South Korea would have a significant urban component because of the proximity of Seoul to the border. The US military must accept that odds are high that the next large-scale conflict will have a heavily urban character within days of beginning. There will not be time to make up then for the lack of preparation today. This can be partly addressed now—at low cost—by training echelons above brigade staffs how to campaign in urban areas.

Major Brandon Schwartz, US Army, is currently a doctrine author at the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate. He holds a BA from the University of Michigan and an MA from Air Command and Staff College. During his career, Major Schwartz served with the Third Expeditionary Sustainment Command, 82nd Airborne Division, Cadet Command, and Army Central.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Combined Arms Center. Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Spc. Charles Leitner, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Brandon Schwartz · February 5, 2025

6. Ukraine war latest: Kyiv denies reports that North Korean soldiers have not been seen in Kursk Oblast for weeks

Ukraine war latest: Kyiv denies reports that North Korean soldiers have not been seen in Kursk Oblast for weeks

kyivindependent.com · by The Kyiv Independent news desk · February 4, 2025

Key developments on Feb. 4:

• Nearly 8,000 North Korean soldiers still fighting in Kursk Oblast, Budanov says
• Ukraine's strike on Russian command center in Kursk Oblast causes 'significant losses,' General Staff says
• At least 5 killed, 55 injured in Russian missile strike on Izium in Kharkiv Oblast
• Russia records 20,000 claims to declare people dead or missing last year, marking 2.5-fold surge, media reports
• Russian soldiers face execution threats to retake lost ground near Kupiansk, Ukraine claims

About 8,000 North Korean soldiers are still fighting against Ukraine in Russia's Kursk Oblast, Ukraine's military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov said in an interview with The War Zone magazine published on Feb. 4.

After The New York Times reported on Jan. 30 that North Korean troops had been pulled from the front, a Special Operations Forces spokesperson confirmed to the Kyiv Independent that Ukraine's special forces had not faced Pyongyang's soldiers for three weeks.

Budanov denied reports that North Korean soldiers have not been seen on the front line for weeks. However, Budanov noted that the number of North Korean troops has decreased, and Ukraine is trying to establish why.

"We have to wait for some time to see if there are any real changes or if this is just lower activity for a couple of days," Budanov said.

Up to 12,000 North Korean troops were deployed to Kursk Oblast last fall to support Russian forces in countering a Ukrainian incursion launched in early August 2024.

At least 300 North Korean soldiers have been killed and another 2,700 wounded fighting in Russia's Kursk Oblast, South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) claimed on Jan. 13

The heavy losses of the North Korean army may be related to its lack of combat experience and the tactic of human waves attacks with a limited amount of equipment, Ukraine's military intelligence chief added. According to Budanov, North Korean soldiers attack "almost without any combat vehicles."

Budanov also suggested that the North Korean military is so willing to advance on foot against Ukrainian drones and artillery because of its loyalty to North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un. He added that their disregard for personal safety makes Ukraine's defense more challenging.

Ukraine's strike on Russian command center in Kursk Oblast causes 'significant losses,' General Staff says

Ukraine's Air Force carried out a "precision strike" on Feb. 3 at a Russian command post near the village of Novoivanovka in Kursk Oblast, the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces reported.

Kyiv launched a limited incursion into Russia's Kursk Oblast on Aug. 6, first capturing about 1,300 square kilometers (500 square miles) of Russian territory. While Ukraine has reportedly lost around half of that territory since then, fighting continues in the region.

The command post, located in an abandoned building, was used to coordinate Russian troops' offensive against the Ukrainian army in the Kursk sector of the front line, the statement read.

The building was severely damaged, and Moscow suffered significant losses among Russian personnel, the General Staff said.

The Kyiv Independent could not verify these claims.

Earlier on Jan. 31, Ukrainian forces struck another command post of Russia's Kursk group of forces in the Russian city of Rylsk.

These attacks are part of Ukraine's broader strategy to weaken Russian operational capabilities by targeting key command centers. The General Staff has emphasized that such strikes aim to reduce Russia's offensive potential.

What to expect from Ukraine’s defense innovation in 2025

Despite the uncertainty surrounding a potential resolution to the war, Ukrainians know one thing for sure: we must ramp up our defense capabilities to effectively defend against current and future Russian aggression. This requires the rapid development of asymmetrical solutions to counter Russia’s a…

The Kyiv IndependentNatalia Kushnerska

At least 5 killed, 55 injured in Russian missile strike on Izium in Kharkiv Oblast

A Russian missile attack against the town of Izium in Kharkiv Oblast killed at least five people and injured at least 55 on Feb. 4, Governor Oleh Syniehubov said.

Three children were injured in the attack, including a six-year-old boy and two girls, aged 14 and 16. The 14-year-old girl is in a serious condition, while the other two children are in a condition of medium severity, according to Syniehubov.

The governor initially reported four people killed – two men and two women. A fifth victim was reported later during the day when rescue services recovered another body from the rubble.

A pregnant woman was among the killed, Syniehubov reported later.

According to preliminary data, Russian forces used a ballistic missile in the attack, targeting the central part of the city, Syniehubov said.

An administrative building suffered a hit, while another administrative building and several residential buildings were damaged, according to the governor.

Syniehubov stressed that no military facilities were located in the targeted area.

Izium, a town with a pre-invasion population of 45,000, lies in the southeastern part of Kharkiv Oblast, over 100 kilometers (60 miles) from the regional center, Kharkiv, and around 50 kilometers (30 miles) west of the front line.

Transfer of Ukrainian Air Force personnel to infantry continues despite scandal

The Ukrainian military command’s plan to throw high-skilled Air Force personnel into the infantry was said to be halted when the practice gained nationwide attention, followed by a condemnation from President Volodymyr Zelensky. Soldiers, who spoke to the Kyiv Independent on conditions of anonymity…

The Kyiv IndependentAsami Terajima

Russia records 20,000 claims to declare people dead or missing last year, marking 2.5-fold surge, media reports

Russian courts received 20,000 claims in 2024 seeking to declare individuals missing or dead, marking a two-and-a-half increase from previous years, independent media outlet Mediazona reported on Feb. 4.

Before the full-scale war, Russian courts handled approximately 8,000 such cases annually. The surge in filings, which began in mid-2024, represents the first significant rise in missing persons cases since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The figures hint at mounting Russian losses during the full-scale invasion, which various estimates place between 600,000 and 840,000 killed and wounded. Moscow does not publish its official casualty figures.

According to Mediazona, most of the claims last year were initiated by Russian military unit commanders who sought to remove missing soldiers — presumed dead but lacking official confirmation — from personnel rosters. This process allows units to recruit replacements.

Families do not need to consent to these legal declarations, which often leaves them without financial support or clear information about their relatives' fate, the outlet wrote.

The exact number of missing Russian soldiers remains unknown, as courts routinely withhold applicants' names and avoid publicizing rulings. In 2024, an estimated 12,000 additional cases were recorded beyond the usual peacetime figures.

More than 50,000 inquiries have been submitted by Russians seeking information about missing soldiers through Ukraine's "I Want to Find" project, Bohdan Okhrimenko, head of the Coordination Center Secretariat, said on Jan. 3.

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Initially launched in September 2022 as part of the "I Want to Live" hotline, which helps Russian soldiers surrender, the project was expanded to address requests from families searching for missing troops.

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anna Tsivilyova disclosed on Nov. 26 that her ministry had received 48,000 DNA test applications from relatives hoping to locate missing soldiers.

Speaking at a Duma roundtable, Tsivilyova revealed that the DNA data was stored in a database, inadvertently providing a rare glimpse into the scale of Russian casualties.

Andrei Kartapolov, head of the State Duma's defense committee, cautioned against publicizing such figures. "This is sensitive information. When we finalize the documents, we must ensure these figures do not appear publicly," he said.

According to the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces, Russia has lost 842,930 troops since launching its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022.

Russian soldiers face execution threats to retake lost ground near Kupiansk, Ukraine claims

Russian commanders in the Kupiansk sector are ordering their soldiers to retake positions from which they retreated under Ukrainian fire, threatening them with execution if they refuse, Ukraine's Khortytsia group of forces claimed on Feb. 4, citing intelligence reports.

Ukrainian soldiers forced Russian troops to abandon forward positions near a settlement in the Kupiansk sector following intensive assaults, the unit said.

The Kyiv Independent could not verify these claims.

Russian forces intensified their assault on Kupiansk in Kharkiv Oblast in September 2024, pushing toward the city's industrial outskirts in the northeast. Ukrainian forces repelled several attempts to enter the town throughout December.

The estimated Russian advance in the Kupiansk district, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine, as of Feb. 4, 2025. A white symbol marks the city of Kupiansk. (DeepState / OpenStreetMaps)

For months, Russia has sought to establish a foothold along the eastern bank of the Oskil River, attempting to outflank Ukrainian defenses and open the way for a rear attack on Kupiansk. The front line now lies just two kilometers (1.5 miles) from the town.

President Volodymyr Zelensky recently appointed Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi, the commander of Ukraine's Ground Forces, to lead the Khortytsia group of forces as Ukraine works to counter Russian advances in the sector.

Western and Ukrainian officials have pointed to poor morale among Russian troops since the outbreak of the full-scale war. Moscow employs the infamous "human wave" tactics in which its troops overwhelm Ukrainian defenders through sheer numbers despite suffering heavy losses.

Reports of Russian commanders executing their soldiers have also surfaced amid some of the heaviest battles of the war, for example, during Russia's siege of the stronghold town of Avdiivka in late 2023.

Note from the author:

Ukraine War Latest is put together by the Kyiv Independent news desk team, who keep you informed 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

If you value our work and want to ensure we have the resources to continue, join the Kyiv Independent community.

kyivindependent.com · by The Kyiv Independent news desk · February 4, 2025

7. U.S. expert estimates N.K. casualty rate in Russia's war against Ukraine at up to 50 pct

​It is good to see some non-Korea watchers now focusing on north Korea.  

U.S. expert estimates N.K. casualty rate in Russia's war against Ukraine at up to 50 pct | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 5, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Feb. 4 (Yonhap) -- A U.S. expert said Tuesday that up to 50 percent of North Korean troops, who were deployed to support Russia in its war against Ukraine, might be injured or killed on the battlefield, as Moscow is conducting "attrition" warfare that involves "heavy casualties."

Seth Jones, president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), made the remarks amid reports that North Korea has suffered substantial troop casualties after deploying around 12,000 North Korean troops to Russia's front-line Kursk region.

"The casualty rates were significant. By most accounts, we were able to take a look at somewhere between a third and probably on the real high-end, maybe 50 percent casualties among the North Korean forces," Jones said during a CSIS podcast.

"Again, hard to know exactly what reality is ... with as many as 1,000 killed. ... Those are pretty staggering casualties for a force of 11 (or) 12,000," he added.

Seth Jones, president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), speaks during a CSIS podcast on Feb. 4, 2025 in this photo captured from a CSIS YouTube account. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Jones said that Russia is waging "attrition" warfare operations that use human waves in pursuit of progress on the battlefield.

"Their way of retaking territory is to conduct attrition warfare and to take casualties and to accept those casualties," he said.

That is the way Russia has utilized North Korean forces, he said, noting that from Russian President Vladimir Putin's perspective, political costs are not strong given that most Russian troops sent to the battlefields are not from elite families.

"Much of his conventional force of individuals (are) from Siberia, Central Asia, from prison units, not the sons of elites from St. Petersburg or Moscow," he said.

Citing conversations with Ukrainian forces, Jones said that North Korea soldiers, deployed to Russia, were "fierce fighters" who were willing to "fight and die," but somewhat disorganized.

"The cohesion between North Korean and Russian forces, including command and control, was apparently poor. There were language barriers," he said.

This week, South Korea's National Intelligence Service confirmed a report from The New York Times that North Korean soldiers deployed to Russia have been pulled from the front lines in mid-January due to heavy casualties.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 5, 2025

8. 70 pct of experts doubt tangible results even if U.S., N. Korea resume talks: survey

​Although I am not an expert and I was not polled I would be in the 70% category. 

Then again it depends on what the tangible results are - if we think only about the conventional wisdom that talks should lead to a negotiated agreement that is substantive and beneficial to the US and the ROK/US alliance it is definitely a "no." On the other hand if talks are part of a deliberate political warfare strategy that leads to empowering the Korean people in the north to drive change internally then there can be tangible results. But does anyone have the stomach for that kind of strategy?

70 pct of experts doubt tangible results even if U.S., N. Korea resume talks: survey | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 5, 2025

SEOUL, Feb. 5 (Yonhap) -- Seventy percent of domestic experts on Korean Peninsula issues doubt that any tangible results are possible even if the United States and North Korea resume dialogue under President Donald Trump's new administration, a survey showed Wednesday.

The Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University released the assessment following a survey of 40 local experts on security issues involving the Korean Peninsula, conducted online from Jan. 10-20 to predict security trends under Trump's second term.

Of the 40 polled, which included researchers, journalists and former diplomats, 70 percent, or 28 individuals, predicted that even if the U.S. administration resumes dialogue with North Korea, it would be "difficult" to achieve tangible, substantial outcomes, the survey showed.

Only 27 percent said results could be expected from U.S.-North Korea talks if they resume.

Asked about North Korea's future stance on its nuclear and missile programs, the experts were evenly divided. Half predicted Pyongyang would use them as a bargaining chip to seek negotiations with Washington, while the other half said it would maintain its nuclear and missile expansion policy.

Sixty percent, or 24, of the experts surveyed also predicted that inter-Korean relations would remain fractured, regardless of any changes in relations between Pyongyang and Washington.

The survey also showed that 39 experts expected Seoul-Pyongyang relations to either worsen or remain unchanged, with only one person predicting an improvement.

All but two experts said Seoul-Tokyo relations may either weaken or remain at the current level. Regarding Seoul-Beijing ties, 15 experts predicted an improvement, while 18 said they will stay the same.

This computer-generated image shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) and U.S. President Donald Trump. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 5, 2025

9. Foreign, trade, defense ministries block access to DeepSeek amid data collection concerns

​Nip it in the bud.

(2nd LD) Foreign, trade, defense ministries block access to DeepSeek amid data collection concerns | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Woo Jae-yeon · February 5, 2025

(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; ADDS photo, more details in paras 4-6)

SEOUL, Feb. 5 (Yonhap) -- The foreign, trade and defense ministries on Wednesday blocked access to the Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) service DeepSeek amid concerns about user data collection.

According to multiple ministry sources, access to the service has been restricted on ministry computers connected to external networks.

A ministry official told Yonhap News Agency that a message indicating access is restricted appears when attempting to visit the site.

An official from the defense ministry cited "technical concerns" as the reason for restricting access on military work-related computers.

The three ministries are among the key government departments handling sensitive data related to foreign affairs, trade and national security.

The move, implemented based on their own assessments, is viewed as part of the government's efforts to proactively address concerns that important government data could be compromised while officials use generative AI services.

The mobile page of the Chinese artificial intelligence service DeepSeek is shown in this image captured on Feb. 5, 2025. (Yonhap)

The Ministry of the Interior and Safety sent a letter the previous day to government agencies, and metropolitan and provincial governments, urging caution when using AI services like DeepSeek and ChatGPT. The letter is said to emphasize the importance of not sharing personal details and refraining from blindly trusting the outcomes provided by these services.

On the business front, Kakao prohibited the use of DeepSeek for business purposes Tuesday, becoming the first major tech company to do so.

LG Uplus implemented a similar policy earlier Wednesday.

Other major tech companies, including Samsung Electronics, SK Group and LG Electronics, which are all developing their own generative AI services, have banned such programs on company computers without prior authorization.

The logo of DeepSeek is seen in this Jan. 29, 2025, illustration by Reuters. (Yonhap)

jaeyeon.woo@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Woo Jae-yeon · February 5, 2025

10. A Secret to Longer Marriages in South Korea: Lots of Shows About Divorce

​And now for something a little different about Korean culture.

The impact of television.

Maybe they will be able to prevent future Presidential impeachments since everyone is watching the current impeachment reality TV.

A Secret to Longer Marriages in South Korea: Lots of Shows About Divorce

Couples are hooked on a new wave of content about marital splits; ‘I don’t have it that bad’

https://www.wsj.com/lifestyle/divorce-shows-south-korea-marriage-65b30d5b?mod=Searchresults_pos8&page=1

A couple who met on the TV show ‘Love After Divorce.’ Photo: MBN

By Soobin Kim and Timothy W. MartinFollow

Feb. 3, 2025 11:00 pm ET

SEOUL—After more than three decades of marriage, Kim Younok thinks it’s natural to ponder divorce, owing to divergent lifestyles with her husband and their differing personal tastes. 

But she calms down after watching a popular South Korean TV show called “Marriage Hell,” where a celebrity psychiatrist reviews rocky real-life relationships. Some couples bicker about ordering takeout versus cooking at home. Others erupt over excessive spending for things like cellulite-removal surgery.

“I don’t have it that bad,” says the 60-year-old Kim. “Watching the program, I consider myself lucky.” 

South Koreans can’t seem to break up with a new wave of divorce content—even as fewer marriages are actually ending.

Kim Younok considers herself lucky after watching shows about rocky relationships. Photo: SOOBIN KIM/WSJ

Fans of the shows say they enjoy the voyeuristic aspects and practical tips to avoid marriage woes. South Korea, which is socially conservative, has the wealthy world’s lowest birthrate, a reflection of how few young people get married. Those who do tend to stay that way. 

While not wholly taboo, divorce hasn’t been normalized either. That’s left a curiosity void to fill for TV shows, online testimonials and social-media creators. 

Shows bear names such as “Divorce Deliberation Camp: Refresh,” where on-the-rocks couples seek a reset, and “How Is Your Marriage,” a panel talk show discussing shaky relationships. A dating show “Love After Divorce” promises viewers: “Newly single, ready to mingle.”

‘Love After Divorce’ is a popular dating show.

MBN

Yun Hye-yeon, a 30-year-old physical therapist, got hitched just over a year ago—and is happily married. But she consumes a variety of divorce-related shows without her husband around. She’s curious what drives other people to end their partnerships.

“Usually, it was due to personality differences,” Yun says, “or money problems.” 

Two decades ago, South Korea had one of the world’s highest divorce rates, skyrocketing in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s and a landmark ruling that granted homemakers the first-time ability to receive a portion of their spouse’s pension benefits should they split up. Around that time, a forerunner to today’s divorce content made its debut, called “Love and War,” which fictionalized real-life breakups. Viewers then decided if the couple should divorce. 

Today, South Korea’s rate of divorce has declined for the past five years to 1.8 per 1,000 people, or about three-quarters of the figure seen in the U.S., according to government data. 

Divorce attorney Choi Yuna Photo: Choi Yuna

The topic has remained stigmatized enough that Choi Yuna claims she published the first “divorce comic” in 2018, a series of “webtoons” that drew an audience on Instagram. She culled the narratives from her day job as a divorce attorney. Calling it “Marriage Red,” like a stop light at an intersection, she wanted her stories to let people unhappy with their marriages know they weren’t alone.

“Marriage is hard for everyone,” Choi says.

She soon landed a TV deal that became the hit show, “Good Partner,” which Netflix licensed and rose last summer atop the country’s most-watched list. It features a veteran divorce lawyer whose husband is caught cheating and a newcomer grappling with the realities of the profession. In December, the woman portraying the seasoned lawyer took home a top acting prize. 

Choi’s script strayed from the most extreme cases. Even still, viewers found the show scandalous, which she attributes to how divorcés prefer to keep quiet in South Korea. “They never talk about it,” she says. “So nobody knows what they’ve been through.”  

The divorce-content craze has even drawn in viewers like the Rev. Kim Jin-soo, who frequently counsels other couples but lacks an outlet for his own marital challenges. The 61-year-old says he draws some solace—and a degree of familiarity—from seeing actual couples engage in shouting matches or deploy the silent treatment. “People’s lives are not so different,” the Rev. Kim says.

Some of the South Korean shows have attracted fans overseas. Daniel Burapavong, a 42-year-old energy consultant in Atlanta, enjoys the “Love After Divorce” dating show, which is available on Netflix. Watching with his wife, Burapavong enjoyed a human connection often lacking in dating shows that solely prioritize physical appearance. He felt the divorcés were more mature, talking on dates about blending their families and how to handle long-distance relationships.

“I feel like I could be friends with them,” Burapavong says.

Daniel Burapavong enjoyed season 4 of ‘Love After Divorce.’ Photo: Daniel Burapavong

South Korea’s divorce content isn’t limited to traditional TV shows. Among the titles for a new South Korean short-form video platform is “All or Nothing,” which depicts a fictional washed-up celebrity who gets divorced. YouTube has become a haven for viral divorce testimonials, detailing the heart-stopping moment people say they were jilted or discovered their spouse’s affairs.  

Set on getting a divorce about a year ago, a YouTube creator, who goes by “Shintaedee,” was holed up at her parents’ house feeling depressed. She switched on the camera to share the news of her divorce and other life updates. She didn’t expect a boom in popularity.  

Now, more than 80 videos later, the 32-year-old believes she has played a part in reducing South Korea’s stigma around divorce. She hasn’t revealed her real name or face due to the ongoing divorce proceedings, but her channel has amassed nearly 50,000 followers. 

“When my divorce is finalized, I’m going to run the channel as someone who’s newly single,” she says.  

Paik Seoha, a 23-year-old university student, is also a fan of the divorcee dating show. She watches new episodes every weekend with her mother, their conversations about the cast and their actions often stretching well past midnight. It’s their collective “happy time,” Paik says, as the discussions about the relatively young divorcés have helped bridge their generational differences.

“Being close and having things to talk about are two different things,” she says.

Paik Seoha, a fan of the divorcee dating show, likes discussing episodes with her mom. Photo: Paik Seoha

Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com

Appeared in the February 5, 2025, print edition as 'A Country’s Key to Marital Bliss: Lots of Shows About Divorce'.

11. Elite N. Korean IT teams infiltrate global freelance platforms

​north Korea's cyber All Purpose Sword is a global threat that we must aggressively target.

Elite N. Korean IT teams infiltrate global freelance platforms - Daily NK English

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · February 5, 2025

North Korea has intensified its covert foreign currency operations by sending elite IT workers to China and Southeast Asia as freelancers.

According to a Daily NK source in North Korea recently, several teams of young researchers in their late 20s and early 30s from Kim Il Sung University’s Information Technology Institute were dispatched to the region last month to work on freelance platforms. These workers are replacing the previous cohort of North Korean IT freelancers and primarily focus on web development, app creation, and cryptocurrency projects.

The decision to send highly qualified researchers from Kim Il Sung University’s prestigious IT Institute signals a strategic shift to maximize earnings through freelance platforms in China and Southeast Asia. “The authorities are treating this IT deployment as a major state policy to enhance national competitiveness in technology while expanding foreign currency revenue streams,” the source explained.

While North Korea has a history of sending IT workers abroad, the mass deployment of such high-caliber personnel is unprecedented. This move indicates an increasingly sophisticated approach to foreign currency operations, particularly in illicit sectors leveraging advanced IT expertise.

“These IT-based revenue operations in China and Southeast Asia represent a core party strategy for generating funds,” noted the source. “As a result, the authorities are conducting these deployments with extreme secrecy to avoid international scrutiny.”

The operation is overseen by the Central Committee and Ministry of State Security, which conducted final selection interviews in mid-2024. Selected candidates underwent six months of technical assessment and security training in a restricted facility. The agencies evaluated lessons learned from previous deployments and developed new strategies before sending out the latest group.

The process wasn’t without complications – a security breach occurred during the screening and training phase. “One researcher was removed from the program for leaking classified information,” the source revealed. “Following this incident, the Central Committee and Ministry of State Security strengthened their security protocols before proceeding with the scheduled deployment.”

In response to the breach, authorities have repeatedly emphasized to the newly deployed personnel the critical importance of maintaining operational security regarding their overseas activities and the strategic nature of their mission.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · February 5, 2025

12. N. Korean leadership seminar orders new focus on Kim's teachings

When the regime is stressed it does two things: "externalize" the threat (from the ROK and US) and increase ideological training (indoctrination). But you cannot eat ideology so the Korean people in the north see through this. What I just outlined should be a consistent theme and message to the Korean people in the north along with practical information on how to take collective action. This is an ideological war between the north and South and the north and the free world. We should be exploiting the regime's actions and helping the Korean people in the north to see the reima as it really is and provide them with the knowledge that they need to create the conditions for change.

It is easy to dismiss what I have just written as something that cannot be done (which most people I engage with believe). But for all who say that I would ask when have we ever executed an overt and comprehensive information campaign to do what I have outlined? The answer is never. All the secret squirrel stuff to chase the shiny thing spook stuff has never been comprehensive enough or sufficiently aggressive to achieve substantial effects. 

N. Korean leadership seminar orders new focus on Kim's teachings - Daily NK English

During the seminar, the school emphasized its evolving role from a mere training institute to a core policy research directorate supporting party initiatives

By Eun Seol - February 5, 2025

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · February 5, 2025

The Rodong Sinmun newspaper published a photo of Kim Jong Un's portrait juxtaposed with those of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in a report on May 22 saying that the North Korean leader had attended a ceremony to dedicate the Central Cadres Training School on May 21, 2024. (Rodong Sinmun, News1)

North Korea’s premier party institution, the Pyongyang Central Cadres Training School, recently conducted a seminar focused on implementing Kim Jong Un’s latest political theories and directives.

According to a source, the seminar held last month centered on Kim’s Oct. 10, 2024 speech titled “Officials should become communist revolutionaries who are possessed of the Party’s original ideals and spirit as their mental qualities.” The gathering aimed to strengthen the link between party policy and official training while improving implementation strategies.

Participants systematically analyzed Kim’s ideas to enhance cadre training programs and advance national revival efforts. A key focus was bridging the gap between policy and training to ensure officials could better understand and execute party directives, with emphasis on strengthening their political and ideological foundations.

The seminar proposed several initiatives, including new educational programs to transmit party values to younger generations, scientific resource allocation methods, and streamlined decision-making processes to improve economic management efficiency.

However, critics dismiss the talk of simplified decision-making as unrealistic given North Korea’s centralized system and entrenched bureaucracy. “Officials must constantly defer to their superiors, making independent decisions impossible regardless of the situation,” the source explained. “Claims about improving policy implementation through streamlined decision-making are mere propaganda.” Without fundamental reforms, breaking from established patterns appears unlikely.

During the seminar, the school emphasized its evolving role from a mere training institute to a core policy research directorate supporting party initiatives. Officials praised the gathering as a “crucial step in strengthening the alignment between party policy and cadre education under Comrade General Secretary Kim Jong Un’s guidance.”

Following the seminar, party schools across cities and counties received orders to incorporate the discussed concepts into their training programs – much to the frustration of current students. “Officials in the six-month county party school program complained about having to study the seminar materials,” the source said. “They grumbled that it would have been better to simply let them coast through their training instead of adding this new burden.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · February 5, 2025

13. Assembly Speaker Woo reassures China on S. Korea's political stability, invites Xi to APEC Summit

​Oh the irony. China's United Front Department is contributing to the political instability.

(LEAD) Assembly Speaker Woo reassures China on S. Korea's political stability, invites Xi to APEC Summit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Woo Jae-yeon · February 5, 2025

(ATTN: CHANGES headline, dateline, photo; RECASTS throughout with latest details; TRIMS)

BEIJING/SEOUL, Feb. 5 (Yonhap) -- National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik on Wednesday assured China that South Korea is swiftly recovering from political turmoil following President Yoon Suk Yeol's brief martial law declaration late last year.

"I understand concerns over South Korea's political instability," Woo said during a meeting with Zhao Leji, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, in Beijing.

"The country is not unstable at all as the National Assembly made history by immediately preventing martial law from taking effect, and we are addressing the issue in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws," he said.

He also expressed gratitude to Chinese officials for their trust and support.

South Korean National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik (L) shakes hands with Zhao Leji, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in China, before their meeting in Beijing on Feb. 5, 2025, in this photo provided by the speaker's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

During the meeting with Zhao, he asked Chinese leader Xi Jinping to attend the 2025 APEC Summit in Gyeongju, a historical city in North Gyeongsang Province.

In response, Zhao stressed the importance of maintaining "friendly" ties, highlighting the two nations' shared cultural similarities and close geopolitical relationship.

Arriving in Beijing earlier in the day for a five-day visit, Woo is set to attend the opening ceremony of the Asian Winter Games in Harbin on Friday, where he is expected to meet International Olympic Committee President Thomas Bach, along with other dignitaries from Asian countries.

He also plans to visit historical sites related to the Korean independence movement in China.

Talks have been under way to coordinate Woo's potential meeting with Chinese leader Xi, but the schedule has not yet been confirmed, a senior National Assembly official said.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Woo Jae-yeon · February 5, 2025

14. S. Korea, Japan to hold joint lighting event next week for 60th anniv. of diplomatic ties

​Another step forward.....

S. Korea, Japan to hold joint lighting event next week for 60th anniv. of diplomatic ties | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · February 5, 2025

SEOUL, Feb. 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and Japan will hold a joint lighting ceremony next week in celebration of the 60th anniversary of the normalization of their diplomatic relations this year, Seoul's foreign ministry said Wednesday.

N Seoul Tower and Tokyo Tower, the iconic city landmarks located in both nations' capitals, will be lit up at the same time at 6 p.m. on Feb. 15, the ministry said in a press release.

The exterior of N Seoul Tower will be illuminated with the logo and slogan marking the 60th anniversary, with the surrounding area to be lit up in red and blue, symbolizing the national flags of Korea and Japan, the ministry added.

Tokyo Tower is designed to light up on its own with its LED lighting and can show simple messages on the electronic billboard, installed in the middle of the tower.

Seoul and Tokyo have been preparing various projects to mark the 60th anniversary of the 1965 signing of the bilateral treaty that brought the two neighbors back into their normal diplomatic relationship, two decades after Korea was liberated from Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule.

N Seoul Tower in central Seoul (Yonhap)

The logo for the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan, as provided by Seoul's foreign ministry (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · February 5, 2025

15. Editorial: South Korea should strengthen ties in U.S.-Japan-South Korea AI alliance

​At first glance I missed "AI" in the headline. Yes this is another important area for trilateral cooperation.

Editorial: South Korea should strengthen ties in U.S.-Japan-South Korea AI alliance

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/02/05/VSEACU4ZERDD5OOM5BGQHRS37U/

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2025.02.05. 08:43

Updated 2025.02.05. 17:21

OpenAI CEO Sam Altman arrives in South Korea on Feb. 3 via Seoul Gimpo Business Aviation Center. On Feb. 4, he meets with Samsung Electronics Executive Chairman Lee Jae-yong, SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won, and Kakao CEO Chung Shin-a. /News1

OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, facing intensifying competition from China’s artificial intelligence (AI) sector, visited South Korea to explore potential collaborations with Samsung Electronics Executive Chairman Lee Jae-yong, SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won, and Kakao CEO Chung Shin-a. SoftBank Group Chairman and CEO Masayoshi Son, who traveled from Japan, also joined the meeting with Altman and Lee.

Altman and Son are leading the “Stargate AI project,” a large-scale initiative aiming to invest approximately 730 trillion won ($500 billion) over four years to build advanced AI infrastructure. Their apparent goal is to establish a U.S.-Japan-South Korea AI alliance, enlisting South Korean companies as strategic partners to counter China’s growing AI influence. “South Korea seems to be an important part of Stargate,” Altman remarked.

The proposed alliance could provide a significant boost to South Korea’s semiconductor industry. OpenAI is actively developing AI semiconductors for data centers and AI-driven devices, making Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix ideal partners. Samsung Electronics, the world’s largest memory chipmaker, and SK Hynix, a leading producer of high-bandwidth memory (HBM), are well-positioned to play a crucial role in the project. Collaboration with OpenAI could also strengthen Samsung’s foundry business, helping it secure key clients. Meanwhile, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the dominant industry player, has begun constructing a 1-nanometer (nm) semiconductor plant to maintain its lead, underscoring the urgency for Samsung to close the technology gap.

For Lee, this meeting with Altman and Son marked his first major public engagement since being cleared of legal risks that had constrained his leadership for nearly nine years. In 2019, he unveiled the “New Samsung” initiative, pledging to drive transformation by focusing on AI and the foundry business as core growth engines. However, his prolonged legal battles, requiring 185 court appearances, diverted his attention from management. During this period, Samsung’s semiconductor competitiveness weakened, falling behind SK Hynix in certain areas, while its foundry market share lagged even further behind TSMC.

With legal hurdles now behind him, Lee has the opportunity to reassert his leadership by forging AI partnerships with U.S. and Japanese tech giants. Expectations are high that he will drive innovation through large-scale joint ventures and potential mergers and acquisitions. While political uncertainties persist, hopes remain that such transformative progress in the industry will continue to make headlines daily.

16. Yoon, former defense minister refuse on-site parliamentary hearing over martial law bid

(LEAD) Yoon, former defense minister refuse on-site parliamentary hearing over martial law bid | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · February 5, 2025

(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES throughout with Yoon's refusal; ADDS photo)

SEOUL, Feb. 5 (Yonhap) -- A special parliamentary committee investigating President Yoon Suk Yeol's martial law bid failed Wednesday to hold on-site hearings against Yoon and other key officials as they refused its requests to attend.

Yoon, as well as Noh Sang-won, a former commander of the Defense Intelligence Command (DIC), and former DIC Colonel Kim Yong-gun did not appear for the parliamentary hearing at the Seoul Detention Center in Uiwang, south of the capital.

Noh is accused of discussing martial law operation plans with former and incumbent military intelligence officers at a burger franchise in Ansan, southwest of Seoul, two days before the plans were executed and on Dec. 3, the day of their imposition.

Earlier in the day, the committee members also visited the Seoul Dongbu Detention Center in eastern Seoul, to hold a similar hearing against former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, who is now arrested and indicted for charges of insurrection related to Yoon's brief martial law bid.

Kim refused to appear for the hearing, citing the need to prepare for his trial and meet with his legal team.

The ruling People Power Party boycotted the on-site investigations in protest of Yoon being selected as a witness.

The committee will visit a detention center of the Capital Defense Command to meet with Yeo In-hyung, former head of the Defense Counterintelligence Command.

Yeo allegedly received orders from Kim to arrest and detain opposition leader Lee Jae-myung and then ruling party leader Han Dong-hoon, among others, during the martial law imposition.

The National Assembly's special committee investigating President Yoon Suk Yeol's insurrection charges holds a hearing without Yoon at the Seoul Detention Center in Uiwang, south of the capital, on Feb. 5, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

The National Assembly's special committee investigating President Yoon Suk Yeol's insurrection charges holds a meeting without former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun at the Seoul Dongbu Detention Center in eastern Seoul on Feb. 5, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · February 5, 2025

17.  Special Envoy Grenell's diplomatic rampage... Interested in contact with North Korea

​This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

I hope someone can get to Mr. Grennell and show him the potential for a well executed political warfare campaign. I hope no one will delude him with the idea that he can get any kind of reliable agreement from Kim Jong Un. It is imperative that he defend himself (and the US) against Kim 's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy. It is of the utmost importance that before he tries to engage with Kim that he has a deep understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. There is no country more vulnerable to a political warfare (and unconventional warfare) strategy than north Korea.

Special Envoy Grenell's diplomatic rampage... Interested in contact with North Korea

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/richard-grenell-north-korea-venezuela-diplomacy-trump-02042025150817.html

WASHINGTON-Park Jae-woo parkja@rfa.org

2025.02.04

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro (center) and U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Richard Grenell [provided by the Venezuelan Presidential Press Office]

 /AP

00:00 /03:21

Anchor :  Richard Grenell, who was nominated by President Trump as the new special envoy for North Korea and Venezuela, is showing active diplomatic moves. Attention is focused on whether contacts regarding the North Korea issue will begin . Reporter Park Jae-woo reports.

Richard Grenell, who was nominated by President-elect Trump as special envoy for North Korea and Venezuela diplomacy.

Grenell's term as special envoy for North Korea began with President Trump's inauguration.

On the 1st , Special Envoy Grenell visited Venezuela and met with President Nicolas Maduro, who is under suspicion of election fraud .

He has since returned home with six American hostages and is engaging in aggressive diplomatic maneuvers, negotiating to repatriate illegal immigrants in the United States to Venezuela .

On the 24th of last month , he visited the LA wildfire site in the US with President Trump , and Special Envoy Grenell showed off his influence by sitting right next to the President during the on-site inspection and meeting .

Fred Fleitz, vice president of the America First Policy Institute (AFPI), a close associate of US President Donald Trump and a strong candidate to enter the second administration, said in an interview with Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 24th of last month that Special Envoy Grenell is President Trump's most trusted adviser .

[ Vice President Flytes ] President Trump has appointed Richard Grenell as his special envoy to North Korea , and he is considered one of Trump’s most trusted advisers . The appointment of Grenell sends a strong message that Trump is willing to talk to North Korea . 

It appears that he is exerting influence not only in foreign policy but also in domestic politics, but no information has been released yet regarding contact with North Korea .

Special Envoy Grenell also made a brief comment about North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un during an interview on an American podcast on the 3rd .

[ Special Envoy Grenell ] I have Venezuela, I have North Korea, and now I have to deal with the fires in California . So I tell people , " I 'm dealing with Nicolas Maduro , I'm dealing with Kim Jong Un , I'm dealing with Gavin Newsom . "

As President Trump has stated that he will soon begin talks with Kim Jong-un, attention is focused on whether contact between North Korea and the United States will begin soon.

President Donald Trump and Special Envoy Richard Grenell /AP

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The Trump administration's personnel appointments related to North Korea policy are progressing one after another , including Special Envoy Grenell, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Deputy National Security Advisor Alex Wong .

At the Republican National Convention last July , Special Envoy Grenell called Kim Jong-un a “ madman ,” but explained that it was important to talk to him .

[ Special Envoy Grenell ] I don't think we need to replace Kim Jong-un . North Korea has nuclear weapons . I support President Trump's approach . President Trump is a leader who has truly embraced this crazy guy and said, ' Let's deal with this guy . Let's figure out a way . '

Meanwhile, North Korea has not officially responded to President Trump's love call, and instead reacted angrily to Secretary of State Marco Rubio's brief remark that North Korea is a " rogue state . "

In addition, there is analysis that North Korea is trying to increase its negotiating power by revealing its intention to develop its nuclear response system without limitation by disclosing its nuclear facilities.

Editor Park Jeong-woo,  Web Editor Kim Sang-il

​18. North Korea leaves South’s territory blank on revised map

​Kim Jong Un is demonstrating that we are at an inflection point. Now is the opportunity to pursue a solution to the "Korea question."

North Korea leaves South’s territory blank on revised map

The term used in the map confirms that the North no longer sees South Koreans as of the same ethnic group.

By Taejun Kang for RFA

https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/02/05/north-korea-south-map-blank/

2025.02.05

A RedNote user says this image shows a North Korean map dated to April, 2024. (RedNote)

TAIPEI, Taiwan – North Korea left South Korean territory blank on a revised map, labeling it with a different term that reflects Pyongyang’s policy change to view the South as a completely separate and hostile nation.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un pledged last year to amend the constitution to declare South Korea the “primary and immutable enemy,” abandoning the established notion of the South being a partner in reconciliation and reunification. Kim added that he no longer saw South Koreans as the same ethnic people.

However, it remains unclear whether North Korea has formally amended its constitution, as no official reports or announcements have been released.

The peninsula was divided in the aftermath of World War II but both the pro-communist North and pro-U.S. South have until last year professed the goal of eventual reunification.

A North Korean map, seen by Radio Free Asia, was posted on the Chinese social media platform RedNote, also known as Xiaohongshu, on Jan. 28 by a Chinese user claiming to study the North Korean language.

Dated April 2024 – just months after Kim’s announcement – the map refers to South Korea as “Hanguk,” the Korean term for the Republic of Korea.

Prior to January 2024, North Korea had consistently referred to the South as “Namjoson,” a term suggesting that South Korea was merely the southern part of one Korea.

While RFA has not independently verified the map’s authenticity, a Seoul-based North Korean defector who reviewed it said that he believed it was genuine.

The new map also leaves South Korean territory blank, in contrast to the 2012 and 2018 editions, which included details of administrative divisions for the South.

Earlier versions also marked key geographical endpoints of South Korea, such as “the southernmost point of Marado, Seogwipo City, Jeju Province” and “the easternmost point of Dokdo, Ulleung County, North Gyeongsang Province,” along with the total length of the Korean Peninsula from east to west and north to south.

However, all of these details have been omitted from the latest edition.

Boosting Kim Jong Un’s profile

Previous editions of the map included instructions from former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, but these have been replaced with directives from his son, current leader Kim Jong Un.

Apart from that, the map was emblazoned with “2024” – not “Juche 113,” as it would have previously under the dating system based on the birth of North Korea’s founder Kim Il Sung, the current leader’s grandfather.

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The change appears to be yet another way that Kim Jong Un is trying to boost his profile by playing down reverence for his two predecessors.

Over the years, state propaganda has increasingly emphasized his leadership as the singular authority, reducing references to his father and grandfather in official documents, on monuments and in ideological material.

For instance, North Korea reportedly stopped the juche count in October, in favor of the Gregorian calendar used in most of the rest of the world.

The juche dating system is named after North Korea’s founding juche ideology of self-reliance, a philosophy conceived by Kim Il Sung.

In 1997, three years after Kim Il Sung’s death, official North Korean calendars began counting the years in terms of the era of juche, retroactively renaming 1912, the year of Kim’s birth, “Juche 1.”

According to this dating system, Korean independence from Japanese colonial rule occurred not in 1945, but “Juche 34,” and North Korea was founded not in 1948, but in “Juche 37.”

Edited by Mike Firn.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com