Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"You can discover what your enemy fears most by observing the means he uses to frighten you."

– Eric Hoffer

"Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored."

– Aldous Huxley

"Nothing else in the world...not all the armies...is so powerful as an idea whose time has come."

– Victor Hugo

1. New coalition 'The Citizens' Solidarity for One Korea' to reject 'two-state' policy

2. A CRINK in the Armor of Deterrence: The Axis of Upheaval in the Indo-Pacific

3. BOOK REVIEW: ‘Fallout: The Inside Story of America’s Failure to Disarm North Korea’

4. Korea Regional Review - Submit Articles and Research for Publication

5. North Korea executes citizens for watching South Korean TV, Amnesty report says

6. N. Korean police use spies to entrap merchants in foreign currency stings

7. N. Korea drone incident shows peace talks are political mirage

8. Ukraine says North Korean troops are still carrying out strikes from Russia

9. Defense ministry proposes joint, partial management of DMZ to U.S.: source

10. N. Korea holds winter sports competition at home after failing to qualify for 2026 Olympics

11. Seoul official stresses need to improve lives of N. Koreans through inter-Korean exchanges

12. Top military commander urges firm readiness posture near border area

13. Security adviser expresses concerns over U.S. tariff risk's impact on security consultations

14. Gov't unveils strategy to enhance rare earth supply chains

15. S. Korea to chair FORGE critical minerals initiative through June: State Dept.

1. New coalition 'The Citizens' Solidarity for One Korea' to reject 'two-state' policy

Summary:

More than 50 civil society groups, north Korean escapees, and overseas Koreans launched “Citizens’ Solidarity for One Korea” in Seoul, drawing about 350 leaders. The coalition rejects proposals to formalize two Koreas as two sovereign states, arguing this would institutionalize division, violate South Korea’s constitutional framework, and weaken national identity. Speakers tied the issue to separated families, law, regional stability, and human rights abuses in north Korea. The group announced “Korea Link,” a global fundraising effort targeting 100 billion won to expand north Koreans’ access to outside information, including possible satellite approaches. It also launched a “One Korea One Million Signature Campaign” to signal public support and keep unification on the global agenda.

Comment: It is good to see the popular mobilization against this morally bankrupt position.

World News Feb. 4, 2026 / 2:02 PM

New coalition 'The Citizens' Solidarity for One Korea' to reject 'two-state' policy

By Hyojoon Jeon

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/04/korea-one-korea-solidarity-coalition/9291770231263/

Photo caption: Members of the Citizens’ Solidarity for One Korea hold placards rejecting the "two-state" policy during the coalition's launch ceremony at the Korea Press Center in Seoul on Feb. 4, 2026. Photo by the Citizens’ Solidarity for One Korea

SEOUL, Feb. 4 (UPI) -- A broad coalition of over 50 civil society organizations, North Korean defectors, and overseas compatriots officially launched the Citizens' Solidarity for One Korea on Wednesday, rejecting growing "two-state" policy proposals and calling for a renewed commitment to peaceful unification.

The inauguration, held at the Korea Press Center in Seoul, brought together around 350 leaders across the political and social spectrum, including civic activists, legal experts, and youth representatives. The alliance declared a mission to transition from merely "managing division" to actively "realizing unification," asserting that accepting a permanent split would be a historical and humanitarian failure.

Rejecting the 'two-state' policy

The alliance was formed as a direct response to recent proposals to formalize North and South Korea as two separate, sovereign states -- a policy the group argues undermines constitutional principles and national identity. Some policymakers argue that a two-state framework reflects current geopolitical realities, a view the alliance strongly disputes. Leadership of the group is shared by six co-standing chairs: Jang Man-sun (Committee for the 10 Million Separated Families), Lee Hee-bum (Korea NGO Federation), Heo Kwang-il (Committee for the Democratization of North Korea), Kenneth Bae (Nehemiah Global Foundation), Seo In-taek (Action for Korea United), and Kang Chol-hwan (North Korea Strategy Center).

"The 'two-state' policy is a dangerous approach that institutionalizes division," said Jang Man-sun during the vision declaration. "Unification is not a matter of choice; it is a collective responsibility before our Constitution and history. With the first generation of separated families passing away daily, treating division as a permanent policy is tantamount to abandoning our ethnic duty."

Kim Chun-sig, former vice minister of unification, provided a legal critique in his keynote address. "The South Korean Constitution defines the entire peninsula as its territory," Kim noted. "A two-state system is not only a violation of our constitutional principles but also fails to address the long-term peace and stability of the region."

Concrete initiatives: 'Korea Link' and 'One Million Signatures'

The group outlined a roadmap for action, centering on breaking the information monopoly in the North. Seo In-taek, co-standing chair, announced the launch of "Korea Link," a global fundraising project aimed at expanding North Koreans' access to outside information.

The coalition set an ambitious fundraising target of 100 billion won (approx. $75 million) for the project. "Expanding information access is essential to the unification process," Seo said, adding that the group plans to explore satellite-based technologies to bypass the North's stringent information restrictions.

In tandem with the media project, the alliance launched the "One Korea One Million Signature Campaign." The initiative aims to demonstrate broad public support for unification to both the South Korean government and the international community. Citing Germany's reunification experience, Thae Yong-ho, former secretary-general of the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council, stressed the urgency of the movement. "Developments inside North Korea point to the need for a coordinated national effort to achieve unification by 2030," Thae said.

Human rights as a moral mandate

Other prominent figures highlighted the humanitarian stakes. Kim Tae-hoon, chairman of the Council for Human Rights in North Korea, emphasized the link between human rights and unity. "Recognizing two states is an admission that we will overlook crimes against humanity occurring in the North's political prison camps," he said.

The event featured a series of speeches representing diverse stakeholders, including Kang Chol-hwan of the defector community and youth representative Kim Ga-young, who both argued that the two-state policy abandons those suffering under the current regime.

The Citizens' Solidarity for One Korea concluded the ceremony with a formal declaration, vowing to preserve the "special relationship" framework between the Koreas and to keep the vision of a unified peninsula at the forefront of the global diplomatic agenda.

2. A CRINK in the Armor of Deterrence: The Axis of Upheaval in the Indo-Pacific

Summary:

The authors argue that deterring a China move on Taiwan may depend less on air and naval power than on forward-postured ground forces, especially U.S. Forces Korea, that can hold Beijing’s interests at risk while also deterring a ground war on the Korean Peninsula. They frame the key problem as the China-Russia-Iran-north Korea (CRINK) alignment, with the Russia-north Korea partnership as the most operationally mature driver of a credible two-front challenge. They claim Moscow’s support has increased Kim Jong Un’s resources, legitimacy, and access to advanced capabilities, constraining U.S. options and weakening deterrence. They propose a multi-pronged response: strengthen forward posture in South Korea, institutionalize trilateral coordination with Japan, tighten sanctions and exposure of illicit networks, and use targeted diplomacy to constrain the most destabilizing transfers.

Comment: I believe it is wrong to separate and compartmentalize the actions of China and north Korea and Russia and north Korea. This argument has already been rejected by the USD/W (P). But this article leads to some important questions and considerations.

If USFK is both a peninsula deterrent and a cross-theater lever against Beijing, what specific “costs” must it credibly impose to change Xi’s risk calculus before a Taiwan crisis begins? Again the fundamental question of what deters Xi (and Kim and Putin) must be answered.

The authors argue the Russia-north Korea partnership makes “reverse Kissinger” logic implausible. What evidence would prove this relationship is truly durable rather than transactional and reversible? I think the relationship will remain "strongly transactional" until it isn't necessary anymore. But I think both Putin and Kim will assess it is very necessary for each for the foreseeable future.

If the proposed answer is more posture, more trilateral integration, more sanctions, and selective diplomacy, where is the point of diminishing returns, and what tradeoffs in readiness or escalation risk follow? A strategic challenge the strategists and planners must solve.

A CRINK in the Armor of Deterrence: The Axis of Upheaval in the Indo-Pacific

by Christopher Lee, by Ben Blane

02.05.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/05/a-crink-in-the-armor-of-deterrence/

In the calculus of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, America’s most decisive deterrent may not be a carrier strike group or a bomber task force, but a forward-postured ground-force capable of holding Beijing’s interests at risk while simultaneously deterring a ground war on the Korean Peninsula. The new National Security Strategy (NSS) rightly prioritizes the Chinese Communist Party as the pacing threat, with the invasion of Taiwan the most prescient danger to a free and open Indo-Pacific. Yet beyond this explicit focus lie tacitly overt challenges that carry equally consequential implications for regional stability that cannot be ignored.

Chief among them is the burgeoning China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) alignment and, more specifically, the battle-hardened partnership between Moscow and Pyongyang. No longer peripheral, this relationship functions as a direct logistical and strategic pipeline that enables Beijing to divert Washington’s attention and tie down U.S. forces. In any Taiwan contingency, South Korea will inevitably face a newly provocative and emboldened North Korea, forcing allied planners to contend with a second front.

But viewing U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) merely as a defensive backstop misses its most critical role. As General Xavier T. Brunson, Commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and USFK has repeatedly reiterated the centrality of USFK – anchored by the U.S. Army’s only field army and enabled by its unique geographic and operational posture – provides a powerful preemptive lever to impose direct costs on the Chinese Communist Party. Properly leveraged, USFK fundamentally alters President Xi’s risk analysis and offers policymakers a more potent path to deterring a two-front war before it begins.

Russia-North Korea: CRINK’s Rising Comradeship

The emergence of a credible two-front challenge in Northeast Asia is neither accidental nor episodic. It is the product of deliberate state action, enabled most directly by Russia’s evolving partnership with North Korea. While China stands to benefit from any diversion of U.S. attention during a Taiwan contingency, it is Moscow – not Beijing – that has most tangibly altered Pyongyang’s capabilities, confidence, and willingness to act. Since the onset of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the relationship has shifted from episodic arms transitions into a sustained strategic alignment, providing Kim Jong-un with resources, legitimacy, and access to military technology unavailable through any other partner.

This evolution matters, not because it reflects a centralized CRINK strategy, but because it materially constrains U.S. and allied options. Russian support has redacted the plausibility of decoupling North Korea from broader anti-U.S. alignments through diplomatic realignment, or so-called reverse Kissinger approach. Rather than a fissure to be exploited, the Russia-North Korea partnership increasingly functions as a force multiplier within CRINK – accelerating North Korea’s military development while directly supporting China’s concepts for unrestricted warfare with direct implications for a Taiwan contingency.

Accordingly, comprehending how this partnership has emerged, how it functions, and how it accelerates Beijing’s capacity for future territorial aggression is critical. This new partnership within CRINK now constitutes a central driver undermining U.S. efforts to reestablish deterrence in the region.

When Putin Met Kim: CRINK’s Center of Gravity

What began as transactional arms exchanges between North Korea and Russia has deepened significantly into a formal strategic alignment with far-reaching security implications. Since mid-2024, the relationship has progressed from opportunistic weapons transfers into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty signed by Vladimir Putin and Kim, reportedly including mutual defense commitments. Under this arrangement, North Korea has supplied Russia with large quantities of artillery ammunition, ballistic missiles, and as many as 11,000 troops in support of Moscow’s war in Kyiv.

In return, Moscow has provided Pyongyang with financial relief, diplomatic legitimacy, and potential access to advanced military technologies – including missile guidance, electronic warfare, air defense capabilities, and advanced intelligence supporting operational planning and targeting today. These exchanges have transformed North Korea from a chronic regional irritant into a more capable, risk-acceptant actor with growing confidence in its ability to coordinate regional provocations against the U.S. and allied forces.

The December 2025 NSS reinforces the U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific and the Chinese Communist Party as the pacing threat, while simultaneously prioritizing a swift resolution in Ukraine and renewed “strategic stability” with Russia. While welcomed in Moscow, this shift raised concerns among Korea watchers, who warned it may signal reduced U.S. urgency toward the Russia-North Korea partnership. While North Korea is notably absent from the strategic spotlight, the most consequential reading lies in what the strategy implies:

Moscow’s ongoing partnership with Pyongyang effectively strengthens a second front critical to Beijing’s ability to execute a successful Taipei contingency. This partnership directly supports Xi’s concept of unrestricted war by forcing U.S. and allied forces to divide attention and resources across multiple theaters, signaling that regional strategy must account for the operational leverage this partnership provides to China.

Among CRINK, the Russia-North Korea partnership has emerged as the most operationally mature and immediately consequential alignment. While China, Iran, and Russia cooperate across economic and technological domains, the Moscow-Pyongyang relationship is an overt military partnership demonstrated through direct battlefield integration in Kyiv.

This partnership accelerates North Korea’s nuclear and missile development timelines while providing Kim with a degree of strategic autonomy from Beijing the world has not seen in decades. In doing so, it creates a more permissive environment for coordinated pressure against U.S. and allied interests and linking European and Indo-Pacific theaters through active military cooperation rather than abstract alignment.

From Comradeship to Brinkmanship: Implications for Deterrence and Regional Stability

The maturation of the Russia-North Korea partnership carries implications well beyond the war in Ukraine. Russian non-compliance with United Nations sanctions, including the veto of Resolution 1718 enforcement mechanisms, has significantly weakened denuclearization diplomacy and eroded international constraints. Simultaneously, this partnership complicates the reestablishment of deterrence for the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Russian assistance that materially improves North Korea’s survivable nuclear capabilities raises unavoidable questions about deterrence credibility, alliance assurance mechanisms, and the evolving role of the Nuclear Consultative Group.

More broadly, the alignment of two nuclear-armed states that explicitly reject the No First Use policy – Russia and North Korea – alongside China’s rapid force expansion, intensifies escalation risks in Northeast Asia. Pundits assessed this convergence as a revisionist alignment – one that actively undermines global sanctions regimes and emboldens North Korean provocations. North Korea is no longer a dependent proxy but an increasingly capable actor operating within a permissive, great-power ecosystem. Even if hostilities in Ukraine subside, the Russia-North Korea partnership is unlikely to dissolve, with mutual benefits eliminating the prospect of short-term diplomatic separation strategies and reinforcing the need for deterrence rooted in posture, integration, and denial.

For the U.S. and its allies, the challenge is not to reverse this alignment, but to prevent it from translating into coordinated coercion across theaters. This requires treating the Korean Peninsula not as a secondary contingency but as a central node in cross-theater deterrence – one that will shape Beijing’s calculations in a Taiwan crisis rather than merely respond to Pyongyang’s provocations.

If the war in Ukraine comes to an end, it will accelerate China-Russia cooperation rather than diminish it. The U.S. and allies must contain this adversary alignment to prevent its expansion to other countries. The strongest response lies in deepening alliances and working with partners to counter this alignment, while tactically constraining the forms of cooperation that pose the greatest risk to U.S. and allied interests. While the Russia-North Korea cooperation extends Moscow’s capacity to sustain its campaign in Ukraine, its broader significance lies in accelerating North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, which has direct implications for regional stability and U.S. national security. Addressing these and the strategic signals they send requires a coordinated, multi-pronged approach.

Countering the Axis: A Multi-Pronged Approach

No single measure can dismantle the Russia-North Korea partnership, rooted as it is in mutual desperation: Moscow’s isolation from the West and Pyongyang’s reliance on sanctions evasions for regime survival. Nevertheless, a balanced, multi-pronged approach can mitigate the partnership’s most dangerous effects by containing risk, deterring escalation, and exploiting internal vulnerabilities. The following four pillars form the foundation of this strategy.

1. Strengthening Forward-Postured Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula

The priority is establishing deterrence through additional rotational capabilities forward postured in South Korea and assigned to USFK. While the U.S. can deploy more advanced capabilities to the Korean Peninsula, those forces must be fully integrated across the broader Indo-Pacific theater rather than treated as a peninsula-bound asset. Properly postured, they must provide both flexible deterrence and response options relevant to a Taiwan contingency while also ready to respond to a secondary front in a protracted and adaptive war. General Brunson illustrates how Korea occupies a unique position at the nexus of geography, allied partnerships, and operational reach, placing it at the forefront of driving technological innovation, deterrence concepts, and joint and multinational coordination – not just for the region but across the entire joint force. In this context, South Korea must be positioned to present Xi with something he can feel – a credible, integrated military reality that complicates Chinese Communist Party planning and raises the perceived costs of territorial aggression beyond the Taiwan Strait.

2. Enhancing Trilateral Alliance Coordination

Beyond force posture, the U.S. must elevate alliance coordination by institutionalizing and operationally testing the trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan around a broader threat that explicitly includes a Taiwan contingency and a secondary front response. Historically, trilateral mechanisms focused almost exclusively on North Korea; the growing Moscow-Pyongyang nexus requires planners include the Russia factor as a standing assumption – one capable of providing logistical support to both China and North Korea in order to open a second front and to further prolong a Taiwan contingency.

Expanding joint exercises – such as Freedom Shield and Orient Shield – can simulate hybrid contingencies involving coordinated missile launchers, cyber operations, or gray-zone coercion. This trilateral cooperation approach enables Japan to assume a greater share of the operational burden for both a Taiwan contingency and a secondary front, while South Korea can visibly demonstrate and rehearse its commitment under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, capabilities that would otherwise be exercised only after deterrence efforts have failed. A strong, unified trilateral response clearly communicated to Moscow can deter Russian involvement in a Taiwan contingency by sharply raising the costs of participation, thereby allowing U.S. allies and partners to remain focused on the pacing threat.

3. Policy and Targeted Diplomacy

The effectiveness of U.S., South Korea, and regional allies’ military efforts depends on policy frameworks that constrain the transactional foundations of the Russia-North Korea partnership and preserve avenues for targeted diplomacy and de-escalation. Robust sanctions enforcement, multilateral mechanisms such as the UN structure, and systematic exposure of illicit activity underpin deterrence by limiting the flow of weapons, technology, and financing that sustains this relationship while multilateral mechanisms – including newer initiatives such as the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team launched in 2025 – serve as critical enablers by increasing transparency and disrupting evasion networks. Targeted designations of entities involved in technology transfers, as well as secondary sanctions on third parties facilitating illicit trade, further strain the partnership’s operational viability. Furthermore, maintaining limited, purpose-built diplomatic channels – leveraging existing President Trump’s personal rapport with Kim established during the 2018-2019 summits – can create off-ramps focused on constraining the most destabilizing forms of cooperation, such as nuclear or advanced military technology transfers, without reviving unrealistic expectations of near-term denuclearization. Parallel engagement with China, which tacitly accepts North Korea’s nuclear status but prioritizes regional stability to avoid refugee flows and uncontrolled escalations, can reinforce shared incentives to limit Pyongyang’s most provocative behavior. Because the relationship is fundamentally opportunistic – exchanging Russian capital and technical assistance for North Korean munitions – publicly revealing arms transfers, shipping routes, and financial intermediaries will erode trust between the parties. When calibrated carefully and paired with diplomatic signaling, such disclosures impose reputational and operational costs that reinforce allied and military posture while preserving space for de-escalation, a critical component of Peace Through Strength.

4. Countering Hybrid and Asymmetric Threats

Allied deterrence is reinforced when military pressure is complemented by policy-enabled diplomatic and hybrid measures that exploit distrust among authoritarian partners. Investments in cyber defense, intelligence collection, and law-enforcement coordination are essential to disrupt the covert activities that sustain the Russia-North Korea partnership, including cyber operations, organized crime networks, and illicit finance. Because the Russia-North Korea partnership thrives in opacity, policies that increase transparency, resilience, and exposure directly enable allied forces by narrowing the strategic space in which Moscow and Pyongyang can act.

Targeted diplomatic engagement with North Korea, conducted in close coordination with Seoul, can probe constraints on the most destabilizing forms of cooperation – such as nuclear and advanced missile technology transfers – while recognizing that denuclearization remains a longer-term objective rather than a near-term negotiating outcome. On the Russia front, progress toward resolving the conflict in Ukraine would likely diminish Pyongyang’s battlefield relevance and reduce incentives for sustained military cooperation. Together, these efforts reinforce the credibility of allied deterrence by constraining the operational freedom of CRINK without provoking uncontrolled escalation.

President Xi appears to expect Putin and Kim to act as his reliable wingmen in his “unstoppable” campaign to reunify China and Taiwan. History, however, shows he is asking for a Mercedes Benz on a rickshaw budget. North Korea committed “boots on the ground” to support Russian operations in Ukraine, while China’s contributions to its partners have been indirect, cautious, and limited – more a spectator than a participant. Xi’s assumption that he can leverage Russia and North Korea to advance a Taiwan contingency underscores fundamental reality: an unreliable partner will inevitably find himself aligned with other unreliable partners. By combining diplomatic signaling, sanctions enforcement, and exposure of illicit networks, the United States and its allies can impose reputational and operational costs, degrade the effectiveness of CRINK’s covert channels, and reinforce a free and open Indo-Pacific.

A Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Despite the CRINK

The CRINK alignment, centered on the Russia-North Korea partnership, now represents the most immediate and operationally consequential threat to a free and open Indo-Pacific. For the U.S. and its allies, the Korean Peninsula is not simply a secondary concern but a linchpin for shaping Beijing’s calculations in any Taiwan contingency. As Secretary of War Pete Hegseth put in his deliberately blunt formulation, deterrence ultimately rests on a simple premise: adversaries who FA must be prepared to FO. USFK, alongside other forward postured elements within the strategic triangle in the Indo-Pacific, provides that visible, forward-postured mechanism to enact that guidance against Beijing miscalculation.

The Moscow-Pyongyang axis – battle-tested, overt, and operationally relevant – has turned the axis of upheaval or CRINK into a cross-theater lever, with Beijing riding along like a hopeful third wheel hoping to reap the rewards without doing the heavy lifting. Despite the tenuous ties across all CRINK partners, the U.S. cannot ignore the advancement of Russia-North Korea collusion. That said, the U.S. could exploit the transactional nature of Russia-North Korea cooperation through sanctions enforcement, transparency measures, and targeted diplomacy. Xi may assume he can rely on these partners, yet his expectations outpace his contributions; an overconfident Chinese Communist Party risks being undone by the very partners it counts on. By combining posture, integration, and policy, the U.S. and its allies can impose real costs on potential aggressors, reinforce alliance credibility, and uphold the NSS’ top priority: deterring Chinese aggression and preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Tags: CRInK, Russia - North Korea Relations

About The Authors

Christopher Lee
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Lee is an Indo-Pacific foreign area officer. He holds an undergraduate degree from the United States Military Academy and graduate degrees from Columbia University and UCLA.
View all posts
Ben Blane
Lieutenant Colonel Ben Blane is a field artillery officer with multiple operational deployments and experience with multidomain formations throughout the Indo-Pacific. He holds an undergraduate degree from the United States Military Academy and graduate degrees from Columbia University and John Jay College. He is a research fellow with the Modern War Institute.

3. BOOK REVIEW: ‘Fallout: The Inside Story of America’s Failure to Disarm North Korea’

Summary:

Donald Kirk reviews Joel Wit’s Fallout, arguing Wit blames U.S. choices for the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the dangerous standoff that followed. Kirk notes Wit’s perspective as a former State Department official who later verified compliance and ran 38 North. Wit contends the United States did not have to abandon the deal in 2002 after claims of a secret highly enriched uranium program, though Kirk faults Wit for not stating what the north Korean envoy reportedly said. Kirk says Wit treats the Otto Warmbier case as a mishap used to discourage talks, portrays John Bolton as a principal villain, and praises Stephen Biegun. Yet Kirk concludes Wit’s optimism about 2018–2019 summit diplomacy is misleading because Kim Jong Un was not going to give up nuclear weapons. Kirk adds Wit ultimately offers no convincing solution, citing instead a 38 North idea for a “virtual” U.S. security commitment with minimal peacetime presence.

Comment: A scathing review of Joel Wit's book. The book is actually a narrative that supports the Kim family regime's political warfare strategy. I think the only thing it gets right is the praise for Steve Biegun.

If Don is right that Kim Jong Un was never going to surrender his program (and I think he is right), what does that imply about the limits of summit-driven diplomacy as described in Wit’s “inside story”? We should understand that summit diplomacy will not achieve the desired effects and that applying conventional international relations theory and diplomacy will not work against Kim Jong Un. We need a superior political warfare strategy that focuses on the Korean people in the north and helping them seek the conditions for change.

Wit points to U.S.-ROK military exercises as a factor in failure and references a “virtual” security commitment. What risks does Kirk’s review imply when deterrence is reduced while negotiating with north Korea? It implies that Kim Jong Un will come out on top with a reduction in readiness and deterrence and will view the "virtual security" guarantee as another victory for political warfare and blackmail diplomacy.

BOOK REVIEW: ‘Fallout: The Inside Story of America’s Failure to Disarm North Korea’

washingtontimes.com · The Washington Times https://www.washingtontimes.com

Why Washington, Pyongyang have been at odds ever since 1953

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By Donald Kirk - Wednesday, February 4, 2026

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/feb/4/book-review-fallout-inside-story-americas-failure-disarm-north-korea/

OPINION:

When he was a State Department official, Joel Wit assisted in difficult talks between American and North Korean diplomats on the 1994 “framework agreement” for Pyongyang to halt its nuclear warhead program.

Mr. Wit writes from the perspective of one who later visited North Korea to verify compliance with the deal. For years afterward, he ran the website 38 North, watching the communist state above the 38th parallel that sliced the Korean Peninsula between North and South after World War II.

As the title of his book suggests, Mr. Wit believes the Americans didn’t have to walk away from the framework eight years later, in 2002. That was after the North Korean envoy was believed to have acknowledged the existence of a separate secret program for the building of warheads with highly enriched uranium outside the nuclear complex Mr. Wit had seen.

Mr. Wit shows his disdain for the failure of the agreement without telling readers what the envoy reportedly said. Instead, Mr. Wit suggests that repeated American failures account for why the U.S. and North Korea have been at dangerous odds ever since the Korean War ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty, in July 1953.

On the way, he recounts a number of nasty episodes, including the 2016 arrest and jailing of University of Virginia student Otto Warmbier. The North Koreans held Warmbier for more than a year for a relatively trivial (and trumped-up) infraction, only to then hand him over to a senior U.S. diplomat when he was in a coma.

Warmbier never regained consciousness, and he died back in the U.S. under mysterious circumstances shortly after being returned to his family.

Far from showing the impossibility of negotiating with the North, Mr. Wit treats this episode as a mishap that the Americans used to discourage talks.

In an account laced with reminiscences of his own role and his memories of some of the leading American figures, Mr. Wit leaves no doubt as to whom he sees as the good guys and whom he sees as the bad. The worst, he makes clear, is John R. Bolton, whom President Trump named national security adviser in 2018.

Mr. Bolton was retained long enough to get a seat at the table in Mr. Trump’s summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at Singapore in June of that year and at Hanoi in February 2019. Mr. Bolton had a “history of disloyalty to his bosses,” Mr. Wit writes, and “cheered when the 1994 deal collapsed.”

Among the good guys, in Mr. Wit’s opinion: Stephen Biegun, a former Ford executive once in charge of international relations. Mr. Biegun took on the role of trying to deal with the North in a style “guaranteed to alienate Bolton.”

Mr. Wit laces this account with colorful details. Mr. Kim, he writes, was “more than ready to tackle denuclearization” in a meeting in Pyongyang with the often abrasive Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the soft-spoken, open-minded Mr. Biegun.

Yet the sense that success was within reach, as divined by Mr. Wit, is misleading despite the almost minute-by-minute detail he provides on the breakdown of the second summit in Hanoi. Surprisingly, Mr. Bolton was not to blame. There was no getting around the reality that Mr. Kim was not about to give up his nuclear program.

Mr. Wit does tell the inside story of that failure in a way that I could not have imagined from my perspective in a giant press center not far from the venerable Metropole Hotel. There, several hours earlier, I saw a young North Korean and a young American soldier standing guard outside the room where Messrs. Kim and Trump and their entourages were to meet.

For all his colorful writing, much of it carefully footnoted, Mr. Wit can hardly avoid the fact that he doesn’t have the answers either.

Mr. Wit believes that a final “Hail Mary pass appeared to have paid off” four months later, when Mr. Trump diverted from a mission to see liberal South Korean President Moon Jae-in in Seoul for a third meeting with Mr. Kim. Mr. Trump became the first American president to set foot across the North-South line as the men embraced like bosom buddies.

Dourly, Mr. Wit blames “Washington’s military exercises with South Korea” for the failure of this final attempt at reconciliation.

In the end, though, like everyone else, Mr. Wit has no convincing solutions. Instead, he resorts to quoting a paper on 38 North in which “two defense experts” suggest a “‘virtual’ security commitment … where the American peacetime military presence is minimal.”

Is Mr. Wit advocating withdrawal of America’s 28,500 troops and an end to war games? He never mentions the invasion of South Korea, ordered by Mr. Kim’s grandfather, Kim Il-sung, in June 1950, when only 500 advisers were left of American forces south of the 38th parallel.

• Donald Kirk is a former Far East correspondent for the Chicago Tribune and the old Washington Star.

• • •

Fallout: The Inside Story of America’s Failure to Disarm North Korea

Joel Wit

Yale University Press, $38, 535 pages

washingtontimes.com · The Washington Times https://www.washingtontimes.com

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5. North Korea executes citizens for watching South Korean TV, Amnesty report says

Summary:

Amnesty International reports that north Korea is imposing harsh, arbitrary punishments on citizens caught watching South Korean television and other foreign media. Drawing on interviews with 25 escapees who left between 2012 and 2020, the report describes a system where viewing smuggled dramas is common, yet consequences depend on money and connections. People without bribe funds can be sent to labor camps or executed, while the well connected may receive warnings. Witnesses describe forced attendance at public executions as terror and “ideological education.” The crackdown intensified after COVID border closures and new laws that authorize long forced labor and death for distribution.

Comment: I cannot emphasize enough how this is one indication that Kim fears the Korean people in the north more than the combined ROK and US militaries. And it is South Korea, and its very existence, that is the existential threat to the regime. Information and human rights are the path to change in the north. And yes, I will again address the argument about the moral hazard that information poses. But we should listen to those from north Korea who tell us Koreans in the north know the risks and they are not deterred. They want information. They need information. And it is our responsibility to provide it.

World News Feb. 4, 2026 / 1:15 AM

North Korea executes citizens for watching South Korean TV, Amnesty report says

By Thomas Maresca

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/04/Amnesty-International-report-North-Korea-human-rights-execution-South-Korean-media/1461770183804/

North Korea is punishing citizens caught watching South Korean television with forced labor and even death, according to an Amnesty International report released Wednesday. File Photo by Stephen Shaver/UPI | License Photo

Feb. 4 (UPI) -- North Korea is carrying out arbitrary and brutally disproportionate punishments, including executions, against citizens caught watching South Korean television and other foreign media, an Amnesty International report released Wednesday says.

Based on interviews with 25 North Korean escapees, the report documents a system in which secret consumption of South Korean dramas and films is widespread but the consequences, ranging from public humiliation and years in labor camps to execution, vary depending on wealth and connections.

"These testimonies show how North Korea is enforcing dystopian laws that mean watching a South Korean TV show can cost you your life -- unless you can afford to pay," Sarah Brooks, deputy regional director of Amnesty International, said. "The authorities criminalize access to information in violation of international law, then allow officials to profit off those fearing punishment."

The report includes testimony from individuals who fled the isolated state between 2012 and 2020. Choi Suvin, 39, escaped in 2019 and said many North Koreans sell their homes to raise up to $10,000 to bribe officials and avoid harsh punishment.

"People are caught for the same act, but punishment depends entirely on money," she said.

Another escapee, Kim Joonsik, 28, was caught watching South Korean dramas three times before fleeing but received only warnings because his family had ties to officials. He said three of his sisters' high school friends were given years-long sentences in labor camps because their families could not afford bribes.

The report also details how public executions and forced attendance at such events have been used as tools of terror. Kim Eunju, 40, recalled being taken with middle school classmates to watch people being executed for watching or distributing South Korean media.

"It's ideological education: if you watch, this happens to you too," she said.

Pyongyang ramped up its crackdown on foreign media access as it closed borders and tightened control during the COVID-19 pandemic. A 2020 law banning "anti-reactionary thought" mandates up to 15 years of forced labor for possession of foreign media and the death penalty for large-scale distribution of South Korean dramas, films or music.

Despite the risks, interviewees said many citizens continue to watch smuggled dramas and listen to K-pop on USB drives.

The report echoes longstanding issues chronicled by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry and other human rights organizations. A landmark 2014 COI report documented North Korean crimes against humanity, including torture, rape, execution, deliberate starvation and forced labor, which it said were "without parallel in the contemporary world."

A follow-up U.N. human rights assessment released in 2025 found that North Korea's human rights situation "has not improved over the past decade and, in many instances, has degraded," citing worsening food shortages, widespread forced labor and tight restrictions on movement and expression.

The U.S. State Department's 2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices also documented continued brutality, citing executions, physical abuse and arbitrary detention as central tools of state control.

Amnesty's report calls on the North Korean government to repeal laws criminalizing access to information, abolish the death penalty for such offenses and protect fundamental freedoms.

"This government's fear of information has effectively placed the entire population in an ideological cage, suffocating their access to the views and thoughts of other human beings," Brooks said. "People who strive to learn more about the world outside North Korea, or seek simple entertainment from overseas, face the harshest of punishments."

6. N. Korean police use spies to entrap merchants in foreign currency stings

Summary:

Daily NK reports north Korean police in Sinuiju are tightening enforcement of the foreign exchange control law by using undercover “buyers” to lure wholesalers into accepting foreign currency, then raiding the deal site and seizing both cash and goods. The crackdown hits person-to-person transactions that have grown as professional moneychangers lie low, pushing merchants to trade directly in dollars or yuan. Sources say police also investigate landlords and intermediaries tied to storage or meeting venues. Merchants now avoid new partners and big transactions ahead of the Ninth Party Congress, fearing an economic case could be reframed as a political offense.

Comment: A country that cannot control its currency usually cannot survive. But the regime has shown great resilience when others fail.

N. Korean police use spies to entrap merchants in foreign currency stings

dailynk.com

Police spies disguised as merchants entrap wholesalers using foreign currency, seizing both cash and goods under foreign exchange control laws as merchants avoid big deals before the Ninth Party Congress

By Seon Hwa - February 5, 2026

https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korean-police-use-undercover-spies-to-entrap-merchants-in-foreign-currency-stings/

FILE PHOTO: A market official on patrol in Sunchon, South Pyongan province. (The Daily NK)

North Korea is intensifying crackdowns on person-to-person foreign currency transactions under its foreign exchange control law, with police in Sinuiju, North Pyongan province, recently arresting wholesalers for conducting deals in foreign currency.

“Police are again intensifying crackdowns on foreign currency transactions based on the foreign exchange control law,” a Daily NK source in North Pyongan province said recently. “If they have evidence that you conducted a foreign currency transaction, the police seize your money and all your wares.”

According to the source, on Jan. 20, police arrested several wholesalers in Sinuiju who had been taking payments in foreign exchange for sending goods to provincial regions.

With professional moneychangers laying low and suspending business due to intensified crackdowns over the last couple of years, many merchants now conduct transactions entirely in foreign currency without changing money. In response, North Korean authorities have now put merchants who directly engage in foreign currency transactions firmly within their sights.

Police use undercover spies to entrap merchants

“Police spies have recently approached wholesalers disguised as ordinary people or merchants, offering to buy goods with foreign currency,” the source said. In other words, police are actively trying to entrap merchants.

“The police raid where the transaction is going down and seize not only the foreign currency but the wares,” the source added. “In the process, they investigate not only the busted parties in the transaction but also the people who stored the items or provided the transaction venue.”

These sorts of police crackdowns are based on North Korea’s foreign exchange control law, which strictly bans individuals from possessing or circulating foreign currency without state permission. According to the law, people must exchange foreign currency for North Korean won. If they are caught circulating foreign currency, they face having their cash confiscated or administrative or criminal punishments.

Under the law, police have harshly cracked down on person-to-person foreign currency transactions outside state control, treating them as completely illegal.

Merchants complain that “shaking them down using the foreign currency control law amounts to theft.”

As a result, market activity is declining. “Even if you have foreign currency, you don’t use it, and even if you have goods, you don’t sell them,” the source said. “The more business you do, the more careful you are, and in particular, merchants are increasingly wary of doing business with new partners.”

Above all, merchants are avoiding doing big deals ahead of the Ninth Party Congress. They worry that if they are caught moving large amounts of foreign cash, the case could blow up into a political issue rather than a simple economic crime.

“I know the state intends to stop private foreign currency transactions and circulation, but if they simply crack down on them, they’ll bring markets to a halt,” the source said. “And foreign currency won’t disappear. It will just go deeper underground.”

Read in Korean

A Note to Readers

Daily NK operates networks of sources inside North Korea who document events in real-time and transmit information through secure channels. Unlike reporting based on state media, satellite imagery, or defector accounts from years past, our journalism comes directly from people currently living under the regime.

We verify reports through multiple independent sources and cross-reference details before publication. Our sources remain anonymous because contact with foreign media is treated as a capital offense in North Korea—discovery means imprisonment or execution.

This network-based approach allows Daily NK to report on developments other outlets cannot access: market trends, policy implementation, public sentiment, and daily realities that never appear in official narratives. Maintaining these secure communication channels and protecting source identities requires specialized protocols and constant vigilance.

Daily NK serves as a bridge between North Koreans and the outside world, documenting what’s happening inside one of the world’s most closed societies.

dailynk.com

7. N. Korea drone incident shows peace talks are political mirage

Summary:

Daily NK argues the Jan. 4 drone incident and north Korea’s Jan. 10–11 statements expose “peace talks” as theater. It says Seoul’s rapid denial that the drone was a South Korean military asset leaked sensitive capabilities, then the government compounded the problem by treating Kim Yo-jong’s claims as a trigger for domestic investigations, signaling fear of provoking Pyongyang. The article reads Kim’s language as consistent with Kim Jong Un’s “hostile two-state” line: no reconciliation, only coercion and “taming” Seoul. It claims Pyongyang is raising the price of any summit toward demands like curbing South Korea’s institutions and alliance posture.

Comment: I like that characterization of "training Seoul to respond to Pyongyang's terms." I hope POTROK and his advisors can recognize this.

When Seoul investigates its own citizens based on enemy assertions, does it strengthen deterrence, or does it invite the next provocation? It simply demonstrates to KJU that his political warfare strategy is working and that he should double down WHich means more provocations are ahead.

N. Korea drone incident shows peace talks are political mirage

dailynk.com

Kim Yo-jong's mocking statement shows North Korea has no interest in dialogue—only in training Seoul to respond on Pyongyang's terms

By Kang Dong Wan, Dong-A University - February 5, 2026

Rodong Sinmun reported Jan. 10 through a General Staff spokesperson statement: "On Jan. 4, our units performing border air defense surveillance duties detected and tracked an aerial target moving northward over the skies of Hado-ri, Songhae-myeon, Ganghwa-gun, Incheon city. We tactically lured it into our airspace up to the 8-kilometer line, then attacked it with special electronic warfare assets and forced it to crash at a point 1,200 meters from Hill 101.5 in Moksan-ri, Gaepung district, Kaesong city." The photo shows the wreckage of the crashed drone. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

North Korea’s statements and rhetoric regarding the drone incident are once again roiling South Korea. Less than a day after the North Korean General Staff released its statement at 6:00 AM on Jan. 10, the Ministry of National Defense hastily announced that the drone did not belong to the South Korean military—effectively leaking classified information about the military’s weapon systems.

Kim Yo-jong’s statement the following day was even more dramatic. She went so far as to say, “The current authorities in Seoul have no right to comment on the Pyongyang drone infiltration incident committed by the previous ‘Yoon-mangnani’ [Yoon the wretch] regime as if it were someone else’s business.” The National Security Office then stepped in, stating it would uncover the truth through a joint military-police investigation and promptly release the results, while reaffirming it had no intention to provoke or irritate North Korea.

Meanwhile, the president of South Korea spoke of “grave crimes” and turned his focus toward the civilian sector. He effectively treated his own citizens as criminals based on the unilateral claims of an enemy state, ordering a strict investigation. While expressing regret over the drone infiltration, he failed to respond resolutely, appearing desperate only to avoid offending North Korea.

The content of Kim Yo-jong’s statement reveals North Korea’s intent clearly: “Whether committed by the Yoon clan or the Li clan, to us, it constitutes a grave provocation against the sovereignty of the DPRK.” In line with Kim Jong Un’s declared “hostile two-state” relationship, they have absolutely no intention of discussing exchange or cooperation with the South. They are simply “taming” the South in the manner they desire.

The timing of the statement is crucial. By mentioning events from last September and this January simultaneously, they are indirectly expressing dissatisfaction that the current administration’s North Korea policy does not meet their demands. In other words, unlike the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, the current government speaks of peaceful coexistence—but North Korea’s demands go far beyond that. They seem to be suggesting that a summit might only be possible after the dissolution of the Ministry of Unification, the abolition of the National Security Act, and even the withdrawal of US Forces Korea. And strictly speaking, that would not be the inter-Korean summit the current government desires, but a “DPRK-ROK Summit” based on the two-state concept.

At this point, the “peaceful coexistence” and “shared prosperity” spoken of by the current government are nothing more than empty political slogans with no realistic path forward. Under Kim Jong Un’s “hostile two-state” framework, North Korean authorities are compelled to stoke internal solidarity through military confrontation rather than easing tensions. Jan. 4—the day they claim the drone infiltrated—was the day the President flew to China to request Xi Jinping’s mediation for inter-Korean dialogue. North Korea’s intent to preemptively block any clumsy mediation or intervention by China appears evident.

It is a transparent ploy for the South Korean government to consistently emphasize peace while clearly knowing North Korea will not respond. Using division to maintain power seems to be a quality shared by leaders on both sides of the DMZ. However, there is hope—because nothing lasts forever.

Translated by Angela Somigli.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

8. Ukraine says North Korean troops are still carrying out strikes from Russia

Summary:

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence says a remaining group of north Korean troops is still fighting from Russia’s Kursk region, even after several thousand rotated home. Kyiv claims these forces operate under Russian command and conduct tube artillery and MLRS (rather MRLs) strikes on Ukrainian border communities, using aerial and artillery reconnaissance to adjust fires. DIU argues Pyongyang’s aim is to learn modern warfare, especially unmanned systems, then recycle veterans as instructors. The report estimates about 3,000 combat experienced troops have already returned to north Korea. Separate estimates of casualties vary widely, and Pyongyang has also supplied artillery, munitions, and other equipment.

Comment: Is north Korea turning Kursk into a live training pipeline? If so, how many soldiers of the nKPA can be trained there? But more importantly, for any qualitative improvements to the nKPA for warfighting against the South, how much training can be provided to the majority combat forces in north Korea and can the regime sustain the training necessary to improve the combat readiness of the nKPA? Combat experience of some small percentage of soldiers is not a game changer. It is whether a sufficient number of combat forces can be trained and have their training sustained that is the game changer. It is not the Army with the most combat experience that wins. It is the best trained Army. My money will always be on the training of the ROK Army.

Ukraine says North Korean troops are still carrying out strikes from Russia

Kyiv underscores continued DPRK involvement in combat operations despite return of thousands of troops

Anton Sokolin February 5, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/ukraine-says-north-korean-troops-are-still-carrying-out-strikes-from-russia/

North Korean soldiers in Kursk | Image: KCTV (Aug. 22, 2025)

North Korean troops continue to participate in combat operations against Ukraine despite the return of several thousand soldiers to the DPRK, carrying out artillery strikes from Russia’s Kursk region, according to Kyiv’s military intelligence.

The Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) reported on Wednesday that a “group” of DPRK soldiers was located in Kursk and attacking Ukrainian border communities as of last month.

The agency did not state the number of North Korean troops that remain on active duty in Russia but noted that the Kursk corps regularly undergoes rotations.

Operating under Russian command, these soldiers use conventional tube artillery and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) for strikes, combined with aerial and artillery reconnaissance missions to adjust MLRS fires, according to DIU.

“Mastering unmanned technologies and gaining experience in modern warfare” is one of the DPRK’s key objectives in joining the Ukraine war, it said.

“Since the start of the North Korean contingent’s involvement in the war against Ukraine, around 3,000 soldiers — trained and combat-experienced — have already returned to the DPRK.”

The intelligence agency added that most of the returned soldiers later become military instructors, passing on their skills in “conducting 21st-century warfare to the entire DPRK armed forces.”

North Korea has deployed more than 14,000 troops to aid Russia’s efforts to repel Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region since Oct. 2024. DPRK leader Kim Jong Un personally welcomed some special operations forces soldiers and demining specialists when they returned to Pyongyang.

State media coverage has hinted at a death toll from the deployment in the hundreds, while Western intelligence estimates roughly 1,500 killed in action and some 4,000-5,000 total casualties.

In addition to troops, Pyongyang has supplied Russia with a wide range of artillery systems, munitions, and other equipment to prop up its war effort against Ukraine.

An NK Pro investigation found that the allies’ arms smuggling operation out of the North Korean border city of Rason slowed in January, possibly due to frozen ports in Russia, but the appearance of new containers on Rason’s pier in the latest satellite imagery suggests the export scheme may get a second wind this month.

Edited by Bryan Betts

9. Defense ministry proposes joint, partial management of DMZ to U.S.: source

Summary:

South Korea’s Defense Ministry has proposed to the United States a joint, partial arrangement for managing access to parts of the southern half of the DMZ. The aim is to give South Korean forces more control over civilian entry to areas that sit south of the barbed wire fence but still inside the DMZ’s legal boundaries, which remain under U.N. Command administration under the 1953 armistice. The plan responds to pending legislation and an Lee Jae Myung government push to reopen DMZ Peace Trail sections. UNC objects, warning the bills conflict with the armistice and could imply South Korea exits it.

Comment: Again, this action is supporting Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy. Anything that attacks the UNC is to Kim's benefit.

World News Feb. 5, 2026 / 3:28 AM

Defense ministry proposes joint, partial management of DMZ to U.S.: source

By Lee Minji, Yonhap News Agency

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/05/korea-DMZ-UNC-South-Korea-buffer-zone-civilian-control-access/9201770279302/

Seoul's Defense Ministry has proposed to the United States that South Korea's military jointly manage parts of the southern half of the DMZ, according to a source Thursday. This 2019 photo shows an area of the DMZ Peace Trail in Goseong. File Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI | License Photo

The defense ministry has proposed to the United States that South Korea's military jointly manage parts of the southern half of the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas, a source said Thursday.

The proposal came as the South Korean government aims to secure control of civilian access to the 250-kilometer-long, 4-km-wide stretch of the DMZ. Currently, the U.S.-led U.N. Command (UNC) administers the military buffer zone as the south-side enforcer of the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War.

Amid the UNC's outright objection to Seoul's move, the defense ministry proposed a measure under which South Korea's military oversees entry to parts of areas located south of the barbed-wire fence within the DMZ.

The South's fence technically runs alongside the southern boundary of the DMZ, or the Southern Limit Line (SLL), located 2 km south of the Military Demarcation Line, the inter-Korean border.

But parts of the fence were installed north of the SLL to overcome geographic limitations for surveillance operations. The size of the area is known to account for roughly 30 percent of the southern half of the DMZ.

In addition to making the request to the UNC, the ministry also seeks to include the issue as an agenda item in bilateral defense talks, such as the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue and the Security Consultative Meeting, the source said.

The issue of DMZ access control has come into the spotlight since Unification Minister Chung Dong-young voiced his support for pending bills seeking to grant the South Korean government control of nonmilitary access to the DMZ.

Chung has also vowed to restore three sectors of the DMZ Peace Trail, which are situated within the DMZ, as part of the Lee Jae Myung government's push to restore inter-Korean trust.

The UNC has voiced strong opposition against the pending bills, saying they are "completely at odds" with the armistice agreement.

"If the legislation passes, a rational, logical, legal interpretation is that the ROK government has removed itself from the armistice and is no longer bound by it," a UNC official told reporters last month, referring to South Korea by the acronym of its formal name, the Republic of Korea.

In a rare statement issued in December, the UNC also stressed that it has been the "successful administrator" of the DMZ since 1953 to ensure that "military and civilian movements within the DMZ and other activities uphold the terms and the spirit of the armistice in the interest of stability."

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

10. N. Korea holds winter sports competition at home after failing to qualify for 2026 Olympics

Comment: Failure to reach the Olympics is another failure due to the policies of Kim Jong Un.

N. Korea holds winter sports competition at home after failing to qualify for 2026 Olympics | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 5, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260205001100315?section=nk/nk

SEOUL, Feb. 5 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has launched a winter sports competition at home, state media reported Thursday, after the country failed to qualify for this year's Winter Olympics.

The opening ceremony for the ice hockey, figure skating, skiing and two other winter sports competitions took place the previous day at an ice hockey rink in a sports village in the Mount Paektu district of Ryanggang Province, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

About 50 competitions across the five sports categories will be held, the KCNA said, quoting a speaker from the ceremony as calling the event an "important opportunity to advance winter sports skills" to a higher level.

The sports village in the Mount Paektu district, situated on a hill at an altitude of about 1,600 meters, reportedly houses winter sports facilities, including ice rinks, ski slopes and accommodations.

The local sports event comes as North Korea failed to qualify for any events at the 2026 Winter Olympics in Italy, set to run from Friday through Feb. 22.

The North last competed in the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics in South Korea, dispatching a team of 22 athletes to compete in five categories.

The country skipped the 2021 Summer Olympics in Tokyo due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It again missed the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing after the International Olympic Committee suspended the country's Olympic Committee over its "unilateral decision" not to participate in the Tokyo Games.

This image, captured from the Korean Central Television on Jan. 26, 2026, shows a national students' sports competition launched in January 2026 in the city of Samjiyon, Ryanggang Province. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 5, 2026

11. Seoul official stresses need to improve lives of N. Koreans through inter-Korean exchanges

Comment: There are only 14 words that will lead to the improvement of the lives of the Korean people living in the north:

Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.

Seoul official stresses need to improve lives of N. Koreans through inter-Korean exchanges | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · February 5, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260205014600315

SEOUL, Feb. 5 (Yonhap) -- Vice Unification Minister Kim Nam-jung on Thursday highlighted the need to improve the lives of North Koreans through inter-Korean exchanges during his meeting with the U.N. rapporteur on North Korean human rights, the unification ministry said.

Kim made the remarks while speaking with Elizabeth Salmon, U.N. special rapporteur on North Korea's human rights situation, as he explained Seoul's policy on North Korea's human rights and peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.

"The vice minister underscored the importance of making substantive improvements to the lives of North Korean people through inter-Korean exchanges and the establishment of peace," the ministry said.

He also outlined various policy measures for humanitarian solutions to separated families, abductees, detainees and prisoners of war.

Salmon voiced concerns over the continued isolation of North Korea, saying she is willing to cooperate with Pyongyang on areas where possible, such as technical assistance, according to the ministry.

She echoed the importance of mutual recognition and respect between the two Koreas, and called for working with Seoul to achieve the shared objective of enhancing the lives of the North Korean people.

Vice Unification Minister Kim Nam-jung (R) poses with Elizabeth Salmon, U.N. special rapporteur on North Korea's human rights situation, ahead of their meeting in Seoul on Feb. 5, 2026, in this photo provided by the unification ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · February 5, 2026

12. Top military commander urges firm readiness posture near border area

Comment: The Chairman is doing his job. We are approaching the optimal attack time for the nKPA. It will soon be completing its winter Training cycle which is designed to bring the nKPA to the highest state of reading and through March the ground in South Korea will likely remain frozen (for maneuver). That is why we had long conducted Team Spirit in March: to bring ROK and US forces to the highest state of readiness as well as to mobilize ROK forces and reinforce the peninsula with US forces to demonstrate strength and resolve. At one time team Spirit was the largest exercise in the Free World.

Security adviser expresses concerns over U.S. tariff risk's impact on security consultations | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · February 5, 2026

By Kim Eun-jung

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260205015400315

SEOUL, Feb. 5 (Yonhap) -- National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said Thursday the United States' move to raise tariffs on South Korea is having a negative effect on follow-up security consultations between the two allies, including talks on nuclear-powered submarines.

In an interview with the Kyunghyang Shinmun, Wi expressed concern that security negotiations have slowed after U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to raise tariffs on South Korean goods from 15 percent to 25 percent, reversing an earlier agreement reached in November.

"We have built a framework for relations with the U.S., China and Japan to shape the security environment around the Korean Peninsula, but (Trump's) talk of raising tariffs back to 25 percent is shaking one pillar of that framework," Wi said in the interview.

Following the release of a joint fact sheet outlining trade and security agreements, Wi visited Washington in December for meetings with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Energy Chris Wright.

Wi said earlier the talks covered South Korea's bid to build nuclear-powered submarines, as well as uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, noting that working-level consultations were expected to take place early this year.

"By now, (U.S. officials) should have come here for talks, but it is being delayed," he said. "It is very concerning."

He also said the Trump administration is paying attention to several other issues, including digital trade barriers and regulations, as well as Coupang, a U.S.-listed e-commerce company currently under investigation by South Korean authorities over a massive personal data breach.

Wi said the overlapping issues are complicating negotiations on security matters, voicing concern about their broader security implications.

While Coupang should take responsibility for the personal data breach, Wi said that South Korean authorities should also carefully address concerns raised by the U.S. and handle the issue "without procedural flaws."

National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac (R) speaks with a presidential official during President Lee Jae Myung's meeting with his senior aides at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul on Feb. 5, 2026. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · February 5, 2026

14. Gov't unveils strategy to enhance rare earth supply chains

Comment: If South Korea still plans short-term cooperation with China, how does it prevent diversification from becoming dependence by another name? Can domestic processing, recycling, and stockpiling scale fast enough to matter in a crisis before Beijing’s leverage is tested?

Gov't unveils strategy to enhance rare earth supply chains | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Na-young · February 5, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260205005500320

By Kim Na-young

SEOUL, Feb. 5 (Yonhap) -- The government on Thursday announced a comprehensive strategy aimed at strengthening South Korea's supply chains for rare earth elements amid the growing importance of such materials that are critical in many advanced industries but currently dominated by China.

The comprehensive plan, the first of its kind, is centered around boosting the country's capacities in every stage of rare earth supply chains, ranging from the upstream chain of resource development to the midstream chain of separation and purification of the elements, and the final downstream chain of turning the rare earths into usable materials, such as permanent magnets.

The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources said it has devised such a plan as rare earth elements are essential to strategic industries, such as the semiconductor, electric vehicle (EV) and defense sectors, but the country relies heavily on foreign supply chains.

In the short term, the government will work to expand cooperation with China, a dominant force in rare earths, and other countries with abundant reserves, such as Vietnam and Laos, to prevent possible disruptions to supply chains.

Korea will also seek expanded supply chain cooperation with major economies, including the United States, Japan and Australia, while participating in global supply chain initiatives, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, the ministry said.

At the same time, the government will actively support private-led overseas resource development projects while working to expand domestic infrastructure for rare earth production.

To this end, the government will expand the loan program for overseas resource development projects to 67.5 billion won (US$46.2 million) this year, sharply up from 39 billion won in 2025, and also increase policy finance.

For the internalization of rare earth production, it plans to extend support to companies investing in domestic production facilities and devise measures to increase domestic demand for such materials by prioritizing the stockpiling of locally produced rare earths.

It will also put forth efforts toward facilitating an ecosystem of resource recycling to recover rare earths from used EVs and home appliances.

The ministry said the plan also includes a road map for independent development of technologies for separation and purification of rare earths, as well as those related to resource recycling.

This file photo, taken Oct. 16, 2025, shows Vice Industry Minister Moon Shin-hak (2nd from L) speaking at a public-private joint meeting in Seoul on the government's response to rare earth supply chains. (Yonhap)

nyway@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Na-young · February 5, 2026

15. S. Korea to chair FORGE critical minerals initiative through June: State Dept.

Comment: some questions for our economics experts:

If Seoul chairs FORGE only through June, what concrete “policy and project level” deliverables will it lock in that survive the handoff and actually change supply-chain behavior?

Does Washington’s proposed “preferential trade zone” with price floors and adjustable tariffs complement FORGE, or does it create a parallel system that fractures allies into insiders and outsiders, including South Korea?

(LEAD) S. Korea to chair FORGE critical minerals initiative through June: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · February 5, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260205006051315

(ATTN: ADDS foreign ministry's comments in paras 8-12; CHANGES dateline; ADDS byline)

By Song Sang-ho and Kim Seung-yeon

WASHINGTON/SEOUL, Feb. 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will lead a new multinational initiative, launched under a U.S. push to beef up cooperation with allies on critical minerals supply chains, through June, the State Department said Wednesday, as Washington steps up efforts to counter China's formidable clout over key resources.

The department made the announcement on Seoul's role for FORGE, or Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement, after the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial, a meeting aimed at reinforcing and diversifying supply chains for critical minerals key to the manufacturing of high-tech military and consumer products.

"FORGE, which will be chaired by the Republic of Korea through June, will lead with bold and decisive action to address ongoing challenges in the global critical minerals marketplace," the department said in a fact sheet.

"Understanding the benefits of working together and building on the MSP, FORGE partners will collaborate at the policy and project levels to advance initiatives that strengthen diversified, resilient, and secure critical minerals supply chains," it added.

MSP is short for the Minerals Security Partnership, a precursor to FORGE. South Korea previously served as the MSP chair as well.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio holds a press conference during the Critical Minerals Ministerial at the State Department in Washington on Feb. 4, 2026, in this photo, released by Reuters. (Yonhap)

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted the ministerial meeting on critical minerals at the State Department, where officials from 54 countries and the European Commission participated, including South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and representatives from Japan, Australia, Canada and India, to name a few.

At the start of the meeting, U.S. Vice President JD Vance said that U.S. President Donald Trump's administration is seeking a "preferential trade zone," which will maintain "price floors" through "adjustable tariffs" and guard itself from "external disruptions."

The idea of a preferential trade bloc is believed to be a newly envisioned multilateral mechanism the U.S. is seeking to establish with allies and partners distinct from FORGE, according to Seoul officials.

Washington is reportedly in initial talks with the European Union and Japan about creating the new platform, although they have yet to flesh out the details, such as its objectives and scope.

The U.S. has yet to request South Korea's participation in this mechanism, a diplomatic source said.

"It is slightly different in nature (from FORGE)," Park Il, the foreign ministry spokesperson, said in a press briefing earlier. "While they certainly share the same objectives, what I am saying is that our government has not yet reviewed the matter in detail."

The U.S. has also been signing bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on minerals cooperation with individual countries. A foreign ministry official said Seoul has received a request from Washington about bilateral MOUs and that it is currently under review.

The meeting came as Washington has been intensifying efforts to bring allies and partners closer together to address supply chain vulnerabilities and other risks as China wields dominant influence over rare earths and other vital resources.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · February 5, 2026

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

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Russia-North Korea: CRINK’s Rising Comradeship

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From Comradeship to Brinkmanship: Implications for Deterrence and Regional Stability

Countering the Axis: A Multi-Pronged Approach

A Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Despite the CRINK

About The Authors

BOOK REVIEW: ‘Fallout: The Inside Story of America’s Failure to Disarm North Korea’

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A Note to Readers

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