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Quotes of the Day:
“The foreign states may become actively involved for positive purposes only if and when the internal resistance movement has already begun shaking the dictatorship, having thereby focused international attention on the brutal nature of the regime.”
- Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy
"Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent."
- Isaac Asimov
"A mob almost inevitably looks to its lowest elements for leadership, or else it would not be a mob."
- James L. Stokesbury's account of London's Gordon Riots in 1778
1. Balloon Incident Reveals More Than Spying as Competition With China Intensifies
2. Media: Zelensky to dismiss Defense Minister Reznikov, intelligence chief seen as likely successor
3. The U.S. is blocked from ports in PRC-Influenced Solomons, Vanuatu
4. Biden’s ‘Sputnik moment’: Is China’s spy balloon political warfare?
5. Yes, Chinese Spy Balloons Flew Over The U.S. When President Trump Was In Office Too
6. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 5, 2023
7. 'Pacific Winds' wargame offers insight to deter potential adversaries, address global challenges
8. Some Ospreys on Flight Restrictions Pending Part Replacement
9. Chinese Espionage - Five Books Expert Recommendations
10. Does Artificial Intelligence Change the Nature of War?
11. The 47 Pro-Democracy Figures in Hong Kong’s Largest National Security Trial
12. Senior Taiwan opposition leader to visit China amid continued tensions
13. America’s top cyber diplomat says his Twitter account was hacked
14. Special Operations News Update - February 6, 2023 | SOF News
15. How Russia Decides to Go Nuclear
16. Iran’s Hard-Liners Are Winning
17. Why did China send a balloon?
18. The Evolution of the Special Forces (SF) Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA)
19. US special operators surprised the hell out of San Diego residents during urban combat training
20. China accuses US of indiscriminate use of force over balloon
21. Shaping in Strategic Competition: How to Win Friends and Influence People with Military Power
1. Balloon Incident Reveals More Than Spying as Competition With China Intensifies
It may reveal how China's unrestricted warfare can cause political divisions within the U.S. The "intelligence" the balloon gathered was not imagery intelligence or signals intelligence but political intelligence. The Chinese may assess US strategic decision making and how it is impacted by the political divisions in our country. They are using this incident to determine the ways ways to influence US strategic decision making in various scenarios. A conclusion they may draw is that the US can be easily distracted due to the political divide.
On the other hand, if the DOD reports are accurate, they may be able to conclude that strategic decision making was NOT adversely affected by the bloviating pundits and those who would use the incident to advance their political agenda. Based on my interpretation of the actions by the White House and DOD, it seems they took measured and well thought out actions to deal with this despite the bloviation that was running rampant.
I know I am beating a dead horse, but we need to remember that "it is of supreme importance to attack the enemy's strategy." (recognize, understand, expose, and attack) When it comes to national security perhaps we should think more about attacking our enemy's strategy rather than our domestic political opponents.
Again from DOD:
U.S. officials first detected the balloon and its payload on January 28 when it entered U.S. airspace near the Aleutian Islands. The balloon traversed Alaska, Canada and re-entered U.S. airspace over Idaho. "President Biden asked the military to present options and on Wednesday President Biden gave his authorization to take down the Chinese surveillance balloon as soon as the mission could be accomplished without undue risk to us civilians under the balloon's path," said a senior defense official speaking on background. "Military commanders determined that there was undue risk of debris causing harm to civilians while the balloon was overland."
...
Long before the shoot down, U.S. officials took steps to protect against the balloon's collection of sensitive information, mitigating its intelligence value to the Chinese. The senior defense official said the recovery of the balloon will enable U.S. analysts to examine sensitive Chinese equipment. "I would also note that while we took all necessary steps to protect against the PRC surveillance balloon's collection of sensitive information, the surveillance balloon's overflight of U.S. territory was of intelligence value to us," the official said. "I can't go into more detail, but we were able to study and scrutinize the balloon and its equipment, which has been valuable." https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3288543/f-22-safely-shoots-down-chinese-spy-balloon-off-south-carolina-coast/
Balloon Incident Reveals More Than Spying as Competition With China Intensifies
The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · February 5, 2023
News Analysis
There is nothing new about superpowers spying on one another, even from balloons. But for pure gall, there was something different this time.
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A U.S. fighter jet shot down the Chinese balloon off the coast of South Carolina on Saturday.Credit...Randall Hill/Reuters
By
Feb. 5, 2023Updated 5:08 p.m. ET
It may be months before American intelligence agencies can compare the audacious flight of a Chinese surveillance balloon across the country to other intrusions on America’s national security systems, to determine how it ranks.
After all, there is plenty of competition.
There was the theft of the designs of the F-35, enabling the Chinese air force to develop its own look-alike stealth fighter, with Chinese characteristics. There was the case of China’s premier hacking team lifting the security clearance files for 22 million Americans from the barely secured computers of the Office of Personnel Management. That, combined with stolen medical files from Anthem and travel records from Marriott hotels, has presumably helped the Chinese create a detailed blueprint of America’s national security infrastructure.
But for pure gall, there was something different about the balloon. It became the subject of public fascination as it floated over nuclear silos of Montana, then was spotted near Kansas City and met its cinematic end when a Sidewinder missile took it down over shallow waters off the coast of South Carolina. Not surprisingly, now it is coveted by military and intelligence officials who desperately want to reverse-engineer whatever remains the Coast Guard and the Navy can recover.
Yet beyond the made-for-cable-news spectacle, the entire incident also speaks volumes about how little Washington and Beijing communicate, almost 22 years after the collision of an American spy plane and a Chinese fighter about 70 miles off the coast of Hainan Island led both sides to vow that they would improve their crisis management.
“We don’t know what the intelligence yield was for the Chinese,” Evan Medeiros, a Georgetown professor who advised President Barack Obama on China and Asia with the National Security Council. “But there is no doubt it was a gross violation of sovereignty,” something the Chinese object to vociferously when the United States flies over and sails through the islands China has built from sandbars in the South China Sea.
“And this made visceral the China challenge,” Mr. Medeiros said, “to look up when you are out walking your dog, and you see a Chinese spy balloon in the sky.”
As it turns out, it was hardly the first time. Hours before the giant balloon met its deflated end, the Pentagon said there was another one in flight, over South America. And it noted a long history of Chinese balloons flying over the United States (which the Pentagon, somehow, never wanted to talk about before, until this incident forced it to).
Better Understand the Relations Between China and the U.S.
The two nations are jockeying for influence on the global stage, maneuvering for advantages on land, in the economy and in cyberspace.
“Instances of this kind of balloon activity have been observed previously over the past several years,” the Pentagon spokesman, Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, said in a statement published on Thursday. One senior official said many of those were in the Pacific, some near Hawaii, where the Indo-Pacific Command is based, along with much of the naval capability and surveillance gear of the Pacific Fleet.
General Ryder’s admission raises the question of whether the United States failed to set a red line years ago about the balloon surveillance, essentially encouraging China to grow bolder and bolder. “The fact that they have come into airspace before is not comforting,” said Amy B. Zegart, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the author of “Spies, Lies and Algorithms,” a study of new technologies in ubiquitous surveillance. “We should have had a strategy earlier,” she said, and “we should have signaled our limits much earlier.”
Of course, there is nothing new about superpowers spying on one another, even from balloons. President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized surveillance of the Soviet Union by lofting cameras on balloons in the mid-1950s, flying them “over Soviet bloc countries under the guise of meteorological research,” according to an article published by the National Archives in 2009. It “yielded more protests from the Kremlin than it did useful intelligence,” the author, David Haight, an archivist at the Eisenhower Library, reported.
With the advent of the first spy satellites, the balloons appeared to become obsolete.
Now they are making a comeback, because while spy satellites can see almost everything, balloons equipped with high-tech sensors hover over a site far longer and can pick up radio, cellular and other transmissions that cannot be detected from space. That is why the Montana sighting of the balloon was critical; in recent years, the National Security Agency and United States Strategic Command, which oversees the American nuclear arsenal, have been remaking communications with nuclear weapons sites. That would be one, but only one, of the natural targets for China’s Ministry of State Security, which oversees many of its national security hacks.
The N.S.A. also targets China, of course. From the revelations of Edward Snowden, the former contractor who revealed many of the agency’s operations a decade ago, the world learned that the United States broke into the networks of Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications firm, and also tracked the movements of Chinese leaders and soldiers responsible for moving Chinese nuclear weapons. That is only a small sliver of American surveillance in China.
Such activities add to China’s argument that everyone does it. Because they are largely hidden — save for the occasional revelation of a big hack — they have rarely become wrapped in national politics. That is changing.
The balloon incident came at a moment when Democrats and Republicans are competing to demonstrate who can be stronger on China. And that showed: The new chairman of the House intelligence committee, Representative Michael R. Turner, an Ohio Republican, echoed the many Republicans who argued the balloon needed to come down sooner.
He called the shoot-down “sort of like tackling the quarterback after the game is over. The satellite had completed its mission. It should never have been allowed to enter the United States, and it never should have been allowed to complete its mission.”
It is not yet clear what that “mission” was, or whether the risk of letting it proceed truly outweighed the risk of taking the balloon down over land, as Mr. Turner seemed to imply. It is only a small part of the increasingly aggressive “Spy vs. Spy” moves of superpower competitors. That has only intensified as control of semiconductor production equipment, artificial intelligence tools, 5G telecommunications, quantum computing and biological sciences has become the source of new arms races. And both sides play.
Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke about the Chinese balloon during an event with the South Korean foreign minister on Friday.
Yet it was the obviousness of the balloon that made many in Washington wonder whether the intelligence community and the civilian leadership in Beijing are communicating with each other.
“Whatever the value of what the Chinese might have obtained,” said Gen. Michael Rogers, the former director of the National Security Agency during the Obama and Trump administrations, “what was different here was the visibility. It just has a different feel when it is a physical intrusion on the country.” And once it was detected, China “handled it badly,’’ he said.
The balloon drifted over the continental United States just days before Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken was supposed to make the first visit of a top American diplomat to Beijing in many years. Chinese officials maintained that it was a weather balloon that had entered U.S. airspace by accident.
Mr. Blinken canceled his trip — a public slap that many American officials believe President Xi Jinping cannot be happy about, at a moment the Chinese leader appears to be trying to stabilize the fast-descending relationship with Washington.
This was hardly a life-threatening crisis. But the fact that Chinese officials, realizing that the balloon had been spotted, did not call to work out a way to deal with it was revealing.
That kind of problem was supposed to be resolved after the 2001 collision of an EP-3 spy plane and a Chinese fighter that brought down both planes. For days after that incident, President George W. Bush could not get Chinese leaders on the phone. Efforts by the secretary of state at the time, Gen. Colin Powell, also failed. “It made you wonder what might happen in a deeper crisis,” General Powell said later.
Afterward, hotlines were set up, and promises made about better communications. Clearly, those failed. When the balloon was shot down, China issued a statement saying “for the United States to insist on using armed forces is clearly an excessive reaction.”
Few experts doubt that had the situation been reversed, China would have used force — it has threatened to do that when it believed outsiders were entering disputed waters, much less established Chinese territory.
“It makes you wonder who was talking to whom in China,” Ms. Zegart said. “This is clearly the greatest unforced error the Chinese have made in some time.”
The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · February 5, 2023
2. Media: Zelensky to dismiss Defense Minister Reznikov, intelligence chief seen as likely successor
Media: Zelensky to dismiss Defense Minister Reznikov, intelligence chief seen as likely successor
kyivindependent.com · by The Kyiv Independent news desk · February 5, 2023
Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov will likely be dismissed from his ministerial post next week, Ukrainian news outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on Feb. 5, citing government and military sources.
According to the sources, the likely replacement for Reznikov is understood to be Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine's military intelligence agency HUR.
In a soon-to-be-published interview with Ukrainska Pravda, Reznikov reportedly denied any knowledge of an imminent dismissal.
“I have not had any conversations about my resignation from this position,” he reportedly said.
A government source confirmed to the Kyiv Independent that Reznikov was likely to be replaced in the very near future.
Upon dismissal, Reznikov could be appointed to a new post as Justice Minister, as “no one in the Presidential Office has any doubt” that Reznikov should stay in the government, according to the Ukrainska Pravda article.
According to the report, Denys Maliuska, the current Justice Minister, could be appointed as an ambassador to a Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Europe.
The report hasn't provided information on who will head Ukraine's military intelligence agency if Budanov is appointed as defense minister.
Reznikov, 56, has served as Defense Minister since he was appointed on Nov. 4, 2021, overseeing the ministry throughout the entirety of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine.
In this time, Reznikov played an important role in the campaigning for and securing of Western military aid that has proved vital to Ukraine's resistance against Russia.
In late January, the Defense Ministry was beset by a high-profile corruption scandal that led to the firing of several top officials.
Ukrainian newspaper ZN.UA reported on Jan. 21 that the Defense Ministry procured large amounts of food products for the military at inflated prices. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine has since opened an investigation into the alleged scheme.
Reznikov’s deputy, Vyacheslav Shapovalov, was dismissed from the Defense Ministry on Jan. 24.
On Jan. 31, Reznikov said that an audit of the army's procurement process had been launched on June 29. Its initial results in December found that the procurement system was deficient.
When the ZN.UA article first broke, Reznikov denied any wrongdoing, saying that whoever leaked the procurement documents committed a crime.
A court arrested Shapovalov for 60 days on Feb. 2.
kyivindependent.com · by The Kyiv Independent news desk · February 5, 2023
3. The U.S. is blocked from ports in PRC-Influenced Solomons, Vanuatu
Map and photos here: https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/u-s-blocked-ports-prc-influenced-solomons-vanuatu?utm_source=pocket_saves
"how far advanced Chinese political warfare operations are in the region."
Excertps:
Perhaps not coincidentally, Solomons is also home to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. PRC political warfare predictably targets and tries to weaken regional organizations that create cohesion and threaten its interests.
Anyone concerned about illegal fisheries (and so the economic security of the Pacific Islands), including and especially the Pacific Islands Forum, might like to take a closer look at how the protection regime is being undermined, and perhaps even start the discussion about whether Solomons is a fit host country in which to headquarter the effort.
In the meantime, lack of refuelling ports is stretching the US’ thin naval capabilities even further, and allowing illegal Chinese fishing fleets even greater unrestricted access to the stocks of undefended nations.
Not to mention PRC political warfare gains that can translate into positioning advantages in advance of kinetic activity.
So, what about that new embassy? Hon. Kenilorea has been working towards a reopening since he was Foreign Minister in 2017. “There is no Ambassador but the fact the American flag is flying over a building has brought so much hope for many Solomon islanders who were looking forward for this day.”
The staff at that new US embassy is going to be very busy indeed.
The U.S. is blocked from ports in PRC-Influenced Solomons, Vanuatu - The Sunday Guardian Live
sundayguardianlive.com · February 4, 2023
PRC-linked actors attempting to politically take out Premier Daniel Suidani of Malaita.
The United States just reopened its embassy in Solomon Islands, the country that last year signed a security deal with China. Problem solved, right? If only.
Two other things just happened that give a sense of how unstable the situation is, and how far advanced Chinese political warfare operations are in the region.
AN IMMEDIATE THREAT
The first involves pro-PRC Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare government’s ongoing attempts to crush—politically if possible but perhaps by force if necessary—anti-PRC resistance in the province of Malaita.
That resistance has been fronted by Malaita Premier Daniel Suidani, who is concerned about the social and economic effect of PRC activities in the country.
Soon after Sogavare unilaterally “switched” Solomons from Taiwan to China in 2019, Suidani’s provincial government issued the “Auki Communiqué” named for the capital of the province.
The Communiqué said the Malaita government “strongly resolves to put in place a Moratorium on Business Licences to new investors connected directly or indirectly with the Chinese Communist Party.”
One of the reasons noted was that the Malaita government “acknowledges the freedom of religion as a fundamental right and further observes the entrenched Christian faith and belief in God by Malaitan and MOIan peoples and therefore rejects the Chinese Communist Party—CCP and its formal systems based on atheist ideology”.
Needless to say, that didn’t endear Premier Suidani and his government to those in power who are pro-PRC (and its money), and when Suidani needed medical care outside the country, Sogavare’s government refused to help, unless he accepted the PRC. Suidani refused. He preferred to risk death than take Chinese money.
After the President of Taiwan’s office was alerted to Suidani’s humanitarian need by Prof M.D. Nalapat, she stepped in and provided Suidani with the required care. The Chinese embassy in Solomons was publicly furious, and called on the central government to punish Suidani.
(L-R) Daniel Suidani and Manasseh Sogavare.
A major attempt to politically take out Suidani was made via an attempted 27 October 2021 Vote of No Confidence against him. In that case, people of Malaita physically blocked access to the legislature to impede the tabling of the motion. The police intervened and defused the situation and it didn’t go ahead.
That doesn’t mean Sogavare’s government or the PRC gave up. They’ve just regrouped, rearmed and spread around more money.
There is likely to be a Vote of No Confidence brought in the Malaita provincial legislature against Premier Suidani on 7 February. This time though, there is a coterie of police who have been trained in China and armed by both China and Australia.
Also, in the interim, Sogavare has “postponed” elections and the climate of fear has spread. The tinder is much more dry and there are more sparks around.
To understand more about the Vote of No Confidence, The Sunday Guardian spoke with respected Solomon Islands leader Hon. Peter Kenilorea, Jr.
The first question was, given the term of the Malaita government runs out in less than six months, why now?
Kenilorea explained: “I think this is definitely a last-ditch effort to destabilize Malaita and the [Suidani] government, orchestrated by the central government. I think this is to do with some political points scoring by the government and China. And, individually, the Deputy Prime Minister [who is from Malaita] is feeling threatened by some potential candidates that might run against him.”
There could be another reason as well. A US government aid program in Malaita is proving very popular and that isn’t good for either the central government or China: “The USAID funding [in Malaita] is really starting to roll out. Last week was filled with photos in the local press and social media of leaders, associations, tribal groups signing agreements and collecting funds to kickstart their small projects. This is clearly to destabilize that process.”
In terms of how it is being done, one way, he explained, is: “resources are possibly being channeled through the SBD$40 million China-funded so-called ‘mini-hospital’ in the Deputy Prime Minister’s constituency. It could be a conduit through which funds will be flowing to destabilize [Suidani’s government] and to build up a war chest for the next election.”
Last time, the police helped defuse the situation. How about this time?
“There was blowback from the PM’s office and police superiors in the capital to the police for defusing the last Vote of No Confidence. Since then, there has been police training in China and Australia and then an almost ‘gun show’ [when Australia gave Solomon Islands weapons]. Politicians were gleefully looking at weapons. It was bad taste in my view.
“Now there is a new provincial police commander in Auki. They are not sending police as visibly as last time. Perhaps that explains why there is not much news going around. It doesn’t mean nothing is in the works, just that it is not as visible. The Malaitan public don’t have the appetite for these kind of destabilizing schemes—everybody just sees through it. There are elements in the Malaitan public who might resort to violence if they feel threatened. People see it very clearly.
“It is as serious as anytime, it’s just the visibility is different. Stakes are still high. “They know the stakes are high—they need to please their masters in Beijing. I keep saying we are in the front line.”
It’s very likely Sogavare is perfectly fine with retriggering a civil war in Solomons. He can’t win a fair election, and putting down “successionist” or whatever he decides to call the demonstrators could give him an excuse to trigger his security deal with China for the sake of “internal stability”.
It would also give him a good excuse to postpone elections for even longer—or at least until he gets in a voting system he likes.
We could go into where Australia is in all of this, and how there are actual solutions (i.e. enacting the Townsville Peace Agreement) but that will have to wait until next time. There is another situation developing that also needs urgent attention.
ONE SLOW BURNING THREAT
The second threat is slower moving but even more troubling. The US is quietly being blocked out of some Pacific Islands ports, likely by pro-PRC elements. In the latest case, Vanuatu failed to issue timely clearance for US Coast Guard Cutter JUNIPER (a 225’ buoy tender) to enter Port Vila on 26 January to commence planned ship-rider illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing operations. The ship, running out of fuel and unable to continue waiting, diverted to Fiji instead.
This wasn’t the first time a Coast Guard Cutter was blocked from entry in a Pacific port.
In August 2022, the USCGC Oliver Henry, which was also on an IUU fisheries patrol, couldn’t obtain entry to refuel in Solomon Islands. Solomons then blocked ALL foreign naval port visits. It later said it would allow in Australian and New Zealand vessels but, as of last reporting, the US is still blocked (as is Japan, India, and everyone else).
In both cases, national governments are blaming overwhelmed domestic bureaucracies. However, that rings hollow, given: The high-profile nature of the incidents. The subsequent lack of effort to correct the issue (indeed doubling down in the case of Solomons). The fact these patrols are for something all the countries in the region say they want (help with illegal fishing).
Additionally, both countries seem to have strong pro-PRC elements, with Solomon Islands having signed a security agreement with China, and possibly Vanuatu did as well.
Perhaps not coincidentally, Solomons is also home to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. PRC political warfare predictably targets and tries to weaken regional organizations that create cohesion and threaten its interests.
Anyone concerned about illegal fisheries (and so the economic security of the Pacific Islands), including and especially the Pacific Islands Forum, might like to take a closer look at how the protection regime is being undermined, and perhaps even start the discussion about whether Solomons is a fit host country in which to headquarter the effort.
In the meantime, lack of refuelling ports is stretching the US’ thin naval capabilities even further, and allowing illegal Chinese fishing fleets even greater unrestricted access to the stocks of undefended nations.
Not to mention PRC political warfare gains that can translate into positioning advantages in advance of kinetic activity.
So, what about that new embassy? Hon. Kenilorea has been working towards a reopening since he was Foreign Minister in 2017. “There is no Ambassador but the fact the American flag is flying over a building has brought so much hope for many Solomon islanders who were looking forward for this day.”
The staff at that new US embassy is going to be very busy indeed.
Cleo Paskal is The Sunday Guardian Special Correspondent as well as Non-Resident Senior Fellow for the Indo-Pacific at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.
sundayguardianlive.com · February 4, 2023
4. Biden’s ‘Sputnik moment’: Is China’s spy balloon political warfare?
YES.
When are we going to conduct a superior form of political warfare to challenge China's Unrestricted Warfare?
POTUS needs to turn to the NSC (principals not the national security staff) and ask the following questions:
Recognize: (to the DNI): What is the Chinese strategy? How do we observe and assess. Can we identify it? What are the indicators?
Understand: (to the DNI, SECSTATE, SECDEF): What do I need to know about the strategy? What are the objectives of the strategy and what are its methods, lines of operation, etc.?
Expose: (to SECSTATE [GEC], SECDEF (JS J39 and USSOCOM): How do we explain the Chinese strategy to inoculate the American public and the international community to its actions and effects?
Attack: (to SECSTATE, SECDEF [USSOCOM]): How to I conducta superior political warfare campaign to attack the Chinese unrestricted warfare strategy?
Biden’s ‘Sputnik moment’: Is China’s spy balloon political warfare?
BY BRADLEY A. THAYER, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 02/04/23 7:00 AM ET
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3842982-bidens-sputnik-moment-is-chinas-spy-balloon-political-warfare/?utm_source=pocket_saves
The spy balloon that China sailed over the United States and Canada should compel Americans to ask what, exactly, Beijing is doing. China claims the balloon is a weather “airship” that went off course, a contention the Pentagon dismissed. At a minimum, the balloon has been gathering meteorological intelligence, but its detection over U.S. military sites makes it more likely a component of China’s political warfare campaign against the U.S. and its allies.
Here’s why the high-altitude vessel — like its antecedents sent previously over Hawaii and elsewhere over U.S. sovereign territory — may be an attempt at political warfare. First and foremost, it reminds Americans that their homeland is vulnerable to attack. In World War II, Japan launched thousands of balloons armed with incendiary explosives, with the aim of killing Americans and damaging U.S. installations. Although many went into the Pacific Ocean and others landed fecklessly across North America, one balloon bomb tragically did kill several Oregonians, including children, who were picnicking in 1945 and, in a separate incident that reflects the role of chance in warfare, nearly disrupted plutonium production at the Hanford facility in Washington state.
Hanford was producing plutonium for the Trinity atomic test in July 1945 and for the nuclear bombs used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki on Aug. 6 and 9, 1945, respectively. With this history in mind, we may understand China’s basic message to be that U.S. airspace can be penetrated and we are vulnerable to attack.
This balloon incident follows China’s hypersonic vehicle and fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) tests in 2021. If China executed a hypersonic or FOBS nuclear attack against the U.S., we likely would be ill prepared to address it, because of the speed of hypersonics and because a FOBS attack vector may be from the south, rather than the traditionally expected northerly vectors. Together, these incidents convey a powerful message to the Biden administration and the American people: We could bomb your homeland.
Second, China may perceive President Biden’s decision not to shoot down the balloon — for now — as a sign of weakness. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reportedly advised Biden against downing the balloon, but doing so would send a forceful message that the United States will not tolerate China’s penetrations of its airspace. This would be within America’s rights as a sovereign state and fully in keeping with precedent.
China has labored assiduously to down aircraft or drones over its territory or on its periphery in international airspace. In fact, when the U.S. or Taiwan have attempted to penetrate China’s airspace, China has attempted to shoot down the aircraft or vehicle, including the first aircraft lost to an SA-2 — the RB-57 flown by Taiwanese pilot Yin Chin Wong in October 1959, many months before Francis Gary Powers’s U-2 aircraft was downed in Soviet airspace on May 1, 1960. China shot down at least four of Taiwan’s U-2s and other aircraft flown by the “Black Cat Squadron,” a joint effort of the CIA and Taiwan.
Third, there is much in the political warfare realm that must be accomplished. Even if the U.S. intelligence community is monitoring the balloon’s “take” in real time, making its sojourn valuable for U.S. intelligence, the political warfare aspect could be more important. When the Soviet Union’s Sputnik, the first artificial satellite, orbited over U.S. homes in 1957, the Eisenhower administration was excoriated for allowing the U.S. to fall behind the Soviets in technological development. So, it would appear that China has provided the Biden administration with its own “Sputnik moment” — if it chooses to act upon it — to enlist a whole-of-society response against the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party.
Accordingly, the Biden administration should execute these measures:
- Shoot down the balloon and harvest the intelligence yield it may produce, even if modest. The message sent is the required one: China cannot violate U.S. airspace.
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Since China sent a message to the U.S., seize the opportunity to inform Americans about the threat that China poses. Treat this event, along with the FOBS launch, as a Sputnik moment — the shock that a foe provides to mobilize the American people — and capitalize upon the threat that China has made. It is incumbent upon the Biden administration to explain to the American people the nature of China’s threat: It could kill them.
- Once the balloon is recovered, make public its technologies, including solar panels, many of which are like the ones Americans purchase for their homes, and use the balloon’s technology to reinforce the warning to Americans that using China’s technology — including apps such as TikTok or Huawei’s 5G or other technologies — is like having an ever-present balloon floating overhead, collecting intelligence on Americans.
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Reciprocity is needed in political warfare. Postponing Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing was a smart first step — and the U.S. need not send any balloons over China’s airspace.
Whereas Eisenhower invested in the military — and many non-military measures, such as STEM education and languages — to best the Soviets, Biden’s job may be fundamentally easier. What he must do is publicize the Chinese Communist Party’s record, and explain why China has become a threat to the world.
This sordid record includes China’s consistent abuse of human rights of the Chinese people, its genocide against Muslims in Xinjiang, and its global presence to exploit people and the environment through its enterprises such as the Belt are Road Initiative. This reconnaissance balloon can be useful to awaken and mobilize Americans to the threats Beijing has made, but the Biden administration must act with dispatch.
Bradley A. Thayer is director of China policy at the Center for Security Policy and co-author of “Understanding the China Threat.”
5. Yes, Chinese Spy Balloons Flew Over The U.S. When President Trump Was In Office Too
Yes, Chinese Spy Balloons Flew Over The U.S. When President Trump Was In Office Too
Matt NovakContributor
FOIA reporter and founder of Paleofuture.com, writing news and opinion on every aspect of technology.
Feb 4, 2023,01:31pm EST
Chinese spy balloon flies above Charlotte, North Carolina on February 04, 2023. The Pentagon ... [+]ANADOLU AGENCY VIA GETTY IMAGES
Talking heads on cable TV are up in arms about the Chinese spy balloon that was floating across the continental U.S., before it was shot down Saturday afternoon. Conservative commentators have insisted President Joe Biden should’ve ordered the balloon be shot down earlier and that a foreign balloon flying over U.S. territory never would’ve happened under President Donald Trump. But it did happen under Trump, according to several new reports.
The Chinese government claims the balloon, which was first spotted by civilians on Wednesday over Billings, Montana, was actually just a weather balloon that was blown off course. But the Pentagon says it’s definitely a surveillance balloon and China had the ability to maneuver the aircraft.
“I can nearly guarantee you that that balloon would not still be flying if we were still there,” Mike Pompeo, former Secretary of State under Trump, told Sean Hannity on Friday.
But is Pompeo telling the truth? The Pentagon was quick to point out on Thursday that this kind of thing has happened before, though it didn’t get into specifics.
“Instances of this kind of balloon activity have been observed previously over the past several years,” Pentagon Press Secretary Pat Ryder said in a statement published online.
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But several reports have been published in the past two days that give us a better sense of when spy balloons operated by New Cold War adversaries have sailed into U.S. airspace. Bloomberg News reported on Friday that Chinese balloons flew over the U.S. while President Trump occupied the White House.
“The balloon spotted this week over Montana was not the first time the U.S. has detected Chinese balloons over their territory—with previous incursions occurring during the Trump Administration,” Bloomberg reported.
But an unnamed source from the Trump administration insisted to Bloomberg in that same article that it wasn’t a big deal.
“One top national security official from the administration of former President Donald Trump said none of the Chinese spy balloons were near sensitive sites or had payloads as large as this one appears to carry,” Bloomberg continued.
And if you can’t trust an unnamed official who worked for Trump, who can you trust, right?
The Associated Press also has a new report that quotes a defense expert who said that Chinese spy balloons have been detected near sensitive sites in Hawaii, home to a large U.S. military presence, during the past five years.
“Craig Singleton, a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, said Chinese surveillance balloons have been sighted on numerous occasions over the past five years in different parts of the Pacific, including near sensitive U.S. military installations in Hawaii,” the Associated Press reported on Saturday.
President Biden has been in office for two years, leaving three years of Trump’s presidency in that window of five years.
The Wall Street Journal also independently reported that Chinese spy balloons have flown over the U.S. before, though didn’t specify the era.
“China has sent surveillance balloons over the continental U.S. on at least a handful of occasions, U.S. officials said,” the Journal reported on Friday.
In this photo provided by Brian Branch, a large balloon drifts above the Kingston, N.C. area, with ... [+]BRIAN BRANCH
And all of this still leaves open the possibility that other adversary aircraft have flown over the U.S. during the Trump years, aside from balloons. We still don’t know why swarms of drones were flying over Colorado and Nebraska in December 2019 and January 2020. If you’ll recall, President Trump was president at that time and we never got an answer to who was behind that.
Trump himself posted a video to Twitter yesterday, rambling about how the University of Pennsylvania might be compromised by Chinese spies, an accusation for which he provided no evidence. Trump, a known liar and continued threat to the safety and security of the United States, also called for a the U.S. government to shoot down the Chinese spy balloon.
Ignoring the incoherent ramblings of Trump for a moment, the Chinese spy balloon situation still left plenty of valid questions about what should’ve been done and when. Pentagon officials reportedly considered shooting down the balloon earlier this week, but didn’t want to have debris hit anything on the ground. But the U.S. is a very large place with plenty of farm land. It seems illogical that there wasn’t at least a stretch of land where the military could’ve safely forced the balloon down.
Reasonable people can disagree on whether the waiting game chosen by the Biden administration was the right course of action. But the question of whether something similar would’ve happened under Trump appears to have been answered. It did.
Update, 3:20 pm ET: The balloon was shot down around 2:40pm ET by the U.S. military over the Atlantic Ocean. Local TV news in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina captured the moment on a YouTube livestream. This story has been updated with that information.
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Matt Novak
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I’m a technology reporter and founder of Paleofuture.com, a website I started in 2007 that looks at past visions of the future, from flying cars and jetpacks to utopias and dystopias. Paleofuture was formerly hosted at Smithsonian magazine (2011-2013) and Gizmodo (2013-2020).
My work has appeared at BBC Future, Slate, The Verge, GOOD, Pacific Standard, The Wall Street Journal, The Atlantic, and Buzzfeed. Most recently, I was a senior writer at Gizmodo for ten years. I’ve also given talks at South by Southwest, dConstruct in Brighton, The Conference in Malmo, UCLA’s Digital Cash conference in Los Angeles, and the University of Virginia’s edUi conference. In 2012, I partnered with the BBC to put on an exhibit of retro-futuristic items from my personal collection in Hollywood, California. Read Less
6. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 5, 2023
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-update-february-5-2023
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on February 5:
- Current Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov (pending a potential reshuffle) stated that Ukrainian officials expect possible Russian offensive operations ahead of the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, but noted that there are no Russian strike groups near Kharkiv City.[24]
- German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that Ukraine is not using Western-provided weapons to strike Russian territory.[25]
- US officials stated that Russia and Iran plan to build a factory in Russia to manufacture up to 6,000 drones for combat in Ukraine.[26] A Russian source claimed that Russian arms company Lobaev Arms is beginning to develop and produce these drones.[27]
- Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kreminna area, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces launched renewed offensive operations northwest of Svatove in recent days.[28]
- Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks around Bakhmut.[29] Russian milbloggers are conflicted on whether Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from Bakhmut, as Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied claims of a Ukrainian withdrawal.[30] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely unable to force an imminent Ukrainian withdrawal from Bakhmut.
- Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are transferring reserves in the Vuhledar direction.[31]
- Geolocated satellite footage shows that Russian forces built a fortified base on the Arabat Spit in northeastern Crimea between October 18, 2022, and January 21, 2023.[32]
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continue to import medical personnel from Russia to treat wounded military personnel in occupied Luhansk Oblast, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are preparing for a renewed offensive in Luhansk Oblast.[33]
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 5, 2023
understandingwar.org
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko and Mason Clark
February 5, 9pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, February 5. This report focuses on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s cautious approach to risk-taking after having thrown the dice on launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, an act he likely did not see as a risk. Putin’s hesitant wartime decision making demonstrates his desire to avoid risky decisions that could threaten his rule or international escalation—despite the fact his maximalist and unrealistic objective, the full conquest of Ukraine, likely requires the assumption of further risk to have any hope of success.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decisions regarding Ukraine since his initial flawed invasion on February 24, 2022, indicate a likely disconnect between his maximalist objectives and his willingness to take the likely high-risk decisions necessary to achieve them. Putin likely operated under the flawed assumption that Russian forces could force Kyiv to capitulate without any significant military sacrifices and saw Russia’s invasion as a limited and acceptable risk. Captured Russian military plans, for example, revealed that the Kremlin expected Russian forces to capture Kyiv in days, Russian intelligence services reportedly expected the Ukrainian military to collapse, and Kremlin propagandists preemptively published a prewritten article extolling Russia’s “victory” on February 26, 2022.[1] Reports that Putin dismissed the Russian Central Bank’s prescient warnings in February 2022 of the effect of a war in Ukraine on the future of the Russian economy under harsh Western sanctions likely suggest Putin wrongfully assumed the West would not impose major costs on his invasion.[2] The failure of Russian forces in the Battle of Kyiv—and with it the Kremlin’s war plan—forced Putin to face complex decisions as the Kremlin fought an increasingly costly and protracted conventional war. Putin, however, has remained reluctant to order the difficult changes to the Russian military and society that are likely necessary to salvage his war.
Putin has consistently ignored, delayed, or only partially implemented several likely necessary pragmatic decisions concerning his invasion. Putin was reluctant to order full mobilization following the costly capture of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in June-July 2022 and several unsuccessful offensives that depleted much of his conventional military. Putin ignored repeated calls from the Russian nationalist community in May 2022 to mobilize reservists, declare war on Ukraine, implement martial law in Russia, and modernize the military call-up system.[3] Putin likely feared antagonizing Russian society and instead prioritized recruiting and committing relatively ineffective irregular armed formations over the summer.[4] Putin also attempted to maintain the façade of a limited war to shield much of Russian society from the scale and cost of the Russian war in Ukraine.[5] Putin also did not make many public appearances relating to the war effort from the start of the war until mid-December.[6] Putin additionally did not attempt to silence the large group of Russian pro-war and ultra-nationalist milbloggers and public figures who supported Putin's war aims but began to criticize what they perceived as a half-hearted Russian war effort.[7]
Putin continued to select comparatively less risky options even when faced with spiraling military failures in fall 2022. Putin only began to accept domestically unpopular—and potentially risky—policies such as the declaration of partial mobilization or the expansion of martial law far after the dire situation on the front lines following Ukrainian successes made clear the Kremlin required additional combat power.[8] Putin could have announced a larger mobilization effort than the reported 300,000 servicemen but likely feared that the already unpopular prospect of mobilization would further damage his appeal within Russian society. Putin additionally made a significant rhetorical effort to downplay mobilization by defining it as the mobilization of select reservists, despite the realities of Russian military recruitment centers being unable to implement such a targeted campaign.[9] Putin also did not formally declare martial law outside of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts, but instead directed areas outside Ukraine to build out the legal framework necessary to support Russian mobilization.[10] Putin also only selectively appeased milbloggers by meeting some of their demands, such as launching a “retaliatory” strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, while refraining from implementing other consequential demands such as clearly defining Russia’s claimed borders.[11]
ISW assesses the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is belatedly implementing large-scale-military reforms and treating Ukraine as a protracted and major war—yet Putin is continuing a similar pattern of reserved decision-making. ISW assessed on January 15 that the Kremlin is belatedly taking the personnel mobilization, reorganization, and industrial actions it realistically should have before launching its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[12] However, Putin is evidently reticent to announce a second wave of mobilization, with US and Western officials noting that Putin is again leaning towards conducting “silent mobilization” due to the concerns over the extreme unpopularity of the first wave of mobilization.[13] Putin is additionally reportedly conducting surveys to gauge Russians’ perception of mobilization and has not made up his mind on when to start further mobilization, despite Defense Minister Shoigu announcing wide-ranging reforms to increase the manpower of the Russian Armed Forces on January 17.[14] ISW had also observed conflicting messaging from Russian State Duma officials and Kremlin representatives regarding changes to mobilization and conscription protocols, possibly indicating that Putin has ordered the preparation of these provisions but is reluctant to announce them to the public.[15]
Putin notably relies on a group of scapegoats to publicly take risks in his place and shoulder the blame for Russian military failures and unpopular policies. Putin allows and at times has contributed to Russian milblogger criticism of the Russian MoD to deflect blame from himself.[16] Putin, for example, positioned Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and the MoD to be the face of his most domestically unpopular decision to date—ordering partial mobilization—by having Shoigu explain mobilization provisions in a televised interview.[17] Putin has also repeatedly blamed the Russian MoD for every problem relating to the execution of partial mobilization and even publicly rebuked the MoD and called on it to listen to criticism.[18] Putin has repeatedly reshuffled the Russian command structure throughout the war and allowed successive commanders to take blame, blaming overall Russian military failures on individual commanders rather than his unrealistic and maximalist objective of seizing all of Ukraine.[19] Putin’s state propaganda networks have also placed responsibility for the controversial Russian withdrawal from west (right) bank Kherson Oblast and Kherson City in November 2022 on the former Commander of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine, Army General Sergey Surovikin (who now serves as deputy Commander of the Russian grouping in Ukraine under the new commander, Army General Valery Gerasimov) and Putin did not comment on this significant Russian loss.[20] Putin has regularly used the Russian State Duma to set conditions for controversial decisions in order to frame Putin as balanced leader. Putin has repeatedly snubbed extreme Russian State Duma’s proposals such as the legalization of the Wagner Group in Russia or fully committing to calls to nationalize property from Russians who have fled the country during the war.[21] Putin has also failed to fully commit to the ultra-nationalist rhetoric that naturally flows from his maximalist invasion of Ukraine, despite using some of its elements in his justification for the war in Ukraine.[22]
Putin’s reluctance to take risks directly related to his conventional war in Ukraine indicates that he remains highly unlikely to pursue nuclear escalation or war with NATO. ISW previously assessed that Russian conventional war threats against NATO do not correspond with Russia’s capabilities and that Russia uses nuclear threats primarily to intimidate the West.[23] Putin evidently values his domestic status quo and seeks to avoid risky and controversial policies to support his own aims. Putin also continues to demonstrate that he remains a calculated individual who places considerable emphasis on eliminating risks—even while his perception of the situation he faces diverges from reality. Putin has thus repeatedly placed himself in the position of articulating maximalist and unrealistic objectives, calling on his government and military to achieve them—yet refraining from making the costly decisions the large-scale and protracted conventional war he has embarked on likely requires.
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on February 5:
- Current Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov (pending a potential reshuffle) stated that Ukrainian officials expect possible Russian offensive operations ahead of the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, but noted that there are no Russian strike groups near Kharkiv City.[24]
- German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that Ukraine is not using Western-provided weapons to strike Russian territory.[25]
- US officials stated that Russia and Iran plan to build a factory in Russia to manufacture up to 6,000 drones for combat in Ukraine.[26] A Russian source claimed that Russian arms company Lobaev Arms is beginning to develop and produce these drones.[27]
- Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kreminna area, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces launched renewed offensive operations northwest of Svatove in recent days.[28]
- Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks around Bakhmut.[29] Russian milbloggers are conflicted on whether Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from Bakhmut, as Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied claims of a Ukrainian withdrawal.[30] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely unable to force an imminent Ukrainian withdrawal from Bakhmut.
- Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are transferring reserves in the Vuhledar direction.[31]
- Geolocated satellite footage shows that Russian forces built a fortified base on the Arabat Spit in northeastern Crimea between October 18, 2022, and January 21, 2023.[32]
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continue to import medical personnel from Russia to treat wounded military personnel in occupied Luhansk Oblast, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are preparing for a renewed offensive in Luhansk Oblast.[33]
Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.
ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)
Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated on February 5 that Ukrainian officials continue to not observe the formation of Russian assault groups in Belarus necessary for an attack on Kyiv.[34] Reznikov reported that there are currently 12,000 Russian servicemembers training at Belarusian training grounds.[35]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://ria dot ru/20220921/shoygu-1818321328.html
[15] https://www.pnp dot ru/social/povyshat-prizyvnoy-vozrast-khotyat-nachat-uzhe-v-etom-godu.html ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011223; https:www.interfax dot ru/russia/883327 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012723; https://t.me/pravda_oborona/2473; https://t.me/ninaostanina/2861; https://t.me/ninaostanina/2860; https://t.me/ninaostanina/2864; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/news/2023/01/13/958899-gosdume-otmenu-otsrochki-mobilizatsii-mnogodetnih-ottsov[GB5]; https://t.me/turchak_andrey/966 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/16794735; https://t.me/readovkanews/50597
[17] https://ria dot ru/20220921/shoygu-1818321328.html
[24] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2023/02/5/7388012/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/05/vzhe-zavtra-rozpochynayutsya-navchannya-ukrayinskyh-voyiniv-na-tankah-leopard/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-defence-minister-being-repl...
[25] https://m.bild dot de/politik/inland/politik-inland/olaf-scholz-im-bams-interview-klimakleber-viele-schuetteln-den-kopf-ich-auch-82789486.bildMobile.html?t_ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bild.de%2Fpolitik%2Finland%2Fpolitik-inland%2Folaf-scholz-im-bams-in...
[34] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2023/02/5/7388012/
[35] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2023/02/5/7388012/
understandingwar.org
7. 'Pacific Winds' wargame offers insight to deter potential adversaries, address global challenges
'Pacific Winds' wargame offers insight to deter potential adversaries, address global challenges
By Lt. Col. Craig ChildsFebruary 1, 2023
https://www.army.mil/article/263692/pacific_winds_wargame_offers_insight_to_deter_potential_adversaries_address_global_challenges
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, Hawaii — U.S. Army Pacific Commanding General Gen. Charles A. Flynn, hosted senior leaders from across the Department of Defense and several allied nations as part of the Unified Pacific Wargame Series intelligence-focused event “Pacific Winds” held at Schofield Barracks January 23 to 27.
The Unified Pacific Wargame Series is a series of rigorous, strategic and operational, computer-aided wargames designed to provide critical insights into the Theater Army’s contribution to joint warfighting concepts in the Indo-Pacific and support a DOD-wide campaign of learning. It builds upon lessons learned from previous wargames and provides crucial insights to improve the joint force’s ability to defend the U.S. homeland and maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.
“Pacific Winds was the first event this year in the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army-sponsored Unified Pacific Wargame Series,” said Lt. Gen. James Jarrard, deputy commanding general for U.S. Army Pacific and wargame director. “It focused on the period leading up to conflict by testing and evaluating theater intelligence operations and explored the challenges, opportunities, activities and assumptions related to the detection of an adversary’s preparations for conflict.”
More than 175 intelligence experts, senior leaders and operators from five nations and more than 40 defense and intelligence organizations participated in Pacific Winds, establishing it as one of the most comprehensive intelligence wargames conducted.
“This wargame pulled together a robust team from across the Department of Defense and intelligence community, Indo-Pacific joint service components, allied nations, the total Army enterprise and academia.” said Jarrard. “Convening such a diverse team of experts provided the comprehensiveness and rigor needed to really look at this problem set from varying perspectives and identify the critical insights to help us better achieve integrated deterrence.”
In keeping with the Unified Pacific Wargame Series format, Pacific Winds was comprised of two distinct, but connected tracks: a senior leader discussion forum and an action-officer-level, computer-aided wargame. The senior leader portion allowed for strategic level discussions and conclusions based on the outcomes of the action-officer level wargame.
Led by Flynn, 17 generals, flag officers and members of the senior executive service from across the DOD, joint service components, total Army enterprise and allied nations participated in the senior leader portion of Pacific Winds.
During her recent trip to the Indo-Pacific, Secretary of the U.S. Army, the Honorable Christine Wormuth, observed Pacific Winds and received updates from the players on site.
Admiral John Aquilino, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, received a briefing January 27 on the initial results and insights from the wargame.
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Samuel Paparo, who also attended the Pacific Winds outbrief, lauded the value of the event.
"For my staff and I, this was an invaluable wargame to help us and the rest of the joint force, along with our allies, collectively identify and better understand strategic and operational problems, address capability gaps and leverage opportunities in support of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. The teamwork of USARPAC to integrate our team into the wargame is inspiring," said Paparo.
The Army’s senior intelligence officer, Lt. Gen. Laura Potter, who attended the senior leader seminar portion of Pacific Winds, said, “The Unified Pacific Wargame Series is incredibly important in establishing a shared understanding across the joint, interagency, and allied intelligence community of the challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific, as well as the opportunities we have, and the actions we must take to address them.”
“This event will pay huge dividends in the future,” said Potter. “Lessons learned from this wargame, and others like it, will inform how our Army Intelligence and Security Enterprise invests in its force structure, modernization of capabilities, and reform of its intelligence processes and training. Integral to this campaign of learning is further investment in increasing our interoperability and collaboration with our regional allies and partners as we posture the intelligence warfighing function in support of all operations.”
A critical component to the event’s success was the inclusion of intelligence experts and senior leaders from U.S. allies Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
“From my perspective, this event was incredibly important in establishing a shared understanding of the challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific and in further enhancing the already strong relationships and interoperability among the intelligence community of our closest allies,” said the commanding officer of the British Army’s Land Intelligence Fusion Center, who attended the event but could not be named as a matter of organizational policy.
Designed to help the Army, Indo-Pacific Command and DOD refine resourcing and posture discussions and decisions, the innaugral Unified Pacific Wargame Series ran from January through May 2022 and included participation from hundreds of people from across the U.S. defense, diplomatic and academic community.
U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. James C. McConville, sponsors Unified Pacific and attended the 2022 event virtually. McConville emphasized the importance of this wargame series.
“The Army plays a critical role in the Indo-Pacific region,” said McConville. “We will continue to exercise our strength as a combat credible force and as a member of the joint force alongside strong allies and partners to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.”
Speaking at the conclusion of the 2022 wargame series, Flynn highlighted the unique aspects, lessons learned and value of Unified Pacific.
“This is going to be invaluable for the Joint Force,” he said. “Wargaming is a way to test your plans. It’s a way to look at new concepts. It’s a way to identify capability gaps. From the concepts and the capabilities and the gaps that you identify, you can come up with ideas and paths to creating warfighting advantages.”
In September, U.S. Army Pacific published the findings of the 2022 Unified Pacific Wargame Series which, offered key insights to build on and inform similar analytic efforts, such as the Joint Staff’s Globally Integrated Wargame, the U.S. Navy’s GLOBAL series, and Army Futures Command’s Indo-Pacific Threat Based Assessment.
The second event in the 2023 Unified Pacific Wargame Series will occur in spring and focuses on assessing the structure, processes, and capabilities for joint theater logistics at the scale and speed of war.
Units and organizations that participated in this year’s intelligence-focused wargame, Pacific Winds included: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Headquarters Department of the Army, U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific, Office of Director National Intelligence, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligenc Agency, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army Futures Command, U.S. Army Cyber Command, Mission Command Capability Development Integration Directorate, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, U.S. Army National Guard, Hawaii National Guard, Intelligence Center of Excellence, National Ground Intelligence Center, U.S. Army First Corps, 8th Theater Sustainment Command, 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, 1st Multidomain Task Force, 3rd Multidomain Task Force, 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade, 311th Signal Command, 500th Military Intelligence Brigade, 5th Battlefield Coordination Detachment, United Kingdom Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, United Kingdom Army Futures Force Development, the RAND Corporation and others.
8. Some Ospreys on Flight Restrictions Pending Part Replacement
The bugs still being worked out?
Excertps:
Citing “operational security concerns,” the defense official would not provide the new flight hour limit, nor the number of Ospreys affected.
Manufacturer Bell-Boeing is working on a complete redesign of the clutch, which is part of the long-term goal of finding a permanent fix for the hard clutch engagement problem, the defense official said.
Until then, mechanics will replace maxed out input quill assemblies at the squadron level. Squadrons already have the parts, equipment, and procedures necessary, the defense official said.
Once the assembly is replaced, it should work for years, a defense official said.
Some Ospreys on Flight Restrictions Pending Part Replacement
U.S. military limiting the lifespan of a gearbox part to address V-22 hard clutch incidents.
defenseone.com · by Caitlin M. Kenney
The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force will implement a time limit on a gearbox part in the V-22 Osprey as part of the military’s efforts to resolve the aircraft’s hard clutch problem.
Air Force Special Operations Command grounded their Ospreys in August because of concerns with the hard clutch, though the Marines and Navy continued flying the tiltrotor aircraft. AFSOC returned their Ospreys to the air in September. The flight hour limit comes from the V-22 Joint Program Office’s 24 initiatives to find solutions to the problem, the official said.
“This recommendation was based on a progressive increase in these hard clutch engagement events. And from that, and looking at the totality of the data, we in recent weeks have been able to determine that this time limit was an appropriate step for us to take,” the defense official said.
The recommendation does not stop flight operations; however, a “subset” of the tiltrotor aircraft with assemblies that have already exceeded the limit will be on flight restrictions until the part can be replaced, the defense official said.
The hard clutch engagement problem usually occurs just after take-off, and the Marine Corps has trained its pilots to conduct a “hover check” to look at the aircraft’s instruments before continuing the flight, a defense official told Defense One in August.
“A hard clutch engagement event occurs when the clutch, driven by the engine, releases from the rotor system and suddenly re-engages, sending an impulse through the drive train, potentially causing damage,” the defense official told reporters Saturday.
The clutch, which “enables single-engine operation of the V-22,” is inside the input quill assembly, “the part that connects the engine to the drive system,” the defense official said.
Citing “operational security concerns,” the defense official would not provide the new flight hour limit, nor the number of Ospreys affected.
Manufacturer Bell-Boeing is working on a complete redesign of the clutch, which is part of the long-term goal of finding a permanent fix for the hard clutch engagement problem, the defense official said.
Until then, mechanics will replace maxed out input quill assemblies at the squadron level. Squadrons already have the parts, equipment, and procedures necessary, the defense official said.
Once the assembly is replaced, it should work for years, a defense official said.
“Timelines to hit that threshold are based on overall flight time on the asset and will vary. This is a mid-term mitigation to reduce the likelihood of a hard clutch engagement event; we will continue to follow the data and update our mitigation efforts,” the defense official said.
defenseone.com · by Caitlin M. Kenney
9. Chinese Espionage - Five Books Expert Recommendations
There are actually 6 books below.
Chinese Espionage - Five Books Expert Recommendations
Five Books · by Five Books
When it comes to spy books, stories about British, American and Soviet secret agents loom large. Everyone has heard of Russia's KGB (now the FSB), the CIA, Britain's MI6 and even Mossad. Fewer people know about China's spying department, the 国家安全部 (Guójiā Ānquán Bù, 'Guoan' for short) or Ministry of State Security (MSS). There are also not as many books about it, whether spy thrillers or more serious works of nonfiction. We've listed some options below:
Buy now
Spies and Lies is a recent (October 2022) and readable account of Chinese espionage activities by Alex Joske, an Australian analyst who knows China well and has scoured Chinese language sources to put this story together. It’s a lot about how some apparently Western-friendly, reformist figures turn out to have been agents of the Ministry for State Security, spreading the influence of China’s ruling party around the world.
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Chinese Spies is by a French journalist, Roger Faligot, who has written a lot about intelligence. This is a history of spying in China from the 20th century onwards, starting with the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, which was broken up by the police. The Soviets loom large in the early years. Faligot writes: “The history of the Chinese Communist Party had barely even begun and it had already exposed a shadowy web of informants, secret police and spies.”
Buy now
Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer bills itself as a reference guide and though definitely aimed at specialists, it’s not inaccessible. It gives a historical perspective—one of the authors is a historian of early CCP intelligence operations—and highlights the critical importance of Chinese language sources. It opens with the execution of a Chinese spy in 2011, who was revealed to have been working for the CIA. His pregnant wife was also executed, in front of their colleagues. “The two were shot in the ministry’s interior courtyard, the proceedings shown on closed-circuit television.” The book also covers domestic surveillance and the situation in Xinjiang.
“This book has many of the qualities of a spy novel, though it’s a true story…It’s about an American secret agent who ends up in Mao’s China during the Korean War and is a prisoner there for a long time…In this book, you learn a lot about Mao’s China, you learn about the Korean War, you learn about McCarthyism in America and even about the history of Chinese studies. All this is woven into this page-turner.” Read more...
The Best China Books of 2022
Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Historian
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“It talks a lot about Chinese espionage from the People’s Liberation Army unit 61398.
They are a really interesting unit set up in about 2011 and very actively stealing corporate information on behalf of Chinese companies. They use US college campuses very effectively to exfiltrate information from companies. It’s totally fascinating. First of all, it lasts for so long. It goes on for years and years and years in the same US steel companies as well as Siemens Westinghouse. They’ve got access to every email and every server. They steal so much information and it’s so hard to understand what they do with it.
The narrative of US-China cyber espionage in terms of popular discussion often centers on this idea of ‘they’re stealing intellectual property and ruining US companies.’ You steal the intellectual property and then you make the iPhone. But that’s not at all how it works. Instead it’s all about, ‘Do we know how they’re going to come into this trade negotiation? Can we use this information to our advantage at all?’ I don’t mean to dismiss the threat of economic espionage, it’s just that the actual arc of it is very slow and very complicated and very hard to pull out. It’s very hard to show that, ‘Well, you only did that because of this information you stole.’”—Josephine Wolf on the best cyber security books.
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“In Typhoon I was trying to let people know what is going on in terms of human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the Uighur Muslim province in Northwest China… The most important thing that I can do is to keep people reading the books that I write – to entertain them and interest them in the characters I have created. Writers shouldn’t be preachy. But if at the same time I can add a layer of political commitment to my books, or whatever you want to call it, then that’s a laudable goal, as far as I’m concerned.” –Charles Cumming on the best books on Espionage.
Five Books · by Five Books
10. Does Artificial Intelligence Change the Nature of War?
Nature? Character perhaps but the nature of war is enduring. Tell us how it will change the fact that war is about imposing one's will? How will it change that the political object must be achieved in war? Tell us how it will change the "trinity?"
War is thus more than a mere chameleon, because it changes its nature to some extent in each concrete case. It is also, however, when it is regarded as a whole and in relation to the tendencies that dominate within it, a fascinating trinity—composed of:
1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; **
2) the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and
3) its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason.
https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TrinityTeachingNote.htm
The author answers these questions and more.
Conclusion:
Our humanity is often defined by our ability to be intelligent and creative. Yet, the rise of AI seems to challenge this assumption. Far from changing the nature of war, however, it is the contrast it brings alongside humans that shows what this nature is all about: it is first and foremost the realm of passions. For this reason, as AIs become work partners, in warfare as elsewhere, the role of psychology should keep rising in importance. Indeed, questioning the moral and philosophical grounds behind human phenomena as fundamental as dissent, for instance, does increasingly matter for AI will never be able to sort out these kind of questions. Hence, a deeper inquiry into this singular side of warfare would probably be beneficial if we are to become better strategic thinkers at all.
Does Artificial Intelligence Change the Nature of War? - Military Strategy Magazine
Baptiste Alloui-Cros - Strand Simulations Group, London, England
militarystrategymagazine.com
In his book, ‘Men against Fire’, the American General S.L.A. Marshall designated the battlefield as ‘the epitome of war’[i], where everything that characterises the deep essence of war, as theorised by Clausewitz, comes into action. Violence, passions, opposition of wills, frictions: whatever the war, this blunt reality is always reached, at one point or another. This makes war a human activity before everything else.
And yet, the battlefield seems to slowly give way to non-human elements. The rise of automated weapons based upon Artificial Intelligence (AI), such as autonomous drones, raises questions about the human character of the battlefield. It even interrogates the validity of the concept of the battlefield itself, as AI weapon systems are programmed to act or react over long distances at fantastic speeds, far out of human reach. This displacement of warfare toward new dimensions of time and space seems to challenge the monopoly humans traditionally own over the conduct of war and the use of force. Where has the ‘epitome of war’ gone then? Does the rise of AI truly challenge the nature of war itself?
This piece argues that although AI alters the character of war in significant ways, it does not change its nature. Rather, it has the contrary effect. It emphasises the essential element behind the deep nature of war: its human component. Psychology, ethics, politics, passions and the proximity of pain and death are what war is all about. A ‘trinity of violence, chance and politics’.[ii] By departing from all this, by showing how relative other elements are, by handling all the practical details, AI enables us to focus on what matters most. It is this contrast that reminds us that war is a very intimate expression of our humanity, and something we cannot delegate.
This essay treats the influence of Artificial Intelligence on the nature of war through three different layers.
First, it examines how AI changes the strategic landscape, the physical world, and shows that its impact is not disproportionate or fundamentally different from other technological military revolutions. Then, it looks at what AI brings to strategic decision-making, how it influences the mind, and argues that when used right, it does not alienate decision-makers but rather allows them to make the most of their own potential.
Finally, it interrogates the possibility that AI may eventually make war obsolete and concludes with the observation that while AI can affect both the realms of the physical world and the mind, it can never handle the affairs of the heart. Yet this is where war starts, ends, and where it is mostly conducted. Thus, AI will never emancipate us from it on its own, and neither will it change its deep nature.
The impact of AI on the strategic landscape
Science and War have always been intertwined, and technological innovation is one of the primary drivers of warfare and civilisation at large. One can easily argue that some innovations were decisive in the way some conflicts resulted. From Archimedes defending Syracuse to Vauban’s fortifications during the wars of Louis XIV, from Jean Bureau’s guns in the hundred years war to Gribeauval’s artillery system that was a cornerstone of Napoleon’s campaigns, from British ships of the line to German U boats, most major conflicts are characterised by such innovations.[iii] But do they fundamentally change the nature of war?
Arguably not. There is a step between affecting the conduct of war and changing the nature of war. Although the appearance of gunpowder or nuclear weapons considerably shaped the way we fight those wars, they did not diminish the importance of politics, passions, uncertainty, and frictions in general. On the contrary, the increase in firepower and potential for destruction contributed to raising the stakes around warfare and, therefore, brought even more importance to human decision making and the role of psychology and morality, as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 tends to prove.
The apparition of Artificial Intelligence on the battlefield, in the narrow sense of the term, i.e., systems that excel at a single task, remains in line with this progression of the conduct of war. Besides, their most specific feature, the fact they are being automated, is not especially new. Landmines, for instance, carry out their task without the need for human intervention. It is rather the amount and the complexity of tasks that can be automated thanks to AI that represent a novelty. And it is the limited level of agency that humans have once these processes are started that can be worrisome.[iv] The following quote by sociologist Ted Nelson summarises the dilemma of the tactical use of AI perfectly:
“The good news about computers is that they do what you tell them to do. The bad news is that they do what you tell them to do.” [v]
As such, AIs are nothing else but tools, and can be as efficient as detrimental to their users. Like any other weapon, they require appropriate use and proper incorporation into military doctrines to be useful. Growth in the use and scale of AIs on the battlefield brings another concern for the military: the fear that combat becomes too fast-paced for humans to remain engaged. Indeed, the automation of weapon systems, such as missile systems, or other military agents, makes the timeframe available to respond to incoming threats lower and lower, to the point only pre-programmed AIs could react in time.
This compression of space and time, however, is a logical corollary of the evolution of warfare over time.[vi] From swords and close combat to bows, javelins and muskets all the way to ballistic missiles, technological innovations accompanied the need for adding more distance with the adversary and striking him faster to reduce the threat he causes to ourselves. One can even argue the annihilation of space and time is the aim of technologies in general, whether it is the railroad, the telegraph, or the internet.[vii] It also led to increasing confusion between the scales of war, from strategy to tactics, as the physical dimensions of war seem to merge. And yet, for Jomini, the specificity of the strategist consists in his ability to master space and time.[viii]
Yet, this concern is not enough to assess if it fundamentally changes the nature of war. From a concrete point of view, AIs are not going to monopolise the conduct of war. They are severely limited and cannot achieve just any kind of tactical task nor be used efficiently in any kind of war. Just like any other kind of weapon, they have counters, and it would not be surprising to see them regularly backfiring against their users.
Indeed, their main limitation was induced by the quote by Ted Nelson given earlier on: they do what they are told to do. It means that once their logical rules of engagement are understood, it becomes very easy for the enemy to predict their behaviour and take advantage of it. On the other hand, leaping away from this rigidity and making more flexible AIs requires another trade-off: decreasing human control and increasing chances of failure. Indeed, in the words of Alan Turing, “if a machine is expected to be infallible, it cannot also be intelligent”.[ix] This is a logical trade-off, and the most critical one that lies on the road from narrow AI to general AI. A logical system can produce perfect answers to a limited number of questions but not to all possible questions. The more questions this system is asked, the lower the rate of correct answers will be. Hence, extending an AI to make it more flexible and complex implies decreasing its effectiveness at doing individual tasks.[x]
Friedrich the Great, as related by Henri de Catt in his ‘Memoirs’, asserted “but in war, as in everything else, a man does what he can and seldom what he desires.”[xi] The same goes for the machine. It is programmed to specific ends, but since it is impossible to predict every obstacle that it might encounter, it is never guaranteed to succeed. Hence, AI does not represent a particularly different form of technological innovation tactically speaking. Since its use is limited, it will not fully replace human beings on the ground. Rather, it will probably be used to carry out very specific tactical tasks in coordination with other weapon systems and military personnel. As this paper shall now argue there is, however, one very important difference between AI and previous innovations in warfare: AI does not only have kinetic use, it can also affect the mind by assisting decision-making.
AI and the formulation of decision in strategy
Strategy is calculus if nothing else, the interplay of imagination and probabilities. Or, more formally, ‘the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute’.[xii] If AI is to revolutionise war, and alter its character, it is in this direction that one should look: its impact on strategic thinking and decision-making.
Indeed, the development of neural networks and deep learning AIs has shown very convincing results in complex strategy games, such as chess, Go and even imperfect information games like poker or Starcraft, where the decision space is so enormous it seems impossible to break through pure ‘computing strength’. Very recently, Cicero, an AI designed by Meta to play ‘Diplomacy’, consistently achieved top performances in a game relying almost entirely on negotiation and psychology, realms where humans traditionally enjoy an edge over the machine.
On their own, those feats might yet still appear slightly abstract to the reader wondering how this will change our ways to think and take strategic decisions. So perhaps most insightful is the case of AlphaZero and how it impacted the practice of the game of chess. This AI recombined ideas and principles well known to humans in ways that were never thought of before, despite the fact the game existed for thousands of years. Not only did these principles give the AI total dominance over all its counterparts, but it also taught high-level chess players new ways to think about the game. Nowadays, these high-level players make use of these new perspectives in their own games and play arguably much better than before AlphaZero. In a nutshell: it made them better strategic thinkers on the chessboard.[xiii]
The ability of AI to find its own, independent ways of solving a problem makes it a remarkably creative tool. Partially free from human biases, and empowered with much better computing abilities, it comes up with new ways of playing games, but also new ways of solving scientific problems or suggesting artistic creations. Hence, Strategy is a natural playground for AI, as it thrives when combining means and ideas to reach specific ends.
Therefore, it is not absurd to think that the potential of AI can be leveraged by strategists to make better sense of the options available to them. By simulating a strategic problem, in the form of a wargame for instance, and programming an AI around it, one might get interesting and creative insights into the problem and how to tackle it. To put it simply, it would provide the strategist with additional options and a more complete overview of the strategic problem. In a way, it would integrally be part of what Clausewitz calls the general’s ‘imagination’ and act as a kind of sixth sense, reinforcing intuition; or to frame it in a better way: enhance his coup d’oeil.
And this coup d’oeil is well needed in a world where entropy keeps increasing while our cognitive abilities remain the same. The notion of entropy in warfare, in fact, is a very interesting way to conceptualise the resilience and efficiency of a military organisation. It was first theorised by Mark Herman in 1997, and describes ‘the state of disorder imposed on a military system at a given moment’.[xiv] For instance, a military unit whose entropy reached the maximum level is then ‘no more than a mob’. This concept goes well along with the increased use of AI in command and control and decision-making, and can apply to any kind and any size of military organisation.
Indeed, the use of AI at this level requires very specific agency. It requires humans to define well the place of the machine in their decision-making process, a lucid understanding of what the machine brings and where its strengths lie as well as its limitations. This human-machine teaming is sometimes labelled ‘centaur warfighting’, as first expressed by ex-secretary for defence Robert Work.[xv] In this paradigm, the machine uses its superior cognitive capabilities to provide situational awareness and potential solutions, enabling the human to focus on actual decision-making and on the political and psychological components of the problem. The strategist, having a better grasp of the situation, can then redirect the efforts of the machine to more precise points of the problem, effectively resulting in a virtuous circle. Reaching such a level of cohesion can explain how, for instance, two amateur chess players with engines could beat grandmasters also using engines in a tournament in 2005.[xvi] In a similar way, a wrong understanding or use of the machine can have adverse consequences on the cohesion of an organisation, effectively raising the entropy level instead of decreasing it. Therefore, although software and hardware can both be replicated, actual AI-human teaming is hard to produce and always unique to each organisation. In the words of Paul Scharre, “There’s also better people, training, doctrine, experimentation. That all goes into making that package together, and that’s actually really hard to replicate.”
The incorporation of AI into the decision-making process of military organisations is a definite change from previous technologies and is likely to alter the character of war. But does it actually change the nature of war?
As long as humans remain in control and have the choice to apply or not the propositions of the machine, it does not. According to Kenneth Payne, the danger in AI, whether employed for a tactical weapons system or a strategic-scenario planner, “lies primarily in the gap between how the AI solves a problem framed by humans, and how those humans would solve it if they possessed the AI’s speed, precision and brainpower.”[xvii] As long as the strategist is conscious of this gap, and merely uses the AI as a tool for suggestions and a source of inspiration, the machine cannot be alienating. Rather, it enables them to focus on the heart of the problem and facilitate their stream of thoughts. Finally, human biases are always present in the process, as humans are the ones designing the AI and feeding it with their own perception of the strategic problem at hand. Thus, AI is never completely bias-free, nor is it totally separated from human touch.
Will AI make war obsolete?
In ‘the causes of war’, Geoffrey Blainey makes the point that war always happens out of miscalculations from one or both camps about their respective power and will and that, without these miscalculations, war would not break out.[xviii] But then what does the involvement of AI in war imply for this assumption? As AI becomes more and more elaborated, and closer to general AI, miscalculations should be fewer. Hypothesising that war will not be an attractive solution in the eye of AI thus sounds defensible. In the words of the supercomputer Joshua from the movie Wargames:
“A strange game. The only winning move is not to play.”
As we rely more and more on AI, war would then be pushed outside of the human realm, and what was normally the realm of passions becomes something else. He who lived by the sword would no longer die by the sword.
The danger of this perspective is perhaps best illustrated by ‘A taste of Armageddon’, an episode from Star Trek in which two planets, concluding that to kill was an unavoidable feature of human nature, decide to wage an eternal war through computer simulation, only killing the citizens that fell victim in the simulation without any other kind of physical violence to not have to fight a real war. But simultaneously, the simulation immunised both societies to the horrors of war, hence they see no reason to end it:
“Death, Destruction, Disease, Horror. That’s what war is all about. That makes it a thing to be avoided. You made it neat and painless. So neat and painless, you’ve had no reason to stop it. And you’ve had it for 500 years.”
Ultimately, technology is an expression of ourselves. It can be misused, and we can be driven by it just like we can be driven by our impulses and passions. But we always have a choice, ethics are in our control. We cannot outsource problems of ethics, politics, and decision-making to AIs. It cannot conceive what dissent is, despite dissent being the first act of war. The morale factor and the will to resist, the most crucial factors in war, are things AI cannot compute. All these features are essential to the phenomenon of war.
Indeed, the deep nature of war lies within the heart, as the purple heart medal awarded to killed and wounded American soldiers reminds us. This is also why it is an art and not a science. AI is not a pill of Murti-Bing, it cannot be a cure for independent thought.[xix] Eventually, human dilemmas and the most critical choices will always remain in our hands, for war is mostly a matter of conscience. And the human element in combat shall remain essential.[xx]
Conclusion
Our humanity is often defined by our ability to be intelligent and creative. Yet, the rise of AI seems to challenge this assumption. Far from changing the nature of war, however, it is the contrast it brings alongside humans that shows what this nature is all about: it is first and foremost the realm of passions. For this reason, as AIs become work partners, in warfare as elsewhere, the role of psychology should keep rising in importance. Indeed, questioning the moral and philosophical grounds behind human phenomena as fundamental as dissent, for instance, does increasingly matter for AI will never be able to sort out these kind of questions. Hence, a deeper inquiry into this singular side of warfare would probably be beneficial if we are to become better strategic thinkers at all.
References
[i] Marshall, S.L.A. Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War. 1947
[ii] Clausewitz, Carl. On War. 1984.
[iii] Guerlac, Henry. "3. Vauban: The Impact of Science on War". Princeton: 2010
[iv] Cummings, M.L. The Human Role in Autonomous Weapon Design and Deployment, 2014
[v] Nelson, Theodor H. Computer Lib ; Dream Machines. 1987.
[vi] Solnit, Rebecca. "The Annihilation of Time and Space." 1990
[vii] Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. "Railroad space and railroad time." 1978
[viii] Jomini, Antoine H. The Art of War. 1863.
[ix] Turing, Alan. Lecture to The London Mathematical Society, 20 february 1947
[x] Lucas, J.R. Minds, Machines and Goedel. 1961
[xi] Catt, Henri. Frederick the Great: The Memoirs of His Reader, 1758-1760. 1916.
[xii] Beaufre, Andre. An Introduction to Strategy. 1965.
[xiii] Sadler, Matthew, Natasha Regan, Garry Kasparov, and Demis Hassabis. Game Changer: Alphazero's Groundbreaking Chess Strategies and the Promise of AI. 2019.
[xiv] Herman, Mark. Entropy-Based Warfare: Modeling the Revolution in Military Affairs. 1997
[xv] Scharre, Paul. Centaur Warfighting: The false choice of humans vs automation. 2016
[xvi] Dark horse ZackS wins Freestyle Chess Tournament, Chessbase, 2015
[xvii] Payne Kenneth. I, Warbot: The Dawn of Artificially Intelligent Conflict. 2021.
[xviii] Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War. 1988
[xix] Miłosz, Czesław. The Captive Mind. 1981.
[xx] Henderson, Darryl. Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat Leadership and Societal Influence in the Armies of the Soviet. 1985
militarystrategymagazine.com
11. The 47 Pro-Democracy Figures in Hong Kong’s Largest National Security Trial
The photos and graphcis are at this link: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/02/06/world/asia/hong-kong-47-democracy-trial.html?utm_source=pocket_saves
The 47 Pro-Democracy Figures in Hong Kong’s Largest National Security Trial
By K.K. Rebecca Lai, David Pierson and Tiffany MayFeb. 6, 2023
The New York Times · by Tiffany May · February 6, 2023
Forty-seven pro-democracy figures in Hong Kong have been accused of a conspiracy to commit subversion in a landmark political case. Many of the defendants have been in jail for nearly two years while awaiting trial.
The case highlights the sweeping power of a national security law China imposed to tighten its grip on the city after massive anti-government protests. These are the politicians, academics and activists who are now facing prison sentences.
Benny Tai, 58, was a professor of law at the University of Hong Kong.
Benny Tai, 58
Joshua Wong, 26, became a prominent activist at the age of 14.
Joshua Wong, 26
Twelve were elected lawmakers, who had often used their presence in the legislature to protest China’s encroachment on Hong Kong’s autonomy.
Claudia Mo, 66
Mo had served as a lawmaker for eight years and is known as “Auntie Mo.”
Leung Kwok-hung, 66
Better known as “Long Hair,” Leung had been a mainstay of the opposition for nearly two decades.
Helena Wong, 63
Kwok Ka-ki, 61
Wu Chi-wai, 60
Raymond Chan, 50
Chan was Hong Kong’s first openly gay lawmaker.
Andrew Wan, 53
Jeremy Tam, 47
Eddie Chu, 45
Lam Cheuk-ting, 45
Alvin Yeung, 41
Au Nok-hin, 35
Twenty-one had been elected district officials, including younger activists who were voted in following months of anti-government protests in 2019.
Gary Fan, 56
Andy Chui, 55
Lawrence Lau, 55
Ricky Or, 51
Andrew Chiu, 37
Roy Tam, 42
Sze Tak-loy, 40
Clarisse Yeung, 36
Ben Chung, 34
Jimmy Sham, 35
Sham was a leader of an activist group that organized massive pro-democracy rallies throughout 2019.
Kalvin Ho, 34
Cheng Tat-hung, 34
Henry Wong, 32
Kinda Li, 31
Sam Cheung, 29
Tiffany Yuen, 29
Lester Shum, 29
Lee Yue-shun, 29
Michael Pang, 28
Ng Kin-wai, 27
Fergus Leung, 25
Others were prominent activists who had worked on various social causes.
Carol Ng, 52
Ng was a former flight attendant who became a union leader.
Winnie Yu, 35
Tam Tak-chi, 51
Gordon Ng, 44
Hendick Lui, 40
Ventus Lau, 29
Gwyneth Ho, 32
Ho was a journalist who rose to fame in 2019 when, during her livestream of a mob attack on protesters, she herself was beaten by thugs.
Mike Lam, 34
Frankie Fung, 27
Owen Chow, 26
Prince Wong, 25
Wong was a student leader who began her activism when she was in high school.
Lau Chak-fung, 26
Lengthy Detentions Without Trial
The 47 defendants were first charged in February 2021 with subversion in a case centering on the holding of an unofficial primary vote.
Unlike other types of offenses, national security cases impose a high threshold for bail, which, in effect, lets the authorities hold defendants for months or even years before trial. Critics say that amounts to a presumption that defendants are guilty.
34
Detained
13
Granted bail
In hearings before the trial, 16 pleaded not guilty and 31 pleaded guilty, including Benny Tai and Joshua Wong. Most, if not all, of the 47 are expected to receive prison sentences, which could range from less than three years to life.
The defendants and their lawyers are barred from commenting on the case. But legal experts say the democracy proponents are likely under enormous pressure to plead guilty because of the lengthy detentions, dwindling financial resources and the difficult chances of winning in a court modeled after China’s authoritarian system.
“The process is designed to be as painful as possible,” said Samuel Bickett, a lawyer and activist based in Washington, D.C., who was jailed in Hong Kong after scuffling with a plainclothes police officer in 2019.
31
Pleading guilty
16
Pleading not guilty
The Transformation of Hong Kong’s Political Landscape
Hong Kong was engulfed in widespread protests calling for greater freedom from China starting in June 2019. To quell the unrest, Beijing imposed a national security law in June 2020, days before the 47 democrats held the primary election that would lead to their arrests months later for subversion.
Nearly three-quarters of the 47 have been jailed ever since, a span of almost two years. Their absence contributed to the dearth of anti-establishment voices in Hong Kong’s legislature, which passed controversial measures without opposition such as a “patriots only” litmus test for political candidates.
June 2019
Protests began
Mass antigovernment protests began and escalated in intensity over months.
2020
June 30, 2020
National security law enacted
The new law bans vaguely defined crimes of secession, subversion and terrorism, with a potential sentence of life in prison.
July 11
Pro-democracy primary
Pro-democracy candidates held a primary vote ahead of the upcoming Legislative Council election. The 47 defendants helped organize or participated in this event.
Sept. 6
Original date of the election
2021
Feb. 28, 2021
47 people charged, most denied bail
They were charged with “conspiracy to commit subversion,” for organizing and participating in the pro-democracy primary. Most were denied bail and kept behind bars as a long legal process began.
March 11, 2021
New election rules announced
China announced new rules for Hong Kong elections, limiting candidates to only those deemed loyal to Beijing.
Dec. 19
“Patriots-only” election takes place
2022
More than 30 defendants are currently detained. Most of them had been jailed for almost two years before the trial even started.
2023
Feb. 6, 2023
Trial begins
The trial is expected to last three months.
The New York Times · by Tiffany May · February 6, 2023
12. Senior Taiwan opposition leader to visit China amid continued tensions
Senior Taiwan opposition leader to visit China amid continued tensions
Reuters · by Reuters
TAIPEI, Feb 6 (Reuters) - A senior leader of the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan's main opposition party, will visit China this week and meet its top Taiwan policy-maker, the party said on Monday, amid continued military and political tensions between the two sides.
China has during the past three years ramped up pressure on Taiwan to accept Chinese sovereignty, including staging regular military drills near the democratically governed island. Taiwan's government rejects China's territorial claims.
The KMT said its deputy chairman, Andrew Hsia, would leave for China on Wednesday and meet Song Tao, the newly appointed head of China's Taiwan Affairs Office, in a rare high-level interaction between top politicians from Taiwan and China.
Hsia, a former Taiwanese diplomat and one-time head of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, and his delegation will "conduct exchanges and dialogue on the basis of equality and dignity", the KMT said.
They will "reflect Taiwan's latest public concerns about the security of the Taiwan Strait and expectations for regional peace and stability", the party added.
The Mainland Affairs Council said the KMT had informed it of the trip, adding that Taiwanese politicians who visit China should "reflect" the Taiwan people's insistence on maintaining democracy and peace and not enter into any authorised negotiations.
The KMT traditionally favours close ties with China, but strongly denies being pro-Beijing. China's Taiwan Affairs Office said it welcomed Hsia's visit.
Hsia visited China last August, on a trip condemned by Taiwan's government, shortly after Beijing staged war games near Taiwan to express anger at a visit to Taipei by then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.
China has not spoken with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen's administration since she took office in 2016, believing she is a separatist, and has rebuffed frequent calls from Tsai for dialogue to resume.
The KMT has defended its outreach to China, saying lines of communication must be kept open.
The party's statement on Hsia's visit said that considering the current "stalemate" in relations across the Taiwan Strait, "it is natural not to sit idly by" and that the KMT would report on the trip to the government once back.
Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Christian Schmollinger and Gerry Doyle
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Reuters
13. America’s top cyber diplomat says his Twitter account was hacked
Excerpt:
Fick is scheduled to travel to Seoul this week to discuss cybersecurity cooperation with the South Korean government, according to the State Department. Washington and Seoul share a common cyberspace foe in North Korea, which has robust hacking capabilities despite its reputation as a digital backwater.
America's top cyber diplomat says his Twitter account was hacked | CNN Politics
CNN · by Sean Lyngaas · February 5, 2023
America’s top cyber diplomat says his Twitter account was hacked
By Sean Lyngaas, CNN
Published 3:39 PM EST, Sun February 5, 2023
Link Copied!
Nate Fick speaks at a technology summit in Santa Monica, California, in March 2017.
Patrick T. Fallon/Bloomberg/Getty Images
CNN —
America’s top cybersecurity diplomat Nate Fick said his personal Twitter account was hacked, calling it part of the “perils of the job.”
Fick tweeted the news from his personal account Saturday evening.
It was not clear who was responsible for the hack or if they had made any unauthorized posts on Fick’s account. He did not immediately respond to a request for comment Sunday.
There did not appear to any broader fallout from the hack. Fick uses the account sparingly and instead promotes his work through an official State Department account.
A pedestrian walks past a seal reading "Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation", displayed on the J. Edgar Hoover FBI building, in Washington, DC, on August 15, 2022.
Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images
New US ransomware strategy prioritizes victims but could make it harder to catch cybercriminals
President Joe Biden announced in June his intent to nominate Fick, a Marine Corps veteran and former chief executive of a cybersecurity firm, to lead the newly formed Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy.
The new bureau is an effort to make digital rights issues an intrinsic part of US foreign policy at a time when Russia and China are increasingly trying to put their own authoritarian stamp on the internet.
Fick was sworn into office in September as the country’s first “ambassador-at-large” for cyberspace and digital policy. His charge includes helping build US allies’ ability to respond to cyberattacks and promoting secure 5G communications technology.
Fick is scheduled to travel to Seoul this week to discuss cybersecurity cooperation with the South Korean government, according to the State Department. Washington and Seoul share a common cyberspace foe in North Korea, which has robust hacking capabilities despite its reputation as a digital backwater.
CNN · by Sean Lyngaas · February 5, 2023
14. Special Operations News Update - February 6, 2023 | SOF News
Special Operations News Update - February 6, 2023 | SOF News
sof.news · by SOF News · February 6, 2023
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.
Photo / Image: A Hungarian Special Operations Forces operator conducts training during an infiltration and exfiltration exercise on the Danube River during Black Swan, May 6, 2021. Black Swan 21 is an annual Hungarian-led multinational special operations forces exercise, demonstrating peer-to-peer deterrence and the resiliency of alliances and partnerships in Europe. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Therese Prats)
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SOF News
Gen. (Ret.) Clarke Has a New Job. General Dynamics announced that its board of directors has elected Richard Clarke to be a director of the corporation. He retired from the military in August 2022 after serving as the commander of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). (Cision PR Newswire, Feb 3, 2023).
Tovo on SF. Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Ken Tovo presented his view on the past and current state of U.S. Army Special Forces at a meeting of retired military officers, defense contractors, and state officials in North Carolina. Dan Barkin was in attendance and he provides us with a synopsis of what the former commander of United States Army Special Operations Forces (USASOC) had to say. “Military spends years fostering relationships to resolve conflicts”, Business North Carolina, January 30, 2023.
Amphib MC-130J – Not Getting Wet Soon. The initial test flight of an amphibious MC-130J special operations transport aircraft is being postponed. “C-130 Seaplane Program Put on Back Burner”, by Howard Altman, The War Zone, February 2, 2023.
House Hearing on SOF. ISO Hearing: The Role of Special Operations in Great Power Competition. The Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations will meet in open session to receive testimony from Seth Jones, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Charles Cleveland, and Dr. David Ucko. February 8, 2023. Watch on YouTube.
Former JSOC Intel Officer and TS Docs. A retired intelligence officer who worked for JSOC, USSOCOM, and other DoD intelligence organizations had Top Secret/SCI and SECRET documents in his home. The documents were on a computer hard drive, thumb drive, and paper. He goes to trial in February. The likihood of jail time is high; for Biden and Trump, not so much. “Retired Air Force Intel Boss Caught With Hundreds of Top Secret Docs at Home”, Daily Beast, January 30, 2023.
Rep. Crenshaw – Not HS Committee Chair. A former Navy SEAL and now Representative from Texas (R-TX) will not be heading up the Homeland Security committee of the House of Representatives. Dan Crenshaw was lobbying for the position but it went to a member of the House Freedom Caucus. Speculation is that Crenshaw lost out because Speaker Kevin McCarthy had to make side deals with the House Freedom Caucus to win the speakership. “Crenshaw speculates secret McCarthy side deal was reason for Homeland chair defeat”, The Washington Examiner, February 3, 2023.
Kevin Merrill for BG. Air Force Col. Kevin J. Merrill has been nominated for appointment to the grade of brigadier general. Merrill is currently serving as the mobilization assistant to the director of operations, Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida.
SOFREP’s Ship Getting Back on Course. Apparently the news media outlet known as SOFREP had some difficulties over the past year and there has been a shakeup within the organization. Brandon Webb, the current CEO, explains in “Righting the Ship at SOFREP”, February 5, 2023. (Editor’s note: SOF News and SOFREP are two distinct animals with no association between each organization).
‘MARSOC 3’ – Not Guilty. Four years after a retired Green Beret was killed in Iraq following an altercation, two Marine Raiders were acquitted on charges of involuntary manslaughter and negligent homicide. The two were convicted of violation of a lawful general order, for drinking alcohol while deployed in Iraq. The Green Beret, Rick Rodriguez, had served more than 20 years in the Army with multiple combat deployments. He was working in Irbil, Iraq as a contractor at the time of the incident. “2 Marines found not guilty of homicide in Green Beret veteran’s death”, Marine Corps Times, February 2, 2023.
International SOF
NORSOCOM. Oscar Rosengren does a deep dive into the background, evolution, units, tactics, weapons, and vehicles of Norway’s SOF. “NORSOCOM: Norway’s Special Operatons Command”, Grey Dynamics, February 5, 2023.
ASD SO/LIC Visits Norway. Chris Maier, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict – ASD SO/LIC – visited Norway to sign a Bilateral Joint Special Operations Study which will detail means of closer cooperation between the special operations forces of both countries. (DoD Press Release, Feb 3, 2023).
Ukraine’s Brotherhood Battalion. A small group of fighters, a volunteer group of Ukrainian special forces, are fighting the war deep in Russia. They are, according to this news report, destroying key military infrastructurre and downing Russian aircraft. “Group of Ukrainian special forces active in Russia”, Yahoo!, February 5, 2023.
Navy SEALs Training Croatia’s ZSS. In 2022, a platoon of Navy SEALs were in Croatia training the country’s maritime special operations unit – the ZSS. Most of the training took place in the Adriatic Sea. “How US Navy SEALs train new special-operations units to make the seas into ‘our playground'”, Business Insider, January 30, 2023.
SOF History
Evolution of the SFODA. Troy J. Sacquety of the USASOC History Office writes about the structural transitions of the Special Forces ODA. This basic unit is currently staffed with 12 soldiers; but it wasn’t always that way. The number of personnel has ranged from twelve to fifteen, depending upon era and contempoary doctrine and force structure requirements. “The Evolution of the Special Forces (SF) Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA)”, Veritas, January 2023.
SF Heroism in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC) launched the ‘Tet Offensive’ at the end of January 1968. This country-wide offensive was an attempt to break the will of the South Vietnamese military and incite a popular uprising against the government of South Vietnam. Four Green Berets from the 5th Special Forces Group demonstrated exceptional valor during a five-week period in early 1968. Read more in “Indomitable Valor: Special Forces Heroism during Tet Offensive”, by Christopher Howard, USASOC History Office, January 31, 2023.
Commentary
Is SOF Too Risk Adversed? Spencer Reed, a career special operator, thinks so. He cites several ‘must haves’ for the conduct of special operations missions that commanders, staff, . . . and operators need to conduct missions. And that limits the U.S. SOF community, especially in times of large scale conflict. Read about the ‘Seven Deadly Norms of Risk Avoidance’. “Recalibrating Special Operations Risk Tolerance for the Future Fight”, War on the Rocks, January 31, 2023.
RW = GW + P . . . and Bernard Fall. One of the prominent and early experts on the conflict in South Vietnam was a former resistance fighter with the French Resistance in World War II and a scholar whose knowledge of Vietnam was sought by the Special Warfare community as well as well-known news commentators of the 1960s. Bernard Fall and his writings on revolutionary warfare is featured in this essay by Nathaniel L. Moir. And for those not clicking the link; Revolutionary Warfare = Guerrilla Warfare and Politics. Read more in “The Overlooked Irregular Warfare Expert the Pentagon Should Study Today”, Modern War Institute at West Point, January 31, 2023.
“A dead Special Forces sergeant is not spontaneously replaced by his own social environment. A dead revolutionary usually is.”
Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy
Nonstate Armed Actors in 2023. Vanda Felbab-Brown examines the overall landscape of militants and organized crime around the world. With ever-increasing attention paid to ‘great power competition’ there is less emphasis on nonstate threats. She believes that hybrid threats will grow as the United States keeps its attention on Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. “Nonstate armed actors in 2023: Persistence amid geopolitical shuffles”, Brookings Institute, January 27, 2023.
National Security
‘Feet Wet’ and ‘Splash’. The North American Aerospace Defense Command tweeted out the news that the U.S. detected a high altitude surveillance balloon over the United States. NORAD tracked the balloon as it crossed the country from west to east. It was traveling well above commerical air traffic and posed no military or physical threat to people on the ground. The decision to not shoot it down before it had traveled across the country had some folks up in arms – a little political theater going on perhaps. The Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed the balloon going through U.S. airspace was an off-course civilian airship intended for scientific research. Some commentators are speculating that the balloon excursion could be a ‘dry run‘ for testing the feasibility of a nuclear EMP attack. The end result is as soon as it cleared the U.S. land mass (‘feet wet’) it was shot down by an F-22 Raptor inside of U.S. territorial waters using one AIM-9X Sidewider missile. The balloon fell approximately six miles off the coast in about 47 feet of water from a height of about 60,000 feet. Boats and divers are in the area attempting to recover the debris.
Air Bases in the North. The possible entry of Finland and Sweden into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will change the balance of airpower over Scandinavia and the ‘high north’. NATO can project its power closer to Russia while Russia has to contend with NATO air bases close to its borders. An important aspect of this airpower equation will be how to use and defend airbases in the four Nordic countries. “A Flexible and Resilient Nordic Air Base Concept”, Strategem, January 30, 2023.
Norway Buys More Tanks. The Russians have put Europe on edge and many countries are increasing their defense budgets and purchasing additional armament. Norway is buying some Leopard 2 tanks; a tank that Sweden and Finland also have in their inventory. Norway has 36 older Leopards . . . that may soon find their way to Ukraine. “Norway buys 54 Leopards for protection of the north”, by Atle Staalesen, The Barents Observer, February 3, 2023.
Ramping Up in the Philippines. U.S. service members will be doing a lot more training and exercises alongside their Philippine allies as the defense alliance between the U.S. and that country continue to grow. In a recent agreement the two nations announced that there will be five new locations in the country where U.S. forces will conduct operations and training. “U.S.-Phillipine Alliance Strengthens as it Enters New Phase”, DoD News, February 2, 2023. See also “How the US-Philippines military pact could counter China’s rising threat”, by Brad Dress, The Hill, February 2, 2023.
ISIS – Down But Not Out. Although the Islamic State has lost its territory in Iraq and Syria it still is active and poses a threat. The U.S. continues to work with its partner forces in Iraq and Syria to degrade the terror network. In January 2023 U.S. operations resulted in 11 ISIS operatives klled and another 227 detained. “The US military is ramping up operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria”, by Jared Keller, Task & Purpose.
Al-Shabaab’s Intelligence Wing. Bobby Payne provides a detailed account of the intelligence organization of al-Shabaab. He writes on the command structure, regional commanders, finances, logistics, intel collection, and more. “The Amniyat: Al-Shabaab’s Secret Security and Intelligence Wing”, Grey Dynamics, January 21, 2023.
Upcoming Events
February 8, 2023. D.C.
ISO Hearing: The Role of Special Operations Froces in Great Power Competion
House Armed Services Committee
April 5-6, 2023. San Diego, California
Warrior West
ADS
April 14-16, 2023. Fort Benning, Georgia
Best Ranger Competion
May 8-11, 2023. Tampa, Florida
SOF Week
USSOCOM
May 22-26, 2023. Indianapolis, Indiana
Special Forces Association Convention
Old Salt Coffee is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. The company offers a wide range of coffee flavors to include Green Eyes Coffee, a tribute to those Navy special operations personnel who operate in the night.
Books, Pubs, and Reports
Sentinel. Chapter 78 of the Special Forces Association has posted its February 2023 issue of Sentinel. Some good stories this month. Topics include SF history, honoring our legacy, Salvadoran war criminal, Army’s new Sergeant Major, and stories of the “Originals”.
https://www.specialforces78.com/chapter-78-newsletter-for-february-2023/
Book Review – Enemies Near and Far: How Jihadist Groups Strategize, Plot, and Learn. John P. Sullivan reviews this book by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Thomas Joscelyn. Small Wars Journal, February 4, 2023.
Report – Powerful Narratives. A 52-page pub (PDF) has been posted on the Army Cyber Institute website that discusses weaponized harmony and the soft power tools of China’s rise to global primacy.
CTC Sentinel. The January 2023 issue of the CTC Sentinel by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has been posted. A number of articles on terrorism; this issue focused on Africa, the current epicenter of global jihadi terror. Among the topics are the Wagner Group in Burkina Faso, Somalia’s new offensive to defeat al-Shabaab, and views of the Deputy Director of Intelligence for U.S. Africa Command.
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/january-2023/
Podcasts, Videos, and Movies
Video – 2023 Best Ranger Competition. Rangers from units all over the world will be going against each other for the annual Best Ranger Competion at Fort Benning, Georgia on April 14-16, 2023. Watch a one-minute long video teaser on the event. Fort Benning, YouTube, January 27, 2023.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b_0UIi2D1QQ
Spy Series – ‘Rabbit Hole’. Kiefer Sutherland is off on a new adventure. The star of 24 is now in a new eight-episode spy thriller series set to stream on Paramount+ starting March 2023. “Jack Bauer Goes Corporate in Spy Series ‘Rabbit Hole'”, Military.com, January 30, 2023.
Podcast – The End of the War. In July 2021, Colonel Matt Hardman deployed with his unit to support 10th Mountain Division Operations in Afghanistan. His unit was tasked with providing security at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul as well as at the Kabul international airport during the August 2021 non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). Hardman is interviewed about this chaotic time in Afghanistan. The Spear, Modern War Institute at West Point, February 1, 2023.
https://mwi.usma.edu/podcast-the-spear-the-end-of-the-war/
Video – The Quiet Professional. A Navy Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewman (SWCC), Nick O’Sullivan, talks about his job. America’s Navy, July 2022, 5 minutes.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wZDfqE6YHik
Podcasts
SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command
https://linktr.ee/sofcast
The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing
https://www.thepinelander.com/
The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command
https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA
Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385
sof.news · by SOF News · February 6, 2023
15. How Russia Decides to Go Nuclear
Excertps:
The most perilous moment will be when Ukraine is on the cusp of victory, and Putin feels he can salvage his invasion only through an unprecedented escalation. But another perilous moment will come if Russian military or political leaders decide that a direct military confrontation with NATO is inevitable. It is this second contingency that Western policymakers should actively seek to mitigate, by using, calibrated deterring communication and military manuevers that cannot be misinterpreted as preparations for an operation against Russia.
A nuclear attack is unlikely to help Russia win its war of aggression in Ukraine. Moscow’s theory about first use—that it will force a terrified Ukraine and shaken West to sue for peace instead of continuing to fight—is unlikely to be borne out. The Ukrainians appear committed to fighting at any cost, and more horror will only harden their resolve. Western policymakers will not let Putin get away with using nuclear weapons to succeed in conquest, an act that would set a terrible precedent. Instead, it will lead them to redouble their efforts to make Russia pay a price for its aggression.
But Russian nuclear use in Ukraine or beyond would cause horrible devastation. It would lead Western and Russian decision-makers alike into uncharted territory. It would produce extremely difficult choices for the United States about a range of issues, including the right level of political and military denunciation and punishment, for example. It will also challenge NATO to formulate a suitable response. In short, the situation would require calibrated statecraft from leaders everywhere to de-escalate from what would be the most dangerous moment in modern history.
How Russia Decides to Go Nuclear
Deciphering the Way Moscow Handles Its Ultimate Weapon
February 6, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Kristin Ven Bruusgaard · February 6, 2023
Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine last February, there has been a near-constant debate about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear arsenal—and what he might do with it. The United States has repeatedly warned that a flustered Russia may actually be willing to use nuclear weapons, and the Kremlin itself has regularly raised the specter of a nuclear strike. According to top U.S. officials, senior Russian military leaders have discussed when and under what circumstances they might employ nuclear weapons. The concerns have even prompted states close to Russia, notably China, to warn Moscow against going nuclear.
The ultimate weapon has, of course, not been employed in this conflict, and one hopes that it never will be. The world may never know to what extent Russian leaders considered it a real option or whether it was Western signaling that persuaded Moscow not to make such a drastic choice. But as long as tensions remain high between Russia and NATO, the possibility of a nuclear war persists, and U.S. and European leaders must consider how to prevent the Kremlin from using its missiles. To do this, they must understand the protocols that govern Russia’s nuclear weapons.
Political leaders in all nuclear-armed states have to balance two competing imperatives: ensuring that their weapons can never be used without proper authorization and keeping the weapons in a state of constant readiness. They solve this dilemma in different ways, designing idiosyncratic command-and-control systems that affect nuclear decision-making. In the case of Russia, the process for commanding the use of nuclear weapons requires the sign-off of multiple officials, unlike the system in the United States, where the commander in chief has full latitude. That said, the Russian military has a disproportionate impact on nuclear policy; there are few outside analysts who can sway the Kremlin’s decisions on nuclear weapons. And although the system by which nuclear commands are issued is strictly centralized in Russia, the command and control of low-yield—or so-called tactical—nuclear weapons creates particular challenges for Western policymakers seeking to prevent Russian nuclear use.
These challenges make it more difficult for Western policymakers to know whether Moscow has ordered a nuclear launch or whether it is engaging in mere signaling, and to formulate policies that would mitigate an actual strike. But given Moscow’s protocols, the West should pay attention not only to Putin but also to Russia’s military leaders when thinking about Russia’s nuclear weapons. The West should also convey the significant risks and costs increased nuclear signaling- and actual use- entails in order to deter Russia. Ultimately, the ambiguity around Russia’s doctrine and protocols means that nuclear use would create a deeply dangerous situation that neither side may be able to control.
CHECKS AND BALANCES
In the United States, the president can order nuclear strikes without any oversight. That is not the case in Russia. The Russian constitution, the country’s defense laws, its military doctrine, and its formal principles on nuclear deterrence do say that only the president can order the use of nuclear weapons in combat and that only the president can order a nuclear weapons test. Yet all public accounts of Russia’s nuclear command-and-control system indicates that the president needs the consent of other key officials before the military can follow through on any nuclear command.
Like his U.S. counterpart, Putin has a so-called nuclear briefcase that aides keep with him at all times. But so do two other people: Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s defense minister, and Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the military’s general staff. An order must pass from both Putin’s briefcase and the briefcase of one of the other two military officials before Russia can use nuclear weapons. Gerasimov’s sign-off is especially important, and perhaps even essential. Any nuclear order must be authenticated through a central nuclear command post of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, which is under the direction of Gerasimov’s general staff.
As with many aspects of Russia’s nuclear strategy, these checks and balances were inherited from the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders sought to ensure that no single person—an aging Communist Party leader, for example, or one suffering from dementia—could unleash nuclear Armageddon on a whim. At the same time, the system was designed to prevent the military from ordering strikes on its own. As a result, every public source today indicates that the Russian president has to be involved in a nuclear order.
Few people are more familiar with this protocol—and its evolution—than Putin. Russia’s president has been personally involved in nuclear planning for over 20 years, overseeing a major overhaul of Russia’s nuclear strategy in 1998, which increased the role of nuclear weapons in the country’s military preparedness. He then served as the chief of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the secretary of the Russian Security Council, positions in which he saw Russia’s nuclear policies up close. At events and press conferences, Putin has been able to rattle off facts and theories about Russian nuclear strategy even in moments that are apparently unscripted.
Few people are more familiar with Russian nuclear protocol than Putin.
Putin’s statements on nuclear doctrine reflect the positions of the Russian military, which is where the country’s current nuclear planners and policymakers all reside. There is no think tank, no Russian equivalent of the RAND Corporation, that can raise substantive challenges to Russian nuclear strategy, and so general staff and scientists dominate the country’s nuclear debates. Putin, of course, could have opinions of his own, and he could solicit input from members of his closest circle—such as Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Security Council. But the views of the armed forces will most closely inform Putin’s nuclear decisions.
If Putin were to seriously consider nuclear use, he would consult with Gerasimov and Shoigu, both of whom are old-timers in his regime and still have his trust. In response, Gerasimov’s staffers (who oversee nuclear planning in Russia) would provide the three leaders with key aspects of current policy and ongoing debates about what political outcomes nuclear weapons use could produce and at what risk. The staff would then make a recommendation on whether Russia should carry out an attack or reserve this option for later. If they were to recommend nuclear use, or were ordered to place options on the table, they would likely provide detailed advice about what kind of attack to consider, what weapon to use, what type of target to hit, where in the world the strike should occur, and what the anticipated consequences would be.
So far, the Russian military’s nuclear strategists have been mostly preoccupied with how important these weapons would be in convincing a technologically advanced adversary—specifically NATO—to give up its objectives in a war with Russia. Not coincidentally, Russian doctrine calls for nuclear use in a conflict that could threaten Russia’s very existence. Russian leaders, including Putin, have specified that the invasion of Ukraine is not the kind of war in which Russia would resort to nuclear weapons.
But at the same time, Russian military doctrine provides little guidance for the situation Russia currently faces in Ukraine because the same doctrine declares that Russian conventional forces should be able to win this kind of war. Instead, Russian forces are facing a better-equipped adversary than they anticipated, in large part because of significant Western arms transfers. This has produced a situation in which analysts wonder whether Russian losses (in Crimea, for example) would make Russian strategists reconsider the threshold for using nuclear weapons.
CHAIN REACTION
The Russian military’s underperformance in Ukraine raises questions about whether Russia’s nuclear arsenal would perform any better. Despite the battlefield setbacks, there is reason to believe it would. Russia’s strategic nuclear forces—which include the big, extraordinarily destructive, long-range weapons that menace even the United States—have for decades been the most prioritized part of the military, and experts generally consider them to be in better shape than any other part of the armed forces. But these weapons are the ones that are least likely to be used in Ukraine. Instead, their main purpose is deterring Western states from becoming directly involved on the ground in helping Kyiv. In this, they have been only partially successful. NATO has been deterred from meddling directly in the conflict, yet despite Russia’s nuclear threats, NATO countries are providing Ukraine with an ever-expanding portfolio of sophisticated armaments.
Instead, if Russia were to consider using nuclear weapons in Ukraine, it would more likely turn to its sub-strategic nuclear arsenal. These are nuclear weapons mounted on air, sea, or land-based platforms that generally travel shorter distances than the strategic arsenal. Their warheads can have a smaller impact, with a yield range that spreads from one to several hundred kilotons. (For reference, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima had a yield of about 15 kilotons.) In other words, these weapons can deal limited to significant battlefield damage and potentially level an entire city center.
The president and one of his two top military officials would still have to order the use of a tactical warhead. But beyond that step, there is less available public information about this part of Russia’s nuclear protocol than there is about the procedures guiding the country’s larger weapons. And protocols surrounding low-yield weapons are more likely to have changed after the Cold War, when Russian doctrine increased the number of scenarios in which it would embrace nuclear use. For example, it is likely that the authorization of nuclear use is now detached from early warning systems that detect an incoming missile attack on Russia. The country, in other words, appears to be more comfortable with being the first one to use nuclear weapons in a conflict than it was in the past.
The military’s relative sanity may not hold.
Still, Russia maintains strict political control of its nuclear weapons, which is embodied by the civilian Ministry of Defense’s 12th Directorate, a unit that physically controls Russian nuclear warheads in centralized storage sites. If Russia were to deploy nuclear weapons, this directorate would likely install the warheads on the missiles capable of launching them. Many of the missiles that potentially could carry nuclear warheads have already been used in Ukraine, including ground-based, short-range Iskander missiles, sea-based Kalibr cruise missiles, and air-launched Kinzhal ballistic missiles.
Western policymakers are on the lookout for any practical evidence that Russia is moving to use such weapons—indeed, CIA Director William Burns said that watching such indicators remains one of his most important responsibilities. Still, observing nuclear activity would not necessarily prove that Russia had decided to employ a nuclear weapon. Russia conducted a nuclear deployment procedure test in 2013 as a way of signaling to the West that it was willing to up the nuclear ante. Yet such activity would at least indicate that a nuclear attack is possible. Western and Ukrainian leaders could then take steps to persuade Russian officials to reverse course. Such steps could include telling Russian military and political leaders of the risks they face for such a move. They could also include military signaling to back up any messaging. And they could include increasing the pressure on Moscow through unconventional coercive measures, such as cyberattacks.
The success of these efforts would, of course, depend on whether the Kremlin was receptive to being deterred. But it would also depend on whether Moscow could reliably return its weapons to centralized storage once they arrived on the field or whether it could reliably withdraw a launch order already issued to a field commander. Russia likely practices and trains for take-back procedures, as demonstrated by the 2013 exercise. Still, actually carrying out such an order would be unprecedented in Russia, as it would be in any other nuclear weapons state. For Western interlocutors, this uncertainty makes it harder to convey critical redlines about Russian nuclear use to the Kremlin’s leaders and to determine what could be done to stop the country from using nuclear weapons once they had left storage.
FINE LINES
Western officials hope that they will never have to deal with a Russian nuclear attack. Putin still appears to believe that conventional weapons can deliver a victory (or at least a partial victory) in Ukraine. And although he has the most power over Russia’s nuclear arsenal, Putin would have to consult with his defense advisers, who could break with the president over any mooted strike. The military seems convinced that Russia should reserve nuclear weapons for a potential war with NATO: an event that Moscow desperately wants to avoid, but one that Russian nuclear use in Ukraine could provoke.
The military’s relative sanity, however, may not hold in the face of more significant Russian losses—such as a successful Ukrainian campaign for Crimea or major Ukrainian attacks on the Russian homeland with NATO-supplied weapons. Western countries have thus far tread a fine line in supplying Ukraine with substantive capabilities yet refraining from providing battle systems that are certain to provoke a direct confrontation with Moscow. But as Ukraine advances and improves its capabilities, Western policymakers should continue to try to understand where Russia’s redlines are. Otherwise, it may well be that they discover Moscow’s thresholds only after they have been crossed.
The most perilous moment will be when Ukraine is on the cusp of victory, and Putin feels he can salvage his invasion only through an unprecedented escalation. But another perilous moment will come if Russian military or political leaders decide that a direct military confrontation with NATO is inevitable. It is this second contingency that Western policymakers should actively seek to mitigate, by using, calibrated deterring communication and military manuevers that cannot be misinterpreted as preparations for an operation against Russia.
A nuclear attack is unlikely to help Russia win its war of aggression in Ukraine. Moscow’s theory about first use—that it will force a terrified Ukraine and shaken West to sue for peace instead of continuing to fight—is unlikely to be borne out. The Ukrainians appear committed to fighting at any cost, and more horror will only harden their resolve. Western policymakers will not let Putin get away with using nuclear weapons to succeed in conquest, an act that would set a terrible precedent. Instead, it will lead them to redouble their efforts to make Russia pay a price for its aggression.
But Russian nuclear use in Ukraine or beyond would cause horrible devastation. It would lead Western and Russian decision-makers alike into uncharted territory. It would produce extremely difficult choices for the United States about a range of issues, including the right level of political and military denunciation and punishment, for example. It will also challenge NATO to formulate a suitable response. In short, the situation would require calibrated statecraft from leaders everywhere to de-escalate from what would be the most dangerous moment in modern history.
Foreign Affairs · by Kristin Ven Bruusgaard · February 6, 2023
16. Iran’s Hard-Liners Are Winning
Not good news.
Conclusion:
Washington and its allies must therefore devise a credible strategy to at least slow Iran’s hard-line turn. Such a strategy will require coupling threats and punishments with dialogue on the most urgent dangers emanating from the Islamic Republic, including Iran’s role in the war in Ukraine and the expansion of Tehran’s nuclear program. Iranian and Ukrainian officials recently met in Oman to discuss Iran’s role in the war. This was a good start. Europe and the United States should build on such efforts, launching a broader diplomatic initiative that goes beyond the stalled nuclear talks to encompass Ukraine and regional issues. Otherwise, Iran’s hard-liners will continue to push the country in an ever more dangerous direction.
Iran’s Hard-Liners Are Winning
How Months of Protest Forged an Even More Intransigent Regime
February 6, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Vali Nasr · February 6, 2023
Over the past five months, a wave of protests has rocked Iran. Young women calling for an end to the compulsory headscarf have been joined by students, laborers, and professionals demanding individual rights, political reform—and even, increasingly, an end to the Islamic Republic itself. These demonstrations posed the most significant threat to Iran’s government since 1979, fueling speculation that today’s theocratic regime could ultimately go the way of yesterday’s monarchy.
For now, the regime has retained the upper hand, thanks to a harsh crackdown by security forces and a lack of leadership and coordination among the protesters. But popular anger is still mounting, and dire economic conditions make further unrest all but inevitable.
So precarious is the regime’s position that many insiders have publicly broken with the government line. Grand ayatollahs in Najaf and Qom, former senior government officials, and even decorated former commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have criticized the government’s reaction to the protests and decried the extent to which a small group of hard-liners around President Ebrahim Raisi has consolidated control. News outlets popular with hard-liners and close to the IRGC have openly faulted Raisi for his mismanagement of the economy, and regime stalwarts, including former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani and former parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani, have condemned the government’s harsh reaction to the protests. Such critics have called for meaningful change if the Islamic Republic is to weather the storm.
But there is no evidence that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is listening. Since the start of the crisis, hard-liners have tightened their grip on the reins of power. This faction opposes engagement with the West and does not wish to return to the 2015 nuclear deal. At home, it favors isolationism and tight control of the social and political spheres. Abroad, it favors aggressive regional policies and increasing collaboration with Russia. Far from chastened by the protests, in other words, the regime that is now emerging from the initial phase of the unrest is even more intransigent and potentially aggressive than ever before.
KHAMENEI’S HARD LINE
Iran’s hard anti-Western turn is not driven by a desire to defend the regime’s Islamist ideology. In every speech since the demonstrations began, Khamenei has said little about religion—and a great deal about foreign meddling. Khamenei views the protests as a U.S. conspiracy, hatched in concert with Israel and Saudi Arabia, to weaken Iran and topple the Islamic Republic. In his mind, Iran must mobilize all its resources to respond to this assault. Security officials, taking their cue from Khamenei, have blamed satellite television stations and social media campaigns originating in Europe for stoking unrest in Iran and mobilizing public opinion against the Islamic Republic. They have also blamed turmoil in Iran’s Baluch and Kurdish regions on foreign interference. Last fall, Iran mobilized troops along its border with Azerbaijan and warned Iraq that it might cross the border into that country to close down Kurdish separatist camps.
Khamenei is determined to preserve the regime that he has ruled over for more than three decades. He is 83 years old and rumored to be in ill health. Compromise with dissenters at this stage would sully his legacy, and could even prove counterproductive. He witnessed firsthand how accommodating protesters only hastened the collapse of the monarchy in 1979.
Instead of caving to the demonstrators or heeding the advice of critics, Khamenei has turned to violence and repression. Since September, hundreds of protesters have been killed and many more maimed in crackdowns by security forces. Thousands of protesters and dissidents are now in jail; four have been executed after summary trials, and several more face the death penalty. The regime has used sophisticated surveillance; threats against families, employers, and businesses of protesters; and propaganda and economic pressure to quell the unrest.
Iran is seeking to become indispensable to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.
Khamenei has also relied more heavily on the counsel of hard-liners within the IRGC, the intelligence agencies, parliament, and the media. To Khamenei, these are the people who understand the problem as he does, share his distrust of the West, and oppose the nuclear deal as a trap designed to cage Iran. In Khamenei’s mind, their distrust has been vindicated, so they should be empowered to shun the West, restrict and censor the internet, and pursue economic and cultural autonomy. These views have long existed within the halls of power, but the protests have added to their prominence.
The protests have also dimmed the prospects for restoring the 2015 nuclear deal. Since the demonstrations erupted in September 2022, Western leaders have winced at the suggestion that sanctions could be lifted as part of a nuclear agreement. The Biden administration is even reluctant to pursue the release of U.S. prisoners held by Iran, fearful of the domestic backlash it would incur if Iranian assets were unfrozen as part of any deal. But hard-liners in Tehran are unfazed by Western opprobrium and have invited still more sanctions by executing young protesters and raising the possibility that the EU could designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization.
Iran is heading into choppy waters at the United Nations as well. Tehran’s nuclear infractions have alarmed the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose chief recently told the European Parliament that Iran has amassed enough highly enriched uranium for “several nuclear weapons.” The IAEA could soon refer Iran to the UN Security Council for censure, raising the possibility that it will reimpose UN sanctions, especially since France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are all eager to maintain an embargo on the sale of arms and missiles to the Islamic Republic. Iran has threatened that it would respond to such a scenario by leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty, effectively declaring that it will become a nuclear state. Doing so could lead to confrontation with Israel, which last month attacked a weapons-manufacturing facility in the Iranian city of Isfahan, and potentially with the United States. As U.S. President Joe Biden has repeatedly stated, his administration will not tolerate Iran becoming a nuclear state.
FROM TEHRAN TO MOSCOW
Iran has responded to its deepening international isolation by drawing closer to Russia. Khamenei and the IRGC have long viewed the Kremlin as a vital ally. Khamenei and Russian President Vladimir Putin share the same jaded view of the West, and Russia’s war in Ukraine has brought into sharper focus Tehran’s and Moscow’s common grudge against the United States. Khamenei brushed aside criticism from within the ruling elite to approve the supply of sophisticated drones to Moscow, which the Russian military has used to wreak havoc in Ukraine. With the United States and its European and Middle Eastern partners arrayed against the Islamic Republic, Khamenei argued, Iran must consolidate its relationship with Russia where it matters most: on the battlefield. Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine makes Moscow a more valuable strategic crutch because as long as the Kremlin needs Iranian weapons, it is unlikely to turn its back on Tehran.
Iran’s decision to provide Russia with drones predictably deepened Western anger at the Islamic Republic, which in turn pushed Tehran even closer to Moscow. In this vicious cycle, the winner will be hard-liners who have always favored closer ties between Iran and Russia and decoupling from the West. As Iran drifts further into Russia’s orbit, the power of these hard-liners will grow, improving the odds that they will prevail in Iran’s looming succession battle.
Iran is now seeking to become indispensable to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. The more Putin needs Iran, the more likely he is to flout Western sanctions and provide Tehran with vital military hardware and technology, including advanced fighter jets and air defense systems. Media outlets connected to the IRGC reported last month that Iran will receive two dozen advanced Russian Sukhoi Su-35 air defense fighters by March and is looking to acquire helicopters and an advanced S-400 air defense system, which is capable of tracking U.S. F-35 fighter jets. Such acquisitions would significantly boost Iran’s military capability, enabling it to better counter Israeli air power in Syria and Iraq, as well as U.S. military pressure in the Persian Gulf. They would also give Tehran the confidence to absorb Western pressure and plan for a potential military attack in response to its expanded nuclear activities.
For all these reasons, Iran’s neighbors are growing increasingly alarmed by Tehran’s drift toward Moscow, fearful that it could further entrench Iranian hard-liners and make Iran even more dangerous. Ultimately, the West could face not just separate crises involving Russia and Iran but also the additional problem of managing their joint behavior—a problem that would be larger than the sum of its parts.
ACTION OVER HOPE
Some Western officials and analysts hope that the power grab by Iran’s hard-liners will accelerate the protests and eventually lead to regime change. But hope is a poor substitute for action. Thus far, the United States and European countries have relied on sanctions and threat of war to deter Iran’s aggressive behavior. But Israel is restive and could escalate its efforts to sabotage Tehran’s military and nuclear programs. Doing so would only reinforce Iran’s militant anti-Western convictions and risk an open conflagration that the United States and its allies can ill afford in the midst of their standoff with Russia and China.
Washington and its allies must therefore devise a credible strategy to at least slow Iran’s hard-line turn. Such a strategy will require coupling threats and punishments with dialogue on the most urgent dangers emanating from the Islamic Republic, including Iran’s role in the war in Ukraine and the expansion of Tehran’s nuclear program. Iranian and Ukrainian officials recently met in Oman to discuss Iran’s role in the war. This was a good start. Europe and the United States should build on such efforts, launching a broader diplomatic initiative that goes beyond the stalled nuclear talks to encompass Ukraine and regional issues. Otherwise, Iran’s hard-liners will continue to push the country in an ever more dangerous direction.
- VALI NASR is Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
Foreign Affairs · by Vali Nasr · February 6, 2023
17. Why did China send a balloon?
Excerpts:
The last thing we need to be doing is picking fights with nuclear-armed Russia and China simultaneously. Washington must prepare for war without courting it. It is time for Americans to recognize the new geopolitical moment we find ourselves in and to recognize that the Chinese actions, while disturbing to the domestic peace, are normal in the context of great power relations.
We will do similar things to China and they will become angry at us for that.
America must do a better job of defending its airspace and deterring future behavior without escalating into the irrational area we all seem heading toward on this subject.
Finally, Americans must recognize that, as we are a great power, our behavior and our words affect the world. We should not be surprised when the world reacts to what we say and do, any more than our rivals should be offended when we respond to the questionable things they do and say.
Welcome to great power competition in the twenty-first century. Grin and bear it.
Why did China send a balloon?
That’s what great powers do, so get used to it
asiatimes.com · by More by Brandon J Weichert · February 5, 2023
Now that the Great Balloon Panic of 2023 has passed us, it is high time to address the context of why the Chinese balloon (which is actually an endoatmospheric satellite) graced our nation’s woefully open airspace in the opening days of February.
The event likely occurred because Beijing’s leadership was trying to figure out just what the hell is going on in the government of the United States. As someone who lives here, I don’t know, either.
In the eyes of much of the rest of the world presently, America’s leadership does not appear very stable. Nations are scrambling to get readings on what’s happening within our borders so that they can make informed strategies.
Frankly, as a geopolitical analyst, I’m surprised that events like the Grand Chinese Balloon Escapade aren’t more commonplace. After all, China is the United States’ number one strategic rival. According to multiple high-ranking US military officials, China and the United States will be at war with each other as early as 2025!
These prognostications are likely truer than most are willing to acknowledge – but in acknowledging these concerns publicly, US military officials may have prompted such reckless behavior from China.
From new world order to world gone mad
The days of things being relatively contained in the Sino-American relationship are at an end. A new world order is being birthed before our eyes. In this new world order, the United States is no longer the dominant player. The world does not march to our drum. And other powers (like China) will compete with us for control. Those other powers may even win.
As this competition becomes more pronounced, with the United States generally being seen as a great state in decline and China in the ascendancy, Sino-American relations are about to take a darker turn than what we had previously experienced since the Nixon Administration accepted Mao Zedong’s offer to embrace China as a trading partner.
Remember the old axiom, “To preserve peace, prepare for war.” China, like the United States, is a great power and is doing what all great powers have done since the dawn of history: preparing for peace to preserve security at home.
That the Americans have fed this particular beast through generous trade deals, information- and technology-sharing agreements and territorial concessions only makes the situation more unbearable for the Americans.
This is especially so because at least some of our leaders recognize just how much of a self-inflicted wound to America’s continued global dominance China’s rise is.
Sadly, there’s no going back to the way things were.
Point of no return
China’s rise is real. China will use its considerable power to reshape the international order as China’s autocratic leaders see fit.
Beijing has converted its enormous wealth into an expanding, modern military. That military is designed to box the Americans out from what Beijing views as its sphere of interest in the Indo-Pacific while possessing the ability to crush whatever regional rival – such as Taiwan, or possibly even Japan or India – China’s leaders think they need to defeat.
China’s goal is to create for itself a regional hegemony that it can then use as a base from which to push its growing military might farther out. It seeks to do this through unconventional means – although Beijing will use force in specific instances, such as Taiwan, if necessary.
Of course, all major powers have such objectives.
The Russia-Ukraine factor
But the recent comments by US military leaders about the likelihood of a war with China by 2025, along with America’s extreme support for Ukraine against nuclear-armed (and China-allied) Russia, likely precipitated the present crisis with China. Consider this: At the same time US leaders are talking about war with China, Western leaders have been courting nuclear war with Russia over Ukraine.
What’s more, those same American and NATO leaders have been talking publicly about overthrowing Vladimir Putin and dismembering the Russian Federation into its constituent parts.
To the Chinese leaders, who are the least emotionally involved people on the planet (save for their obsession with Taiwan), the Americans appear to be unhinged. It is likely that Beijing is attempting to discern if the recent comments both about nuclear war with Russia and about conflict with China in the next two years are merely posturing or something more.
For Beijing to learn this, they needed detailed signals intelligence of the kind that spy satellites and balloons can only provide.
More than a balloon
Consider this: The Chinese military has operated such endoatmospheric satellites over the hotly contested South China Sea for years. These balloons are cheap but effective tools for surveillance– and targeting. They are used by China to track US Navy warships transiting the South China Sea. The surveillance equipment is provided by China’s major technology firm Huawei.
To protect its own wounded political image at home, the Biden Administration has since released information that China launched three similar balloons into the United States during the Trump administration and the forty-fifth president did not respond. This behavior in the context of great power rivalry really is nothing new.
The recent comments by the American officials are clearly concerning to China. Given the trajectory of the Chinese spy balloon, it is obvious that it was surveying America’s nuclear weapons arsenal.
Plus, the altitude of the Chinese balloon gave it clear line-of-sight to sensitive US military satellites operating in low-Earth orbit. Beyond that, the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah – Area 52 – is the home of America’s hypersonic weapons tests.
Given China’s clear supremacy in hypersonic weapon technology, all these points of interest were likely the targets of the Chinese intelligence collection mission. They want to know if America is actually going to war, and if so war against whom and how China will be impacted by it.
This event was a nuisance and a terrible failure in deterrence on the part of the Biden Administration. The infernal balloon should’ve been shot down when it was over the Aleutians, not after it had traversed the whole North American continent.
The spy balloon’s presence over American skies was not, however, the end of the world.
Standing ready but being responsible
America must be vigilant awaiting the time when China seeks to upend the international order by force – which I believe it will. But Washington must balance that need for vigilance with the responsibility to maintain stability as best as it can – especially at a time as critical as the one we find ourselves in.
The last thing we need to be doing is picking fights with nuclear-armed Russia and China simultaneously. Washington must prepare for war without courting it. It is time for Americans to recognize the new geopolitical moment we find ourselves in and to recognize that the Chinese actions, while disturbing to the domestic peace, are normal in the context of great power relations.
We will do similar things to China and they will become angry at us for that.
America must do a better job of defending its airspace and deterring future behavior without escalating into the irrational area we all seem heading toward on this subject.
Finally, Americans must recognize that, as we are a great power, our behavior and our words affect the world. We should not be surprised when the world reacts to what we say and do, any more than our rivals should be offended when we respond to the questionable things they do and say.
Welcome to great power competition in the twenty-first century. Grin and bear it.
Brandon J Weichert is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy (both Republic Book Publishers), and Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life (Encounter Books). He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
asiatimes.com · by More by Brandon J Weichert · February 5, 2023
18. The Evolution of the Special Forces (SF) Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA)
For those who would like to know how the SFODA evolved.
Please go to the link to view all the grpahics. https://arsof-history.org/articles/v19n1_evolution_of_the_special_forces_oda_page_1.html?utm_source=pocket_saves
The Evolution of the Special Forces (SF) Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA)
BY TROY J. SACQUETY, PHD
From Veritas, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2023
arsof-history.org · by U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) History Department
Today, the Special Forces (SF) Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) consists of twelve soldiers. However, that has not always been the case. Its number of personnel has ranged from twelve to fifteen, depending upon era and contemporary doctrine and force structure requirements. What follows is a brief look at the historic organization of the lowest SF unit of action, the ODA. This study starts even before the creation of SF in 1952 by going back to World War II, specifically, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Operational Group (OG) section.
Created on 13 June 1942, the OSS was a separate, joint military service that reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its primary mission was to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. The second was to conduct unconventional warfare (UW). The OG was one of the key OSS UW elements.
A 1960s recruiting poster highlights the 12-soldier ODA. However, it has had organizational models of up to 15 soldiers.
On 4 May 1943, the OSS activated the OG Branch as a “separate tactical unit” within the OSS.
Although it was not a U.S. Army element, it was manned almost exclusively with Army personnel detailed to the OSS who possessed the cultural background and spoke the languages of the areas to be infiltrated. The OGs trained and were employed as small groups. Their mission was to infiltrate enemy-occupied areas to harass the enemy and to be the “operational nuclei of guerrilla units” through organizing, training, equipping, and advising them. OGs operated in France, Norway, Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, Burma, and China.The basic organizational unit in the OG Branch was an Operational Group. An OG fluctuated in size throughout the war but was designed to operate in two independent sections. The main structure for how the OG operated in the field, was the section which could be further divided into two semi-independent squads. The final OG table of organization and equipment (TO&E), dated 20 February 1945, had a fifteen-man section comprised of a commanding officer (usually a Lieutenant), a senior non-commissioned officer (NCO), a medical sergeant, two radio operators, two squad sergeants, and eight riflemen.
This structure later became the basis for the ODA.
OSS Operations Group Section, 1945
After World War II, the OSS disbanded on 1 October 1945, and the Army similarly deactivated its special operations units. Within five years, however, the U.S. was again at war. Korea, the first major flare-up of the Cold War, highlighted that the Army needed to recreate special operations units. Therefore, U.S. Army leaders looked to create an unconventional warfare element to work with guerrilla forces. Rather than invent a new structure, they looked at the OG section as a model.
Special Forces SSI
Special Forces DUI
One of the earliest field manuals (FM) on unconventional warfare, which provided the doctrinal foundation for Army SF, was FM 31-21: Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, dated October 1951. Its author was Colonel (COL) Russell W. Volckmann, leader of Philippine guerrillas on Luzon during World War II. Although COL Volckmann had extensive UW experience, his Philippine formations did not have a codified structure. He therefore looked to the OSS OG, a TO&E element that did. COL Volckmann even borrowed the OSS nomenclature in FM 31-21, when he called for an “Operational Group” of unspecified size, composed of “specially qualified military personnel in uniform, organized, trained, and equipped to operate as teams within enemy territory,” to be the main element to form and assist guerrilla forces.
The proposed TO&E 33-510, dated 14 May 1952, set the organization for an FA Team (no acronym assigned but in current parlance, an ODA). Like the OSS OG section, it was fifteen personnel comprised as follows: a Detachment Commander (O-3), Executive Officer (XO) (Lieutenant), Platoon Sergeant (E-7), Medic (E-7), two Leader Heavy Weapons (E-6), two Leader Light Weapons (E-6), four Demolition Specialists (E-5), and three Radio Operators (E-5).
This same organization was reflected in FM 31-20: U.S. Army Special Forces Group (Airborne), dated August 1955.
FA Team, 1952
The first change to the ODA structure came in Army FM 31-21: Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, dated 8 May 1958. This manual retained the fifteen-man construct but changed the rank structure and job descriptions of the FA team. It now had a commander (O-3), XO (Lieutenant), Team Sergeant (E-8), Medic (E-8), four Weapons Specialists (E-7), four Demolition Specialists (Specialist 2), one Radio Repairman (E-5), one Radio Operator (E-5), and one Radio Operator (Specialist 3).
FA Team, 1958
The first personnel reduction came with TO&E 31-107E, dated 25 September 1963. The FA team, renamed to ODA, was changed to twelve soldiers and restructured the ranks. It had a commander (O-3), an XO (Lieutenant), an Operations Sergeant (E-8), a Heavy Weapons Leader (E-7), an Intelligence Sergeant (E-7), a Light Weapons Leader (E-7), a Medical Specialist (E-7), and Radio Operator Supervisor (E-7), an Assistant Medical Specialist and Demolitions Sergeant (E-6), and a Chief Radio Operator and Combat Demolition Specialist (E-5).
TO&E 31-107G, dated 28 June 1968, kept the same general organization as the 1963 version but increased the rank of the Demolitions Sergeant, now called a Special Forces Engineer Sergeant, to an E-7, and renamed the E-5 Combat Demolition Specialist to a Special Forces Engineer.
ODA, 1963
The twelve-man ODA lasted until TO&E 31-107H, dated 10 June 1970. This document increased the ODA structure to fourteen by adding a Supply Sergeant (E-7) and an Assistant Operations/Intelligence Sergeant (E-6).
A subsequent change to this TO&E on 1 March 1974 reduced the ODA to thirteen men by removing the E-7 Radio Operations Supervisor. Another change on 1 September 1974 brought the ODA back down to twelve by removing the E-7 Supply Sergeant (E-7) and Assistant Operations/Intelligence Sergeant (E-6) but bringing back the Radio Operations Supervisor (E-7). It also changed the Intelligence Sergeant position to an Assistant Operations Sergeant.
ODA, 1971
The final significant change occurred in 1984 when the first SF warrant officers (WO) began to replace lieutenants on ODAs. This change was motivated by a study conducted by COLs Charles A. Beckwith and J.H. “Scotty” Crerar, who were concerned about the lack of continuity and competency within the ODAs. In their estimation, the seconds-in-command, being lieutenants, were still learning their profession; had spent little time on the team; and did not have enough team time to gain adequate experience and knowledge to become an ODA commander. In COL Crerar’s words, “justly or not [lieutenants] were viewed as burdens on their detachments,” necessitating replacing them with a more experienced warrant officer that could provide more seasoned leadership to the ODA.
The ODA structure has not changed since 1984. Currently it is as follows: Detachment Commander (O-3), Assistant Detachment Commander (Chief Warrant Officer 2), Operations Sergeant (E-8), Operations/Intelligence Sergeant, Senior Weapons Sergeant, Senior Engineer Sergeant, Senior Medical Sergeant, Senior Communications Sergeant (E-7), and Weapons Sergeant, Engineer Sergeant, Medical Sergeant, and Communications Sergeant (E-6).
ODA, 2014
As this brief article has detailed, the ODA structure has its roots in the final version of the OSS OG section, which developed based on personnel availability and operational requirements. Since 1952, the SF ODA has had numerous changes to its personnel and rank structure, albeit with a few constants: a captain as commander, a second-in-command (lieutenant and then warrant officer), a senior NCO, and medical, communications, weapons, and demolition (engineer) personnel. With the ODA having fluctuated between twelve and fifteen soldiers, it has historically been treated as a “living” structure and subject to change based on existing requirements.
A more recent version of the 12-soldier ODA mimics the 1960s recruiting poster.
arsof-history.org · by U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) History Department
19. US special operators surprised the hell out of San Diego residents during urban combat training
I remember having to answer for these exercises as the USASOC G3. :-)
It has been my experience that the exercise planners do a good job coordinating with local officials and law enforcement obtaining the proper approvals which are necessary for the exercise to be conducted. However, they depend on local officials to notify the community. But there are always those who do not get the word or ignore (or forget) the notifications. And then it is easy to blme the military.
US special operators surprised the hell out of San Diego residents during urban combat training
“It might have been nice … if there had been something obvious and clear to say that we weren’t being attacked by a foreign power."
BY JARED KELLER | PUBLISHED FEB 4, 2023 9:00 AM
taskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · February 4, 2023
Low-flying helicopters, loud explosions, and simulated gunfire apparently gave some San Diego residents quite the shock as the Army conducted a training exercise across town on Thursday evening.
Army personnel were conducting “coordinated, essential training” in “designated locations” across the military town as part of an exercise scheduled to run from Jan. 24 through Feb. 4, according to a training advisory posted by Naval Base Coronado on Wednesday.
That training, officially carried out by U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), saw rotary-wing aircraft flit across the skies above several San Diego communities over the course of the evening.
Low-flying helicopters doing "military drills" in San Diego last night.
Prepping for WW3? pic.twitter.com/70ZDat421M
— 𝚂𝚘𝚌𝚛𝚊𝚝𝚎𝚎𝚓 (@TheSocrateej) February 3, 2023
“The training consists of air and ground mobility operations and close-quarter combat training to enhance soldiers’ skills by operating in a realistic environment,” according to the Army. “Safety precautions are in place to protect participants, along with planning considerations to minimize impact to the community.”
While the Army said that the “training was coordinated with appropriate officials,” local media outlets reported that some San Diegans were taken by surprise by the loud noises of simulated combat and sudden sounds of UH-60 Black Hawk and MH-6 Little Bird helicopters patrolling the skies above.
“The house was literally vibrating with it … it was scary!” one Point Loma resident told local ABC News affiliate KGTV. “I immediately thought there’s something really serious going on in the neighborhood.”
Legitimately thought we had started a war. 5 military helicopters buzz LOW over the house. Followed by bomb-like booms a few min later. #SanDiego
— Big Red (@TimHasFun) February 3, 2023
There are black helicopters flying super low near the library in east village San Diego right now. What is going on?!
— Doug Jackson (@cadillacjaxon) February 3, 2023
“It might have been nice…if there had been something obvious and clear to say that we weren’t being attacked by a foreign power,” another resident told the KGTV.
Ok downtown San Diego, who has info on these terrifying pitch black helicopters?
— Staci (@myfriendstaci) February 3, 2023
wtf is going on military action in clairemont #sandiego #helicopter #military pic.twitter.com/0mYtkkLO44
— Maximus Davenport (@maksuhmuhs) February 3, 2023
This isn’t the first time “air and ground mobility operations and close-quarter combat training” have ended up scaring the bejesus out of unsuspecting citizens. This past August, a similarly described exercise carried out by USASOC caught several residents of San Antonio, Texas unawares.
While USASOC told the San Antonio Express-news that law enforcement and residents had been notified of the exercises months in advance, local leaders still complained that they hadn’t received appropriate notice.
As Task & Purpose has reported in the past, similar exercises have befuddled residents. An April 2019 exercise in Raleigh, North Carolina, near an abandoned motel ended up being “louder and more disruptive to the nearby neighborhoods than the city anticipated,” scaring residents who hadn’t previously been notified of the event.
The previous month, USASOC had conducted a series of military drills in the skies above the Dallas-Fort Worth area to address over the span of two weeks that prompted curious readers to write in to the Dallas Morning News asking what the heck, precisely, was going on in their neighborhood.
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The month before that, a pair of MH-6 Little Birds with the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment freaked out a bunch of Los Angelenos by conducting training that involved flying super low through the streets of downtown Los Angeles (the Los Angeles Police Department claimed residents had been notified ahead of time).
There are two lessons from Thursday’s mini-freakout in San Diego. First, follow your major military bases on social media so you’re always in the know about local exercises, especially if you live in a military town. And second: if you see a Blackhawk or Little Bird soaring above your head, keep calm, carry on, and don’t forget to yell ‘Merica!’ back like this guy:
Never a dull moment in #DTLA pic.twitter.com/UtW6bq0m8f
— Strezev (@AlexStrezev) February 5, 2019
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taskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · February 4, 2023
20. China accuses US of indiscriminate use of force over balloon
Indiscriminate? Not the word I would use. Measured or prudent would be a better description.
China accuses US of indiscriminate use of force over balloon
AP · by EMILY WANG FUJIYAMA · February 6, 2023
BEIJING (AP) — China on Monday accused the United States of indiscriminate use of force in shooting down a suspected Chinese spy balloon, saying it “seriously impacted and damaged both sides’ efforts and progress in stabilizing Sino-U.S. relations.”
The U.S. shot down the balloon off the Carolina coast after it traversed sensitive military sites across North America. China insisted the flyover was an accident involving a civilian aircraft.
Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng said he lodged a formal complaint with the U.S. Embassy on Sunday over the “U.S. attack on a Chinese civilian unmanned airship by military force.”
Related Coverage
“However, the United States turned a deaf ear and insisted on indiscriminate use of force against the civilian airship that was about to leave the United States airspace, obviously overreacted and seriously violated the spirit of international law and international practice,” Xie said.
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The presence of the balloon in the skies above the U.S. dealt a severe blow to already strained U.S.-Chinese relations that have been in a downward spiral for years. It prompted Secretary of State Antony Blinken to abruptly cancel a high-stakes Beijing trip aimed at easing tensions.
Xie repeated China’s insistence that the balloon was a Chinese civil unmanned airship that blew into U.S. airspace by mistake, calling it “an accidental incident caused by force majeure.”
China will “resolutely safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese companies, resolutely safeguard China’s interests and dignity and reserve the right to make further necessary responses,” he said.
U.S. President Joe Biden issued the shootdown order after he was advised that the best time for the operation would be when it was over water, U.S. officials said. Military officials determined that bringing down the balloon over land from an altitude of 60,000 feet (18,000 meters) would pose an undue risk to people on the ground.
“What the U.S. has done has seriously impacted and damaged both sides’ efforts and progress in stabilizing Sino-U.S. relations since the Bali meeting,” Xie said, referring to a recent meeting between Biden and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in Indonesia that many hoped would create positive momentum for improving ties that have plunged to their lowest level in years.
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Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning provided no new details on Monday, repeating China’s insistence that the object was a civilian balloon intended for meteorological research, had little ability to steer and entered U.S. airspace by accidentally diverging from its course. She also did not say what additional steps China intended to take in response to Washington’s handling of the issue and cancellation of Blinken’s trip, which would have made him the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.
“We have stated that this is completely an isolated and accidental incident caused by force majeure, but the U.S. still hyped up the incident on purpose and even used force to attack,” Mao said at a daily briefing. “This is an unacceptable and irresponsible action.”
Balloons thought or known to be Chinese have been spotted from Latin America to Japan. Japanese Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihiko Isozaki told reporters Monday that a flying object similar to the one shot down by the U.S. had been spotted at least twice over northern Japan since 2020.
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“We are continuing to analyze them in connection with the latest case in the United States,” he said.
Mao confirmed that a balloon recently spotted over Latin American was Chinese, describing it as a civilian airship used for flight tests.
“Affected by weather and due to its limited self-control ability, the airship severely deviated from its set route and entered the space of Latin America and the Caribbean by accident,” Mao said.
Washington and Beijing are at odds over a range of issues from trade to human rights, but China is most sensitive over alleged violations by the U.S. and others of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Beijing strongly protests U.S. military sales to Taiwan and visits by foreign politicians to the island, which it claims as Chinese territory, to be recovered by force if necessary.
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It reacted to a 2022 visit by then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi by firing missiles over the island and staging threatening military drills seen as a rehearsal for an invasion or blockade. Beijing also cut off discussion with the U.S. on issues including climate change that are unrelated to military tensions.
Last week, Mao warned Pelosi’s successor, House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, not to travel to Taiwan, implying that China’s response would be equally vociferous.
“China will firmly defend its sovereignty, security and development interests,” Mao said. McCarthy said China had no right to dictate where and when he could travel.
China also objects when foreign military surveillance planes fly off its coast in international airspace and when U.S. and other foreign warships pass through the Taiwan Strait, accusing them of being actively provocative.
In 2001, a U.S. Navy plane conducting routine surveillance near the Chinese coast collided with a Chinese fighter plane, killing the Chinese fighter pilot and damaging the American plane, which was forced to make an emergency landing at a Chinese naval airbase on the southern Chinese island province of Hainan. China detained the 24-member U.S. Navy aircrew for 10 days until the U.S. expressed regret over the Chinese pilot’s death and for landing at the base without permission.
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The South China Sea is another major source of tension. China claims the strategically key sea virtually in its entirety and protests when U.S. Navy ships sail past Chinese military features there.
At a news conference Friday with his South Korean counterpart, Blinken said “the presence of this surveillance balloon over the United States in our skies is a clear violation of our sovereignty, a clear violation of international law, and clearly unacceptable. And we’ve made that clear to China.”
“Any country that has its airspace violated in this way I think would respond similarly, and I can only imagine what the reaction would be in China if they were on the other end,” Blinken said.
China’s weather balloon explanation should be dismissed outright, said Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military affairs and foreign policy at Stanford University.
“This is like a standard thing that countries often say about surveillance assets,” Mastro said.
China may have made a mistake and lost control of the balloon, but it was unlikely to have been a deliberate attempt to disrupt Blinken’s visit, Mastro said.
For the U.S. administration, the decision to go public and then shoot down the balloon marks a break from its usual approach of dealing with Beijing on such matters privately, possibly in hopes of changing China’s future behavior.
However, Mastro said, it was unlikely that Beijing would respond positively.
“They’re probably going to dismiss that and continue on as things have been. So I don’t see a really clear pathway to improved relations in the foreseeable future.”
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AP journalists Tian Macleod Ji in Bangkok, Mari Yamaguchi in Tokyo and news assistant Caroline Chen in Beijing contributed this report.
AP · by EMILY WANG FUJIYAMA · February 6, 2023
21. Shaping in Strategic Competition: How to Win Friends and Influence People with Military Power
You can listen to the pdcast at this link: https://mwi.usma.edu/shaping-in-strategic-competition-how-to-win-friends-and-influence-people-with-military-power/
Shaping in Strategic Competition: How to Win Friends and Influence People with Military Power - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Kyle Atwell · February 6, 2023
Episode 5, Season 1 of the Social Science of War podcast examines the role of military power, and the Army specifically, in shaping a favorable security environment in the context of great power competition.
Our guests begin by introducing the significance of shaping, when military power is used not only to fight wars but also to attract and influence partners and allies. Shaping includes multiple activities such as multinational training exercises with foreign militaries, establishing US military presence in bases around the world, security force assistance and military aid, and other uses of military power that allow the Army to attract, socialize, delegate to, and assure allies and partners to align with US national security interests. Given the National Defense Strategy places a high priority on the US alliance and partner network, shaping is an essential concept to understand how the United States leverages the US Army to strengthen its relationships.
Topics discussed in detail include the tradeoff between deterrence and shaping, whether the Army needs to invest in unique capabilities to support shaping efforts, what the social science literature finds about the effectiveness of shaping operations (to include a discussion on the impact of US basing posture on reassurance of allies), and the risks involved in shaping activities (to include a discussion on the importance of understanding the security dilemma when making decisions about the employment of US forces). The conversation closes with a discussion on the implications of shaping for tactical- and operational-level Army leaders.
Dr. Brian Blankenship is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Miami. He has published extensively on alliance burden-sharing and reassurance, to include on the effectiveness of US basing posture, joint military exercises, defense spending, and more. He was previously a Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a US foreign policy and international security fellow at Dartmouth College’s Dickey Center for International Understanding. He holds a PhD in political science from Columbia University. His forthcoming book, discussed in this episode, is titled The Burden-Sharing Dilemma: U.S. Coercive Diplomacy and Alliance Politics.
Retired Army Brigadier General Kim Field is currently the director of strategy, plans, and policy at US Special Operations Command. She has previously held multiple senior positions both in the Army and in the Department of State, to include serving as the deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Academically, General Field served as the executive director of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M from 2019 to 2021 and is also a previous assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point.
Major Kyle Wolfley is a US Army strategist at US Cyber Command and recent assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. Kyle’s 2021 award-winning book, Military Statecraft and the Rise of Shaping in the World, is based on his PhD research at Cornell University, and serves as the motivation for today’s conversation.
The Social Science of War podcast is produced by the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. Visit our website if you would like to be a student or teach in the department, or if you would like to connect with any of our instructors based on their expertise.
Kyle Atwell created and is the host of the Social Science of War. Please reach out to Kyle with any questions about this episode or the Social Science of War podcast in general.
Image credit: Sgt. 1st Class Walter E. van Ochten, US Army
mwi.usma.edu · by Kyle Atwell · February 6, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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