“Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally.”  

- George Washington, Farewell Address

“Every reform by violence is to be deprecated, because it does little to correct the evil while men remain as they are, and because wisdom has no need of violence.”

- Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace

Fight for the things that you care about, but do it in a way that will lead others to join you.

- Ruth Bader Ginsburg

• Located 338-kilometers north of the demilitarized zone and only 25-kilometers from the Chinese border in Chagang Province, the Hoejung-ni missile operating base will, according to informed sources, likely house a regiment-sized unit equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).
• Should operational ICBMs not become available in the near term, it is likely that intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) will be deployed. A Hwasong-12 IRBM was launched from Chagang Province on January 30, 2022.
• North Korea is not known to have ever made specific references to the existence of the Hoejung-ni missile operating base. This is the first in-depth open-source reporting confirming the ICBM base, though previous reports of an older base at Yongjo-ni surmised of its existence.
• Although construction began almost 20 years ago, the Hoejung-ni missile operating base represents one of the latest Strategic Forces bases to be completed.
• This long construction timeline suggests a considerable level of prior development planning that is rarely appreciated and was likely linked to projected ICBM developments and basing needs.
• The base is one of approximately 20 ballistic missile operating bases that have never been declared by North Korea. Additionally, it does not appear to have been the subject of any denuclearization negotiations previously conducted between the United States and North Korea.

• While other North Korean ballistic missile operating bases often have UGF entrances near small fordable streams, none have UGF entrances directly on a stream or require a bridge immediately outside the portal to access them. Having either of these characteristics increases the facility’s vulnerability to neutralization from even minor artillery, missile, or air strikes.
• Almost all North Korean ballistic missile operating bases have large protective berms in front of their UGF entrances to help protect them from attack. To date, this facility has none, and it is unlikely that an effective one could be built on the west side of the stream.
• While most existing bases have wide radius turns, the road leading from this facility has a tight 90° turn radius that could present a challenge for ICBM launchers to navigate, especially for longer towed transporter-erectors.
• No North Korean missile operating bases have active mining operations within their confines.

1. While much of the base appears to be externally complete, minor construction is ongoing and the final installation of equipment (and potentially minor construction) of the primary UGF may be ongoing.
2. There are challenges manufacturing finished ICBMs which are operational qualified, as opposed to those for test and evaluation. This is likely a result of both supply chain constraints and competition for limited resources among various programs and design bureaus.
3. There are issues revolving around the supply of sufficient numbers of fully trained missile operators and support personnel and limited opportunities to train with operational missile systems. However, this latter factor may be easing, given the recent missile launches during late-2021 and early-2022.

1. Schmerler, Dave and Jeffery Lewis. “North Korean Missile Base At Yeongjeo-Dong,” Arms Control Wonk, December 6, 2018, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1206442/north-korean-missile-base-at-yeongjeo-dong/. This blog posting was subsequently the source for Choe Sang-hun. “North Korea Is Expanding Missile Base with Eye Toward U.S., Experts Warn,” New York Times, December 6, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/world/asia/north-korea-missile-bases.html.
2. Yongjo-ni is sometimes referred to as Yongjo-ri, Yongjo-dong, or Yeongjeo-dong.
3. Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., Victor Cha and Lisa Collins. “Undeclared North Korea: Missile Operating Bases Revealed,” Beyond Parallel, November 12, 2018, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-koreas-undeclared-missile-operating-bases/.
4. All KPA units have official and cover designations. The latter is what is commonly seen being used in North Korea media. For example, a fictional unit mentioned in Rodong Sinmun might have a cover designation of “KPA Unit 702,” however, its official designation is the “123rd Infantry Division.” Some units also have an honorific name assigned to its official designation in recognition of some significant accomplishment. Using our example “KPA Unit 702” would be the “123rd Guards Infantry Division.” The “Guards” honorific having been applied in recognition of the unit’s accomplishments during the Korean War. To make this more complicated it is not unusual for a cover designation to be randomly changed. Cover designations are sometimes referred to as “military unit cover designation” (MUCD).
5. Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.; Yi Yong-chong: “Taepo Dong-2 Manufactured at Namp’o on Its Way in Camouflage to Launch Site,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 20, 2006; and Hwang, Yang-joon. “North Korea Builds Six Bases for 550 km-range Missiles,” Hankook Ilbo, October 27, 1999.
6. Additionally, at various times over the years, there have been several small footbridges across the stream up and down the valley.
7. Most Korean People’s Army units are responsible for producing a portion of their own food each year.
8. The national designator for the Hoejung-ni missile operating base is unknown.
9. Op cit. Schmerler, Dave and Jeffery Lewis.
10. Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. A brief description of the specialized engineering troops of the KPA’s Military Construction Bureau can be found in Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. Shield of the Great Leader: The Armed Forces of North Korea, (London: I.B. Taurus), 2001.
11. Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

 We call on DPRK to demonstrate a commitment to the wellbeing of its own people by respecting human rights, defunding its unlawful WMD and ballistic missiles program, and prioritizing the needs of its own people – the vulnerable North Koreans.

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"It looks from photos or video shots -- that it exploded above the ground and this is what you do when you want to have a maximum impact on the people on the ground."

"When you master that technology that you're so precise in detonation and the fusing system survives the reentry to the atmosphere, you can do the same with a nuclear device," added Heinonen. "This is, for me, kind of an alarming sign that they have achieved another important threshold that they are able to have the explosion of the warhead above the ground, most likely at the level which they can decide."

“Even if defectors send money, their families are refusing it,” the source continued, adding, “There’s a growing number of North Koreans who would rather live in peace eating only gruel instead of having their family members overseas send money with great difficulty, only to have it stolen by the MSS and get in trouble with the law.”

South Korea has succumbed to Chinese economic retaliation.

In the last month alone, North Korea has launched 11 missiles.

Seoul should recognize the strategic importance of Tokyo.