Quotes of the Day:
“Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally.”
- George Washington, Farewell Address
“Every reform by violence is to be deprecated, because it does little to correct the evil while men remain as they are, and because wisdom has no need of violence.”
- Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace
Fight for the things that you care about, but do it in a way that will lead others to join you.
- Ruth Bader Ginsburg
1. Objective Secure: The Battle-Tested Guide to Goal Achievement
2. How China plays by different rules — at everyone else's expense
3. Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States – International Engineering Services Program (IESP) and Field Surveillance Program (FSP) Support (Patriot)
4. Higher Education’s Confucius Institute Hangover
5. America's Great Security Challenge is China. Why Can't Europe Handle Ukraine?
6. Marines moving to Okinawa need to weigh family safety more than ever
7. Luria: U.S. Needs to Provide 'Strategic Clarity' on Defense of Taiwan
8. A clandestine Army operative concealed his mental health problems until it was too late. Is the military to blame?
9. Young sailors and soldiers are moved out of hot water-less Walter Reed base barracks
10. U.S university reverses decision to remove Olympic protest posters
11. Trump-era nukes, Army programs likeliest FY23 budget cuts: Experts
12. Documents detail U.S. military’s frustration with White House, diplomats over Afghanistan evacuation
13. FDD | Iran 'sham' trial of California resident sparks allegations that world powers have abandoned him
14. Time for More Defense Spending
15. DHS terrorism bulletin warns of focus on synagogues, HBCUs
16. ISIS is regrouping and expanding despite the death of its leader in US raid, experts say
17. The Geopolitical Olympics
18. Special ops wing boss defended female trainee under fire in memo to airmen
19. Channeling the Legacy of Kennan: Theory of Success in Great Power Competition
1. Objective Secure: The Battle-Tested Guide to Goal Achievement
I do not normally recommend these types of books but I am making an exception.
As noted, Nick Lavery is an active duty Green Beret and an amazing American and human being. Few have endured what he has and no one has returned from such catastrophic injuries to continue to serve in combat.. To get to know Nick, I recommend this 13 minute video of LTG Beaudette presenting the OSS Society Peter Ortiz award followed by Nick's speech. It is worth watching and after watching it I think you will want to read his book. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uyTAO4Gs3wk
Objective Secure: The Battle-Tested Guide to Goal Achievement Paperback – January 19, 2022
Nick Lavery is an active-duty Green Beret within the United States Army Special Forces. Although injuries sustained in combat resulted in the above-the-knee amputation of his leg— Nick not only remained in the Army, he returned to his Special Forces Detachment and continues conducting combat operations to this day.
Objective Secure is the methodology Nick employed to return to operational status. It is also the methodology he uses today as he continues this unprecedented journey in service to his country. It is a battle tested guide forged by fire—literally.
Authors Intent
Mission: Reader will absorb the principles and vignettes of Objective Secure at times and locations suitable for maximum focus in order to enhance perspective and facilitate achievement.
Expanded Purpose: Objective Secure was developed to enable those striving toward a goal, those who perceive a goal unobtainable, and those struggling to determine a goal.
Key Tasks:
Read
Ruminate
Implement
End state: Reader has unlocked pre-existing potential. Reader is equipped with a newly acquired series of tools and methodology. Reader recognizes anything is possible with an effective mindset and strategy. Reader employs the Objective Secure system and philosophy, resulting in sustained determination, progress, and inspiration to others.
Strap in for an impactful ride as Nick methodically explains the Objective Secure philosophy and system while also providing a glimpse into the events surrounding its necessary creation and implementation.
The intent is simple—provide readers the tools necessary to achieve any goal no matter how farfetched, unlikely, or impractical it may seem. Period.
2. How China plays by different rules — at everyone else's expense
Excerpts:
Counterintuitively, this inequity presents U.S. leaders with an opportunity, in the form of a demand for reciprocity: Unless China opens its media marketplace to foreign investment and ownership, its firms should be forced to divest their American holdings.
Of course, this demand would be something of a bluff, for China will never open their broadcast media to foreign influence. Still, such a move should provide a fair and reasonable justification for requiring Chinese divestment from U.S. media.
It would also call upon the FCC — which has been loosening restrictions on foreign ownership since 2013, rather than tightening them — to crack down and to investigate chains of ownership and influence more aggressively. In a time of growing disinformation and mistrust, protecting our media from foreign anti-democratic forces is surely a step worth taking.
How China plays by different rules — at everyone else's expense
The Hill · by Christopher Paul, opinion contributor · February 6, 2022
Imagine the U.S. allowing a rival unfettered access not merely to its marketplace, but to its media ecosystem — the fourth pillar of our already fragile democracy. And not just access, but the full-blown ability to own, control, and influence the content. You don’t have to imagine it, because it’s happened — and keeps happening. Chinese companies have successfully burrowed into the U.S. media ecosystem with little to no pushback from U.S. regulators, particularly when it comes to radio stations.
A single Chinese state-run firm, China Radio International (CRI), has secured a controlling interest in at least 33 radio stations in 14 countries — including English language news broadcaster WCRW in Washington, D.C. — to broadcast native language news slanted to favor the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) preferred perspective on events. A 2020 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that “Nearly every Chinese language news outlet in the U.S. is either owned by, or works closely with the Party — and it is making inroads into English language media as well. There are more than a dozen radio stations in cities across the country where Americans hear subtle pro-Beijing propaganda on their FM radio.”
Still, one might argue, these are Chinese companies, not the Chinese government, owning a stake in U.S. media. How is that any different from Mexican-owned Grupo Multimedia’s ownership and control of Spanish-language FM stations in California and Arizona? It is very different, because there is little separation between Chinese companies and the Chinese government.
CCP officials serve on the boards of the companies, or the owners of companies are CCP officials. In the U.S., it is still the expectation that our political leaders will divest or at minimum give up some control of their business interests when elected. Even former President Trump passed control of the Trump Organization and other holdings — albeit not to a blind trust — to a trust run by his sons before his inauguration. All Chinese firms are to some extent state-run, or at least state-influenced or state-subservient in a way that is incomprehensible in the U.S.
The FCC does monitor foreign ownership of radio stations, but China’s CRI complicates these reviews through obfuscation: by making purchases through shell companies, or through owning a partial stake (or several partial stakes) in a nominally American media group, camouflaging the extent of their influence or control while making it appear to the FCC that Chinese interest is less than 25 percent. While China takes full advantage of the opportunities of the free market, and Chinese firms buy up U.S. media, foreign firms are denied similar access in China. Chinese state-controlled media has a lock on the Chinese domestic market, with virtually no opportunity for foreign ownership, input, or influence.
Counterintuitively, this inequity presents U.S. leaders with an opportunity, in the form of a demand for reciprocity: Unless China opens its media marketplace to foreign investment and ownership, its firms should be forced to divest their American holdings.
Of course, this demand would be something of a bluff, for China will never open their broadcast media to foreign influence. Still, such a move should provide a fair and reasonable justification for requiring Chinese divestment from U.S. media.
It would also call upon the FCC — which has been loosening restrictions on foreign ownership since 2013, rather than tightening them — to crack down and to investigate chains of ownership and influence more aggressively. In a time of growing disinformation and mistrust, protecting our media from foreign anti-democratic forces is surely a step worth taking.
Christopher Paul is a senior social scientist at the non-profit, non-partisan RAND Corporation, where his research focuses on national security and the information environment.
The Hill · by Christopher Paul, opinion contributor · February 6, 2022
3. Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States – International Engineering Services Program (IESP) and Field Surveillance Program (FSP) Support (Patriot)
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States – International Engineering Services Program (IESP) and Field Surveillance Program (FSP) Support | Defense Security Cooperation Agency
PDF Version
Media/Public Contact
pm-cpa@state.gov
Transmittal No
21-66
WASHINGTON, February 7, 2022 - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) of equipment and services to support participation in the Patriot International Engineering Services Program (IESP) and Field Surveillance Program (FSP) for five years, including engineering services support, designed to sustain, maintain, and improve the Patriot Air Defense System for an estimated cost of $100 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.
TECRO has requested to buy equipment and services to support participation in the Patriot International Engineering Services Program (IESP) and Field Surveillance Program (FSP) for five years, including engineering services support, designed to sustain, maintain, and improve the Patriot Air Defense System within the performance envelope described in the system specification through the investigation and resolution of identified problems; missile field surveillance support for legacy (Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM)) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles, designed to ensure the reliability and performance of the Patriot missile through storage and aging programs, surveillance firing programs, and configuration management; legacy and PAC-3 missile stockpile reliability testing, to provide quantitative reliability assessments of the deployed missile round; U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support, and other related elements of program support. Participation in the shared IESP and FSP for the life of the Patriot system is a requirement of the U.S. Government. The total estimated program cost is $100.0 million.
This proposed sale is consistent with U.S. law and policy as expressed in Public Law 96-8.
This proposed sale serves U.S. national, economic, and security interests by supporting the recipient’s continuing efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability. The proposed sale will help improve the security of the recipient and assist in maintaining political stability, military balance, economic and progress in the region.
The proposed sale will help to sustain the recipient’s missile density and ensure readiness for air operations. The recipient will use this capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen homeland defense. The recipient will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and services into its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.
The prime contractors will be Raytheon Technologies in Andover, MA; and Lockheed Martin in Camden, AK. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the permanent assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to recipient. Support teams will travel to recipient on a temporary basis.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.
This notice of a potential sale is required by law. The description and dollar value is for the highest estimated quantity and dollar value based on initial requirements. Actual dollar value will be lower depending on final requirements, budget authority, and signed sales agreement(s), if and when concluded.
All questions regarding this proposed Foreign Military Sale should be directed to the State Department's Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, pm-cpa@state.gov.
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4. Higher Education’s Confucius Institute Hangover
Excerpts:
For its part, Congress should pass legislation that withholds certain types of federal funding for U.S. universities that maintain contractual or formal relationships with these problematic Chinese universities. Similar legislation that barred U.S. universities that host CIs from receiving Defense Department language funding resulted in more than a dozen CI closures. Complementary funding guardrails should also be incorporated into the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, which significantly increases R&D investments at U.S. universities. Doing so could prevent Beijing from actively or passively reaping the benefits of these new investments.
Congress and the executive branch also ought to increase transparency surrounding CI contracts and foreign partnership agreements by mandating that U.S. universities publish copies of these documents. Efforts should also be made to levy export restrictions on these Chinese universities, which operate as end-users for the Chinese military.
Lastly, the State Department should expand the grounds for denying visas to Chinese students and researchers from Chinese institutions with military ties. This type of tailored enforcement – one that would apply to approximately 90 Chinese universities or only about three percent of all Chinese institutions of higher education – would allow Chinese students to study in the United States so long as they are not affiliated with schools supporting Beijing’s military build-up.
The Biden administration and bipartisan coalitions in Congress recognize that more must be done to outcompete Chinese tech innovation. That requires more than simply boosting domestic R&D expenditures. It also means cutting off China’s illicit pathways to acquiring American know-how and next-generation innovation. Doing otherwise runs the risk of further prolonging U.S. higher education’s already painful Confucius hangover.
Higher Education’s Confucius Institute Hangover
February 08, 2022
How U.S. Universities Support Beijing’s Military-Industrial Complex
The conviction of acclaimed Harvard scientist Charles Lieber on charges stemming from his improper relationship with the Chinese government has sent shockwaves throughout U.S. higher education. Lieber’s case laid bare China’s efforts to blur the traditional boundaries between academia, defense research, and the private sector to advance its military and technological modernization. These under-the-radar tactics make illicit knowledge and technology transfer very difficult to detect.
Unfortunately, they are just the tip of the iceberg.
A new report by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) reveals that dozens of America’s top research universities have quietly entered into academic and research partnerships with the same Chinese schools working to give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a technological advantage over the U.S. military. U.S. law does not require U.S. universities to disclose the details of such partnerships, even though Beijing has made clear that it intends to harvest cutting-edge American innovation to underwrite its military modernization and nuclear weapons program.
What all of the report’s problematic partnerships share in common is that they can be traced back to decisions by these U.S. and Chinese universities to jointly operate Confucius Institutes (CIs), which are Chinese government-sponsored organizations that offer Chinese language and cultural programming worldwide. CIs have come under fire for promoting the CCP’s preferred political narratives and encouraging the harassment of those on campus who criticize the regime. This latest research reveals that they also advance facets of China’s military-civil fusion, a national strategy aimed at acquiring the world’s cutting-edge technologies to achieve Chinese military dominance.
U.S. universities have long championed academic and research partnerships with Chinese universities as a win-win. By attracting top Chinese talent, U.S. universities dramatically exceeded enrollment and revenue targets. Formalizing such partnerships, which outline everything from exchange programs to joint research initiatives, is also standard operating procedure when a U.S. university establishes a CI program. In those instances, U.S. universities enter into contractual relationships with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to manage their CI operations, as well as a separate contract with a CCP-selected civilian university to support the CI’s programming. Troublingly, these separate contracts, many of which promote joint research collaboration in new and emerging fields, often remain active for years after a CI closure.
Beijing established CIs mainly at America’s top research universities, often referred to as ‘R1’ and ‘R2’ research centers. Before the recent wave of CI closures that began in 2018, more than 70 percent of all CIs were located at one of these U.S. research hubs. These same universities are often affiliated with the National Industrial Security Program (NISP), a Defense Department-led initiative that vets contractors and universities that receive millions of tax-payer dollars to perform classified work. Less surprising is that many of the Chinese sister universities chosen to support these CI programs have also been tapped by the CCP to spearhead defense innovation in fields ranging from nuclear weapons design and submarine development to cyber-espionage and materials science.
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Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made clear his intention to harness the power of academia and civilian research to achieve Chinese military superiority. In a recent speech, Xi stated the CCP would “exhaust all means” to lure tech talent to China. Central to Xi’s strategy are government programs that sponsor Chinese students and researchers specializing in more than 200 academic ‘disciplines with national defense characteristics’ (or 国防特色学科) to study at America’s elite research colleges, after which they are expected to return to China and support its defense build-up. This initiative and others like it, including China’s Thousand Talents and Double First-Class University Plan (世界一流大学和一 流学科建设), are unapologetically aimed at supporting China’s military-civil fusion.
Despite the national security implications of partnering with China, U.S. universities alone decide whether to enter into foreign academic and research relationships. There is no requirement that they coordinate with federal or local authorities, nor are universities required to conduct any formal due diligence on their foreign partners. Neither are U.S. universities required by law to publicly disclose copies of their CI contracts or information about their foreign partnerships. Shockingly, U.S. universities do not even have a legal or regulatory obligation to sever ties with Chinese universities supporting China’s defense industry. For instance, schools can legally maintain partnerships with Chinese universities formally identified as threats to U.S. national security, including those placed on the Commerce Department’s Entity List.
The case of my alma mater, Texas A&M University, is emblematic of how some universities have paid lip service to addressing the Chinese threat while continuing business as usual. Texas A&M, an R1 entity and NISP partner, shuttered its CI in 2018, citing national security concerns raised by Representatives Michael McCaul (R-TX) and Henry Cuellar (D-TX). However, A&M maintained its academic and research partnership with its Chinese sister school, Ocean University. While Texas A&M boasts about its “award winning” Research Security Office’s vetting procedures, a simple internet search reveals that Ocean University has signed multiple strategic cooperation agreements with the People’s Liberation Army Navy to support classified military projects. More disturbing is that such arrangements go back more than a decade, during which time A&M received millions in donations from Ocean University.
A&M also maintains at least half a dozen other partnerships with Chinese universities that, among other things, collaborate with China’s National Transportation War Readiness Office and design crystals used in China’s nuclear weapons research. One of A&M’s partners, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, has even been implicated in cyber-attacks on the United States.
Sadly, A&M is not alone. At least 16 other R1 and R2 universities - including Arizona State University, Tufts, Rutgers, the College of William and Mary, the University of Washington, and Emory - shuttered their CIs but elected to maintain similar partnership schemes with problematic Chinese universities. This figure does not include the 28 additional U.S. universities which, despite ample warnings, continue to host a CI. Of those, at least ten jointly operate their CIs with Chinese civilian universities with direct links to China’s military and cyber-espionage platforms. Those schools include Stanford, the University of Utah, and the University of Toledo.
Not all collaboration between U.S. and Chinese universities entails security risks. But common sense dictates that America’s top research institutions should not be engaging in any meaningful way with Chinese universities with formal research links to China’s military. If history is any guide, however, U.S. universities will resist severing these ties until the U.S. government takes concrete steps to suspend their federal funding.
A targeted approach should mirror current Defense Department-led efforts to publicly identify Chinese companies linked to military-civil fusion. This could include an annual reporting requirement for the Defense Department, in collaboration with the Department of Education and the Intelligence Community, to identify Chinese civilian universities supporting China’s defense and military establishment. Currently, no such effort exists.
For its part, Congress should pass legislation that withholds certain types of federal funding for U.S. universities that maintain contractual or formal relationships with these problematic Chinese universities. Similar legislation that barred U.S. universities that host CIs from receiving Defense Department language funding resulted in more than a dozen CI closures. Complementary funding guardrails should also be incorporated into the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, which significantly increases R&D investments at U.S. universities. Doing so could prevent Beijing from actively or passively reaping the benefits of these new investments.
Congress and the executive branch also ought to increase transparency surrounding CI contracts and foreign partnership agreements by mandating that U.S. universities publish copies of these documents. Efforts should also be made to levy export restrictions on these Chinese universities, which operate as end-users for the Chinese military.
Lastly, the State Department should expand the grounds for denying visas to Chinese students and researchers from Chinese institutions with military ties. This type of tailored enforcement – one that would apply to approximately 90 Chinese universities or only about three percent of all Chinese institutions of higher education – would allow Chinese students to study in the United States so long as they are not affiliated with schools supporting Beijing’s military build-up.
The Biden administration and bipartisan coalitions in Congress recognize that more must be done to outcompete Chinese tech innovation. That requires more than simply boosting domestic R&D expenditures. It also means cutting off China’s illicit pathways to acquiring American know-how and next-generation innovation. Doing otherwise runs the risk of further prolonging U.S. higher education’s already painful Confucius hangover.
Craig Singleton, a national security expert and former U.S. diplomat, is a senior China fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a non-partisan think tank focused on national security and foreign policy. He recently published a research monograph entitled, “The Middle Kingdom Meets Higher Education – How U.S. Universities Support China’s Military-Industrial Complex.”
5. America's Great Security Challenge is China. Why Can't Europe Handle Ukraine?
Excerpt:
The one area where pivot critics are correct is the time and attention of decision-makers. Elites have only so much time and mental energy. Time spent on Russia is not spent on China. The pivot is hard, as it requires US policy-makers to learn more about Asian history and cultures. The sheer familiarity of the Atlantic architecture is likely one reason for the Biden administration’s comfort with the Ukraine issue. But the long-term challenge is still China, and the sooner the Europeans can take over the European portfolio, the better. It is overdue for US decision-makers to follow the pivot.
America's Great Security Challenge is China. Why Can't Europe Handle Ukraine?
As the Ukraine crisis heats up, its impact on the US effort to re-balance to Asia, specifically against China, has arisen. The consensus is that, for the most part, a renewed US focus on European security will pull US resources and policy-maker attention away from Asia and back toward Europe. In a similar manner, the US has hitherto struggled to focus on East Asia, as China took off in the last two decades, because of the war on terror. Yet China is of far greater import to the US in the coming decades than either Eastern Europe or the greater Middle East. On that, there is near consensus in the foreign policy community now.
In a strictly mathematical sense, of course, these concerns are accurate. Scarcity and opportunity costs mean that any US resources, troops, time, and so on devoted to Europe do not go to Asia. Were the US to be pulled into a major conflict in eastern Europe – which it should not do – that would be a major diversion from grappling with China, just as the spiraling war on terror became. But that scenario is unlikely.
Should Ukraine avoid full-scale war, there are two reasons – European joint defense and the huge US national security budget – why the US should be able to remain responsibly – i.e., limitedly – involved in Ukraine while still pursuing the pivot to Asia.
European Allies should be Taking the Lead
Elsewhere in these pages, I have argued that the most pressing issue emergent from the Ukraine crisis – after Ukraine’s own fate – is the European Union’s continuing geopolitical paralysis. European leaders have talked for decades about a European defense identity. They took umbrage when former US President Donald Trump accused them of free-riding. And the vision of two liberal superpowers in the world – not just one – is powerfully attractive. A European Union which could act coherently and in tandem with the US would hugely improve the position of democracy in the world and present a far stronger front against autocracies like China and Russia.
If that is too much, then at least European countries should grasp the obvious logic of Russian predation on their eastern flank and build some long-overdue jointness. Some have, but the passivity of large states like Germany, France, and Italy is fairly disturbing. The problem of US over-extension in Eastern Europe at the cost of ducking China once again would immediately be alleviated by a joint European voice. If the Europeans simply refuse to do this, even as their own security is at stake, then at some point the US should let them carry their own mistakes.
US National Security Spending is so High that It should be Enough
An obvious answer to constraints on resources is to simply spend more in order to do more. And the United States certainly does that. The US spends between 700 and 800 billion dollars per year on defense. Its wider national security budget – including security-related spending outside the Department of Defense budget – is around one trillion dollars per annum. In absolute numbers, that is more than twice what China and Russia spend combined. And that does not include wealthy US allies, such as Germany and Britain in Europe, or Japan and South Korea in Asia. Those allies certainly could, and should, spend more, but the sheer volume of money available is massive and should be more than enough for the US and its allies to handle crises – although not necessarily all-out wars – with China and Russia simultaneously.
In the past, this was known as the ‘two major regional contingency’ (two-mrc) strategy. This faded somewhat during the war on terror. The US was sucked into counterinsurgency insertions across a wide swath of territory at spiraling cost. But with that over – President Biden explicitly wound down the Afgan War last year to open space for the pivot – the US should have the resources, with its allies, to push back on China and Russia simultaneously, at least in limited contingencies. And European military integration and rationalization would make all that much easier by bringing a larger pool of resources to the European theater
The Real Issue is Time and Attention
The one area where pivot critics are correct is the time and attention of decision-makers. Elites have only so much time and mental energy. Time spent on Russia is not spent on China. The pivot is hard, as it requires US policy-makers to learn more about Asian history and cultures. The sheer familiarity of the Atlantic architecture is likely one reason for the Biden administration’s comfort with the Ukraine issue. But the long-term challenge is still China, and the sooner the Europeans can take over the European portfolio, the better. It is overdue for US decision-makers to follow the pivot.
Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; website) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University. Dr. Kelly is a 1945 Contributing Editor as well.
6. Marines moving to Okinawa need to weigh family safety more than ever
When would we conduct a NEO for Okianwa? Or mainland Japan?
Marines moving to Okinawa need to weigh family safety more than ever
The Hill · by Lt. Col. Michael E. Feuquay, opinion contributor · February 7, 2022
As we begin a new year, many military service members and their families have shifted focus to an upcoming summer move. For those moving, the opportunity to learn and perform a new job, make new friends or renew past friendships, and experience a new location can be exciting. For many Marines, an overseas move to Okinawa, Japan, will be their summer destination. Okinawa is a great location with much to offer for both Marines and their families. However, stability in the Asia-Pacific region is diminishing as a direct result of aggressive policy and actions of the People's Republic of China (PRC). As a result, Marines must now consider family safety as a factor in their upcoming move.
It’s one thing for a Marine to deploy to a region with increasing aggression from a rising adversary; it’s what we sign up to do. It’s quite another to add concern about the safety of your family in a foreign land.
For decades, family safety concerns at a new duty station have not been a top consideration. Professionally, I am excited about the opportunity of returning to Okinawa and joining the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF). As the Marine Corps’ main effort, I can count on a tour that is demanding and personally rewarding. In my previous Okinawa tour, a decade ago, my wife and I thoroughly enjoyed the experience. Unfortunately, this time feels different as I view this upcoming move through the lens of husband and father. I find myself more concerned than excited.
The source of my concern lies in the aforementioned actions of the PRC. Daily headlines point to actions and rhetoric by PRC leadership indicating their determination to upset both the regional and global status quo. Whether it be hypersonic missile tests, island fortifications in the South China Sea, or threatening to unify Taiwan, the PRC’s actions have undeniably threatened regional security. It is clear the PRC is on the move, focused on achieving the “China Dream” of ultimately surpassing the U.S. to become the preeminent global power or “center of the world.”
While the United States views our military presence in Okinawa as a force for good, the PRC’s perspective is decidedly much different.
Due to its strategic importance to the U.S. and the PRC’s unwavering pursuit of the “China Dream,” it is not unreasonable to think that Okinawa could find itself caught in the proverbial crosshairs.
The intent of my writing is not to incite fear or call for policy change; rather, it is to share an example of the sacrifice Marines and other U.S. service members face. I am certain Marine Corps leadership would send dependents home should intelligence reports indicate an imminent threat to those on the island of Okinawa; however, with the PRC’s growing confidence and unpredictability, inbound families should take a closer look at potential threats to safety.
Typically, decisions to be a “geographic bachelor” — that is, to leave family members in the U.S. while the service member moves to the forward location — revolve around personal finance or family education considerations. Family safety and security have not previously been major decision factors: they are today.
Ultimately, Marines and their families have a choice. That choice will be to decide whether to be with one’s family, which most desire, or to expose the family to potential harm.
Gen. Stalder was correct when he said Marines are willing to die in defense of Japan. Marines and other U.S. service families now have to consider if they are willing to subject their families to the same standard.
It’s a tough choice which only highlights the sacrifices military families make day in and day out.
Lt. Col. Michael E. Feuquay, U.S. Marine Corps, is a Hoover National Security Affairs Fellow. This piece has been cleared by the U.S. Marine Corps for release; the views expressed here are those of the author and do not constitute endorsement by the U.S. Marine Corps, the Defense Department, or any part of the U.S. government.
The Hill · by Lt. Col. Michael E. Feuquay, opinion contributor · February 7, 2022
7. Luria: U.S. Needs to Provide 'Strategic Clarity' on Defense of Taiwan
Excerpts:
“We need to have the debate in Congress now, not when [the Chinese are] halfway across the strait.” Luria added, “We should not take for granted their will” to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control even if they lack amphibious assault capability.
The American public needs to realize what’s at stake in Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, she said, adding, “Do you want the Chinese to take over [from the U.S.] as the world influencer?”
Although the government is still operating under the constraints of a continuing resolution almost halfway through this fiscal year, Luria didn’t expect to see plus-ups for the Navy when the administration submits its fiscal year 2023 request.
“I think more resources need to go to the Navy and Air Force [due to] the nature” of the Indo-Pacific, and the expected emphasis the theater will receive in the new defense strategy due out this month, she said. Past spending has been roughly divided into three equal parts for the services.
Luria: U.S. Needs to Provide 'Strategic Clarity' on Defense of Taiwan - USNI News
Taiwan’s indigenous fighter. CNA Photo
The United States must “provide strategic clarity” on what Washington would do if China invaded Taiwan, the vice chair of the House Armed Services Committee said Monday.
Rep. Elaine Luria (D-Va.) added, “We need to say [as an administration and Congress] we will come to the aid of Taiwan.” She said the time for Congress to act is now so that the president will have the authority to respond militarily to such an event, which current law does not provide.
“We need to have the debate in Congress now, not when [the Chinese are] halfway across the strait.” Luria added, “We should not take for granted their will” to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control even if they lack amphibious assault capability.
The American public needs to realize what’s at stake in Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, she said, adding, “Do you want the Chinese to take over [from the U.S.] as the world influencer?”
Although the government is still operating under the constraints of a continuing resolution almost halfway through this fiscal year, Luria didn’t expect to see plus-ups for the Navy when the administration submits its fiscal year 2023 request.
“I think more resources need to go to the Navy and Air Force [due to] the nature” of the Indo-Pacific, and the expected emphasis the theater will receive in the new defense strategy due out this month, she said. Past spending has been roughly divided into three equal parts for the services.
“We can’t just build a new fleet in five years,” she said.
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday reenlists Sailors on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) on Feb. 24, 2021. US Navy photo.
She expected “more of the same cuts in shipbuilding” coming forward in the new budget request.t. In the relatively near future 27 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers will be coming up on the end of their service life, and decisions need to be made about possible upgrades and continued service. “It was criminal what we did to the cruisers,” Luria said.
She added that the Navy is studying refueling USS Nimitz (CVN-68) a second time to extend its service life.
“We’re always shooting for the newest things,” like artificial intelligence and quantum computing breakthroughs that could change warfare. “Sounds great [but] the truth is you can’t get rid of the platform,” she said.
On budgeting, Luria wants the services to come to the House Armed Services Committee with presentations that say, “This is what we need; here’s the risk” if those needs aren’t met, as John Lehman did when he was Navy secretary. Otherwise, it’s a “shell game” of publicly supporting the administration’s request and then submitting a list of unfunded requirements, she said.
“Truth is, there was commitment from the top” from President Ronald Reagan for an approach like Lehman’s, which is needed today from President Joseph Biden.
While Navy officials answered questions about the budget, Luria said several times that the Navy has yet to present to Congress with an updated shipbuilding plan that could help decision-making on Capitol Hill.
That plan, along with details about the Navy’s long-time repair needs, also helps private shipyards, like Electric Boat and Newport News, in adjusting the size of their workforce and potentially expanding,and can encourage other companies to look for Navy work.
“We also need to be able to invest in our private yards,” Luria said, to spread out construction on new classes like frigates. She added that Electric Boat and Newport News, in addition to delivering Virginia-class submarines, developing Columbia class and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, are now being asked to also take on major repair work.
“There’s only so much capacity on the waterfront” with public and private yards now, she said. Delays in return to service will only worsen as more ships join the fleet, she added, and other ships need necessary major maintenance to keep them in service if more yards aren’t available.
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8. A clandestine Army operative concealed his mental health problems until it was too late. Is the military to blame?
A clandestine Army operative concealed his mental health problems until it was too late. Is the military to blame?
Sat, February 5, 2022, 5:00 AM·16 min read
Michael Froede in Afghanistan in 2011. (Courtesy of Joanne Wolff)
Michael Froede suspected he was being followed. For weeks after he returned from a highly classified mission in Vietnam, he would see people watching him in Washington, D.C. They’d be parked outside his house or tailing him while driving. Sometimes while on the road, Froede would pull a U-turn and swing back around on the suspected surveillance team to take their pictures, to let them know that he knew they were there.
At 9:30 a.m. on June 23, 2019, Froede drove his Dodge Ram to the third floor of the Carroll Creek parking garage in Frederick, Md. After backing into a parking space, he sat back in his seat, lit up a Camel cigarette and flicked the ash out the window.
Froede was a member of a secret Army unit known by the innocuous-sounding cover name Communications Technology Research Activity, or COMTECH, part of an elite group of Army hackers who received tasks from the National Security Agency. Working from the U.S. or deployed abroad, Froede was one of America’s secret soldiers, a military spy.
Froede finished his first cigarette, dropped it out the window and lit up a second. The next day he was due to see his two daughters, 9 and 12 years old, to spend a full month of leave with them.
Yet his recent behavior had seemed erratic to supervisors and peers at COMTECH, which was based out of Fort Meade. His supervisors had referred him to Barquist Army Health Clinic just four days earlier, but he was released after doctors there decided he wasn’t a danger to himself or others.
Froede put out his second cigarette. Leaving his cellphone on the driver’s seat, he closed the window and locked his truck, putting the keys in his pocket. Security camera footage showed him milling around his vehicle for a few minutes.
Then he turned and threw himself off the side of the parking garage.
He landed three stories down, where pedestrians found him 10 minutes later. Alive, but with massive head injuries, he was rushed to the hospital and put on life support.
Froede was indeed a clandestine soldier who worked highly classified operations for the United States Army in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. But the rest was a paranoid delusion.
Froede was not being followed, but rather, according to his family and an Army investigation, he had been suffering from a number of undiagnosed mental health ailments, some of which stemmed from a traumatic brain injury he had received as a young infantry soldier over 10 years prior as a result of a bomb blast in Iraq. Highly intelligent and trained in the arts of deception, Froede hid his disability from nearly everyone around him for over a decade out of fear that he would lose the career he loved, according to interviews with family members and medical records.
His suicide left friends, family and teammates wondering what more the Army could have done to prevent his death. It also raised larger questions about the health care for America’s clandestine operatives. Froede had successfully concealed his mental health issues until the last few months of his life, lying his way through rigorous screening processes. Army investigators concluded that he had built an entire false persona around himself to keep up a facade of normalcy, something he was trained to do.
“That was what he did with his whole job. He pretended to be someone he wasn’t and go places we were not supposed to be and do things we are not supposed to do,” Kate Kemplin, his ex-wife, told Yahoo News. “And you are telling me you have no clinical method to tell when they are not telling you the truth? It blows my mind.”
Kemplin blames the Army for not doing more. “You just accept everything they say?” she added. “That’s dumb. At the very least it is negligent.”
In December 2007 a roadside bomb detonated under Froede’s vehicle during a mounted patrol in Iraq. When the medics conducted a visual inspection, Froede didn’t appear physically injured, but Kemplin, then his wife, was skeptical. At the time she was halfway through her master’s degree studying traumatic brain injury, and she had seen soldiers coming back with these injuries as a nurse at the hospital at Fort Bragg.
Kemplin called his infantry unit’s surgeon, whom she knew professionally, and suggested that her husband get an MRI scan. “I know just enough about TBI to be a real pain in your ass about this,” she told him. He was polite, she recalled, but declined her request.
“If we did that for every single soldier, we would set the MRI machine on fire,” he told her, she recounted.
But when Froede returned home from Iraq, Kemplin noticed changes in his behavior. He would get headaches, and he was irritable and would become angry for irrational reasons. She tried to get him help, but Froede was afraid it would affect his career. She even arranged for him to see a psychologist off the books without the Army knowing about it, but he refused.
Froede, third from left, in Iraq in 2007. (Courtesy of Joanne Wolff)
Meanwhile, Froede was trained to become a human intelligence, or HUMINT, collector, a job that involved working with and recruiting human intelligence sources — spies. As a HUMINT collector, he worked with a small team as a part of the larger special operations task force in Afghanistan during 2011.
Numerous deployments followed, including trips to North Africa. In 2015 he was deployed to Chad as a member of Third Special Forces Group in support of a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) mission, setting up intelligence collection systems and repeaters to listen in on Boko Haram, the terrorist group that was raiding and pillaging villages in the country at that time.
In 2017, Froede entered the Great Skill Program, a nontraditional career path for soldiers who conduct clandestine human intelligence operations and cyberwarfare. He attended additional training as a military spy, and his identity would have been protected by DASR, a classified database containing the names of spies and special operators.
While his career was on track, Froede was struggling with his personal life. His marriage deteriorated, and Kemplin divorced him. He remarried, but that marriage also collapsed.
Kemplin said he was taking medications, such as Effexor, to treat himself for symptoms he believed were linked to his traumatic brain injury. But he was taking those medications illegally, without a prescription, to hide it from the Army. He went off the meds entirely when he joined COMTECH because he was afraid they would show up during drug testing and he would lose his clearance and be kicked out of the unit.
Froede in Chad in 2016. (Courtesy of Joanne Wolff)
Even without those medications, Froede managed to project an image of a healthy, high-functioning soldier, at least for his Army superiors, who appeared to be unaware of his issues.
As a highly trained human intelligence collector, he was essentially a trained liar. “Froede was extremely well-versed in establishing a persona and was able to present the necessary front to avoid further advanced treatment or inpatient hospitalization due to his distrust in the providers and those around him,” an Army investigation report into his death stated.
In the meantime, Froede completed eight deployments to various theaters of operation, some of them classified assignments. He was also facing personal tragedies. In October 2018, his father, a recovering alcoholic, died. A few months later, in January 2019, a colleague at COMTECH, Shannon Kent, was killed by a suicide bomber in Syria. “That hit him really hard,” said his mother, Joanne Wolff. “He was devastated.”
The facade that Froede built up appeared to be crumbling, but he continued working sensitive deployments, including as part of a small team sent to Vietnam ahead of then-President Donald Trump’s expected summit with North Korean leadership.
Upon their return to the United States, his teammates began to notice that Froede was becoming increasingly paranoid and erratic, expressing mistrust of friends, family and teammates. After hearing him talk about how he was constantly being followed and monitored, they suggested he get some mental health care.
In May 2019 he presented himself as a walk-in for symptoms of anxiety and paranoia and completed three sessions with a psychotherapist. However, “SFC Froede consistently denied any suicidal ideations, plans, intent or past attempts,” an Army investigation concluded, but also noted he was sending emails to his brother, “referencing the government following him and interrogating him through his therapist.”
That month, he also sent an email to his command sergeant major in his unit with an attached handwritten letter requesting that he be taken off the current mission. “I have spent months deployed, been TDY over 112 weeks, I have had two marriages fail and do not live with my children...all because I believe that my efforts overseas would keep the fight out of the neighborhood my children live in and they could worry about what version of smart phone they have instead of their own safety,” he wrote.
Due to his mental health issues, Froede felt alone and ostracized by his teammates. “My peers do not want to talk to me anymore,” he wrote.
The letter he attached detailed his affair with a unit member who, he wrote, in turn cheated on him with a married officer in the unit. It then went into his paranoid beliefs that he was under surveillance by his Army unit because he felt the woman he'd had the affair with reported him as an insider threat in retaliation for his reporting the affair, which would be against Army regulations regarding adultery and fraternization.
Froede with his first wife, Kate Kemplin, and his two daughters. (Courtesy of Joanne Wolff)
Later, the command sergeant major said he had a conversation with Froede about the email and letter. and that at the time Froede seemed “on edge, overly nervous and by his own admission ‘paranoid.’ He seemed tired, stressed and did not articulate himself with the same fluidity as in our previous engagements.”
He also told a teammate during a smoke break about how he was being tailed and followed by a surveillance team. He explained that they would follow him to North Carolina, and on a trip to Disneyland, where he said they had people watching him during his flight. His mother told Yahoo News he kept a notebook of license plates belonging to vehicles he believed were following him. At one point, a teammate visited him and found that he had removed all the lightbulbs in his home from their sockets, believing they were used to eavesdrop on him.
By June, Froede was in a final downward spiral. He had scheduled leave and was preparing his apartment for the arrival of his two daughters. After sending the letter to his sergeant major, he was referred to Barquist Army Health Clinic, where providers found him not to be a threat to himself or others. He also requested that the clinic not communicate with his unit about his treatment or condition.
Froede’s teammate whom he had previously confided in, and also copied on his bizarre letter, remained in touch with him. The teammate even persuaded him to see an operational psychologist at Meade Behavioral Health. But while sharing a cigarette outside one of the unit’s buildings in June, Froede made a startling admission, telling his teammate that if he were ever to kill himself, he’d jump.
“There is a nice parking garage in Frederick by the river,” he said, smiling and laughing as if it were a joke. He also stated that he no longer trusted his mental health care providers, believing his therapist to be an undercover CIA interrogator. “I just don’t trust it,” Froede said. “The [surveillance] teams just won’t leave me alone.”
In the days leading up to his death, Froede could not recognize his own co-workers in the office, his mother was told by his colleagues after his death. He even had to be walked to his truck in the parking lot because he could not recognize it.
On June 23, 2019, Kemplin received an email from her ex-husband that read: “I went to behavioral health for PTSD and it was really a CIA interrogator. I can’t sue the U.S. Government but you can.”
Hours later, she received a phone call that Froede was in the hospital in critical condition. She got in her car and began driving to Maryland.
The next day, after she arrived, his family members made the decision to take Froede off life support.
For America’s clandestine operatives, getting mental health care can be particularly challenging. “There is always going to be a concern that if I self-report, people fear they will lose their security clearance or at least their job,” said Douglas London, who served as a CIA operations officer for 34 years. “I think folks are reluctant to admit to a weakness.”
London said both the CIA and the military intelligence community have made psychologists available to their personnel, but often it’s not enough. “You have folks who are superconfident, usually have an ego, and believe through sheer force of will you can overcome any impediment, so how do you offset that?” he said.
Those struggling can be referred but not forced to seek mental health care, and London pointed out that it runs up against HIPAA, privacy issues and potential litigation.
Under the current rules, co-workers can report their colleagues for being potential inside threats but cannot report them as someone who just needs to see a therapist. “It’s hard to find that balance,” London said, noting that the CIA now provides mental health professionals to employees who can be seen without alerting the chain of command.
But there’s still a reluctance among many to seek help, a Joint Special Operations Command source said, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “Unfortunately, it’s a performance game. If you can do the job, less questions are asked,” the source said. “Also the guys don’t report it because they want to be in the game.”
There remains a stigma around mental health care in compartmentalized intelligence units, according to an Army intelligence official who asked not to be named because of the classified nature of his work. “This is huge, as the major item we are assessed for and relied on is our emotional intelligence, cognition and ability to operate in ambiguity, disconnected from being ‘green,’ to operate in the gray and not look and smell like [Special Operations Forces] guys,” he explained.
The Army Intelligence Command (INSCOM), under which COMTECH falls, declined to answer a detailed list of questions about mental health issues affecting soldiers assigned to the command, citing a new investigation into Froede’s death.
Froede with his children. (Courtesy of Joanne Wolff)
Statistics about mental health care for clandestine Army personnel are not publicly available, but anecdotal evidence suggests that INSCOM has a growing problem with suicides. The command’s senior enlisted leader killed himself in 2020, and the previous INSCOM commander, Gary Johnston, who oversaw the investigations into Froede’s and his own sergeant major’s deaths, took his own life in early 2022.
The stresses that soldiers face are often compounded when they return home. “Eighty percent of the time, our operations, deployments and training are classified, and we aren’t permitted to tell the family,” the intelligence official said. “So lots of details to remember include what not to bring back home, and the more you do, the more your secrets have secrets.”
Froede was not alone in his struggles. A few months later, in September, two members of the highly secretive JSOC intelligence unit known as Task Force Orange took their own lives, sending shock waves through the Army’s clandestine community.
A spokesperson for Special Operations Command declined to discuss classified units but stated that “the command is consistently improving its behavior health care through innovative interventions and training providers on evidence-based therapies.”
Yahoo News obtained and reviewed Froede’s entire Army medical record and found a single document from 2009 in which he sought treatment for PTSD after his deployment to Iraq. He self-reported feeling paranoid, stating that fears of combat would take over when he saw cars or people coming too close, and he felt they were following him even though they were not. This led to a strong physical and emotional reaction, including rapid heart and breath rates and feelings of suffocation and trembling.
Those symptoms appear similar to the ones he experienced in 2019 prior to his death.
For 70 years, military doctors and health care providers were exempt from malpractice lawsuits. However, when Trump signed the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, it created a crack in that policy, known as the Feres Doctrine. Service members can now file claims for compensation using the Federal Torts Claim Act. Froede’s ex-wife and mother have each filed individual tort claims against the U.S. Army for damages resulting from what they say is his unit’s negligence toward attending to Froede’s mental health.
“They took a good horse and rode him to death, knowingly, and willingly,” his mother said. “They let him burn himself out.”
“A trained layperson could see that he was at risk, and they failed to intervene,” Kemplin said.
Within 72 hours of submitting her tort claim — which can trigger a lawsuit — Kemplin received a phone call from a military lawyer at Fort Meade asking her if she needed the money.
“I’m a professor, and my kids are never going to starve. I’m going to set a precedent and embarrass you,” she told him. “I’m coming for you, and I will sue you individually.”
Even in his final troubled moments, Froede also appeared to blame the U.S. government for his undoing.
In a note left for his girlfriend the day he jumped from the parking garage, Froede spoke cryptically of Russian informants and spyware loaded onto the phone of one of his teammates. He insisted he never sold secrets or stole from the government, something he had never been accused of doing.
The last line of the note read, “The things we do in the name of America.”
Froede in Vietnam in 2014. (Courtesy of Joanne Wolff)
9. Young sailors and soldiers are moved out of hot water-less Walter Reed base barracks
Action taken only because of press reporting?
Excerpt:
The movement of the young enlisted troops living in Comfort and Sanctuary halls began Saturday and followed a Navy Times investigation Friday that revealed how some junior sailors and soldiers had been living without hot water and other basic amenities in those buildings for years.
Young sailors and soldiers are moved out of hot water-less Walter Reed base barracks
Navy leadership is moving more than 350 service members out of barracks that had been without hot water for years aboard Naval Support Activity Bethesda, the Maryland base that houses Walter Reed National Military Medical Center.
The movement of the young enlisted troops living in Comfort and Sanctuary halls began Saturday and followed a Navy Times investigation Friday that revealed how some junior sailors and soldiers had been living without hot water and other basic amenities in those buildings for years.
“I already work super-long hours in a high-demand clinic with a huge patient volume,” one affected Navy corpsman told Navy Times last week. “We’ve been short-staffed for a long time and there’s no telework for us. It sucks to have to grit your teeth through a cold shower and go back to the grind.”
The affected troops are being moved to a Navy Lodge and nearby off-base hotel, and will remain there “until the hot water issues are addressed,” base spokesman Jeremy Brooks said in an email.
Rear Adm. Michael Steffen, the commandant of Naval District Washington, made a “surprise visit” to Sanctuary Hall on Saturday to listen to the concerns of residents there.
RELATED
The problems aboard Naval Support Activity Bethesda have been going on for years, young sailors and soldiers say.
“We take the quality of life and basic needs of our personnel very seriously, Capt. Scott Switzer, NSA Bethesda’s commanding officer, said in a release announcing the move. “Service members living in our unaccompanied housing have the right to expect a quality of life that includes basic comforts, and we are going to do everything we can to ensure they do.”
Comfort Hall was built in 1981 and has been plagued by hot water issues for some time.
The building was constructed with no hot water loop to get hot water to the third and fourth floors.
Switzer told a town hall last week before the Navy Times report that fixing the problem will involve completely cutting off the water for five days.
In a release announcing the movement of affected troops out of the hot water-less barracks, the Navy said “the project was approved last year, and production work began in mid-December.”
Sanctuary Hall opened to residents in 2014 and the Navy has been trying to fix that building’s hot water issues since 2015, Switzer said at the town hall.
That work involves replacing a temperature control valve and those repairs are expected to be completed in a few weeks, and new parts for the temperature control valve have been ordered, according to the Navy.
“These repairs will not be done overnight. It will take some time to do this right, but we will get there,” Switzer said in a statement. “Moving our effected (sic) population to suitable quarters will allow us to accelerate the repair process while ensuring our Sailors and Soldiers have adequate living conditions. In the meantime, we will continue to work with our tenant commands and ensure we take care of our service members.”
While Switzer said at the town hall that “trouble tickets” had been mishandled, base leadership encouraged troops to continue submitting them.
“If Sailors feel that repairs to their barracks are not being made in a timely manner, raise it and let us know,” Lt. Cmdr. Kenneth Tate, the base’s executive officer, said in the release. “It is our responsibility to make sure those repairs are made and updates on repairs are communicated.”
Geoff is a senior staff reporter for Military Times, focusing on the Navy. He covered Iraq and Afghanistan extensively and was most recently a reporter at the Chicago Tribune. He welcomes any and all kinds of tips at geoffz@militarytimes.com.
10. U.S university reverses decision to remove Olympic protest posters
The GW President's initial response was quite tone deaf .
U.S university reverses decision to remove Olympic protest posters
Axios · by Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian
The president of George Washington University in D.C. has reversed his earlier decision to remove campus posters protesting the Beijing Olympics, which Chinese student groups had said "incited racial hatred and ethnic tensions."
The big picture: Universities in the U.S., Australia and elsewhere are navigating how to protect Chinese students from rising anti-Asian hate crimes, while protecting speech and art that criticizes Chinese government oppression from censorship by some Chinese students on campus who view that criticism as racist.
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Chinese international student groups sometimes use the language of social justice to silence criticism of the Chinese government's human rights record.
- The incident also highlights the fears among Uyghur, Tibetan, Hong Kong, and pro-democracy Chinese students in the U.S. that they can't exercise their right to free speech.
- "Some Chinese students in the U.S. often don't realize that it's possible to be both victim and oppressor at the same time," Maya Wang, senior China analyst at Human Rights Watch, told Axios.
Details: In early February, posters protesting the Beijing Olympics were posted in several locations on the George Washington University campus, according to a student group statement and photos posted to Twitter.
- The posters show athletes wearing uniforms bearing the Chinese flag pointing a rifle at a bound and gagged Uyghur; pinning down a Tibetan; skating over a Hong Kong flag; riding atop a surveillance camera doubling as a snowboard; and pushing a virus across the ice.
- The identity of the person who put the posters around GWU's campus isn't known.
- Chinese Australian artist and political cartoonist Badiucao created the posters before the Olympics began and made them available for free download online.
- "My art is always targeting the Chinese Communist Party, never the Chinese suffering from this regime," Badiucao, who lives in Australia, told Axios.
What they're saying: In a Feb. 6 statement posted to WeChat, the GWU Chinese Cultural Association said students had reported the posters to the police and the "unauthorized" posters had been removed.
- The posters "pose a potential risk to the personal safety of all Chinese and Asian students at George Washington University, including verbal and physical violence," the group said.
- "The ideas expressed are not based on indisputable facts but rather on highly controversial political disputes," the statement read. "This series of posters incites not only intra-ethnic hatred in China but also inter-ethnic hostility and inter-cultural contempt."
- The Chinese Cultural Association did not respond to a request for comment.
The posters were subsequently removed, but in a Feb. 7 message posted to the university website, GWU President Mark Wrighton said this was a mistaken measure taken in haste.
- "Upon full understanding, I do not view these posters as racist; they are political statements. There is no university investigation underway, and the university will not take any action against the students who displayed the posters," Wrighton said.
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Official Chinese students associations abroad often have close ties to China's embassies and consulates, which often provide funding to the groups and sometimes ask them to hold pro-Chinese Communist Party political activities.
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The Chinese government also uses the language of anti-racism and inclusion to discredit discussion of its repressive policies. Uyghurs who criticize the Chinese government's repressive policies, such as putting people who pray frequently into mass internment camps, have been imprisoned on charges of "inciting ethnic hatred."
Between the lines: "This student group seems to be exporting Chinese government oppression and conflating a number of issues while referencing Black Lives Matter," Wang of Human Rights Watch told Axios.
- "Racism and discrimination against people of Chinese origin is definitely real," said Wang.
- "But some are exploiting this legitimate grievance and twisting it to say that any criticism of China is racism against Chinese people and should not be raised in any form. It is quite disingenuous of them to raise the oppression of African Americans, while completing dismissing the oppression of Uyghurs, Tibetans and Hong Kongers."
The university's initial response was also "disappointing," Wang said, because it seemed to take official Chinese student associations on campus as representative of all Chinese students.
- "I know of many Chinese students in the U.S. who are afraid of these Chinese student associations," Wang said.
- "They don’t think these groups represent their views, they don’t want to participate in their activities because they feel they are being bullied," she added, but students with different views don't feel it is safe to form their own independent associations for fear of reprisal back in China.
Go deeper:
Axios · by Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian
11. Trump-era nukes, Army programs likeliest FY23 budget cuts: Experts
Excerpts:
While a topline number for the defense budget has not been announced, experts speculated that the defense topline could range from $733 billion to $765 billion.
Mackenzie Eaglen, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Initiative, expects that the FY23 budget will continue to divest legacy equipment in order to make funding available for research and development.
Last year, the department divested a total $3 billion worth of equipment, and “I think they’ll attempt to triple if not quadruple that number next year,” she said.
The biggest news to come out of the Pentagon’s FY23 budget request may not have anything to do with defense, said Harrison.
“What assumptions does [the Office of Management and Budget] make in their official budget documents for what inflation will be in the future? I think the markets are going to be looking at that number,” he said.
“If they put realistic inflation assumptions in there. It will be an official Biden administration government document that is telling everyone that higher than historical inflation will be continuing for years to come. And I think that that’s going to be a downer, quite frankly, on the markets.”
Trump-era nukes, Army programs likeliest FY23 budget cuts: Experts - Breaking Defense
With the release of the Pentagon's FY23 budget request likely only a month or so away, defense experts offered their best guesses about what programs might be on the chopping block.
Pentagon comptroller Anne McAndrew and Navy Vice Adm. Ronald Boxall brief the news media on President Joe Biden’s fiscal 2022 defense budget from the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. on May 28, 2021. (US Air Force/Staff Sgt. Jack Sanders)
WASHINGTON: Trump-era nuclear weapons, the Army’s new fighting vehicle and reconnaissance rotorcraft, and the venerable MQ-9 Reaper are all programs that could be on the chopping block in the Pentagon’s upcoming fiscal year 2023 budget request, a panel of defense experts predicted today.
The Biden administration is behind schedule on submitting its FY23 budget (which, by statute, should have been submitted to Congress today). In lieu of a new spending request, five defense experts gathered for a virtual roundtable about what the upcoming budget could include — and what could be cut as the administration seeks out cost savings.
Two of those programs seen as most vulnerable are a pair of new nuclear weapons that were announced as part of the Trump Administration’s nuclear posture review in 2018: the W76-2 nuclear warhead — a low-yield nuke launched from submarines, which first deployed in 2019 — and the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile.
Both President Joe Biden and progressive lawmakers have signaled a desire to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and canceling these programs gives him a political win without having to make a major sacrifice to nuclear capability, said Stacie Pettyjohn, director of defense programs at the Center for a New American Security.
“It’s not a tremendous loss, but it is a tangible thing that we are taking away without really cutting into the major acquisition programs,” such as new intercontinental ballistic missiles, the B-21 bomber or a new air-launched nuclear cruise missile, she said. “It’s making a sort of gesture in that direction without having to cut off an entire limb.”
Experts also raised the possibility that the Pentagon targets Army programs for cancelations in FY23. Tom Spoehr, who leads the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense, pointed to the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, which Army Futures Command hopes to replace the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.
Similarly, the Army’s Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft — a new rotorcraft that will replace the service’s Kiowa Warrior scout helicopters — could also face potential cancellation, said Todd Harrison, director of defense budget analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“That’s a program that if it doesn’t get killed outright, I think it gets pushed out, slipped into the future to pay bills,” Harrison said, adding that it will be difficult for the Army to justify why it needs that capability.
“If we’re supposed to be focused on high-end competition, helicopters aren’t going to get anywhere near the fight,” Harrison said. In a fight against low-end threats, the MQ-1C Grey Eagle drone “can provide that scouting and a limited attack capability, and you’ve got your legacy helicopters that you can keep around a little bit longer.”
Spoehr added that the OMFV is “desperately needed” to replace to 40 year old Bradley, but that the Army may have few other choices if it needs to find funding for other priorities.
Meanwhile, the MQ-9 Reaper is an example of a legacy program that could continue to face scrutiny as counterinsurgency missions become less of a priority for the department, said Travis Sharp, a fellow for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
“The system has become a symbol. It’s closely tied to the type of counterterrorism operations that the United States has been doing over the last 20 years. There’s a feeling that we need to transition to great power competition,” he said. “The question remains, can people kind of break out of this way that they’ve been thinking about systems like the MQ-9 for the last couple of decades?”
The Road Ahead
Defense experts spoke a little more than a week before the Feb. 18 expiration of the continuing resolution currently funding the government. On Sunday, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, D-Md., told MSNBC that Congress will likely approve another stopgap CR to give lawmakers more time to come to a spending agreement for the rest of the year, with some reports emerging Monday of roughly a roughly month-long extension in the works.
Despite the sluggish pace of passing a FY22 budget — and the potential negative effects a yearlong CR could have on the pace and cost of weapons acquisition — experts agreed that the FY23 budget request would likely come out several weeks after the National Defense Strategy is released, likely in early March.
While a topline number for the defense budget has not been announced, experts speculated that the defense topline could range from $733 billion to $765 billion.
Mackenzie Eaglen, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Initiative, expects that the FY23 budget will continue to divest legacy equipment in order to make funding available for research and development.
Last year, the department divested a total $3 billion worth of equipment, and “I think they’ll attempt to triple if not quadruple that number next year,” she said.
The biggest news to come out of the Pentagon’s FY23 budget request may not have anything to do with defense, said Harrison.
“What assumptions does [the Office of Management and Budget] make in their official budget documents for what inflation will be in the future? I think the markets are going to be looking at that number,” he said.
“If they put realistic inflation assumptions in there. It will be an official Biden administration government document that is telling everyone that higher than historical inflation will be continuing for years to come. And I think that that’s going to be a downer, quite frankly, on the markets.”
12. Documents detail U.S. military’s frustration with White House, diplomats over Afghanistan evacuation
We should keep in mind the Admiral was providing statements for the investigation. He did not make these statements in public and likely did not make them with the intent for public release.
Excerpts:
Military personnel would have been “much better prepared to conduct a more orderly” evacuation, Navy Rear Adm. Peter Vasely, the top U.S. commander on the ground during the operation, told Army investigators, “if policymakers had paid attention to the indicators of what was happening on the ground.” He did not identify any administration officials by name, but said inattention to the Taliban’s determination to complete a swift and total military takeover undermined commanders’ ability to ready their forces.
Vasely could not be reached for comment.
Documents detail U.S. military’s frustration with White House, diplomats over Afghanistan evacuation
Senior White House and State Department officials failed to grasp the Taliban’s steady advance on Afghanistan’s capital and resisted efforts by U.S. military leaders to prepare the evacuation of embassy personnel and Afghan allies weeks before Kabul’s fall, placing American troops ordered to carry out the withdrawal in greater danger, according to sworn testimony from multiple commanders involved in the operation.
An Army investigative report, numbering 2,000 pages and released to The Washington Post through a Freedom of Information Act request, details the life-or-death decisions made daily by U.S. soldiers and Marines sent to secure Hamid Karzai International Airport as thousands converged on the airfield in a frantic bid to escape.
Beyond the bleak, blunt assessments of top military commanders, the documents contain previously unreported disclosures about the violence American personnel experienced, including one exchange of gunfire that left two Taliban fighters dead after they allegedly menaced a group of U.S. Marines and Afghan civilians, and a separate incident in which U.S. troops killed a member of an elite Afghan strike unit and wounded six others after they fired on the Americans.
The investigation was launched in response to an Aug. 26 suicide bombing just outside the airport that killed an estimated 170 Afghan civilians and 13 U.S. service members. But it is much broader, providing perhaps the fullest official account yet of the evacuation operation, which spanned 17 nightmarish days and has become one of the Biden administration’s defining moments — drawing scrutiny from Republicans and Democrats for the haphazard nature in which the United States ended its longest war.
Military personnel would have been “much better prepared to conduct a more orderly” evacuation, Navy Rear Adm. Peter Vasely, the top U.S. commander on the ground during the operation, told Army investigators, “if policymakers had paid attention to the indicators of what was happening on the ground.” He did not identify any administration officials by name, but said inattention to the Taliban’s determination to complete a swift and total military takeover undermined commanders’ ability to ready their forces.
Vasely could not be reached for comment.
The report includes witness statements from dozens of people interviewed after an Islamic State-Khorasan operative detonated a suicide vest at the airport’s Abbey Gate. Senior defense officials announced Friday that the investigation had determined that a single bomb packed with ball bearings caused “disturbing lethality” in the tightly packed outdoor corridor leading to the airfield.
The operation evacuated 124,000 people before concluding about midnight Aug. 31. It required U.S. commanders to strike an unusual security pact with the Taliban and rapidly deploy nearly 6,000 troops to assist a skeleton force of about 600 left behind under Vasely’s command to protect U.S. Embassy personnel. U.S. officials have lauded the effort, but critics have said that although U.S. troops performed heroically, the evacuation was flawed and incomplete, leaving behind hundreds of Americans and tens of thousands of Afghans who supported the war effort and were promised a way out.
John Kirby, the Pentagon’s chief spokesman, said in response to questions about the report that while the airlift was a “historic achievement,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has acknowledged it was “not perfect.”
“We are committed to, and are intensely engaged in, an ongoing review of our efforts during the evacuation, the assessments and strategy during the conflict, and the planning in the months before the end of the war,” Kirby said. “We will take those lessons learned, and apply them, as we always do, clearly and professionally.”
Marine Gen. Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, chief of U.S. Central Command, said in an interview Tuesday that he was “not surprised” commanders had different opinions about how the evacuation could have gone better. “But remember,” he said, “what did happen is we came together and executed a plan. There are profound frustrations; commanders, particularly subordinate commanders, they see very clearly the advantages of other courses of action. However, we had a decision, and we had an allocation of forces. You proceed based on that.”
There “might have been other plans that we would have preferred,” the general added, “but when the president makes a decision, it’s time for us to execute the president’s decision.”
Military officials told investigators that although the evacuation was in many ways cobbled together on the fly, planning within the Defense Department began months earlier. Initial discussions presumed the possible use of Bagram air base, a sprawling U.S. military installation 30 miles north of Kabul, and assistance from Afghan government forces to help secure the path there, Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Farrell J. Sullivan, who was involved in planning and oversaw the Marines sent into the capital, told investigators. Those plans evolved from incorporating both airfields to “just HKIA,” the Marine general said, using the military’s shorthand for Hamid Karzai International Airport.
U.S. officials have said previously that the decision to turn over Bagram to the Afghan government was made because it was deemed too far outside Kabul, where the majority of evacuees were expected to be, and because it would have required a significant number of U.S. troops.
“Everyoneclearly saw some of the advantage of holding Bagram,” McKenzie said Tuesday, “but you cannot hold Bagram with the force level that was decided.”
Disagreement between U.S. military officials and American diplomats in Kabul about when to press forward with an evacuation appears to have gone back months. Vasely, who took command as the top officer in Afghanistan in July, said he was told by the departing four-star commander, Army Gen. Austin “Scott” Miller, that there would be opposition among senior officials at the embassy to shrinking its footprint in Kabul.
Ross Wilson, the acting U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, was focused on maintaining a diplomatic presence there, Vasely said, and questioned how the United States was supposed to preserve its influence without an embassy, the admiral added.
Wilson did not respond to requests for comment.
Vasely told investigators that he was advised by embassy staff that he should provide those close to the acting ambassador with data illustrating the country’s rapid collapse to the Taliban, “so it could be sold as a collective approach and not a power grab by DoD.”
Wilson wanted two weeks to evacuate the embassy and leave a skeleton staff at the airport, military officials said. But by Aug. 12, three days before Kabul’s fall, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan called Wilson and instructed him to move more quickly, Vasely told investigators.
Vasely “was trying to get the Ambassador to see the security threat for what it really was,” said another military official, whose name is redacted from the report. As many as 10 government-controlled districts were falling to the Taliban daily, this official noted, adding, “The embassy needed to position for withdrawal, and the Ambassador didn’t get it.”
By mid-July, Sullivan, the senior Marine officer involved in planning the evacuation, wanted to stage supplies to host 5,000 evacuees at the airport, but his effort was complicated because he was not permitted to discuss the possibility of a full-scale evacuation with anyone other than British officials, he told investigators. Other U.S. military leaders, whose names were redacted from the report, said there were fears among administration officials that if the United States, by raising alarm, inspired other governments to quickly leave Afghanistan, it would accelerate the central government’s demise.
The Marine general told investigators that trying to engage the embassy in discussions about an evacuation was “like pulling teeth” until early August. “After that,” he said, “it became more collaborative.”
A spokesman for Sullivan referred questions to McKenzie.
During an Aug. 6 meeting, a National Security Council official, who is not identified in the report, appeared to lack a sense of urgency and told others involved that if the United States had to execute an evacuation, it would signal “we have failed,” Brig Gen. Sullivan recalled. “In my opinion, the NSC was not seriously planning for an evacuation,” he said.
The White House declined to comment.
National Security Council officials convened meetings in July and early August to discuss embassy security in Kabul and assess whether the Taliban’s advance met previously identified benchmarks for taking further action, a person familiar with the situation said. Like some others who discussed the investigation’s findings with The Post, this person spoke on the condition of anonymity because the issue remains highly sensitive.
On Aug. 9, three days after the first provincial capital fell to the Taliban, Biden’s advisers convened meetings to discuss whether to begin closing the embassy, but senior officials unanimously decided it was still premature, the person said.
Another senior administration official on Monday defended how the State and Defense departments coordinated to execute Biden’s decisions. The State Department “steadily drew down our diplomatic presence in Kabul starting in April 2021, nearly four months before the fall of Kabul, when the Embassy went on ‘Ordered Departure’ status,” the official said.
The official declined to address criticism from senior military officials that the State Department showed a lack of urgency initially, but said the U.S. government “swiftly and nimbly” assembled a network of nearly two dozen overseas locations that hosted tens of thousands of Afghans, while also working to ensure “they’d pose no security or health threat” to American communities before being resettled in the United States.
By Aug. 14, Vasely believed Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s government would collapse, he told investigators. The United States carried out 10 airstrikes against the Taliban that day 10 miles south of Kabul, killing about 100 fighters, but it did not halt its advance.
“We were killing them in bunches, destroying tactical vehicles, and they kept coming,” he said.
After word spread the next day that Ghani had fled the country, the airfield in Kabul descended into chaos, as thousands of desperate people sought a flight out. One medical officer interviewed by investigators compared the atmosphere that week to “Lord of the Flies,” the classic book in which teenagers stranded on an island fail to govern themselves. Several military officials recalled U.S. Marines coming under fire that night by Taliban fighters, and the Marines, in turn, killing two.
Army Maj. Gen. Christopher Donahue, who arrived after the collapse and oversaw airfield security, recalled that early discussions with the Taliban were tense.
“We told them that we would control the gates and they would push people out,” said Donahue, commanding general of the 82nd Airborne Division. “We expressed that they will comply, because if they fight us on this we would be able to kill more of them than they would ever hope to kill of us. After that their tone changed.”
At the embassy, U.S. troops went room to room on Aug. 15, pressing people to meet deadlines and get ready to go, an Army officer from the 10th Mountain Division told investigators. Some State Department personnel were “intoxicated and cowering in rooms,” and others were “operating like it was day-to-day operations with absolutely no sense of urgency or recognition of the situation,” the officer said.
An administration official said they had not previously heard that allegation. “Were there any truth to it, we presumably would not be learning of it six months after the fact,” the official said.
The mission eventually hit a rhythm in which thousands of people were screened and allowed to enter the airport each day to board outbound flights. But it remained dangerous.
Four Afghans were crushed to death in the first four days, and U.S. troops remained concerned that crowds could break open a gate and riot, service members recalled to investigators. A Marine officer reported that a stun grenade used for crowd control killed a civilian.
Between 40 and 50 people were detained each night after jumping fences, the report says.
Sullivan, the Marine general, told investigators that there were changing expectations about how many people associated with Afghan paramilitary units aiding the evacuation needed to be taken out of the country. He initially thought it was 6,000 people — including strike unit members and their families — but later learned the correct number was about 38,800, and advised that it would be wise for the military to request commercial airline help through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to increase overall flights.
Additionally, U.S. troops were overwhelmed with thousands of requests from the White House, Congress and as far as the Vatican to locate and rescue specific people in the crowd, including some who would not otherwise have been eligible for the evacuation.
The bombing on Aug. 26 set off a scramble to save as many people as possible, but there was little the on-site medical personnel could do for those who died, they told investigators. The survivors relied on tourniquets and other first-aid equipment to help anyone they could, the report says.
Officials said on Friday that, in addition to the 13 service members who died, another 45 were wounded in the blast, with some suffering brain injuries that surfaced later.
On Aug. 29, an errant U.S. drone strike killed 10 Afghan civilians, including seven children. Top Pentagon officials initially justified the attack, saying they believed it had targeted another would-be suicide bomber. The victims included an aid worker and several members of his family.
Sullivan, the Marine general, suggested that those tense final days of the war in Afghanistan would have a lasting impact on those exposed to danger. Commanders, he suggested, should stay vigilant and watch for any further fallout.
“I am not particularly soft, as adversity comes with our duties,” he said, “but this was an extremely challenging situation.”
Horton reported from Kyiv, Ukraine. Karoun Demirjian contributed to this report from Manama, Bahrain.
13. FDD | Iran 'sham' trial of California resident sparks allegations that world powers have abandoned him
FDD | Iran 'sham' trial of California resident sparks allegations that world powers have abandoned him
fdd.org · by Benjamin Weinthal Research Fellow · February 7, 2022
Jamshid Sharmahd, a German Iranian dissident and long-term legal resident of California who was abducted by Iran’s regime in Dubai in 2020, went on trial Sunday and could face the death penalty, all over what critics are calling false links to a deadly bombing at a mosque in 2008.
Political prisoners routinely face sham legal proceedings and coerced confessions in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The German and European governments are facing intense criticism for prioritizing a nuclear deal with Tehran over securing the release of the 66-year-old Sharmahd, who has lived in the U.S. since 2003 and campaigned against the Islamist tyranny.
Gazelle Sharmahd, Jamshid’s daughter, wrote to Fox News Digital via email from California, saying, “This is not a court or a trial at all, this is a propaganda show they have been preparing for the last 18 months. It is very disturbing that the free world can stand by and do little to help Jimmy [Jamshid] and so many others who are going through this.”
She added, “The Iranians are fabricating charges and scapegoating an innocent man to make an example of him in order to shock the entire opposition, no matter which part of the opposition, but all people who work for a free Iran or hold points of view different from the Supreme Leader [Ali Khamenei].
“Jimmy has not had access to his own lawyer in Iran or to his legal team in the U.S. This is a violation of his fundamental rights. How can you try someone without allowing them to review the evidence against them? Only savage people do this, not a civilized society,” Gazelle wrote.
Jamshid is the spokesperson for the Los Angeles-based Kingdom Assembly of Iran exile opposition group. Iran’s regime has alleged, without providing any evidence, that Sharmahd was complicit in a 2008 bombing of the Hosseynieh Seyed al-Shohada Mosque in the city of Shiraz. The bombing resulted in the deaths of 14 people, and 215 others were injured.
Attorney Jason I. Poblete, who is president of Global Liberty Alliance and is representing the Sharmahd family, told Fox News Digital: “The German and American governments have a duty to secure Mr. Sharmahd’s unconditional release from Iran; they are not doing nearly enough. If the U.S.-Iran envoy, Robert Malley, cared more about helping Americans rather than inking a deal Iran is already breaking, Jimmy and other hostages would be home today.”
Poblete was referencing the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the formal name for the nuclear deal, which Iran’s regime has breached. The U.S., Germany and other world powers have been seeking in Vienna to trade sanctions relief for Iran’s regime in exchange for a renewed agreement they hoped would impose temporary restrictions on Tehran’s capability to build nuclear weapons.
Gazelle asked, “America and Germany, where are you? You go to Vienna to fancy hotels [for nuclear talks] while my dad is paraded in this made for a television show or kangaroo trial. Where is your humanity? The so-called international community: Where is this compassion for your fellow human being? If Iran wants to be treated as an equal among the nations, it has to earn it. The supreme leader is making a mockery of you all.”
A State Department spokesperson told Fox News it’s “aware of the reports” of Sharmahd’s detention. The German Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to Fox News Digital’s requests for comment.
Gazelle Sharmahd said, “This is supposed to be a public event, but it’s all staged.”
Masih Alinejad, a Voice of America journalist and a women’s rights campaigner, tweeted, “His name is #JamshidSharmahd. This German-Iranian was kidnapped from Dubai by the Islamic Republic of Iran for being critical of the regime. He faces an unfair trial today. Meanwhile, EU & Germany don’t want to raise his case because ‘the nuclear deal with Iran is more important.’”
His name is #JamshidSharmahd. This German-Iranian was kidnapped from Dubai by the Islamic Republic of Iran for being critical of the regime. He faces an unfair trial today.
Meanwhile, EU &Germany don’t want to raise his case because“the nuclear deal with Iran is more important” pic.twitter.com/j1QK2ejLrv
The Iranian government sought to abduct Alinejad in Brooklyn, the FBI said in 2021, because of her opposition to the clerical regime in Tehran.
Sharmahd said, “My dad was almost assassinated by the regime on U.S. soil, right here in California. Now he is kidnapped in the UAE; the UAE is not safe and they have not helped either. Repeated overtures to the UAE in D.C. and their high-priced lobbyists have been ignored. What do they have to hide, the UAE? The Iranians and the WGAD [the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention body of independent human rights experts] have been more responsive to our American legal team than the UAE, Germany and the U.S.”
Fox News Digital previously reported that agents of the Islamic Republic sought to assassinate her father in California in 2009 because of his opposition activities, including his radio talk show.
The 2009 assassination plot garnered widespread media attention and resulted in the conviction of Mohammad Sadeghnia, who arranged the planned murder.
Sharmahd gave birth to a girl on Dec. 31, 2020. She said the situation has been “killing us” because her father was “not going to see her.” The baby, Jamshid’s first grandchild, is named Kiana (“elements of nature,” i.e. earth, wind, fire, etc., in Persian).
She added, “We still do not know how he is, we just saw these pictures that were allowed to be circulated by the press. I can see the sheer terror in my dad’s face, even hidden behind the mask and the prisoner uniform. They could not hide the terror that is evident in his eyes.
“555 days of isolation, torture and forced confessions, yet he is still in shock when they present this garbage of a show trial to him. How can anyone endure this amount of physical and psychological pressure for such a long time?” she said.
Benjamin Weinthal reports on human rights in the Middle East and is a fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. You can follow him on Twitter @BenWeinthal. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Benjamin Weinthal Research Fellow · February 7, 2022
14. Time for More Defense Spending
Excerpts:
The most dangerous and expensive of all mistakes is to underspend on defense at a time of growing threat. In 1940, as Hitler marched into Paris, the U.S. was spending 1.7% of GDP on defense. By 1944 that figure reached 37%.
Mr. Biden is going to have one challenge after another from a newly empowered and implacably hostile Eurasian alliance. To protect his presidency and the nation he leads, he must level with the American people about the new threats and call on both parties in Congress to support the defense spending the country urgently needs.
Time for More Defense Spending
The U.S. will face challenges from the new alliance between China and Russia.
WSJ · by Walter Russell Mead
By
Walter Russell Mead
Feb. 7, 2022 5:13 pm ET
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Feb. 4.
Photo: Aleksey Druzhinin/Kremlin/REUTERS
The 2022 Winter Olympics will be remembered for geopolitics, not sports. It’s where Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin declared war on the post-Cold War world order and the American primacy that sustained it. Issuing a joint statement that criticized the U.S. by name six times and outlined an ambitious program of anti-Western collaboration from Ukraine to the South China Sea, the two leaders left no doubt that the world’s holiday from history has come to an end.
The world has changed, and American policy must change with it. The longer the U.S. waits to build a national defense adequate to the challenges it faces, the greater the danger and expense ultimately will be.
Americans shouldn’t deceive themselves. The end of the post-Cold War era is a major setback. For 30 years the American intellectual and policy establishment mocked Russia, fantasized about China, and frittered the country’s resources away on ill-judged diversions. At the same time, opponents—clearer-eyed than the U.S. was about the foundations of international power—created new realities that Washington must confront.
The shift is hard for the Biden administration. Team Biden came into office believing that the U.S. could pay less attention to European and Middle Eastern security issues while focusing attention and resources on the Indo-Pacific and the challenge from China even as it addressed “global governance” issues like climate change. But the perception that the U.S. was cutting back on Europe and the Middle East led Russia and Iran to step up plans for expansion—while leading Beijing to double down on its links with Moscow and Tehran as a way of making life difficult for the Americans.
Whether this new era of geopolitical competition is another cold war is a question of semantics. We certainly are back to Cold War levels of insecurity, with powerful adversaries seeking to diminish U.S. national security and that of its allies. The response of the U.S. and its allies must be equally energetic. Rebuilding American foreign policy will take time. The immediate task is relatively simple, however, and one America can do on its own, without allies. America must get serious again about defense spending.
During the Cold War, American defense spending averaged close to 7% of gross domestic product. After the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, America enjoyed a so-called peace dividend, and defense spending fell as low as 2.9% of GDP during President Clinton’s second term. As the costs of the war on terror grew, spending climbed past 4% by 2008. The Congressional Budget Office projects a total Defense Department budget of $715.1 billion, or 2.98% of current GDP, for 2022.
Increasing defense spending to 4% of GDP would mean an increase of more than $200 billion a year from the current budget, a number that defense analyst Mackenzie Eaglen says would meet the global challenges confronting the U.S.—though the shipbuilding, aerospace and technology industries would need assurances that this would be sustained to invest in the needed capacity. This level of spending, still well below the defense budgets of the Reagan years as a percentage of GDP, would give American forces the resources required to keep Taiwan out of Beijing’s reach and address growing Chinese and Russian power elsewhere. It also would reassure allies around the world that Mr. Biden was serious when he said early in his term that “America is back.”
Increased defense spending wouldn’t be a drag on economic growth. The capabilities America needs to add to its defense arsenal are mostly high-tech and have civilian as well as military applications. Just as Israel’s investments in cybersecurity and high-tech weaponry helped it become a startup nation with the most dynamic civilian economy in its history, a renewed commitment to national defense can increase the competitiveness of American industry while boosting national security.
The most dangerous and expensive of all mistakes is to underspend on defense at a time of growing threat. In 1940, as Hitler marched into Paris, the U.S. was spending 1.7% of GDP on defense. By 1944 that figure reached 37%.
Mr. Biden is going to have one challenge after another from a newly empowered and implacably hostile Eurasian alliance. To protect his presidency and the nation he leads, he must level with the American people about the new threats and call on both parties in Congress to support the defense spending the country urgently needs.
Copyright ©2022 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the February 8, 2022, print edition.
WSJ · by Walter Russell Mead
15. DHS terrorism bulletin warns of focus on synagogues, HBCUs
DHS terrorism bulletin warns of focus on synagogues, HBCUs
The Hill · by Rebecca Beitsch · February 7, 2022
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued one of its starkest terrorism advisory bulletins Monday on the heels of a recent hostage situation at a Texas synagogue and bomb threats at historically Black universities across the country.
The National Terrorism Advisory System bulletin again warns of the role disinformation is playing in motivating domestic extremists. But a senior DHS official said the new bulletin includes its “highest degree of specificity” with a stress on the interest in targeting religious and racial minorities.
“We're seeing a greater level of specificity as it relates to calling for acts of violence or acts of targeted violence against certain elements of our society to include faith-based institutions, institutions of higher learning” and government entities as well as greater specificity in the types of tactics called for, another official said.
“They're calling people to use mass shootings, using vehicles, knife attacks, and [offering] some greater specificity in the types of targets they're urging people to target,” the official said.
“In addition to that, after the events in Colleyville, Texas, we've also observed an increase in calls by these same organizations for followers to replicate what occurred,” the official added.
The official was referencing a January hostage situation in which a man held four members of Congregation Beth Israel for hours inside the synagogue, with the group ultimately escaping without being physically harmed.
A senior DHS official said the event has since sparked chatter among both white supremacists and “thought leaders across the globe who tend to be supportive of ISIS and Al Qaeda operations actually pointing to Colleyville as an example of the types of activities that lone actors or others should be taking.”
DHS officials said they have not yet seen such explicit references to the bomb threats at historically Black colleges and universities, where the FBI said it arrested six juveniles who used sophisticated methods to attempt to conceal their identities.
“This is a threat environment where people tend to look at what happened in the past. They look at the reactions of activities that were taken whether it's shooting or bomb threats, and then we're always concerned about people saying, ‘Hey, that's a great idea. Let me try at copycatting it,” an official said.
DHS noted nonprofits like places of worship and universities can apply for grants to bolster their security. It’s a grant program that was already accessed by Congregation Beth Israel several years ago.
The advisory retains many elements of the prior bulletin last issued in November, including the stress on disinformation and its impact in exacerbating distrust of the government, particularly around themes like election fraud and COVID-19.
It also warns of the calls to lone actors to carry out mass acts of violence on soft targets who may be gathered in crowds.
The bulletin also noted that groups outside the U.S. are seeking to take advantage of disinformation.
“Foreign terrorist organizations and domestic threat actors continue to amplify preexisting false or misleading narratives online to sow discord and undermine public trust in government institutions. Some of these actors do so to encourage unrest,” the bulletin states.
Updated at 2:55 p.m.
The Hill · by Rebecca Beitsch · February 7, 2022
16. ISIS is regrouping and expanding despite the death of its leader in US raid, experts say
Excerpts:
Others cautioned that the Biden administration should not take its eye off of ISIS, even as it transitions from one leader to the next.
“This is a win for antiterrorism. It's a win for the Biden administration,” said retired Army Lt. Col. Douglas Ollivant, the former director for Iraq at the National Security Council during both the Bush and Obama administrations. “But let's not kid ourselves that this is going to move the needle in a significant way on either counterterrorism writ large, or for that matter, the Biden administration's approval ratings.”
Ollivant, who also served in senior Department of Defense policy roles on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, said he worries that the recent jailbreak is an omen of more trouble to come.
“It showed some interesting levels of command and control and sophistication,” by ISIS, Ollivant said. “So while this will denigrate ISIS command and control, let’s not overplay it."
ISIS is regrouping and expanding despite the death of its leader in US raid, experts say
Though ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi is dead, experts say the terror network has expanded its reach and has a continuity plan in place.
| USA TODAY
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Biden confirms special forces raid in Syria has killed an ISIS leader
A raid in Northern Syria by U.S special forces has killed an ISIS leader. Other reports include civilian casualties, including women and children.
Associated Press, USA TODAY
- Al-Qurayshi detonated a bomb that killed himself and several other people, including his wife and children, in a U.S. raid.
- But the terror network he oversaw has a continuity of operations plan, experts say.
- The group, experts and U.S. intelligence officials said, still poses a threat to U.S. interests.
WASHINGTON – The Biden administration celebrated its killing of the leader of ISIS this week, but there are signs the terror network is regrouping, expanding far outside of its Middle East stronghold – and potentially poised to strike American targets anywhere in the world.
"Thanks to the bravery of our troops, this horrible terrorist leader is no more," President Joe Biden said Thursday in announcing the U.S. military raid against Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi in northwest Syria.
But while al-Qurayshi might be gone, the Islamic State terror network he oversaw is flourishing, has a continuity of operations plan and poses a significant threat to U.S. interests, according to USA TODAY interviews with more than a dozen current and former U.S. intelligence officials and counter-terrorism experts.
ISIS once boasted of as many as 30,000 fighters and a functioning government, or caliphate, in Iraq and Syria with its own taxation and education system. Adherents came from around the world to train in its camps and return home – including to Europe – to wage jihad or Islamic holy war.
In March, 2016, 32 people were killed and hundreds wounded in ISIS-linked suicide bomb attacks in Brussels, Belgium. That July, 86 people were killed in Nice, France, after a large truck barreled into a crowd of revelers watching Bastille Day fireworks. ISIS claimed responsibility for both attacks.
In contrast, al-Qurayshi’s words and actions were aimed at avoiding headlines and attracting attention to ISIS after al-Baghdadi was killed in a similar U.S. raid in the same part of Syria’s rebel-held Idlib province in October 2019.
Taking ISIS underground
Al-Qurayshi kept such a low profile during his two-plus years as the group’s leader, in fact, that he never appeared in public or in Islamic State propaganda videos, the current and former officials said. And virtually no public photos of him exist from this time, they said.
But al-Qurayshi – a veteran ISIS insider and top ideologue – was just as ruthless as Baghdadi, if not more so. As Biden noted, he played a leading role in one of ISIS’s most brutal atrocities – the enslavement of thousands of women from Iraq’s Yazidi community and other religious minorities.
Al-Qurayshi also was a driving force in ISIS’s external operations, or attacks internationally, since the early days, according to Douglas London, a 34-year veteran CIA counterterrorism officer who retired in 2019.
“He believed that was going to attract – and it did attract – recruits and the people he wanted into the organization,” said London, author of the 2021 book, “The Recruiter: Spying and the Lost Art of American Intelligence.”
And al-Qurayshi was a military strategist who took ISIS underground after Baghdadi’s death and the punishing U.S. military campaign that led to it. That enabled the organization to retool itself as an under-the-radar insurgency that could regroup and rebuild without the once-vast territory it had held in the Middle East, according to current and former U.S. officials, including London.
And that is what is really causing alarm among veteran ISIS watchers, who say the group has rebounded in significant ways while the world’s attention has been focused elsewhere.
Marshaling its forces
Under al-Qurayshi’s leadership, ISIS had been quietly marshaling its forces in Syria and Iraq, raising money and enlisting recruits. It has also branched out, cultivating new strongholds on several continents, said Aaron Zelin, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Zelin said that compared to al-Qaida, ISIS isn't an organization that built itself around a charismatic leader, especially after the death of Baghdadi. Instead, its strength has come more from the power of its ideas, including building a caliphate and developing its territorial control in many locations.
“So while it's a huge coup that the U.S. did kill him, on a day-to-day basis the operation of ISIS probably won't change that much,” said Zelin, author of the forthcoming book, "Your Sons Are At Your Service," about young jihadists. “They still have a large presence in other areas of the world beyond just Iraq and Syria, and the IS (Islamic State) machine will continue with whoever its new leader is.”
“They're not in the news on a day to day basis,” Zelin added. “But they've been building up their capacities” outside of Iraq and Syria for years.
And ISIS has also grown its operations in places like Nigeria, Mali, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, according to Zelin and others.
“It's not about building one caliphate," Zelin said. "It's more of a multi-generational fight, and they’re hoping to someday connect all of the territories that they’re currently operating in.”
Although thousands of ISIS fighters remain in custody in Syrian prisons overseen by the U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic Forces, many of them have paid $2,000 or more to smuggle in cellphones that they have been using to fundraise, communicate and plot future operations, said Jomana Qaddour, a resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.
And there are many thousands more ISIS members and their families in camps in Syria that have become hotbeds of recruitment and radicalization, said Qaddour, who is also a member of the Syrian Constitutional Committee, a United Nations-facilitated agency seeking to reconcile the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition. She said anti-Western animosity is rampant in the camps, and potentially creating many hundreds of future terrorists.
Raking in money and recruits
Overall, Qaddour said, ISIS has been pulling in as much as $1 million a day from various sources in Syria and Iraq alone, from extortion of local officials, taxes on ships trying to cross the Euphrates River and other sources.
And it has become far more ambitious in its plots and designs.
“The fact that ISIS has been accumulating so much logistical and financial support is something that has been alarming and concerning for those of us who have heard for some time now that the U.S. is considering maybe withdrawing from Syria and thinking that its mission there is over,” Qaddour said.
The Biden administration has said it has no intention of withdrawing U.S. troops from Syria or elsewhere in the region. And Biden himself, in his remarks Thursday, vowed that U.S. forces would hunt down the rest of ISIS just as it did al-Qurasyhi, before he detonated a bomb, killing himself and numerous members of his family.
“We will come after you and find you," Biden said.
Many Syria watchers, including Qaddour, say the administration has been sending mixed signals about its commitment.
Dreading a US pullout
Without U.S. support in the rebel-held areas of Syria, Qaddour added, ISIS “can continue their resurgence unhindered. They're not going to take the U.S.-led coalition head on, but they're hoping we withdraw so they can take over then.”
Anne Speckhard, a longtime ISIS analyst who has interviewed more than 250 of its members, said the group's ambitious assault on the Gweiran prison in northeast Syria last month was actually the second time the group has tried such an attack in recent months, and that it is part of a coordinated – and worrisome – campaign.
In that assault, ISIS fighters used car bombs and heavy weapons to break free some of their most hardened comrades incarcerated there, even as the facility was surrounded by Kurdish-led, U.S.-allied forces.
“They definitely have, and have had, the dream of ‘breaking the walls’ and releasing prisoners and thereby reinvigorating their ranks,” Speckhard said.
ISIS's predecessor, al-Qaida in Iraq, did the same thing at the notorious Abu Ghraib prison in 2013, she said. That effort significantly expanded its ranks through a combination of freeing some of its hardened fighters and also enlisting the aid of foreign fighters from other countries.
In the recent jailbreak, ISIS reclaimed between 200 and 500 members, according to Speckhard and others. “That’s a serious number for the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) to try to round up and contend with,” she said. “How skilled they are is unknown, but ISIS is trying to regrow, no doubt about it.”
Speckhard has also seen evidence of increasing, and successful, ISIS external operations and fundraising far from its center in Syria and Iraq.
“Chillingly, we found evidence of fundraising in Europe for ISIS wives,” in some cases involving "European men who marry them over the internet and then send funds to them to live in the camps and to help them escape,” Speckhard said.
'A catastrophic blow'
On Thursday, White House press secretary Jen Psaki described the killing of al-Qurayshi as one of the most significant operations in the U.S. war on terror since the 9/11 attacks, saying it delivered "a catastrophic blow to ISIS."
Even Republicans grudgingly praised Biden. "It was a significant operation. I'll give credit where credit is due on the strike," said Texas Sen. John Cornyn.
Others cautioned that the Biden administration should not take its eye off of ISIS, even as it transitions from one leader to the next.
“This is a win for antiterrorism. It's a win for the Biden administration,” said retired Army Lt. Col. Douglas Ollivant, the former director for Iraq at the National Security Council during both the Bush and Obama administrations. “But let's not kid ourselves that this is going to move the needle in a significant way on either counterterrorism writ large, or for that matter, the Biden administration's approval ratings.”
Ollivant, who also served in senior Department of Defense policy roles on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, said he worries that the recent jailbreak is an omen of more trouble to come.
“It showed some interesting levels of command and control and sophistication,” by ISIS, Ollivant said. “So while this will denigrate ISIS command and control, let’s not overplay it."
Former Kansas teacher alleged to have a senior role with ISIS
Allison Fluke-Ekren, a former teacher from Kansas, is charged with providing material aid to ISIS.
Hank Farr and Jessica Koscielniak, USA TODAY
17. The Geopolitical Olympics
Excerpts:
And so, in the Orwellian finale, "democracy is a universal human value, rather than a privilege of a limited number of States." Democracy is not a matter of whether you are a citizen of those "limited number of States" where your vote actually matters. If democratic countries speaks about democracy, these are simply "attempts at hegemony." If people protest because they would like to vote, or would like for their votes to be counted, these are simply "colour revolutions," which Russia and China agree to oppose.
The surreal claim that everything is democratic is heartening in a certain way. It shows how robust the value of democracy is, even in troubled times. In the twentieth century, communist regimes likewise could not concede the language of democracy. Thus East Germany was officially the "German Democratic Republic," and the other communist regimes referred to themselves as "people's democracies." North Korea to this day is officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was to be understood that “people’s republics” were superior to "bourgeois democracies," where people voted and the votes counted. In the end, it usually turns out that people like to vote. And, one suspects, people in Russia and China today would also like to have their votes counted. If their leaders are promising democracy, then that is a natural demand.
In their post-modern way, Russian and Chinese leaders are pulling on the same thread as fallen communist regimes. Even as they offer nothing more to the world than the absence of democracy, they cannot concede the language of democracy. Their tactic is to make this language meaningless. Which means that the best way to oppose them is to make it meaningful.
The Geopolitical Olympics
How China rules the world (or at least Russia)
Before the Olympics, China protested against diplomatic boycotts by democratic countries, calling them a politicization of the event. This is odd, given that China is using the Olympics to announce how it plans to run the world.
One leader who did arrive in Beijing, President Vladimir Putin of Russia, certainly had political purposes in mind. On the day reserved for the opening ceremony, he held a summit meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping. It produced a statement describing a new world order with Beijing (and Moscow) in control.
In the statement, each side endorsed the other's worldview. China approved the Russian effort to establish a "just multipolar system of international relations." Russia blessed the far grander Chinese notion of a "community of common destiny for mankind." All that is clear about this common destiny is that it involves the defeat of the United States and the European Union.
The statement is very much a twenty-first century document: it contains no positive content, only critique of others. It replicates, on the scale of the world, what individual authoritarians do in their own countries: relativize the values of others, while providing no substitute. Thus "universal human rights" are endorsed, but only in the mocking sense that they must be adapted to the particularities of countries, as understood by their dictators. Democracy is endorsed, in the sense that every dictatorship is actually a democracy, because everywhere people have some relationship to their government. And, we are reassured, the Chinese and the Russians like things the way they are, and believe that their countries are democratic.
It is also clear that China (with some Russian assistance) is to be in charge after the Americans and Europeans are brought to heel. In a passage that is worth pondering, Beijing and Moscow "reaffirm that the new inter-State relations between Russia and China are superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War era." Cold war alliances provide an interesting point of reference. The main Soviet cold war alliance was the Warsaw Pact, used by Moscow to invade its ally Czechoslovakia in 1968. What does it mean to be superior to that? That this time bigger countries get invaded by their allies?
The summit and the statement (which I am citing according to the Kremlin presentation) are meant to be seen as triumphs of Russian diplomacy. This is not how the situation appears from a distance. Russia gets its talking points, but China defines the "common destiny for mankind," which presumably includes the destiny of its northern neighbor. The claim that "friendship between the two States has no limits" pungently recalls the hyperbolic language of Stalinism. Frankly, if I were Russian, I would hope that were some limits to friendship with China, such as for example the Russian-Chinese border. It was after all in the name of the friendship of the peoples that communist countries invaded one another.
In the West, we tend to speak of Putin as a strategic genius, with a certain undertone of admiration for the authority a dictator can wield in international affairs. But whatever talents Putin might possess, and they are indeed considerable, he is not a strategist. Russia as a country is not threatened by Europe and North America. Russian land and resources are not of great interest to Germans and Americans. They are, however, very much of interest to China, which is Russia's most important neighbor: that Chinese-Russian border is more than four thousand kilometers long. China already invests more in Siberia than Russia itself does.
The long-term strategic interest of Russia lies in keeping a balance between West and East, so as to be able to pivot from one to the other as necessary. It is China's interest to pull Russia so far in its direction that Russia cannot exercise leverage by moving back towards the West. Putin's foreign policy is thus a gift to China, because it makes equilibrium very difficult. By invading Ukraine in 2014, Putin pushed Russia away from the West and towards the East. By threatening to invade Ukraine again in 2022, Putin is denying his country any Western option for the foreseeable future. The grandiose language of the statement is meant to cover this fundamental error.
Putin and Xi, 4 February 2022.
Naturally, China is happy to speak of ruling the world together with Russia. The generous words, so appealing to fragile egos in Moscow, cost the Chinese nothing. The advantages that Russia brings to China are those of a client state. Putin arrived in Beijing with yet another deal for natural gas: Russia is a supplier of raw materials to a Chinese economy that is about ten times larger than its own. Russia also helps China with the shortsighted exuberance by which it challenges the United States and the European Union. Russia volunteers to take the punishment for what is, in the end, China's cause.
In the statement, China offers no direct support of a Russian invasion of Ukraine. Its diplomats are perhaps too wise for any such open bellicosity. But if Russia does attack Ukraine again, the main winner will be China. Putin can enjoy the adrenaline boost of doing something dramatic, but the net result will be pinning his country to Beijing for a generation. It does say a lot about the relationship between the two countries that, whatever Russia may now do, it will have done so after Putin flew to Beijing to consult with Xi.
As a strategy for Russia as a country, riding Chinese coattails is senseless. But as a tactic for an oligarchic regime to stay in power, it makes perfect sense. Putin may be inviting China to dominate Russia, but he knows that China will do so tactfully. Xi will never criticize his methods of rule. In comically sinister passages, Beijing and Moscow congratulate each other on being the real democracies that really understand human rights. What is meant is that dictators have the human right to refer to their countries as democracies.
They "note that Russia and China as world powers with rich cultural and historical heritage have long-standing traditions of democracy," which is just not true. What seems to be meant is that Russia and China are democratic because… they are not democratic. The argument runs like this. Most of the world is not democratic, but authoritarian. It is thus authoritarianism that is democratic, since authoritarians rule more people than do elected leaders. It is therefore wrong for the actual democrats to speak of democracy, since they are just "actors representing but the minority on the international scale."
And so, in the Orwellian finale, "democracy is a universal human value, rather than a privilege of a limited number of States." Democracy is not a matter of whether you are a citizen of those "limited number of States" where your vote actually matters. If democratic countries speaks about democracy, these are simply "attempts at hegemony." If people protest because they would like to vote, or would like for their votes to be counted, these are simply "colour revolutions," which Russia and China agree to oppose.
The surreal claim that everything is democratic is heartening in a certain way. It shows how robust the value of democracy is, even in troubled times. In the twentieth century, communist regimes likewise could not concede the language of democracy. Thus East Germany was officially the "German Democratic Republic," and the other communist regimes referred to themselves as "people's democracies." North Korea to this day is officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was to be understood that “people’s republics” were superior to "bourgeois democracies," where people voted and the votes counted. In the end, it usually turns out that people like to vote. And, one suspects, people in Russia and China today would also like to have their votes counted. If their leaders are promising democracy, then that is a natural demand.
In their post-modern way, Russian and Chinese leaders are pulling on the same thread as fallen communist regimes. Even as they offer nothing more to the world than the absence of democracy, they cannot concede the language of democracy. Their tactic is to make this language meaningless. Which means that the best way to oppose them is to make it meaningful.
18. Special ops wing boss defended female trainee under fire in memo to airmen
There is always more to the story.
Special ops wing boss defended female trainee under fire in memo to airmen
Last month, as Air Force Special Operations Command scrambled to address anonymous allegations of foul play in special tactics training, the head of the 24th Special Operations Wing sought to reassure his subordinates that nothing was amiss.
The claims had gone viral on social media five days earlier, alleging that the service bent its qualification standards in favor of a trainee who may become its first female special tactics officer — including the unusual move of letting her restart the program after she quit at least once.
The anonymous letter alarmed the special ops community, spurred media coverage, triggered an Air Force inspector general investigation and caught at least one lawmaker’s attention. But several parts aren’t true, wing commander Col. Jason Daniels told airmen in a Jan. 10 memo that was obtained by Air Force Times.
The female officer did formally quit during a key training phase last spring, the commander confirmed, but he said a second alleged departure wasn’t so clear-cut and a third was due to an injury she sustained. Also, what the anonymous letter saw as special treatment — including a chance to work for AFSOC leadership after she quit — Daniels viewed as a rare opportunity for the command to solicit feedback from a uniquely talented female candidate.
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The claims are incorrect or missing important context, said Lt. Gen. Jim Slife, the head of Air Force Special Operations Command. But he has called for the service's inspector general to investigate.
“The anonymous email includes inaccuracies throughout and sows a slanted narrative that has degraded trust in the training architecture as well as damaged the candidate’s reputation,” Daniels wrote. “While I hesitate to give such an email this much light, I also understand the community is rightly concerned and would like to be reassured that standards are maintained.”
He wrote to airmen a few days after AFSOC declined to publicly address any of the points made in the anonymous letter, citing privacy concerns. The Air Force also said Feb. 4 it would not answer questions about Daniels’s memo because of the ongoing investigation.
Air Force Times is withholding the female airman’s name for privacy reasons.
The unnamed author claimed the woman has tried to quit training three times — twice in water training sessions and once during a solo land navigation course.
In 2018, she unsuccessfully tried to finish Phase II of special tactics officer training — a weeklong process to pick who will advance to years of formal special tactics courses — and cleared the hurdle on her second try in 2019.
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"The change in standards invalidated me with a majority of my team,” the female special tactics officer candidate wrote in April 2021.
Daniels wrote that during the Phase II class in 2018, the candidate struggled in a rigorous session and got out of the pool. That can be classified as “quitting by action” or “failure to train,” two common incidents in special warfare training that also happen with male trainees, he said.
AFSOC has codified procedures for deciding whether a trainee is struggling or leaving altogether, Daniels wrote. The Air Force declined to provide a copy of that policy.
“She indicated she did not intend to quit,” Daniels said. “She got back in the pool and finished the session along with the remainder of the week.”
A special tactics instructor, who requested anonymity to speak candidly about the incident, told Air Force Times that the woman felt she was holding her team back.
“It was a huge deal,” he recalled. “All of the [instructors] got called into a room to discuss what happened.”
She was allowed to continue training with the rest of the Phase II candidates after talking with a senior instructor, the airman said. Daniels indicated the female airman spoke to the lead instructor — someone between the ranks of major and colonel — and the senior enlisted leader.
But Daniels pushed back on allegations that instructors unanimously voted against her being selected during her second attempt at Phase II in 2019.
Most of the trainers recommended that she continue, and she earned positive reviews from her peers, Daniels said. The wing commander argued that the woman is a good communicator and critical thinker, and would be a successful special tactics officer.
Air Force special tactics candidates participate in a pool training session while a cadre member evaluates them as part of assessment and selection at Hurlburt Field, Florida, March 24, 2021. The arduous selection process screens candidates to join the elite community, leading global access, precision strike and personnel recovery. (Tech. Sgt. Rose Gudex/Air Force)
The anonymous author also claimed the female candidate quit pool training a second time — at a course in Texas to prepare airmen for combat dive training. Then, the author alleged, she was allowed to attend a “more relaxed” version at Hurlburt Field, Florida, instead.
Daniels responded that the woman had sought medical attention and returned to Florida to treat an unnamed injury. There, she joined the final pre-dive course offered at the Special Tactics Training Squadron.
The Air Force did not answer whether the class was intended for special tactics officers, and if so, whether other combat control or pararescue trainees also attended. The service has historically provided tactical air control party specialists pre-dive training through similar programs at the Florida schoolhouse.
“Upon completing pre-dive, the candidate completed the Special Forces Combat Diver Qualification Course at Key West, FL, where she became the first woman to graduate that course,” Daniels said in his letter.
Daniels acknowledged that the female candidate formally quit training at Combat Control School in North Carolina in April 2021, but wasn’t ejected from the program — a claim corroborated by training forms obtained by Air Force Times.
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More than five years after the Jan. 1, 2016, deadline to let women into all-male special warfare fields, they are still a rarity in parts of Air Force Special Operations Command.
Daniels’s memo did not specifically address land navigation, the portion of Combat Control School during which the woman dropped out. But her decision to quit prompted wing leaders to ask her for a report on policies, standards or conduct she felt held trainees back — shedding light on her struggle in the woods.
Her April 2021 after-action report, obtained by Air Force Times, recommended giving trainees more time to practice planning routes before having to prove themselves as navigators in the field.
The female airman ran into multiple people who were lost, she said. Trainees don’t fully understand how to plot a path without “hand railing” — or relying on roads to get around.
“There were several times that myself and others got completely thrown off by roads that were not on the map,” she said. “Operationally we may not have access to completely updated information, but while students are learning a skill for the first time, it is important to solidify the fundamental skills before asking them to perform like seasoned navigators.”
Though the Air Force suggested that other airmen who dropped out at various points in Combat Control School should be retrained into other jobs, citing Air Force policy, the woman’s paperwork advised supervisors to readmit her and “proceed [in accordance with Special Warfare Training Wing and 24th Special Operations Wing] determination,” Air Force Times previously reported.
The woman’s after-action report also stated that all of her face-to-face interactions with instructors and staff were professional. However, rumors spread before she arrived at Combat Control School in North Carolina.
Multiple students told her instructors were “preparing their warships” and did not want her to graduate, she wrote in the report. One told her that a trainer openly discussed his disdain of the soon-to-arrive female candidate in front of an entire team of students.
The female candidate’s feedback ultimately led the Air Force to review its training pipeline standards and professionalism, Daniels wrote. The service declined to discuss the results of that inquiry.
“Some behavior of individuals in the special warfare training enterprise does not align with professional standards, [and] while a good-faith effort was made to integrate female trainees, much more work remains before credibility can be restored,” Daniels wrote. “The [special warfare] enterprise should be devoid of institutional, occupational or individual barriers that cause anyone to feel like they do not belong.”
Special tactics operators assigned to the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron, watch a CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft assigned to the 8th Special Operations Squadron, take off from the Eglin Range Complex, Florida, Dec. 8, 2021. (Tech. Sgt. Carly Kavish/Air Force)
The female candidate’s feedback and her performance in training led the 24th Special Operations Wing to give her another chance to finish the program, he added.
“For years, the 24 SOW standard operating procedure for [special tactics officer] selection and re-entry into the pipeline has been to wait for one year or longer before returning for another attempt,” Daniels continued. The Special Warfare Training Wing “is currently finalizing a written policy to codify the waiting period.”
The Air Force did not provide Air Force Times with a copy of that policy, or answer questions about whether any other male officer was granted that opportunity after quitting.
Critics also alleged the woman was given other forms of preferential treatment not afforded to other trainees who quit, such as working in a job that directly reports to AFSOC boss Lt. Gen. Jim Slife. They worry she is too inexperienced to have a hand in shaping future policy for commandos at the Cochran Group, an in-house think tank of sorts for special operations.
“Based on the candidate’s performance in her core [Air Force specialty] and the in-depth knowledge of the candidate’s attributes, the candidate was selected to work in the AFSOC Cochran Group while she considered reentry into the pipeline and awaited a one-year period,” Daniels said.
The trainee’s record and performance in her previous career field, plus her understanding of the traits that officers develop throughout special tactics training, also “resulted in allowing the officer an opportunity to assess at a special mission unit to work within her previous career specialty,” he wrote.
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The anonymous author had claimed that the woman was given a prestigious special mission unit job without going through the usual competitive selection process.
Daniels likewise brushed off the suggestion that Maj. Spencer Reed, formerly the head of the 352nd Special Warfare Training Squadron in North Carolina, said the service would get its first female special tactics officer, even if she falls short of the field’s high standards.
“Neither the current commander, nor any other commander of a [special warfare training squadron or special tactics] unit, would make this statement,” he wrote. “Wing leaders have made statements that it is imminent that a female candidate will make it through the pipeline after they meet the same graduation standards as their male counterparts.”
He chided the community for airing their grievances on social media, and asked that any further complaints come through the wing’s front office instead.
“Few people would appreciate a similarly detailed account of their own struggles and experiences laid bare for their peers and future teammates to dissect,” Daniels said.
Rachel Cohen joined Air Force Times as senior reporter in March 2021. Her work has appeared in Air Force Magazine, Inside Defense, Inside Health Policy, the Frederick News-Post (Md.), the Washington Post, and others.
Kyle Rempfer is an editor and reporter who has covered combat operations, criminal cases, foreign military assistance and training accidents. Before entering journalism, Kyle served in U.S. Air Force Special Tactics and deployed in 2014 to Paktika Province, Afghanistan, and Baghdad, Iraq. Follow on Twitter @Kyle_Rempfer
19. Channeling the Legacy of Kennan: Theory of Success in Great Power Competition
Excerpts:
First, using military language, a theory of success, when clear, explicit, and well considered, is the strategic version of commander’s intent. It provides subordinate or lateral actors and institutions a strategy heuristic, allowing them to make decisions about the development of their own innovative, timely, and tailored responses to the evolving context. Simultaneously, a theory of success helps limit the play of operational and strategic creativity to the logic path set forth in the founding strategy, which facilitates rapid, tailored responses and iterative evolution of strategy while reducing the likelihood of line-of-effort or iteration fratricide. In this context, John Boyd’s OODA loop is as relevant to the strategist-practitioner and policymaker as it remains to the fighter pilot. If US strategic choices are made more rapidly, by those lateral or subordinate elements that have a clearer and more immediate view of the changing strategic context, then the United States will be able to cumulatively outthink our more hierarchical, top-driven strategic competitors by getting inside their strategic OODA loops. In concept, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have explicitly emphasized getting in the adversary’s OODA loop by highlighting the importance of “intellectual overmatch.” However, without a flattening of the strategy decision structure, something that could be facilitated by a clear theory of success, intellectual overmatch buys limited strategic benefit.
Second, a theory of success clarifies the underlying hypothesis and supporting assumptions of a strategy. This gives US intelligence agencies, the policy community, think tanks, and scholars a defined set of targets from which they can develop valuable intelligence requirements and conduct analysis. If a nation’s entire theory of success or strategic hypothesis is underpinned by three or four major assumptions, then proving or disproving those assumptions (e.g., looking for trends and indicators of accuracy or inaccuracy) is a clear and exceptionally beneficial process for the national security community to undertake. Pitting the combined analytic power of our intelligence agencies, the broader policy community, and the think tank and academic communities against a set of underlying assumptions based on a clear theory of success substantially decreases the chances of the United States charging boldly and unswervingly down the wrong strategic path. In fact, the ability to leverage vibrant and robust governmental and civilian analysis and public debate is an asymmetric advantage of our liberal society—an advantage that is best leveraged when a theory of success is clearly defined.
I often tell my students that everyone who writes a strategy or engages in developing a strategy has a theory of success—however, most do not actually know what that theory is. The theory is assumed, felt, believed, or held in the subconscious but nonetheless guiding strategy development. The theory of success needs to be overt, direct, understood, analyzed, challenged, and then promulgated as the most important element of the strategy for a reader or implementer to take away. Because, when all the details of a strategy are stripped away, at its core a strategy is a theory of success. George Kennan gave the West a theory of success for the Cold War. That theory carried the United States and our allies, in admittedly halting, indirect, and frequently stumbling steps, to victory. The United States has yet to identify a theory of success to carry forward in its strategic competition with China and a reemergent Russia. Without one, our strategy and policy will continue to be inconsistent, incoherent, and frequently self-conflicting.
Channeling the Legacy of Kennan: Theory of Success in Great Power Competition - Modern War Institute
This article is part of the National War College’s contribution to the series “Compete and Win: Envisioning a Competitive Strategy for the Twenty-First Century.” The series endeavors to present expert commentary on diverse issues surrounding US competitive strategy and irregular warfare with peer and near-peer competitors in the physical, cyber, and information spaces. The series is part of the Competition in Cyberspace Project (C2P), a joint initiative by the Army Cyber Institute and the Modern War Institute. Read all articles in the series here.
Special thanks to series editors Capt. Maggie Smith, PhD, C2P director, and Dr. Barnett S. Koven.
Good strategy is more than a collection of objective instrument packages, or a list of acceptable initiatives loosely bound to the pablum of fluffy objectives. Good strategy must have a clear, well-considered vision of the world combined with a uniting theory that focuses action on viable objectives and creates power and clarity amid uncertainty and complexity. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has experienced a slide into strategic atrophy: we have slowly bled international support, squandered advantage, and burned resources while repeatedly coming out on the losing side of generally unnecessary conflicts. Our brief unipolar moment meant the immediate cost of this strategic atrophy was bearable, yet as we rapidly transition back to a period of multipolar competition, the likes of which hasn’t been seen since before World War II, that is no longer the case. It is time to begin putting our strategic house in order.
I have taught the art of security strategy at National War College for the last six years, and over that time my appreciation for the complexity of strategy and the value I put on the different elements of strategy has changed substantially. When I first started teaching, I delved deeply into the details of Art Lykke’s three-legged stool: ends, ways, and means. I focused most of my time and energy with students on developing viable ways-means packages and parsing the details of potential ends-means gaps. In other words, focusing on the mechanics of writing a strategy in the belief that good details meant good strategy. However, over the last few years, I have come to believe that, while a focus on the mechanics of combining ends, ways, and means remains valuable, it is less important than developing a crystal-clear diagnosis of the problem and then creating an understandable and viable theory of success. Fundamentally, I now believe the beating heart of good strategy is a clear, coherent, and well-challenged theory of success.
George Kennan is frequently referenced as a (if not the) preeminent post–World War II strategist practitioner. He is universally credited with the Cold War containment strategy and often with the Marshall Plan. Yet, upon further examination, Kennan created neither strategy. The actual containment strategy he suggested was never fully implemented and its recommendations were superseded by Paul Nitze’s NSC-68 less than two years after Kennan proposed them. Kennan’s ideas on European recovery also failed to evolve into what could even loosely be called a complete strategy. Kennan’s brilliance, and why he is justifiably America’s most revered strategist-practitioner, is rooted in how, for both the Cold War and European recovery, he clearly diagnosed the problem and developed an understandable and viable theory of success. Once that hard intellectual work had been done, the relatively easier work of creating and adapting strategies that accounted for the evolving international and domestic context could be accomplished by multiple individuals across the interagency. Despite repeated and substantial change to US national strategy between 1948 and 1991, Kennan’s theory of success remained the core. Kennan illuminated the corridor; others figured out how best to get through it.
Most basically, a theory of success (the term is agency dependent: while the State Department might seek a theory of success, the Defense Department’s focus will be on a theory of victory, USAID’s on a theory of change, and so on) is the strategist’s understanding of why, not how, a strategy will work. In other words, it is not an explanation of what actions will be taken, but instead a theory of why, and through what causal mechanisms, those actions will produce the desired end state. More specifically, it is a strategist’s hypothesis of expected causal relationships—namely, if we take X action, it will produce Y reaction/response from our target(s) because of reason Z, which will move conditions toward the strategy’s end state. This logic, explicit or implicit, underlies all strategic actions (i.e., ways). Consider the following example:
- Strategic Action: Sail a carrier strike group through the Taiwan Strait following significant Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone.
- Assumed Reaction: Beijing will recognize the strength of the US will to defend Taiwan.
- Theory of Success: China’s recognition of US resolve, demonstrated by sailing a carrier strike group through the Taiwan Strait, will make existing and future US deterrent threats more credible, thus improving the likelihood the United States’ preferred strategy of deterrence will work to prevent Chinese aggression against Taiwan and maintain the status quo.
Clearly, the above assumed reaction and resultant theory of success is only a hypothesis—it cannot be known for certain what reaction China will have. It is assumed China will see the action as a demonstration of will instead of an empty display. Additionally, it is assumed China will not take the opportunity to attack the carrier strike group. Furthermore, the strategist assumes this demonstration of US resolve increases the likelihood China understands any future threats to Taiwan will also be taken seriously by the United States. At a deeper level, the entire idea rests on the theory-based assumption that perceived will and perceived capability are the two elements needed for successful coercion.
By clarifying the expected results of strategic actions, the causal mechanism believed to lead to those results, and how those results are expected to move the context toward the desired end state, the strategist brings greater analysis to bear on often unchallenged or unrecognized assumptions, biases, and gaps in knowledge. This focuses attention on key questions: When have similar actions (ways) in the past produced an end state or condition like what we are shooting for in this situation? When have they failed? Why did they fail? How can we avoid similar failure? It also facilitates the identification of cognitive biases, like mirror imaging, availability, or illusion of control, by forcing strategists to make explicit their expectations. The process also prompts additional questions like Alexander’s Question: What information, if I had it, would make me change my mind? In the example of sailing a carrier strike group through the Taiwan Strait, we might ask, Since we have done this before, what response did we previously see from China? Is that the same response we are expecting this time? Why or why not? Or, In what other ways might China respond to this action, and what information would lead us to believe one of those responses is more likely than our expected response? In short, an explicit, clear, and understandable theory of success facilitates a much deeper exploration of a proposed strategy, which creates more opportunities to identify risks to, or from, the strategy before they come to fruition.
Strategic actions are initiated because of the hypothesis made in the theory of success (and its assumptions). Said another way, a strategist’s theory of success drives strategic choices—completely, whether the strategist knows it or not. A good theory of success is based on clear analysis of context paired with a uniting model to interpret the results. There are many approaches available, but in the current context, the competitive strategy framework provides a valuable option. This framework prescribes engaging in a disciplined process of net assessment of competitors, other relevant international actors, and internal, domestic conditions. The process further requires the identification of strengths, weaknesses, and durable propensities. Using the Kennan example, his theory of success was based on assessments of the nature of military power and an evaluation of which states or regions around the world could generate strategically significant military capabilities, which led to his containment hypothesis. But his conceptualization of successful containment was also grounded in an assessment of the long-term health of the domestic systems and proclivities of the two major competitors—the United States and the Soviet Union. Kennan’s analysis gave him confidence: if the West could maintain control of key regions around the globe and avoid being either attacked or undermined it would, in the long run, prevail. The problem is, unlike Kennan, many strategists and policymakers do not clearly understand what their own theories of success are, or they fail to define them. Even when strategists and policymakers both understand and define their theories, they often fail to take the next step of identifying and challenging the assumptions upon which their theories of success are built. The result of failing to identify, define, and validate the theory of success is a strategy that is “nothing more than a loose collection of initiatives and misplaced hope.” The implications of such incoherent strategy for strategic competition are clear.
First, using military language, a theory of success, when clear, explicit, and well considered, is the strategic version of commander’s intent. It provides subordinate or lateral actors and institutions a strategy heuristic, allowing them to make decisions about the development of their own innovative, timely, and tailored responses to the evolving context. Simultaneously, a theory of success helps limit the play of operational and strategic creativity to the logic path set forth in the founding strategy, which facilitates rapid, tailored responses and iterative evolution of strategy while reducing the likelihood of line-of-effort or iteration fratricide. In this context, John Boyd’s OODA loop is as relevant to the strategist-practitioner and policymaker as it remains to the fighter pilot. If US strategic choices are made more rapidly, by those lateral or subordinate elements that have a clearer and more immediate view of the changing strategic context, then the United States will be able to cumulatively outthink our more hierarchical, top-driven strategic competitors by getting inside their strategic OODA loops. In concept, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have explicitly emphasized getting in the adversary’s OODA loop by highlighting the importance of “intellectual overmatch.” However, without a flattening of the strategy decision structure, something that could be facilitated by a clear theory of success, intellectual overmatch buys limited strategic benefit.
Second, a theory of success clarifies the underlying hypothesis and supporting assumptions of a strategy. This gives US intelligence agencies, the policy community, think tanks, and scholars a defined set of targets from which they can develop valuable intelligence requirements and conduct analysis. If a nation’s entire theory of success or strategic hypothesis is underpinned by three or four major assumptions, then proving or disproving those assumptions (e.g., looking for trends and indicators of accuracy or inaccuracy) is a clear and exceptionally beneficial process for the national security community to undertake. Pitting the combined analytic power of our intelligence agencies, the broader policy community, and the think tank and academic communities against a set of underlying assumptions based on a clear theory of success substantially decreases the chances of the United States charging boldly and unswervingly down the wrong strategic path. In fact, the ability to leverage vibrant and robust governmental and civilian analysis and public debate is an asymmetric advantage of our liberal society—an advantage that is best leveraged when a theory of success is clearly defined.
I often tell my students that everyone who writes a strategy or engages in developing a strategy has a theory of success—however, most do not actually know what that theory is. The theory is assumed, felt, believed, or held in the subconscious but nonetheless guiding strategy development. The theory of success needs to be overt, direct, understood, analyzed, challenged, and then promulgated as the most important element of the strategy for a reader or implementer to take away. Because, when all the details of a strategy are stripped away, at its core a strategy is a theory of success. George Kennan gave the West a theory of success for the Cold War. That theory carried the United States and our allies, in admittedly halting, indirect, and frequently stumbling steps, to victory. The United States has yet to identify a theory of success to carry forward in its strategic competition with China and a reemergent Russia. Without one, our strategy and policy will continue to be inconsistent, incoherent, and frequently self-conflicting.
Colonel Steve Heffington is a professor of national security strategy at the National War College, where he has been a faculty member since 2015. While at NWC, Colonel Heffington has served as a deputy core course director and director of education technology, and has been the NWC Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Professor of Military Studies Chair since 2017. Colonel Heffington is the coauthor of A National Security Strategy Primer.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the author is affiliated with, including the National War College, National Defense University, and US government.
20. Maybe it's Time for a new Comms Policy after Military Raids
I wonder if anyone is really considering this important analysis. Unfortunately I just do not think this would fly in our media environment as well as the desire and need for transparency. Unfortunately because of past mistakes if we adopted these recommendations we would come under severe criticism.
I did like Admiral Kirby's description of the mission: "... US Special Operations Forces under the control of the US Central Command conducted an operation ..."
Conclusion:
As in most policy analysis, there is no perfect answer and, in this case, there may not even be a good answer. Yet, a policy of post-strike silence and ambiguity could go far in protecting not only our troops and their tactics, but it could also help to mitigate retribution, terrorist recruitment and incitement within vulnerable allied nations. Such a policy would endure criticism from the media, transparency advocates and perhaps even constitutional jurists, but it is a policy worth consideration.
Maybe it's Time for a new Comms Policy after Military Raids
OPINION — On 3 February, US forces attacked an ISIS leadership site in Syria, targeting its top leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi. In characteristic fashion, the ground assault was executed brilliantly at the cost of one helicopter but there were no US casualties. Rather than be taken alive, it was reported by the Administration that Abu Ibrahim set off an explosive device, killing himself and his family. Soon thereafter, unnamed sources began to provide information to the media and, later that day, President Biden made an address to the nation.
As is so often the case since the beginning of the War on Terrorism, this was a one-day story. By Friday, the media was reporting on the Winter Olympics, the Ukraine crisis, and a positive jobs report.
Yet less reported on by Western media, and perhaps far more significant, has been reaction to the raid within the region. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported about, “A photo of a girl circula(ing) on social media … who appeared to be about five with blood on her face and “a wrecked bedroom (with) a wooden crib and the stuffed rabbit doll, claiming that, “the US launched the operation knowing the ISIS leader might respond by killing innocent people”, clearly working against US efforts to improve its image abroad. boost to ISIS recruiting and propaganda efforts.
Even though President Biden’s speech and media reports were relatively absent of the bombast and triumphalism that the comments that followed the attack on Qassim Soleimani had, one wonders whether these operations would be better met with official silence or at least official ambiguity.
Employed by the Israeli government for years, Tel Aviv’s no-comment policy on issues like this, is seen as a means to avoid retaliation, allow foes to save face and smooth cooperation with friendly neighbors. Several reasons stand out for why this may merit consideration of a similar US policy.
First, the highly telegenic images and detailed accounts which emerge from operations unintentionally benefit similar terrorist organizations and future planning. Repeated helicopter malfunctions in the recent Qurashi raid, the raid against Osama bin Laden and even the 1979 Desert One operations, exposed vulnerabilities in troop insertions. Overhead night vision cameras showed forces assaulting compounds and revealed much about their equipment, unit sizes and movement techniques. Well-known Close Quarter Combat (CQC) techniques may have been one of the reasons that Qurashi chose to kill himself with explosives rather than face the marksmanship skills of a special operator. Unfortunately, the adversary is a learning enemy and over-reporting on operations are teaching moments.
Second, such announcements dictate retribution. According to Jonathan Hessen, TV7 Israel News Editor in Chief and Host of “Jerusalem Studio” and “Europa Stands”, “Mideastern societies adhere to an unwritten cultural code of “Sharaf,” (Honor). When a relative is killed, it demands revenge to ‘reclaim honor in the eyes of society’ or else it risks being depicted as ‘weak’. Following rules of ambiguity (neither confirming nor denying responsibility) provides a way out for those who carry out attacks to seek to avoid escalation.” Moreover, the bombast which often accompanies Presidential announcements (“he died a coward”) is not only an affront to “Karama” (dignity) but is culturally naïve as these deaths are not seen as cowardice but revered as martyrdom.
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Not only do announcements and widespread dissemination of attacks require retribution, but they also serve as a tool for those forced, inspired or humiliated into joining extremist groups. Experts such as Shajkovki remain concerned that post-raid communications are a propaganda boost for recruitment. Recruitment is a longstanding problem in Europe and elsewhere, whether done face-to-face or via hundreds of videos propagated on the internet.
Experts are divided on the legality and wisdom of targeted strikes. For those who argue that targeted strikes are illegal, announcements by the president are seen as an admission of guilt. Rosa Brooks of the Georgetown School of Law believes that the strikes also flaunt the absence of settled law and works against the efforts of international legal standards. Silence or ambiguity, which can mitigate an individual or organizational response, can also provide legal vagueness, giving sates face-saving ways to avoid conflict, enabling them to, “look the other way”. It can also reduce pressure on friendly governments that often face significant public criticism for aligning themselves with the US, even if they had no direct role in operations.
Others feel that these strikes and post-strike transparency have a purpose other than for internal US consumption. Andrew Parasiliti, president of Al-Monitor notes that, “By making it known, the terrorists are on notice that the US led ‘Defeat ISIS’ campaign is not letting up. This mission has been an unqualified American success, militarily and diplomatically, with bipartisan support, over three administrations, and a signal to US allies and adversaries of sustained leadership and engagement on this vital interest. There’s something to be said for making that known.”
The media will assert a right to report and claim because, as the Washington Post masthead reminds, “Democracy Dies in Darkness”. A journalist with years in the region notes that, “The default mode now is not saying anything and it’s extremely disturbing. We had access to information when the military needed us to sell their war in Iraq. Now, pretty much all we have are unanswered questions about actions and issues Americans need to know about.” Yet, advocates of ambiguity will point to venues to oversee and scrutinize these operations outside of the public sphere such as congressional committees, judicial proceedings, and Freedom of Information procedures. Many would argue the insufficiency of these processes, although most of those arguments do not go to the question of ambiguity versus full transparency.
As in most policy analysis, there is no perfect answer and, in this case, there may not even be a good answer. Yet, a policy of post-strike silence and ambiguity could go far in protecting not only our troops and their tactics, but it could also help to mitigate retribution, terrorist recruitment and incitement within vulnerable allied nations. Such a policy would endure criticism from the media, transparency advocates and perhaps even constitutional jurists, but it is a policy worth consideration.
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Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, US Army (Ret) was the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from 2008-2009. Prior to that, he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Affairs from 2006-2008. These positions followed a 30-year career in the military with service as Deputy Director for Strategy and Plans at US Central Command, Deputy Director of Operations for Coalition Forces in Iraq and significant command assignments worldwide. He currently leads a private consulting business for US clients in the Middle East and provides regional security commentary on Arabic, Turkish and English-speaking media channels worldwide.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.