Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

I have returned to DC. I should resume my regular news distribution schedule tomorrow

Quotes of the Day:

"We should measure the prosperity of a nation not by the number of millionaires, but by the absence of poverty, the prevalence of health, the efficiency of the public schools, and the number of people who can [and] do read worthwhile books."

– W.E.B. Du Bois

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But, since no one was listening, everything needs to be said again."

– Andre Gide

"Every man's life ends the same way. It is only the details of how he lived and how he died that distinguish one man from another."

– Ernest Hemingway

1. N. Korea's removal of unification references could cause ideological confusion: minister

2. Avoiding war in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist

3. Ditching Ukraine Would Help China and Iran

4. Report of the Expert Study Group on NATO and Indo-Pacific Partners

5. N. Korea has sent more than 10,000 containers of munitions, materials to Russia since Sept.: State Dept.

6. Mentions of Cuba in N. Korean media abruptly halt after establishment of Seoul-Havana ties

7. S. Korea investigating company on U.S. sanctions list over Russia connection

8. Inside North Korea’s Forced-Labor Program in China

9. G7 leaders decry N. Korea's exports of ballistic missiles to Russia

10. Across the river from North Korea, a laser light show for peace

11. North Korea assumes control of border industrial zone

12. ‘Why Are We Being Treated as the Villains?’ South Korean Doctors Stage Mass Walkouts

13. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Efforts to implement the“20x10 policy for regional development” begin…As people are mobilized to construction projects, complaints start to emerge

14. 'Justifying' civilian casualties

15. Songjin Steel Mill workers face struggle session after enjoying South Korean music

16. Drunken brawlers take to the stage to celebrate Kim Jong Il’s birthday

1. N. Korea's removal of unification references could cause ideological confusion: minister

This is an inflection point (and we need to recognize it as such), an historic opportunity for the ROK to put forth a real and detailed unification plan. The ROK can fill the ideological vacuum Kim Jong Un has created with his major strategic mistake.

We need an information campaign more than ever that focuses on human rights and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.

During my trips to Korea over the past two months I have been troubled by the lack of acknowledgement and understanding by US government and military officials on unification. I have heard many distributing comments but mostly dismissive ones that repeat long held tropes about the Korean people in the South losing interest in unification or that China will not allow it. No one seems to pay attention to the ROK and US presidents (and the Japanese Prime Minister) and their statements.

But we have an opportunity here to really change the calculus in the north if we will not allow our imaginations to be limited (which of course are very limited by our fears of nuclear weapons). If only we understood the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.

N. Korea's removal of unification references could cause ideological confusion: minister | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · February 25, 2024

SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's recent removal of unification references could create an ideological vacuum or confusion among the elite ranks, leading the regime to carry out a military provocation to bring stability, Seoul's point man on Pyongyang said Sunday.

Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho made the remark during an appearance on public broadcaster KBS, referring to the North's recent dismantlement of a monument honoring the unification efforts of late leader Kim Il-sung, which came after current leader Kim Jong-un called South Korea a "primary foe" and vowed not to seek inter-Korean unification.

"There's a high possibility that erasing the achievements of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, who are the basis for hereditary power, will create an ideological vacuum or confusion among North Korea's elite," he said, referring to the current leader's grandfather and father, respectively.

"If there is internal conflict, there's a high possibility it will carry out a military provocation to overcome the crisis," he continued. "Our government considers the situation very serious, and we have prepared thorough measures in response, including military deterrence measures."

The minister also said the removal of images of the Korean Peninsula from North Korean broadcasts is aimed at "blocking the North Korean people's longing for South Korean society."

"It clearly shows that North Korea has lost to South Korea in the regime competition," he said.

Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · February 25, 2024

2. Avoiding war in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist

The 31 page report can be downloaded here: https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2024-02/SR201%20Escalation%20risks%20in%20the%20Indo-Pacific.pdf?VersionId=Ec1JMi.G8DGKlGvD_w6Qf3B.rEYCW393

I am glad to see the recognition of the importance of instability in north Korea. From my two recent trips to Korea I have noticed a singular focus on the nuclear threat (for obvious reasons) and little to no acknowledgement or understanding of the threat of internal instability.

I am becoming more and more convinced that our fear of escalation and nuclear use has stunted our strategic thinking and actually makes miscalculation more likely.

Regarding China, when we wrote the first instability CONPLAN in the 1990s we recognized the need for a joint coordination center that would include all counties in the region to try to mitigate misunderstanding and miscalculation. In three Track II events in 2018-2019 with China, South Korea, and the US with very senior former foreign affairs and military officials we saw that both China and South Korea were receptive to the idea of a joint coordination center. Of course the current political situation with China might preclude that. But then again all three countries might be interested in avoiding a chance contact or meeting engagement with military forces trying to protect their nation's interests during a contingency north Korea.

The Korean Peninsula

A very serious crisis centred on North Korea remains a real possibility. The drivers could come from within

North Korea, through international tension, or some combination of both.

In 2015, Peter Varghese, while Secretary of the Department of Foreign A.airs and Trade, speculated that

North Korea might collapse under the weight of its own economic gravity and contemplated the future of the

Korean Peninsula in terms of when, rather than whether, reunification will occur.68 Even if the North Korean

regime doesn’t collapse, there’s potential for a succession crisis within the regime, in which the alignment and

conduct of the military could be crucial.69

Domestic instability in North Korea would pose a range of problems for the international community. The

safety of North Korean nuclear weapons would be a pre-eminent concern.70 A large-scale humanitarian

catastrophe, which could drive migrants across the Chinese border, would be another concern, and the

regional and international community would need to be mindful of Beijing’s equities in how the crisis were

handled. The US, South Korean and Chinese militaries would probably need to be involved in managing such

eventualities and could potentially be acting in close proximately to each other inside North Korea in the

event of a regime collapse. In such situations, the potential for misunderstanding resulting in either accidental

escalation or pressure to pre-empt could be very real.

A crisis on the Korean Peninsula could also be more immediately international rather than domestic. For

instance, the North Korean regime might miscalculate the tolerance of a future US administration for nuclear

brinksmanship, or a US administration might miscalculate the regime’s own thresholds.71 Some research

suggests that the North Korean regime consistently responds to US – South Korea joint military exercises as

a serious security threat, not mere theatre, providing a regular basis for miscalculation.72 And there’s plentiful

space for accidents with tragic outcomes, including involving third countries. For instance, a North Korean

missile test over Japan could misfire and hit a populated area, dramatically escalating tensions.

Crisis

Whatever its cause, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula would almost certainly involve both the US and China.

Any crisis or conflict could involve heavy fighting, potentially including the use of nuclear weapons, close

to the Chinese border. The need to avoid inadvertent or accidental escalation with China because of allied

actions on the peninsula would clearly be a pre-eminent concern.

Russia would also be a factor in any crisis scenario because of its border with North Korea, its close relations

with the regime in Pyongyang, its new ‘no limits’ strategic partnership with China and its historical place

at the table in formats such as the Six Party Talks. The prospects for Moscow playing a constructive

crisis-management role look very dim, at least while Vladimir Putin leads Russia.73

Avoiding war in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by William Leben · February 22, 2024

War in the Indo-Pacific is a real possibility. Increased competition, a growing trust deficit between global and regional powers and potential miscalculations heighten the danger. There needs to be a more engaged Australian discussion on conflict-escalation risks and how they might be managed.

Today I examine these issues in a new ASPI special report: Escalation Risks in the Indo-Pacific: A review for practitioners.

Policymakers and leaders need to understand escalation risks as they manage Australia’s relationship with the US, China, North Korea and Australia’s key regional defence partners over coming decades. In rhetoric and in action, Australia also needs to be attentive to how the acquisition and employment of our own new capabilities—strike missiles, evolving cyber capabilities and nuclear-propelled submarines—affect strategic stability dynamics in a fast-changing world.

This report addresses key priorities for the Australian Government. Australian ministers and senior officials have consistently called for governments across the region to use their agency to shape great-power dynamics, including supporting the development of so-called ‘guardrails’ to manage strategic competition between China and the US.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has heightened concern about escalation risks in general terms. While there are many important lessons to be learned from that conflict, it’s essential that similar concerns are understood by Australian policy- and decision-makers as they relate to our key partners and our geography.

The first and principal aim of the report is to provide a review and discussion of various escalation risks in the Indo-Pacific. This is a complex issue which can be approached from multiple directions, drawing on a vast and rich literature which can help us think about the challenges. But for the historical reasons—among them that Australia has not had to think too hard about crisis management and escalation risks in recent decades—much muscle memory has been lost.

I argue against a rosy view of strategic stability in Australia’s region and suggest there are four main reasons we should remain concerned that crises and escalation pathways could be very difficult to control. These are: the ambiguous nature of maritime capabilities, novel technologies, unknowns in the nuclear balance and simple human frailty.

There is no reason for complacency. Taken together, these factors mean that there are all-too-imaginable possibilities for inadvertent and accidental escalation around flashpoints like the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and in the East and South China Seas. Moreover, the maritime nature of the Western Pacific as a military theatre, combined with emerging technologies like hypersonics, means that decision makers could face very strong pressures toward pre-emption in a crisis. Put more simply, the fear-driven pressure to ‘shoot first’ could be very strong and very dangerous.

The report also identifies policy options for mitigating those concerns. Australia certainly cannot manage these risks alone, and we shouldn’t exaggerate Australian influence over the various factors influencing strategic stability. Nonetheless, the potential consequences are so serious that significant regional players, Australia included, cannot be bystanders. These are not just issues for the US and China alone. Indeed, there is a history of Australia playing a constructive role in this area.

Accordingly, the report makes three recommendations. First, Australian policy makers should support the establishment of appropriate crisis-management mechanisms. Second, Australia should continue and improve crisis exercises, in which national decision-makers should participate. Thirdly, it is important that there is continued investment in understanding escalation thresholds.

It’s important to be up front that my emphasis in this report is on Australian and allied capabilities and concepts. To borrow some military jargon, the report is focused on ‘blue’ (one’s own side) and not on ‘red’ (potential adversaries). I encourage further research and discussion about the escalatory implications of what our potential adversaries are doing. Conflict and contest are always two-sided (or many-sided) affairs, and the actions we take—even in combination and coordination with allies and partners—can’t determine outcomes on their own.

Moreover, the risks discussed here can never be eliminated. If deterrence is to be a significant part of the answer to our security challenges over coming decades, then the management of escalation risks will be an ongoing imperative.

aspistrategist.org.au · by William Leben · February 22, 2024

3. Ditching Ukraine Would Help China and Iran (and north Korea)

I am glad to see Seth included north Korea (but note how the headline editor left it out of the title). I am still mad (jokingly) for not including north Korea in his book: “Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran and the Rise of Irregular Warfare.” north Korea has been masterful in the gray zone and has long conducted irregular warfare on the Korean peninsula. We just don't notice it and ignore it because of the nuclear and huge conventional military threat.

But is this about "appeasing" or our "fear to provoke" as I commented in the NY Times Article "The Spy War: How the C.I.A. Secretly Helps Ukraine Fight Putin?" Or does our "fear to provoke" lead to appeasement?

Ditching Ukraine Would Help China and Iran

Beijing, Tehran, Moscow and Pyongyang all work closely together. Appease one, and you help the rest.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ditching-ukraine-would-help-china-and-iran-house-military-aid-package-03efda95?mod=hp_opin_pos_4#cxrecs_s

By Seth Jones

Feb. 21, 2024 2:12 pm ET

The U.S. Capitol in Washington, Feb. 14. PHOTO: JOSE LUIS MAGANA/ASSOCIATED PRESS

As Congress debates an emergency supplemental bill to aid Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, some lawmakers and pundits insist that the U.S. can pick and choose between opposing China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. It can’t. The growing military, economic and diplomatic cooperation between these countries means that appeasing one of them helps the whole axis of autocracy.

The opponents of American assistance come in several flavors. There are those who believe the threat China poses necessitates that the U.S. focus on opposing Beijing, not Moscow. They fail to appreciate how a Russian victory would be a boon to autocratic regimes around the globe—most of all China. Others want to kill funding for Israel, despite growing Iranian-backed aggression in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. Finally, some isolationists believe America can bury its head in the sand and focus mainly on domestic issues, such as immigration and border security, as though there’s no real trade-off. In each case, they misunderstand how wider American interests are tied into the security of each of these front-line states.

The evidence of closer relations between China, Russia, Iran and even North Korea is clear. Take China. While it is true that Beijing poses a serious danger to American interests, China also has tied itself tightly to Russia—particularly in its fight for Ukraine.

Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have bragged that their friendship “has no limits,” and according to American intelligence, China is “an increasingly important buttress for Russia in its war effort.” The report found that Beijing is “probably supplying Moscow with key technology and dual-use equipment used in Ukraine.” This includes navigation equipment for M-17 military helicopters, jamming technology for military vehicles, parts for fighter jets, components for defense systems like the S-400 surface-to-air missile system, semiconductor chips for weapons systems, and drones for battlefield use. China denies sending military equipment to Russia.

China also clearly sees a national interest in the success of Iran and North Korea. Beijing has stepped up aid to both regimes, including advanced technology that can be used for weapons as well as trade that circumvents U.S. and international sanctions.

Almost every element of the axis works together. Tehran has provided growing military assistance to Moscow, including Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6 drones, artillery shells, short-range ballistic missiles, and more than one million rounds of small-arm ammunition. Iran is also building a sprawling drone factory in the Russian town of Yelabuga, which will produce thousands of attack drones. Iran’s president has denied sending drones and weapons to Russia since the war in Ukraine began.

North Korea has supplied military aid to Moscow, such as artillery shells, short-range ballistic missiles, and other munitions for Mr. Putin’s war in Ukraine. Russia has likely supplied North Korea with advanced technology for satellites, nuclear-powered submarines and ballistic missiles. Last November, Pyongyang launched its new Chollima-1 rocket in Tongchang-ri in an attempt to put up its first military spy satellite, thanks in part to technical help from Moscow. North Korea and Russia have denied that Pyongyang is sending arms to Moscow.

These despotic regimes have disagreements, as all friends do. Chinese leaders have complained about Russia’s warming military relations with North Korea. Beijing has been far more reluctant to help Pyongyang develop nuclear weapons. Iranian leaders were also recently upset with Russia for taking sides with the United Arab Emirates in a spat over the sovereignty of three islands in the Persian Gulf.

The members of this axis are nevertheless developing increasingly close relationships, contributing to 17 straight years of declining democracy worldwide, according to the U.S.-based Freedom House. Their remarkable cooperation disproves those in Congress and the media who think the U.S. can focus on only one adversary at a time.

America’s allies certainly don’t see it that way. South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand have contributed billions of dollars in economic assistance and weapons to help Ukraine defeat Russia. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia have all visited Kyiv to demonstrate solidarity with Ukraine. Even Taiwanese leaders have expressed alarm at the prospect that the U.S. will slash funds to Ukraine.

Military aid is a sliver of the federal budget, and more than 75% of the bill the Senate passed would go to U.S. defense jobs, including in Texas, Pennsylvania, California, Florida and Alabama.

It is time to be realistic about growing cooperation between U.S. adversaries. If Congress doesn’t pass a bill providing military and economic aid to Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan and other front-line states, it will endanger American interests in every theater. To paraphrase former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. needs to deal with the world as it is, not the world that some might wish it to be.

Mr. Jones is senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and author most recently of “Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran and the Rise of Irregular Warfare.”

Report of the Expert Study Group on NATO and Indo-Pacific Partners

usip.org

Key Takeaways

NATO’s interests in the Indo-Pacific are both historic—based on relations with regional countries, operations, and transnational threats—and current. These interests precede the alliance’s focus on China as a security challenge.

NATO began regular contact with Japan in the 1990s, with New Zealand in 2001, and with Australia and the ROK in 2005. It has also had regular contact with China since 2010. Australia, the ROK, and New Zealand all contributed personnel to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan (2003–2014), while Japan was a significant financial contributor for Afghanistan. In addition to ISAF and a follow-on mission in Afghanistan, NATO led three counter-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean, including Operation Ocean Shield (2009–2016). Australia and New Zealand participated in Ocean Shield, and Japan and the ROK, as well as China, ran or participated in parallel counter-piracy missions that coordinated with Ocean Shield.

NATO formalized its partnerships with Australia, Japan, the ROK, and New Zealand by signing Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme documents with each of these countries between 2012 and 2014. Beyond NATO’s operations in the region and Afghanistan, the four countries and NATO connected over shared values and over transnational threats such as terrorism, challenges to maritime security, and cyberattacks, as well as North Korea’s nuclear and missile program, which has been a regular subject of NATO summit declarations and North Atlantic Council statements since 2006. NATO did not mention China in a high-level public document until December 2019, after a period of reckoning within Europe about security challenges posed by the country’s behavior and ambitions. By June 2022, China as a challenge to alliance interests, security, and values was formalized in NATO’s Strategic Concept. Aside from China, North Korea, existing and emerging transnational threats, and relations with its partners in the region, NATO’s contemporary Indo-Pacific interests are based on growing perceived ties between security in the region and in the Euro-Atlantic.

NATO engages with its Indo-Pacific partners both on a bilateral basis and, increasingly, as a group, the IP4. Each partner country’s bilateral relationship with NATO is of primary importance and is the product of unique priorities, perceptions, and circumstances. Although the IP4 format, which brings these countries together, is not new, the frequency and levels at which the group meets have increased over time, as have its relevance and visibility.

In terms of bilateral relations, Australia is the most integrated into NATO’s military operational structure of the Indo-Pacific partners and enjoys the status of an Enhanced Opportunities Partner. Canberra sees NATO as a partner for crisis response and protecting the rules-based international order, as a more effective way of engaging with the European security community than bilateral efforts with individual nations, and as a platform for specialist technical and professional resources. Japan has had the longest relations with NATO of the Indo-Pacific partners and is the most openly enthusiastic about its association with the alliance. Tokyo’s priorities for NATO include informing European understanding of China and of the importance of Indo-Pacific security, and coordinating on transnational security challenges. NATO is also relevant to Tokyo’s interest in increasing ties between US alliances in response to China’s growing power relative to the United States. Relations between the ROK and NATO have been relatively superficial until recently. Seoul has viewed NATO in a positive light as an extension of the US-ROK alliance and as an organization of states with which it shares values and can undertake political dialogue and cooperation on transnational threat issues of mutual relevance. NATO has seemed largely incidental, however, to Seoul’s main security focus, North Korea, and therefore of limited priority. That said, ROK-NATO relations are currently in a dynamic state as a result of external and internal changes, including the war in Ukraine and the Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s interest in cultivating supportive partners in Europe. The key benefits of NATO relations for New Zealand include interoperability, capability enhancement of its armed forces, information exchange and dialogue, and the ability to contribute to the global security environment and to the protection of the rules-based international order. Various contextual realities have colored Wellington’s perceptions of NATO, including New Zealand’s antinuclear stance, its small size, and its attachment to an independent foreign policy. Wellington has traditionally seen the direct practical benefits of NATO partnership as limited for its regional security interests, especially in the South Pacific.

NATO began to engage intermittently with the Indo-Pacific partners as a group of four at least six years before the IP4 grouping burst onto the global stage in June 2022 with the historic participation of the leaders of Australia, Japan, the ROK, and New Zealand in the summit of NATO heads of state and government in Madrid. Although initial meetings focused on North Korea, engagement in the IP4 format subsequently expanded to include such things as transnational threats and China and has picked up considerably since 2019. Meetings have taken place at various levels of the North Atlantic Council, from ambassadors to ministers and leaders, as well as with the NATO Military Committee. The IP4 grouping is not meant to replace or be privileged above bilateral relations between NATO and each of its Indo-Pacific partner countries, but understanding of the grouping outside narrow policy circles remains limited.

Indo-Pacific partner countries are a relatively cohesive grouping, but their views and interests are far from uniform. In this regard, the four countries’ perspectives on China are similar in some respects but differ in others; they have similar basic expectations of NATO on the Indo-Pacific but various nuances beyond these; and they share the most consistency in views on Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The expert study group examined the relevant perceptions and positions in the partner countries on several key areas of overlap with NATO—China, expectations of NATO on the region, and Russia’s war against Ukraine. All four partner countries appear interested in being invited to participate in relevant internal discussions on China at NATO, although none appear to want their cooperation with NATO to be characterized in terms of China. More broadly, perceptions and positions regarding China reflect each country’s unique circumstances, with varying overlap, just as they do for NATO member states. Canberra and Tokyo both proactively engage on China at NATO and tend to see the alliance’s increased interest in China as highly positive. Wellington and Seoul both feel vulnerable to disruptions of trade relations with China and have been careful about managing relations with Beijing, although each is growing more willing to push back against China. Traditionally, Seoul’s threat perceptions of China have been fundamentally different from those of the other Indo-Pacific partner capitals because of China’s perceived importance in addressing the ROK’s greatest security threat, North Korea. Although Seoul is cognizant of the threats China poses in the longer term, these concerns have come second to the immediate danger posed by North Korea.

Regarding NATO on the Indo-Pacific, none of the partner countries appear to expect NATO to be a significant direct actor in the region. Instead, they expect the alliance to coordinate with them on issues of mutual concern in, stemming from, or affecting the Indo-Pacific. In this regard, all four appear interested in coordinating with NATO on identified areas of mutual concern such as cyber defense, emerging and disruptive technologies, and resilience. There is also interest in all four countries in NATO increasing public diplomacy efforts toward them and the region. More broadly, Indo-Pacific partner views on NATO and the region are nuanced and varied. On the Russian war against Ukraine, meanwhile, the four countries hold largely similar views. Their governments make up four of only six outside the Euro-Atlantic area to place sanctions on Russia over Ukraine. All have provided financial assistance and nonlethal military aid, and all have channeled some of that assistance through NATO. The war in Ukraine and its impacts on the Indo-Pacific region have greatly raised awareness in all four countries about the security implications of events in Europe on the Indo-Pacific. The war has also raised concerns in all four about growing China-Russia relations. Successful cooperation between Indo-Pacific and European partners on Ukraine may provide a model for potential coordination between the two regions on a contingency in the Indo-Pacific. European understanding of expectations the unified response to Ukraine might create for a future contingency with China in the region appears nascent.

There is little indication that Indo-Pacific partner countries currently see the IP4 grouping as a strategic asset beyond its tactical utility as a platform for information sharing, coordination, and cooperation. The extent of NATO’s ambition for the grouping is also unclear. What is clear is that neither NATO nor the partner countries appear interested, at this time, in formalizing the IP4.

Relevant officials are fleshing out areas of practical cooperation between NATO and the IP4. Additionally, the IP4 format has already been valuable as a platform for discussion, consultation, information sharing, and exchange with NATO. The IP4 and NATO have also coordinated positions on issues such as North Korea. The IP4’s role as a talk shop and coordination mechanism may have particular added value when demonstrating widespread support and unity on a topic is seen as critical, when all four countries have a stake in an issue and hold similar views or can benefit from one another’s input, and when coordination between the partners before engagement with NATO may be beneficial.

Partner country participants were able to identify strategic benefits of IP4 engagement, such as the access, inclusion, and safety in numbers the grouping provides. The four countries get much greater attention and space at NATO as a group than any of them would enjoy alone, and the grouping facilitates valuable diplomatic opportunities on the sidelines of high-level meetings. The IP4 has also served as a platform for Japan-ROK engagement that would have been controversial bilaterally due to tensions between Tokyo and Seoul at the time. Increased ties within the group may also make it more difficult for China to pressure individual countries against closer relations with NATO. However, despite these benefits, there is little indication that Indo-Pacific partner countries see the IP4 grouping as a strategic asset for maximizing national and regional gains from NATO engagement.

Similarly, the extent to which NATO sees the IP4 as a useful unit rather than as just a collection mechanism or a way to emphasize the importance of the Indo-Pacific remains unclear. This may relate to differing views within NATO, where some allies are more ambitious about the IP4 format and some less so. Despite its increased prominence, the IP4 grouping also remains informal, unlike NATO’s regionally based, formalized partnership frameworks (Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative). This appears consistent with the views of both allies and partners, however, with no current demand from either side for greater formalization. The benefits of informality include greater flexibility and providing less of a hook for China to raise false alarms about a so-called Asia-Pacific version of NATO.

Understanding of NATO and the benefits of NATO partnership in Indo-Pacific partner countries remains limited, and public diplomacy aimed at these countries has been uneven. Growing disinformation efforts by Russia and China about NATO increases the significance of this issue.

Understanding of NATO’s remit, processes, and relevance to national interests is relatively limited at public levels in all four countries and varies even within policy circles across countries. Similarly, although NATO has been meeting with the IP4 grouping for a number of years, this was not readily visible outside diplomatic circles in Brussels or a topic of much discussion in capitals. Since the relatively sudden emergence of the IP4 into public view in 2022, awareness of the grouping has largely exceeded understanding of it within the partner countries. Although part of the reason for this lack of understanding is a result of domestic factors such as bureaucratic silos, finite government resources for NATO, and sparse interest within expert communities, part is also due to NATO’s limited reach into Indo-Pacific partner capitals, including through public diplomacy efforts. In this regard, the contact point embassy model—through which NATO shares information with partner governments and coordinates public diplomacy in partner countries via a designated NATO member state embassy—has not functioned well or consistently across Indo-Pacific partner countries in the past.

High-profile visits by NATO officials to capitals and participation by national officials in high-level NATO events, meanwhile, have raised NATO visibility in public discourse and interest in NATO at all levels in each of the Indo-Pacific partner countries. Intermittent visits by delegations from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly have also provided opportunities to engage lawmakers and the public. It is significant that NATO is aware of shortcomings in its public diplomacy outreach to Indo-Pacific capitals and is working to address them. The inclusion of public diplomacy goals in Individually Tailored Partnership Programs may also help. Such efforts become even more important in light of Russian disinformation efforts and as China increases its negative messaging about NATO.

NATO has used two main narrative frames to communicate the strategic rationale for its relations with Indo-Pacific partner countries over time: transnational threats and shared values. Although these frames are still relevant today, there is room to identify new strategic benefits for mutual engagement between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners.

Structural changes to the international system that have solidified in recent years and affect both NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners suggest space for the identification of new strategic benefits to mutual engagement that may resonate with both sides. Three additional strategic rationales stem naturally from the changed geopolitical circumstances. One centers around an exploration of the connections between the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions that make them more relevant for each other’s security than previously understood. A second has to do with the critical role of the United States in deterrence and defense in both regions and how—given that the return of strategic competition in the international system means that the United States and its allies need to deter two major power competitors simultaneously—deterrence dynamics in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are more interdependent today than during the Cold War. A third links transnational threats to the return of strategic competition and notes how existing transnational threats may be more acute or take on different relevance in the face of strategic competition and how responses to transnational threats like cyberattacks can have implications for both the threats themselves and for strategic competition.

Policy Options

As Indo-Pacific ministers and leaders meet increasingly in the IP4 format with NATO, partner governments can seize the opportunity to advance national and regional agendas in areas of agreement. To do so, Indo-Pacific partner governments should identify any common agenda or goals for NATO engagement, given both similarities and differences between these partners on key issues like expectations for NATO’s role on the Indo-Pacific and threat perceptions regarding China. Track 1.5 dialogues involving experts and officials from the Indo-Pacific partner countries may be a helpful way to approach this task, increasing mutual understanding of national perceptions and highlighting areas where all four countries could benefit from working together with NATO.

Relatedly, while continuing to maintain a focus on advancing bilateral relations with NATO, Indo-Pacific partner governments should consider internally and then in consultation with one another how they can take greater strategic advantage of the IP4 grouping. Indo-Pacific partners generally recognize the tactical utility of the IP4 grouping as a platform for information sharing, coordination, and cooperation. The grouping does have strategic benefits as well, however, and is a fact on the ground, even if informal. Rather than interpreting the IP4 format as a convenience for NATO, partner countries should consider how they can take better advantage of its strategic potential so as to maximize the effectiveness of engagement with NATO for their own national and regional benefits.

NATO should increase regular public diplomacy outreach to Indo-Pacific partner countries about what NATO does and how relations with NATO benefit each country’s national and regional interests, as well as shared global priorities. Public diplomacy efforts could, inter alia, focus on increasing the consistency and effectiveness of contact point embassies in partner capitals, taking advantage of more regular participation by national officials in high-level NATO events, and, as with much of the effort to deepen relations with the Indo-Pacific partners, making greater use of existing mechanisms such as exchanges between national parliamentarians and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. In this regard, NATO’s already increased efforts regarding public diplomacy for Indo-Pacific countries should be recognized and welcomed. A NATO liaison office in Tokyo, if approved by the alliance, could help further shore up public diplomacy outreach to Indo-Pacific partners.

Relatedly, given Chinese and Russian disinformation about NATO, NATO officials should publicly both highlight the alliance’s long-standing engagement with these partners and their region and clarify the nature of the IP4 grouping. Messaging about the Indo-Pacific could underscore that NATO’s engagement with its Indo-Pacific partners and the region precedes the alliance’s acknowledgment of China as a security challenge. Messaging about the IP4 grouping might explain that it is not a formalized, regionally based partnership framework, is not new, and is not meant to replace or be privileged over bilateral relations with Indo-Pacific partner countries. Such messaging is relevant not only for the broader Indo-Pacific region but also for media and domestic audiences in Indo-Pacific partner countries, whose familiarity with both NATO’s history regarding the Indo-Pacific and with the IP4 grouping remains low.

In light of the changed geopolitical circumstances that have brought them closer together, NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners should explore new strategic rationales for their mutual engagement that go beyond shared values and transnational threats. Three potential strategic rationales are worth exploring: connections between the regions that make them more relevant for one another’s security; the growing interdependence of deterrence dynamics in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific with the rise of strategic competition between the United States and China and Russia; and the impact of strategic competition on transnational threats. More systemic discussion between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners on these issues would also help improve each side’s situational awareness and coordinate perceptions.

NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners should explore, at least privately, the relevance of successful cooperation between Indo-Pacific and European countries on Ukraine as a potential model for coordination on a contingency in the Indo-Pacific and clarify views and expectations on all sides. NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners have recognized Russia’s war against Ukraine as not only a regional European problem but also one with global reach that affects the Indo-Pacific. Any contingency involving China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific region will similarly have global reach and inevitably require economic, political, and diplomatic coordination between Indo-Pacific partners and Europe, as well as the coordination of any nonlethal military assistance. NATO, along with the European Union, is an important Euro-Atlantic institution relevant for this kind of coordination and one through which regular avenues for security consultation with Indo-Pacific partners already exist.

About the Expert Study Group on NATO and Indo-Pacific Partners

The dynamics of influence, deterrence, and defense in the Indo-Pacific have changed, with potentially far-reaching consequences for peace and security in the region. European allies’ recognition of the strategic challenges posed by China; US efforts to invigorate alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea; Russia’s war in Ukraine; and China’s reactions to these developments will play a major role in shaping the Indo-Pacific’s future. To increase understanding of these changes and their impacts, the United States Institute of Peace convened a study group consisting of experts from NATO countries and Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—the alliance’s partners in the Indo-Pacific. The group explored Indo-Pacific partner perspectives on NATO and the opportunities and challenges of NATO and Indo-Pacific partner relations.

Expert Study Group Members

Mirna Galic, Chair

Senior Policy Analyst, China and East Asia, United States Institute of Peace

Joe Burton

Professor of International Security, Politics, Philosophy, and Religion, Lancaster University

David Capie

Director, Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington

Jean-Dominique Dulière

Former Head, Crisis Response Systems and Exercises Section, NATO

Stephan Frühling

Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

Gorana Grgić

Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich; Senior Lecturer, United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney

Yoko Iwama

Professor and Director, Strategic Studies Program, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Kwang-Jin Kim

Brigadier General (Retired), Republic of Korea Air Force; Chair Professor, Sookmyung Women’s University; Consultant Board Member, Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff

Geunwook Lee

Professor of Political Science, Sogang University; Advisory Board Member, Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Joint Chiefs of Staff

Jonathan Berkshire Miller

Senior Fellow and Director of Foreign Affairs, National Defence, and National Security, Macdonald-Laurier Institute; Senior Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs; Senior Fellow on East Asia, Asian Forum Japan; Director and Co-founder, Council on International Policy

Philip Shetler-Jones

Senior Research Fellow for Indo-Pacific Security, International Security, Royal United Services Institute

Luis Simón

Director, Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy, Brussels School of Governance; Director, Brussels Office, Elcano Royal Institute; Senior Nonresident Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Michito Tsuruoka

Associate Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University; Visiting Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University; Senior Fellow, Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy, Brussels School of Governance

usip.org

5.vN. Korea has sent more than 10,000 containers of munitions, materials to Russia since Sept.: State Dept.

What is the description of a "container?" A rail car? Or a single crate with a 152mm artillery round?

But I am sure there is a lot of ammunition going to Russia and I am sure Kim is getting a lot of money in return (or other things like a new armored limousine).

(2nd LD) N. Korea has sent more than 10,000 containers of munitions, materials to Russia since Sept.: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 24, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS more info in last para; RECONSTRUCTS)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Feb. 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has shipped over 10,000 containers of munitions or munition-related materials to Russia since September, the State Department said Friday, as Moscow strives to replenish its weapons stockpile for use in Ukraine.

The department pointed out the arms transactions as it and the Treasury Department together announced sanctions against more than 500 individuals and entities to ensure accountability for Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine and the death of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny.

The transactions between the North and Russia defied international criticism that they have run afoul of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, which Moscow itself voted for as a permanent council member.

"Since September 2023, the DPRK has delivered more than 10,000 containers of munitions or munitions-related materials to Russia," the department said in a fact sheet. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In October, the White House revealed that the North sent more than 1,000 containers of military equipment and munitions.

In the latest sanctions package, the department designated two additional entities involved in the transfer of munitions from the North to Russia. They are a Russian firm that manages a terminal at Vostochny Port in the Russian Far East and a naval facility near Vladivostok.

The White House has said that in addition to munitions, the North also provided Russia with several dozen ballistic missiles, some of which were fired against Ukraine on Dec. 30, Jan. 2 and Jan. 6.

Observers have expressed worries that the North's arms support for Russia could contribute to prolonging the war in Ukraine while what in return Moscow might have given to Pyongyang could further undermine security on the Korean Peninsula.

This image, provided by the White House, shows Russia's launch of North Korean ballistic missiles into Ukraine. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 24, 2024

6. Mentions of Cuba in N. Korean media abruptly halt after establishment of Seoul-Havana ties

The ROK has surrounded or captured north Korean stones on the Baduk/Go board here.

Mentions of Cuba in N. Korean media abruptly halt after establishment of Seoul-Havana ties

The Korea Times · February 25, 2024

Choe Ryong-hae, right, chairman of North Korea's Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, receives credentials from the Cuban Ambassador to North Korea Eduardo Luis Correa Garcia in Pyongyang, North Korea, Jan. 31. Yonhap

By Kim Hyun-bin

North Korean media outlets are no longer mentioning Cuba whatsoever since the establishment of formal diplomatic ties between South Korea and the Caribbean nation on Feb. 14.

Speculation is rising that Pyongyang is not happy with the unexpected move by Cuba, which has long been considered a close ally of North Korea. The forging of diplomatic relations with South Korea, a country labeled as its "number one hostile state," leaves no ambiguity regarding the North's stance.

The Rodong Sinmun, a newspaper widely regarded as the voice of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, last featured news related to Cuba on Feb. 15, a day after the announcement of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Havana.

Previously, the Rodong Sinmun routinely covered various aspects of North Korea's relationship with Cuba, including events at the North Korean Embassy in Cuba, expressions of solidarity from Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel, speeches by Cuban ambassadors at the United Nations and tributes to Cuban hero Jose Marti.

However, since the announcement of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Cuba, there has been a notable absence of any mention of Cuba in the newspaper.

"Although economic cooperation between Cuba and North Korea might have been limited, the mutual reliance and cooperation between the two socialist countries were substantial. From this perspective, I believe North Korea would have been considerably shaken," said Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies.

Furthermore, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), another key state media outlet in North Korea, has not reported on any developments. This absence of coverage extends to significant events, such as the celebration of the 82nd birthday of Kim Jong-il, which was celebrated at its diplomatic missions in 26 countries along with visits by various dignitaries on Feb. 23 and 24, where once again, Cuba was notably absent from the reports.

It is unprecedented for the KCNA to exclude Cuba, especially in reports about major events like Kim Jong-il's birthday, considered the paramount national holiday in North Korea. In the past, events related to Cuba were prominently featured, with highlights on participants and speeches.

"Looking back at history, in the 1990s, when diplomatic relations were established between South Korea and China, and between South Korea and Russia, North Korea found itself somewhat isolated. Despite initial reluctance, diplomatic ties were eventually acknowledged by North Korea," Yang said.

"Reflecting on this, the recent establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Cuba may be seen as a situation North Korea has no choice but to accept. It could potentially serve as an opportunity for North Korea to strengthen its cooperation with China and Russia."

The Korea Times · February 25, 2024

7. S. Korea investigating company on U.S. sanctions list over Russia connection

(2nd LD) S. Korea investigating company on U.S. sanctions list over Russia connection | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 25, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS more details in last 3 paras)

SEOUL, Feb. 25 (Yonhap) -- A South Korea-based company sanctioned by the United States over its alleged connection to Russia is currently under investigation by authorities here, a foreign ministry official said Sunday.

Daesung International Trading, a company located in South Korea's southeastern city of Gimhae, was one of 93 entities added to an "entity list" for export restrictions by the Bureau of Industry and Security under the U.S. Commerce Department on Friday.

"Regarding the company, we shared information with the U.S. in advance, and our relevant authorities are also currently conducting an investigation," the official said, noting the government plans to continue to work closely with Washington and other key nations in implementing sanctions against Russia.

According to a South Korean government official, the head of Daesung International Trading is a Pakistani national.

This photo, released by the Associated Press, shows President Joe Biden speaking about his meeting with Alexei Navalny's widow, Yulia Navalnaya, and daughter, Dasha, in San Francisco on Feb. 22, 2024. (Yonhap)

South Korea's trade ministry said it and the country's customs agency are looking into the company's alleged law violations, such as the Foreign Trade Act. After the probe, the government plans to punish and sanction it if any breach of law is found.

The U.S. sanctions were announced on the eve of the second anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and in the wake of the death of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny.

Meanwhile, Cubit Semiconductor Ltd., a Dublin-based company, has been sanctioned by the U.S., as it has made dozens of shipments of sensitive electronic components to sanctioned Russian manufacturer, JSC Mikron, The Irish Times reported, citing the U.S. treasury department's office of foreign assets control.

The directors of Cubit Semiconductor are two Korean nationals, and the company has offices in Ireland and Korea, it said.

South Korea's foreign ministry said it has been in close consultation with the U.S. over the case, as Washington has shared related information with Seoul in advance of the company's addition to the sanctions list.

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 25, 2024

8. Inside North Korea’s Forced-Labor Program in China

A long but very informative read.

This is another reason why we need a human rights upfront approach targeting both north Korea and China. China is complicit in north Korean human rights abuses in addition to its own problems.

Excerpts:

In 2017, after North Korea tested a series of nuclear and ballistic weapons, the United Nations imposed sanctions that prohibit foreign companies from using North Korean workers. The U.S. passed a law that established a “rebuttable presumption” categorizing work by North Koreans as forced labor unless proven otherwise, and levying fines on companies that import goods tied to these workers. China is supposed to enforce the sanctions in a similar manner. Nevertheless, according to State Department estimates, there are currently as many as a hundred thousand North Koreans working in the country. Many work at construction companies, textile factories, and software firms. Some also process seafood. In 2022, according to Chinese officials running pandemic quarantines, there were some eighty thousand North Koreans just in Dandong, a hub of the seafood industry.

Last year, I set out with a team of researchers to document this phenomenon. We reviewed leaked government documents, promotional materials, satellite imagery, online forums, and local news reports. We watched hundreds of cell-phone videos published on social-media sites. In some, the presence of North Koreans was explicit. Others were examined by experts to detect North Korean accents, language usage, and other cultural markers. Reporting in China is tightly restricted for Western reporters. But we hired Chinese investigators to visit factories and record footage of production lines. I also secretly sent interview questions, through another group of investigators and their contacts, to two dozen North Koreans—twenty workers and four managers—who had recently spent time in Chinese factories. Their anonymous responses were transcribed and sent back to me.

The workers, all of whom are women, described conditions of confinement and violence at the plants. Workers are held in compounds, sometimes behind barbed wire, under the watch of security agents. Many work gruelling shifts and get at most one day off a month. Several described being beaten by the managers sent by North Korea to watch them. “It was like prison for me,” one woman said. “At first, I almost vomited at how bad it was, and, just when I got used to it, the supervisors would tell us to shut up, and curse if we talked.” Many described enduring sexual assault at the hands of their managers. “They would say I’m fuckable and then suddenly grab my body and grope my breasts and put their dirty mouth on mine and be disgusting,” a woman who did product transport at a plant in the city of Dalian said. Another, who worked at Jinhui, said, “The worst and saddest moment was when I was forced to have sexual relations when we were brought to a party with alcohol.” The workers described being kept at the factories against their will, and being threatened with severe punishment if they tried to escape. A woman who was at a factory called Dalian Haiqing Food for more than four years said, “It’s often emphasized that, if you are caught running away, you will be killed without a trace.”

Inside North Korea’s Forced-Labor Program in China

The New Yorker · by Patricia Marx · February 25, 2024

Inside

North Korea's

Forced-Labor

Program

Workers sent from the country to Chinese factories describe enduring beatings and sexual abuse, having their wages taken by the state, and being told that if they try to escape they will be “killed without a trace.”

February 6, 2024

Illustration by Cleon Peterson

In February of last year, Donggang Jinhui Foodstuff, a seafood-processing company in Dandong, China, threw a party. It had been a successful year: a new plant had opened, and the company had doubled the amount of squid that it exported to the United States. The party, according to videos posted on Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok, featured singers, instrumentalists, dancers, fireworks, and strobe lights. One aspect of the company’s success seems to have been its use of North Korean workers, who are sent by their government to work in Chinese factories, in conditions of captivity, to earn money for the state. A seafood trader who does business with Jinhui recently estimated that it employed between fifty and seventy North Koreans. Videos posted by a company representative show machines labelled in Korean, and workers with North Korean accents explaining how to clean squid. At the party, the company played songs that are popular in Pyongyang, including “People Bring Glory to Our Party” (written by North Korea’s 1989 poet laureate) and “We Will Go to Mt. Paektu” (a reference to the widely mythologized birthplace of Kim Jong Il). Performers wore North Korean colors, and the country’s flag billowed behind them; in the audience, dozens of workers held miniature flags.

A party held by Donggang Jinhui Foodstuff, a seafood-processing company in Dandong, China, last year, included what appeared to be North Korean workers.Source: Douyin

Drone footage played at the event showed off Jinhui’s twenty-one-acre, fenced-in compound, which has processing and cold-storage facilities and what appears to be a seven-floor dormitory for workers. The company touted a wide array of Western certifications from organizations that claim to check workplaces for labor violations, including the use of North Korean workers. When videos of the party were posted online, a commenter—presumably befuddled, because using these workers violates U.N. sanctions—asked, “Aren’t you prohibited from filming this?”

Like Jinhui, many companies in China rely on a vast program of forced labor from North Korea. (Jinhui did not respond to requests for comment.) The program is run by various entities in the North Korean government, including a secretive agency called Room 39, which oversees activities such as money laundering and cyberattacks, and which funds the country’s nuclear- and ballistic-missile programs. (The agency is so named, according to some defectors, because it is based in the ninth room on the third floor of the Korean Workers’ Party headquarters.) Such labor transfers are not new. In 2012, North Korea sent some forty thousand workers to China. A portion of their salaries was taken by the state, providing a vital source of foreign currency for Party officials: at the time, a Seoul-based think tank estimated that the country made as much as $2.3 billion a year through the program. Since then, North Koreans have been sent to Russia, Poland, Qatar, Uruguay, and Mali.

This piece was published in collaboration with the Outlaw Ocean Project.

In 2017, after North Korea tested a series of nuclear and ballistic weapons, the United Nations imposed sanctions that prohibit foreign companies from using North Korean workers. The U.S. passed a law that established a “rebuttable presumption” categorizing work by North Koreans as forced labor unless proven otherwise, and levying fines on companies that import goods tied to these workers. China is supposed to enforce the sanctions in a similar manner. Nevertheless, according to State Department estimates, there are currently as many as a hundred thousand North Koreans working in the country. Many work at construction companies, textile factories, and software firms. Some also process seafood. In 2022, according to Chinese officials running pandemic quarantines, there were some eighty thousand North Koreans just in Dandong, a hub of the seafood industry.

Last year, I set out with a team of researchers to document this phenomenon. We reviewed leaked government documents, promotional materials, satellite imagery, online forums, and local news reports. We watched hundreds of cell-phone videos published on social-media sites. In some, the presence of North Koreans was explicit. Others were examined by experts to detect North Korean accents, language usage, and other cultural markers. Reporting in China is tightly restricted for Western reporters. But we hired Chinese investigators to visit factories and record footage of production lines. I also secretly sent interview questions, through another group of investigators and their contacts, to two dozen North Koreans—twenty workers and four managers—who had recently spent time in Chinese factories. Their anonymous responses were transcribed and sent back to me.

The workers, all of whom are women, described conditions of confinement and violence at the plants. Workers are held in compounds, sometimes behind barbed wire, under the watch of security agents. Many work gruelling shifts and get at most one day off a month. Several described being beaten by the managers sent by North Korea to watch them. “It was like prison for me,” one woman said. “At first, I almost vomited at how bad it was, and, just when I got used to it, the supervisors would tell us to shut up, and curse if we talked.” Many described enduring sexual assault at the hands of their managers. “They would say I’m fuckable and then suddenly grab my body and grope my breasts and put their dirty mouth on mine and be disgusting,” a woman who did product transport at a plant in the city of Dalian said. Another, who worked at Jinhui, said, “The worst and saddest moment was when I was forced to have sexual relations when we were brought to a party with alcohol.” The workers described being kept at the factories against their will, and being threatened with severe punishment if they tried to escape. A woman who was at a factory called Dalian Haiqing Food for more than four years said, “It’s often emphasized that, if you are caught running away, you will be killed without a trace.”

In all, I identified fifteen seafood-processing plants that together seem to have used more than a thousand North Korean workers since 2017. China officially denies that North Korean laborers are in the country. But their presence is an open secret. “They are easy to distinguish,” a Dandong native wrote in a comment on Bilibili, a video-sharing site. “They all wear uniform clothes, have a leader, and follow orders.” Often, footage of the workers ends up online. In a video from a plant called Dandong Yuanyi Refined Seafoods, a dozen women perform a synchronized dance in front of a mural commemorating Youth Day, a North Korean holiday. The video features a North Korean flag emoji and the caption “Beautiful little women from North Korea in Donggang’s cold-storage facility.” (The company did not respond to requests for comment.) Remco Breuker, a North Korea specialist at Leiden University, in the Netherlands, told me, “Hundreds of thousands of North Korean workers have for decades slaved away in China and elsewhere, enriching their leader and his party while facing unconscionable abuse.”

An investigator visited a plant called Donggang Haimeng Foodstuff, last year, and found a North Korean manager sitting at a wooden desk with two miniature flags, one Chinese and one North Korean. The walls around the desk were mostly bare except for two portraits of the past North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Portions of this image have been blurred to protect sources.Photograph from The Outlaw Ocean Project

In late 2023, an investigator hired by my team visited a Chinese plant called Donggang Xinxin Foodstuff. He found hundreds of North Korean women working under a red banner that read, in Korean, “Let’s carry out the resolution of the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party.” (The company did not respond to requests for comment.) Soon afterward, the investigator visited a nearby plant called Donggang Haimeng Foodstuff, and found a North Korean manager sitting at a wooden desk with two miniature flags, one Chinese and one North Korean. The walls around the desk were mostly bare except for two portraits of the past North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The manager took our investigator to the workers’ cafeteria to eat a North Korean cold-noodle dish called naengmyeon, and then gave him a tour of the processing floor. Several hundred North Korean women dressed in red uniforms, plastic aprons, and white rubber boots stood shoulder to shoulder at long metal tables under harsh lights, hunched over plastic baskets of seafood, slicing and sorting products by hand. “They work hard,” the manager said. The factory has exported thousands of tons of fish to companies that supply major U.S. retailers, including Walmart and ShopRite. (A spokesperson for Donggang Haimeng said that it does not hire North Korean workers.)

At times, China aggressively conceals the existence of the program. Alexander Dukalskis, a political-science professor at University College Dublin, said that workers have a hard time making their conditions known. “They’re in a country where they may not speak the language, are under surveillance, usually living collectively, and have no experience in contacting journalists,” he said. In late November, after my team’s investigators visited several plants, authorities distributed pamphlets on the country’s anti-espionage laws. Local officials announced that people who try “to contact North Korean workers, or to approach the workplaces of North Korean workers, will be treated as engaging in espionage activities that endanger national security, and will be punished severely.” They also warned that people who were found to be working in connection with foreign media outlets would face consequences under the Anti-Espionage Act.

The border between China and North Korea.

Dandong, a city of more than two million people, sits on the Yalu River, just over the border from North Korea. The Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge links Dandong to the North Korean city of Sinuiju. A second bridge, bombed during the Korean War, still extends partway across the river, and serves as a platform from which Chinese residents can view the North Koreans living six hundred yards away. The Friendship Bridge is one of the Hermit Kingdom’s few gateways to the world. Some trade with North Korea is allowed under U.N. sanctions, and nearly seventy per cent of the goods exchanged between that country and China travel across this bridge. At least one department store in Dandong keeps a list of products preferred by North Korean customers. Shops sell North Korean ginseng, beer, and “7.27” cigarettes, named for the date on which the armistice ending the Korean War was signed. The city is home to a museum about the conflict, officially called the Memorial Hall of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. On boat tours, Chinese tourists purchase bags of biscuits to toss to children on the North Korean side of the river.

Government officials carefully select workers to send to China, screening them for their political loyalties to reduce the risk of defections. To qualify, a person must generally have a job at a North Korean company and a positive evaluation from a local Party official. “These checks start at the neighborhood,” Breuker said. Candidates who have family in China, or a relative who has already defected, can be disqualified. For some positions, applicants under twenty-seven years of age who are unmarried must have living parents, who can be punished if they try to defect, according to a report from the South Korean government; applicants over twenty-seven must be married. North Korean authorities even select for height: the country’s population is chronically malnourished, and the state prefers candidates who are taller than five feet one, to avoid the official embarrassment of being represented abroad by short people. Once selected, applicants go through pre-departure training, which can last a year and often includes government-run classes covering everything from Chinese customs and etiquette to “enemy operations” and the activities of other countries’ intelligence agencies. (The North Korean government did not respond to requests for comment.)

The governments of both countries coördinate to place workers, most of whom are women, with seafood companies. The logistics are often handled by local Chinese recruitment agencies, and advertisements can be found online. A video posted on Douyin this past September announced the availability of twenty-five hundred North Koreans, and a commenter asked if they could be sent to seafood factories. A post on a forum advertised five thousand workers; a commenter asked if any spoke Mandarin, and the poster replied, “There is a team leader, management, and an interpreter.” A company called Jinuo Human Resources posted, “I am a human-resources company coöperating with the embassy, and currently have a large number of regular North Korean workers.” Several people expressed interest. (The company did not respond to requests for comment.)

Jobs in China are coveted in North Korea, because they often come with contracts promising salaries of around two hundred and seventy dollars a month. (Similar work in North Korea pays just three dollars a month.) But the jobs come with hidden costs. Workers usually sign two- or three-year contracts. When they arrive in China, managers confiscate their passports. Inside the factories, North Korean workers wear different uniforms than Chinese workers. “Without this, we couldn’t tell if one disappeared,” a manager said. Shifts run as long as sixteen hours. If workers attempt to escape, or complain to people outside the plants, their families at home can face reprisals. One seafood worker described how managers cursed at her and flicked cigarette butts. “I felt bad, and I wanted to fight them, but I had to endure,” she said. “That was when I was sad.”

The Daily

Workers get few, if any, holidays or sick days. At seafood plants, the women sleep in bunk beds in locked dormitories, sometimes thirty to a room. One worker, who spent four years processing clams in Dandong, estimated that more than sixty per cent of her co-workers suffered from depression. “We regretted coming to China but couldn’t go back empty-handed,” she said. Workers are forbidden to tune in to local TV or radio. They are sometimes allowed to leave factory grounds—say, to go shopping—but generally in groups of no more than three, and accompanied by a minder. Mail is scrutinized by North Korean security agents who also “surveil the daily life and report back with official reports,” one manager said. Sometimes the women are allowed to socialize. In a video titled “North Korean beauties working in China play volleyball,” posted in 2022, women in blue-and-white uniforms exercise on the grounds of the Dandong Omeca Food seafood plant. (The company that owns the plant did not respond to requests for comment.) A commenter wrote, “The joy of poverty. That’s just how it is.”

Factories typically give the women’s money to their managers, who take cuts for themselves and the government, and hold on to the rest until the workers’ terms in China end. Kim Jieun, a North Korean defector who now works for Radio Free Asia, said that companies tell workers their money is safer this way, because it could be stolen in the dormitories. But, in the end, workers often see less than ten per cent of their promised salary. One contract that I reviewed stipulated that around forty dollars would be deducted each month by the state to pay for food. More is sometimes deducted for electricity, housing, heat, water, insurance, and “loyalty” payments to the state. Managers also hold on to wages to discourage defections. The women have been warned, Kim added, that if they try to defect “they will be immediately caught by Chinese CCTV cameras installed everywhere.” This past October, Chinese authorities repatriated around six hundred North Korean defectors. “China does not recognize North Korean defectors as refugees,” Edward Howell, who teaches politics at Oxford University, told me. “If they are caught by Chinese authorities, they will be forcibly returned to the D.P.R.K., where they face harsh punishment in labor camps.”

Chinese companies have significant incentives to use North Korean workers. They’re typically paid only a quarter of what local employees earn. And they are generally excluded from mandatory social-welfare programs (regarding retirement, medical treatment, work-related injury, and maternity), which further reduces costs. In 2017, Dandong’s Commerce Bureau announced a plan to create a cluster of garment factories that would use North Korean labor. The bureau’s Web site noted that all such workers undergo political screenings to make sure they are “rooted, red, and upright.” “The discipline among the workers is extremely strong,” it added. “There are no instances of absenteeism or insubordination toward leadership, and there are no occurrences of feigning illness or delaying work.” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to questions for this piece, but last year the Chinese Ambassador to the U.N. wrote that China has abided by sanctions even though it has sustained “great losses” as a result. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently said that China and North Korea have “enjoyed long-standing friendly ties,” adding, “The United States needs to draw lessons, correct course, step up to its responsibility, stop heightening the pressure and sanctions, stop military deterrence, and take effective steps to resume meaningful dialogue.”

North Koreans face difficult circumstances across industries. In January of this year, more than two thousand workers rioted in Jilin Province, breaking sewing machines and kitchen utensils, when they learned that their wages would be withheld. Many North Koreans—perhaps thousands—work in Russian logging, in brutal winter weather without proper clothing. Hundreds have been found working in the Russian construction industry; some lived in shipping containers or in the basements of buildings under construction, because better accommodations were not provided. One recounted working shifts that lasted from 7:30 A.M. to 3 A.M. In preparation for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, held in Russia and Qatar, thousands of North Koreans were sent to build stadiums and luxury apartments. A subcontractor who worked alongside the North Koreans in Russia told the Guardian that they lived in cramped spaces, with as many as eight people packed into a trailer, in an atmosphere of fear and abuse like “prisoners of war.”

At Donggang Haimeng, last year, several hundred workers, many of whom were North Korean, stood shoulder to shoulder at long metal tables under harsh lights. Dressed in head-to-toe red uniforms, plastic aprons, and white rain boots, they hunched over baskets of seafood, slicing and sorting products by hand.Source: The Outlaw Ocean Project

Although it’s illegal in the U.S. to import goods made with North Korean labor, the law can be difficult to enforce. Some eighty per cent of seafood consumed in America, for example, is imported, and much of it comes from China through opaque supply chains. To trace the importation of seafood from factories that appear to be using North Korean labor, my team reviewed trade data, shipping contracts, and the codes that are stamped on seafood packages to monitor food safety. We found that, since 2017, ten of these plants have together shipped more than a hundred and twenty thousand tons of seafood to more than seventy American importers, which supplied grocery stores including Walmart, Giant, ShopRite, and the online grocer Weee! The seafood from these importers also ended up at major restaurant chains, like McDonald’s, and with Sysco, the largest food distributor in the world, which supplies almost half a million restaurants, as well as the cafeterias on American military bases, in public schools, and for the U.S. Congress. (Walmart, Weee!, and McDonald’s did not respond to requests for comment. Giant’s parent company, Ahold Delhaize, and ShopRite’s parent company, Wakefern, said their suppliers claimed that they currently do not source from the Chinese plant in question, and added that audit reports showed no evidence of forced labor.)

Two of the plants that investigators from my team visited—Dandong Galicia Seafood and Dalian Haiqing Food—had an estimated fifty to seventy North Korean workers apiece. One worker who has been employed at Galicia said that the managers are “so stingy with money that they don’t allow us to get proper medical treatment even when we are sick.” Galicia and Haiqing have shipped roughly a hundred thousand tons of seafood to American importers since 2017, and Haiqing also shipped to an importer that supplies the cafeterias of the European Parliament. (Dalian Haiqing Food said that it “does not employ overseas North Korean workers.” Dandong Galicia Seafood did not respond to requests for comment. One of the U.S. importers tied to Haiqing, Trident Seafoods, said that audits “found no evidence or even suspicion” of North Korean labor at the plant. Several companies, including Trident, High Liner, and Sysco, said that they would sever ties with the plant while they conducted their own investigations. A spokesperson for the European Parliament said that its food contractor did not supply seafood from the plant.) Breuker, from Leiden University, told me that American customers quietly benefit from this arrangement. “This labor-transfer system is for North Korea and China as economically successful as it is morally reprehensible,” he said. “It’s also a boon for the West because of the cheap goods we get as a result.”

North Korea doesn’t just export seafood workers; it also exports fish—another means by which the government secures foreign currency. Importing North Korean seafood is forbidden by U.N. sanctions, but it also tends to be inexpensive, which encourages companies to skirt the rules. Sometimes Chinese fishing companies pay the North Korean government for illegal licenses to fish in North Korea’s waters. Sometimes they buy fish from other boats at sea: a letter from a North Korean, leaked in 2022, proposed selling ten thousand tons of squid to a Chinese company in return for more than eighteen million dollars and five hundred tons of diesel fuel. Sometimes the seafood is trucked over the border. This trade is poorly hidden. In October, a Chinese man who said his last name was Cui posted a video on Douyin advertising crabs from North Korea. When someone commented, “The goods can’t be shipped,” Cui responded with laughing emojis. In other videos, he explained that he operated a processing plant in North Korea, and gave information on the timing of shipments that he planned to send across the border. When I contacted Cui, he said that he had stopped importing North Korean seafood in 2016 (though the videos were actually from last year), and added, “It’s none of your business, and I don’t care who you are.” My team found that seafood from North Korea was imported by several American distributors, including HF Foods, which supplies more than fifteen thousand Asian restaurants in the U.S. (HF Foods did not respond to requests for comment.)

Chinese companies often claim that they are in compliance with labor laws because they have passed “social audits,” which are conducted by firms that inspect worksites for abuses. But half the Chinese plants that we found using North Korean workers have certifications from the Marine Stewardship Council, which is based in the U.K. and sets standards for granting sustainability certifications, but only to companies that have also passed social audits or other labor assessments. (Jackie Marks, an M.S.C. spokesperson, told me that these social audits are conducted by a third party, and that “We make no claims about setting standards on labor.”) Last year, one of my team’s investigators visited a seafood-processing plant in northeastern China called Dandong Taifeng Foodstuff. The company has been designated a “national brand,” a status reserved for the country’s most successful companies, and supplies thousands of tons of seafood to grocery stores in the U.S. and elsewhere. At the plant, our investigator was given a tour by a North Korean manager. On the factory floor, which was lit by bright fluorescent bulbs, more than a hundred and fifty North Korean women, most of them under thirty-five years old, wore head-to-toe white protective clothing, plastic aprons, white rubber boots, and red gloves that went up to their elbows. They stood with their heads down, moving red, yellow, and blue plastic bins of seafood. Water puddled at their feet. “Quick, quick,” one woman said to the other members of her small group. (Taifeng did not respond to requests for comment.) Just weeks after that visit, the plant was recertified by the Marine Stewardship Council.

Marcus Noland, who works at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, said, of social audits within the seafood industry, “The basic stance appears to be ‘See no evil.’ ” Skepticism of such audits is growing. In 2021, the U.S. State Department said that social audits in China are generally inadequate for identifying forced labor, in part because auditors rely on government translators and rarely speak directly to workers. Auditors can be reluctant to anger the companies that have hired them, and workers face reprisals for reporting abuses. This past November, U.S. Customs and Border Protection advised American companies that a credible assessment would require an “unannounced independent, third-party audit” and “interviews completed in native language.” Liana Foxvog, who works at a nonprofit called the Worker Rights Consortium, argues that assessments should involve other checks too, including off-site worker interviews. But she noted that most audits in China fall short even of C.B.P.’s standards.

Joshua Stanton, an attorney based in Washington, D.C., who helped draft the American law that banned goods produced with North Korean labor, argues that the government is not doing enough to enforce it. “The U.S. government will need to put more pressure on American companies, and those companies need to be more diligent about their suppliers and their supply chains, or face stricter sanctions,” he said. Chris Smith, a Republican congressman from New Jersey and a specialist on China, noted that social audits “create a Potemkin village.” He added, “The consequence is that millions of dollars, even federal dollars, are going to Chinese plants using North Korean workers, and that money then goes right into the hands of Kim Jong Un’s regime, which uses the money to arm our adversaries and repress its own people.”

Late last year, when I set out to contact North Koreans who had been sent to China, I ran into significant obstacles. Western journalists are barred from entering North Korea, and citizens of the country are strictly prohibited from talking freely to reporters. I hired a team of investigators in South Korea who employ contacts in North Korea to get information out of the country for local and Western news outlets—for example, about food shortages, power outages, or the rise of anti-government graffiti. The investigators compiled a list of two dozen North Koreans who had been dispatched to a half-dozen different Chinese factories, most of whom had since returned home. The investigators’ contacts then met with these workers in secret, one-on-one, so that the workers wouldn’t know one another’s identity. The meetings usually occurred in open fields, or on the street, where it’s harder for security agents to conduct surveillance.

The workers were told that their responses would be shared publicly by an American journalism outlet. They faced considerable risk speaking out; experts told me that, if they were caught, they could be executed, and their families put in prison camps. But they agreed to talk because they believe that it is important for the rest of the world to know what happens to workers who are sent to China. The North Korean contacts transcribed their answers by hand, and then took photos of the completed questionnaires and sent them, using encrypted phones, to the investigators, who sent them to me. North Koreans who are still in China were interviewed in a similar fashion. Because of these layers of protection, it is, of course, impossible to fully verify the content of the interviews. But the responses were reviewed by experts to make sure that they are consistent with what is broadly known about the work-transfer program, and in line with interviews given by North Korean defectors. (Recently, the investigators checked in on the interviewers and interviewees, and everyone was safe.)

Transcribed interviews with North Korean workers. Portions have been blurred to protect sources.

“At first, I almost vomited at how bad it was, and, just when I got used to it, the supervisors would tell us to shut up, and curse if we talked. ”

“They called me in as if something happened in the room, and then coerced me into sex. They threatened me that, if I don’t comply, then they will send me back, or they will take out money from my living expenses. ”

“Earning money was good, but I kept thinking about the sexual assault and it was driving me crazy. ”

“They would say I’m fuckable and then suddenly grab my body and grope my breasts and put their dirty mouth on mine and be disgusting. ”

“Sixty to seventy per cent are depressed. We regretted coming to China but couldn’t go back empty-handed. ”

In their answers, the workers described crushing loneliness. The work was arduous, the factories smelled, and violence was common. “They kicked us and treated us as subhuman,” the worker who processed clams in Dandong said. Asked if they could recount any happy moments, most said that there had been none. A few said that they felt relieved when they returned home and got some of their pay. “I was happy when the money wasn’t all taken out,” the woman who did product transport in Dalian said. One woman said that her experience at a Chinese plant made her feel like she “wanted to die.” Another said that she often felt tired and upset while she was working, but kept those thoughts to herself to avoid reprisals. “It was lonely,” she said. “I hated the military-like communal life.”

The most striking pattern was the women’s description of sexual abuse. Of twenty workers, seventeen said that they had been sexually assaulted by their North Korean managers. They described a range of tactics used to coerce them into having sex. Some managers pretended to wipe something from their uniforms, only to grope them. Some called them into their offices as if there were an emergency, then demanded sex. Others asked them to serve alcohol at a weekend party, then assaulted them there. “When they drank, they touched my body everywhere like playing with toys,” a woman said. The woman who did product transport in Dalian said, “When they suddenly put their mouths to mine, I wanted to throw up.” If the women didn’t comply, the managers could become violent. The worker who was at Haiqing for more than four years said, of her manager, “When he doesn’t get his way sexually, he gets angry and kicks me. . . . He calls me a ‘fucking bitch.’ ” Three of the women said that their managers had forced workers into prostitution. “Whenever they can, they flirt with us to the point of nausea and force us to have sex for money, and it’s even worse if you’re pretty,” another worker at Haiqing said. The worker from Jinhui noted, “Even when there was no work during the pandemic, the state demanded foreign-currency funds out of loyalty, so managers forced workers to sell their bodies.” The worker who spent more than four years at Haiqing said, of the managers, “They forced virgin workers into prostitution, claiming that they had to meet state-set quotas.”

The pandemic made life more difficult for many of the women. When China closed its borders, some found themselves trapped far from home. Often, their workplaces shut down, and they lost their incomes. North Korean workers sometimes pay bribes to government officials to secure posts in China, and, during the pandemic, many borrowed these funds from loan sharks. The loans, typically between two and three thousand dollars, came with high interest rates. Because of work stoppages in China, North Korean workers were unable to pay back their loans, and loan sharks sent thugs to their relatives’ homes to intimidate them. Some of their families had to sell their houses to settle the debts. In 2023, according to Radio Free Asia, two North Korean women at textile plants killed themselves. The worker who told me that she wanted to die said that such deaths are often kept hidden. “If someone dies from suicide, then the manager is responsible, so they keep it under wraps to keep it from being leaked to other workers or Chinese people,” she said.

This past year, pandemic restrictions were lifted, and the border between China and North Korea reopened. In August, some three hundred North Korean workers boarded ten buses in Dandong to go back home. Police officers lined up around the buses to prevent defections. In photos and a video of the event, some of the women can be seen hurriedly preparing to load large suitcases onto a neon-green bus, then riding away across the Friendship Bridge. In September, another three hundred boarded a passenger train to Sinuiju, and two hundred were repatriated by plane. Workers who return face intense questioning by officials. “They asked about every single thing that happened every day from morning to evening in China, about other workers, supervisors, and agents,” the worker who processed clams in Dandong explained. As 2023 ended, the North Korean government began planning to dispatch its next wave of workers. In the past couple of years, according to reporting by Hyemin Son, a North Korean defector who works for Radio Free Asia, labor brokers have requested that Chinese companies pay a large advance; they were being asked to pay ahead of time, one broker told her, because “Chinese companies cannot operate without North Korean manpower.”

Some North Korean workers have yet to go home. One woman said that she has spent the past several years gutting fish at a processing plant in Dalian. She described working late into the night and getting sores in her mouth from stress and exhaustion. In the questionnaire, I had asked about the worst part of her job, and she said, “When I am forced to have sex.” She also described a sense of imprisonment that felt suffocating. “If you show even the slightest attitude, they will treat you like an insect,” she said. “Living a life where we can’t see the outside world as we please is so difficult that it’s killing us.”

This piece was produced with contributions from Joe Galvin, Maya Martin, Susan Ryan, Jake Conley, Austin Brush, and Daniel Murphy.

More on China’s Seafood Industry

For more about China’s seafood industry, read “The Crimes Behind the Seafood You Eat,” an immersive investigation into the human cost of China’s maritime expansion.

Read “The Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish,” an investigation into China’s forced-labor practices.

Watch “Squid Fleet,” a film that offers a close look at the gruelling work of squid fishing.

The New Yorker · by Patricia Marx · February 25, 2024

9. G7 leaders decry N. Korea's exports of ballistic missiles to Russia

G7 leaders decry N. Korea's exports of ballistic missiles to Russia

The Korea Times · February 25, 2024

From left, Canada's Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attend a video conference with Group of Seven leaders, on the second anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine, Feb. 24. Reuters-Yonhap

The leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) leading democracies strongly condemned arms transactions between North Korea and Russia on Saturday, as they marked the second anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The G7 leaders issued a joint statement, stressing that the transactions between Pyongyang and Moscow are in breach of U.N. Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). The G7 countries are the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Canada and Japan.

"We strongly condemn North Korea's exports and Russia's procurement of North Korea's ballistic missiles in direct violation of relevant UNSCRs and call upon them to immediately cease such activities," they said in the statement.

The U.S. government has revealed that the North provided Russia with several dozen ballistic missiles, some of which were fired at Ukrainian targets on Dec. 30, 2023, Jan. 2 and Jan. 6.

Moreover, the State Department revealed Friday that the North has shipped over 10,000 containers of munitions or munition-related materials to Russia since September 2023.

In the statement, the G7 leaders also expressed their concern about transfers to Russia from businesses in China of dual-use materials and components for weapons and equipment for military production.

They also welcomed the expansion of the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine to include South Korea, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.

Launched in January last year, the platform coordinates the support for the immediate financing needs of Ukraine and future economic recovery and reconstruction needs.

Highlighting their steadfast support for Ukraine, the G7 leaders said, "As Ukraine enters the third year of this relentless war, its government and its people can count on the G7's support for as long as it takes." (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · February 25, 2024

10. Across the river from North Korea, a laser light show for peace

I think the ROK should use its advanced drone technology and put on shows along the DMZ like it was displayed at the 2018 Olympics. Imagine how the frontline four corps in the nKPA would think when they viewed such a show.

Across the river from North Korea, a laser light show for peace - UPI.com

By Thomas Maresca

upi.com

1 of 9 | The South Korean city of Gimpo held a laser light show and performance across the river from North Korea on Saturday night to celebrate the first full moon of the Lunar New Year. Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI

GIMPO, South Korea, Feb. 24 (UPI) -- On a snowy Saturday night, the South Korean city of Gimpo held a laser light show and performance for two audiences: local residents and -- perhaps -- their North Korean neighbors across a narrow river.

The event celebrated the first full moon of the Lunar New Year at Aegibong Peace Ecopark, an exhibition hall and observatory on the Jogang River that offers an unparalleled view of small North Korean villages, farms and military posts less than a mile away.

"We would like to send a message of peace to North Korea," Gimpo Mayor Kim Byung-soo told UPI before the show began. "When the lights go up, we hope they can see it."

As darkness fell Saturday, an enormous LED full moon installation and laser lights illuminated the night sky -- the first time such a display has been held in a border area, according to organizers.

The program also included music, dance and the ceremonial decoration of a tree with messages of hope and peace.

The good wishes come at a time when inter-Korean relations are at their lowest point in years, however, amid a steady stream of weapons tests from the North and a hardened military stance from the South.

Last month, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un proclaimed South Korea the "principal enemy" and publicly rejected a longstanding official policy goal of peaceful reunification. Pyongyang's rubber-stamp parliament also ditched its laws on economic cooperation with the South earlier this month.

Gimpo, a satellite city west of Seoul, opened Aegibong Peace Ecopark in 2021, replacing an observatory that had been left abandoned for several years.

The site is one of several areas along the DMZ designated for "peace tourism," a project that began during a period of inter-Korean rapprochement in 2019 but has faced hurdles due to the COVID-19 pandemic and rising hostilities.

Aegibong has welcomed around 250,000 visitors since its reopening, according to Gimpo officials, and has hosted other nighttime events such as a Christmas tree lighting in December.

Saturday's festivities were also meant to send a reassuring message to South Korean and international visitors, the mayor said.

"People might imagine that this place is dangerous because it's located close to North Korea," Kim said. "But actually it is peaceful and safe for everyone."

Along with the positive vibes, the signs of a country still technically at war with North Korea are unmistakable. Barbed wire fences and military checkpoints line the roads leading up to the park, which remains home to a regiment of South Korean marines.

"We will constantly send peaceful messages to North Korea," Kim said. "But we also would like to say we have enough power to be dangerous."

upi.com

11. North Korea assumes control of border industrial zone

Rule BY law and no respect of the rule based international order. How does anyone expect the north to be a responsible member of the international community?

North Korea assumes control of border industrial zone

Pyongyang is using factories and equipment in the Kaesong Industrial Complex without Seoul’s permission.

By Hyemin Son for RFA Korean

2024.02.23

rfa.org

North Korea is using factories and equipment in the shuttered inter-Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex to develop a new industrial base in the city, independent of South Korea, government officials in the North told Radio Free Asia.

The de-facto nationalization of the complex is yet another move by the North Korean leadership to distance itself from Seoul. Since the new year, Pyongyang has officially redefined the South as its main enemy, ended all economic cooperation, and begun scrubbing all references to reunification.

“The Central Committee has given an order to develop a new industrial base at the Kaesong Industrial Complex,” an official from Pyongyang told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

Located just north of the demilitarized zone that divides the Korean peninsula, the complex opened in 2004, marrying South Korean capital and technology with cheap North Korean labor.

But it was shuttered in 2016, shortly after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, and cannot be reopened until the U.S. and UN lift sanctions on the North.

Since the closure, North Korean companies have secretly used factories and equipment left behind by South Korean companies in Kaesong on several occasions, but now they are being ordered to do so as part of an official policy.

North Korean workers assemble jackets in a factory belonging to a South Korean-owned company, at the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea, Dec. 19, 2013. (Kim Hong-Ji/Pool via AP)

Not all of the industry will stay in Kaesong; officials confirmed that authorities have approved the relocation of facilities that produce tires, rice cookers and shoes to nearby counties.

North Korea is pushing ahead with its newly adopted “20x10 plan” to revitalize the economy in 20 counties per year over the next 10 years. Assuming control of the complex will significantly reduce costs associated with the plan, but is a clear violation of the Kaesong Industrial Zone Act.

“[North Korea] has secretly made use of some facilities in the Kaesong Industrial Complex without South Korea’s approval,” the official said. “Now, [we will] move the facilities in each factory of the Kaesong Industrial Complex to a newly renovated local industrial base and operate officially.”

Authorities demolished a small garment factory and are scaling up a larger factory that will be placed under the jurisdiction of the Kaesong City Local Industrial Bureau, he said.

The reorganization is bad news for business owners who were hoping to use the equipment in Kaesong for themselves this year, an official in the northwestern province of North Pyongan told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely.

“Before the pandemic, powerful trading companies received orders from China and planned to use sewing machines and cutting equipment left behind by South Korea in the Kaesong Industrial Complex under the pretext of earning foreign currency for the government,” he said. “But now, they won’t be able to do so.”

The organization of the new industrial base in Kaesong should be complete within the year, the North Pyongan official said.

“The Central Party renovated and expanded the clothing and footwear factories in the Kaesong Industrial Complex to develop them into a light industrial base,” he said. “This measure appears aimed at eliminating the complex, which is South Korea’s property, and intentionally redeveloping it as our own, as we have now defined South Korea as our primary enemy.”

Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.

rfa.org

12. ‘Why Are We Being Treated as the Villains?’ South Korean Doctors Stage Mass Walkouts

‘Why Are We Being Treated as the Villains?’ South Korean Doctors Stage Mass Walkouts

A showdown between physicians and the government hinges on how to address one of the industrialized world’s worst doctor shortages

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/south-korea-doctors-walkouts-321a99dd?mod=Searchresults_pos6&page=1

By Dasl Yoon

Feb. 23, 2024 7:44 am ET

Kim Jung-geun, an internal medicine resident, is part of a showdown between South Korea’s government and the country’s physicians. PHOTO: JEAN CHUNG FOR WALL STREET JOURNAL

SEOUL—At a hospital just outside Seoul, Kim Jung-geun, an internal-medicine resident, wrapped up a recent 34-hour shift, downed a coffee and crashed. He hasn’t gone back to work since.

Kim isn’t switching careers. He is on the front lines of a spectacular showdown between South Korea’s government and the country’s physicians over attempts to reverse one of the industrialized world’s worst doctor shortages.

Government officials plan to dramatically expand the ranks of medical school students starting next year. That has drawn the wrath of doctors, who argue what they need is better working conditions and higher pay—not more competition.

“It would make more sense if the government pursued expanding medical school admission after improving working conditions,” said Kim, 31 years old.

Since Tuesday, Kim along with thousands of other young South Korean doctors have submitted resignation letters and walked off the job. Only about one-fifth of the nation’s roughly 13,000 medical residents are left working, the country’s health ministry said. The Korean Medical Association, the country’s largest physicians group, is holding a vote March 3 on whether practicing doctors will also take action.

The work stoppages have already proven disruptive. On Friday, South Korea, in effect, declared a healthcare emergency, raising its alert level to the highest threshold. Telemedicine can be practiced nationally for now. Some of the country’s biggest hospitals have pared back surgeries by half. Military hospitals have been opened to civilians.

Nearly 200 individuals have lodged complaints to the government about the abrupt walkout. In an online platform for cancer patients, one user said their surgery had been canceled. An elderly man, who had been rushed to the emergency room for necrosis, had to be transported to a hospital about 80 miles away, local media reported.

A protest against the South Korean government’s proposals in Seoul. PHOTO: JEON HEON-KYUN/SHUTTERSTOCK

The country’s young doctors “who are key players in future medicine should not take collective action by taking the people’s lives and health hostage,” South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said during a cabinet meeting this week.

South Korea’s government has threatened to arrest and revoke the licenses of young doctors who have effectively gone on strike, citing medical laws that ban essential workers from leaving their posts.

“Why are we being treated as the villains after dedicating our time and energy into saving people?” Kim said. “We’re scared too that the rapport with patients will be ruined.”

The blowback in South Korea shows the challenges and risks governments can face when undertaking major changes to their medical systems. In the past year, doctors or medical residents have gone on strike in the U.K., Germany and in New York City’s borough of Queens. But South Korea faces a particularly acute problem: It has a rapidly aging population and a low number of physicians.

Only Mexico has fewer doctors relative to the population among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development members. The country also has universal healthcare, with low out-of-pocket costs, leading South Koreans to visit the doctor’s office more than citizens in any other advanced nation—more than two times the OECD average.

South Korea has about 140,000 doctors. Within the next decade or so, the country is projected to have a shortfall of 15,000 physicians, according to government estimates.

The most controversial facet of the Yoon administration’s solution was to dramatically boost the incoming ranks of medical students. The quota, which currently stands at roughly 3,000 medical students a year, will rise to 5,000 applicants starting next year.

As a part of the overhaul, South Korea would also boost medical fees at hospitals outside the Seoul metropolitan area—where roughly half of the country’s 52 million people live—and for in-demand fields, such as pediatrics and gynecology. Rural hospitals would be improved, too.

The Korean Medical Association argues there are already enough doctors, given the country’s declining birthrate—the lowest in the world. The organization says boosting the number of doctors will degrade the quality of medical care and intensify competition at the top hospitals where there are limited spots for specialized fields. They also want more legal protections for medical malpractice.

Only 3% of applicants get into one of South Korea’s 40 medical schools. PHOTO: JEAN CHUNG FOR WALL STREET JOURNAL

In Seoul’s wealthiest neighborhoods, school students can attend dedicated cram schools to prepare them for becoming physicians. PHOTO: JEAN CHUNG FOR WALL STREET JOURNAL

“Doctors are quitting because of legal threats and the lack of adequate compensation despite harsh working conditions,” said Joo Su-ho, a spokesman for the Korean Medical Association. The group warned of an indefinite strike by practicing doctors if the trainees were penalized for resigning.

The medical field holds unusually esteemed status in South Korea, given its stability, high pay and social standing. Koreans have a proverb for those from working-class backgrounds who land a prestigious job like a physician: A dragon rises from a small stream.

Only 3% of applicants get into one of the nation’s 40 medical schools. Half of South Korean parents aspire for their young children to become doctors. The bestseller lists at local bookstores are dominated by study guides for the once-a-year college entrance exam.

Yu Ji-yeon, an 18-year-old valedictorian from Seoul, said she studied at least 10 hours a day outside of school, breaking only for meals. She got accepted at two of the six medical schools where she applied, overcoming tough odds: Just one in five applicants get accepted on their first try. Most take another year—or more—to try the national exam again.

As a medical student, she originally wanted to take a semester or two off to experience life outside a classroom. But now she can’t fathom taking a break.

“I would then be entering the medical field with more competitors,” said Yu, who wants to go into forensic medicine.

In the wealthiest neighborhoods in Seoul, elementary-school students can attend dedicated cram schools, or hagwons, which prepare them to become physicians. Recently one of the largest such schools held a briefing on how the expanded medical-school quota would affect college admissions—3,700 parents and students signed up, according to Lim Sung-ho, head of Jongno Hagwon. Even office workers in their 20s and 30s are making inquiries, he added.

As an elementary school student, Ahn Ye-eun, now 14, set her heart on becoming a doctor after watching a medical drama on TV. She convinced her mother to move to a neighborhood in Seoul with more cram schools. Most days she doesn’t come home until after 10 p.m.

She set up a YouTube channel to livestream herself studying at her bedroom desk for hours at a time and has around 8,600 followers. “I know that in Korea it’s hard to get into medical school, even if you have top 1% grades,” Ahn said. “So I have to study really hard.”

Kim says he worked at least 80 hours a week for the equivalent of around $7.40 an hour. PHOTO: JEAN CHUNG FOR WALL STREET JOURNAL

About three-quarters of South Koreans backed raising the number of incoming medical students, according to a Gallup Korea poll. The current clash mirrors a similar labor stoppage in 2020 when a prior effort to increase medical school ranks by a fraction of the size that Yoon is proposing triggered a monthlong strike. The plan was shelved.

Kim, the internal medicine resident, didn’t take his resignation lightly. He had spent six years in medical school, 18 months as a public health doctor for his military conscription and another year as an intern.

He worked at least 80 hours a week. On an hourly basis his salary equated to roughly the country’s minimum wage of about $7.40 an hour, he said.

He says he still wants aspiring doctors to make the same choices he made. “I wanted to know what it felt like to actually save people,” Kim said.

Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com

Appeared in the February 24, 2024, print edition as 'Doctor Shortage Prompts Walkouts In South Korea'.

13. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Efforts to implement the“20x10 policy for regional development” begin…As people are mobilized to construction projects, complaints start to emerge

Will this create instability?

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Efforts to implement the“20x10 policy for regional development” begin…As people are mobilized to construction projects, complaints start to emerge

asiapress.org

A view of the long-abandoned and tattered Cheongsu Chemical Factory, which is currently undergoing renovations. Photographed by ISHIMARU Jiro from the Chinese side of the border with the DPRK in July 2017.

In a speech to the Supreme People's Assembly on January 15, Kim Jong-un pointed out the gap between the capital and the provinces, and between urban and rural areas, and ordered factories to be built for rural development, dubbing it the "20×10 policy for regional development.” A month later, the government has now moved to begin to build factories in various regions. (By KANG Ji-won ／ ISHIMARU Jiro)

◆ North Hamgyong Province’s Gyongsong and Orang counties will be sites for new factories…Mobilizations for construction have already begun

"Build modern provincial industrial plants in 20 counties every year, and within 10 years, raise the basic material and cultural living standards of all cities, counties, and the entire population to a higher level," Kim Jong Un said in the January 15 speech, laying out the blueprint for his "20×10 policy for regional development.”

In mid-February, ASIAPRESS reporting partners in Yanggang and North Hamgyong provinces reported that the sites for the new factories were announced and labor mobilization for construction began.

In North Hamgyong Province, the new factory sites this year are in Gyongsong County and Orang County. A reporting partner in Musan County had this to say about the labor mobilization that has begun:

"Musan mine workers have been mobilized for the construction called for by the '20×10 policy for regional development.’ The number of workers is said to be about two battalions, with 500 to 600 people. They will be mobilized for three-month shifts in the counties of Gyongsong or Orang. The selection of workers has already begun. At workplaces, there are 'party members' and 'youth league shock troops' who will work in the construction sites, and meetings are being organized to encourage people to volunteer for enlistment in these groups.”

Shock troops: Specialized construction and civil engineering organizations mobilized for national construction projects. There are two types: permanent "shock troops” that are mainly recruited from the Youth League and serve for about three years, and temporary "shock troops” that are recruited for projects from workplaces and party members.

"This year will end with the construction of a local factory. A specialized department has been created in the Musan County Workers' Party Committee to organize material support for the construction. Cadres say they are setting an example to mobilize everything."

Urban residents mobilized for Yalu River dike construction. Unpaid labor puts further pressure on people’s lives. Photo taken from the Chinese side of the border across from North Pyongan Province in mid-July 2021. (ASIAPRESS)

◆ Government calls for “all people to be mobilized for factory construction”

ASIAPRESS spoke to another reporting partner in City A, North Hamgyong Province, about the progress of the 20×10 policy. He is a party member who works for a state-owned company.

-- Some areas are already selecting people for mobilization as early as February, correct?

That's right. In City A, we'll be mobilizing a lot of people, so we're organizing party members' shock troops, youth league shock troops, and company-affiliated shock troops to gather people. I think they’ll be mobilized in late February.

-- What will the new factory make?

In Orang County, we are building a seafood processing plant, and in Gyongsong County, we are building a factory for local specialties and basic food products. We are either building completely new modern factories or renovating existing ones.

This year, the authorities have said that everyone will be mobilized to build factories in both counties. Since the country has decided to make each province compete with each other, the provincial party organizations have become feverishly busy, urging their subordinate organizations and workplaces to fill the ranks.

asiapress.org

14. 'Justifying' civilian casualties

Whether we like it or not this is what journalists should do - make comparisons and ask critical questions. There is a lot of history packed into this short essay.

Excerpts:

By now much of the world is wondering if the Israelis, beyond fighting to destroy Hamas, are exacting revenge. The Israelis, however, speak with regret of the collateral damage in which civilians have died. How else, they ask, can they exterminate the last of Hamas, closing down the tunnels in which the terrorists have operated with impunity, snuffing the war machine that’s counted on Iran for arms and ammunition?

That question leads to unpleasant comparisons that may not justify anything but show the guilt shared by all sides in all wars. It’s difficult to explain why the Americans had to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 or why the Brits and Yanks fire-bombed Dresden in February 1945. For that matter, what about the American bombing of North Korea during the Korean War in which just about every city and town in the North was destroyed?

...

Still, what are the Israelis to do? They can’t just let Hamas lick their wounds, and then rebuild to strike again. Nor can they do nothing while other terrorist groups, notably Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, also threaten them with arms provided by Iran.

Those are questions that all sides might be asking while Kim Jong-un in North Korea rains rhetorical threats against the South. Kim would be an idiot to make good on his bold words, knowing the holy hell that would descend on him, his regime and his country. The Americans inculcated that lesson in the North after Kim’s grandfather invaded the South at the instigation of the regimes in Beijing and Moscow on which Pyongyang depends to this day.

'Justifying' civilian casualties

The Korea Times · February 22, 2024

By Donald Kirk

The vast majority of victims in wars are not members of the armed forces on either or both sides but civilians caught in the crossfire, in attacks and counterattacks intended to annihilate the enemy.

So it is in Israel, or rather in Gaza, the 25-mile-long sliver of land on the eastern Mediterranean that’s wedged between Israel and Egypt. By now Gaza is ravaged by Israel’s assault on Hamas, which had ruled the Gaza Strip since driving out the relatively moderate Fatah in elections staged in 2007 supposedly under the aegis of the State of Palestine.

The rationale for the Israeli attacks, by air and land, is that Israel has got to destroy Hamas once and for all to stop it from repeating the kind of barbaric attack that it launched into southern Israel on Oct. 7, killing about 1,200 and kidnapping another 240 as hostages. The Israelis by now have killed about 30,000 civilians in Gaza while thousands more are deprived of food, medical care and places to live and work with no relief in sight.

By now much of the world is wondering if the Israelis, beyond fighting to destroy Hamas, are exacting revenge. The Israelis, however, speak with regret of the collateral damage in which civilians have died. How else, they ask, can they exterminate the last of Hamas, closing down the tunnels in which the terrorists have operated with impunity, snuffing the war machine that’s counted on Iran for arms and ammunition?

That question leads to unpleasant comparisons that may not justify anything but show the guilt shared by all sides in all wars. It’s difficult to explain why the Americans had to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 or why the Brits and Yanks fire-bombed Dresden in February 1945. For that matter, what about the American bombing of North Korea during the Korean War in which just about every city and town in the North was destroyed?

We can play the game of whataboutism forever. It’s easy, maybe even correct, to say that the war against Japan would have gone on much longer, with many more casualties, if U.S. President Harry Truman had not decided to unleash a weapon that he knew would kill tens of thousands of civilians. It was Truman’s decision again to counter the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 with a ferocity that neither North Korea’s Kim Il-sung nor China’s Mao Zedong had anticipated.

The U.S. during the Vietnam War was by comparison relatively restrained. Sure, the Americans expended more bombs against Communist forces in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos than in all of World War II, but most of the bombs fell on jungle regions. Hanoi was never "flattened" like Pyongyang despite the bombing that preceded the signing of the "Paris Peace" in January 1973.

Crueler than the bombing was the use of Agent Orange, the chemical that defoliated jungle regions, depriving North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces of cover but also killing and deforming thousands of civilians. The U.S. military could claim truthfully that they did not know Agent Orange would be so devastating, that American soldiers also died years later from the air they breathed pursuing the enemy, but the scientists who devised it for Dow Chemical and Monsanto had to have had an idea of the effects of what they said were herbicides for killing plants.

Whataboutism, though, will not exonerate the Israelis for slaughtering civilians, not in the eyes of the world. No wonder President Biden wants them to knock it off. He is thinking of the reaction against the U.S. for its alliance with Israel, the biggest recipient of American military aid that is powering the Israeli assault on Hamas.

Still, what are the Israelis to do? They can’t just let Hamas lick their wounds, and then rebuild to strike again. Nor can they do nothing while other terrorist groups, notably Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, also threaten them with arms provided by Iran.

Those are questions that all sides might be asking while Kim Jong-un in North Korea rains rhetorical threats against the South. Kim would be an idiot to make good on his bold words, knowing the holy hell that would descend on him, his regime and his country. The Americans inculcated that lesson in the North after Kim’s grandfather invaded the South at the instigation of the regimes in Beijing and Moscow on which Pyongyang depends to this day.

Donald Kirk (www.donaldkirk.com) writes about war and peace in Asia mainly from Seoul and Washington.

The Korea Times · February 22, 2024

15. Songjin Steel Mill workers face struggle session after enjoying South Korean music

This is significant in that the desire for Southern entertainment must have been greater than their fear of punishment. It was only that their OPSEC was bad and they did not vet all the guests (inviting the wife of a policeman?)

Are there cracks in the system in the north?

Songjin Steel Mill workers face struggle session after enjoying South Korean music

"Officials...sternly warned the other workers of the need to eliminate all non-socialist elements from their lives" during the struggle session, a source told Daily NK

By Jong So Yong -

February 23, 202

dailynk.com

Songjin Steel Mill workers face struggle session after enjoying South Korean music - Daily NK English

Two female switchboard operators who were caught engaging in non-socialist behavior last year recently faced a struggle session at the cultural center of the Songjin Steel Mill, Daily NK has learned.

“A woman working as a switchboard operator at Songjin Steel Mill invited a female colleague to her father’s birthday party and then played South Korean music for a dance party. This came to the attention of the police and the two women were publicly criticized,” a source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Wednesday, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The two women were arrested late last year and investigated for two months. After the Lunar New Year, they were sent to a public ideological struggle session and also face legal consequences, the source said.

According to the source, the two women, who worked as switchboard operators at the Songjin Steel Mill, were both into South Korean movies, dramas, and music and had formed a close relationship while secretly watching South Korean videos.

One of the switchboard operators invited the other to her home on the birthday of her father, an official with the food administration office in Kimchaek, in late December 2023. The two of them played South Korean music on the stereo, turned up the volume, and danced to the music from early in the evening until 11 PM.

The wife of a city policeman who had recently moved to the neighborhood had also been invited to the father’s birthday party. After the police officer’s wife returned home, she told her husband that the songs at the party had the distinctive feel of South Korean music, prompting the police to investigate the incident.

“Sensing an opportunity for promotion, the police officer checked the facts of his wife’s claim and immediately reported the affair to his superiors. As a result, the two switchboard operators at the steel mill were promptly arrested, and their own superiors – the manager of the switchboard room and the secretary of the steel mill’s Socialist Patriotic Youth League chapter – were also reprimanded over the matter,” the source said.

After their arrest, the two women were subjected to a two-month investigation and then dragged in front of all the steel mill workers for a public ideological struggle session for non-socialist behavior. The source said the two women stood on stage with their hands tied and heads bowed as they endured scathing criticism in front of the entire workforce.

“The officials denounced the women’s non-socialist behavior during the struggle session and at the same time sternly warned the other workers of the need to eliminate all non-socialist elements from their lives. In the end, the official’s daughter, who was identified as the instigator, was sentenced to three years in prison, and her colleague was sent to a forced labor camp,” the source said.

The cadre at the municipal food administration office was dismissed from his post and transferred to a labor-intensive job for failing to keep his daughter in line, the source added.

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Jong So Yong

Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK’s freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynk@uni-media.net.

Drunken brawlers take to the stage to celebrate Kim Jong Il’s birthday

"After some excessive drinking, the workers began to argue, and the argument soon turned into a brawl, complete with fisticuffs," a source told to Daily NK

By Jong So Yong -

February 22, 2024

dailynk.com

Drunken brawlers take to the stage to celebrate Kim Jong Il’s birthday - Daily NK English

Workers at the Kilju Pulp and Paper Factory got into a drunken brawl ahead of the Feb. 16 holiday marking the birthday of late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, Daily NK has learned.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Tuesday that the party committee of the Kilju Pulp and Paper Factory organized “loyalty singing groups” at the workplace to mark the late Kim’s birthday on Pyongyang’s orders. “However, on the evening of Feb. 14, the day before the event, the workers got drunk after singing practice and then got into a fight,” he said, adding that the authorities “made a big issue out of it.”

According to the source, the factory’s party committee ordered the formation of “loyalty singing groups” a month before Kim Jong Il’s birthday, warning that it would judge the loyalty of each workplace based on their performance. Accordingly, the workplaces selected musically inclined workers and began preparations for the “loyalty singing groups” in mid-January.

The day before the main singing group event, the party committee inspected the artistic props that the workers would use in the event at the factory’s cultural hall and made a final review of the preparations, including deciding on the order of the performances.

The committee confirmed that the preparations had gone smoothly and expressed appreciation for the efforts of the workers, who worked as usual during the day and met every evening to practice singing. Then the committee held a dinner for the workers, and this is where things began to go very wrong.

Drunken disaster

“About 30 workers who participated in the loyalty singing groups gathered for dinner and secretly drank among themselves,” the source said. “After some excessive drinking, the workers began to argue, and the argument soon turned into a drunken brawl, complete with fisticuffs.”

The drunken brawlers were so relentlessly agitated that they let bare fists fly. About 10 workers were injured in the brawl. But because the Feb. 15 show had to go on, the battered and bruised workers took the stage that day anyway.

“The factory officials and all the factory workers who saw this were frowning and whispering as they watched the stage,” the source said. “The singers were essentially hospital cases without hospital gowns. You could hear the people in the audience expressing their shock at seeing this truly defeated army singing with long faces.”

The factory’s party committee – believing that even bigger problems would arise if the Kilju county or provincial party committees learned of the affair – summoned the official in charge of the event and the ringleaders of the drunken brawlers to take statements and find out exactly what happened and spent the holiday in less than festive fashion.

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

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Jong So Yong

Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK’s freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynk@uni-media.net.