Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“We hereby declare that Korea is an independent state and that Koreans are a self-governing

people. We proclaim this fact to all nations to reaffirm the great truth that all humans are

equal, so that our descendants may forever enjoy their rights to live as an autonomous

people.” - Korean Declaration of Independence (1919)

"In the absence of affirmative decision on our part, the rest of the free world is almost certain to become demoralized.

Our friends will become more than a liability to us; they can eventually become a positive increment to Soviet power.

In sum, the capabilities of our allies are, in an important sense, a function of our own.

An affirmative decision to summon up the potential within ourselves would evoke the potential strength within others and add it to our own."

- NSC 68, April 7. 1950, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm

"The strength of a person's spirit [can be] measured by how much truth he could tolerate or more precisely, to what extent he needs to have it diluted, disguised, sweetened, muted, and falsified."

- Friedrich Nietzsch

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 28, 2023

2. FBI Director Says Covid Pandemic Likely Caused by Chinese Lab Leak

3. Treasury Official Travels to Beijing Despite U.S.-China Tensions

4. Putin’s War Rhetoric Rallies Russia’s Border Towns, but Nerves Fray

5. Lawmakers Question Pentagon on Ukraine Funds, Signaling Fresh Doubts

6. Red Balloons and China's Hybrid Warfare Challenge to International Law | SOF News

7. Bipartisan lawmakers warn of China threat at select committee's first hearing

8. China’s Spymasters Can Get More From TikTok Than From Balloons

9. NCOs Key to Ukrainian Military Successes Against Russia

10. The Cyberwar Is Here

11. Thailand, US resume Cobra Gold exercises at full scale

12. It’s not what the spy balloon gathered — it’s what it exposed

13. Our military leaders need a national security ‘fast lane’ to compete with China

14. Why sending more US military troops to Taiwan is so risky

15. CIA’s Supremacy in Global Spy Ring and Hammering Russian Intelligence Since Cold War

16. Taiwan's unofficial diplomacy gains as democracies sour on China

17. GOP-led House steps up scrutiny of Biden’s military aid for Ukraine

18. The Ukrainian Army Is Leveraging Online Influencers. Can the U.S. Military?

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 28, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2023

Key Takeaways

Russian authorities appear to be escalating their promotion of false flag information operations in an effort to distract from their lack of tangible battlefield gains and slow down the provision of Western tanks and other aid in advance of expected Ukrainian counter-offensives.
US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl stated that the US has no indication that Russian forces will use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized the role of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in supporting the war in Ukraine during an address to the FSB board.
The Kremlin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko are likely attempting to intensify efforts to falsely portray Russia as open to negotiations to end its war in Ukraine.
Lukashenko may facilitate Sino-Russian sanctions evasion schemes during his official trip to Beijing, China from February 28 to March 2.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Svatove and Kreminna and likely made limited advances north of Kreminna.
Russian forces made tactical gains in northern Bakhmut and continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.
Ukrainian officials continue to report potential Russian preparations for renewed offensive operations in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, though ISW has not observed indicators that Russian forces plan to renew offensive operations in these directions.
Armenian authorities detained a Russian citizen in Yerevan for an act of protest against the war in Ukraine committed in Moscow in July 2022.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky enacted a Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council decision to sanction 109 Russian citizens involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 28, 2023

Feb 28, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Nicole Wolkov, Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 28, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian authorities appear to be escalating their promotion of false flag information operations to distract from their lack of tangible battlefield gains and slow down the provision of Western tanks and other aid in advance of expected Ukrainian counter-offensives. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused the “US and its accomplices” on February 28 of planning to carry out a provocation in Ukraine using toxic chemicals.[1] The Russian MoD relatedly claimed on February 19 that Ukrainian officials are planning false-flag attacks at hazardous radiation facilities in Ukraine to accuse Russian forces of indiscriminately striking such sites.[2] The apparent uptick in fallacious biochemical and nuclear false flag warnings accompanies a concerted Russian false flag information operation accusing Ukraine of preparing for an invasion of Russian-occupied Transnistria, Moldova.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin also notably re-introduced nuclear rhetoric into the Russian information space during his address to the Russian Federal Assembly on February 21 when he announced Russia’s intent to suspend participation in START.[4] The recent resurgence of several standard Russian information operations in the form of false flag warnings and tired nuclear threats suggests that Russian officials are increasingly trying to mitigate the informational impacts of a continued lack of Russian battlefield successes as well as to slow down the provision of Western tanks and other equipment in advance of expected Ukrainian counter-offensives. ISW has previously reported on the correlation between Russian information operations and battlefield realities, particularly when Russian forces are failing to take significant ground in offensive operations in Ukraine.[5] The Russian MoD and top Russian officials will likely escalate their engagement with such information operations as the ongoing Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast nears culmination and the opportunities for Ukrainian counter-offensives grow.

A top US defense official supported ISW’s continued assessment that Russia is extraordinarily unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl stated that the US does not assess that Russia will use nuclear weapons during a House Armed Service Committee hearing on American military support for Ukraine on February 28.[6] ISW has assessed that Russian invocations of nuclear threats and nuclear doctrine are part of an information operation meant to discourage Ukraine and the West but do not represent any material Russian intent to employ nuclear weapons.[7]

Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the Federal Security Service (FSB) board on February 28 and emphasized the role of the FSB in supporting the war in Ukraine in a law enforcement and counterterrorism capacity. Putin lauded the FSB for its direct participation in the war in “non-standard field tasks” such as protection of the Russian border and cracking down on terrorist activities, organized crime, corruption, and extremism.[8] Putin also emphasized that the FSB’s primary purpose is to support the Russian Armed Forces and Rosgvardia in their efforts to accomplish the objectives of the “special military operation” and noted the FSB’s role in preventing incursions of Ukrainian sabotage groups onto Russian territory.[9] Putin has frequently invoked mentions of domestic security, law enforcement, and counterterrorism efforts when speaking about the war in Ukraine in order to portray the war as a threat to Russian internal security and to bring the war closer to his domestic constituency as ISW has previously reported.[10] Putin’s address to the FSB similarly aligns the FSB and its traditional domestic law enforcement and counterterrorism role with Russian military efforts in Ukraine in order to frame Russian victory in the war as necessary for Russia’s domestic security.

The Kremlin is likely attempting to reintroduce a Russian information operation aimed at falsely portraying Russia as being open to negotiations while the collective West refuses to negotiate. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 28 that Russian officials are open to negotiations to end the war in Ukraine but that Ukraine and the West must recognize new “territorial realities” associated with Russia’s illegal annexation of occupied territories in Ukraine.[11] Peskov added that Ukraine also needs to consider Russia’s specific goals in the war in Ukraine to reach a negotiated settlement.[12] These goals include regime change of the Ukrainian government under the rubric of “denazification“ and the elimination of Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against future Russian attacks under the rubric of “demilitarization.”[13] Peskov also stated that Russia made serious preparations for security talks before launching the invasion of Ukraine but accused the West of being unreceptive to such talks.[14] Russia’s suggested pre-invasion security talks called for the West to acknowledge a list of “security guarantees” demanding a moratorium on NATO expansion, a ban on the deployment of Western strike weapons near Russia, and the de facto withdrawal of NATO forces to their 1997 posture.[15]

The Kremlin appears to be using Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko as a conduit to reengage with this information operation, likely in pursuit of negotiations on favorable terms to Russia and further delays in the West’s provision of critical weapons systems to Ukraine. Lukashenko stated during his official trip to China that Russia is ready to take steps towards a peaceful settlement and that there is a unique opportunity to end the war in Ukraine before Russia puts its economy on a stronger war footing.[16] Lukashenko also blamed the West and the US for coercing Ukrainian officials into rejecting negotiations with Russia.[17] The Kremlin and Lukashenko are likely seizing on China’s release of a 12-point peace plan to reintroduce an existing Russian information operation that the Kremlin used in December 2022. That information campaign centering on Russia’s openness to negotiations aimed to prompt Western officials to offer preemptive concessions and coerce Ukraine to negotiate on Russian terms and likely contributed to the delay in the provision of Western tanks and other equipment essential for the continuation of Ukrainian mechanized counteroffensives.[18] The Kremlin may be reintroducing the negotiations information operation to reduce the effectiveness of future Ukrainian counteroffensives by delaying the provision of essential Western aid and to seek to gain concessions before potential further setbacks in Ukraine.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may facilitate sanctions evasion schemes between Russia and China during his official trip to Beijing, China from February 28 – March 2. Deutsche Welle reported that Lukashenko will sign a large package of agreements on developing joint projects, trade, economic, investment, humanitarian cooperation, and political cooperation with China during his three-day visit.[19] Lukashenko previously stated that the Belarusian defense industry can produce weapons since Belarus has access to microelectronics, optics, and other component imports from other states.[20] Ukrainian intelligence officials stated that Belarus supplied Russia with artillery ammunition from Belarusian warehouses to support operations in Ukraine.[21] US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns stated on February 25 that the CIA is confident that Chinese leadership is considering the provision of lethal equipment to Russia.[22] China may clandestinely transfer equipment to Russia via Belarus.

Key Takeaways

Russian authorities appear to be escalating their promotion of false flag information operations in an effort to distract from their lack of tangible battlefield gains and slow down the provision of Western tanks and other aid in advance of expected Ukrainian counter-offensives.
US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl stated that the US has no indication that Russian forces will use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized the role of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in supporting the war in Ukraine during an address to the FSB board.
The Kremlin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko are likely attempting to intensify efforts to falsely portray Russia as open to negotiations to end its war in Ukraine.
Lukashenko may facilitate Sino-Russian sanctions evasion schemes during his official trip to Beijing, China from February 28 to March 2.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Svatove and Kreminna and likely made limited advances north of Kreminna.
Russian forces made tactical gains in northern Bakhmut and continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.
Ukrainian officials continue to report potential Russian preparations for renewed offensive operations in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, though ISW has not observed indicators that Russian forces plan to renew offensive operations in these directions.
Armenian authorities detained a Russian citizen in Yerevan for an act of protest against the war in Ukraine committed in Moscow in July 2022.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky enacted a Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council decision to sanction 109 Russian citizens involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Svatove on February 28. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are engaged in fierce fighting near Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[23] Another milblogger claimed that assault detachment elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Guards Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) pushed Ukrainian forces out of unspecified high-ground positions on the Svatove-Kreminna line.[24]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna on February 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Kreminna itself, Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna), Dibrova (6km southwest of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that while Russian forces in Luhansk Oblast still have the initiative, Russian offensive operations in Luhansk Oblast are unsuccessful, supporting ISW’s previous assessment that the Russian forces’ offensive in Luhansk Oblast lacks sufficient reserves to increase the scale or intensity of the offensive.[26] Geolocated footage published on February 27 showed two Russian tanks firing at Ukrainian positions west of Chervonopopivka (5km north of Kreminna) indicating limited Russian advances.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) fought near Kreminna.[28]

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian concentration areas in the rear of Luhansk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on February 28 allegedly shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian ammunition warehouse in Kadiivka.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and made tactical gains within Bakhmut on February 28. Wagner Group-affiliated media outlet RIAFAN posted footage on February 27 and 28 showing Wagner fighters walking around northern Bakhmut near the Stupky railway station and “Sady Bakhmuta” garden store, indicating that Wagner has advanced in northern Bakhmut.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; north of Bakhmut near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest), Berkhkivka (4km north), Yahidne (1km northwest), Vasyukivka (13km northwest), and Bohdanivka (8km northwest); west of Bakhmut near Chasiv Yar (10km west); and southwest of Bakhmut near Bila Hora (15km southwest).[31] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized that the situation in Bakhmut is becoming increasingly complicated, and Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces Colonel General Oleksandr Syrsky remarked that Wagner is increasingly committing its most prepared assault units to offensives in the area.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner forces are trying to advance on central Bakhmut from the north near the Stupky station and from positions on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[33] A Russian milblogger remarked that Russian troops are attacking towards Bohdanivka in order to threaten the Khromove-Bakhmut route.[34] Geolocated footage posted on February 27 shows Ukrainian troops striking Wagner positions near Ivanivske (5km west of Bakhmut), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops continue assaults towards Ivanviske itself.[35] Footage taken by a Ukrainian soldier in Chasiv Yar shows heavy incoming fire directed at the settlement, suggesting that Russian forces are continuing to strike areas along the T0504 Kostiantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway.[36]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on February 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions in the Avdiivka area near Kamianka; on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Pervomaiske; Krasnohorivka, and Nevelske; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka and Pervomaiske.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian troops broke through Ukrainian defensive lines in Pobieda and gained new footholds within Marinka.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff detailed a successful strike on a Russian grouping in Marinka on February 27 that destroyed five tanks and seven BMP infantry fighting vehicles.[39]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on February 28. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian troops continued unspecified offensive actions in the western Donetsk Oblast direction.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian naval infantry elements are fighting towards Vuhledar from the Mykliske dacha area and within Vuhledar itself, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian troops within Vuhledar.[41]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces may be preparing for offensive operations in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are defending in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts but are trying to create conditions that will allow Russian forces to conduct offensives in some unspecified areas of this part of the front.[42] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian forces have transferred between 20,000 and 25,000 personnel from Mariupol Raion, Donetsk Oblast, to unspecified areas of the front, although Russian forces likely transferred most of these personnel to areas of active offensive operations elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast.[43] Russian forces have conducted infrequent localized attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast in recent months but have not conducted any meaningful offensive activity in Kherson Oblast since withdrawing from the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in November 2022. ISW has not observed indicators that Russian forces are preparing to resume prolonged offensive activity in Zaporizhia Oblast or any offensive activity in Kherson Oblast.

A Ukrainian official reported that Russian forces are vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes on the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast and may be preparing to withdraw from positions closer to the Dnipro River on the east (left) bank in Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated that Russian shelling of Mykolaiv Oblast has become less intense because Russian forces are hesitant to go to the end of the Kinburn Spit to shell Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast and surrounding areas.[44] Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces immediately locate Russian artillery units on the Kinburn Spit once they fire and that these Russian units do not have enough time to evacuate the area before Ukrainian forces conduct counterbattery fire.[45] Humenyuk also claimed that Russian forces are shelling Russian-occupied settlements on the east (left) bank in Kherson Oblast to give Russian occupation officials and forces the pretext to conduct evacuations from Oleshky, Skadovsk, and Nova Kakhovka and withdraw closer towards Crimea.[46]

Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to engage in reconnaissance activity and skirmishes in the Dnipro River delta. Geolocated footage published on February 27 claims to show Ukrainian Special Forces conducting a raid against Russian forces on Krukhlyk Island (4km south of Kherson City) and likely indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions on at least the northern part of neighboring Velikiy Potemkin Island.[47] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance occasionally try to move between islands in the Dnipro River in converted civilian vessels and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two of these watercraft on February 28.[48]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian force concentrations and logistics in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian Polohy Mayor Yuriy Konovalenko reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian force concentration area in the southern part of Polohy, Zaporizhia Oblast, on February 27.[49] Humenyuk reported that Ukrainian forces do not shell residential areas or critical infrastructure in southern Ukraine and strike Russian forces ensuring that local residents will not be affected.[50]

Russian forces continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[51] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Kherson City, Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast, and Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[52]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Several Russian opposition news sources reported on February 28 that Armenian police detained Russian citizen Nikita Kamensky in Yerevan, Armenia for vandalism, ostensibly because Russian authorities added him to their wanted persons database in December for allegedly painting anti-war slogans on Timiryazevskaya Metro Station, Moscow in July.[53] This arrest demonstrates Russian authorities’ willingness and ability to target Russian citizens abroad in Russia-friendly countries for acts of protest committed previously within Russia. The extension of Russian prosecution efforts and Armenian cooperation are both significant events, though it is noteworthy that Russia and Armenia have an existing extradition treaty.[54] Armenian officials have not yet publicly commented on the potential to extradite Kamensky to Russia.[55]

Russian forces continue to face severe difficulties in replenishing military equipment and ammunition. The Ukrainian General Staff amplified on February 28 a report from Ukraine’s Head of the Center for Trophy Research, Colonel Alexander Zaruba, assessing that Russian purchases of equipment from North Korea and Iran and deployment of outdated Kh-22 missiles indicate that Russia itself cannot meet wartime production needs.[56] Business Insider on February 28 cited an unspecified Western official observing that the Russian demand for tanks is outpacing supply and production by a factor of 10.[57] Russia reportedly loses 150 tanks a month in Ukraine while Russia’s sole tank production factory, UralVagonZavod, produces 20 tanks a month.[58] Business Insider and The Economist noted that 18 Russian factories are refurbishing old tanks and that two more repair plants will soon join the efforts.[59] Business Insider concluded that Russian production remains unlikely to meet demand levels, however.[60] A prominent Russian milblogger on February 28 amplified a report from a Russian soldier on December 9 that Russia has also fallen behind Ukrainian forces in terms of drone production and drone-operator training.[61]

Russian authorities are increasing recruiting efforts targeting foreigners. Russian opposition source Meduza reported on February 27 that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing foreigners to sign one-year military contracts as privates and sergeants, as opposed to the traditional five-year contracts. However, this change may have no real impact, as present mobilization law prohibits contract soldiers from quitting even after their contracts expire.[62]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely using a potentially staged appeal of mobilized soldiers seeking to join Wagner PMC in hopes of improving Wagner PMC’s reputation and appeal to potential recruits.[63] Video footage posted to social media on February 27 shows a group of mobilized Russian soldiers from the dissolved 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment requesting that Prigozhin help them serve in the Wagner Group rather than in traditional mobilized units.[64] Prigozhin praised the soldiers and stated that he has already asked Russian military authorities to transfer them to a Wagner subgroup.[65]

Some Russians continue limited resistance to the war in Ukraine. A Saint Petersburg local news source reported that a graduate student faces criminal charges for breaking a window at the Vyborg Raion, Saint Petersburg military registration and enlistment office, and painting anti-war slogans in the office on February 26.[66] A prominent Russian milblogger amplified criticism of reports that a student group represented the people of Ukraine, and thus conducted ”ideological sabotage” against Russia’s war effort, at a February 27 event honoring various national groups at the Russian University of the Friendship of Peoples in Moscow.[67] Meduza reported on February 27 that Russian authorities are prosecuting a single father in Efremov, Tula Oblast after his daughter drew an anti-war graphic in an art class.[68] Russian independent media outlets also reported on February 27 that Russian courts extended the sentence of a Moscow resident previously sentenced for an arson attack on a military commissariat and sentenced a Volgograd resident to four years in prison for setting fire to the back room of a military registration and enlistment office on May 15.[69]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky enacted a Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council decision to impose sanctions on Russian officials involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children on February 28.[70] The decision imposes sanctions on 109 Russian citizens involved in the deportation and forced adoption of Ukrainian children, including many regional representatives of the Russian Children’s Rights Commission and Human Rights Commission.[71] ISW reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed in a February 16 meeting with Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova that the Kremlin is directly involved in facilitating the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children into Russian families.[72] The decision also imposes sanctions on seven Russian humanitarian and social movement organizations involved in various Russian schemes aiming to deport children.[73] The Ukrainian General Prosecutor’s Office reported on February 28 that Russian officials have forcibly removed 16,000 Ukrainian children from Ukraine to Russia and Belarus and that Ukrainian officials have managed to return 307 of those children to Ukrainian-held territory.[74] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on February 27 that Russia’s forced deportation of Ukrainian children is “probably the largest forced deportation in modern history” and a genocidal crime.[75] ISW continues to assess that the forced deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children may constitute a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to use educational institutions to eradicate Ukrainian identity in occupied territories. Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo called on teachers from Russia to teach in Kherson Oblast, specifically Russian history, and stated that his administration intends to shape the educational curriculum with lessons on patriotism and military affairs under the guidance of the Russian Military Historical Society.[76] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation officials in Tokmak, Zaporizhia Oblast are forcing students to write letters to Russian military personnel and attend daily hour-long informational sessions that present the Russian framing of the war in Ukraine.[77]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)

Damage to the Russian Aerospace Forces Beriev A-50 airborne early warning and control plane at the Machulishchi Air Base in Minsk, Belarus, remains unclear as of February 28. Satellite imagery taken on February 28 shows the first pictures of the A-50 since Belarusian partisans reportedly attacked it on February 26.[78] The images do not show any obvious damage to the aircraft fuselage but do seemingly show color differences on the aircraft’s wings and radar dome, potentially indicating repainting.[79] Neither Belarusian nor Russian authorities have commented on the reported attack as of this publication. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense reported that Russia’s Aerospace Forces would likely have only six operational A-50s in service if this attack were successful.[80]

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. Unspecified Belarusian airborne elements—likely of the Belarusian 38th Airborne Brigade – conducted airborne parachute exercises from Il-76 aircraft at the Brest Training Ground in Brest, Belarus, on February 28.[81]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/24466; https://t.me/mod_russia/24467; https://...

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://t.me/mod_russia/24273

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022323; https://isw.pub/UkrWar02242023

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022123

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-does-not-see-significant-near-term-r... https://www.vice.com/en/article/bvmwk4/pentagon-putin-nukes-ukraine

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[8] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70597

[9] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70597

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013123; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121322;

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-russia-open-ukraine-talks-w...

[12] https://tass dot com/politics/1582547

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122722

[14] https://tass dot com/politics/1582471

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120222 ; https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1790809/; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/

[16] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-sejchas-unikalnyj-moment-chtoby-ostanovit-konflikt-v-ukraine-poka-rossija-ne-postavila-552793-2023/

[17] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-sejchas-unikalnyj-moment-chtoby-ostanovit-konflikt-v-ukraine-poka-rossija-ne-postavila-552793-2023/

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[19] https://www.dw dot com/ru/lukasenko-pribyl-s-vizitom-v-kitaj/a-64846196

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates-2022

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[23] https://t.me/wargonzo/11149

[24] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10899

[25]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dDf2w34VWwwcuYqnxSQ...

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/11149; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroun...

[27] https://t.me/btr80/5171; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/16305795...; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1630263342756515840

[28] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/79250; https://t.me/sashakots/38680

[29] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1630616430210170880?s=20; ht... https://t.me/LPR_JCCC/8071; https://t.me/LPR_JCCC/8069

[30] https://twitter.com/fdov21/status/1630339835058593794 ; https://t.me/y...

[31]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dDf2w34VWwwcuYqnxSQ...

[32] https://www.facebook.com/watch/president.gov.ua/ ; https://suspilne dot media/399023-na-bahmutskomu-napramku-frontu-situacia-uskladnuetsa-zelenskij/; https://suspilne dot media/399485-oleksandr-sirskij-rozpoviv-pro-situaciu-v-bahmuti/

[33] https://t.me/readovkanews/53706; https://t.me/readovkanews/53701; http...

[34] https://t.me/readovkanews/53706

[35] https://t.me/ukrbavovna/6824; https://twitter.com/seanders_geo/status/1...

[36] https://twitter.com/chris__759/status/1630324113616297984?s=20

[37]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dDf2w34VWwwcuYqnxSQ...

[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/11149; https://t.me/readovkanews/53706

[39] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=133231762743931

[40]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dDf2w34VWwwcuYqnxSQ...

[41] https://t.me/readovkanews/53706; https://t.me/sashakots/38685

[42]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dDf2w34VWwwcuYqnxSQ...

[43] https://t.me/andriyshTime/7176

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/02/28/kinburnska-kosa-kvytok-v-odyn-kinecz-dlya-okupanta-nataliya-gumenyuk/

[45] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/02/28/kinburnska-kosa-kvytok-v-odyn-kinecz-dlya-okupanta-nataliya-gumenyuk/

[46] https://suspilne dot media/399500-rosijski-okupanti-ogolosuut-evakuaciu-koli-zbirautsa-tikati-gumenuk-pro-situaciu-na-livoberezzi-hersonsini/ ; https://suspilne dot media/398990-armia-rf-obstrilue-okupovani-naseleni-punkti-hersonsini-sob-vipravdati-svou-vtecu-gumenuk/

[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/39332; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/16306...

[48]https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0QKZqHXVCM4m...

[49] https://suspilne dot media/399572-zsu-vlucili-po-rosianah-u-timcasovo-okupovanomu-misti-pologi-na-zaporizzi/

[50] https://suspilne dot media/399500-rosijski-okupanti-ogolosuut-evakuaciu-koli-zbirautsa-tikati-gumenuk-pro-situaciu-na-livoberezzi-hersonsini/

[51] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/3344 ; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/2691...

[52] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/3344 ; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/2691...

[53] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/02/28/v-erevane-zaderzhali-rossiyanina-podozrevaemogo-po-delu-ob-antivoennyh-nadpisyah-v-moskve; https://www.police dot am/ru/news/view/%D5%BE%D5%A1%D5%B6%D5%A4%D5%A1%D5%AC%D5%A B%D5%A6%D5%B4280223.html; https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32292266.html; https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2023/02/28/armenia-detains-russian-anti-war-activist-at-airport-a80355; https://ovd dot news/express-news/2023/02/28/podozrevaemogo-po-delu-ob-antivoennyh-nadpisyah-v-moskve-zaderzhali-v

[54] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2023/02/28/armenia-detains-russian-anti-war-activist-at-airport-a80355

[55] https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32292266.html

[56]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NL2GH6ye8Z9QKkzyTCr...

[57] https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-demand-tanks-outstrips-production...

[58] https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-demand-tanks-outstrips-production...

[59] https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-demand-tanks-outstrips-production...

[60] https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-demand-tanks-outstrips-production...

[61] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7267; https://t.me/Lunay14/3910

[62] https://t.me/meduzalive/79461

[63] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/528

[64] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1630478324215455745; https://t.me...

[65] https://t.me/grey_zone/17471; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/528; ...

[66] https://www.fontanka dot ru/2023/02/27/72090578/; https://t.me/astrapress/21942

[67] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/19653; https://t.me/SergeyKolyasnikov/4666...

[68] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/02/27/shkolnitsa-iz-tulskoy-oblasti-narisovala-antivoennyy-risunok-teper-otets-kotoryy-vospityvaet-ee-odin-figurant-ugolovnogo-dela-o-diskreditatsii-armii

[69] https://t.me/astrapress/21972; https://t.me/sotaproject/54572

[70] https://minre.gov dot ua/news/ukazom-prezydenta-vvedeno-v-diyu-personalni-sankciyi-shchodo-rosiyan-prychetnyh-do-deportaciyi; https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/1152023-45957

[71] https://minre.gov dot ua/news/ukazom-prezydenta-vvedeno-v-diyu-personalni-sankciyi-shchodo-rosiyan-prychetnyh-do-deportaciyi; https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/1152023-45957

[72] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021623

[73] https://minre.gov dot ua/news/ukazom-prezydenta-vvedeno-v-diyu-personalni-sankciyi-shchodo-rosiyan-prychetnyh-do-deportaciyi; https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/1152023-45957

[74] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/02/28/rosiya-nasylno-vyvezla-z-ukrayiny-ponad-16-tysyach-ditej-ofis-genprokurora/

[75] https://www.dw dot com/en/ukraine-calls-transfer-of-children-to-russia-genocidal-crime/a-64835163

[76] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/481 ; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/480

[77] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/02/28/rosiyany-zmushuyut-ukrayinskyh-ditej-pysaty-lysty-okupantam/

[78] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[79] https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/1630535360735334400; https://tw... https://twitter.com/GianlucaMezzo/status/1630577307260690435?s=20

[80] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1630453726304518144

[81] https://t.me/modmilby/23811

FBI Director Says Covid Pandemic Likely Caused by Chinese Lab Leak

Christopher Wray provides first public confirmation of bureau’s classified assessment of suspected laboratory incident

https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-director-says-covid-pandemic-likely-caused-by-chinese-lab-leak-13a5e69b

By Michael R. GordonFollow and Warren P. StrobelFollow

Feb. 28, 2023 6:37 pm ET

WASHINGTON—FBI Director Christopher Wray said Tuesday that the Covid pandemic was probably the result of a laboratory leak in China, providing the first public confirmation of the bureau’s classified judgment of how the virus that led to the deaths of nearly seven million people worldwide first emerged.

“The FBI has for quite some time now assessed that the origins of the pandemic are most likely a potential lab incident in Wuhan,” Mr. Wray told Fox News. “Here you are talking about a potential leak from a Chinese government-controlled lab.”

Mr. Wray added that the Chinese government has been trying to “thwart and obfuscate” the investigation that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, other parts of the U.S. government and foreign partners have been carrying out into the origin of the pandemic, but that the bureau’s work continues.

The Wall Street Journal reported Sunday that the FBI had come to the conclusion with “moderate confidence” in 2021 that the Covid-19 pandemic was likely the result of an accidental lab leak and still holds to this view.

The FBI and Energy Department’s assessments are included in a classified report that was provided to the White House and some lawmakers earlier this year.

Four other intelligence agencies that officials haven’t named and the National Intelligence Council, which conducts long-term strategic analysis, still favor the theory that the virus emerged when it leapt from an animal to a human, though with “low confidence.”

The Central Intelligence Agency and another agency that officials haven’t identified remain undecided between the lab-leak and natural-transmission theories, people who have read the classified report said.

There is a consensus among the agencies that the virus wasn’t the result of a biological-weapons program, people familiar with the classified report said.

China has disputed that the virus could have leaked from one of its labs and has suggested it emerged outside China.

White House Says U.S. Not Ready to Reach Consensus on Covid Origins

Treasury Official Travels to Beijing Despite U.S.-China Tensions

Senior Asia policy official from U.S. Treasury Department held meetings with his Chinese counterpart on macroeconomic and financial issues

https://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-official-travels-to-beijing-despite-u-s-china-tensions-5c2ca9d6

By Andrew Duehren

and Keith Zhai

March 1, 2023 5:30 am ET

A senior Treasury Department official recently traveled to Beijing, according to people familiar with the matter, in a sign of continued diplomacy despite recent tensions between the U.S. and China.

Robert Kaproth, a deputy assistant secretary focused on Asia, met last week with Chinese counterparts for technical, staff-level discussions on macroeconomic and financial issues, the people said.

The meetings came during a delicate time in the U.S.-China relationship. The two superpowers last year agreed to restart high-level diplomatic engagements. But Secretary of State Antony Blinken postponed a planned trip to Beijing last month after the U.S. shot down what it said was a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon.

More recently, the U.S. has said it believes China is weighing whether to supply weapons to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. Officials including Mr. Blinken and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen have repeatedly said the U.S. wouldn’t hesitate to sanction Chinese entities if the country aids Russia in the fighting. Beijing said the allegation that it may help Moscow is merely “disinformation” and instead blames Washington for stoking the conflict.

Tensions over the war hung over a recent gathering of finance ministers from the Group of 20 advanced economies in Bengaluru, India. Treasury officials held staff-level discussions with Chinese officials during the summit, though Ms. Yellen didn’t meet senior Chinese officials.

“The administration’s approach to China has not changed,” a Treasury spokeswoman said in a statement. “We still believe it is important to keep the lines of communication open, now more than ever. At the same time, the administration will always do what’s required to defend our national security.”

Ms. Yellen had been planning to visit China not long after Mr. Blinken. She said last month that she hoped a trip would still be possible.

“I do think improved communication is important,” Ms. Yellen said after Mr. Blinken postponed his trip. “I still hope to be able to visit China and meet with economic counterparts, but I don’t have any more details to offer you on just when.” She said any trip would be up to the State and Defense Departments.

A person familiar with Mr. Kaproth’s trip said it wasn’t aimed at setting up a visit by Ms. Yellen. Another person described the meetings between Mr. Kaproth and his Chinese counterparts as “constructive and friendly.” The two sides briefly discussed the possibility of a visit, though no conclusion was reached, this person said.

Eswar Prasad, a former head of the International Monetary Fund’s China division, said tensions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine made a trip to China by Ms. Yellen unlikely in the near future.

“It has become a complicated dance,” he said. “I think tensions on the Ukraine war have certainly escalated. At the G-20 it became clear that China wasn’t willing to make any concessions to the U.S. position and in fact seemed to move more towards a hard-line stance.”

Ms. Yellen met with her then-Chinese counterpart, Vice Premier Liu He, in Switzerland in January. The two sides largely discussed economic outlooks in their respective countries, which together account for around 40% of the world’s gross domestic product. Ms. Yellen and Mr. Liu only discussed contentious topics such as trade in private, speaking one-on-one during a coffee break from the group meeting, Treasury officials said.

Mr. Liu is stepping down this month in a leadership shuffle. During their meeting, he recommended that Ms. Yellen visit China at a suitable time this year, and the two parties also reached an agreement that their economic and trade teams would maintain communication at various levels, according to the official Chinese readout.

Ms. Yellen and her team have been hoping to get to know a new set of Chinese economic officials after Beijing shuffles its cabinet officials, including China’s top trade negotiator with the U.S., this month.

Treasury officials used to hold regular staff-level and senior meetings with their Chinese counterparts on economic issues, but those engagements stalled during the Covid-19 pandemic and as tensions heightened between the U.S. and China. Stephanie Segal, a senior Treasury official during the Obama administration, said Mr. Kaproth’s visit is a return to form.

“Relative to the past few years it does stand out, but those sorts of visits absolutely were common in the past,” she said. “That kind of technical level of visit would be consistent with what the administration has signaled.”

The Treasury Department is at the center of deliberations within the Biden administration over policy toward China, including how to craft an expected executive order regulating U.S. investment in China and other adversarial countries.

Treasury officials have tried to keep that order limited to what they see as national-security risks posed by advances in specific technologies such as advanced semiconductors. Some lawmakers have called for broader screenings focused on shifting supply chains away from China.

Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo said last week that the U.S. would seek to ensure that U.S. investors aren’t helping national-security adversaries develop technologies such as quantum computing. He said investment rules should be focused on national-security risks and not interfere in economic competition.

Write to Andrew Duehren at andrew.duehren@wsj.com and Keith Zhai at keith.zhai@wsj.com

4. Putin’s War Rhetoric Rallies Russia’s Border Towns, but Nerves Fray

Photos at the link.

Excerpts:

When Mr. Putin ordered a draft of 300,000 reservists last fall, Katerina Ivanova, a local psychologist, saw an uptick in clients—men worried about going to serve, women concerned about their husbands, fathers and sons.

Yet within several months, the anxiety receded. The war “is not as scary as it was,” she said. “It became something normal.”

The growing strains—for now—haven’t affected support for Mr. Putin’s war.

Ms. Nikolayeva, the military wife, and her friend, Yulia, whose husband is also fighting in Ukraine, run a volunteer group gathering food, clothes and letters of support for soldiers in the 76th Division. “Our guys are finishing what in their time our great grandfathers couldn’t finish,” said Yulia.

Asked if she was worried about her husband, however, Ms. Nikolayeva fought back tears as she said, “No.”

Days earlier, Yulia’s husband returned home on leave, she wrote on VKontakte, Russia’s version of Facebook. She found him in the kitchen in the middle of the night with puffy eyes, thumbing through photos of fellow service members, half of whom were now dead. He was listening to a song released last summer about a soldier yearning to return home from war, titled “I’m Alive.”

Putin’s War Rhetoric Rallies Russia’s Border Towns, but Nerves Fray

Growing casualties haven’t so far shaken Pskov, an impoverished region that is home to the elite paratrooper division that occupied Bucha

https://www.wsj.com/articles/putins-war-rhetoric-rallies-russias-border-towns-but-nerves-fray-8b269360

By Evan GershkovichFollow | Photographs by Nanna Heitmann/Magnum for The Wall Street Journal

March 1, 2023 5:30 am ET

PSKOV, Russia—A jackhammer pounded the frozen ground on a recent afternoon as gravediggers uncovered fresh soil to provide the resting place for the body of a Russian soldier killed in Ukraine.

At the Vybuty village cemetery in the western region of Pskov, the digging, the men said, has become a near daily job.

But even as the fatalities rise—Western officials estimate nearly 200,000 Russians have been killed or wounded in Ukraine—there is little resistance in places such as Pskov to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion.

Instead, Mr. Putin’s use of state oppression and relentless nationalist propaganda has secured the acquiescence to the war of most Russians, for whom the military offers a rare escape from the crushing poverty still widespread outside Moscow and St. Petersburg.

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Mr. Putin’s claim that the war in Ukraine is meant to protect Russia from an aggressive West is felt vividly in Pskov, home to an elite paratrooper division just 35 miles from Latvia and Estonia, both members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

“Look at our history. Russia has never attacked first,” said Nadezhda Nikolayeva, who is married to a soldier fighting in Ukraine. “That our men have died is of course a tragedy for everyone. But it isn’t in vain. They defended their people, their wives, their children, their future.”

The armed forces have pride of place in Pskov, a poor region that offers few options to young men and where the military is the biggest employer along with a local distillery and the border control. The regional capital is home to the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, whose paratroopers have been at the forefront of most major battles in Ukraine.

Graves in a cemetery outside Pskov, a poor region that offers few options to young men and where the military is one of the biggest employers.

They took heavy losses in Russia’s early assault of Kyiv before occupying the nearby town of Bucha, where Ukrainian authorities say they were among the forces that committed war crimes against civilians. The division later defended Kherson before the city was retaken by Kyiv’s forces, and its paratroopers are now part of a brutal assault in the east.

A member of a Kremlin working group on mobilization said in January that Russia’s airborne troops have lost as much as half their combat forces.

Pskov’s elite 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, a special-forces division, also lost dozens of servicemen in the assault on Kharkiv, according to Janes, a defense and intelligence firm.

Russia’s Defense Ministry didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Mr. Putin, preparing Russians for a possibly long conflict, hails dying at war as honorable.

“The question is how we lived. After all, it’s not clear whether some live or don’t live, and how they depart, from vodka or from something else,” the Russian president told a mother of a soldier who died in Ukraine in a recent televised meeting. “Your son lived—you understand? His goal has been achieved. This means that he did not die in vain.”

Pskov’s own history provides fertile ground for Mr. Putin’s narrative. In a reminder of Soviet bravery in fighting Nazi Germany in World War II, a billboard in one village features the story of a man who “covered the embrasure of an enemy bunker with his body.”

On the banks of nearby Lake Chudskoye, known as Lake Peipus on its Estonian shore, is a monument for Alexander Nevsky, famed for defending Russia against European invaders in the 1240s, including on the frozen lake. Now a hero of Russian nationalists, his likeness appears on billboards outside the base of the 76th Division. One reads: “Russian borders don’t end anywhere.”

Mr. Putin has said that Nevsky showed that “there are people on Russian land who are ready to fight for it without sparing themselves.” State propaganda has drawn parallels between the Ukraine war and Nevsky’s defense of medieval Russia.

Lyudmila Semyonova, who runs an embroidery shop in the regional capital of Pskov, buys Mr. Putin’s narrative. She berates a 34-year-old nephew who she says is unemployed and sits at home drinking, living off his wife’s earnings.

“I tell him, ‘Why don’t you go to war,’” she said. “His mother scolds him and tells him to prove that he is worth something. There are a lot of people like this in Russia. They should prove that they are people, that they can sacrifice something.”

A bus with passengers in Pskov and a monument for Alexander Nevsky, famed for defending Russia against European invaders in the 1240s.

When Mr. Putin ordered a draft of 300,000 reservists last fall, Katerina Ivanova, a local psychologist, saw an uptick in clients—men worried about going to serve, women concerned about their husbands, fathers and sons.

Yet within several months, the anxiety receded. The war “is not as scary as it was,” she said. “It became something normal.”

The growing strains—for now—haven’t affected support for Mr. Putin’s war.

Ms. Nikolayeva, the military wife, and her friend, Yulia, whose husband is also fighting in Ukraine, run a volunteer group gathering food, clothes and letters of support for soldiers in the 76th Division. “Our guys are finishing what in their time our great grandfathers couldn’t finish,” said Yulia.

Asked if she was worried about her husband, however, Ms. Nikolayeva fought back tears as she said, “No.”

Days earlier, Yulia’s husband returned home on leave, she wrote on VKontakte, Russia’s version of Facebook. She found him in the kitchen in the middle of the night with puffy eyes, thumbing through photos of fellow service members, half of whom were now dead. He was listening to a song released last summer about a soldier yearning to return home from war, titled “I’m Alive.”

The toll on Pskov continues to grow. A shopkeeper at a store for military equipment said soldiers—still bearing injuries—come for new gear before returning to the front lines. One soldier clad in a fresh uniform limped through town with what he said was a bullet wound to the foot.

At a cafe in the nearby village of Seredka, a barista manned the counter as a teenage boy watched television. The barista had one brother drafted over the fall; the boy had two. Nearly everyone in the village had a family member or friend drafted, the barista said. “My brother calls home every two weeks and says there may not be a next time,” she said.

Nikolai Rassadin, in Pskov’s Imperial Mall where he is the managing director, says shoppers are spending less. Lev Shlosberg, at his offices, is chairman of the local branch of the liberal Yabloko Party, one of the last platforms for opposition in Russia.

But Russians are adapting. Nikolai Rassadin, managing director of Pskov’s Imperial Mall, says shoppers are spending less at his mall. Mr. Rassadin, who is against the war and moonlights as a poet and musician, has adjusted, selling more gardening equipment because people are growing their own vegetables to save money.

“Russia is a country that for all of its existence has been at war,” he said. “War is in our blood. And if, as we say, the motherland orders it, then you have to take a weapon in your hands and go. What else can you do?”

Less pessimistic is Lev Shlosberg, chairman of the local branch of the liberal Yabloko Party, one of the last remaining platforms for opposition in a country where the Kremlin has stamped out dissent. Mr. Shlosberg, who has received two misdemeanor charges for discrediting the military, believes that a quarter of Russians strongly support the invasion while a quarter are just as strongly against it.

“Between them is a swamp—people who haven’t worked out a position and have a high level of doubt,” he said. “I think these 50% are gradually starting to wake up.”

Many in Pskov are afraid or reluctant to oppose the war, especially after Mr. Putin ordered state payments of 5 million rubles, equivalent to about $65,000, to the families of dead soldiers, said Yury Alexeyev, a former officer in the 76th Division. The average monthly salary in Pskov is around 39,000 rubles, or about $500.

And while the battlefield casualties are high, Mr. Alexeyev says, “more people die from drinking.”

For many, the war is inexorable.

Even as the fatalities rise, there is little resistance in places such as Pskov to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion.

After finishing vocational school in 2021 in Novoshakhtinsk, a small mining city on the Ukrainian border, Nikolai Kartashev was conscripted and dispatched for his mandatory year of military service to the base in Pskov, his half-brother, Dmitry, said by phone.

Drawn by a salary of 40,000 rubles a month—big money for a then 19-year-old from a provincial city—and the pride of military service, Nikolai signed a two-year contract with the 76th Division’s 234th regiment. He planned on signing his next contract for deployment in Syria.

Instead, he was dispatched to Ukraine, where Ukrainian authorities say his regiment occupied Bucha before shifting east in April. Then, early last summer, Nikolai and several fellow servicemen deserted and hitchhiked home, Dmitry said.

Nikolai sat in his room all summer playing computer games. “He became antisocial and didn’t see any of his friends,” Dmitry recalled. Nikolai told his mother that all of the soldiers he knew from home had died and that he didn’t want to go back to Ukraine, Dmitry said.

On Dec. 16, a military court found him guilty of desertion and issued him with a suspended sentence, according to the ruling posted to its website. But the prosecutor told Nikolai he still had to finish his contract, Dmitry said.

With his parents’ money, Nikolai returned to Pskov in early January and was soon sent to the Russian-occupied Luhansk region in eastern Ukraine.

At the start of February, Nikolai’s mother received a call saying he had been taken captive by Ukrainian forces, Dmitry recalled. Nikolai then came on the line and said that most of his unit died in battle before he was taken prisoner. Videos on Telegram showed Nikolai’s interrogations and the paratrooper denying having been in Bucha during his first tour.

Dmitry is worried about his brother, who went to war not once, but twice. “He was just a child,” he said.

Kate Vtorygina contributed to this article.

Write to Evan Gershkovich at evan.gershkovich@wsj.com

5. Lawmakers Question Pentagon on Ukraine Funds, Signaling Fresh Doubts

Are tough times ahead as Ukraine becomes a political football in Congress?

That said it is important to have proper oversight and the Pentagon and Executive Branch must be transparent when it comes to spending our taxpayer dollars.

I wonder when Congress will insist on a Special Inspector General For the Defense of Ukraine like the SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction).

Lawmakers Question Pentagon on Ukraine Funds, Signaling Fresh Doubts

The New York Times · by Karoun Demirjian · February 28, 2023

Some Republicans and Democrats quizzed military officials about the money that has been sent to Kyiv so far and what is still to come, threatening a consensus in favor of aid.

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This week marked the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Some Republicans and Democrats questioned senior Pentagon officials on Tuesday at a House Armed Services Committee hearing.Credit...Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times

Feb. 28, 2023, 7:18 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON — Republicans in Congress sharply questioned senior Pentagon officials on Tuesday about the tens of billions of dollars in military and other aid the United States has sent to Ukraine, casting doubt on whether they would embrace future spending as Democrats pleaded for a cleareyed assessment of how much more money would be needed.

The exchanges at committee hearings, coming just days after the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, highlighted how concerns about the high cost of sending weapons to Kyiv have intensified on Capitol Hill. The growing doubts have threatened what was once a strong bipartisan consensus in favor of the aid and could make it more difficult for the Biden administration to win congressional approval of funds to replenish its military assistance accounts. The funding inflection point could come as soon as this summer, months earlier than previously expected.

The hearings also illustrated how members of both parties, despite expressing confidence that a majority in Congress remains committed to supporting Ukraine, are concerned that a determined minority — including right-wing Republicans who eschew U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts and liberal antiwar Democrats — may weaken that resolve if the war continues to drag on.

On Tuesday at a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Mike D. Rogers, of Alabama, the chairman, took the unorthodox step of handing over his question time to Representative Andrew Clyde, an outspoken critic of funding for Ukraine who does not sit on the panel. Mr. Clyde, a Georgia Republican, quizzed a top Defense Department official about allegations of lost and diverted weapons, whistle-blowers, and fraud.

“Accountability of the weapons shipped in is absolutely paramount, especially the most sensitive weapons, to ensure they are being used for their intended purposes and not diverted for nefarious purposes,” Mr. Clyde told Robert P. Storch, the Pentagon’s inspector general.

Pledges to send tanks, the grinding nature of the war on the ground and a steady clamor from certain corners of Congress to greenlight advanced systems for Ukraine have threatened to drain war funds at a faster clip than appropriators anticipated last December, when lawmakers approved about $45 billion in military and other assistance, projecting it would last until the end of September.

The steep price tag of the war has prompted Congress to issue a battery of oversight requirements for information about how the money has been spent, some of which has been provided to lawmakers. Yet few of those details have reached the public.

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Military Advisers: American troops are assisting Somali soldiers fighting Al Shabab, a branch of Al Qaeda, in what is the most active front in the “forever wars” that the United States has waged since the Sept. 11 attacks.
An American Nightmare: Ian Fishback was a decorated soldier and a whistle-blower against torture. Then he was undone by his own mind — and by a health care system that utterly failed him.
Victim or Criminal?: A Navy officer was sentenced to three years in Japan after causing a deadly traffic accident in 2021. The case has irritated U.S. relations with a crucial military ally.
J.R.O.T.C. Programs: After The Times reported that some high schools were automatically placing freshmen in military classes, congressional leaders are expanding their scrutiny of Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs.

“We’re all concerned about accountability,” said Representative Joe Wilson, Republican of South Carolina, who has supported Ukraine funding ventures in the past. “Please, let’s get this publicized so the American people can trust what the expenditures are.”

The accelerating spending and dearth of detailed information have fueled the resolve of several naysayers, who doubled down this week on a campaign to cast the Ukraine assistance program as a failed boondoggle, with the apparent tacit blessing of party leaders.

Mr. Storch and other Pentagon officials testified that there had been no substantiated instances of sensitive weapons being diverted for ill purposes, but his statements did not silence the critics.

“You cannot testify that we have complied with the end-use monitoring requirements at all times during this conflict, can you?” insisted Representative Matt Gaetz, Republican of Florida, accusing Mr. Storch of dodging.

Democrats, too, voiced concerns on Tuesday, pleading with Pentagon leaders to be straight with them about how much more money lawmakers could expect to be asked to approve for Ukraine.

“How many more times do you think Congress needs to provide aid?” Representative Ro Khanna, Democrat of California, asked Colin H. Kahl, the under secretary of defense for policy, during his appearance before the Armed Services panel. “What do you think, at the end, is the end game?”

The questioning was mirrored by some Democrats on the House Appropriations panel that oversees military spending posed similar questions to Celeste Wallander, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

“How much bigger would the bill be?” asked Representative Ed Case, Democrat of Hawaii, expressing concern about the administration’s successive requests for more aid. “We have to at least anticipate that possibility that we would see a higher bill next year.”

Pentagon leaders were reluctant to commit to either a figure or a timeline upon which they would be seeking additional funds, saying that the vagaries of the war made it impossible to commit to a schedule.

“I don’t have a sense of whether it would be higher or reduced; I just know that we are planning for the kind of effective deterrent force that Ukraine will need,” Ms. Wallander said.

Mr. Kahl suggested that the demands of some lawmakers to step up military assistance to Ukraine could further complicate the Biden administration’s efforts to keep the war effort supplied.

In the past week, the bipartisan group of House members calling on President Biden to supply Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets has more than tripled. On Tuesday, Representative Chrissy Houlahan, Democrat of Pennsylvania, a member of the group and former Air Force officer, implored Mr. Kahl to explain why programs to train Ukrainian pilots to operate the systems had not commenced.

Mr. Kahl insisted that doing so would not save time, estimating that it would take about 18 months to train Ukrainian pilots to use the F-16 jets, which was also the Pentagon’s shortest projected time frame for sending them.

“It doesn’t make sense to start training them on a system they may never get,” he said, noting that while F-16s were a priority for Ukraine, “it’s not one of their top three priorities.”

He also said that even sending older models of F-16s would be costly, totaling $2 billion to $3 billion for about 36 planes, which falls short of the 50 to 80 that the Pentagon estimates Ukraine would need to update its existing air force.

“That would consume a huge portion of the remaining security assistance that we have for this fiscal year,” Mr. Kahl noted, ticking through the numbers. “These are the trade-offs we are making in real time.”

The New York Times · by Karoun Demirjian · February 28, 2023

6. Red Balloons and China's Hybrid Warfare Challenge to International Law | SOF News

To offer a counterpoint. If we had shot down the balloon over the Aleutians few would have believed what was intended for the balloon. CHina would simply call out the US for hostile action against a peaceful weather balloon blown off course. Regardless of what material might have been received, few would believe it and we would be charged with over reacting (of course shooting down the three subsequent objects might be considered an overreaction). As long as DOD and the IC were confident they could prevent collection activities, having the balloon fly the path that it did provided insight and evidence into China's true intentions. And the recovered material will be much more credible when exposed.

And hopefully, as the author notes in the opening paragraph, the balloon could be a Sputnik like wakeup call for the US. If we had shot it down over the Aluetians we would not have the same effect. If Americans truly wake up to China's unrestricted warfare and three warfares, the balloon could be considered a positive for US national security in the long run. Why can't we use this incident to our advantage rather than all the self flagellation?

Red Balloons and China's Hybrid Warfare Challenge to International Law | SOF News

sof.news · by Guest · February 27, 2023

By Michael J. Listner.

The passage of an intelligence-gathering balloon from the Peoples Republic of China through U.S. sovereign airspace earlier this month created a Sputnik-conundrum in terms of international law and national sovereignty. The balloon, which was first detected entering U.S. sovereign airspace around the Aleutian Island chain was permitted to transit this airspace unimpeded into Alaska and then reenter the continental U.S. where it was allowed to transit the continental U.S. unchecked until it was finally brought down within the 12-mile zone of the southeast coast of the U.S. Much is not publicly known what types or amount of intelligence was gathered by the balloon; however, aside from this the permissive entry and transit of the balloon raises questions about the effect of incident on international law and U.S. national sovereignty.

Hybrid Warfare and International Law

The term hybrid warfare was coined by Xu Sanfei, the editor of Military Forum and a senior editor in the Theory Department of Liberation Army News. Hybrid warfare “…refers to an act of war that is conducted at the strategic level; that comprehensively employs political, economic, military, diplomatic, public opinion, legal, and other such means; whose boundaries are blurrier, whose forces are more diverse, whose form is more mixed, whose regulation and control is more flexible, and whose objectives are more concealed.” The CCP’s Central Military Commission adopted the concept of hybrid warfare when it announced in 2003 three new types of warfare capabilities: legal warfare (lawfare), psychological warfare, and media warfare, which individually and collectively attain a political objective. This new strategy, which is called the Three Warfares, was subsequently adopted by the Peoples Liberation Army. This article will focus on the legal aspect of hybrid warfare.

Sovereign Airspace and Near Space

The Federal Aviation Administration regulates territorial airspace up to 60,000 feet (approximately 18.288km), which makes this airspace unquestionably sovereign airspace. Beyond this altitude some question whether the so-called “near-space” can be claimed as sovereign airspace. The non-legal spatial demarcation for where outer space begins is 60 miles (approximately 100km). The U.S. does not recognize the need for an international legal demarcation for where outer space begins and gives supports for a rule of international law that a nation’s sovereign airspace extends not only beyond the 60,000-foot altitude but up to where an aircraft or spacecraft would enter a full orbit of the Earth and unquestionably be in the sovereignless domain of outer space. This rule that a nations sovereign airspace extends past 60,000 feet into near-space and into outer space is borne out with high-flying reconnaissance aircraft that have operated in near-space altitudes. The U-2 operates at altitudes of 70,000 feet, and the CIA’s OXCART program and the Strategic Air Command’s SR-71 both operated at altitudes of 80,000+ feet, which is well within the alleged legal gray zone purported to exist. Moreover, all these aircraft encountered defensive actions while at these altitudes from nations as they overflew or flew in proximity to what these nations claimed as sovereign territory, including a U-2 shot downed over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960 while flying over the Soviet Union and at least six U-2s operated by the Black Cat Squadron of the Taiwanese Air Force while flying at so-called near-space altitudes over the PRC.

Chinese Balloons and Hybrid Warfare

The transit of the PRC balloon over U.S. territory creates a larger question as to the purpose of the action. The primary purpose of the balloon was undoubtedly to collect intelligence; however, ancillary to that mission is whether the PRC was testing for a political response from the U.S. to see if it could use the legal aspect of hybrid warfare and the Three Warfares, which is called lawfare, to potentially test of a new rule of international law for near-space and assess the resolve of the U.S. to not only defend its territory but also support and assert its sovereign rights under international law. Two aspects of the intrusion are pertinent to this analysis.

First, the unimpeded transit of the balloon brings into question whether the PRC was seeking to establish an international rule of law for passing over sovereign territory at “near-space” altitudes. The balloon’s trek over U.S. territory began its violation of sovereign U.S. air space when it passed over the Aleutian Islands yet, no action was taken to intercept its course purportedly because it was not deemed a military threat. Regardless, no assertion in messaging by the U.S. was made the balloon was violating its sovereign airspace. This potentially gives the PRC the impression that if not creating a toe-hold for a rule of customary international law for overflights at near-space altitudes it at least shows a reluctance by the U.S. to push-back on implicit attempt to create a rule of international law. A repeat of the overflight that would give further credence to this claim would be difficult considering the political fallout following this incident. Yet, even if the PRC were to attempt to repeat the incursion and the U.S. intercepted, would the U.S. assert its sovereign rights as trigger for the intercept? This leads into the second legal aspect.

The second legal aspect of the incursion is whether it was a test by the PRC to see how the U.S. would respond to a violation of its sovereign airspace and whether it would assert international law or waiver politically. The intrusion into and passage through U.S. airspace was a direct challenge to this rule of international law and arguably could have been a lawfare action to dilute the precept itself. By failing to properly message the true nature of the incursion, the U.S. not only waivered on its defense of national airspace but signaled to the PRC it might waiver on asserting international law in other domains, which brings into questions the U.S. response to future geopolitical events.

The Strategic and Geopolitical Effect

The lack of coherent messaging to enunciate the violation of U.S. airspace and assert the violation of international law and instead down-playing the seriousness of the incident creates strategic problems for the U.S. This lack of messaging continued with the intercept of the objects subsequent to the intrusion where the Administration cites safety as the rationale for the interventions instead of the violation of sovereign U.S. airspace. This brings into question the U.S. commitment to not only defending the sovereign airspace of the U.S. but the rule of international law at home and abroad. This in turn has a psychological effect on the public perception of political leaders in the U.S. to uphold national security. More critically, it also creates shadows of doubt about the willingness of the U.S. to uphold international law and respond decisively to challenges to international law abroad, including both treaty commitments and political assurances. Moreover, the lack of decisive action and clear messaging by the U.S. dilutes the credibility of the U.S. not only enforcing and asserting international law in other domains but also it standing to conjure new standards of behavior in other domains, including outer space.

Conclusion

The reluctance of the U.S. to immediately deal with and unambiguously charge the incursion of the PRC surveillance balloon as a violation of its sovereign territorial rights under international law and the hesitancy to demonstrate resolve in intercepting the balloon eroded the credibility of the U.S. in the eyes of its domestic citizens and allies in the geopolitical sphere. More critically, the standing of the U.S in geopolitical adversaries in the context of great power competition has shifted as the PRC analyzes the U.S. response to the incursion and makes its next calculation in great power competition to shift the rule of international law to its world-view.

**********

Author: Michael J. Listner is a licensed attorney in the State of New Hampshire and the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions. He is a subject matter expert in outer space law, outer space policy and hybrid warfare/lawfare strategy and the author and editor of the space law and policy briefing-letter, The Précis.

Photo: A U.S. Air Force U-2 pilot looked down at the suspected Chinese surveillance balloon as it hovered over the Central Continental United States February 3, 2023. Recovery efforts began shortly after the balloon was downed. (Photo courtesy of the Department of Defense)

sof.news · by Guest · February 27, 2023

7. Bipartisan lawmakers warn of China threat at select committee's first hearing

With HR McMaster and Matt Pottinger.

Bipartisan lawmakers warn of China threat at select committee's first hearing | CNN Politics

CNN · by Clare Foran · March 1, 2023

CNN —

Bipartisan lawmakers warned of the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party on Tuesday during the first hearing of the House select committee on China, a rare demonstration of unity across the aisle in a Congress increasingly divided along partisan lines.

The panel’s chairman, Republican Rep. Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin, described the stakes in sweeping and dire terms at the outset of the hearing, saying, “This is an existential struggle over what life will look like in the 21st century – and the most fundamental freedoms are at stake.”

Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi of Illinois, the panel’s top Democrat, argued that working across the aisle is critical for the US to counter the threat. “We must practice bipartisanship,” he said. “We must recognize that the CCP wants us to be fractious, partisan and prejudiced,” a reference to the Chinese Communist Party.

Gallagher made a clear distinction between the Chinese government and its citizenry, saying, “We must constantly distinguish between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people themselves, who have always been the party’s primary victims.”

And Krishnamoorthi stressed the need to “avoid anti-Chinese or Asian stereotyping at all costs.”

The hearing featured several high-profile witnesses, including former President Donald Trump’s national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, and China expert and former deputy national security adviser Matthew Pottinger.

McMaster said the committee “can help determine the combinations of policies and legislation necessary to counter CCP aggression and rebuild America’s and the free world’s competitive advantages.”

The hearing also featured compelling first-person testimony from Tong Yi, former secretary to one of China’s leading dissidents and human rights activist Wei Jingsheng.

Tong described being interrogated by police at a detention center in Beijing about what Wei had said to US dignitaries. “They were truly afraid that the US might listen to Wei,” she said.

Tong argued that the US must confront its own role in the development current state of affairs.

“In the US, we need to face the fact that we have helped to feed the baby dragon of the CCP until it has grown into what it now is,” she said. “Since the 1990’s US companies have enriched themselves by exploiting cheap labor in China and have in the process also enriched the CCP,” she added.

“I am a proud immigrant citizen of the US, and I want my country to do better,” Tong said.

Ahead of the hearing, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have worked to set a tone of cooperation for the panel.

The US-China relationship has garnered heightened attention in the wake of the US shooting down a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon, an incident that took place in early February after the balloon had traveled across the continental US. China has denied the vehicle was used for spying, saying instead it was a research airship blown off course and accusing US of overreacting to the incident.

McMaster was asked during the hearing what message China was sending to the US with the balloon. “I think the message is that we are intending to continue a broad range of surveillance activities. The balloon, I think, is in many ways a metaphor for the massive effort at espionage,” he said. “The balloon is important to look at but placing the balloon in context is perhaps most important.”

In a display of unity across party lines, the House of Representatives voted to pass a resolution condemning China’s use of the suspected surveillance balloon. The measure passed unanimously with overwhelming bipartisan support by a vote of 419 to zero.

This story has been updated with additional developments.

CORRECTION: This story has been updated to reflect the correct day of the first hearing of the House select committee on China.

CNN’s Alayna Treene contributed to this report.

CNN · by Clare Foran · March 1, 2023

8. China’s Spymasters Can Get More From TikTok Than From Balloons

All the TikTok users say: "Prove it." "Show me." "I do not believe you." And my favorite is in response to the question of "do you want the Chinese to see all the information on your phone, all your text messages, etc?" The response is "I don't care if the Chinese read my text messages. I have nothing to hide." And the response to that should be "let me or your mother read all your text messages. Or we can post them all on the internet for everyone to read. How do you feel about that?"

China’s Spymasters Can Get More From TikTok Than From Balloons

The Chinese approach to espionage is much less about seizing classified information and much more about building influence.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-02-25/huawei-and-tiktok-could-be-bigger-spy-threats-than-chinese-balloons?sref=hhjZtX76

Always watching.Photographer: Roy Liu/Bloomberg

ByTobin Harshaw

February 25, 2023 at 8:00 AM EST

The Great Spy Balloon Panic of 2023 may have deflated, but the episode did raise significant questions about America’s preparedness for the next era of superpower rivalry. Bloomberg Opinion’s Niall Ferguson, for example, argued that the Chinese flying object exposed the US “domain awareness gap” and aging military industrial base. Admiral James Stavridis questioned the cost-benefit ratio of using Sidewinder missiles (costing over $400,000 each) to bring down what might turn out to be weather balloons or scientific experiments. The best-selling horror novelist Whitley Strieber warned of the “remarkable, complex and secretive presence" of extraterrestrials. (Then again, Strieber says he was abducted by aliens on Boxing Day in 1985.)

As the hysteria abates, let’s pay attention to the big threat: the global web of Chinese intelligence operations that have largely flown beneath the radar of public awareness. This week I tracked down Alex Joske, an Australian risk analyst and expert on Beijing’s adept influencers — not the TikTok kind. Joske, who lived in China for six years and has studied in Taiwan, is the author of Spies and Lies: How China's Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World, which published in October. Here is a lightly edited transcript of our exchange.

NCOs Key to Ukrainian Military Successes Against Russia

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

Since 2014, the United States has sent Ukraine more than $32.4 billion in security assistance, and while the transfer of equipment is important in Ukraine's defense, the training aspect of this aid may have longer term implications.

These military capabilities — including Javelins, tanks, air defense systems and more — have been crucial, but Ukraine's investment in developing a noncommissioned officer corps may be the key to victory against the Russian invader.

The Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman Ramón "CZ" Colón-López said that looking at a year of conflict in Ukraine since Russia invaded, he has been convinced of "the decisive advantage that the human brings" to combat.

Patch Swap

Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman Ramón "CZ" Colón-López swaps patches with Command Sergeant Major of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Kosynskyi during the ICC.

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VIRIN: 220908-O-D0439-101

The SEAC — who spent most of his career in special operations — noted that the No. 1 rule in his military community "is that humans are more important than hardware."

Colón-López spoke before traveling to Europe to meet with his counterparts among the NATO frontline states. "That is true, not only for special operations, but for conventional forces, because you can have the best technology in the world, but if you don't have the will and the pride to fight for your nation, you're going to be on the losing end of the equation," he said. "We have seen this play over and over again."

Spotlight: NATO

One lesson of the conflict in Ukraine is that government and military leaders must prioritize the training, development and education of service members, he said. "At the end of the day, the rivets and steel is not as important as the flesh and bone if the flesh and bone is not willing to go all-in in the execution of the wartime mission," he said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin expected an easy and quick war on Ukraine, U.S. officials have said. Ukraine and Russia had many of the same capabilities, including T-72 tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, air defenses and more. Still, Russia — with more money — had the advantage there, as well.

"It's like when you have two football teams. Everybody's got the same equipment; they got the pads to helmets; they got a coach; they got the headsets and everything else," Colón-López said. "But it all boils down to the execution and the strategy that actually decides who is the victor in that game. It's no different in the military. And that is exactly what the Ukrainians have done."

The U.S. military relationship with Ukraine began in 1993 soon after the Soviet Union broke apart and the nation declared its independence. Ukraine joined the State Partnership Program and partnered with the California National Guard — with whom they are still partnered.

Ukraine — and the rest of the nations that were in the Soviet orbit — used Soviet tactics and doctrine. When those nations participated in training sessions with U.S. and other NATO forces — most notably in an exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in 1995 — they invariably got waxed. Many of the nations aspired to join NATO, and they took to learning the NATO playbook.

Poland Visit

Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman Ramón "CZ" Colón-López speak with paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division during a visit to Nowa Deba, Poland, March 4, 2022.

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"We decided to go ahead and start partnering with a lot of those regional partners to be able to help them break away from the Soviet model," the SEAC said. "In the meantime, we had sporadic engagements."

The Ukrainian military was still very "officer-centric" and not responsive or agile. If the officer went down, the unit had no idea what to do. "The NCOs … were not empowered, they were not entrusted, and they were not properly trained or educated to be autonomous on the battlefield," he said.

All this changed after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, illegally annexed Crimea, and fomented uprisings in the eastern provinces of the nation. "The government of Ukraine decided to go all in on an NCO development model," Colón-López said. "They wanted to westernize their approach. So, immediately, they enlisted the help of the United States and also of NATO to go ahead and shift their mechanism and their procedures."

The idea was to empower junior leaders, to have them operate within the commanders' intent, to display initiative, and to accomplish the missions. Colón-López said NATO's Defense Education Enhancement Program was key to developing the capability.

Ukraine developed three service-specific NCO training centers. The military leaders introduced a new NCO education and training system. "Everything that they did in that curriculum and the syllabus was directly adapted from the NATO model to be able to go ahead and create interoperable NCOs — Ukrainian NCOs to be able to go ahead and partner and train with other NATO entities, even though they're not part of NATO," he said.

Like the United States and other NATO nations, NCOs were responsible for training new recruits and developing new small-unit tactics and being integral parts of the chain of command. "Right now, their basic training is about 2 1/2 to three months in duration, and it heavily focuses on the critical combat skills," Colón-López said. "That was one of the key factors when they started taking in their recruits, that they immediately started implementing the ethos and the change in these young people's minds to be able to go ahead and execute any type of wartime mission.

Allied Powers

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe hosted the 18th international command senior enlisted leader conference.

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"That is the force that you see fighting today," he continued.

Compare that to what the Russians are doing. The Russians still use conscription. They stint on training. The Russian military is still officer centric. They use tactics that haven't changed since World War II.

"It is the human dynamic that is actually tipping the scales on victory versus failure out on that battlefield," he said. "It is definitely a decisive advantage that the Ukrainians have that the Russians do not."

The combat action in Ukraine has many military leaders looking. "Our partners are listening, and they're wanting to learn, and a lot more officers are being open to the idea that … maybe we need to start educating [NCOs] more, so that they're critical thinking thinkers on this hybrid battlefield," the SEAC said. "That is going to be the way of the future."

Spotlight: Support for Ukraine Spotlight: Support for Ukraine: https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/Support-for-Ukraine/

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

10. The Cyberwar Is Here

The Cyberwar Is Here | National Review

https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/the-cyberwar-is-here/

By JIM GERAGHTY

February 28, 2023 9:22 AM

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On the menu today: For the second time in a few weeks, a federal law-enforcement agency suffered a serious cyberattack, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services warned that Russia-linked ransomware group Clop had reportedly taken responsibility for a mass attack on more than 130 organizations, including some in the health-care industry. Ransomware attacks are now as common as rainstorms, even though you only hear about them intermittently. Often, but not always, the trail leads back to Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran — another demonstration of how those faraway foreign-policy problems aren’t always quite so far away.

Thailand, US resume Cobra Gold exercises at full scale

militarytimes.com · by Grant Peck, The Associated Press · February 28, 2023

BANGKOK — Thai and U.S. officials officially opened annual Cobra Gold multinational military exercises on Tuesday, now restored to one of the world’s largest following three years of sharp pandemic cutbacks, reinforcing the security alliances of the United States and six Asian nations.

Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia are full participants in the two-week planning and field exercises, which are co-hosted by the Royal Thai Armed Forces and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

More than 3,800 U.S. troops and 3,000 Thai personnel will participate. But this year’s full-scale return comes as relations between the co-hosts have come under long-term strain. Thailand is a traditional ally of the United States but has built increasingly closer security ties with China. There has also been resentment in the Thai military and government over U.S. criticism of military coups that ousted elected governments in 2006 and 2014.

Twenty-three other countries are joining as exercise partners or observers for a total of 7,394 personnel participating in a variety of security and humanitarian drills.

“Today, Cobra Gold is an exercise focused on the future. It brings together 30 countries from around the world to solve complex challenges that no single country can solve alone,” U.S Ambassador to Thailand Robert F. Godec said at the opening ceremony at a Thai navy base in the eastern province of Rayong. “Only through cooperation can we rise to these challenges and keep our people safe.”

US Defense Secretary Austin meets Thai leader to boost ties

Thailand and the United States are longtime military allies.

Cobra Gold began as a joint Thai-U.S. maritime exercise in 1982 and has evolved into a much larger operation. It consists of three parts — field training, a “command post” staff exercise, and disaster relief and humanitarian exercises.

For the first time this year, the command post exercise will include training on possible space disasters to “foster understanding of the impacts of aerial phenomenon, such as solar storms, on military operations, communication systems, and satellites, which in turn will help the staff to prepare for these phenomena,” organizers said.

The humanitarian exercises include the construction of school buildings at six sites, a “tabletop exercise” to practice coordination in case of natural disasters, and live search and rescue, emergency response, medical evacuation, chemical leak, and firefighting drills.

Field training will consist of an amphibious exercise, a strategic airborne operation, noncombatant evacuation, and a combined arms live-fire exercise.

“Cobra Gold strengthens our ability to plan and conduct combined joint high-end security peacekeeping operations across all domains,” Adm. John Aquilino, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said at the opening ceremony. “Through Cobra Gold we demonstrate our resolve to respond together to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific so that all nations can maintain peace, stability and prosperity.”

China, India and Australia are taking part in the humanitarian assistance exercise. Bangladesh, Canada, France, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, the Philippines, Fiji, the United Kingdom and Brunei will take part in planning and executing multinational operations in response to small-scale contingencies other than war.

Observers are attending from Cambodia, Laos, Brazil, Pakistan, Vietnam, Germany, Sweden, Greece, Kuwait, and Sri Lanka.

12. It’s not what the spy balloon gathered — it’s what it exposed

A Sputnik moment?

Conclusion:

In 1959 when told of the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union, then-Senator Lyndon Johnson quipped, “I refuse to sleep at night under the light of a communist moon” (Americans, unfamiliar with what a satellite was, were told to think of it as another moon orbiting the earth). I am confident that most Americans do not want to sleep at night under the watchful eye or listening ear of a communist spy balloon regardless of its capabilities. I am also confident the world is a safer, more secure, free and prosperous place when the United States takes positions of strength and clarity and backs those positions up with decisive action. We must take every step necessary to make sure events like this do not happen again.

It’s not what the spy balloon gathered — it’s what it exposed

The U.S. must take a clear, bold stance against China in the wake of its spy balloon traveling over U.S. airspace, Lt. Gen. Charlie “Tuna” Moore writes in an op-ed.

LT. GEN. CHARLIE “TUNA” MOORE

FEBRUARY 27, 2023

defensescoop.com · by Lt. Gen. Charlie “Tuna” Moore · February 27, 2023

While the United States seems intent on referring to China as our “pacing challenge” and a “strategic competitor,” the People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping is very comfortable referring to the United States as his country’s most dangerous adversary. As the most recent violation of our national sovereignty by their spy balloon demonstrates, China is prepared to back up that view with brazen action. Make no mistake, the United States should not seek confrontation with China. On the contrary, we should be taking actions that demonstrate our resolve across all levers of national power in order to avoid conflict, while posturing ourselves to defeat any acts of aggression. Unfortunately, our current rhetoric and approach to China seem to ignore the overtly aggressive positions they are taking in regard to the United States and will only lead to more confrontation.

In 1983, during the height of the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan labeled the Soviet Union as the “Evil Empire” and made the case that the struggle between our two nations was one of “good vs. evil” because it was a choice between totalitarianism and freedom. His political opponents immediately condemned Reagan’s rhetoric, suggesting it was reckless and could provoke the Soviet Union to war. But the “great communicator” — as Reagan was known — understood something those opponents did not: When communicating a position or vision, whether about domestic politics or international affairs, it is far better to paint a picture that uses “no pale pastels, but bold colors which make it unmistakably clear where we stand on all of the issues troubling the people.”

When China refers to the United States as its “adversary” and we choose to use terms like “pacing challenge,” we should not be surprised that the actions that follow are disparate. As history has proven, to the leaders of the CCP (Communist Chinese Party) it would be unthinkable to allow a U.S. spy balloon, or any other aerospace vehicle, to transverse the majority of their nation if they had the means to stop it. Furthermore, the talk of it being a violation of their national sovereignty and a potential act of war would certainly have followed.

However, during the most recent spy balloon incident, not only did we not shoot the balloon down at our first opportunity, we allowed it to continue its mission. The Department of Defense has stated that we took steps to protect against the collection of sensitive information and that by allowing it to continue its journey across America we were able to gather important information about how it operates. Additionally, while the DOD did shoot down the subsequent three “objects” when they became a safety concern in regard to civilian aviation, we still don’t know the origin or purpose of those devices. While I do not doubt the authenticity of the DOD’s claims, it still raises several key questions.

First, as the DOD has admitted, we have been observing these balloons for several years in other locations around the globe. If we had gaps in our understanding of how these aerospace vehicles were operating and the missions they were conducting, wouldn’t it have been better to gather that data in a location outside our sovereign airspace? Second, if we still wanted/needed to gather information on how the platform operates, how confident are we that we prevented it from collecting any sensitive information? Finally, how confident are we that these smaller objects are not also part of the Chinese near-space surveillance enterprise/network? If we viewed China as the adversary they openly claim to be, these questions would have been addressed long before the events of the last few weeks.

Regardless, the issues above still miss the bigger point. The optics and accompanying message sent to the CCP, our allies and other potential foes by allowing a week-long journey over our homeland by what we have admitted is a foreign nation’s spycraft is far more damaging than any of the intelligence it may have gathered. When it comes to issues of national security and the sovereignty of our nation, we must paint a picture of clarity and resolve using bright “bold colors.” We must also be ready to back up those words with action — not to cause conflict but to prevent it. Make no mistake, authoritarian regimes — like those of the Soviet Union and today’s CCP — interpret weak words as weak resolve. Reagan’s tough and accurate rhetoric in regard to the Soviet Union did not escalate the Cold War or turn it into a hot one. On the contrary, his clear and concise description of the choices between our two forms of government gave the citizens of the United States a clear understanding of our foe and the rest of the world a clear choice — choose freedom over tyranny and good over evil. And most importantly, back up those words with supportive actions.

The United States, and the world, benefits when our country takes clear positions of strength and resolve. When we don’t take those positions in regard to our own sovereignty, it’s only natural that our friends and allies will have doubts about our commitment to theirs. The question now is how do we reassure our citizens, the CCP, and others around the globe that the United States is serious about national security and our future approach to China? I suggest a clear and completely unambiguous statement to the Chinese government that any future events like this will not only result in the immediate destruction of the aerospace vehicle but in ramifications across all our levers of national power. Additionally, show the recovered wreckage, and its obvious intelligence-gathering sensors, to the world to further demonstrate the CCP’s flagrant disregard for international law and aversion to the truth. Most importantly, call the CCP what they are: an authoritative regime and an adversary to the United States and all freedom-loving countries.

In 1959 when told of the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union, then-Senator Lyndon Johnson quipped, “I refuse to sleep at night under the light of a communist moon” (Americans, unfamiliar with what a satellite was, were told to think of it as another moon orbiting the earth). I am confident that most Americans do not want to sleep at night under the watchful eye or listening ear of a communist spy balloon regardless of its capabilities. I am also confident the world is a safer, more secure, free and prosperous place when the United States takes positions of strength and clarity and backs those positions up with decisive action. We must take every step necessary to make sure events like this do not happen again.

Lt. Gen. Charlie “Tuna” Moore (retired) is a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Vanderbilt University. He is a former US Air Force fighter pilot and Deputy Commander of U.S. Cyber Command.

defensescoop.com · by Lt. Gen. Charlie “Tuna” Moore · February 27, 2023

13. Our military leaders need a national security ‘fast lane’ to compete with China

Excerpts:

In our divided and overtly political times, it may be unrealistic to expect Congress to pass a budget on time. But even so, there are achievable steps that can make a difference. For starters, Congress can create a limited authority permitting each military branch to move the funds required to start 10 new initiatives aimed at countering China, even as the full budget awaits approval. On its side, the Department of Defense can delegate the authority to shift funds between efforts to the managers actually running these initiatives, bypassing outdated accounting rules. These two simple steps could shave almost two years from the time it takes to launch a new strategic defense initiative. It’s not enough, but it would be a start.

The spy balloon is a wake-up call that highlights the boldness and aggression of China. This should remind Americans to expect more focus and agility from their government’s national security processes. They should expect leaders who recognize that our greatest national security challenges in the current era are not the ones we faced in the past and are willing to make unpopular choices to address them. They should expect a Congress willing to take investment risks to protect against catastrophe. They should expect that the defense financial stakeholders charged with protecting taxpayer funds — the Defense comptroller, the Office of Management and Budget, and the congressional appropriators — build a fast lane for matters of strategic national priority.

Our military leaders need a national security ‘fast lane’ to compete with China

BY MIKE HOLMES AND DAN PATT, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 02/28/23 7:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3872045-our-military-leaders-need-a-national-security-fast-lane-to-compete-with-china/?mc_cid=9df68b9524

The Chinese spy balloon incident highlights both the brashness of China’s military ambitions and the U.S. military’s struggle to counter China’s bold moves with new capabilities such as modern air surveillance tools. The most pressing weapons threat the People’s Liberation Army poses to the United States is not balloons, however, but a vast missile program designed to hold the U.S. military at arm’s length, now outnumbering the U.S. in launch capacity and possessing technical advantage in the form of hypersonic missiles designed to outmaneuver defenses.

More systemically, the balloon incident lays bare the audacity of China’s increasingly aggressive military strategy and its focus on rapidly developing and fielding new capabilities. In response, the United States must focus on rapidly developing and fielding new tools to counter China’s bold actions.

The fundamental job of any leader is to identify priorities — challenges and opportunities — communicate them, and then make the hard choices necessary to make progress against these priorities. Too often, our defense enterprise fails to meet this bar. But the U.S. does have a few people in leadership positions who correctly identify a rising China as not only a top rhetorical priority but one that merits difficult and sometimes unpopular decisions. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has defined seven initiatives to counter China, and Gen. David Berger, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, has launched a sweeping redesign of his force toward this same end.

What too few people realize is that even those rare defense leaders willing to make difficult tradeoffs are hamstrung to affect change in relevant time frames. An incoming Air Force secretary will be told that, given previous investments and must-pay bills, they can expect to affect only about 3-5 percent of the Air Force budget — and those changes in spending won’t be realized before three years from the date of their confirmation. Imagine, for a moment, that a corporate board replaced a CEO but the new leader wasn’t permitted to make investment changes for three years. Such a company would be outmaneuvered and outcompeted in its market, no matter the talent and vision of the CEO. Our government owes leaders a more agile system if we hope to compete with rival powers.

Starting new initiatives in a complex bureaucracy such as the Department of Defense will always be hard, because it means cutting existing, proven activities to nurture unproven ones. But even the rare leaders willing to face our stark new threats find themselves hindered. For example, Kendall was confirmed in July 2021 and inherited a 2023 budget that was already largely formulated. He announced seven initiatives in August, and immediately set to work inserting them in the arcane defense planning process. Congress will receive the first spending plan that fully incorporates his vision in March, and when it does, the request will be for funding starting in October 2023 — more than two years after his confirmation.

This stems from a plodding budget preparation process run by an industrial age bureaucracy. It gets worse, though. If this year resembles the past dozen, Congress won’t pass a budget on time but will vote to keep the lights on for the military through a continuing resolution, which prevents starting any new activity for an average of six months.

Even when funds are finally approved, chances are the military won’t spend them well. Managers charged with their use are forced to follow shocking and archaic rules. It takes months or even years to negotiate contracts and they are under intense pressure to spend funds or lose them at the end of a year. Managers often don’t have the freedom to shift funds from an effort that is failing to another that is succeeding. The practical result of this is that the Air Force won’t begin to move out on its new initiatives for a full year after funds are sent from Congress. Leaders like Kendall or Berger will face the end of their terms before the impacts of their work begin to be felt. This is no way to compete with the most serious military challenger that the U.S. has confronted since the Soviet Union.

In our divided and overtly political times, it may be unrealistic to expect Congress to pass a budget on time. But even so, there are achievable steps that can make a difference. For starters, Congress can create a limited authority permitting each military branch to move the funds required to start 10 new initiatives aimed at countering China, even as the full budget awaits approval. On its side, the Department of Defense can delegate the authority to shift funds between efforts to the managers actually running these initiatives, bypassing outdated accounting rules. These two simple steps could shave almost two years from the time it takes to launch a new strategic defense initiative. It’s not enough, but it would be a start.

The spy balloon is a wake-up call that highlights the boldness and aggression of China. This should remind Americans to expect more focus and agility from their government’s national security processes. They should expect leaders who recognize that our greatest national security challenges in the current era are not the ones we faced in the past and are willing to make unpopular choices to address them. They should expect a Congress willing to take investment risks to protect against catastrophe. They should expect that the defense financial stakeholders charged with protecting taxpayer funds — the Defense comptroller, the Office of Management and Budget, and the congressional appropriators — build a fast lane for matters of strategic national priority.

Gen. Mike Holmes retired as commander of the Air Force Air Combat Command and is now an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for New American Security.

Daniel Patt is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and studies technology and organizational change.

14. Why sending more US military troops to Taiwan is so risky

Assessment from the Quincy Institute.

Excerpts:

The latest source of tension is the U.S. charge that the Chinese government is considering providing lethal aid to Russia’s war in Ukraine, which Beijing has angrily denied. Washington and Beijing can’t move past the last breakdown in relations before the next problem crops up. The “great power competition” framing of the relationship means that the emphasis is always on point-scoring and one-upping the other side rather than de-escalation.

In general, the United States needs to work on reducing tensions with China, and that definitely means avoiding provocative actions in connection with Taiwan. Jessica Chen Weiss recently made the case for calming things down in an op-ed for The Washington Post: “In the current atmosphere of intense distrust, verbal assurances have to be accompanied by coordinated, reciprocal actions to reduce the risk of a catastrophic crisis.”

It is not enough simply to say that the United States doesn’t seek conflict or a new cold war. The United States has to back up those statements by exercising restraint in what it does and how it talks about the relationship with China. To prevent tensions over Taiwan from getting worse, Washington needs to worry less about building up its military strength in the region and instead focus on reassuring the Chinese government that it does not want to abandon the status quo that has kept the peace for more than 40 years.

Why sending more US military troops to Taiwan is so risky - Responsible Statecraft

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Daniel Larison · February 28, 2023

East Asia

Why sending more US military troops to Taiwan is so risky

Biden officials insist there have been no changes to its policy with respect to Beijing and Taiwan, but its words and actions say otherwise.

February 28, 2023

Written by

Daniel Larison

Why sending more US military troops to Taiwan is so risky

The United States is reportedly planning to increase its military presence in Taiwan from nearly 40 to between 100 and 200 military personnel.

According to the first report by The Wall Street Journal last week, the additional troops will arrive in the coming months. The small number of U.S. forces in Taiwan has been growing steadily in recent years from less than two dozen at the start of 2021 to what could be nearly ten times as many by the middle of this year. News of the larger troop presence came on the heels of a high-level meeting between U.S. and Taiwanese officials in Washington last Tuesday. There are also separate reports that 500 Taiwanese troops will be sent to the United States for combat training.

While the total numbers involved are still small, these moves represent significant increases in cooperation between the two governments and could portend larger deployments in the future. As the Journal article states, the planned increase would be “the largest deployment of forces in decades by the U.S. on Taiwan.” The United States and Taiwan have had some military cooperation and unofficial ties despite the lack of formal relations between the two, but the difference now is that these ties are becoming stronger and more visible at the same time and therefore harder for the Chinese government to ignore.

The article suggested that the administration had been trying to keep the larger troop presence out of the public eye. According to the report, the training program is one that “the Pentagon has taken pains not to publicize,” but the public also has a right to know about decisions that the government is making that increase the direct U.S. commitment to Taiwan. If the Washington is going to deploy more troops to Taiwan than it has in decades, the public should be aware of it and Congress should be asking pointed questions about the potential implications of these decisions.

The increased troop presence is consistent with the Biden administration’s more overt signals of support for Taiwan over the last two years. The president himself has repeatedly said that U.S. troops would be sent to fight for Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, and in so doing he has made a commitment that goes far beyond what the Washington is obligated to do. While administration officials have stuck to the line that there have been no changes to U.S. policy with respect to China and Taiwan, both their words and actions have been saying otherwise.

For its part, the Taiwanese government seems nervous enough about the reporting of the increase that it made a point of clarifying that U.S. troops are not permanently stationed there. It’s true that U.S. troops have been rotated in and out, but this distinction may be lost on the Chinese government when they see more American troops involved in training their Taiwanese counterparts. There needs to be greater clarity about the administration’s plans.

As the United States intensifies its efforts to support Taiwan, it risks further damaging the relationship with China and hamstringing its ability to advance U.S. interests on a wide range of other issues from arms control to climate change. There is also the danger that an increased U.S. military presence in Taiwan could trigger Chinese responses in the form of increased economic warfare and military exercises that would create additional headaches and costs for Taiwan. Combined with Speaker McCarthy’s expected visit to Taiwan in the spring, these moves may lead to another unnecessary confrontation. Insofar as they are perceived as further eroding U.S. commitments to a One China policy, these actions could make the overall situation less stable rather than more.

All of this is happening against a backdrop of generally heightened tensions and a U.S.-led military buildup in the region, including the expansion of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines. Despite brief hopes of a thaw in the relationship after the breakdown resulting from then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taipei last summer, every attempt to repair ties has stalled before it could even begin. As we saw with the overreaction to the incident with the Chinese surveillance balloon and the decision to cancel Secretary Blinken’s visit to Beijing, accidents and mistakes that will sometimes happen with other major powers have become occasions for panic and alarmism rather than the manageable problems that they are.

Under these circumstances, there is a danger that previously routine activities that did not disrupt the bilateral relationship in the past will now be perceived as provocations and lead to strong responses from the other government. To the extent that every incident is treated as a “test” of resolve rather than an irritant to be smoothed over, it becomes practically impossible to stabilize, much less repair, what many would consider to be the most significant bilateral relationship in the world. The balloon incident showed how inadequate our governments’ preparations for crisis management are, and the instinct to cancel diplomatic meetings in response to an incident does not inspire confidence that a more serious clash could be safely navigated.

U.S.-Chinese relations are as bad as they have been since at least the early 1990s, and they are arguably worse than at any time since our governments normalized relations in 1979. During the long period of U.S.-China détente, there would be tensions and sharp disagreements between our governments as there always will be, but the desire on both sides to maintain a stable and productive relationship prevailed to make sure that these were only temporary setbacks. Today, détente has been replaced by a policy of actively pursuing rivalry and containment, which means that every incident will cause an already poor relationship to deteriorate further.

The latest source of tension is the U.S. charge that the Chinese government is considering providing lethal aid to Russia’s war in Ukraine, which Beijing has angrily denied. Washington and Beijing can’t move past the last breakdown in relations before the next problem crops up. The “great power competition” framing of the relationship means that the emphasis is always on point-scoring and one-upping the other side rather than de-escalation.

In general, the United States needs to work on reducing tensions with China, and that definitely means avoiding provocative actions in connection with Taiwan. Jessica Chen Weiss recently made the case for calming things down in an op-ed for The Washington Post: “In the current atmosphere of intense distrust, verbal assurances have to be accompanied by coordinated, reciprocal actions to reduce the risk of a catastrophic crisis.”

It is not enough simply to say that the United States doesn’t seek conflict or a new cold war. The United States has to back up those statements by exercising restraint in what it does and how it talks about the relationship with China. To prevent tensions over Taiwan from getting worse, Washington needs to worry less about building up its military strength in the region and instead focus on reassuring the Chinese government that it does not want to abandon the status quo that has kept the peace for more than 40 years.

Written by

Daniel Larison

15. CIA’s Supremacy in Global Spy Ring and Hammering Russian Intelligence Since Cold War

This is one helluva an introductory paragraph of cognitive dissonance to introduce the story of Virginia Hall. First paragraph = CIA has always had the upper hand with sinister designs and the Russians were unable to keep up (what?) on the other hand, the story of Virginia Hall = greatest female spy.

But note this is a view from India.

CIA’s Supremacy in Global Spy Ring and Hammering Russian Intelligence Since Cold War

Published 1 day ago on February 28, 2023

By Srijan Sharma

https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/02/28/cias-supremacy-in-global-spy-ring-and-hammering-russian-intelligence-since-cold-war/

I Doubt Therefore I Survive”- Michael Richard Daniell Foot, British Intelligence Historian.

Since world war US always had upper hand in conducting sub/ unconventional warfare especially Covert Psyops, Americans have always heavily invested in sinister designs- the famous MKultra progaramme of using high psychotic drugs- LSD to psychologically weaken Human’s mental state and force confessions out of them. Also, Its aim was to develop mind-controlling drugs for use against the Soviet bloc. The project attempted to produce a perfect truth drug for interrogating suspected Soviet spies during the Cold War, and to explore other possibilities of mind control. CIA’s Subversion techniques and plans into the Soviet’s camp and other communist camps are also one of the greatest security headache for Soviets. The problem was that Soviets espionage/ Intelligence temperament was not that ruthless, hard and developed as CIA’s. Eventually, this became a reason of how and why US’s psychological operations substantially harmed Russian/Soviets’ influence too much. If we leave Vietnam, the scores of US in espionage circles, activities of de-installing regimes and squeezing Soviets sphere of influence and even now squeezing Russia’s sphere of influence are much higher than of Russia. Further, this also becomes a strong reason why Russians were not able to swiftly retort to these activities in a fashion in which US does or the tit for tat temperament was not proactively seen from the Russian or Soviet’s side. In other words, they struggled to match and register covert successes in countering US’s influence in substantial sense. A story of one of the greatest female spies and phenomenal covert operations led by US and west which set the stage rolling for “espionage” in global politics.

We mostly idealize male as spies, because of their endurance and the tradition or culture of talking only about male spies, the amount of glorification/popularization which a male spy gets is somewhere reduced to less when the story of female spy comes in. Though the mindset is now changing and people are now equally focusing on both the cases, However, it has been observed that stories of female spies are still struggling to get glorified or talked about in some parts of the world. The tides changed their directions when a female spy- Virginia Hall, regarded as one of the greatest female spy whose contribution led to Allied Forces Victory in World War-II. In America she is regarded as one of America’s greatest heroes.

The Past

She was born on 6th April 1906 in Maryland, attended Roland Park country school, later for her higher studies she went to Barnard College(Columbia University) where she learned French, Italian and German and later moved to Geroge Washington University to peruse Economics. Virginia Hall’s life was filled with roller coaster rides with dramatic twists and turns. She had a dream to become the first female Ambassador of the United States. She even started to work towards her dream by taking up the job of a clerk at the consular office in Warsaw Poland and later in Turkey. She didn’t know that a major setback is still waiting for her. In an accident she lost her left leg, However, this accident didn’t slow down Hall’s dream, She was firm and determined to achieve her dreams and serve for her country.

Making of A Spy

Later, She applied for Foreign Services and her application in the foreign services was turned down because of disability and her gender(Females were rarely hired at that time). Repeatedly her applications were turned down over and over. However as usual her determination and refusal to comprise with her dreams were fueling/ not letting her dreams die. Later she moved to France for employment, where During World War-II in February 1940 (the early period of war) she become an ambulance driver for France Army, after the defeat of French she again moved to Spain for employment where she accidentally met British Intelligence Official name Geroge Bellows. Bellows got amazed by her communication and thinking skills and gave her the number of a “friend” who was working in Special Operations Executive(SOE), United Kingdom secret operations unit in World War-II. After getting in touch with “friend” she joined the SOE in April 1941.

The First Job

She gets the training in SOE and sent to France by France Section of SOE. She was given a cover of a reporter/ journalist for New York Post which enabled her to interview people, gather information from surroundings which can be useful for intelligence/ military officials of Allied Forces. Gradually she became an expert and learned how to arrange contacts, logistics, and who to bribe to get information and get the required work done. She also learned how to distribute and supervise wireless sets among agents and the network of SOE. Despite the French occupation by the Germans, she managed a long tenure as a spy-transmitting information to London about German which highlights her operational brilliance and. She also sensed danger and refused to attend a meeting of SOE Agents and later French Police raided the meeting place and SOE agents got arrested.

The Journey with Americas

After successfully planning an escape of the SOE agents from jail, when Hall returned, she was declined to serve in France because she and SOE networks were almost compromised, and sending her again would be too much risk. After this, Hall got in the contact with OSS(predecessor of CIA) and joined American Intelligence at the low rank. She was sent to France again by OSS. This time she was given a cover of poor peasant women, she used to roam around the various places and often changed her disguise to a milkmaid and prepared Cheese and sold cheese to German Soldiers. Hall was tasked to prepare resistance force known as Maquis and set up Anti- Nazi The environment in France, which would help Allied Forces during Invasion. Hall continued to gather information about German Soldier’ locations and finance Maquis and help to set up resistance force which later helped Allied Forces in planning effective Invasions- Operation Jedburgh. No doubt with an artificial leg, she ruled the helm of Spy Networks, and in those times when females were rarely hired for jobs. German described her as “Most Dangerous Allied Spy” She successfully established Anti Nazi resistance which eventually led to the collapse of the Nazi and victory of Allied Forces, It was Hall with whom help Allied Forces were victories over the Axis Powers effectively. Hall broke all the stereotypes in the spying network who believe that Females are not that smart witted to survive in the Intelligence Word. She was awarded Distinguished Service Cross in 1945 and earlier she was also awarded prestigious British Medal. Later She becomes the first female to work in CIA, she was given desk jobs in CIA and due to her age she couldn’t perform well in the tests which were mandatory in CIA and after a brief period of time she resigned and took retirement at the age of 60. She lived with her husband Paul Barnesville, Maryland, until her death in 1982. She always refused to talk/write about her World War-II or in-field experience which led to the curiosity of many. The way she believed in her instincts, intuition, and with the brilliant skill set despite one leg has made her one of the greatest spies of all time.

Related Topics:CIA espionage psychological warfare Russia USA

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Srijan Sharma

Srijan Sharma is a national security analyst specializing in Intelligence and security analysis and worked as a Research Assistant in India's premier and prestigious national security and foreign policy think tank United Service Institution of India(USI) He has extensively written on matters of security and strategic affairs for various institutions, journals, and newspapers(Telegraph) Currently, he is a guest contributor to the JNU School of International Studies. He has also served as Defence Editor for a journal.

16. Taiwan's unofficial diplomacy gains as democracies sour on China

Taiwan's unofficial diplomacy gains as democracies sour on China

Foreign minister Wu's recent visit to U.S. unimaginable just a few years ago

CHRIS HORTON, contributing writer

February 28, 2023 12:33 JST

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Taiwan-tensions/Taiwan-s-unofficial-diplomacy-gains-as-democracies-sour-on-China

TAIPEI -- Last week, Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu met with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and several other top Biden administration officials just across the Potomac river from the American capital to discuss Taiwan's security.

The same week, it was widely reported that Washington would increase the number of troops stationed in Taiwan, and Taipei would send a battalion of its own to the U.S. A normal week in 2023, perhaps, but all of this would have been unimaginable just a couple of years ago.

Since Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen's reelection in January 2020, the politically isolated democracy has deepened ties with the U.S., Japan, and central and eastern European countries. This is despite these nations not formally recognizing the government in Taipei.

Increasingly frayed ties between Beijing and democracies stemming from China's more confrontational approach to foreign policy has created an opening for Taiwan to expand its diplomatic footprint.

The increasingly divided geopolitical landscape -- especially since Russia's invasion of Ukraine a year ago -- has accelerated Taiwan's emergence from the diplomatic erasure imposed upon it by democratic countries who once feared Beijing's wrath. It is the biggest setback in decades for China's attempts to isolate Taiwan, and Beijing is not happy.

At a Feb. 24 news conference in Beijing, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said: "The U.S. stresses the need to respect Ukraine's sovereignty, yet it is exactly the U.S. that has wantonly violated other countries' sovereignty, grandstanded on the Taiwan question and blatantly interfered in China's internal affairs."

Since the administration of former U.S. President Donald Trump, Taiwan-U.S. ties have grown steadily stronger, creating space for other countries to get closer to Taipei. This trend shows no sign of abating, especially given Beijing's continued coercive diplomacy and Chinese leader Xi Jinping's tacit support for Russia's war in Ukraine.

"Taiwan has benefited from China's 'wolf warrior' diplomacy," said former Chinese diplomat Chen Yonglin, who defected to Australia in 2005. "Xi has openly shown his ambitions, and his war preparations are bringing the U.S., the U.K., Japan and Australia together. When these countries change their attitudes, other countries are likely to follow. It's a great opportunity for Taiwan to seize."

In 1979, Washington ended recognition of the Republic of China's government, which took control of Taiwan in 1945 and fled there from China following Mao Zedong's communist revolution in 1949. In the following decades, most governments that hadn't already recognized Beijing followed suit. Today only 13 countries and the Vatican recognize the ROC government in Taiwan.

That number could shrink further this year, depending on the outcome of Paraguay's presidential election on April 30. Popular opposition candidate Efrain Alegre has vowed to break ties with Taipei to recognize Beijing if elected.

Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, left, waves ahead of talks with U.S. officials in Washington on Feb. 21. © Central News Agency/Kyodo

Previous Taiwanese presidents engaged in so-called dollar diplomacy, using infrastructure projects and other means to keep countries from recognizing China. Chen said that with the rise of China's economy, more resources became available for Beijing's envoys to outbid their Taiwanese rivals.

Under Tsai, Taiwan has focused on unofficial relationships with fellow democracies capable of helping push back diplomatically, economically and potentially in the security sphere against China's attempts to coerce Taiwan into relinquishing its sovereignty.

Once reluctant to discuss Taiwan in the open, Japan is now publicly supporting Taiwan's right to exist free of Chinese threats -- a trend that began with the administration of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was assassinated last year after having left government.

"While Japan and Taiwan do not have official diplomatic relations, engagements between Tokyo and Taipei seem to be advancing in a forward-leaning trajectory," said Eleanor Shiori Hughes, defense analyst at Washington-based business advisory The Asia Group. "Many decision-makers in Tokyo are no longer as hesitant about vocalizing their concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and the impact that a potential contingency would have on Japanese national interests."

Hughes said several developments over the past three years show warming Japan-Taiwan ties. An April 2021 joint statement between U.S. President Joe Biden and former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga mentioned Taiwan for the first time since 1969. There has also been a growing number of legislative exchanges and Japanese parliamentary delegations to Taiwan, as well as diplomatic and security talks between Japan and Taiwan's majority parties.

Several central and eastern European countries have become vociferous supporters of Taiwan, beginning with Lithuania, which in 2021 drew Beijing's ire by agreeing to allow Taiwan to open an unofficial embassy in Vilnius under the name "Taiwan" rather than "Taipei," as used elsewhere in Europe.

Since then, parliamentary delegations from Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Ukraine have visited Taipei -- a trend that gained momentum with the war in Ukraine. In January, Czech Republic President-elect Petr Pavel, who has labeled China a threat to national security, called Tsai, expressing his hope to meet in person.

"European countries, particularly those that have experienced Russian occupation, understand the threat that Putin's Russia represents to their sovereignty," said Jorge Guajardo, former Mexican ambassador to China and current senior director of Washington-based consultancy McLarty Associates. "Therefore, they also understand the threat that Putin's ally [China] represents to Taiwan, so there's a natural bond."

Guajardo attributed a growing willingness of countries to openly engage with Taiwan rather than China and its heavy-handed diplomacy and interference in other countries' domestic affairs.

"Before Xi's support of Putin, there was still a possibility that China could coerce other countries to avoid following Lithuania's path," he said. "However, after the invasion, it has become an existential issue for European countries to stand up to Putin and his allies -- and support those that are threatened with occupation."

While such support is welcome in Taipei, geopolitical realities will influence when and where new opportunities for Taiwan arise.

Ukrainian parliament member Inna Sovsun said legislators in Kyiv and Taipei have had increasingly frequent interactions in the past year, especially following China's truculent reaction to Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan last August. But given Beijing's closeness to Moscow, the government of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is unlikely to make overtures to Taiwan anytime soon, she said.

"I understand why the government is passive. Official contacts could provoke China to supply Russia with weapons, that is why the government is very careful about Taiwan," she said. "I don't think relations between Ukraine and Taiwan will rise to a higher level until the end of the war."

17. GOP-led House steps up scrutiny of Biden’s military aid for Ukraine

GOP-led House steps up scrutiny of Biden’s military aid for Ukraine

A top U.S. defense official tells lawmakers that supplying warplanes to Kyiv is not the wisest use of U.S. funds at this stage in the war

By Dan Lamothe

Updated February 28, 2023 at 10:37 p.m. EST|Published February 28, 2023 at 7:00 a.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Dan Lamothe · February 28, 2023

The Biden administration’s sprawling effort to help Ukraine fend off Russia’s invasion will face scrutiny in the Republican-led House on Tuesday during a pair of hearings at which lawmakers from both political parties are expected to press senior defense officials about whether the effort is sustainable and if there is adequate accounting of the advanced weapons that have left American stockpiles.

Republicans, in particular, have promised vigorous oversight of the administration’s commitment of tens of billions of dollars in military and other aid, even as a split calcifies in the GOP over whether to scale back U.S. support.

The first hearing will be convened by the House Armed Services Committee at 10 a.m., with testimony from Colin Kahl, the undersecretary of defense for policy; Robert Storch, the Defense Department inspector general; and Lt. Gen. Douglas Sims II, director of operations for the Pentagon’s Joint Staff.

In the afternoon, the House Appropriations subcommittee on defense is scheduled to hear testimony from Sims and Celeste Wallander, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. That hearing is due to start at 2 p.m.

Their testimony is likely to provide fresh insight into how the administration’s military assistance for Ukraine could evolve — while lawmakers’ banter and line of questioning could reveal just how tenuous Republican backing has become.

Tuesday’s hearings come about two weeks after the armed services committee’s new chairman, Rep. Mike D. Rogers (R-Ala.), led a bipartisan congressional delegation to Poland and Romania meant to observe how the U.S. military delivers and tracks the weapons it provides to Ukraine. The lawmakers released a joint statement after their trip calling for greater transparency on the issue.

“The American people have every right to know that U.S. military equipment donated to Ukraine is being used for its intended purpose — Ukraine’s fight for national survival,” the lawmakers said. They added that they “came away with a clear understanding of the various safeguards” that have been put in place after a briefing with the American general who oversees the effort, but warned that “should we confirm that any defense articles are siphoned off, diverted, or missing the flow of U.S. equipment would cease to be tenable.”

While some outspoken conservatives want to end U.S. military and financial support for Ukraine, many mainstream Republicans have instead called for tougher oversight while continuing to support robust assistance packages — with some criticizing President Biden for not doing more to help. A number of Republicans and Democrats have called on the administration to send long-range missiles, F-16 fighter jets and other weapons that have been held back.

In December, Republicans in the House Foreign Relations Committee backed a resolution by Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) to audit U.S. economic aid for Ukraine. The legislation was ultimately defeated 26-22 as Democrats, still in the House majority at that time, stayed united on the issue. Nevertheless, the vote served as a preview of Republican demands for greater accountability.

In November, U.S. officials said they had so far inspected about 10 percent of the weapons provided to Ukraine while pledging to expand the effort in coming months, with an emphasis on Javelin antitank missiles, Stinger antiaircraft missiles and other smaller systems that could have a heightened risk of going missing.

The Washington Post · by Dan Lamothe · February 28, 2023

18. The Ukrainian Army Is Leveraging Online Influencers. Can the U.S. Military?

No. Because in the US way of war it is easier to get permission to put a hellfire missile on the forehead of a terrorist than it is to get permission to put an idea between his ears.

Conclusion:

I can only imagine that these recommendations will horrify the typical public affairs officer. The military is accustomed to strictly controlling its message and a program like this relinquishes some of that control. However, this new age may require more than just a small flow of finely calibrated public affairs posts and developing authenticity of content and trusted voices could be a good place to start. Ukraine learned this lesson quickly and, at least for them, the result has been a heralded success.

The Ukrainian Army Is Leveraging Online Influencers. Can the U.S. Military? - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Todd C. Helmus · March 1, 2023

On May 11, 2022, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Twitter account highlighted the results of a deadly artillery assault on a failed Russian pontoon crossing of the Siverskyi Donets river. The tweet generated over 14,000 likes and nearly 2,000 retweets. Another tweet, posted by a Ukrainian soldier that same day, on the same assault, read simply, “What I did to destroy Russian pantonne bridge over Siverskyi Donets — a thread.” In this tweet, a self-described Explosive Ordnance Disposal specialist told the story of his personal role in the Ukrainian attack. He wrote how he scouted the location, instructed observers to listen for “the sound of [Russian] motorboats,” and set the artillery’s sights on the river crossing. The tweet reverberated quickly, generating over 45,000 likes, over 12,000 retweets and serving as the central source of information for Newsweek, France24, and various other news blogs.

Much has been said about Ukraine’s astounding success in the information battlefield. Russia — the preeminent force in propaganda and its subvariety, disinformation — has been brought to its knees by a country that few thought could prevail.

The reasons underlying this success are many. President Volodymyr Zelensky, the actor turned statesman, has out-messaged Putin at every turn. Ukraine also benefits from its status as an underdog and as a sovereign country invaded by a foreign power. Russia’s aggression and war crimes were so bald-faced as to enable most any Ukrainian communication to succeed.

But the lessons of Ukraine go even further and speak to the enormous power of a distributed message campaign that relies on everyday Ukrainian citizens and soldiers to post pro-Ukrainian content directly to their social media feeds. This tactic is not new, as commercial companies have long seized on the strategy to credibly promote their brands. And it is one that the U.S. military could emulate to not only help win wars, but perhaps to address its flagging campaign to recruit new members.

Become a Member

The U.S. military should not only encourage but empower soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to tell their stories of service on social media. This model of storytelling has not only worked for Ukraine but also numerous Fortune 500 businesses, which have demonstrated success and established guidelines for what are called employee advocate programs. This approach has some risk for the U.S. military. Yet, the rewards are potentially great and may generate highly personal and compelling narratives about the military at a time in which such stories are sorely needed. To do this, the Department of Defense should consider developing its own employee advocate program by recruiting social media–savvy personnel, training them in established policies, and rewarding successful content creators. It should also develop a template as to how these influencers can best support future military operations.

The Rise of Ukrainian Influencers

For most any person following the war on social media, it is apparent that government-sanctioned accounts represent only a small fraction of war-related content. Ukrainian civilians, which number some 43 million people, surely make up the bulk of this content. Consider Margo Gontar, a Ukrainian journalist who live-tweets the air raid siren alerts that dominate life in Kyiv. She has over 30,000 followers.

But the Ukrainian military has its own cadre of online influencers. Kriegsforscher is a Ukrainian marine with 68,900 followers on Twitter. He posts videos of drone attacks against Russian forces and offers a slice of life from the front lines. Viking is a Ukrainian Army pilot who shares an Instagram feed from the cockpit of his attack helicopter to over 9,000 followers. Meanwhile, @kirilkoo,_a self-described Ukrainian soldier, shares TikTok videos of successful attacks against Russian forces to some 26,000 followers.

It is unclear the degree to which the Ukraine Ministry of Defense coordinates or incentivizes such activities although it seems reasonable that the military puts some limits to prevent, say, a soldier’s account giving away its geolocation or showcasing sensitive facilities.

It seems obvious, though, that the ministry permits some service personnel to use social media and it has reaped the benefits. These accounts serve as a force multiplier for Ukraine, expanding the volume of content that any official account could create and cumulatively reaching a far greater audience. The people and personalities behind the accounts also establish a human connection with their followers. This helps personalize the content and personalize the war in ways that a slick propaganda video can never match. The result is that many Americans and Europeans are reminded of the war, its costs, and Ukraine’s tactical victories every time they scroll through Twitter or TikTok.

The Rise of Word of Mouth and Employee Advocacy

These lessons are not unique to Ukraine. In fact, the business community has been working for more than a decade to take advantage of online voices. They do this through a variety of different programs from supporting influencers — super-connected and highly popular YouTube stars —, to helping promote “word of mouth” from everyday social media users as well as employee advocate programs that encourage employees to talk up the products and experiences they create. Many top corporations are seeking to leverage authentic and credible online voices.

The movement draws on a fundamental characteristic of the modern social media age. Social media and its static forerunner, blogs, broke down the barriers erected by traditional media. Anybody can create a blog or YouTube video or really any social media post, and potentially have it go viral and gain a following. This much is well known. However, the change has revolutionized the locus of trust in communications. Why trust a brand touting its own virtues when you can rely on the experiences of a friend on Facebook who has no proverbial axe to grind? Surveys bear this out. The annual worldwide Edelman Trust barometer shows that since 2012, the entity that is more trusted than CEOs, government officials or journalists is a “person like yourself.” Another survey shows that social media users are more likely to trust the recommendations from “everyday social media users” than subject matter experts, celebrities, or online stars.

It is here that employee advocate programs can pay big dividends. Like the soldiers who carry the weight of Ukraine’s messaging campaign, a firm’s employee base represents a natural reservoir to tap for social influence. Their lives and livelihoods revolve around the company, providing ample experiences to draw on for social content. Many are loyal to their employers, which creates a natural incentive to post positive content. And through a number of policies, employers can help shape the content that gets produced. Employers develop social media training programs that improve the quality and impact of employee posts, they set and enforce rules that help employees avoid sharing content that is harmful to the company and they create incentives that motivate social behavior. Numerous businesses including Starbucks, Dell, and Reebok have developed employee advocate programs.

One of the most heralded employee advocate programs belongs to Adobe, the firm that makes Photoshop, Lightroom, PDF software, and more. Adobe has had a formal employee advocate program in place for over eight years. In articulating the rationale, Adobe’s head of employee advocacy, Rani Manis, told one interviewer, “People do business with people and not brands, so it makes good business sense to shine a light on our people.”

Adobe has developed a special program to encourage its employees to talk about the brand on social media. It formally inducts employees into the program, educates them on its goals and objectives, and encourages them to post original content showcasing their stories as employees, their use of Adobe products, and their participation in Adobe’s social impact campaigns. It offers in-person and online trainings that seek to help advocates master online influence and the company curates its own social media content that advocates can use to post directly to their own feeds. Finally, the firm incentivizes social media posting though what it calls “fun rewards.” These rewards are meant to serve as “small nudges” and can include an extra day off, a pizza party, or recognition in a companywide newsletter.

Programs like Adobe’s significantly expand the social reach and influence of a firm. It has been estimated that over seven years, approximately 200 employee advocate programs generated over 13 million clicks on social media. Forbes estimates that such clicks would have cost more than $57 million in online ads. Other studies estimate that employees can generate 561 percent more reach than a firm’s branded channels alone. And the programs are also seen as instrumental in helping firms recruit new talent.

Can the U.S. Military Adopt This Strategy?

Adobe is not the U.S. military. However, there are some basic parallels in that both organizations hope to recruit top talent hence getting their message out to prospective employees could be a critical endeavor. Both organizations also seek to build a trusted reputation among key constituents. For Adobe, that translates into sales and market investment. For the U.S. military it may translate into improved relationships with the American public or improved communications during contingency operations. And most basically, aside from any similarity in communication goals, the employee advocate programs run by Adobe and other corporations provide a model that the military can learn from for how a large organization can effectively leverage the social media activity of its workforce.

For a variety of reasons, the U.S. military could benefit from such a program. First, in peacetime, the capability could serve as a recruiting tool. Nearly 70 percent of military personnel report satisfaction with their jobs. Many also have amazing stories to tell, from the trials and successes at bootcamp to training exercises, deployments and travel abroad. The military already inducts young people adept at social media and properly harnessing this capability could significantly expand the number of young Americans with positive military related content in their feeds. Such content could have a significant impact on America’s youth who are considering their next career move.

Second, the capability could be crucial during contingency operations and deployments. Images and stories of humanitarian operations can tell the story of U.S. assistance and generosity, photos captured at the frontlines can convincingly give the lie to adversary disinformation operations and — like in Ukraine — under conditions of grinding warfare, soldier social media posts can help maintain support from the international community, document adversary war-crimes and demonstrate success on the battlefield.

The military does not yet see the opportunity. A Defense One article, “Army Special Ops Is Changing Psyops Training to Reflect Ukrainian War,” observed how psychological operation exercises now incorporate “synthetic internet and real time sentiment analysis to educate students on the speed of information.” But it makes no mention of soldiers using social media themselves. And at least once when the military did use social media, it did not go so well. Meta recently removed three dozen Facebook accounts and two dozen Instagram accounts that appeared associated with the military and were used to promote U.S. interests abroad. The fake accounts were ineffective and gained little traction or influence.

The military also does not actively encourage social media use on the part of its personnel. The recent Army social media policy for example has put in place restrictions on the use of new and emerging platforms that official Army accounts can use and has generated confusion over whether personnel can mention their Army affiliation in their account profiles.

The Army offers courses in social media, but descriptions of these efforts make social media appear more a danger than opportunity. Trainings address the “left and right boundaries” of social media use, the need to educate TikTok influencers on the things that can “get you in trouble very quickly,” and “avoiding scams.” These are important lessons. Social media is dangerous. I think about the dangers every time I post. But it also offers the opportunity to communicate more robustly and credibly to wide swaths of the American public, to include prospective recruits.

It may be important for the military think about encouraging the type and volume of content that can achieve these ends and to do so in a way that could also meet important objectives of warfare. To this end, the military could look to adopt the lessons of Ukraine and the established practices in marketing.

What might this look like in practice? First, there are obvious limitations. It would not be wise to issue every soldier, sailor, airman, or marine an iPhone and encourage them to live-tweet their day job or some sensitive military operation. There could be dangers and risks to social media use in the military. Soldiers must not give away their positions on the battlefield either through improperly geotagging their position or, as what may have happened to Russian troops, giving off large electronic signatures from an encampment. The heat of battle also may not be the best time to be snapping photos or checking the number of likes on a recent post. And you probably wouldn’t want a disgruntled airman to be casting aspersion on their commands or on the service as a whole.

Effective programs can mitigate these risks by careful selection of advocates and the development, training and enforcement of “rules of engagement” that dictate when and how content can be posted. Broad guidelines, that give ample room for authentic and spontaneous social media posts can also identify the types of content that personnel should not post. The military could actively monitor the social media activity of ambassadors to ensure rules are followed. To do so they could leverage software already developed to help businesses monitor and assess impact of employee advocate social media posting.

Starting small, the military could onboard an initial cadre of carefully selected personnel active on social media. The military could train them in established policies and newly developed rules that dictate the types of content that can be shared and of course the types of content that cannot be shared. They could develop both in-person and online trainings to help personnel make the most of their social media presence. And like Adobe, they could identify ways to celebrate and reward those personnel who take up the mantle and actively tell their stories online. The Department of Defense and the individual services could also measure the impact of such efforts and of course identify any attendant risks.

The military might also think about what a social media presence looks like during military contingencies. Working with public affairs, the Department of Defense and individual services could identify the types of content that will support different types of operations, recognize the attendant risks of tactical posting and identify rules and restrictions that can guide a new breed of influencers. Doctrine in hand, the military could then train as it intends to fight. In training activities and exercises, the military could identify personnel who are authorized to post content and then integrate simulated social media activity into the exercise. After-actions could determine whether content supported the public affairs objectives of the exercise.

There are risks that a soldier, for example, has a bad day at the office or in the field and says as much to online followers. This remains a risk even without a formal advocacy program. But the advocacy program is set up to help manage the risks in part by shaping the dissemination of more positive content. But the name of the game is authenticity and you can’t have authenticity for the positive content if personnel cannot post their critiques or occasional gripes. So there is an expectation that if someone has a bad day they may well post that and doing so only adds credibility to other more positive content.

I can only imagine that these recommendations will horrify the typical public affairs officer. The military is accustomed to strictly controlling its message and a program like this relinquishes some of that control. However, this new age may require more than just a small flow of finely calibrated public affairs posts and developing authenticity of content and trusted voices could be a good place to start. Ukraine learned this lesson quickly and, at least for them, the result has been a heralded success.

Become a Member

Todd C. Helmus is a senior behavioral scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He has written extensively about using influencers to support the Iraq war, to counter the Islamic State, and to support pro-Ukrainian influencers.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Todd C. Helmus · March 1, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 28, 2023

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The Ukrainian Army Is Leveraging Online Influencers. Can the U.S. Military? - War on the Rocks