Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"I count him braver who overcomes his desires than him who conquers his enemies; for the hardest victory is over self."

– Aristotle

"There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is striking at the root."

– Henry David Thoreau

"You don't have to burn books to destroy a culture. Just get people to stop reading them."

– Ray Bradbury

1, Lessons I learned in a Ukrainian military safe house

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 9, 2024

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 9, 2024

4. TikTok Crackdown Shifts Into Overdrive, With Sale or Shutdown on Table

5, Two Canals, Two Big Problems—One Global Shipping Mess

6. U.S. Military Enters a New Phase With Gaza Aid Operations

7. Ukraine's Fight Against Time

8. ISIS Is Back and Threatens to Be Deadlier Than Ever

9. Philippines’ new playbook is a threat to South China Sea peace

10. Adoption of Gibo’s defense concept backed by expert (Philippines)

11. US, Japan Mull Defense Cooperation That Could Help Ukraine, Yomiuri Says

12. The Houthis have the world’s attention — and they won’t give it up

13. Oppenheimer Couldn’t Run a Hamburger Stand. How Did He Run a Secret Lab?

14. How To Deconstruct The New Iron Curtain – OpEd

15. Exclusive: US prepared ‘rigorously’ for potential Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine in late 2022, officials say

16. The next steps for Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework

17. What a Nazi-baiting radio genius can teach us about today’s infowars

18. Five ways to crack the Islamist conundrum

19. The IC OSINT Strategy 2024-2026 - The INT of First Resort: Unlocking the Value of OSINT

1. Lessons I learned in a Ukrainian military safe house

Another view from the human domain.

Lessons I learned in a Ukrainian military safe house

Ross recounts the cold mornings translating for an elite Ukrainian reconnaissance unit; Myroslava walks us through the annual tulip-giving that is part of International Women’s Day in Ukraine!

https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/lessons-i-learned-in-a-ukrainian?utm

ROSS PELEKH, TIM MAK, AND MYROSLAVA TANSKA-VIKULOVA

MAR 10, 2024

∙ PAID

Editor’s note: This Thursday, March 14th, The Counteroffensive is teaming up with the Kyiv Independent to hold an event on how to break through Ukraine fatigue. Join us this Thursday! Write to Oksana@counteroffensive.news to RSVP and for details!

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Whenever I go to the Donbas, near the frontlines, I make a point to stop in with my friends on a Ukrainian reconnaissance team, some of whom I knew before the invasion.

They have a safe house where they rest and regroup in between missions.

I try to persuade myself that I do these trips not for mere adrenaline, or as an excuse for not fighting directly in the trenches.

So usually I visit the recce (pronounced reck-ie, for recon) house and spend days volunteering by translating for a couple of U.S. Marines at different shooting ranges.

Here’s what I’ve learned over the past two years over countless embeds with Ukrainian elite troops.

Snoring overheard late at night in the safe house.

War reveals character

People are the biggest discovery for me in this war. Their good or bad nature, and all the different shades of it. Through this war I have met some of the most unbelievable characters, the kind of people I thought that you could only see in books or movies.

Me with one of the U.S. Marines training Ukrainian forces.

The mornings near the frontlines are early, dark and cold. The days are long and wet. We wake up around 6 am, and by 7 or 8, I am picked up to go to a shooting range. We spend the whole day running in trenches, teaching the basics of assaults. When there are medics with us, we always try to teach some tactical medicine, so everyone is able to help himself and their brothers.

Here’s what I learned about the guys I trained with: being people of a good heart, they couldn't just ignore what was happening in Ukraine, and knowing that they had the required skills, they decided that they were going to live here, and pass on these skills, as long as it is needed.

They’ve been here now for more than two years, since the very beginning of the war, sacrificing their own personal lives and time, just to teach people day and night, with no breaks or holidays.

Just humble, hard work. Work without a salary, or promotions, or any future for you in it.

At this moment, my friends have managed to teach and instruct thousands of people, from numerous different units. I’ve been honored to share some time with them, and I have seen and felt the nature of their work, and what it does to the hearts and spirits of people.

There’s no time to mourn

Most of the people we trained are dead already.

Every time I arrive there, faces change.

This war has been nothing else but a conveyor of death.

Names and faces change faster than you are capable of remembering them, and for some individuals it even changes their perception in general. For these people, the value of life is never going to be the same as for a normal person.

Members of the public pay their last respects during the memorial for Ukrainian defender Daniil Semenenko, who was killed in action on the Donetsk axis on February 29, 2024. (Volodymyr Tarasov / Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images)

And it also takes its toll. I feel this mental pressure: you get to know people, some of them you get to know very well. You train with them, and eat with them on a break, get to know their names and stories.

Then you get to hear a story about how some of them died. Sometimes for a good reason, sometimes just as another number of other casualties because of a ‘meat assault,’ or simply because of some officer’s stupidity.

It is war and I have seen numerous cases of everything mentioned above. But the feeling of discovering that someone you got to know is dead that fast, just a couple of days after you’ve been drinking tea and laughing with them in a cold forest, it is always the same.

And it is always sorrow and discouragement – the kind that questions why you’re doing all this in the first place. It is discouraging when your work is getting nullified by someone else’s stupidity, especially if this costs lives.

We need better, and more, weapons

Tim observed early in the war that as long as there was a twelve year old boy in Ukraine with a plastic butter knife, there would be resistance to Russian occupation.

But why would we want it to come to that?

One morning I arrived at the rifle range to help translate for marksmen who were training on long-range shooting. I learned they were using M14 rifles.

And don’t get me wrong, I firmly believe that this is a good weapon, with good ergonomics and precision. But a weapon that was produced in 1957, even when it is a quality piece of equipment. gives you limited opportunities on the battlefield.

On a larger scale Ukraine won’t be able to win war in the 21st century with weapons from the 20th. But for now we have what we have, and we train and fight with that.

Cold War-era weapons at the range.

The pace of war is dizzying

To live in a house where around 15 soldiers live constantly and only leave when they’re on duty is a charming experience, in some ways. Life in the house never stops, no matter the hour.

It is a really interesting contrast to observe, especially to civilian life with its sane life schedule, when you have time for activities, and time for full rest in the form of sleep.

In this war sleep is something ephemeral, some attribute from our previous life, because now the battle is not stopping even for a second. Day and night there are people who are going to observe, deflect assaults, bring supplies, evacuate wounded, and there is simply no option to hit pause.

One of the Ukrainian recon team’s members, who goes by the callsign ‘Wolf.’

I have seen the sheer numbers of people that go through the crucible of war, and it is scary. Most of those people aren't warriors from myths and legends, or some monsters bred for war, most of the people I meet there are simple civilians that have put on a military uniform and embraced their new role.

They weren’t made for war, but they made themselves so, as a sacrifice for a peaceful living for the rest of the country, and for the chance to regain old life, life without a war.

One was a dentist, another one had a successful business, and a friend of mine dropped out of university where he studied history with me. All of them did it because someone had to do it.

They dropped the plough and took the sword, because there was a need. And after days of training, there come nights of working, and when they come back from work it rarely looks nice. Wet, dirty, exhausted, mentally drained.

Coming back only to take a short break, recover, and get back into battle.

Dirty weapons in the safehouse, while its owner gets a little R&R.

Friendly animals are worth their weight in gold

The average return from a mission rarely looks good, but when everyone comes back alive and well it is a huge slice of fortune.

The recce house gives you the only slice of warmth and comfort, a short rest before you have to return into the fields and forests.

Despite being so near to the fighting, I even started to see it as a safe and warm place, where I can get some rest after daily activities.

I was used to seeing new faces every time I visited, and on one of my last trips, I was pleasantly surprised to discover a new member of the recon unit that was looking after the house.

I couldn’t discover her actual name, as everyone there was calling her by a different title. But for sure she has changed the atmosphere in the house dramatically, and practically become a mascot of the house.

On duty. Feline’s name unknown.

The house became better when the cat started to live with the boys. She brought a lot of warmth and laughter there, countless silly and funny moments.

And amidst all the madness that happens around here, this furry friend becomes the best therapy you can have.

AFTER THE PAYWALL: Dueling views from Ukraine’s allies on the concept of western troops deploying into the conflict zone. And Myroslava walks us through the Ukrainian experience of International Women’s Day! For our cat of conflict, the recce house’s feline chases a laser during a light moment for Ukrainian troops.

NEWS OF THE DAY:

Good morning to readers; Kyiv remains in Ukrainian hands. Here’s what we’re reading today –

WESTERN TROOPS IN UKRAINE? French President Emmanuel Macron's suggestion of Western soldiers in Ukraine is continuing to stir debate. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslav Sikorski said that a coalition of UN members being sent into Ukraine "is not unthinkable,” as long as it would be to stop Russian aggression.

Meanwhile the British foreign secretary, David Cameron, poured cold water on the idea, saying that such a mission would create "obvious targets for Putin."

POPE CALLS FOR CEASEFIRE: In a controversial use of terms, Pope Francis said that Ukraine ought to have "the courage of the white flag" and negotiate an end to the war. His spokesperson later clarified that the phrase ‘white flag’ was only meant to indicate a willingness for a truce and negotiations, rather than surrender, the traditional meaning of a 'white flag.'

The New York Times has said that the Vatican wants to stay relatively neutral so as to keep open the potential of being a meditator in a future peace process.

UKRAINE BEEFS UP FRONTLINE DEFENSES: The military is accelerating its work on defensive fortifications near the frontline, according to the U.K.'s ministry of defense. These fortifications include anti-tank obstacles, trenches, and minefields. The city of Kupiansk, in eastern Ukraine, is coming under threat by the Russian military. It had been occupied by Russia in 2022.

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Hi there, it’s Myroslava here!

Since my childhood, March 8th has been associated with the flowers and spring. Every year my father would give me and my mom huge bouquets of tulips or roses for International Women’s Day.

It was a longstanding tradition all over Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries.

The Soviet Union made this day a holiday starting in the 1960s, a celebration of spring and femininity. At that time on postcards we could see more and more gifts for mothers and, of course, Soviet carnations, lilies and mimosas.

February 24, 2022 changed this day.

I remember that first post-invasion March 8th very well. Russian soldiers were already in the Kyiv region, and at any minute they could have broken through the Kyiv defense. All shops and cafes were closed, people were depressed and in a panic.

Despite the chaos, my husband found me a small bunch of flowers. And my former colleagues gave me a small gingerbread cookie, signed "Russian warship, go f*ck yourself".

Photos I took on March 8th, 2022.

At that moment I understood: March 8th going forward would not be about frail femininity, it would be about women’s strength, wisdom and endurance.

Thousands of fathers, husbands and sons went to fight with the understanding that they may never come back. That meant that thousands of women were left alone with their children and other problems. Some of them were forced to flee to other countries, while some stayed, to be closer to their loved ones. Others just can't leave because of health problems.

Some of the women were pregnant, with babies or older children, but all of them had the same responsibility – to save their lives and their families.

Dozens of women joined the army to fight for their country. The latest data shows that more than 62,000 women are serving in the Ukrainian military.

For all these women, including me, it's not about wearing skirts or high heels, it's not about red lipstick or bright manicures. It’s about bravery.

That's how it was when this day began in the 19th century, when women began to fight for their rights, demanding to receive equal pay with men, to reduce their working shifts to 10 hours, and to get the access to education and to vote.

Ukraine, which at that time was a part of the Russian Empire, celebrated International Women's Day for the first time in 1917. That year, Russian Tsar Nicholas II abdicated and the interim government immediately gave women the right to vote. In 1921, International Women's Day was recognized by the Communist authorities as a holiday to emphasize the role of women in the revolution. At the same time, girls were granted the right to education and the opportunity to work and earn an income.

Everything changed after the Holodomor (1932-1933) and mass repressions of that time. The Soviet government gradually banned the right to abortion, made divorce more difficult, and began to emphasize the importance of motherhood.

There have been many changes in the past century, but now, in wartime, International Women’s Day has a new meaning in Ukraine.

This year, as usual, my husband gave me a lovely bouquet of tulips. They are about love and respect for me as a person, not just as a girl.

Bouquet of tulips from my husband, March 8th, 2024.

Because we are returning to the traditions that began more than 100 years ago, showing that women are something more than housewives or mothers with tulips in the kitchen.

Nowadays March 8th is an International Women's Rights Day in every sphere. It’s a day that shows women are the ones who can change history because of our strength.

Our cat of conflict today is the recce house’s feline mascot. One of the soldiers is using a laser mounted on his rifle to play with it.

Stay safe out there.

Best,

Myroslava

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 9, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2024

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes targeting Rostov Oblast overnight on March 8-9 and may have struck a Russian aircraft plant refurbishing and modernizing Russian A-50 long range radar detection aircraft.
Russian sources widely circulated footage of a Russian strike on March 9 to claim that Russian forces destroyed a Patriot air defense system in eastern Ukraine, although there has yet to be any confirmation of these claims.
US officials reportedly told CNN that Russia considered using “tactical or battlefield” nuclear weapons in Ukraine in 2022 – during the same time Russia conducted an intense information operation aimed at the West about Russia potentially using a nuclear weapon against Ukraine to deter Western support for Ukraine.
Senior Armenian officials stated that Armenia is considering seeking membership in the European Union (EU), against the backdrop of deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine would be open to negotiations with Russia only after Ukraine and its partners develop a peace plan and as Turkey continues to promote its own negotiation platform for the war in Ukraine.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna and Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting along the entire frontline on March 9.
Open-source researchers analyzed satellite imagery and assessed that Russia has reportedly removed 25 to 40 percent of its tank strategic reserves, depending on the model, from open-air storage facilities, although ISW cannot independently verify this report.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 9, 2024

Mar 9, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 9, 2024

Christina Haward, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, and George Barros

March 9, 2024, 5:55pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:40 pm ET on March 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes targeting Rostov Oblast overnight on March 8-9 and may have struck a Russian aircraft plant refurbishing and modernizing Russian A-50 long range radar detection aircraft. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 41 Ukrainian drones overnight over Rostov Oblast, and eyewitnesses reportedly stated that the strike caused at least five explosions.[1] Geolocated footage of a strike shows an explosion at the Beriev Aircraft Plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.[2] The Beriev Aircraft Plant in Taganrog is reportedly refurbishing and modernizing Russian A-50 aircraft for use in Ukraine, and Russian sources claimed that the plant was repairing an A-50 damaged in a previous drone strike (possibly referring to the attack on a Russian A-50 at the Machulishchi Air Base in Minsk, Belarus, in February 2023).[3] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty published satellite imagery dated February 29 indicating that the geolocated explosion occurred roughly 900 meters from a Russian A-50 aircraft that previously had been present at the Beriev Aircraft Plant, although it is unclear whether the A-50 was in the same location at the time of the strike.[4] Senior Ukrainian officials have not commented on the strike at the time of this publication. ISW is unable to confirm that the reported strike damaged any Russian A-50 aircraft, facilities repairing or refurbishing aircraft, or other Russian military infrastructure in the area.

Russian sources widely circulated footage of a Russian strike on March 9 to claim that Russian forces destroyed a Patriot air defense system in eastern Ukraine, although there has yet to be any confirmation of these claims. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on March 9 purportedly of Russian forces striking a Ukrainian S-300 air defense missile launcher with Iskander missiles near Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast.[5] Russian sources amplified additional footage of the strike’s aftermath purportedly showing destroyed German MAN KAT1 trucks, which can be used as a base for Patriot air defense missile launchers.[6] Russian sources used this footage to claim that Russian forces destroyed a MIM-104 Patriot air defense system, although the Russian MoD has yet to revise its earlier claim about destroying a Ukrainian S-300 system.[7] Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti reported that a source in Russian law enforcement stated that the Russian Iskander strike destroyed two Patriot air defense systems.[8] Several OSINT social media accounts concluded that the strike likely destroyed a Ukrainian Patriot air defense system, although another OSINT account noted that Ukrainian forces also use the MAN KAT1 trucks as logistics vehicles.[9] ISW has not yet observed evidence confirming that Russian forces destroyed a Patriot air defense system.

US officials reportedly told CNN that Russia considered using “tactical or battlefield” nuclear weapons in Ukraine in 2022 – during the same time Russia conducted an intense information operation aimed at the West about Russia potentially using a nuclear weapon against Ukraine to deter Western support for Ukraine. CNN reported on March 9 that two senior Biden administration officials stated that the United States began “preparing rigorously” for a potential Russian “tactical or battlefield” nuclear strike in late 2022 after collecting intelligence indicating that Kremlin officials at various levels were discussing this possibility.[10] The United States reportedly contacted multiple high-level Kremlin officials, discussed the issue with US allies, and asked China and India to discourage Russia. CNN reported that one US official assessed that Chinese and Indian public statements were a “helpful, persuasive factor” that showed Russia the costs of their potential decision. The sources reportedly stated that the United States believed that significant Russian territorial or personnel losses in Ukraine could have been a “potential trigger” for a Russian tactical nuclear strike as the Kremlin viewed areas of occupied Ukraine, such as Kherson City, as Russian territory and potentially viewed the loss of such territories as a direct threat to the Kremlin or the Russian state – one scenario in which Russia would contemplate using nuclear weapons. CNN reported that US officials believed that the Kremlin may have tried to use claims that Ukraine intended to use a “dirty bomb,” which Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and other Kremlin officials were reportedly promoting in conversations with Western military and political officials at the time, as “cover” for a Russian tactical nuclear strike. Shoigu and other Kremlin officials routinely publicly promoted claims about a Ukrainian “dirty bomb” in October 2022 as part of an information designed to deter Western security assistance to Ukraine following Ukrainian forces’ rout of Russian forces in Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022.[11] Ukrainian forces have transgressed Russia’s nuclear “red lines” several times over the course of the war with no Russian nuclear strike, indicating that many of Russia’s “red lines” are most likely information operations designed to deter Ukrainian and Western action to defeat Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine’s liberation of Russian-occupied territories during counteroffensives in eastern and southern Ukraine in fall 2022 and subsequent Ukrainian strikes against occupied Ukraine violated Russia’s ”red lines.”[12] Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO accession also violated Russia’s so-called red lines. ISW continues to assess that Russian nuclear use in Ukraine remains highly unlikely.[13]

Senior Armenian officials stated that Armenia is considering seeking membership in the European Union (EU), against the backdrop of deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated in a March 9 interview with Turkish TV channel TRT World that Armenia is considering new opportunities “taking into account the challenges [Armenia] has faced in the last three to four years” including “the idea of joining the EU.”[14] Armenian Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan stated on February 29 that ”[Armenia] should think about [seeking EU candidate status].”[15] Russian officials have not responded to Armenian officials’ statements as of this publication. ISW continues to assess that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s acknowledgement and criticism of Armenia’s lack of participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) indicates that the Kremlin may be preparing a more concerted response to its deteriorating relations with Armenia.[16] The Kremlin has conducted hybrid wars against former Soviet states that have sought EU accession.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine would be open to negotiations with Russia only after Ukraine and its partners develop a peace plan and as Turkey continues to promote its own negotiation platform for the war in Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine would invite representatives of Russia to a peace summit only after Ukraine and other countries have developed a peace plan at a first peace summit.[17] Ukraine plans to hold the first Ukrainian Peace Formula Summit in Switzerland in 2024.[18] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated on March 8 that Turkey is ready to host a peace summit between Ukraine and Russia.[19] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in good faith negotiations with Ukraine and has no interest in ending the war on anything but Russia’s articulated maximalist terms of destroying Ukraine’s sovereignty and eradicating the notion of a unique Ukrainian national identity.[20]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes targeting Rostov Oblast overnight on March 8-9 and may have struck a Russian aircraft plant refurbishing and modernizing Russian A-50 long range radar detection aircraft.
Russian sources widely circulated footage of a Russian strike on March 9 to claim that Russian forces destroyed a Patriot air defense system in eastern Ukraine, although there has yet to be any confirmation of these claims.
US officials reportedly told CNN that Russia considered using “tactical or battlefield” nuclear weapons in Ukraine in 2022 – during the same time Russia conducted an intense information operation aimed at the West about Russia potentially using a nuclear weapon against Ukraine to deter Western support for Ukraine.
Senior Armenian officials stated that Armenia is considering seeking membership in the European Union (EU), against the backdrop of deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine would be open to negotiations with Russia only after Ukraine and its partners develop a peace plan and as Turkey continues to promote its own negotiation platform for the war in Ukraine.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna and Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting along the entire frontline on March 9.
Open-source researchers analyzed satellite imagery and assessed that Russia has reportedly removed 25 to 40 percent of its tank strategic reserves, depending on the model, from open-air storage facilities, although ISW cannot independently verify this report.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced west of Kreminna amid continued positional fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 9. Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[21] Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman; southeast of Kupyansk near Kyslivka; west of Kreminna near Yampolivka and Terny; and south of Kreminna near Spirne.[22] Elements of the Russian 123rd and 7th motorized rifle brigades (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[23]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional fighting continued near Bakhmut on March 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced within Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut) and that Russian forces control over half the settlement, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[24] Positional fighting continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Druzhba and Shumy.[25] Elements of the Russian “Vostok-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Bohdanivka.[26]

Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lykhovyi stated on March 8 that the situation in the Avdiivka direction has stabilized and that Russian forces are currently only achieving localized marginal advances.[27] Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka as fighting continued in the area on March 9. Geolocated footage published on March 8 shows that Russian forces recently advanced further in central Orlivka (west of Avdiivka).[28] Geolocated footage published on March 9 shows that Russian forces also marginally advanced in fields south of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka), though Russian forces likely did not make this advance recently.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 500 meters deep on a 1.27-kilometer-wide front south of Orlivka and up to 1.35 kilometers in depth near southwestern Tonenke.[30] Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Stepove, Berdychi, and Semenivka; west of Avdiivka near Orlivka, Tonenke and Sieverne; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[31] Elements of the Russian 1st “Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) continue to operate in the Avdiivka direction, and elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Nevelske.[32]

Positional fighting continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda, Novomykhailivka, and Volodymyrivka (southeast of Vuhledar on the T0509 Vuhledar-Volnovakha-Mariupol highway).[33] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) reportedly continue to operate near Krasnohorivka.[34]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have decreased the tempo of their offensive operations near Robotyne due to Ukrainian drone strikes and difficulties clearing seized Ukrainian trenches.[36] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are also struggling with inadequate electronic warfare (EW) protection near Robotyne.[37] Elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade and 165th Artillery Brigade (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction; elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne; and elements of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Robotyne and Verbove.[38]

Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky as of March 9.[39]

The main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea reportedly remains the only Russian naval base on the Black Sea capable of repairing certain types of ships despite Russian efforts to move some BSF naval assets away from the Sevastopol base. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 9 that Russian forces are currently repairing the project 775 Ropucha-class Olenegorsk Miner and Azov large landing ships and the project 1171 Tapir-class Nikolai Filchenkov large landing ship at the Sevastopol base as this is the only Black Sea naval base that can repair these types of ships.[40] Mashovets also stated that Russian forces currently have docked the project 1135M Inquisitive Burevestnik-class patrol ship; the project 22800 Cyclone Karakurt-class corvette; the project 1124 Kasimov, Muromets, and Eisk Grisha-class corvettes; the project 12411 Naberezhnye Chelny Tarantul-class corvette; the project 266M Kovrovets and Ivan Golubets Natya-class minesweepers; and the project 12700 Georgiy Kurbatov and Ivan Antonov Alexandrit-class minesweepers at the Sevastopol BSF base. Mashovets stated that the project 775 Yamal Ropucha-class landing ship is currently preparing for sea trials in Sevastopol after Russian forces repaired the ship.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 15 Shahed-136/131 drones from occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down 12 of the drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Poltava oblasts.[41] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck an industrial enterprise in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and a Ukrainian substation in Zaporizhia Oblast.[42] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command also reported that Russian forces launched a Kh-31 missile at Odesa City and that the missile struck an open field outside of the city.[43]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 8 that elements of the Russian 112th Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) stationed in Voronezh Oblast used at least 16 North Korean KN-23 (Hwasong-11 Ga) missiles during the Russian strike series on January 23, February 7, and February 15.[44]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Open-source researchers analyzed satellite imagery and assessed that Russia has reportedly removed 25 to 40 percent of its tank strategic reserves, depending on the model, from open-air storage facilities, although ISW cannot independently verify this report.[45] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Russia and Eurasia Program Senior Fellow Dara Massicot assessed that Russia likely removed its best equipment from strategic reserve and that Russia still retains “worse” or “unsalvageable” equipment in storage. Massicot also assessed that Russia’s “remaining inventory will dwindle in the next couple of years” if Russia continues its current tempo of operations.[46] ISW has observed that reports of Russia’s reported tank “production” numbers in recent years largely reflect restored and modernized tanks drawn from storage rather than new production.[47] These assessments suggest that the Russian military has been largely leveraging vehicles from storage to sustain its war effort, rather than using new production to offset battlefield losses. Russia may face equipment shortages in the next several years if Russia’s current loss rate remains the same or accelerates and Russia’s current level of new vehicle production remains the same.

Reuters reported on March 8 that the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) announced that it uncovered “a major human trafficking network” that lured Indian citizens to work in Russia but would force them to join the Russian military.[48] The CBI stated that Russian authorities have coerced about 35 Indian citizens into joining the Russian military after promising them work opportunities. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated in late February that India is aware of several Indian nationals serving in the Russian military and trying to secure the “early discharge” of 20 Indian nationals who were reportedly working as support staff for Russian forces.[49]

Russian forces may have formed their first-ever specialized drone brigade. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military formed the “Grom-Kaskad” Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Brigade consisting of more than 820 personnel and up to 40 UAV crews that operate throughout Ukraine.[50] Mashovets stated that the Russian military formed the “Grom-Kaskad” UAV Brigade on the basis of the “BARS-Kaskad” Combined Tactical Detachment and units of the 55th Helicopter Regiment (4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Southern Military District [SMD]). Mashovets stated that the brigade is composed of two battalions of reconnaissance and strike UAV operators, one squadron of reconnaissance UAV operators, and up to a company of support units. Mashovets stated that the “Grom-Kaskad” UAV Brigade uses Zala, Orlan-30, Supercam, and first-person view (FPV) drones. This is the first time ISW has observed a report about Russian forces standing up a specialized drone unit at the brigade level.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian Air Force (VKS) reportedly started using guided glide bombs against Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently started conducting air strikes with guided glide bombs with universal interspecific glide ammunition (UMPB), as opposed to using unguided glide bombs with unified planning and correction modules (UMPK), in unspecified areas in Ukraine.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that the guided glide bombs with UMPB have jet engines, which are absent from FAB-250/500 bombs with UMPC, and thus can increase the range of a FAB-250/500 from 40-60 kilometers to 80-95 kilometers.[52]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 9 that the Russian military conducted 22 joint aerial reconnaissance flights with Belarusian forces along the Belarusian border with Poland and Lithuania in recent days.[53] Mashovets stated that up to two Russian Su-24 aircraft of the 4th Reconnaissance Aviation Squadron participated in the reconnaissance flights and at least one Russian aircraft operated from the Belarusian 61st Fighter Airbase in Baranovichy, Brest Oblast.[54]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 9, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-9-2024

Key Takeaways:

Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli raids in several sectors of the northern Gaza Strip.
Central Gaza Strip: The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis.
Political Negotiations: Israeli Mossad Chief Dadi Barnea told CIA Director Bill Burns that Hamas is not interested in a ceasefire deal and is intent to “burn the area” during Ramadan.
West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Israel: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting Israeli military and civilian infrastructure in Haifa and in the Golan Heights.
Yemen: The Houthis fired naval missiles at Singapore-flagged, owned, and operated vessel M/V Propel Fortune in the Gulf of Aden.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 9, 2024

Mar 9, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, March 9, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on March 9 and 10, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, March 11, 2024

Key Takeaways:

Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli raids in several sectors of the northern Gaza Strip.
Central Gaza Strip: The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis.
Political Negotiations: Israeli Mossad Chief Dadi Barnea told CIA Director Bill Burns that Hamas is not interested in a ceasefire deal and is intent to “burn the area” during Ramadan.
West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Israel: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting Israeli military and civilian infrastructure in Haifa and in the Golan Heights.
Yemen: The Houthis fired naval missiles at Singapore-flagged, owned, and operated vessel M/V Propel Fortune in the Gulf of Aden.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli raids in several sectors of the northern Gaza Strip on March 9. An Israel Defense Forces (IDF) unit in the Combat Intelligence Collection Corps identified several Palestinian fighters operating near Israeli forces in Beit Hanoun and directed an airstrike targeting them.[1] Israeli forces have been conducting an operation in Beit Hanoun to reclear the area of Palestinian fighters and locate military infrastructure for the past week.[2] Palestinian militias reported that their fighters fired mortars and rockets targeting Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia and Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City.[3] Palestinian fighters also clashed with Israeli forces in Zaytoun neighborhood.[4]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 9. Israeli forces killed approximately 10 Palestinian fighters.[5] The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting areas in the central strip from where Palestinian fighters have launched rockets targeting Sderot in southern Israel.[6] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published footage of its fighters mortaring Israeli forces east of the central Gaza Strip.[7]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis on March 9. The IDF Givati Brigade (162nd Division) raided military infrastructure in Hamad neighborhood, northwestern Khan Younis, detained Palestinian militia fighters, and located improvised explosive devices (IED) in the area.[8] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed that its fighters detonated a bomb in Hamad.[9] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, reported that its fighters fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces in Hamad.[10] The IDF Bislamach Brigade clashed with Palestinian fighters in Qarara.[11] Israeli armor, dismounted infantry, and engineering elements destroyed military infrastructure in Qarara, where Hamas’ Qarara Battalion (Khan Younis Brigade) remains combat effective.[12]

Israeli Mossad Chief David Barnea told CIA Director Bill Burns that Hamas is not interested in a ceasefire deal and is intent to “burn the area” during Ramadan.[13] Barnea and Burns met in Jordan to discuss the state of ceasefire negotiations on March 8.[14] Barnea said that Hamas is “entrenched in its position,” possibly referencing Hamas’ repeated demands for a permanent ceasefire, return of displaced people, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, and sufficient humanitarian aid.[15] The spokesperson for Hamas’ military wing called for the month of Ramadan to be an escalation of the ”flood of Al Aqsa,” referring to the October 7 attack.[16] Ramadan is expected to begin around March 10.

Three US and Israeli officials told Axios on March 9 that United States and international mediators are intensifying their efforts to reach a hostage deal and temporary ceasefire.[17]

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 9.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 8.[18]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 8.[19]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting Israeli military and civilian infrastructure in Haifa and in the Golan Heights on March 8.[20] The group fired drones targeting an oil refinery in Haifa and an IDF base in the Golan Heights. Israeli officials have not commented on the attack at the time of writing.

US CENTCOM conducted preemptive strikes targeting two Houthi mobile anti-ship missiles in Houthi-controlled Yemen on March 8.[21]

The Houthis separately fired naval missiles at Singapore-flagged, owned, and operated vessel M/V Propel Fortune in the Gulf of Aden on March 8.[22] CENTCOM and UK Maritime Trade Operations confirmed that the missiles did not impact the ship.[23]

The Houthis claimed that they launched 37 one-way attack drones targeting US warships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory on March 9.[24] CENTCOM reported that US Navy and coalition aircraft and ships intercepted at least 28 drones.[25] CENTCOM reported that the Houthi drones did not damage any US coalition or commercial vessels.

4. TikTok Crackdown Shifts Into Overdrive, With Sale or Shutdown on Table

TikTok Crackdown Shifts Into Overdrive, With Sale or Shutdown on Table

Bobby Kotick, former CEO of Activision, has floated idea of buying TikTok to potential partners

https://www.wsj.com/tech/why-the-new-effort-to-ban-tiktok-caught-fire-with-lawmakers-7cd3f980?mod=hp_lead_pos3

, Stu Woo

and Jessica Toonkel

March 9, 2024 1:53 pm ET

TikTok was caught by surprise by the passage of a new bill by a House committee. PHOTO: PATRICK T. FALLON/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

WASHINGTON—Legislation that would ban TikTok in the U.S. or force its sale is hurtling toward a vote in the House following months of behind-the-scenes efforts on Capitol Hill. The new push caught the service off-guard, ratcheting up interest from possible buyers and raising the possibility that one of the most popular apps in the country could soon be shut down.

Lawmakers have decried TikTok for years, expressing concern that the app’s Beijing-based parent would share data about its users with the Chinese government or lean on TikTok to promote Beijing’s propaganda and shape Americans’ political opinions. But there were countervailing concerns that a forceful move against TikTok would spark a backlash from the millions of users who have embraced the app.

Efforts had seemingly stalled until this week, when a new bill passed the House Energy and Commerce Committee 50-0. An effort by TikTok to push users to call their congressional representatives in opposition to the bill appeared to backfire by only hardening proponents’ resolve.

The bill caught TikTok by surprise. The company, which says it wouldn’t comply with an order from the Chinese government if asked for data and has never been asked, had been tracking the legislation. But internally, leaders didn’t expect it to gain so much traction so quickly, people familiar with the matter said. Having cleared the committee, the bill is set to get a vote in the full House on Wednesday, and lawmakers and people close to TikTok expect the House to approve the bill. If it passes, it will then head to the Senate.

“I’ve had discussions with a lot of the [senators], and we welcome that and hope they could act swiftly,” said Republican Rep. Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin, who leads the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party and co-wrote the bill.

Rep. Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin co-wrote the bill involving TikTok. PHOTO: MICHAEL BROCHSTEIN/ZUMA PRESS

The legislation calls for Beijing-based parent ByteDance to divest itself of TikTok or face the platform being banned from app stores and web-hosting services in the U.S. ByteDance would have a little more than five months from the enactment of the bill to comply. TikTok, which is accessed by more than 170 million Americans, sees this as an effective ban, said a spokeswoman. The company says separating the U.S. portion of its app wouldn’t be practical and would undercut the appeal of the content app, which is global in nature.

Already, U.S. tech and media titans are circling. In recent days, some executives have discussed buying TikTok if ByteDance agrees to sell. Bobby Kotick, the former chief executive of videogame publisher Activision, has already approached ByteDance Executive Chair Zhang Yiming to express interest, according to a person familiar with the situation. Any price tag is estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

Kotick is looking for partners. At a dinner at an Allen & Co. conference earlier this week, Kotick floated the idea of partnering to buy TikTok to a table of people that included OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, according to people familiar with the situation. OpenAI could use TikTok to help train its AI models if a partner such as Kotick could raise the capital for such an acquisition.

Bobby Kotick, former Activision CEO, seen last year, has expressed interest in buying TikTok if ByteDance agrees to sell it. PHOTO: KEVIN DIETSCH/GETTY IMAGES

TikTok sees two ways to stop the bill from becoming law, according to a person close to the company. The first is the Senate, where some senators have already expressed opposition to legislation that could effectively ban the app in the U.S., citing wanting to protect free speech and a desire to not meddle in business.

Should it pass both the House and the Senate and be signed by President Biden, TikTok could also challenge the legality of the bill, arguing that it violates the First Amendment.

Biden on Friday said he would sign the legislation if Congress passed it, a pledge that could give it further momentum in the Senate. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D., N.Y.) said a ban “should be looked at” but didn’t commit to bringing the House legislation up for a vote. Bills typically require 60 votes to advance in the Senate, which the Democratic caucus controls 51-49.

“I’m not going to nitpick at it, other than to say the intent behind it is something I strongly support and I think it’s impressive that it’s moving,” said Sen. Marco Rubio (R., Fla.), who wanted to take a closer look at the legislation. He was one of the first to call for banning the app, about four years ago.

Some senators have expressed concerns about attempts by Congress to ban the app.

“I don’t think we should ban ownership in companies because we don’t like some of the different governments that are involved, or some of the different countries,” said Sen. Rand Paul (R., Ky.) on Friday.

The quick passage by the House Energy and Commerce Committee was the result of months of work behind-the-scenes with lawmakers known for being pragmatic and cutting deals. Gallagher of Wisconsin and Democrat Raja Krishnamoorthi of Illinois, the top members of the House panel focused on China, have been working for months on the bill, with the White House.

Key to smoothing out this effort was Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, people familiar with the matter said. One person said Krishnamoorthi asked Monaco to help with the process because she was both a senior Biden administration official and a vocal proponent of a TikTok ban or divestment.

Monaco helped draft the legislation, and her presence as a Biden administration senior official helped congressional Democrats buy into supporting the bill, one of the people said. Members of the Biden administration’s national-security team also pitched in, holding closed-door sessions with Congress members to brief them about what they said were national-security threats about TikTok.

Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco is a proponent of a TikTok ban or divestment. PHOTO: AMANDA ANDRADE-RHOADES/REUTERS

“It’s narrowly tailored to get members from both sides, even former skeptics,” said Rep. Josh Gottheimer (D., N.J.) of the bill. “It focuses solely on our foreign adversaries who pump out disinformation and collect data on Americans.”

Gallagher is well-liked by Democrats and his GOP colleagues and respected as an expert on the issue. His efforts appeared to stall in 2023, but were revived in part by the fallout from the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas on Israel, according to people close to TikTok and people close to lawmakers. TikTok’s users quickly inundated the platform with videos about the attack and Israel’s war on Gaza. Some lawmakers said TikTok appeared to favor pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel content, and renewed calls to ban the app in the U.S.

TikTok’s spokeswoman said that the videos that lawmakers are concerned about were created by its users, and the company argued it has been fair in moderating pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian videos.

“Oct. 7 really opened people’s eyes to what’s happening on TikTok” and its “differential treatment of different topics,” said Krishnamoorthi, adding that the coming election also fueled concerns. “People are concerned about interference using TikTok.”

The first push to force ByteDance to sell TikTok started from then-president Donald Trump. Lawmakers have since banned TikTok from government-owned devices, but broader efforts stalled. Biden administration officials concluded that TikTok represented a national-security threat but were uncertain they had the legal authority to effectively ban the app or separate it from its Chinese owner. The new TikTok bill aims to give the White House clear authority to do so.

ByteDance would have a little more than five months to comply if the bill is enacted. PHOTO: HOW HWEE YOUNG/SHUTTERSTOCK

TikTok has been in negotiations for several years with an executive-branch panel called the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. over whether it can remain in the country, but it hasn’t reached an agreement. In 2022, TikTok and the U.S. government had been in talks over a potential deal under which the company would store American user data on Oracle Corp. servers in the U.S. and limit access for others to it. But senior administration officials, including Monaco, argued that wasn’t sufficient, The Wall Street Journal previously reported.

In the absence of an agreement, TikTok implemented a program called Project Texas to store user data. All U.S. data is stored in the Oracle cloud, according to a TikTok spokeswoman, who said it has done more than other U.S. companies to separate and protect users’ data.

Trump on Thursday appeared to reverse his position, writing on social media that banning TikTok would help

Meta Platforms’s Facebook, which he described as an “enemy of the people.” Trump’s positions carry significant sway among Republican lawmakers, but his statement didn’t directly call for them to reject the bill. Meta declined to comment on that claim Friday.“I don’t think it will slow momentum in the House because people who have read the legislation, they understand what we’re doing here,” said Rep. Kat Cammack (R., Fla.), a member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. “As an America First candidate, I would never want foreign adversaries to have this data.…This is the vehicle that is going to move forward.”

Write to Natalie Andrews at natalie.andrews@wsj.com, Georgia Wells at georgia.wells@wsj.com, Kristina Peterson at kristina.peterson@wsj.com, Stu Woo at Stu.Woo@wsj.com, Keach Hagey at Keach.Hagey@wsj.com and Jessica Toonkel at jessica.toonkel@wsj.com

5. Two Canals, Two Big Problems—One Global Shipping Mess

Two Canals, Two Big Problems—One Global Shipping Mess

Drought in Panama and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are delaying deliveries and pushing up costs

https://www.wsj.com/business/logistics/shipping-panama-red-sea-suez-canal-edc91172?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Costas ParisFollow

March 10, 2024 12:01 am ET

More than 50 ships queued to cross the Panama Canal on a recent day—from tankers hauling propane to cargo ships packed with food. A prolonged drought has led the canal’s operator to cut the number of crossings, resulting in longer waits. The tolls that ships pay are now around eight times more expensive than normal.

Over 7,000 miles away, vessels that move containers through Egypt’s Suez Canal are waiting for naval escorts or avoiding the passage altogether to take a much longer voyage around South Africa. Ship operators fear that their crews could be imperiled on the journeys through the Red Sea by missile or drone attacks from a Yemen-based rebel group.

The Suez’s problems are geopolitical and those in Panama are climate-based, but both are roiling global trade. Cargo volumes through the Suez and Panama canals have plunged by more than a third. Hundreds of vessels have diverted to longer routes, resulting in delivery delays, higher transportation costs and economic wreckage for local communities.

Ship operators are bracing for months of uncertainty in the waterways where some 18% of global trade volumes crossed last year.

The Panama Canal is in the midst of one of the driest periods in the artificial waterway’s century of operation. Officials hope the drought, which started in mid-2023, will let up at the end of the dry season in May.

In the Suez, some ship operators have indefinitely suspended voyages because of strikes on commercial vessels further south. Houthis have attacked more than 50 ships since November, including a cargo vessel loaded with fertilizer that sank into the Red Sea and another that resulted in three deaths.

Retaliatory strikes by an American-led coalition have destroyed roughly a third of Houthi military assets, according to a Pentagon official.

Dire Straits

Disruptions near critical shipping chokepoints have altered routes and jeopardized global trade.

Routes where cargo and oil ship traffic increased from Dec. 2022 to Dec. 2023

Houthis have attacked ships approaching the Suez Canal.

Minimal change

More traffic

Suez Canal

Taiwan

Strait

Bab el-Mandeb

Strait

Panama

Canal

Strait of Malacca

Drought left water levels too low for canal locks to function.

Cape of Good Hope

Note: Based on total number of hours ships spent within each square kilometer

Source: Global Maritime Traffic

Carl Churchill/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

“It’s the first time that both are disrupted simultaneously so you have to plan way in advance where to send your ship and you pay a hell of a lot more regardless,” said Tim Hansen, chief operations officer of Stamford, Conn.-based

Dorian LPG, which operates a fleet of 25 ships that move propane and butane.The problems haven’t had a huge impact on consumers yet, but businesses are starting to feel the ripples. Tesla and Volvo paused vehicle production for up to two weeks in January because of parts shortages.

Some apparel companies opted for their spring fashions to be delivered by air instead of sea to ensure items arrived on time.

For now, the interruptions to supply chains are on a modest scale compared with the more widespread bottlenecks seen in 2020 and 2021.

A containership at the Suez Canal in December. PHOTO: BLOOMBERG NEWS

Back then, shippers passed along the higher costs on ocean freight to consumers, contributing to inflation on a range of consumer goods. Daily freight rates on some routes between Asia and the U.S. surged to more than $20,000 per box, roughly five times higher than current levels.

Businesses have also learned lessons from supply chaos during the pandemic, and some have built up bigger inventories to avoid running out of products.

Suez disruptions have lengthened average sailing times by about 10 days, but consumers haven’t been affected, said Jesper Brodin, CEO of Ingka Group, the company that operates most of the world’s IKEA stores.

“The huge difference is that we have recuperated after the pandemic,” he said in January at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. “So that means our stocks in our warehouse are in good shape.”

But as more businesses return to pre-Covid practices of keeping minimal inventories and rely on timely deliveries, they are more vulnerable to disruptions if bottlenecks at the two canals continue.

“It is a watershed moment for consumers because they have been accustomed to globalization,” said Peter Sand, chief analyst at Norway-based shipping platform Xeneta. “They have been getting goods from everywhere at any given time, so it’s paramount to safeguard maritime supply chains.”

A ship passed through the Panama Canal in September. PHOTO: JUSTIN SULLIVAN/GETTY IMAGES

Less water

The problems meant Connecticut-based Dorian changed the calculus for its ships late last year—twice.

The Panama Canal offers the shortest route for Dorian’s ships setting sail from the Gulf of Mexico to make deliveries to clients in China, Japan and South Korea. The westbound trip, through the canal and then across the Pacific, takes roughly 25 days, compared with 40 going east through the Suez.

Some 14% of seaborne trade in and out of the U.S. sails through the waterway. Several Latin American countries use the canal to move roughly a quarter of their exports.

The drought has meant less water to feed the locks that allow ships to cross the canal. More than 50 million gallons of water are washed to sea every time a ship moves through the locks. That water is replenished from a reservoir that’s now running low.

How the Panama Canal Works

Under normal conditions, full cargo ships are able to move freely through the canal system. However under drought conditions, authorities fear with low water levels, the ships can't pass through without lightening their payload and fewer are being allowed through.

Canal locks

Source: Panama Canal Authority Note: Not to scale

Brian McGill/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The canal’s operator normally allows around 36 ship crossings a day. It cut the number to 24 in November and had planned to further cut the transits to 18 in February, but some rainfall helped to stabilize water levels.

To avoid potential multiweek delays in cargo movement, Dorian sent 10 ships to the Suez. Those voyages stopped in early December because of the Houthi attacks. Now ships are being routed again through the Panama Canal, amid longer waits and higher prices.

A single Panama Canal crossing costs around $500,000, with the exception of a handful of boxship operators that are the canal’s top clients. Companies like Dorian have to go through a bidding process where the highest offer secures a crossing. “We paid $2 million extra but we know others that paid close to $4 million more.” Hansen said. Dorian passed those higher costs to its customers.

Ship transits at the Panama Canal in January were down 36% from a year earlier.

The canal’s operator wants to invest around $1 billion on construction and engineering projects to increase access to water reserves, pending government approval. The project could take years to complete.

A view of the Panama Canal’s Miraflores Locks in January. PHOTO: MARTIN BERNETTI/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

The canal also supplies water to about 2.5 million people, or around half the country’s population—and the drought is taking a toll on local businesses.

Sabina Torres runs a general store, Tienda 98, at a dock on Lake Alajuela, which is part of the freshwater network that feeds the Panama Canal.

Under the drought, the lake has receded from the dock. Water is available only every other day, from 7 to 9 a.m. Those days, the 46-year-old Torres scrambles to fill tanks and jugs with water for drinking, washing and flushing toilets.

Products that she sells typically arrive by boat, but fewer deliveries can now make it in. Torres bought an all-terrain vehicle and hired additional workers to navigate the mud and rocks and bring her products from the boats.

Torres’s store, which largely serves local residents, makes around $1,500 a month. That fell to $800 in both December and January. She’s now buying more items in advance to make sure she has enough stock. “We are rushing to get enough supplies,” she said.

How the Panama Canal’s Drought Is Threatening Global Supply Chains

Under attack

Around the world, prices are rising for cargo owners. Daily boxship rates along routes from Asia to the Americas more than doubled in January from a year earlier, data from U.K. brokerage

Braemar showed. Rates for Asia-to-Europe trips were up 67%.Trade volumes going through the Suez fell more than 40% in December and January compared with the year-earlier period, according to United Nations data. The canal is used by dozens of ships moving Asian exports to Northern Europe and the Mediterranean, along with some of the world’s biggest tankers moving oil from the Middle East.

Maersk,

Hapag-Lloyd and other large carriers of ocean freight haven’t returned to the Red Sea, despite the U.S.-led naval coalition’s attacks on the rebel group. “To go back, we will need to meet a very high threshold to ensure our crews and ships are not in risk,” said Maersk Chief Executive Vincent Clerc, whose company typically made 15 to 17 Suez crossings a week. “So far there is an escalation and I don’t know if the attacks on the Houthis will help out things.”

Clerc said returning to the Suez would require guarantees from security officials that ships could travel safely through the region.

Nikolaev Balan, the executive officer of a European-owned tanker, has crossed the Red Sea and the Suez dozens of times. On Jan. 11, his ship was in the Red Sea during the first U.S. raid on Houthi targets in Yemen.

“We saw a drone flying a few meters from the stern and as we called it in to say that we are targeted. There were warnings on the radio to get out because the Americans will attack,” he said. “We turned back and we are not going back in there.”

A photo released by the Houthi Media Center shows a Houthi helicopter approaching a cargo ship in November. Houthis seized the ship off the coast of Yemen. PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS

In Egypt, supply boat operator Eman Ayad, 42, hasn’t earned much money to move cargo around the Suez over the past several weeks.

Ayad is one of about a dozen independent owners of boats regularly working in the canal zone offering towing services and supplies like food, lubricants and spare parts. The boat’s services generate about $800 a month.

He inherited the boat from his father around a decade ago and it serves as his family’s sole source of income. He said his family, including his wife and three small children, is living on savings.

“If this lasts for another month I will have to sell [the tugboat] to pay debts,” Ayad said. He’s thinking about immigrating to the U.S. where relatives could help him land a job if Suez business doesn’t return—and soon.

Not all vessels are ditching the Suez. Operators sailing the waterway to access the wider region via the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea routinely hire armed guards to help repel attacks. Four guards per vessel can cost about $40,000 per Red Sea voyage, shipowners and operators said.

Toll revenue paid by ships to cross the Suez fell by almost half in January to $428 million, compared with $804 million in the same month last year, said Suez Canal Authority Chairman Osama Rabie. Along with tourism, the Suez Canal is one of the main foreign income sources for Egypt.

At the Panama Canal, the drop in permitted crossings hasn’t dented overall revenue, in part because the per-ship toll increased. The canal brought in $3.3 billion from tolls in 2023, up from more than $3 billion the year prior.

Ships in the Panama Bay in September. PHOTO: JUSTIN SULLIVAN/GETTY IMAGES

“The operators are complaining, but we try to accommodate as many crossings as possible. The weather has been very unforgiving,” said Ricaurte Vásquez Morales, the canal’s administrator.

Canal authorities don’t expect the bump from crossing fees to last. Ship operators prefer a steady toll regime and the canal wants good relations with its customers, Vásquez Morales said.

The canal authority plans to review the number of permitted daily crossings in April, depending on rainfall levels in March. It expects the effects of the drought to reduce its revenue this year by around $200 million, he said.

Write to Costas Paris at costas.paris@wsj.com

6. U.S. Military Enters a New Phase With Gaza Aid Operations

U.S. Military Enters a New Phase With Gaza Aid Operations

As the United States continues providing Israel with munitions, the Pentagon will deliver food and other assistance to Gazans by sea and air.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/09/us/politics/us-military-gaza-aid.html

The U.S. military has built floating causeways like this one off the coast of Australia for troops to cross rivers, unload supplies and conduct other military operations. Credit...U.S. Army Photo by Sgt. Ashunteia’ Smith, 16th Combat Aviation Brigade

By Helene Cooper Eric Schmitt

Reporting from Washington

Published March 9, 2024

Updated March 10, 2024, 9:00 a.m. ET

The United States has a history of using its military to get food, water and other humanitarian relief to civilians during wars or natural disasters. The walls of the Pentagon are decorated with photographs of such operations in Haiti, Liberia, Indonesia and countless other countries.

But it is rare for the United States to try to provide such services for people who are being bombed with tacit U.S. support.

President Biden’s decision to order the U.S. military to build a floating pier off the Gaza Strip that would allow aid to be delivered by sea puts American service members in a new phase of their humanitarian aid history. The same military that is sending the weapons and bombs that Israel is using in Gaza is now also sending food and water into the besieged territory.

The floating pier idea came a week after Mr. Biden authorized humanitarian airdrops for Gaza, which relief experts criticized as inadequate. Even the floating pier, aid experts say, will not do enough to alleviate the suffering in the territory, where residents are on the brink of starvation.

Nonetheless, senior Biden officials said, the United States will continue to provide Israel with the munitions it is using in Gaza, while trying to deliver humanitarian aid to Palestinians under bombardment there.

So the Pentagon is doing both.

For decades the Army Corps of Engineers, using combat engineers, has built floating docks for troops to cross rivers, unload supplies and conduct other military operations. Maj. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, the Pentagon spokesman, said on Friday that the Army’s Seventh Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary), out of Joint Base Langley-Eustis, near Norfolk, Va., would be one of the main military units involved in the construction of the floating pier for Gaza.

On Sunday, the U.S. military said that an Army ship, the General Frank S. Besson, had set sail from a base near Norfolk, Va., a day earlier, carrying equipment to build a floating dock and pier on Gaza’s coast.

The dock will be built and assembled alongside the Army ship off the Gaza coast, General Ryder said. The ship will need armed escorts, particularly as it gets within range of the coast, Defense Department officials said, adding that they are working through how to ensure its protection.

A U.S. Army official said that typically in these operations, a large vessel sits off the shore of the desired location, and a “roll-on-roll-off discharge facility” — a big floating dock — is constructed next to the ship to serve as the holding area. Cargo driven or placed on the dock is loaded onto smaller Navy boats and moved toward a temporary pier or causeway anchored ashore.

The 1,800-foot, two-lane temporary causeway is built by Army engineers, flanked by tugboats and driven, or “stabbed,” into the shore. Cargo aboard the smaller Navy boats can then be driven onto the causeway and onshore.

General Ryder insisted on Friday that the military could build the causeway and stab it into the shore without putting any American boots — or fins — on the ground in Gaza. He said it would take up to 60 days and about 1,000 U.S. troops to move the ship into place from the East Coast and to build the dock and causeway.

After the ship arrives offshore, it will take about seven to 10 days to assemble the floating dock and the causeway, a Defense Department official said.

“This is part of a full-court press by the United States to not only focus on working on opening up and expanding roads via land, which of course are the optimal way to get aid into Gaza, but also by conducting airdrops,” General Ryder said.

Israel-Hamas War: Live Updates

Updated

March 9, 2024, 7:38 p.m. ETMarch 9, 2024

March 9, 2024

The floating pier will allow for the delivery of “upward of two million meals a day,” he said. The Gaza Strip has a population of about 2.3 million people.

General Ryder acknowledged that neither the airdrops nor the floating pier would be as effective as sending aid by land, which Israel has blocked. “We want to see the amount of aid going via land increase significantly,” General Ryder said. “We understand that is the most viable way to get aid in.”

But, he added, “we’re not going to wait around.”

The United States will work with regional partners and European allies to build, fund and maintain the corridor, officials said, noting that the idea for the project originated in Cyprus.

On Thursday, Sigrid Kaag, the U.N. humanitarian and reconstruction coordinator for Gaza, welcomed the Biden announcement. But, speaking with reporters after briefing the Security Council, she added, “At the same time I cannot but repeat: Air and sea is not a substitute for land, and nobody says otherwise.”

The Biden humanitarian efforts in Gaza so far “may make a few people in the United States feel good,” Robert Ford, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria, said in an interview. But, he added, “this is applying a very small Band-Aid to a very big wound.”

The humanitarian aid will probably be gathered in Larnaca, Cyprus, some 210 nautical miles from Gaza, officials said. That would allow Israeli officials to screen the shipments first.

While the temporary port will initially be military-run, Washington envisions it eventually being commercially operated, the official said.

Officials did not go into detail about how aid delivered by sea would be transferred from the coast farther into Gaza. But the assistance will be distributed in part by the Spanish chef José Andrés, founder of the nonprofit World Central Kitchen, which has served more than 32 million meals in Gaza.

Two diplomats briefed on the plans said the port would be erected on Gaza’s shoreline slightly north of the Wadi Gaza crossing, where Israeli forces have erected a major checkpoint.

The central problems, however, remain unsolved. Aid officials say that delivering supplies by truck

And delivering assistance by sea may not prevent the chaos that has accompanied deliveries.

More than 100 people in Gaza were killed

The U.S. military has airdropped aid in the Middle East and South Asia during previous conflicts, even during wars in which the United States was directly involved.

In 2014, President Barack Obama ordered military aircraft to drop food and water to tens of thousands of Yazidis trapped on a barren mountain range in northwestern Iraq. The Yazidis, members of an ethnic and religious minority, were fleeing militants who were threatening genocide.

In 2001, President George W. Bush ordered British and American troops striking the Taliban in Afghanistan to airdrop daily rations to civilians trapped in remote areas of the country.

Helene Cooper More about Helene Cooper

Eric Schmitt More about Eric Schmitt

7. Ukraine's Fight Against Time

Ukraine's Fight Against Time

The American public’s war-weariness and the urgency of Ukrainian progress against Russia are pressing issues, reflecting a historical reluctance to engage in foreign conflicts, reminiscent of pre-World War II sentiments.

19fortyfive.com · by Curtis Fox · March 10, 2024

Summary: The American public’s war-weariness and the urgency of Ukrainian progress against Russia are pressing issues, reflecting a historical reluctance to engage in foreign conflicts, reminiscent of pre-World War II sentiments. The Ukrainians, bolstered by Western support totaling over $165 billion in aid, military hardware, and financial support, are battling against formidable Russian defenses and internal military coordination challenges. Despite achieving favorable kill ratios using Western tactics and equipment, Ukraine’s future hinges on continuous support as Russia aims to deplete Ukrainian resources.

Ukraine’s Military Challenges: The Path to Victory or Stalemate?

The American public clearly admires Ukrainian valor in the face of brutal Russian aggression, but after recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans are war-weary. This places the Ukrainians on a timer. They need to make forward progress against the Russians before American aid runs out.

When running for his third term in 1939, Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not bring forward a litany of foreign policy “experts” to wag their fingers at isolationists.

Quite the opposite.

After taking over 300,000 casualties in World War I, many Americans were decidedly against fighting in yet another war over European borders and colonial possessions. Roosevelt recognized the validity of the isolationist position in his political rhetoric. His council of war was full of heavy-hitter advisors. These experts were directed to take the facts to Congress, who passed a series of bills increasing funding to the army and navy, instituting the draft, and providing the allies with desperately needed war materials and equipment.

Prewar preparation meant consulting with and persuading the American people. Roosevelt sought to reassure isolationists that he was against war, while simultaneously making preparations to defend American interests. Roosevelt knew that the people had to understand why the rise of fascism in Europe and Asia was their problem.

The current administration has made no such case to the American people regarding support for Ukraine.

Following the Russian invasion in February 2022, Ukraine won Western patronage through its impressive (if audacious) defense of Kyiv and the Donbas against the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Russians. Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson were wildly successful, capturing an entire army’s worth of weapons, military hardware, munitions, and vehicles. This loosened Western purse strings.

The United States has donated over $75 Billion to the Ukrainian cause. This includes:

-$4.5 Billion in military grants and loans;

-$18.3 Billion for Training, equipment, weapons, and logistics support;

-$26.4 Billion in financial aid to the Ukrainian national budget;

-$2.7 Billion in humanitarian assistance;

-$23.5 Billion of military hardware and weapons which was authorized by the Executive Branch to be drawn from existing stockpiles.

NATO’s European members have provided over $43 Billion in financial aid and $29 Billion in military hardware, weapons, and training for Ukrainian soldiers. The EU also provided another $18 Billion to support Ukrainian refugees who fled to EU member states, totaling European and NATO support to $90 Billion.

Despite the influx of Western support, Ukraine failed to make measurable gains during the fighting season of 2023. With the U.S. nearly matching European support to the conflict, it is clear that U.S. support is vital to Ukraine’s continuing combat operations.

Russia worked diligently to consolidate Russian Ground Forces to defensible positions after the fall of 2022. These consolidations were meant to frustrate a Ukrainian thrust east towards Rostov-on-Don – the source of Russian logistics and supply – or south towards the Sea of Azov.

Russia’s timely adjustments to the line firmly entrenched their troops behind fortifications and minefields. There were (and remain) no weak spots; no low-hanging fruit that the Ukrainians could exploit to achieve a breakthrough.

Russian entrenchments are now so thick that they can be seen from space.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are also revealing their limitations. There is self-destructive competition between Ukrainian military leaders. They don’t coordinate advances well. Ukrainian artillery batteries cannot support infantry movements from other battalions or brigades. Close air support is non-existent.

On August 21st, 2023, Hungarian President Viktor Orban sat down with populist commentator Tucker Carlson in Budapest and said something shocking: Ukraine cannot win. He further claimed that the West did not understand Russia; that Moscow sees dominance of Ukraine as imperative to their national survival.

The Russian Ministry of Defense may have shown itself to be impotent, but Moscow cannot back down. Russia is fielding a conscripted army in Ukraine of over 600,000 soldiers. Realizing the Ground Forces are not capable of fighting a war of maneuver, the Ministry of Defense is procuring antiquated and inaccurate weapons systems for mass bombardments and strikes against both Ukrainian infrastructure and the Ukrainian people themselves.

Ukraine increased its military from 300,000 in 2019 to roughly 700,000 in 2022 – though estimates are difficult when factoring in paramilitaries and civilian volunteers. Building an army and sustaining an army are two very different problem sets, and they can only sustain th with international backing.

Over the next several years Russia will slowly grind the Ukrainian economy down until it can no longer support a national government or field an army. Once foreign aid dries up, the writing is on the wall for the regime in Kyiv and the Ukrainian people.

Using Western tactics and equipment, Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) are currently achieving a kill ratio of 3:1 and sometimes even 5:1 against Russian Ground Forces. This is unfortunately not nearly enough.

In my recent book on Hybrid Warfare, I write in detail about Russia’s unique approach to warfare, and what lessons may be taken from their application of war. Russia rarely backs out of a war due to casualties. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution forced Russia to remove itself from the First World War, only after the deaths of over 1.8 Million Russian soldiers. For reference, on December 4th, 2023 British Defense Intelligence posted estimates on Twitter that Russia had suffered 70,000 soldiers killed and another 220,000-280,000 soldiers wounded.

Rostov-on-Don is the staging point and logistics hub for Russia’s entire war effort. Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov and his deputies also run the conflict from the city’s Southern Military District’s Headquarters. If Kyiv wants to bring Moscow to the negotiating table realistically, then Rostov-on-Don is the intuitive target.

Ukraine would have to bet it all, and would likely take enormous losses. But the time to gamble is now.

American patience is waning. The clock is ticking.

About the Author

Curtis L. Fox is the author of the recently published book Hybrid Warfare. Despite being accepted to the graduate engineering program at Virginia Tech, Curtis chose to enlist in the Army, where he learned to speak Russian and earned his Green Beret. After completing his time in service, Curtis studied at Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business, earning a Master’s of Business Administration. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

19fortyfive.com · by Curtis Fox · March 10, 2024

8. ISIS Is Back and Threatens to Be Deadlier Than Ever

Excerpts:

As well as cruelty and misogyny, Taliban rule has also brought a resurgence in the threat from ISIS. The Sunni Muslim terror group has been allowed to re-group and re-tool in Afghanistan where thousands of fighters are training and plotting attacks, despite Taliban claims that they are trying to clamp down on them.

Hundreds of people—like Mohammad—have already been killed in dozens of attacks inside Afghanistan and in the wider region this year, as part of a new campaign of violence announced in January called “Kill Them Wherever You Find Them.” The campaign was originally billed as a plan to target the Jewish community in response to Israel’s bombing of Gaza after the Oct. 7 attacks, but has since seemingly expanded to include other groups that ISIS deems heretical.

“Afghanistan is currently flushed with U.S. weapons. It is very easy right now to build a war chest in Afghanistan.”

— Former Afghan security official

ISIS Is Back and Threatens to Be Deadlier Than Ever

NEW HOME OF TERROR

After losing its territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS has a new haven where it is plotting more of the terror attacks that have already killed hundreds of people this year.

Ruchi Kumar

Updated Mar. 10, 2024 3:59AM EDT / Published Mar. 09, 2024 8:28PM EST

The Daily Beast · March 10, 2024

Photo Illustration by Erin O’Flynn/The Daily Beast/Getty Images and Public Domain

It was a little over two weeks since Mohammad Ali Raihani, 28, a student of engineering at Kabul University, had started a day job to provide for his brother and sister while he studied. On Jan. 6, an explosion ripped through the minibus taking him to the printing press where he worked, killing him and six others.

“He studied at night so he could work during the day and support the family. He was our only breadwinner,” his sister Sumaya Raihani told The Daily Beast, choking back tears. “When Mohammad got this job, he was always telling us to study. He promised to buy a bicycle for my younger brother to encourage him to study harder.”

Sumaya has been unable to work or go to school herself under the brutal restrictions on women and girls imposed since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021.

As well as cruelty and misogyny, Taliban rule has also brought a resurgence in the threat from ISIS. The Sunni Muslim terror group has been allowed to re-group and re-tool in Afghanistan where thousands of fighters are training and plotting attacks, despite Taliban claims that they are trying to clamp down on them.

Hundreds of people—like Mohammad—have already been killed in dozens of attacks inside Afghanistan and in the wider region this year, as part of a new campaign of violence announced in January called “Kill Them Wherever You Find Them.” The campaign was originally billed as a plan to target the Jewish community in response to Israel’s bombing of Gaza after the Oct. 7 attacks, but has since seemingly expanded to include other groups that ISIS deems heretical.

“Afghanistan is currently flushed with U.S. weapons. It is very easy right now to build a war chest in Afghanistan.”

— Former Afghan security official

The explosion that killed Mohammad was the first of two attacks that week targeting a neighborhood in Kabul with a majority population of Shia Muslims of Hazara ethnicity. The attacks were claimed by the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP), the wing of ISIS based in Afghanistan.

Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi visits one of the people injured in the Islamic State attack in Kerman, Iran, on Jan. 5, 2024.

Iran’s Presidency/WANA/Handout via Reuters

The biggest of the ISIS attacks so far this year was a double suicide bombing in Iran that killed over 100 people at a memorial for Qassem Soleimani, a top commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. While the Iranian government blamed Israel for the attack, a U.S. intelligence report released shortly after confirmed to the media that “the U.S. has pretty clear intel” that ISKP had conducted the attack.

A former Afghan security official told The Daily Beast that ISIS would continue to grow in Afghanistan, where there is a huge supply of weaponry left behind following the U.S. withdrawal. He said an expanded ISIS would start to plan attacks on targets across the world if the Taliban continues to effectively allow them to set up a new haven.

A New Home for ISIS

The Taliban, who have been downplaying the threats posed by ISKP, won’t admit to the scale of their ISIS problem. The Taliban have been struggling to seek international recognition for their government in Afghanistan, and to attract investment into the flailing economy amidst crushing sanctions from the U.S. and its allies.

The Taliban government is trying to portray itself as a viable international partner in counter-terrorism, despite continuing to maintain close ties with al Qaeda and Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP), allowing the militant groups to mobilize, recruit and train on Afghan soil. A U.S. operation in 2022 targeted and killed Ayman al-Zawahiri, the al Qaeda chief in a house in an upscale Kabul neighborhood linked to a top Taliban member.

Efforts to get the Taliban government recognized internationally have had marginal success with the Chinese, who have directed some investment into the oil and mining sectors, and more recently, became the first country to officially accept the credentials of a Taliban ambassador. However, ISKP attacks on the few remaining diplomatic missions in Kabul and on business interests have damaged the Taliban’s illusion of security in Afghanistan.

According to the latest U.N. Security Council report, released in February, despite being largely diminished from its peak presence in 2014-19, ISIS in Afghanistan has seen a resurgence since the Taliban takeover and “managed to undermine Taliban security by carrying out multiple high-profile attacks.”

The U.N. report noted that, since 2022, the group has claimed more than 190 suicide bomb attacks in major cities in the region, resulting in over 1,300 casualties. In 2022, the ISKP conducted large-scale attacks on the embassies of Pakistan, Russia and several Chinese interests in Kabul. In fact, the ISKP attacks in 2022 were found to be “greater lethality than in 2021,” according to the UNSC.

“Over the past year, the group has benefited from increased operational capabilities and freedom of movement inside Afghanistan. It seeks to maintain the intense pace of attacks,” the UNSC report noted, adding that its member states had assessed ISKP as “the most serious current terrorist threat in Afghanistan” with growing local recruitment and movement of fighters from Arab and African States to Afghanistan.

Taliban fighters at a security checkpoint warm themselves by a fire on Jan. 17, 2022, in Kabul.

Scott Peterson

While an accurate assessment of the strength of ISKP is not possible, the UNSC report estimates that there are between 4,000 and 6,000 ISKP members in Afghanistan, including family of the fighters. Most of them are mobilized in training camps in the north and northeastern parts of the country where loyalties to the Pashtun-majority Taliban are fluid owing to the ethnic tensions between the largely non-Pashtun population.

A former Afghan security official who has been monitoring the movements of local and foreign fighters through existing intelligence networks shared similar numbers. “The largest group among them are Afghans and Pakistanis, but there are significant fighters coming from Syria, Bangladesh, India, and Central Asian countries,” he told The Daily Beast on condition of anonymity.

“With the Taliban in charge of counter-terrorism, Afghanistan is on its way to becoming a safe haven for global terrorists, including the ISKP who are regrouping in the region,” the ex-official said. “Right now, most of these groups [in Afghanistan] are still mobilizing and their attacks are limited to the region, but if allowed to gain a geographical base, groups like ISIS will be empowered to conduct larger, more deadly attacks globally,” he warned.

The Taliban’s own failures in government are contributing to the surge in recruitment, the ex-official said. “Before the fall of the Afghan government, recruitment into all regional insurgent groups followed the same narrative, calling for a fight against the U.S.-backed government. But since the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban takeover, ISKP has directed its efforts at amplifying its anti-Taliban propaganda,” he said.

The UNSC report noted an increase in ISKP’s media operations in the region with “new publications releasing content in 12 languages and building a network of Telegram channels as part of an ongoing internationalization strategy.” Recent pamphlets issued by ISIS media have repeatedly referred to the Taliban as murtad (apostates). “They criticise the Taliban for defending ‘infidels’ through their protection of foreign embassies and the United Nations in Afghanistan,” the report stated.

While UNSC noted that much of ISKP funding came from its parent organization, as well as from other non-governmental sources and donors, the ex-official added that the group also has access to weapons left behind by U.S. and NATO forces. “Afghanistan is currently flush with U.S. weapons. It is very easy right now to build a war chest in Afghanistan with weapons that were left behind by foreign forces, and those sold by former fighters for reasons of money or sympathies, defecting fighters often take weapons and ammunition with them,” he said.

Will the Taliban Really Fight ISIS?

Security analysts observing the situation in the region warn that connections between terrorist groups should not be ignored. “One must understand Taliban-ISKP relations in the context of Islamist Jihadism,” said Omar Sadr, senior research scholar at University of Pittsburgh. “The ideological divide between various Jihadist groups, including the Taliban and the ISKP, is extremely porous. Many Taliban militants embrace ISKP's extremist transnational Salafi worldview,” he said, adding that there were several ex-ISKP members who joined the Taliban and vice versa.

Factionalism within the Taliban has also played a significant part in the situation on the ground, Sadr added. “While some Taliban follow the traditional Hanafi sect, others sympathize with the international jihadist movement,” he said, adding that the Taliban might even at times leverage select ISKP channels as a strategic weapon against Afghanistan’s neighbors such as in case of attacks on Iran.

A suspected ISIS member sits blindfolded in a Taliban Special Forces car in Kabul, Afghanistan, Sept. 5, 2021.

West Asia News Agency via Reuters

The Taliban, he said, tolerate transnational jihadis as long as they do not pose a substantial existential threat, leaving little motivation to resolve Afghanistan’s ISIS problem. It was after all the Taliban that released a number of ISKP captives upon their takeover of Kabul, Sadr pointed out, referring to multiple jailbreaks in August 2021 across Afghanistan.

It was later confirmed that several of those ISKP prisoners were involved in major attacks in Kabul, including an airport bombing on Aug. 26 that killed nearly 200 people, including 13 U.S. service members.

The Afghan ex-official added, “The ISKP are also exploiting these fractures and factionalism. They are also seeking out those among the radicalized fighters within the Taliban who are disillusioned with their leaders seeking support and recognition from erstwhile enemy countries.

“They have been laying the groundwork [against Taliban] for years, but with recent evidence [of the Taliban working with foreign governments] they have been able to draw in larger numbers of fighters from across Afghanistan and globally,” the former security official said.

The regrouping of ISKP fighters in Afghanistan is terrible news for religious and ethnic communities already marginalized by the Taliban at home, and it is about to become a massive problem for Washington and other Western capitals in the battle against global terrorism.

The Daily Beast · March 10, 2024

9. Philippines’ new playbook is a threat to South China Sea peace

Excerpts:

The situation in the South China Sea has entered a new phase. Stakeholders in the region are employing various strategies, tactics and tools. As politicians prioritise self-interest, the goodwill and trust between the parties are diminishing.

The fear is that the situation in the South China Sea could worsen, descending into unrestrained and deceitful behaviours, with covert methods driving an escalation of tensions, which would have a severe impact on the region’s peace and stability.

Philippines’ new playbook is a threat to South China Sea peace

By Zhihua Zheng South China Morning Post3 min

March 9, 2024

View Original

The reason behind Manila’s new approaches is the significant disparity in maritime law enforcement and naval power between the Philippines and China. Manila lacks the capability to get Beijing to withdraw from disputed areas like Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.

To ensure the constant presence of its maritime law enforcement in the waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal however, providing “humanitarian supplies” to Filipino fishermen operating in the area can be used as a plausible pretext.

There is also a legal aspect. The 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling only confirms that Filipino fishermen possess traditional fishing rights in the waters of Scarborough Shoal.

But the ruling does not address the issue of whether the Philippine coastguard or Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources has the authority to patrol or enforce laws in the waters of the shoal. The latter involves the issue of territorial sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, which is outside the scope of an arbitral tribunal under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Hence, Manila has devised a strategy combining Philippine-style grey-area operations and so-called assertive transparency to contest China’s control over Scarborough Shoal, aiming to return to the situation before the 2012 naval stand-off.

Last June, the Philippines unveiled the LAYAG WPS project (Livelihood Activities to Enhance Fisheries Yield and Economic Gains from the West Philippine Sea) to provide critical resources including equipment, fuel and livelihood support to Filipino fishermen in disputed areas such as Scarborough Shoal. It also aims to consolidate the Philippines’ presence and claims in the disputed region.

Philippines counts the cost of tough South China Sea stance against Beijing

As part of this, Manila earmarked 2.5 billion pesos (US$44.5 million) for the acquisition of floating assets to enhance the country’s presence in the West Philippine Sea and support Filipino fishermen. A recent mission delivered 44,900 litres of diesel and other supplies to fisherfolk at Scarborough Shoal, where the government is helping as many as 44 Philippine fishing boats.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr has directed the Philippine coastguard and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to continue their deployments around Scarborough Shoal, stressing the Philippines “will not allow any attempt by any foreign power to take even one square inch of our sovereign territory”.

Yet, if the LAYAG initiative was simply intended to aid fishermen’s livelihoods, surely it would be easier to give out the subsidies and supplies on shore than in the middle of the ocean. It should be also noted that China restored Filipino fishing access to the surrounding waters of Scarborough Shoal in 2016, after then-president Rodrigo Duterte visited Beijing. The shoal has remained accessible to Filipino fishermen since.

By acting under the banner of protecting fishermen’s livelihoods and delivering humanitarian supplies, Manila is trying to limit the space for protest from Beijing and camouflage its potentially provocative moves. Its unique packaging of its grey-zone operations as humanitarian resupply missions is meant to put Beijing on the defensive.

Manila’s “assertive transparency” in portraying itself as the victim does not address any of the underlying issues or consequences but it does succeed in attracting a lot of attention. The narratives of China’s bullying behaviour and environmentally degrading activities put out by the Philippines strongly resonate with both domestic and international audiences. They also boost the image of Filipino leaders as courageous individuals willing to confront a powerful nation.

There should be concern over whether China will accept this. Since the second half of last year, China has increased its countermeasures, with many voices in Chinese policy circles advocating for teaching the Philippines a lesson for its reckless behaviour. Chinese coastguards may once again expel Filipino fishermen from the waters of Scarborough Shoal.

On the other hand, Beijing seems to recognise the need to separate the issue of maritime security in the South China Sea from the regular economic exchanges between the two countries. However, it remains unclear how or if these South China tussles will affect economic and other collaboration between the two countries.

The situation in the South China Sea has entered a new phase. Stakeholders in the region are employing various strategies, tactics and tools. As politicians prioritise self-interest, the goodwill and trust between the parties are diminishing.

The fear is that the situation in the South China Sea could worsen, descending into unrestrained and deceitful behaviours, with covert methods driving an escalation of tensions, which would have a severe impact on the region’s peace and stability.

Zhihua Zheng is an associate professor and head of the East Asia Marine Policy Project at the Centre for Japanese Studies, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

10. Adoption of Gibo’s defense concept backed by expert (Philippines)

Excerpts:

“For many decades and several administrations, our defense has been focused on internal security operations,” De Castro said.

“But now, the emerging major challenge is external security threat – our waters and marine resources are being gobbled up. If we let this continue, even our interisland waters and resources will be targeted in the future, so we really need this (CADC),” he said.

He recalled that President Marcos, in his speeches last year, had acknowledged the need for greater emphasis on external defense.

...

“We will not be forced into any kind of making a choice between one country or another in terms of alliances. I always say that the foreign policy of the Philippines comes down to two very basic things. Number one is peace, and number two is the national interest,” he added.

Marcos expressed belief that no one, not even the “major players,” wants to go to war even if there are still disagreements that need to be resolved.

“That’s what we (are working) on but on a peaceful basis, through diplomatic channels, through informal channels. Whatever is available to us, that is what we take advantage of,” the Chief Executive said.

Adoption of Gibo’s defense concept backed by expert

philstar.com · by Alexis Romero

MANILA, Philippines — The Marcos administration’s adoption of a Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) is a move in the right direction and a manifestation of its seriousness in tackling external security challenges, particularly China’s growing aggressiveness in the West Philippine Sea.

This was according to De La Salle University professor Renato de Castro at a forum in Quezon City yesterday.

He was reacting to Department of Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro’s pronouncement on Friday that he had ordered the Armed Forces of the Philippines to “operationalize” the CADC “to ensure that our people and all the generations of Filipinos to come shall freely reap and enjoy the bounties of the natural resources that are rightfully ours within our domain.”

“For many decades and several administrations, our defense has been focused on internal security operations,” De Castro said.

“But now, the emerging major challenge is external security threat – our waters and marine resources are being gobbled up. If we let this continue, even our interisland waters and resources will be targeted in the future, so we really need this (CADC),” he said.

He recalled that President Marcos, in his speeches last year, had acknowledged the need for greater emphasis on external defense.

De Castro said the very essence of the strategy is to develop the country’s ability to project comprehensive power in its exclusive economic zone – not only in the West Philippine Sea and South China Sea but also in the entirety of its territorial jurisdiction.

“When we talk about comprehensive power, what comes to mind is the Armed Forces – so this means we will have to strengthen our maritime capabilities and air, and of course develop (the other services under) Armed Forces of the Philippines,” De Castro pointed out.

“Of course, this will entail a huge amount of money as we really have to start from scratch, but this is of course our effort to address what I call a quintessential security threat, which is of course China literally knocking on our door,” he added.

Last week, Chinese coast guard and militia vessels made another attempt to block a resupply mission for troops on the BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin Shoal, using water cannons and engaging Filipino boats in dangerous maneuvers.

Also recently, two Chinese scientific survey vessels were seen in the vicinity of the Philippine (Benham) Rise off the country’s eastern coast in the Philippine Sea.

In an interview in Australia on the sidelines of the ASEAN-Australia summit, Marcos said he shares China’s view that maritime security cooperation among allies should not disrupt regional peace, but stressed the importance of ASEAN members working together in addressing disputes.

He was reacting to recent remarks of Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, who said the South China Sea is “generally stable” and that countries’ maritime security cooperation “should not undermine other countries’ interests or disrupt regional peace and stability.”

The Chinese officials made the remarks after the Philippines and Australia signed an agreement that aims to enhance their maritime cooperation and promote their shared vision for the region.

“I think I have to agree with everything that she (Mao) said. She said very clearly the aspiration of all countries,” Marcos said in the interview.

“However, another country cannot decide to change their territorial area unilaterally. And that is something that is an idea we had rejected a long time ago but we are seeing that maybe somehow...some other powers have other ideas,” he added.

No ‘Cold War’ mindset

In the same interview, Marcos reiterated that the Philippines is not in the “Cold War” mentality wherein a country is forced to take sides in unarmed rivalry between superpowers.

“What we have always tried to promote is the idea that we will not regress into the old Cold War bipolar world... During the Cold War, most smaller countries essentially had to choose between the United States and the Soviet Union and that was it. That’s your political alignment. Whereas now, that is certainly irrelevant in this case,” the President said.

“We will not be forced into any kind of making a choice between one country or another in terms of alliances. I always say that the foreign policy of the Philippines comes down to two very basic things. Number one is peace, and number two is the national interest,” he added.

Marcos expressed belief that no one, not even the “major players,” wants to go to war even if there are still disagreements that need to be resolved.

“That’s what we (are working) on but on a peaceful basis, through diplomatic channels, through informal channels. Whatever is available to us, that is what we take advantage of,” the Chief Executive said.

philstar.com · by Alexis Romero

11. US, Japan Mull Defense Cooperation That Could Help Ukraine, Yomiuri Says

US, Japan Mull Defense Cooperation That Could Help Ukraine, Yomiuri Says

Two sides look at arms arrangement ahead of April summit
Japan has provided Patriot missiles to widen US arms pool

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-10/us-japan-mull-defense-cooperation-that-could-help-ukraine-yomiuri-says?sref=hhjZtX76

By Yoshiaki Nohara

March 9, 2024 at 9:37 PM EST

Japan and the US are discussing collaborating on military gear in a bid to provide more munitions to Ukraine and increasing ways for the Asian country to repair American warships and jet fighters, the Yomiuri newspaper said.

The allies are trying to put together an arrangement in conjunction with an April 10 summit in Washington between Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President Joe Biden, the Japanese daily reported Sunday, citing government sources it did not name.

A key theme for the summit will be finding ways Japan could help widen the US’s pool of armaments. American arms makers have been straining to supply weapons ranging from artillery shells to air defense systems that Washington has committed to Ukraine to fight off invading Russian forces.

Japan, which adopted a pacifist constitution after its loss in World War II, has provided Ukraine with nonlethal aid as well as assistance and loan guarantees worth billions of dollars — but not weapons. Loosening Tokyo’s restrictions on military exports could help the US and European nations send arms to Ukraine in the short term, while in the long term, it could widen the opportunities for Japan to sell arms overseas.

In December, the Japanese government announced it would allow sales of weapons produced under license back to the country of origin, and would export Patriot missiles to its sole military ally. The move increased the amount of interceptors available to the US, giving it more flexibility on how it supports Ukraine’s air defenses.

Kishida and Biden are expected to accelerate complementary relations and look at ways to strengthen the supply chain of their defense equipment, with China in mind, the Yomiuri said.

Tokyo and Washington are also considering expanding an arrangement in which Japanese companies would regularly do maintenance and repairs for US military equipment, the report said, adding the matter is expected to be on the agenda at the summit.

The US Seventh Fleet and other Navy vessels forward-deployed to Japan are among the candidates for the project, as well as F-35A fighter jets, the newspaper said. That would shorten maintenance periods for the US while it would help Tokyo strengthen its defense production and technology.

But such a move could be politically risky for Biden, especially in an election year. It could open his administration to criticism that it’s sending American jobs to Japan.

12. The Houthis have the world’s attention — and they won’t give it up

Excerpts:

So what do they really want? And what would make them stop?

The Houthis’ stated goal for their campaign is to disrupt trade linked to Israel and its backers, in solidarity with the people of Gaza. (Notably, though, many of the ships targeted have had few if any links to Israel and the actual Israeli economy has seen relatively little impact. Two of the sailors killed on the True Confidence hailed from the Philippines; one was from Vietnam.)

A spokesman for the group, Mohammed Abdulsalam, told Reuters in February that “there will be no halt to any operations that help Palestinian people except when the Israeli aggression on Gaza and the siege stop.”

A ceasefire in Gaza seems possible in the coming weeks, if not the coming days, but it is far from clear whether that will mean an end to the crisis in the Red Sea as well. For what it’s worth, the Houthis attacked a US warship during the last temporary ceasefire in late November. More fundamentally, a group that few outside the Middle East had given much thought to until a few months ago has, through these attacks, achieved a global profile and shown it can strike at the very heart of global capitalism while resisting the most powerful militaries in the world. Is it really just going to give that up?

As one Yemeni analyst, Mohammed al-Basha of the private consultancy Navanti, put it to Vox, “That’s the million-dollar question.”

...

The US and British airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen have not effectively deterred them, which should not be surprising: A decade of Saudi and Emirati airstrikes didn’t deter them either. The rationale for these strikes appears to be based on “a mistaken analysis of how much pain the Houthis can endure,” said Johnsen. “They’ve been fighting for the past few decades, and they’ve endured quite a bit.”

While some analysts have called for the US to commit itself to an effort to defeat the Houthis, there’s little appetite in Washington to get more deeply involved in another Middle Eastern civil war.

Some critics of Biden’s support for Israel have suggested that rather than fighting the Houthis, the US should focus on pressuring Israel to stop its war in Gaza — the proximate cause of this crisis. But even if the US can pull this off, it may not make a difference in Yemen. The Houthis have the world’s attention, and they don’t appear likely to give it up any time soon.

The Houthis have the world’s attention — and they won’t give it up

What do Yemen’s suddenly world-famous rebels really want, and what will make them stop?

By Joshua Keating Mar 9, 2024, 8:00am EST

Vox · by Joshua Keating · March 9, 2024

Supporters of the Houthis take part in a rally against Israel and in solidarity with the people of Gaza on February 28, 2024, in Sana’a, Yemen.

Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images

Joshua Keating is a senior correspondent at Vox covering foreign policy and world news with a focus on the future of international conflict. He is the author of the 2018 book, Invisible Countries: Journeys to the Edge of Nationhood, an exploration of border conflicts, unrecognized countries, and changes to the world map.

Until last week, the damage wrought by the campaign of attacks Yemen’s Houthis have been waging against shipping in the Red Sea has been mostly measured in dollars and cents. Cargo ships have made long, expensive detours around the Cape of Good Hope; a Tesla factory in Germany halted production thanks to a shortage of parts; Egypt’s cash-strapped government is struggling with the loss of Suez Canal transit fees as ships avoid the Red Sea.

But the crisis took a serious and deadly turn over the past week. Last Saturday, for the first time, the Houthis sank a ship. The tanker Rubymar was struck by a Houthi missile on February 18, and finally sank after weeks of taking on water. In the process of sinking, the Rubymar’s anchor likely damaged three key underwater telecommunications cables in the Red Sea, according to US officials. Meanwhile, the Rubymar’s cargo of 21,000 metric tons of fertilizer threatens to cause an environmental disaster.

Then on Wednesday, three sailors were killed in a missile strike on the container ship True Confidence, some 50 miles off the Yemeni coast. They were the first reported fatalities caused by the Houthi attacks.

The Houthis’ Red Sea campaign is already the most disruptive, consequential, and attention-grabbing of the actions taken by the so-called “Axis of Resistance” of Iranian-backed proxy groups since the war in Gaza began in October. The Houthis have continued their attacks even as other Iran-backed groups have appeared to pull back, wary of a direct military confrontation with the United States. Several rounds of US-led airstrikes have also failed to deter the group.

So what do they really want? And what would make them stop?

The Houthis’ stated goal for their campaign is to disrupt trade linked to Israel and its backers, in solidarity with the people of Gaza. (Notably, though, many of the ships targeted have had few if any links to Israel and the actual Israeli economy has seen relatively little impact. Two of the sailors killed on the True Confidence hailed from the Philippines; one was from Vietnam.)

A spokesman for the group, Mohammed Abdulsalam, told Reuters in February that “there will be no halt to any operations that help Palestinian people except when the Israeli aggression on Gaza and the siege stop.”

A ceasefire in Gaza seems possible in the coming weeks, if not the coming days, but it is far from clear whether that will mean an end to the crisis in the Red Sea as well. For what it’s worth, the Houthis attacked a US warship during the last temporary ceasefire in late November. More fundamentally, a group that few outside the Middle East had given much thought to until a few months ago has, through these attacks, achieved a global profile and shown it can strike at the very heart of global capitalism while resisting the most powerful militaries in the world. Is it really just going to give that up?

As one Yemeni analyst, Mohammed al-Basha of the private consultancy Navanti, put it to Vox, “That’s the million-dollar question.”

The cargo ship Rubymar sinking after it was targeted by Yemen’s Houthi forces in the Red Sea, on March 7, 2024.

Al-Joumhouriah channel via Getty Images

Opportunity in chaos

As Basha sees it, the strikes in the Red Sea allow the Houthis to “disrupt economic activity, extract political concessions, and bolster their standing as defenders of Palestinians and Yemenis. These motivations would likely persist regardless of ceasefires elsewhere.”

Houthis are no doubt also enjoying the global publicity they have gained, which included a specific mention in President Biden’s State of the Union address on Thursday night. “They’re feeding off of all the media attention. No one’s talking about Hezbollah right now,” said Basha, referring to the Lebanon-based militia that has long been Iran’s largest and most prominent proxy in the Middle East.

All of this would have been unimaginable 20 years ago when Houthi leaders were holed up in caves in the mountains of Northern Yemen, trying to survive under a blistering bombardment from Yemeni government forces. Those attacks would kill Hussein al-Houthi, the group’s founder, namesake, and brother of its current leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi.

The Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, are members of the minority Zaydi sect of Shia Islam and began as a rebel group fighting the government of longtime Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in the 1990s. Even after they regrouped following Hussein’s death and were able to take over the capital city, Sanaa, in 2014, most Western governments viewed them as a regional concern at best. This despite the fact that their official slogan — “Death to America/Death to Israel/Curse upon the Jews/Victory to Islam” — hinted at wider global ambitions.

The Houthis fought a brutal decade-long war against Yemen’s internationally recognized government that was aided by an international coalition led by Saudi Arabia (and supported by the United States). Yemen has been in a state of uneasy truce since a UN-mediated ceasefire in 2022, which has not fully ended the underlying conflict but has brought some degree of relief from a war and a resulting humanitarian crisis that has killed more than 377,000 people.

The Saudis had been looking to extract themselves from what they had come to see as a fruitless quagmire in Yemen and had been involved in talks with the Houthis about making the ceasefire permanent, though that process has been on hold since October 7.

Gregory Johnsen, a veteran Yemen observer and non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, says the state of play in Yemen prior to the ceasefire is key to understanding their motivations now. The pause in hostilities allowed the Houthis to consolidate control of about a third of Yemen’s territory, home to around 70 percent of its population.

While undoubtedly an effective fighting force, the Houthis have been markedly less effective at governance. They were struggling to provide basic services to the civilian population in the areas they control and were failing to contain infighting from opposition groups. Never exactly liberal pluralists, their rule was becoming increasingly repressive, including targeted assassinations, an extensive surveillance state, and Taliban-like restrictions on women’s rights.

The war in Gaza, therefore, couldn’t have come at a better time.

“War is good for them,” Johnsen said. “The Palestinian cause ... is incredibly popular all over Yemen. Just by doing what they’re doing, the Houthis can take advantage of a rally-round-the-flag effect and expand their pool of potential recruits within Yemen.” According to one report from the Washington Institute on Near East Policy, the Houthis have attracted 16,000 recruits to their ranks since the war in Gaza began.

While the Houthis may temporarily halt or reduce their attacks after the fighting in Gaza stops, it seems very unlikely they will stop altogether. For one thing, the Houthis have left themselves quite a bit of wiggle room with their statements on the war. Many in the Middle East would argue that Israeli “aggression” on Gaza and a state of “siege” in the territory existed even before this current war.

“It’s easy to come up with an excuse to launch another missile,” Basha said.

As Johnsen sees it, while the Houthis may be sincere in their support for Palestine, they have also “utilized what’s happening in Gaza to advance their own goals.”

What are those goals exactly?

Ultimately, the Houthis would like to control all of Yemen, in particular the country’s southern coastline as well as valuable oil and gas deposits, which are currently mainly in areas still run by the internationally recognized government. They would also like to be recognized internationally as Yemen’s legitimate government. More ambitiously, Houthi propaganda has also discussed retaking regions across the border in Saudi Arabia with significant Zaydi populations or even retaking the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

That’s still far-fetched, but in their attacks on the Red Sea, the Houthis have discovered that the mere fact of their location, adjacent to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, gives them the ability to sow an enormous amount of chaos with only relatively rudimentary missiles and drones.

“This ability to disrupt is what they are good at,” said Fatima Abo Alasrar, a Yemeni political analyst with the Middle East Institute. “The Houthis are basically seeking to gain bargaining power in negotiations with either Yemeni forces or Saudi Arabia or international stakeholders. Ultimately, they aim to use this leverage to secure favorable terms that would ensure their political survival and influence.”

What does that mean for Yemen’s uneasy ceasefire? Prior to the truce with the Saudi coalition going into effect, the Houthis had been trying to take some of the country’s most valuable energy deposits, as well as Marib, the last major city in Northern Yemen outside their control. In recent weeks, there have been some limited strikes by the Houthis and skirmishes in these areas.

Alasrar is concerned that “when the conflict [in the Red Sea] winds down, that would be a perfect opportunity for them to expand.”

A new star in the axis

One of the most striking things about the Houthis conduct in this war has been the much higher tolerance for risk they’ve shown than many of their Iran-backed militia counterparts — or even Iran itself.

Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq and Syria have mostly halted their attacks against US troops in recent weeks: Authorities in Tehran reportedly instructed them to stand down after an attack that killed three US troops in Jordan in January, a potentially dangerous escalation in the ongoing US-Iran shadow war. Hezbollah has continued to fire rockets at northern Israel, and another all-out war on Israel’s northern front is not out of the question, but that group has also appeared to be holding back to some extent, not wanting a repeat of the catastrophic 2006 Lebanon war.

All of which presents another question: How much control does Iran have over the Houthis? Some experts have described the Houthis as a “southern Hezbollah” in terms of their ability to project Iranian power across the region. But one difference is that while Hezbollah seeks to exert power over the Lebanese state, the Houthis seek to be the Yemeni state.

The Houthis have seemed a lot less cautious and a lot less concerned about drawing fire from the US military or anyone else. Unlike in the case of Hezbollah, which also acts as a political party within Lebanon and is somewhat sensitive to public opinion, “there is no domestic politics that can hold [the Houthis] accountable,” Alasrar says. “At the moment, they have absolute control [in the areas they control], and they answer to no one.”

The Houthis are often described as an Iranian proxy, and they undoubtedly rely on funding and weaponry from Iran, but at times they’ve also shown independence. (Iranian officials reportedly advised the Houthis against taking Sanaa in 2014. They were ignored.)

At this point, says Johnsen, “The Houthis are less a proxy of Iran than they are an ally of Iran.”

Just when we thought we were out of Yemen

There’s some dark irony to the fact that the Biden administration finds itself increasingly enmeshed in a conflict with the Houthis. Starting in 2015, under the Obama administration, US lent support to the Saudi-led coalition, but as the war dragged on, the number of casualties rose and human rights criticism of both sides grew. That support became increasingly controversial, including within the administration itself.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan are among the Obama administration veterans who during the Trump administration signed a 2018 letter expressing regret for that support and calling for an end to the war. In February 2021, Biden announced a halt to the Saudi war effort — one of his first major foreign policy decisions, and one in keeping with his overall goal of reducing the US military footprint in the Middle East.

But now, Yemen appears to be sucking America’s foreign policy leaders back in.

When it comes to US policy in the Middle East, it’s almost a cliche at this point to say there are no good options, but sometimes there really are just no good options. The US-led naval forces in the Red Sea have been effective at shooting down many of the Houthis’ missiles and drones, but as the strikes on the Rubymar and the True Confidence showed, only a few need to get through to cause catastrophic damage.

The Houthis have also been bold enough to target US warships directly, and it does not seem out of the question that one of these strikes will eventually cause US military casualties. (Two Navy SEALS drowned during an attempt to board a ship suspected of carrying Iranian weapons to Yemen in January.)

The Biden administration has slapped sanctions on the Houthis and restored their Trump-era designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, but that won’t do much against a group that barely participates in the legitimate global economy to begin with.

Nor do regional partners seem eager to help. The Saudis are desperately trying to extract themselves from the war in Yemen, and despite the global economic costs to shipping, many Middle Eastern countries are wary about signing onto a military effort that will be seen as tacitly supporting Israel.

The US and British airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen have not effectively deterred them, which should not be surprising: A decade of Saudi and Emirati airstrikes didn’t deter them either. The rationale for these strikes appears to be based on “a mistaken analysis of how much pain the Houthis can endure,” said Johnsen. “They’ve been fighting for the past few decades, and they’ve endured quite a bit.”

While some analysts have called for the US to commit itself to an effort to defeat the Houthis, there’s little appetite in Washington to get more deeply involved in another Middle Eastern civil war.

Some critics of Biden’s support for Israel have suggested that rather than fighting the Houthis, the US should focus on pressuring Israel to stop its war in Gaza — the proximate cause of this crisis. But even if the US can pull this off, it may not make a difference in Yemen. The Houthis have the world’s attention, and they don’t appear likely to give it up any time soon.

Vox · by Joshua Keating · March 9, 2024

13. Oppenheimer Couldn’t Run a Hamburger Stand. How Did He Run a Secret Lab?

Oppenheimer Couldn’t Run a Hamburger Stand. How Did He Run a Secret Lab?

The theoretical physicist had zero experience as a manager. But with the world hanging in the balance, he became one of the most effective leaders in history.

https://www.wsj.com/business/oppenheimer-robert-movie-oscars-los-alamos-manhattan-project-7f753525?utm

By Ben Cohen

March 8, 2024 9:00 pm ET

When he was named the director of the Manhattan Project’s Los Alamos Laboratory, J. Robert Oppenheimer was an improbable choice for the most important job in America.

At the time, he was a 38-year-old theoretical physicist who had never managed anything more than a dozen graduate students, much less an operation with the fate of the world at stake. Leslie Groves, the Army general who hired him, said he received “no support, only opposition” for his decision. One close friend who would later win a Nobel Prize called Oppenheimer “absolutely the most unlikely choice” to run a secret lab that would build the atomic bomb.

“He couldn’t run a hamburger stand,” said another colleague.

So how did he transform into one of the most effective and consequential leaders in history?

Cillian Murphy as Robert Oppenheimer in a scene from ‘Oppenheimer.’ The movie is nominated for 13 Academy Awards. PHOTO: MELINDA SUE GORDON/UNIVERSAL PICTURES/ASSOCIATED PRESS

This weekend, “Oppenheimer” is expected to dominate the Oscars. But even watching a three-hour movie from a painstakingly meticulous auteur like Christopher Nolan isn’t enough to understand what made Oppenheimer tick. If you really want to get inside his mind, you have to read two Pulitzer Prize-winning books, “American Prometheus” by Kai Bird and the late Martin J. Sherwin and “The Making of the Atomic Bomb” by Richard Rhodes.

I recently called the authors to find out more about Oppenheimer the manager.

They helped me understand four elements of his success that apply to any sort of project—even the ones that don’t involve gigantic explosions.

Oppenheimer the recruiter

Before he could build the bomb, Oppenheimer had to build something else with the potential to blow up in his face: a team.

Los Alamos hadn’t yet been selected as the site of his secret lab when Oppenheimer began hunting for talent. Once he identified scientists and decided to hire them, he did whatever it took to get them. When the physicist Richard Feynman turned him down because his wife was sick with tuberculosis, for example, Oppenheimer found a sanatorium close enough to Los Alamos that he could visit on the weekends.

It’s a revealing story not because Feynman was a star but the opposite: The future Nobel winner was still merely a graduate student, “not anybody famous at all,” as he put it, and yet Oppenheimer still went above and beyond.

The base camp for the testing of the first atomic bomb in New Mexico. PHOTO: NATIONAL ARCHIVES/COVER IMAGES/ZUMA PRESS

He understood that hiring was essential to his team’s success and made it a priority from the very beginning, when he told a colleague they should adopt a “policy of absolutely unscrupulous recruiting of anyone we can lay hands on.”

And it absolutely worked. Never before or since have so many of the nation’s most brilliant scientists been concentrated in the same place for such a long time.

Many of his brainy recruits didn’t love the idea of uprooting their lives and moving to a military post in the desert for who knows how long. But he could be as patient as he was relentless when he really wanted someone, pursuing some for months, leaning on mutual friends to persuade others and even researching the local medical facilities.

Oppenheimer the communicator

Once he got them, Oppenheimer knew how to get the best work out of his scientists. In his new book, Charles Duhigg writes about “supercommunicators,” people who are “capable of saying exactly the right thing, breaking through to almost anyone, figuring out how to connect in even the most unlikely circumstances.” Oppenheimer, as it turns out, was a supercommunicator.

Others in Los Alamos were better physicists, chemists and engineers. But what he could do better than anybody there—and maybe better than anybody on the planet—was take scientists with different perspectives and bring them to a consensus.

“He would stand at the back of the room and listen as everyone argued,” Bird said. “Then he would step forward at just the right moment, summarize the salient points that everyone had been making that were in common and point the way forward.”

“He would walk in, quickly grasp what the problem was and almost always suggest some leads to a solution,” Rhodes said.

Oppenheimer, in hat, with colleagues at a nuclear test site near Alamogordo, N.M. PHOTO: BETTMANN ARCHIVE/GETTY IMAGES

Bird told me that Oppenheimer was both the “director and dictator” of Los Alamos, but he was a peculiar sort of authoritarian: He didn’t believe in giving orders.

Instead, the charismatic physicist with sparkling blue eyes and a magnetic presence gently nudged the scientists in the right direction, speaking in a voice so quiet that “you had to lean forward to make sure you caught everything,” said Bird, whose biography inspired the blockbuster movie. What made him the ideal manager of this sprawling operation was not just his knowledge of physics but his intuitive grasp of human psychology. Oppenheimer had close personal relationships with hundreds of the 10,000 people who came to work at Los Alamos. Even the ones that didn’t know him felt like he knew them. That made them want to work harder for him.

“Everybody certainly had the impression that Oppenheimer cared what each particular person was doing,” Hans Bethe, the head of the project’s theoretical-physics division, told Rhodes. “He made it clear that that person’s work was important for the success of the whole project.”

There were several reasons besides his complete inexperience running complex organizations that Oppenheimer was an astonishing selection as the Manhattan Project’s scientific director: his lack of Nobel Prize, his links to the Communist Party, his knack for breaking every piece of equipment he walked past.

But what set him apart from the other geniuses at Los Alamos was his broad knowledge and breadth of interests, which allowed him to make connections across disciplines and see what others in the room couldn’t. They were specialists. He was a generalist. They were singularly focused on their narrow fields of research. He was curious about philosophy, literature, poetry and the Bhagavad Gita. “He was a good scientist precisely because he was also a humanist,” Bird says.

Groves was so impressed by Oppenheimer’s range of interests that he once declared: “Oppenheimer knows everything.” He also could explain everything he knew without condescending, another trait that distinguished him from other eminently qualified scientists who interviewed for the job.

“He was able to speak in plain English,” Bird said.

Oppenheimer, left, with Leslie Groves, the general who hired him. Groves said he received ‘no support, only opposition’ for his decision. PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS

Oppenheimer the collaborator

The scientists were willing to drop everything in their lives to work around the clock in the middle of nowhere. What they were not willing to do was wear a military uniform.

Oppenheimer himself was so allergic to hierarchy that he objected to making a basic organizational chart. He was intense but informal, someone who commanded respect without demanding it, and the biggest difference between Oppenheimer and Army generals was how they believed teams should operate.

The military relied on compartmentalization. He insisted on collaboration.

Scientists and other workers rig the world’s first atomic bomb to raise it up onto a 100-foot tower. PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS

By demanding a flatter structure, Oppenheimer might as well have asked the Army if everyone in Los Alamos could have a mullet. In fact, when Groves learned that Oppenheimer was in favor of instituting a weekly colloquium for hundreds of scientists, he tried to shut it down. Oppenheimer prevailed. He understood the value of gathering people from different parts of a project in the same place, encouraging them to discuss their work and combine their ideas.

“Very often a problem discussed in one of these meetings would intrigue a scientist in a completely different branch of the laboratory,” Bethe once wrote, “and he would come up with unexpected solutions.”

The meetings also improved morale at Los Alamos, providing a weekly reminder that everyone on the Manhattan Project had a role to play. Oppenheimer was right to fight for their existence.

“He won the loyalty of people inside the fence,” Bird says. “They could see that he was protecting them, allowing them to collaborate and talk freely, which was necessary to the success of the project.”

They worked six days a week, but Oppenheimer made sure they weren’t only working. On their off days, there was horseback riding, mountain climbing, skiing, hiking and some of the geekiest basketball games of all time. When a local theater group staged a performance of “Arsenic and Old Lace,” Oppenheimer brought the house down with his surprise cameo as a corpse. And he was especially famous for his parties, where Oppenheimer paired his deadly gin martinis with his favorite toast: “To the confusion of our enemies!”

Oppenheimer ‘decided he was going to be the best lab director there ever was,’ said author Richard Rhodes. ‘That’s what he became.’ PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS

Oppenheimer the actor

There’s one more thing that everyone at the Academy Awards can appreciate—and everyone at home can emulate—about the way Oppenheimer turned himself into a leader.

“Oppenheimer,” Rhodes told me, “was something of an actor.”

In fact, Rhodes told me about one unforgettable conversation with Bethe in 1982, when the Nobel-winning physicist marveled about Oppenheimer’s reinvention at Los Alamos. Before the war and after the war, Oppenheimer could be nasty and make geniuses feel like fools, Bethe said. But not during the war.

Oppenheimer morphed into someone else altogether and became so unrecognizable to previous versions of himself that it was almost as if he were playing a character.

“He decided he was going to be the best lab director there ever was,” Rhodes said. “That’s what he became.”

Write to Ben Cohen at ben.cohen@wsj.com

14. How To Deconstruct The New Iron Curtain – OpEd

Two words: Blame America.

How To Deconstruct The New Iron Curtain – OpEd

March 9, 2024 0 Comments

By John Feffer

eurasiareview.com · March 9, 2024

The head of the U.S. Strategic Command told Congress last week that a powerful set of countries is ganging up against the United States and World War III is on the horizon.

General Anthony Cotton’s testimony didn’t receive much attention from the U.S. press, other than some breathless coverage from conservative outlets eager to emphasize the weakness of the Biden administration and the necessity of boosting the U.S. military budget.

Though under-reported, the general’s comments are a useful window onto the Pentagon’s worldview. They reveal the increasingly Cold War thinking that is developing in Washington, which mirrors the hardening of attitudes in Moscow.

Such talk of “us versus them” is but the latest sign that the world has been thrown back to 1946. It was 78 years ago this week that former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his infamous “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri. At that time, an international community that had recently been conjured into existence with the formation of the United Nations was threatening to cleave into two spheres, Communist and non-Communist. Churchill, among others, pushed hard to reinforce this division.

Today, a similar chasm has opened up between what Vladimir Putin calls the “collective West” and his preferred axis of allies including China, Iran, North Korea, and Syria. But how united are these two respective spheres? Is war inevitable between them?

In 1946, irrevocable conflict between Moscow and Washington was not a foregone conclusion. Strategic diplomacy could have averted the Cold War, or at least, softened the confrontation. Perhaps lessons from the origins of that great twentieth-century divide can help the world avoid embarking on another decades-long global ideological slugfest.

What Cotton Said

In February, the chair of the House Intelligence Committee Mike Turner (R-OH) made a mysterious statement about a “serious national security threat” that generated a lot of media attention. It turned out to be information about a new Russian capabilityto attack U.S. satellites with nuclear weapons. Turner insists that he dropped his bombshell to wake up the Biden administration to a new threat, though it seems more likely that he was simply trying to prod his fellow House Republicans to support the most recent bill to provide military assistance to Ukraine.

General Cotton’s subsequent testimony came in part because Congress wants reassurance that Russia has not opened up a technological advantage over the United States. And indeed, Cotton went into great detail on what the United States is doing to maintain an edge. But not all of his words were reassuring:

Today, the United States, its Allies, and partners continue to be confronted by two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries: the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. We are also faced with the growing nuclear threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Islamic Republic of Iran’s continued expansion of its nuclear program. What’s more, our potential adversaries are increasing their level of coordination and cooperation with one another. This threat environment raises the possibility of near-simultaneous conflicts with multiple nuclear-armed, opportunistic adversaries.

Cotton went on to discuss military cooperation between Russia and China, the modernization of their nuclear arsenals, and the supply of ammunition from North Korea and Iran to Russia for its war in Ukraine. He expressed concerns over North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and the continued expansion of Iran’s nuclear program. He then sought to reassure Congress that the administration is undertaking its own modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad and upgrading capacities in such high-tech arenas as electromagnetic spectrum operations and hypersonic weapons.

But after getting the attention of members of Congress by raising the specter of the United States fighting wars simultaneously again multiple adversaries, Cotton didn’t give many examples of this increased “coordination and cooperation” among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. He cites a couple of joint military exercises and some arms deliveries.

That’s not exactly comparable to the Soviet moves to create an international, Communist alliance in the late 1940s and 1950s. So, is this new axis of illiberalism arrayed against the “collective West” just a fever dream of Vladimir Putin and/or a useful way of getting Congress to cough up more military dollars?

Russia and the Sovereignistas

The Russian economy is not doing so bad considering all the sanctions slapped on it. In 2023, it grew by 3.6 percent, largely as a result of government stimulus programs, like massive military expenditures. Many countries continue to buy Russian oil, natural gas, and coal. China has been the top customer, followed by India and Turkey. But European countries have also continued to buy Russian fossil fuel to the tune of $18 billion in 2023. So, obviously, consumers of Russian fossil fuels don’t necessarily share the Kremlin’s ideological agenda.

Putin’s far-right positions on religion, anti-LGBTQ “family values,” and illiberal political structures such as an unconstrained executive have some appeal outside of Russia. Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary, cozies up to Putin on the basis of an ideological affinity. So do a number of other far-right actors in Europe and the United States. But Putin’s emphasis on Christianity doesn’t serve as the basis for a powerful bond with China, North Korea, or Iran.

It’s Putin’s emphasis on Russia’s sovereignty—the country’s right to do what it wants within its own borders regardless of the dictates of international law and international organizations—that appeals to other countries led by autocrats who are also defying global norms and institutions. That includes countries in the Global South as well: Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, the military junta in Myanmar.

Let’s call this axis of defiant countries the Soveriegnistas. They may not agree with each other on everything, but they know what they don’t like: globalists telling them what to do. These globalists range from international human rights lawyers and officials from the International Monetary Fund to Eurocrats from Brussels and representatives from environmental NGOs.

In other words, not much really connects Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. It’s an updated version of George W. Bush’s “axis of evil,” a bunch of countries thrown together that Washington policymakers generally find distasteful at the moment. They are an axis in the eye of the American beholder.

Take Russia and China. Despite increasing economic ties, Beijing is wary of Moscow, and always has been. Putin is an unpredictable actor who, from the Chinese point of view, has put the global economy at unnecessary risk because of his invasion of Ukraine. Of course, China prefers Putin to the alternative, which they fear is chaos or collapse. But his decision to continue fighting—for at least five years, no less—despite suffering a range of battlefield setbacks speaks not only to his stubbornness but his reluctance to take Chinese priorities into consideration.

China and North Korea, meanwhile, are said to be “as close as lips and teeth.” But Pyongyang has long chafed at Beijing’s superior attitude and efforts to push a particular agenda on its “younger brother:” don’t build nuclear weapons, pursue a more market-oriented economic reform, and so on. Iran supplies Russia with drones, but Russia recently angered Tehran by again siding with the UAE over three disputed islands. In response, Iranian commentators brought up all the past examples of Russia ignoring Iranian interests, such as its support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.

And the “collective West”? It has come together, fitfully, to apply sanctions against Russia and supply Ukraine with weapons. But there is division here, too, with a number of EU leaders—Viktor Orban of Hungary, Robert Fico of Slovakia, Geert Wilders of The Netherlands—diverging from the European consensus. Even the United States is not really a reliable member of the “collective West,” with MAGA Republicans and Donald Trump himself taking Ukraine-skeptical positions.

Learning from 1946

The Cold War was not inevitable. After 1945, Stalin was not eager, at least initially, to confront the capitalist world directly. He certainly continued to be ruthless at home, but he eventually withdrew Soviet troops from Iran in 1946 as a result of Western pressure and from Austria in 1955 after assurances that the country would remain neutral. He was initially reluctant to back Kim Il Sung’s plan to invade South Korea in 1950.

But the United States in particular was convinced that there could be no lasting agreements with Stalin or, later, with Mao. Today, the Cold War seems like it was foreordained. But an alternative history might have been constructed out of provisional agreements with Stalin and then with Khrushchev during the Thaw. The extreme polarization of the Cold War era could have been avoided, or at least moderated.

It’s hard to imagine making deals with Putin today, though he seems as reluctant as Stalin was in 1946 to confront the “collective West” directly. Putin has threatened to use nuclear weapons if NATO directly enters the war in Ukraine, which speaks to his strong preference to avoid such a direct confrontation, and he has gone out of his way not to do anything like interdicting NATO weapons shipments for fear of such a confrontation.

But the most important lesson of 1946 is that the United States should do what it can to avoid pushing Russia and its allies closer together. They do not form a natural axis of ideological affinity, although anti-Western sentiment could supply the necessary glue to hold the axis together.

To avoid providing such glue, the United States should first and foremost stop the economic decoupling from China. The Chinese leadership needs to demonstrate that it can deliver economic growth, and the United States can still help ensure that outcome and prevent China from tipping fully into the anti-West camp.

Second, the United States must rescue the Iran nuclear deal from hospice and breathe new life into it. Iran is not a monolith. It has a strong middle class and a heterogeneous reformist bloc. Donald Trump’s cancellation of the Obama-era nuclear agreement all but guaranteed the victory of the current conservative leadership in Tehran by confirming their skepticism of engagement with the United States. The United States needs to mend fences as quickly as possible with Iran in the hopes that the reformists will return to power.

North Korea is the toughest nut to crack. But here, too, the United States can accomplish much by simply opening up negotiations and showing a little flexibility. It’s bad enough alienating a near-totalitarian state. It’s considerably worse pissing off one with nuclear weapons.

It took a long time before the United States figured out, during the Cold War, that it could drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow, that it could cultivate relations with an increasingly independent Yugoslavia, that it could even form informal alliances with anti-Western mujahidin in Afghanistan (which turned out to be a lousy idea).

The lesson for today: the United States should moderate uncompromising attitudes that are ultimately self-defeating. Putin thinks that he is leading a powerful, united alliance against the “collective West.” Only the United States, in its misguided efforts to push those adversarial countries together, seems to take Putin seriously.

Let’s not wait a couple decades before realizing what smart diplomacy can achieve. Let’s learn the lessons of history now when they really count.

This article was published by FPIF

eurasiareview.com · March 9, 2024

15. Exclusive: US prepared ‘rigorously’ for potential Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine in late 2022, officials say

I should hope so. We would be negligent and irresponsible if we failed to do so. And I hope we are already planning and preparing "rigorously."

“We had to plan so that we were in the best possible position in case this no‑longer unthinkable event actually took place,” the same senior administration official told me.

I wonder if our adversaries think that there is no country more afraid of nuclear weapons use than the US? Certainly no other country talks about preventing escalation and the dangers of a nuclear exchange as much as the US.

Exclusive: US prepared ‘rigorously’ for potential Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine in late 2022, officials say

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/09/politics/us-prepared-rigorously-potential-russian-nuclear-strike-ukraine/

By Jim Sciutto, CNN

8 minute read

Updated 10:06 AM EST, Sat March 9, 2024

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CNN looks back at the 2 years of war in Ukraine