​Quotes of the Day:

"I told you once that I was searching for the nature of evil. I think I've come close to defining it: a lack of empathy. It's the one characteristic that connects all the defendants. A genuine capacity to feel for their fellow man. Evil, I think, is the absence of empathy."

– G. M. Gilbert (psychologist who interrogated Nazis that were being prosecuted in Nuremberg)

“The old world is dying. And a New World struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters.”

– Antonio Gramsci

"It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their own selfish purposes."

– Andrew Jackson

1. Strengthening South Korea's defense: a path to self-reliance and strategic alliances

2. North Korean Deployment in Kursk: A Window into the DPRK Military

3. What to expect after South Korea’s Constitutional Court rules on the impeachment of President Yoon

4. How S Korea would respond to Taiwan hostilities

5. The unraveling of the U.S.-Korea alliance

6. Faction led by North's old pal rises in major South Korean party

7. N. Korea ramps up criticism against S. Korea-U.S. drills, but no mention of missile launch

8. U.S. military decries N.K.'s missile launches, calls on it to refrain from 'unlawful,' 'destabilizing' acts

9. White House reaffirms commitment to 'complete' denuclearization of N. Korea after regime's missile launches

10.  S. Korea raises issue over potential U.S. designation as 'sensitive country': FM

11. Acting president vows 'zero tolerance' for any violence amid imminent ruling on Yoon's impeachment

12. Air Force dismisses 2 unit commanders over accidental jet bombing

13. Opposition lawmakers launch hunger strike calling for Yoon's removal from office

14. “North Korea Publicly Executes 3 Young Men Who Attempted to Defect”

15. ＜Inside N. Korea＞The 'Last Stronghold' of Defection in Crisis: Security Bureau Receives Commendation for Crackdown Success - Smuggling and Defections Nearly Eradicated

16. Sing for the regime: N. Korea's mandatory song sessions face public resistance

17. Behind the cold exile: How N. Korea punishes 'hostile class' citizens

18. Empty promises, empty stomaches: The plight of N. Korean farmers under party restrictions

1. Strengthening South Korea's defense: a path to self-reliance and strategic alliances

​I still think one line of effort in dealing with the demographic challenge and improving national security is building a large, professional, and well resourced reserve force.

Conclusion.

South Korea stands at a crossroads. The changing geopolitical landscape, coupled with shifting U.S. priorities, requires a recalibration of its defense strategy. The goal is not to reduce dependence on the U.S. but to evolve into a more capable and proactive ally. By extending military service, expanding training infrastructure and strengthening regional alliances, South Korea can enhance its self-defense capabilities while maintaining a robust partnership with the United States. Now is the time for decisive action. South Korea must make the necessary reforms to ensure that its military remains strong, its alliances remain firm and its people remain secure. Only by doing so can it navigate the uncertainties of the future and uphold its role as a key pillar of stability in Northeast Asia.

Strengthening South Korea's defense: a path to self-reliance and strategic alliances

The Korea Times · March 11, 2025

By Chun In-bum

Chun In-bum

In less than two months, the second Donald Trump administration is already reshaping America and the world. Economic tariffs, cryptocurrency regulations and diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East and Europe are putting both friends and foes off balance, creating uncertainty and, in some cases, fear. Koreans, both North and South, are watching these developments closely, assessing the potential impact of U.S. policies and contemplating how best to respond and prepare for a rapidly changing global order.

In South Korea, progressives are advocating for a more capable national military and a shift toward greater independence from the United States. Some even support a direct deal between North Korea and the U.S., potentially excluding South Korea from negotiations. While this may sound like a benign or even pragmatic approach, without the proper safeguards, it represents a highly risky course of action that could undermine national security.

The United States needs allies, but more importantly, it needs capable and reliable allies. South Korea's focus on cost-sharing in the alliance, while important, is missing the broader point. The U.S. does not merely seek financial contributions; it wants partners who are prepared to defend themselves and contribute meaningfully to regional stability. South Korea must first ask itself a fundamental question: Are we truly capable of defending ourselves? If not, we must work toward strengthening our military while maintaining our alliance with the United States.

The current 18-month mandatory military service period is insufficient to meet the operational requirements of modern warfare. Nearly half of the soldiers in combat units are discharged each year, and most units are consistently understrength. The notion that technological advancements in artificial intelligence, robotics and automation will fully compensate for this shortfall is unrealistic. While innovation can enhance efficiency, human personnel remain the backbone of any military force.

South Korea must extend its conscription period to at least 24 months. A well-trained, well-prepared standing force is a necessity, not a luxury. Additionally, the military should integrate more women into its ranks. Currently, women can only serve as officers or noncommissioned officers, but opening enlisted positions would expand the talent pool and alleviate manpower shortages. Other countries, including Norway and Israel, have successfully integrated women into their armed forces, proving that this approach is both viable and effective. A structured plan for recruitment, training and long-term career opportunities for female soldiers should be implemented.

Special attention must also be given to reserve forces and mobilization plans. South Korea’s reserve system needs modernization to ensure that trained personnel can be rapidly mobilized and effectively reintegrated into active duty when required. More frequent training cycles and better equipment allocations for reserve units would enhance readiness and combat effectiveness.

Modern warfare requires extensive training in a variety of combat scenarios, particularly live-fire exercises and nighttime operations. However, the existing training infrastructure in South Korea is inadequate. Due to urbanization and civilian resistance, many training areas are too limited or outdated to accommodate the full range of necessary exercises. South Korea must invest in more dedicated military training facilities, especially for live-fire drills and combined operations with U.S. forces. This requires close collaboration with local governments and communities to mitigate concerns about noise, environmental impact and land use. Compensation programs, public engagement efforts and stricter safety regulations could help address civilian objections.

Furthermore, South Korea should explore the possibility of conducting joint training abroad with allied nations. Japan, Australia and other regional partners could provide additional training grounds that would not only enhance operational readiness but also strengthen international military cooperation.

South Korea’s security cannot be considered in isolation. It must work closely with other nations invested in the stability of Northeast Asia. The United Nations Command plays a crucial role in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula, and its contributing nations should be recognized for their ongoing support. Most critically, South Korea must deepen its security cooperation with Japan. Although historical disputes have long complicated military relations, the strategic reality is clear: Korea and Japan are inseparably linked. In the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, Japan serves as a vital logistical and supply hub. Conversely, South Korea is a crucial outpost for Japan’s security.

Trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan must be reinforced, including intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and interoperability enhancements. Security agreements such as the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) should be maintained and expanded. A pragmatic approach to diplomatic relations with Japan, focusing on shared security interests rather than historical grievances, will ultimately benefit both nations.

The United States has provided security for the Korean Peninsula for the past 75 years. In return, South Korea has proven itself a reliable ally. The Republic of Korea deployed troops to Vietnam for over seven years, suffering 25,000 casualties. Since then, South Korean forces have stood alongside U.S. troops in every major conflict, from the Gulf War to Afghanistan and Iraq. This history of commitment underscores the strength of the alliance.

However, alliances are not static; they require constant adaptation. As the U.S. shifts its global priorities, South Korea must step up and demonstrate its ability to defend itself while remaining a dependable partner. This means not only contributing financially but also improving its military capability, strategic posture and regional cooperation efforts.

South Korea stands at a crossroads. The changing geopolitical landscape, coupled with shifting U.S. priorities, requires a recalibration of its defense strategy. The goal is not to reduce dependence on the U.S. but to evolve into a more capable and proactive ally. By extending military service, expanding training infrastructure and strengthening regional alliances, South Korea can enhance its self-defense capabilities while maintaining a robust partnership with the United States. Now is the time for decisive action. South Korea must make the necessary reforms to ensure that its military remains strong, its alliances remain firm and its people remain secure. Only by doing so can it navigate the uncertainties of the future and uphold its role as a key pillar of stability in Northeast Asia.

Chun In-bum (truechun@naver.com) served as a lieutenant general in the ROK Army and was commander of Special Forces Korea.

The Korea Times · March 11, 2025

2. North Korean Deployment in Kursk: A Window into the DPRK Military

​If only we had advisors on the frontline to be able to peer into that window and get a good assessment of north Korean military capabilities.

North Korean Deployment in Kursk: A Window into the DPRK Military

https://geopoliticalmonitor.com/north-korean-deployment-in-kursk-a-window-into-the-dprk-military/

Situation Reports - March 10, 2025

By Lorenzo Fedrigo

The direct intervention of North Korea in the Ukraine war represents a test benchmark for the Korea’s People Army, whose battlefield actions are now challenging the traditional Western opinions that have always drawn it as an obsolete and ineffective power.

Looking beyond the dominant media’s narrative, North Korean involvement allows us to analyze with a better precision the operative capabilities of an army which is historically shrouded in secrecy.

A deepening North Korea-Russia bilateral relationship

The Kim Jong-un regime, Moscow’s historical ally, has constantly demonstrated its support for Russian expansionism in Ukraine. In 2017, the DPRK recognized Crimea as part and parcel of the Russian Federation, and then endorsed the invasion of February 2022. A few months later, the North Korean regime recognized the sovereignty of self-proclaimed independent republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. The latest significant diplomatic action between the two countries dates back to November 2024, with the ratification of an important military cooperation agreement which includes a mutual protection clause, sealing the strategic agreement we now see in action.

In addition to political support, Pyongyang has provided an ever growing and more relevant military contribution. The first military supplies date from the end of 2022, when it appeared clear to Moscow that the conflict would last beyond its initial forecast, requiring external support in order to compensate for the military production shortfalls of Russia’s defense industry. The first North Korean aid included large deliveries of artillery munitions, but, according to data out of Ukraine, about half of the rounds fired were defective. Pyongyang continues to provide a great amount of its own ammunition production to its Russian ally.

After the signing of the November 2024 agreements, this output has risen, now including self-propelled howitzers, short-range missile systems, and even soldiers in support of the Russian army – a fact still denied by Moscow and Pyongyang.

The strategic rationale behind Pyongyang sending its men to support the Ukraine war resides in various conditions laid out in the above bilateral agreements. In exchange for what Moscow sees as mere frontline fodder, the North Korean regime gains significant advantages, including access to sophisticated Russian satellite technology and the ability to acquire foreign currency to finance their nuclear and missile programs. In addition, North Korea benefits from Moscow’s sharing of advanced military technology and a reassurance of Russian support in the event of a conflict on the Korean peninsula.

Unpacking the composition of the North Korean deployment in Kursk

According to reporting out of Ukraine, the North Korean force sent in support to Russia amounts to between 10,000 and 12,000 men in five infantry brigades. After receiving basic training in Vladivostok, the troops were moved by air over 7,000 kilometers to the outskirts of Kursk, placed under the Russian military command, and here they’d have received Russian uniforms and equipment, in addition to forged identity documents that attribute them to the Russian region of Tuva, thereby concealing any evidence of North Korean involvement. The troops are supported by an estimated 500 officers and three North Korean generals, including Kim Yong Bok, commanding 1,500 men from the special operations forces of the People’s Army of Korea (조선인민군 특수작전군) whose presence was also confirmed by the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS).

The North Korean deployment in Kursk has been used to launch continuous assaults, keeping Ukrainian forces engaged such that the Russians can concentrate on other critical areas of the front. The first North Korean attack on Ukrainian lines is likely to have been launched on 4 November, confirming Western fears dating back to August, when unit movements from Pyongyang were first detected near Vladivostok. The estimated 10,000 men deployed by the Pentagon at about 50 kilometers from the Ukrainian front, were initially considered part of a defensive contingent aimed at guarding the Kursk region, which had been the subject of the Ukrainian counteroffensive a few months earlier.

Assessments gathered by Ukrainian forces suggest that these North Korean forces are totally unprepared for modern war. The tactics they employ are obsolete, based on military concepts that are at least four decades old, notably in the advancing of infantry fronts without mechanized support. But above all, these strategies completely neglect the decisive role of drone warfare in modern conflicts, which the North Koreans hitherto had no experience with.

Despite the outdated tactical approach, the standard equipment provided to North Korean soldiers appears qualitatively higher than the average Russian. Weapons recovered from the dead confirm the presence of AK-12 assault rifles with a dozen magazines, between five and ten grenades, several mines and an updated version of the Russian tactical backpack containing very scarce water reserves and supplies. The surprising mobility of Pyongyang’s troops, facilitated by the absence of armor and bulletproof vests, makes these fighters particularly difficult targets to hit for drones.

On the disciplinary level, North Korean soldiers are distinguished by a physical and mental resistance much higher than the worn-out Russian ranks. Their absolute dedication to the orders received lends itself to treacherous frontal assaults. There are numerous reports of North Korean soldiers who, instead of surrendering, preferred to be blown up with grenades.

Ideological indoctrination seems to play a central role in the behavior of these units. According to some testimonies, North Koreans would eliminate the wounded comrades in order to avoid falling prisoners, just as the Russians have opened fire several times on retreating North Koreans, in the fear that capture may reveal their true identity. As part of the role played by propaganda, notes were found on the bodies of the fallen soldiers, in which they extol the superiority of North Korea and the willingness to sacrifice themselves for the glory of their own country at any cost.

Offering a counter view to this alleged ideological fanaticism inherent to North Korean soldiers, there are some revelations confirmed by both the NIS and the former National Security Communications Advisor of the White House J. Kirby. It seems that the North Korean soldiers are forced by high command to commit the unthinkable in order to avoid capture, because being taken prisoner by the Ukrainians risks serious reprisals against their families back home. Particularly relevant are some documents found on officers’ bodies, including disciplinary records that outline punishments for crimes such as stealing food from supplies or hesitating to commit suicide attacks.

Captured prisoners provide window into the North Korean deployment

Although the news that filters through the North Korean regime is scarce, according to the NIS, the five North Korean brigades consist mainly of conscripts called up for military service from the age of 17. The mandatory service period would be around eight years, which would explain the great physical and mental resistance of the troops, as well as the good combat skills reported by the Ukrainians.

Precisely because of the poor knowledge about these soldiers and the extreme difficulty in taking them prisoner, Ukrainian troops have been on a mission for over a month to capture at least one North Korean. As reported in an interview with the Kyiv Independent, the operation that led to the capture of two North Korean soldiers in mid-January was plagued by numerous difficulties. The two prisoners had been wounded during the fighting and were lying on the battlefield; the capture operations in both cases proved particularly complex, due to the immediate Russian reaction. Although they had never fired a single shot before, when the Russian command understood that the soldiers were being recovered, they opened fire in a deliberate attempt to prevent their capture. The two prisoners are currently in the custody of the Ukrainian secret services and are subject to numerous interrogations aimed at extracting as much information from them as possible.

One of the soldiers, identified as Lee Jong Nam, born in 1999 in Pyongyang, a 25-year-old sergeant, enlisted in 2016, serving in a reconnaissance platoon as a sharpshooter. His first combat mission dates back to 8 January, during which he was wounded in the jaw. All the other members of his seven-man unit were killed in operations prior to his capture.

The second prisoner, born in 2005, remains unidentified. Captured by the Ukrainian media in a film from his hospital bed, he stated that he was wounded on the ground for “three, four or five days.” He also revealed that the name on his Russian military card was false, stating that he did not remember it and that it did not correspond to his real identity. The soldier revealed that he was convinced he was in the middle of a drill. According to a recent statement by prisoners, many of his fellow soldiers were even convinced that they were fighting against South Korean troops.

An ongoing learning experience with wider implications

According to Seth John, an academic at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, North Korean losses are difficult to quantify accurately. However, he estimates that they may be between 30% and 50% of the total, with at least 1,000 men killed in the course of the operations. The figures vary according to the sources: the South Korean NIS, for example, claims that Pyongyang has lost about 300 men, with 2,700 wounded and missing, while for Kyiv the number of casualties is estimated at 4,000.

In any case, the losses are substantial, mainly due to the threat posed by drone warfare and the language barrier between North Koreans and Russians, which significantly complicates coordination on the ground.

In light of this high human cost, according to Ukrainian reports, the North Korean contingent was temporarily withdrawn from the front to reintegrate personnel and receive further training, probably focused on drone tactics. There are also rumors of a possible new troop deployment by Pyongyang, in compliance with the military cooperation agreements ratified last November.

As per an article published by the BBC on 7 February, the North Korean contingent has since returned to combat, however the news remains to be confirmed.

Although the North Korean intervention is not essential in determining the outcome of the war, it offers us interesting insights from multiple perspectives, not only for the organization of the North Korean military, but also in the context of a wider geopolitics. The North Korean deployment in Ukraine is already producing significant effects: troops are gaining first-hand experience on the modern battlefield, mitigating against decades of tactical backwardness. At the same time, the use of domestically produced weapons and equipment in a high-intensity conflict allows Pyongyang to assess their effectiveness. Armed with this knowledge, Pyongyang, with strong Russian support, could establish itself as a relevant regional actor in East Asia.

3. What to expect after South Korea’s Constitutional Court rules on the impeachment of President Yoon

​The real question is will there be political violence?

What will agitators influenced by China and north Korea do?

What to expect after South Korea’s Constitutional Court rules on the impeachment of President Yoon

South Korea’s Constitutional Court could soon rule whether to dismiss or reinstate impeached conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/10/south-korea-constitutional-court-yoon-martial-law/a1c84cae-fe14-11ef-b7a7-d938159de2bc_story.html

March 10, 2025 at 10:27 p.m. EDTYesterday at 10:27 p.m. EDT

0

FILE - South Korea’s impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol attends a hearing of his impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court in Seoul, South Korea, Tuesday, Feb. 11, 2025. (AP Photo/Lee Jin-man, Pool, File)

By Hyung-Jin Kim | AP

SEOUL, South Korea — South Korea’s Constitutional Court could soon rule on whether to dismiss or reinstate impeached conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol . That doesn’t mean the political crisis caused by Yoon’s short-lived imposition of martial law is over.

Get concise answers to your questions. Try Ask The Post AI.

South Korea’s already-severe political divide between conservatives and liberals will likely intensify as Seoul grapples with major foreign policy challenges like U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy platform and North Korea’s increasing military cooperation with Russia.

Here’s what to expect about the court’s likely impending verdict on Yoon's Dec. 3 martial law decree that is testing South Korea’s democracy.

What might the court do?

The Constitutional Court has been deliberating whether to formally end Yoon’s presidency since the liberal opposition-controlled National Assembly in December voted to suspend him. Yoon is also facing a separate criminal trial after his arrest and indictment by prosecutors in January for alleged rebellion in connection with his martial law decree.

If the Constitutional Court rules against him, he will be officially thrown out of office and a national election will be held for a successor within two months.

Following World news

Following

If the court rules for Yoon, he would return to presidential duties. It was earlier unclear whether or how soon he might return to work, because he had been in jail until Saturday.

Yoon is South Korea’s first president who has been arrested while in office, and there are no clear laws or past rulings that could guarantee his immediate return to office, analysts say. But he was eventually released from prison, after a Seoul court canceled his arrest and allowed him to stand his criminal trial without being detained.

After hearing 16 witnesses, the court ended arguments on Feb. 25, but it hasn’t announced when it will announce a verdict. Observers say it could come as early as this week or next week, citing past cases where the court ruled on former presidents.

The biggest issue is why Yoon sent hundreds of troops and police officers to the assembly after declaring martial law. Yoon says he wanted to maintain order, but some top military and police officers sent there have said that Yoon ordered them to drag out lawmakers to block an assembly vote about his decree or detain his political rivals.

Lawmakers eventually managed to get in and vote down his decree. No violence and no arrests of politicians actually happened.

What fallout is expected?

Hundreds of thousands of people had earlier rallied near the assembly, calling for Yoon’s ouster. But those protests have since been scaled down after Yoon’s impeachment. Yoon supporters have also regularly staged major rallies to denounce Yoon’s impeachment.

Ousting Yoon from office would prompt his supporters to ramp up protests before a presidential byelection to boost prospects for a new conservative president. Reinstating him would rekindle huge liberal demonstrations demanding Yoon’s resignation, according to Choi Jin, director of the Seoul-based Institute of Presidential Leadership.

“No matter what decision the Constitutional Court comes up with, South Koreans’ division and extremely polarized politics can’t help but to deepen,” Choi said.

Acting President Choi Sang-mok said Tuesday the government won’t tolerate any illegal, violent protests, saying concerns about physical clashes between pro- and anti-Yoon forces are growing ahead of the court’s verdict on Yoon.

Pro-Yoon rallies turned violent in January when protesters stormed the Seoul Western District Court after it approved Yoon’s formal arrest warrant. The protesters attacked police officers with bricks, steel pipes and other objects. The attack injured 17 police officers.

What about Yoon's rebellion trial?

Investigative authorities have alleged that Yoon’s martial law enforcement amounted to rebellion, describing it as riots with the purpose of undermining the constitution. If he’s convicted of rebellion, he could face the death penalty or life imprisonment.

Results of Yoon’s criminal trial will likely be affected by the Constitutional Court ruling.

The Constitutional Court’s endorsement of Yoon’s impeachment would confirm his violation of the constitution and could help increase prospects for Yoon’s conviction of rebellion, said Park SungBae, a lawyer specializing in criminal law.

But a rejection would mean that the Constitutional Court believed Yoon’s martial law decree wasn’t serious enough to warrant dismissal, or maybe wasn’t even illegal. Prosecutors would subsequently find it burdensome to raise Yoon’s alleged rebellion at the criminal trial, Park said.

Prosecutors indicted Yoon only on charges of rebellion, because he has presidential immunity from most criminal prosecution. Some could question whether his criminal trial should continue if his impeachment is overturned at the Constitutional Court.

Even if the Constitutional Court reinstates Yoon, Choi said that Yoon’s authority has already been badly hurt, so South Korea’s leadership vacuum will likely continue.

4. How S Korea would respond to Taiwan hostilities

​Excerpts:

Given its deep economic interdependence with China, South Korea finds itself strategically caught between Washington and Beijing.

To examine this issue, this writer conducted interviews last year with South Korean military officials in which I classified China’s potential hostile actions against Taiwan into three scenarios:

(1) gray zone operations, which include actions such as deploying China’s maritime militia and coast guard vessels to harass Taiwanese ships, thereby exerting pressure on Taiwan without directly provoking open conflict; (2) a naval blockade; and (3) a full-scale military invasion.

There was a strong consensus among the officials on how South Korea should respond if China were to initiate (1) gray zone operations, (2) a naval blockade, or (3) a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.

...

Given that these differences in strategic priorities could create challenges in a potential crisis—whether in a Taiwan contingency alone or a simultaneous Taiwan-Korean Peninsula conflict—it is crucial for the US, South Korea and Japan to develop a clear understanding of each country’s likely responses during a crisis.

By doing so, the three nations can work toward closing capability gaps and improving coordination before a major conflict arises.

How S Korea would respond to Taiwan hostilities - Asia Times

Korean military officials explain how they would react variously to China gray zone operations, a blockade and invasion of Taiwan

asiatimes.com · by Ju Hyung Kim · March 10, 2025

Despite being a key US regional ally, questions are rising about whether South Korea would take proactive measures if China were to initiate hostile actions against Taiwan?

Given its deep economic interdependence with China, South Korea finds itself strategically caught between Washington and Beijing.

To examine this issue, this writer conducted interviews last year with South Korean military officials in which I classified China’s potential hostile actions against Taiwan into three scenarios:

(1) gray zone operations, which include actions such as deploying China’s maritime militia and coast guard vessels to harass Taiwanese ships, thereby exerting pressure on Taiwan without directly provoking open conflict; (2) a naval blockade; and (3) a full-scale military invasion.

There was a strong consensus among the officials on how South Korea should respond if China were to initiate (1) gray zone operations, (2) a naval blockade, or (3) a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.

In all three scenarios, they agreed that South Korea should increase its alert level within the US-ROK Combined Forces and reinforce deterrence against potential North Korean provocations.

This concern stems from the possibility that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, whether acting in coordination with China or independently, might view a regional shift in US military focus toward the Taiwan Strait as an opportunity to exploit a potential power vacuum on the Korean Peninsula.

To prevent such a miscalculation, it is essential to consistently signal to North Korean authorities that US-ROK contingency plans will function effectively as intended, eliminating any perception of nuclear decoupling between South Korea and the US.

Regarding military capability, South Korea should prioritize acquiring additional ground-to-ground precision missiles capable of penetrating underground bunkers, which would serve as critical assets for South Korea’s kill chain and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) strategies.

Apart from strengthening deterrence, South Korea’s response strategy varied across the three scenarios. In scenario one, where China engages in gray zone operations, most South Korean military officials recommended maintaining neutrality and avoiding actions that could unnecessarily provoke China, such as deploying naval vessels to the Taiwan Strait or providing logistical support to US forces in the region.

This cautious approach stems from South Korea’s economic interdependence with China and the expectation that any direct involvement could lead to significant economic retaliation, as evidenced by the backlash following the 2017 THAAD deployment.

Additionally, it is important to note that the 1953 US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty primarily emphasizes the defense of South Korean territory against external threats, but does not contain provisions obligating South Korea to participate in military operations beyond its borders.

Meanwhile, in scenario two, where a Chinese naval blockade in the Taiwan Strait could disrupt South Korea’s sea lines of communication (SLOC), some officials suggested that South Korea should deploy naval forces to secure these critical trade routes, which are essential for economic stability.

To address this challenge, South Korea should acquire five to six Aegis-equipped naval vessels, each with a minimum capacity of 100 Battle Force Missiles (BFM)—a metric that represents the total number of missile cells on a naval vessel capable of launching both offensive and defensive missiles, serving as a standardized measure of a fleet’s overall missile firepower.

In this particular scenario, the focus would be on anti-ship missiles designed to target Chinese naval vessels. Under this framework, two to three ships could be stationed in the Taiwan Strait for extended periods, rotating between South Korean waters and the Taiwan Strait.

To effectively implement this strategy, South Korea should focus on developing a Blue Water Navy, capable of sustaining extended operations far from its shores.

This is particularly important because rerouting South Korea’s SLOCs away from the Taiwan Strait—through the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos or around Papua New Guinea via the Solomon Sea—would be both time-consuming and costly.

In scenario three, some South Korean officials believed that, at a minimum, South Korea should provide logistical support to US forces in Korea deploying to the Taiwan Strait, such as access to South Korean airfields and fuel supplies for US Forces Korea (USFK).

Beyond logistical support, South Korea should also pursue the acquisition of five to six Aegis-equipped naval vessels, along with expanded ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities and an increased arsenal of precision-guided missiles.

However, this situation becomes significantly more complex if North Korea launches military aggression against South Korea at the same time that China invades Taiwan—indicating that deterrence against North Korea has failed.

If a two-front war scenario were to materialize, many South Korean military officials suggested that their military assets, along with key US Forces Korea (USFK) assets, should not be deployed to the Taiwan Strait. This position is understandable, considering the response I received from Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) officials during my discussions in 2023.

When asked about Japan’s response in a two-front war scenario, JSDF officials stated that Japan would prioritize defending the Taiwan Strait, allocating approximately 60-70% of its air and naval assets to support US operations in the region, while only 30-40% would be reserved for Japan’s own defense.

This allocation would significantly impact Japan’s ability to operate under OPLAN 5055, a joint US-Japan military strategy designed to address potential contingencies on the Korean Peninsula in the event of a crisis involving North Korea.

Such a shift in Japan’s strategic focus could directly affect the joint US-ROK Operation Plan (OPLAN), which assumes that in the event of a North Korean invasion, South Korean and USFK would initially hold positions north of the Han River until reinforcements arrive from US Forces Japan (USFJ) within approximately two weeks.

Under this plan, the JSDF plays a critical role in supporting US military operations through logistical and operational assistance.

Given that the bulk of US reinforcements from the US mainland would take approximately 90 days to fully deploy—a timeline expected to overwhelm North Korean aggressors—the timely arrival of reinforcements from Japan is crucial in the early phase of the conflict.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

If USFJ and Japan’s military assets are largely tied up in the Taiwan Strait, South Korea would have no choice but to allocate all of its own military resources to compensate for the reduced support from US forces in Japan, further complicating South Korea’s ability to contribute to regional security in Taiwan.

Overall, while it remains unclear whether the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework (TSCF) has addressed South Korea’s specific action plans in a Taiwan contingency—as its detailed provisions remain classified—South Korea’s response to Chinese aggression across all three scenarios is unlikely to be highly proactive.

Instead, South Korea is expected to focus primarily on strengthening deterrence against potential North Korean military aggression rather than directly intervening in a Taiwan crisis.

This approach reflects the slightly different strategic priorities between South Korea and the US and Japan, as well as the limited availability of military assets in the region that all three countries must carefully allocate.

Given that these differences in strategic priorities could create challenges in a potential crisis—whether in a Taiwan contingency alone or a simultaneous Taiwan-Korean Peninsula conflict—it is crucial for the US, South Korea and Japan to develop a clear understanding of each country’s likely responses during a crisis.

By doing so, the three nations can work toward closing capability gaps and improving coordination before a major conflict arises.

Dr Ju Hyung Kim, CEO of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

Thank you for registering!

An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.

asiatimes.com · by Ju Hyung Kim · March 10, 2025

5. The unraveling of the U.S.-Korea alliance

​I could not disagree more.

Yes, the alliance can, should, and must evolve but the foundation of the alliance remains strong and it is necessary to support America First both in defense of the homeland from north Korea and in strategic competition with China as well as the defense of Taiwan and Japan. America First - Allies Always.

The ROK/US alliance needs to be like a shark - always moving forward.

What happens on the Korean peninsula will have global effects and will directly affect the US homeland militarily, politically, and especially economically.

​​

Commentary

The unraveling of the U.S.-Korea alliance

The logic that once made an American military presence indispensable is no longer as strong as it was during the Cold War

https://www.junotane.com/p/the-unraveling-of-the-us-korea-alliance?r=7i07&utm

Mar 09, 2025

3

3

1

Share

The Cold War often feels like the defining moment of modern geopolitics, the era where alliances were forged and the global order was set. But in the grand sweep of history, it is merely a brief interlude in the much longer story of regional dynamics shaped by geography. The Korean Peninsula has existed for millennia at the crossroads of larger powers—China, Japan, and the steppe empires before them—long before the U.S. and Soviet Union imposed their ideological struggle onto the region.

The division of Korea, the rise of military alliances, and the presence of American troops were not the beginning of history but rather temporary responses to the momentary conditions of the 20th century.

Now, as the Cold War recedes further into the past, older patterns of regional power—China’s gravitational pull, Korea’s struggle for strategic autonomy, and the ebb and flow of external influence—are reasserting themselves. What seemed like a fixed order was in reality just a brief pause in the longer and more fundamental forces of geography and history.

For more than seventy years, the U.S.-South Korea alliance has been a pillar of security in East Asia, forged in war and sustained through Cold War tensions. But today, the forces that once held the alliance together are weakening.

Over the next four years, the pressures pulling Washington and Seoul apart will accelerate to a point where the alliance, once considered indispensable, begins to fade into history.

First, strategic priorities are diverging. The United States was historically opposed to military alliances. It was large enough and dominant enough in its region to shun military alliances. When it finally did enter into military alliances, they were supportive of broader global strategic interests - maintaining U.S. strength and capacity as a maritime power in competition with a continental power stretching from Eastern Europe to the Pacific.

There are broad regions of strategic competition between maritime and continental powers. Each region changes as the relative strength transforms. During the Cold War, the U.S. saw South Korea as a frontline state in this strategic competition, justifying its military presence and security commitments. As global power dynamics shift, Washington’s global strategic priorities are evolving. South Korea no longer represents the essential strategic pivot onto the continent that it once did.

In a broader sense, American foreign policy has seen periodic shifts between global engagement and strategic retrenchment. Reducing U.S. overseas military commitments, and the presence of U.S. troops in Korea, are no longer necessarily central to this global strategy.

Second, South Korea has developed. South Korea has transformed from a war-torn country dependent on U.S. security guarantees into a global economic and military power. South Korea now has one of the world’s most advanced militaries, an indigenous arms industry, and growing confidence in its ability to manage its own security.

The country’s military advancements—ranging from next-generation fighter jets to long-range missile systems—reduce its reliance on the U.S. Moreover, discussions about South Korea acquiring its own nuclear deterrent, once unthinkable, are reaching a point of no-return. If South Korea determines that its security can be or must be maintained independently, the logic of hosting U.S. troops and adhering to an alliance structure largely shaped by American priorities will fade.

From the moment the Rhee Administration accepted the division of the Peninsula and an end to the Korean War, the alliance was transactional. The Vietnam War, the Gulf War, Afghanistan, and everything in-between. The relationship never stopped being transactional - the only difference is that for South Korea, these transactional costs are starting to match real costs.

Third, both states now have divergent approaches to the region. For decades, Washington and Seoul have coordinated their policies toward North Korea and China. However, with inherently different strategic outlooks as a result of their size, geography, and histories, their approaches have often been covered over by short-term concessions - the first of which started with the U.S. desire to end the Korean War and the Rhee Administration’s desire to unify the Peninsula. Individuals and groups have consistently made concessions to stay in power that are contrary to national interest. It’s getting increasingly difficult to justify such concessions.

No matter how strong military alliances may be, they cannot override the gravitational force of a billion-strong market sitting just across the Yellow Sea. China is South Korea’s largest trading partner, its key supplier of raw materials, and a crucial destination for its exports. While security concerns may push Seoul closer to Washington, economic survival pulls it inevitably toward Beijing.

The reality is simple: no country can ignore the economic influence of a neighbor that dwarfs it in size, market potential, and production capacity. Over time, trade, investment, and supply chains may do more to reshape Korea’s strategic orientation than any defense treaty ever could.

Fourth, and most importantly, domestic politics has changed. Alliances are not just shaped by international strategy—they are also influenced by domestic political and generational shifts.

Younger South Koreans, who have no personal memory of the Korean War or the Cold War, do not view the U.S. alliance in the same way that older generations did. Many see South Korea as a fully independent nation capable of determining its own foreign policy rather than as a junior partner in an alliance framework set decades ago.

Likewise, in the U.S., domestic debates over military spending and foreign commitments are intensifying. If American voters prioritize economic and domestic issues over global military presence, political leaders - both Republican and Democrat, will begin to steadily reduce America’s overseas obligations, including its troop presence in Korea.

Unlike past periods of tension in the alliance, where disputes could be managed through diplomatic negotiations, these generational shifts represent deeper, more permanent changes in national priorities.

Time and geography not power or ideology?

The weakening of the U.S.-Korea alliance is not the result of a dramatic rupture, but of long-term historical forces that are difficult to resist. While diplomatic agreements, military treaties, and political decisions shape the short-term trajectory of alliances, time and geography play a more decisive role in the long run.

The Korean Peninsula has always been subject to the influence of larger regional powers—China, Japan, Russia, and, more recently, the United States. The logic that once made an American military presence indispensable is no longer as strong as it was during the Cold War.

South Korea’s economic interdependence with China, its growing military self-sufficiency, and shifting generational perspectives are all pushing the country toward a new phase in its foreign relations. Alliances are never eternal, they are always transactional. History is filled with examples of once-strong military partnerships fading as geopolitical realities shift.

While the alliance will not dissolve overnight, the forces pulling it apart—geopolitical shifts, economic realities, and the slow but steady passage of time—are more powerful than any single treaty, military agreement, or leader. Ultimately, history and geography will shape the future of this alliance more than policymakers or theorists anticipate

6. Faction led by North's old pal rises in major South Korean party

​We should be very concerned about Im Jong Seok and his direct ties to north Korea. Actually the Korean people should be very concerned with him.

Faction led by North's old pal rises in major South Korean party - Asia Times

As legal troubles hobble Lee Jae-myung, Im Jong-seok emerges as a key challenger to lead main opposition Democratic Party

asiatimes.com · by Hanjin Lew · March 11, 2025

Seated beside Lee Jae-myung at a luncheon on February 27, Im Jong-seok said to Lee, “I intend to support and encourage those who bravely compete with you and strive to surpass you.” With this statement, Im publicly distanced himself from Lee, signaling a potential shift in the party’s internal dynamics.

Im Jong-seok is a seasoned politician with deep roots in South Korea’s radical left movements. He first gained prominence as a student activist in the 1980s, advocating for reunification with North Korea.

Im played a key role in facilitating fellow activist Im Su-gyong’s unauthorized visit to North Korea in 1989 for the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang. At the time, he was the leader of the National Council of Student Representatives, the same organization to which Im Su-gyong belonged.

After her return to South Korea, both were arrested and imprisoned for violating the National Security Act.

Im remained steadfast in his political convictions as the years passed and he attracted political support. Serving as the presidential chief of staff under Moon Jae-in solidified his status within the pro-Moon faction of the DPK.

Lee Jae-myung’s consolidation of power

Lee Jae-myung, since ascending to the leadership of the DPK in August 2022, has systematically consolidated his power, often sidelining opponents and critics within the party. His leadership style has led to a widespread perception of the DPK as a “one-man party.”

During the nomination processes for elections, several prominent figures, including those aligned with the pro-Moon faction, were excluded or marginalized. Notably, in February 2024, Im Jong-seok was denied the DPK nomination for Seoul’s Jung-Seongdong district, a constituency long considered his stronghold. This move was widely interpreted as an attempt by Lee to eliminate potential rivals and tighten his grip on the party.

Rising factional rivalry

The DPK is currently experiencing heightened factional tensions, primarily between supporters of Lee Jae-myung and those aligned with the pro-Moon faction, led by Im Jong-seok. Im has been vocal in his criticism of Lee’s leadership style and policy direction. He publicly refuted Lee’s attempt to redefine the party’s ideological stance as center-left, asserting that such changes “cannot be made overnight by one person, even if he is the leader.”

This internal discord has led to public disputes, raising concerns about the party’s cohesion and its ability to effectively challenge the ruling party. If President Yoon Suk Yeol were to be impeached, the constitution requires a presidential election to be held within 60 days.

Moon Jae-in’s influence

Former President Moon Jae-in continues to exert a strong, albeit indirect, influence over the DPK. While he has maintained a relatively low public profile since leaving office, his support for the pro-Moon faction remains evident.

As Moon’s former chief of staff, Im Jong-seok is widely regarded as a key figure in this faction. The alignment between Moon and Im suggests a strategic effort to counterbalance Lee Jae-myung’s dominance within the party. This dynamic underscores the deepening factionalism within the DPK and hints at potential shifts in its leadership and policy directions in the near future.

Yoon Suk Yeol’s release

In a parallel development, South Korea’s political landscape was jolted by the recent release of impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol from detention. A court decision deemed his arrest illegal, leading to his release.

This development adds another layer of complexity to South Korea’s political scenario, especially with the Constitutional Court expected to decide in coming days whether to overturn Yoon’s impeachment and order him reinstated or kick him out of office permanently.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

Legal challenges facing Lee Jae-myung

Concurrently, Lee Jae-myung is facing multiple criminal trials – seven cases with 11 charges. Court rulings are expected soon and, depending on the sentencing, he could be barred from holding public office for up to ten years. This would prevent him from running in the next presidential election. Such an outcome would significantly reshape the DPK’s leadership dynamics and could pave the way for the pro-Moon faction to regain prominence within the party.

Potential shift in DPK’s power dynamics

If Lee Jae-myung becomes legally incapacitated, the DPK’s power structure is likely to shift back toward the pro-Moon faction. Im Jong-seok, with the backing of former President Moon Jae-in, is well-positioned to ascend within the party ranks. This transition could lead to a reorientation of the party’s policies and strategies, particularly in light of the broader political upheavals stemming from Yoon Suk Yeol’s situation.

South Korea’s political landscape is undergoing significant transformations. The Democratic Party of Korea faces internal factionalism, legal challenges to its current leadership, and the potential resurgence of the pro-Moon faction. These developments, coupled with the uncertainty surrounding Yoon Suk Yeol’s future, suggest a period of volatility and realignment in South Korean politics.

Hanjin Lew is a political commentator specializing in East Asian affairs and a former international spokesman for South Korean conservative parties.

Thank you for registering!

An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.

asiatimes.com · by Hanjin Lew · March 11, 2025

7. N. Korea ramps up criticism against S. Korea-U.S. drills, but no mention of missile launch

Political warfare to subvert South Korea and drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance to drive US forces from the peninsula

Blackmail diplomacy – the use of threats, increased tension and provocations to gain political and economic concessions​

Advanced military tech (nuclear and missile) to support political warfare and blackmail diplomacy until Kim determines he can and must use force to achieve his objective

N. Korea ramps up criticism against S. Korea-U.S. drills, but no mention of missile launch | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 11, 2025

SEOUL, March 11 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's state media on Tuesday ramped up criticism against joint military drills by South Korea and the United States, calling them a "nuclear war exercise," but made no mention of the North's ballistic missile test a day earlier.

North Korea fired what appeared to be multiple close-range ballistic missiles toward the Yellow Sea on Monday, according to South Korea's military, in the North's first ballistic missile test since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House.

No state news media, including the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), had published a report on the ballistic missile launch as of Tuesday morning.

The KCNA instead published an article on the launch of the joint exercise, Freedom Shield, calling it an "incursive, confrontational war rehearsal."

"It is yet another largest-ever joint military exercise," launched at a time when military drills between the U.S. and "puppet South Korean military gangsters" were carried out at an unprecedentedly "frantic" level, the KCNA said.

"It clearly reveals who is responsible for worsening the security situation on the Korean Peninsula," it said.

In a separate article, the Rodong Sinmun newspaper, which caters to the general North Korean readers, also denounced the joint military exercise as a "nuclear war exercise" targeting North Korea.

The newspaper accused the allies of "mobilizing various kinds of latest nuclear war equipment, a massive scale of invasion forces and civilians" to carry out the exercise annually across South Korea.

It marks the latest in the North's back-to-back condemnations of the joint exercise. On Monday, the country lambasted it as a "dangerous provocative act."

South Korea and the U.S. kicked off Freedom Shield on Monday for an 11-day run, involving computer-simulated drills and on-field training, as part of their annual regular exercises to counter threats from North Korea.

For this year's exercise, the two sides plan to stage 16 large-scale on-field drills, up from 10 last year, to strengthen their combined defense posture against North Korean threats and other challenges, including the regime's growing military cooperation with Russia.

This photo shows Patriot missiles installed at Camp Humphreys, a United States Army garrison in Pyeongtaek, about 60 kilometers south of Seoul, on March 10, 2025, after North Korea test-fired multiple ballistic missiles. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 11, 2025

8. U.S. military decries N.K.'s missile launches, calls on it to refrain from 'unlawful,' 'destabilizing' acts

U.S. military decries N.K.'s missile launches, calls on it to refrain from 'unlawful,' 'destabilizing' acts | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 10, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, March 10 (Yonhap) -- A U.S. military command condemned North Korea's ballistic missile launches Monday, calling on the recalcitrant regime to refrain from further "unlawful" and "destabilizing" acts and reaffirming America's "ironclad" security commitment to South Korea and Japan.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command issued the statement after the North fired multiple ballistic missiles toward the Yellow Sea in its first known missile launches since U.S. President Donald Trump took office in January.

"The United States condemns these actions and calls on the DPRK to refrain from further unlawful and destabilizing acts," the command said, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"While we have assessed that this event does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel, or territory, or to our allies, we continue to monitor the situation. The U.S. commitments to the defense of the ROK and Japan remain ironclad," it added. ROK is short for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.

The command noted that the U.S. is consulting closely over the launches with South Korea and Japan as well as other regional allies and partners.

The missile launches came as South Korea and the U.S. kicked off their annual Freedom Shield exercise on Monday for an 11-day run. The North has long decried the allies' drills as a rehearsal for an invasion against it.

This file photo, released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 3, 2024, shows an intermediate-range ballistic missile tipped with a hypersonic warhead being fired the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 10, 2025

9. White House reaffirms commitment to 'complete' denuclearization of N. Korea after regime's missile launches

​Emphasis on north Korea - as in the 'complete' denuclearization of N. Korea versus the Korean peninsula.

(LEAD) White House reaffirms commitment to 'complete' denuclearization of N. Korea after regime's missile launches | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 11, 2025

(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; UPDATES with NSC statement in 2nd para)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, March 10 (Yonhap) -- A White House official reiterated the United States' commitment to the "complete" denuclearization of North Korea on Monday, after Pyongyang fired multiple ballistic missiles in its first known launch since U.S. President Donald Trump took office in January.

"We're aware of the missile launches and refer you to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's statement," National Security Council Spokesman James Hewitt said in response to a request for comment by Yonhap News Agency. "The U.S. is committed to the complete denuclearization of North Korea."

Earlier in the day, the Indo-Pacific Command released a statement criticizing the North's missile launches.

"The United States condemns these actions and calls on the DPRK to refrain from further unlawful and destabilizing acts," the command said, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"While we have assessed that this event does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel, or territory, or to our allies, we continue to monitor the situation. The U.S. commitments to the defense of the ROK and Japan remain ironclad," it added. ROK is short for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.

The command noted that the U.S. is consulting closely over the launches with South Korea and Japan as well as other regional allies and partners.

The missile launches came as South Korea and the U.S. kicked off their annual Freedom Shield exercise on Monday for an 11-day run. The North has long decried the allies' drills as a rehearsal for an invasion against it.

This file photo, released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 3, 2024, shows an intermediate-range ballistic missile tipped with a hypersonic warhead being fired the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 11, 2025

10.  S. Korea raises issue over potential U.S. designation as 'sensitive country': FM

​WTFO?

Sounds like some new political appointee in DOE does not know the difference between the "good Korea" and the "bad Korea."

(LEAD) S. Korea raises issue over potential U.S. designation as 'sensitive country': FM | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Shim Sun-ah · March 11, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with more response from Cho in last 3 paras)

SEOUL, March 11 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has been informally told that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) was considering categorizing it as a "sensitive country" and has since raised the issue with the department, Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul said Tuesday.

Cho made the remarks during a parliamentary session amid signs that the DOE, which oversees energy and nuclear policies, is reviewing the possibility of placing South Korea on its sensitive country list.

If placed, researchers from countries on the list undergo more stringent scrutiny when joining research facilities or projects affiliated with the department, potentially making it harder for them to participate in U.S. research on advanced technologies, such as atomic energy, artificial intelligence or quantum technology.

Cho said his ministry received an "unofficial tipoff" about the DOE's review of South Korea and is working to "grasp the situation" based on this information.

The DOE does not appear to have finalized South Korea's designation yet, the foreign minister also noted.

Based on the unofficial information it has, South Korea has raised an issue with the DOE, which is now looking into the matter again, according to Cho.

"As far as I know, once the United States grasps the situation internally, it may come to us and discuss it," he said.

Asked whether growing public calls for South Korea's nuclear armament may have influenced Washington's review, Cho acknowledged that such speculation exists.

"It is understandable that such a view is circulating as one possible explanation," he said. "However, we need to see whether it is the only factor. Since the internal circumstances remain unclear, we cannot rule out the possibility that this is a one-time occurrence caused by a less significant factor than we assumed."

Once more information becomes available, the government will conduct a thorough review of the situation and take necessary measures, he added.

Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul speaks during a parliamentary session in Seoul on March 11, 2025. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Shim Sun-ah · March 11, 2025

11. Acting president vows 'zero tolerance' for any violence amid imminent ruling on Yoon's impeachment

​The acting president is coming into his own? Is he undergoing an audition to prove himself for the next election? On the job training to prepare for the future permanent job?

Acting president vows 'zero tolerance' for any violence amid imminent ruling on Yoon's impeachment | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · March 11, 2025

By Kim Han-joo

SEOUL, March 11 (Yonhap) -- Acting President Choi Sang-mok on Tuesday pledged "zero tolerance" for any acts of violence as the Constitutional Court is set to deliver its ruling on whether to reinstate or remove impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol.

The court is expected to announce its decision as early as this week, raising concerns over potential clashes as both Yoon's supporters and opponents are anticipated to gather in large numbers.

"The government will guarantee the right to hold lawful and peaceful rallies to the fullest extent," Choi said during a Cabinet meeting. "However, any illegal or violent demonstrations, as well as any challenges to public authority, will be dealt with strictly in accordance with the law, without exception."

He also urged citizens to uphold mature civic consciousness befitting the status of the nation, saying the international community is closely watching the situation.

Amid concerns over possible unrest, police earlier announced they would mobilize all available resources and designate areas surrounding the Constitutional Court as special crime prevention zones on the day of the ruling.

Rallies for and against President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment are simultaneously held on the campus of Seoul National University in southern Seoul on Feb. 17, 2025. (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · March 11, 2025

12. Air Force dismisses 2 unit commanders over accidental jet bombing

​Swift action.

Excerpts:

"The Air Force dismissed a colonel-level group commander and a lieutenant colonel-level squadron commander who were identified to have breached their duty to abide by regulations," the armed forces said in a notice to reporters.

It cited a major dereliction of duty, and insufficient command management and supervision as reasons for the decision.

Air Force dismisses 2 unit commanders over accidental jet bombing | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · March 11, 2025

SEOUL, March 11 (Yonhap) -- Two Air Force unit commanders were dismissed Tuesday over fighter jets' accidental bombing of a village last week, the armed services said, citing charges of dereliction of duty and insufficient supervision.

On Thursday, two KF-16 fighter jets dropped eight 500-pound MK-82 bombs outside a training range in Pocheon, some 40 kilometers north of Seoul, during live-fire drills, injuring 31 people, including 19 civilians.

"The Air Force dismissed a colonel-level group commander and a lieutenant colonel-level squadron commander who were identified to have breached their duty to abide by regulations," the armed forces said in a notice to reporters.

It cited a major dereliction of duty, and insufficient command management and supervision as reasons for the decision.

Separately, the Air Force said it plans to hold a meeting next week to deliberate on whether the two pilots who flew the fighter jets will be qualified to continue to operate aircraft.

In an interim probe, the Air Force pointed to pilot error for the accidental bombing, saying that the pilots had at least three opportunities to catch their mistakes after entering wrong target coordinates prior to takeoff.

The Air Force also attributed the accident to inadequate management and inspection procedures, saying specific instructions were not given by superiors.

This March 9, 2025, photo shows troops taking part in restoration work at a village in Pocheon, some 40 kilometers north of Seoul, which was mistakenly bombed by fighter jets last week. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · March 11, 2025

13. Opposition lawmakers launch hunger strike calling for Yoon's removal from office

​A sign of desperation? Do they think that the court will rule for President Yoon and that he will return to power?

(LEAD) Opposition lawmakers launch hunger strike calling for Yoon's removal from office | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 11, 2025

(ATTN: AMENDS headline, lead; ADDS details in para 6, photo)

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, March 11 (Yonhap) -- Some lawmakers of opposition parties on Tuesday launched a hunger strike calling for a verdict by the Constitutional Court to officially remove impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol from office over his failed bid to impose martial law.

A group of opposition lawmakers, including from the main opposition Democratic Party (DP), the Rebuilding Korea Party and the Progressive Party, went on the hunger strike urging the court swiftly dismiss Yoon, who was released from detention last Saturday.

Yoon's release came as another court allowed him to stand trial without physical detention, citing some questions about the legality of investigations over his charges.

Democratic Party Reps. (from L) Jeon Jin-sook, Park Hong-bae and Kim Moon-soo have their heads shaved as they call for President Yoon Suk Yeol's removal from office outside the National Assembly's main building in western Seoul on March 11, 2025. (Yonhap)

"Yoon Suk Yeol must return to jail," they said, calling on the court to "immediately detain Yoon, the mastermind behind the insurrection."

They also demanded the resignation of Prosecutor General Shim Woo-jung, who released Yoon, and said the ruling People Power Party (PPP) should be disbanded, accusing it of obstructing Yoon's impeachment.

DP Reps. Park Hong-bae, Kim Moon-soo and Jeon Jin-sook shaved their heads outside the National Assembly's main building, demanding Yoon's removal from office.

Earlier in the day, the DP and the Rebuilding Korea Party set up tents in Gwanghwamun in Seoul to continue with their outdoor rallies.

Meanwhile, the PPP said it has no plans to stage rallies or take any "collective action" in response to the opposition.

"If there is a particular issue, we may take collective action, but we will have various meetings to express our position, so unlike the DP, we will not resort to street rallies or hunger strikes to pressure the Constitutional Court," PPP floor leader Kweon Seong-dong told reporters after a general meeting of the party's lawmakers.

Lawmakers of the main opposition Democratic Party rally at the National Assembly in Seoul on March 11, 2025, to call for the Constitutional Court to uphold President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment in connection to his short-lived imposition of martial law in December. (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 11, 2025

​14. “North Korea Publicly Executes 3 Young Men Who Attempted to Defect”

​This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

This statement speaks for itself and the inhumanity of the Kim family regime:

'There is no place for defectors to be buried in this land' Public execution and then cremation

“North Korea Publicly Executes 3 Young Men Who Attempted to Defect”

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/03/10/north-korea-defector-public-execution/

Seoul-Kim Ji-eun xallsl@rfa.org

2025.03.10

North Korea public execution graphic (Photo - Reuters, RFA Graphic)

Anchor: It has been reported that North Korean authorities recently arrested and publicly executed residents who were trying to go to South Korea. Local sources reported that authorities even committed the atrocity of burning the bodies in order to “eliminate any trace of defectors.” Reporter Kim Ji-eun reports from inside North Korea.

A source from North Pyongan Province (who requested anonymity for safety reasons) told Radio Free Asia on the 3rd, “Now, if anyone is caught trying to go to South Korea, they are publicly executed without exception,” and “Last February, the authorities publicly executed young men who were caught trying to go to South Korea in front of local residents .”

The source said, "A few days ago, an acquaintance in South Hwanghae Province (who witnessed the public execution) came here (to Sinuiju) on a business trip and told me about the public execution of young men who were trying to defect," and pointed out that "it was an incident in which three young men in their 30s (two Kim brothers and a friend of the older brother, Mr. Lee) were discovered by our (North Korean) patrol boat and arrested while trying to escape by sea (last January)."

He added that “those who prepared for months and purchased a boat (wooden boat) unfortunately found themselves in a difficult situation where they could not see an inch in front of them because of the clouds (fog) in the middle of the sea.” He continued, “However, they blindly headed south (looking at the compass) and when they saw a patrol boat, they thought it was a South Korean fishing boat and shouted, ‘We are people who defected to South Korea. Please spare us.’ Then, they were arrested at the scene by the (North Korean) patrol boat on January 6.”

He continued, “The authorities ordered all (Songjeong-ri residents) to gather at designated locations in nearby factories, farms, and schools in an attempt to instill fear in the residents what would happen if they defected,” and “Most residents gathered without knowing what was happening and witnessed the horrific scenes of executions.”

Meanwhile, he said, “ The members of the provincial security bureau, provincial security bureau, and provincial prosecutor’s office who carried out the public execution (on February 20) committed the atrocity of shooting each person 90 times, saying, ‘There is no place to bury the bodies of North Korean defectors in this land,’” and “They even burned all the scattered bodies (without a trace).”

According to sources, there was a commotion at the public execution scene that day, with young students screaming in terror and some residents fainting and collapsing.

On the afternoon of November 8, 2019, the South Korean Navy tows a North Korean wooden boat in the East Sea to return it to the North. The boat was carrying two North Korean citizens, who were deported to North Korea. (Photo is not related to the article) (Yonhap)

Related Articles

Yanggang Province authorities hold public trial immediately after 'Gwangmyeongseongjeol'

North Korean authorities create atmosphere of fear by resuming public executions

(Visited Songjeong-ri) Another resident of North Pyongan Province who witnessed the execution scene (requested anonymity for personal safety) told Radio Free Asia on the 4th, “Now, residents who defect to South Korea are executed by firing squad,” and “The reeducation sentence (maximum 15 years) that was imposed on residents who defected in the past has been changed to execution by firing squad starting this year,” and “I heard this story at the execution scene.”

'There is no place for defectors to be buried in this land' Public execution and then cremation

“Last February, three young men from South Hwanghae Province were executed in a public trial while trying to escape to South Korea on a boat (wooden boat),” the source said. “The authorities are terrorizing the residents by brutally shooting young men who tried to escape to the sea.”

Also, “Originally, the target of execution was tied to a stake with three sections around the neck, body, and legs, but this time, the target of execution was tied with six sections because he could not support his body due to the severe torture,” he said. “He fired 90 bullets at each of them, saying, ‘Those who have betrayed the country should be executed. ’”

He continued, "Most of the residents gathered in the middle of a field in Ban 13, Songjeong-ri (currently Naengjeong-ri, Masan-myeon, Ongjin-gun, Hwanghae-namdo) without even knowing what was happening, and witnessed a horrific execution scene." He added, "We witnessed young men being dragged out with black cloths over their eyes and gagged, being shot dozens of times and their bodies being torn to pieces."

He added, “In the past, defectors who defected for a living were subject to reeducation (up to 15 years), but now the authorities are responding with execution, which is making residents angry.”

This is Ji-eun Kim of RFA's Radio Free Asia in Seoul.

Editor Yang Seong-won

15. ＜Inside N. Korea＞The 'Last Stronghold' of Defection in Crisis: Security Bureau Receives Commendation for Crackdown Success - Smuggling and Defections Nearly Eradicated

​Lifeline and hope cut off. What comes next for the Korean people in the north?

＜Inside N. Korea＞The 'Last Stronghold' of Defection in Crisis: Security Bureau Receives Commendation for Crackdown Success - Smuggling and Defections Nearly Eradicated

asiapress.org

North Korean Checkpoint No. 10 across the Yalu River: This security post is managed by the Security Bureau (secret police). It blocks major access routes to the border and primarily inspects travelers' identification cards, travel permits, and mobile phones. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border from Sakju County, North Pyongan Province, September 2023 (ASIAPRESS)

The Security Bureau (secret police) in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province in northern North Korea, reportedly received a commendation late last year for its successful crackdown on the border area with China. Located along the upper reaches of the Yalu River, Hyesan City has been the largest and "last stronghold" for smuggling and defections along the 1,400km North Korea-China border. Kim Jong-un's regime continues its "sweeping operations" in the area. (ISHIMARU Jiro / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Hyesan: The Main Hub for Defections and Smuggling

Since its establishment in 2012, the Kim Jong-Un regime has struggled with the illegal movement of people, goods, money, and information. The regime has built wire fences along the entire North Korea-China border and strengthened surveillance and control of residents in border areas in an attempt to eradicate these activities. However, Hyesan had somehow managed to maintain both smuggling and defection operations.

Smuggling and border crossings have thrived in Hyesan for over 40 years. This is due to "favorable" conditions: the width of the Yalu River is only a few dozen meters at this point, and ethnic Koreans make up 16.7% of the 72,000 residents in Changbai County, Jilin Province, across the border. (Population statistics as of late 2023, according to the Changbai County government)

Hyesan City has become the primary target of crackdowns under the border closure policy implemented since the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The Security Bureau's commendation suggests these efforts have yielded results.

The width of the Yalu River between Hyesan and Changbai County is merely a few dozen meters wide. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border from Ryanggang Province's Hyesan, October 2024. (ASIAPRESS)

◆ Rigorous Crackdown on Chinese Mobile Phones

A reporting partner, A, who lives in Hyesan, relayed the following information directly from a security officer:

"The Hyesan Security Bureau, which had consistently ranked last each year, received a commendation from the central Security Department late last year. This was due to their successful management of residents through effective crackdowns on Chinese mobile phones, smuggling, and border crossings into China. Some security officers even received cash rewards."

The security authorities are particularly vigilant about smuggled Chinese mobile phones. In border areas within range of Chinese signals, these phones are virtually the only means of communicating with the outside world and are essential for smuggling, defection, and illegal money transfers.

They also serve as crucial channels for leaking internal information to the outside world. ASIAPRESS also maintains regular contact with North Korean reporting partners using Chinese mobile phones.

North Korean authorities constantly emit jamming signals to disrupt communications. Additionally, security officers patrol the streets and villages near the border carrying signal detectors.

"They are re-summoning and interrogating people who previously used Chinese mobile phones. They're also asking neighborhood units to report households spending money inconsistent with their income, offering rewards for information. Those reported are subjected to house searches," (Reporting Partner A)

*Neighborhood units are the lowest administrative organizations, typically consisting of 20-30 households, or about 60-80 people.

asiapress.org

16. Sing for the regime: N. Korea's mandatory song sessions face public resistance

​Could forced singing be a tipping point?

Sing for the regime: N. Korea's mandatory song sessions face public resistance - Daily NK English

"Songs might have worked for ideological control in the past, but now, as people face harsher realities, they ignore them no matter how much they're forced to sing," a source told Daily NK

By Eun Seol - March 11, 2025

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · March 11, 2025

On Feb. 17, North Korea's Workers' Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun reported that the entire country grandly celebrated Kim Jong Il's birthday (Feb. 16), referred to as "February's Holiday," the nation's greatest celebration. /Photo=Rodong Sinmun·News1

The South Hwanghae provincial party committee has made weekly “song dissemination” sessions mandatory at all workplaces, leaving many North Koreans frustrated as they’re forced to sing propaganda songs amid difficult living conditions.

According to a Daily NK source, the provincial party committee issued an order on Feb. 15 requiring all workplaces to conduct these weekly sessions. Employees must now participate in group singing before their mandatory reading and study sessions.

“These song sessions used to happen only when a new song appeared in the Rodong Sinmun or when the party specifically ordered certain songs to be sung. Now we have to sing together once a week at work,” the source explained.

Party cell secretaries at each workplace select the songs, with options ranging from revolutionary music dating back to the anti-Japanese struggle era to the latest propaganda tunes.

“All music in North Korea serves regime propaganda, so it doesn’t really matter who picks the songs,” the source noted. “But having the party cell secretary make the selections is considered ‘party policy’ – a rule that can’t be broken.”

The provincial authorities have made clear that these sessions aim to instill loyalty to the party, leader, and revolutionary spirit by having citizens memorize the lyrics. Workplaces are required to organize regular question-and-answer sessions about the songs, forcing employees to rehearse repeatedly until they’ve memorized all the words.

However, the initiative has been met with widespread discontent. Many citizens openly question whether “things will improve just because they sing.”

North Korea has long used music as a key tool for promoting official ideology and regime cohesion. Since founder Kim Il Sung’s era, songs have been used to cultivate public loyalty under the slogan “Where there’s a revolution, there are songs” – a practice that continued through Kim Jong Il’s and Kim Jong Un’s leadership.

Yet as economic conditions worsen and people struggle to feed their families, these propaganda songs have lost their effectiveness.

“Songs might have worked for ideological control in the past, but now, as people face harsher realities, they ignore them no matter how much they’re forced to sing,” the source said. “Plus, with more outside information getting in, people are less influenced by propaganda.”

“People openly say that singing songs won’t make rice appear or improve their lives when they can barely make ends meet,” the source added. “Ultimately, this coercive approach of forcing people to memorize and sing songs will only increase public distrust of the regime.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · March 11, 2025

17. Behind the cold exile: How N. Korea punishes 'hostile class' citizens

​Songbun. The most evil social classification system. 51 social classes broken down into three major groups: the loyal class, the wavering class, and the disloyal class.

Read Robert Collins' seminal report: 

Marked for Life: SONGBUN, North Korea’s Social Classification System

https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/eng/HRNK_Songbun_Web.pdf

Behind the cold exile: How N. Korea punishes 'hostile class' citizens - Daily NK English

https://www.dailynk.com/english/behind-the-cold-exile-how-n-korea-punishes-hostile-class-citizens/

dailynk.com · by Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University · March 11, 2025

FILE PHOTO: A clip from a video showing North Koreans being called up to face a public criticism in March 2023. (Daily NK)

Recent reports indicate that the North Korean Workers’ Party continues its harsh discrimination against citizens who hold views different from the regime.

According to a source in South Pyongan Province, in mid-February, a family was exiled to Maengsan County in an open truck without any cover despite temperatures of -20°C. The reason for their exile is outrageous – they were accused of distributing South Korean dramas and having ancestors who supposedly collaborated with South Korean forces during the Korean War, labeling them as a “hostile class.”

Is sharing K-culture, which is respected worldwide, such a severe crime that it warrants being thrown into a cold, mountainous region? And must the regime still cling to outdated notions of family background in the 21st century?

It seems Kim Jong Un and the Workers’ Party cannot maintain control without such measures. Since liberation, the Kim dynasty has engaged in inhumane practices to preserve power, inventing absurd terms like “political criminals,” “factionalists,” and “side branches” while creating management centers (political prison camps) where they commit atrocities that would make even animals blush.

The “class principles” in North Korean society weren’t inherited from tradition but were fabricated by the Workers’ Party. Our ancestors never imagined their descendants would be divided into classes and face discrimination.

There’s a reason why family background matters in North Korean society. In totalitarian systems, the regime evaluates current behavior based on parents’ and grandparents’ backgrounds to determine whether someone is “with us” or “against us.” From childhood, people are made to wear red neckties while being indoctrinated with the idea that “South Korea is the enemy” and that “if you’re not with us, you’re against us.”

Kim Jong Un and the Workers’ Party leadership cleverly exploit humans’ natural tendency to live in groups and depend on each other, creating a social climate that emphasizes collectivism. Furthermore, they use the logic that “everything is the enemy’s fault” to hide their own failures, skillfully manipulating conflict. Thus, they promote anti-enemy sentiment and readily practice discrimination.

Recently, the international human rights organization Freedom House released its “2025 World Freedom Index” report. North Korea scored just 3 out of 100, ranking among the lowest of 208 countries. The organization evaluated the human rights situation worldwide based on “political rights” and “civil liberties,” giving North Korea scores of 0 and 3, respectively. North Korea was classified as a “not free country” and also made the list of “worst of the worst” – a designation given to only 17 out of 67 “not free” countries.

Even a dictator prioritizing power maintenance should feel shame as a human being. People should no longer be divided into “us” and “enemy” and discriminated against within a class framework.

Currently, Kim Jong Un and the Workers’ Party reject 5,000 years of Korean history and designate South Korea as an enemy to maintain their grip on power.

North Korean citizens must realize that the state encourages discrimination based on background, family environment, region, and gender in all social interactions from survival and education to labor and organizational life. They must stop being deceived.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University · March 11, 2025

18.  Empty promises, empty stomaches: The plight of N. Korean farmers under party restrictions

​What else can I write about the evil nature of the Kim family regime?

Loyalty does not grow food. And you cannot eat ideology.

Empty promises, empty stomaches: The plight of N. Korean farmers under party restrictions - Daily NK English

North Korean ruling party bureaucrats continue to seek solutions to food shortages by demanding increased agricultural production based on loyalty

By Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University - March 11, 2025

dailynk.com · by Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University · March 11, 2025

An article in the Rodong Sinmun on Feb. 19, 2024, called on farms to "take responsibility for farming preparations." The photo shows farmers at the Namup Farm in Pyongyang's Sunan District. (Rodong Sinmin-News1)

North Korean farmers are growing increasingly resentful as the ruling party’s interference in their autonomy reaches new extremes. While authorities boast of an unprecedented harvest, farmers have seen little income and are desperately seeking ways to survive the difficult spring months.

In the country’s agricultural heartlands – including Mundok, Sukchon, and Pyongwon in South Pyongan province’s Sohae Plain – farmers are resorting to risky money-making ventures while struggling under excessive state restrictions.

According to a source, the party secretary of Taejong village in Pyongwon county recently ordered the confiscation of two months’ worth of grain from farmers who haven’t been working since the beginning of the year. Workers on the village’s collective farm had received a six-month grain allocation per person, and confiscating one-third of this essentially condemns these individuals to starvation.

Farmers across rural South Pyongan province have turned to alternative income sources such as digging for clams and oysters along the Yellow Sea coast and panning for gold to survive the winter. So many desperate farmers have descended on coastal clam habitats that locals joke “people outnumber clams.” Visit any gold panning site along the rivers and fields of Pyongwon, Taedong, or Kaechon, and you’ll find farmers consumed with the search for precious metal.

These farmers are simply trying to survive, yet the state not only fails to help them supplement their income but actively takes away their food. Many farmers compare officials to “wicked cops during the Japanese colonial era.” The authorities constantly refer to themselves as the “mother party,” but as farmers bitterly note, what mother would take away her children’s food and leave them to starve?

North Korean ruling party bureaucrats continue to seek solutions to food shortages by demanding increased agricultural production based on loyalty. This approach is fundamentally flawed. Data shows that agricultural household income has returned to levels not seen since the “Arduous March” famine of 30 years ago, with farmers receiving less than 60% of their previous annual grain allocation, while urban workers’ average income has fallen by more than half.

For over 70 years, North Korean authorities have emphasized “rural development,” but ideological control and forced loyalty have proven ineffective. Ensuring farmers’ autonomy is the only way for North Korea to escape its reputation as a “bad beggar” condemned as one of the world’s poorest and most rights-abusing nations.

If North Koreans are to avoid starvation, authorities must grant farmers economic autonomy so they can feed themselves and improve rural incomes.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University · March 11, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com