Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Beijing and Moscow pledged to defend their illiberal politics – which they, of course, termed, “democracies” – against Western impositions. They condemned U.S. alliance blocs in Europe and Asia as Cold War relics; the touted Sino – Russian cooperation with “no limits,” and” no forbidden areas.” The text was dense, yet the meaning was clear: the two Eurasian powers were, as Xi had said, fighting “back-to-back” against the oppressive hegemony of the liberal world. It wasn't quite Molotov – Ribbentrop or the Tripartite Pact. But it was another call for a radically new system with an illiberal Eurasia at its core.”

– Hal Brands, The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World

"Now is no time to think of what you do not have. Think of what you can do with what there is."

- Ernest Hemingway, The Old Man and the Sea

“We should measure the prosperity of a nation, not by the number of millionaires, but by the absence of poverty, the prevalence of health, the efficiency of the public schools, and the number of people who can and do read worthwhile books.”

– W.E.B. Du Bois.

1. Experts: “We need to review readjustment of USFK to respond to China’s threat… It could become a logistics and power projection base”

2. North Korea: A 'Game Changer' in Russia's Invasion of Ukraine?

3. Trump and Kim, Act Two: Challenges of Engagement in a New Geopolitical Landscape

4. In Brief: Asian Allies Adjust Security Policies in Response to Trump Administration

5. S. Korea-U.S. joint drills target growing N. Korean WMD threats

6. N. Korea slams Seoul-Washington joint military drills, citing S. Korean accidental jet bombing

7. Germany not to reopen embassy in N. Korea while Ukraine war continues: German official

8. Gov't shifts to emergency response system as U.S. tariffs on steel imports take effect

9. Editorial: Democratic Party's impeachment madness is real threat to democracy

10. Steelmakers face tough road ahead on U.S. tariffs

11. S. Korean trade minister to visit Washington this week for tariff negotiations

12. Acting president calls for strong readiness posture against N.K. threats

13. Fukushima water discharge is still controversial, but tests show no signs of harm

14. N. Korea ramps up cyber offensive: New research center to focus on AI-powered hacking

15. N. Korea rushes to modernize military education following Kim's harsh criticism

16. N. Korea launches crackdown as market prices surge nationwide

17. Friendly fire: How a communication breakdown in N. Korea's 29th brigade led to border violence

18. North Korean Human Rights Groups Send Open Letter to Zelensky: “North Korean POWs’ Free Will Must Be Respected”

19. “US shipbuilding industry faces serious production speed and cost issues… Korea and other allies can utilize their capabilities”

20. 100 days after martial law: street politics deepen national divide

1. Experts: “We need to review readjustment of USFK to respond to China’s threat… It could become a logistics and power projection base”

This is a Google translation of a VOA report.

Experts: “We need to review readjustment of USFK to respond to China’s threat… It could become a logistics and power projection base”

https://www.voakorea.com/a/8007285.html

2025.3.12

Jo Eun-jung

The Rotational Brigade (3rd Cavalry Regiment) of the 2nd Infantry Division, a ROK-US combined division, conducted the Integrated Firepower Training (CALFEX) at the Rodriguez Training Area in Pocheon, Gyeonggi Province on July 22, 2024. Photo = Provided by the 8th Army of the US Forces Korea.

U.S. military experts say that given the growing threat from China, the role of U.S. forces in Korea could be re-adjusted and expanded. There are also opinions that U.S. forces in Korea could expand their general activities in the region rather than targeting China. Reporter Cho Eun-jung reports.

Raphael Cohen, Director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the RAND Corporation. Photo = RAND Corporation

Raphael Cohen, director of the RAND Corporation's Strategy and Doctrine Program, said in a telephone interview with VOA on the 11th that the U.S. military posture in the Indo-Pacific region, including in South Korea, should be reviewed in response to the growing threat from China.

“China Threat Rising… Need to Review U.S. Forces Korea and Other Situations”

[Recording: Director Cohen] “It was true under the Trump one administration and even to an extent under the Obama administration, that real concern over the growth of Chinese both military capabilities and aggression in the Indo-Pacific and as a result, the United States needs to react accordingly and that includes, you know, rethinking both what forces we have in the Indo Pacific and how those forces are aligned to threats.”

“Concerns about China’s growing military power and coercive behavior in the Indo-Pacific have been around since the first Trump term and to some extent since the Obama administration,” Cohen said. “We need to rethink how our military is positioned to respond to threats in the Indo-Pacific.”

He said, “From a military perspective, it is certainly possible to reorganize US forces in Korea to respond to threats other than North Korea.”

He then said that the composition of the US Forces in Korea, centered on ground forces, could be adjusted.

“To deal with the North Korean threat, you obviously need a certain amount of ground force, but if you’re partially focused on the China threat, then obviously your naval and air forces will be more useful,” Cohen said.

However, he pointed out that this reorganization of the USFK is “an issue that needs to be negotiated with Korea,” and that “Korea has traditionally had concerns about being caught in the middle of the conflict between the US and China.”

He said that if the Trump administration wants to reorganize the U.S. Forces Korea, “the key will be whether it can successfully induce a change in South Korea’s policy preferences.”

“Possible to respond to terrorism, maintain peace, and provide humanitarian services within the region”

Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, told VOA on the 11th that the traditional mission of U.S. forces in Korea to respond to North Korea is still very important.

However, he said, “It may be healthier for the alliance if the US-ROK alliance expands to a regional scope, including some missions against China, but the pace of change must be gradual.”

He also said that “it would be okay to generalize the mission, but it would not be good to focus only on China,” given that “South Korea would not want to get involved in a conflict with China.”

[Recording: Researcher O’Hanlon] “So some generalization of the mission is perhaps okay but I would not focus it exclusively on China. I would think also in terms of regional counter-terrorism, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and maybe even other potential adversaries that can't be easily predicted in advance could even be Russia, for example. But rather than fixate on China and run the risk of trying to drag South Korea into our anti-China campaign, I think it's better to stay a little more flexible and look for modifications that are a little more modest and maybe a little more generic than some people might prefer.”

He said that the U.S. military's activities in Korea could be expanded to include counter-terrorism, humanitarian operations, and peacekeeping missions within the region, and potentially even to respond to Russia.

But rather than “obsess over China and risk dragging South Korea into the anti-China campaign,” he said, “it would be better to be more flexible and reorient the mission of USFK in a more limited and general direction.”

“US Forces in Korea can expand into a regional logistics and power projection base”

David Maxwell, Vice President, Asia Pacific Strategy Center

David Maxwell, deputy director of the Asia-Pacific Strategy Center and former chief of staff of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, also emphasized that the USFK must be optimized to support the ROK-US Combined Forces Command’s activities to prevent war on the Korean Peninsula, saying, “This is non-negotiable.”

However, he said that a change in the military posture through strategic review is possible and that the number of US forces in Korea could be increased considering threats within the region, including from China.

“USFK could be augmented with additional logistics units and could serve as a platform for launching combat units, along with air bases throughout the Philippines, Japan and South Korea.”

He said this would “provide the U.S. Air Force with strategic flexibility to conduct operations throughout the Indo-Pacific.”

[Recording: Vice President Maxwell] “USFK could be augmented with additional logistics forces and it could be a platform to launch combat forces from and together with the air bases throughout the region in the Philippines, Japan and South Korea that would provide strategic flexibility for air power to operate throughout the Indo Pacific. So there doesn't necessarily need to be a major revision of USFK but the strategic review should look at all of our interests, look at all of our capabilities, look at all of the threats and then determine what are the best forces to be forward stationed in which country and which forces should be available to be deployed from Guam, Hawaii, Alaska or from the continental United States. That’s what a holistic strategic review should do.”

“A major reorganization of USFK is not necessarily necessary, but we need to do a strategic review to look at all of our interests, capabilities, and threats, and to look holistically at which units to deploy where,” Maxwell said.

Elbridge Colby, nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, speaks during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 4, 2025. (Photo source: Senate Armed Services Committee website)

President Trump has nominated Elbridge Colby, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense who advocated for “adjusting the role of U.S. forces in Korea,” as the undersecretary of defense for policy in his second term.

Colby has expressed the view that the US military capabilities are limited and should focus on “containment of China” and that allies should take more responsibility.

In particular, he has repeatedly told VOA that South Korea must defend itself as much as possible against threats from North Korea, and that U.S. forces stationed in Korea must be reorganized to respond to China.

This is Eun-Jeong Jo from VOA News.

2. North Korea: A 'Game Changer' in Russia's Invasion of Ukraine?

Excellent analysis here. I like the conceptualization nK SOF as another weapons system added to all the other hardware and munitions Kim is providing (er…selling) to Putin. I agree that taken together it is changing the game for Putin (while making a lot of money for Kim). And I do think Kim wants the war to drag out for a long time for obvious reasons.

North Korea: A 'Game Changer' in Russia's Invasion of Ukraine?

19fortyfive.com · by Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. · March 11, 2025

Will an infusion of fresh troops from North Korea significantly impact the war in Ukraine? Not a lot. However, the deployment of more North Korean soldiers to Russia in support of the war with Ukraine is important if it is simply a very small part of a much larger picture. It has now been confirmed by a plethora of sources that more North Korean combat troops are going to be fighting in the war Russia is waging against Ukraine.

North Korea Enters the Ukraine War: A Game Changer?

The questions that arise from this are why now, what personnel are being deployed, what is the bigger picture of North Korean proliferation to Russia in support of the war in Ukraine, is the proliferation North Korea is providing to Russia a “game changer” in the conflict with Ukraine, and of course, what is this likely to mean in the long term?

North Korea is reportedly in the process—if it is not already complete—of deploying an additional 1,000-3,000 troops to the Ukraine conflict in support of Russian forces. These numbers range suspiciously close to the number of reported casualties that the 12,000 North Korean Special Operations Forces (SOF) troops already deployed have suffered thus far in the conflict.

According to sources in the press quoting South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, the North Koreans had approximately 300 dead and 2,700 wounded as of January. These figures seem small compared to the 2,000 dead a week that the Russians are reportedly suffering. Of course, the North Koreans have far fewer troops in the conflict. Thus, the new troops sent to Russia may simply be replacement troops for the casualties the North Koreans have taken thus far.

Reportedly, in 2022, North Korea offered up 100,000 troops to support the fight. That appears unlikely to happen now, but the North Koreans have contributed to the Russian war machine in much more significant ways in terms of both largesse and lethality.

North Korea in Ukraine: By the Numbers

The amount of troops North Korea has sent to Russia for combat is not nothing. In fact, when compared to other troop deployments such as North Korean SOF (and sometimes other units) sent to places such as Angola, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and most recently, Syria (during the Syrian Civil War), this deployment has been considerably more significant in numbers—though it may end up being shorter in time duration.

The North Korean troops sent to Russia are reportedly the best trained, best fed, and best equipped that Pyongyang has to send. Yet, because of the relatively small personnel numbers (roughly 12,000 men), they are a small and minor (if symbolic) contribution to the overall and significant part of the war effort that North Korea is contributing to.

Another important element to consider is the cry from many pundits that the North Koreans are simply being used as “cannon fodder.” While the North Korean SOF have taken heavy casualties, it is certainly not more or at a higher rate than their counterparts in the Russian army, and Ukrainian forces have reportedly been impressed with their bravery and discipline.

Arms Proliferation

What are the other contributions North Korea is making to Russia’s war against Ukraine? The numbers are actually quite staggering. By January 2024, the list of arms North Korea had transferred to Russia included short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), anti-air missiles, and anti-tank missiles, as well as several types of artillery. In addition, North Korea had, by this time, transferred rifles, rocket launchers, rockets, mortars, and shells along with a great deal of ammunition.

In fact, by February of 2024, the US State Department reported that North Korea had exported more than 10,000 containers of munitions or munitions-related materials to Russia—roughly all in the first year of Pyongyang’s proliferation to Moscow’s effort against Ukraine. This contribution was a vast and unprecedented number. Military weapons analyst Joost Oliemans stated at the time that these deliveries reportedly primarily consisted of “120-millimeter mortars, 122mm and 152 mm artillery shells and 122 mm rockets.”

The shipments continued in 2024, and the volume of weapons did not slow down. In fact, in 2024, the North Koreans added long-range 170MM self-propelled artillery to the mix, 240MM multiple rocket launchers, and “Bul-sae” anti-tank guided missile systems to the mix (among other systems) while continuing to supply SRBM and heavy artillery at a high and steady rate—along with many other types of conventional weapons systems and ammunition. By early 2025, it was widely assessed that North Korea had shipped around 20,000 containers to Russia containing military systems and ammunition.

And of note, North Korea has reportedly been responsible for more than 50% of the ammunition used by the Russians in this war and about a third of the ballistic missiles used. In early 2025, according to press reports, North Korea had made more than $6 billion in profits from military proliferation to Russia. The proliferation includes many conventional weapons systems and hundreds of ballistic missiles.

This activity and proliferation of systems from North Korea that are essentially copies of systems Pyongyang originally got from Russia can be head-scratching. One is tempted to ask why. The answer lies in the way the Russian army operates. The Russian military is a blunt instrument, unlike American or NATO forces, which strive to use precision targeting. Thus, this campaign consisted of Russia firing millions of artillery rounds, thousands of missiles, and many other conventional systems at its disposal. Moscow simply does not have the resources to pump munitions at the present rate into Ukrainian military units, cities, and towns without also being supplied by outside entities.

Enter North Korea. Since North Korea’s systems are essentially copies of old Soviet or Russian systems, their compatibility and inclusion fairly quickly into combat is a relatively easy task for the Russian army.

Thus, if one is to ask, as I did at the beginning of this essay, are the 12,000 troops the North Koreans have interjected into combat at Russia’s request a game changer? The answer would be no, not if one considers them alone. But the overall North Korean contribution to the war in Ukraine can be called nothing but a game changer. Anyone following this war would have to be blind not to assess just that.

When one state is supplying more than half of the ammunition for another state in a war dominated by artillery and rockets, of course the inclusion of that state into the military supply system is a game changer. North Korea is precisely that—at least as long as the war continues. It is also important to realize that to the North Korean government, SOF troops are simply a weapons system to be proliferated, like Koksan 170MM artillery or Bul-sae ATGM’s. The big picture is the money generated by the proliferation and the ability it gives the Kim regime to continue and maintain its key objectives.

North Korean Military. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

North Korea Will Be Part of the Ukraine War for the Long Haul

What will this mean in the long term? North Korea is currently receiving Russian assistance with several of its military programs. Pyongyang also receives foodstuffs, money and fuel from Russia like never before since the end of the Cold War. So now the question arises: how will all of that go when the war with Ukraine is over, and Russia no longer needs North Korea’s weapons?

Only time will tell. Thus, it is in North Korea’s interest for this war to go on as long as possible. Let us hope that does not happen.

Image Credit: KCNA/DPRK State Media.

About the Author: Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.

Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. is a professor of Political Science at Angelo State University. He is also the president of the International Council on Korean Studies and a fellow at the Institute for Corean American Studies. The author of five books dealing with North Korea, his latest work is entitled North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa.

19fortyfive.com · by Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. · March 11, 2025

3. Trump and Kim, Act Two: Challenges of Engagement in a New Geopolitical Landscape

If there is ever a place for unconventional diplomacy backed up unconventional warfare (political warfare) activities it is on the Korean peninsula. But despite meeting with Kim three times in 2019-2019, I do not think even Presint Trump is sufficiently unconventional for what needs to be done with the Kim family regime. But certainly the same tired international relations theories have never sufficiently explained or been useful in dealing with the Kim family regime.

Excerpts:

Trump’s return to the presidency coincides with a volatile geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific. The DPRK’s deepened alliances with Russia and China, coupled with the domestic political challenges in the ROK and Japan, complicate traditional U.S. strategies. The administration must monitor pivotal developments in the region, including the reconvening of the Special Assembly, the fate of the Yoon administration, and Ishiba’s regional diplomacy. As these developments unfold, Rubio’s emphasis on avoiding nuclear proliferation in the region underscores the administration’s cautious yet pragmatic approach to managing these challenges. In their first days in office, Rubio and Hegseth individually engaged with their respective Japanese and South Korean counterparts, reinforcing U.S. commitment to regional stability through trilateral cooperation.

Additionally, the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war could significantly influence Russia-DPRK relations. Experts suggest that a favorable settlement for Russia might reduce its reliance on the DPRK, weakening their relationship. Conversely, an unfavorable outcome could deepen their partnership, making Pyongyang less willing to engage with Washington. However, if Russia’s position is weakened, it could create opportunities for renewed U.S. dialogue with the DPRK.

Navigating these complexities will require the second Trump administration to carefully balance global priorities and regional commitments. Success depends on crafting strategies that address immediate threats while adapting to long-term shifts shaping the Indo-Pacific.

Trump and Kim, Act Two: Challenges of Engagement in a New Geopolitical Landscape

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/12/trump-and-kim-act-two-challenges-of-engagement-in-a-new-geopolitical-landscape/

by Jonathan Bak

03.12.2025 at 06:00am

Abstract

The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2025 introduces new complexities to the already volatile geopolitical landscape. This is particularly true in the U.S.–Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) relations. Trump’s first term was marked by unprecedented direct engagement with DPRK’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, capturing global attention but failing to secure lasting agreements. Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s alliance-building efforts were rebuffed by Pyongyang. Recent years have seen the DPRK strengthen alliances with Russia and China, leveraging these relationships to bolster its strategic and economic resilience. This evolving alignment complicates the United States’ capacity to recalibrate its approach under Trump’s renewed leadership.

Simultaneously, domestic political turbulence in the Republic of Korea and Japan further disrupts the regional security framework, challenging trilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Trump’s potential approaches to alliances raise questions about the sustainability of U.S. influence and the ability of allies to adapt independently. As the DPRK deepens military and economic ties with Russia, its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict could reshape its strategic posture. This analysis explores how these shifting dynamics test the viability of U.S. strategies in the Indo-Pacific and highlights the urgent need for adaptable, multi-faceted policy approaches to address emerging challenges and sustain long-term stability.

(Author’s note: This analysis was completed on February 9, 2025. As world news is constantly evolving, developments may have occurred since this date that could counter the arguments and perspectives proposed herein.)

Introduction

The outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election surprised many, with Donald Trump returning to the White House and promising significant changes in U.S. foreign policies. Among these, U.S. policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains a critical question. Trump’s first term marked a bold departure from previous strategies, involving unprecedented direct engagement with DPRK’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and high-profile summits. While these efforts garnered global attention, they faced challenges in achieving lasting agreements. In contrast, the Biden administration prioritized alliance-building in the Indo-Pacific. While efforts were made to contact the DPRK, they were ultimately rebuffed. Since then, the DPRK has deepened alliances with Russia and China, recalibrating its strategy and complicating the United States’ traditional methods of engagement. As global dynamics shift, the viability of renewed U.S.-DPRK engagement remains uncertain.

North Korea’s Geopolitical Shift and Strategic Alliance

Since Trump’s departure in 2021, the DPRK has undergone significant geopolitical shifts, with its reignited relationship with Russia standing out as the most consequential. In a short amount of time, the bilateral relationship has intensified. Key developments have brought renewed attention to the DPRK’s strategic maneuvers. These include high-level state visits, the ratification of the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty,” and the deployment of DPRK soldiers to Europe in support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, the March 2024 Russian vote against renewing the United Nations’ expert panel tasked with monitoring sanctions targeting the DPRK highlights the growing partnership between the two nations.

While Russia provides military and strategic support, China remains the DPRK’s largest partner and is a crucial source of economic stability. Despite this, Beijing’s role in recent DPRK maneuvers has been comparatively subdued. While trade between the two nations reached its highest monthly volume of 2024 in November, experts have noted that it remains slightly below pre-pandemic figures. This dynamic reflects China’s measured approach, supporting DPRK economically while observing its evolving relationship with Russia. Despite this cautious stance, China continues to supply essential aid, enabling the DPRK to circumvent sanctions and focus on its military modernization.

Trump 2.0: New Challenges with the DPRK

Trump’s second term introduces new challenges for U.S.-DPRK relations. During his first term, Trump’s approach combined “maximum pressure” through sanctions with high-profile summits and direct engagement, representing a significant distinction from previous U.S. strategies. While it drew global attention, the complexities of denuclearization remained unresolved. Recent developments, however, suggest a shift in focus. The selection of Richard Grenell as Special Missions Envoy, tasked with “addressing multiple global hotspots,” signals that DPRK may not “be as high a priority as it was during Trump’s first term.” In addition, Marco Rubio endorsed a “rethinking of U.S. policy toward the DPRK” during his January 2025 confirmation hearing for his nominated position of Secretary of State. He emphasized “actively engaging the DPRK over-relying on sanctions,” signaling a shift from the Biden administration’s approach. Moreover, Trump’s reference to the DPRK as a “nuclear power” shortly after his inauguration, paraphrased by Secretary Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, signals a potential shift in tone. While not a formal policy change, South Korean officials characterized the comment as consistent with Trump’s previous approach and reaffirmed the administration’s goal of complete denuclearization. Despite this recognition, Trump has repeatedly expressed a willingness to re-engage in dialogue with Kim Jong Un, signaling his preference for direct diplomacy. This dual narrative of acknowledging Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities while pursuing disarmament reflects both the transactional nature of his approach and the complexities of negotiating with a nuclear-armed DPRK.

However, the perspective has changed north of the 38th Parallel. Kim’s remarks at the opening ceremony of the Military Hardware Exhibition Defense Development in November 2024 cast uncertainty on the viability of diplomatic efforts for the United States. In his speech, Kim expressed skepticism about U.S. support for its allies and dismissed the possibility of productive dialogue, stating, “We already did everything possible in the bilateral negotiations with the United States, and what we were eventually convinced of was not the superpower’s will to co-exist with us but its domineering stand and unchangeably aggressive and hostile policy towards the DPRK.” Additionally in February 2025, DPRK state media reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Rubio for calling the country “a rogue state” in an interview. The ministry asserted in their press statement that “We will never tolerate any provocation of the U.S., which has been always hostile to the DPRK and will be hostile to it in the future, too, but will take tough counteraction corresponding to it as usual.” These sentiments, combined with Kim’s strengthened alliance with his closest ally, question whether Trump’s prior tactics can be effective.

Another challenge that involves the DPRK is its role in the Russia-Ukraine war. Officials from Europe, advisors to Trump, and Special Envoy Keith Kellogg have collectively noted recalibrations in Trump’s strategy for resolving the conflict. His initial plan to end the war in “24 hours” has been extended to “several months,” signaling “continued U.S. involvement in the conflict to ensure a stronger negotiating position.” Should negotiations to end the conflict occur, potentially involving Trump, the resulting settlement could affect the DPRK and reshape its relations with Russia. This potential shift, dependent on the terms of the agreement and Trump’s approach, remains a critical factor in the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Regional Security Dynamics

The second Trump administration will face intricate challenges with its Indo-Pacific allies, especially within the trilateral alliance. In the Republic of Korea (ROK), political uncertainty following President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment and subsequent leadership changes complicates its capacity to align with U.S. strategic priorities. Acting President Choi Sang-mok has vowed to maintain stability, but domestic turmoil poses challenges for advancing trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan. Prior to Yoon’s December 2024 marital law incident, concerns were already growing about alliance assurance under Trump’s transactional approach, prompting renewed discussions on nuclear armament as a means of self-reliance.

In Japan, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s administration faces its own political challenges following significant parliamentary losses by the ruling coalition in the late 2024 elections. The outcome has limited his party’s dominance, exposing challenges in maintaining political stability. Ishiba’s emphasis on enhancing Japan’s defense posture and maintaining dialogue with both the United States and China highlights a dual strategy of deterrence and engagement. Ishiba’s February 2025 meeting with Trump reaffirmed the commitment to strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, which the White House described as the “cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.” The summit underscored key priorities, including defense cooperation, economic security, and a renewed commitment to the complete denuclearization of the DPRK. Ishiba has also expressed interest in meeting with Xi Jinping. These diplomatic engagements underscore Japan’s efforts to stabilize relations with its largest trading partners while balancing regional security concerns, particularly regarding the DPRK.

These dynamics underscore broader regional recalibrations driven by DPRK’s strategic alignments with Russia and China. Experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies note that the DPRK’s reliance on Russia for sanctions relief and military support has significantly reduced its incentive to negotiate with the United States. This growing alignment has further weakened the effectiveness of U.S.-led sanctions and diplomatic efforts for engagement. Indo-Pacific scholars affirm that both the ROK and Japan remain pivotal to U.S. efforts in the Indo-Pacific. Still, their domestic and foreign policy challenges could complicate the endurance of the trilateral alliance.

Furthermore, Trump’s potential “America First” policies, which might emphasize transactional alliances, could reshape U.S. partnerships. Some foreign policy scholars argued that this approach risks alienating allies who view alliances as essential for mutual defense and regional stability. However, others suggest that such a stance could drive greater burden-sharing among U.S. allies, especially in the Indo-Pacific, fostering stronger coalitions independent of the United States. Multilateralism defined the Biden administration’s foreign policy approach to the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the trilateral alliance. Pyongyang is likely to monitor each member’s domestic and foreign policy challenges, as well as the impact of U.S. policies on the alliance’s future.

Conclusion

Trump’s return to the presidency coincides with a volatile geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific. The DPRK’s deepened alliances with Russia and China, coupled with the domestic political challenges in the ROK and Japan, complicate traditional U.S. strategies. The administration must monitor pivotal developments in the region, including the reconvening of the Special Assembly, the fate of the Yoon administration, and Ishiba’s regional diplomacy. As these developments unfold, Rubio’s emphasis on avoiding nuclear proliferation in the region underscores the administration’s cautious yet pragmatic approach to managing these challenges. In their first days in office, Rubio and Hegseth individually engaged with their respective Japanese and South Korean counterparts, reinforcing U.S. commitment to regional stability through trilateral cooperation.

Additionally, the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war could significantly influence Russia-DPRK relations. Experts suggest that a favorable settlement for Russia might reduce its reliance on the DPRK, weakening their relationship. Conversely, an unfavorable outcome could deepen their partnership, making Pyongyang less willing to engage with Washington. However, if Russia’s position is weakened, it could create opportunities for renewed U.S. dialogue with the DPRK.

Navigating these complexities will require the second Trump administration to carefully balance global priorities and regional commitments. Success depends on crafting strategies that address immediate threats while adapting to long-term shifts shaping the Indo-Pacific.

Tags: alliances, INDO-PACIFIC, Korea

About The Author

Jonathan Bak
Jonathan Bak is an independent researcher on international affairs, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific. He holds a Master of Arts in International Security Studies from the University of Arizona.

4. In Brief: Asian Allies Adjust Security Policies in Response to Trump Administration

In Brief: Asian Allies Adjust Security Policies in Response to Trump Administration - War on the Rocks

Lauren Dickey, Benjamin Charlton, Jenny Town, and Gregory Poling

https://warontherocks.com/2025/03/in-brief-asian-allies-adjust-security-policies-in-response-to-trump-administration/

March 11, 2025

Members

A lot happens every day. Alliances shift, leaders change, and conflicts erupt. With In Brief, we’ll help you make sense of it all. Each week, experts will dig deep on a single issue happening in the world to help you better understand it.

***

As America’s allies in Europe rush to adjust to the Trump administration’s foreign policy shifts, allies in Asia are also watching and considering how President Donald Trump will approach China and other security concerns in the Pacific. We asked four experts to explain how Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are adjusting their strategies and defense spending in response to new leadership in Washington.

(Yonhap Feature) S. Korea-U.S. joint drills target growing N. Korean WMD threats | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 12, 2025

By Chae Yun-hwan

YANGJU, South Korea, March 12 (Yonhap) -- Under the cover of yellow smoke screens, South Korean soldiers cut through barbed wire before charging into a training ground in Yangju, just north of Seoul, on Wednesday during joint drills with U.S. troops over North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

Simulating an assault on a North Korean facility suspected of storing an unidentified WMD, the drills were designed to secure and neutralize North Korean WMDs in the event of an all-out war as the allies seek to enhance readiness against Pyongyang's growing nuclear threats.

Aerial drones equipped with K2 rifles and an unmanned armed vehicle provided covering fire as South Korean troops from the 25th Infantry Division in gas masks and protective gear deployed a four-legged robot to enter and clear enemy-occupied buildings.

Once the area was secured, U.S. troops under a Stryker combat vehicle unit advanced into a pitch-black underground bunker to seize and remove the weapon, guided by the faint green glow of light sticks scattered on the ground.

An unmanned vehicle leads South Korean troops to enter a training ground simulating a North Korean weapons of mass destruction facility in Yangju, north of Seoul, during joint drills with U.S. troops on March 12, 2025. (Yonhap)

The Army granted rare media access for the drills targeting WMDs at the remote training site in the mountains, which took place as part of the allies' ongoing annual Freedom Shield exercise.

Cross-border tensions flared up this week after North Korea fired multiple ballistic missiles into the Yellow Sea on Monday in apparent anger over the annual springtime exercise that kicked off the same day.

Pyongyang has long decried the allies' joint drills as a rehearsal for an invasion, despite South Korea and the United States describing such exercises as defensive in nature.

The North has issued a series of condemnations against Freedom Shield since late last week, denouncing it Tuesday as training for a "preemptive" strike against the country's nuclear weapons facilities.

An Army official said Wednesday's drills proceeded under a scenario set after a war had already broken out, noting troops trained on securing facilities containing an unidentified WMD rather than procedures to eliminate a specific weapon.

Some 500 personnel participated in the WMD exercise, with South Korean troops mostly focused on working together with advanced unmanned assets to overpower enemy forces at the simulated WMD site.

U.S. troops prepare to enter a bunker simulating a North Korean weapons of mass destruction facility at a training ground in Yangju, north of Seoul, on March 12, 2025. (Yonhap)

The allies have sought to sharpen readiness against North Korean WMD threats, highlighted by Pyongyang's continued push to diversify its nuclear delivery systems and large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.

Last November, North Korea test-fired the Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is theoretically capable of striking the U.S. mainland. Pyongyang is also believed to possess about 2,500-5,000 tons of chemical weapons, according to South Korea's defense white paper.

Lt. Col. Ma Dong-hyuk, who oversaw the exercise, said the training allowed his troops to practice joint operations with U.S. troops in a realistic manner, vowing to continue to stage such drills.

"(We) will strengthen the South Korean and U.S. militaries' interoperability through continued (personnel) exchange, cooperation and combined exercises," he said.

The springtime Freedom Shield exercise is based on a scenario of an all-out war and takes place across all domains, including land, air, sea, cyber and space. This year's exercise will involve some 19,000 South Korean troops.

A four-legged Army robot stands by as troops wear protective gear before entering a facility suspected to be storing weapons of mass destruction at a training ground in Yangju, north of Seoul, on March 12, 2025. (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 12, 2025

6. N. Korea slams Seoul-Washington joint military drills, citing S. Korean accidental jet bombing

No surprise. And of course they would exploit the accident. The Propaganda and Agitation Department is firing on all cylinders.

N. Korea slams Seoul-Washington joint military drills, citing S. Korean accidental jet bombing | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 12, 2025

SEOUL, March 12 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Wednesday continued to denounce joint military drills by South Korea and the United States, claiming South Korean jet fighters' latest accidental bombing of a village was an "ominous" sign that points to the danger of the exercise.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said in a commentary that the enemies should immediately stop their "nuclear war" simulation as Seoul and Washington kicked off the annual springtime Freedom Shield exercise Monday for an 11-day run.

North Korea called attention to two South Korean KF-16 fighter jets' accidental dropping of eight bombs on a village near the inter-Korean border during live-fire drills Thursday. The accident, blamed on pilot error, left 31 people injured, including 19 civilians.

"The enemies should not give a sigh of relief, but they should take seriously an ominous sign of the dangerous U.S.-S. Korea joint military drills and immediately stop a nuclear war simulation, the root cause for the worsening security situation on the Korean Peninsula," the KCNA said.

North Korea said the bombing accident occurred days before the start of the joint military exercise in an area just south of the border, claiming if one of the bombs had dropped slightly northward past the border, it could have yielded a disastrous outcome.

North Korea warned it would not require a "far-fetched imagination" to believe a new armed conflict could occur on the Korean Peninsula with an "accidental spark of fire."

"We are closely watching even a single military act by the enemies to cope with any sudden development of situations. In case of emergency, we will move to ruthless action without warning," North Korea said.

North Korea has long denounced the allies' joint military drills as rehearsals for an invasion and uses them as a pretext for provocations. South Korea and the U.S. have said their exercises are defensive in nature.

The North fired multiple close-range ballistic missiles toward the Yellow Sea on Monday in an apparent protest against the allies' military drills, the first known ballistic missile test since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House.

Military helicopters prepare to take off at the U.S. Forces Korea's Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, about 60 kilometers south of Seoul, on March 10, 2025, as South Korea and the United States kicked off their annual springtime Freedom Shield exercise. (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 12, 2025

7. Germany not to reopen embassy in N. Korea while Ukraine war continues: German official

Germany not to reopen embassy in N. Korea while Ukraine war continues: German official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 11, 2025

SEOUL, March 11 (Yonhap) -- Germany has no plans to reopen its embassy in North Korea while the Russia-Ukraine war continues, a German government official said Tuesday, citing the country's involvement in the conflict.

"Under these circumstances of the ongoing conflict and North Korea involved in Ukraine, we cannot see the possibility to reopen the embassy," the German official said on condition of anonymity.

Some European countries that operated diplomatic missions in North Korea, such as Germany, Britain and Sweden, pulled out of the reclusive country in early 2020 due to Pyongyang's COVID-19 restrictions.

Germany had reportedly been considering reopening its embassy in North Korea. In a related effort, a German diplomat in charge of East Asia affairs visited the country in February 2024 to inspect the embassy building and local living conditions.

North Korea deployed thousands of troops to support Russia in its war against Ukraine last year, while Germany formally joined the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) in charge of overseeing the armistice of the 1950-53 Korean War last August.

North Korea has since strongly denounced Germany's entry into the UNC, calling it an act of ruining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

"As long as the conflict (in Ukraine) is ongoing, we will not open (the embassy)," the German official told Yonhap News Agency.

Among Western countries, Sweden reinstated its diplomats to its embassy in North Korea for the first time in September last year. Poland and Switzerland also resumed diplomatic activities in the North.

According to the South Korean unification ministry, 15 foreign embassies were operating in North Korea as of recently, including those from Brazil, Iran, India, Nigeria and Nicaragua.

This file photo, provided by the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, shows a German foreign ministry official visiting North Korea at the invitation of the country's foreign ministry on Feb. 26, 2024. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 11, 2025

8. Gov't shifts to emergency response system as U.S. tariffs on steel imports take effect

Does it have to be this way with our alliances?

Gov't shifts to emergency response system as U.S. tariffs on steel imports take effect | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · March 12, 2025

SEOUL, March 13 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean government will go into a full emergency response mode as the U.S. tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports went into effect Wednesday, Seoul's industry ministry said, amid efforts to minimize the impact of new U.S. duties on local industries.

The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy held a meeting with officials from various business associations, industries, academic institutes and support institutions to devise a strategy for the Donald Trump administration's new tariff scheme.

In the meeting, Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun said his ministry will strengthen communication with local industries and beef up response measures against U.S. tariffs to protect the interests of Korean companies.

"We will work to arrange meetings between senior trade officials from Seoul and Washington for negotiations, and closely monitor response measures of other major countries affected by the U.S. tariffs," he said.

This illustrated image depicts the Donald Trump administration's new tariff scheme. (Yonhap)

The meeting took place as the Trump administration's 25 percent duties on all steel and aluminum imports kicked off at 1:01 p.m. (Korea time).

South Korea was the fourth-largest exporter of steel to the U.S. last year, accounting for 9 percent of Washington's steel imports, according to data from the U.S. International Trade Administration (ITA).

The country was also the fourth-biggest exporter of aluminum to the U.S., taking up about 4 percent of the U.S.' aluminum imports.

Washington also plans to impose levies on various other goods, including automobiles, semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, as well as reciprocal tariffs on its trading partners, in the near future.

Steel products are piled up at a port in Pyeongtaek, about 65 kilometers south of Seoul, on March 11, 2025, a day before the U.S. government's 25 percent tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports kick off. (Yonhap)

To help with Korean companies' response to U.S. duties, the industry ministry plans to hold briefing sessions on Washington's trade policies, operate an emergency help desk and provide consultations on business strategies that it says may include diversification of export destinations and relocation of manufacturing facilities.

The ministry also plans to devise a set of strategies to bolster the global competitiveness of carmakers and other major industries.

In a recent interview with Yonhap News Agency, Trade Minister Cheong In-kyo said the government will work to swiftly identify what the Trump administration wants from Seoul in tariff negotiations and work to induce a favorable assessment of South Korea's contributions to the U.S. economy through what Seoul has called massive corporate investments that amounted to over US$160 billion since the start of the first Trump administration.

Following Ahn's visit to Washington late last month, the Seoul government has launched consultative bodies on promoting bilateral cooperation in shipbuilding and energy industries with the U.S. as part of their negotiations on Trump's tariff plans.

South Korea has also conveyed interest in participating in the gas pipeline development project in Alaska, one of Trump's key agenda items, as part of efforts to increase its energy imports from the U.S. and thus reduce its trade surplus.

nyway@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · March 12, 2025

9. Editorial: Democratic Party's impeachment madness is real threat to democracy

Conclusion:

The DPK accused President Yoon of insurrection, but its repeated impeachment attempts are just as serious in undermining the system. It has pushed through baseless motions and used legislation to block governance—all to protect Lee Jae-myung. Is this not an abuse of power disguised as law? It is hard to find another country where this happens.

Editorial: Democratic Party's impeachment madness is real threat to democracy

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/03/12/4LR3EDVBZFHTZM4UBTH4ZXDISM/

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2025.03.12. 08:55

Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung (left) and floor leader Park Chan-dae call for the resignation of Prosecutor General Shim Woo-jung at a protest held after a morning emergency meeting at the National Assembly in Seoul on March 9. /News1

South Korea’s Democratic Party (DPK) is ramping up pressure to impeach Prosecutor General Shim Woo-jung. While the party leadership will decide when to submit the motion, it could happen anytime. If the DPK moves forward, this will be the 30th impeachment attempt under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration—more than the total 21 impeachment motions in South Korea’s history since 1948. This could be a world record.

Of these impeachment attempts, 13 have been pushed through unilaterally in the National Assembly. The acting president and the head of the Board of Audit and Inspection were impeached, and Interior Minister Lee Sang-min faced impeachment twice—something never seen before. Acting President Han Duck-soo was impeached despite uncertainty over the quorum, with accusations of insurrection, even though he opposed martial law. The DPK likely saw him as an obstacle to its plan for an early presidential election to benefit its leader, Lee Jae-myung.

The DPK also pressured Acting President Choi Sang-mok to appoint a Constitutional Court judge, repeatedly threatening impeachment. Other cabinet members have faced similar warnings. The party has used impeachment as a weapon, even during emergencies. The Korea Communications Commission (KCC) was paralyzed for 174 days due to back-to-back impeachment motions against its chairman and commissioners.

Impeachment should be based on serious constitutional or legal violations, but many DPK motions lack clear legal grounds. The motion against former KCC Chairman Lee Dong-kwan contained no specific legal violations and was mostly copied from past prosecutor impeachment motions. KCC Commissioner Lee Jin-sook was impeached just two days after taking office, before she could even start her duties.

Prosecutors investigating Lee Jae-myung were impeached based on rumors, one-sided claims, or cases already dismissed. This was an open attempt to block investigations. When a claim that a prosecutor had lied turned out to be false, the DPK changed its impeachment reason afterward. When the Constitutional Court indicated the motions could be dismissed, the DPK even asked the court to find evidence for them. In the end, all four impeachment motions were rejected. These were not legitimate legal actions but political attacks.

Filing false accusations to punish someone is a crime. The DPK’s reckless impeachment moves not only harm those targeted but also paralyze governance and disrupt the legal system. Yet, they have done this 30 times.

The DPK accused President Yoon of insurrection, but its repeated impeachment attempts are just as serious in undermining the system. It has pushed through baseless motions and used legislation to block governance—all to protect Lee Jae-myung. Is this not an abuse of power disguised as law? It is hard to find another country where this happens.

10. Steelmakers face tough road ahead on U.S. tariffs

(2nd LD) Steelmakers face tough road ahead on U.S. tariffs | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Choi Kyong-ae · March 12, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES figure in 15th para)

SEOUL, March 12 (Yonhap) -- South Korean steelmakers are facing new and tough challenges in the U.S. market as the U.S. government began imposing tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports Wednesday.

U.S. President Donald Trump has announced a wide range of levies on some of his country's trading partners since taking office in January.

Among them are 25 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum imports that kicked off at 1:01 p.m. Wednesday (Korea time).

In response to the steep tariffs, Korean steel firms, including POSCO and Hyundai Steel Co., said they will closely cooperate with the government and develop more high-end products to maintain their share in the U.S. market.

"The company will put a bigger focus on developing value-added products and cutting manufacturing costs further to secure an 'unrivaled' competitiveness despite rapidly changing external market conditions," a POSCO spokesperson said over the phone.

POSCO has said it is considering building a steel plant in the United States to cope with the tariffs.

Hyundai Steel said the U.S. tariffs will have a negative impact on domestic steelmakers in the mid- to long-term.

Steelmakers are concerned that the hefty tariffs may significantly affect their price competitiveness in the U.S. market compared with local rivals, such as United States Steel Corp.

In late February, South Korean officials requested an exemption from the tariffs on steel and aluminum during their visit to Washington, but to no apparent avail.

Seoul's responses to the Trump administration's latest tariff plans have been affected by political turmoil sparked by President Yoon Suk Yeol's brief martial law imposition in December.

Under the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (FTA), almost all tariffs between the two countries have already been eliminated.

During his first term, Trump imposed 25 percent and 10 percent tariffs, respectively, on all steel and aluminum imports to the U.S. in 2018, citing national security concerns.

At the time, the U.S. waived the tariffs on South Korean steel products in exchange for a yearly import quota of 2.63 million tons, which accounted for about 70 percent of Seoul's average export volume between 2015 and 2017.

Once the new tariffs are imposed, the quotas will be immediately abolished.

The U.S. also imposed a 25 percent import tariff on 259 steel and aluminum derivative products.

"With the removal of the 70 percent quota (for Korean firms), we will draw up a new export strategy. We will be able to selectively ship our products to the U.S. market," a Hyundai Steel spokesperson said.

South Korea was the fourth-largest exporter of steel to the U.S. last year, accounting for 9 percent, or US$2.9 billion, of Washington's steel imports, according to data from the U.S. International Trade Administration (ITA).

The country was also the fourth-biggest exporter of aluminum to the U.S., taking up about 4 percent of the U.S.' aluminum imports.

On Wednesday, shares in POSCO Holdings, the holding company of POSCO Group, jumped 5.9 percent to 314,000 won, and Hyundai Steel advanced 2.46 percent to 29,150 won. The broader Korea Stock Price Index (KOSPI) rose 1.47 percent.

In spite of the new U.S. tariffs, the steel stocks jumped on the possibility of their joining the Trump government's natural gas pipeline project in Alaska, analysts said.

Trump mentioned South Korea and Japan as countries interested in the "gigantic" project during his address to a joint session of Congress last week.

U.S. President Donald Trump delivers remarks in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C., on March 7, 2025, in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)

kyongae.choi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Choi Kyong-ae · March 12, 2025

11. S. Korean trade minister to visit Washington this week for tariff negotiations

Why are we allowing this self imposed distraction when there are so many important issues that should be addressed?

S. Korean trade minister to visit Washington this week for tariff negotiations | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · March 12, 2025

SEOUL, March 12 (Yonhap) -- South Korean Trade Minister Cheong In-kyo will visit Washington later this week to meet with U.S. government officials for tariff negotiations, Cheong's office said Wednesday.

Cheong will depart Thursday on a two-day trip to Washington for negotiations with the Donald Trump administration on the latter's new tariff scheme, according to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy.

During the visit, Cheong plans to discuss bolstering bilateral cooperation on supply chains with officials from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and other government agencies, and stress the need for a stable environment for South Korean companies' investments in the United States.

"The ministry will continue negotiations on topics discussed during the bilateral ministerial meeting in February," Cheong said in a press release, vowing to work to promote the interests of both Seoul and Washington.

Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun met with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick and other officials late last month, and discussed expanding bilateral cooperation in shipbuilding, energy and other industries.

Following the meeting, Seoul and Washington launched consultative bodies on tariff negotiations, shipbuilding collaboration and energy cooperation, which includes South Korea's possible participation in the U.S.' gas pipeline development project in Alaska.

Earlier Wednesday, the Trump administration's 25 percent tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports took effect, stoking fears of a global trade war.

The Seoul government has been working to devise response measures to the U.S. tariff scheme, which is expected to affect major industries, from steel to car manufacturing and semiconductors.

Trade Minister Cheong In-kyo speaks in an interview with Yonhap News Agency in Belgium on March 10, 2025, in this photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

nyway@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · March 12, 2025

12. Acting president calls for strong readiness posture against N.K. threats

Acting president calls for strong readiness posture against N.K. threats | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · March 12, 2025

SEOUL, March 12 (Yonhap) -- Acting President Choi Sang-mok called on the military Wednesday to maintain a staunch readiness posture against North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile capabilities, his office said.

Choi made the call during a graduation ceremony of the Korea Air Force Academy held on its campus in the central city of Cheongju, according to the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

"North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities while persisting in provocations and threats. It also poses a threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the world through illegal weapons transactions with Russia," Choi said in his congratulatory speech.

"Now is the time for the military to maintain a strong readiness posture by faithfully fulfilling its role and missions," he added.

Choi also highlighted the recent shift in the paradigm of warfare driven by advanced science and technologies, such as artificial intelligence, and called for the need to apply them to the military so as to "proactively respond to fast-changing battlefield circumstances."

In a separate meeting with commanders following the event, Choi stressed the need to ensure safety of the people over the course of conducting military drills and other activities.

The comment came as two KF-16 fighter jets dropped eight 500-pound MK-82 bombs outside a training range in Pocheon, some 40 kilometers north of Seoul, during live-fire drills last week, injuring 31 people, including 19 civilians.

Acting President Choi Sang-mok (front row, C) flies paper airplanes with graduates of the Korea Air Force Academy during a graduation ceremony at the academy's campus in Cheongju, central South Korea, on March 12, 2025. (Yonhap)

graceoh@yna.co.kr

(END)

13. Fukushima water discharge is still controversial, but tests show no signs of harm

Fukushima water discharge is still controversial, but tests show no signs of harm

Japan's Fukushima nuclear power plant has completed 10 rounds of treated water discharge amid political backlash

https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/03/12/JEKNMY2YABGDFMTNG6D6AUNN5Y/

By Lee Jong-hyun,

Lee Hojun,

Lee Jae-eun

Published 2025.03.12. 14:54

Democratic Party of Korea leader Lee Jae-myung / News1

Fourteen years have passed since the Fukushima nuclear accident, which occurred on March 11, 2011, following the Great East Japan Earthquake. The earthquake and tsunami damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant’s electrical grid, releasing hydrogen and radioactive wastewater into the surrounding environment.

When the Japanese government and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) began discharging ALPS-treated water from the Fukushima plant into the Pacific Ocean in August 2023, South Korea’s opposition parties and civil society groups strongly criticized the move, warning that the contaminated water could spread to Korean waters and lead to a catastrophe. Lee Jae-myung, leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, said at the time, “The discharge of contaminated water from Fukushima will be recorded as the second Pacific War.”

TEPCO recently announced plans to begin the 11th batch of wastewater discharge from March 12 to 17. This time, Korea’s main opposition party has not voiced any criticism. Apart from the fact that South Korea is in the midst of political turmoil, awaiting the court’s impeachment ruling on President Yoon Suk-yeol, the 11th discharge has faced little political pushback because the ten previous wastewater discharges have taken place without incident. According to reports from the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS), the discharges have not yet contaminated the sea or seafood.

Noryangjin Fisheries Wholesale Market in Seoul./ News1

“Back in 2011, radioactive water from the Fukushima plant was released without any treatment, but since August 24, 2023, Japan has been discharging ALPS-treated water that has been diluted to meet regulatory safety limits,” said Chung Bum-jin, a professor at Kyunghee University’s Department of Nuclear Engineering. “If untreated water did not cause major issues back then, there is no scientific or logical reason to believe that treated water would be problematic now.”

ChosunBiz collected radiation safety data from various government agencies, including the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety, and the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, to see whether any problems have arisen since the discharge began on August 24, 2023.

Since the first discharge in August 2023, KINS has conducted monitoring after each release, publishing reports that so far have concluded no abnormalities have been detected.

The Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries has also conducted radiation tests on seafood distributed in South Korea. The surveyed items include sea salt, mackerel, seaweed, halibut, anchovies, cutlassfish, oysters, yellowfin tuna, blue crab, and squid. Since August 24, 2023, more than 28,000 radiation tests have been conducted on seafood, and no sample has failed safety standards.

The same pattern holds for radiation surveys of domestic waters and coastal areas. Testing for cesium and tritium—two key radioactive isotopes—has shown that they remained within normal levels. Nationwide monitoring from 238 radiation stations, including the southernmost island of Marado, has consistently reported no abnormal readings.

Food imported from Japan also showed no signs of significant risk. The Ministry of Food and Drug Safety releases daily reports on radiation tests for food imports. Since August 24, 2023, a total of 55,231 radiation tests have been conducted on food imported from Japan. Of these, 55,198 passed, while only 33 samples were deemed non-compliant, resulting in a failure rate of just 0.059%.

Imported food from other countries had higher failure rates for radiation testing during the same period, such as 1.114% for China, 0.535% for Russia, 0.583% for the United States, and 2.586% for Italy. Given that Japanese food imports undergo more testing than other countries, data suggests that Japanese food is relatively safer than imports from many other nations.

“Since January 2023, a total of 457 ships arriving from Japanese ports, including Chiba Prefecture, have had their ballast water tested for radiation, and all have met safety standards,” said Song Myung-dal, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries.

Fukushima

radioactive wastewater

14. N. Korea ramps up cyber offensive: New research center to focus on AI-powered hacking

You cannot say that the regime does not have learning organizations.

N. Korea ramps up cyber offensive: New research center to focus on AI-powered hacking - Daily NK English

North Korea plans to operate Research Center 227 around the clock to respond immediately to real-time information from RGB hacking groups deployed overseas

By Jeong Tae Joo - March 12, 2025

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · March 12, 2025

North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported on Oct. 15 that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un “convened a consultative meeting on National Defence and Security,” where he heard several reports, including a report from the director of the General Reconnaissance Bureau on the general analysis of the case of enemy's serious provocation that violated the sovereignty of the DPRK and a report from the chief of the KPA General Staff on the military counteraction plan. (Rodong Sinmun, News1)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has ordered the establishment of “Research Center 227” under the military’s Reconnaissance General Bureau to research and develop international cyber hacking technologies.

A Daily NK source inside North Korea said recently, “In late February, the Supreme Commander issued an order to the RGB under the General Staff Department to enhance overseas information warfare capabilities. This order included instructions to establish Research Center 227 for hacking technology research.”

According to the source, following this order transmitted through the Operations Bureau to the RGB staff department, efforts to establish the center officially began March 9.

“This research center is separate from existing institutes under the RGB,” the source emphasized. While RGB headquarters is located in Pyongyang’s Hyongjesan District, Research Center 227 is situated in Mangyongdae District.

Within the RGB, there’s a widespread belief that the new center was created to enhance foreign intelligence collection. However, the source indicated that the center will focus less on information gathering and more on developing offensive hacking technologies and programs.

Through Research Center 227, North Korean authorities appear to be planning to neutralize Western countries’ cybersecurity systems while strengthening hacking capabilities aimed at stealing information and assets and disrupting computer networks.

According to the investigation, the center’s main missions include: researching techniques to neutralize security networks, developing AI-based information theft technologies, hacking financial assets and establishing automated programs for information collection and analysis.

North Korean authorities plan to operate Research Center 227 around the clock to respond immediately to real-time information from RGB hacking groups deployed overseas, while concentrating resources and personnel on developing sophisticated hacking programs.

The RGB is currently selecting personnel for Research Center 227, with plans to initially recruit about 90 computer experts who graduated with outstanding results from major universities and doctoral programs.

“The personnel being selected are all talented individuals who majored in program development, automation systems or information security at central universities, doctoral programs or university research institutes,” the source said.

“These are not cyber warriors who directly carry out information warfare missions in foreign locations, but internal research staff who develop offensive programs. With the establishment of Research Center 227, the RGB’s cyber operational capabilities will be significantly strengthened in the future,” the source added.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · March 12, 2025

15. N. Korea rushes to modernize military education following Kim's harsh criticism

As long as the priority for all training and education remains on ideology and loyalty to the Kim family regime the north will never produce a superior fighting force. It is not serious about professional military education. Its only education and training capability is intense ideological indoctrination.

N. Korea rushes to modernize military education following Kim's harsh criticism - Daily NK English

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · March 11, 2025

The Rodong Sinmun reported on Feb. 26 that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had carried out “on-the-spot guidance” at the Kang Kon Military Academy, which trains junior commanders, on Feb. 25. Kim said during an address that “military education should focus on practical matters” and that “students need to learn from actual experience on modern battlefields in the North Korean way.” (Rodong Sinmun, News 1)

North Korea is working to modernize educational facilities and update drone warfare education at a leading military school, Daily NK has learned.

The changes follow reforms ordered by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during his Feb. 25 visit to Kang Kon Military Academy, where he criticized outdated learning environments and military tactics education.

“The Ministry of National Defense’s education bureau ordered Kang Kon Military Academy on March 1 to repair facilities, modernize lecture rooms and update the curriculum in response to Kim’s criticisms during his ‘on-the-spot guidance’ visit,” a North Korean military source told Daily NK recently.

According to the source, Kim criticized the academy for being disconnected from modern warfare realities.

Kim harshly condemned educational methods stuck in the 1970s and 1980s, such as wargaming with wooden miniatures, while today’s battlefield centers on drones and electronic warfare.

“How can we train effective infantry field commanders with such outdated techniques?” Kim reportedly asked.

Kim demanded a major curriculum overhaul. “Drone warfare and automated command systems are now central to modern battlefields. I’m puzzled why we’re still teaching infantry tactics from decades past.”

In essence, Kim wants junior infantry commanders trained for emerging battlefield trends.

“Our soldiers may be highly motivated and possess revolutionary mindsets, but they won’t succeed in battle unless their commanders are prepared for modern warfare. When instruction at our military academies falls behind changing times, our commanders’ capabilities suffer. This can lead to units being destroyed in combat,” the source quoted Kim as saying.

“Kim emphasized the urgency of revamping military education to address drone warfare and autonomous command systems,” the source added.

Following Kim’s criticism, the North Korean military quickly procured dozens of advanced computers for the academy. On March 2, the academy began comprehensive work to repair facilities and modernize classrooms.

The academy is also collaborating with experts from the Ministry’s education bureau to develop a new curriculum covering modern warfare, including drones.

“The education bureau instructed Kang Kon Military Academy to complete its curriculum updates and submit a report to Kim Jong Un by late June. The bureau stressed meeting this deadline is crucial for training junior infantry commanders for the Korean People’s Army,” the source said.

The apparent motivation behind the curriculum overhaul is the regime’s conclusion that North Korean troops deployed to Russia’s Ukraine war were tactically limited by their inability to effectively respond to drone warfare.

“Given Kim’s criticism, the military must update tactical training for junior infantry commanders that has fallen behind current standards. However, there’s skepticism within the military about whether these curriculum changes will yield significant short-term improvements,” the source said.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · March 11, 2025

16. N. Korea launches crackdown as market prices surge nationwide

Markets and the philosophy behind them are a threat to the regime.

High prices come from shortages that are a result of regime policies.

Markets are the lifeline of the people and the key to resilience.

N. Korea launches crackdown as market prices surge nationwide - Daily NK English

"Joint market strike forces formed by Pyongsong's people's committee and city police have been inspecting markets to crack down on merchants who encourage price increases or sell at unusually high prices," a source told Daily NK

By Jeong Seo-yeong - March 12, 2025

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · March 12, 2025

A "grasshopper market," or unofficial market, in a village near Pyongyang. (Chinese blogger Lóng Wǔ*Láng Zhī Wěn)

North Korean authorities have begun taking aggressive action against nationwide price increases that started in mid-February, Daily NK has learned.

“The government has launched a response as rising prices that began in major cities like Pyongyang and Pyongsong last month have spread throughout the country, with general inflation increasing the financial burden on ordinary citizens,” a source told Daily NK recently.

Despite several earlier warnings to merchants against arbitrarily raising prices, costs have continued to climb steadily since mid-February. The price surge initially began in markets across Pyongyang, the capital city. As news spread, markets in nearby Pyongsong soon followed, with essential items like flour, sugar, and cooking oil jumping more than 20% in price.

Rice, corn, and other staple foods have also become more expensive, intensifying hardships for many North Koreans. Some residents have reportedly started panic buying, fearing prices might climb even higher.

With struggling citizens facing increasingly difficult circumstances, North Korean authorities finally took action, according to the source.

Officials from South Pyongan province’s people’s committee, along with local city and county committees, have reminded merchants of state policy that blames “arbitrary price increases” as the root cause of inflation. They’ve warned that merchants engaging in such practices will face “merciless” sanctions.

“Joint market strike forces formed by Pyongsong’s people’s committee and city police have been inspecting markets to crack down on merchants who encourage price increases or sell at unusually high prices. They’re threatening to revoke market selling privileges and impose punishments,” the source explained.

These strike teams aren’t limiting their efforts to formal markets. They’ve also targeted home-based sellers, creating tension throughout communities as enforcers visit private residences posing as potential customers.

“Prices are rising because essential goods are scarce, and merchants are growing increasingly frustrated with the government, which simply threatens punishment without acknowledging its own responsibility,” the source added. “People are also criticizing that these intensified controls and crackdowns will only expand the black market.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · March 12, 2025

17. Friendly fire: How a communication breakdown in N. Korea's 29th brigade led to border violence

I wonder also if there was a breakdown or disagreement among the three chains of military control.

But what is "pre-approved state smuggling?"

Friendly fire: How a communication breakdown in N. Korea's 29th brigade led to border violence - Daily NK English

The incident likely won't cause diplomatic issues as state smuggling regularly occurs secretly along the North Korea-China border

By Jeong Tae Joo - March 12, 2025

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · March 12, 2025

FILE PHOTO: The Yalu River between Dandong, China (right) and Sinuiju, North Korea (left). (Daily NK)

A clash along the North Korean border in Jagang province left both smugglers and soldiers injured after border guards attempted to crack down on a state-sanctioned smuggling operation they weren’t informed about.

“Last month, soldiers from the 29th Brigade tried to stop smugglers who were actually conducting state-approved smuggling along the Jagang province border,” a Daily NK source in the province reported. “The incident happened because the soldiers weren’t notified about the operation due to a command system failure.”

According to the source, the smugglers were waiting to receive pharmaceuticals and electronic devices, exchanging flash signals with their Chinese counterparts across the Yalu River around 11 p.m. when two soldiers from the 29th Brigade on stakeout spotted them.

Though the smugglers were conducting pre-approved “state smuggling,” the uninformed soldiers mistook them for illegal operators and fired warning shots. Startled, the smugglers fled along the riverbank while the soldiers pursued them after reporting the situation to their company.

As one smuggler was about to be caught, he panicked, threw a rock at the soldiers and shouted, “I’m engaged in state smuggling. Weren’t you informed?” The rock struck one soldier, who fell. His comrade responded by firing live ammunition, hitting the smuggler in the leg.

Additional soldiers who arrived after receiving the report managed to defuse the situation. However, the smuggling operation failed after Chinese traders, witnessing the chaos from across the river, disappeared.

The Ministry of State Security reportedly reprimanded the 29th Brigade for interfering with an approved operation and embarrassing North Korea in front of China by causing an unnecessary confrontation.

“We learned that 12 hours before the incident, the province’s trade bureau and trade management bureau had requested cooperation from the 29th Brigade headquarters for this operation, but due to a command system mixup, guard post personnel were never informed,” the source explained.

Following the incident, the 29th Brigade “intensified security by closing the 1-kilometer section of the Yalu River border where the clash occurred and adding more guard posts,” the source said. “The two soldiers at the scene were demoted as punishment.”

Amid ongoing international sanctions, North Korea imports restricted items through state-sanctioned smuggling separate from its formal customs trade. This officially approved illicit trade is called “state smuggling.”

The incident likely won’t cause diplomatic issues as state smuggling regularly occurs secretly along the North Korea-China border. However, it remains unclear whether China will use this incident to strengthen restrictions on cross-border smuggling.

Meanwhile, controversy over responsibility continues within the 29th Brigade. The source reported that soldiers have expressed frustration with their commanders, complaining that “the brigade messed up, but only lower-ranking soldiers were punished,” that “only the bottom ranks took the blame despite command failing to properly inform them,” and that “they wouldn’t know whose orders to trust if this happens again.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · March 12, 2025

18. North Korean Human Rights Groups Send Open Letter to Zelensky: “North Korean POWs’ Free Will Must Be Respected”

This is a Google translation of a VOA report.

North Korean Human Rights Groups Send Open Letter to Zelensky: “North Korean POWs’ Free Will Must Be Respected”

https://www.voakorea.com/a/8007295.html

2025.3.12

An Jun-ho

On February 11, 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy released a photo on social media X, claiming it was of a captured North Korean soldier. (Photo source: X@ZelenskyyUa)

Families of victims of North Korean human rights abuses and North Korean human rights groups have sent a letter to the Ukrainian president asking him to respect the free will of North Korean prisoners of war who want to go to South Korea. They emphasized that respecting the free will of the prisoners is not only in line with international conventions, but also will help the Ukrainian war. Reporter Ahn Jun-ho reports.

Families of North Korean defectors forcibly repatriated from China, families of missionaries detained in North Korea for a long time, and North Korean human rights groups sent an open letter to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the 11th, urging him to respect the free will of North Korean military prisoners who wish to go to South Korea.

“This is not only the right thing for Ukraine to do, but it could also help Ukraine’s war effort in the long run by encouraging more North Korean soldiers to surrender or defect,” they argued in the letter.

[Open Letter] “We urge Ukraine to respect the free will of North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) to go to South Korea. This will not only be the right thing to do for Ukraine, but it may also help Ukraine's war efforts in the long term by inducing more North Korean soldiers to surrender or defect.”

“North Korean POWs at Risk of Persecution if Repatriated”

They pointed out that captured North Korean POWs are “the most definitive evidence of North Korean involvement, despite denials by Russia and North Korea,” and that “while Russia and North Korea execute wounded North Korean soldiers to erase evidence of North Korea’s involvement, it is only a matter of time before more soldiers are captured.”

He continued, “According to Article 109 of the Geneva Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, parties to an armed conflict can conclude an agreement for the repatriation of prisoners of war. However, this is based on the premise that, in the spirit of humanitarianism, each country will protect, not persecute, its own prisoners of war.” He pointed out that, “This is not the case in North Korea, where surrendered soldiers and their families are likely to be harshly punished as traitors.”

This is interpreted to mean that North Korean soldiers should not be included in the prisoner exchange with Russia, as North Korea is more likely to punish the families of captured soldiers rather than protect them.

“North Korean POWs to South Korea, Induce Surrender by Distributing Leaflets” Proposal

They also proposed sending North Korean prisoners of war who had expressed their intention to go to South Korea to South Korea, and informing North Korean soldiers of this through leaflet distribution and other means to induce them to surrender.

[Open Letter] “We propose that North Korean POWs who express the wish to go to South Korea are speedily sent to South Korea and that North Korean soldiers are informed about this through means such as leaflets to surrender.”

He then said, “It is known that during the Korean War, the UN forces distributed about 2.5 billion leaflets against North Korea.”

“Hundreds of North Korean soldiers are captured and sent back to South Korea, creating unwanted family relationships between the two Koreas. This is an even worse situation for Kim Jong-un, and he will have no choice but to reconsider sending North Korean troops,” they argued in the letter.

This letter was signed by the family of Kim Cheol-ok, a defector who was forcibly repatriated from China in October 2023, Kim Jeong-sam, the older brother of missionary Kim Jeong-wook who has been detained in North Korea for more than 10 years, the Citizens' Coalition for Human Rights in North Korea, the Transitional Justice Working Group, the North Korean Justice Solidarity, the Families of Korean Prisoners of War, Mulmangcho, Nochain, Jinggeomdari, and Think.

This is Ahn Jun-ho from VOA News.

19. “US shipbuilding industry faces serious production speed and cost issues… Korea and other allies can utilize their capabilities”

We need a JAROKUS Shipbuilding consortium to defeat the Chinese shipbuilding lead.

This is a Google translation of a VOA report.

“US shipbuilding industry faces serious production speed and cost issues… Korea and other allies can utilize their capabilities”

2025.3.12

Lee Jo-eun

https://www.voakorea.com/a/8007236.html

The Bath Iron Works shipyard in Maine, USA, where U.S. Navy warships are built. (File photo)

The U.S. Navy is planning a massive fleet expansion, but the domestic shipbuilding industry is struggling due to a lack of infrastructure and manpower, U.S. government officials said. There are suggestions that leveraging the technology and production capabilities of allies like South Korea could be an alternative. Reporter Lee Jo-eun reports.

Brett Sidle, Acting Under Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, said on the 11th that the U.S. shipbuilding industry still produces world-class warships, but faces serious challenges in terms of production speed and cost.

Brett Sidle, Acting Under Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, speaks during a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Sea Power and Projection to examine the state of U.S. shipbuilding, March 11, 2025. (Source: House Armed Services Committee YouTube screenshot)

Acting Under Secretary of Defense Seidel made the announcement in a written report submitted to a hearing held by the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Maritime Power and Projection Capabilities to examine the status of U.S. shipbuilding, pointing out in particular that "there is a shortage of key technical personnel, such as skilled welders, plumbers, and electricians, which is delaying production schedules, and supply chain issues are delaying the delivery of key parts."

[Acting Vice Minister Saidl] “We face a shortage of skilled welders, pipefitters, and electricians, which is delaying production timelines. Additionally, supply chain issues have resulted in delayed deliveries of critical components… Our Navy and Marine Corps must maintain the world’s most capable maritime force, and that requires a robust shipbuilding industrial base, a skilled workforce, and a resilient supply chain.”

Acting Undersecretary of Defense Saidle said that the U.S. Navy is aware of these problems in the domestic shipbuilding industry and is undertaking large-scale reforms, emphasizing that “strengthening the shipbuilding supply chain and nurturing personnel are essential for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to maintain the world’s strongest maritime force.”

“American shipyard facilities are aging… lack of skilled workers”

Shelby Oakley, director of the Government Accountability Office's Office of Contracts and National Security Acquisitions, speaks during a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Maritime Power and Projection to examine the state of U.S. shipbuilding, March 11, 2025. (Source: House Armed Services Committee YouTube screenshot)

Shelby Oakley, director of the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Office of Contracts and National Security Acquisitions, also pointed out in a written report that day that domestic shipyards lack the capacity to build ships at the speed the U.S. Navy needs.

In particular, the shipyard's aging facilities and space constraints are affecting shipbuilding performance, and the overall construction schedule is being delayed due to the ongoing shortage of skilled workers in the U.S. shipbuilding industry and low productivity of new workers, it said.

[Director Oakley] "Shipyards have problems with aging facilities and equipment as well as space limitations that are affecting shipbuilding performance...The shipbuilding industrial base continues to struggle with workforce shortages, with new workers taking longer to reach the productivity levels required to meet the Navy's schedule."

Accordingly, there is a suggestion that the U.S. Navy should take note of the operating methods of Korea and Japan in order to strengthen its shipbuilding competitiveness.

“It is necessary to refer to the operation methods of the Korean and Japanese shipbuilding industries”

Ronald O'Rourke, a naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service (CRS), speaks during a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Sea Power and Projection Power to examine the state of U.S. shipbuilding on March 11, 2025. (Source: House Armed Services Committee YouTube screenshot)

Ronald O'Rourke, a naval affairs analyst with the Congressional Research Service (CRS), an affiliate of the U.S. Congress, said at the hearing that "Japan and Korea are often cited as best practices in the global shipbuilding industry," and that the U.S. needs to learn from their methods in training new personnel and managing the flow of materials within shipyards.

[Recording: Analyst O’Rourke] “Japan and South Korea, often mentioned almost side by side when people talk about best practices on world standard in shipbuilding. And there are two things that, you could learn from, the Japanese one, which you can also learn from the South Korean, is how to manage shipyard operations more efficiently in terms of training new workers and staying on top of and managing the material flow through the shipyard… Japan and South Korea are in competition with China, so they are trying to hold on to their market share against the Chinese shipbuilding. And so they are laser focused on making their own operation."

In particular, Japan and Korea are maximizing the operational efficiency of their own shipyards in order to survive the fierce competition with the Chinese shipbuilding industry, and this competitive structure is analyzed as the main driving force behind innovation in the Japanese and Korean shipbuilding industries.

“Building naval ships in Korea and Japan could be an alternative”

In a written report submitted to the hearing that day, Analyst O'Rourke cited former Navy Secretary Carlos del Toro, who served in the Biden administration, as suggesting a plan for Korean and Japanese shipbuilders to invest in shipyards in the United States and share advanced shipyard operation techniques.

[O'Rourke Analyst] "Carlos Del Toro, who was the Secretary of the Navy during the Biden Administration, encouraged foreign shipbuilders, particularly those in Japan and South Korea, to invest in shipbuilding facilities in the United States, and to share their world-class shipyard management best practices with US shipbuilders… Another option would be to build Navy ships or parts of such ships in foreign shipyards, such as shipyards in Japan, South Korea, or allied countries in Europe. Former Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro stated that he would be open to having foreign shipyards assemble modules for certain US Navy ships… Adopting the South Korean approach to design for producibility, which includes a focus on developing ship designs requiring fewer labor hours to build.”

He also mentioned the alternative, which former Secretary Toro suggested, of building U.S. Navy ships or major components in South Korea, Japan, or European allies, where modules for specific U.S. Navy ships would be built in overseas shipyards and final assembly would be done in U.S. shipyards.

In particular, it was analyzed that the 'Design for Producibility' method possessed by Korean shipbuilding companies can contribute to reducing the labor time required to build ships.

However, O'Rourke pointed out that since overseas construction of U.S. Navy ships or major components is currently restricted under U.S. law, Korean shipbuilders still have to overcome legal barriers to directly participating in U.S. Navy projects.

As President Donald Trump mentioned the shipbuilding industry as a major area of cooperation with South Korea after being elected in November last year, interest in cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea in the shipbuilding industry has been growing in Washington recently.

Currently, a bill is pending in the U.S. Congress aimed at strengthening the shipbuilding industry to check China and a bill allowing warships to be built in allied countries.

This is Lee Jo-eun from VOA News.

20. 100 days after martial law: street politics deepen national divide

100 days after martial law: street politics deepen national divide

donga.com

Posted March. 12, 2025 08:13,

Updated March. 12, 2025 08:13

100 days after martial law: street politics deepen national divide. March. 12, 2025 08:13. by 안규영, 이상헌 kyu0@donga.com.

One hundred days after the declaration of martial law on December 3, political divisions in South Korea are deepening over President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment trial. On March 11, the opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) launched a full-scale street protest, setting up tents in Gwanghwamun, central Seoul, to demand Yoon’s removal from office. Meanwhile, lawmakers from the ruling People Power Party (PPP), particularly those loyal to Yoon, began a 24-hour relay demonstration in front of the Constitutional Court, calling for the impeachment case to be dismissed. Despite growing public calls for unity and for lawmakers to respect the court’s decision, critics argue that both sides are fueling national division through escalating street politics.

The Democratic Party of Korea, joined by smaller progressive groups like the National Innovation Party, began their sit-in protest in Gwanghwamun, with lawmakers holding nightly rallies and relay speeches. DPK lawmakers Park Soo-hyun, Min Hyung-bae, and Kim Jun-hyuk, alongside Progressive Party lawmaker Yoon Jong-oh, all of whom are advocates of Yoon’s impeachment, began a hunger strike in the protest tent. Meanwhile, DPK legislators Park Hong-bae, Kim Moon-soo, and Jeon Jin-sook shaved their heads in front of the National Assembly in a symbolic act of defiance. On March 12, the entire DPK caucus plans to march from Yeouido to Gwanghwamun. “We will do whatever it takes to defend democracy,” said DPK floor leader Park Chan-dae.

In response, pro-Yoon lawmakers from the PPP staged their relay protest outside the Constitutional Court. “Dismissing the impeachment is the only way to restore normalcy and rebuild the nation’s legal order,” said PPP lawmaker Yoon Sang-hyeon. Legislators Kim Seon-kyo, Park Dae-chul, and Jang Dong-hyeok also vowed to join the demonstrations.

The heightened street demonstrations come as the Constitutional Court prepares to deliver its ruling, with speculation mounting that Yoon’s release could influence the verdict. Rival protests erupted across Seoul. Conservative pastor Jeon Kwang-hoon’s group began occupying three road lanes near Anguk Station to stage an overnight anti-impeachment vigil starting Monday. Meanwhile, pro-impeachment groups continued hunger strikes and overnight protests in Gwanghwamun. The conflict has spread to university campuses, where students clashed over their polarized stances on impeachment.

“The nation is already deeply divided, and political leaders are only adding fuel to the fire,” said Um Ki-hong, a professor at Kyungpook National University. Lee Joon-han, a political science professor at Incheon National University, warned that lawmakers should leave the trial to the judiciary and refocus on their duty to public welfare.

한국어

donga.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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