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Quotes of the Day:
“Anybody can become angry – that is easy, but to be angry with the right person, and to the right degree, and at the right time, and for the right purpose, and in the right way – that is not within everybody's power, and it is not easy.”
– Aristotle
“If you are the smartest person in the room, then you are in the wrong room.”
– Confucius
“Life is not a problem to be solved, but a reality to be experienced.”
– Soren Kierkegaard
1. What’s Driving North Korea’s Frantic Military Development?
2. Defense chief calls for capabilities to 'swiftly eliminate' N.K. leadership in event of war
3. Unification minister calls for ceaseless efforts to improve N.K.'s human rights situation
4. North Korean Workers Abroad Can’t Escape the Regime’s Human Rights Abuses
5. Danger ahead as Kim and Yoon bury inter-Korean detente
6. N. Korea's vice FM, Mongolian president discuss strengthening ties
7. A Korean missionary arrested in Russia on espionage charge
8. Air Force stages drills against N. Korean cruise missile, TEL threats
9. Putin says North Korea has its own 'nuclear umbrella'
10. North Korean workers' unrest in Russia 'behind South Korean's arrest'
11. Role of democracy in South Korea's alliance
12. North Koreans try to avoid forced construction work
1. What’s Driving North Korea’s Frantic Military Development?
"Torture of hope." I may have to adopt that phrase.
We must observe for the indications and warnings of internal instability.
Excerpts:
What is noteworthy is that the worsening economy and food shortages are rapidly spreading dissatisfaction with the Kim regime, especially among marginalized local residents and the generation born during or after the “Arduous March” in the 1990s. Although the North Korean authorities are strengthening legal measures to control the spread of South Korean ideology and culture every year, anti-regime sentiment among North Korean residents is growing, especially among the youth generation. In fact, 99 of the 196 North Korean defectors who entered South Korea in 2023 were from the youth generation, and the predominant reason for their defection was not “lack of food” but “rejection of the North Korean system.”
The nervous North Korean authorities are trying to strengthen the ideological control of the people by legally defining South Korea as a “hostile country at war,” but it appears to be insufficient to reverse this phenomenon.
How Long Can Kim Jong Un Provide ‘Circuses Instead of Bread’?
The Kim regime is continuing the so-called torture of hope by showing starving residents a thrilling circus show instead of the bread they want, and telling them that they can make a good living if their country completes an unrivaled nuclear force.
However, today’s North Korean youth were born at a time when ideological confrontation disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Even within North Korea, the distribution system, the foundation of the communist system, collapsed and today’s younger North Koreans grew up in the “jangmadang” (markets). In other words, it should be kept in mind that these people have significantly less loyalty to the Kim family and the party. Younger North Koreans have a strong tendency to seek their own way of living without entrusting their survival and fate to an absolute leader, and have an open tendency to South Korean culture and values.
As North Koreans watched the results of the recent North Korea-Russia summit, they must have been once again disappointed by the Kim regime, which prioritizes nuclear weapons and military technology over the people’s livelihood. History shows very often that dictatorships collapse from within, not from invasion by external forces.
What’s Driving North Korea’s Frantic Military Development?
thediplomat.com
Kim Jong Un is attempting to circumvent discontent at home with a strong show of military prowess. It’s a dangerous game.
By Jung Jae-wook
March 12, 2024
Credit: Pixabay
Following its run of missile tests last year, North Korea continues its nuclear and conventional military provocations targeting South Korea and the United States at an unprecedented level. Some experts believe that the current situation on the Korean Peninsula is more dangerous than at any time since the Korean War.
At the ninth plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee in December last year, North Korea’s top leader, Kim Jong Un, declared an ultra-hardline offensive policy against the United States, defined inter-Korean relations as “two hostile countries at war,” and announced his will to go to war for the unification of the Korean Peninsula.
Why Is North Korea So Committed to Military Provocations?
What is the background and strategic intention behind North Korea’s unusual level of military provocation over the past two years? Above all, North Korea seems to believe that the so-called new Cold War structure between North Korea, China, and Russia on one side and South Korea, the United States, and Japan on the other is being revived in the wake of the Ukraine War. Additionally, it appears that Kim believes that this international power structure provides the best opportunity to launch active offensives against South Korea and the United States.
Based on this judgment of the international situation, what Kim wants to achieve can be analyzed in two ways: the domestic and the international.
First, it appears that Kim intends to strengthen internal solidarity by breaking through the crisis caused by the failure to reach a deal at the 2019 North Korea-U.S. summit in Hanoi and subsequently the COVID-19 pandemic.
The North Korean people had hoped that they would be able to live better lives through the lifting of economic sanctions and food aid if North Korea-U.S. relations improved, only to face disappointment and frustration when the U.S. president walked out of the summit. Their misery deepened thanks to North Korea’s draconian border closure amid the pandemic. In order to overcome this internal crisis, Kim Jong Un declared a “head-on breakthrough strategy” at the ninth plenary meeting in December last year.
Second, Kim appears to be trying to create favorable conditions for future negotiations with the next U.S. administration by raising the international priority of the North Korean nuclear issue through a display of his power. Although the Hanoi summit was not successful, Kim appears to have judged the current international situation as a golden opportunity to resume “brinkmanship” against the United States. Indeed, to date North Korea has not faced many consequences for its rapid succession of military provocations, as antagonism between China and Russia on one side and the United States on the other has paralyzed the United Nations Security Council.
Kim Jong Un Trapped in the “New Cold War” Structure
However, there are significant doubts as to whether Kim’s strategic intentions can actually be achieved. First, Kim’s judgment of the international situation appears to contain an inherent error of overlooking the important differences between today and the original Cold War. In fact, the recently developed North Korea-China-Russia cooperation has clear limitations. It is not a steadfast solidarity based on the shared values and ideologies of the Cold War era, but a marriage of convenience to respond to a common enemy.
Moreover, the feasibility of North Korea-China-Russia cooperation developing into an actual military alliance is highly uncertain due to differences in mutual interests. In particular, China is a country with a strong tendency to be a so-called status seeker, prioritizing its reputation in the international community. China’s situation as a budding global leader is completely different from North Korea and Russia, which are isolated under sanctions from the international community. In that regard, China is well aware that the strengthening of North Korea-China-Russia solidarity will not only cause trade friction with the West, but also provide justification for accelerating the United States’ military intervention in East Asia and blockade of China.
Furthermore, Kim should keep in mind that the more he accelerates his nuclear and missile provocations by relying on North Korea-China-Russia solidarity, the more the United States’ extended deterrence and the South Korea-U.S. combined preparedness posture will be strengthened. As is well known, North Korea has consistently demanded from the United States a “permanent cessation of ROK-U.S joint exercises” and a “ban on the deployment of US strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula” in order to “guarantee the right to survive.” This was also strongly requested at the Stockholm working-level meeting in September 2019. However, the recent increase in North Korea’s military provocations is resulting in further strengthening of extended deterrence, which is already considered to be at the highest level ever.
What is especially noteworthy is that if the North Korean nuclear threat continues to increase, not only can extended deterrence be strengthened at the bilateral level between South Korea and the United States, but a separate extended deterrence system involving regional countries such as Japan and Australia may be formed. If necessary, some NATO allies may also participate.
Deepening Economic Hardship and Domestic Instability
What needs to be noted more than anything is the seriousness of North Korea’s internal situation. As the asymmetry between defense and the economy, the two essential pillars for the survival of the Kim regime, deepens, the North Korean people’s dissatisfaction with the system is rapidly spreading.
At the 8th Party Congress in 2021, Kim Jong Un simultaneously announced a five-year defense development plan and a five-year economic development plan along the line of “nuclear and economic development side by side.” However, unlike North Korea’s achievements in nuclear capabilities, the economic sector has been recording a negative growth rate for several years and has gradually worsened.
According to the Korea Rural Development Administration, North Korea’s food production in 2023 will be 700,000 tons short of requirements. Despite the perpetual food insecurity facing its residents, North Korea’s government launched various missiles in January of this year alone, at an estimated cost that could have funded the food consumption of all North Korean residents for the month (300,000 tons).
What is noteworthy is that the worsening economy and food shortages are rapidly spreading dissatisfaction with the Kim regime, especially among marginalized local residents and the generation born during or after the “Arduous March” in the 1990s. Although the North Korean authorities are strengthening legal measures to control the spread of South Korean ideology and culture every year, anti-regime sentiment among North Korean residents is growing, especially among the youth generation. In fact, 99 of the 196 North Korean defectors who entered South Korea in 2023 were from the youth generation, and the predominant reason for their defection was not “lack of food” but “rejection of the North Korean system.”
The nervous North Korean authorities are trying to strengthen the ideological control of the people by legally defining South Korea as a “hostile country at war,” but it appears to be insufficient to reverse this phenomenon.
How Long Can Kim Jong Un Provide ‘Circuses Instead of Bread’?
The Kim regime is continuing the so-called torture of hope by showing starving residents a thrilling circus show instead of the bread they want, and telling them that they can make a good living if their country completes an unrivaled nuclear force.
However, today’s North Korean youth were born at a time when ideological confrontation disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Even within North Korea, the distribution system, the foundation of the communist system, collapsed and today’s younger North Koreans grew up in the “jangmadang” (markets). In other words, it should be kept in mind that these people have significantly less loyalty to the Kim family and the party. Younger North Koreans have a strong tendency to seek their own way of living without entrusting their survival and fate to an absolute leader, and have an open tendency to South Korean culture and values.
As North Koreans watched the results of the recent North Korea-Russia summit, they must have been once again disappointed by the Kim regime, which prioritizes nuclear weapons and military technology over the people’s livelihood. History shows very often that dictatorships collapse from within, not from invasion by external forces.
Authors
Guest Author
Jung Jae-wook
Jung Jae-wook is a professor at Hoseo University and previously served in South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense. Jung holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Korea University.
thediplomat.com
2. Defense chief calls for capabilities to 'swiftly eliminate' N.K. leadership in event of war
Marshall Kim Jong Un, as head of the north Korean People's Army, is a legitimate military target and if eliminated would certainly be cutting the head off the snake. But are we thinking through who and what comes next? Are we laying the groundwork now to influence his successor?
(LEAD) Defense chief calls for capabilities to 'swiftly eliminate' N.K. leadership in event of war | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 13, 2024
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; ADDS more details throughout)
SEOUL, March 13 (Yonhap) -- Defense Minister Shin Won-sik called on special operations troops Wednesday to equip themselves with capabilities to "swiftly eliminate" the North Korean leadership if it starts a war against the South.
Shin made the call at the Army Special Warfare Command in Icheon, 56 kilometers southeast of Seoul, as South Korea has been conducting the Freedom Shield joint military exercise with the United States since last week to boost deterrence against the North's threats.
"If Kim Jong-un starts a war, as a key unit of Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR), you must become the world's strongest special operations unit to swiftly eliminate the enemy leadership," Shin said, according to his office.
This photo, provided by the defense ministry on March 7, 2024, shows Defense Minister Shin Won-sik (2nd from R) making an on-site inspection of a command bunker in Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
KMPR refers to an operational plan to incapacitate the North's leadership in a major conflict.
It is a pillar of the military's "three-axis" deterrence system against North Korea, which also includes the Kill Chain pre-emptive strike platform and the Korea Air and Missile Defense system.
South Korean and U.S. special operations troops have been staging combined strike drills to hone combat capabilities since last Friday in connection with Freedom Shield, according to the ministry.
The special operations exercise is aimed at strengthening operational capabilities in infiltrating key enemy command facilities and paralyzing their operations.
Shin also visited Command Post TANGO (Theater Air Naval Ground Operations), a key wartime command bunker in Seongnam, just south of Seoul, and highlighted training during Freedom Shield to neutralize the North's nuclear and missile threats.
"Through this exercise, (we) must master operational systems that neutralize the North's nuclear and missile network early on," Shin was quoted as saying. "(We) must also strengthen operational capabilities to the next level to overwhelm the enemy in all domains."
The bunker complex serves as the primary command and control center of South Korean and U.S. forces in the event of an armed conflict. It is known to be strong enough to survive a tactical nuclear attack.
This undated photo, provided by the defense ministry on March 13, 2024, shows South Korean and U.S. special operations troops holding a combined exercise at an unspecified location. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 13, 2024
3. Unification minister calls for ceaseless efforts to improve N.K.'s human rights situation
Human rights upfront. The minister is living up to that. There can be no shying away from human rights in the naive hope that doing so will cause Kim to agree to denuclearization.
Unification minister calls for ceaseless efforts to improve N.K.'s human rights situation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 12, 2024
SEOUL, March 12 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho said Tuesday continued efforts to improve North Korea's human rights situation could bring a positive change to North Koreans suffering from Pyongyang's human rights records.
Kim made the remark at the first meeting of an advisory committee on improving North Korea's human rights situation that began its one-year second term earlier in the day. The committee was launched in March last year.
"If we accurately know the North's situation and continue to call on North Korea to improve its human rights situation while maintaining solidarity with the international community, these efforts could bring hope and a positive change to North Koreans," Kim said.
The committee will play an important role in addressing key issues related to North Korea's human rights, such as access to information and accountability, he added.
The advisory committee was launched as the North Korean Human Rights Foundation has not set sail yet due to the main opposition party's reluctance to recommend its board members.
The North Korean Human Rights Act, which came into force in 2016, stipulated the creation of the foundation. The yearslong delay in the establishment prompted the ministry to launch the advisory committee last year to address the North's dire human rights situation.
North Korea has long been accused of grave human rights abuses, ranging from holding political prisoners in concentration camps to committing torture and carrying out public executions.
This photo, taken March 12, 2024, shows Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho (3rd from L, bottom row); Lee Jung-hoon (4th from L, bottom row), head of an advisory committee on enhancing North Korea's human rights situation; and other committee members holding red cards reading "North Korea's law on rejecting reactionary ideology and culture, OUT," as they held the first meeting of the committee in Seoul to discuss ways to improve the North's direct rights records. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 12, 2024
4. North Korean Workers Abroad Can’t Escape the Regime’s Human Rights Abuses
We should have an information campaign that targets overseas workers from north Korea. They should know they can walk into a South Korea or US embassy and request asylum. I know that creates a headache for our diplomats but we need to think about the potential for asylum seekers on multiple levels.
North Korean Workers Abroad Can’t Escape the Regime’s Human Rights Abuses
thediplomat.com
The world must expand its channels of communication with North Koreans working overseas to prevent human rights abuse.
By Lee Sang Yong
March 13, 2024
Credit: Depositphotos
In mid-November 2023, Daily NK posted a banner ad on our website that said, “We want to hear from North Koreans living overseas.” A number of North Korean workers who saw the banner emailed us directly about the despicable behavior of a state security officer in Russia. Specifically, the officer was accused of demanding money from workers and taking away their cell phones, claiming they were watching South Korean news or dramas.
After Daily NK released the article, however, the North Korean government response was disappointing: Instead of punishing the state security officer in question, the North Korean authorities sought to reassure him, and the incident was used as grounds to increase surveillance and oppression of workers in Russia.
Officials proceeded to: (1) enact a curfew of 7 p.m.; (2) implement a strict ban on smartphones; (3) demand that any electronic devices be reported and handed over; and (4) increase monitoring of workers and their contact with other people. The authorities essentially intended to place North Koreans working overseas under the same controls as North Koreans at home.
The story is of great importance because it confirms once more how casually the North Korean authorities violate the basic rights and liberties, including the freedom of expression, of North Koreans working overseas.
North Koreans who have defected to China or other countries say they have learned the truth about reality and gained a critical mindset by watching YouTube videos and frequently browsing websites about North Korea such as Daily NK and Radio Free Asia. Numerous North Koreans have also attempted to communicate with the outside world by maintaining two or more mobile phones.
However, North Koreans working abroad have a harder time connecting with their host countries. It is very possible that the North Korean authorities will track these behaviors and institute harsher penalties, which could undermine these workers’ right to access information.
In fact, Daily NK recently reported that the North Korean Ministry of State Security has been cooperating with Russian intelligence organizations this year on issues related to North Korean workers in Russia. As North Korea and Russia improve ties, they are cooperating on a wider range of matters, such as preventing North Korean workers from defecting, more closely than ever before.
In addition, North Korea and China already seem to have held in-depth discussions about repatriating defectors. Every few months there are reports about mass deportations of hundreds of North Koreans from China back to North Korea, where they likely face imprisonment or torture. There are also reports about China employing its counter-espionage law to prevent defectors in China from attempting to reach South Korea.
In essence, North Koreans in China and Russia are exposed to political surveillance similar to that found inside their home country.
Given COVID-19’s endemic status and North Korea’s pursuit of the funds needed to develop nuclear weapons, there is a growing likelihood that large numbers of North Korean workers will be dispatched abroad – not only to China and Russia but also Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Considering that the international community’s sanctions against North Korea remain in place (in the form of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2375), the international community needs to closely monitor how many workers are being sent abroad and where they are headed. Other issues to monitor are how those workers are being exploited and whether they enjoy political and economic freedoms.
One notable development in regards to overseas North Korean labor was the death in January of a male North Korean official in his 50s at the hands of North Korean workers at a Chinese garment factory. When several workers complained to the official about their wages, a fight broke out, leading to the official’s death. With this case in mind, we should take note of the changing attitudes of North Koreans working overseas, who not only expressed their grievances but also took direct action.
We should also watch carefully to see what steps the authorities will take to prevent workers’ ideological deviation. Those measures could have the knock-on effect of further degrading workers’ right to access information.
Given these circumstances, the world needs to quickly uncover the human rights abuses that North Koreans working overseas have been suffering since COVID-19 entered the endemic phase. Shining a light on human rights abuses that occur outside of the public eye can serve as an opportunity both to console North Korean workers overseas, who are the victims in these abuses, and to constrain the activities of the perpetrators.
It is time to fully investigate the conditions of these North Koreans overseas with a view toward developing a plan to improve their rights that can be implemented by the international community. The New Yorker’s recent investigation of conditions faced by North Korean workers in Chinese seafood factories is a good example of this.
The world must also keep developing ways to strengthen communication with North Koreans overseas. The only way to protect their basic human rights is to find a way for them to share the injustice that they suffer. They need a way to send accurate information to the outside world – not only to raise awareness abroad, but also to provide outside confirmation for the victims that their freedoms and labor rights are indeed being violated by the North Korean government.
Just as international human rights organizations already run programs to bring information to people inside North Korea, various “freedom of information” programs should also be run for North Koreans who are currently overseas. Daily NK and other organizations with contacts in the North Korean overseas labor community can take the lead on these efforts.
Importantly and more broadly, the world must voice criticism against North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his regime, which does little to punish human rights offenders. The international community must reiterate that as long as the North Korean regime fails to condone officials who perpetrate human rights abuses against its own people, the country can never stand shoulder-to-shoulder with other members of the international community.
Authors
Guest Author
Lee Sang Yong
Lee Sang Yong is the director of research and analysis at Daily NK.
thediplomat.com
5. Danger ahead as Kim and Yoon bury inter-Korean detente
When was there ever a real north-South detente?
And isn't fear what Kim wants us to have? And doesn't he need the perceived threat from the South and the alliance that he is generating to justify the sacrifice and suffering of the Korean people in the north?
But the north has bever sought peaceful unification in a way acceptable to all the Korean people. It has always sought "peaceful" unification through subversion and collapse of the South. And we should be very clear, the regime is not giving up its objective to dominate the entire peninsula and will do so either through subversion and collapse of the South or by the use of force.
Excerpts:
Kim’s explicit rejection of unification marks an important shift in how the regime talks about and publicly presents the future of the two Koreas. But in practice, North Korea’s ideas of what ‘peaceful’ unification with the South would mean lost touch with reality a long time ago.
The conventional Pyongyang idea of unification means the collapse of the South Korean state and a Kim Jong-un-led government from Jeju Island to Sinuiju. Even a confederation, as loosely defined as it has been up to now, would require permanently expelling US and UN Sending State forces — including personnel from key US allies such as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom — from the peninsula and somehow forging permanent connective tissue between illiberal totalitarianism and robust democracy.
Danger ahead as Kim and Yoon bury inter-Korean detente | East Asia Forum
Arius Derr
Australian National University
eastasiaforum.org · March 11, 2024
IN BRIEF
Tensions have escalated on the Korean Peninsula after North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un, ordered changes to the country's constitution, removing the aim of a peaceful unification with South Korea and treating it as a hostile separate country. This policy shift, along with renewed support from China and Russia, has provoked the current South Korean administration, which was already disinclined toward engagement. With the possibility of Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency in 2024, the region is thrown into a new era of uncertainty.
–––––––
Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have not been this high since 2017, when then US president Donald Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un exchanged threats of nuclear war and North Korea tested its first long-range missile capable of reaching the United States.
On 16 January 2024, Kim ordered a change to the country’s constitution — a document of unclear utility in an Orwellian personality cult — so that peaceful unification of North and South Korea was stricken from official policy. Party officials must also eliminate or downsize agencies and organisations related to inter-Korean relations, pointing to long-term institutional changes to all inter-Korean issues.
Kim’s explicit rejection of unification marks an important shift in how the regime talks about and publicly presents the future of the two Koreas. But in practice, North Korea’s ideas of what ‘peaceful’ unification with the South would mean lost touch with reality a long time ago.
The conventional Pyongyang idea of unification means the collapse of the South Korean state and a Kim Jong-un-led government from Jeju Island to Sinuiju. Even a confederation, as loosely defined as it has been up to now, would require permanently expelling US and UN Sending State forces — including personnel from key US allies such as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom — from the peninsula and somehow forging permanent connective tissue between illiberal totalitarianism and robust democracy.
The reconciliation of free and fair elections in some territories and state-approved pro-Kim ballots in others, or the reach and scope of South Korean corporate governance in a country that does not recognise private enterprise, is impossible. A confederation that is nothing more than regular cash and resource transfers from South to North without sanctions restrictions may be the closest thing to a realistic confederation, but that is extremely far-fetched even during periods of detente.
North Korea now regards South Korea as a hostile separate country. Kim has taken steps to reinforce this position, including ripping up the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement he signed with then South Korean president Moon Jae-in to reduce military activity at the border.
In the agreement’s absence, the North Korean army resumed artillery drills so close to South Korean territory that border residents were forced to evacuate their homes. State media regularly promotes new short-range ballistic weapons capabilities that Pyongyang says are aimed at US and South Korean forces.
North Korea also keeps lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use. Not only does it now consider nuclear weapons appropriate for pre-emptive strikes, but even the routine deployment of military assets to South Korea may be enough to convince Kim Jong-un to fire missiles at South Korea and elsewhere.
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration is seemingly doing all it can to fan the flames. Yoon and his officials regularly encourage frontline troops to shoot first and ask questions later. The South Korean Ministry of Unification is downsizing under the command of the John Bolton-esque North Korea hawk Kim Yung-ho. While Seoul has rightfully elevated North Korea’s human rights issues, it has otherwise expressed little creativity in proposed inter-Korean policies that it is likely Yoon is not actually that interested in changing the status quo.
None of the above suggests war is likely to break out anytime soon, nor is North Korea’s rhetoric and behaviour particularly anomalous. Yoon might be the most pro-US president elected to office and will not act unilaterally during a serious contingency, while the White House is almost as uninterested in North Korea as Yoon’s presidential office.
More importantly, the Kim regime has never harboured a realistic strategy for unification — regularly threatening violence against the United States and its allies, including nuclear annihilation, and spending enormous resources on the military. Past periods of detente, such as the ‘Sunshine’ and ‘Moonshine’ eras in the early 2000s and late 2010s, were exceptions to the rule.
Two important variables introduce some level of uncertainty. First, North Korea has more support than ever before from China and Russia, who are eager to undermine Western leadership wherever possible. Both have shielded Pyongyang from punitive action at the United Nations, allowing the regime a free hand to test new and stronger nuclear-capable weapons. Russia has few friends and will need North Korean missiles and other weapons for as long as it presses its imperial ambitions against Ukraine.
Kim Jong-un may feel emboldened by this new manoeuvrability to engage in ever greater provocations, including attacks on South Korean targets as have occurred in the past. His apparent disenchantment from nuclear talks in 2018 and 2019 convinced him to never give up his nuclear weapons.
The second variable injecting a level of uncertainty is the prospect that Donald Trump returns to the White House. His extortionary tactics toward South Korea and obsession with retrenchment of US military forces generated disdain in Seoul and fuelled robust discussion about the merits of a South Korean nuclear deterrent — a major threat to global proliferation norms that was unheard of just a few years ago.
Trump will either once again fall ‘in love’ with Kim Jong-un and be willing to throw South Korea under the bus, return to the ‘fire and fury’ rhetoric that marked the first year of his presidency, or both. This level of uncertainty could wreak the most havoc on the Korean Peninsula in 2024.
Arius M Derr is a PhD candidate in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University.
https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1710194400
eastasiaforum.org · March 11, 2024
6. N. Korea's vice FM, Mongolian president discuss strengthening ties
Mongolia: A bridge between north and South?
Mongolia: A country that has transitioned from communism to capitalism and dictatorship to democracy. But is that example a threat to north Korea?
(LEAD) N. Korea's vice FM, Mongolian president discuss strengthening ties | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · March 12, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with photos, details released by Mongolia's foreign ministry in paras 5-6)
SEOUL, March 12 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong-ho has met with Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh for talks on advancing bilateral ties, state media reported Tuesday.
Their meeting came as a North Korean diplomatic delegation led by Pak departed for the Asian country over the weekend in what marked the first such visit since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. The North last sent a delegation to the country in 2019.
During their meeting on Monday, Pak and Khurelsukh shared views on advancing bilateral ties, and strengthening exchange and cooperation, the North's Korean Central News Agency said.
Pak also met with foreign ministry officials, including Mongolian Foreign Minister Battsetseg Batmunkh, to discuss ways to boost mutual support and cooperation, it added.
This photo, taken from the website of Mongolia's foreign ministry on March 12, 2024, shows North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong-ho (L) and his Mongolian counterpart, Amartuvshin Gombosuren. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
During talks between Pak and his Mongolian counterpart, Amartuvshin Gombosuren, on Monday, both sides agreed on the need to further strengthen ties through constructive cooperation and step up collaboration in areas including education, culture and agriculture, Mongolia's foreign ministry said on its web site.
Pak was quoted as stressing the importance of Mongolia as a neighbor in the Northeast Asia region, while Gombosuren expressed hope that the delegation's visit would contribute to boosting their traditionally friendly relations after the pandemic, according to the ministry.
The latest trip is seen as part of the North's diplomatic efforts to strengthen ties with its traditionally friendly countries.
Mongolia is viewed as having close relations with the North, having maintained its diplomatic mission in Pyongyang even during the pandemic despite strict border restrictions.
In January, Mongolia's new top envoy to Pyongyang, Luvsantseren Erdeneddavaa, submitted his letter of credentials to the North.
This photo, taken from the website of Mongolia's foreign ministry on March 12, 2024, shows North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong-ho (C) attending talks with his Mongolian counterpart, Amartuvshin Gombosuren. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · March 12, 2024
7. A Korean missionary arrested in Russia on espionage charge
All of these great humanitarians, working to rescue Koreans from the north, are vulnerable and at risk in Russia (and China).
A Korean missionary arrested in Russia on espionage charge
donga.com
Posted March. 13, 2024 07:51,
Updated March. 13, 2024 07:51
A Korean missionary arrested in Russia on espionage charge. March. 13, 2024 07:51. by Jin-Woo Shin niceshin@donga.com.
In early 2024, Russian authorities arrested a South Korean national, known by the surname Baek, on charges of espionage, as disclosed by several South Korean government sources. Baek, a missionary based in Vladivostok in Yeonhaeju, Russia, was reported to have been actively involved in the rescue efforts of North Korean defectors in the region. His arrest came concurrently with the apprehension of his wife and a local businessman, who have since been released. The South Korean government has learned that North Korea urged Russia to tighten enforcement against North Korean defectors in the area.
Baek, a former Christian missionary in China, arrived in Russia in 2020 by land and became affiliated with the Vladivostok branch of a South Korea-based private foundation. In Russia, Baek provided essential supplies, including medicine and clothing, to North Korean lumberjacks in the region. A source from the South Korean government revealed that Baek conducted missionary activities targeting North Korean defectors and carried out rescue operations. It was known that Baek established a travel agency in Yeonhaeju in 2020, although it remains unclear whether he actually operated the business.
On Tuesday, Russian state media TASS reported that Baek, presenting himself as a writer, allegedly gained access to confidential Russian information. Despite Russia’s espionage claims, there is speculation that the real motive behind his arrest might be linked to his support for North Korean defectors. In the past year, Russia has increased surveillance on South Korean organizations aiding North Korean defectors and refugee brokers. The growing closeness in North Korea-Russia relations prompted North Korea to request stricter enforcement against North Korean defectors from Russian authorities early this year.
The South Korean government received information about Baek’s arrest from Russia’s Federal Security Service last month in writing and has been providing consular support from the official residence.
한국어
donga.com
8. Air Force stages drills against N. Korean cruise missile, TEL threats
Excerpts:
The drills involved fighter jets shooting down enemy aircraft and a cruise missile, and dropping guided bombs to destroy transporter erector launchers (TELs), it said.
TELs allow missile units to be mobile, making missile launches relatively more difficult to detect beforehand, compared with fixed launch sites.
Air Force stages drills against N. Korean cruise missile, TEL threats | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 13, 2024
SEOUL, March 13 (Yonhap) -- The Air Force on Wednesday held an exercise aimed at boosting readiness against threats posed by North Korean cruise missiles and mobile missile vehicles amid an ongoing major South Korea-U.S. military exercise.
The air interdiction drills, which mobilized some 20 aircraft, including F-35A and F-15K fighters, took place on the second last day of the Freedom Shield exercise that began last week to bolster deterrence against North Korean nuclear and missile threats.
Pilots trained on response procedures in various scenarios, such as enemy aircraft infiltrations and cruise missile launches, by closely coordinating with the on-ground control and reporting center, according to the Air Force.
The drills involved fighter jets shooting down enemy aircraft and a cruise missile, and dropping guided bombs to destroy transporter erector launchers (TELs), it said.
TELs allow missile units to be mobile, making missile launches relatively more difficult to detect beforehand, compared with fixed launch sites.
Pyongyang has continued its weapons development push this year, staging five rounds of cruise missile launches, including what it claimed to be a new surface-to-sea missile on Feb. 14.
This unrelated photo, provided by the Air Force on March 6, 2024, shows F-15K fighter jets taking part in an air exercise. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 13, 2024
9. Putin says North Korea has its own 'nuclear umbrella'
Excerpt:
In a media interview with the state-owned Russia-1 channel and RIA Novosti news agency, Putin said “the DPRK has its own nuclear umbrella” and that “no requests were made to Russia” on nuclear weapons.
Wednesday
March 13, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 13 Mar. 2024, 16:29
Putin says North Korea has its own 'nuclear umbrella'
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-03-13/national/northKorea/Putin-says-North-Korea-has-its-own-nuclear-umbrella/2001395
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during an interview in Moscow on Tuesday. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a media interview Wednesday that North Korea possesses its own nuclear umbrella and hasn’t made any requests to Moscow regarding nuclear weapons.
Mentioning North Korea’s nuclear umbrella could itself be interpreted as recognition of North Korea as a de facto nuclear state.
In a media interview with the state-owned Russia-1 channel and RIA Novosti news agency, Putin said “the DPRK has its own nuclear umbrella” and that “no requests were made to Russia” on nuclear weapons.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK, is North Korea’s official name.
Related Article
Putin declared that Russia is ready for nuclear war and warned against the deployment of U.S. troops to Ukraine.
“From a military-technical point of view, we are of course ready for a nuclear war,” Putin said during the interview. “We will use nuclear weapons when it is related to the existence of Russia or when our sovereignty and independence are undermined.
“Our three major nuclear forces are more modern than that of other countries,” Putin said, referring to the nuclear triad, which includes intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and strategic bombers.
Regarding the possibility of the United States sending troops to Ukraine, Putin said Russia “knows what it means for U.S. troops to appear on Russian territory” and that it will be “seen as interference.”
“We will treat the deployment of U.S. troops to Ukraine as interference if it happens and the U.S. understands this,” said Putin. “[In the United States] there are enough specialists in the field of Russian-American relations and in the field of strategic restraint.”
Putin is set to win another election, which will begin on March 15. The latest poll shows that he will likely receive more than 80 percent of the votes.
A poll conducted by Russian state-run public opinion polling agency Vciom showed that Putin will receive 82 percent of the votes, according to a report by German news agency DPA on Tuesday. This was the last public opinion poll conducted before the Russian presidential election, and the expected voter turnout is 71 percent.
The re-election of Putin, who is running for a fifth term in the Kremlin, appears inevitable, with the Russian president emphasizing that this election is “for the future of Russia.”
North Korea and Russia have recently been deepening ties, with the Kim Jong-un regime supplying Moscow with more than 10,000 containers of munitions or munition-related materials to Russia since September last year, according to reports from the U.S. State Department.
Pyongyang has been seeking military assistance from Moscow in return for the provision of arms, according to U.S. officials.
This comes as South Korea, Japan and the United States draw closer in trilateral security cooperation, with Washington offering strengthened extended deterrence to its East Asian allies.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un "almost certainly has no intentions" of negotiating away his country's nuclear weapons program, according to a recent U.S. intelligence report, as he perceives it "to be a guarantor of regime security and national pride."
Kim "probably hopes that he can use his burgeoning defense ties with Russia to pursue his goal of achieving international acceptance as a nuclear power,” the Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) reported in its 2024 Annual Threat Assessment.
BY LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]
10. North Korean workers' unrest in Russia 'behind South Korean's arrest'
Someone must be blamed (other than the Russians or the Kim family regime)
Wednesday
March 13, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 13 Mar. 2024, 18:31
North Korean workers' unrest in Russia 'behind South Korean's arrest'
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-03-13/national/northKorea/North-Korean-workers-unrest-in-Russia-behind-South-Koreans-arrest/2001517
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin shake hands during Kim's visit to the Vostochny Cosmodrome in January 13, 2024. [NEWS1]
The arrest of a South Korean national on suspicion of espionage by Russian authorities suggests Moscow is trying to put pressure on individuals and groups that help North Korean workers in Russia.
On Monday, Russian state-owned news agency TASS reported that South Korean national Baek Won-soon was arrested and detained on charges of espionage, citing that “state secrets” were passed on by Baek to foreign intelligence authorities. At the time of his arrest, Baek, a missionary, was working in Vladivostok helping North Korean defectors, according to multiple South Korean media reports.
As this is the first time that a South Korean national has been arrested on suspicion of espionage in Russia, attention is being drawn to the context of the arrest.
Analysis suggests that Baek’s arrest is related to the phenomenon of growing negative public sentiment among North Korean workers dispatched overseas earning foreign currency. With the arrest of a missionary helping North Korean defectors in Russia, Putin could be trying to alleviate Kim Jong-un’s worries regarding the unrest among North Korean workers in the country.
Related Article
Currently, most North Korean workers scattered across China and Russia are unable to return to their hometowns and have stayed overseas for long periods due to borders being blocked during the Covid-19 pandemic. It is pointed out this is an environment in which dissatisfaction is bound to accumulate, as workers have not been replaced for several years and most of the money owned is paid as remittance back to North Korea.
Last January, an allegation was raised by Koh Young-hwan, a North Korean defector with a diplomatic background currently serving as a special adviser to the Unification Minister handling inter-Korean affairs, that about 2,000 North Korean workers in Jilin Province in China protested for four days about unpaid wages. The workers occupied a sewing and seafood processing factory during the time.
There was another report that added that managerial staff were allegedly taken hostage by the protesting workers, assaulted and eventually died.
Dozens of North Korean workers in Dandong, China, also refused to go to work last month, demanding that they be sent back home, according to Cho Han-bum, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification.
The National Intelligence Service responded to these reports in China's Jilin Province and Dandong by saying that “we are monitoring the related incidents that are occurring due to poor living conditions of North Korean workers dispatched overseas,” confirming that such cases had indeed occurred.
A building in Vladivostok where Baek Won-soon, a South Korean national arrested on charges of espionage, worked at, is seen on March 12, 2024. [YONHAP]
Similarly, the situation of North Korean workers in Russia is very poor, even considering that workers can move in and out of their workplaces relatively freely as compared to workers in China.
“North Korean workers are scattered throughout Russia, including in Khasan, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and Moscow,” a missionary who was expelled from Russia in 2013 while helping North Korean defectors told the JoongAng Ilbo, an affiliate of the Korea JoongAng Daily. “Most of these workers are forced to send over 75 percent of the money they earn to North Korean authorities, while at the same time trying to send some of their earnings to their families, so they live in extreme difficulty.”
Experts point out that control over North Korean workers has been tightened as North Korea and Russia build stronger ties through munition trade regarding the war in Ukraine.
“Currently, we know that about 3,000 North Korean workers are residing in Russia,” said Cho. “After the Ukraine war, the so-called ‘quiet diplomacy’ activities of rescuing North Korean defectors as Russia turned a blind eye became impossible, and the intensity of pressure by Moscow on North Korea-related activists increased.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s concerns have likely deepened regarding the overseas workers as they have served as a key source of foreign currency for the regime and are increasingly attempting to defect. As North Korean workers lived abroad for a long period of time, they were exposed to foreign cultures. Some workers realized the contradictions of the regime’s system and tried to defect.
Overseas workers additionally pose a risk for the regime as upon their return, they become channels of outside information to the North Korean general public. The Korea Institute for National Unification observed in a report published last month that “the mass strike by North Korean overseas workers is the birth of a North Korean version of the labor movement.”
Despite these challenges, North Korea, facing a chronic economic crisis, cannot afford to give up on dispatching workers overseas, as other means of earning foreign currency are blocked due to sanctions. North Korea is making specific plans to dispatch a large number of workers to develop Russia’s Far East region. In the long term, they hope to help Russia rebuild after the war in Ukraine ends.
The arrest of a South Korean missionary who has been active in helping North Korean workers in Russia is thus seen as related to the larger dilemma concerning overseas workers for the Kim Jong-un regime. It is possible that judicial authorities in countries friendly with North Korea — Russia and China — took action when signs of deviation from North Korean overseas workers were detected.
The fact that Russia arrested Baek on charges of espionage, which can result in up to 20 years in prison, can be seen as a warning message in itself.
“This is the first time that a South Korean missionary has been taken to Moscow by Russian authorities, so everyone is being cautious and the general atmosphere is very subdued,” a local source in Vladivostok told the JoongAng Ilbo.
BY CHUNG YEONG-GYO, PARK HYUN-JU, LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]
11. Role of democracy in South Korea's alliance
Important insights here.
Excerpts:
This is a departure from previous South Korean administrations, both progressive and conservative, who avoided a values-based foreign policy. There were notable exceptions, of course, such as former President Kim Dae-jung’s decision to send a battalion of soldiers to help Timor Leste’s democratic transition despite Seoul’s close ties with Jakarta.
But South Korean leaders, if not the public, have mostly stayed silent when it came to the suppression of democracy and violation of human rights in other countries if it might antagonize powerful authoritarian regimes or trade with non-democratic partners.
South Korean strategic thought is generally assumed to prioritize geopolitical realism over ideological idealism. Economic and military power are considered more vital than normative influence or regime type.
...
The Yoon administration foreshadowed that it would break from this “timid” tradition of strategic ambiguity prior to its election. At the 2022 Summit for Democracy, it pledged to spend $100 million by the end of its term on democracy promotion, with a particular focus on leveraging South Korea’s advanced technologies.
The Summit also serves another purpose, which is to strengthen South Korea’s alliance with the United States on the basis of shared democratic values, as opposed to just common strategic aims.
...
This raises the question of whether South Korea should continue to pursue a values-based foreign policy, even in the event that the United States shirks its responsibilities.
It should. South Korea and other U.S. allies must carry the torch of democratic solidarity, especially if the United States falters come November. That should be the message of the Summit for Democracy in Seoul.
Role of democracy in South Korea's alliance
The Korea Times · March 12, 2024
By Peter K. Lee
Peter Lee
When the Yoon administration hosts the third Summit for Democracy in Seoul later this March, it will be a timely reminder to the world of the contrast between South Korea’s vibrant democracy and North Korea’s totalitarian hereditary dictatorship.
Democracy is under threat everywhere, especially in this year of elections, when half of the world’s population will go to the ballot box. Freedom House, an American non-profit organization, reports that global freedom has declined for the 18th consecutive year.
In recent years we have seen the hitherto tacit and opportunistic coordination between non-democratic regimes like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran become increasingly brazen and systematic. These regimes are helping each other to destabilize their neighbors through disinformation campaigns, political interference, arms transfers, and diplomatic cover.
Democracies are also being undermined from within. A recent joint statement by a network of democratic thought leaders known as the Sunnylands Initiative that I attended stated, the “assault on democratic values around the globe continues unabated, exacerbated by economic instability and injustice that undermine democratic resilience and erode the social fabric of democracy.”
The Biden administration first announced the Summit for Democracy in December 2021 to foster cooperation among the world’s democracies. By volunteering to host the third Summit in Seoul, the Yoon administration is signaling that South Korea is prepared to include democracy promotion and democratic solidarity in its foreign policy.
This is a departure from previous South Korean administrations, both progressive and conservative, who avoided a values-based foreign policy. There were notable exceptions, of course, such as former President Kim Dae-jung’s decision to send a battalion of soldiers to help Timor Leste’s democratic transition despite Seoul’s close ties with Jakarta.
But South Korean leaders, if not the public, have mostly stayed silent when it came to the suppression of democracy and violation of human rights in other countries if it might antagonize powerful authoritarian regimes or trade with non-democratic partners.
South Korean strategic thought is generally assumed to prioritize geopolitical realism over ideological idealism. Economic and military power are considered more vital than normative influence or regime type.
The Yoon administration foreshadowed that it would break from this “timid” tradition of strategic ambiguity prior to its election. At the 2022 Summit for Democracy, it pledged to spend $100 million by the end of its term on democracy promotion, with a particular focus on leveraging South Korea’s advanced technologies.
The Summit also serves another purpose, which is to strengthen South Korea’s alliance with the United States on the basis of shared democratic values, as opposed to just common strategic aims.
The Yoon administration has adopted strategic clarity as part of its efforts to strengthen the ROK-US alliance. It is supporting Ukraine with humanitarian and non-lethal military aid, released an Indo-Pacific strategy, criticized North Korea’s human rights violations, and repaired trilateral cooperation with Japan and the United States. It has also signed up to new U.S.-led partnerships on regional trade, semiconductors, minerals, Pacific Islands cooperation, and more without fear of Chinese intimidation.
Democratic solidarity is the latest addition to this portfolio of alliance cooperation. And so, the Summit for Democracy is both a reflection of South Korea’s commitment to democracy promotion and its commitment to the ROK-U.S. alliance.
But this strategy ultimately depends on the United States also remaining committed to a democracy agenda that privileges shared values over material self-interest. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, periods of intense security competition tend to invite strategic opportunism by even the most principled of states.
The Summit for Democracy is a flagship initiative of President Biden. If Biden is re-elected, the Yoon administration’s efforts will pay strong dividends. But if former President Trump is re-elected, it is unlikely that the Summit for Democracy will continue. Trump has made clear his respect for authoritarian leaders as more capable and effective than what he considers feeble, free-riding democratic governments.
In that case, the Yoon administration may find itself exposed while the United States shifts back to a great power balancing strategy that has little regard for democratic values.
This raises the question of whether South Korea should continue to pursue a values-based foreign policy, even in the event that the United States shirks its responsibilities.
It should. South Korea and other U.S. allies must carry the torch of democratic solidarity, especially if the United States falters come November. That should be the message of the Summit for Democracy in Seoul.
Dr. Peter K. Lee is a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and a non-resident fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. He is on X @pklee27.
The Korea Times · March 12, 2024
12. North Koreans try to avoid forced construction work
Would any normal person try to avoid slave labor?
These are not the stormtroopers of Star Wars.
The regime wants no idle hands.
North Koreans try to avoid forced construction work
The workers, called ‘stormtroopers,’ must endure harsh conditions working on Kim Jong Un’s 10,000 homes project.
By Ahn Chang Gyu for RFA Korean
2024.03.12
rfa.org
Rural factory workers in North Korea are doing whatever they can to avoid being conscripted as construction workers on a major state project to build tens of thousands of homes in the capital of Pyongyang because the hours are long, the conditions are harsh and they cannot return home even in emergencies, residents told Radio Free Asia.
Normally people would consider it a privilege to be sent to Pyongyang, as only the elite and well-connected are allowed to live there and only the most loyal of people from the provinces are ever allowed to visit.
But as construction workers, officially called “stormtroopers,” they are made to toil endlessly on supreme leader Kim Jong Un’s pet project that promises 10,000 homes in the capital per year over a period of five years.
Started in 2021, the project is entering its fourth year, and has been rife with setbacks, fatal accidents, and a lack of food so severe that workers resort to crime to feed themselves.
Most stormtroopers are people in the military, but the project is such a priority that the government also diverts workers from among the civilian ranks.
Bribes and sacrifice
To avoid going to Pyongyang, workers in factories are even trying to bribe their way out of it, the residents told RFA.
“Each factory and company is busy preparing shift workers to go to join the housing construction stormtroopers in Pyongyang,” an official from a company in Onsong county, in the northeastern province of North Hamgyong, told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
He explained that the next crop of workers will need to replace those finishing their six-month tour at the end of this month.
“We need to confirm the manpower to be mobilized within this month, but no one wants to go,” the resident said. “There are quite a few factories that determine who gets chosen by drawing numbers. But many workers insist that they cannot go with various personal excuses when their number is called.”
A man in his 30s was selected from the resident’s company, but he tried to defer because his wife is expected to give birth in May, the resident said.
“No one wanted to change turns with him, so he ended up paying 100,000 won (about US$12) and was barely able to change his turn with another worker,” he said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends a groundbreaking ceremony for a construction project in Pyongyang, Feb. 23, 2024. (KCNA via Reuters)
Even if they aren’t among those sent to Pyongyang, the factory workers must sacrifice for the project.
“Confirming the number of people to be sent to the Pyongyang construction stormtroops is not the end,” the resident said. “We need to prepare items for them such as their work clothes, raincoats, and boots to be used during long-term dispatch as well as their pocket money.”
The next batch of stormtroopers will head to Pyongyang in early April, he said.
Even if they complete their six months, there still remains the possibility that a conscripted stormtrooper will have to work for more than a year, a resident of the northern province of Ryanggang told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely.
“Everyone doesn’t want to go to the stormtroopers,” he said. “Stormtroopers are never sent home before the arrival of their replacements from the factories. There are many cases where they don’t arrive on time and the workers are stuck there for more than a year.”
Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
rfa.org
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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