Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

Political war remains a fact of international life. Among the three great categories of war-nuclear, conventional, and political-only political war lies outside the realm of East-West negotiation. And yet of all types, it is the one most closely linked to the political visions at the root of conflict. Men are not hostile, it is often noted, because they are armed; they are armed because they are engaged in hostility. What use is it for the opponents in the present drama to pursue nuclear and conventional disarmament while they ignore the continued presence and deployment of political warfare capabilities? And what are the prospects for meaningful reduction n overall tension when the most threatening form of hostility remains undisclosed, unrestrained, and unacknowledged by those who practice it most aggressively?

- Paul Smith, On Political War, 1991

"I do not fear death. I have been dead for billions and billions before I was born, and had not suffered the slightest inconvenience from it."

- Mark Twain

Characteristics of the American Way of War (8 of 13)

8. Large-scale. As a superpower, the United States tends to excel at enterprises conducted on a scale that matches its total assets. Professor Huntington believes, at least he believed in 1985, that "the United States is a big country, and we should fight wars in a big way." More controversially, he claimed that "[b]igness not brains is our advantage, and we should exploit it." No doubt those words will irritate and anger many readers. However, there is an important self-awareness in Huntington's point. As a large rich country, for the better part of 200 years the United States has waged its many wars, regular and irregular, domestic and foreign, as one would expect of a society that is amply endowed materially. Poor societies are obliged to wage war frugally. They have no choice other than to attempt to fight smarter than their rich enemies. The United States has been blessed with wealth in all its forms. Inevitably, the armed forces, once mobilized and equipped, have fought a rich person's war. They could hardly do otherwise. From the time of the Civil War, foreign observers have been astonished by the material generosity with which American troops have been supplied and equipped. Strategic necessity is the mother of military invention, and since the 1860s, at least, Americans have had little need to invent clever work-arounds for material lack. It is not self-evident that the United States is able to wage war in a materially minimalist fashion, any more than that today's volunteer soldiers and their families would tolerate campaign conditions marked by what would be regarded as unnecessary discomfort. The American Army at war is American society at war. This is not so much a problem as a condition.

True, Americans have at times waged modern war on a shoestring, and the experience was predictably unhappy. Anyone wondering how Americans perform when the material balance is not weighted heavily in their favor will not be short of historical evidence. They could do worse than study the campaign on Guadalcanal in the second half of 1942, or, for another grim classic, the fate of Task Force Smith in Korea in July 1950. These, however, were exceptions to the rule that because the United States was the world's greatest industrial nation, it waged its industrial-age warfare on a scale that others could not hope to match. But because the American way of war traditionally had to be unleashed only after a surge of emergency and time-consuming mobilization, the cost was apt to be heavy for the soldiers at the sharp end. To "come as you are with what you have got" is ever a bloody and extraordinarily dangerous duty. The implications of America's excellence in the conduct of warfare on the large scale for its ability to combat irregular enemies are mixed, but on balance probably have been negative. Warfare against a lightly armed irregular foe short of numbers is not simply a somewhat scaled-down version of warfare as usual. The American strategic cultural trait of "bigness," of functioning with large footprints, is apt to be counterproductive. In COIN, the more evident the American presence and influence, the less legitimate and competent the local authorities must appear to be. The larger the American military contribution, particularly if its soldiers look hostile and behave as if they are in bandit country, the more the U.S. presence will resemble an occupation.78 American culture, in all senses of the term, is a powerful force, particularly in its hold on Americans. Large numbers of Americans, being Americans, acting like Americans, and indeed living in cultural and social facsimiles of America in an alien society, amount to a challenge, or insult, to local mores. This is a necessary consequence of the injection of large numbers of Americans, with all the logistics deemed essential to the American way of life that the volunteer soldier expects, into the midst of an alien cultural milieu. Of course, Americans can reduce their visibility by retreating into fortified bunkers or by deploying away from heavily populated areas. To behave thus, however, is to operate in a manner counterproductive for irregular warfare, where the battlefield, as we keep insisting, is the people.

- Colin Gray, 2006

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN UPDATE, MARCH 13, 2023

2. SOF Quills for the Porcupine: Applying Lessons from Ukraine to Taiwan

3. After years of isolation, Xi’s China looks to dominate world stage

4. International Court to Open War Crimes Cases Against Russia, Officials Say

5. Want to beat China? Let in more Chinese!

6. Department of Defense Releases 2024 Military Intelligence Program Budget Request

7. Comptroller Michael J. McCord and Vice Adm. Sara A. Joyner Hold a Press Briefing on President Biden's Fiscal 2024 Defense Budget

8. Aukus, the Anglosphere and the return of great power rivalry

9. More modernisation investment for US MH-47G Chinooks

10. Ukraine short of skilled troops and munitions as losses, pessimism grow

11. DoD keeps Ukraine aid out of its budget, punting to divided Congress

12. ANALYSIS | China now seen as influencing politics more than ever, on a global scale

13. Why the US Navy wants to retire eight ships early

14. The Army keeps getting smaller

15. Here’s Everything We Know About the Pentagon’s 2024 Budget Proposal

16. Philippine-US annual military drills will be biggest ever - official

17. US-sanctioned general to become public face of China's growing military

18. The changing face of Chinese governance

19. What is it and why does AUKUS matter?

20. China flexes muscles in Latin America in latest security challenge to US

21. 'Evil empire,' 40 years later

22. Arm Ukraine or Prepare for China? Wrong Question.

23. A Full Spectrum of Conflict Design: How Doctrine Should Embrace Irregular Warfare

24. China has three roads to Taiwan: The US must block them all

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN UPDATE, MARCH 13, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-update-march-13-2023

Key Takeaways

A member of the Kremlin-affiliated Valdai Discussion Club accused Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of pursuing political objectives in Russia that are endangering Wagner forces in Bakhmut. This attack on Prigozhin is in line with ISW’s March 12 assessment that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be deliberately expending Wagner forces in Bakhmut to derail Prigozhin’s political aspirations.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to maintain Chechnya’s relevance in the Russian political and military sphere.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Iranian officials in Tehran on March 13 to expand bilateral cooperation and bolster sanctions mitigations.
Russian milbloggers continue to speculate about a prospective Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine, suggesting increasing concern in the Russian information space about Ukrainian combat capabilities as Russian forces pin themselves on offensive operations in Bakhmut.
A Russian State Duma bill aiming to raise the conscription age suggests that the Kremlin is not planning to conduct full mobilization in the future.
The Russian military is reportedly employing the newly created “assault detachments” in different manners across different tactical situations.
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine Iryna Vereshchuk confirmed that Russia has illegally deported 2,161 Ukrainian orphans to Russia.
Russian forces continued ground attacks throughout the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and made marginal gains northeast of Kupyansk and east of Siversk.
Russian forces continued making advances in and around Bakhmut but have not succeeded in completing a turning movement, envelopment, or encirclement of the city as of March 13.
Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast front line.
Ukrainian forces continue to conduct raids against areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
Subordination of mobilized Russian military personnel to Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR/LNR) formations is generating increasing discontent.
Russian occupation officials continue to introduce new provisions to discourage and restrict the use of the Ukrainian language in educational facilities.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN UPDATE, MARCH 13, 2023

Mar 13, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 13, 2023

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 13, 7:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

A member of the Kremlin-affiliated Valdai Discussion Club accused Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of pursuing political objectives in Russia that are endangering Wagner forces in Bakhmut. Russian political scientist Aleksey Mukhin—who contributes to the Valdai Discussion Club and Russian state media—commented on Prigozhin’s March 11 sarcastic announcement that he will be running in the Ukrainian presidential election in 2024.[1] Mukhin stated on his Telegram channel that the Russian public began to interpret Prigozhin’s statement as an announcement that he will run for the Russian presidential elections, which are also scheduled for 2024. Mukhin rhetorically asked if Prigozhin notified Russian President Vladimir Putin about his “presidential ambitions.” Mukhin argued that Prigozhin’s presentation of himself as the “commander” of the Wagner private military company (PMC) “directly affects the planning and management of the assault squads’ combat operations.” Mukhin also sarcastically stated that Prigozhin is a “prospective politician” who searches for scapegoats to blame for Wagner’s high losses among personnel. Mukhin observed that everyone knows that the Russian government pays for Prigozhin’s forces and their ammunition and stated that Prigozhin’s failure to acknowledge the support from conventional Russian forces alienated him from other Russian battlefield commanders. Mukhin concluded that Prigozhin “has placed the Wagner fighters in danger of encirclement during the expected Ukrainian counterattack” as a result of his actions. Mukhin stated that Prigozhin now is demanding that Russian conventional forces “cover his flanks,” and that Russian forces may need to put aside their distaste for Prigozhin to prevent further Wagner losses in Bakhmut.

Mukhin’s attack on Prigozhin is in line with ISW’s March 12 assessment that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be deliberately expending Wagner forces in Bakhmut in part to derail Prigozhin’s political aspirations.[2] Mukhin’s accusations also support ISW’s assessment that the Kremlin and Russian MoD may be attempting to blame Prigozhin for the slowed pace of advance in Bakhmut and for high casualties among Wagner mercenaries. Mukhin’s statement showcases how the Kremlin may be perceiving Prigozhin’s controversial statements and his threat to Putin’s regime. ISW previously observed harsh criticism towards Prigozhin from milbloggers such as disgraced Russian officer Igor Girkin, but Mukhin’s statement is notable because of his existing affiliation with the Kremlin institution that is the Valdai Club.[3]

Prigozhin likely indirectly responded to Mukhin’s accusations on March 12 but has not scaled back his hostile rhetoric towards the Russian MoD. Prigozhin responded within an hour of Mukhin’s statement, stating that the situation in Bakhmut remains “really hard” and that his “550 attempts” to procure ammunition for Wagner were ignored.[4] Prigozhin, however, emphasized that servicemen subordinated to the Russian MoD have been bringing 12 to 15 cars full of ammunition to Wagner in Bakhmut from Zaporizhia, Donetsk City, and Avdiivka frontlines. Prigozhin noted that “there is no conflict between Wagner PMC fighters and Russian MoD fighters,” and claimed that he is confident that Wagner will continue to receive such donations due to friendly relations with these units. Prigozhin doubled down on his statements on March 13 and reportedly met with an unnamed commander of an unspecified Russian brigade.[5] Prigozhin claimed that he had developed a relationship with unspecified conventional forces after they had suffered a year of “betrayal” and stated that these forces are not covering one of Wagner’s flanks—a statement that mimics Mukhin’s claim that Russian conventional forces are not interested in assisting Wagner.

A Wagner-affiliated milblogger also directly responded to Mukhin’s commentary stating that while Prigozhin was simply “trolling” about his presidential ambitions in Ukraine, he does not need to notify Putin of his political ambitions according to Russian law.[6] The milblogger further echoed Prigozhin’s claims that Wagner is on good terms with conventional forces, which further confirms that Prigozhin’s March 12 and March 13 statements were in response to Mukhin’s accusations.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to maintain Chechnya’s relevance in the Russian political and military sphere. Kadyrov met with Putin on March 13 to discuss Chechnya’s socioeconomic achievements and domestic developments in 2022.[7] Kadyrov also used the meeting to laud the success of Chechen fighters in Ukraine and emphasized that Chechen fighters are dutifully fulfilling Putin’s orders and “aim to act to the bitter end,” to which Putin responded by acknowledging the role of Chechen fighters and thanking Kadyrov.[8] Kadyrov appeared visibly nervous during the meeting, potentially indicating that he felt considerable pressure to present Chechnya, himself, and his troops to Putin in a positive and productive light.[9] Chechen troops are currently playing a very minimal role on the frontline in Ukraine and mainly appear to be conducting offensive operations near Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast, and are otherwise carrying out law enforcement tasks in rear areas of occupied Ukraine.[10] Kadyrov may therefore fear that he is losing favor with Putin because he has very little to show in terms of Chechen combat gains, and likely hoped to correct and bolster his reputation over the course of this meeting. Putin, in turn, likely hopes to pressure Kadyrov into increasing the role of Chechen fighters in combat operations due to continued losses to both the Wagner Group and conventional Russian forces in ongoing offensive operations in Ukraine.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Iranian officials in Tehran on March 13 to expand bilateral cooperation and bolster sanctions mitigations. Iranian state media reported that Lukashenko met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber.[11] Raisi and Lukashenko signed eight cooperation agreements in the spheres of comprehensive cooperation, trade, transportation, agriculture, and culture and noted that Belarus and Iran tripled bilateral trade in 2022 compared to 2021.[12] Raisi notably stated that cooperation with Belarus could be a way for both nations to counter sanctions.[13] Lukashenko has frequently acted as a Kremlin vassal in recent trips to foreign countries, and his visit to Tehran is likely a component of the Kremlin’s wider effort to secure continued Iranian support in the face of international sanctions.[14] Iranian state media notably announced on March 11 that Iran has finalized a deal to buy Su-35 combat aircraft from Russia, indicating that military, political, and economic agreements between Tehran and Moscow are continuing to prove mutually beneficial for both parties.[15] The Kremlin will likely continue to leverage Lukashenko’s influence to deepen cooperation with Tehran.

Russian milbloggers continue to speculate about a prospective Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine, suggesting increasing concern in the Russian information space about Ukrainian combat capabilities as Russian forces pin themselves on offensive operations in Bakhmut. The milbloggers largely agreed that Ukrainian forces would prioritize an offensive in the south against Berdyansk-Melitopol in Zaporizhia Oblast or Mariupol-Volnovakha in Donetsk Oblast, but some claimed that Ukrainian forces have enough combat power to conduct a second counteroffensive either in another area of southern Ukraine or along the Kupyansk-Svatove line in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.[16] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger agreed with ISW’s prior assessments on the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut, claiming that Ukrainian forces are grinding Russian forces’ best available infantry around Bakhmut to reduce Russian forces’ capability to stop any Ukrainian advances.[17] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces would be able to drive south and face minimal Russian resistance in southern Ukraine, unlike other areas of the front line. Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces would target southern Ukraine because a “destroyed Crimea” holds strategic importance while a “destroyed Donbas” does not.[18] Russian State Duma Deputy Dmitry Kuznetsov claimed that Ukrainian forces would target the Kerch Strait Bridge in Crimea in a months-long interdiction campaign like the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson Oblast and called on Russian forces to quickly develop anti-drone warfare to defend the critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Crimea to mainland Russia.[19]

A Russian State Duma bill aiming to raise the conscription age suggests that the Kremlin is not planning to conduct full mobilization in the future. The Russian State Duma received a bill for consideration on March 13 that would implement Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s proposal for raising the conscription age.[20] The bill would raise the maximum conscription age from 27 to 30 immediately while raising the minimum conscription age from 18 to 21 with a one-year annual increase between 2024 and 2026.[21] Shoigu proposed the conscription age increase at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) board meeting on December 21, 2022, and Russian officials have since offered oscillating statements on whether the increase would apply to upcoming conscription cycles in the spring and fall of 2023.[22] The bill’s immediate increase of the maximum age likely seeks to expand the conscription age range to fulfill some portion of the Russian military’s immediate manpower demands in Ukraine and then subsequently shrink the overall conscription demands on Russian society in the following years. The gradual increase of the minimum conscription age means that three-year groups of potential Russian conscripts will essentially receive deferments of three, two, and one years each, while the current year groups eligible for conscription face continued attritional fighting in Ukraine. The Kremlin may be attempting to shield a new generation of Russians from the demographic and social impacts of attritional fighting in Ukraine by siloing these impacts among one generational group of Russians. The timeline given for the contraction of the conscription age range may also suggest that the Kremlin does not expect the war in Ukraine to last longer than the next three years. This proposed expansion of the conscription age range is another incremental force generation effort well below full mobilization and indicates that the Kremlin is still highly averse to the prospect of a full mobilization.

The Russian military is reportedly employing the newly created “assault detachments” in different manners across different tactical situations. A Ukrainian reserve officer who has previously reported on a captured Russian military manual on the new “assault detachment” reported on March 12 that Russian forces are using both formalized permanent assault (“storm”) units and ad hoc temporary assault detachments in Ukraine.[23] The Ukrainian officer reported that Russian forces have integrated permanent assault units into battalion, regiment, and brigade structures and that their size ranges from that of a company to that of a reinforced battalion.[24] Russian forces reportedly assemble temporary assault detachments within a regiment or battalion for specific operations and do not give these temporary detachments a number, name, defined structure, regular commander, or specific armaments.[25] Permanent Russian assault detachments reportedly have designated commanders and are most often comprised of one or two tanks, several armored personnel carriers, and 40 to 80 personnel.[26] Russian forces reportedly will form temporary assault detachments to respond to situations as they arise, and these formations apparently often retreat after initial losses and suffer from significant communication and coordination problems.[27] Russian forces reportedly designed permanent assault units to break through Ukrainian positions and may have modeled them after the Wagner Group‘s small-scale assault tactics in the Bakhmut area.[28] Russian forces have also reportedly used some of these permanent assault units for punitive reasons and forcibly staff them with problematic and disobedient soldiers to retaliate against them for bad behavior.[29]

The Russian military is likely attempting to concentrate combat-ready forces and equipment in permanent formations trained to conduct small-scale assaults while distancing severely degraded formations from offensive operations of tactical importance. Russian forces are reportedly employing these assault formations to attack well-fortified Ukrainian positions and conduct urban warfare.[30] These non-doctrinal formations would likely struggle to conduct a mechanized advance across open country in Ukraine, and Russian forces are likely implementing them for conditions on the current frontlines and not for any wider operational goals.

Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine Iryna Vereshchuk confirmed that Russia has illegally deported 2,161 Ukrainian orphans to Russia.[31] The Ukrainian government previously verified the illegal deportation of a total of 16,207 children to Russia, including those deported alongside their families, and estimated that the total number of children may be closer to 150,000.[32] ISW previously reported on a Russian documentary series following Ukrainian children after adoption into Russian families that claimed that Russian officials “evacuated” over 150,000 children to Russia from Donbas alone.[33] ISW continues to assess that the forcible deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children is a violation of the Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and a potential constituent element of a wider ethnic cleansing campaign.[34]

Key Takeaways

A member of the Kremlin-affiliated Valdai Discussion Club accused Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of pursuing political objectives in Russia that are endangering Wagner forces in Bakhmut. This attack on Prigozhin is in line with ISW’s March 12 assessment that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be deliberately expending Wagner forces in Bakhmut to derail Prigozhin’s political aspirations.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to maintain Chechnya’s relevance in the Russian political and military sphere.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Iranian officials in Tehran on March 13 to expand bilateral cooperation and bolster sanctions mitigations.
Russian milbloggers continue to speculate about a prospective Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine, suggesting increasing concern in the Russian information space about Ukrainian combat capabilities as Russian forces pin themselves on offensive operations in Bakhmut.
A Russian State Duma bill aiming to raise the conscription age suggests that the Kremlin is not planning to conduct full mobilization in the future.
The Russian military is reportedly employing the newly created “assault detachments” in different manners across different tactical situations.
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine Iryna Vereshchuk confirmed that Russia has illegally deported 2,161 Ukrainian orphans to Russia.
Russian forces continued ground attacks throughout the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and made marginal gains northeast of Kupyansk and east of Siversk.
Russian forces continued making advances in and around Bakhmut but have not succeeded in completing a turning movement, envelopment, or encirclement of the city as of March 13.
Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast front line.
Ukrainian forces continue to conduct raids against areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
Subordination of mobilized Russian military personnel to Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR/LNR) formations is generating increasing discontent.
Russian occupation officials continue to introduce new provisions to discourage and restrict the use of the Ukrainian language in educational facilities.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces have made marginal territorial gains northeast of Kupyansk as of March 13. Geolocated footage posted on March 13 shows that Russian forces advanced south of Hryanykivka (17km northeast of Kupyansk).[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions northeast of Kupyansk near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk), Dvorichna (17km northeast of Kupyansk), and Hryanykivka on March 12 and 13.[36]

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on March 12 and 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Kreminna, Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna), Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna), and the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna) on March 12 and 13.[37] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are focusing on operations near Kreminna and Bilohorivka and constantly attack near the Kreminna area.[38] Haidai also stated that Russian forces dedicated new T-90 tanks to offensive operations near Kreminna but ran out after two weeks and are now using T-72s.[39] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces achieved localized successes along the Svatove-Kreminna line on March 12 and 13, including in the Serebrianska forest area.[40] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Terny, (17km west of Kreminna), Nevske, and Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna), but made marginal gains near Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna) and the Zhuravka gully (18km west of Kreminna) after repelling a Ukrainian counterattack on March 12.[41] The milblogger claimed on March 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack near Karmazynivka (13km southwest of Svatove).[42]

Russian forces made marginal territorial gains east of Siversk as of March 13. Geolocated footage posted on March 13 shows that Russian forces made slight advances northeast of Verkhnokamianske (7km east of Siversk).[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Verkhnokamianske on March 13.[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued making advances in and around Bakhmut on March 12 and 13 but have not succeeded in completing a turning movement, envelopment, or encirclement of the city as of March 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attacked towards Minkivka (15km northwest of Bakhmut) on March 12 and 13, indicating that Russian forces have likely advanced along the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway in order to launch assaults further northwest of Bakhmut.[45] Geolocated footage posted on March 12 indicates that Russian forces have also made advances about 8km northwest of Bakhmut in the area between Dubovo-Vasylivka and Bohdanivka.[46] Geolocated footage posted on March 13 shows that Russian forces have advanced to new positions in southwestern Bakhmut along the T0504 Kostiantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway.[47] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson Colonel Cherevaty reported on March 12 that over 39 combat clashes took place within Bakhmut over the past day, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; north of Bakhmut near Vasyukivka (15km north); northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (12km northwest) and Hryhorivka (10km northwest); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west) and Chasiv Yar (10km west) between March 12 and 13.[48]

Russian sources continued to make claims about Russian gains in and around Bakhmut on March 12 and 13. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin notably refuted claims that Wagner took control of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, despite conflicting reports by other Russian sources that Wagner captured the settlement.[49] One milblogger noted that Russian forces control the southern half of Orikhovo-Vasylivka and are clearing two recently captured strongholds.[50] Russian milbloggers widely circulated on claims on March 12 that Wagner fighters began assaults on underground sections of the AZOM complex in northwestern Bakhmut and strengthened their positions at the complex on March 13.[51] Several Russian sources also discussed purported Russian attacks and gains in southern Bakhmut.[52] Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Wagner Group has further advanced towards the T0504 and is conducting positional battles near Ivanivske, Stupochky (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and Khromove (5km west of Bakhmut).[53] Russian sources notably warned that Ukrainian forces are massing near Bakhmut in preparation for a counterattack to break Wagner’s blockade of the city, with one milblogger reporting that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks along the Klishchiivka-Chasiv Yar line west of Bakhmut on March 13.[54] A Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger remarked that Wagner troops are trying to extend their flank west of Bakhmut along the Siversky Donetsk-Donbas water canal to create an artificial operational encirclement of the Bakhmut area, suggesting that Wagner will likely continue efforts to push west to reach the banks of the canal.[55]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on March 12 and 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations on Avdiivka itself; in the Avdiivka area near Krasnohorivka (9km north of Avdiivka), Kamianka (4km northeast of Avdiivka), and Severne (5km west of Avdiivka); on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Nevelske, Vodyane, and Pervomaiske; on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka and Pobieda.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces gained new positions in Krasnohorivka on March 12 and are clearing Kamianka as of March 13. Milbloggers highlighted these claims as evidence that Russian sources are close to encircling Avdiivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian advances near Avdiivka, and several Russian milbloggers, including former officer Igor Girkin, disputed reports that Avdiivka is near encirclement.[57] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces are fighting on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City and within Marinka on March 12 and 13.[58]

Russian forces conducted a ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast on March 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensives near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) on March 12 and did not confirm any ground attacks in the area on March 13.[59] A Russian source posted footage on March 10 of scouts of the 5th Guards Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) targeting Ukrainian drones near Vuhledar.[60]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct raids against areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian officials posted footage on March 10 showing Ukrainian forces conducting a limited raid in an unspecified area in east bank Kherson Oblast.[61]

Russian forces continued routine fire against areas west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on March 12 and 13.[62] Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated on March 12 that Russian forces have the capacity to replace damaged military equipment positioned on the Kinburn Spit, but noted on March 13 that Ukrainian fire against Russian positions on the spit has reduced the pace of Russian artillery fire.[63] Humenyuk also stated on March 13 that Ukrainian forces are working to push Russian forces 20km away from the Dnipro River bank.[64]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The subordination of mobilized Russian military personnel to Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR/LNR) formations is generating increasing discontent. Russian personnel and relatives of servicemembers from Kursk, Sverdlovsk, Perm, and Moscow oblasts released video addresses to Russian officials and Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 11 and 12 in which they complain about their subordination to LNR and DNR formations.[65] ISW previously reported that formations from at least 17 Russian federal subjects have released video complaints appealing to various Russian leaders in February and March alone, with many of these complaints being about the poor quality of DNR and LNR command.[66] The increasing rate of public complaints appears to be in part associated with the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) effort to integrate LNR and DNR formations into the Russian military by subordinating mobilized personnel under them.[67] The Russian MoD is likely struggling to address complaints from Russian military personnel about poor DNR and LNR command as recent dismissals of DNR and LNR commanders have resulted in significant backlash from portions of the Russian ultranationalist community.[68]

A Russian milblogger claimed that there is a high desertion rate among Russian SPETSNAZ forces in Ukraine.[69] The milblogger claimed that SPESTNAZ units in Ukraine are all understaffed, that even commanders have deserted these units, and that many SPETSNAZ veterans returned to serve with Russian forces in Ukraine following the start of partial mobilization but have since deserted in high numbers. SPETSNAZ units are some of the most combat-capable forces within the Russian military and the reported high desertion rate may suggest that persistent personnel issues among Russian forces in Ukraine affect elite units as much as they do non-elite units. ISW has not observed confirmation of the high SPETSNAZ desertion rate, however.

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that there are significant regional disparities in the Russian casualty rate in Ukraine. The UK MoD reported on March 12 that Russian military personnel from eastern regions of Russia die in Ukraine at per capita rates up to fortyfold of those of Russian personnel from Moscow City.[70] The UK MoD also stated that there are ethnic disparities in casualty rates, reporting that Kazakh and Tartar minorities represent 75 percent of the casualties among Russian military personnel from Astrakhan Oblast.[71] An earlier open-source investigation by BBC’s Russia service and independent Russian outlet Mediazona suggests that confirmed Russian casualties in Ukraine occur along regional lines as opposed to predominantly ethnic ones.[72]

Russian milbloggers called on Russian officials to expand efforts to send commercially available drones to Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers continued to criticize Russian officials for not following through on promises to deliver drones to Russian forces as well as for reportedly constraining the use of small commercially available drones in operations in Ukraine.[73] Russian milbloggers also continued to extoll volunteer groups for reportedly manufacturing commercially available drones, mostly quadcopters, with their own funds.[74] Russian milbloggers called on Russian officials to not just fund efforts to manufacture commercially available drones but to also rapidly expand training programs for operating these small drones.[75] A prominent Russian milblogger argued that Russian officials need to extend these proposed training programs to youth-focused military patriotic programs and begin instructing schools to offer classes for drone assembly and operations.[76] These small commercially available drones can normally carry payloads of one to four kilograms, and milbloggers are likely overstating their tactical usefulness.

A Russian source claiming to be affiliated with BARS (Combat Reserve of the Country) claimed that the Russian MoD has suspended BARS recruitment. A Vkontakte page allegedly run by BARS veterans claimed on March 12 that the Russian MoD issued an order on February 16 suspending BARS recruitment until further notice.[77] BARS formations have reportedly not been receiving promised compensation from the Russian MoD, another indication that the MoD may be abandoning its effort to raise reserves through BARS recruitment.[78] Current BARS formations provide Russian forces with little combat power in Ukraine, and the RU MoD may be temporarily halting BARS recruitment to prioritize crypto-mobilization efforts and the upcoming spring conscription cycle in April.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials are continuing to introduce new provisions to discourage and restrict the use of the Ukrainian language in educational institutions in occupied Ukraine. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Education Minister Elena Shapurova announced on March 13 that the administration will end compulsory Ukrainian instruction in schools from September 1.[79] Shapurova claimed that parents will be able to choose the language of instruction for their children, but noted that if parents choose Russian instruction, then their children will not receive any Ukrainian instruction. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Administration Head Yevgeny Balitsky stated on March 13 that those residents that consider Ukrainian as their native language can study Ukrainian for a maximum of three hours a week in schools in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[80] Balitsky added that if students refuse to study Ukrainian their curriculum will only include Russian language instruction. Balitsky attempted to frame these harsh restrictions on the study of the Ukrainian language as the Russian Education Ministry’s respect for the Ukrainian language and original culture. Russian occupation authorities may use the allocated three hours of Ukrainian language study to identify residents with openly pro-Ukrainian attitudes to further suppress Ukrainian culture and identity and consolidate control of occupied territories. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov also announced on March 11 that Moscow State University is offering free Russian language classes in occupied Enerhodar.[81]

Ukrainian partisans damaged a railway track in occupied Kherson Oblast on March 11. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on March 12 that the Ukrainian and Tatar partisan group “Atesh” destroyed a railway track between Abrykovisvka and Radensk, Kherson Oblast, in an effort to disrupt Russian ground logistics supply chains.[82] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk stated on March 13 that the resistance movement continues to help Ukrainian forces keep Russian supply lines under control.[83]

Russian occupation authorities are intensifying law enforcement activities in occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on March 13 that Russian occupation officials are unable to ensure the security of occupied territories from partisan threats and stop Wagner Group and Akhmat forces from looting property in occupied settlements—which Russian occupation officials likely hoped to keep for themselves. The Resistance Center stated that Russian occupation authorities asked Moscow for additional police staff to target Ukrainian civilians for partisan sentiments, rather than focusing on preventing looting by Russian-affiliated groups.[84] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) additionally continues to target the ethnic Tatar communities and arrest Tatars on claimed suspicions of “sabotage” in Crimea and Kherson Oblast.[85]

Russian occupation authorities are attempting to improve economic conditions by mirroring policies instituted following Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014. Rogov stated on March 11 that the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration is creating a free economic zone (FEZ) to intensify business and investment activity in the region, a policy that Rogov claimed has also been implemented in occupied Crimea.[86] Rogov claimed that the occupation administration has already introduced a zero-tax rate for the production and processing of agricultural and other food products, as well as unspecified services in the social, household, and educational sectors.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/AlekseyMukhin/4937

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[4] https://m.vk.com/wall-177427428_2294; https://t.me/concordgroup_officia...

[5] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/587

[6] https://t.me/grey_zone/17711

[7] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70667; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/13/03/2023/640f00179a79470bf59938c6

[8] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70667

[9] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/13/03/2023/640f00179a79470bf59938c6

[10] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3397; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua... https://t.me/andriyshTime/6612

[11] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1401122215997/%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D9%87%D9%85%D9%87-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%B3%DA%A9-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AF; http://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26368; http://www.president dot ir/fa/142935

[12] http://www.president dot ir/fa/142935; http://www.president dot ir/fa/142954; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85055893/%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B4%D9%87-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%87%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%87%D9%85%D9%87-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%88-%D9%87%D9%81%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%87%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85056217/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D9%84%D9%88%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%DA%A9%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C; https://www.farsnews dot ir/media/14011222000481/%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D9%85%7C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3-%DB%B8-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%E2%80%8C%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-%D9%87%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF;

[13] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/12/22/2867005/%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B4%D9%87-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA-%D9%84%D9%88%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%DA%A9%D9%88-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D9%84%D9%88%DB%8C-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A8%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%AF

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar03012023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022523

[15] https://twitter.com/IrnaEnglish/status/1634481569300709377

[16] https://t.me/grey_zone/17706; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/13331; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23181; https://t.me/StolitsaRassveta/1106; https://t.me/notes_veterans/8462; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/19882 ; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/19890

[17] https://t.me/grey_zone/17706

[18] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/19882

[19] https://t.me/StolitsaRassveta/1106

[20] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/890792; https://sozd.duma dot gov.ru/bill/312507-8; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/03/13/v-gosdumu-vnesli-zakonoproekt-o-povyshenii-prizyvnogo-vozrasta-do-30-let

[21] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/890792; https://sozd.duma dot gov.ru/bill/312507-8; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/03/13/v-gosdumu-vnesli-zakonoproekt-o-povyshenii-prizyvnogo-vozrasta-do-30-let

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122122 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011223 ; https:...

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar02272023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030623 ; http... https://censor dot net/ru/news/3386414/minoborony_rossii_izdalo_metodichku_po_shturmovym_deyistviyam_po_opytu_voyiny_protiv_ukrainy_dokument

[24] https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1634799680126058502?s=20 ; https://censor dot net/ru/news/3386414/minoborony_rossii_izdalo_metodichku_po_shturmovym_deyistviyam_po_opytu_voyiny_protiv_ukrainy_dokument

[25] https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1634799680126058502?s=20 ; https://censor dot net/ru/news/3386414/minoborony_rossii_izdalo_metodichku_po_shturmovym_deyistviyam_po_opytu_voyiny_protiv_ukrainy_dokument

[26] https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1634799680126058502?s=20 ; https://censor dot net/ru/news/3386414/minoborony_rossii_izdalo_metodichku_po_shturmovym_deyistviyam_po_opytu_voyiny_protiv_ukrainy_dokument

[27] https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1634799680126058502?s=20 ; https://censor dot net/ru/news/3386414/minoborony_rossii_izdalo_metodichku_po_shturmovym_deyistviyam_po_opytu_voyiny_protiv_ukrainy_dokument

[28] https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1634799680126058502?s=20 ; https://censor dot net/ru/news/3386414/minoborony_rossii_izdalo_metodichku_po_shturmovym_deyistviyam_po_opytu_voyiny_protiv_ukrainy_dokument

[29] https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1634799680126058502?s=20 ; https://censor dot net/ru/news/3386414/minoborony_rossii_izdalo_metodichku_po_shturmovym_deyistviyam_po_opytu_voyiny_protiv_ukrainy_dokument

[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030623

[31] https://suspilne.media/411249-rosia-nezakonno-vivezla-2161-ukrainsku-dit... http://ukr.radio/schedule/play-archive.html?periodItemID=3387935

[32] https://suspilne.media/411249-rosia-nezakonno-vivezla-2161-ukrainsku-dit...

[33] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111622

[34] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[35] https://twitter.com/mon_mon_1064552/status/1635280871145213954; https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1635259753508274176

[36]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02J4n2YN6CLyZaqH4GC9...

[37]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02J4n2YN6CLyZaqH4GC9...

[38] https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/9614

[39] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/9189

[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/11355; https://t.me/rybar/44525; https://t.me/wargonzo/11366

[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/11351

[42] https://t.me/wargonzo/11366

[43] https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1635141582684065792; https://tw... https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1635174398213918721; https://twitter.com/Noobieshunta_/status/1635203380451880964

[44]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02J4n2YN6CLyZaqH4GC9... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021kucdph3u7hdvE94a3...

[45]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jQRBYRBKAnoVRbjxNk9...

[46] https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1634880883902808070?s=20 ; h... https://twitter.com/Lust4Eternity/status/1635012967988342784

[47] https://twitter.com/davidnewschool/status/1635264572289581056?s=20; htt... https://twitter.com/JonHallin/status/1635276314189131776

[48]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jQRBYRBKAnoVRbjxNk9...

[49] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/584; https://t.me/milchronicles/1655...

[50] https://t.me/rybar/44545

[51] https://t.me/brussinf/5743; https://t.me/readovkanews/54580; ttps://t....

[52] https://t.me/rybar/44545; https://t.me/rybar/44523; https://t.me/milch...

[53] https://t.me/milchronicles/1655; https://t.me/rybar/44545; https://t.m...

[54] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46028; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11001; h...

[55] https://t.me/grey_zone/17694; https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB_%D0%A1%D0%B...

[56]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jQRBYRBKAnoVRbjxNk9...

[57] https://t.me/rybar/44537; https://t.me/milinfolive/97885; https://t.me...

[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/11351; https://t.me/wargonzo/11366

[59]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jQRBYRBKAnoVRbjxNk9...

[60] https://t.me/garmaev_alexander/2863

[61] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/ukrainski-rozvidnyky-zdiisnyly-reid-na-terytoriiu-livoberezhnoi-chastyny-khersonskoi-oblasti.html; https://t.me/SobolevskyiYurii/1100

[62] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/17375; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/4506; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/4511; ht...

[63] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU ; https://suspilne dot media/411309-zsu-utrimuut-pozicii-v-bahmuti-dania-peredast-ukraini-blizko-100-tankiv-leopard-1-382-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/13/na-pivdni-krayiny-cherez-kontrbatarejnu-borotbu-syl-oborony-ukrayiny-vorog-vidsuvaye-syly-ta-rezervy/

[64] https://suspilne.media/411825-na-hersonsini-sili-oboroni-pracuut-nad-tim...

[65] ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/9902 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/st...

[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[67] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022323 ; https:...

[68] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022023

[69] https://t.me/rsotmdivision/5684

[70] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1634801422985314304

[71] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1634801422985314304

[72] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120922

[73] https://t.me/rybar/44534 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/13335

[74] https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/13335 ; https://t.me/rybar/44534

[75] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/19887 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/...

[76] https://t.me/rybar/44563 ; https://t.me/rybar/44534

[77] https://vk.com/wall-216488729_11662

[78] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021823

[79] https://t.me/readovkanews/54582

[80] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/859

[81] https://t.me/vrogov/8096

[82] https://t.me/atesh_ua/533; https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/03/12/partyzany-pidirvaly-zaliznychnu-koliyu-na-hersonshhyni/; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/32670

[83] https://t.me/hueviyherson/36310

[84] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/03/13/okupanty-posylyuyut-policzejskyj-rezhym-na-tot/

[85] https://t.me/rybar/44565; https://t.me/kommunist/16365; https://ru.kry... com/a/news-krym-obysk-simferopol-rayon/32314030.html

[86] https://t.me/vrogov/8098

[87] https://t.me/vrogov/8098

After years of isolation, Xi’s China looks to dominate world stage

President expected to visit Iran and to meet Vladimir Putin soon as he aims to build ties abroad

The Guardian · by Amy Hawkins · March 13, 2023

In Xi Jinping’s closing speech at China’s annual parliamentary meeting on Monday, his message was clear: China is back. Speaking to nearly 3,000 delegates in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Xi, newly anointed as president for a precedent-busting third term, said: “After a century of struggle, our national humiliation has been erased … the Chinese nation’s great revival is on an irreversible path.”

The speech comes as Xi is trying to position himself as a global statesman, leading a China that is ready to dominate the world stage. After three years of isolation caused by the zero-Covid policy, Chinese diplomats and Xi himself are jetting across borders to participate in international summits once again.

On Friday, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced a Chinese-brokered deal to restore diplomatic relations, seven years after the relationship was severed. In a joint statement, the Saudi and Iranian governments thanked China for sponsoring and hosting the talks. Chinese diplomats have been working the Middle East circuit for several weeks and Xi is expected to visit Iran soon.

On Saturday, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said: “China pursues no selfish interest whatsoever in the Middle East … China always believes that the future of the Middle East should always be in the hands of the countries in the region.”

US officials brushed off the notion that the deal represented a blow to US influence in the Middle East. But that is how it was portrayed in China. Wang Yiwei, the director of the Institute of International Affairs at Renmin University of China, said the deal “proves that Chinese medicine can solve problems that western medicine cannot solve”.

Stability in the region serves China’s interests. About half of China’s crude oil imports come from the Middle East, and on a visit to Saudi Arabia last year Xi vowed to buy more. Energy security is increasingly important to Beijing as it looks to become more resilient to international sanctions in the event of a conflict with Taiwan.

Xi’s ambitions for Taiwan were another key theme of Monday’s speech. China regards the self-governing island as a renegade province that needs to be reunited with the mainland. Xi has not ruled out the use of force to achieve that aim.

On Monday, he said China “should actively oppose the external forces and secessionist activities of Taiwan independence” and “unswervingly advance the cause of national rejuvenation and reunification”.

He promised to build China’s military into a “great wall of steel”. China’s defence budget will increase by 7.2% in 2023, compared with a general public expenditure increase of 5.7%.

Analysts are watching for signs that China is preparing its military to be ready for an invasion of Taiwan. According to the CIA, Xi has told the army to be ready for an invasion by 2027, although some fear that the date could come sooner. The outcome of next year’s presidential election in Taiwan may be an influencing factor: if the pro-independence DPP wins and declares formal independence from China, that could provoke a reaction from Beijing.

In Monday’s speech, Xi also stressed the importance of self-sufficiency in science and technology. Last week, the Netherlands joined a US plan to restrict the export of semiconductor-making technology, a move aimed at slowing China’s military and technological advances.

On Sunday, Li Shangfu was appointed as China’s new defence minister. Li has been on a US sanctions list since 2018 for engaging with individuals linked to Russia’s defence sector. Li’s appointment will make military dialogue between the US and China – which has been paused since the then US House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, visited Taiwan in August – even harder.

Li’s links with Russia are another sign that Xi wants to protect the Sino-Russian relationship. Xi’s support for Vladimir Putin during the war in Ukraine has been evident, although China claims to be neutral and denied US claims that it was considering sending lethal arms to Russia. Last month, China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, met Putin in Moscow and said the Sino-Russian relationship was “never dictated by any third parties”.

Xi is also expected to visit Putin. On Monday, Reuters reported that the visit, which would be Xi’s most high-profile diplomatic meeting in months, could happen as soon as next week.

The Guardian · by Amy Hawkins · March 13, 2023

4. International Court to Open War Crimes Cases Against Russia, Officials Say

Western governments? Perhaps except the US which is not a signatory to the iCC.

Excerpts:

But looming over the investigations is the question of whether any cases against Russia will ever reach a courtroom.

In recent weeks, a group of governments and international organizations have stepped up talks on the need to create a separate international court with the power to prosecute Russia for the crime of aggression, over which the I.C.C. has no jurisdiction. The court can hold individuals, even leaders, accountable for only war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in this case.

But advocates of a new court argue that aggression is the paramount crime from which all others flow. It is effective because it addresses most directly the political or military leaders who decide to wage war.

Still, Western governments believe that the I.C.C. does has a role and should proceed. The issuance of any arrest warrant, even if not carried out, is symbolically important because it can make someone a pariah as these charges do not go away, legal experts say.

International Court to Open War Crimes Cases Against Russia, Officials Say

The New York Times · by Marlise Simons · March 13, 2023

The cases before the International Criminal Court would accuse Russia of abducting Ukrainian children and of deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure.

Send any friend a story
As a subscriber, you have 10 gift articles to give each month. Anyone can read what you share.

A photograph released by Russian state media showing President Vladimir V. Putin and the commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, last month.Credit...Mikhail Metzel/Sputnik/EPA, via Shutterstock

Reporting from Paris.

March 13, 2023, 9:04 a.m. ET

The International Criminal Court intends to open two war crimes cases tied to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and will seek arrest warrants for several people, according to current and former officials with knowledge of the decision who were not authorized to speak publicly.

The cases represent the first international charges to be brought forward since the start of the conflict and come after months of work by special investigation teams. They allege that Russia abducted Ukrainian children and teenagers and sent them to Russian re-education camps, and that the Kremlin deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure.

The chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, must first present his charges to a panel of pretrial judges who will decide whether the legal standards have been met for issuing arrest warrants, or whether investigators need more evidence.

It was not clear whom the court planned to charge in each case. Asked to confirm the requests for arrest warrants, the prosecutor’s office said, “We do not publicly discuss specifics related to ongoing investigations.”

Some outside diplomats and experts said it was possible that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia could be charged, as the court does not recognize immunity for a head of state in cases involving war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.

Still, the likelihood of a trial remains slim, experts say, as the court cannot hear cases in absentia and Russia is unlikely to surrender its own officials.

The Kremlin has denied accusations of war crimes, but international and Ukrainian investigators have gathered powerful evidence of an array of atrocities since the invasion’s early days.

The International Criminal Court prosecutor, Karim Khan, right, and Ukraine’s prosecutor general, Andriy Kostin, near Kyiv last month.Credit...Valentyn Ogirenko/Reuters

The first case, the briefed officials said, deals with the widely reported abduction of Ukrainian children, ranging from toddlers to teenagers. As part of a Kremlin-sponsored program, they were taken from Ukraine and placed in homes to become Russian citizens or sent to summer camps to be re-educated, The New York Times and researchers have found. Some came from orphanages or group homes.

Moscow has made no secret of its program, presenting it as a humanitarian mission to protect orphaned or abandoned Ukrainian children from the war.

The State of the War

Testing Swiss Neutrality: The Alpine nation makes arms that Western allies want to send to Ukraine. Swiss law bans this, driving a national debate about whether its concept of neutrality should change.
Kupiansk: Months after Russian soldiers were driven out of the town in Ukraine's Kharkiv region, Ukrainian authorities are stepping up efforts to evacuate civilians amid relentless Russian shelling.
Bakhmut: Ukraine insisted that its forces were fending off relentless Russian attacks in Bakhmut, even as Western analysts said that Moscow’s forces had captured most of the embattled city’s east and established a new front line cutting through its center.

Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, the program’s public face, began sending children to Russia within weeks after the invasion began in February 2022 and has regularly appeared on television to promote adoptions. Mr. Putin signed a decree last May to speed up access to Russian citizenship for Ukrainians.

Mr. Khan, the prosecutor, has publicly signaled his intentions to pursue this case, saying that illegal transfers of children to Russia or to occupied parts of Ukraine were a priority for his investigators.

Earlier this month, he visited a children’s home in southern Ukraine, now vacated, and his office posted a photograph of him standing among empty cots. “Children cannot be treated as the spoils of war,” he said in a statement following his visit.

A report published in February by Yale University and the Conflict Observatory program of the U.S. State Department said that at least 6,000 children from Ukraine were being held in a total of 43 camps in Russia, with the actual number thought to be higher. The National Information Bureau of the Ukrainian government said that as of early March it could be more than 16,000.

A large residential building in Dnipro, Ukraine, after it was hit by a missile in January.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

“There has been a lot of focus on this issue, and pursuing it as a crime will generate a lot of reaction,” said Mark Ellis, executive director of the International Bar Association. “It’s forbidden to forcibly transfer civilians across a border, and during a conflict it can be a war crime. It can also amount to crimes against humanity if it is part of a widespread and systematic policy. Deporting children could even be part of genocidal intent.”

In the second case, the I.C.C. chief prosecutor is expected to address Russia’s unrelenting attacks on civilian infrastructure, including water supplies and gas and power plants, which are far from the fighting and are not considered legitimate military targets.

The U.S. government has evidence shedding light on Kremlin decisions to deliberately target vital civilian infrastructure, and many in the Biden administration are said to favor sharing it with the court, although it is not a member. But the Defense Department is blocking the intelligence from being shared because it fears setting a precedent that could open the way for prosecuting Americans.

President Biden has yet to decide whether to approve the release of the material, according to officials.

Russian forces have repeatedly knocked out power in Ukraine. A blackout in Mykolaiv in December.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

Arrest warrants for suspects in either of the two cases are not expected imminently.

In the past, the judges at the international court have taken several months to review charges before issuing arrest warrants or summons to appear. But the devastation taking place in Ukraine has put the court under pressure to act swiftly.

More than 40 countries who are parties to the court have requested its intervention. Ukraine itself is not a formal member, but it has granted the court jurisdiction over its territory.

Ukraine’s government is now holding its own war-crimes trials, and a host of other international bodies are also investigating.

But looming over the investigations is the question of whether any cases against Russia will ever reach a courtroom.

In recent weeks, a group of governments and international organizations have stepped up talks on the need to create a separate international court with the power to prosecute Russia for the crime of aggression, over which the I.C.C. has no jurisdiction. The court can hold individuals, even leaders, accountable for only war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in this case.

But advocates of a new court argue that aggression is the paramount crime from which all others flow. It is effective because it addresses most directly the political or military leaders who decide to wage war.

Still, Western governments believe that the I.C.C. does has a role and should proceed. The issuance of any arrest warrant, even if not carried out, is symbolically important because it can make someone a pariah as these charges do not go away, legal experts say.

The New York Times · by Marlise Simons · March 13, 2023

5. Want to beat China? Let in more Chinese!

The thesis:" More immigration from China would both hobble a geopolitical rival and make America richer and better."

Excerpts:

More important than any effect on partisan considerations, being open to more Chinese immigrants would be safer and more effective than Washington's current policy consensus. Antagonism presents a risk that the Beijing and Washington will stumble into a deadly, perhaps even nuclear, military conflict.

The U.S. might not win a conventional war. And even if it did, its victory might not be complete enough to keep China from emerging as a global power. A war could also entrench the world into two competing camps, cementing China's sphere of influence instead of breaking it. Even a complete victory for the U.S. could be pyrrhic. It might leave the economy in ruins or cause so much loss of life that the U.S. is worse off than before.

If officials really want to get tough on China, the most effective thing to do is to lower the drawbridge for people fleeing the CCP's totalitarian grip. This would not only weaken the regime in Beijing. It would benefit the U.S., have potential bipartisan appeal, and carry low risks of escalation.

Want to beat China? Let in more Chinese!

Reason · by Kraz Greinetz · March 13, 2023

Immigration

Want To Beat China? Let in More Chinese!

More immigration from China would both hobble a geopolitical rival and make America richer and better.

Kraz Greinetz | 3.13.2023 1:30 PM

( Cfoto/ZUMAPRESS/Newscom)

Bipartisan consensus is rare in Washington. But while politicians today seem eager to draw battle lines around everything, from gas stoves to cars to suburbs, they all seem to agree on one thing: It's time to get tough on China.

While many politicians and pundits from across the spectrum are pushing for Congress to ban TikTok, the popular social media app with ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), they'd do better to direct their fury at America's strict immigration laws, not a platform for viral videos.

A complex set of formulas caps immigration from China at about 150,000 people per year. For a country with 1.4 billion people, that's not even a drop in the bucket. Radically increasing or eliminating this limit would do much more to halt China's rise as a global power than harming American users by banning TikTok. Many young Chinese would jump at the chance to move to the U.S.

Why would so many Chinese be eager to leave their homes to move thousands of miles away? For starters, the United States is much, much richer. Despite decades of unprecedented economic growth, China's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is still 80 percent lower than America's. For all its development and flashy infrastructure projects, China is barely a middle-income country. As of 2022, more than half of the country lives on less than $10 per day, compared to only 3 percent of Americans and about 2 percent of Europeans.

Further, China has a repressive, authoritarian government. Despite China's harsh penalties for dissent, many of its citizens have taken to the streets in recent months to speak out against state oppression. This suggests that many Chinese, especially young and educated ones, are unhappy with the Communist regime.

On top of that, only 7 percent of Chinese citizens are members of its ruling CCP. The party has made membership a highly competitive and coveted necessity for those wishing to advance in Chinese business or government. That leaves 93 percent of Chinese citizens without access to the country's biggest source of money, power, and influence. For these people especially, America offers for opportunity for advancement.

This is a perilous situation for the regime in Beijing. Millions of working-aged people could escape its poverty and tyranny if restrictive immigration laws weren't a barrier. From 1940 to 1950, well over a million black Americans left the destitute and oppressive regime of the Jim Crow South. That was more than 10 percent of the South's African-American population. If just 1 percent of China's working-age population took the chance to escape, the nation would lose nearly 10 million people.

China already faces a demographic crisis. Its population is aging and now declining, with its social safety net increasingly strained. The CCP, long reliant on economic growth for its legitimacy, faces the possibility that China will grow old before it grows rich. Bright young people drive economic growth in any nation. Their exodus would doom China to languish in economic and demographic turmoil.

Allowing more Chinese people into American would not only harm a perceived adversary; it would actively help the United States as well. Immigrants have been an economic engine for America. Immigrants and their children make up a disproportionate share of patent holders, as well as nearly half of the founders of Fortune 500 companies. Even an average year of immigration to the U.S., according to some estimates, increases GDP by as much as $72 billion.

Just look at what other refugees from communism have done for America. It's difficult to imagine Miami without its Cuban influence, Los Angeles without its Cambodian-owned donut shops, Orange County without Little Saigon, or New York without its Russian community. Beyond the moral arguments for letting millions escape communism and for weakening a tyrannical state, opening up to Chinese migrants just makes economic sense.

Unlike most immigration issues, this one has a serious shot at finding bipartisan support. Since 2016, Democrats have increasingly called for more open immigration laws, criticizing restrictive ones as inhumane. Republicans have taken a tougher stance, but they might make an exception this time: Worldwide, refugees from communism tend to gravitate toward conservative. In 2020, these communities in New York, Florida, and California strongly backed Donald Trump. That might increase the GOP's interest in letting in more immigrants from China, especially if many settle in swing states.

More important than any effect on partisan considerations, being open to more Chinese immigrants would be safer and more effective than Washington's current policy consensus. Antagonism presents a risk that the Beijing and Washington will stumble into a deadly, perhaps even nuclear, military conflict.

The U.S. might not win a conventional war. And even if it did, its victory might not be complete enough to keep China from emerging as a global power. A war could also entrench the world into two competing camps, cementing China's sphere of influence instead of breaking it. Even a complete victory for the U.S. could be pyrrhic. It might leave the economy in ruins or cause so much loss of life that the U.S. is worse off than before.

If officials really want to get tough on China, the most effective thing to do is to lower the drawbridge for people fleeing the CCP's totalitarian grip. This would not only weaken the regime in Beijing. It would benefit the U.S., have potential bipartisan appeal, and carry low risks of escalation.

Reason · by Kraz Greinetz · March 13, 2023

6. Department of Defense Releases 2024 Military Intelligence Program Budget Request

All we learn is the top line: "The total is $29.3 billion and is aligned to strategic priorities of the Secretary of Defense."

RELEASE

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Department of Defense Releases 2024 Military Intelligence Program Budget Request

March 13, 2023 |

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3327603/department-of-defense-releases-2024-military-intelligence-program-budget-request/

On March 13, 2023 the Department of Defense released the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) top line budget request for fiscal year 2024. The total is $29.3 billion and is aligned to strategic priorities of the Secretary of Defense.

The department determined that releasing this top line figure does not jeopardize any classified activities within the MIP. No other MIP budget figures or program details will be released, as they remain classified for national security reasons.

fy24 budget

7. Comptroller Michael J. McCord and Vice Adm. Sara A. Joyner Hold a Press Briefing on President Biden's Fiscal 2024 Defense Budget

Comptroller Michael J. McCord and Vice Adm. Sara A. Joyner Hold a Press Briefing on President Biden's Fiscal 2024 Defense Budget

March 13, 2023

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer Michael J. McCord; Vice Adm. Sara A. Joyner, director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, Joint Staff

defense.gov

STAFF: Good morning. I'm Christopher Sherwood, OSD Public Affairs.

Today's briefing is on the Department of Defense's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request. Speaking with you today are the undersecretary of defense comptroller chief financial officer, Michael J. McCord, and director of force structure, resource and assessment with Joint Staff, Vice Admiral Sara A. Joyner. They will provide opening remarks and take a few questions. Attribution is on the record.

Prior to asking your question, please state your name and your affiliation. Please limit your questions to one and one follow-up. I will let you know when we're nearing the end and there's time for one last question.

With that, it's my pleasure to introduce the Honorable Mike McCord and Vice Admiral Sara Joyner.

Sir?

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) MICHAEL J. MCCORD: Thank you, Chris, and thanks, everyone, for being here today. Vice Admiral Joyner and I will be -- giving overview, and then after that, we'll take questions.

So before I talk about the contents of the budget, I just want to take a minute to thank the people who made it the high-quality product that it is. I want to start by thanking the secretary and the deputy secretary for their leadership, and Secretary Hicks in particular, and Admiral Grady for their leadership of the very comprehensive department-wide review process that we go through over a period of months. I think you just got a flavor from the deputy's remarks of the vision and the drive that she has in leading our construction of this budget.

I also want to thank CAPE Director Susanna Bloom, who is a superb integrator and thought leader. Throughout this process, she has been a partner to Admiral Joyner and I every step of the way. She is ill today and not with us here today, but she has been ably assisted by Joe Nogueira, who just retired, Mike Payne and the whole CAPE team. On my team, nobody works harder or longer to get a quality budget across the finish line than our deputy comptroller, Anne McAndrew, who leads my team and is sitting right there. So -- and there's also many others in the services, in the combatant commands across DOD who contribute, some of whom I see all the time, and you'll see them follow us today here on the -- in this room, and some of whom I will never meet out in the field. So it takes a real team to do this.

So with that, let me get to the budget. I want to make three main points before I go into any slides.

First, to me, one of the big themes of this budget is continuity. This is our third budget of this administration. It's based on the same National Defense Strategy we submitted 11 months ago, so there's no big surprises in here, I don't think. Everything we cared about and funded in last year's budget, which was -- was released contemporaneously with the NDS, is funded and we care about still in this budget.

Second, the thing that is newest and biggest -- and you've already heard about this a little bit -- is probably munitions. This is is new in the sense of the emphasis in this budget, but we've been talking with our committees about it, and I think we've been talking with some of you about it for at least six months, so -- Ukraine has really informed and highlighted the need to up our game here, so we'll talk about that as we go through. We are, for the first time ever, expanding the multiyear procurement authority which has been in law for decades, of what -- beyond platforms like ships, airplanes and helicopters, into the munitions and missile space, following up on the authorities we were given in this area in the National Defense Authorization Act last -- late last year.

Third main point, as in the -- as was the case with last year's budget, the focus here is making our military more capable, not making it larger. You won't see a lot of force structure changes in this budget.

And finally, Ukraine support above the pre-conflict levels is not in this budget. The situation remains too fluid. The way we're handling this is the way we've handled every emerging operation in the last 50 years, and that is supplementals, so that is what we're doing in '23. That would be the plan for '24.

So with that, let me go to the first slide on the strategy.

Vice chairman kind of touched on this. The strategy, as Secretary Austin says, is our North Star. The point of this budget is to expand our implementation of the NDS and go further in the same direction, not go in new directions. So we've been working actively to implement this strategy. A big part of that is linking the strategy and the resources. That's what our review is all about. You've heard about that from the deputy secretary and the vice chairman. You're going to continue to hear it from us.

I won't read this to you. I think you all are familiar with this. Again, this -- the strategy remains focused on the PRC. What happened in Ukraine has not changed that. So the four priorities the vice chairman noted remain important to us.

And let me next turn to the budget itself. The top line broken out by our major military department components. The budget is driven by and vital to the execution of our strategy and the -- both the National Security Strategy and the NDS. We -- was built in a thoughtful way to align those two. The secretary, that is his top priority with us, is making sure that we are implementing his strategy, not doing anything else in this budget.

The top line itself, $842 billion, is $26 billion, or 3.2 percent more than what Congress enacted last year. It's closer to nine percent more than what we requested last year, and it's basically $100 billion higher than what we had just two years ago.

This budget represents a 0.8 percent real growth, so just under one percent real growth, over F.Y. '23 enacted level, which included, as you recall, a fairly substantial congressional increase of $43 billion to our top line, so it is higher than that still by $26 billion.

When I give you that real growth calculation, that ensumes a -- assumes a GDP inflation rate for F.Y. '24, next year, compared to this year of 2.4 percent as directed by OMB. This applies to the goods and services we buy. We can talk about this later, but pay raises and other items such as housing costs are adjusted by separate factors. The 2.4 doesn't literally apply to everything in this budget.

I will also just make a note that there's a footnote there you probably can't read from here, that the CHIPS Act, which is a -- a big a congressional action last year, is technically a different kind of funding than the regular discretionary budget. It -- it's a small amount of money, $400 million, but important, and it is additive to these numbers.

Let me turn next to this chart, which kind of sketches out what our plan is over the next five years.

Over the next five years, F.Y. '24 through '28, our FYDP years for this budget, we are at $297 billion, so we could perhaps round to $300 billion higher on the top line than we were just a year ago in the plan that we submitted to Congress last year. For the out-years, as I said, the -- for this year, the budget is a increase of 3.2 percent over what Congress enacted last year. For the out-years, that increase grows at the rate of inflation as predicted -- as projected by OMB.

So that's why that out-year profile has a steady slope. It's -- it's the OMB assumptions that drive that.

So, over the last two years going from the -- this administration's first budget, F.Y. '22, to where we are now, the president has agreed to give us $100 billion per year additional resources to implement the NDS with urgency. So, we are putting our money where our strategy is. And our efforts together with support of Congress are really moving the needle.

I -- you know, as the deputy said, outputs are what matter, $100 billion a year, however, is real progress. The budget alone does not deter anyone, but you get that returns from capability, capacity, will, alliances, many other factors. But without the capacity and capability that is funded in a budget, it's hard to make things real.

So, the budget is an important contributor to the outputs that the deputy was talking about. Again, as she said, if we get the funding on time. As she noted, we've lost 51 months, if you're counting, and I do, stuck in C.R.s over the last 13 years, over four years. So that effectively has shrunk the fiscal year in a sense from 12 months to 8 months over the last decade plus. And that is something -- a path that we don't want to continue on. We do like the path on that chart, but we don't like the path of the timing that kind of underlies it.

So, let me now -- next chart, just to give you a little bit of a rundown on how the top line has looked over the last dozen or so years. Mainly the Budget Control Act there, which it kind of spans the whole middle of that chart. You can see how it dropped down and has come back up.

You can see also that, again, the old concept of OCO funding, which was phased out at the start of this administration, is the red bars on top. We are past that now, although those activities in Central Command, of course, are continued now, have been moved into the base budget.

And again, you can see, kind of, how the Budget Control Act impacted us. We're certainly in a better place now, as evidenced by the way the top line has -- and the support has grown in the last couple years. Given our security challenges, we think that's appropriate. And I for one certainly hope we don't see a revival of the approach of arbitrary funding cuts that we experienced during my first tour here.

Next, this goes back to my earlier comment that our end-strength remains largely stable and consistent with what was anticipated a year ago and what was authorized. We have a slight increase, about 12,000, about 9,000 in the active side, mostly Navy, Air Force, about 3,000 on the Reserve side. The Army end-strength, what you see there, this is something I’ve discussed directly with Secretary Warmouth is this is what SECARMY and Chief of Staff believe is realistic for the next twelve months. This stability in endstrength, as you know, kind of, has two aspects. There's the recruiting challenges, which many of you are aware of, and the incredibly strong retention.

Granted, those two are not perfect substitutes for each other, so you -- they are separate things that have to be looked at separately. I will say, on the recruiting side, I think you already probably know this, but these are the lowest unemployment rates in the 50-year history of the all-volunteer force. There has always been a correlation, an inverse correlation, between the job market on the outside and our ability to recruit.

Last year, calendar year '22, 3.6 percent, again, the lowest unemployment rate in over 50 years. And it stayed that -- it's staying that low in the first parts of this calendar year. So that remains a tough environment. Nevertheless, retention is strong.

Again, we can talk about some of the specifics as the services, the military departments come along later today to talk about how their end-strength increase is tied to particular programs, whether on the soldier side or on the platform side, such as realigning KC-10s to KC-46s, but overall a fairly stable picture on the size of the military. Again, we're about capability in this budget.

With that, let me turn it over to Admiral Joyner to talk about some of those capability increases.

VICE ADMIRAL SARA A. JOYNER: Thank you, Mr. McCord.

Good morning. The budget request aligns with the strategic guidance and balances department priorities to maintain a ready, lethal and combat-credible joint force.

It represents the largest procurement and R&D levels ever for the DOD. We will invest over $61 billion to develop, modernize and procure lethal air forces. Our request includes 83 Joint Strike Fighters, 24 F-15 EXs and 15 KC-46 tankers.

Additionally, the budget continues next-generation air dominance and future vertical-lift platform developmental efforts.

The department's $48.1 billion request in seapower funds key investments critical to our national defense, including one Columbia class submarine, two Virginia class submarines, two Arleigh Burke destroyers, two Constellation class frigates that bring greater capability to our maritime forces.

The F.Y. '24 request also incrementally funds Ford class nuclear aircraft carriers and future Columbia class ballistic submarines.

Finally, the $13.9 billion request for land power funds procurement of 80 amphibious combat vehicles for the Marine Corps, 91 armored multi-purpose vehicles for the Army, and also invests nearly $1 billion in R&D efforts for the optionally manned fighting vehicle, which is the replacement for the Bradley fighting vehicle.

All together, our historical investments in platforms and systems across the air, sea and land domains will increase the lethality of our joint force, enhance our ability -- and enhance our ability to deter threats well into the future.

Nuclear weapons continue to provide foundational strategic deterrent effects that our nation and our allies and partners have relied on for decades. The F.Y. '24 budget requests increases funding for modernization and recapitalization of all three legs of the nuclear triad.

For example, this budget includes $5.3 billion to continue development and procurement of the B-21 program; $6.2 billion for the production of the second Columbia class ballistic submarine. Also, F.Y. '24 is the first year of advanced procurement funding for the Sentinel missile program to obtain long-lead items for initial production launch.

As Mr. McCord mentioned, the national defense strategy and our national leadership make clear that our highest defense priority is to protect the homeland and deter attack on the United States.

China and Russia are fielding conventional long-range and hypersonic weapons with the capability to threaten our allies, partners and U.S. forces from extended standoff ranges. Therefore the F.Y. 24 budget invests $29.8 billion to enhance U.S. missile defense capabilities to defend the homeland, deployed forces and allies and partners against an increasingly complex adversarial threat.

The budget increases investments in missile defense sensors to enhance domain awareness, regional missile defense networks, hypersonic weapons and defenses, space-based systems and additional short-range air defense battalions.

And then, finally, the F.Y. '24 budget request includes additional investments for the defense of the United States and territories, including all domain situational awareness capabilities for the Continental United States, Alaska and Hawaii.

Our F.Y. 24 budget request includes $11 billion to develop and procure the proper mix of highly lethal, precision weapons. This budget continues the development, testing and procurement of hypersonic missiles and other long-range fires. Extensive hypersonic prototyping and testing efforts have helped the department overcome technological challenges prior to fielding hypersonic weapons.

Additionally, this budget maximizes Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, JASSM, and Long Range Anti-Ship, or LRASM, and Standard Missile, also known as SM-6, capacity through multi-year procurements.

Enhancements to the munitions industrial base will grow future production capacity and result in savings for the department. These substantial investments will grow the department's advance offensive fires capability and field multi-domain hypersonic capabilities from air, land and sea platforms, beginning in the mid-2020s, in order to achieve maximum deterrent effect against a peer adversary.

Space capabilities are a critical component of U.S. military power projection and integrated deterrence. China and Russia continue to feel weapons -- field weapons that could deny or destroy our space capabilities. To meet these potential threats, the budget invests over $33 billion to accelerate space capabilities that can be protected, survive attack, degrade gracefully under attack and be reconstituted in a reasonable time when required.

The budget also builds capabilities that can defeat adversary space systems, especially those that target our joint force. Our budget improves missile warning capabilities to detect advance threats by investing $5 billion to develop a multi-layer space-based missile warning and tracking architecture, along with resilient next-generation ground control segment.

This request also invests $4 billion to develop secure, survivable and jam-resistant satellite communication capabilities for joint and allied forces.

Finally, the budget includes almost $3 billion for 15 space vehicle -- launch vehicles, to provide assured access to space and funds infrastructure projects that will help modernize our space launch ranges to support increased commercial and government launches.

The F.Y. '24 budget request reaffirms the department's enduring cyberspace missions, defend the DOD information network, defend the nation and prepare to fight and win the nation's wars. With this budget request, we will continue to modernize network defense capabilities to build a secure and resilient cyber architecture.

Specifically, this budget invests $13.5 billion to fund programs and activities that advance cybersecurity, cyberspace operations and advance cyber research and development activities. The request provides commander of U.S. CYBERCOM with enhanced authority, direction and control of a $3 billion budget to organize, train and equip the joint cyber force, joint cyberspace war-fighting architecture infrastructure and joint cyberspace operational capabilities.

The budget request also includes increases in funding for additional cyber mission force teams who are engaged in day-to-day campaigning to disrupt adversary actions, demonstrate capability and resolve, shape adversary perceptions and gain a war-fighting advantage should deterrence fail.

Strategic readiness is the department's ability to build, maintain and balance war-fighting forces, capabilities and competitive advantages to assure we can achieve strategic objectives across threats and time horizons.

Our F.Y. '24 budget request invests nearly $150 billion to ensure our Joint Force is ready to respond to any strategic challenge. The department's Strategic Readiness Framework ensures that competing demands of the present are carefully balanced when preparing for the future.

Mr. McCord?

MR. MCCORD: Thanks. Readiness, by the way, that -- that Admiral Joyner just talked about, I know is hard to write about, especially in the input side, but I -- it's a very high interest item with our committees and I -- we -- it's something I know we're going to talk a lot as we go to -- to brief them.

Something that is, I think, a little more high profile perhaps in that -- in that frame, in -- the campaigning, which is the second of the ways of our -- and of -- we implement the NDS, Indo-Pacific and European theaters, the so-called Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the -- and the longer standing European Deterrence Initiative, we continue to use those categories in these budget.

These are not funds, these are not accounts, these are what we sometimes call tagging exercises. In particular, in the Pacific theater, these are -- these are the way Congress wants them to be categorized. They are far from the sum of all that we do in either theater, by the way, just to remind on that, but within the categories of Pacific deterrence, the $9 billion is a significant increase over last year's level, about 40 percent increase in fact. Those of you who follow this may also know that there is a report required, it's called the 1254 report this year, that is a different number and a different categorization, in some cases.

On the European side, this is a little bit harder to do apples and apples now, given everything that's going on because of Ukraine. What we have in the European Deterrence Initiative had included the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative of $300 million to year ?. We've moved that out of this category just because there's now such a large number in '23 through supplementals that it -- it's really an apple and an orange. So we've moved that out to kind of keep Ukraine entirely out of the European Deterrence Initiative discussion.

In addition, there are things that are informed by Ukraine but broader than that that were agreed at last year's NATO Summit to increase our military contribution, to increase the whole NATO military budget, including the infrastructure budget. The U.S. share of that is increasing in both cases. We have also left that out because that is new and different.

So we could think about the European Deterrence Initiative number, it's about $3.6 billion, but when you add some of these other things in, we're closer to $5 billion, still less than the Pacific, again, in recognizing our -- our primary focus being on the Pacific theater, and again, a -- Ukraine is really not, in any way, other than that $300 million, in this budget. That's the pre-war existing level.

Moving to the third of our ways (inaudible) in the strategy, the first being integrated deterrence, the second being campaigning, third -- building enduring advantages, which has two primary legs of it. One is on the people side, taking care of people. The other is on on the industrial base and -- and the -- and the industry ecosystem that we depend on of innovation.

On the people side, the Secretary, as you know, put out a memorandum last -- mid-to-late September on this and had a couple of initiatives in there, including making sure that the commissary price differential remained visible and substantial for our service members, also to provide additional enhancements for when people move, given the -- that moving expenses when fuel prices were high, in particular, were -- were an irritant for folks. So temporary lodging and dislocation allowances, extending those.

The big -- the big number -- of course, the big number financially and probably in terms of visibility is the pay raise -- 5.2 percent for the military. That is exactly in keeping with what the statutory formula would tell you should be done.

On the civilian side, the statutory formula, as I recall, is half a percent lower than that, but President Biden has, in all three of his budgets, opted for pay raise parity. That remains the policy of the administration again this year. So we have the same pay raise, 5.2 percent, for both. As I think you've probably have heard from OMB on Thursday, that would be the largest pay raise in over two decades on the military side, the largest in four decades on the civilian side.

Moving next to some of the other areas, again, this remains a focus of the Secretary's and our colleagues in the personnel and readiness front. Family support has always been important to the Biden family, both to the President and the First Lady -- enhanced investments in education and childcare.

We're going to universal pre-K now at our DODEA schools, both here and overseas. We are upping our and trying to standardize our employee discounts to incentivize people to work in our childcare centers, to give them a discount if they do so.

Also, continuing to focus on suicide prevention, and as the -- Secretary Hicks mentioned, implementing the recommendations that were already laid down by the Sexual Assault Prevention Independent Review Commission.

So that, we got our first substantial tranche of funding last year, about three months ago now I guess, from Congress enacted to allow us to -- to move out, continuing all -- again, that's a good example of continuing along the same pathway. We're not deviating or altering course on that but we're trying to get farther along that pathway.

Second path -- second leg then or second branch of enduring advantages is on more of the industry innovation side. Here, we have, again, the largest R&D budget ever, four percent increase over last year. As Secretary Hicks noted, we also have the largest procurement budget ever, and that is really about putting capability in the field, but we continue to look to the future because, as you recall her saying, we're about deterrence today, tomorrow, in the future. So we don't want to stop with -- with today's investments.

Healthy science and technology budget, investing in artificial intelligence. JADC2 is, as the Vice Chairman mentioned, not the biggest number in the budget but a very central organizing concept of how we're trying to link information together.

Of the Deputy Secretary, one of her key initiatives, the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve, trying to be more agile, more joint on how we do experiments and then feed those into a feedback loop back into what we're doing.

And finally, a relatively small number but -- but an initiative that the Secretary cares a lot about also, Office of Strategic Capital. This is trying to connect us better with the venture capital world to get their ideas and their capabilities into our system. It's not connecting us to the Silicon Valley Bank but it is connecting us to that world.

On the industrial base and supply chain, this is a good example of what I said earlier, that everything we cared about last year and funded last year, we've -- continuing this year. The five things you see on the top of this slide are things that we cared about and funded last year -- microelectronics, including but not limited to the CHIPS Act. In fact, largely on top of the CHIPS Act, what's listed on this slide -- casting and forging batteries, energetics that power munitions, stockpiling strategic and critical materials.

In addition, we continue to focus on the submarine industrial base. Strong support from Congress on that. That was true last year, that's true this year. That investment includes some -- what I would call precursor, for lack of a better word, support for the AUKUS agreement, but in -- in general, AUKUS is in front of us, it's not particularly a big theme of this budget. That effort really is getting started with the President's announcement today. But there is -- the work we've been doing on submarine industrial base is definitely supportive of that direction as well.

Also, multi-year procurements, as we've talked about, trying to increase capacity. We'll talk more about that in a second -- actually, we'll talk more about that right now because I'm going to pivot to our munitions slide again.

Again, this is what we consider the biggest new thing in our budget or new emphasis. And very much informed by what's happening in Ukraine.

But if you notice what's on these slides, these are not the kind of missiles that are key to the Ukraine fight. These are key to Indo-Pacific deterrence. What we're trying to do here, what the deputy has been pushing us to do is to think about lessons that we're learning today and apply them to the future, apply them to other scenarios and think about where would -- what would I have liked to have done four years ago if I'd had a crystal ball about Ukraine. Let's try and do some of those things now about things that could be coming.

So again, we are moving into the multi-year space on munitions in a way that we have not done before. In the past, I think, we considered it. It was often considered that you buy munitions in much higher quantities generally than airplanes and ships so that multi-years weren't necessary and weren't done. But we have still found the industrial base is not where it needs to be on this front.

So, we are trying to bring forward a concept that my team has been working on for a couple years called large-lab procurement that is not just a multi-year for A and a multi-year for B and a multi-year for C, but thinking about them as a package. How they work together trying to increase capacity and efficiency and do the upfront ordering of common components that are often part of multi-years.

The deputy put it really well. This is sort of step process where you have a max capacity today. You want to get that max capacity today and we do that on a number of these missiles. But if that mass capacity is not enough you need to do things to expand that capacity so that tomorrow you can keep climbing up that ladder. That is something that my colleague, Bill LaPlante has been working on.

On the Ukraine side, on the ground side, this is something I -- Bill LaPlante and his team have also been working on, is to take that next step and broaden that out. So, this is probably the biggest news or and a Ukraine-informed part of budget, even if it's not Ukraine-specific.

Pivoting just a little bit more to the Enduring Advantages side, to the question about how we are trying to make this place run as efficiently as possible. Many different aspects of that, divestment which is, again, an example of something that we cared about last year, had in our budget last year. We're going to ask Congress to support us on some of those same things.

We've been making some progress, not as fast as we would like. But some of those things will be back in there. Some of the older LCSs, moving out -- away from the A-10, things like that. In addition, we have process reforms. We have -- we have other transformational efforts. You've heard the deputy talk about the CDAO, a better use of AI to get data and analytics more widely diffused throughout the department.

Something else I just want to mention here that is probably of high interest inside our department, maybe more so even than outside our department, is the last bullet on here, investing in buying down technical debt. For those of you who remember the thread that was going around on Twitter, fix our computers. That really resonated. I don't think we had more support of any -- at any particular meeting than on investing in that.

So that, and investing in cloud, enhancing our cloud-computing efforts, really glad that we are beyond all of the years of protest on that, to move forward on both those fronts. Those are examples of some of the ways we're trying to get better inside our house here.

Take a moment to talk about climate and that area. Again, we have about $5 billion, again, this is something that we had in the budget last year, continue to have a focus on this year. Installations are the big ones. Also, how we can be more agile and cut our logistic footprint.

And finally, very important in all this area is moving in tandem with where industry's going. So, we are trying to buy what they're -- what they're making now, what they're going to be making next. And we're not sort of planting our flag over here while everybody's moving on. So there's an industrial part, a logistics part and an actual, you know, helping ourselves withstand extreme weather part. There's multiple aspects of why this makes sense.

Moving sort of toward the end here, we have, on the facility side, a very large, by our standards, military construction increase -- military construction budget both for readiness, for European deterrence, specific deterrence and dispersal in the Pacific, for the Navy Shipyard Optimization Program, you've probably heard as the second use -- DOD use of the acronym SYOP, for those of you who remember the original one. Some very large projects there. In particular, the Hawaii project had over $1 billion. Continuing to invest in housing quality of life. And on the -- in the operating budget, $19 billion for facilities, SRM, repairing facilities that we already have in place without building new ones. So we have both those fronts in this budget.

So in summary, just want to say we are continuing, notwithstanding what -- what -- the importance of Ukraine, the amount of time that we're spending on it, the strategy remains aligned to the more comprehensive challenge -- and this is true both of DOD and the interagency -- presented by the People's Republic of China, across the diplomatic, economic and military space. And we're going to continue to follow the secretary's strategy and trying to get ourselves in the best possible position there.

And with that, we're happy to take some questions.

STAFF: Okay, thank you, sir. We'll start with Tara Copp with the Associated Press.

Q: Hi. Thank you for doing this.

On the slide that had the space capabilities, you mentioned the need to develop more anti-jamming capability, and then this is, I think, the -- the most breakout we've seen in the hypersonics. Are these two being driven specifically by what you saw from Russia in the last year in Ukraine?

And then secondly, when we saw the growth chart, the growth spending chart, it looks like you're anticipating $919 billion, you know, by F.Y. '28, and a budget almost a trillion dollars. But we will still see that it's not enough to do all the ships, to do all of the aircraft. Same question I kind of asked in the earlier session: How come that's not enough? What -- what more needs to be done for the Defense Department's budget to be where it needs to be?

MR. MCCORD: Okay, let me start -- pivot to Admiral Joyner, and then come back. Let me -- just -- I'll just say on the space and the anti-jam, my quick answer would be no, it's not particularly informed by Ukraine. But if you want to go a little deeper on that, and then I'll come back to the other part.

ADM. JOYNER: So space is a -- a background of the U.S. military, as we all know. We are -- look, we have been working towards enhancing our anti-jam, our SATCOM capabilities, building resilient and robust space architecture. It -- it predates well before what we're seeing in regards to Russia, and it is a backbone to our operations as we -- as we look for longer-range type of weapons. and to be able to see around the globe and be able to monitor from space. We know that our adversaries can target some of those -- those assets, so resiliency has been a huge effort by the Joint Force at this point. I think some of the innovations that the department is taking right now are not necessarily driven by anything other than a urgency to make sure that we have the right architecture airborne.

MR. MCCORD: Just back on the sufficiency of the top line, I would say the secretary believes this is a good -- a good number. He's happy with this number. It is -- doesn't buy everything that we would've liked to do. We had some other good ideas as a -- as a collective DOD group that we -- that we could not get in at this level, but we got our highest priorities in, and we're happy with that. There are things that, in a perfect world, we'd like to be buying that are not producible. I know there's been some interest, like for example, last year in buying three DDGs -- DDGs a year. We would love to live in a world where the yards could make three a year, or three submarines a year, but we don't live in that world. So there are things that we could do that are not feasible and not good -- good -- not good ways to invest money.

In terms of the top line in general, again, the -- the -- the existence of unfunded priority list does not prove that our budget's insufficient, I don't think. It -- there are always things that we could be doing more of. But again, if you -- if you want to think of the budget representing our top 10,000 priorities, the unfunded list start at 10,001. That doesn't mean that they're not good things to do, whether they're amphibious ships or anything else. But we are happy with the way we prioritized what is in this budget.

And just on -- on the point that you made with the deputy secretary, just do the math. The budget will hit $1 trillion probably before this end -- even -- even if it only grew three percent a year, when the numbers are what they are, it's inevitable, and I think that might -- maybe that's going to be a psychological big watershed moment for -- for many of us, or -- or some of us. But it is inevitable, and it just reflects the growth of the economy, among other things.

When I was -- when I was born, we were -- we, the United States, were at nine percent of GDP on defense. Ronald Reagan was considered high at six percent. We're now at three. So it's a big number, but in other contexts, you know, you could look at it another way.

STAFF: Okay, we'll go with Meghann.

Q: Hi. Meghann Myers from Military Times. I wanted to ask about the end-strength numbers. You'd mentioned, based on last year's projection, or this current year's projection, next year's request, that shows a -- a -- an increase. But based on last year's authorized and the request for -- for 2024, it's actually a little bit of a dip. It's almost an equal dip. Is this reflective of a -- a march toward a smaller overall end strength, or is it more about trying to find a sweet spot between what you guys want, what the services want, and what they are able to accomplish?

MR. MCCORD: I would say it's more the latter. In particular, the Army believes that they can come back up in a couple years, say, from $452-, which is what's on the paper in front of you. If you looked at a couple years, it would go $456-, $460-. So they believe they can come back up, but they believe that based on what they're seeing now, that the -- that, you know, that -- that end goal is not achievable in the next year.

Again, recruiting is -- it -- recruiting at any time in my lifetime would have been tough at this kind of unemployment level, where people have so many other -- other opportunities, especially the people that we want, right? We want talented people, people -- people with drive, people with high school degrees, et cetera, people with technical skills. So that -- that's going to be a challenge, and that is sort of reflected here. Again, the services recognize that, and it is something that we're -- of course, there are initiatives here to address the recruiting side. The retention is already on -- in a pretty good place.

But yes, I think it is more informed by what -- what seems realistic. There is not a good reason to put something that you could hope for, but is not really achievable in here and consume resources on an end strength that you can't hit any more than there would be to put a third DDG in if -- if people can't build them at that rate.

Q: Sure. I mean, the Army's request here is pretty flat with what they were able to actually achieve last year. It's actually the other services that showed a little bit of a projection shortfall from what they were allowed to have, but that they -- but maybe that they would like to be able to get back a little bit to where they had originally wanted to be. Is it -- would you say it's only the Army's having that -- that struggle, or it looks like, you know, for at least part of the year, the Navy was well over 10,000 (inaudible) --

MR. MCCORD: No, I -- I -- I would not say the Army is the only one. They tend to be the most sensitive to this, but -- but as our -- as our colleagues come up and follow us today, I'm sure each of them could talk a little more specificity than I'd be able to about their own particular picture. But no, the -- everybody has some of the same concerns and -- and has gone into their delayed entry pool, for example. I think that's correct. All of them probably have?

ADM. JOYNER: I think that -- so I do know that there's some significant work by the services in the coming year to -- for their recruiting, how they're going to get at those recruiting goals. So I know they're going to be able to expand on -- on significant programs that they're putting in place in order to address recruiting challenges that they have, especially in light of the aftermath of COVID and not being able to get into some key places.

STAFF: Okay, thank you. And we'll go to Tony please.

Q: Tony Bertuca, InsideDefense. Back to the topline, you said that the overall growth -- real growth in this budget is 0.8 percent. That still represents a loss of buying power at the department in -- in the billions, even though nominally the -- the numbers are very big. The Deputy Secretary said there's no such thing as a -- as a risk-free budget.

So first of all, why is that level of less than one percent growth appropriate risk to take, given the lost buying power you're taking on? And also, it seems like the message to Congress is "give us an on time budget rather than fight it for three months and then give us more money with a late budget." Could you unpack why that is significant? Thank you.

MR. MCCORD: Okay, let me -- let me take the second part first. Yeah, the -- as the Deputy said, you can't buy back time with money. This is something I've -- I've observed has been a frequent phenomenon over -- over my 38th or 39th year in this business now, is that the thing that Congress can do for us and does do for us, right, is -- is provide resources, but -- but writing a check doesn't address every problem. And so the time that you lose, you cannot -- you cannot make up with more money. It's just -- it's just a fact. And there -- there are things you can address with more money but there are also things that you can't.

Why is the topline sufficient? Again, this is -- as you say, it is not a phenomenal growth rate over last year, but again, last year, Congress added $43 billion for things that I would argue were, in many cases, lower priorities and that did not get at the heart of our strategy the way that the first $773 billion we put in is.

So we think the content of this is -- is quite strong. Going over the content that we had last year, about a nine percent increase. Again, it is -- it is a smaller increase over what -- the $43 billion Congress added but it is still an increase.

It is not lost buying power if the inflation assumptions are correct, which who can tell at this point? We're -- we're talking about a period that starts six or seven months from now and -- and goes on another year beyond that.

And just last point I would make is that, as I said, this is $100 billion more than was -- we were projecting to have just two years ago at this time. So depending on what your starting point is, it's a small increase or a fairly substantial one.

STAFF: Okay, we'll go to Sam.

Q: Hi. Sam LaGrone from USNI News. Just a couple points of clarification from Admiral Grady. Earlier, he talked about a new amphibious study looking at the -- the amphibious forces. We understand that's a capabilities-based assessment. Is that foreseeing some kind of, you know, JRAC acquisition process? How much was OSD and CAPE involved in that moving forward on this?

And then second question is -- is how do you all know shipbuilders can't build three DDGs a year?

MR. MCCORD: Let me answer the second one and turn to Admiral Joyner for the first one. She's much more cognizant on the -- on the first point about -- about the studies.

On the second one, I'm just going by the evidence of what has happened the last X number of years, is the amount of money that goes in equals two a year and the amount of ships that come out is less than two, it's about one and a half. It -- it's different for the submarines and the DDGs but in neither case does it equal two. So I'm just going on track record here.

ADM. JOYNER: And as far as the amphib studies, with the new NDS that came out in '22, the thought is -- is that what we have right now is sufficient for what we need in order for near term requirements for amphibs but the chance to redirect and take another look was something that was valued and that -- so the Department of the Navy is moving forward with that study and it will be their study that they will bring forward, is -- is -- is -- to my knowledge, is how that will -- will occur.

Q: Is that (OSD-directed ?), ma'am?

ADM. JOYNER: I -- yeah, I --

MR. MCCORD: Many of the studies are congressionally directed. I -- I -- I'm -- I may have -- not had this one binned correctly in my mind, of whether this is a congressionally mandated study or a Navy study.

STAFF: All right, we'll move on. If we can go over to Mike Stone please?

Q: Mike Stone from Reuters, thanks. Can you put a dollar figure on exactly how much AUKUS money is in this budget?

And for Ukraine, have you -- how long's it take to put together a supplemental and have you started?

MR. MCCORD: Again, I will follow my pattern of answering the second question first. We have not started putting together a Ukraine supplemental for '24, nor have we started putting together any additional supplementals for '23. The -- the spring, for lack of a -- you know, offensives are really not far enough along for us to draw any conclusions on that.

Last year, you might remember that we did four supplementals in less than 12 months. So we can do them quickly if -- especially if we're doing them for relatively short windows where we're not trying to prognosticate a whole year in advance.

Last year, obviously on average, if we had four in less than a year, none of them were -- were very long windows, although the most-- the last one was -- was the longest -- I'm sorry, I'm talking in calendar year, we did four covering two fiscal years.

Remind me, the first question was?

Q: How much is --

MR. MCCORD: AUKUS. I would say probably only about $50 million is sort of directly AUKUS -- AUKUS-focused but the whole several hundred million dollars -- I think it's over $350 in industrial base funding, if not larger -- submarine industrial base investments, both in -- on the capacity side and the workforce side, are all an important foundation for that.

Again, AUKUS is really mostly about something that -- it's going to -- in the future, this -- this budget was not really -- you know, we knew it was coming but it was not really an AUKUS program of any great definition in this budget.

STAFF: Okay, and we have time for one last question. Tony Capaccio?

Q: I had a question on the -- the overall -- the budget. The superlatives that reporters and the public should use on this thing, it's been described in various ways, like the New York Yankees -- the largest, the best, the biggest. Is this the largest defense budget in recent years, exclusive of the late 2000s Iraq-Afghanistan War efforts?

And Admiral, I hate to ask this but I -- a month ago, the world was transfixed with the balloon. Is there anything in -- that was added or shifted into all-domain security awareness because of the balloon shoot down -- the detection and shoot down?

MR. MCCORD: Yeah, let me start. First of all, if you will describe me -- like, compare me to Aaron Judge, then I will be happy to say that this is the largest budget ever --

Q: -- (inaudible) Reggie Jackson --

MR. MCCORD: Reggie Jackson -- you mean in terms of age --

Q: Yeah.

MR. MCCORD: -- you're talking about? Okay.

(Laughter.)

It is the -- it is the largest in nominal terms, as -- as the Deputy said. In real terms, no, it is not as large as that peak of when -- where the Iraq surge was still in place and the Afghanistan surge was coming. You might remember, at that time, which was about 2008 and '9, we had supplementals in 2008 dollars that -- over $150 billion of supplemental funding, on top, which was a -- almost like a one-third expansion of the -- of the base defense budget of that time.

So in real dollars, that was larger than this. That was north of $900 billion in today's budget. But going back prior to that, this would basically, I think, put you in the largest range in sort of the post-Vietnam, all volunteer force era, excluding war-type supplementals. We had the one-year peak for Desert Storm, you might remember, and then the Iraq, kind of, Afghanistan surge. But in terms of basic, you know, baseline defense budget, this is the largest. And again, there is no Ukraine at this time to compare to.

On the balloon, we did add some funding late in the process. Of course, the events occurred late in the process. Late in the process of our build. Specifically on what I would call sensing and analysis in that particular set of altitudes and phenomenology. We already had, and the admiral can speak to this, domain awareness I think is -- I think you used the correct term, much broader aperture, right? And cruise missiles are the things we care about probably the most in that space of looking at our air space. So, in that broader category I don't have a number off the top -- tip of my tongue of the larger amount that we spend. But we -- on this particular niche, if you will, we did add some funding to try and refine some capabilities on the back end.

Q: One of the largest defense budgets.

ADM. JOYNER: Yes.

Q: You need to put that caveat in there, exclusive of war spending (inaudible).

MR. MCCORD: Right. And in terms of largest ever, I will just go to the way back machine, prior to Reggie Jackson or myself, World War II we were spending about a third of our GDP on defense.

ADM. JOYNER: And just to go back to the balloon, there's significant investments and I think the comptroller did a good job of sort of characterizing those. About $90 million going into the budget. But I would tell you that the sensors that we have today are capable of seeing the high-altitude balloons. They're capable of tracking them. It's a matter of tuning and optimizing those systems to try to get out -- after all forms of intrusions into our airspace. So, we've been very focused on hypersonics and those -- cruise missiles, those types of things that we think were on the high-end, fast-moving threats and tuning for something that's much slower, like a balloon. That's part of what all this will go into.

We've got over the horizon radars that have been invested in. Four of those will be fielded in the -- in the near future. And so, you know, those investments are ongoing in order to enhance our overall defense of the homelands, which is extremely important and is it number one NDS priority. But also it flows throughout this budget. I think you can see those investments coming online. Thank you.

MR. MCCORD: All right, thank you. That concludes our briefing.

defense.gov

8. Aukus, the Anglosphere and the return of great power rivalry

Aukus, the Anglosphere and the return of great power rivalry

Financial Times · by Gideon Rachman · March 13, 2023

Aukus, the Anglosphere and the return of great power rivalry The US, the UK and Australia believe that preparing for a war with China may be the best way of preventing one

GIDEON RACHMAN

When an American president and a British prime minister stand side by side on a warship, it is hard to avoid the historical echoes. In August 1941, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill met off the coast of Newfoundland to sign the Atlantic Charter, setting out a joint vision for a postwar world.

The Pacific is the site for Monday’s summit between Joe Biden, Rishi Sunak and Anthony Albanese. The leaders of the US, UK and Australia were due to meet on board the USS Missouri to spell out the Aukus accord, an arms and technology deal centred on supplying nuclear-powered submarines to Australia.

Aukus is not a grand philosophical statement like the Atlantic Charter. But the underlying geopolitical intent is clear. The nations of the “Anglosphere” are renewing their alliance — this time to counter China’s efforts to gain naval dominance in the Pacific.

While Aukus has its roots in 20th-century history, it is not obviously a partnership made for the 21st century. Britain is no longer an imperial power with Pacific colonies and bases. Australia’s economic ties are now primarily with Asia; China is its largest trading partner.

As for the Americans, Australia and Britain seem, in some ways, odd choices for what The Washington Post calls potentially “the most consequential trilateral defense technology partnership in modern history”. America has military bases in Japan and South Korea that are far closer to the Chinese mainland.

The Aukus deal has already provoked plenty of controversy. It involved Australia repudiating a previous submarine deal with France — a decision that so infuriated the French that they briefly withdrew their ambassadors from Washington and Canberra.

In Australia, some wonder if their government has truly grasped the expense, time and technological demands of getting so deeply involved in nuclear technology. In the UK, sceptics in the military establishment believe that the “Indo-Pacific tilt” will stretch Britain’s military too thin and divert resources from the Russian threat. In America, parts of the government are digging in their heels against sharing some of the country’s most closely guarded technological secrets.

Some strategists argue that the deal is contributing to a dangerous rise in military tensions with China. Sam Roggeveen of Australia’s Lowy Institute think-tank has questioned why Australia is “buying a weapon expressly designed to hem China’s navy in along its coastline and strike targets deep inside Chinese territory . . . Australians should be asking themselves: is this really who we are?”

Despite these concerns, the Aukus pact enjoys bipartisan support in all three countries. Australia’s governing Labor party, like the Liberals who negotiated the pact, regards Aukus as a necessary response to a decades-long military build-up by China that has provided Beijing with the largest navy in the world. Like the Americans, the Australians are concerned by a pattern of aggressive Chinese behaviour — including the building of military bases in the South China Sea, deadly clashes with the Indian army and, above all, increasing belligerence towards Taiwan.

For the designers of Aukus, the purpose of the pact is not to wage a war but to prevent one. It is justified as a classic act of deterrence, intended to dissuade China from deploying its military muscle against Taiwan or in the South China Sea. They believe that the west’s failure to respond forcefully earlier encouraged China to keep pushing. As one senior Australian official puts it: “Weakness is provocative.”

Arthur Sinodinos, Australia’s ambassador to Washington, has described Aukus as a “moonshot”. Like the original moonshot, it requires an act of faith that — with sufficient determination and national will — technological and economic problems can be overcome.

As tensions rise with China and Russia, all three Aukus countries see a merit in tightening what is already a very close security and intelligence relationship. The Americans see China as the biggest geopolitical and security challenge they face — and understand that they need allies to counter Chinese power. In Washington, Aukus is seen as a demonstration of US determination not to back away from the Indo-Pacific. One senior official even defends the way France was treated as a useful demonstration of American “ruthlessness”.

Australians know that, throughout their nation’s history, a friendly power — first Britain, then America — has ensured the openness of the oceans to their north. The idea that one day these oceans might be dominated by an authoritarian China deeply unsettles Canberra, particularly given the recent sharp deterioration in Sino-Australian relations. Binding the Americans into a tighter security relationship is seen as an important guarantee for the future.

As for the British, they argue that the security of Europe is “indivisible” from the security of the Indo-Pacific, particularly given the increasingly close relationship between Russia and China. For a Conservative government that is still trying to make sense of Brexit, Aukus is also a useful symbol that “Global Britain” can be something more than an empty slogan.

The mood on board the USS Missouri is likely to be celebratory. But the underlying reality is grim. The US, the UK and Australia, having fought on the same side in two world wars, are again preparing for a possible global conflict.

gideon.rachman@ft.com

Financial Times · by Gideon Rachman · March 13, 2023

9. More modernisation investment for US MH-47G Chinooks

I love the MH-47.

Excerpts:

While all militaries are feeling the panic to modernise their platforms and capabilities in the current security climate, the component changes to the MH-47G still remain unresolved, and another procurement contract worth even more is needed to get the job done.

The MH-47G is a reliable aircraft that is coveted by air forces across the world. It incorporates a monolithic, machine-framed fuselage integrating long-range fuel tanks, and an extendable refuelling probe to receive fuel mid-air from fixed-wing tankers. The helicopter also possesses advanced cargo-handling capabilities.

The helicopter can be fitted with special operations equipment such as a fast rope insertion extraction system, a special patrol insertion and extraction system, a rope ladder, an electrically powered rescue hoist and a personnel location system.

The variant also includes the Silent Knight Radar system, which provides safe low-level flight in adverse environments, including navigation support weather information to air crews.

More modernisation investment for US MH-47G Chinooks - Airforce Technology

airforce-technology.com · by John Hill · March 13, 2023

US Air Force Special Tactics Operators conduct helocast training from the ramp of an MH-47G Chinook, February 2020. Credit: DVIDS.

The Boeing MH-47G – a special operations variant of the CH-47 Chinook multirole, heavy-lift helicopter – has received more investment from the US Department of Defense (DoD) on 10 March.

The DoD contract will see Boeing procure even more long lead components and parts in support of the MH-47G. The DoD says that this “contract action supports a requirement for replacement of the aging fleet of remanufactured MH-47G aircraft that has airframe components dating back more than 45 years”.

This contract, issued on 10 March 2023, follows another DoD contract for the same parts on 14 July 2022. The first of these contracts in 2022 awarded Boeing $18,559,000, while the latest in 2023 awarded the company a further $18,749,000 for more of these components.

Boeing states that the MH-47G “provides commonality across the fleet to ensure that the Chinook fleet will be available to serve for decades to come”. All the while the need for modernised parts remains a problem for US Special Operations Command.

While all militaries are feeling the panic to modernise their platforms and capabilities in the current security climate, the component changes to the MH-47G still remain unresolved, and another procurement contract worth even more is needed to get the job done.

The MH-47G is a reliable aircraft that is coveted by air forces across the world. It incorporates a monolithic, machine-framed fuselage integrating long-range fuel tanks, and an extendable refuelling probe to receive fuel mid-air from fixed-wing tankers. The helicopter also possesses advanced cargo-handling capabilities.

The helicopter can be fitted with special operations equipment such as a fast rope insertion extraction system, a special patrol insertion and extraction system, a rope ladder, an electrically powered rescue hoist and a personnel location system.

The variant also includes the Silent Knight Radar system, which provides safe low-level flight in adverse environments, including navigation support weather information to air crews.

British procurement from the US Chinooks

The UK’s procurement of Chinooks from the US has also come to standstill.

The new transport helicopters that will benefit UK special forces is now expected to achieve initial operational capability by 2028. This pushes forward the original delivery date by an extra two years.

As the pressure of demand for capability like that provided by the Chinook mounts in this decade, Boeing’s extended modernisation efforts may continually fail to catch up.

Boeing faces the problem of stretching itself as the company must meet the needs of US Special Operations Command as well as the need to replenish the UK rotary aircraft fleet.

With fleet sizes reducing as a result of the West’s campaign to support Ukraine, British and American procurers are pressuring companies to make up for the shortfall. On top of this pressure, Chinooks could be falling even further behind.

Share this article

airforce-technology.com · by John Hill · March 13, 2023

10. Ukraine short of skilled troops and munitions as losses, pessimism grow

A key point - Ukraine has lost many of its trained junior officers and NCOs.

Excerpts:

A Ukrainian official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly, said the battle for Bakhmut was depleting Russian forces there — mainly Wagner fighters who have been Moscow’s most effective of late — and that Ukrainian units now defending the city were not slated to be deployed in upcoming offensive operations anyway.

Ukraine has lost many of its junior officers who received U.S. training over the past nine years, eroding a corps of noncommissioned officers that helped distinguish the Ukrainians from their Russian enemies at the start of the invasion, the Ukrainian official said. Now, the official said, those forces must be replaced. “A lot of them are killed,” the official said.

At the start of the invasion, Ukrainians rushed to volunteer for military duty, but now men across the country who did not sign up have begun to fear being handed draft slips on the street. Ukraine’s internal security service recently shut down Telegram accounts that were helping Ukrainians avoid locations where authorities were distributing summonses.

Ukraine short of skilled troops and munitions as losses, pessimism grow

By Isabelle Khurshudyan, Paul Sonne and Karen DeYoung

March 13, 2023 at 5:33 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Isabelle Khurshudyan · March 13, 2023

DNIPROPETROVSK REGION, Ukraine — The quality of Ukraine’s military force, once considered a substantial advantage over Russia, has been degraded by a year of casualties that have taken many of the most experienced fighters off the battlefield, leading some Ukrainian officials to question Kyiv’s readiness to mount a much-anticipated spring offensive.

U.S. and European officials have estimated that as many as 120,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed or wounded since the start of Russia’s invasion early last year, compared with about 200,000 on the Russian side, which has a much larger military and roughly triple the population from which to draw conscripts. Ukraine keeps its running casualty numbers secret, even from its staunchest Western supporters.

Statistics aside, an influx of inexperienced draftees, brought in to plug the losses, has changed the profile of the Ukrainian force, which is also suffering from basic shortages of ammunition, including artillery shells and mortar bombs, according to military personnel in the field.

“The most valuable thing in war is combat experience,” said a battalion commander in the 46th Air Assault Brigade, who is being identified only by his call sign, Kupol, in keeping with Ukrainian military protocol. “A soldier who has survived six months of combat and a soldier who came from a firing range are two different soldiers. It’s heaven and earth.”

“And there are only a few soldiers with combat experience,” Kupol added. “Unfortunately, they are all already dead or wounded.”

Such grim assessments have spread a palpable, if mostly unspoken, pessimism from the front lines to the corridors of power in Kyiv, the capital. An inability by Ukraine to execute a much-hyped counteroffensive would fuel new criticism that the United States and its European allies waited too long, until the force had already deteriorated, to deepen training programs and provide armored fighting vehicles including Bradleys and Leopard battle tanks.

The current situation on the battlefield may not reflect a full picture of Ukraine’s force, because Kyiv is training troops for the coming counteroffensive separately and deliberately holding them back from current fighting, including the defense of Bakhmut, a U.S. official said, speaking on condition of anonymity to be candid.

Andriy Yermak, head of Ukraine’s presidential office, said the state of the Ukrainian force does not diminish his optimism about a coming counteroffensive. “I don’t think we’ve exhausted our potential,” Yermak said. “I think that in any war, there comes a time when you have to prepare new personnel, which is what is happening right now.”

And the situation for Russia may be worse. During a NATO meeting last month, U.K. Defense Minister Ben Wallace said that 97 percent of Russia’s army was already deployed in Ukraine and that Moscow was suffering “First World War levels of attrition.”

Kupol said he was speaking out in hopes of securing better training for Ukrainian forces from Washington and that he hopes Ukrainian troops being held back for a coming counteroffensive will have more success than the inexperienced soldiers now manning the front under his command.

“There’s always belief in a miracle,” he said. “Either it will be a massacre and corpses or it’s going to be a professional counteroffensive. There are two options. There will be a counteroffensive either way.”

How much increased Western military aid and training will tip the balance in such a spring offensive remains uncertain, given the scars of attrition that are beginning to show.

One senior Ukrainian government official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to be candid, called the number of tanks promised by the West a “symbolic” amount. Others privately voiced pessimism that promised supplies would even reach the battlefield in time.

“If you have more resources, you more actively attack,” the senior official said. “If you have fewer resources, you defend more. We’re going to defend. That’s why if you ask me personally, I don’t believe in a big counteroffensive for us. I’d like to believe in it, but I’m looking at the resources and asking, ‘With what?’ Maybe we’ll have some localized breakthroughs.”

“We don’t have the people or weapons,” the senior official added. “And you know the ratio: When you’re on the offensive, you lose twice or three times as many people. We can’t afford to lose that many people.”

Such analysis is far less optimistic than the public statements by Ukraine’s political and military leadership.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has described 2023 as “the year of victory” for Ukraine. His military intelligence chief, Kyrylo Budanov, touted the possibility of Ukrainians vacationing this summer in Crimea, the peninsula Russia annexed illegally from Ukraine nine years ago.

“Our president inspires us to win,” Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, Ukraine’s ground forces commander, said in an interview with The Washington Post. “Generally, we all think the same, and we understand that for us it is of course necessary to win by the end of the year. And it is real. It is real if we are given all the help which we have been promised by our partners.”

On the front lines, however, the mood is dark.

Kupol, who consented to having his photograph taken and said he understood he could face personal blowback for giving a frank assessment, described going to battle with newly drafted soldiers who had never thrown a grenade, who readily abandoned their positions under fire and who lacked confidence in handling firearms.

His unit withdrew from Soledar in eastern Ukraine in the winter after being surrounded by Russian forces who later captured the city. Kupol recalled how hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers in units fighting alongside his battalion simply abandoned their positions, even as fighters for Russia’s Wagner mercenary group pressed ahead.

After a year of war, Kupol, a lieutenant colonel, said his battalion is unrecognizable. Of about 500 soldiers, roughly 100 were killed in action and another 400 wounded, leading to complete turnover. Kupol said he was now the sole military professional in the battalion, and he described the struggle of leading a unit composed entirely of inexperienced troops.

“I get 100 new soldiers,” Kupol said. “They don’t give me any time to prepare them. They say, ‘Take them into the battle.’ They just drop everything and run. That’s it. Do you understand why? Because the soldier doesn’t shoot. I ask him why, and he says, ‘I’m afraid of the sound of the shot.’ And for some reason, he has never thrown a grenade. … We need NATO instructors in all our training centers, and our instructors need to be sent over there into the trenches. Because they failed in their task.”

He described severe ammunition shortages, including a lack of simple mortar bombs and grenades for U.S.-made MK 19s.

Ukraine has also faced an acute shortage of artillery shells, which Washington and its allies have scrambled to address, with discussions about how to shore up Ukrainian stocks dominating daily meetings on the war at the White House National Security Council. Washington’s efforts have kept Ukraine fighting, but use rates are very high, and scarcity persists.

“You’re on the front line,” Kupol said. “They’re coming toward you, and there’s nothing to shoot with.”

Kupol said Kyiv needed to focus on better preparing new troops in a systematic way. “It’s like all we do is give interviews and tell people that we’ve already won, just a little bit further away, two weeks, and we’ll win,” he said.

Dmytro, a Ukrainian soldier whom The Post is identifying only by first name for security reasons, described many of the same conditions. Some of the less-experienced troops serving at his position with the 36th Marine Brigade in the Donetsk region “are afraid to leave the trenches,” he said. Shelling is so intense at times, he said, one soldier will have a panic attack, then “others catch it.”

The first time he saw fellow soldiers very shaken, Dmytro said, he tried to talk them through the reality of the risks. The next time, he said, they “just ran from the position.”

“I don’t blame them,” he said. “They were so confused.”

The challenges stem from steep losses. Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s commander in chief, said in August that nearly 9,000 of his soldiers had died. In December, Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Zelensky, said the number was up to 13,000. But Western officials have given higher estimates and, in any case, the Ukrainian figures excluded the far larger number of wounded who are no longer able to fight.

A German official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that Berlin estimates Ukrainian casualties, including dead and wounded, are as high as 120,000. “They don’t share the information with us because they don’t trust us,” the official said.

Meanwhile, a Russian offensive has been building since early January, according to Syrsky. Budanov, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, told The Post last month that Russia had more than 325,000 soldiers in Ukraine, and another 150,000 mobilized troops could soon join the fight. Ukrainian soldiers report being outnumbered and having less ammunition.

The stakes for Ukraine in the coming months are particularly high, as Western countries aiding Kyiv look to see whether Ukrainian forces can once again seize the initiative and reclaim more territory from Russian control.

Russia is also facing ammunition, manpower and motivation problems — and has notched only incremental gains in recent months despite the strained state of Ukraine’s force. As bad as Ukraine’s losses are, Russia’s are worse, the U.S. official said.

“The question is whether Ukraine’s relative advantage is sufficient to attain their objectives, and whether those advantages can be sustained,” said Michael Kofman, a military analyst at Virginia-based CNA. “That depends not just on them, but also on the West.”

Despite reports of untrained mobilized Russian fighters being thrown into battle, Syrsky said those now arriving are well-prepared. “We have to live and fight in these realities,” he said. “Of course, it’s problematic for us. … It forces us to be more precise in our firing, more detailed in our reconnaissance, more careful in choosing our positions and more detailed in organizing the interaction between the units. There is no other way.”

Russia’s recent gains — notably around Bakhmut — have not significantly tilted the battlefield, and U.S. military officials have said that even if Russia seizes Bakhmut, it would be of little strategic importance. But given the heavy casualties Ukraine is suffering there, officials in Washington have questioned Kyiv’s refusal to retreat. The United States has been advising Ukraine to retreat from the city since at least January, the U.S. official said.

A Ukrainian official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly, said the battle for Bakhmut was depleting Russian forces there — mainly Wagner fighters who have been Moscow’s most effective of late — and that Ukrainian units now defending the city were not slated to be deployed in upcoming offensive operations anyway.

Ukraine has lost many of its junior officers who received U.S. training over the past nine years, eroding a corps of noncommissioned officers that helped distinguish the Ukrainians from their Russian enemies at the start of the invasion, the Ukrainian official said. Now, the official said, those forces must be replaced. “A lot of them are killed,” the official said.

At the start of the invasion, Ukrainians rushed to volunteer for military duty, but now men across the country who did not sign up have begun to fear being handed draft slips on the street. Ukraine’s internal security service recently shut down Telegram accounts that were helping Ukrainians avoid locations where authorities were distributing summonses.

Initially, the United States focused its training on new weapons systems Washington had decided to provide Kyiv, such as M777 artillery pieces and HIMARS rocket launchers. In January, after nearly a year of all-out war, the United States began training Ukrainian forces in combined-arms warfare. Just one battalion, of about 650 people, has completed the training in Germany so far.

Additional Ukrainian battalions will complete the training by the end of March, and the program will adjust as Ukraine’s needs evolve, said Lt. Col. Garron Garn, a Pentagon spokesman.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin “remains laser-focused on ensuring that Ukraine is receiving the training it needs for the current fight,” Garn said. The United States is “working around-the-clock” to fulfill Ukraine’s security needs, in addition to investing billions of dollars to produce and procure artillery ammunition, he said.

“The bottom line is that we are getting the Ukrainians what they need, when they need it,” Garn said. “And as President Biden and Secretary Austin have emphasized repeatedly, we will continue to support Ukraine for as long as it takes.”

Even with new equipment and training, U.S. military officials consider Ukraine’s force insufficient to attack all along the giant front, where Russia has erected substantive defenses, so troops are being trained to probe for weak points that allow them to break through with tanks and armored vehicles.

Britain is also training Ukrainian recruits, including about 10,000 last year, with another 20,000 expected this year. The European Union has said it will train 30,000 Ukrainians in 2023.

Ukraine has been holding back soldiers for a spring offensive and training them as part of newly assembled assault brigades. Kyiv is also organizing battalions around the new fighting vehicles and tanks that Western nations are providing.

Syrsky said he is focused on holding the line against Russian attacks while his deputies prepare soldiers for the next offensive.

“We need to buy time to prepare reserves,” Syrsky said, referring to the Ukrainian soldiers now training abroad with Western weapons. “We know that we have to withstand this attack to prepare the reserves that will take part in future actions properly. … Some people defend, others prepare.”

U.S. officials said they expect Ukraine’s offensive to start in late April or early May, and they are acutely aware of the urgency of supplying Kyiv because a drawn-out war could favor Russia, which has more people, money and weapons manufacturing.

Asked at a recent congressional hearing how much more U.S. aid might be required, Pentagon policy chief Colin Kahl told House lawmakers that he did not know. “We don’t know the course or trajectory of the conflict,” Kahl said. “It could end six months from now, it could end two years from now, three years from now.”

Sonne and DeYoung reported from Washington. Souad Mekhennet in Munich, David L. Stern in Kyiv and Siobhán O’Grady in Kharkiv, Ukraine, contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Isabelle Khurshudyan · March 13, 2023

11. DoD keeps Ukraine aid out of its budget, punting to divided Congress

DoD keeps Ukraine aid out of its budget, punting to divided Congress

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · March 13, 2023

WASHINGTON — Sending military aid to Ukraine has been one of the Defense Department’s highest profile focuses for more than a year, but defense officials left it out of the Pentagon’s new budget request and say the plan is to continue to seek emergency funding from Congress.

The notable exclusion of politically sensitive Ukraine contingency funding from the budget request suggests the Pentagon may be seeking to insulate its core programs against Capitol Hill cross-currents. House Republicans are divided on Ukraine aid, and some have also made an ambitious promise to slash discretionary spending by at least $130 billion even as they seek to grow the overall defense budget.

But excluding Ukraine aid from the $842 billion in Pentagon spending the Biden administration has requested for fiscal 2024 puts the onus on Congress — if it wants to continue to help Kyiv — to pass billions of dollars more in supplemental appropriations.

Pentagon budget officials attributed the decision to rely on supplementals to the uncertain nature of the war.

“Ukraine support above the pre-conflict levels is not in this budget; the situation remains too fluid,” Pentagon Comptroller Mike McCord told reporters at Monday’s budget rollout. “The way we’re handling this is the way we’ve handled every emerging situation in the last few years, and that’s supplementals.”

The Republican divide over whether to continue aid to Kyiv ― and Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy’s vow not to grant Ukraine a “blank check” ― has prompted House GOP leaders to spotlight the extensive oversight on Ukraine aid and that U.S. weapons have not been diverted from their intended use.

But even some Democrats supportive of the aid have have begun to question the Biden administration’s reliance on extra-budgetary means. Senate Budget Committee Chairman Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I., for instance, told Defense News he would rather include Ukraine aid as part of the defense budget.

“My personal preference would be to bake it into the base budget,” Whitehouse said. “That sends a very positive signal to Ukraine. But there are a lot of players in this world who have a voice on that. And I’m very comfortable following the lead of my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee as to what they think the best way to go would be.”

At a defense appropriations subcommittee hearing last month, Rep. Mike Garcia, R-Calif., said the Biden administration needs to “do a better job of messaging on this long-term, especially over the next two years,” while Rep. Ed Case, D-Hawaii, called on the Pentagon at the same hearing to “be totally honest with everybody about what this is all going to cost.”

“People need to know what this will cost and people need to consider how to fund it,” Case said. “We have colleagues that are good representatives of their constituents who want to increase, who want to decrease, who want to borrow more, who want to borrow less and we just need to know what it takes realistically to get through the assumption … that this war is going to continue.”

Emergency spending for the Pentagon is not new, but it grew increasingly controversial in the final years of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Funds were appropriated through Overseas Contingency Operations spending packages outside the base budget, which some lawmakers likened to a “budget gimmick.”

According to the Congressional Budget Office, emergency funds made up 2% of the Pentagon’s budget between 1970 and 2000, but grew after Sept. 11, 2001 and peaked at 28% in 2007 and 2008. Overseas Contingency Operations spending averaged about $119 billion per year before President Joe Biden’s 2022 budget request eliminated it.

Though the Biden administration has doubled down on using emergency Ukraine spending rather than starting to integrate it into the regular budget process, as recently as last month a senior Pentagon official testified that the Biden administration had started work on placing Ukraine assistance within the base budget.

“There is work ongoing to build it into a base budget, and we are not ruling out coming back to you for a supplemental,” Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander told the House Appropriations Committee’s defense panel on Feb. 28.

But on Monday, McCord said the Pentagon would rely on emergency supplementals. Though his office has not put together additional supplemental spending requests for fiscal 2023 or fiscal 2024, he said, the Pentagon was able to quickly draft four supplementals in 12 months.

“The spring offensives are not far along enough for us to draw any conclusions on that,” McCord said. “We can do them quickly, especially if we do them in short windows, but we’re not trying to prognosticate a whole year in advance.”

McCord noted some proposed funds that had gone into the base budget’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative would now go into the European Deterrence Initiative — for which the Biden administration has requested nearly $5 billion in FY24.

The White House’s Office of Management and Budget announced last week it was only seeking $6 billion in Ukraine aid as part of its FY24 base budget, an amount roughly on par with funding for Kyiv before Russia’s invasion last year.

That $6 billion is also a small fraction of the $113 billion in military and economic aid for Ukraine that Congress passed last year via four emergency supplemental packages.

About Bryant Harris and Joe Gould

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

Joe Gould is the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He served previously as Congress reporter.

12. ANALYSIS | China now seen as influencing politics more than ever, on a global scale

Excerpts:

What's the role of the United Front Work Department?

The United Front Work Department (UFWD) is an official arm of the Chinese Communist Party that seeks to influence political activities domestically and abroad. But its importance was noted during a Sept. 2014 speech by Xi Jinping, who referred to it as one of CCP's "magic weapons."

"It's basically the propaganda arm; they interface with overseas advocacy groups, work with the diaspora worldwide," said Anna Puglisi, director of Biotechnology Programs and Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

"And I think it's really hard for westerners to understand because we don't have that. Their main goal is for the world to see China in a good light, that China controls the message."

But beyond propaganda UFWD is also believed to be linked, either directly or through affiliated groups, to political interference ventures, say some experts.

"United front work encompasses a broad spectrum of activity, from espionage to foreign interference, influence and engagement," wrote CCP researcher Alex Joske in a 2020 report for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

"United front work generally involves covert activity and is a form of interference that aids the CCP's rise and reduces resistance to its encroachment on sovereignty," he wrote.

But Joske, in an interview last year, said that while United Front networks are involved in a whole range of activities, China's professional intelligence agencies are "behind the scenes and actually directing some of these political influence operations and other covert activities."

ANALYSIS | China now seen as influencing politics more than ever, on a global scale | CBC News

CBC · by Mark Gollom

The uproar over possible Chinese interference in recent Canadian elections is a reminder of what researchers and intelligence agencies have warned regarding Beijing's attempts to politically influence other nations.

The allegations of direct meddling and of money flowing from Beijing operatives into the hands of some Canadian federal candidates is indicative of China's ramped up strategy in recent years to attempt to interfere in the political processes of countries, some observers say.

In a 2017 report, Anne-Marie Brady, a professor of political science at the University of Canterbury and specialist of Chinese politics, wrote that China's foreign influence activities have accelerated under Chinese President Xi Jinping and have the potential to undermine the sovereignty and integrity of the political system of targeted states.

In terms of foreign interference by China, "we're not used to seeing this on such a global scale," she said in a telephone interview with CBC News. "We haven't seen anything like this from any country for a very long time."

Indeed, this is the first time since Mao's era that China is assertively trying to meddle in the internal politics and societies of countries on nearly every continent, according to Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Experts explain how China interferes in foreign politics, methods used and where such methods have been deployed:

How does China interfere in foreign politics?

China uses a wide range of direct and indirect resources in attempts to influence the political process of countries and "spent years developing strategies to influence politics and elections throughout the Pacific Rim," Kurlantzick wrote in an article for the Council on Foreign Relations.

"China often uses its state media and control of Chinese language media in other countries. Its toolbox also includes economic coercion, disinformation on social media platforms, its growing power on university campuses, and its wielding of influence directly over politicians," Kurlantzick wrote.

China's foreign election interference has included "sizeable Communist Party-linked donations to political parties, financial support for friendly research institutions, harassment of the overseas diaspora, monopoly of Chinese-language media ... and other avenues," China foreign policy experts Rush Doshi and Robert D. Williams wrote in a 2018 Lawfare article.

Taiwan's 2020 presidential election candidate, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, right, and her running mate William Lai celebrate their victory with supporters in Taipei on Jan. 11, 2020. (The Associated Press)

Jacob Wallis, an expert on election interference at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said China will use financial inducement and at times coercion to "shift the playing field" by exploiting corrupt and malleable political elites.

"Here in Australia, we've had a number of scandals where politicians [were] being handed shopping bags full of cash. So if that's what works, then that's the kind of action that we'll see, just pure political corruption," he said.

Wallis said they have also observed how Chinese information operations are shifting in their use of Mandarin, Cantonese and English language.

"[They are] getting increasingly confident of working in other languages. And that tells us that they are trying to target beyond diaspora groups. They're trying to target kind of international political discourse."

What's the role of the United Front Work Department?

The United Front Work Department (UFWD) is an official arm of the Chinese Communist Party that seeks to influence political activities domestically and abroad. But its importance was noted during a Sept. 2014 speech by Xi Jinping, who referred to it as one of CCP's "magic weapons."

"It's basically the propaganda arm; they interface with overseas advocacy groups, work with the diaspora worldwide," said Anna Puglisi, director of Biotechnology Programs and Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

"And I think it's really hard for westerners to understand because we don't have that. Their main goal is for the world to see China in a good light, that China controls the message."

China's Xi confirmed for unprecedented 3rd presidential term

But beyond propaganda UFWD is also believed to be linked, either directly or through affiliated groups, to political interference ventures, say some experts.

"United front work encompasses a broad spectrum of activity, from espionage to foreign interference, influence and engagement," wrote CCP researcher Alex Joske in a 2020 report for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

"United front work generally involves covert activity and is a form of interference that aids the CCP's rise and reduces resistance to its encroachment on sovereignty," he wrote.

But Joske, in an interview last year, said that while United Front networks are involved in a whole range of activities, China's professional intelligence agencies are "behind the scenes and actually directing some of these political influence operations and other covert activities."

What are some recent examples of China's alleged election meddling on other countries?

China's alleged election meddling has made headlines across the globe. Most recently, the U.S. midterms were said to have been a target of Beijing through a social media disinformation campaign. But as Kurlantzick recently noted, reports filed to the U.S. Justice Department claim that China has spent more money in the past six years to influence U.S. politics than any other foreign country.

Former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, centre, is shown Tuesday arriving at the Court of Appeal in Putrajaya, Malaysia. He was defeated in 2018 elections despite backing from China. (The Associated Press)

"With members of Congress wary of Chinese influence, Beijing has increasingly targeted local politicians, mayors, governors, and state legislators, according to a report by the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center," wrote Kurlantzick.

Australia has also been a main target for political interference, experts say. Last year, Australia media reported attempts by Chinese spies to fund candidates for Australia's centre-left Labor opposition party in its upcoming federal election but that the plot was foiled by the national security agency.

In New Zealand, there are reports that the Chinese government has "built multiple links to some of the country's top politicians and business leaders in part by orchestrating cushy post-retirement sinecures for some of them at Chinese state firms," according to Kurlantzick in his new book Beijing's Global Media Offensive: China's Uneven Campaign to Influence Asia and the World.

"In addition, at least before Covid, Beijing stepped up people-to-people links between Chinese enterprises, many of them state-owned or with state connections, and New Zealand companies," he wrote.

Taiwan as well has reportedly been a target of election interference in both the 2018 local elections and 2020 presidential elections through media and disinformation tools, as China sought to promote the Beijing-friendly candidates, said Kurlantzick.

"They tried to use a whole wide range of their control over some Taiwanese media outlets, as well as a range of disinformation," he said.

WATCH | 'What did you know?' PM faces more questions about election interference:

'What did you know?' PM faces more questions about election interference

4 days ago

Duration 3:02

On his way into a caucus meeting, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau explained the creation of the special rapporteur looking into election interference when reporters pressed him for more answers on his knowledge of the situation.

In the 2018 Malaysian presidential elections, Beijing attempted to influence the election "through soft power and through covert and possibly corrupt means, also known as sharp power. Beijing cultivated Chinese Malaysians," Kurlantzick wrote in the Washington Monthly.

However, while China scored some success in the 2018 Taiwan elections, Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen won re-election in 2020 against China's preferred candidate Han Kuo-yu, which was seen as a major rebuke to Beijing.

Meanwhile, the coalition of then Malaysian prime minister Najib tun Razak, which was backed by China, also suffered defeat.

Indeed, Kurlantzick notes that China has "failed in its efforts more often than not," and its efforts have often been caught, leading to a backlash.

But those setbacks, Kurlantzick told CBC News, aren't likely to deter China's election meddling efforts. China could potentially improve its efforts when it comes to disinformation campaigns, better conceal money that's funnelled to politicians or conceal pressure placed on politicians by Beijing-linked businesses, he said.

"China has been able to adapt in the past to challenges and problems. So as a result, I expect that they're going to come up with a shifted, more sophisticated influence strategy on a whole wide range of areas, including possibly election influence."

CBC · by Mark Gollom

13. Why the US Navy wants to retire eight ships early

Why the US Navy wants to retire eight ships early

Defense News · by Megan Eckstein · March 13, 2023

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy intends to decommission 11 ships in fiscal 2024, including eight ahead of their planned end of service life — fewer than the 24 it requested to decommission in its FY23 submission, but still likely to reignite debate on Capitol Hill.

Those set for early retirement as part of a divestment strategy include three Whidbey Island-class amphibious dock landing ships the Navy tried to retire last year; three Ticonderoga-class cruisers, one of which the Navy tried to retire last year; and two Independence-variant littoral combat ships that would be just eight and nine years old at decommissioning.

The Navy would lose a cumulative 54 years of service life from these ships under this plan.

The service also plans to decommission two additional cruisers and one attack submarine that have reached the end of their planned life.

Erik Raven, undersecretary of the Navy, told Defense News in a March 10 media roundtable the service “did a ship-by-ship review to understand the material state of each of the ships” set for early retirement.

In considering further investment in repair, modernization and operations for these individual ships, “as judged hull by hull, the return on investment is not there,” he added. “We have sailors and Marines who are serving on these ships; we think that getting them matched up with the right platforms is the way to go.”

Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for budget and director of fiscal management, said in a March 13 budget briefing that “for the cruisers and [amphibs], the decision to request this divestment was based on material condition, life remaining, cost and then time to upgrade, and of course the resultant warfighting value. These six vessels did not pass” that return-on-investment analysis.

Congress last year rejected the Navy’s plan, with lawmakers voting to save four amphibious ships, five LCSs and a cruiser from early retirement.

Here’s a look at the plan the Navy has put forward this year.

Two littoral combat ships

The Navy is proposing the early retirement of LCSs Jackson and Montgomery, which were commissioned in 2015 and 2016 respectively. These ships were meant to serve for 25 years.

This proposal comes, simply, because the Navy bought more ships than it now says it needs.

The littoral combat ship Montgomery enters dry dock at a BAE Systems repair facility in 2017. (Electronics Technician First Class Adam Ross/U.S. Navy)

The Navy determined in a 2021 review its ideal fleet would have 15 Independence-variant ships on the West Coast and 6 Freedom-variant ships on the East Coast, all capable of operating with the surface warfare mission package and the Indy-variants also capable of using a mine countermeasures mission package.

As a first step, the Navy asked in its FY23 budget to decommission all Freedom-variant LCSs, which have a flawed combining gear and would cost an undisclosed amount of money to fix with a new combining gear system. The Navy determined, based on its need for just six ships to conduct surface warfare in the Atlantic fleet, it would decommission these existing ships and await delivery of the final six ships in the class, which would be built with the proper combining gear design.

Congress rejected this idea, instead saving five of the hulls.

This year, though, there’s nothing materially wrong with the two LCSs set for decommissioning. The Navy needs 15 Independence-variant hulls and will have 19 by the time the remaining ones deliver from Austal USA. The two oldest in the fleet are up for decommissioning in 2024, even though that would leave the Navy with 12 until the next couple deliver to the fleet.

Naval Surface Forces spokesman Cmdr. Arlo Abrahamson told Defense News decommissioning Jackson and Montgomery allows the Navy to spend on higher-priority ships, as well as “reallocate manpower and critical skillsets to bolster our remaining LCS crews and other fleet assets” to increase near-term readiness.

“There are no near-term risks associated with these proposed decommissionings. Adequate inventory of hulls exist to support the operational demand,” he added.

Gumbleton said during the roundtable the decommissioning plan is not tied to any particular outcome for the hulls, but that the Navy would look into selling them to an ally or partner.

Three amphibious ships, again

The Navy will try again this year to convince Congress of the need to decommission three Whidbey Island-class LSDs: the Germantown, Gunston Hall and Tortuga.

The Navy requested to decommission these three, plus the Ashland, in its FY23 plan, but Congress voted to save all four. The service is once again looking to decommission them early: Germantown would be 38 years into a 40-year planned life, Gunston Hall would be 35 and Tortuga would be 34.

A draft FY24 memo, obtained by Defense News as the Navy and Marine Corps were finalizing their budget plan to send to the Defense Department for further work, showed the Navy wanted to decommission four other notably younger LSDs. It appears that, during negotiations in the late summer and early fall, the Navy abandoned the effort to retire the four younger ships and decided to restart negotiations with Congress over Germantown, Gunston Hall and Tortuga.

The dock landing ship Ashland is seen heading to Japan to conduct a hull swap with the amphibious dock landing ship Tortuga. (MCSN Amber O'Donovan/U.S. Navy)

Raven said during the press briefing these particular ships “are challenged in terms of readiness.”

Still, the Marine Corps insists its forces need these ships.

Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. David Berger said last week the overall readiness of the entire amphibious fleet was just 32%, quite a bit lower than other parts of the Navy ship fleet. But he added that the Marine Corps needs the Navy to maintain an inventory of 31 total amphibs or risk the Marines not being able to respond to a crisis or conflict.

Cruiser Vicksburg, also again

The Navy and Congress have also debated cruisers in recent years. The FY24 proposal asks to decommission Cowpens, Shiloh and Vicksburg, each of which would be 32 or 33 years into their 35-year planned life.

Last year, the Navy asked to decommission four cruisers that had reached the end of their planned service life, and Vicksburg early, but Congress voted to save Vicksburg.

The Navy struggled to get some of the cruisers through a lengthy, multi-phase overhaul and life extension, as and the service has tried to ditch some of these ships rather than continue to pour money into the hulls.

The service has previously argued the ships aren’t a sound investment, and in fact a Navy budget book notes that accelerating the Cowpens’ decommissioning from the planned 2026 timeline to 2024 would save $130 million amid the ship’s “increased maintenance availability costs and poor return on investment in terms of operational employment and capability.”

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday last spring also offered another argument: the ships aren’t safe. He referred to several emergent repairs during cruiser deployments, including ones involving water leaking into the main engine room or berthing areas below the water line. The ships have also faced ongoing cracks in fuel tanks.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense offered up an additional pitch in its FY24 budget briefing: the cruisers are less necessary “as the mission transitions to Flight III” Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the first of which is going through trials now ahead of its delivery to the Navy later this year.

About Megan Eckstein

Megan Eckstein is the naval warfare reporter at Defense News. She has covered military news since 2009, with a focus on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations, acquisition programs and budgets. She has reported from four geographic fleets and is happiest when she’s filing stories from a ship. Megan is a University of Maryland alumna.

14. The Army keeps getting smaller

The Army keeps getting smaller

armytimes.com · by Todd South · March 13, 2023

The Army’s end strength continues to decrease under its most recent budget request.

The service unveiled its part of President Joe Biden’s overall defense budget request to Congress today.

The Army is asking to fund an Army with 452,000 active duty soldiers, 325,000 soldiers in the Army National Guard and 174,000 soldiers in the Army Reserve.

That’s a drop of 21,000 soldiers from the active rosters as compared to last year’s initial request for 473,000 active troops.

Numbers game: Inside the Army’s end strength scramble

To meet its end strength goals, the Army will need to recruit somewhere between 27,000 and 33,000 new soldiers in less than 11 weeks.

And last year’s figure was already the smallest active Army since before World War II, Army Times previously reported.

Last year bot the Guard and Reserve were left untouched. This year, the Guard’s numbers remain the same as the previous request but would cut 11,500 soldiers from the number of Guardsmen in uniform this time last year, which was 336,500.

The reserve suffers its own cuts from 178,000 reservists in Army green down to 174,000 under this current request.

As cuts to personnel began to mount last year in order to make room for modernization spending, Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville said at the time.

The service is fielding major platforms in nearly all categories now and in the coming years, from robotic combat vehicles to new helicopters, futuristic mixed reality goggles and anew rifle and machine gun.

But last year, senior leaders promised to put the Army on a path to increase its forces back to 485,000 active duty soldiers, though it didn’t provide a timeline.

Current projections would begin adding 4,000 more troops per year in the next fiscal year’s request. That would mean a 485,000-soldier Army sometime in the early 2030s.

Officials did not provide a timeline or target year for reaching that figure. Though previously officials have said that incremental increases could occur over the five-year budgeting period.

As it cuts soldiers from the rolls, the Army faces some of its most challenging recruiting obstacles in decades.

The force fell short on recruiting goals lasts year by 15,000 troops. The shortfall was one quarter of what the Army had expected to bring into the ranks.

Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth said at the time that 2022 was the most difficult recruiting year for the Army since the start of the All-Volunteer Force in the 1970s.

She said then also that the active-duty side would need to lean on the Guard and Reserve to fill empty slots for deployments and training. Last year the Guard and Reserve remained level on their end strength numbers, with no cuts called by senior leaders.

The 2022 shortfall was when the service had a target of recruiting 60,000 new soldiers. That missed mark hasn’t stopped the service from setting an even more ambitious goal of recruiting 65,000 new soldiers this year, Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth said recently.

To recruit those soldiers the Army has revamped and relaunched its “Be all you can be” marketing strategy, pushed into major urban centers where it previously had little success.

It also added bonuses and rank to a soldier referral program and adopted a mentality that every soldier serves as a kind of recruiter.

The service is continuing its 10-year, $10 billion barracks and housing improvement plan.

This budget calls for five new barracks projects, costing the service $288 million in the coming fiscal year. Those efforts will add two buildings to Fort Bragg, North Carolina and one each at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, Fort Wainwright, Alaska and at the Natick, Massachusetts Soldier Systems Center, said Army Under Secretary Gabe Camarillo.

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

15. Here’s Everything We Know About the Pentagon’s 2024 Budget Proposal

Here’s Everything We Know About the Pentagon’s 2024 Budget Proposal

The spending plan includes $315 billion to develop and buy new weapons.

defenseone.com · by Marcus Weisgerber

The Biden administration sent Congress what defense officials are calling the “largest, nominal-dollar peacetime budget ever” for the Pentagon.

The Pentagon’s share of the fiscal 2024 budget request sent to lawmakers Monday totals $842 billion—a defense-spending figure that jumps past $886 billion with the Energy Department’s nuclear weapons work and other federal projects.

It includes the largest-ever requests for procurement of weapons; research-and-development spending; and space-related activities, according to a senior defense official who characterized the spending plan as a continuation of the Biden administration’s China-focused defense strategy unveiled last year.

“This is a budget about continuity and deepening our implementation of the strategy, not going off in new directions,” the official told reporters on the condition of anonymity to speak about the administration’s budget request in advance of Monday’s formal roll out.

Here are some overarching themes and highlights from each branch of the military:

Overall

The request is $25 billion more—roughly 3 percent higher, not counting inflation—than the $816 billion Congress appropriated for 2023.
The $170 billion procurement request is the largest ever, the official said. Part of the reason for the high number is the simultaneous purchase of new bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines that make up the nuclear triad. “We're trying to modernize the triad, not at the expense of other capabilities,” the official said.
The Pentagon is seeking lawmakers’ approval to sign multiyear procurement deals for five types of missiles: Naval Strike Missile, SM-6, AMRAAM, JASSM-ER, and LRASM.
The request includes $145 billion for research-and-development projects, the most ever.
The budget request includes $29.8 billion for missile defense; $11 billion for hypersonic weapons and other long-range missiles; $13.5 billion for cyber activities; $1.8 billion for artificial intelligence-related efforts; and $1.4 billion joint all-domain command-and-control projects.
Aside from $300 million in security assistance, there is no money or weapons for Ukraine. “If [Ukraine] is still an ongoing issue in ’24, we would expect to handle that by contingency or supplemental funding,” the senior defense official said, noting a lot can happen before this budget is passed.
A 5.2 percent pay raise for uniformed military and civil servants.

Army

The 2024 budget envisions 452,000 active duty soldiers, 325,000 in the Army National Guard, and 174,800 in the reserve. This is a further reduction from last year’s budget of 473,000 active soldiers. The Army fell 25 percent short of its 60,000-person recruiting goal last year.
The Precision Strike Missile is budgeted at $273 million in research and development.
Planned procurement for the Next Generation Squad Weapon includes 17,112 rifles, 1,419 automatic rifles, and 14,932 fire control systems.

Navy & Marine Corps

The Navy wants to buy nine ships: one Columbia-class submarine; two Virginia-class subs; two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers; two Constellation-class frigates, a submarine tender replacement ship; and a John Lewis class fleet oiler. It has not requested funding for any amphibious ships.
It wants to decommission several ships earlier than planned, including ships that Congress previously refused to let the Navy retire: guided missile cruisers, three dock landing ships, and two littoral combat ships.
It has requested 35 F-35s for the Navy and Marine Corps.

Air Force and Space Force

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall announced last week that the service’s 2024 budget request would aim to speed up planned aircraft purchases. It asks for 96 aircraft, including 72 fighter jets
The service wants to retire more than 300 aircraft to free up funds for newer planes.
The Air Force’s research-and-development budget tops its procurement request.
It also plans to launch an effort to develop a new refueling tanker that can fly in more contested airspace as well as a different effort to buy 1,000 drone wingmen.
The largest-ever space budget request of $33.3 billion, according to the defense official.

Audrey Decker, Caitlin M. Kenney, and Sam Skove contributed to this report.

defenseone.com · by Marcus Weisgerber

16. Philippine-US annual military drills will be biggest ever - official

We should note that at this time the US is participating in Cobra Gold in Thailand, Balikatan in the Philippines, and Freedom Shield in Korea.

Philippine-US annual military drills will be biggest ever - official

Reuters · by Reuters

MANILA, March 14 (Reuters) - The Philippines and the United States will carry out their biggest ever joint military drills next month, a spokesperson for the annual war games said on Tuesday, highlighting improved ties with the Western power under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

This year's "Balikatan" or 'shoulder-to-shoulder' drills also come against the backdrop of what the Philippines calls "aggressive" Chinese actions in the South China Sea.

The drills, held from April 11 to 28, will see 17,600 participants from both sides, including around 12,000 from the United States, and "live fire exercises into the water" for the first time, according to Col. Michael Logico, director of the Philippine military's training centre and spokesperson for the event.

"This is officially the largest Balikatan exercise," Logico said.

Previously, the biggest joint drills were undertaken in 2015, with more 11,000 troops participating.

The larger-scale drills follow Marcos' decision last month to expand the United States' access to his country's military bases, which China says undermines regional stability.

Regarding the possibility of the joint exercises further infuriating China, Logico said, "We have the absolute, inalienable right to defend our territory. We are here to show that we are combat ready."

The Balikatan exercises are to be carried out across several provinces, including Palawan, which is near the South China Sea. They will also see some 111 participants from the Australian defence force, though their participation will be limited to "smaller land-based exercises", Logico said.

Reporting and writing by Enrico Dela Cruz; Editing by Kanupriya Kapoor

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

17. US-sanctioned general to become public face of China's growing military

Excerpts:

Some scholars believe Li has close ties to Zhang Youxia, a close military ally of Xi, whom Li replaced as head of the department.

Zhang was promoted to first vice-chairman of the CMC during the Communist Party's Congress in October, with Li following him onto the commission's governing seven-person group.

As defence minister, Li is also likely to be closely involved with military relations in Asia, attending events such as meetings of Asian defence leaders and the informal Shangri-La Dialogue on security in Singapore.

"I think he has been elevated to this position because he's delivered for Xi Jinping in key areas of modernisation," said Singapore-based security analyst Alexander Neill, an adjunct fellow with Hawaii's Pacific Forum think-tank.

"This is someone who will have to hold their own in front of an international audience."

US-sanctioned general to become public face of China's growing military

Reuters · by Greg Torode

HONG KONG, March 12 (Reuters) - General Li Shangfu, named on Sunday as China's new defence minister, is a veteran of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) modernisation effort - a drive that led the United States to sanction him over the acquisition of weapons from Russia.

Although his new post within the Chinese system is viewed as largely diplomatic and ceremonial, Li's appointment is being closely watched given his background, regional diplomats say.

His tenure starts as Washington pushes to restore military dialogue and communications that soured as Beijing reacted angrily to the August visit to Taiwan by then-U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi.

Li's history as a technocrat - he is an aerospace engineer who worked in China's satellite programme - will help him play a key part in meeting the interim targets of President Xi Jinping's goals for the PLA, experts say.

"The operational and technological background of the next Chinese defence minister is especially pertinent given that the PLA aims to become a world-class military by 2049," said James Char, a security scholar at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

In 2016, Li was named deputy commander of the PLA's then-new Strategic Support Force - an elite body tasked with accelerating the development of China's space and cyber warfare capabilities.

He was then appointed head of the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), China's governing defence body, headed by President Xi Jinping.

RUSSIAN PURCHASES

As director, he was named in sanctions imposed by the U.S. State Department in September, 2018 over the purchase of 10 Su-35 combat aircraft in 2017 and equipment related to the S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia's main arms exporter, Rosoboronexport.

Some security scholars note the sanctions - while not a deal-breaker for future meetings - add a potential complication, and could provide China's military leadership with leverage.

When asked last week about Li's impending rise, Pentagon spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Marty Meiners said that the U.S. military could not comment on media reports about China's leadership changes, but that they had been clear in wanting to maintain communications with the PLA.

"Open lines of communication can help us manage risk, avoid miscalculation, and responsibly manage competition," Meiners said.

Oriana Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, said China was likely to use the dynamic for diplomatic gain - either by presenting the sanctions as immaterial if they are overlooked, or by suggesting it's Washington, not Beijing, that doesn't want to engage.

"Engagement has always been a priority for the U.S., and China sees it as a concession," Mastro said.

Li's term at the Central Military Commission has highlighted his ties to Xi, who has strengthened his grip across the military.

Some scholars believe Li has close ties to Zhang Youxia, a close military ally of Xi, whom Li replaced as head of the department.

Zhang was promoted to first vice-chairman of the CMC during the Communist Party's Congress in October, with Li following him onto the commission's governing seven-person group.

As defence minister, Li is also likely to be closely involved with military relations in Asia, attending events such as meetings of Asian defence leaders and the informal Shangri-La Dialogue on security in Singapore.

"I think he has been elevated to this position because he's delivered for Xi Jinping in key areas of modernisation," said Singapore-based security analyst Alexander Neill, an adjunct fellow with Hawaii's Pacific Forum think-tank.

"This is someone who will have to hold their own in front of an international audience."

Reporting By Greg Torode; additional reporting by Phil Stewart, Idrees Ali and Michael Martina in Washington. Editing by Gerry Doyle

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Greg Torode

18. The changing face of Chinese governance

Excerpts:

While COVID-19 policy is only one area of public policy, it is a critical illustration of the nature of China’s governance. And it offers hints as to how Xi runs China.

Since his assumption of power, Xi has had a profound impact on the institutions of Chinese governance. The biggest change was to remove the critical safety valve for attribution of political responsibility — to throw out the idea of collective decision making. In the post-Mao era, all decisions were linked to a committee. Documents issued by groups outranked those issued by individual figures of authority, including the paramount leader.

Under Xi’s new rules, one person carries responsibility for every policy decision. Xi has put himself at the head of many of the groups issuing China’s most important decisions. This certainly means that more power and responsibility are in his hands. But it’s less clear whether he knows, or how effectively he is now advised, what to do with that power.

Xi is practically limited in what he can do. It is very hard to have direct influence over the direction of one of the world’s most complex organisations. Tracking his policies from start to finish suggests that Xi has his subordinates regularly nudge the rudder, while he now and again comes in for grand swings of the wheel.

The changing face of Chinese governance | East Asia Forum

eastasiaforum.org · by Ryan Manuel · March 14, 2023

Author: Ryan Manuel, Bilby

Chinese President Xi Jinping had only just launched his third term in power when questions about his leadership began to circulate at home and abroad. China’s complete turnaround on its zero-COVID policy was so rapid and extraordinary that it caught almost everyone by surprise.

But China’s course correction was signalled well before policy shifted in December 2022. In February 2022 responsibility for controlling COVID-19 was devolved to local governments, which made China’s shift from ‘dynamic clearing’ or zero-COVID possible. Before the 20th Party Congress, the Yangtze River Delta was slated as the centrepiece of China’s COVID-19 recovery. After the Party Congress, local governments began to loosen restrictions a week before official central word. But the national scale of the reversal was more surprising than the implication that some areas could follow different policies.

Following the zero-COVID turnaround, there was central silence until February, when Xi’s role was portrayed as visionary and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) united behind the new policy direction. That was more than three months after the decisions were taken, and they were then announced by the health authorities rather than by Xi himself.

A similar transfer of political credit had earlier trapped China into its COVID-19 problem. Xi did not take over COVID-19 policy until August 2020, when he was confident enough to declare that China had dealt with the pandemic. He then took all credit for the success of the national lockdown. China’s response to COVID-19, Xi claimed, ‘show[ed] the superiority of the Chinese system’.

While COVID-19 policy is only one area of public policy, it is a critical illustration of the nature of China’s governance. And it offers hints as to how Xi runs China.

Since his assumption of power, Xi has had a profound impact on the institutions of Chinese governance. The biggest change was to remove the critical safety valve for attribution of political responsibility — to throw out the idea of collective decision making. In the post-Mao era, all decisions were linked to a committee. Documents issued by groups outranked those issued by individual figures of authority, including the paramount leader.

Under Xi’s new rules, one person carries responsibility for every policy decision. Xi has put himself at the head of many of the groups issuing China’s most important decisions. This certainly means that more power and responsibility are in his hands. But it’s less clear whether he knows, or how effectively he is now advised, what to do with that power.

Xi is practically limited in what he can do. It is very hard to have direct influence over the direction of one of the world’s most complex organisations. Tracking his policies from start to finish suggests that Xi has his subordinates regularly nudge the rudder, while he now and again comes in for grand swings of the wheel.

The practical challenges of control are redoubled by the lack of a masterplan. There is no Xi doctrine. Xi is a true believer in the CCP’s role as the only political machine suitable for running the nation. His contribution to the theoretical canon could be pithily summarised as ‘follow the Party’. It is far less clear what Party matters people are to follow. We see an inconsistent set of policy stances expressed through Xi’s speeches that range from stridently anti-Western diatribes to strategies that warmly welcome Western enterprise.

Judging from his speeches, Xi believes that policy missteps and public backlashes are the result of poor implementation of central directives and that a stronger, more disciplined and centrally controlled Communist Party can deliver better governance. He sees this as the way, for example, to help build modern finance and tech sectors that can make China strong. The battle is how to achieve technocratic excellence while still having constant reporting upwards and centralised political direction from the Party.

This system manifests itself in regular swings back and forth. The COVID-19 policy shift was not the first abrupt turnaround under Xi’s leadership. There was a disastrous stock market intervention in 2015, from which Xi was rescued by the technocrats. Then there was cancellation of the Ant IPO in 2019 and the sudden so-called ‘big tech crackdown’ on online education that created uncertainties in business.

Xi sent signals on governance during his first two terms in office that create a range of mixed incentives that will now guide Chinese governance over the next five years.

Instead of a government pushing an agenda that is developed through multiple inputs and broad buy-in, there is a much higher risk of decisions being pushed upwards until there is a sudden policy lurch that everyone is stuck enforcing.

This is magnified by the lack of a discernible framework and a lack of incentives to deliver technocratic policy successes. In personnel matters, Xi has not rewarded those who have delivered his reforms, as seen in the demotion of former vice premier Hu Chunhua. Now, general executors with experience in regional government rather than policy specialists dominate China’s peak leadership bodies.

In business matters, the relationship between the CCP and China’s giant tech firms remains uncertain. While there have been cases of strict regulation involving the destruction of market capitalisation, these firms are essential to Xi and the operation of Chinese policy. Without their distribution channels, reach and large financial contributions, Xi’s signature poverty alleviation program would not have been effective. It has not gone unnoticed that Xi lists solving extreme poverty as his greatest achievement and yet has marginalised both the individual (Hu Chunhua) and private sector actors (tech giants) who executed it.

These tensions, and Xi’s constant leaning on Party bodies rather than ministries to get things done, point to greater divergence between China and the West — if not the entire international community.

How the rest of the world views China and how China relates to the international community is now dominated by strong international pushback against the CCP. The West sees the political control of the CCP as inconsistent with a market-based economy and an open society. But the entrenchment of the market economy is deep and China’s leadership remains resolutely pro-market — capital market reforms during Xi’s second term were dramatic and wide-ranging. The resolution of this tension will be essential for stabilising China’s place in the international community.

Xi’s policy statements since the beginning of his third term remain mixed. One focus has been on security and localising Chinese research and development. At the same time, there is a push to access overseas markets and talent, and to attract and utilise foreign investment. Moreover, China’s self-proclaimed new growth engines — advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence and big data and a green economy led by electric vehicles and renewable energy — require deep international engagement.

The question now is what the terms of that engagement might be and what influence it might have on the future of China’s governance.

Ryan Manuel is Founder and Managing Director of Bilby, a company which uses artificial intelligence and big data to predict Chinese policy developments.

eastasiaforum.org · by Ryan Manuel · March 14, 2023

19. What is it and why does AUKUS matter?

Excerpts:

This is the second reason why AUKUS matters strategically. In a context in which advanced technology will matter increasingly more to maintain a military edge, only trusted partners will be able to achieve the most from defence collaborations. In AUKUS’s case, renewed conversations about cooperation between Australia and France, and among Japan and AUKUS partners, indicate that AUKUS is not an exclusive club, but one with a membership defined by high standards of innovation and information security.

This does not mean that AUKUS will not face challenges along the way. Implementing the agreement will put national industrial capacity under pressure. Recent comments from senior American officials suggest that building the initial boats in the US would be problematic. On the other hand, until the propulsion system is chosen, the design and building of the boats remain an open question. When considered against the impact of technology on future changes in systems and sensors, the division of labour is likely to remain a major changing variable.

What is certain is that one year on AUKUS has started to chart a clear path as to what it is, and why it matters. AUUS is set on a path about a maritime informed worldview in which accelerating advanced technology cooperation might very well make the difference in how strategic advantages can be secured, and maritime stability can be maintained.

What is it and why does AUKUS matter?

cosmosmagazine.com · by Cosmos · March 12, 2023

By Professor Alessio Patalano

Professor of War and Strategy in East Asia

Kings College, London

Since its announcement AUKUS has divided opinions. Critics of the agreement linking the UK and the US to Australia’s ambition to acquire nuclear-powered submarines have portrayed it as an alliance that could destabilise regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. The proliferation of nuclear powered submarines invites arms racing – the argument goes – and leaves the door open to the eventual additional step of arming future Australian boats with nuclear weapons.

Professor Alessio Patalano

Are the critics right in their concerns about AUKUS? This question can be answered only by understanding what AUKUS is, and what it is not, and why this agreement matters beyond its immediate technical provisions.

AUKUS is not a security alliance. It holds no provision to suggest such a notion, nor any of the steps undertaken so far are aimed at making it an alliance. AUKUS is a technology accelerator agreement for the purpose of national defence, no more, no less. It is designed to allow the three countries to work closely together to translate the promise of today’s maturing technologies such as quantum and artificial intelligence into tomorrow’s military edge.

Last year the three governments clarified that the implementation of AUKUS would be overseen by separate senior officials and joint steering group meetings to define the different lines of efforts. These areas would be developed through seventeen technical working groups. Nine of them focus on the submarine programme, whilst eight related to advance capabilities.

This is not an alliance building policy process, though the nature of the technologies in questions demands a commitment to sharing sensitive information.

Get an update of science stories delivered straight to your inbox.

This clarification leads to a second observation. AUKUS is not about achieving stability through a form of deterrence delivered by nuclear-armed submarines. In fact, the opposite is true. The themes in the working groups on advanced capabilities suggest that the main aim is to elevate the intelligence and deterrent value of conventional capabilities. In this regard, one of the most striking assumptions about AUKUS is the belief in technology as the key to unlock the full potential of conventional undersea capabilities through enhanced early warning and, if needed, unmatched targeting precision.

AUKUS reveals how leaders in the three capitals view the maritime domain as a central pillar to the stability of the Indo-Pacific, and the wider international order. This is why understanding what AUKUS is matters strategically. It matters because it sheds light on a worldview in which the sea is vital to international affairs and, as a consequence, technology that allows to better operate in, and from, this domain has critical value.

AUKUS’s worldview is one that stems from the recognition that the maritime foundations of international order stand vulnerable to state coercion. Safe and secure shipping lanes and intact underwater sea cables are the engine fuelling economic prosperity and political stability. This is true in the Indo-Pacific, as elsewhere. The recent experiences of the Russian blockade of the Black Sea and of China’s military manoeuvres across the Strait of Taiwan are a reminder of the risks of disruption to global prosperity at the hand of states willing to exploit the maritime order to exert political pressure.

Also in Cosmos: How are our universities preparing for AUKUS?

AUKUS is, therefore, a down payment to prevent one of the most critical components of the international order from being further destabilised. AUKUS is a statement about why such a specific technology agreement has wider strategic relevance. It does not destabilise regional security because no other piece in the regional architecture is designed to ensure that the sea remains open to business and unchallenged by revisionist states.

Yet, like any investment in future capabilities – the first submarines are planned to be delivered by 2040 – AUKUS is likely to change over time. The sensitive nature of the advanced capabilities explored in the collaboration, from submarines to hypersonic missiles, will invite greater proximity and strategic convergence among the partners. The recent news that Australians submariners will train on British boats implies the understanding of such a demand, and the willingness to pursue it.

The new Royal Navy submarine HMS Astute emerges from its berth after being launched by Camilla, Duchess of Cornwall at the BAES shipyard on June 8, 2007 in Barrow-in-Furness, United Kingdom. Credit: Christopher Furlong / Staff / Getty Images

This is the second reason why AUKUS matters strategically. In a context in which advanced technology will matter increasingly more to maintain a military edge, only trusted partners will be able to achieve the most from defence collaborations. In AUKUS’s case, renewed conversations about cooperation between Australia and France, and among Japan and AUKUS partners, indicate that AUKUS is not an exclusive club, but one with a membership defined by high standards of innovation and information security.

This does not mean that AUKUS will not face challenges along the way. Implementing the agreement will put national industrial capacity under pressure. Recent comments from senior American officials suggest that building the initial boats in the US would be problematic. On the other hand, until the propulsion system is chosen, the design and building of the boats remain an open question. When considered against the impact of technology on future changes in systems and sensors, the division of labour is likely to remain a major changing variable.

What is certain is that one year on AUKUS has started to chart a clear path as to what it is, and why it matters. AUUS is set on a path about a maritime informed worldview in which accelerating advanced technology cooperation might very well make the difference in how strategic advantages can be secured, and maritime stability can be maintained.

Prof. Patalano specialises in maritime strategy and doctrine, Japanese military history and strategy, East Asian Security, and Italian defence policy. In Japan, Prof. Patalano has been a visiting professor at Aoyama Gakuin University and at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), both in Tokyo, and currently is Adjunct Fellow at the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University Japan and Visiting Professor at the Japan Maritime Command and Staff College (JMCSC). At Kings College, Prof. Patalano is the Director of the Asian Security and Warfare Research Group the leading UK forum for research and education on East Asia and the King’s Japan Programme. Prof. Patalano is also a senior fellow with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and at Policy Exchange, he leading think tanks on defence and security matters in the UK.

Originally published by Cosmos as What is it, and why does AUKUS matter?

cosmosmagazine.com · by Cosmos · March 12, 2023

20. China flexes muscles in Latin America in latest security challenge to US

China flexes muscles in Latin America in latest security challenge to US

foxnews.com · by Caitlin McFall | Fox News

Video

Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg calls for US to decouple from China as tensions persist

Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg says China is an adversary, not a competitor amid growing concerns over rising threats on 'Your World.'

Over the past two decades, China has ramped up its economic ties with nations across Latin America, but it is China's rising influence in the region that has Washington increasingly concerned.

The growing threat China poses to the U.S. has moved ever forward in the American conscious as defense officials and lawmakers continue to monitor emerging trends from Beijing’s burgeoning relationships worldwide.

China’s quiet expansion in the southern hemisphere has increasingly caught the attention of U.S. defense officials and lawmakers, including Florida Republican Rep. María Elvira Salazar, who last month drew attention to growing security threats emerging from Latin America.

Chinese President Xi Jinping waves during a visit to a housing development in Caracas, Venezuela 2014. The Chinese president has visited Latin America more times over the past decade than former Presidents Obama, Trump and current President Biden combined. (REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins)

CHINA HOLDS ‘MILITARY ADVANTAGE’ OVER US AS WASHINGTON PREPARES FOR CONFLICT OVER TAIWAN: RETIRED GENERAL

In a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, Salazar told lawmakers that Argentina, along with nations like Venezuela and Bolivia, were allowing China to gain a military foothold in Latin America.

"[Chinese President] Xi Jinping has been to Latin America more times than President Obama, Trump and Biden combined in the last 10 years," Salazar told lawmakers. "The Chinese are not here for trade. They're here for war."

The Florida congresswoman pointed to China’s sales of military equipment and arms to the region over the last decade and claimed that Argentina is now considering opening a Chinese fighter jet factory.

Argentina’s Ambassador to the U.S. Jorge Arguello rejected Salazar’s claims earlier this month as false and called them "absurd."

However, Salazar also drew attention to a Deep Space Station the size of "400 football fields" in the middle of Argentina’s Patagonia desert as another chief security concern.

The installations of a Chinese space station are seen in Las Lajas, Argentina, Jan. 22, 2019. (REUTERS/Agustin Marcarian)

"I am sure the Chinese are very interested in studying the stars and every constellation. But the problem is that Argentina has no idea what's going on there because the Chinese don't let them in," she said before questioning whether this program has anything to do with the recent Chinese "balloon" activity over the U.S.

The ambassador scoffed at Salazar’s concerns regarding the space station, saying he has personally visited it and claimed it was akin to another agreement Argentina has with the European Space Agency.

However, one expert on Latin America told Fox News Digital that the U.S. has serious concerns when it comes to this space station.

PUTIN CONGRATULATES CHINA'S XI ON THIRD TERM, PRAISES 'STRATEGIC COOPERATION'

"We have no clue what takes place there and neither do the Argentinians. We believe that [China’s] using that as a mechanism to monitor our space activity and otherwise be a collector of intelligence," Juan Cruz, former National Security Council senior director for Western Hemisphere affairs said.

Beijing’s involvement in Latin America stretches far beyond its military interests there.

China will provide Venezuela with a $4 billion credit line under an agreement signed on Monday, with the money to be repaid by oil shipments from OPEC member Venezuela. The deal was inked during a 24-hour visit to Venezuela by Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, who is on a tour of Latin America. (REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins)

China has a "physical presence" in 25 out of 31 Latin American countries and nearly 30% of its global lending goes to Latin America, according to Salazar’s office.

Trade between China and Latin America also grew 26-fold from 2000-2020 – an increase from $12 billion to $315 billion according to the World Economic Forum.

This growth is only expected to keep rising, reaching more than $700 billion a year by 2035.

While the U.S. remains Latin America’s largest trading partner, China is quickly rising to overtake Washington in nearly every field in the region, including in trade, security, tech, and diplomatic relations – a feat it is carrying out largely through soft power.

"We woke up one day and the Chinese were in our neighborhood," Cruz said. "That displacement takes place not just in business and government [and] diplomatic influence but in terms of technology and what they’re doing around the world with a lot more relevance to U.S. interests."

Cruz explained that the U.S. has a "crisis oriented" view when it comes to Latin American foreign policy, which generally means Washington pays attention to regions after they are already in trouble or causing an issue for the U.S.

"Chinese investment and Chinese involvement is the opposite," he said. "They’re investing, and they’re having a role where no one’s looking."

China first started investing in small local projects throughout Latin America in the late 90s. By the early 2000s with the start of the war on terrorism, China ramped up its investments in places like the Caribbean where former colonial powers were no longer expending as many of their resources.

Cuba's President Raul Castro, right, stands next to Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, in Santiago de Cuba July 23, 2014. Xi ended an eight-day trip through Latin America on Wednesday with a visit to eastern Cuba, where both the island's independence struggle against Spain and Fidel Castro's revolution began. (REUTERS/Liu Bin/Pool )

CANADA’S TRUDEAU OPENS INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA ELECTION MEDDLING

Cruz explained that this left a "vacuum" that China stepped in and filled, solidifying itself as a top international player in Latin America.

"That’s how quickly they got into the game and bought their influence," he said. "They come in with these little projects or insignificant things that you or I diminish the importance of, yet they’re thinking of this in a totally different way."

American businesses have largely left Latin America for a variety of reasons relating to corruption, legal parameters and other foreign financial incentives.

However, under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese companies have not only not been deterred by the same hurdles, but they have chosen to invest in projects that do not show obvious or even immediate gains.

"No one makes money off a public utility – that’s why they’re selling them. But the Chinese are buying," Cruz detailed. "And what’s that get them? It gets noticed. It gets influence."

However, investing in public infrastructure and technology development not only buys China favor in the region, it opens them up to a certain amount of control.

"The Chinese are brilliant," Cruz said. "They buy agreements that don’t make money, but it gets…influence that you can’t tabulate."

U.S. and international defense officials have long warned of the intelligence that China could be collecting through its Huawei infrastructure and the threat this poses to international security.

However, Cruz pointed to another advantage that China gains in acquiring public utility services like water, electric and internet facilities – bargaining chips.

Demonstrators holds flags of China and Taiwan during Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's stop-over after her visit to Latin America January 2017. (REUTERS/Stephen Lam)

"Do you want another country operating and controlling that kind of infrastructure in your country?" Cruz questioned. "If they wanted they could place a tool in their software that controls your electricity remotely.

"It makes these countries more beholden to the Chinese," he explained.

CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

The influence China appears to be buying in Latin America has security officials concerned by the number of fronts Beijing is inserting itself into, including the acquisition of natural resources, 5G development, space security and major geopolitical hot topics like the security of Taiwan.

"The Chinese playbook is not just one. They have tool after tool after tool that they’re employing," Cruz said, explaining that it is becoming near impossible to counter China in every sector they are involved in.

"They’ve opened 10 fronts against us. Do we fight on all 10 fronts?" he continued. "Can it be done? I don't know."

Caitlin McFall is a Reporter at Fox News Digital covering Politics, U.S. and World news.

foxnews.com · by Caitlin McFall | Fox News

21. 'Evil empire,' 40 years later

'Evil empire,' 40 years later

The Korea Times · March 14, 2023

By Donald Kirk

The U.S. and the Soviet Union were still waging the Cold War, immersed in concerns about arms control and nuclear proliferation, when President Ronald Reagan, on March 8, 1983, warned against "the aggressive impulses of an evil empire" in "the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil." Forty years later, those words ring truer than ever.

The "evil empire" of the Soviet Union had broken up by the end of 1991 with the fall of Communist rule over the lands that Josef Stalin had seized from the devastation of World War II. In the relief of the post-Soviet, post-communist days, the prospects for democracy in Russia and the former Soviet "satellites" appeared quite bright.

The Soviet Union may no longer exist, but Russia's President Vladimir Putin, in his long-running invasion of Ukraine, has visions of reviving Moscow's role in Europe and elsewhere. From Russia's former eastern European satellites to North Korea, he yearns to recover what he sees as the days of Russian grandeur going back not merely to the era of communist rule but to the glory of the ancient Tsars.

Nor are Putin's fantasies of the renaissance of Russian power in Eastern Europe the only reminder of the existence of an "evil empire" confronting NATO and the Americans.

We have Dwight Eisenhower to thank for introducing another phrase, "the domino theory," into the dialogue on China's intentions. President Eisenhower came up with that one in 1954, a month before the French surrendered to the Vietnamese communists under General Vo Nguyen Giap at Dien Bien Phu. "You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one," he predicted, "and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly."

History rarely works out exactly as predicted. It has long been fashionable to mock the "domino theory," which held that the nations of Southeast Asia would fall like a row of dominoes if the former French colonies of Indochina, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos fell to communism.

In China after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the outlook for Chinese relations with America brightened after years of hostility including the full-scale war between American and Chinese forces in Korea from 1950 to 1953. I remember during China's Great Cultural Revolution a Chinese diplomat screamed at me when I asked him about protests on the streets in Hong Kong, then a British colony.

Relations improved markedly after President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited China in February 1972, meeting both Mao and Zhou Enlai. President Jimmy Carter in December 1978 normalized diplomatic relations with Beijing. More than a decade later, in June 1989, Deng Xiaoping cracked down ruthlessly on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square but ruled as an economic pragmatist, encouraging capitalism under communist rule.

However, how much has really changed? Going on 30 years after the British ceded Hong Kong to China in 1997, the Chinese under President Xi Jinping, the strongest Chinese leader since Mao, snuffed out protests demanding the right for the former crown colony to make its own laws and elect its own leaders.

If the nations of Southeast Asia are not falling exactly like a row of dominoes, one could draw an analogy to a chess match in which China is making the shrewdest moves. China may not have steamrollered over the rest of the region as feared but has zeroed in on finely chosen targets. The Chinese, backing North Korea as fiercely as ever, threaten Taiwan with increasing ferocity, have fortified bases in the South China Sea, all of which they officially claim, and extend their reach across South Asia and the Middle East to Africa.

As for the former Soviet colossus that Reagan, from a text written by his speech writer, Anthony Dolan, called "the evil empire," that image still works. For posterity the "evil empire" label ranks as vividly as Reagan's immortal plea four years later, "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall," imploring Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, to destroy the barrier that had divided Berlin between east and west since 1962.

Current events bear out those phrases for which both Reagan and Eisenhower are remembered. Tensions, if anything, are potentially worse today than they were during the era of the Cold War. Russian and Chinese troops may face one another across the Amur River, but their leaders know that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Historically often at odds along their 1,000-mile Asian border, Russia and China are united in their zeal to push the boundaries of power against the U.S. and its allies.

The "evil empire" of old Soviet rule is morphing into a new Sino-Russian empire as each of these huge countries pursues expansionist aims across land and sea borders thousands of miles apart. Forty years after Reagan inveighed against Moscow's "evil empire," everything old is new again.

Donald Kirk (www.donaldkirk.com) writes from Washington as well as Seoul.

The Korea Times · March 14, 2023

22. Arm Ukraine or Prepare for China? Wrong Question.

Excerpts:

In munitions, the need is greatest. For example, Ukraine expends about 7,700 artillery shells on an average day. The U.S. Army plans to eventually increase its orders to 90,000 shells per month, that is, supplying about 12 days of Ukraine-level fighting per month. No one knows how long a potential war with China would last, but wars involving industrialized great powers can be long, grinding affairs. Although howitzer shells and some types of rockets would be of little utility in a Pacific war, facilities and workers to produce significantly greater supplies of explosives, propellants, rocket motors, and rocket bodies would be valuable.

The Ukraine aid skeptics are correct to note that time is of the essence. China’s unprecedented peacetime naval expansion is a harbinger of a much bleaker future for Asia, and the United States’ allies and partners in the region, such as Taiwan, need to arm themselves accordingly. Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered his military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, so the U.S. buildup needs to be ready before then. The longer Washington waits to rebuild, the more likely it will create a situation similar to 1941, when the Japanese military leadership knew it had a short window of time to attack an unprepared United States before the U.S. buildup put Japan’s goals out of reach. Without the capacity to wage war, deterrence to prevent it will fail. Surely it is better to have the factories and workforce to build up stockpiles and raise production in an emergency than to manage a stagnant or declining supply of missiles.

During World War II, building new factories and getting them to full efficiency took several years. U.S. forces should not have to wait even longer for production of today’s much more complicated weapons to be ramped up. From the anti-ship missiles that will be essential in any East Asian conflict to the man-portable launchers and artillery munitions being used in great numbers in Ukraine, the United States and its allies need more of everything to prepare for—and thereby, one hopes, prevent—the worst. By helping the Ukrainians help themselves, Washington can get a running start in solving the problem.

Arm Ukraine or Prepare for China? Wrong Question.

No matter the goal, Washington needs to quickly fill gaps in defense production.

By Peter Rough, the director of the Hudson Institute’s Center on Europe and Eurasia, and Mike Watson, the associate director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for the Future of Liberal Society.

Foreign Policy · by Peter Rough, Mike Watson · March 13, 2023

Now that the war in Ukraine has entered its second year, the United States needs to address a supply problem that is growing more acute as the war goes on: The United States’ own military does not have enough missiles, rockets, and artillery munitions for modern warfare. As Joint Chiefs Chairman U.S. Army Gen. Mark Milley said recently : “One of the lessons of this war is the very high consumption rates of conventional munitions, and we are reexamining our own stockages and our own plans to make sure that we got it right.” The consequences are potentially alarming: When the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently conducted war games simulating a war over Taiwan, they revealed that the U.S. military would run out of missiles in less than one week.

Washington is searching for an answer. For some, the logical conclusion is to dramatically cut back munitions deliveries and other military aid for Ukraine, starting yesterday. As they see it, China—not Russia—is the United States’ main adversary and biggest threat. Washington should therefore prioritize scarce resources for the Indo-Pacific theater, especially as China’s rapid military buildup increasingly endangers Taiwan. Others counter that Russia is China’s junior partner, and weakening Moscow will make Beijing less willing to tangle with Washington. A Russia diminished and made less threatening by Ukraine will also allow for an even more decisive U.S. pivot to Asia later. Military aid to Ukraine should therefore be prioritized, even at the risk of diminished readiness elsewhere for now.

Whether to direct supplies to Ukraine or the Pacific, however, is the wrong question to ask, because what the United States military can currently field will not secure the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. The intense use of munitions in the war in Ukraine, the sobering result of the Taiwan war game, and the simple fact that U.S. production of munitions and other equipment is inadequate for much beyond the quick, surgical strikes preferred by military planners all point to one conclusion: The U.S. defense industrial base must be strengthened if these shortfalls are to be met. This will be necessary whether or not any additional U.S. arms go to Ukraine. In fact, arming Ukraine does not need to slow down the response to China. Instead, it can give the United States a running start on revitalizing its defense manufacturing, if the right conclusions about the need to raise defense industrial capacity are drawn now.

The U.S. Defense Department is starting to reach this conclusion. It is ramping up procurement of artillery shells, Javelin and Stinger man-portable missiles, and other surface-to-surface missiles to replace the munitions that have gone to Ukraine, and Lockheed Martin is doubling its Javelin production in response. How much does the aid for Ukraine weaken our deterrence in the Indo-Pacific? Not as much as the Ukraine-versus-Taiwan debate suggests. For the most part, Americans are sending to Ukraine armored vehicles, howitzer shells, and artillery rockets that can only hit stationary targets. These will not be used in the Pacific Ocean. Taiwan has yet to receive the Javelins and Stingers it ordered in 2015, but this is due to a manufacturing backlog that existed long before the war began. Ukraine’s Javelins and Stingers reduce America’s reserve supply, not Taiwan’s orders.

The munitions shortage problem has two distinct, yet interrelated, components. The first is the size of the stockpile. As the war in Ukraine shows, modern militaries expend tremendous amounts of missiles and shells. Consider just one example: The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that by April 2022, the United States had already sent 7,000 Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, roughly one-third of the total U.S. inventory at the time. In December, Raytheon chief executive Greg Hayes noted that “we’ve essentially used up … five years’ worth of Javelin production.” The United States therefore needs to maintain a larger stockpile of munitions for its own defense, as do many of its allies.

The other part of the puzzle is the rate of production. The U.S. defense industrial base is simply not ready to sustain a long-term war effort. In December, Lockheed Martin chief executive James Taiclet said that “the U.S. defense industrial base is scoped for maximum efficiency at peacetime production rates.” The resulting lack of surge capacity in case of war is a profound vulnerability, and unless it is addressed, it will exist whether the war in Ukraine ends tomorrow or in a decade. Simply put, if a war breaks out, the military will have to make do with its existing peacetime stockpile and little ability to replenish its stores.

Washington confronted similar problems in the 1930s. As the situation in Europe and Asia darkened, the United States was only slowly modernizing its military. But when Britain and France ramped up their arms purchases from the United States in 1938, it helped kickstart a revitalization of the U.S. defense industry and even lured new companies into the sector. The Grumman F4F Wildcat, a carrier-based fighter aircraft that was the U.S. Navy’s mainstay during the battles of Midway and Guadalcanal, first entered mass production because of French and British orders. The U.S. Air Force gained air superiority over Western Europe with the aid of the P-51 Mustang fighter, whose manufacturer, North American Aviation, first designed and built that plane for the British. London’s purchases of old U.S. artillery and small arms paid for investments in new artillery production. The mass-produced Liberty ship, a cargo and fuel carrier, was the workhorse that enabled the U.S. military to operate across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and it was first ordered by Britain before the United States entered the war. As they armed America’s friends, U.S. manufacturers built the factories their own country would need when it entered the war.

This solution could work again today. Of course, the U.S. military in the 2020s is much stronger than it was in the 1930s, but the defense industrial base is not in great shape. At the end of the Cold War, there were 51 prime defense contractors. Five of them remain today, and most have only survived by focusing on the big-ticket, prestige projects favored by Pentagon planners, and otherwise avoiding risks. As a result, the military only has a single supplier for several key rocket and missile components. One industrial accident could therefore shut down an entire procurement program. For defense manufacturers, building new production lines and factories for ammunition is a major long-term investment, which they will be reluctant to make without evidence that it will pay off. The larger the orders they receive now, the better that investment decision will look.

In munitions, the need is greatest. For example, Ukraine expends about 7,700 artillery shells on an average day. The U.S. Army plans to eventually increase its orders to 90,000 shells per month, that is, supplying about 12 days of Ukraine-level fighting per month. No one knows how long a potential war with China would last, but wars involving industrialized great powers can be long, grinding affairs. Although howitzer shells and some types of rockets would be of little utility in a Pacific war, facilities and workers to produce significantly greater supplies of explosives, propellants, rocket motors, and rocket bodies would be valuable.

The Ukraine aid skeptics are correct to note that time is of the essence. China’s unprecedented peacetime naval expansion is a harbinger of a much bleaker future for Asia, and the United States’ allies and partners in the region, such as Taiwan, need to arm themselves accordingly. Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered his military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, so the U.S. buildup needs to be ready before then. The longer Washington waits to rebuild, the more likely it will create a situation similar to 1941, when the Japanese military leadership knew it had a short window of time to attack an unprepared United States before the U.S. buildup put Japan’s goals out of reach. Without the capacity to wage war, deterrence to prevent it will fail. Surely it is better to have the factories and workforce to build up stockpiles and raise production in an emergency than to manage a stagnant or declining supply of missiles.

During World War II, building new factories and getting them to full efficiency took several years. U.S. forces should not have to wait even longer for production of today’s much more complicated weapons to be ramped up. From the anti-ship missiles that will be essential in any East Asian conflict to the man-portable launchers and artillery munitions being used in great numbers in Ukraine, the United States and its allies need more of everything to prepare for—and thereby, one hopes, prevent—the worst. By helping the Ukrainians help themselves, Washington can get a running start in solving the problem.

Foreign Policy · by Peter Rough, Mike Watson · March 13, 2023

23. A Full Spectrum of Conflict Design: How Doctrine Should Embrace Irregular Warfare

Graphics are at the link: https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/a-full-spectrum-of-conflict-design-how-doctrine-should-embrace-irregular-warfare/

Excerpts:

The Way Ahead

Today, both the State Department and the Department of Defense often identify belligerent aggression that does not fit neatly along a linear conflict continuum, resulting in a bewildered and delayed response. Hybrid warfare and gray zone aggression will likely continue to be the foremost methods for employing ways and means in twenty-first-century conflict. As such, a full spectrum of conflict design framework better allows for collaboration within the US government in matters of national security. As Philip Kapusta argued in 2015, understanding the gray zone can “enable early application of U.S. instruments of power . . . by shaping the arc of change closer to its origins.” Utilizing the full spectrum of conflict design better identifies origins in the gray zone.

Employing means in multiple ways creates the advantages of hybrid warfare and gray zone competition, but current joint doctrine and its linear approach to conflict limits the US military’s ability to detect or employ these methodologies. Joint doctrine can broaden conflict analysis by adopting a framework that integrates the distinct ways of (a) traditional warfare, (b) deterrence, (c) irregular warfare, and (d) competition. The full spectrum of conflict design allows for increased understanding of the linkages and relationships between direct and indirect means across the continuum of peace and war. This framework provides a fuller picture of multiple efforts oriented toward the same desired outcome. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a prime example of how the use of the full spectrum of conflict design can be applied to better illustrate and articulate aspects of conflict in one graph.

Military planners can adopt the full spectrum of conflict design to synchronize activities throughout engagement and contingency plans, as well as major operations and campaigns. This simple framework allows practitioners to analyze and integrate multiple ways and means into one planning frame, as well as to synchronize resources and actions to achieve strategic ends. Finally, the full spectrum of conflict design can help scholars, planners, and theorists graphically appreciate, and potentially anticipate, the strategies of opponents.

A Full Spectrum of Conflict Design: How Doctrine Should Embrace Irregular Warfare - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Robert S. Burrell · March 14, 2023

China’s gray zone conflict. Russian hybrid warfare. These terms have emerged to describe belligerent activities that standard US military operations struggle to address. Although these adversarial approaches remain central to today’s security environment, they are absent from the current joint doctrinal framework. Even the new joint doctrine note on strategic competition (JDN 1-22) fails to address hybrid warfare at all and there is only one mention of the gray zone. In fact, these two methods of conflict should remain front and center. Since the inception of joint doctrine, the United States has generally envisioned conflict in a linear fashion where peace and full-scale war occupy opposite sides of a continuum, with varying degrees of each in between. Doctrine’s evolution has made little change in this concept of a conflict continuum over time.

The 2022 US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy made progress in detailing a more comprehensive approach to conflict. But much more can be done to incorporate both deterrence and competition, as well as irregular warfare, into operational design. As Eric Robinson detailed in an Irregular Warfare Initiative essay in 2020, there are four foundational ways of responding to belligerents: traditional warfare, deterrence, irregular warfare, and competition. If planners adopted this framework, they would have a full spectrum of conflict design that would help them to integrate ends, ways, and means into a coherent campaign plan. And they would also be better able to understand the activities of the United States’ most important competitors.

Understanding Conflict—From One Dimension to Two

The US joint force has attempted to define different forms of conflict for decades, but it has failed to move beyond a linear understanding. A competition continuum was introduced in a 2019 joint doctrine note, with cooperation on one end, adversarial competition below armed conflict in the middle, and war on the other end. This one-dimensional concept has been adopted by other doctrinal publications, such as Joint Publication 1 (the joint force’s capstone doctrine) and Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations. While this is the most recent conceptualization, for the past two decades doctrine has only slightly redefined categories between war and peace through minor revisions to descriptions and these changes have added little significance.

Connecting ways and means to strategic ends remains the essential task of strategy. Thus, adding a second means-based dimension to the existing continuum creates a full spectrum of conflict design, which dramatically improves our understanding. This second dimension—which serves as the y-axis in Figure 1—is similar to Herman Kahn’s work on escalation. While escalation of means varies with circumstances, means can generally be employed directly (and overtly), indirectly (including covertly and clandestinely), or somewhere in between. The full spectrum of conflict design creates a holistic framework that clarifies the relationship between means (the resources used in conflict) and ways (how those means are employed). Figure 1 illustrates the two-dimensional framework where the x-axis delineates the continuum between war and peace while the y-axis delineates the military means utilized. Together, these axes produce four ways: (a) traditional warfare, (b) deterrence, (c) irregular warfare, and (d) competition.

Figure 1: Full Spectrum of Conflict Design

Traditional warfare. This quadrant is characterized by the authorized use of conventional military force to defeat an adversary’s army. Traditional warfare also includes the implementation of a diplomatic treaty for the purposes of combined warfare. Conventional forces primarily dominate in this quadrant.

Deterrence. In this quadrant, a government prevents adversaries’ aggressive actions by threatening the use of traditional means. In addition, a peacetime coalition of treaty allies or the buildup of weapons of mass destruction can also deter aggression. The deterrence quadrant is characterized by nonviolent and low-intensity conflict between competitors—reinforced and backstopped by hard power.

Irregular Warfare. This quadrant identifies violent activities waged against an opponent through nontraditional and indirect methods, such as foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare (either conducted to support resilience and resistance). Special operations typically dominate in irregular warfare, and the means utilized are typically more population-centric tools than those utilized in the direct approach.

Competition. This quadrant is characterized by rivalry between nation-states or nonstate actors where the means utilized fall short of violence. This includes nonproliferation activities to deny competitors arms or equipment and sanctions imposed on persons, groups, and nations. It also includes persistent engagement by special operations forces to prepare an environment for violent irregular warfare if required. Finally, humanitarian assistance and stability activities occur in this space as they alleviate human security demands in unstable regions where rivals operate (like al-Qaeda and ISIS).

The Relationship Among Quadrants

These four ways directly relate to one another; they are not independent, and a nation can employ all of them simultaneously. For instance, deterrence fundamentally connects to traditional warfare because they both use the same means, from nuclear arsenals to aircraft carriers. In other words, weapons of mass destruction or conventional arms can be used for war or deterrence equally. One could also use traditional warfare and deterrence simultaneously, such as employing military forces while threatening the use of a nuclear response.

Likewise, competition and irregular warfare are directly related. Each can take deliberate actions in opposition to a state (or nonstate) competitor with indirect application of military means. The main distinction between the two is that irregular warfare simply uses more violence than competition. For instance, foreign internal defense might assist a partner force to ensure fair elections in a fragile state. This nonviolent activity occurs in the space of competition. However, that same military force can be used in a different way—to counter irregular threats with violence.

The five recognized components of irregular warfare (foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, stabilization activities, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency) actually span the breadth of both competition and irregular warfare—a subject I published on in 2021. In fact, activities like stabilization primarily exist in nonviolent competition in most situations, rather than irregular warfare. The full spectrum of conflict design better allows the visualization of indirect use of military means in both competition and irregular warfare. Indirect uses of military power include (a) support to another regime’s resilience to protect its society from threats like subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, and (b) supporting indigenous resistance against an adversary’s governance to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow the regime. Neither of these two methods (support to resilience or resistance) are constrained to violent means and concurrently exist in both the irregular warfare and competition quadrants. It is precisely for this reason that Joint Special Operations University has transitioned to the terms “support to resilience” and “support to resistance” as opposed to “irregular warfare.” These terms acknowledge the interdisciplinary nature of conflict in these quadrants, which serves to offer more comprehensive solutions that include diplomatic, informational, military, and economic aspects.

Military planners can more holistically address irregular threats by including both competition and irregular warfare as separate but related ways of dealing with violent and nonviolent threats. With this framework planners and operators will be prepared for nonviolent activities to evolve into irregular warfare, or for violent activities to revert to competition. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia is a good example of military force initially utilized for peaceful humanitarian assistance quickly evolving to employ violent means to establish rule of law. My 2021 article further illustrates such shifts.

In short, the full spectrum of conflict design framework should not be used to compartmentalize any nation’s activities into a single quadrant or type of military means as conflict rarely relies exclusively on one type of means. Figure 1 uses dotted lines to indicate that conflict might (and likely will) include activities in more than one space. As further explained below, activities that span multiple ways result in hybrid warfare or gray zone competition.

Clarifying Gray Zone and Hybrid Warfare

By employing multiple means illustrated in the full spectrum of conflict design framework, nations may specifically operate near the axes where activities are blurred to intentionally complicate an adversary’s response. Fortunately, the framework allows scholars and practitioners to visually identify gray zone conflict and hybrid warfare as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Identifying Gray Zone and Hybrid Warfare

In the figure, gray zone conflict occurs along the y-axis, because the gray zone blurs the line between war and peace. For example, the Chinese Communist Party tends to operate aggressively in the gray zone, as this gives it freedom of action without consequences. In the South China Sea, it often employs a maritime militia, instead of its navy, to enforce recognition of its territorial claims to disguise its intentions where actions are not clearly identified as warlike or peaceful.

Hybrid warfare occurs along the x-axis by purposefully implementing both direct and indirect means. In 2014, Russia invaded Crimea by sponsoring proxies and inserting Russian operatives without uniforms. At the same time Russia used its air force and navy to enforce air and maritime exclusion zones. Further, Russia used economic pressure and nuclear threats to ensure noninterference from NATO. Russia also established and maintained its narrative through propaganda with domestic and international audiences to justify its aggression.

Applying the Full Spectrum of Conflict Framework

One application for the full spectrum of conflict design is to map out major events in a struggle, to better appreciate the ways and means utilized and to identify the inherent nature of the conflict or the strategies of the participants. Applied to Ukraine, as an example, the product is a graph illustrating major Russian actions taken against Ukraine from 2003 through 2022.

Figure 3: Full Spectrum of Conflict Design, Russian Aggression, 2004-2022

In general, the graph demonstrates that Russian aggression has been escalatory in terms of military means over time. Russia began its campaign with influence, cyber, and economic coercion (2003–2013), subsequently transitioned to irregular warfare supported by traditional warfare (2013–2021), and finally transitioned to traditional warfare (2022) while simultaneously making threats of a nuclear response for the purposes of deterrence (2022). Russia’s activities occupy all four quadrants, generally employing a hybrid warfare approach (particularly in 2014) and leveraging multiple ways and means in achieving national objectives.

The Way Ahead

Today, both the State Department and the Department of Defense often identify belligerent aggression that does not fit neatly along a linear conflict continuum, resulting in a bewildered and delayed response. Hybrid warfare and gray zone aggression will likely continue to be the foremost methods for employing ways and means in twenty-first-century conflict. As such, a full spectrum of conflict design framework better allows for collaboration within the US government in matters of national security. As Philip Kapusta argued in 2015, understanding the gray zone can “enable early application of U.S. instruments of power . . . by shaping the arc of change closer to its origins.” Utilizing the full spectrum of conflict design better identifies origins in the gray zone.

Employing means in multiple ways creates the advantages of hybrid warfare and gray zone competition, but current joint doctrine and its linear approach to conflict limits the US military’s ability to detect or employ these methodologies. Joint doctrine can broaden conflict analysis by adopting a framework that integrates the distinct ways of (a) traditional warfare, (b) deterrence, (c) irregular warfare, and (d) competition. The full spectrum of conflict design allows for increased understanding of the linkages and relationships between direct and indirect means across the continuum of peace and war. This framework provides a fuller picture of multiple efforts oriented toward the same desired outcome. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a prime example of how the use of the full spectrum of conflict design can be applied to better illustrate and articulate aspects of conflict in one graph.

Military planners can adopt the full spectrum of conflict design to synchronize activities throughout engagement and contingency plans, as well as major operations and campaigns. This simple framework allows practitioners to analyze and integrate multiple ways and means into one planning frame, as well as to synchronize resources and actions to achieve strategic ends. Finally, the full spectrum of conflict design can help scholars, planners, and theorists graphically appreciate, and potentially anticipate, the strategies of opponents.

Dr. Robert S. Burrell is an award-winning military historian and teaches interdisciplinary studies at Joint Special Operations University.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the author is affiliated with, including Joint Special Operations University and US Special Operations Command.

Image credit: AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda

24. China has three roads to Taiwan: The US must block them all

Very succinct and good analysis here. Political Warfare and the use of military force.

Excerpts:

China is pursuing three roads to unification, not one. It seeks to persuade the Taiwanese people and the international community to accept unification peacefully. It seeks to coerce such acceptance through forceful means short of war. And it is preparing to compel unification through direct military action.

China wins — and Taiwan and the West lose — if Beijing arrives in Taipei by any one of these roads. The U.S. and its partners must block all three.

China has three roads to Taiwan: The US must block them all

BY DAN BLUMENTHAL AND FRED KAGAN, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 03/13/23 10:15 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3896916-china-has-three-roads-to-taiwan-the-us-must-block-them-all/

Washington has become preoccupied with the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the near future. American national security discussions focus ever more intently on the military requirements for deterring or defeating that invasion.

These discussions — and the action they will hopefully generate — are important because the threat of a Chinese invasion is real. Yet it is not the most likely course that China’s President Xi Jinping will pursue to gain control of Taiwan.

China is pursuing three roads to unification, not one. It seeks to persuade the Taiwanese people and the international community to accept unification peacefully. It seeks to coerce such acceptance through forceful means short of war. And it is preparing to compel unification through direct military action.

China wins — and Taiwan and the West lose — if Beijing arrives in Taipei by any one of these roads. The U.S. and its partners must block all three.

China has been advancing along all three roads for decades. It began a massive general military modernization program in the 1990s, spurred in large part by the fear that the astonishing American success in the first Iraq War generated in China’s military. That modernization campaign does not aim solely at building an invasion force; China wants generalized military capabilities in order to face down and, if necessary, defeat a U.S.-led military coalition in any conflict.

The Chinese military has nevertheless focused, naturally, on expanding its capabilities to invade Taiwan as part of that effort, and China’s military capabilities powerfully aid both the persuasion and the coercion campaigns that Beijing has simultaneously waged against Taipei.

The persuasion campaign targets both Taiwan and the U.S.-led coalition supporting Taiwan. Its main effort is to persuade Washington and other members and potential members of a defensive coalition that Taiwan is already part of China. Beijing also seeks to persuade the international community of two lies: that Washington’s unofficial support for Taiwan is provocative and that it violates supposed bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). One purpose of this persuasion campaign is to reduce or break the will of the U.S. and its partners and allies to defend Taiwan — in other words, why would Americans, Japanese or anyone else go to war to prevent China from establishing a reality we already agreed to?

The U.S. and its partners and allies have agreed to no such reality, however.

U.S. law, in the form of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and longstanding U.S. policy, commit America to insisting on the peaceful resolution of the conflict between Taiwan and China. A cornerstone of this policy is that the U.S. does not take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty. The U.S. has always insisted that Taipei and Beijing must work out political and legal differences peacefully, at the negotiating table. The TRA requires the U.S. to maintain robust security and economic ties with Taiwan and to resist Chinese coercion of the island.

During the process of normalizing diplomatic relations with China, the U.S. was clear that it would not allow Beijing to reunify Taiwan by force and that it would predicate its defense relationship with Taiwan on China’s military posture across the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. has every right, as part of its publicly stated policy commitment to ensuring peace across the Strait, to increase its security partnership with Taiwan in the face of China’s military threat to the island.

The U.S. made an enormous concession to the PRC by removing its recognition of the Republic of China (Taiwan’s official name) as an independent state. The PRC pocketed that concession without making concessions of its own and now is attempting to portray U.S. efforts to follow through on its longstanding public statements of policy and law as betrayals and provocations when they are nothing of the sort.

These Chinese efforts also are meant — by persuading the Taiwanese that the U.S. and its partners will abandon them — to weaken Taiwan’s resolve to resist reunification. Beijing’s persuasion campaign directly targets Taiwan by driving the narrative that the world has already agreed to China’s interpretation that Taiwan is part of China.

An associated strategic effort by Beijing is its Orwellian campaign to pressure countries to exclude Taiwan from international organizations, and then use such exclusion as “proof” that Taiwan is not a country. Moreover, it portrays Taiwanese who want to maintain Taiwan’s de facto independence (which is most of Taiwan’s citizens) as dangerous extremists, or “separatists” fueling tension and the risk of conflict. U.S. policy on diplomatic recognition of Taiwan did not negate Taiwan’s status as an independent country with rights to retain the recognition of other states, nor does it bar Taiwan from operating as a legitimate entity in the international system. The “extremists” are those in Beijing who insist that Taiwan’s leaders unilaterally give up doing so.

The Chinese coercion campaign reinforces this persuasion effort by creating an environment of constant fear in Taiwan. Chinese combat aircraft enter the Taiwanese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) constantly; Taiwan’s air force must scramble fighters and put air defenses on alert every time. Chinese commercial drones constantly buzz Taiwanese offshore islands; Chinese ships constantly menace Taiwanese waters. Taiwanese actions in response to these threats wear down the personnel and equipment of the Taiwanese military and create a climate of fear on the island.

Beijing accompanies these activities with a continuous information campaign telling the Taiwanese people that the U.S. is a greedy, unreliable partner that will not defend Taiwan in the end. The PRC is sending a message to the Taiwanese people that if only they had more pliant leaders, who accepted the “reality” that Taiwan is part of China, this fear and intimidation would stop. If, on the other hand, Taiwan’s leaders cross China’s ever-shifting redlines, China will increase the pain. The message is that China can become very violent indeed if the island’s leaders do not eventually come around to Beijing’s view.

The coercion campaign is, in turn, strengthened by China’s menacing preparations for a compellence campaign — direct use of force to compel Taiwan to surrender. That campaign could take the form of an invasion, to be sure, and the U.S. and its partners must be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat such a direct attack.

But Beijing could pursue another form of compellence — isolation. China could begin by blockading Taiwan, cutting it off by air, sea, and even in cyberspace by cutting the undersea cables through which Taiwan communicates with the world. Taiwan is, after all, an island; it is not and cannot be self-sufficient. If China can cut off lines of communication and interdict military and civilian supplies by air and sea, then Taiwan eventually would have to capitulate.

Such an isolation campaign may be more attractive to Chinese leaders than an invasion. It could begin, for one thing, with Chinese ships and aircraft deterring or blocking commercial air and sea traffic without shooting. Such a stratagem would put Taiwan and its supporters in the predicament of choosing to initiate actual exchanges of fire and appearing to be responsible for an escalation that China, in fact, initiated. It also would offer more promising off-ramps to Beijing if things appeared not to be going China’s way.

An invasion might seem more attractive to Xi, on the other hand, because it could appear to offer a faster, more certain resolution of the conflict. Yet the decision to launch an invasion immediately poses a critical geopolitical dilemma for Xi.

The militarily optimal approach would be to attack U.S. bases in Japan and the U.S. territory Guam right away — but doing so has a high likelihood of turning a campaign to reunify Taiwan into World War III. Thus, Xi would have to choose between two unpalatable options — escalate immediately to war with the U.S. and Japan, at least, or leave in place the forces the U.S. would use to impose potentially devastating losses on China’s invasion fleet. American strategists understandably preoccupied with the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the U.S. position in such a conflict often underestimate the unpleasantness of the choices Xi would have to make in launching an invasion.

Some U.S. analysts therefore propose means to counter an invasion that inadvertently undermine the strategy required to stop China from succeeding via persuasion, coercion or isolation. Understandable concern about China’s ability to sink U.S. ships and shoot down U.S. aircraft is driving a certain tendency toward a strategy that relies on long-range, far-over-the-horizon standoff systems to minimize the risk of U.S. losses. But a standoff strategy would make it easier for China to coerce and isolate Taiwan.

The U.S. must recognize the centrality of maintaining the Taiwanese people’s confidence that America and its partners will not abandon them. They must be sure not only that the U.S. will fight to defend them but also that it will prevent China from isolating them. Thus, an effective defense of Taiwan from coercion and isolation requires more forward basing, not less. It requires more U.S. presence on an around the island. It also requires much more concerted efforts to push back against the Chinese persuasion campaign by countering the false narratives about what the U.S. has agreed to, what formal American policy actually is, and what Taiwan’s own position under international law has been and remains. The U.S. must counter the expanding coercion campaign and lift the pall of fear Beijing is casting over Taiwan.

Washington must resist the tendency to focus narrowly on blocking Beijing’s potential invasion and develop a more comprehensive approach that blocks all three roads to Taipei.

Daniel Blumenthal is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, focusing on East Asian security issues and U.S.-China relations. He previously was senior director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the Defense Department and is the author of several books, including “The China Nightmare: The Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State” (2020).

Frederick W. Kagan is director of the Critical Threats Project and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington. He also advises the Russia team at the Institute for the Study of War.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN UPDATE, MARCH 13, 2023

Tags

After years of isolation, Xi’s China looks to dominate world stage

International Court to Open War Crimes Cases Against Russia, Officials Say

The State of the War

Want to beat China? Let in more Chinese!

Want To Beat China? Let in More Chinese!

More immigration from China would both hobble a geopolitical rival and make America richer and better.

Department of Defense Releases 2024 Military Intelligence Program Budget Request

Comptroller Michael J. McCord and Vice Adm. Sara A. Joyner Hold a Press Briefing on President Biden's Fiscal 2024 Defense Budget

March 13, 2023

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer Michael J. McCord; Vice Adm. Sara A. Joyner, director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, Joint Staff

Aukus, the Anglosphere and the return of great power rivalry

More modernisation investment for US MH-47G Chinooks - Airforce Technology

British procurement from the US Chinooks

Ukraine short of skilled troops and munitions as losses, pessimism grow

DoD keeps Ukraine aid out of its budget, punting to divided Congress

What's the role of the United Front Work Department?

ANALYSIS | China now seen as influencing politics more than ever, on a global scale | CBC News

How does China interfere in foreign politics?

What's the role of the United Front Work Department?

What are some recent examples of China's alleged election meddling on other countries?

'What did you know?' PM faces more questions about election interference

Why the US Navy wants to retire eight ships early

Two littoral combat ships

Three amphibious ships, again

Cruiser Vicksburg, also again

The Army keeps getting smaller

Here’s Everything We Know About the Pentagon’s 2024 Budget Proposal

The spending plan includes $315 billion to develop and buy new weapons.

Philippine-US annual military drills will be biggest ever - official

US-sanctioned general to become public face of China's growing military

RUSSIAN PURCHASES

The changing face of Chinese governance | East Asia Forum

What is it and why does AUKUS matter?

Also in Cosmos: How are our universities preparing for AUKUS?

China flexes muscles in Latin America in latest security challenge to US

'Evil empire,' 40 years later

Arm Ukraine or Prepare for China? Wrong Question.

No matter the goal, Washington needs to quickly fill gaps in defense production.

A Full Spectrum of Conflict Design: How Doctrine Should Embrace Irregular Warfare - Irregular Warfare Initiative

Related Posts

China has three roads to Taiwan: The US must block them all