Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Disobedience, in the eyes of any one who has read history, is man’s original virtue. It is through disobedience that progress has been made, through disobedience and through rebellion.”

– Oscar Wilde

"You educate a man; you educate a man. You educate a woman; you educate a generation."

– Brigham Young

"The snake that does not shed its skin perishes; likewise, people who do not change their thoughts, perish."

Freidrich Nietzsche

1. Secretary of Defense Directs Restructuring of the Office of Net Assessment to Align With Strategic Priorities

2. Hegseth 'disestablishing' Office of Net Assessment, Pentagon's strategic analysis specialists

3. Pete Hegseth to overhaul US military lawyers in effort to relax rules of war

4. Putin Rejects Immediate Cease-Fire in Ukraine

5. The Ukraine Minerals Deal Is Fair

6. Taiwan Cracks Down on Chinese ‘Gray Zone’ Espionage

7. Make the U.S. Civil Service Effective Again

8. Understanding the PRC Grand Strategy AI Model: China’s Strategic Vision Decoded

9. Canada Finds Solidarity at G-7 in Push Against Trump’s 51st State Idea

10. Trump’s Ukraine Peace Strategy Put to Test After Putin Balks at Cease-Fire

11. A New Hope for Europe’s Ailing Economies: the Military

12. Belgian Authorities Arrest Suspects in Huawei, European Parliament Corruption Probe

13. Census Operations

14. The New Paradigm: How AI is Shaping Narratives and Conversation

15. Thom Shanker: Ukraine War Has Proven Drones Are the Future of Warfare

16. Ukraine’s Hidden Front: The Strategic Impact of Resistance Operations (STRONGLY RECOMMEND LISTENING TO THIS PODCAST)

17. Musk visits National Security Agency after urging 'overhaul' of U.S. cyberespionage hub

18. Arlington Cemetery website drops links for Black, Hispanic, and women veterans

19. Peace or no peace, America can and should arm Ukraine

20. Ukraine Needs US Weapons But It Needs Intelligence More

21. ‘Peace Through Strength’ Starts with Rebuilding the US Air Force

22. Getting Out of Forever Wars

23. Autonomy Has Outpaced International Space Law

24. A Better Way to Defend America

25. Misunderstanding McKinley – Why the Gilded Age Tariff Model Won’t Work for Trump

26. Actions create consequences: equanimity under stress – A letter from a veteran

1. Secretary of Defense Directs Restructuring of the Office of Net Assessment to Align With Strategic Priorities

I think this headline might be misleading unless the definition of "restructuring" includes "completely dissolving."

Will there be a new improved ONA some day in the future? Perhaps the DOGE wiz kids will develop an algorithm that performs the functions of ONA. (note sarcasm).

If China is the priority then perhaps the SECDEF would like to know that ONA was identifying and addressing the threats from China long before the last two administrations. What other DOD organization could have produced this 565 page report. And this is just one small example.

CHINA: THE THREE WARFARES FOR ANDY MARSHALL DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NET ASSESSMENT OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. PREPARED BY: (b) (7)(C) MAY 2013

https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading Room/Litigation_Release/Litigation Release - China- The Three Warfares 201305.pdf

Secretary of Defense Directs Restructuring of the Office of Net Assessment to Align With Strategic Priorities

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4119924/secretary-of-defense-directs-restructuring-of-the-office-of-net-assessment-to-a/

March 13, 2025 |

Attributed to Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell:

As part of the Department's ongoing commitment to strengthening our national defense, the Secretary of Defense has directed the disestablishment of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) and the development of a plan to rebuild it in alignment with the Department's strategic priorities. This decision ensures that our resources are focused on the most pressing national security challenges while maintaining accountability and efficiency.

All ONA personnel will be reassigned to mission-critical roles within the Department, and statutory requirements will continue to be met without disruption. The Department remains committed to conducting rigorous, forward-looking strategic assessments that directly inform defense planning and decision-making.

We will provide further updates as we implement this transition.

2. Hegseth 'disestablishing' Office of Net Assessment, Pentagon's strategic analysis specialists

Which office will do the long term assessments if a new ONA is not created.

As Cohen and Gooch wrote, all military failures can be attributed to three things: the failure to learn, the failure to adapt, and the failure to anticipate.

Of course ONA was focused on anticipating what no one else could foresee. Who can or will do that?

Although not related to ONA directly, I remember that one of the ways the intelligence community evolved in the Post Cold War World and especially after 9-11 is that the priorities for current and future intelligence completely flipped. During the Cold War 75% of the intelligence effort was focused on future intelligence and threats while 25% of the intelligence effort was focused on current intelligence and threats. Especially after 9-11 75% of the effort shifted to current intelligence and 25% was focused on the future. I wonder what the percentages are currently.

It seems that we are seeing the cementing of an anti-intellectual philosophy in the Pentagon with a focus only on short term gratification.

But it also seems that Congress is questioning the value of ONA as well.

Excerpts:

“The Department remains committed to conducting rigorous, forward-looking strategic assessments that directly inform defense planning and decision-making,” the statement said.

Founded in 1973, the Office of Net Assessment is sometimes referred to as the Pentagon’s internal think tank due to its role providing classified, long-term strategic-level studies on threats, trends, risks and opportunities that could shape the geopolitical environment 20 to 30 years in the future.

Jim Baker, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel, took over ONA in 2015 following the retirement of Andrew Marshall, its founding director who was often referred to as the “Pentagon’s Yoda.” The Washington Post reported in 2015 that Baker’s appointment reflected then-Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s interest in receiving assessments related to near-term threats as well as the long-term studies the office was known for.

On Feb. 7, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley, (R-Iowa), sent a letter to Hegseth questioning whether the office was still necessary and asking for information related to ONA’s production net assessments since 2007 and the last decade of contracts.

“I remain concerned that ONA is not performing its mission for the taxpayer and has engaged in financial waste,” he wrote at the time.

Hegseth 'disestablishing' Office of Net Assessment, Pentagon's strategic analysis specialists - Breaking Defense

A March 13 memo from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, obtained by Breaking Defense, orders all employees of the Office of Net Assessment reassigned to different roles and cancels related contracts.

breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · March 13, 2025

Seal of the Pentagon on display at the Pentagon visitor center. (Photo by Trevor Raney

Digital Media Division)

WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is “disestablishing” the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, a key office responsible for high-level strategic analysis, according to a memo obtained by Breaking Defense.

The memo, dated today and signed by Hegseth, directs the Pentagon’s Performance Improvement Officer and Director of Administration and Management to reassign all civilian employees to other “mission critical positions” inside the department, while military personnel will return to their service to receive new billets.

Simultaneously, the Pentagon’s top acquisition official is directed to “ensure that the necessary steps are taken” by department contracting authorities to terminate “all ONA contracts awarded for ONA and ONA-related requirements.” A number of DC think tanks and research organizations will likely be impacted by these cancelled contracts.

However, it appears ONA will live on in some manner: The memo directs the deputy secretary of defense to provide a plan in 30 days to rebuild the office in a manner “consistent with [Hegseth’s] priorities.”

The Pentagon did not directly return a request for comment. At roughly the time this story was published, Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell sent out a brief public statement announcing the move, saying, “This decision ensures that our resources are focused on the most pressing national security challenges while maintaining accountability and efficiency.”

“The Department remains committed to conducting rigorous, forward-looking strategic assessments that directly inform defense planning and decision-making,” the statement said.

Founded in 1973, the Office of Net Assessment is sometimes referred to as the Pentagon’s internal think tank due to its role providing classified, long-term strategic-level studies on threats, trends, risks and opportunities that could shape the geopolitical environment 20 to 30 years in the future.

Jim Baker, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel, took over ONA in 2015 following the retirement of Andrew Marshall, its founding director who was often referred to as the “Pentagon’s Yoda.” The Washington Post reported in 2015 that Baker’s appointment reflected then-Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s interest in receiving assessments related to near-term threats as well as the long-term studies the office was known for.

On Feb. 7, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley, (R-Iowa), sent a letter to Hegseth questioning whether the office was still necessary and asking for information related to ONA’s production net assessments since 2007 and the last decade of contracts.

“I remain concerned that ONA is not performing its mission for the taxpayer and has engaged in financial waste,” he wrote at the time.

3. Pete Hegseth to overhaul US military lawyers in effort to relax rules of war

"Relax the rules of war?" How can they be "relaxed?"

How do you "remake" the JAG corps to "relax the rules of war?"

Will we see an exodus of the current military legal leadership?

I am sorry to say but these ideas could only be espoused by those who have no practical experience with professional military lawyers and their advice to military commanders during actual military operations.

And we as Americans need to think hard about these words: "take a more lenient approach in charging soldiers with battlefield crimes." A crime is a crime and must be dealt with in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (which by the way I believe is established by Congress and not the Pentagon). But do we want to take a "lenient" approach to war crimes? I also believe that every soldier who is charged with a crime is charged by a commander which is usually a court martial convening authority. And the only ones with court martial convening authority are commanders, not lawyers. The case is usually tried before a military judge (who is a lawyer) with a military panel (jury) made up of military members who are not lawyers to render a verdict. If we want to be more "lenient" than we already are then perhaps the focus should be on retraining military commanders to make them more "lenient." (note my snarky sarcasm).

Excerpts:

The overhaul of the Jag corps will be aimed at retraining military lawyers, the people said, so that they provide more expansive legal advice to commanders to pursue more aggressive tactics and take a more lenient approach in charging soldiers with battlefield crimes.

Part of that approach reflects Parlatore’s views on Jag officers, whom he has described to associates as effectively becoming involved in decision making and failing to exercise discretion when deciding what charges to include in military prosecutions.

One of the complaints has been that Jags have been too restrictive in interpreting rules of engagement and took the requirement that soldiers positively identify a target as an enemy combatant before opening fire to mean soldiers needed to identify the target having a weapon.

The Pentagon did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Pete Hegseth to overhaul US military lawyers in effort to relax rules of war

The defense secretary has empowered his lawyer Tim Parlatore to remake the judge advocate general’s corps

The Guardian · by Hugo Lowell · March 13, 2025

The US defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, is expected in the coming weeks to start a sweeping overhaul of the judge advocate general’s corps as part of an effort to make the US military less restricted by the laws of armed conflict, according to two people familiar with the matter.

The changes are poised to have implications across the military, as Hegseth’s office considers changes to the interpretation of the US rules of engagement on the battlefield to the way that charges are brought under the military justice system.

The defense department is currently in the process of nominating new judge advocate generals (Jags) for the army, navy and air force after Hegseth fired their predecessors in a late-night purge last month, and the overhaul is not expected to start until they are in place.

Education department slashed in half after Trump administration mass firings

But remaking the Jag corps is a priority for Hegseth, who on Friday commissioned his personal lawyer and former naval officer Tim Parlatore as a navy commander to oversee the effort carrying the weight and authority of the defense secretary’s office.

The commission is as a reservist in the Jag corps and he will continue to run his private practice outside his military obligations. Parlatore previously defended Donald Trump for mishandling classified documents and former Navy Seal Eddie Gallagher on war crimes charges.

The overhaul of the Jag corps will be aimed at retraining military lawyers, the people said, so that they provide more expansive legal advice to commanders to pursue more aggressive tactics and take a more lenient approach in charging soldiers with battlefield crimes.

Part of that approach reflects Parlatore’s views on Jag officers, whom he has described to associates as effectively becoming involved in decision making and failing to exercise discretion when deciding what charges to include in military prosecutions.

One of the complaints has been that Jags have been too restrictive in interpreting rules of engagement and took the requirement that soldiers positively identify a target as an enemy combatant before opening fire to mean soldiers needed to identify the target having a weapon.

The Pentagon did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The criticism of the Jag corps has come from both Hegseth and Parlatore, the people said. Hegseth has made reworking the rules of engagement a tenet of how he intends to lead the defense department and about the need to restore a “warrior ethos” to a US military leadership he sees as soft.

Some of those rules were a deliberate policy shift by the US military, after senior officers such as Gen David Petraeus came to believe that civilian deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan were turning the local population against US forces and drawing support to the enemy.

But in his book, The War on Warriors, Hegseth derisively referred to the lawyers as “jagoffs” and expressed frustration with the laws of armed conflict as being too restrictive for frontline soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, which allowed the enemy to score battlefield victories.

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And in Trump’s first term, Hegseth privately and publicly as a host on Fox and Friends appealed to Trump to pardon US soldiers accused of committing war crimes, including Gallagher, who was accused of murdering a captive Islamic State fighter in Mosul.

Hegseth’s views as expressed in his book are shared by Parlatore, who saw the Gallagher case as an example of overzealous prosecution and suggested he could reform the Jag corps because he had experience as both a former officer and defense lawyer.

Parlatore made clear to the defense secretary’s office that he was not pushing for the US to not abide by the Geneva conventions and the uniform code of military justice even if the US’s enemies ignored them. But he intends to change how they are interpreted, the people said.

The legal positions of Jags has often been fraught, including in the George W Bush administration after the September 11 terrorist attacks, when Jags resisted the administration’s view that Bush could lawfully direct the military to ignore the Geneva conventions when handling detainees.

The Bush administration claimed it was taking the justice department’s legal interpretations and moved to cut out military lawyers from deliberations, and then tried to subordinate them to politically appointed civilian general counsels for their branches.

In 2004, Congress passed laws that made it illegal for anyone at the Pentagon to interfere with the ability of Jags to “give independent legal advice” to secretaries and chiefs of staffs for their branches. But it did not constrain a reform of the Jag corps from within.

The Guardian · by Hugo Lowell · March 13, 2025

4. Putin Rejects Immediate Cease-Fire in Ukraine

Opening negotiating positions?

Excerpts:

Putin said any pause in fighting at this point would be in Ukraine’s interest because Russia is gaining on the battlefield, and a host of issues would need to be resolved before a cease-fire could be reached.

“The idea itself is good, and we of course support it, but there are questions we have to discuss,” Putin said, referring to a proposed 30-day cease-fire in the war, adding that Russia sought a lasting peace that would need to eliminate the “root causes” of the conflict.

The comments were the first official response from Moscow after Ukraine agreed this week to a U.S.-backed proposal for a pause in the war, now in its fourth year. Putin spoke as President Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, was due in Moscow to discuss the cease-fire proposal, according to two U.S. officials.

Putin Rejects Immediate Cease-Fire in Ukraine

Russian leader said battlefield conditions made such a pause good for Ukraine

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-kursk-witkoff-ukraine-b1349c4f?mod=world_lead_story

By Matthew Luxmoore

Follow and Natalie Andrews

Updated March 13, 2025 6:32 pm ET

The Ukraine Minerals Deal Is Fair

Washington’s effort to recoup some of the money it provided Kyiv is fiscally imperative—and doesn’t diminish Ukrainians’ heroic sacrifices.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-ukraine-minerals-proposal-is-a-fair-deal-u-s-war-peace-1392cde2?mod=latest_headlines

By Mark T. Kimmitt

March 13, 2025 5:05 pm ET

Representatives of the U.S. and Ukraine meet in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, March 11. Photo: Salah Malkawi/Getty Images

Secretary of State Marco Rubio went to Saudi Arabia this week to negotiate with President Volodymyr Zelensky on the future of the war in Ukraine. Negotiators likely discussed President Trump’s proposed deal for Ukrainian minerals in return for continued economic and military support. Seeking to recoup some of the funds provided to Ukraine is both reasonable and fiscally imperative.

Critics express distaste that America would force this on an ally in the middle of a war. They suggest the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties outlaws such a deal. They argue that it would violate the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which commits the U.S. and others to “refrain from economic coercion, designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.”

Throughout history, wars have been financed with borrowed money. In World War I, America lent the Allies $10 billion ($317 billion in 2024 dollars)—and the U.K. defaulted on most of that debt in 1934. After World War II, Washington helped Britain recover with a loan of $3.75 billion ($60.5 billion in 2024 dollars)—which wasn’t paid off until 2006. These figures don’t include the billions of dollars in private U.S. loans to finance Allied operations in both wars.

Washington is $37 trillion in debt, and the cost of servicing that debt exceeds the defense budget. Economic and military assistance isn’t free, even if it benefits American businesses. Taxpayers bear those staggering costs. The current federal debt held by the public translates to $233,000 per U.S. household; that same household paid $6,850 to fund the defense budget in 2024. This resonates with American citizens burdened by government obligations and personal debt. The growing debt imperils the defense budget and, by extension, American defense.

Critics argue that Ukraine needs its mineral wealth to rebuild after the war. But that is up to Mr. Zelensky to decide, when considering the postwar costs of prolonging the conflict.

Opponents of a minerals deal also argue that the war is simply using American funds already obligated to deter a war in Europe—and is a relatively cheap operation considering it comes at no cost in U.S. lives. Washington hasn’t always been asked to repay money provided by allies, they claim, citing the 1991 Gulf War precedent. The U.S. persuaded Middle East allies Germany, Japan, and Korea to contribute more than $50 billion in cash and in-kind support for the Gulf War—and none of them demanded repayment. Opponents warn that forcing the minerals bargain would diminish trust in America.

The minerals deal reflects Mr. Trump’s transactional approach to international relations. To him, our allies have been at best parsimonious, and at worst free riders with collective defense expenditures and modernization. While foreign countries maintain cradle-to-grave welfare systems, the U.S. bears by far the heaviest defense burden. Even with a 30% increase between 2021 and 2024, European Union members spent only $326 billion for defense (1.9% of gross domestic product) while the U.S. spent nearly $1 trillion (3.4% of GDP). By contrast with American debt, France’s $4 trillion government debt works out to just $133,000 per household, with a defense-budget share of $1,700 per household in 2024. Through this lens, the burden-sharing looks lopsided.

Any expectation that U.S. taxpayers—or for that matter any Western taxpayers—should fully fund Ukraine’s war is unreasonable. That might have made sense after World War II when Europe, enjoying an economically pyrrhic victory against Germany, didn’t have the means to defend against an even more dangerous Soviet Union. A generous Marshall Plan to promote a European postwar economic recovery today isn’t necessary or financially practical.

The minerals deal wouldn’t diminish the bravery of the Ukrainian people or the gratitude the world owes them for their fight against Vladimir Putin’s illegal invasion. The hundreds of thousands of deaths and the destruction of much of the country’s infrastructure bear witness to Ukrainian patriotism.

But the U.S. has the heaviest government debt in the world and no longer has the luxury of offering a blank check to the Ukrainian war effort. Sharing the mineral wealth of Ukraine seems a fair deal to make.

Mr. Kimmitt, a retired U.S. Army brigadier general, served as assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, 2008-09.

6. Taiwan Cracks Down on Chinese ‘Gray Zone’ Espionage

Some good news perhaps. But it is more than just espionage. The PRC is conducting active subversion in Taiwan (and in countries around the world (certainly every One Belt and One Road country). What can we learn from Taiwan's experiences?

Looks like Taiwan is taking the four critical steps. First to recognize China's strategy. Second is to understand the strategy. Third is to EXPOSE the strategy to inoculate the citizens against PRC malign activities. The question is will the Taiwan government execute the fourth step- Attack the strategy with a superior political warfare strategy. Perhaps some advisors could assist the Taiwan leadership.

As an aside I wrote this in 2017 after I returned from an Asymmetric Warfare conference in Taiwan.

1. Problem. Taiwan faces two strategic threats from the PRC.

A. A PRC subversion campaign to undermine the ROC government and achieve unification through political means.

B. If subversion fails a PRC invasion to achieve unification by force.

C. PRC action since 1996 has minimized the visible military threat to the ROC and that has possibly made some ROC citizens complacent due large part to engagement among ROC and PRC citizens in both the ROC and PRC and the extensive employment of PRC “soft power” – economic and cultural.

2. Assumptions.

ROC and PRC are fighting an “invisible war.” Best to keep it that way.

It is better (feasible suitable, and acceptable) to manage the subversion campaign than suffer invasion.

Education of the people on the PRC subversion and invasion strategy will make them resilient and resistant to the subversion campaign. (Exposure of PRC strategy allows it to be attacked publicly)

Education can inoculate the population against PRC propaganda efforts – especially the most subtle methods.

If the people are well educated regarding the PRC strategies, they can enjoy and benefit from PRC soft power (economic and cultural ties) without allowing ROC society to be subverted. (Note: This is a potential theme to be exploited as part of information and influence activities).

ROC SOF does not need to be recreated in the US image. ROC Army and the larger military contain sufficient capabilities across a variety of organizations and the organization of these capabilities should be in accordance with ROC customs, traditions, and proven application.

PRC Sleeper agents (and 2+ million tourists per year) will support the communication part of the deterrence equation if they are shown the capabilities (and dilemmas and unsolvable problems) the ROC wants to transmit to PRC leadership.

3. Comparative Advantages.

The ability to exploit the ROC comparative advantages over PRC in order to create the credible perception that PRC actions will bring unacceptable cost to the PRC, thus deterring it from action, especially catastrophic action.

The ROC has a whole of society approach to defense from the Military –Army – T.O.s to county, local government officials, first responders, and volunteers.

Democracy

Freedom

College education – education level per capita

Economic development (relative)

Flesh out the above and develop others (thorough ROC introspection and analysis – these also become themes and messages for information and influence activities.)

4. Guiding Principles.

Deterrence rests on credibility, capability, and communication. Must have demonstrated will with visible consistent actions over time and remember actions speak louder than words.

Q: How can the PRC subversion campaign be made to fail? Alternatively, how can the PRC subversion campaign be managed and undermined but not necessarily defeated so the ROC people can be allowed to enjoy and benefit from PRC soft power without the ROC government and society being delegitimized and undermined?

Capitalize on the whole of government approach and the civil-military integration and collaboration that exists. The civil-military coordination mechanisms that exist and have been proven during HA/DR and training provide the foundation for furthering the capabilities and also will serve to “harden” society against PRC subversion and infiltration (and in the future sabotage) and thus provide the PRC with a dilemma that may be too difficult (or costly) to solve.

5. Recommendations for consideration.

A. Create the perception that if the PRC attempts to enter the ROC by force, its forces will be absorbed into the black hole of Taiwan. The combination of the terrain and a whole of society defense posture (that will attack PRC units from multiple directions) will absorb assaulting PRC forces because they will be unable to generate sufficient combat power to pacify the ROC population and capture ROC infrastructure intact.

B. Develop an overall strategy that focus not only creating and sustaining the capabilities necessary but publicizing them.

C. Develop a plan for regular scheduled civil defense exercises that focus on identifying PRC military infiltrators (via air, land, and sea). Rotate these exercises among all the T.O.’s on a sustained basis. Include local press coverage that focuses on highlighting the local forces, first responders, and volunteers.

D. Examine the concepts being developed by the Poles, Fins, Latvians, and Lithuanians for civil defense against Russia’s hybrid warfare and infiltration of “Little Green Men.” Some of these concepts may have value for use in civil-military defense operations against the PRC’s “Little Red Men.” See below for a few references.

Taiwan Cracks Down on Chinese ‘Gray Zone’ Espionage

President accused Beijing of exploiting Taiwan’s democracy to sow division, create unrest and destabilize the island

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/taiwan-cracks-down-on-chinese-gray-zone-espionage-3067426b?mod=world_lead_pos3

By Joyu Wang

Updated March 13, 2025 10:31 am ET

President Lai Ching-te accused Beijing of exploiting Taiwan’s democracy to sow division, unrest and destabilize the island. Photo: ritchie b tongo/Shutterstock

TAIPEI—Taiwan’s president signaled a widening divide with Beijing in remarks in which he said the island would step up efforts to combat Chinese espionage and influence, including by reinstating military courts to handle spy cases and scrutinizing the activities of Chinese citizens.

“China is a foreign adversary to Taiwan,” President Lai Ching-te said Thursday, using sharp wording that emphasized his effort to prevent China from taking control of the self-ruled island democracy, which Beijing claims as its own territory.

China’s near-daily military activities around Taiwan, backed by so-called “gray zone” efforts to convince Taiwanese people to accept Beijing’s rule, have turned the simmering dispute into a flashpoint that could draw in the U.S. and others if it were to erupt.

Lai accused Beijing of exploiting Taiwan’s democracy to sow division, create unrest and destabilize the island. Speaking to reporters after meeting with senior national security officials, he said he would strengthen measures to counter China’s efforts to undermine Taiwan.

Taiwan is prosecuting a sharply rising number of cases of alleged Chinese espionage. Active and retired Taiwanese military officers allegedly collaborated with Chinese intelligence, gathered sensitive information, plotted an armed network or pledged allegiance to the Chinese armed forces, among other charges.

Officials in Taiwan describe the cases as part of Beijing’s campaign to assimilate the island without force, alongside concerns that Taiwanese celebrities are being pressured by China to support unification on social media.

China’s Taiwan Affairs Office didn’t respond to requests for comment about Lai’s statements.

China’s military has staged exercises around the island in the past in response to the president’s comments, and could do so in response to Thursday’s statements, political analysts said.

“China will likely respond with a visual display of displeasure in the form of military drills or missile testing in the weeks to come,” said Wen-Ti Sung, a Taipei-based fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

Make the U.S. Civil Service Effective Again

State deregulatory reforms have enhanced agencies’ efficiency and flexibility. Congress should take note.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/make-the-u-s-civil-service-effective-again-efficiency-flexibility-states-b71fe701?mod=latest_headlines

By Judge Glock

March 13, 2025 3:59 pm ET

Photo: Getty Images

President Trump’s sweeping dismissals of federal employees have revived the debate around the American civil service. Many of Mr. Trump’s critics argue that extensively regulating the hiring and firing of the government’s civilian workforce is necessary to ensure the country doesn’t return to the bad old days of political patronage.

But several states have experience with deregulating the civil service, and the results have been overwhelmingly positive. In the past few decades states such as Georgia, Kansas and Arizona have moved most or almost all of their public employees to at-will employment and given individual agencies discretion to hire in the manner they think best. These reforms have been bipartisan and effective, and there’s little evidence they’ve led to political favoritism. It’s time for the federal government to learn from these successful state experiments.

In 1996 Georgia’s Democratic Gov. Zell Miller declared that the state’s civil-service system, which promised to hire and manage employees based on merit rather than political affiliation, instead “provides cover for bad workers.” A comprehensive state bill that year made all new public workers at-will employees. Other states, such as Florida, soon followed with reforms giving hiring authority to individual agency managers and loosening employee job protections. Another wave of at-will employment and decentralized hiring reforms began after a sweep of Republican victories in the 2010 state-level elections.

In at-will employment states, public employees can be dismissed for almost any reason other than political allegiance or unlawful discrimination. Many of these states have limited the ability of fired public employees to appeal to quasijudicial state boards, instead requiring them to defer to internal agency processes. Managers in civil-service-reform states can hire whom they want by the method they think best. This is the norm in private-sector employment outside union shops.

Although it’s difficult to measure the effectiveness of government workers, the results of such reform have been promising. A 2013 study surveying human-resource directors at state agencies in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Missouri and South Carolina found that directors “are more likely to register agreement with positive assessments of at-will employment than negative assessments.” A 2024 survey of human-resource professionals across state and local governments revealed that respondents ranked the effectiveness of at-will systems in recruitment, hiring, promotion and retention higher than that of traditional civil-service systems.

Changes to employee discipline can ensure more accountability for poor performance. When Utah’s legislative auditor general examined public employee dismissals in 2010, it found that an average 0.3% of career-service employees were dismissed for cause each year between fiscal 2007 and 2009. For non-career-service employees, who can be fired more easily, the rate was 1.9%.

In Texas, the authority to hire public employees lies with each agency rather than a centralized human-resources office. A 2006 survey found that more than 90% of Texas human-resource officials thought the decentralized system allowed them to create hiring policies tailored to their departments’ specific needs. More than 75% believed a central personnel office would make agencies less flexible and effective.

Reform states haven’t become cesspools of corruption and patronage. The lack of national or local coverage of negative effects of these changes is one indication of success. Others include a 2002 study from the IBM Endowment for the Business of Government, which examined Texas’, Georgia’s and Florida’s civil-service reforms and found “no convincing evidence presented of widespread, systemic abuse in any of the three states.” In 2012 Indiana’s state personnel director found that after the state passed deregulatory civil-service reforms in 2011, the number of formal complaints by employees decreased, and agency performance declined “in almost every category, including customer service and teamwork.”

Congress should learn from these states. The bipartisan Chance to Compete Act of 2024 gave managers at federal agencies more authority to evaluate potential hires on their technical expertise. But reforms can go much further. Like private-sector workers, federal employees shouldn’t be able to appeal dismissal decisions to an external, quasijudicial board, as they can under existing policy.

The Office of Personnel Management, which currently determines federal hiring practices, should instead assume an advisory role. Firing and hiring employees based solely on political allegiance should still be prohibited, but agency managers should have as much discretion as possible to govern their own departments.

States have performed their duty as laboratories of democracy when it comes to civil-service reforms. The federal government can learn from these states and make the civil-service system effective again.

Mr. Glock is director of research at the Manhattan Institute and author of “The Dead Pledge: The Origins of the Mortgage Market and Federal Bailouts, 1913-1939.”

Understanding the PRC Grand Strategy AI Model: China’s Strategic Vision Decoded

irregularwarfare.org · by Umar Ahmed Badami · March 13, 2025

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long concealed its strategic vision behind a great information wall. Western views of Chinese strategy often blend Sun Tzu’s antiquated platitudes with designs for revenge following the Century of Humiliation. Although these ideas are relevant to the philosophy informing the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), they are not sources of military doctrine. The paucity of accessible Chinese-origin doctrinal materials sustains far fewer Chinese experts today relative to the plethora of information available to Russia hands available during the Cold War.

Today’s China analysts must formulate their own frameworks of PRC grand strategy. These are largely based on research reports and policy positions promoting a looming “China threat” from the perspective of the Westphalian world order and Western conceptions of realpolitik. These frameworks may identify patterns across CCP-linked global events, but they cannot adequately explain the rationale behind those events as they lack a Chinese perspective.

Competing with China and countering misinformation are major policy goals in America’s national security strategy. Sun Tzu reminds us that knowing and understanding one’s adversaries is critical to effectively competing. In the absence of widespread China expertise, artificial intelligence provides an opportunity to better approach this problem.

The following analysis will examine how artificial intelligence and machine learning models can fill contextual and predictive capability gaps to better understand the PRC’s motivations, with particular emphasis on modeling irregular warfare strategy creation and implementation from a Chinese doctrinal perspective. We begin by discussing existing sources, along with their limitations, and then introduce a new AI model capable of understanding Chinese strategic thought. Next, we run the model on a case study involving a simulated country similar to the Solomon Islands in the 2019-2022 timeframe. Finally, we discuss the model’s nuances and consider its future applications for irregular warfare and strategic competition.

Modeling Chinese Sources

Literature on Chinese military doctrine drawing from PRC-origin sources is sparse, and roughly divided into insider perspectives and outsider perspectives. Insider perspectives are publications from authoritative sources within the CCP or affiliated think tanks and academic journals, while outsider perspectives are primarily Western syntheses of insider perspectives. Only relying on one category fails to fully address Chinese grand strategy in relevant ideological and historical contexts.

The “In Their Own Words” (ITOW) series is a key publicly-available source for the insider perspective. These works translate accessible PRC documents into English. ITOW includes strategic-level documents, such as Basic Issues of Xi Jinping Thought and Science of Military Strategy, which emphasize an integrated approach to securing China’s national priorities. ITOW also includes operational documents focused on military capabilities such as space and joint operations to achieve specific objectives. The latter sources focus primarily on military means and only operationalize a fraction of the whole-of-nation framework, and do not fully explain how CCP strategic-level concepts like striving for strategic advantage across all domains are translated into campaigns leveraging China’s instruments of national power.

In contrast, Western scholars from the outsider perspective, such as Rush Doshi and Taylor Fravel, seek to outline a complete framework for Chinese military strategy. Both Doshi’s The Long Game and Fravel’s Active Defense chart the evolution of the CCP’s approach to national security in response to internal leadership dynamics and external pressures. They analyze China’s strategic shifts from the perspective of CCP political doctrine and Chinese philosophical concepts such as shashoujian (the assassin’s mace). The authors deemphasize the impact of ancient Chinese tradition and history on modern CCP thought and actions, instead placing their arguments within the Chinese intellectual and military milieu that matured after the First National Congress of the CCP in 1921.

PLA colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui wrote the 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare, the only English-language source written by insiders that comprehensively addresses the PRC’s strategic framework in the context of Chinese tradition. Like Doshi and Fravel, Liang and Xiangsui examine strategy from the lenses of military modernization, evolving national priorities, and security challenges. However, they also regularly reference traditional Chinese principles of war and philosophy, particularly Sun Tzu, along with lessons from both recent and ancient Chinese histories. Unrestricted Warfare predates the 2008 financial crisis and Xi Jinping’s rise to power, leaving gaps in understanding the influence of traditional Chinese principles in the Party’s evolving priorities.

Thus, a significant gap remains in synthesizing PRC military doctrine, CCP thought, and traditional Chinese philosophy into a cohesive theory of modern CCP geostrategy. Artificial intelligence models may offer new ways to bridge this divide. Doing so may illuminate a more unified and dynamic understanding of Chinese grand strategic thought.

Introducing PRC-StrateGPT: A Model Chinese Strategist

PRC-StrateGPT is an artificial intelligence model built on OpenAI’s ChatGPT framework. This model is the first of its kind, built to think like a CCP strategist. PRC-StrateGPT is trained on English translations of Chinese-language doctrinal sources, including the products and authors mentioned above. The former provides PRC-StrateGPT with data to holistically understand the PRC’s strategic framework, while the latter contextualizes Chinese operations across the instruments of national power within that framework. PRC-StrateGPT’s training data also incorporates philosophy influencing CCP leadership, including the works of Meng Ki, Lao Tzu, and Kong Qiu, allowing the model to understand traditional Chinese thought.

PRC-StrateGPT is unique in its ability to focus on PRC strategy from a CCP-centric perspective. Outsider items like the US National Security Strategy are deliberately excluded from PRC-StrateGPT’s training dataset. These could influence the model to view China as a revisionist state with a destabilizing influence, something that is clear in Western policy documents but is nowhere in Chinese sources.

Model Attributes

PRC-StrateGPT’s ultimate goal is to shape any given geopolitical scenario to secure long-term PRC advantage. To accomplish this, PRC-StrateGPT has three primary sub-functions as a strategist:

Generate PRC strategic priorities based on a given geopolitical situation.
Conduct a context-and-consequences analysis of possible actions based on those priorities.
Generate a campaign plan using those parameters to achieve strategic objectives.

Initially, the model ingests a geopolitical situation the user provides. The situation can derive from an existing crisis, or the user can input fictionalized or anonymized prompts. In the case of real crises, PRC-StrateGPT adds additional context using information from the internet. The model provides detail commensurate to the level of background a user inputs. PRC-StrateGPT then creates short and long-term priorities based on the user’s scenario. These can span the spectrum of the instruments of national power depending on the scenario, but the priorities tend to amplify economic and diplomatic objectives over hard power options.

Figure 1. Example short- and long-term priorities. Source: PRC-StrateGPT.

The strategic objectives then process through a context-and-consequences framework. PRC-StrateGPT generates a strategic narrative that provides the greatest long-term benefit to the PRC. The framework shapes the consequences of various potential actions by analyzing likely reactions and responses from world powers while also considering regional histories.

Lastly, PRC-StrateGPT creates a campaign plan aligned with the chosen strategic objectives using all available means. Campaigns are generally multi-phased and simultaneously leverage different instruments of national power to achieve specific effects. Campaign plans are expressed as general PRC actions that are modifiable in response to iterative scenario inputs. Additionally, PRC-StrateGPT provides tactical and operational-level details if prompted, allowing for adaptive and flexible wargaming and response modeling. The model can reflexively justify proposed actions based on doctrine from its training sources.

Figure 2. An example of a high-level campaign plan. Source: PRC-StrateGPT.

The PRC and the Solomon Islands, 2019-2022: A Case Study

Strengths and weaknesses of a strategic explanatory framework can be identified by applying the framework to a real-world case. PRC-StrateGPT does not contain data on recent PRC activities in the Solomon Islands, making it a helpful opportunity to test the model against real-world outcomes in operationalizing Chinese grand strategy.

The Real-World Situation

During the Second World War, the people of the Solomon Islands distinguished themselves as staunch Western allies. They maintained close relations with Australia and the United States throughout the Cold War and recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country. However, in a dramatic shift in 2019, the Solomon Islands broke with longstanding diplomatic tradition, severing ties with Taiwan and officially recognizing the PRC. What led to this significant reversal in foreign policy?

Figure 3. Map of the Solomon Islands (Source: FreeWorldMaps).

The relatively isolated Solomon Islands rely heavily on foreign aid and security assistance from allies and partners, and the nation’s economy is disproportionately centered on resource extraction. The PRC signed a series of agreements with other Pacific Islands in 2017 and 2018 under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The PRC pledged infrastructure loans and commercial deals, but the incumbent government in the Solomons hesitated to engage. However, after presidential elections in April 2019, the new Sogavare government pivoted away from the West and toward China.

During this time, a leaked deal revealed that the Solomon’s Tulagi Province and a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) agreed to grant the SOE exclusive development rights for the entire province along with deepwater port access. The PRC and Tulagi signed the deal on September 22, 2019, just one day after the new Sogavare national government switched from recognizing Taiwan’s independence to recognizing the PRC instead. These changes marked the beginning of a multiyear campaign shifting the Solomon Islands away from the West and toward the PRC.

The Artificial Campaign: PRC-StrateGPT versus Real Events

PRC-StrateGPT ingested an anonymized version of the multidimensional campaign China waged against the Solomon Islands to construct a situational framework. This input represented relevant historical and geopolitical developments concerning the Solomon Islands up to the April 2019 elections. Minor details were altered in the model, substituting a simulated “Country X” in place of the Solomons. PRC-StrateGPT identified three primary short-term priorities driving CCP engagement with Country X:

Diplomatic recognition of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan.
Economic engagement, focusing on the mining sector.
Co-opting local elites.

These simulated priorities reflect the actual chain of events. The Sogavare government switched to recognizing the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan and a Chinese SOE brokered a province-level deal on infrastructure and mining rights, all in line with these priorities.

PRC-StrateGPT then received new information that the SOE deal was leaked. The Solomons’ attorney general subsequently quashed the deal. The model then generated a communications strategy countering anti-China messaging in the Solomons while creating a rebranded version of the deal. The model also suggested intensifying efforts to co-opt Country X’s politicians and business leaders to help protect future deals with the PRC. PRC-StrateGPT suggested that “China should gradually rebuild influence over the next 6-12 months before attempting any further major agreements.” The PRC appears to have taken similar steps in the real world. For example, the PRC agreed to fund the main stadium in the Solomon Islands for the 2023 Pacific Games. In another unprecedented move, politicians in the Solomons considered taking $100 billion in loans from the PRC.

Figure 4. The model’s recommended response to the leaked and canceled deal. Source: PRC-StrateGPT.

Not all outcomes matched reality, however. Unlike the path PRC-StrateGPT suggested, the PRC did not successfully take control of local narratives. Instead, some public mistrust of Chinese business interests in the Solomons remained, leading the province of Malaita to float an independence referendum in September 2020 in protest. PRC-StrateGPT received these developments and then suggested that the CCP quickly wrest control over local narratives in the Solomons using high-visibility aid projects while coopting provincial politicians. The model also sought to lay the groundwork for long-term resource development agreements and a youth influence campaign run through Confucius Institutes and scholarships.

In the real world, the PRC intensified political influence operations after the events in Malaita. Local pro-PRC factions in the Malaita government tabled a vote of no confidence against the provincial governor. The vote failed due to mass public protest. This public resistance was fed into PRC-StrateGPT. The model shifted efforts toward controlling the narrative via media manipulation despite previously avoiding this tactic when the situation was less dire for CCP interests. The model also began advocating for political and economic consequences against the resistant province. In line with PRC-StrateGPT’s predictions, the China-aligned Honiara government did threaten to suspend the Malaita government due to its anti-China pronouncements while also scrutinizing American development funding for the province.

Figure 5. PRC-StrateGPT’s assessment of protests in Malaita. Source: PRC-StrateGPT.

Protests erupted in the capital decrying the Sogavare government’s China ties a month later in November 2021. The protests turned violent and only subsided after Australia supported a multinational peacekeeping mission to the islands. The PRC’s narrative blamed the protests on opposition figures rather than public grievances, just as PRC-StrateGPT recommended. This narrative incentivized greater security cooperation between the PRC and the Solomons, formalized via treaty soon after. The model also recommended expanding business development, which the PRC began doing in 2022. The PRC also started direct investment in media and education in the Solomons to shore up future control over public narratives. Notably, PRC-StrateGPT predicted that the PRC would supply riot control equipment to Country X, something the PRC actually did at the end of 2021. Thus, despite lacking significant real-world context and not knowing that Country X was the Solomon Islands, PRC-StrateGPT’s outputs comported well with the PRC’s actual moves in the Solomon Islands between 2019 and 2022.

Figure 6. Security-focused elements of PRC-StrateGPT’s short-term strategy in the aftermath of violent protests in Country X. Source: PRC-StrateGPT.

Ways Ahead

PRC-StrateGPT effectively generated potential strategies and plans the PRC may contemplate to advance its interests. The model replicates a PRC strategist’s perspective to achieve PRC national security goals in a given geopolitical scenario, drawing from various PRC sources, academic treatises, and philosophical works to create an informed view of the CCP’s strategic outlook. The tool can examine scenarios in which PRC doctrine is operationalized in various contexts, including multi-domain operations and whole-of-government scenarios drawing upon China’s full range of instruments of national power. PRC-StrateGPT also demonstrates an inherent flexibility for irregular campaigns, as it adjusts its campaign plans depending on the strategic dynamics within a conflict or crisis environment. The tool is not a definitive predictor of PRC strategic moves—rather, its value lies in demonstrating the ways Chinese doctrine and ideologies translate into action, a process that is currently poorly understood in the West.

PRC-StrateGPT is in active development. The model requires user-provided context to make fictionalized and real scenarios more robust. Future iterations of PRC-StrateGPT will integrate news feeds, allowing decision adjustments in response to real-world developments. Additionally, a standardized plan format is in development to streamline analysis. PRC-StrateGPT is a helpful addition to any China analyst’s toolbox. Future refinements may even make it essential.

Access the PRC-StrateGPT tool here.

Access the full transcript of PRC-StrateGPT’s campaign simulation against Country X used in this article here.

Umar Ahmed Badami is Head of Wargaming at the Irregular Warfare Initiative and a Department of Defense contractor. He focuses on the impact of technologies on irregular warfare strategy and global cross-domain approaches to the competition continuum. Umar previously researched the effectiveness of unconventional maritime attacks in the Black Sea, gray zone conflict applications of transponder vulnerabilities, and historical comparisons of US and Chinese approaches to localized development in sub-Saharan Africa. Umar studies international security and physics at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is a commercial pilot, civilian flight instructor, and software engineer.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, Georgetown University, or the United States Government.

Image Credit: Shutterstock.com

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

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9. Canada Finds Solidarity at G-7 in Push Against Trump’s 51st State Idea

Someday I hope we can look back and laugh about these "proposals." We will say that it was all much ado about nothing (and I hope that time is sooner rather than later).

Canada Finds Solidarity at G-7 in Push Against Trump’s 51st State Idea

Trade and annexation threats loomed over meeting of foreign ministers

https://www.wsj.com/world/canada-finds-solidarity-at-g-7-in-push-against-trumps-51st-state-idea-e29a9932?mod=world_lead_pos1

By Vipal Monga

Follow and Michael R. Gordon

March 13, 2025 5:33 pm ET

Canadian Foreign Minister Melanie Joly and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Photo: saul loeb/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

LA MALBAIE, Canada—Top diplomats from the world’s industrial democracies gathered here with an extraordinary question looming: How to respond to President Trump’s threats to economically target, and potentially absorb, the meeting’s host, Canada.

The result was an unusual Group of Seven meeting of foreign ministers, with some of them lining up to show solidarity with Canada in its intensifying trade and border dispute with the organization’s most powerful member, the U.S. From the White House, Trump on Thursday stoked the anxiety, saying Canada would make a great 51st state and implying it would lose out on trade if it resisted.

“We don’t need anything they have,” Trump told reporters.

In response to Trump’s threats, Germany’s top diplomat, Annalena Baerbock, posed for a picture with the EU’s foreign-affairs chief, Kaja Kallas, that included a reassuring message on social media for Canada’s Foreign Minister Melanie Joly: “We’ve got your back Melanie Joly.” The two diplomats also coordinated their outfits, the German wearing white and Kallas in red, the colors of Canada’s flag, in a show of solidarity, Kallas told a CNN interviewer as other journalists hovered nearby.

Baerbock also told reporters that she had watched a patriotic Canadian television ad about what it means to be a Canadian. “As a German, as a European, we can learn a lot from this common spirit,” she said.

Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani dismissed Trump’s talk of making Canada an American state. “The answer is very clear. Canada will be Canada in the future,” he said.

As tensions rise with Washington, Canada is moving to strengthen its bonds with the European Union. Mark Carney, the incoming prime minister, is due to travel to Europe next week, after he is officially sworn in on Friday. A Canadian official said the trip was meant to signal to the U.S. that Canada isn’t isolated in its attempts to thwart Trump’s tariff agenda.

British Foreign Minister David Lammy, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, Canadian Foreign Minister Melanie Joly, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. Photo: Saul Loeb/Press Pool

The meeting was intended to show unity on important global matters, including countering Russian aggression, containing turmoil in the Middle East, contending with North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal and managing China’s growing economic and military might.

But the threats of annexation and new tariffs from the White House cast a shadow over a gathering designed to strengthen ties among top officials from Western democracies, including by arranging events that enable diplomats to interact in less formal settings.

A reception on Wednesday was held around an open fire where the ministers roasted marshmallows and made s’mores. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who had just flown in from Saudi Arabia, decided to get some rest instead.

On Thursday, the officials were scheduled to snowshoe around the hotel located on the banks of the St. Lawrence River, but that excursion was canceled and the ministers instead made maple syrup taffy on a balcony overlooking the river. Rubio skipped that event as well.

In another goodwill gesture, delegates received pens made of Canadian aluminum that Trump has recently tariffed.

Rubio had sought to defuse tensions before the summit over Trump’s goal to make Canada the 51st state and the growing tariff wars.

“We have a lot of other things we work on together,” said Rubio, referring to joint U.S. and Canadian military cooperation in defending North American airspace and their efforts to end the Ukraine war, among other issues.

“That’s what the meeting is about,” Rubio said on Wednesday. “It is not a meeting about how we’re going to take over Canada.”

“I mean, they’ve invited us to come,” Rubio continued. “The alternative is to not go. I think that would actually make things worse, not better.”

Rising global trade conflict dominated the gathering.

This week, Trump announced a 25% global duty on steel and aluminum imports that would hit both Canada and the EU. The EU reacted with retaliatory tariffs, including a 50% levy on American whiskey, which prompted Trump to say he would impose a 200% tariff on wine and other alcohol from the EU.

Rubio defended Trump’s tariff policies as he headed to Canada, saying they weren’t intended as unfriendly actions but were needed to rebuild U.S. industry and to safeguard national security.

“It’s not just against Canada, it’s not just against Mexico, it’s not just against G-7 countries,” Rubio said. “He’s imposed steel and aluminum tariffs now on virtually the entire world, and the reason why is not to punish those countries; it’s because he has outlined the need to develop a domestic capability.”

Kallas had her own warning about Trump’s trade policy. The only party that was benefiting from the flare-up of trade tensions between the U.S. and its Canadian and European allies, she said, was Beijing.

She said China was laughing while the U.S. and the EU traded salvos. “There are no winners in trade wars,” she said. “China is definitely benefiting from this.”

Write to Vipal Monga at vipal.monga@wsj.com and Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com

Appeared in the March 14, 2025, print edition as 'G-7 Backs Canada Against Trump’s 51st State Scheme'.

10.Trump’s Ukraine Peace Strategy Put to Test After Putin Balks at Cease-Fire

Perhaps POTUS gave Putin the carrots up front and since he did not bite now he will have to use the stick, starting with sanctions.

Trump’s Ukraine Peace Strategy Put to Test After Putin Balks at Cease-Fire

If Moscow walks away, U.S. leader will have to decide whether to impose new sanctions

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trumps-ukraine-peace-strategy-put-to-test-after-putin-balks-at-cease-fire-00c8460b?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Alexander Ward

Follow and Lindsay Wise

March 13, 2025 11:00 pm ET

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte and President Trump in the Oval Office on Thursday. Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

WASHINGTON—President Trump finds himself a “yes” away from brokering a cease-fire between Russia and Ukraine. But it is Russian President Vladimir Putin who has to say it, and he is leaning in the other direction.

That has put Trump, the self-professed master dealmaker, in a bind of his own making. After promising Putin wants peace and pressuring Kyiv to back the 30-day fighting pause, Trump will face a decision on imposing new sanctions on Moscow, as he had vowed to do if the Kremlin balked at the U.S.-brokered plan.

But punishing Moscow could add another roadblock on the already arduous path to a deal, one that would put at risk his larger goal of improving relations with Russia.

Asked Thursday about leverage he might have over Putin, Trump insisted at the White House, “I don’t want to talk about that.” But he said of the three-year-old war, “We have to get it over with fast.”

Whether Trump achieves the goal depends on how he and his advisers navigate talks with Moscow in the coming days. Instead of rejecting the cease-fire outright, Russian officials are signaling they may demand concessions before talks on ending the war ever begin, putting even more pressure on Trump.

The larger question is whether Putin is as committed to peace as Trump has insisted he is—or whether the concessions required to get him on board will cost Trump the support of Ukraine and European governments fearful that Russia will resume fighting without a strong deal.

Trump said Thursday that negotiators have already been discussing the outlines of an agreement, including territorial concessions that will be required and narrower issues, such as control of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant now in Russian hands.

National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes insists Trump “is focused on one objective: bringing this conflict to a peaceful resolution” by first getting Russia to agree to the 30-day cease-fire.

But many analysts remain skeptical that Putin will ultimately sign off on this or any other proposal. “There is no deal to be had with the Russians and they would reject any deal that the U.S. negotiates with Ukraine,” said Alina Polyakova, president and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington.

Trump said ending the war would be easy, claiming on the campaign trail that it would take him only 24 hours. After failing to meet that deadline once back in office, Trump has turned to wooing Russia and pressuring Ukraine to catalyze a deal.

The president has said Kyiv wouldn’t be offered NATO membership and has yet to endorse a European plan that calls for sending British and French troops to Ukraine as peacekeepers. Moscow opposes both ideas.

Ukrainian infantry soldiers training this month. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

After a disastrous White House meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Trump paused military and intelligence support to his forces until Kyiv backed the U.S. cease-fire plan this week.

That has left the war’s immediate future in Putin’s hands.

“Who will give orders to stop fighting? What is the price of those orders? Who will determine where and by whom they were violated?” the Russian president said Thursday, enumerating issues that he says need clarification before a cease-fire.

He might prefer to fill in the blanks during an expected future conversation with Trump.

Senate Republicans, including some of Trump’s staunchest allies, are calling on him to retaliate against Russia if Moscow walks away from the negotiations. “Putin deserves a lot more pressure than Ukraine does,” said Sen. Mike Rounds (R., S.D.), adding there would “absolutely” be congressional support for more large-scale sanctions on Moscow.

In a joint statement Thursday, Sen. Roger Wicker (R., Miss.) and Rep. Mike Rogers (R., Ala.), who each chair their respective chamber’s armed services committee, implored Trump to “make clear that the costs of continuing the bloodshed will far exceed anything Putin has experienced to date.”

Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.), arguably Trump’s closest Senate confidant, posted Wednesday to X: “I am extremely skeptical that Russia will accept the cease fire and I am very doubtful they want to end this war.” The lawmaker revealed he would introduce “bone-breaking sanctions and tariffs” on the Kremlin by the week’s end.

Trump has shown few signs that he feels constrained by skepticism of the Ukraine negotiations by allies, either in Congress or overseas. He is operating on his own instincts and for his own reasons, unconcerned about almost any views but his own, analysts said.

“The last threads of constraint on presidential power in foreign policy have snapped,” said Elizabeth Saunders, an international-relations professor at Columbia University.

How Republicans react to Trump’s handling of Putin in this precarious moment, especially if he balks at imposing sanctions on Moscow, could be the next big test of the actual foreign-policy constraints Trump faces.

“It would be a critical moment for Republican leadership in the Senate for them to demonstrate that when they say we should back Ukraine and we should achieve a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, that they mean it,” said Sen. Chris Coons (D., Del.).

Write to Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com and Lindsay Wise at lindsay.wise@wsj.com

11. A New Hope for Europe’s Ailing Economies: the Military

It will be ironic if it is President Trump who saves the European economies. His demands for increased defense spending and more self reliant defense could jump start their economies.

A New Hope for Europe’s Ailing Economies: the Military

Economists say the region’s planned defense buildup may be exactly what its economy needs, despite some sizable hurdles

By Tom Fairless

March 13, 2025 11:00 pm ET

A NATO-led exercise in Latvia last month. Photo: Toms Kalnins/Shutterstock

A massive military buildup across Europe could achieve what governments have failed to do in years: jump-start a sluggish economy, seed new innovations and create new industries.

Countries from the U.K. to Germany and Denmark have announced vast increases in military spending to counter Russia’s threats as the U.S. warns Europe not to take America’s protection for granted.

For some economists, this could be just what the region needs to support an under-pressure manufacturing sector and unlock new engines for growth and exports. There are numerous hurdles along the way, including a skills shortage, and the rewards might be unevenly distributed, they warn.

Rearmament could mean sacrifices in some areas as the peace dividend Europe has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War is unwound. Yet recent economic research suggests the benefits of the dividend, which was used primarily to fund a steady expansion in the welfare state, might have been exaggerated.

The European Commission, the European Union’s executive arm, this month unveiled a “ReArm Europe” initiative aimed at mobilizing around €800 billion, equivalent to about $868 billion, for military spending. In Germany, likely future Chancellor Friedrich Merz has floated plans to exempt such spending from the country’s strict self-imposed debt limits. Denmark said last month it would increase its defense budget to more than 3% of gross domestic product over the next two years, while the U.K. unveiled plans to boost military spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027.

The investments, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said Sunday, could “trigger a powerful tailwind for important industries.” Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, secure communication, satellite networks, autonomous vehicles and robotics all stand to benefit, she said.

Military spending affects the economy in multiple, sometimes contradictory ways. In the short term, it can employ idle workers and capital, and encourage private companies and households to spend and invest. It can also divert state money from potentially more productive uses, push up borrowing costs and crowd out some private investment.

Longer term, research suggests that military expenditure can increase the efficiency of the broader economy. Government defense contracts can foster economies of scale and spur innovations in civilian industries, economists say. The internet was built on protocols used in the U.S. Defense Department.

“The consensus is really clear that [gross domestic product] does expand in order to accommodate defense buildups. It’s not a fixed pie,” said Ethan Ilzetzki, associate economics professor at the London School of Economics.

To be sure, producing munitions and warheads doesn’t have the same economic benefit as investing in factory machinery or infrastructure. Weapons are intended to be stored or destroyed, rather than used to speed production or shorten journey times.

Yet Ilzetzki estimates that increasing European military spending from 2% to 3.5% of GDP could increase the continent’s economic output by 0.9% to 1.5%, based on his broad survey of the economic literature published last month for the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Conversely, falling military spending can coincide with slower growth. Annual GDP growth in the U.S. declined from around 4% in the 1960s to less than 3% recently as military spending slumped from 8% of GDP to less than 4%, Ilzetzki noted. In the EU, economic growth has halved since the 1960s as military spending declined by two-thirds.

One reason is that public investment in cutting-edge research during wartime or military buildups is lost in peacetime. A temporary increase in military spending of 1% of GDP could increase long-term productivity by 0.25%, Ilzetzki found. A 10% increase in government-funded military research and development can bolster private R&D by more than 4%, according to a 2019 study by economists Enrico Moretti, Claudia Steinwender and John Van Reenen.

“Perhaps we can find ways [to support cutting-edge research] that don’t necessitate military expenditure, but so far there are few examples of that,” Ilzetzki said. “It is difficult to imagine nuclear power emerging so early without World War II R&D or space exploration technologies in the 1960s without NASA.”

America’s military R&D spending is currently 12 times as large as Europe’s, according to a 2024 report on Europe’s economic competitiveness by former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi. Increasing the share of government defense R&D to GDP in the eurozone to U.S. levels would result in a 350% to 420% boost to defense industry R&D, according to an estimate by Barclays.

Military spending can also offer jobs for idled workers with the right skills. German carmakers, for instance, have cut tens of thousands of jobs as global demand for the country’s cars has softened.

“The types of jobs created are exactly those jobs hollowed out in the middle of the income distribution…higher-paid jobs that don’t require large amounts of education,” Ilzetzki said.

On both sides of the Atlantic, war has spurred industrial development. The American Civil War appeared to promote industrialization of the North, by stimulating infrastructure investments such as the first transcontinental telegraph line and railroad expansions.

In Europe, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 may have supported the nascent industrial base of newly unified Germany, boosting industrial giants including Krupp, BASF and Siemens. Last century, President Richard Nixon’s threat to withdraw U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula motivated government support for military-relevant industries in South Korea, which caused them to nearly double from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, according to research by Nathan Lane, an economist at the University of Oxford.

The cannon of a military vehicle at a production line in Unterluess, Germany. Photo: Fabian Bimmer/Reuters

Yet there is a caveat: To maximize the benefits of higher military spending, Europe needs to build more equipment domestically rather than buying it overseas.

This isn’t what’s happening: Arms imports to European North Atlantic Treaty Organization members more than doubled from 2020 to 2024 compared with the previous five years, and the U.S. supplied 64% of those weapons, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Historically, a much larger portion of European defense supplies have been purchased domestically—around 90% in France and 80% in Germany between 2005 and 2022, according to Goldman Sachs.

There are other hurdles, too. Finding enough skilled workers will be challenging in aging Europe. There is also a limit to how much highly indebted nations like France or Italy can borrow to finance their buildups.

These and other reasons mean Germany could benefit more than most given its large and currently underused industrial base and its comparatively low public debt.

European defense stocks such as Rheinmetall of Germany and Leonardo of Italy have soared this year, while bigger American counterparts such as Lockheed Martin have sagged as investors anticipated more aggressive European competition.

“Europe is going to be a formidable military exporter,” said Jacob Kirkegaard, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Aircraft displayed at the Farnborough International Airshow in southern England last year. Photo: Jason Alden/Bloomberg News

Write to Tom Fairless at tom.fairless@wsj.com

Appeared in the March 14, 2025, print edition as 'A New Hope for Europe’s Ailing Economies: the Military'.

12. Belgian Authorities Arrest Suspects in Huawei, European Parliament Corruption Probe

Belgian Authorities Arrest Suspects in Huawei, European Parliament Corruption Probe

Prosecutors claims corruption took place on a regular basis from 2021 to the present day

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/belgian-authorities-arrest-suspects-in-huawei-european-parliament-corruption-probe-b852113d?mod=world_lead_story

By Mauro Orru

Updated March 14, 2025 5:42 am ET

Authorities in Belgium said they have detained several people as part of a probe into alleged corruption involving China’s Huawei Technologies. Photo: frederick florin/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Belgian authorities said they detained several people as part of an investigation into alleged corruption within the European Parliament that they say was committed for the benefit of China’s Huawei Technologies.

Prosecutors said the Belgian federal police conducted 21 searches across the country and took several suspects in for questioning over their alleged roles in corruption as well as forgery of documents. Searches were also carried out in Portugal, and a suspect was arrested in France, the authorities said.

The announcement came hours after Belgian daily Le Soir and other media reported that representatives for Chinese telecoms giant Huawei were suspected of lobbying European Parliament members to promote the company’s interests in Europe.

Huawei said in a statement that the company had a zero tolerance policy toward corruption or other wrongdoing and was committed to complying with all applicable laws and regulations.

“Huawei takes these allegations seriously and will urgently communicate with the investigation to further understand the situation,” the company said.

The alleged acts of corruption took place on a regular basis from 2021 to the present day under the guise of commercial lobbying, according to prosecutors.

Authorities said the supposed perpetrators resorted to payments, food and travel gifts, and invitations to watch soccer matches in exchange for favorable political decisions to advance private commercial interests. The investigating judge in charge requested for the EU Parliament offices of two parliamentary assistants that are allegedly involved in the corruption to be sealed.

A spokeswoman for the European Parliament said it had received a request from Belgian authorities to assist with their investigation, “which the Parliament will swiftly and fully honor.”

The probe comes just over two years after Belgian police detained two EU lawmakers and several other people linked to the European Parliament over suspicions they accepted hundreds of thousands of euros from Qatari officials to influence the legislature’s decisions. Qatar had denied any involvement.

Write to Mauro Orru at mauro.orru@wsj.com

13. Census Operations

Does conducting a "census" operation give the perception of being an occupying power? Perhaps the host nation (i.e., the sovereign nation) should be conducting the census.

Excerpts:

Census operations are fundamental to the efficient and successful functioning of any city, state, province, or nation. In counterinsurgencies and small wars, census operations are crucial. In fact, without these, modern campaigns and operations will not easily succeed, and military and security forces will not attain sufficient levels of awareness about their AOs and areas of interest, resulting in unnecessarily prolonged conflicts. Therefore, every unit involved in COIN or similar security operations should obtain or initiate and complete thorough censuses of their respective AOs and share that information with other units in the theater of operations. It is imperative that units conduct census operations on a regular basis. Of equal importance, units should review and update information on populations throughout their AOs as areas are revisited during subsequent operations and patrols. Additionally, authorities and units assuming responsibility for an AO must understand the degree and status of census operations already conducted and yet to be conducted throughout the entire AO. Finally, it is crucial that newly arriving units and staffs continue to maintain and update census databases initiated by their predecessors.

Neither information nor knowledge is power. Only the proper application of knowledge, achieving a desired outcome, is power. Consequently, militaries need to provide guidance, information, and training to soldiers on PRC measures, particularly census operations, and their advantages. For the U.S. military, FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations lists populace and resources control as the number one core task for Civil Affairs personnel and units. JP 3-57.1 Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs mentions this indirectly. Logically, Civil Affairs should assume the lead in initiating and coordinating census operations, one of the most important subsets of PRC. Unfortunately, census operations are not explained or discussed to any degree in either FM 3-05.40 or JP 3-57.1. Even more unfortunate, FM 3-05.401 (MCRP 3-33.1A) Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures has no mention of census operations.

Civil Affairs forces are not the only group missing the fundamental importance of census operations. Neither FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency nor FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency addresses or explain census operations or adequately covers PRC. Due to its preeminence in successful COIN operations, a full chapter on PRC, with a section thoroughly covering census operations, should be developed and incorporated into newer editions of the above-mentioned and similar publications. This would ensure that Soldiers and Marines would at least have sources from which they could begin reading and learning about these critical operations. One positive example regarding PRC is the Special Forces Population and Resources Control Handbook, offered through the Center for Army Lessons Learned. Unfortunately, it also lacks information on census operations. Finally, courses of instruction should be developed that teach census operations and PRC measures to Civil Affairs personnel and maneuver units requiring such knowledge so that they can properly apply these tactics, techniques, and procedures, achieving desired objectives.

Interestingly, the Special Forces Population and Resources Control Handbook referenced in the conclusion was based on the work of the 1st Special Forces Group in the Philippines in 2002 and beyond. 1st SFG codified the work and published it in the 1st Special Forces Group Populations Resources Control Handbook. And this was based on the work of 3d Special Forces Group Haiti in 1994-1995. The work of course was not called census taking but it was based on the very fundamental Special Forces activities of area study (learning about the operational area prior to deployment) and then area assessment (continuously gathering information about the operational area during the entire operation). These are fundamental Special Forces activities. They are deliberately not census operations due to the perception of sovereignty issues but the surveys conducted (specifically adapted for the local culture) and the information gathered can have a census "feel." Again only the sovereign government should be conducting a census of its own population. Area Study and Area Assessment are the exact activities described in the T.E. Lawrence quote at the beginning of the article.

So I went to the Center for Army Lessons Learned to look for the referenced handbook and I could not locate it. I could not locate it through Google. I did locate an NPS thesis discussing it and referencing the 1st SFG Handbook. But Google AI provided this interesting statement about the search:

AI Overview

Learn more

While there isn't a publicly available "Special Forces Population and Resources Control Handbook," it's likely a highly classified document used by U.S. Special Operations Forces for planning and executing complex, covert missions involving population and resource control.

Here's why and what it might entail:

Secrecy and Sensitivity:
Special Operations, especially those involving population and resource control, are inherently secretive and require a high level of security. A handbook outlining such tactics would be classified to protect sensitive information and operational capabilities.
Operational Planning:
Such a handbook would likely cover a wide range of topics relevant to controlling populations and resources in various operational environments, including:
Intelligence Gathering: Techniques for collecting information about target populations and resources, their vulnerabilities, and potential resistance.
Influence Operations: Methods for shaping public opinion, promoting desired narratives, and countering opposing ideologies.
Resource Management: Strategies for securing and controlling vital resources, such as water, food, infrastructure, and energy.
Civil Affairs: Techniques for interacting with local populations, building trust, and establishing rapport.
Security Operations: Measures for protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring the safety of personnel, and preventing attacks.
Examples of Special Operations Units:
Delta Force: Known for their counter-terrorism and high-risk missions, they likely use such a handbook for complex operations.
Navy SEALs: Tasked with a wide range of missions, including special reconnaissance, direct action, and counter-terrorism, they also likely utilize such a handbook.
Army Special Forces (Green Berets): Experts in unconventional warfare, they are trained to operate in a variety of environments and engage with local populations.
Why it's not public:
The information contained in such a handbook would be extremely valuable to potential adversaries, so it is kept highly classified.

In summary, the "Special Forces Population and Resources Control Handbook" is likely a classified document used by U.S. Special Operations Forces for planning and executing complex, covert missions involving population and resource control.

But this is all social science voodoo that the DOD seems to want to eliminate. The Minerva program has been eliminated as have all social science research contracts. Again, it seems DOD wants to dumb down military operations which is ironic when you think about what else T.R. Lawrence said: "Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge."

Census Operations

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/14/census-operations-2/

by Michael Trevett

03.14.2025 at 06:00am

When I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant—and many an irrelevant—factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards—all were at my finger-ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side. I risked myself among them a hundred times, to learn.

T.E. Lawrence: Letter to Liddell Hart, 26 June 1933.

Background

Mao explained that the guerrilla or insurgent swims among the sea of people. Consequently, thoroughly knowing the population is the best method of identifying, finding, and fixing the insurgent. Only after identifying the insurgent, does it become possible to isolate and kill him and protect the population. From the perspective of the counterinsurgent, these are the fundamental purposes of census operations, a subset of populace and resources control (PRC) measures, which, when attained, significantly contribute to the elimination of an insurgency and the establishment of civil governing control.

Law enforcement officers and civil authorities use census information and databases on a daily basis in most nations. In developed nations, when a citizen is stopped and questioned by local, state, or federal law enforcement officers, these officers have multiple databases of information at their disposal. The officials can obtain detailed information about the individual within minutes from these databases, which provide specific data on most aspects of the individual including age, full name, physical description, place of birth, residence, digital photos, and vehicles owned. Although it is more time-consuming to obtain, much information on illegal aliens and foreign nationals is also available to law enforcement agencies. Regardless of the database, and there are many, the information used to populate it was collected consistently and systematically, usually over a period of years or decades.

The resulting available information permits law enforcement officers to make determinations about individuals and groups of people in the field at the scene of an event or incident. In the United States, for example, registration databases on vehicles not only include specifics on the vehicle but also provide detailed information about the registered owner, including home address, telephone numbers, insurance particulars, and much more. When a driver’s license is included in the law enforcement query, the officer is able to obtain more extensive information, including a detailed description of the individual, criminal history, arrest warrant information, and, in many cases, employment and medical information. These databases were created from the collection of census-type information, not in the sense of the door-to-door questioning performed by U.S. Census Bureau employees, but from the planned and systematic collection, collation, and maintenance of data organized by authorities on specific populations for precise purposes.

Census operations are fundamental to the efficient and successful functioning of any city, state, province, or nation. In counterinsurgencies and small wars, census operations are crucial.

Regarding contingency or stability and security operations, particularly counterinsurgencies (COIN), the example above provides a degree of insight into the level of clarity and situational awareness that military forces need in order to know their areas of operation (AO), the populations, and pertinent aspects of those populations within their AOs. After all, during these types of operations or small wars, military forces are most often the only authorities present to ensure the safety and security of affected populations from internal criminal organizations, insurgents, or foreign enemies. Therefore, information available in existing or newly created databases is critical for effective decision-making, operational planning, and executing security operations. Unfortunately, most military commanders and units do not come to this realization until many months into their deployments, losing valuable opportunities and time to collect, analyze, and disseminate such detailed data. That is where census operations significantly contribute to successful operations.

What are Census Operations?

Neither the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms nor Operational Terms and Graphics (FM1-02) provides a definition of census operations. Historically, military civil affairs personnel and units have had responsibility for populace and resources control, and the census operation subset. However, no current U.S. civil affairs publication offers a definition or explanation of it. Consequently, the following definition of “census operation” is offered: “The systematic collection of all pertinent information on a population, including but not limited to, information on employment, individual, familial, and group identities, property, transportation, and photographs and biometric data, stored in databases accessible by civil and military authorities requiring the information to effectively govern and protect the population.”

Census operations are but one method of contributing to PRC in COIN and one method of contributing to mapping the human terrain. PRC includes determining who lives in an area, what they do, how they travel, and, specifically, where they live, shop, study, travel, and work, and then affecting these aspects of the population for desired outcomes. These tasks require determining societal patterns and relationships including clan, familial, interpersonal, political, professional, religious, and tribal. Establishing population control must logically begin with conducting a census, creating databases of accessible information with search capabilities for use by military, law enforcement, and civil authorities. Census operations should be advertised to educate the affected population and must be conducted consistently and systematically. Additionally, census tasks include identifying and mapping who resides and works in which buildings and houses, and who the heads of cultural and social organizations are. Ideally, those heads of tribes, households, families, clans, or other social organizations must then be required to report any changes in the categories of information discussed throughout this article to the responsible civil or military agencies and authorities, systematically contributing to the updating of databases. Information obtained or provided must be cross-checked by periodic patrols and searches, or subsequent, dedicated census operations.

Census operations must be designed to collect information on all aspects of the targeted population. Beyond the obvious information related to individual and familial characteristics, these aspects also include business associations, educational backgrounds, familial relations, military records and training, political and religious affiliations, property and weapons ownership, social groups and organizations, and any other patterns and relationships. In addition, authorities must identify and record data on apartments, houses, other living accommodations, and places of employment, such as descriptions, ten-digit grid coordinates, or location by latitude and longitude. If this information does not exist or insufficiently exists, then a methodical, numerical or alphanumerical system of designating these infrastructures must be undertaken, recorded in databases, standardized, and disseminated to all concerned.

The main open-market in Jisr Diyala, in southeast Baghdad. Businesses, markets, and black markets are also important sources of information to be targeted with census operations and other PRC measures. Photo taken by author during a counterinsurgency patrol in Jisr Diyala and Salman Pak, Iraq, 9 March 2007.

Conducting Census Operations

The key to developing a sufficient census database that consistently contributes to operations and situational awareness is systematic and thorough collection. Census operations must be planned and are not tantamount to simple cordon and search or cordon and knock patrols. As a declassified study on COIN for the U.S. Army indicated, census operations should be planned and executed as an independent operation with the aim of collecting census data beneficial to civil and military authorities. The study further explained:

To accumulate the necessary data, populations of whole villages would be fingerprinted, photographed, and required to provide vital statistics and personal histories, including the names and locations of all relatives. This could be done by police of the indigenous power (with such supervision by US advisors as might seem desirable for accuracy and thoroughness). Thereafter the data would be processed by electronic means that can be readily made available. Local police could then periodically sample group populations, picking up individuals at random at odd times and places, and any newcomers would have to explain themselves. The effect of an accurate, operating system of this kind on the morale of the guerrillas should be considerable.

If units are unable to execute operations exclusively for census operations, they can incorporate the task of data collection into other types of patrols and missions. Regardless of the type of mission or patrol, census information must be sought, captured (usually through patrol debriefs), collated, analyzed, and disseminated during and after all types of operations. Such information must be collated and inputted into the unit census database upon completion of each operation. For example, during routine patrols in neighborhoods, the systematic collection of all pertinent information about all residents on one or more specific streets or blocks should be a goal. This information must then be input into a database covering that unit’s AO. Standard forms and questions should be developed for use by all authorities involved or potentially involved in census operations. These forms or questionnaires should be designed to capture all information deemed relevant to a peaceful populace for that culture or environment. However, they should also be developed and updated to highlight any potential abnormalities within the populace and to identify any indicators of illicit activities.

Systematically obtain information from the population. Photo taken by author during a counterinsurgency patrol in Jisr Diyala and Salman Pak, Iraq, 9 March 2007.

Any apparent conflicting information should be flagged and examined. Conflicting or new information dissimilar to information in the database for a group of people or a neighborhood can expose anomalies that might show links to insurgent, militia, or terrorist organizations. For example, if after visiting a house and obtaining census data on the residents, an abnormally high number of males or nonresidents are seen frequenting the same house, civil or military authorities should begin questioning neighbors and, if deemed necessary, begin surveillance on the house, residents, and visitors. Similarly, if it becomes known that registered residents or visitors are using dialects and languages foreign to the locale, these issues should also be investigated.

Other indicators might not initially become obvious through direct observation. For example, if a family of five is recorded as the only residents of a single-family home, but abnormally high levels of electricity or water are being used for five people, authorities could surveil the property to identify other people using it or search the property to identify why such abnormalities exist. For example, law enforcement agencies in the West have used these techniques to identify clandestine drug labs hidden in homes, garages, or backyards. Abnormally high levels of electricity use, which can easily be monitored, should serve as a red flag to observant authorities.

Many similar situations and indicators exist for abnormal or illicit activities that authorities might be able to link to insurgents or other illegally armed groups. Such indicators might include volumes of traffic during hours of darkness that are abnormally high for the home or neighborhood in question; the presence of numerous sleeping spaces over that needed for the size of the resident family; comparing the number of children claimed with the amount of children’s clothing, toys, photographs, and other items for the specific culture and environment. As the behaviors, tactics, and techniques of illegally armed groups are practically unlimited, so too are the countless indicators and signs associated with them.

Photographic and Biometric Data

The realm and discussion of biometrics has expanded exponentially in the last decade. In various forms and degrees, biometrics are indispensable to effective census operations and PRC. Although seemingly obvious, digital photographs and biometric information must be methodically collected on all people individually, then, if possible, together as family units and other groups. Fingerprints and other biometric data are essential in identifying individuals as insurgents or associating their involvement in illicit activities. Soldiers and Marines should systematically take digital photographs of all living accommodations and methods of transportation. Methods of transportation should include aircraft, boats, buses, cars, motorcycles, pack animals, trucks, vans, and any other air, land, or waterborne methods of transporting people or cargo. In Iraq, for example, despite the fact that the country is arid, descriptions and photographs of all waterborne craft should also have been collected, because insurgents and militias used the Euphrates River (the size of a creek for most of its length) and the Tigris River to ferry fighters, transport arms and ammunition, and evade Coalition Forces (CF). If systems of registration do not already exist for living accommodations, work sites, and methods of transportation, then the responsible units must create them. U.S. and other regional, state, or national systems for automobile and waterborne vessel monitoring and registration should suffice for emulation. Authorities must then issue and track identification and registration cards.

Responsibilities

Brigadier General Frank Kitson stated, “The main responsibility for developing background information rests with operational commanders and not with the intelligence organization.” This fundamental fact is consistently missed by academics, pundits, and even military authorities. Consequently, PRC measures and census operations are inconsistently and infrequently applied because of inadequate education and understanding about the various benefits derived from this type of information. Although operational civil or military units should conduct census operations, responsibility for maintaining the data should rest with civil authorities, particularly upon cessation of major combat operations or with the restoration of law and order. The declassified study on counterinsurgency conducted for the U.S. Army in 1966 concluded:

It is a big task for the government to learn as much as possible about every individual, but it has been achieved in one form or another, throughout history. The first essential is a registration of the population, and some form of personal identification. The ideal, from the government point of view, is an identity card with photograph, issued universally, with safeguards against forgery and duplication. This is a task for the civil police, but troops may also have to be used, and will probably be needed in any case to man checkpoints and to carry out surprise checks.

In the absence of a legitimate and effective host nation government, the Department of State (DOS) should be responsible for at least collating the data and maintaining the database of census-related information. This would benefit the transition process from military control to civil and police control and would ensure a longer-term continuity in maintaining the data. However, due to the lack of security in most COIN or other operational environments, it is highly unlikely that DOS would assume such responsibilities. Consequently, the best location for maintaining such databases is within the staff element of the overall military commander responsible for the operations in the country or region in question. For example, during the active insurgency in years past, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) would have served as the best central repository for such data in Iraq, and currently, the International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan is the best repository there.

In any case, units, beginning at the company level and responsible for designated areas of operation, should create one or more databases comprising the information outlined above. To be effective, these databases must be readily accessible via the Nonsecure Internet Router Network (NIPRNET). Eventually, the regional commands should link the various databases in their respective AOs. Finally, the national or theater-level command would maintain the database or multiple databases from all AOs throughout the theater of operations and serve as the central repository for related information with every accessible, knowledgeable personnel being the continuity. Databases could be escalated in terms of the information added, analyzed, and processed. This additional information would likely require storage and use on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). Subordinate commands should be able to access the nation-wide data via links on the NIPRNET or SIPRNET and use the data for civil affairs, intelligence analysis, operational planning, and targeting. Limited distribution of information and access could be permitted for other governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations.

Successful Cases in Point

One real-world example that highlights some of the best practices and lessons learned mentioned above is that of the census operation conducted in the AO of Multinational Force-West (MNF-W), primarily by the 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division (1/1AD), U.S. Army. Although various units undertook some aspects of census operations in Ramadi, they never completed this project but, nonetheless, did progress further than any other organization in Iraq during the peak of insurgent activities. MNF-W made the data readily accessible to coalition forces. The information, with an intuitive format, included multiple levels of hyperlinks and maps. City sections were color-coded and linked to smaller subsections and neighborhoods. A user could simply drill down from the city level to a section then to a neighborhood and finally to individual houses or apartments. Data available on the individual homes or apartments included digital photographs of occupants, names with spelling variations, employment data, and other demographic information. The 1/1 AD census program, covering an AO including the city of Ramadi, served as a positive model and was used as a teaching tool at the Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence at Camp Taji to instruct maneuver units arriving in Iraq.

Example of a hyperlinked, numbered overlay covering a city section.

Perhaps the best description of a company-level success in conducting census operations is that of Company F, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines responsible for a 200 square kilometer AO in and around Al Yusufiyah, Iraq: “The company collected census information in over 80 percent of the towns and villages” in their AO. Towns with over 2,000 homes took the company just a week to complete with small villages taking only one or two days. The results were tremendous. They had critical information on almost 17,000 Iraqi males, including digital photographs, which they used to build targeting packages. They incorporated information from CIA and DIIR reports and made all the information in the database easily accessible through common searches on computers. Directly because of their efforts with census operations and databases, the company detained over 300 insurgents and seized 100,000 pounds of explosives. However, the Company Commander explained, “The key to a census operation’s success…was not the actual operation itself but the follow up database workflow process.”

Neither information nor knowledge is power. Only the proper application of knowledge, achieving a desired outcome, is power. Consequently, militaries need to provide guidance, information, and training to soldiers on PRC measures, particularly census operations, and their advantages.

In some areas of Iraq, successful coalition forces incorporated their Iraqi counterparts into census operations, thus ensuring long-term situational awareness and enhanced human terrain mapping. In August 2007 for example, Marines with Battery K, 1st BN, 11th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Logistics Group (Forward) worked with their Iraqi counterparts in Sin Adh Dhibban to execute a multilateral census operation “To help secure the village by documenting its residents, the operation consisted of a joint foot patrol, which allowed them time to interact with the population.” Colonel Muhammed Karim Muhammed, commander of the participating Iraqi Army BN, explained the census operation: “They collected key data that includes ages of family members, the number of vehicles per household, the name of the male head of household as well as any standard of living complaints.” Colonel Muhammed further explained that the information would be used to determine the needs of the population and “to recruit members for the Iraqi army and police.” Most importantly, he pointed out that the information obtained during the census operation “serves a tactical purpose by clarifying the Iraqi army’s picture on who is coming in and out of their assigned area, making it easy for them to watch for potential insurgents.”

When truly examined, census operations and the more encompassing PRC measures are so essential to effective governmental control over a populace and security for that populace that most nations, including the United States and other western nations, must necessarily be successful at conducting these operations. Unfortunately, the government of Iraq under Saddam Hussein conducted census operations and used the information for both benign and malicious purposes. This is one important reason why many Iraqis feared a new census. Conversely, the requirement for the U.S. Government to conduct censuses was first established in the late 1700s and soon after codified in the U.S. Constitution in 1787. To understand what information the U.S. Government collects for its purposes, examine the six-page U.S. Census short questionnaire. Census forms can provide a foundation from which units can build their own census questionnaires or surveys, transliterated and targeted, of course, in the appropriate languages used in their AOs. To get a better idea of how the U.S. Census Bureau uses the information, examine the Census Bureau website to view some of their products, which show detailed demographic statistics and trends in table formats and interactive map displays for the nation, all 50 states, and the thousands of counties composing all the states.

Opportunities for Improvement

Census operations are fundamental to the efficient and successful functioning of any city, state, province, or nation. In counterinsurgencies and small wars, census operations are crucial. In fact, without these, modern campaigns and operations will not easily succeed, and military and security forces will not attain sufficient levels of awareness about their AOs and areas of interest, resulting in unnecessarily prolonged conflicts. Therefore, every unit involved in COIN or similar security operations should obtain or initiate and complete thorough censuses of their respective AOs and share that information with other units in the theater of operations. It is imperative that units conduct census operations on a regular basis. Of equal importance, units should review and update information on populations throughout their AOs as areas are revisited during subsequent operations and patrols. Additionally, authorities and units assuming responsibility for an AO must understand the degree and status of census operations already conducted and yet to be conducted throughout the entire AO. Finally, it is crucial that newly arriving units and staffs continue to maintain and update census databases initiated by their predecessors.

Neither information nor knowledge is power. Only the proper application of knowledge, achieving a desired outcome, is power. Consequently, militaries need to provide guidance, information, and training to soldiers on PRC measures, particularly census operations, and their advantages. For the U.S. military, FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations lists populace and resources control as the number one core task for Civil Affairs personnel and units. JP 3-57.1 Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs mentions this indirectly. Logically, Civil Affairs should assume the lead in initiating and coordinating census operations, one of the most important subsets of PRC. Unfortunately, census operations are not explained or discussed to any degree in either FM 3-05.40 or JP 3-57.1. Even more unfortunate, FM 3-05.401 (MCRP 3-33.1A) Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures has no mention of census operations.

Civil Affairs forces are not the only group missing the fundamental importance of census operations. Neither FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency nor FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency addresses or explain census operations or adequately covers PRC. Due to its preeminence in successful COIN operations, a full chapter on PRC, with a section thoroughly covering census operations, should be developed and incorporated into newer editions of the above-mentioned and similar publications. This would ensure that Soldiers and Marines would at least have sources from which they could begin reading and learning about these critical operations. One positive example regarding PRC is the Special Forces Population and Resources Control Handbook, offered through the Center for Army Lessons Learned. Unfortunately, it also lacks information on census operations. Finally, courses of instruction should be developed that teach census operations and PRC measures to Civil Affairs personnel and maneuver units requiring such knowledge so that they can properly apply these tactics, techniques, and procedures, achieving desired objectives.

Tags: COIN, counterinsurgency, Iraq, strategy

About The Author

Michael Trevett

14. The New Paradigm: How AI is Shaping Narratives and Conversation

The New Paradigm: How AI is Shaping Narratives and Conversation - EdgeTheory

edgetheory.com · March 4, 2025

Let’s say you and I are discussing a recent basketball game. The conversation might cover the final score, the coach’s decisions, or a controversial call from the referees.

Now, what if the mode of delivery changes?

Maybe we’re talking in person, texting, or debating in a public social media thread. The topic stays the same, but the way we communicate shifts dramatically.

In person, I might gesture for emphasis or raise my voice when complaining about a bad call. Over text, I’d be more casual, using abbreviations and concise phrasing. On social media, I might tread carefully—or not at all—knowing my words are on public display.

Each new medium reshapes how we engage in conversation. Throughout history, humanity has continuously evolved how we share narratives, from oral tradition to the written word, from the printing press to the internet, and now social media. The medium influences the message.

Truthfulness is irrelevant to a narrative’s power. The ability to shape public perception and influence discourse has always been a critical factor in communication. This makes it all the more critical to understand and adapt to new communication mediums. And now, we face the next evolution in conversation: artificial intelligence. Unlike previous shifts, AI doesn’t just change how narratives are transmitted—it actively participates in their creation, enabling the rapid, large-scale production of persuasive content that can blur the line between authentic discourse and engineered influence.

AI as the Next Medium of Conversation

Artificial intelligence is both here and still emerging. We don’t yet fully understand its long-term effects because we are living through its rapid development and adoption across nearly every sector. But one thing is certain: AI is changing the way we communicate.

Unlike previous mediums, AI introduces an asymmetry. Conversations are no longer just human-to-human; they can be human-to-machine. AI systems—built by humans—interact with us, contribute to discussions, and in some cases, steer the direction of conversations.

This reality presents both a challenge and an opportunity. AI has the ability to generate and distribute vast amounts of seemingly genuine content at scale. It can shape public opinion, amplify certain perspectives, and even manufacture the illusion of organic discourse. This makes AI not just a tool but an influential force in modern communication.

The Challenge: AI and the Rapid Production of Narrative Content

Every evolution in communication has brought unintended consequences. The internet expanded global connectivity but also enabled the viral spread of misinformation, the rise of cybercrime, and the amplification of extremist ideologies.

AI presents a similar challenge, particularly in its ability to generate convincing, large-scale narrative content. Whether through AI-generated articles, deepfake videos, or automated social media posts, the sheer volume of AI-created material can overwhelm traditional information channels and distort public discourse.

AI-driven content engines can:

Mass-produce articles, videos, and social media posts that mimic human-created content.
Manufacture engagement by generating comments, likes, and shares to boost credibility.
Amplify specific narratives, making them appear more widely accepted than they actually are.

This volume of content can flood digital spaces with information that is difficult to verify, making it easier for misleading or manipulative narratives to take hold.

The Opportunity: AI as a Tool for Narrative Intelligence

But AI isn’t just a challenge—it’s also a powerful tool for understanding and managing narratives at scale. Organizations can harness AI to detect, analyze, and respond to narrative trends in real time.

AI as an Analytical Engine

The first step in managing the spread of AI-generated narratives is identifying their sources and strategies. AI-powered narrative intelligence can:

Detect emerging trends by analyzing patterns in messaging across platforms.
Identify the origins of coordinated influence operations.
Map the spread and evolution of narratives across digital ecosystems.
Distinguish between organic discourse and AI-generated content.

By rapidly analyzing and classifying information, AI enables decision-makers to understand how narratives are evolving and respond strategically.

AI as a Counterbalance to Narrative Manipulation

Once a narrative is identified, AI-driven narrative intelligence enables organizations to:

Develop precise, data-driven counter-narratives.
Deploy responsive messaging that resonates with target audiences.
Disrupt misleading or harmful information before it gains traction.

AI can amplify truth just as effectively as it spreads falsehoods—when guided by human oversight and strategic intent. However, without careful direction, its capacity for mass content generation can just as easily distort reality as it can clarify it. The key is to strike the right balance between automation and human expertise.

The Need for Narrative Intelligence

The importance of narrative intelligence extends far beyond online discourse. Here’s how it applies to just two key areas: National security and supply chain risk.

National Security

Modern threats are not just physical—they are informational. Adversaries use AI-driven content to:

Undermine public trust in democratic institutions.
Influence elections and political stability.
Shape public perception of global conflicts and policies.

Narrative intelligence allows governments to anticipate and counteract these efforts, ensuring that strategic messaging remains aligned with national security objectives.

Supply Chain Risk

Global supply chains are vulnerable to both physical and informational disruptions. AI-enhanced narrative intelligence helps businesses and governments:

Detect coordinated misinformation campaigns targeting specific industries.
Identify emerging geopolitical risks that could impact supply chain stability.
Counter false narratives that erode trust in key suppliers or markets.

By monitoring how narratives shape public perception, organizations can mitigate risks before they escalate into crises.

Conclusion

Narrative intelligence is no longer optional—it’s essential. As AI reshapes how information is created, shared, and consumed, organizations must adapt to stay ahead.

The rise of AI-generated content presents real challenges, but it also offers unprecedented opportunities. By leveraging AI-driven narrative intelligence, decision-makers can detect emerging trends, counteract misinformation, and ensure that truth remains a powerful force in the evolving information landscape.

AI is not just changing the conversation—it is becoming the conversation. The question is not whether we engage with this reality, but how well we prepare for it.

edgetheory.com · March 4, 2025

15. Thom Shanker: Ukraine War Has Proven Drones Are the Future of Warfare

The podcast can be accessed at the link.

Thom Shanker: Ukraine War Has Proven Drones Are the Future of Warfare

Posted By RCP Radio

On Date March 13, 2025

https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2025/03/13/thom_shanker_ukraine_has_proven_drones_are_the_future_of_warfare.html

Wednesday on the RealClearPolitics podcast, Andrew Walworth talks to former NY Times Pentagon correspondent Thom Shanker about what U.S. military strategists have learned from Ukraine's extremely successful use of drones in combat. Is the Pentagon learning the right lessons from the war in Ukraine?

Thom Shanker is the author of: "Age of Danger: Keeping America Safe in an Era of New Superpowers, New Weapons, and New Threats"

"Drones have really redefined the battle plan in Ukraine, and believe me, everyone is watching," Shanker said. "When Russia invaded three years ago, it was very much traditional, columns of armored tanks rolling forward meeting Ukrainians in trench warfare, but drones have absolutely revolutionized that. Blunting the Russian attack, making terror strikes on Russian territory. Currently, 70% of all deaths and injuries in Ukraine are caused by drones."

"Ukraine says they’ve made more than one million drones in 2024, and the Russians brag they can churn out 4,000 per day, so they are both betting on drones," Shanker added.

"The Pentagon is investing in drones because they think the way to deter China in the Taiwan straits is to flood the zone with drones," he explained. "But the program at DOD called Replicator is imagining maybe 10,000 drones, so it’s kind of ridiculous."

"The American ones are bigger, smarter, and more capable, but the key has been proven to be cheap," he said. "The word is 'attritable,' which means if you lose them, you don’t care."

"In the recent drone attack on Moscow, Ukraine sent about 300 drones. The Russians claim they shot down more than 200 of them, but 100 drones landing in or near the Russian capital has a real effect on the city. Even if they don’t do much damage, it takes the terror of war to Putin’s capital at a very, very low cost," Shanker said.

"They’re not just eyes in the sky, but they are a thousand snipers in the sky. They’re mounting shotguns on these drones to blast Russian drones out of the sky. And the most horrific of all, the Ukrainians have a larger drone that carries molten steel that it pours into Russian trenches. It’s sort of like the World War III equivalent of mustard gas in World War I," he said. "You don’t want to be in a trench if you can get fried with molten steel. Very powerful, very horrific, and very worrisome for the future of war."

"There are two kinds of drones. One is the fiber optic, wire-guided, which has a limited capability because there’s only so much wire, but it’s incredibly accurate. There’s a video online of the Russians using some of these fiber optic-guided drones to hit the exact spot on the Ukrainian tanks that are most vulnerable. That’s very, very powerful. They’re using AI to calculate where drones are launched from and their likely course, so they can counter them."

"But there’s also one called FPV, or first-person view, and these are the ones you steer like in a video game. Yes, they can be jammed, but you can rain ordnance on a position with incredible accuracy, and it is truly revolutionizing warfare."

16. Ukraine’s Hidden Front: The Strategic Impact of Resistance Operations

A fascinating podcast about resistance, SOF, irregular warfare, conventional-SOF integration and the importance studying and understanding war and warfare. This is very much worth one hour to listen to this.

What is really important about this podcast is that the guests are not SOF practitioners yet do an excellent job of discussing the importance of resistance and the roles of SOF in irregular warfare and support to conventional warfare.

This podcast is also an indirect and unspoken argument for social science research that DOD is eliminating.

Ukraine’s Hidden Front: The Strategic Impact of Resistance Operations

https://irregularwarfare.org/podcasts/ukraines-hidden-front-the-strategic-impact-of-resistance-operations/

March 14, 2025 by Alisa Laufer, Kyle Atwell Leave a Comment

Episode 125 examines the impact of Ukraine’s irregular warfare and resistance operations on its broader strategic objectives. Our guests discuss how Ukrainian resistance activities have evolved throughout the conflict and evaluate their strategic importance in the war against Russia.

Our guests begin by describing how Ukrainian resistance and irregular warfare activities developed through different phases of the war, from initial guerrilla tactics during the invasion to the sophisticated long-range attacks within Russian territory. They then assess whether these operations accomplish battlefield effects, their influence on escalation dynamics, and how they shape both Ukrainian and Russian populations’ perceptions of the war. Finally, our guests provide insights on the synergy between conventional and special operations forces, the role of technology in resistance, and lessons that can be applied to future conflicts.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Mark Hertling served for 38 years in the US Army as a tanker and cavalryman, serving at every level from tank platoon leader to Commander of the 7th Army. He retired in December 2012 after serving as the Commanding General of US Army Europe, where he led over 60,000 soldiers and partnered with the armies of 51 nations. LTG Hertling worked with Ukrainian forces as early as 2004 and has extensive experience in military transformation and coalition operations.

Dr. Alexandra Chinchilla is an Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M’s Bush School of Government and Public Service. Her research examines how powerful states use security cooperation tools to increase their influence over allies, partners, and proxies, with extensive research on the war in Ukraine. She has conducted fieldwork in Ukraine since the full-scale invasion and serves as an advisor to the IWI Special Project on Proxies and Partners.

Alisa Laufer and Kyle Atwell are the hosts for Episode 125. Please reach out to them with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

17. Musk visits National Security Agency after urging 'overhaul' of U.S. cyberespionage hub

Musk visits National Security Agency after urging 'overhaul' of U.S. cyberespionage hub

The unannounced visit suggests Musk’s drive to slash the federal workforce now extends to a secretive agency known as the "puzzle palace" for its famed codebreaking abilities.

NBC News · by Dan De Luce, Carol E. Lee and Courtney Kube · March 14, 2025

Elon Musk paid an unannounced visit to the National Security Agency on Wednesday and met with its chief, an NSA spokesperson said, days after he called for revamping the country’s top cyberespionage hub.

It was Musk’s first publicly confirmed visit to an intelligence agency since he launched the Trump administration’s effort to drastically slash the federal workforce.

The NSA is one of the country’s most valuable tools for collecting intelligence, according to experts, overseeing a vast eavesdropping operation, as well as sophisticated cybersecurity capabilities.

Musk, the billionaire businessman who has come under criticism for his aggressive tactics and sweeping secrecy, posted on his social media platform, X, last week, “The NSA needs an overhaul.” Musk’s post and his visit suggested the long secretive agency, known as the “puzzle palace” for its famed codebreaking abilities, may be next.

The National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Md.Patrick Semansky / AP file

During his visit to the NSA’s headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, Musk held talks with Air Force Gen. Timothy Haugh, who oversees the agency, as well as the military’s Cyber Command, the spokesperson said. Musk was also given a tour of the NSA’s Remote Operations Center, according to a source with knowledge of the matter.

Asked about the focus of the meetings, the NSA spokesperson said in an email that the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command are focused on priorities outlined by the president, the defense secretary and the director of national intelligence and that “meetings with key advisors ensure we are aligned."

The Wall Street Journal first reported Musk’s visit.

Looming layoffs

Some former intelligence officials and Democrats in Congress have warned against rushing to fire employees without careful planning to avoid losing talented officers and damaging national security. For decades, the federal government has struggled to compete with the private sector when it comes to hiring talented tech workers.

The Defense Department oversees the budgets of parts of the intelligence community, and, as a result, some spy agencies are under instructions to meet a goal set by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to reduce the civilian workforce by 5% to 8%, the source said.

“As part of the defense secretary’s direction to streamline operations, bolster readiness and prioritize critical missions, the Department of Defense will continue efforts to eliminate positions that are non-mission critical and reduce the civilian workforce by 5 to 8 percent over the coming months,” according to a Pentagon memo signed by the acting deputy assistant defense secretary for civilian personnel policy, which was obtained by NBC News.

The Defense Department memo encourages managers to use early retirement or other buyout options to meet the goal by June.

To try to meet the administration’s orders to reduce its workforce, the NSA is looking at offering employees early retirement and/or other buyout options, the source said.

Other intelligence agencies are also grappling with how to reduce their numbers of employees without damaging their missions. The CIA has started to fire some employees who were hired in the past two years, NBC News has reported.

The head of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Navy Vice Adm. Frank Whitworth, acknowledged this week that there is some concern among employees about plans to cut the workforce across the federal government.

“There is nothing like mission to help people stay focused no matter what else is going on,” SpaceNews quoted Whitworth as saying at an event Monday in Washington. “That said, they’re humans, they have stresses.”

NBC News · by Dan De Luce, Carol E. Lee and Courtney Kube · March 14, 2025

18. Arlington Cemetery website drops links for Black, Hispanic, and women veterans

What are we doing?

We really need to grow up. This anti-woke, anti-DEI war has escalated out of hand. It reminds me of Clausewitz' total war and what happens when war is unchecked by reasons (in the holy trinity of the nature of war (passion, reason, and chance) where passion (or hate, enmity, and greed) is out of control and unchecked by reason.

Do we really need to disrespect Rocky Versace aspart ofthe DEI war? This one really hurts (as they all do)

Photos at the link: https://taskandpurpose.com/news/arlington-cemetery-scrubs-website-dei/?utm

Excerpts:

“I know the historians and the educators at Arlington, because they meet with our staff every year, and they’ve done a great job of creating lesson plans, they go out of their way to meet with teachers. And I know for a fact that a lot of our teachers are using these lesson plans,” Levin said. “I get the sense that this is being carried out in the sloppiest manner. I get the sense that we’re talking about people who are setting up algorithms and are looking for certain things. I don’t know if this is the end of it. I don’t think it is, I just don’t think these people, whoever is responsible, really knows what they’re doing.”

Levin said he hesitated to post about the missing documents because public exposure could reflect poorly on the professional historians who work at the cemetery and who are “exactly what you want from a federal agency that is responsible for interpreting the past.”

But the slash-and-burn approach to the website, he said, was too much.

“I’ll put it bluntly, this is a shitshow,” he said. “And this one hit home, so I did what I did.”

Arlington Cemetery website drops links for Black, Hispanic, and women veterans

The website for Arlington National Cemetery "unpublished" links to lists of notable graves, walking tours and educational material pertaining to Black, Hispanic and women veterans, as well as some Medal of Honor recipients.

taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White

Arlington National Cemetery is the most venerated final resting ground in the nation, overseen by silent soldiers in immaculate uniforms with ramrod-straight discipline. Across its hundreds of acres in Virginia, they watch over 400,000 graves of U.S. service members dating back to the Civil War, including two presidents, and more than 400 Medal of Honor recipients.

But in recent weeks, the cemetery’s public website has scrubbed dozens of pages on gravesites and educational materials that include histories of prominent Black, Hispanic and female service members buried in the cemetery, along with educational material on dozens of Medal of Honor recipients and maps of prominent gravesites of Marine Corps veterans and other services.

Cemetery officials confirmed to Task & Purpose that the pages were “unpublished” to meet recent orders by President Donald Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth targeting race and gender-related language and policies in the military.

Gone from public view are links to lists of dozens of “Notable Graves” at Arlington of women and Black and Hispanic service members who are buried in the cemetery. About a dozen other “Notable Graves” lists remain highlighted on the website, including lists of politicians, athletes and even foreign nationals.

Screenshots of the “Notable Graves” landing page and sidebar menu on the Arlington National Cemetery website from December (left) and March 12 (right). Links to three lists of Black, Hispanic and female service members buried at the cemetery have been removed in recent weeks, Arlington confirmed, to comply with Pentagon edicts on race- and gender-related policies.

Also gone are dozens of academic lesson plans — some built for classroom use, others as self-guided walking tours — on Arlington’s history and those interred there. Among the documents removed or hidden from the cemetery’s “Education” section are maps and notes for self-guided walking tours to the graves of dozens of Medal of Honor recipients and other maps to notable gravesites for war heroes from each military service. Why information on recipients of the Medal of Honor — the nation’s highest award for combat valor — would be removed is unclear, but three of the service members whose graves were noted in the lessons were awarded the Medal of Honor decades after their combat actions following formal Pentagon reviews that determined they had been denied the award on racial grounds.

Like the “Notable Graves” lists, some of the lesson plans remain live but ‘walled-off’ on the cemetery’s website, with no way to reach them through links on the site. Task & Purpose located the de-linked pages by copying the original URL addresses from archived pages at Archive.org or by searching specifically for the pages on Google, which still lists them.

On at least one page that can still be accessed on search engines, language referring to civil rights or racial issues in the military appears to have been altered. A page on Black soldiers in World War II read in December that they had “served their country and fought for racial justice” but now only notes that memorials in the cemetery “honor their dedication and service.”

Altered language on a since-hidden page on African American History at Arlington National Cemetery. In December, the page was home to over a dozen lesson plans, maps and fact-sheets intended for school groups and visitors. All of those documents have been “unpublished,” according to an Army spokesperson, but will be reposted after they are “updated.”

A spokesperson at Arlington National Cemetery — which is operated by the Army under the Army Office of Cemeteries — confirmed that the pages had been delisted or “unpublished” but insisted that the academic modules would be republished after they are “reviewed and updated.” The spokesperson said no schedule for their return could be provided.

“The Army has taken immediate steps to comply with all executive orders related to diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA) personnel, programs, and policies,” an Army spokesperson at Arlington told Task & Purpose. “The Army will continue to review its personnel, policies, and programs to ensure it remains in compliance with law and presidential orders. Social media and web pages were removed, archived, or changed to avoid noncompliance with executive orders.”

As of March 12, the three original “Notable Graves” lists and the dozens of educational pages appear to still be posted on Arlington’s military domain — arlingtoncemetery.mil — as webpages. Some can be accessed on the cemetery’s website by tracing a multi-click trail of embedded links on other still-public pages. It was unclear if those ‘backdoor’ paths to the pages were left intentionally or were overlooked when the main links to the unpublished pages were removed.

A censorship ‘shitshow’

The removal of the academic lessons hit hard for Civil War historian Kevin Levin, who first noted that Arlington had removed the pages on his substack newsletter. Levin lectures and writes on Civil War history and each year leads trips of history teachers — mostly high school and middle school teachers — through Arlington, so they can better teach students about the cemetery.

Levin noticed that the lessons were missing, he told Task & Purpose, when a teacher he works with tried to prepare a lesson for her students.

“One of the teachers went online and couldn’t find the pages, so that’s when she contacted me,” Levin said. He compared the wholesale removal of entire lesson plans to the recent revelation that photos of the first bomber to drop an atomic bomb had reportedly been marked for removal from a Pentagon photo archive. “I don’t know who did it. If we’re talking about one of these, low-level [Department of Government Efficiency] people or whatever, who has just been given a list of key terms, yeah, kind of the Enola Gay situation, right? It’s got ‘gay’ in it, so we have to delete it, right?”

A photo of Arlington National Cemetery’s Section 27. Army photo.

Levin said Arlington’s own historians often accompany his group’s trips.

“I know the historians and the educators at Arlington, because they meet with our staff every year, and they’ve done a great job of creating lesson plans, they go out of their way to meet with teachers. And I know for a fact that a lot of our teachers are using these lesson plans,” Levin said. “I get the sense that this is being carried out in the sloppiest manner. I get the sense that we’re talking about people who are setting up algorithms and are looking for certain things. I don’t know if this is the end of it. I don’t think it is, I just don’t think these people, whoever is responsible, really knows what they’re doing.”

Levin said he hesitated to post about the missing documents because public exposure could reflect poorly on the professional historians who work at the cemetery and who are “exactly what you want from a federal agency that is responsible for interpreting the past.”

But the slash-and-burn approach to the website, he said, was too much.

“I’ll put it bluntly, this is a shitshow,” he said. “And this one hit home, so I did what I did.”

What’s missing from Arlington’s website

Task & Purpose compared Arlington website pages available on March 12 to copies preserved on Archive.org in December and early January. Between those dates, several web pages appear to have been walled off from public view on the main Army-run Arlington website, though not fully deleted. They are:

Three lists of “Notable Graves” that highlight several dozen gravesites of notable Black, Hispanic and female service members and public figures buried in Arlington. The pages list the location of graves in the cemetery and provide a one-paragraph biography of each person. The pages that host the three lists are still on the website but have been removed from links and navigation menus on the site. They can still be found using Google or other search engines. They were previously linked to on the main page’s side-bar menu that leads visitors to other “Notable Graves” pages, but have been removed.
Also gone are any mention of six educational sections — which an Army spokesperson referred to as “modules” and the website calls “themes” — containing dozens of lesson plans, maps, biographies and other educational information created by Arlington, linking to dozens of documents. The lesson plans covered six topics, ranging from Women’s History to Medal of Honor recipients. The six modules have been removed from both a drop-down menu and from the site’s main Education page.
Under the “History of Arlington National Cemetery” menus, pages on Freedman’s Village (archived version) and Section 27 (archived version) — two fundamental chapters in the cemetery’s post-Civil War history as a home for freed slaves — have been delinked. The pages were still accessible on March 12 among links embedded in the text on the main “History of Arlington” page.
Some pages appear to have had phrases like “civil rights” and “racial justice” erased in favor of cliches referring to “service.”

The sidebar menu of Arlington National Cemetery’s website in December 2024 (left) is currently stripped of links (right) to Freedman’s Village and Section 27, two foundational areas in the cemetery’s origins.

Hidden ‘Notable Graves’ webpages

Some pages, while they do still exist on the Arlington National Cemetery website, cannot be navigated to from the website itself, and have essentially been walled off. Below are direct links to the pages as they exist at time of publication, as well as links to archived versions.

African American History/(archived version): The hidden page of “Notable Graves” of Black service members includes 32 individuals and memorials to five groups, some of which include “co-mingled” remains of members of those groups. The individual graves on the list include dozens of Black veterans and other high-profile Black Americans with ties to the military or high government posts, including Gen. Colin Powell, boxing champion Joe Louis and Supreme Court Chief Justice Thurgood Marshall. The groups on the list include the Contraband militia of freed slaves, the Buffalo Soldiers of the Spanish American War, and the Tuskegee Airmen and 6888th Central Postal Directory Battalion of World War II.
Hispanic American History/(archived version): The unpublished list of “Notable Graves” for Hispanic service members includes nine individuals and a monument to the Borinqueneers, a unit of Puerto Rican soldiers in the Army’s 65th Infantry Regiment, who fought in the Korean War. Among the individual graves on the list is Pvt. Felix Longoria. Born and raised in Texas, Longoria enlisted in the Army in 1944. After he was killed in fighting in Luzon, Philippines on June 16, 1945, his remains were not recovered until 1948. In Texas, a funeral director refused to hold a wake for Longoria because of his Mexican roots. In response, then-Texas Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson authorized Longoria’s remains to be buried at Arlington in February 1949, with Johnson and his wife in attendance. His death and burial at Arlington became known as the “Felix Longoria Affair” and, according to historians, played a significant role in catalyzing Mexican-American political activism.
Women’s History/(archived version): Among the listed “Notable Graves” of women buried at Arlington are Dr. Ollie Josephine Prescott Baird Bennett, a medical doctor who joined the Army in World War I, Maj. Gen. Marcelite Jordan Harris, the Air Force’s first African American female brigadier general, Lt. Kara Spears Hultgreen, the Navy’s first female carrier-based fighter pilot who flew F-14s, and Maj. Marie Therese Rossi, the first American woman to fly helicopters in combat, when she commanded a CH-47 Chinook helicopter company during Desert Storm (she died on a mission ferrying POWs on March 1, 1991, the day after a ceasefire agreement, which kept her from being awarded a posthumous Purple Heart).

Missing educational materials

Six educational modules have been removed from the website’s educational section (archived version here). The modules vary from walking tour maps and fact-sheets to classroom worksheets, PowerPoint presentations and lesson plans. A missing module on Nurses in the Spanish American War included six PowerPoint presentations tailored for elementary, middle school and high school classes.

An archived screenshot (left) of the Arlington National Cemetery website’s educational menus shows tabs that have been removed from public view (right).

Many bear only tangential relations to DEIA-related topics. An Arlington spokesperson confirmed the missing modules cover:

“Civil War” (archived version) – 7 educational modules removed.
“Environment at ANC” (archived version) – page renamed and 1 educational module removed.
“Medal of Honor” (archived version) – 1 module removed with three walking tour guides.
“Service Branches” (archived version) – 5 walking tour modules for notables graves of veterans of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard.
“Women’s History” (archived version) – 7 educational modules removed.
“African-American History” (archived version) – 14 educational modules removed.

According to Archive.org pages, the Civil War section had 5 documents:

A lesson plan designed for high school students that would “prompt analysis of different perspectives on the Civil War” using biographical sketches of those interred at Arlington.
Maps and fact-sheets of a 5-mile self-guided walking tour covering “thousands of Civil War service members,” discussions of why the U.S. Army first occupied the property in 1861 and the “histories of enslavement and emancipation that this land also embodies.”
A half-mile walking tour of Freedman’s Village, a “community of formerly enslaved African Americans, established in 1863” that lies on Arlington property and became the first largely black town in the Washington, D.C. area.
Two modules on Section 27, where thousands of former slaves were buried in the years after the Civil War, often with “citizen” or “civilian” on their tombstone.

Though the lesson plans have been removed from the cemetery’s education page, a few of the documents can still be accessed indirectly. If a visitor navigates to the main “History of Arlington” page, links to the Freedman’s Village page are clickable in the text of the page. On that Freedman’s Village page, links to some of the still-live walking tours and other fact sheets are listed under “Additional Resources.” It’s unclear if these paths were left intentionally or overlooked in the unpublishing process.

‘Unpublished’ Medal of Honor material

But the missing lesson plans also cover topics with no obvious ties to the mandate to remove DEIA-related material, including three self-guided walking tours for the graves of Medal of Honor recipients. Each tour covers about 10 Medal of Honor recipients with directions to their graves and biographical fact-sheets.

An archived screenshot from the Arlington National Cemetery website (left) alongside a recent screenshot (right) showing changes to its Walking Tours: Medal of Honor section.

Also missing are links to material Arlington dubbed “Honoring the Service Branches,” which until recently listed links to maps and fact-sheets for tours aimed at gravesites of specific notable members of the Marine Corps, Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard. The page that previously held that material has been delinked and is blank.

A screenshot of Arlington National Cemetery’s website (left) alongside a recent screenshot (right) showing changes to its “Honoring the Service Branches” section.

None of the fact-sheets previously linked in the Medal of Honor or Service Branches pages mentioned the terms “diversity,” “equity,” or “inclusion,” according to archived copies reviewed by Task & Purpose.

The Service Branches fact-sheets appear to contain a glancing reference to racial and gender disparities in military history. For example, the walking tour fact-sheet focused on notable Navy graves covers about a dozen, including Rear Adm. Richard Byrd, Fleet Adm. William “Bull” Halsey and a monument to the USS Maine. The pamphlet also includes three women, including Rear Adm. Grace Hopper, and one half-page essay entitled “Women in Combat” that reviews the history of women in naval service.

A page from an unpublished walking tour guide on gravesites of notable Navy veterans at Arlington National Cemetery.

It may be a similar story for the material struck from the cemetery’s Medal of Honor educational page.

For example, the walking guide of the central part of the cemetery highlights four of the best-known graves in the cemetery: the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, 1st Lt. Audie Murphy, Gen. James “Jimmy” Doolittle and Marine Gunnery Sgt. John Basilone, along with Lt. Vernon Baker.

Baker, a World War II soldier, saw his Medal upgraded in later reviews, along with Sgt. Henry Johnson from World War II and Sgt. Cornelius Charlton, who fought in the Korean War. Johnson and Charlton are highlighted on two other walking tours that have been hidden from view on the website.

Baker was, according to his citation and the now-unpublished Arlington fact sheet, a one-man wrecking crew as a platoon commander during an assault on a German artillery post in Castle Aghinolfi, Italy in April 1945. Facing heavy fire, he shot his way past lines of defenders, survived a dud grenade landing next to him, and — moving forward alone — used his own grenades to blow open hatches to artillery bunkers. With 19 of his platoon’s 25 soldiers wounded or dead in the attack, he kept up his assault on machine gun nests to cover the platoon’s withdrawal.

In 1997, Baker’s Distinguished Service Cross for the fighting was upgraded to the Medal of Honor after the 1997 review, along with six other Black soldiers. Baker was the only of the seven still alive.

Vernon died in 2010, the walking tour fact-sheet says, and is interred at Arlington, Section 59, Grave 4408.

The latest on Task & Purpose

Soldiers in Alaska landed their Black Hawk on a train in a special ops exercise
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Fort Moore renamed Benning, this time for a corporal who fought heroically in WWI
In 15 months, the Navy fired more air defense missiles than it did in the last 30 years
The Army’s top enlisted leader goes dark on social media

Matt White

Senior Editor

Matt White is a senior editor at Task & Purpose. He was a pararescueman in the Air Force and the Alaska Air National Guard for eight years and has more than a decade of experience in daily and magazine journalism.

taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White

19. Peace or no peace, America can and should arm Ukraine

Peace or no peace, America can and should arm Ukraine

Defense News · by Bradley Bowman and Ryan Brobst · March 13, 2025

We may be on the verge of peace in Ukraine — or not. Either way, the United States will need to continue providing Kyiv weapons. That’s because, despite significant progress, Europe still lacks the military-industrial might to replace the United States and meet Ukraine’s and NATO’s deterrent requirements.

A failure to arm Ukraine will increase the chances that the Kremlin will come back for even more Ukrainian territory in the future. The good news is that the United States can afford to provide Ukraine security assistance and has the means to do so without materially delaying the provision of weapons to Taiwan.

This assertion may surprise some, but consider some facts.

The United States has provided about $67 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since Feb 24, 2022, when Putin launched his massive, unprovoked re-invasion. That may sound like an enormous sum, but it actually equates to less than 3 percent of what Washington spent on the Pentagon over the same time period.

And what did Americans get for that relatively modest investment?

U.S. aid has helped Ukraine destroy over 10,500 tanks and other armored vehicles, over 270 aircraft, and a significant portion of the Russian Black Sea fleet. These losses, which will take Russia many years to replace, decrease Putin’s ability to launch further acts of aggression, both against Ukraine and America’s NATO allies.

In short, thanks to Ukrainian bravery and sacrifice — and American weapons — Russia is even weaker relative to the United States and may be less eager and certainly less able to launch future aggression.

That sustainable level of U.S. support for Ukraine has also sent a valuable deterrent message to adversaries elsewhere contemplating additional aggression, including to the Kremlin’s authoritarian “no limit” partner in Beijing, which is considering whether it should try to conquer the free people of Taiwan.

If the United States does not have the political will to provide Ukraine the means of self-defense without putting any U.S. service members in harm’s way, Beijing is likely to conclude Washington will not send Americans to fight in the Taiwan Strait, thereby making Beijing’s aggression more likely.

But does the United States have the industrial capacity to simultaneously arm Ukraine and Taiwan? Or must it choose between them?

We examined 15 major weapons systems and munitions committed to both Ukraine and Taiwan and found that their provision to Kyiv did not delay the delivery of any of them to Taipei by more than a year.

Why is that?

First, the two U.S. partners have somewhat different needs due to their geography and the nature of their actual or potential conflicts.

Second, where there is overlap, the respective production lines are often healthy and/or expanding. For example, the production of Javelin missiles, which the Trump administration provided to Ukraine after the Obama administration refused to do so, is set to double over the next few years.

Third, in several cases, such as TOW missiles, the United States possesses a large inventory or stockpile of the relevant system, which enables its rapid provision to partners from U.S. inventories.

Fourth, most of the weapons Taipei seeks from the United States are being acquired through contracts for new systems, such as the AIM-120C-8 air-to-air missile. By contrast, most of the weapons sent to Kyiv have been older systems already fielded by the U.S. military.

When a neighbor’s home has been stormed by a serial home invader, it is smart to support your neighbor and oppose the intruder. Otherwise, one should expect more home invasions in the future — some of which may be much more costly.

Thankfully, the United States can afford to provide Ukrainians the weapons they need to defend their homes against invading Russian forces, and doing so need not come at the expense of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Perhaps that is why Taiwan has urged support for Ukraine.

Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Ryan Brobst is a senior research analyst.

20. Ukraine Needs US Weapons But It Needs Intelligence More

Ukraine Needs US Weapons But It Needs Intelligence More

Shutting off the flow of information for a few days cost Ukraine countless lives, and Putin will want Trump to do it again before any ceasefire.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-03-13/ukraine-needs-us-weapons-but-it-needs-intelligence-more?sref=h

March 13, 2025 at 12:00 AM EDT

By James Stavridis

James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group.

One of Ukraine’s eyes in the sky. Photographer: Genya Savilov/AFP/Getty Image

Over the past couple of weeks, America’s Ukrainian partners have been riding a roller-coaster of President Donald Trump’s making. The low point was the disastrous blow-up in the Oval Office between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, which led to the US cutting off military aid and intelligence sharing until the Ukrainians were “ready for peace.”

In recent days, after US-Ukraine meetings in Saudi Arabia, things may seem better. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz appear to have somewhat mended the relationship and have a ceasefire proposal to present to Moscow. Most importantly for the Ukrainians, this has come with a reopening of the taps on military assistance and, above all, on intelligence.

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The problem is that, on issue after issue, Trump changes course on a whim. And given the Kremlin’s apparent insistence that any ceasefire include a halt on US military assistance, the Ukranians are living under a Sword of Damocles.

You may think the key resource for the Ukrainian military is hardware: artillery shells, tanks, armored personnel carriers, cruise missiles, air-defense missiles. And yes, those are all crucial. But what really put my heart in my throat was the stoppage of intelligence sharing.

Why is that flow so vital? How would stopping it again affect the Ukrainians’ ability to hold off Russia’s more powerful military?

When I was supreme allied commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2011, we conducted a complex operation in Libya against Moammar Al Qaddafi’s military. The dictator had threatened to massacre rebels in the eastern part of Libya, swearing he would make the streets of Benghazi run with blood. So the UN Security Council requested that NATO institute a no-fly zone over the entire country to negate Qaddafi’s advantage in air power; create a maritime arms embargo so he could not be rearmed from the sea; and conduct airstrikes to prevent him from slaughtering civilians.

This was a major undertaking, and included strikes led by the US with support from 14 NATO countries, Sweden (not then in NATO) and Arab partners: Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Operation Unified Protector lasted nearly eight months, and we launched more than 25,000 combat air missions and dropped some 7,000 bombs and missiles. The key lesson for me as the overall operational commander was simple: There is no underestimating the power of information, intelligence and imagery.

These are really three different but complementary intel resources for a military commander, especially one conducting air operations — as the Ukrainians are doing, despite being so outgunned in the skies over their own territory. They are crucial to not only prevailing in combat, but also to protecting the civilian population when a murderous opponent like Russian President Vladimir Putin violates the laws of war and bombs indiscriminately.

Let’s start with the broadest category: information. In a combat context, this is the ability to tap into open-source data for military advantage. This has always been an important component of war, but with the rise of mass communications in the 20th century — and of course today’s internet and social networks — it has never been more crucial. An example in Ukraine is the use of artificial intelligence to surveil huge tranches of data from Russian media, Russians’ personal social networks, government announcements and the behavior of Russia’s commercial sector. This helps discern the enemy’s capacity to continue the war, its recruiting trends, civilian morale, the flow of draft dodgers departing the country, and other key indicators. While not classified, such information can be assembled like a mosaic to find valuable insights that can become actionable at the operational and tactical levels.

Next and most obviously is the gathering of intelligence. This involves obtaining the answers to the “known unknowns” on the battlefield. How will the Russians divide their forces between the current offensives in Donbas and Kursk? How many air sorties will Moscow launch over the next week? What are their targets? Where are they storing fuel, ordnance and unmanned aircraft? Where, when and how — in real time — are the Russian bombers, missiles and drones going to be coming against Ukrainian cities.

Intelligence is a difficult and intricate mix of human reporting; data from overhead sensors like long-dwell drones; electronic signal collection (cell phones, UHF radio communications); cyber intrusions to collect the most sensitive information; hyperspectral analysis and a host of other tools. Intelligence is the superpower of the US military: No other NATO ally can come close to matching American capabilities in collection, analysis and dissemination. It has been freely shared with Ukraine, and it has been a major part of keeping it in the fight.

When I commanded US European Command from Stuttgart, Germany, a decade ago, I marveled at the Star Trek-like intelligence fusion center in my headquarters, where enormous technical abilities were combined with brightest analytic human minds. Believe me, when Washington suddenly cut off intelligence last week, for the Ukrainians it would have been like being in the boxing ring and suddenly having a blindfold put over your eyes.

And finally, there is imagery, generated by overhead sensors. If we know that big shipments of fuel are moving toward a key destination, we can direct the unblinking eye of our satellites to provide photographic images and video. In war, a picture isn’t worth a thousand words — it is worth a million at least. Imagery provides the roadmap to reverse-engineer and destroy your enemy’s campaign plan and logistics.

I’m heartened by the White House’s decision to restart intelligence cooperation with the Ukrainians. It is hard to overstate how damaging cutting it off even for a few days has been, and Ukrainians have died as a result. Let’s hope the US keeps up the flow of information, intelligence and imagery, despite Putin’s unacceptable conditions for any ceasefire. Getting to a meaningful halt in the fighting and eventual peace deal will require the Ukrainians to keep punching above their weight. They can’t do that with a blindfold on.

‘Peace Through Strength’ Starts with Rebuilding the US Air Force

March 13, 2025 | By Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula USAF (Ret.) and Douglas A. Birkey

airandspaceforces.com · · March 13, 2025

March 13, 2025 | By Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula USAF (Ret.) and Douglas A. Birkey

“Airpower, anytime” is, as Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. David Allvin recently declared, a promise the Air Force must uphold for the nation. “We have to sustain and maintain the ability to go anytime, anywhere in the densest threat environment and put ‘warheads on foreheads’ anywhere the President might want.” He is right.

The roles and missions executed by Air Force warriors are essential to the nation’s security. Yet after three decades of constant demand and minimal replenishment, our Air Force is too small and too old. It needs to be rebuilt. The Trump administration and Congress must fund that modernization to ensure that the Air Force is sufficiently equipped, sized, and ready to fight and win when necessary. The nation’s security depends on it.

Air Force Underfunded for Decades

The challenges facing the Air Force stem from executing non-stop combat operations since 1990—longer than any other service. Operations Desert Storm, Northern and Southern Watch, Deliberate Force, Allied Force, Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, Unified Protector, Inherent Resolve, and additional engagements demanded much from the Air Force. Other services participated in some of these, but only the Air Force engaged in all of them. Post-Cold War budgets failed to keep pace with the demands on the Service. In the wake of the Berlin Wall falling, Department of the Air Force procurement funding plunged 52 percent, deeper than cuts to the Navy, at 32 percent or the Army at 40 percent.

Later, the Air Force became the bill-payer for U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq: In the 20 years after the 9/11 attacks, national investment in the Army outstripped spending on the Air Force by $1.3 trillion; spending on the Navy was over $900 billion greater than the Air Force. Further spending reductions spurred by the 2011 Budget Control Act cut billions more from the Air Force, undermining readiness, reducing capacity, and slowing modernization.

Virtually every Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force for the past several decades has identified the risks of the consistent underfunding of the Department of the Air Force.

“Budget pressures are forcing us to be a smaller Air Force,” said Secretary Michael W. Wynne in 2007.

“We can’t continue to cut force structure to pay the cost of readiness and modernization, or we risk being too small to succeed,” said Chief of Staff Mark Welsh in 2015.

“The Air Force is too small for the missions demanded of it,” said Secretary Heather Wilson in 2017.

Doing more with less for too long will break any military service. The Air Force is on that precipice. It is now the smallest, oldest, and least prepared in its entire history—a dangerous reality given the scale and scope of the threat environment. Worse, Biden’s last budget plans—still in effect—have the Air Force scheduled to get even smaller by 2030. Now Gen. Allvin has made it clear that “America needs more Air Force.”

At the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Air Force had more than 4,300 fighters; today it has just over 2,000—less than half as many. The Air Force had 410 bombers in 1989, but just 140 today—over 65 percent less. Airlifters, aerial refuelers, command and control types, plus intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft are also down substantially.

It is not just that the Air Force is smaller. It is also less ready. On any given day, only 54 percent of all of its aircraft are available due to maintenance issues and parts shortages worsened by ever increasing age. Apply that reality and those 2,000 fighters and 140 bombers drop to just 1,093 and 76, respectively. The fact is, when needed, 46 percent of all USAF aircraft cannot do what combatant commanders need them to do. On top of this, concurrent demands in multiple theaters—including homeland defense, Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific—take a small Air Force inventory and spread it thinner. Not only do combatant commanders not have enough in their Air Force components to meet peacetime missions, but in a time of war, the capacity gaps could prove catastrophic.

Risk of War Dramatically Increasing

Yet today, the risk of major war is greater than at any time since the Berlin Wall fell. The U.S. and China are increasingly locked in a rivalry that spans economic, technological, and military spheres. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to the most significant war in Europe since World War II, and Moscow’s rhetoric around nuclear weapons makes the situation even more precarious. The combination of heightened geopolitical tensions between the U.S., China, and Russia, regional flashpoints, and new threats like cyber warfare, all contribute to an intensely dangerous international environment. The risk of miscalculation, aggressive posturing, and the breakdown of diplomatic channels all increase the potential for conflict.

Since the end of the Cold War, Air Force leaders across multiple decades received insufficient funding to buy enough new aircraft. Divestments of aging airframes outpaced new aircraft procurement for too long. The service now finds itself in a force structure nosedive. In the Biden administration’s 2025 budget request, the Air Force sought to divest 250 aircraft, while buying just 91. That math becomes terminal at some point, which is how the nation risks losing the next war.

Rebuild the Air Force America Requires

Among the Air Force’s 140 bombers, just 19 are stealthy B-2s that can rapidly strike targets anywhere on the planet with virtually no fear of detection. The largest USAF bomber fleet is comprised of 76 B-52s—jets that average 63 years old. Only 28 percent of the Air Force fighters are fifth-generation aircraft, which possess the stealth, sensors, processing power, electronic warfare capabilities, and connectivity necessary to survive in the modern battlespace. The mobility and training fleets are also long in the tooth: T-38 trainers and KC-135 tankers predate the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, and airlifters are on average a quarter century old.

Getting healthy will involve accelerating acquisition rates for aircraft like the F-35, F-15EX, Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), KC-46, T-7, and others. The Air Force must also continue to modernize types like the MQ-9, F-22, F-16, B-52, C-5, C-130, C-17, and KC-135. On top of this, the Air Force needs to recapitalize two legs of the nuclear triad with the Sentential intercontinental ballistic missile and the B-21 bomber.

Rebuilding the Air Force involves more than new equipment. Underfunding is also causing dangerous risk when it comes to the readiness of pilots and other crew members. At the recent AFA Warfare Symposium, Gen. Allvin shared a chart showing that the Air Force has been unable to meet its total “required flying hours” since 2017—gradually degrading overall pilot proficiency. With fewer aircraft available, pilots cannot fly the training sorties needed to maintain mission qualifications.

Current Air Force leaders, like so many of their predecessors, are committed to fixing these deficiencies, but they cannot do so without additional resources. President Trump’s goal of peace through strength demands an Air Force with the capacity, capability, and readiness to meet our collective combatant command requirements for America’s defense. This is not just for the Air Force’s sake—it’s about ensuring the U.S. does not lose the next war. No form of U.S. joint power projection is possible without some element of the Department of the Air Force.

Gen. Allvin sums up what is at stake: “I think we need more options for the President. And that’s what more Air Force provides. It means everything from rapid response all the way to decisive victory.”

It is time to heed this call for action before it is too late. It is time to rebuild the Air Force the nation requires.

David A. Deptula is a retired Air Force lieutenant general and dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, and Douglas A. Birkey is the Mitchell Institute’s Executive Director.

AFA Warfare Symposium

Air

airandspaceforces.com · by Tobias Naegele · March 13, 2025

22. Getting Out of Forever Wars

Conclusion:

The post-9/11 wars have cost the United States $8 trillion, nearly a million lives directly and indirectly, and decades of overstretched resources—losses no nation can sustain indefinitely. To secure its interests, the U.S. must pivot from endless military entanglements to a strategy of calculated restraint: reducing outdated overseas commitments, redirecting funds to homeland defense and economic resilience, and leaning on diplomacy and allied cooperation to project influence.

This shift isn’t retreat—it’s recalibration. By prioritizing what strengthens the nation, from border security to soft power, America can safeguard its future without repeating its past mistakes.

Getting Out of Forever Wars

By Don McGregor

March 14, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/03/14/getting_out_of_forever_wars_1097553.html?mc_cid=e4aae97a1d

A Pragmatic Approach to Protecting U.S. Security Interests

Introduction

Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has been mired in "forever wars"—prolonged conflicts with no clear victory, draining trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and economic vitality. A 2023 Pew poll shows 54% of Americans favor reducing overseas military commitments, with 83% prioritizing domestic needs—a clear call for change.

The U.S. can no longer afford years of military overreach. A pragmatic strategy emphasizing diplomacy, allied burden-sharing, and strategic restraint is essential to protect national interests without exhausting finite resources.

The Overwhelming Cost of War

The post-9/11 wars have exacted a staggering toll. Brown University’s Costs of War Project estimates the U.S. has spent $8 trillion—38% of 2020’s GDP—on conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria, equating to $24,000 per citizen.

Future interest on this debt could add $2.2 trillion to the national debt by 2050, burdening future generations. Human losses are equally dire: 7,000 service members and 8,000 contractors killed, 55,000 injured, and 940,000 total deaths from direct violence, with 3.6 million more dying indirectly in war zones.

Beyond numbers, the mental health crisis is profound. Veterans and active-duty personnel from these conflicts have died by suicide at four times the rate of combat losses—over 28,000 since 2001, according to 2022 VA data – mainly driven by post-traumatic stress disorder and repeated deployments.

Adding to the exhausting cost of conflict, caring for these veterans will cost $2.2-$2.5 trillion by 2050. These financial and human costs prove the wars’ unsustainability; constrained resources and public concerns require the U.S. to reassess its global security approach.

Rethinking Overseas Commitments

The U.S. maintains 750 military facilities across 80 countries, per a 2021 International Institute of Strategic Studies, at an annual cost of $80 billion—$55 billion for bases alone. The Quincy Institute reports that 91% of post-9/11 operations relied on these bases. Yet, they’ve often fueled instability—think of the disorder stemming from Iraq’s insurgency or Afghanistan’s collapse—rather than the security they were supposed to provide. This sprawling footprint, born of Cold War logic, no longer aligns with today’s fiscal environment, demanding a leaner, more practical approach.

A Pragmatic Path Forward

Some argue that overseas military bases help deter terrorism, but the evidence suggests otherwise. According to the Cato Institute (2023), the probability of dying in a U.S. terrorist attack is just 1 in 150 million.

Since 9/11, America has experienced nine terrorist attacks, resulting in a total of 44 deaths. In contrast, during the same period, the U.S. military suffered over 7,000 fatalities and 55,000 injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan, raising questions about the purpose of military operations overseas.

The cost alone is staggering. According to a Cato Institute report, a conservative baseline for total overseas basing costs is $80 billion annually, with some estimates reaching $100-$150 billion. This reflects differing indirect expenses, like troop support, highlighting the obscurity of overseas spending.

A 2023 RAND study also found that 30% of bases lack strategic purpose. A 25% reduction, focusing on outdated Cold War sites and unproductive Middle East efforts, would save $15 billion annually.

However, completely withdrawing is unwise; bases in Japan and Germany still deter Russia and China and allow forces to posture when needed. Closing outdated posts in stable regions—like parts of Europe or Asia—frees billions for pressing domestic defense needs.

The use of hard power has become overextended, yielding little success and eventually weighing heavily on the American public. A more effective strategy entails carefully reducing America’s overseas presence, reallocating resources, and reprioritizing homeland defense.

Strengthening Homeland Defense

President Trump’s campaign emphasized ending long-term military engagements, reducing overseas commitments, and reprioritizing defense strategies to enhance defending the homeland.

His 2025 executive order for an “Iron Dome” system reflects this shift, focusing on missile defense against nuclear and newer hypersonic weaponry from advancing adversaries. However, these initiatives currently face funding challenges.

The FY2024 defense budget ($850 billion) allocates $69 billion to overseas operations—defending allies—while just $29.8 billion (3.5%) boosts missile defense, unchanged since 2019.

Redirecting even half of that $69 billion could modernize defenses, aligning spending with existential risks over foreign entanglements.

However, missile defense is not the only way to protect the nation. It also demands attention to vulnerabilities closer to home, such as securing the borders—another pillar of homeland security.

Securing the Border

Border security, a neglected homeland priority, ties directly to resource reallocation. In FY2024, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) logged 3 million encounters at the southern border—up 400% from the 700,000 in the 2020s—costing an estimated $130 billion, challenging public safety and straining national security.

To help tackle this unprecedented challenge, President Trump's recent executive orders, which declare a national emergency at the southern border and direct the military to support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in safeguarding the nation's territorial integrity, highlight the priority of protecting the homeland.

DHS has also ramped up the activities of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), leading to a significant 627% increase in the detainment of criminal aliens since January. This surge has prompted DHS to request additional military assistance to aid the detainment process. As a result, more military troops are being deployed to support CBP along the border, and the military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay is being repurposed to accommodate the detention of criminal migrants.

While reallocating military resources from overseas commitments to border security can effectively address domestic threats without requiring additional spending, as illustrated by Secretary of Defense Hegseth's recent decision to shift eight percent of the FY26 defense budget toward homeland priorities, this approach also highlights a more significant imbalance in U.S. defense spending.

Burden Sharing Security

Disproportionate global security commitments add to the problem, as the U.S. must push NATO allies to meet their 2% GDP defense spending target—America spent twice their combined total from 2014 to 2022.

Leading allies, like the United Kingdom and Germany, spend less as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with the U.S. shouldering a disproportionate burden of European defense. Additionally, the U.S. upholds numerous other global security agreements that extend well beyond Europe, such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative—a U.S.-only defense investment and activity used to counter China that costs $10B annually.

The United States can no longer bear the burden of defending others. It must reassess its global security stance and agreements to ensure that costs are shared equitably. A balanced use of projecting power is needed to secure American influence abroad.

Balancing Power Projection

America’s decades-old philosophy of fighting its battles on someone else’s property remains vital to national security. A platform that can project US power quickly and support those efforts remains relevant.

Overseas “power projection platforms”—like overseas mobility bases and carriers in the Pacific—are necessary, enabling rapid response and sustainment to a crisis. However, basing that does not support projecting power should be reconsidered for closure. Trimming these frees funds for soft power—diplomacy and economic leverage—that achieves similar ends at a lower cost.

Harnessing Soft Power

Soft power—persuading through attraction, not force—offers a sustainable edge. Diplomacy can preempt conflicts that mimic hard power wins, such as the ceasefire that paused fighting in Sudan, allowing 150,000 to flee safely and aid to reach 500,000, per UNHCR reports.

Diplomacy can also secure trade deals, such as the 2020 U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement, which cut tariffs and secured U.S. farm exports to counter China’s trade dominance. Yet, while diplomacy can secure trade wins to help balance its trade, its effectiveness diminishes when multilateral agreements lead to persistent inequities.

For example, the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a multilateral trade agreement, incurred a deficit of $913 billion in 2024, a 12 percent increase ($97.7 billion) over 2023. Further, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, America’s total global goods and services deficit was $918.4 billion in 2024, up $133.5 billion from $784.9 billion in 2023.

This unsustainable trend indicates that the U.S. needs to rethink its negotiating approach in line with more equitable agreements that work directly with each partner, making adherence and fairness more manageable.

However, diplomacy and trade agreements alone cannot guarantee a nation's security. Economic strength is vitally important and underwrites all its activities, making it essential to influence, leverage, and safeguard its interests.

Prioritizing Economic Security

The U.S. economy—$29 trillion in 2024, 25% of global wealth—thrives on energy, innovation, and resilience. For example, since 2019, an 8-quadrillion-BTU energy surplus has fueled energy exports, supporting Europe against Russia and countering Iran. Energy independence and growth are critical in maintaining America’s edge over rivals and securing its position as a preeminent global power.

However, the U.S. must address significant financial challenges, including its $34 trillion national debt and nearly $2 trillion budget deficit. While the U.S. currently has an economic advantage over China, purchasing power parity, or how much your currency can buy, shows that China leads by 23% and is growing. More concerning is that experts predict that China will surpass the total U.S. economy by 2040.

Remaining a global leader requires economic security and realigning priorities. Protecting against rising financial challenges and economic juggernauts like China means redirecting excessive global commitments to infrastructure and tech, not unproductive overseas commitments.

Conclusion

The post-9/11 wars have cost the United States $8 trillion, nearly a million lives directly and indirectly, and decades of overstretched resources—losses no nation can sustain indefinitely. To secure its interests, the U.S. must pivot from endless military entanglements to a strategy of calculated restraint: reducing outdated overseas commitments, redirecting funds to homeland defense and economic resilience, and leaning on diplomacy and allied cooperation to project influence.

This shift isn’t retreat—it’s recalibration. By prioritizing what strengthens the nation, from border security to soft power, America can safeguard its future without repeating its past mistakes.

Major General Don McGregor (USAF, ret.) is a combat veteran and an F-16 fighter pilot. While serving as a General Officer in the Pentagon, he was the National Guard Director of Strategy, Policy, Plans, and International Affairs, advising a four-star Joint Chiefs of Staff member.

23. Autonomy Has Outpaced International Space Law

Excerpts:

As commercial space activities expand and more state and non-state actors deploy autonomous space systems, the risk of accident increases exponentially. The recent growth in satellite launches — with over 7,000 active satellites now in orbit — has already strained the ability to manage space traffic. Adding more autonomous systems — and ones eventually capable of decision-making through AI — to this increasingly crowded environment without updating the legal framework invites potential disaster. The need for change is clear to anyone training the next generation of space professionals.

Every year, cadets at the Air Force Academy grapple with scenarios that highlight the growing disconnect between current space law and operational realities. For instance, do anti-satellite missile tests constitute harmful interference with another space actor? While the existing legal interpretation on the issue is unclear, crowded satellite constellations in low earth orbit suggest that they do. Cadets’ insights regularly remind me that they are training to operate in a space environment governed by legal frameworks that long predate today’s technology.

The time has come to align international space law, especially the concept of harmful interference, with the era of autonomous and AI-enabled space operations. The United States should update its legal frameworks to account for autonomous systems while upholding the Outer Space Treaty’s core principles of international cooperation and mutual benefit in space activities.

Maintaining the status quo risks rendering Article IX meaningless, precisely at a time when the United States should have strong legal frameworks to manage an increasingly complex space environment. The success of commercial space ventures, the safety of military space operations, and the sustainable development of space activities all depend on the ability to adapt international law to this new reality. Continuing to operate autonomous systems under legal frameworks that never contemplated their existence risks turning space into a domain where technology outpaces the ability to govern it safely and responsibly.

Autonomy Has Outpaced International Space Law - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Matthew Ormsbee · March 14, 2025

In 2021, a Starlink satellite and OneWeb spacecraft came dangerously close to colliding in orbit. While both companies’ automated systems detected a potential collision, the incident sparked intense debate about communication and de-confliction between autonomous space systems. As competing satellite operators increasingly rely on automated collision avoidance software to manage their growing constellations, this near-miss highlights a crucial gap in international outer space law: Legal frameworks never contemplated a future where automated systems, sometimes guided by AI, would make critical decisions in outer space that could constitute “harmful interference” under existing international law — that is, when a country’s space operations intrude on the activities of other countries operating in space.

Integrating autonomy into space operations has created a fundamental mismatch between the state-based, human-centric communication requirements of existing space law and the realities of autonomous space systems operated by both state and non-state actors. As I teach cadets at the United States Air Force Academy — some of whom will become operators managing these very systems — it has become clear that the existing understanding of harmful interference in space is dangerously outdated.

To address the problem, the United States should work to modernize the legal framework governing space activities. The effort should focus on embracing instantaneous consultations between non-human actors to avoid space collisions, updating standards for harmful interference to include the potential for cascading damage in space, and amending U.S. space policy to identify when automated systems make decisions. The proliferation of AI-enabled autonomous systems in space and mounting collision-avoidance incidents in recent years demand an urgent update to international space law.

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A 20th Century Legal Framework Collides With 21st Century Technology

The scope of the problem of overcrowded outer space extends far beyond individual collision avoidance scenarios. Today’s space operations increasingly rely on automated systems for everything from debris tracking and satellite navigation to power management and communication routing. Such systems make thousands of small but crucial operational decisions daily, potentially affecting the activities of other space actors. The European Space Agency employs machine learning algorithms to predict collisions and automatically adjust satellite orbits, while the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Blackjack program develops autonomous satellite constellations that can independently coordinate their decisions and maneuver without human input from the ground.

In November 2024, Oman launched its first satellite for remote sensing that relies on AI for real-time data processing. Additionally, SpaceX made tens of thousands of autonomous collision-avoidance maneuvers in the first six months of 2024. The rapid proliferation of data processing and collision avoidance systems has created an operational environment that the drafters of the key outer space treaty could not have envisioned.

Article IX of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies — or the “Outer Space Treaty” — requires that both states and non-state actors undertake “appropriate international consultations” before proceeding with any activity that may harmfully interfere with the actions of other entities. This requirement assumed that operators would have time to communicate and, if necessary, de-conflict actions that might affect others. However, the reality of modern space operations has rendered this Cold War–era assumption obsolete. When automated systems make split-second decisions to alter a satellite’s orbit to avoid collisions, there is no time for the kind of consultation envisioned by the treaty. Moreover, such autonomous maneuvers may constitute harmful interference. In 2021, China’s Tiangong space station was forced to maneuver twice to avoid potential collisions with two SpaceX Starlink satellites. A Chinese source questioned whether SpaceX deliberately sought to test China’s sensitivity to close approaches.

The presence of autonomous systems in space exposes three critical flaws in the Outer Space Treaty. First, the treaty’s consultation requirement implicitly assumes human decision-making timelines that are slower than autonomous systems. Second, the standard for what constitutes harmful interference fails to account for the complex interdependencies created by networked autonomous systems. Third, disagreements between powerful countries have precluded the treaty from being updated to account for attributing responsibility when autonomous systems interact with each other.

New Developments and Near Misses

Legal issues lead to real-world challenges when satellites with autonomous systems begin to overcrowd orbits. In March 2023, an Astroscale debris-removal demonstration showcased how autonomous systems challenge the traditional understanding of harmful interference. The mission’s AI-driven mechanism for capturing in-orbit satellites made independent decisions about approaching debris, potentially raising the alarm about liability and consent that existing space law fails to consider. Similarly, OneWeb’s deployment of autonomous orbit-raising capabilities represents a significant shift toward autonomous space operations that can affect multiple actors simultaneously.

The U.S. Air Force’s Global Futures Report predicts that by 2035 most military and commercial space operations will rely heavily on autonomous systems. This shift is already evident in programs like the Space Development Agency’s National Defense Space Architecture, which envisions a constellation of satellites capable of autonomous threat response and collaborative decision-making. These systems interact with commercial autonomous platforms, creating complex webs of autonomous and, eventually, AI-driven decision-making that far exceed the scope of current space law.

Consider the implications of the breakthrough in autonomous space system coordination by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Blackjack Program. The program showed that AI-enabled satellites could independently adjust their orbits, modify their communication patterns, and respond to potential threats without human intervention. While this capability enhances operational resilience, it also raises questions about interference when multiple autonomous systems interact in ways that affect each other’s missions. The Astroscale and OneWeb examples reflect how private actors can match and exceed government autonomy efforts. Increased levels of autonomy, while operationally efficient, create scenarios where automated systems must balance competing priorities in ways that affect other space actors’ activities.

Proposing a New Legal Framework

To address the integration of autonomy in space, the United States can take three steps toward establishing a new legal framework governing such activity. First, the United States should establish clear parameters for communications between automated systems. Space operators require greater transparency when autonomous systems are used in orbit by others, but operators should also reveal the extent to which they rely on autonomy for their systems. The United States should enforce clear usage of autonomy in space (and potential liability) using preexisting licensing requirements. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration currently licenses all launches and reentries from space. Additionally, the Federal Communications Commission allocates the radio frequency spectrum through which U.S. operators communicate with their satellites. These gatekeeper functions authorize space activities and can take steps to enforce the responsible use of automated systems in space. This is even more vital as AI is more likely to be integrated into space systems in the future.

Second, the United States should develop an updated definition for harmful interference in space, considering the cumulative effects of autonomous systems’ interactions. This definition should include an updated framework for fault-based liability as well as the possibility of cascading effects following a collision in space. If a space operator’s automated system causes a collision, that state must be liable for immediate damage and follow-on damage from space debris. This would lead to more responsible use of autonomous space systems, putting space actors on notice and encouraging responsible use of autonomy. With greater predictability for the use of autonomy in space, other states might follow the U.S. example.

Finally, space operators would benefit from legal frameworks to attribute responsibility when automated systems make decisions that affect other operators. The first Trump administration recognized the need for such updates through Space Policy Directive-5, which called for new approaches to space system cybersecurity and automated processes. Additional measures should now be taken to regulate the reckless use of new or experimental types of autonomy in space, such as establishing a “reasonable person” standard for attributing responsibility.

In making these moves, the United States could account for the rapid proliferation of autonomous space systems operated by state and non-state actors. However, any lasting change on this issue would likely need to be made through a multilateral effort. Ideally, this should take place through a U.N. framework such as the Outer Space Treaty.

The Stakes Are High

As commercial space activities expand and more state and non-state actors deploy autonomous space systems, the risk of accident increases exponentially. The recent growth in satellite launches — with over 7,000 active satellites now in orbit — has already strained the ability to manage space traffic. Adding more autonomous systems — and ones eventually capable of decision-making through AI — to this increasingly crowded environment without updating the legal framework invites potential disaster. The need for change is clear to anyone training the next generation of space professionals.

Every year, cadets at the Air Force Academy grapple with scenarios that highlight the growing disconnect between current space law and operational realities. For instance, do anti-satellite missile tests constitute harmful interference with another space actor? While the existing legal interpretation on the issue is unclear, crowded satellite constellations in low earth orbit suggest that they do. Cadets’ insights regularly remind me that they are training to operate in a space environment governed by legal frameworks that long predate today’s technology.

The time has come to align international space law, especially the concept of harmful interference, with the era of autonomous and AI-enabled space operations. The United States should update its legal frameworks to account for autonomous systems while upholding the Outer Space Treaty’s core principles of international cooperation and mutual benefit in space activities.

Maintaining the status quo risks rendering Article IX meaningless, precisely at a time when the United States should have strong legal frameworks to manage an increasingly complex space environment. The success of commercial space ventures, the safety of military space operations, and the sustainable development of space activities all depend on the ability to adapt international law to this new reality. Continuing to operate autonomous systems under legal frameworks that never contemplated their existence risks turning space into a domain where technology outpaces the ability to govern it safely and responsibly.

Become a Member

Matthew Ormsbee is an assistant professor of law and the director of space law at the United States Air Force Academy. He earned his master’s degree in air and space law from McGill University in 2023. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U. S. Air Force Academy, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Image: European Space Agency via Wikimedia Commons.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Matthew Ormsbee · March 14, 2025

24. A Better Way to Defend America

I cannot agree to stationing fewer forces in Asia but that is my professional bias.

I do agree that we need to understand the world as it is and what it might look like in the future and plan accordingly.

Excerpt:

Discussions of U.S. defense posture should begin by asking not who is virtuous but what does the world look like now and what will it look like in the future. Given the dramatic shifts in the global economy in recent decades, as well as the transformation of nonnuclear weapons capabilities and the rise of space-based sensors, it is clear that the defense posture that the United States established 75 years ago is no longer appropriate or adequate. The United States should look beyond its current disputes with its allies and ask how it can better situate its forces to protect core U.S. national interests in a more dangerous world.

A Better Way to Defend America

Foreign Affairs · by More by Stephen Peter Rosen · March 14, 2025

Base More U.S. Forces in the Western Hemisphere—and Fewer in Asia and Europe

Stephen Peter Rosen

March 14, 2025

A U.S. aircraft carrier in the East China Sea, November 2024 Kim Kyung-Hoon / Reuters

STEPHEN PETER ROSEN is a Research Associate at Columbia University’s Institute of Global Politics and is Beton Michael Kaneb Professor Emeritus of National Security and Military Affairs at Harvard University. He served in the Department of Defense and on the National Security Council staff in the Reagan administrations.

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The United States is now engaged in an intense dialogue about the future of its relations with its European and Asian allies. This debate has been emotional, in part because it has been cast as a morality tale. On the one hand, advocates of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America first” agenda argue that allies have not been grateful for U.S. backing and do not deserve the protection of the United States. They believe these states do not do enough to defend themselves and may not even share American values. On the other hand, those who defend the existing alliance structure argue that the United States must be faithful to its commitments and stand by the heroic people of Ukraine and Europe against a revanchist Russia.

But the United States did not shape the global military posture that it has maintained since World War II around a morality tale. The strategy of containment that remains the basis of current U.S. posture was based on an assessment of how the United States could protect what it valued most. A better way to approach the current debate is to ask whether the assessment that led to that strategy is as valid today as it was 75 years ago. The empirical answer to that question is no. What the United States should do in response can be debated, but its actions should be based on reality.

In the 1950s, when the existing alliance system was established, the distribution of economic power in the world meant that the United States had a major stake in the defense of Europe and Japan. Washington had to deploy its forces on the periphery of its Eurasian adversaries to deter attacks on its allies and defend them if war occurred. A defense posture is not a strategy or a foreign policy, but it is the basis of military capabilities, and it does create binding commitments. This force posture and associated commitments made sense during the Cold War because of the economic value of Europe and Japan to the United States and the ability of the United States to deploy its forces safely nearer to enemy forces.

But the world has changed significantly since the Cold War. Although the U.S. share of global GDP is roughly the same as it was in 1990—26 percent, as measured by current exchange rates, or 17 percent using purchasing power parity exchange rates—Europe and Japan’s combined share of global GDP has declined by 50 percent. Moreover, because of the proliferation of short-range drones and long-range precision-strike cruise and ballistic missiles, it is now much more difficult for the United States to defend bases that are close to American adversaries against nonnuclear attacks. Finally, the current threats to the United States are not limited to attacks using nuclear and conventional intercontinental weapons. They also include unconventional warfare using cyber, drone, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as clandestine methods such as sabotage of critical infrastructure and threats to key personnel.

These changes in the global distribution of economic power and military technology do not mean that U.S. allies are irrelevant. Nor do they mean that the United States should give up its global military role. But they do mean that the United States needs to change the kinds of forces at its disposal and how it deploys and operates them, both to better defend the territory of the United States and for Washington to be able to exercise military power abroad as it judges necessary. Specifically, the United States will have to operate more of its forces from the Western Hemisphere and in space, and it needs to be able to better defend those forces. From bases primarily in the United States and in space, U.S. forces can retain global reach to operate against enemies in Asia and Europe. Experience shows that it has been impossible to predict where the United States will need to fight, so a reasonable approach is to build long-range forces that can pivot to wherever they are needed. The United States should also build forces that can be quickly deployed close to adversaries and survive attacks.

This new hemispheric posture will enable the United States to fully defend itself against emerging threats and maintain coercive dominance relative to its adversaries while allowing U.S. forces to strike at targets globally. Transitioning to this posture would necessarily be gradual and may require building relations with new partners such as Finland and Sweden and rebuilding relations with old partners such as Japan and the Philippines. But the defense of the United States will need to rest on forces based in the United States and in earth orbit.

THE NEW ECONOMICS OF POWER

Since the mid-twentieth century, a fundamental assumption of U.S. defense strategists has been that Eurasia contained multiple centers of industrial power. In 1947, the American diplomat George Kennan explicitly argued that there were five centers of industrial power in the world: the United States, the United Kingdom, western Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Estimates of western Europe’s share of world GDP in the 1920s and 1930s, in the world in which Kennan began his career, are of course rough, but it was about 30 percent. According to this logic, a Eurasian enemy who captured one of the other centers of industrial power would endanger the United States. So Europe and Japan were naturally the central focus of U.S. defense posture after World War II.

But the economic importance of Europe has diminished. In 1988, a study by Andrew Marshall and Charles Wolf on the “future security environment”—an assessment of present and emerging geopolitical trends shaping defense priorities—observed that the European Community accounted for about 25 percent of global GDP and projected this share to decline only slightly, to about 22 percent, by 2010. Similarly, the study predicted that the Japanese share of global GDP, which was about 13 percent in 1988, would remain constant out to 2010. The study estimated that Europe’s and Japan’s combined share of global GDP would remain roughly constant at around one-third of world GDP.

Reality, however, has diverged from those projections. Figures from the International Monetary Fund confirm that—using purchasing power parity currency conversion rates, as the study did—the EU share, as of 2024, has declined to 14 percent of world GDP, far less than the 22 percent the study predicted for 2010. Japan did even worse. Japan’s economy surged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with its share of world GDP rising rapidly and peaking at about 14 percent in the mid-1990s. But since then it has steadily fallen, to the point that it accounted for just three percent in 2024.

U.S soldiers in Pocheon, South Korea, August 2024 Kim Soo-hyeon / Reuters

In other words, since the end of the Cold War, the relative economic power of two of the traditional five centers of industrial power, Europe and Japan, has fallen from about 34 percent to 17 percent, a decline of about 50 percent. If the share of world GDP is measured using current currency conversion rates, that drop is even sharper, but since national security is primarily purchased from domestic sources with domestic inputs, purchasing power parity currency conversion provides a better assessment. By contrast, in the 34 years since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ share of global economic power has roughly held steady, and China’s has risen by a factor of ten, from 1.8 percent to 18 or 19 percent.

Trends in productivity growth suggest that the gap between the Japanese and EU economies on the one hand and the U.S. economy on the other will continue to grow. In the five decades between 1950 and 2000, the economies of France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom steadily narrowed the U.S. advantage in output per hour worked. From 2000 to 2019, however, Japan’s productivity went flat, as did the United Kingdom’s, whereas the United States’ advantage in productivity relative to Germany’s remained constant. In the following five years, from 2019 to 2024, Japan continued to show zero productivity growth, and the U.S. advantage in productivity relative to the EU continued to widen. A 2024 report for the European Central Bank found that over that five-year period, hourly labor productivity in market services in the United States increased by more than 12 percent, whereas in the euro zone it increased by less than four percent.

What about the future distribution of economic growth? There is broad consensus that artificial intelligence is likely to be the new general-purpose technology that transforms economies around the world. In his 2024 book, Technology and the Rise of Great Powers: How Diffusion Shapes Economic Competition, the political scientist Jeffrey Ding presents data that suggests that the number and quality of AI engineers will be crucial to the coming AI-driven Fourth Industrial Revolution, and it uses an index that ranks universities worldwide for the number and quality of their AI resources. Thirty-two U.S. and Canadian universities, and seven Chinese universities, are in the top 50. By contrast, only one university in the United Kingdom and three in the EU make the list, and none in Japan do. Hence, the already observable declines in European and Japanese shares of world GDP are not likely to be reversed by the current revolution in data analysis.

THE PRECISION-STRIKE PROBLEM

Even as Japan and the countries of Europe have declined as economic powers, the difficulty of providing for their military defense has increased. The 1988 study also investigated the emergence of military power based on digital information technology, which gave rise in the 1980s and 1990s to precision-strike weapons. These weapons have made it possible to hit fixed and many mobile targets with great accuracy, regardless of the distance from which they are launched. U.S. military forces stationed on fixed bases on the periphery of China and Russia—the defense model that has been used since the early years of the Cold War—are now vulnerable to nonnuclear long- and shorter-range precision strikes.

There is general agreement among defense strategists on what needs to be done to make these forces less vulnerable: fixed bases must be increased in number and the available forces dispersed among them. They must be concealed and mobile; or they must be put underground and defended with antimissile systems such as Patriot and Aegis Ashore that the United States has been transferring to Israel, Poland, and Ukraine. Strategists also agree that these mobile, dispersed, defended, and disguised forces should be deployed in what is called “complex terrain”—urban areas or jungle or mountainous regions, where they can be hidden more easily.

The problem is that all of these approaches entail significant resources and, more important, require access to land, often in densely populated areas. At the same time, the United States faces the costs of modernizing all three legs of its nuclear triad, defending critical U.S. infrastructure against conventional and unconventional attacks, and protecting U.S. forces in space. This means building satellites that can detect impending attacks and maneuver away from them and that can defend themselves or avoid detection by being stealthy. It also means protecting ground stations that link to and support the networks of satellites. These are not optional tasks: without secure nuclear deterrence, secure bases in the United States, and secure capabilities in space, the U.S. military cannot operate at all. And given its fiscal pressures, the United States will not be able to pay for both these core defense needs and the costly steps required to defend its current forces in Europe and Asia.

Faced with this security dilemma, Washington does have an alternative. It can base and operate the bulk of its forces from bases in the United States and the Western Hemisphere. The logic here is straightforward: it is harder for China and Russia to strike at targets in the United States—and easier for the United States to defend against them—than at targets on those countries’ own peripheries. The longer a weapon has to travel, the more fuel it needs and the larger it must be; the larger it is, the easier it is to detect and attack. Stealth can reduce the visibility of large platforms, but stealth is expensive.

STRONG SHIELD, SWIFT SWORD

Although it is easier for a global power to maintain defense closer to home than to defend bases abroad, it is still difficult and expensive. Nor is such a homeland strategy adequate by itself. A comprehensive hemispheric shield must also be accompanied by a sword that can be swiftly and responsively wielded globally from defended bases at home. In fact, such a strategy was already envisioned in the early years of the Cold War.

In 1953, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower introduced the New Look security policy, which set out to defend the country from Strategic Air Command bases in the Western Hemisphere. According to the concept, the United States would rely on a combination of strategic offensive nuclear forces based inside the country and dense continental air defenses based in the United States and Canada, which could protect against adversaries’ bombers, as well as antisubmarine warfare forces, to defend against submarines carrying missiles. As the official history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense puts it, “The new-style containment would depend primarily on offensive retaliatory power, chiefly strategic nuclear weapons plus continental defense.” Notably, in this approach, known as massive retaliation, other forms of defense, including conventional ground forces, would play a secondary role.

At the time, however, the strategy proved infeasible. In 1955, the cost of effective anti-bomber defenses was estimated at $40 billion over five years, or about 11 percent of U.S. GDP. The secretary of the treasury found the cost projections “incredible.” But the excessive price tag was mainly the result of technological limitations of that era. Thus, the most expensive components of the air defenses were not the radars or the weapons but the information system that would have been required to operate them, a capability that, in the era of vacuum tube computers, would have involved exorbitant costs.

Today, those costs have been dramatically reduced by Moore’s Law, even as the information systems themselves have exponentially increased in power. Enhanced missile defenses for the United States could involve expansion of the ground-based missile defense installation at Fort Greely, Alaska. In the 1970s, ballistic missile interceptors were also based in Montana and North Dakota. The expansion of bases in those locations should be reviewed, taking into account political constraints on land use. The possibility that adversaries could launch shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles from submarines at targets in Alaska, Hawaii, and other Pacific and Atlantic coast states, means that defenses against theater-range ballistic missile and cruise missile defenses, such as the Aegis air defense system based on ships deployed off the coasts of the United States, would also have to be considered. These defenses could also be complemented by so-called passive defenses—steps such as more widely dispersing military assets or concealing and burying them—which raise the difficulty of launching an attack. In order to deter unconventional attacks, including cyberwarfare and sabotage operations, by China and Russia, a hemispheric defense strategy will also require much stronger internal security infrastructure.

The United States must deny adversaries positions in the Western Hemisphere.

Finally, the United States will need to maintain naval and air forces in the Western Hemisphere to enforce a new kind of Monroe Doctrine. A crucial part of this presence will be to prevent adversaries from establishing military positions in the Western Hemisphere from which the United States could be attacked with theater-range weapons, and destroy any such forces that are clandestinely inserted. The areas to be denied to possible adversaries include Canada, Iceland, Greenland, Mexico, Central America, northern South America, and the Caribbean islands and littoral areas.

Active and passive defenses are useful but have their limits. By enhancing its ability to launch global offensive strikes, the United States can reduce the damage that a potential attacker can inflict and deter attacks in the first place. Precision strike capabilities mean that now, unlike at the time of Eisenhower’s massive retaliation policy, nonnuclear offensive strike forces based in the United States can carry out effective attacks, even against faraway adversaries. And those attacks can be modulated both in terms of the targets they attack and the levels of destruction they inflict.

To strike effectively at targets, the United States must be able to detect, identify, locate, and—if the targets are moving—track them. Satellites in low-earth orbit are surprisingly close to targets on earth, since they are typically in orbits 150 to 300 miles in space, the distance from Boston to Philadelphia or from Kyiv to Kharkiv. Advances in precision timing make it possible to combine the data from many small sensors to produce information as accurate as one big sensor. Compared with NASA’s space shuttle, SpaceX’s partially reusable two-stage rocket, Falcon 9, has reduced the cost of putting a satellite into orbit by a factor of 20. If successful, SpaceX’s Starship spacecraft, which is now undergoing test launches, could reduce that cost by another factor of 20 or more. So intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR, that previously could be done affordably only with airplanes and radars that operated close to enemies can now be undertaken from networks of satellites launched from the United States.

With high quality, survivable ISR, the United States will be able to find and designate targets almost anywhere. And with intercontinental range, stealthy, recoverable platforms that can carry many weapons, it will be able to strike them in a sustained nonnuclear campaign anywhere in the world from defended bases inside the country. Currently, that would mean using B-2 and B-21 bombers and cruise-missile-carrying nuclear submarines.

CORE STRENGTH

To be truly effective for the coming decades, any shift in the U.S. defense posture will have to be undertaken carefully and flexibly. Although some countries outside the Western Hemisphere matter less because their relative economic power has declined, some may matter more because of their location. Countries that are close to potential targets in the territory of a U.S. adversary and that have large amounts of complex terrain with low population densities may offer particular advantages to the United States. Deployed in such places, shorter-range offensive mobile weapons can better escape detection and destruction. Smaller weapons will also be lighter and easier to hide. Operating from countries comparatively close to potential targets, the United States can use smaller drones to provide useful ISR.

Washington may wish to work with allies that are close to U.S. adversaries and that have territories with these characteristics. In this case of Russia, this means that rather than abandoning NATO, the United States should reshape its relations with select NATO countries, such as Finland and the other Nordic and Baltic states. On the periphery of China, the Philippine archipelago—which is close to the island of Hainan, which serves as the base of the Chinese southern fleet—is another such area. The U.S. Marine Corps is already working with the Philippine government to explore the defensive use of these islands. Kyushu, the southernmost island in the Japanese home island chain, is also well located relative to the coast of the East China Sea and Chinese northern fleet bases. Hokkaido is well located relative to Vladivostok on the east coast of Russia. Access to these areas in times of war or crisis could be granted by the local governments; they could allow mobile U.S. forces with precision-strike weapons to deploy in return for military guarantees. In the longer term, autonomous offensive forces might be inserted by low observable aircraft or submarines and left behind with small or no human crews.

Ocean areas outside the Western Hemisphere include sea lanes that adversaries use to import food, fossil fuels, and other critical goods. The United States might wish to be able to interdict this activity, which would involve a distant blockade. The challenge of imposing distant blockades is primarily one of information: there are thousands of ships transiting these sea-lanes every day and no navy has enough ships to stop and search them all to find the ones of interest. Today, developments in space-based surveillance have gone a long way toward solving that problem.

Discussions of U.S. defense posture should begin by asking not who is virtuous but what does the world look like now and what will it look like in the future. Given the dramatic shifts in the global economy in recent decades, as well as the transformation of nonnuclear weapons capabilities and the rise of space-based sensors, it is clear that the defense posture that the United States established 75 years ago is no longer appropriate or adequate. The United States should look beyond its current disputes with its allies and ask how it can better situate its forces to protect core U.S. national interests in a more dangerous world.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Stephen Peter Rosen · March 14, 2025

25. Misunderstanding McKinley – Why the Gilded Age Tariff Model Won’t Work for Trump

Excerpts:

Universal tariffs, or even just the threat of them, will ultimately undermine U.S. national security by inviting retaliation, alienating partners and allies, throwing the marketplace into uncertainty, and hiking costs for U.S. consumers and producers. If Trump must have tariffs, a less damaging approach would be to revisit the policy of his first term and apply targeted tariffs rather than universal ones. Doing so would protect industries that are vital for national security and limit the broader effect on the U.S. economy. Even better would be to pursue policy goals by using the many other economic tools the United States has at its disposal, including multilateral and bilateral trade deals, voluntary agreements, industry and research assistance, export and import restrictions, export promotion, investment screening, sanctions, intellectual property protection, asset freezing, and standards development.

Whatever path Trump chooses, he cannot escape basic principles of international relations and economics. Foreign policy is a game of infinite stages; other countries always get to respond. Furthermore, time matters in economic policy: some economic tools may be fast-acting, but the most powerful ones take years to take full effect. Both can be useful, but reaching for the quick solution may undermine long-term results. Additionally, as this week’s stock market slump revealed, haphazard threats do not happen in a vacuum. The market reacts poorly to uncertainty and disorder. Lastly, a policy as broad as universal tariffs is bound to have unintended consequences for overall economic health. The more surgical a corrective policy change, the less likely it will be to cause collateral damage. Policies that ignore any of these realities will subvert U.S. economic security, not protect it.

McKinley offers a final cautionary tale for Trump. Over the course of his presidency, McKinley’s initial theory of U.S. security fell apart. A growing fear of instability in nearby Cuba (mixed with humanitarian concerns for Cubans suffering from Spanish oppression) led him to declare war on Spain in 1898. After defeating Spain in just a few months, the United States acquired former Spanish colonies as far away as the Philippines—where, facing a rebellion, McKinley then waged his own colonial war. Just a year later, the United States joined an eight-country alliance to quell the Boxer Rebellion in China. McKinley lost sight of his domestic economic vision, and as he got more and more involved in conflicts abroad, he became so invested—and fearful of instability thousands of miles away—that he could not let go. Greater military and territorial power bred a greater feeling of alarm.

This cycle of insecurity is something that the war-averse Trump should desperately want to avoid. He may regret his provocative threats to take territory in Canada, Gaza, Greenland, and Panama if his bluffs are called and he feels compelled to follow through. Trump, of course, has long been skeptical of U.S. intervention abroad. But then again, so was McKinley.

Misunderstanding McKinley

Foreign Affairs · by More by Aroop Mukharji · March 14, 2025

Why the Gilded Age Tariff Model Won’t Work for Trump

Aroop Mukharji

March 14, 2025

U.S. President William McKinley delivering his inaugural address in Washington, D.C., 1897 Library of Congress / Reuters

AROOP MUKHARJI served as Senior Advisor for Economic and National Security to the Deputy Secretary at the Department of Commerce from 2022 to 2024. The views expressed here are his own.

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U.S. President William McKinley is having his biggest moment since 1928, when his face was printed on the $500 bill. For the last few decades, only a smattering of quirky historians and cult devotees have paid much attention to him. But in repeated comments over the last several years, including in his second inaugural address, President Donald Trump has brought McKinley back into the spotlight. McKinley was “a natural businessman,” Trump remarked, who “made our country very rich through tariffs and through talent.”

Tariffs are at the core of Trump’s veneration of McKinley. This economic policy defined McKinley’s political career. His final act as a congressman was spearheading the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890, which set the average tariff on dutiable imports at around 50 percent. For most of his professional life, McKinley conceptualized American power and security as functions of the country’s domestic economic well-being, not the size of its military. This was not unusual. Two protective oceans, new industrial wealth, legal limits on the military, and few foreign threats led even the U.S. Navy in the Gilded Age to often see its primary peacetime role as protecting commerce.

Today, across the U.S. national security establishment, economics is once again a central concern. For Trump, U.S. alliances and relationships, Washington’s reputation, and even foreign threats often boil down to a single—if misleading—statistic, such as a trade deficit. McKinley’s tariff policy thus offers Trump an elegantly simple solution to the United States’ many, varied challenges. One policy to solve them all.

The problem for Trump is not a lack of precedent; his policies’ connection to American history is clear. The problem is that McKinley’s tariff approach does not suit today’s world. What is more, whereas McKinley used tariffs primarily to accomplish a domestic goal—to expand U.S. industry, Trump’s primary goal is external. He wants to change the behavior of other countries, relying on the threat of blanket tariffs to bring them to the negotiating table and extract concessions in areas of disagreement far beyond trade. Trump will judge his success not by measuring the tariffs’ effect on U.S. economic health but by whether allies and adversaries cave to his demands. In essence, Trump has McKinley’s model backward.

PEACE THROUGH TARIFFS

When McKinley became president in 1897, he had little interest in foreign policy. He was mostly concerned with domestic economic health, especially on the heels of the Panic of 1893, which caused a multi-year depression. He believed that broad-based tariffs, applied to thousands of goods, would help U.S. industries grow and protect the American worker.

For most of his career, McKinley was not a foreign trade expansionist eager to exploit markets abroad, unlike such jingoes as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and the next president, Theodore Roosevelt. McKinley was skeptical of international trade. He thought it was fickle and unreliable. “Why need we vex ourselves about foreign commerce?” he asked on the House floor in 1890. In 1896, he told a group of Midwestern farmers: “The home market is the best friend of the farmer. It is his best market. It is his only reliable market. It is his own natural market.” McKinley said this over and over in that year’s presidential campaign.

McKinley was a dyed-in-the-wool protectionist. Tariffs were a “big government” policy designed to shape consumer demand. By taxing imported goods, McKinley wanted to guide consumers toward domestic suppliers. Doing so would not only support infant American industries that could not compete globally but would also ensure stable and predictable domestic demand. McKinley’s belief in the home market’s reliability thus became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

At times, McKinley’s rhetoric seemed to suggest a flexible tariff philosophy. In a 1901 speech in Buffalo, New York, shortly before he was assassinated, he extolled the virtues of reciprocity, a modified protectionism that selectively lowered tariffs in noncompetitive industries to allow for mutually beneficial bilateral trade. On the campaign trail five years earlier, he repeatedly lauded this approach, calling protection and reciprocity the “twin measures of a true American policy.” In practice, however, McKinley did not give reciprocity high priority, spending little political capital on reciprocity treaties with other countries during his presidency.

McKinley’s tariff approach does not suit today’s world.

The protectionist tariff was McKinley’s policy of choice. He spent more time studying it and more effort promoting it over the length of his career than any other policy. He saw it less as a tool of economic coercion than as a guarantor of U.S. prosperity. In a way, he also saw the tariff as central to national security. “Economic security” and “national security” were not widely used terms in McKinley’s era. Nevertheless, his comments about war, peace, safety, power, law, order, and the military provide a sense of how he conceptualized the security of the country and its people as freedom from uncertainty, depression, instability, and chaos.

McKinley believed the tariff promoted self-sufficiency and offered a defense against economic struggle. “A population whose labor is insufficiently remunerated . . . must in the end fall through hideous misery and degradation to utter ruin,” McKinley said in 1891, quoting the biologist Thomas Huxley while campaigning for governor. McKinley lived at a time when economic recessions were not uncommon and anarchism was on the rise. Philosophically, he connected a protectionist economic policy not just to prosperity but also to an absence of fear.

Before he became president, McKinley conceptualized security in a nonmilitary way. A physical attack on the United States by a foreign adversary seemed a distant prospect. He was far more concerned about a breakdown of law, order, institutions, and civilization resulting from economic hardship. He subtly indicated this way of thinking to a group of Pennsylvanians in the 1896 campaign, promising that Republican economic policy and the tariff would ensure “peace and tranquility in the United States.”

McKinley believed that economic health, not the size or activities of the military, determined American strength. That the United States’ wealth exceeded that of its European competitors by the late 1880s proved to him that it was the most powerful country in the world. The country’s military, its projection of force, its foreign trade, and the spread of democracy were secondary factors, if that. In fact, on a few occasions, McKinley derided U.S. force projection and celebrated low military spending.

THE RETURN OF ECONOMIC SECURITY

The connection between economics and national security did not last. As the historian Peter Roady has elegantly argued, a more militarized and international conception of national security dominated establishment thinking in Washington after World War II. But now, the pendulum is swinging back. Over the last decade, as China emerged as an economic powerhouse and a security competitor to the United States, as the erosion of U.S. manufacturing challenged the wisdom of unfettered globalization and free trade, and as varied crises disrupted global supply chains, economics has reentered U.S. national security policy. It is not merely that American leaders are increasingly using economic tools to address traditional security threats. It is that security means more than freedom from attack.

At the heart of the current debate is an old question: What relationship should the government have with trade and industry? The Democratic Party generally emphasizes direct assistance to domestic U.S. industry through measures such as the CHIPS and Science Act over universal tariffs, Trump’s preference. But Trump and the Democrats largely agree that economics belongs in the national security equation and that laissez-faire capitalism is not the solution. Where deep disagreement does exist is primarily within the Republican Party itself, where free traders are increasingly sidelined.

By abusing tariffs as a policy tool, Trump invites the world to do the same.

The revival of old ways of thinking about power and security is the most profound link between today’s policy discussions and those of McKinley’s era. On a tactical level, Trump also clearly shares McKinley’s love of the tariff. His public admiration of McKinley dates back at least to 2017, when he linked his brand of economic protectionism to the Republican policy of the 1890s. Trump’s Republican Party, with its relentless focus on protectionism, recovered a forgotten Republican legacy after decades of free-trade orthodoxy.

Some critics have argued that Trump’s historical comparison overlooks the failure of McKinley’s policies. At first glance, that interpretation makes sense: McKinley’s eponymous 1890 tariff preceded a Democratic wave in the 1890 midterm elections—McKinley himself was voted out of office—and was eventually replaced by a federal income tax. But this is misleading history; it is a case of “explanation bias,” wherein hindsight knowledge of the tariff’s death in the early twentieth century has led many experts to distort the retelling of its life. In 1890, McKinley did not lose his seat in Congress because the electorate rejected his policies. He was, instead, gerrymandered out of office. And if there was any doubt of his popularity, within months of that loss, he turned around and won the first of two statewide elections as governor of Ohio.

Republican economic policies were strikingly popular, too. Although Democrats posted victories in the 1890 and 1892 elections, Republicans swept the 1894 midterm elections, retaking the Senate and the House—the latter with a record gain of 130 seats, largely due to a long economic depression pinned on the Democrats. The 1896 presidential election, which McKinley won, centered on the tariff, his number one issue. It featured in nearly every campaign speech he gave. Republicans went on to dominate U.S. politics for the next generation, drawing support not just from Wall Street and wealthy industrialists but also from immigrants, factory workers, laborers, and racial and religious minorities.

THE DIFFERENCE A CENTURY MAKES

Of course, popularity is not the same as wisdom. Trump argues that tariffs produced American wealth in the industrial age, and McKinley believed the same. Experts have long been skeptical of that claim. The economic historian Douglas Irwin contends that Gilded Age tariffs had a neutral effect, on balance neither significantly helping nor significantly harming the overall U.S. economy. That history, however, is unlikely to repeat itself. Implementing the tariffs Trump has suggested in today’s world, with today’s economy, would eventually harm the United States.

Trump might well achieve some short-term goals. In January, his threat of tariffs against Colombia if it did not accept deportation flights led Bogotá to blink. Trump is now using the same tactic against Mexico, Canada, and China, the United States’ three largest trading partners, to extract concessions on border and drug-related issues. Its success so far has been underwhelming. This week, as a consequence of his tariff policy, the U.S. stock market tumbled, and Trump tacitly acknowledged the United States could enter a recession.

Meanwhile, other countries get a vote in what happens next. If they do not retaliate immediately with a tariff of their own or some other escalatory response, they will in time. The more the United States threatens, the more other countries will see the United States as a threat, and the more they will balance against it. The system of alliances and institutions the United States has built up since World War II will erode. If Washington antagonizes its partners willy-nilly, they will start seeking alternatives. Multilateral coordination on sanctions and export controls, trade agreements, and even intelligence sharing and support for U.S. military campaigns could all begin to fall apart.

Trump cannot escape basic principles of international relations and economics.

Another reason Trump’s tariffs are likely to bring harm today is that the world is meaningfully different than it was in the late nineteenth century. At that time, tariffs were a normal part of politics. During the Gilded Age, McKinley and other Republicans were not the only American politicians who wanted high tariffs; Democrats, the “free traders” of the 1890s, voted for tariffs, too, when they were in power, just at lower rates. U.S. politicians generally did not consider using universal tariffs as a coercive or punitive policy, either. Coercion was an exception, not the rule.

Today, systematic tariff threats do not resurrect the U.S. tariff policy of the 1890s because they cannot resurrect the world of the 1890s. Instead, they distort an out-of-date practice. The policy sows confusion, disrupts markets, and unravels norms of economic interaction. By abusing tariffs as a policy tool, Trump invites the world to do the same.

The U.S. economy of today is also markedly different, in makeup and in size, from what it was when McKinley was elected president. Not only does foreign trade claim a larger share of U.S. GDP—the percentage today is easily twice that of 1897—it also rose to the dizzying height of $7.3 trillion in 2024. In a globally integrated economy, U.S. markets are much more exposed. A tariff is a duty or tax on imports, and the added cost is usually passed on to consumers. A high universal tariff would make U.S. consumer costs rise considerably. In the short term, such a tariff might bring money into the U.S. Treasury or shield some U.S. industries from global competition, but the public would pay the price. So would U.S. producers that depend on foreign inputs; these firms could be forced to fire more workers than protected industries can hire, resulting in a net job loss. Moreover, if other countries impose retaliatory tariffs, foreign demand for U.S. goods could drop sharply. To threaten high universal tariffs is to play a game of chicken with the United States’ $3.2 trillion export market. McKinley’s policy, by contrast, was designed to protect the U.S. economy—not gamble with it.

Few experts believe Trump’s universal tariffs are wise. Those who do make simplistic assumptions. For instance, one scholar has argued that tariffs would merely shift excess consumer demand to the home market, boosting production, increasing wages, and strengthening labor. But drawing such an optimistic conclusion requires holding all other facts of the world constant as if running a controlled lab experiment. What happens if foreign countries respond with either tariffs or some other punitive measure? What happens if consumers instead spend more on foreign products? What about the effect of inflation? What about the market disruption caused by unpredictable threats and pauses of tariffs? Any experiment run 1,000 times may yield an unusual result once. But policymakers should bet on the 999 that point the other way.

A CAUTIONARY TALE

Universal tariffs, or even just the threat of them, will ultimately undermine U.S. national security by inviting retaliation, alienating partners and allies, throwing the marketplace into uncertainty, and hiking costs for U.S. consumers and producers. If Trump must have tariffs, a less damaging approach would be to revisit the policy of his first term and apply targeted tariffs rather than universal ones. Doing so would protect industries that are vital for national security and limit the broader effect on the U.S. economy. Even better would be to pursue policy goals by using the many other economic tools the United States has at its disposal, including multilateral and bilateral trade deals, voluntary agreements, industry and research assistance, export and import restrictions, export promotion, investment screening, sanctions, intellectual property protection, asset freezing, and standards development.

Whatever path Trump chooses, he cannot escape basic principles of international relations and economics. Foreign policy is a game of infinite stages; other countries always get to respond. Furthermore, time matters in economic policy: some economic tools may be fast-acting, but the most powerful ones take years to take full effect. Both can be useful, but reaching for the quick solution may undermine long-term results. Additionally, as this week’s stock market slump revealed, haphazard threats do not happen in a vacuum. The market reacts poorly to uncertainty and disorder. Lastly, a policy as broad as universal tariffs is bound to have unintended consequences for overall economic health. The more surgical a corrective policy change, the less likely it will be to cause collateral damage. Policies that ignore any of these realities will subvert U.S. economic security, not protect it.

McKinley offers a final cautionary tale for Trump. Over the course of his presidency, McKinley’s initial theory of U.S. security fell apart. A growing fear of instability in nearby Cuba (mixed with humanitarian concerns for Cubans suffering from Spanish oppression) led him to declare war on Spain in 1898. After defeating Spain in just a few months, the United States acquired former Spanish colonies as far away as the Philippines—where, facing a rebellion, McKinley then waged his own colonial war. Just a year later, the United States joined an eight-country alliance to quell the Boxer Rebellion in China. McKinley lost sight of his domestic economic vision, and as he got more and more involved in conflicts abroad, he became so invested—and fearful of instability thousands of miles away—that he could not let go. Greater military and territorial power bred a greater feeling of alarm.

This cycle of insecurity is something that the war-averse Trump should desperately want to avoid. He may regret his provocative threats to take territory in Canada, Gaza, Greenland, and Panama if his bluffs are called and he feels compelled to follow through. Trump, of course, has long been skeptical of U.S. intervention abroad. But then again, so was McKinley.

AROOP MUKHARJI served as Senior Advisor for Economic and National Security to the Deputy Secretary at the Department of Commerce from 2022 to 2024. The views expressed here are his own.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Aroop Mukharji · March 14, 2025

26. Actions create consequences: equanimity under stress – A letter from a veteran

Another thoughtful and thought provoking column from one of my mentors, Dr. Cynthia Watson.

Please go to the link to view the image of the reference letter from a veteran. https://cynthiawatson.substack.com/p/equanimity-under-stress?utm

Excerpts:

Empathy helps us recognize how others feel about the profound reconsideration underway of our country's future. The simple act of thinking from someone else's perspective appears woefully lacking these days, yet it is vital for each and every one of us. I highly recommend we recognize others’ concerns more often as we navigate the shoals of our current tension. I prefer a social contract to a chaotic country full of 350 million individuals acting solely as on their day-to-day whims.

Take a few moments to ask yourself how you feel about the changes under way and why others embrace or reject them. This column is about Actions creating consequences because that reality pertains for our choices, whatever they are.

We live in a fantastic country despite our frustrations of all types. We are foolish to assume the contract undergirding this system will continue without care and feeding, translated into engagement and study. We make a difference every single day but do we want more than what we are going?

The comments about the importance of empathy sadly remind me of these two quotes.

“The fundamental weakness of Western civilization is empathy.”

– Elon Musk

“The death of human empathy is one of the earliest and most telling signs of a culture about to fall into barbarism.”

– Hannah Arendt

Actions create consequences

212Upgrade to founding

equanimity under stress

A letter from a veteran

Cynthia Watson

Mar 14, 2025

The Constitution really is our national social contract. As you know, I take this document quite seriously because it offers us a framework to allow an ever expanding population to live together with some sort of equanimity. We can and do revise the document when a majority deems necessary through the amendment process, an open and transparent system. Changes come slowly as we are, amazingly, a deliberate nation, but that means some will find the change too sudden while others find it far to slow. The Constitution is imperfect but so are we citizens, yet it's been a relatively useful framework for nearly two hundred fifty years. I excerpt the Preamble to that document.

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence (sic), promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Late Wednesday afternoon, I came across the letter below on social media from someone who served to "provide for the common defence (sic)". I don’t know Lt Col Shappart but believe his moving thoughts are more common among military personnel than many people realize.

We who never served in the military may never ponder what the country asks of those we empower to defend us. Our history is overwhelmingly one of apolitical armed forces serving us against foreign enemies. Yes, we can cite instances where the command authorities used those armed forces against internal opposition, but that is far less frequent than it might have been (I also understand that Native Americans would respond differently to any consideration of the armed forces than others). But our history has been far better than it might have been—or has been in vast swaths of the world. Those bearing arms had a mission that they saw as consistent with the Constitution to which they swore an oath.

As a reminder, that oath includes

“…I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter; So help me God.”

The nineteenth-century Posse Comitatus Act (1878) restricts domestic employment of the military as law enforcement. Put another way, we ask those in uniform to fight only foreign concerns unless a statute or Congress specifically authorizes actions at home. We have had a professional, non-partisan force, as a result, respecting the lawful orders from civilian authorities, regardless of political party. This standard is as central to our country as personal freedom since one of our core reasons for separating from Britain was British Army oppression under George III.

Those who sign up to serve almost invariably take seriously their commitment to carry out the nation's defense under lawful orders without mental reservation since that commitment has potentially deadly consequences. Those who serve, in turn, expect our elected officials to govern with integrity in a non-partisan manner when civilian leaders ask the armed forces to engage on the nation’s behalf. This is part of our national social contract.

I welcome your thoughts in response to Lt Col Allan Shappert's letter in the Bloomberg, Pennsylvania Press Enterprise on 11 March 2025. He is a retired Air Force officer who served us honorably. He is registering deep concerns. You may agree or dismiss him, but he identified profound worries publicly and respectfully, understanding that consequences may ensue.

Empathy helps us recognize how others feel about the profound reconsideration underway of our country's future. The simple act of thinking from someone else's perspective appears woefully lacking these days, yet it is vital for each and every one of us. I highly recommend we recognize others’ concerns more often as we navigate the shoals of our current tension. I prefer a social contract to a chaotic country full of 350 million individuals acting solely as on their day-to-day whims.

Take a few moments to ask yourself how you feel about the changes under way and why others embrace or reject them. This column is about Actions creating consequences because that reality pertains for our choices, whatever they are.

We live in a fantastic country despite our frustrations of all types. We are foolish to assume the contract undergirding this system will continue without care and feeding, translated into engagement and study. We make a difference every single day but do we want more than what we are going?

Thank you for your time this morning. I welcome any and all rebuttals, comments, questions, and thoughts on this or any other topic. Thanks to those who invest resources in this column. $50 a year supports my writing, as does $8 a month if you want to invest.

Be well and be safe. FIN

Allan Shappert, “Grieving a Wasted Life”, PressEnterpriseOnline.com, 11 March 2025, retrieved at https://www.pressenterpriseonline.com/daily/031125/page/15/story/grieving-a-wasted-life

“Empathy”, dictionary.com, retrieved at https://www.dictionary.com/browse/empathy

“Preamble to the Constitution”, Constitution of the United States of America (1787). Archives.gov, retrieved at https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript

“U.S. Military Oaths of Office”, Oath.us, 14 March 2025, retrieved at https://oaths.us/us-military-oath-of-enlistment-and-oaths-of-office/

“vicarious”, dictionary.com, retrieved at https://www.dictionary.com/browse/vicarious

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

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