Quotes of the Day:
"It is the repeated performance of just and temperate actions that produces virtue."
- Aristotle
"Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them."
- William Shakespeare
"To be yourself in a world that is constantly trying to make you something else is the greatest accomplishment."
- Ralph Waldo Emerson
1. The Western World Is in Denial
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 14
3. Axios Finish Line: Be like Zelensky
4. U.S. works to keep China on board in Ukraine conflict
5. Russia-Ukraine live updates: Kyiv under attack as European leaders announce visit to besieged capital
6. The View of Ukraine from Taiwan: Get Real About Territorial Defense
7. Regime Change, But for Whom
8. Ukraine makes clear the US must reconsider its one-war defense strategy
9. Air Force special ops chief says it’s time to embrace new missions
10. General Valery Gerasimov’s Great Ukrainian Disaster
11. Ukraine War Update - March 15, 2022 | SOF News
12. Understanding China’s rising military spending
13. Wither Hybrid War
14. Guernica II: Russian Bombing in Ukraine Echoes the Civil War in Spain and All It Meant
15. Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
16. Lifting Human Rights Sanctions on Iran Would Be a Mistake
17. International Law Goes to War in Ukraine
18. Attack on Ukrainian base came from warplanes inside Russia, Pentagon says, underscoring limits of a no-fly zone
19. The Biden administration is poised to hand Hezbollah a win in Vienna | Opinion
20. Reconciliation of China bills in Congress could produce big cybersecurity wins
21. FDD | Russia's Putin looks to import Syrian mercenaries to do the 'dirty tricks' against Ukraine’s population
22. US sends sizable contingent to Norway for giant NATO exercise in region rattled by Russia
23. Three Critical Defense Reallocations for U.S. Strategic Competition with China
24. Before the Next Shock – How America Can Build a More Adaptive Global Economy
25. The Terrifying Truth Putin Has Taught Us
26. EXPLAINER: How plausible is Chinese military aid for Russia?
27. An Airlift Could Save Ukraine
28. How Kyiv’s outgunned defenders have kept Russian forces from capturing the capital
29. QAnon Thinks Trump Says ‘Chy-na’ to Send a Secret Message About Ukraine
1. The Western World Is in Denial
Read the subtitle. Think about it. Then read it again. And again, and again...
Then read and think about the excerpts below.
The read the entire article.
Excerpts:
What I see from NATO is a version of this message: The war in Ukraine is not our war. We will come forward only if Russia attacks an alliance member or bombs our convoy to Ukraine.
People of Europe and the U.S. have been pressing their governments to take a proactive position. They sent donations. They sent thoughts and prayers. The governments, especially in Europe, are still very cautious when it comes to making any move that might provoke Russia. Leaders, such as Emmanuel Macron, still seem to believe that dialogue can persuade Putin to stop his atrocities. For many in Europe, Russia’s petroleum and gas are more valuable than Ukrainian lives.
I understand the Western governments’ position.
I also used to say “This is not my war” while watching Russia’s atrocities in Aleppo. I also sent my thoughts and prayers to the people of Syria, also destroyed with the help of Putin. And back in 2008, I was so young that I did not even care to think about Georgians, whose land was also devastated and divided by Putin. And before that Moldova, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Libya, and other African countries.
Those were not my wars. But in 2014 the war came to my country. Back then, the world continued to cooperate with the aggressor Russia, deepening its dependence on Russia’s fossil fuels. Western leaders were willing to turn their backs on the war, certain that Putin would never dare to attack the powerful collective West.
The Western World Is in Denial
I understand why democratic countries are reluctant to fight, but I worry they don’t understand what will happen next.
KYIV, Ukraine—It’s been 19 days since Russia started the unprovoked war in Ukraine. I have changed my location three times, but I am staying in Kyiv to take care of my elderly parents. Every day I see Russians getting closer to my city from the northwest. I have been sleeping on the floor since February 24, when Vladimir Putin ordered his troops to invade my country. I am lucky. Others have lost their homes, or have no water, food, or heating. Russian troops have already killed several thousands of Ukrainians, including more than 80 children.
Every night I close my eyes thinking I might be next on Putin’s death-toll list. Nowadays you never know where the Russians will drop their bombs—onto a residential building, a kindergarten classroom, a monastery, or a maternity hospital.
Every day Russians commit more and more atrocities in my country. Only after Putin unleashed hell on our lands did the West finally unite in support of Ukraine, providing more weapons. Finally, the collective democratic world squeezed Russia with unprecedented sanctions.
However, this has not stopped Putin from bombing and destroying Ukraine. If anything, his resolve has only strengthened. The Kremlin knows that Russians will feel the full impact of sanctions in a month or so. It also knows that Europe is so dependent on Russian fossil fuels that such harsh sanctions likely won’t last long. I already see more and more tweets sympathizing with Russians, saying those people do not deserve the limitations imposed against their nation for Putin’s war.
This is the same nation where 58 percent of people support Putin’s actions in Ukraine, according to the latest polls. Putin doesn’t kill anyone in Ukraine with his own hands; other Russians are doing that. The Kremlin has been planning to invade and destroy the identity of my country, and to do it quickly, and the Russian people are backing it. Russians are making this calculation because they believe they can afford to. The Kremlin knows that the West, despite its public admiration for Ukrainian courage, has left Ukraine alone on the actual battlefield. Westerners would rather help Ukraine with weapons and money but stand aside.
People in these countries are scared of World War III. I understand the fear—but don’t you understand that World War III may have already arrived? Ukraine has been begging NATO to establish a no-fly zone, to protect us from Russian bombs, or at least give us fighter jets so we can better protect our skies. So far, the answer on both is “no.”
Meanwhile, more than 2,187 people have died because of Russian attacks in Mariupol alone, according to officials there. Russian attacks from the air have almost destroyed Volnovakha, Kharkiv, and many other towns in Ukraine. Ukraine’s authorities, who first pressured world powers to impose preventive sanctions, then pushed them to cut Russia from the SWIFT international payment system, then pushed them to cut Russia from the rest of the world, have been asking how many more people should die for the skies to be closed over Ukraine?
What I see from NATO is a version of this message: The war in Ukraine is not our war. We will come forward only if Russia attacks an alliance member or bombs our convoy to Ukraine.
People of Europe and the U.S. have been pressing their governments to take a proactive position. They sent donations. They sent thoughts and prayers. The governments, especially in Europe, are still very cautious when it comes to making any move that might provoke Russia. Leaders, such as Emmanuel Macron, still seem to believe that dialogue can persuade Putin to stop his atrocities. For many in Europe, Russia’s petroleum and gas are more valuable than Ukrainian lives.
I understand the Western governments’ position.
I also used to say “This is not my war” while watching Russia’s atrocities in Aleppo. I also sent my thoughts and prayers to the people of Syria, also destroyed with the help of Putin. And back in 2008, I was so young that I did not even care to think about Georgians, whose land was also devastated and divided by Putin. And before that Moldova, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Libya, and other African countries.
Those were not my wars. But in 2014 the war came to my country. Back then, the world continued to cooperate with the aggressor Russia, deepening its dependence on Russia’s fossil fuels. Western leaders were willing to turn their backs on the war, certain that Putin would never dare to attack the powerful collective West.
We in Ukraine also did not believe that Putin would dare to launch a full-scale invasion. But he did. Because in Moldova, Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine, Russia got away with its crimes. It did all this after the infamous “reset” of relations with the United States, and the United States allowed it. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on March 3, the West will “get over” its “hysteria” about Ukraine, too.
I am afraid he might be right. And I am afraid of what that will mean for the rest of the world. Russia can’t let itself lose in Ukraine and has enough resources to keep its economy alive. Putin has made clear that he doesn’t see Ukraine as a sovereign nation and that he would rather destroy it than let it exist as a free European nation. Many, if not most, Russians share his view. Even many who claim to be liberals have tended to see Ukraine as a “special country,” meaning their country.
So maybe by saying This is not our war, the world’s leading democratic countries are simply showing that they are in denial about what will happen next. What if World War III has already started? Perhaps it began in Georgia, Moldova, and Syria. Perhaps in the future, the invasion of February 24 won’t be seen as the start, but as a key turning point.
It is obvious that Russia will not stop its crusade against democratic values and common sense in Ukraine. Russian propagandists have been talking about which country will be invaded next. Ukraine’s Defense Secretary Olexiy Danilov has said it might be Lithuania, a NATO member. Will NATO act only after Lithuania is invaded?
I don’t know. And I don’t call upon the peaceful nations of Europe to join our war either. All I can ask is that you think about your beloved cities and the people that might one day become Putin’s next targets.
Ukraine used to be known as a country of beautiful Soviet modernist architecture, featured in numerous Western music videos. It used to be a country of beautiful landscapes, cool restaurants, and vibrant rave culture. It is a country that hosted two Eurovision Song Contests and one European soccer championship. A country that has become a battleground for U.S. politics and led to an impeachment scandal in America.
Kyiv used to amaze people with the beauty of the Dnipro River and impossibly long summer nights; Lviv dazzled people with its restaurants; Mariupol offered a vibrant mix of heavy industry and a lazy seashore-vacation mood. Kherson had awful roads but offered beautiful nature, pink lakes, the Black Sea, and plenty of homegrown food as compensation. Kharkiv, an education center, has hosted hundreds of international students and kept the special pride only a country’s first capital can have. For me, Kharkiv was a city of mathematics and large squares.
The Ukrainian people always welcomed guests from across Europe. We were so proud that the world had finally become interested in what we had to offer after the Euromaidan Revolution of 2014. Now the whole world is watching Putin destroy our land and murder our people: Kharkiv, Mariupol, Kherson, and now, the analysts say, Kyiv will be next.
Sanctions work, but they have not stopped Putin’s rockets falling from the skies. Now, after Georgia and Syria, those deathly rains have come to my land. What if they come to your land next?
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 14
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 14
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 14
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 14, 5:00 pm ET
Russian forces made small territorial gains in Luhansk Oblast on March 14 but did not conduct any major attacks toward Kyiv or in northeastern Ukraine. Russian forces continue to assemble reinforcements and attempt to improve logistical support in both the Kyiv and southern operational directions. Ongoing Russian efforts to replace combat losses with both Russian replacements and non-Russian sources, including Syrian fighters and the Wagner Group, are unlikely to enable Russia to resume major offensive operations within the coming week.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces conducted several limited attacks northwest of Kyiv on March 14, unsuccessfully attempting to bridge the Irpin River.
- Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations east of Kyiv and continued to prioritize improving logistics and reinforcing combat units.
- The continued ability of Ukrainian forces to carry out successful local counterattacks around Kharkiv indicates that Russian forces are unlikely to successfully bypass Kharkiv from the southeast to advance toward Dnipro and Zaporizhia in the near term.
- Russian and proxy forces continue to achieve slow but steady territorial gains in Donetsk Oblast after initial failures in the first week of the Russian invasion.
- Ukrainian forces halted resumed Russian attacks from Kherson toward Mykolayiv and Kryvyi Rih on March 14.
- Russia will likely deploy small units of Syrian fighters to Ukraine within the week and is confirmed to have deployed private military company (PMC) forces.
- Russian and Belarusian forces increased their activity near the Ukrainian border in the last 24 hours in a likely effort to pin down Ukrainian forces but likely do not have the capability to open a new axis of advance into western Ukraine.
- Russia and China deny that Russia seeks military aid from China and claimed that Russia does not need additional military support to complete its objectives in Ukraine.
Russia continues to face difficulties replacing combat losses and increasingly seeks to leverage irregular forces including Russian PMCs and Syrian fighters. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Russian servicemen are increasingly refusing to travel to Ukraine despite promises of veteran status and higher salaries.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Russia has recruited over a thousand Syrian fighters in “recent days” and that approximately 400 Syrian fighters have arrived in Russia.[2] Russia reportedly established training camps near Rostov (in Russia, directly east of Donbas) and Gomel (in Belarus, north of Kyiv). Senior Lieutenant Sergey Zavadsky of the Russian PMC Wagner Group was confirmed killed in Ukraine on March 13, the first verified Russian PMC casualty since the start of the invasion on February 24.[3]
Russian and Belarusian forces increased their activity near the Ukrainian border in the last 24 hours in a likely effort to pin down Ukrainian forces but likely do not have the capability to open a new axis of advance into western Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly conducting reconnaissance of settlements near the Ukrainian-Belarusian border in western Ukraine.[4] The General Staff additionally stated that Belarusian forces “strengthened the protection” of the Belarusian-Ukrainian border.[5] It is unclear if the Ukrainian General Staff has observed additional Belarusian forces deploying to the Ukrainian border or if troops already in place are increasing their readiness. ISW cannot independently confirm any additional Belarusian redeployments in the last 48 hours. Social media users observed Russian forces, including Rosgvardia units, deploying to southern Belarus on March 13-14.[6] These forces will likely reinforce existing Russian operations toward Kyiv. Russian and Belarusian forces likely seek to pin Ukrainian forces on the Belarusian border with the threat of new offensive operations, preventing those forces from reinforcing the defense of Kyiv. However, Russian and Belarusian forces remain unlikely to have the capability or intent to open a new axis of advance into western Ukraine at this time.
Russian and Chinese officials both denied US intelligence reports that Russia sought military aid from China. Both claimed that Russia does not need additional military support. Russian and Chinese officials and state media denied US media reports on March 13 that Russia requested military aid from China, calling these reports disinformation.[7] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov pushed back on the reports and denied that Russia would need any external aid, claiming that "Russia has an independent potential to continue the operation" and that Russian operations “will be completed on time and in full.”[8] Chinese state media similarly stated that Russia does not need Chinese help in its “limited-scale” war in Ukraine but emphasized that the United States cannot obligate China to promise not to export arms to Russia.[9] Russia and China likely have discussed possible Chinese military aid to Russia, but both seek to frame Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a limited operation and to avoid acknowledging growing Russian supply issues.
Ukrainian military intelligence reported on March 14 that Russian forces are seizing Ukrainian farming machinery for engineering work, constructing fortifications, and as ad hoc armored vehicles and are forcing Ukrainian civilians to help them.[10] Independent Ukrainian human rights organizations additionally report Russian forces are abducting activists, volunteers, and journalists in several occupied cities, including Kherson, Berdyansk, and Melitopol.[11]
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
- Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
- Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;
- Supporting effort 2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast; and
- Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east.
Russian forces conducted several limited attacks northwest of Kyiv on March 14, unsuccessfully attempting to bridge the Irpin River. Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations east of Kyiv and continued to prioritize improving logistics and reinforcing combat units. Russian forces may not be able to concentrate the combat power necessary to resume major offensive operations toward Kyiv within the week, despite several operational pauses to reconstitute forces.
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
Russian forces launched several unsuccessful assaults against Irpin and Bucha on March 13-14, attempting to cross the Irpin River.[12] Russian VDV (Airborne) forces supported by engineers unsuccessfully attempted to establish a pontoon bridge over the Irpin river.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces primarily continued to restore combat capability, regroup their troops, and improve logistics and have not resumed large-scale offensive operations, despite the limited attacks in Irpin and Bucha.[14] Russian forces have not conducted any major attacks on northwestern Kyiv since March 9.
Putin-appointed strongman leader of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on Telegram to have traveled to the northwestern Kyiv suburb of Hostomel to meet with Chechen forces on March 13.[15] ISW cannot verify Kadyrov’s video and claimed travel to Ukraine, though Chechen forces are confirmed to be participating in Russian efforts to encircle Kyiv from the west. Kadyrov likely seeks to increase the morale of Chechen troops that have reportedly suffered heavy losses in Ukraine, regardless of the veracity of his video.
Subordinate supporting effort—Chernihiv and Sumy axis
Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations toward the eastern Kyiv suburb of Brovary or against Chernihiv in the last 24 hours.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces northeast of Kyiv “moved to the defense” in the last 24 hours and focused on replenishing supplies and conducting reconnaissance.[17] Russian forces likely intend to reinforce their exposed line of communication in northeastern Ukraine against counterattacks prior to resuming offensive operations toward northeastern Kyiv.
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
Ukrainian forces repelled Russian forces around Izyum (southeast of Kharkiv) late on March 13, repelling Russian attacks near several villages, including Topolske, Shpakivka, and Donetske.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted several attacks to reclaim the territory throughout March 14, with fighting ongoing as of 6:00 pm local time on March 14.[19] Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in or around Kharkiv in the past 24 hours and continued to shell the city.[20] The continued ability of Ukrainian forces to carry out successful local counterattacks indicates that Russian forces are unlikely to successfully bypass Kharkiv from the southeast to advance toward Dnipro and Zaporizhia in the near term.
Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast:
Russian forces conducted several unsuccessful attacks on Severodonetsk late on March 13.[21] Ukrainian authorities reported Russian forces shelled the town of Popasnaya with prohibited incendiary rockets on March 12-13.[22]
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast:
Russian forces conducted several assaults on eastern Mariupol on March 13-14.[23] Russian artillery continued to shell the city and its northern outskirts, and Russian aircraft are increasingly conducting close-air-support missions near the city.[24] Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed 5,000 Chechen soldiers are fighting near Mariupol on March 14. Social media users on the ground confirmed the presence of Chechen fighters.[25]
Russian and proxy forces continue to achieve slow but steady territorial gains in Donetsk Oblast after initial failures in the first week of the Russian invasion. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed Russian forces have advanced 15-17km from the pre-invasion line of contact in Donetsk Oblast as of March 14.[26] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) additionally announced a list of 90 settlements it claims to have captured as of March 14.[27] Russian and proxy forces likely seek to advance toward Zaporizhya and mitigate the possibility of any Ukrainian attempts to relieve Mariupol or attempts by its defenders to break out.
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and west:
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces halted resumed Russian attacks from Kherson toward Mykolayiv and Kryvyi Rih on March 14.[28] Russian forces have not abandoned their effort to encircle Mykolayiv.[29] The Ukrainian Border Guard found three dead Russian soldiers in Mykolayiv while patrolling the area of a possible Russian airborne landing on March 14 and stated they believe these three servicemen were left behind by their own detachment.[30] Russian forces may intend to advance toward Kryvyi Rih to encircle Zaporizhya but are unlikely to have the forces necessary to do so while Russian forces in the south remain committed to the encirclement of Mariupol.
Immediate items to watch
- The Kremlin likely seeks to pressure Belarus to join the war in Ukraine and will deploy Syrian fighters to Ukraine in the near future.
- Ukrainian counterattacks and operations by Territorial Defense Forces in northeastern Ukraine threaten Russia’s exposed line of communicating, requiring Russia to redeploy forces away from the offensive towards eastern Kyiv.
- Russian forces are undertaking another operational pause to prepare for renewed efforts to encircle Kyiv from east and west and/or to seize the city center itself following their failures of March 8-9.
- Russian troops may drive on Zaporizhya City itself within the next 48-72 hours, likely attempting to block it on both banks of the Dnipro River and set conditions for subsequent operations after Russian forces take Mariupol, which they are currently besieging.
[8] https://tass dot ru/politika/14061833; https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/rossiya-i-mir/peskov-rf-ne-prosila-u-knr-voennoy-pomoshchi-dlya-prodolzheniya-specialnoy-voennoy-operacii-na-ukraine.
[9] https://www dot globaltimes dot cn/page/202203/1254841.shtml.
[26] https://dan-news dot info/defence/sily-russkoj-koalicii-nachali-priblizhatsja-k-marinke-s-juga/.
[27] https://dnronline dot su/pod-kontrolem-dnr-90-naselennyh-punktov-ranee-okkupirovannyh-ukrainskimi-boevikami/.
3. Axios Finish Line: Be like Zelensky
Rarely do we get self help advice in the national security space. But we should all learn to be like Zelensky (not just if our country is being invaded!)
Axios Finish Line: Be like Zelensky
Axios on facebookAxios on twitterAxios on linkedinAxios on email
What leadership looks like: A Ukrainian at a refugee shelter in Hungary listens to Volodymyr Zelensky. Photo: Bernadett Szabo/Reuters
One of our favorite mantras at Axios (pardon the language): When shit happens, shine.
Why it matters: The idea is simple. Anyone can be — or do — good when it's easy. Real character is carved in terrible or tumultuous times.
Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky is showing in real time how to dig deep into places you didn’t know existed to find a better, more courageous version of yourself:
-
Seize the moment. There's that memorable line in "Miracle," the movie about the 1980 U.S. hockey team upsetting, ironically, the Russians: "Great moments are born from great opportunity." Zelensky has risen to the moment as an eloquent wartime leader. All of us confront lesser moments.
- Take risks. Zelensky could flee or hide, but instead he has plunged fully into leading his people. Too often we duck from the tough stuff or hide in our own fears. But courage is contagious — and lurks inside even the most timid.
-
Watch your words. Words stick. Words move people. Think hard about how to explain to others what needs to be done. Do it with grace but directness. There's a reason this tight Zelensky statement echoed worldwide: "I need ammunition, not a ride."
- Ya never know. Zelensky was a reality TV star — a joke of a politician to many before Vladimir Putin invaded. There was little in Zelensky's past to suggest heroism. That's the great lesson of my life: The most unlikely people rise in the most unlikely of moments. You could be one of them.
- Get the big things right. Before this crisis, there were real questions about Zelensky’s preparedness and judgment. We all carry baggage. But nailing the moments that matter most is a worthy legacy.
A quote with pop... Zelensky, in an interview with Jonathan Swan for "Axios on HBO," in Kyiv in January 2021: "I really want the people of the United States of America to understand that Ukraine is having a difficult time, to understand that Ukraine is strong."
- "I know Ukraine is changing every day. And frankly, if we did not spend so much time and money on the war in the East, Ukraine would make big leaps forward."
4. U.S. works to keep China on board in Ukraine conflict
I really think the Biden Administration is making good use of intelligence by making it public to expose Russian and Chinese actions or future actions. There is no way China can provide any kind of support under the radar now. China has been exposed. And while we strengthen our alliances, we are attacking the pseudo alliance of China and Russia.
Sun Tzu:
4. Thus, what is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy's strategy.
5. Next best is to disrupt his alliances,
6. The next best is to attack his army.
7. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative
(Griffith translation)
U.S. works to keep China on board in Ukraine conflict
Officials meet amid reports that Moscow sought weapons from Beijing; Biden considers a trip to Europe to rally allies
Today at 7:58 p.m. EDT
National security adviser Jake Sullivan issued a direct warning to his Chinese counterpart Monday about the potential consequences of any assistance that Beijing might provide Russia in its war with Ukraine, officials said, following Moscow’s recent request for military equipment and aid.
The seven-hour meeting in Rome between Sullivan and Yang Jiechi, planned several weeks ago, took on added urgency as Russia’s war against Ukraine dragged into its third full week without any signs of winding down. A day after Russia launched a salvo of cruise missiles at a military facility near the Ukraine-Poland border, the United Nations estimated the total civilian toll in Ukraine at 596 dead and 1,067 injured, though it has said it believes that the actual figures are “considerably higher.”
Sullivan’s meeting — which a senior administration official described as “intense” and “candid” — came amid reports that President Biden is considering a trip to Europe in the coming weeks to rally and reassure allies, a visit that would follow Vice President Harris’s trip to Poland and Romania last week. And congressional leaders announced that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would deliver a virtual address to Congress on Wednesday, an event likely to carry deep emotional resonance.
Biden officials declined to disclose any specific warnings Sullivan may have conveyed to the Chinese about offering assistance to Russia, but the senior administration official said that the United States has “deep concerns about China’s alignment with Russia at this time” and that Sullivan was “direct” with the Chinese about “the potential implications and consequences of certain actions.” The official spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters during a phone call with reporters.
White House press secretary Jen Psaki said Monday that the consequences for China would be “significant,” and speaking on several Sunday shows the day prior, Sullivan offered a similar refrain, telling CNN’s “State of the Union” that “we have communicated to Beijing that we will not stand by and allow any country to compensate Russia for its losses from the economic sanctions.”
On the phone call with reporters, the senior administration official refused to say whether the administration believes that China has already provided military or financial assistance to Russia.
In a statement issued after the meeting, Chinese officials said Yang had made it clear that Beijing is not pleased with the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
“Yang Jiechi pointed out that the situation today in Ukraine has reached a stage that the Chinese side does not want to see,” the statement said. “China has always advocated respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.”
Still, the statement did not condemn Russia, which unilaterally launched the invasion, saying that “the reasonable concerns of all parties should be responded to.”
Earlier, Zhao Lijian, a spokesperson for the Chinese government, denied the reports that Russia has asked China for military and economic assistance, calling them “false information” that is “neither responsible nor ethical” and adding, “Recently, the U.S. has been spreading false information against China on the Ukraine issue, with sinister intentions.”
At Monday’s session, Sullivan and Yang also discussed North Korea, as well as the importance of keeping lines of communication between their two nations open, officials said.
Asked about Biden’s possible European trip — first reported by NBC News — Psaki said the administration has made no final decision but signaled that any such visit would involve shoring up NATO and other Western countries.
“We are, of course, closely engaged with our NATO partners and European allies … about the next steps in diplomacy — whether that’s providing additional humanitarian or security assistance or the mechanics for future conversations,” Psaki said.
Monday’s discussions — an outgrowth of Biden’s Nov. 15 virtual meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping — took place at Rome’s Waldorf Astoria, a hotel isolated from the city and favored by politicians and officials visiting from Washington. Journalists were not permitted to enter.
In the months before Russia’s invasion, Beijing and Moscow were drawing closer, forming a nascent alliance as Biden sought to bring together the world’s democracies in a coalition against authoritarianism. But the invasion’s messiness and lethality have put China in a sensitive position, given its emphasis on stability and continuity.
Michele Geraci, a former Italian undersecretary of state who lives part time in Shanghai, said he saw little incentive for China to support Russia in a direct way. “For China, this war is a pain,” Geraci said. “China needs to have a stable world for them to continue to develop their own economy. For them, this is a disruptive event.”
Geraci added that the Chinese officials he knows were hoping Beijing could play a mediating role between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukraine’s Zelensky. “In order to sit between Putin and Zelensky, you need to be neutral,” he said.
The Sullivan-Yang meeting came as the Pentagon concluded that Russia had attacked the International Peacekeeping and Security Center, a Ukrainian military facility about 12 miles from the border with Poland, with cruise missiles launched from long-range bombers Sunday. Poland is a NATO country, and U.S. troops had been deployed at the Ukrainian facility as recently as last month before the Pentagon withdrew them as it became evident that Russia was about to invade.
At least 35 people were killed and 134 more were injured in the attack, Ukrainian officials said. Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said Monday that several structures at the training center were hit. A senior U.S. defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the Pentagon, said that “more than a couple dozen” missiles were involved and that the bombers were in Russian airspace when they launched.
Kirby said the Pentagon is not looking at the missile salvo as an effort to “go after” U.S. weapons shipments to Ukraine, which are entering under a cloak of secrecy from neighboring European countries. “I would just tell you that we have multiple routes to get security assistance into the hands of the Ukrainians,” Kirby said. “This was not one of them.”
The senior defense official, speaking at a separate briefing at the Pentagon, said Russian advances on major cities remain stalled on numerous fronts, forcing the Russians to attack from a distance with artillery, rockets and other long-range weapons. Those cities include the capital, Kyiv; the northeastern city of Kharkiv; and the port city of Mariupol in the south.
“Clearly, they are increasing the amount of long-range fires they are applying to these cities, these population centers that are holding out,” the official said.
And in Ukraine, the carnage and chaos continued to pile up.
Shells that appeared to be Russian struck a nine-story residential building in Kyiv’s Obolon district at about 6 a.m., prompting frightened civilians to flee the building and firefighters to rush to the scene. At least one person was killed, according to Red Cross volunteers at the scene.
In Mariupol, which has been isolated and besieged by Russian forces for days, more than 160 cars carrying civilians were able to leave the city. They departed along a previously established humanitarian corridor and were heading north to the city of Zaporizhzhia, on the Dnieper River, the Mariupol City Council said in a statement. The council’s message, posted Monday afternoon, said a cease-fire was being observed along the humanitarian corridor.
Russian and Ukrainian officials announced Monday that they had agreed on 11 evacuation routes out of Mariupol, with corridors opening at 10 a.m. each day. It was not clear if they were working effectively, or if Russia — which has dropped explosives on previously established humanitarian corridors — was honoring the agreement.
Among the dead in Mariupol was a pregnant woman depicted in an Associated Press photograph after a maternity hospital there was hit with a bomb last week. The AP reported Monday that she and her unborn child had died in the aftermath, as the mother suffered from a crushed pelvis and detached hip.
A convoy of trucks packed with food and medicine bound for Mariupol was again turned away by fierce fighting Monday, in the latest setback to providing help to trapped residents.
The convoy, which also could offer residents a chance to get out, remains stalled about 50 miles southeast of Mariupol, near Berdyansk, the Mariupol City Council said in its statement. The vehicles were originally expected to arrive Sunday afternoon, but Russian forces continued to thwart them and violate a cease-fire agreement, the city official said.
As the violence continued, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) announced in a letter to their colleagues that Zelensky would deliver a virtual address to members of Congress on Wednesday morning. Zelensky has addressed other national legislatures, generally to raucous applause.
“The Congress remains unwavering in our commitment to supporting Ukraine as they face Putin’s cruel and diabolical aggression, and to passing legislation to cripple and isolate the Russian economy as well as deliver humanitarian, security and economic assistance to Ukraine,” Pelosi and Schumer said in the letter.
Kim Bellware, Miriam Berger, Karim Fahim, Jennifer Hassan, Ellen Nakashima, Siobhán O’Grady, David Stern, Annabelle Timsit and Reis Thebault contributed to this report.
5. Russia-Ukraine live updates: Kyiv under attack as European leaders announce visit to besieged capital
Russia-Ukraine live updates: Kyiv under attack as European leaders announce visit to besieged capital
The heads of three governments in the European Union — the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia — are set to travel to Kyiv to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The visit, at a moment when Europe is engaged in an extraordinary effort to isolate Russian President Vladimir Putin, was meant to “confirm the unequivocal support of the entire European Union for the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine," the Czech prime minister said in a Facebook post.
The visit comes as fierce fighting continues across Ukraine, including in the besieged capital, where a suspected Russian missile attack on another apartment building Tuesday killed at least two people. Officials were once again struggling to get humanitarian aid to the besieged southern port city of Mariupol, which is surrounded by Russian troops. Videos captured blasts striking at least three locations in the heart of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, on Monday night.
Ukrainian officials have reported progress in opening “humanitarian corridors” to besieged cities. Officials in Sumy province said Tuesday that evacuation routes would be opened from several cities in the region, in northeastern Ukraine near the Russian border.
Talks between Ukraine and Russia are set to resume after what Ukrainian negotiators on Monday described as a “technical pause.” Zelensky is set to deliver a virtual joint address to the U.S. Congress on Wednesday.
Here’s what to know
UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT
Zelensky to family of slain U.S. journalist: ‘The people of Ukraine ... are mourning with you’
6:30 a.m.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky paid tribute Monday to U.S. journalist Brent Renaud, who was killed while reporting outside Kyiv, writing a letter to the family of the second journalist reported killed in Ukraine since Russia’s invasion of the country more than two weeks ago.
In a letter posted to his official Twitter account Monday, Zelensky called Renaud “a talented and brave journalist” who “lost his life while documenting human tragedy, devastation and suffering of the millions of Ukrainians.”
“The people of Ukraine, who are fighting against the Russian regime to defend their Homeland and democracy in the world, are mourning with you,” he wrote.
Renaud, a 50-year-old, award-winning journalist and documentarian from Little Rock, was shot Sunday in a car while at a checkpoint in Irpin, a besieged suburb of Kyiv, Ukrainian officials said. He was the second journalist killed in the conflict, as confirmed by the Committee to Protect Journalists, highlighting the dangers of wartime reporting.
How Kyiv’s outgunned defenders have kept Russian forces from capturing the capital
6:15 a.m.
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IRPIN, Ukraine — The bodies of Russian soldiers were scattered by the wreckage of charred military vehicles and shelled buildings. Twenty feet away, behind tanker trucks, Ukrainian volunteers stood watch, their eyes on a cement mixer about 500 yards away. Behind it were Russian troops on the edges of Bucha, the next town over.
This front line in Irpin, on Kyiv’s northwest outskirts, had not moved in two weeks despite the Russian military superiority. That itself was a victory for Cmdr. Casper and his fighters.
“The Russians were trying to push forward,” said the short, burly unit leader who did not give his full name for security reasons but goes by a nom de guerre. “But they didn’t expect that the Ukrainians were waiting for them.”
When Russian forces seized control of a military airport in Hostomel, a few miles north of Irpin, on the first day of the war, many military observers expected a rapid takeover of Kyiv. But more than two weeks later, Russian troops have struggled to advance.
Digital iron curtain spells cyber vulnerabilities for the Russian people
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Russia is growing increasingly isolated from the global Internet in ways that spell trouble for its citizens’ cybersecurity.
A slew of Western tech and cybersecurity companies have stopped selling in Russia since it invaded Ukraine. That could make it far easier to hack Russian citizens — and far tougher for them to maintain privacy online.
It will also leave Russian citizens and companies reliant mostly on Russian tech and cyber companies, such as the anti-virus provider Kaspersky, which U.S. intelligence officials say can’t be trusted.
Ukrainian officials announce latest round of humanitarian corridors
5:45 a.m.
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Ukrainian officials announced the latest round of evacuation routes Tuesday to get civilians out of besieged cities.
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk said Tuesday that nine humanitarian corridors “have been agreed on” — without clarifying whether the agreement involves Russian troops, whom Ukrainian officials have accused of impairing evacuation efforts by continuously shelling cities in recent days.
Vereshchuk also said a humanitarian convoy that has been stuck in Berdyansk since the weekend, unable to bring its cargo of food, water and medicine to nearby Mariupol, would renew its efforts to reach the blockaded port city on Tuesday. From there, she said, the convoy would take “everyone who needs [to leave]” to the city of Zaporizhzhia.
The corridors, Vereshchuk said, will take people from two villages near Kyiv to Brovary, a suburb east of the capital; from Sumy in the northeast farther south to Poltava; and from the village of Oskil, some 85 miles southeast of Kharkiv. Ukrainian officials accused Russian forces last week of firing on a boarding school in Oskil for children with psychological and neurological disabilities, with 330 people inside.
She said authorities “are working on” opening a route from Ivankiv, about 50 miles northwest of Kyiv, and sought to reassure Ukrainians that information they post on social media is being seen, and that “we will not leave anyone” behind.
Dmytro Zhyvytsky, the regional governor of Sumy, wrote in a post on Telegram that columns of personal vehicles and evacuation buses would leave cities in the east and north of the country starting at 9 a.m. local time and head for Lubny, a city in central Ukraine under government control.
Zhyvytsky said evacuation buses would prioritize pregnant women, women with children, elderly people and those with disabilities. A wartime decree bans men of fighting age from leaving Ukraine. “There can be no men except [those] driving a car,” Zhyvytsky said.
Bombardment of Kyiv continues, with another residential block hit
5:33 a.m.
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KYIV, Ukraine — A suspected Russian missile attack on an apartment building in the Ukrainian capital early Tuesday killed at least two people and sparked a frenzied effort to rescue residents from the top floors as fires raged below.
The strike, on a tall building in the Sviatoshynskyi district shortly before 4 a.m., was one of at least three suspected Russian attacks on residential neighborhoods in Kyiv in the past two days.
Fires burned a few hours after the suspected strike, as dozens of firefighters battled the flames and used cranes to try to extract residents trapped inside. Residents said there were roughly 128 apartments in the building and that about half the occupants had fled before Tuesday’s attack.
Ukraine’s State Emergency Service said at least two people were killed, but the toll from the attack, which badly damaged most of the building, was expected to rise. Families and elderly people still inhabited the building, neighbors said. Residents described the area as a tight-knit community, with a garden, stores and cafes.
Ukrainian lawmaker Oleksiy Goncharenko tweeted a video from the scene and called on Western countries to further support Ukraine. “Please help us,” he said.
— Oleksiy Goncharenko (@GoncharenkoUa) March 15, 2022
Emergency responders and others were photographed guiding panicked residents to safety. At least 35 people were rescued, the State Emergency Service said.
Tuesday’s strike followed attacks in the Obolon and Podilskyi districts Monday, leaving residents trapped in blackened high-rise apartments while emergency workers tried to free them.
Three E.U. heads of government to meet with Zelensky in Kyiv
5:21 a.m.
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BERLIN — The heads of three governments in the European Union were scheduled to travel Tuesday to the besieged Ukrainian capital to meet with President Volodymyr Zelensky.
In a Facebook post, the prime minister of the Czech Republic, Petr Fiala, said he would be in Kyiv along with Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa. The visit, he said, was meant to “confirm the unequivocal support of the entire European Union for the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.” It would come two days after Russian missiles struck a military training base close to Ukraine’s border with Poland, a NATO member.
Fiala said the delegation, which was working in concert with E.U. authorities, would present a broad aid package for Ukraine.
Ukrainian presidential adviser says Moscow could run out of resources to continue war
5:08 a.m.
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A senior Ukrainian adviser, Oleksiy Arestovich, outlined Monday a number of scenarios that he envisioned could end the war in Ukraine — one of them a prediction that it could be over as soon as “early May,” after he said Moscow would run out of resources.
Arestovich, an adviser to the Ukrainian president’s chief of staff, said the time frame for ending the war would depend on the amount of resources the Kremlin was willing to commit to the conflict.
“I think that no later than in May, early May, we should have a peace agreement. Maybe much earlier, we will see. I am talking about the latest possible dates,” Arestovich said in a video broadcast on Ukrainian television, Reuters reported.
“We are at a fork in the road now,” he said, adding that there would either be “a peace deal struck very quickly, within a week or two, with troop withdrawal and everything,” or a “round two” of Russia offensives.
He also said it was possible Russia would involve fighters from Syria to bolster its forces. Even if Kyiv and Moscow reached a peace deal, Arestovich did not rule out a continuation of small tactical clashes between the two sides in the future.
However, Arestovich has not been personally involved in official peace talks, which have so far yielded little. The talks resumed Tuesday after what Ukrainian negotiators on Monday described as a “technical pause.”
Pfizer says all of its profit in Russia will go to help Ukraine
4:50 a.m.
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Pfizer on Monday said it will donate all profits from its Russian subsidiary to causes that provide direct humanitarian support to Ukrainians.
In a statement, the New York-based drugmaker also said it would not initiate new clinical trials in Russia. Pfizer, which doesn’t own or operate production sites in Russia, will separately cease all planned investments with local suppliers that had aimed to build manufacturing capacity in the country.
But Pfizer said it would keep shipping critical medical supplies to Russia, including those needed to help patients suffering from cancer or cardiovascular problems.
“We cannot stop the flow of our medicines to Russia. Our medicines are medicines, not like an iPhone Pro, for example, or the new Mac,” Albert Bourla, Pfizer’s chief executive, said Tuesday during an interview with Yahoo Finance.
Pfizer made $81.3 billion in revenue last year. Less than 0.5 percent of that was made in Russia, Bourla said last week on CBS’s “Face the Nation.”
Last week, BioNTech, the German firm that co-developed a coronavirus vaccine with Pfizer, announced a donation of 1 million euros to a nonprofit organization providing refugee relief. Some 2.8 million people have fled Ukraine since Russia invaded last month, according to the United Nations.
‘Why are Europe and the U.S. holding back?’: Reporters answered your questions
4:40 a.m.
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Over the weekend, Russian forces widened the scope of their attacks across Ukraine. As the war continued into its third week, Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected appeals from French and German leaders to de-escalate the attacks.
On Sunday, at least 35 people were killed and 134 injured after Russian missiles struck a Ukrainian military facility about 15 miles away from the border with Poland. A Pentagon spokesman said no U.S. service members were killed in the attack.
Post reporters Isabelle Khurshudyan, Max Bearak, Karoun Demirjian and Missy Ryan answered readers’ questions about the war on Monday. Isabelle and Max are reporting from Ukraine. Karoun and Missy, who cover the Pentagon and the State Department respectively, are based in Washington. Here are some of the questions they answered:
Russia is installing its own mayors, staging referendums to ‘subvert Ukrainian democracy,’ Britain says
4:29 a.m.
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Russia is ramping up efforts to “subvert Ukrainian democracy” by installing its own mayors and seeking to stage a referendum in the Ukrainian city of Kherson in a bid to establish the Russian-occupied area as a “breakaway republic,” Britain’s Defense Ministry said Tuesday in its latest intelligence update.
The ministry also said Russian President Vladimir Putin was tightening political control on the country by replacing the Ukrainian mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, with one of Russia’s own.
The intelligence update reported that there were “multiple demonstrations” across Ukraine in the cities of Kherson, Melitopol and Berdyansk — all of which are occupied by Russian forces. In Kherson, Russian troops fired shots into the air to try to disperse crowds of peaceful protesters.
Yevhen Matveyev, the mayor of Dniprorudne in southern Ukraine, was also reportedly abducted by Russian troops, the update said.
In an interview with the “BBC Breakfast” Tuesday, James Cleverly of Britain’s Foreign Office said that Russia’s “plan of attack is not working” — but as a result, more civilian areas are coming under attack.
He also referred to recent predictions from a Ukrainian presidential adviser that the war could end in May, saying such an estimate was “incredibly difficult” to make.
World must end dependence on Russian oil to stop Kremlin ‘bullying,’ Britain’s Boris Johnson says
4:25 a.m.
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LONDON — British Prime Minister Boris Johnson urged world leaders to cut their dependence on Russian oil and gas to end the Kremlin’s “bullying,” in an op-ed published late Monday.
Johnson said world leaders made a “terrible mistake” in 2014, allowing Russian President Vladimir Putin to annex Crimea, “a huge chunk out of a sovereign country,” which set the stage for his current invasion of Ukraine.
“Economic relations did not just resume — they intensified, with the West taking more Russian gas than ever before, becoming more dependent on the goodwill of Putin,” he wrote. “So when he finally came to launch his vicious war in Ukraine, he knew the world would find it very hard to punish him. He knew that he had created an addiction.”
Johnson, writing in Britain’s Daily Telegraph, said the world “cannot go on like this” and be subject to “continuous blackmail.” The prime minister said energy resources were both a strength and a weakness for Putin and applauded the United States and European Union for efforts to ban imports of Russian oil.
Last week, President Biden said he was barring all imports of oil and natural gas from Russia, effective immediately. E.U. officials, meanwhile, unveiled a plan to cut Russian gas imports by about two-thirds this year.
Johnson also said that weaning off Russian oil, although “painful,” could allow more resources and political will for renewable energy initiatives to combat climate change.
“From the destruction of Aleppo, to the deadly use of Novichok on the streets of Salisbury, to the barbarism we are currently witnessing in Ukraine, Putin has been able to get away with too much for too long because he has encouraged and exploited a Western addiction to his oil and gas,” Johnson said. “That addiction must now end.”
New Zealand offers shelter to thousands of Ukrainians with family in the Pacific nation
3:40 a.m.
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New Zealand’s government said Tuesday it would offer temporary visas to about 4,000 Ukrainians with family members already in the Pacific nation, in what officials said was the largest special visa program issued by Wellington in decades.
The new policy will allow Ukrainian-born New Zealand citizens and residents to bring in members of their family whose lives are at risk due to Russia’s invasion, including parents, grandparents, siblings or adult children and their immediate family. Successful applicants will be granted a two-year visa with employment rights, and their children will be able to attend school.
“Our Ukrainian community in New Zealand has also asked us to help in sheltering their family members who have been forced to flee their homes due to Russia’s unprovoked attack,” Immigration Minister Kris Faafoi said in a statement.
“Today’s announcement will provide a pathway for their families’ safety,” he added.
The program is open for a year, and successful applicants will have nine months to make their way to New Zealand after their visa is approved. It comes as U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Monday welcomed New Zealand’s urgent passage of a new sanctions law that targets those of economic or strategic relevance to Russia, including oligarchs.
“New Zealand’s measures show strong solidarity with Ukraine in concert with the international community,” Blinken wrote on Twitter.
Multiple strikes light up Kharkiv’s city center
3:14 a.m.
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Videos captured blasts striking at least three locations in the heart of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, on Monday night.
In a video filmed by the Kharkiv river, a munition streaks across the screen and hits the ground. Two distinct blasts and sparks erupt from the site of impact at approximately 9:50 p.m., according to the clip’s timestamp.
Around the same time, approximately a half-mile southeast, two videos recording a cluster of apartment buildings capture strikes by the residential area. Munitions appear to land next to a medical center on the ground floor of a multistory building, scattering debris everywhere.
According to its website, the center offered family and pediatric care, as well as a broad range of tests for patients.
A little more than a mile northwest of the medical center, two separate fires are seen spreading in the vicinity of Kharkiv’s Central Market and city administration offices. Explosions farther south illuminate smoke billowing from buildings in the distance.
Sustained Russian strikes have devastated Kharkiv. In the overall Kharkiv region, more than 200 civilians have been killed as of Sunday evening, according to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Russians could face war crimes tribunal. The first one, in 1474, ended in a beheading.
2:43 a.m.
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Earlier this month, the International Criminal Court announced it was investigating possible war crimes in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including the alleged use of cluster munitions and vacuum bombs, targeting of civilians and an attack on a nuclear facility. Neither Russia nor the United States is a member of the International Criminal Court. Ukraine isn’t either, although it has previously accepted the court’s jurisdiction within its borders.
The current ICC at The Hague sprang from the Nuremberg trials of high-level Nazis after World War II. But the concept of an international war crimes tribunal goes back more than 500 years, to an empire that no longer exists and a case that ended in a beheading.
6. The View of Ukraine from Taiwan: Get Real About Territorial Defense
We need a resistance operating concept with Taiwanese characteristics.
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Too much ink has already been spilled making the case that Taiwan can and should find ways to make its regular military forces more capable. There is no need to rehash those debates here. Our purpose is to call for the creation of a standing, all-volunteer, Taiwanese territorial defense force.
We come at this with unique perspectives. One of us commanded Taiwan’s military, and the other is a close analyst of the country’s security affairs and a veteran of the invasion of Iraq. Based on our experiences, we lay out the case for such an organization, and why it can enhance deterrence, below. For now, it suffices to say that Ukraine’s experience with its young Territorial Defense Force suggests that popular resistance has merit and might be the difference between Taiwan surviving an assault from the mainland and succumbing.
It is too early to say, but unfortunately, Ukraine may have waited too long to expand its resistance forces to deter Putin meaningfully, to the extent that Putin was deterrable. Taiwan’s existing patchwork of militias and civil defense groups is even less prepared to counter a ruthless occupation. Therefore, as admirable and important as these early civil defense efforts are, they are unlikely to deter a resolute invader. A bottom-up force credibly organized, trained, and equipped to reshape Beijing’s calculus requires top-down leadership, vision, and resources.
The View of Ukraine from Taiwan: Get Real About Territorial Defense - War on the Rocks
Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine has shocked the world, but one country is paying particularly close attention: Taiwan, another democracy threatened by a powerful, proximate, and authoritarian neighbor. To be sure, Putin’s decision to invade a neighbor may not tell us much about Xi Jinping’s willingness to do the same. Nevertheless, stomach-churning images from Ukraine make clear that wars of conquest are not an artifact of the past.
Thankfully, Taiwan is taking notice. Lawmakers and military officials are considering a return to conscription, and even a two-year term of obligated service. Public opinion polls continue to suggest an uptick in the Taiwanese people’s willingness to fight. Most important of all, some citizens are starting to vote with their feet, volunteering to join grassroots civil defense organizations. These are unquestionably positive developments. Just as the Russian military and political leadership are learning the high cost of conquering an unwilling nation, deterrence is enhanced to the degree that the Taiwanese people show the world they are willing to fight.
Unfortunately, as the ongoing tragedy in Ukraine suggests, resolve is not enough. Ukraine’s willingness to provide for its own defense was not — and is not — in question. Indeed, it is offering a master class on how even the most vulnerable democracies can resist aggression. Yet Russia was undeterred, at least in part, because capability matters too. Deterrence rests on the strongest possible foundations when a people’s willingness to fight is matched by its ability to do so in a way that credibly threatens a would-be invader with unacceptable costs and pain.
Too much ink has already been spilled making the case that Taiwan can and should find ways to make its regular military forces more capable. There is no need to rehash those debates here. Our purpose is to call for the creation of a standing, all-volunteer, Taiwanese territorial defense force.
We come at this with unique perspectives. One of us commanded Taiwan’s military, and the other is a close analyst of the country’s security affairs and a veteran of the invasion of Iraq. Based on our experiences, we lay out the case for such an organization, and why it can enhance deterrence, below. For now, it suffices to say that Ukraine’s experience with its young Territorial Defense Force suggests that popular resistance has merit and might be the difference between Taiwan surviving an assault from the mainland and succumbing.
It is too early to say, but unfortunately, Ukraine may have waited too long to expand its resistance forces to deter Putin meaningfully, to the extent that Putin was deterrable. Taiwan’s existing patchwork of militias and civil defense groups is even less prepared to counter a ruthless occupation. Therefore, as admirable and important as these early civil defense efforts are, they are unlikely to deter a resolute invader. A bottom-up force credibly organized, trained, and equipped to reshape Beijing’s calculus requires top-down leadership, vision, and resources.
Territorial Defense and Deterrence
The concept of training civilian volunteers to defend their homes and communities against invasion is not new. In recent years, Estonia, Poland, and Ukraine have shown renewed interest in territorial defense. The logic is straightforward. Although territorial defense cannot defeat a large-scale invasion, it can take a rapid, fait accompli victory off the table by ensuring the subsequent occupation will be violent and prolonged.
As Russian forces are likely to discover if they do manage to overwhelm Ukraine’s military defenses, a foreign invader cannot attain its ultimate goal — political control — until it pacifies the population. A properly organized, trained, and equipped territorial defense force, employed to wage a prolonged insurgency, makes establishing and exercising population control vastly harder. Hopefully, the prospect of waging a prolonged war for hearts and minds will convince a potential aggressor that an invasion is unlikely to work at a price it is willing to pay. And if deterrence fails, a territorial defense campaign can rally international support as well as buy time for outside forces to intervene.
In Taiwan’s case, a territorial defense force will also enhance deterrence by building and signaling national resolve. Analysts and pundits spend far too much time parsing public opinion polls to assess whether the Taiwanese people will fight. A credible, well-organized territorial defense force can put such debates to rest. First — and the Taiwanese are no exception in this regard — people are generally more willing to defend their homes and families, which is exactly what territorial defense forces are organized, trained, and equipped to do. We see this phenomenon playing out in Ukraine: Ordinary Ukrainian citizens are unquestionably more resolved to protect their communities and neighborhoods than Russian soldiers are to seize and occupy them. This clear-cut asymmetry of resolve has galvanized support for Ukraine at home and abroad. Second, territorial defense units that receive rigorous and realistic training, performed on the ground they will be expected to defend, will send a powerful message to the Taiwanese people that they have a role to play in providing for their own defense. Third, a territorial defense force could further reinforce a sense of national identity and resolve.
Indeed, Taiwan can buy all the American weapons it wants. But nothing projects a more powerful signal that the Taiwanese people are ready to “pay any price and bear any burden” to protect themselves than a standing territorial defense force.
Bottom-Up Warfare Requires Top-Down Leadership
As heartening as it is to see ad hoc militia and civil defense initiatives sprouting up around Taiwan, the fact is that a patchwork of grassroots (and currently unarmed) part-time citizen-soldiers is unlikely to affect Beijing’s calculus. Insurgencies are rarely spontaneous. Tough training and clear organization are essential to overcome the collective action problems — and the raw fear — that will deter civilians who might otherwise be willing to fight. There is also a risk that a poorly trained civilian force will squander itself attacking frontline invasion troops, instead of patiently waiting for more vulnerable support units and occupation forces.
Insurgents also need access to arms and ammunition. Taiwan is no Texas. It is not a country that is flush with weapons, ammunition, and people with high levels of experience handling either. Getting weapons and rounds into the hands of the people, ensuring the people know how to use them, and making sure there are enough of both to hold out despite China’s inevitable attempts to isolate the island from the rest of the world are all essential. Access to satellite communications and training on propaganda, social media, and information operations will also prove useful. Mao himself reminds us that the printing press is the guerrilla’s most important weapon.
Creating a territorial defense force out of whole cloth is, therefore, a massive undertaking. Only Taiwan’s government has the authority and resources to accomplish such an ambitious enterprise in time to shape Chinese — and American — perceptions. And only the government can also ensure that Taiwan’s territorial defense efforts are fully integrated into a holistic, multi-layered, denial-centered defensive scheme.
A Blueprint for Taiwanese Territorial Defense
In a perfect world, it would make sense to incorporate territorial defense into the Ministry of National Defense’s ongoing reserve reforms. Unfortunately, because the ministry has already decided to remake Taiwan’s reserve force in the image of America’s so-called operational reserve, that approach is no longer viable. We therefore instead suggest creating a permanent territorial defense force that will operate as a stand-alone service under the aegis of the Ministry of National Defense. This force should have an equivalent status to the army, navy, and air force, along with an equivalently ranked commanding general.
A Taiwanese territorial defense force should be built around volunteers. It should focus on recruiting young men and women who are patriotic and want to serve, but who are either reluctant to do so full time, or who harbor negative views of the regular military. Joining the territorial defense force could even count as an alternative to active military service if Taiwan decides to return to a longer term of conscription. Volunteers should be organized into geographically based units. The goal must be to ensure that territorial defense troops can train (and fight) close to home. In this way, a Taiwanese territorial defense force would be organized akin to the geographically oriented U.S. Army National Guard. Unlike the U.S. Army National Guard, however, territorial defense units should not be trained and equipped to conduct conventional combat operations alongside — or as part of — active-duty units. Although the bulk of this force will be comprised of citizen-soldiers, each unit should be built around a cadre of current and former special operations forces personnel. Building units around elite (perhaps even American-trained) warriors will lend territorial defense credibility, if not an element of glamour. In practical terms, this practice will also increase the odds that territorial defense volunteers will receive meaningful, rigorous, and realistic military training. And, because of how special operations personnel are themselves trained to fight, it ensures that territorial defense units will be ready to conduct independent, small unit operations on the battlefield.
Along these lines, territorial defense units should be trained and equipped to conduct fire team, squad, and platoon-sized combat operations. Units should have access to, and volunteers should have training on the use of, small arms, “technicals” (non-standard tactical vehicles), anti-armor rockets (e.g., Next Generation Light Anti-tank Weapons and Javelins), improvised explosive devices, portable air defense systems (e.g., Stingers), and field medical care kits. Given the success that Ukrainian units have had using relatively inexpensive loitering drones against Russian convoys, Taiwan should also consider equipping territorial defense units with similarly capable small and cheap remotely piloted vehicles. Generators and satellite communications assets are also essential, as China is unlikely to leave the power on. Territorial defense units will need to communicate with one another, regular military units, and potentially even coalition forces. Territorial defense units should also be able to broadcast their operations — and Chinese atrocities — even after the island has been occupied. Here too, Ukraine’s experience is instructive. It was imperative for Ukraine to win the narrative early in the conflict to both rally support around the world and stiffen resolve at home. An appropriately trained and equipped territorial defense force can help Taiwan ensure it is ready to do the same. To ensure ready access to all these things, the government will need to build armories, which can double as mobilization and training centers, all around the country. Building as many armories as possible also reduces the impact of losing some to first strikes and/or insider threats.
Of course, citizen-soldiers only have a fraction as much time to train as their regular counterparts. Training time must therefore be treated as sacrosanct, with every moment devoted to getting volunteers hands-on experience with weapons and tactics. Conversely, territorial defense units should not waste a second on marching, ceremonies, uniform inspections, and the countless other mundane tasks active-duty forces all-too-often waste time on. Volunteers will also need to specialize. It is unrealistic to expect a part-time citizen to master the use of all the capabilities listed above. Instead, the goal should be to organize each territorial defense unit along the lines of a U.S. Army Special Forces “A-Team,” such that any one unit has enough specially trained volunteers to fight as an “all arms” team.
How should a Taiwanese territorial defense force be employed? In peacetime, units can exercise their capabilities by supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, of which there are many due to the number of typhoons and earthquakes that strike Taiwan. They should also be incorporated into the military’s exercises and maneuvers. In wartime, the force should focus on social denial. Territorial defense troops should not be used against frontline combat units given their lack of training and insufficient gear to engage in direct combat against armored formations and assault troops. From the Viet Cong in 1968 to the Fedayeen in 2003 to the Islamic State in 2017, insurgents and guerrillas often fare poorly when going toe-to-toe with conventional forces. Such missions should remain in the hands of active duty and operational reserve units.
Instead, at the first sign of invasion, territorial defense force troops should report to their assigned muster stations, collect their gear, and go home. As the invasion unfolds, territorial defense units should allow the attacker’s leading assault units to pass before conducting mobile, hit-and-run missions to wreak havoc on logistics convoys, supply depots, command posts, and early follow-on forces, especially those that arrive in lumbering cargo jets. If units of the People’s Liberation Army succeed at taking one or more urban areas, territorial defense units transition to form the backbone of a prolonged insurgency.
Critics of territorial defense often point to issues of cost and feasibility. Neither concern should be a barrier to action. In terms of cost, although territorial defense will not be cheap in an absolute sense, it will almost certainly be a bargain compared to some of the things Taiwan is already more than willing to pay for. There is no question that tens of thousands of trained volunteers will give Taiwan more deterrence bang for its buck than a few dozen M109 Paladins or a handful of diesel submarines. There are also creative ways to control costs. Take the Estonian Defense League as an example. Estonian volunteers serve without pay, effectively doubling the size of Estonia’s ground force for a fraction of the price tag.
In terms of feasibility, the surprising success of Ukraine’s territorial defense forces should put to rest any notion that part-time citizen-soldiers have no role to play in modern warfare. Beyond their value in rallying international support for Ukraine’s plight, these troops have helped slow Russia’s advance. It is worth considering how much more effective such a force could have been had it been expanded years ago. Beyond Ukraine, there is also preliminary evidence suggesting that volunteer forces can improve deterrence. And it is important to remember that a territorial defense force need not be massive to be effective. After all, it only took a “mere” 20,000 fighters to effectively undermine the U.S. occupation of Iraq during the first year of that conflict.
Not a Moment to Lose
The time to act is now. It will take Taiwan years to build a viable territorial defense capability from the ground up. Russia’s invasion, tragic though it is, has created a rare window of opportunity to jump-start the process. The visceral images of Russian tanks pouring across Ukrainian borders and Russian rockets slamming into Ukrainian cities show that the threat is real, while the surprising efficacy of Ukraine’s territorial defense forces proves that resistance is possible.
The Taiwanese people are taking note. Many are eager to play an active role in providing for their own defense. What they need now are leadership and resources. We offer one blueprint for moving forward. There are surely others. Any plan will do. The only wrong choice is to squander the moment and momentum which the war in Ukraine has created at an unimaginable price.
Adm. Lee Hsi-Min (Ret.) is a senior research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute. He previously served as the 26th chief of the General Staff of the Republic of China Armed Forces.
Michael A. Hunzeker (@MichaelHunzeker) is an assistant professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, where he is also associate director of the Center for Security Policy Studies. He served in the Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006.
7. Regime Change, But for Whom
Excerpts:
Putin may later rue his humiliation of key government and security figures. No dictator ever rules alone but instead as head of a system and that system, whatever it is, has as much reason to protect itself as its leader does. Russia’s elites may soon face popular unrest over an unpopular war as well as direct threats to their personal wealth at home and abroad from international sanctions and increased international vigilance of money laundering and hidden foreign bank accounts. In addition, Putin’s recent announcement that he has raised the nuclear alert level may unnerve those around him as much as it has caused concern in the West. Russia’s security and economic elites may soon have to decide how far towards disaster they will allow Putin to lead them before taking control of the wheel of a car that may be heading towards a cliff.
Time may not be on Putin’s side and the events of the next several weeks and months will be crucial for Russia’s future. How events eventually unfold cannot be clearly foreseen; this article posits one possible scenario. The United States and its allies and partners should take time now to consider the policy implications and contingency plans for such an event. Those plans should also take into account that the shock waves from the fall of Vladimir Putin could also finally topple Alexander Lukashenko, now a partner in crime against Ukraine, as well. This is not to say that changes in regime leadership will also mean changes in the basic political form of the regimes ruling Russia and Belarus. A democratic revolution would be welcome but one motivation for an internal coup in the Kremlin would be to preempt a popular mass upheaval. The successors of Putin and Lukashenko could be drawn from the same well as their predecessors. But by virtue of being their replacements, they will be expected by those who put them in power to make changes that their predecessors were unable or unwilling to make. The West should not be caught unawares, such events may happen quickly, and therefore be prepared to deal with new leaders and new circumstances to help end this war, repair the damage done to Ukraine, and prevent it from happening again.
Regime Change, But for Whom
By Philip Wasielewski
Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine is now three weeks old. President Putin’s goals for this euphemistically named “special military operation” are the [sic] denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine. “Denazification” is short hand for removing a constitutionally elected government and replacing it with a puppet one. Demilitarization means imposing conditions that will make Ukraine perpetually weak and subservient to Moscow. For Putin, this is a war of regime change to make Ukraine a vassal of Russia.
With enough time and blood, Russia might occupy Ukraine up to the Dnepr River and points beyond. However, no matter what amount of Ukrainian territory Russia occupies, it cannot achieve its war aims. Even if Russian forces capture or kill President Zelensky, take Kyiv, and install a puppet government, they will never be able to leave because any government installed by Russian bayonets will only survive with the constant presence of Russian bayonets. This means a permanent Russian occupation, suppression of resistance, and repression of Ukrainian nationalism. The Kremlin probably understands by now that such a “victory” would mean the end of the Russian economy and near total international isolation. In order to find a face-saving exit from this war, they will actually need the Zelensky government to negotiate with for a cease fire and peace agreement.
Therefore, while it is hard to foresee Russia’s war causing regime change in Ukraine, it is not impossible to consider this same war causing regime change in Russia. President Putin’s decision to go to war has made him vulnerable to both popular and elite discontent in Russia. Public discontent will be fueled by nationwide economic deprivation and the individual personal tragedies of high casualties from a needless war. Elite discontent will be fueled by resentment of the cavalier and incompetent way that Putin led the nation into war and fears that popular unrest will jeopardize the political system, which is best described as “La Cosa Nostra”, from which they receive their power and money.
Putin’s downfall has been predicted before.[1] However, a combination of factors has sustained his hold on power for over two decades including the Kremlin’s control of the mass media; its natural state monopoly of force via the judiciary, police, paramilitary forces, and the armed forces; and the historic Russian fear of anarchy especially of the type experienced between 1991-1998. In that period, Russia’s GDP fell approximately 40% while the average Russian endured currency devaluations, drastic loss of real income, high inflation, and other economic shocks but little therapy culminating in the financial crisis of 1998 when the government devalued the ruble and defaulted on its debts.[2] Despite the past nine years of a declining economy, Russian citizens could console themselves that they have survived worse and have generally accepted their political and economic situation.
However, sanctions related to the Ukrainian war are predicted to impact the Russian economy to the same extent or even worse than in the 1990s. In less than three weeks since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine, the ruble has fallen sharply against the dollar (on February 23, 2022 the ruble traded at 84.05 to one U.S. dollar, on March 10, 2022 the ruble traded at 126.50 to the dollar) and fears of bank runs are rising, as the depreciation threatens to stoke inflation, which some estimate could now be running as high as 70%. On February 28, Russia’s central bank doubled its benchmark interest rate to 20%, to stem the ruble’s fall. Russia has banned foreigners from selling local securities and ordered domestic exporters to sell most of their foreign-currency holdings.[3] The Moscow stock market is still closed while Fitch Ratings has downgraded Russia’s credit to “C”, or junk bond status. The Bank of Russia estimates that GDP in 2022 will shrink by 8% while JP Morgan estimates it will fall by 11% due to sanctions this year (in 1998 it fell 5.3%). The ability of Russia to weather this storm by drawing from its sovereign wealth funds is partly negated by the fact that nearly half of the country’s $640 billion in foreign exchange reserves is frozen due to sanctions. During the week of March 14, 2022, the Russian government must pay $117 million on two of its dollar-denominated bonds. Russia’s finance minister is threatening to pay that debt in rubles, which would mean a default of government debt.[4] What took years to happen to the Russian economy from the collapse of the Soviet Union in the winter of 1991 to the default in the summer of 1998 may now be repeated in just months thanks to Putin’s attack on Ukraine.
How will Russians react if they see a return to the economic ruin of the 1991-1998 era or even worse? A combination of a ruined economy, anger over Putin’s war in Ukraine, continuing fallout from the poor handling of the COVID-19 epidemic, the loss of opportunities for international travel, and other economic and social problems could provide a catalyst for new nationwide street protests. What then?
Putin is certainly willing to give orders to crush dissent and the “guardians of order” will likely carry them out. Following such orders would not just be mere loyalty to Putin but also in the best self-interest of most security officers to maintain their lucrative business interests and to not face some future “truth commission” for their activities of the past two decades.[5] Events in Belarus in 2020 demonstrated that if the security forces stand firm, a dictator can survive long-term popular unrest. For further confirmation of this, it is not too far a look over the shoulder from the Kremlin’s Red Square to Tiananmen Square.
Should there ever be the use of large-scale deadly force against the general public, the correlation of forces and loyalty of the security services may win the day, but also lose forever Putin’s connection with Russian society. A modern-day Bloody Sunday and follow-on unrest paralleling the 1905 Revolution would have consequences. Bloody Sunday, the January 1905 massacre of a march in St. Petersburg to petition the Tsar over economic conditions, took place in the middle of the unpopular Russo-Japanese war. The war had exposed Russia’s weak military and inept civil administration, but this had also happened in the Crimean War, and that time led to beneficial reforms. What made Bloody Sunday a pivotal event in Russian history and compounded the effects of a losing war in the Far East was that it’s violence against loyal subjects in the shadow of the Tsar’s Winter Palace broke the social contract between Nicholas II and the nation that accepted autocratic rule. Until then, most Russians blamed their problems on government officials and not the Tsar whom they believed ruled by divine right and was genuinely concerned with their well-being. After Bloody Sunday the myth of the Good Tsar ended and Russian society now personally identified Russia’s problems with the Tsar. The resulting waves of strikes and violence known as the 1905 Revolution forced Nicholas II to accept the first limits ever on Tsarist power. A similar combination of internal unrest and military defeats in February 1917 culminated in his abdication and later the murder of his entire family after the Bolshevik revolution.
This history may not repeat itself today but is very close to rhyming with an autocratic ruler being personally identified with an unpopular war and growing economic distress. Russia’s modern social contract wherein the Kremlin provides the people with good economic conditions in exchange for noninterference in politics is severely strained. It could shatter if lethal force is applied widespread against society instead of just against a few politically active citizens. There is too much baggage in modern Russian history for major bloodletting to not have an impact on today’s ruled and their approach to their rulers. It could lead to the very cycle of demonstrations that so unnerved the Kremlin during the Bolotnaya Square movement of 2011-2013 and later the nationwide protests supporting Alexei Navalny. If protests against Putin, the war, and the economy become nationwide in location and society-wide in participation, then events could develop their own unforeseen momentum as happened in Iran during the anti-Shah demonstrations in 1978.
Therefore, if the first rule of politics is “Thou shalt stay in power,” how might Russia’s political elites react to nationwide protests in order to survive? Russia has a Soviet past but is not the old Soviet Union. The ideology and mechanisms needed to control an entire population in a totalitarian fashion cannot be refashioned. For those who are part of the ruling regime this could become a true existential threat. To prevent popular unrest from forcing a total change of the ruling system, regime elites would need to make major changes, possibly starting at the top.
If history informs Russian leaders to fear the wrath of the masses, it should also warn that as many Kremlin leaders have been deposed by forces from within its walls as from without. Tsars Peter III (1728-1762) and Paul I (1754-1801) were murdered during palace revolutions and Nikita Khrushchev was unseated by an internal Kremlin cabal in 1964. Unsuccessful military coups also came close to unseating Tsar Nicholas I in 1825 and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. This may be why Putin decided to split Rosgvardia paramilitary units from the MVD, put them under the ultra-loyal Zolotov, and have him report directly to the Kremlin as a counterbalance to any palace intrigue from the FSB and MVD. However, there are many levels of loyalty and those who are in the Kremlin inner circle have their own economic and personal security interests to consider.[6] If it comes to losing the boss or losing their positions, power, and assets; the inner circle may give up the boss. An internal coup to appease massive social disorder could remove Putin from power. In other words, popular unrest does not need to break through the gates of the Kremlin to succeed; it only needs to break through the sense of security within Putin’s inner circle.
Putin himself has helped undermine that sense of security amongst Russia’s elites. Throughout his career, from the sinking of the Kursk to the Beslan and Nord-Ost theater terror attacks, he has been a poor crisis manager. For COVID-19, Putin put the responsibility for the pandemic response on the shoulders of others while remaining isolated from the Russian public and most of his own government.[7]
Now he has begun a war that has the hallmarks of turning into a disaster no matter how much territory Russian forces occupy. Even before the war there were signals that the Russian military may not have been in total agreement of the necessity for invading Ukraine.[8] Since the war has exposed Russian military deficiencies and caused high casualties amongst its most elite units (and Rosgvardia units too), it would not be unusual for the military to react against the political leadership that ordered the war.
Others elements of the government may also react negatively to an unwanted war. A close review of the February 21, 2022, national security meeting shows subtle indications that not everyone in the inner circle supported Putin’s plans. While his innermost circle of advisors, Secretary of the Security Council Patrushev, FSB Director Bortnikov and Defense Minister Shoigu, expressed strong support for war, Foreign Minister Lavrov and Prime Minister Mishustin both avoided giving straight answers till pressed. The same applied to Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff Kozak, who holds the Ukraine portfolio in Russia’s national security system, and who had to be pressed to admit that Kyiv would not accept Russia’s ultimatums. When Kozak later tried to speak again at the meeting, Putin cut him off twice and Putin later humiliated his foreign intelligence chief, Sergei Naryshkin, about whether he would support recognition of the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics – all of which was later broadcast unedited to the nation.[9] Since that meeting, Putin has also reportedly lashed out Russia’s national security elites firing army generals and arresting senior FSB officers as a result of the disastrous conduct of the war to date.[10]
Putin may later rue his humiliation of key government and security figures. No dictator ever rules alone but instead as head of a system and that system, whatever it is, has as much reason to protect itself as its leader does. Russia’s elites may soon face popular unrest over an unpopular war as well as direct threats to their personal wealth at home and abroad from international sanctions and increased international vigilance of money laundering and hidden foreign bank accounts. In addition, Putin’s recent announcement that he has raised the nuclear alert level may unnerve those around him as much as it has caused concern in the West. Russia’s security and economic elites may soon have to decide how far towards disaster they will allow Putin to lead them before taking control of the wheel of a car that may be heading towards a cliff.
Time may not be on Putin’s side and the events of the next several weeks and months will be crucial for Russia’s future. How events eventually unfold cannot be clearly foreseen; this article posits one possible scenario. The United States and its allies and partners should take time now to consider the policy implications and contingency plans for such an event. Those plans should also take into account that the shock waves from the fall of Vladimir Putin could also finally topple Alexander Lukashenko, now a partner in crime against Ukraine, as well. This is not to say that changes in regime leadership will also mean changes in the basic political form of the regimes ruling Russia and Belarus. A democratic revolution would be welcome but one motivation for an internal coup in the Kremlin would be to preempt a popular mass upheaval. The successors of Putin and Lukashenko could be drawn from the same well as their predecessors. But by virtue of being their replacements, they will be expected by those who put them in power to make changes that their predecessors were unable or unwilling to make. The West should not be caught unawares, such events may happen quickly, and therefore be prepared to deal with new leaders and new circumstances to help end this war, repair the damage done to Ukraine, and prevent it from happening again.
[1] Foreign Policy, Russia is in agony but Putin’s is going down, Jonathan Tepperman, 26 January 2021; Foreign Policy, Time to think of a world without Putin, Jeff Hawn and Sim Tack, 10 February 2021; The Harvard Gazette, Is this a tipping point for Putin?, Christina Pazzanese, 05 February 2021; U.S. News and World Report, U.S. ‘very concerned’ Putin will provoke foreign crisis to quell pro-Navalny protest, Paul Shinkman, 03 February 2021.
[2] Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper Number 2019: A Normal Country, by Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, October 2003.
[3] New York Times, How Economic Warfare Is Battering Russia, by Andrew Sorkin, et al., February 28, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/28/business/dealbook/russia-ukraine-sanctions.html.
[4] Jacob Bogage and Adela Suliman, Russia’s “imminent’ default will have harsh ripple effects. Here’s why., Washington Post, March 9, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/03/09/fitch-ratings-russia-default-ukraine-sanctions/; Shalini Nagarajan, Russia’s stock market to close for a third week, while the clock ticks down to a key debt payment deadline, Business Insider, March 14, 2022, https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/russia-stock-market-closed-bonds-default-sovereign-debt-deadline-2022-3.; Jason Lalljee, Russia’s economy could suffer a ‘deep’ recession that cuts GDP by 11% as sanctions sharpen, JPMorgan says, Business Insider, March 4, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-economy-recession-sanctions-nato-swift-putin-ukraine-biden-debt-2022-3#:~:text=1%20JP%20Morgan%20researchers%20predict%20that%20Russia%27s%20GDP,despite%20despite%20the%20protective%20measures%20Putin%20put%20in%20place.; Petr Mironenko, Первые прогнозы падения ВВП и роста инфлации, что будет со ставкой ЦБ и эффект американского нефтяного эмбарго [First estimates of the fall of GDP and the rise of inflation, what will happen to the Central Bank rate and the effect of the American oil embargo], The Bell, March 10, 2022, https://thebell.io/pervye-prognozy-padeniya-vvp-i-rosta-inflatsyii-chto-budet-so-stavkoj-tsb-i-effekt-amerkanskogo-neftyanogo-embargo.
[5] Belton, Catherine; Putin’s People: How the KGB took back Russia and then took on the West, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York, 2020, pages 489-500 for a summary of the control of the “Siloviki” and their families into the Russian economy. For two other, out of many, examples see Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, The Great Russian Oil Heist by Sergei Khazov-Cassia, 22 March 2021 and Bloomberg, When Russian Officials Nightmare Your Business, You Can Lose Everything – Even Your Life by Leonid Ragozin, 29 January 2018.
[6] Seee Zygar, Mikhail, All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin, Public Affairs, New York, 2016.
[7] Moscow Times, Putin keeps self-isolating despite vaccination – reports, 10 May 2021.
[8] See Paul Goble, “Russian Security Experts Say Any Russian Invasion of Ukraine Will Not Be a Cake Walk,” Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor 19, no. 15, February 8, 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-security-experts-say-any-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-will-not-be-a-cake-walk/; Anders Åslund, “Retired Russian Generals Criticize Putin Over Ukraine, Renew Calls for His Resignation, Just Security, February 9, 2022, https://www.justsecurity.org/80149/retired-russian-generals-criticize-putin-over-ukraine-renew-call-for-his-resignation/; Mikhail Khodarenok, Прогнозы кровожадных политологов [Forecasts of Bloody Political Scientists], Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 3, 2022, https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2022-02-03/3_1175_donbass.html; Leonid Ivashov, Обращение председателя ООС [Appeal of the Chairman of the All-Russian Officers’ Assembly], January 31, 2022, https://ooc.su/news/obrashhenie_obshherossijskogo_oficerskogo_sobranija_k_prezidentu_i_grazhdanam_rossijskoj_federacii/2022-01-31-79; Alexander Zhelenin, Атака на Украину: логика и иррациональност Кремля[The Attack on Ukraine: The Logic and Irrationality of the Kremlin], Rosbalt, December 1, 2021, https://www.rosbalt.ru/russia/2021/12/01/1933466.html.
[9] Mark Galeotti, The Personal Politics of Putin’s Security Council Meeting, Moscow Times, February 22, 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/02/22/the-personal-politics-of-putins-security-council-meeting-a76522.
[10] Chris King, Vladimir Putin reportedly fires eight generals, EuroWeekly, March 11, 2022, https://euroweeklynews.com/2022/03/11/vladimir-putin-reportedly-fires-eight-generals/.
About the Author(s)
Philip Wasielewski is a retired 31-year veteran paramilitary operations officer of the Central Intelligence Agency.
8. Ukraine makes clear the US must reconsider its one-war defense strategy
What about resourcing training? Training is perishable and must be sustained. And I would argue training is even more important in a two war defense strategy if we do not want to do what America usually does, which is to lose the first battle. (See America's First Battles 1775-1965)
Excerpts:
In other words, a two-war force would be more affordable if DOD exerts some discipline and reduces investments in overly redundant and costly capabilities some services are developing for the Pacific. This includes long-range hypersonic weapons the Army desires that cost $40 million to $50 million each. DOD could better use these resources to acquire more air, space, and cyber forces that can respond within hours to strike invading forces in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
This approach would be a major step toward creating a force that can credibly deter opportunistic aggression. The next NDS will maintain China as the Defense Department’s pacing challenge and unlikely to support rebuilding a two-war force. It’s time to acknowledge that a “China first” strategy is really a China only strategy that creates a path for Russia to win in Europe if the U.S. military is fully engaged in the Pacific.
Our European allies have heard the wake-up call and understand the need to bolster their defenses to counter Russia. DOD and the Congress must also acknowledge this reality. The choices they make should be informed by a strategy that reduces risk of opportunistic aggression in a second theater, not a spending level proposed by the administration. This should be the purpose of the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
Ukraine makes clear the US must reconsider its one-war defense strategy
By Mark Gunzinger and Kamilla Gunzinger
Mar 14, 02:04 PM
As the world doomscrolls through the grim news from Ukraine, it’s time to reassess the risks created by sizing the U.S. military to fight a single major conflict.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy was a watershed document that shifted DOD’s focus toward defeating Chinese or Russian aggression, defending the U.S. homeland, sustaining nuclear deterrence, and deterring — but not defeating — a lesser aggressor in another theater.
The 2018 NDS also broke with DOD’s long-established requirement to size its forces for two theater conflicts. The risks associated with maintaining a one-war force are apparent as Russia continues to assault Ukraine and China expands its influence in the Pacific. It’s not too late for the Defense Department to address this in its forthcoming National Defense Strategy.
Chief among these risks is a one-war force invites opportunistic aggression in a second theater. As DOD informed Congress after the Cold War, a two-war military was critical to preventing “a potential aggressor in one region to be tempted to take advantage if we are already engaged in halting aggression in another.” This is an increasingly plausible scenario given Russia’s willingness to forcibly recreate a geographic buffer between itself and NATO, and the growing strategic relationship between China and Russia.
This does not mean China and Russia will soon form a pact to fight a war with the United States. Rather, China could decide to take advantage of a Russian campaign against NATO in Europe, or Russia could make a move after China launches an attack on Taiwan. It’s also plausible they could coordinate the timing of their actions.
In either case, a one-war U.S. military lacks the forces, munitions, logistics, and other capabilities needed to respond in both theaters. Force cuts in search of a “peace dividend” and the failure to modernize our military as it fought small wars in the Middle East have resulted in a force that is too small and too old. China and Russia know the U.S. Air Force now has about half the aircraft it had in 1991, and the Navy lacks enough ships, carrier aircraft, and undersea forces to meet its global commitments.
Critics of rebuilding a two-war force are concerned with its cost and its potential to dilute the resources DOD needs to modernize for a China fight. “China first” advocates are not completely wrong if our military services fail to ask for what they would need. Today, they accept what they are given — and less than they need — to develop their plans and programs. This is based on their anticipation of future budgets, not future threats.
This does not mean DOD’s budget should grow to unrealistic levels. Increasing defense spending beyond its current level of roughly 3% of GDP is not unreasonable, given it averaged about 6% of GDP during the Cold War. Even 1% of GDP growth would give DOD about $200 billion more a year, enough to buy a larger fleet, adequate next-generation combat aircraft, AI-enabled unmanned systems, advanced munitions and other capabilities to defeat a Chinese attack and deter Russia.
Selectively reallocating budget shares across the services would be another step toward rebuilding a two-war force. This reallocation should be based on the predominant forces needed for a conflict in the Indo-Pacific and another in Europe — not every service needs to chase the Chinese “pacing threat.” The fact is a conflict with China would take place mostly at sea and in the air, space, and cyberspace; it would not be a boots-on-the-ground land war. On the other hand, a fight to defend NATO’s eastern frontier would be dominated by land, air, space, and cyberspace.
In other words, a two-war force would be more affordable if DOD exerts some discipline and reduces investments in overly redundant and costly capabilities some services are developing for the Pacific. This includes long-range hypersonic weapons the Army desires that cost $40 million to $50 million each. DOD could better use these resources to acquire more air, space, and cyber forces that can respond within hours to strike invading forces in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
This approach would be a major step toward creating a force that can credibly deter opportunistic aggression. The next NDS will maintain China as the Defense Department’s pacing challenge and unlikely to support rebuilding a two-war force. It’s time to acknowledge that a “China first” strategy is really a China only strategy that creates a path for Russia to win in Europe if the U.S. military is fully engaged in the Pacific.
Our European allies have heard the wake-up call and understand the need to bolster their defenses to counter Russia. DOD and the Congress must also acknowledge this reality. The choices they make should be informed by a strategy that reduces risk of opportunistic aggression in a second theater, not a spending level proposed by the administration. This should be the purpose of the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
Retired U.S. Air Force Col. Mark Gunzinger is director for future concepts and capability assessments at the Mitchell Institute. He previously served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for forces transformation and resources within the policy office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Kamilla Gunzinger is a senior program director at the Mitchell Institute.
9. Air Force special ops chief says it’s time to embrace new missions
Air Force special ops chief says it’s time to embrace new missions
ORLANDO — Lt. Gen. Jim Slife is racing the clock.
In June, the Air Force Special Operations Command boss will hit the three-year mark in the top post, around the time when his predecessors have moved on to another assignment or headed into retirement. Slife is using his remaining time in the seat to plan for an era in special operations that could look much different than the past 20 years of war in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.
Revamping how AFSOC does business may come with growing pains. Critics see the command’s vision as an attempt to fix an organization that isn’t broken.
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"The community is rightly concerned and would like to be reassured that standards are maintained," 24th Special Operations Wing commander Col. Jason Daniels wrote in the Jan. 10 memo.
Earlier this year, Slife fended off accusations in an anonymous letter posted to social media that leadership is pushing a female candidate through the all-male special tactics training for the sake of scoring political points — a claim he denies.
“Our standards in the operating forces are tied to mission requirements, and the only time we should change the standards is when the mission changes,” he wrote in a Jan. 7 letter to the force. But he also asked the Air Force inspector general to investigate.
Slife sat down for an exclusive interview with Air Force Times at an Air Force Association conference here March 3. This interview was edited for length and clarity.
Where do you see AFSOC going in the next five years?
We are entering a new operating environment, and I think what we’re seeing in Eastern Europe right now is a great case study. Having our lives defined by the next rotation to Afghanistan or Syria or whatever — while we will still be involved in that work, that’s not the defining thing for the future. How do we pivot around the human capital for this future operating environment? The three lines of effort [in AFSOC’s strategic plan] were about developing our human capital, organizing our human capital and equipping our human capital with concepts and technology.
Among the potential next AFSOC commanders, I think we all have a fairly common understanding that we’ve got to change and this is what the future looks like. I expect that there will be course changes; I would be a little surprised if there was significant course change.
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A female airman will soon begin formal training to become an Air Force combat controller, the closest any enlisted woman has gotten so far to breaking that glass ceiling.
What aspects of AFSOC are still relevant? What is losing relevance or is already irrelevant?
The AFSOC airplane fleet is the youngest fleet in the Air Force. We have essentially recapitalized our entire fleet of airplanes since 9/11. So AFSOC has great ingredients, we just need to make different recipes for the future operating environment.
When you look at things like the “Rapid Dragon” test we did in December, where we launched a JASSM-ER long-range cruise missile out of the back of a C-130, and when you look at this MC-130 amphibious capability, by making the MC-130 float, we turn the entire South China Sea into a landing zone. If the entire South China Sea is a landing zone, there are a lot of interesting things that AFSOC can bring to the table for the joint force. It’s about, how do we use what we have in a way that is relevant?
Some people are concerned that you would get rid of special tactics or combine it into another part of AFSOC or the Air Force. Where do you see that heading?
Form has to follow function. I wouldn’t say pararescue, and I wouldn’t say combat control — those are career fields. The broader question is, what is the role of an Air Force Special Operations ground force in that future environment? What are the functions that will be done? Then we’ll figure out how to execute those functions, whether it looks like the special tactics squadrons that exist today, or whether it’s different Air Force specialty codes. Is there a role for cyber in an Air Force Special Operations ground force? I can think of a host of specialties that are not currently organic to our special tactics squadrons that might be relevant to the future.
Prior to 9/11, there was a relatively limited number of our special tactics airmen that were qualified as terminal attack controllers — somebody on the ground that can call in airstrikes. We had a few airmen in Bosnia that were qualified to do that, and that was the extent of it. After 9/11, the demand for joint terminal attack controllers embedded with special operations teams on the ground exploded, and AFSOC bore much of the brunt of that. Anybody can go through the course and become a JTAC. We took large portions of our special tactics field, particularly combat controllers, and made them all JTACs. When you look at the future operating environment, is there value to providing JTACs to the joint force? That may be part of it. I don’t think it will be the defining feature that it has been for the last 20 years.
Is change afoot in special tactics? Absolutely, just like it is in every other part of AFSOC. The idea that anybody at the headquarters thinks special tactics is irrelevant and should be disbanded is patently false.
A deployed aircraft ground response element airman, assigned to the 352nd Special Operations Wing,l fires an M4 rifle during readiness training in Poland, March 2, 2022.. (Staff Sgt. Izabella Workman/Air Force)
Are you considering combining AFSOC aviation and special tactics in any way? What would be the benefits of that change?
This summer, Col. Mark McGill, who’s a special tactics officer, will be taking command of the 352nd Special Operations Wing in Europe. That will be the first time that a non-aviator has commanded one of our wings other than the 24th SOW, which is our continental U.S. special tactics force. AFSOC forces are more effective when the ground special tactics piece and the aviation special tactics piece are closer together. I can’t envision a squadron that would have these forces integrated, but when you look at what we’ve done at the 352nd in Europe and the 353rd in the Pacific, there are special tactics squadrons and aviation squadrons side-by-side. I think that’s a good model. There are cultural strengths and weaknesses in every community in AFSOC, and the more exposure we can give all of our airmen to other communities, the better.
There’s a lot of folks that are a little discomfited by the fact that a non-aviator’s going to be commanding a flying wing, but it’s not a flying wing. It’s a special operations wing that happens to fly — but it also happens to do ground operations.
What’s unique about the 352nd and 353rd SOWs that could be a model for the rest of AFSOC?
Our flying community tends to be very disciplined with respect to training and standardization and evaluation programs. Special tactics units are particularly skilled at executing mission command. They organize for that very, very well. They have great intelligence, analytic capabilities that they apply to executing the mission. These are strengths that different parts of our formation have that I would like to have brought to the entirety of AFSOC.
What I see in the overseas units where the special tactics squadrons and aviation squadrons coexist in the same group is a lot of that cross talk, and it’s very encouraging to me. I don’t know whether that’s a model for the rest of AFSOC. Until we clearly define the functions of a future special operations ground force inside the United States Air Force, I don’t think we’re going to be able to say whether that’s the right organizational model.
RELATED
"The change in standards invalidated me with a majority of my team,” the female special tactics officer candidate wrote in April 2021.
What’s the timeline for figuring that out?
I think this calendar year. We started this last year, and we have a conceptual outline, but in terms of a detailed implementation plan, we’re not there yet. Part of what we’re doing is taking ideas about the future and sharing them with our special tactics squadrons and having them help us [vet them]. We haven’t gone through the detailed staff analysis to know exactly how much it’s going to cost, when it’s going to happen. That is yet to come.
How do you plan to convince skeptics that what you decide is valid?
Sometimes you have to preach a sermon five times before somebody comes to the altar. A lot of times, it takes walking through the logic of “why,” and why what we have been doing for the last 20 years is not sufficient for the next 20 years. We have to keep talking about it. There is nobody in the entire major command that is further removed from day-to-day operations than me. I need tactical-level leaders to listen, to understand, to provide their feedback, but then importantly, to carry the message forward.
The force is motivated by being relevant to the nation, and if being relevant to the nation means capturing and killing terrorists, then we’ll be really good at that. But if being relevant to the nation means doing other types of special operations missions, I’m totally confident that the force will adapt to that and embrace it. As long as we can explain why the things that we need to do will make us relevant to the future operating environment, I think we’ll come around fairly quickly.
RELATED
The claims are incorrect or missing important context, said Lt. Gen. Jim Slife, the head of Air Force Special Operations Command. But he has called for the service's inspector general to investigate.
Do you have any concerns about force cohesion and AFSOC airmen’s trust in each other? Is AFSOC doing anything to reassure the force and pull people together?
Anytime you have a lot of change going on, there will always be skepticism and discomfort. This is not terribly different from earlier points in my career, looking up the chain of command and wondering what idiots were leading us up there. When you don’t understand something, why something is happening, or when you don’t have all the context behind something, oftentimes the first conclusion you would come to is that leadership doesn’t understand. It is going to naturally put the trust that underpins the entire chain of command under pressure. [Lack of trust] is not something that I spend a great deal of time worrying about. I accept that it is, and we continue to communicate.
How might you move job billets or specialties around within AFSOC to meet future combat needs?
If we’re going to operate in more austere areas, in more contested regions, in smaller, more disaggregated teams, what does the force look like that will execute mission command in that environment? We have built the AFSOC that we have today for efficiency and economy of scale, knowing we could always rely on all that fixed base infrastructure when we deploy. Now we’ve got to pack it up and carry it with us. It has to have a light footprint. What we find is that we’re short of critical specialties inside of AFSOC to support those types of operations. There is some movement afoot inside of AFSOC as we look at our communications and cyber capabilities, our intelligence capabilities, our ability to sustain ourselves in small outposts. We don’t have the right force structure for that. The specialties may change, but the total numbers aren’t really going to grow.
A 352nd Special Operations Support Squadron communications airman checks the connections to the unit's satellite link during exercise Epic Totem at RAF Fairford, United Kingdom, Jan. 11, 2022. The satellite is vital to communications, web and network usage of all personnel deployed from the 352nd Special Operations Wing. (Staff Sgt. Jeremy McGuffin/Air Force)
What specialties do you want to improve upon?
Last March, we started out at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, with mission sustainment teams of 54 airmen that will be together for the next 15 months.
In the first phase, those airmen are in their home squadrons doing their individual training. In that second phase, they come together as a team of 54 and they spend the next five months cross-training in each other’s jobs. The food services airman learns how to operate the belt-fed machine gun; a vertical construction specialist learns how to run the Ethernet cable. When they get to the next phase, they integrate their team with all the other units they deploy with and support. The last phase is the employment phase, where we turn them loose on whatever mission we have assigned. You’re not really a team if you’ve never met each other, if you haven’t trained together. It’s all about putting together those small teams and running through the whole force-generation cycle together.
We don’t have enough communications and cyber airmen, but I think the Air Force has become overspecialized. We have one AFSC who’s allowed to erect the antenna, and we have another airman who is allowed to plug the cable into the antenna. We have another airman who plugs the other end of the cable into the back of the radio, and we have a fourth airman that is allowed to turn the radio on. Our airmen are better than that. You can probably take one airman and teach him how to do all of that, without having four different AFSCs.
Rachel Cohen joined Air Force Times as senior reporter in March 2021. Her work has appeared in Air Force Magazine, Inside Defense, Inside Health Policy, the Frederick News-Post (Md.), the Washington Post, and others.
10. General Valery Gerasimov’s Great Ukrainian Disaster
Excerpts:
Good in theory, and many bought the idea across the world.
Gerasimov’s regime change ideas have failed dismally in Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Russian fifth columnists inside Ukraine were quickly disarmed, the special force airborne assault on Hostomel airfield near Kyiv failed, Russia’s army was halted, and Ukraine became more united and determined.
After its 2014 success, Russia kept conflict bubbling away in the Donbas. These long, hard years built a strong Ukraine nationalism not there when Crimea was captured. It seems Putin and Gerasimov have no idea what’s really happening today in Ukraine. (Note, Vitaly Gerasimov, a Russian General of similar name, was killed fighting in Ukraine recently)
Worse, Gerasimov had designed a modern Russian army under Putin’s leadership based on an active defense concept. This envisaged waging a fighting withdrawal that would bring an enemy deep into Russia to be destroyed, as was done against Napoleon’s and Hitler’s armies.
Gerasimov has now committed Russia’s army to a large scale offensive operation into another country defended by highly motivated soldiers. Russia’s army does not have the logistics systems to supply the fuel, munitions and food its advancing mechanized forces need. It's unsurprising army morale is a growing problem. Lastly, the invading force is too small, some 200,000 strong, to subjugate a country of 44 million angry people.
Today’s Russian army is not designed to fight a war of invasion – it’s too small, not properly equipped, poorly trained, and lacks the will to fight.
Wrong war, wrong army, wrong time, but this creates problems for Ukraine.
General Valery Gerasimov’s Great Ukrainian Disaster
March 14, 2022
.
How did we end up here? We all thought Putin's modernized Russian army was ten feet tall and led by a General who, in military thinking circles, is a veritable rock star. What gives?
Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, in 2013 wrote a famous article that with Russia’s 2014 capture of Crimea was seen as a how-to-guide for overthrowing governments in nearby countries. Russia would use social media and covert interference to turn the population against its government, use economic measures to make it poor, and diplomatic measures to make sure it had no friends. Right at the end of this long, drawn out process, a small Russian invading force would attack, inspiring the populace to rise up and mount a coup that would install a pliant leader.
Good in theory, and many bought the idea across the world.
Gerasimov’s regime change ideas have failed dismally in Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Russian fifth columnists inside Ukraine were quickly disarmed, the special force airborne assault on Hostomel airfield near Kyiv failed, Russia’s army was halted, and Ukraine became more united and determined.
After its 2014 success, Russia kept conflict bubbling away in the Donbas. These long, hard years built a strong Ukraine nationalism not there when Crimea was captured. It seems Putin and Gerasimov have no idea what’s really happening today in Ukraine. (Note, Vitaly Gerasimov, a Russian General of similar name, was killed fighting in Ukraine recently)
Worse, Gerasimov had designed a modern Russian army under Putin’s leadership based on an active defense concept. This envisaged waging a fighting withdrawal that would bring an enemy deep into Russia to be destroyed, as was done against Napoleon’s and Hitler’s armies.
Gerasimov has now committed Russia’s army to a large scale offensive operation into another country defended by highly motivated soldiers. Russia’s army does not have the logistics systems to supply the fuel, munitions and food its advancing mechanized forces need. It's unsurprising army morale is a growing problem. Lastly, the invading force is too small, some 200,000 strong, to subjugate a country of 44 million angry people.
Today’s Russian army is not designed to fight a war of invasion – it’s too small, not properly equipped, poorly trained, and lacks the will to fight.
Wrong war, wrong army, wrong time, but this creates problems for Ukraine.
First, Gerasimov's active defense stresses firepower to both wear down an attacking force and the economic infrastructure of the attacking nation. This is firepower from tactical nuclear weapons, aircraft area bombing, rockets, artillery and cluster munitions.
The use of such firepower against the cities and critical civilian infrastructure looks like Russia's only path to some form of military victory. The model in play seems that of Mariupol: 500,000 people cut off, no power, no water and constant shelling to destroy habitations. This may bring Russia victory but leaves a wasteland and is against the laws of armed conflict.
Second, in making a wasteland, Gerasimov’s army will leave a ruined Ukraine behind. The rebuilding effort will be immense. Russian assets have been seized around the world. Rather than returning them to Russian control after the war finishes, should they be used to rebuild the ravages of the war Russia started?
Third, Gerasimov’s active defense doctrine stresses attacking critical infrastructure in Ukraine, including nuclear power plants. In its emerging wasteland policy, Russia may try to shut the nuclear reactors down it has captured in a way that prevents their being restarted because of radiation concerns.
Four, Russia’s use of offensive social media warfare continues. Russian cyber support for anti-vaxxers is now quickly shifting towards hating refugees. As done previously with Syrians, Ukrainian refugees will be actively depicted by Russian cyber trolls and bots as criminals, rapists and terrorists. Russian aims to create social discord in countries accepting them.
Fifth, there is a rising concern about Russian sabotage operations extending beyond Ukraine into NATO countries supporting the Ukraine resistance. Western leaders constantly state that if Russia attacks NATO, the alliance will attack back. This seems aimed at deterring Russian sabotage operations; it may not work.
Lastly, the front lines appear almost stabilizing. Even so, Russian forces are expected to make advances and encircle Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv and other major towns and then rely on a wasteland policy to bring their surrender. This still leaves vast tracts of Ukraine unconquered, including Lviv, which may become the capital of unoccupied Ukraine until the war ends. There is a looming disaster of food security.
Occupying powers should ensure food supplies for civilians under their control. Russian soldiers, however, have been ransacking supermarkets as their supplies run out and they get hungry. Russia will need to start and keep feeding the millions of civilians coming under its control. It seems unlikely it will be able to and perhaps may not want to.
Equally, the unoccupied parts will need external help as food runs out. NATO may need to set up major food supply transit routes deep into Ukraine. Hopefully, these will be under UN authorization, but this needs Russia’s support on the Security Council. If not, faced with millions starving, military power and no-fly zones may need to be used to bring relief. Moreover, this large-scale humanitarian problem will last well beyond war's end.
Stalin’s Soviet Union withdrew food supplies in Ukraine in the 1930s, starving some four million to death. Putin laments the USSR's fall. Hopefully, he won't allow a repeat of one of its darkest deliberate actions.
Dr. Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University and an Associate Fellow Royal United Service Institute (London).
11. Ukraine War Update - March 15, 2022 | SOF News
Ukraine War Update - March 15, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO.
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Photo: Ukrainian soldiers assigned to 1st Battalion, 92nd Mechanized Brigade, participate in a platoon live-fire exercise at the Yavoriv military base, Ukraine. During the exercise the unit engaged targets from their BTR-4 armored personnel carrier before dismounting and assaulting the remaining objectives on foot. By U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Alexander Rector, Dec 6, 2017.
Russian Campaign Update. The Russians have been, for several days, regrouping their forces, ironing out their logistics difficulties, and preparing for encircling Kyiv and other large Ukrainian cities. It has been shelling several cities with artillery, rocket, and missile fire. The US DoD announced on Monday (14 Mar) that over 900 missiles have been used by the Russians in the 3-week long war. There has been limited advances on the ground. Ukraine has accused Russia of targeting its agricultural economy by destroying key agricultural machinery plants.
Russian Tanks and Their ‘Cages’. Some Russian soldiers have been adorning their tank cupolas with ‘cages’ that are meant to defeat or diminish the effect of anti-armor weapons. The strange structures most likely do nothing to defend against the anti-armor weapons. Western military analysts are referring to them as “cope cages” – meaning they are a coping mechanism to deal with the prospect of being blown up by a Javelin or NLAW. Read more in “Russian tanks in Ukraine are sprouting cages”, The Economist, March 14, 2022.
Ukrainian Defense. The armed forces of Ukraine continue to offer up stiff resistance but may be forced to do some consolidating and collapsing of their interior lines. Martial law has been extended for another month – going until mid-April.
Fight for the Skies. The Ukrainians continue their pleas for a NATO implemented no-fly zone and for the transfer of the 28 MiG-29s that Poland is offering up. The Ukrainians have at least 60 operational fixed-wing aircraft but are not putting the planes up into the sky very often. Some NATO ISR drones and other surveillance aircraft are in flight patterns very close to the border areas of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Presumably, there is some intelligence data being transferred to the Ukrainians. NATO fighter aircraft are constantly in the air and on guard – many being refueled while flying. Watch footage of a U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon get refueled mid-flight over Romanian airspace (DVIDS, Mar 12, 2022, 2 mins)
Jets, MANPADs, and Armed Drones. The fighter jets and close air support aircraft on both sides of the conflict have not been present in the skies over Ukraine as much as one would have thought. This is due to both sides having good air defense weapons. The Ukrainians have been employing the Stinger and other MANPADs very effectively. Watch a DVIDS video of U.S. Marines firing the Stinger during a training exercise in Norway (DVIDS, Mar 11, 2022, 1 min). Drones are playing a big role in the Ukraine War. Both sides are employing them. Ukraine has been using the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 armed drones very effectively. Read more in “Turkey deployed personnel to operate armed drones in targeting Russian military in Ukraine”, Nordic Monitor, March 14, 2022.
Podcast – Understanding No-Fly Zones. The Ukrainian president has been persistently calling for NATO to implement a no-fly zone over his country. Some people across Europe and in the United States support this. NATO and the U.S. are hesitant to take this course of action. A veteran USAF aviator who took part in several no-fly zone operations in the past discusses the practical requirements and challenges of implementing a no-fly zone and how those apply in the airspace over Ukraine. Podcast posted by Modern War Institute at West Point, March 10, 2022, 40 minutes.
No-Fly Zones. A Brief, Concise Explanation. Brad Taylor, a 23-year veteran of U.S. Army Special Forces, provides three reasons why a no-fly zone over Ukraine is not a good idea. “Ukraine’s No-Fly Zone isn’t as Simple as it Sounds”, Brad Taylor Books, March 13, 2022.
Maritime Activities. An amphibious landing force on several ships is still positioned in the Black Sea off the coast of Odessa to land a substantial element of Russian naval infantry. The Russian blockade of Ukrainian shipping continues.
Kyiv. The capital city of Ukraine is considered the primary objective of the Russians. The Capture of Kyiv would allow Russia to put in place its puppet government. The last several days have seen only incremental progress on the part of the Russian forces. The capital is projected to be able to hold out for a few more weeks. Longer if the supply lines from the west are not interdicted. The city received some shelling in the early morning hours of Tuesday (15 Mar).
Podcast – What Will the Battle of Kyiv Look Like? John Spencer, a student of urban warfare, argues that the battle for Kyiv is the only battle that matters in the Ukraine War. Listen to his perspective in this podcast posted by the Modern War Institute at West Point on March 14, 2022 (43 minutes).
Sumy. This city on the Russian border in northeast Ukraine is almost surrounded by the Russians. Sumy has been receiving shelling and the Russians occupy the outskirts of the city and part of the city. There is an area southwest of the city that appears to be held by Ukrainian forces. The Russians have interrupted the flow of electricity and supply of humanitarian aid to the area. There are reports that an evacuation corridor period is set for Tuesday (Mar 15) but it is unknown if the Russians will actually allow it to take place.
Kharkiv. The second largest city of Ukraine is Kharkiv located in the northeast of the country. The city is not quite encircled. It is the recipient of heavy artillery, rocket, and missile fire from the Russians. Social media is deluged with pictures and videos of the destruction by the Russians. Some reports say that around 600 houses have been destroyed by shelling. On Tuesday (15 Mar) the city was also hit by short-range Iskander ballistic missiles launched from Russia.
Mariupol. Located on the Sea of Azov, the coastal city of Mariupol is under siege by the Russians. This city is situated along the coastal road network that would provide Russia with a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea. Social media reported that at least 160 cars were able to leave the city on Monday (Mar 14). Food and water is extremely scarce. A humanitarian convoy loaded with 100 tons of food, water, clothes, and with evacuation buses couldn’t reach the city, blocked in Berdyansk. The Russians have denied entry for three days. The Mariupol City Council estimates that over 2,300 people have died in the city as of Monday (Mar 14).
Mykolayiv. Located on the west bank of the Dnieper River close to the coast of the Black Sea, Mykolayiv is a strategic objective for the Russians that is on the road to Odessa located further west along the coast of the Black Sea.
Negotiations. A video conference between the Russians and Ukrainians took place on Monday (Mar 14), no word if any results came of it.
Refugees. As of March 14, over 2,950,000 refugees have left Ukraine according to data provided by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR). There are almost 2 million displaced personnel within Ukraine. Read more on the humanitarian impact of the Ukraine War in the daily Situation Report of the United Nations Officer for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Cyber and Information Operations
Russia’s TikTok Warriors. An investigation by VICE News uncovered a coordinated campaign to pay TikTok influencers to post videos pushing pro-Kremlin narratives about the war in Ukraine. Campaigns are coordinated in secret Telegram channels that directs the influencers what to say, what videos to use, and when to post the video. Some of these influencers have over a million followers. Read more in this detailed report. “Russian TikTok Influencers Are Being Paid to Spread Kremlin Propaganda”, Vice.com, March 11, 2022.
Russia’s Cyber War Explored. Cyber security researchers are puzzled on the somewhat mild effectiveness of the cyber warfare conducted by Russia against Ukraine. They speculate that Russia is holding back the big cyber guns for the opportune moment to employ them. A wide ranging article explores these topics and more in “Why Russian Cyber Dogs Have Mostly Failed to Bark”, War on the Rocks, March 14, 2022.
Online Event – Cyber Law in Ukraine. Listen to some ‘cyber experts’ that met virtually at the U.S. Cyber Command Annual Legal Conference to discuss the international legal implications of cyber operations in the war between Russia and Ukraine. They explored a broad array of legal issues, including the use of force, sovereignty, cyber intervention, neutrality, co-belligerency, and the application of law-of-war targeting rules to cyber operations. (DVIDS, Mar 10, 2022, 35 mins)
Russia’s Foreign Agent Law. It is becoming more difficult to show dissent in Russia or to share true information about the Russian invasion. There are new rules, regulations, and laws that carry a heavy penalty if expressing opposition to Putin’s war. A revision to Russia’s law on “foreign agents” is going to make things worse. “Putin’s Revised Foreign Agent Law Could Enable Mass Repression”, Lawfare Blog, March 14, 2022.
World Response
Address to Congress. Ukrainian President Zelensky will be addressing the U.S. Congress on Wednesday (Mar 16). The video call will be on 9 a.m. ET. He will no doubt ask for a no-fly zone and MiG-29s among other things.
Germany’s Air Power. The German defense minister, Christine Lambrecht, has confirmed that Germany will equip its air force with F-35 jets built by the United States. Germany has done a policy upgrade to their defense posture – earmarking a lot more money to their armed forces.
China’s Weapons and Support to Russia? Much reporting has taken place over the last few days on Russia’s request to China for drones and other types military equipment. Tom Rogan, a national security observer, says that “China would appear to take on far more risks in providing Russia with military equipment than it would accrue benefits.” China’s strategic power lies in part in its economic interaction with Europe and the rest of the world. In addition, getting aligned with Russia during this sensitive time is going to affect China’s international prestige and political influence. China does not want to be regarded by Europe as an “ideological adversary and security threat.” “Why China is very unlikely to send military equipment to help Russia in Ukraine”, Washington Examiner, March 14, 2022.
And China’ Choice? One superpower has asked another superpower for assistance – and apparently part of the request is for ready-to-eat meals, which seems to be an odd request from a superpower. The food is one of several things on a Russian shopping list. Whether China responds is still an unknown. The Chinese might be trying to distance themselves from the conflict. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, says that China may be key to resolving the conflict through its influence and stance on the Ukraine War. “Putin’s war and China’s choice”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 15, 2022.
General Info
Who is Putin? Listen to a discussion about the impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine and learn a little bit about the leader of the Russian people from Baroness Catherine Ashton and Ambassador Mark Green in this online video. Hindsight Up Front, Wilson Center, YouTube, March 14, 2022.
More Info Snippets. A Fox News reporter was injured while covering events in Ukraine. Correspondent Benjamin Hall was injured near Kyiv on Monday (Mar 14) and has been hospitalized. Over 40,000 (number vary based on news source) Syrians have registered to fight for Russia, as of Monday there are no reports of Syrians actually flying to Russia. There are rumors that U.S. President Biden will head to Europe next week to confer with NATO leaders, with a meeting date of March 23rd. The Washington Examiner is reporting that the leaders of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia will travel to Kyiv on Tuesday (Mar 15) to express the European Union’s “unequivocal support” for Ukraine. The U.S. and EU are trying to wean off Russian energy. The Ukraine War has interrupted key supply chains that will affect the worldwide economy. A US astronaut is nearing completion of his months long stay on the International Space Station – will the Russians bring him back to earth?
Commentary
Podcast – How Ukraine is Changing European Security. Two members of the Brookings Institution are interviewed on their thoughts on the Ukraine War is reshaping Europe’s approach to security affairs. The Lawfare Blog, March 14, 2022, one hour.
The Ukrainian Disaster. The army that everyone thought was 10 feet tall seems a bit diminished after three weeks of war in Ukraine. The Chief of the Russian General Staff wrote a famous article in 2013 on how to overthrow governments in nearby countries. In 2014, Russia took over Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine. This became known as the “Gerasimov doctrine”. It was a good theory until 2022 – Gerasimov’s regime change ideas have failed dismally in Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Read the ‘why’ in “General Valery Gerasimov’s Great Ukrainian Disaster”, Real Clear Defense, March 14, 2022.
Proxy War. Some people are characterizing the war in Ukraine as a proxy war between the United States and Russian. A lot of people disagree with that ‘label’. Michel Wyss, of the Swiss Armed forces Military Academy, argues that a proxy war is already taking shape and warns of the many risks and dangers this may entail. “Is Europe Prepared for a Proxy War With Russia?”, Lawfare Blog, March 13, 2022.
Calling Putin’s Bluff. The Putin threat of nuclear war has prevented the U.S., NATO, and other nations from intervening with military force on Ukraine’s behalf. Kevin R. James argues that the stiff economic warfare against Russia may influence the course of events in the Ukraine War but that eventually Russia will prevail. And then the West will have to contend with an economically damaged but victorious Russia. The West will then have to face up to further aggression from Russia – and probably with military forces. So James argues that the time for action is now. “The case for direct military intervention in Ukraine”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), March 15, 2022.
Regime Change – In Russia. Putin’s decision to go to war has made him vulnerable to both popular and elite discontent in Russia. The economic downturn will erode away his support with the general population. As news filters out about the Ukraine disaster his support will fade even more. Within the inner circles of power concern will build on the road the Putin has taken the country down. It is not far-fetched to envision some sort of ‘regime change’ taking place over the few months. “Regime Change, But for Whom”, by Philip Wasielewski, Small Wars Journal, March 14, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one
Maps of Ukraine
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation
Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.
Janes Equipment Profile – Ukraine Conflict. An 81-page PDF provides information on the military equipment of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. Covers naval, air, electronic warfare, C4ISR, communications, night vision, radar, and armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine Conflict Equipment Profile, February 28, 2022.
Arms Transfers to Ukraine. Forum on the Arms Trade.
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12. Understanding China’s rising military spending
Excerpts:
Spending money is probably the easiest part of building up a military. The bigger challenge is figuring out how to create, equip and train a military that can actually conduct effective operations – especially once the shooting starts.
This isn’t easy to do. If it was, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army would have been the world’s best.
But the Chinese are persistent and intelligent and have come a long way in 30 years.
They have said where they intend to end up, and that includes taking territory that now belongs to other countries, by force if necessary.
They should be taken seriously. And the American financial and business classes really ought to stop funding them.
Understanding China’s rising military spending
China’s challenge is how to create, equip and train a military that can actually conduct effective operations – especially once the shooting starts
China, as with the rest of the world, has had major economic setbacks over the past two years. First, its economy was battered by Covid-19 and now it’s facing disruptions from the war in Ukraine that threaten its oil and food imports.
But that hasn’t stopped China from spending freely on its military.
It has officially announced a 7.1% increase in defense spending this year. Last year the increase was 6.8%. The year before that it was 6.66%. The one before that was 7.5%. It’s been that way for many years – regardless of China’s overall economic performance.
For a nation that has no enemies – other than the ones Beijing declares are its enemies – this may seem odd. So what’s going on?
First, the numbers themselves.
The CCP’s National Party Congress meeting in March 2022 approved Beijing’s latest public defense budget. Photo: gov.cn
Why hide the true figure?
Experts say that the officially released military budget numbers – 1.45 trillion yuan, or US$230 billion this year – are far too low. Is this so? Why does the Chinese government hide the true figure?
One has to assume China’s entire reported defense budget is a lie. There is absolutely no reason for China to provide a correct number.
Indeed, it works in China’s favor to issue a “low” number – so it can claim it poses no threat to anyone and “spends only a third or a quarter of what the Americans do.” So it’s the “American warmongers” who are to blame for trouble around the region and the globe.
The actual figure of China’s defense budget is debatable – and perhaps not worth fixating on. More important is to consider what Beijing gets for its money. A couple of useful data points:
- It pays its troops a fraction of what the Americans spend on personnel.
- In recent years it has launched seven naval warships for every one the US Navy has launched.
It also incorporates civilian transport and logistic capabilities into its military far better than just about any other country – all off the books, as far as official military expenditure is concerned.
And there’s another problem with the $230 billion figure: the Chinese leadership is not bound by Congressional appropriations as is the US Department of Defense. And for local yuan expenditures, the Chinese can and will print any amount necessary.
Who is going to tell Xi Jinping no?
A Chinese PLA nuclear-powered submarine. Photo: 19fortyfive.com
What kind of military does China need?
It comes down to the kind of military China thinks it needs. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is building a military that can do two main things.
First, defeat the US military.
Second, protect China’s global assets and interests, for instance, ports, factories, farmland, and Chinese citizens overseas – which it now cannot do.
The Chinese communists are willing to spend whatever it takes to achieve these two objectives.
Currently, in certain circumstances – say if a fight is near to the Chinese mainland – the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could inflict serious damage on US forces. But the farther out one gets beyond the so-called “first island chain,” the PRC’s military power drops off quickly.
However, with the current rate of expenditure, wait 10 years and things might be different.
Chinese President Xi Jinping in his military uniform. Photo: Xinhua
What areas is China prioritizing?
It may sound glib, but the answer is all of them.
As mentioned, the Chinese are investing in the areas needed to defeat the Americans and to increase power projection overseas. This includes:
- A modern air force (both regular and naval);
- Anti-submarine warfare;
- Long range missiles;
- Cyber;
- Electronic warfare;
- Oute-space capabilities;
- A more modernized ground force able to conduct joint/combined arms operations;
- Logistics capabilities;
- Long-range aerial transport;
- Amphibious forces;
- Airborne forces; and
- Large numbers of modern nuclear weapons.
In other words, they are investing in just about everything – which they can do since they are not constrained by an actual budget as a Western nation would be, nor by legions of in-house lawyers working to ensure they adhere to international treaties.
There is one big limitation, however. That is the need for foreign currency to buy certain things that must be procured overseas. And since the Chinese yuan is not freely convertible, China has to earn dollars and euros and the like.
This should put a limit on the People’s Liberation Army’s capability advances. In theory at least. Unfortunately, Wall Street and Western businesses are providing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with at least several hundred billion dollars of foreign exchange every year – along with access to the high technology the PLA needs.
And if Moscow moves even closer to Beijing, it may have more access to Russian advanced technologies as well.
What are their biggest problems/challenges?
Spending money is probably the easiest part of building up a military. The bigger challenge is figuring out how to create, equip and train a military that can actually conduct effective operations – especially once the shooting starts.
This isn’t easy to do. If it was, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army would have been the world’s best.
But the Chinese are persistent and intelligent and have come a long way in 30 years.
They have said where they intend to end up, and that includes taking territory that now belongs to other countries, by force if necessary.
They should be taken seriously. And the American financial and business classes really ought to stop funding them.
Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine and a former diplomat and business executive who spent many years in Asia. He is a senior fellow with the Center for Security Policy. This article was originally published by Japan Forward and is republished with permission.
13. Wither Hybrid War
Excerpts:
The informational space does remain relevant, as do other mechanisms of below-threshold pressure. However, Western statesmen and strategists risk making an equivalent analytical mistake in the Indo-Pacific as they did in Europe: indeed, how else can the American policy class' unwillingness to dispatch sustained, effective “lethal offensive aid” until an invasion became imminent be explained apart from a severe misunderstanding of Russian actions?
China’s below-threshold pressure against Taiwan is as clear as Russia's below-threshold pressure against Ukraine. The CCP's media outlets continuously parrot the Party's talking points on the island republic. CCP intelligence attempts to penetrate Taiwan's media institutions and compromise electoral candidates. The People's Maritime Militia and China Coast Guard harass Taiwanese vessels and those of other states.
Yet none of this is a substitute for concrete military action, without which Taiwan is unlikely to be brought into China's orbit, much like Ukraine could not be brought into Russia's orbit. The Russian military clearly telegraphed its growing confidence from 2014 onward, deploying to Syria and staging larger and larger military exercises. Russia's year-long buildup along Ukraine's border was insufficient to take the country in a 100-hour war. Nevertheless, internally the Russian staff and political authorities clearly deemed a "military-technical solution" viable. And Russian political leadership, from Putin on down, telegraphed their increasingly hostile intentions towards Ukraine and their willingness to use force to resolve the issue in Russia's favor.
Chinese military expansion should be viewed in the same way as Russian military preparation over the past two years. Like Russia against Ukraine, China has continuously signaled its unwillingness to let Taiwan choose its own future. Like Russia, China has adopted an increasingly assertive military posture. And like Russia's leaders, China's leaders view Taiwan as a central aspect of their political-historical legacies.
The United States must move beyond this "grey zone" conception of modern warfare and its economized conception of modern politics. Force is always an option in international affairs. Modern combat is neither asymmetric nor limited but still a fast-flowing storm of steel, fire, and blood. After Russia opened the sluices in Ukraine, major powers were more likely to use their war machines to secure strategic objectives. We should not delude ourselves into viewing the Sino-American rivalry as merely an economic one. Much like its Russo-American counterpart, Sino-American antagonism builds towards combat.
Wither Hybrid War
March 15, 2022
Putin's Offensive in Ukraine Presages the End of "Hybrid Conflict" as a Distinct Analytical Term. What Comes Next Will Be Far More Brutal.
For years, so-called "hybrid war" has bedeviled Western planners and military theorists. The concept of grey-zone or below-threshold conflict saturated American planning assumptions for around a decade, whether against Russia, Iran, or China. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, however, demonstrates that "hybridity" did not transform the character of war, and kinetic force retains its primacy. Whether Putin succeeds or fails in his Ukrainian gamble, Western statesmen would benefit by taking note: China’s most logical actions against Taiwan mirror Russia’s in Ukraine.
Russia's hybrid campaign in Ukraine began with its 2014 annexation of Crimea. Its "Little Green men," unmarked Russian special operations forces, deployed to Crimea in February. They encountered almost no resistance due to the poor state of Ukrainian political authorities, Russia's long-standing presence on the peninsula and Ukrainian pre-2014 military incapacity. Ukrainian soldiers based in Crimea defected en masse, particularly from naval units. When faced with the choice between better pay and remaining with their families under Russian rule, or worse pay and separation from their loved ones, they naturally selected the former option. Russia's operation in Donbas was more aggressive. Initially supporting local militias, Russia gradually shored up its involvement, ultimately deploying Russian units to preserve the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics.
The conflict simmered for years from 2014 to 24 February 2022. However, Western defense analysts misread Russia’s strategic incentives and operational choices throughout the entire period. Russia's use of the Minsk II Protocols, combining it with limited military action, was not an ingenious political move to gain control over Kyiv without committing to a broader war. It was instead a demonstration of Russian weakness – the Russian military in 2014 was utterly incapable of taking territory in Donbas, as its failure to capture Mariupol demonstrated. Russian intervention in Syria redirected attention from Ukraine, and the Russian Armed Forces needed time to modernize and refine doctrine. Similarly, Russia was never comfortable mounting a breakout from Crimea, allowing Ukraine to cut off the peninsula's water supply.
Russia's master plan to pressure Ukraine internally was an utter failure. Former president Petro Poroshenko walked a fine line, challenging Russia in Donbas and courting NATO membership without fully abandoning the Minsk II agreement. Poroshenko lost to erstwhile comedian and actor Volodymyr Zelenskyy in 2019, with the new president initially appearing amenable to negotiations with the Kremlin but reversing his stance when faced with domestic pressure and, perhaps, a growing understanding that Russia posed a clear existential threat. The Kremlin's gambit to control the whole by controlling the part collapsed. The result was the Ukraine invasion, in which Russia hopes to secure Kyiv in its orbit and gain control of the land corridor between Donbas and Crimea, potentially capturing Odesa.
Russia’s invasion, as is now clear, has not gone according to plan. The historically competent Russian staff was far too ambitious given its means and far too operationally aggressive. Vladimir Putin’s obsession with operational security and Cold War counterintelligence mentality hampered offensive cohesion. And Russian intelligence severely underestimated the quality and resolve of Ukrainian forces. Whether Russia can correct its mistakes is immaterial. Its vaunted hybrid doctrine of informational manipulation and below-threshold pressure miscarried spectacularly. Ironically, Russia has had only limited success in the cyber domain and almost no ability to control the informational space. Modern social media has destroyed Russian propaganda, creating two media systems: state-controlled disinformation for internal Russian consumption and smartphone-filmed shots of Russian brutality that will live in the world’s imagination for a long time.
The informational space does remain relevant, as do other mechanisms of below-threshold pressure. However, Western statesmen and strategists risk making an equivalent analytical mistake in the Indo-Pacific as they did in Europe: indeed, how else can the American policy class' unwillingness to dispatch sustained, effective “lethal offensive aid” until an invasion became imminent be explained apart from a severe misunderstanding of Russian actions?
China’s below-threshold pressure against Taiwan is as clear as Russia's below-threshold pressure against Ukraine. The CCP's media outlets continuously parrot the Party's talking points on the island republic. CCP intelligence attempts to penetrate Taiwan's media institutions and compromise electoral candidates. The People's Maritime Militia and China Coast Guard harass Taiwanese vessels and those of other states.
Yet none of this is a substitute for concrete military action, without which Taiwan is unlikely to be brought into China's orbit, much like Ukraine could not be brought into Russia's orbit. The Russian military clearly telegraphed its growing confidence from 2014 onward, deploying to Syria and staging larger and larger military exercises. Russia's year-long buildup along Ukraine's border was insufficient to take the country in a 100-hour war. Nevertheless, internally the Russian staff and political authorities clearly deemed a "military-technical solution" viable. And Russian political leadership, from Putin on down, telegraphed their increasingly hostile intentions towards Ukraine and their willingness to use force to resolve the issue in Russia's favor.
Chinese military expansion should be viewed in the same way as Russian military preparation over the past two years. Like Russia against Ukraine, China has continuously signaled its unwillingness to let Taiwan choose its own future. Like Russia, China has adopted an increasingly assertive military posture. And like Russia's leaders, China's leaders view Taiwan as a central aspect of their political-historical legacies.
The United States must move beyond this "grey zone" conception of modern warfare and its economized conception of modern politics. Force is always an option in international affairs. Modern combat is neither asymmetric nor limited but still a fast-flowing storm of steel, fire, and blood. After Russia opened the sluices in Ukraine, major powers were more likely to use their war machines to secure strategic objectives. We should not delude ourselves into viewing the Sino-American rivalry as merely an economic one. Much like its Russo-American counterpart, Sino-American antagonism builds towards combat.
Seth Cropsey is founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy.
14. Guernica II: Russian Bombing in Ukraine Echoes the Civil War in Spain and All It Meant
My comments below that both criticize and praise the Biden administration actions in Ukraine.
Guernica II: Russian Bombing in Ukraine Echoes the Civil War in Spain and All It Meant
The mere mention of a 21st century version of World War II raises fears of a nuclear-laced clash among world powers. What if we’re following the footsteps of the democracies in the mid-1930s?
A tapestry by Atelier J. de la Baume-Durrbach of Pablo Picasso's ‘Guernica’ at United Nations headquarters in 2018. AP/Mary Altaffer, file
Monday, March 14, 2022
Fearing a ruinous global clash, democracies shrank from intervening militarily in the Spanish civil war. Historians now consider that a prelude to World War II. Sound familiar?
“The idea that we’re going to send in offensive equipment and have planes and tanks and trains going in with American pilots and American crews — just understand, don’t kid yourself, no matter what y’all say, that’s called World War III,” President Biden told supporters on Friday.
The mere mention of a 21st century version of World War II raises fears of a nuclear-laced clash among world powers. What, though, if rather than preventing, we’re just postponing such a war, as the democracies did in the mid-1930s?
Similar to what happened then, President Putin is urging Russia’s supporters from around the world to join his war, hoping to minimize the agony of mothers of his country’s conscript soldiers fighting a futile war and to maintain what little, if any, he has in the way of domestic support.
The Kremlin-connected Wagner Group, which pays mercenaries $2,100 a month, sent some 400 fighters to Ukraine — after recently lowering its recruitment standards to allow previously banned ex-cons to join. Additionally Moscow has recruited Syrian, Chechen, and other fighters, offering each up to $300 to join the war.
On the other side, President Zelensky said that some 16,000 foreign fighters joined Ukraine as an “international legion” — including a number of American war veterans. Local paramilitary troops, including the fascist Azov Group, are fighting on the Ukrainian side as well.
Yet, just as in the 1930s, the democracies that maintain, or can raise, standing armies are declining calls to confront militarily Mr. Putin’s assault on Kiev’s elected government. They shrink from drawing a line in what is becoming a fight between authoritarians and democrats. The West will not even signal a military response to reported Russian plans to use chemical weapons or commit other war crimes.
At the United Nations, a replica of Picasso’s “Guernica” hangs prominently as a constant reminder of an unacceptable act of war. The piece, one of modern art’s most famous, depicts the April 26, 1937, slaughter of man, woman, and animal when German and Italian aircraft razed the Basque town of Gernike.
The Spanish civil war was nearly a year old by then. That war started when a group of flag officers, led by General Francisco Franco, rebelled against the republic’s elected government. Soon enough fighters from around the world were gathering to help their ideological sides.
Franco’s Nationalists were bolstered by volunteers from places like Morocco, who were flown in by the Germans and Italians. The Italian fascist leader, Benito Mussolini, sent to Spain some 75,000 troops and the Nazi leader in Germany, Adolf Hitler, contributed 5,000 pilots to assure Franco’s ultimate victory.
On the other side, adventurists from democracies around the world volunteered to help the Republican side. War romanticism — as depicted in Ernest Hemingway’s writings — drew in liberals, fierce defenders of democracy, socialists, and communists. Clashing ideologies, including from communists, and differences with Spanish patriots often led to skirmishes among the ragtag groups of volunteers for the Republic.
In 1936 the world’s top powers signed a non-intervention pact. The Europeans and Americans stood by as war raged, though late in the war the American president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, authorized some clandestine operations to help the Republicans.
Italy and Germany also signed the pact, but never ceased their military assistance of the Nationalists.
A historian at the London School of Economics, Paul Preston, writes, “The hesitant role played by decision-makers in Britain, France, and the United States during the Spanish war echoes the response of NATO regarding Ukraine.”
President Zelensky’s plea to impose a NATO no-fly zone over Ukraine was immediately rebuffed — as was Poland’s offer to send MiG29 fighter jets via America’s airbase in Germany. As Mr. Biden warns of World War III, he constantly tells the world — and Mr. Putin — what America would not do.
“We are self-deterred,” a retired Army colonel, David Maxwell, a recent instructor at the National War College, says. There are arguments against enforcing a no fly zone, he says, but “taking it off the table is wrong. Better to say we’d not rule it out. It may be counterintuitive, but the danger of escalation is greater when we say we won’t do something.”
Colonel Maxwell, now with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, also praises Mr. Biden’s constant release of intelligence — including, most lately, the disclosure that Moscow is asking Communist China for military help in Ukraine.
For whatever it’s worth, Beijing has denied such a request took place, but what is clear is that President Xi is watching Ukraine. One of the lessons he clearly internalizes is the reluctance of Western militaries to join the battle for the defense of a fellow democracy.
In the 1930s such a reluctance led Hitler, Mussolini, and Japan’s Hirohito to the belief they could launch a world war with impunity. When they did, our fight turned much more costly than if we had intervened earlier to aid the Spanish Republicans, dwarfing anything Picasso could have imagined.
15. Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
A useful resource for visualization of the conflict.
Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
Updated Tuesday, March 15, 7:05 a.m. ET
The situation now: The leaders of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia crossed into Ukraine on their way to Kyiv to show their support to the government there.
March 13, 2022
Russian strikes kill dozens in western Ukraine
Russian warplanes struck a Ukrainian military base near the Polish border on Sunday, killing at least 35 people and bringing the war dangerously close to NATO’s doorstep. Western Ukraine had been largely spared from the early fighting, but Russian airstrikes on military targets in the region have ramped up in the last few days.
16. Lifting Human Rights Sanctions on Iran Would Be a Mistake
Also lessons for north Korea and more here:
Reagan also negotiated and signed a major arms control agreement—the INF treaty—while strongly pressuring the Soviets on human rights. Reagan publicly called the Soviet Union an “evil empire.” He and his administration pressured the Soviets by raising human rights in meetings with them, highlighting human rights in presidential speeches, and openly discussing the issue with members of Congress, human rights activists, and Soviet dissidents.
After a summit with the Soviets, Reagan publicly declared that “we didn’t limit ourselves to just arms reductions.” Rather, he also discussed the Soviets’ “violation of human rights,” noting that “a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers.”
Reagan, like Carter, found it helpful to portray Congress as a “bad cop” on human rights issues. He emphasized to the Soviets that progress on other bilateral issues, given the human rights concerns of both his administration and congress, would be easier if Moscow would improve its human rights record.
Congressional action underscored this point to Moscow. The House and Senate passed numerous resolutions condemning Soviet human rights violations, while individual lawmakers criticized the administration when it even vaguely appeared to subordinate human rights to arms control.
Kenneth Adelman, Reagan’s top arms control adviser at the time, eloquently described the interplay between human rights and arms control in a January 1987 speech. He argued that human rights advocacy is not a hindrance, but rather a contributor, to effective arms control agreements.
It is no surprise, said Adelman, that “a nation that makes no effort to abide by its human rights agreement commitments also violates its arms control agreements.” It also comes as no surprise, he added, when a nation “that systematically lies to its own people fails to comply fully with an arms agreement it signs with us.” Adelman concluded that “openness and arms control go together.”
Lifting Human Rights Sanctions on Iran Would Be a Mistake
Lifting pressure on human rights abusers is not necessary to negotiate effective arms control agreements.
The Biden administration is reportedly poised to lift all sanctions on many of Iran’s worst human rights abusers and terrorism sponsors in exchange for remarkably weak nuclear concessions from Iran. History has shown that sacrificing human rights concerns to achieve arms control objectives is both unnecessary and counterproductive.
Both Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, due in part to the insistence of Congress, maintained strong human rights pressure on the Soviet Union while successfully negotiating major arms control agreements. The current Congress should step in to ensure that the administration’s eagerness for a deal with Iran does not undermine accountability for Iran’s egregious human rights abuses and sponsorship of terrorism.
The Iranians who will reportedly be freed from all sanctions under the nuclear deal include Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Ebrahim Raisi, Vice President Mohsen Rezaei, and Hossein Dehghan, a former brigadier general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Each has a horrific record of personal responsibility for human rights abuses and terrorism.
Khamenei was Iran's president from 1981 until 1989 and has been its supreme leader since then. As such, Khamenei is ultimately responsible for four decades of Iranian human rights abuses and support for terrorism. A U.S. federal court held Khamenei personally responsible for the deaths of nineteen U.S. servicemembers in the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Federal courts have also held Khamenei personally responsible for the deaths of U.S. civilians in three terrorist bombings in Israel—two on public buses and one at an outdoor market in Jerusalem.
Raisi is responsible for the execution of thousands of political prisoners and the unlawful torture and execution of hundreds of peaceful protesters. All sanctions will likewise reportedly be lifted on Rezaei, a former IRGC commander in chief who is wanted by Argentina for organizing a 1994 attack on a Jewish community center that killed eighty-five people. Dehghan is responsible for mass executions as commander of the IRGC’s Tehran branch. He also commanded the IRGC in Lebanon when Iran ordered the Beirut barracks bombing, which killed 241 U.S. Marines.
The nuclear deal is reportedly also poised to lift all sanctions on the IRGC, which is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Americans and has carried out terrorist activities that have violated human rights around the world for decades. This sends a particularly counterproductive message in the wake of recent reports that the IRGC is actively working to assassinate former U.S. government officials, including former U.S. national security advisor John Bolton.
Lifting sanctions on these Iranian human rights abusers and terrorism sponsors would send a dangerous message of impunity to Vladimir Putin and his henchmen at a time when they are committing war crimes in Ukraine and human rights abuses in Russia. Such a decision is contrary to America’s values, would wrongly abandon the Islamic Republic’s many victims—including hundreds of current political prisoners and detainees—and would also weaken deterrence against future abuses in Iran and make it harder for the Iranian people to liberate themselves from the Iranian regime. Iran saw mass uprisings in 2018, 2019, and 2020; the regime reportedly killed 1,500 demonstrators in November 2019 alone. The regime’s repression is likely to cause even more mass uprisings in the future. If Washington lifts these sanctions, Iranian officials will have even fewer worries about the personal price they might pay for crushing new uprisings.
Lifting sanctions on these Iranian human rights abusers will also empower these hardliners in the broader Iranian political arena. Islamic Republic officials who violate Iran’s legally binding obligations on human rights—including those under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iran is a party—are among those most likely to violate Iran's nuclear commitments. The United States should isolate and sanction them, not relieve them of sanctions pressure or otherwise rehabilitate them.
A decision to lift human rights and terrorism sanctions on these Iranian officials would be inconsistent with the previously expressed policies of the Biden and Obama administrations. For example, during his confirmation hearing, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl said that Washington “should not be loosening sanctions on terrorism or human rights or anything else that checks back Iran’s destabilizing activities.”
In 2015, while discussing the very deal that Biden officials say they seek to resurrect, then-Secretary of State John Kerry told the Senate that the United States would not be violating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) if Washington used “our authorities to impose sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights, missiles, or any other nonnuclear reason.” Kerry also said that “the JCPOA does not provide Iran any relief from United States sanctions under any of those authorities.”
The United States’ experience negotiating with the Soviet Union, which had a much more advanced nuclear program and military than Iran does today, demonstrates that lifting pressure on human rights abusers is not necessary to negotiate and implement verifiable arms control agreements. In fact, past efforts have shown that it is counterproductive.
Neither Carter, while negotiating the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), nor Reagan, while negotiating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, made concessions on human rights in order to achieve progress on arms control. Instead, both Carter and Reagan made clear to the Soviets that progress on human rights was key to increasing trust on arms control.
In a June 1978 speech at the U.S. Naval Academy, Carter both discussed the importance of the ongoing SALT II negotiations and sharply criticized Soviet human rights violations, saying, “The abuse of basic human rights in their own country … has earned them the condemnation of people everywhere who love freedom.” Even at the height of the SALT II negotiations, Carter publicly “condemned” and “deplored” a Soviet sentence on dissident Anatoly Sharansky.
Both Carter and his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, used public and private forums to impress upon Soviet leaders that continued human rights abuses would anger the American public and hinder the possibility of the Senate ratifying the completed SALT II treaty. Carter and Soviet chairman Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT II treaty in June 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan eventually derailed Senate ratification, but both the United States and the Soviet Union announced they would nevertheless abide by its provisions.
Reagan also negotiated and signed a major arms control agreement—the INF treaty—while strongly pressuring the Soviets on human rights. Reagan publicly called the Soviet Union an “evil empire.” He and his administration pressured the Soviets by raising human rights in meetings with them, highlighting human rights in presidential speeches, and openly discussing the issue with members of Congress, human rights activists, and Soviet dissidents.
After a summit with the Soviets, Reagan publicly declared that “we didn’t limit ourselves to just arms reductions.” Rather, he also discussed the Soviets’ “violation of human rights,” noting that “a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers.”
Reagan, like Carter, found it helpful to portray Congress as a “bad cop” on human rights issues. He emphasized to the Soviets that progress on other bilateral issues, given the human rights concerns of both his administration and congress, would be easier if Moscow would improve its human rights record.
Congressional action underscored this point to Moscow. The House and Senate passed numerous resolutions condemning Soviet human rights violations, while individual lawmakers criticized the administration when it even vaguely appeared to subordinate human rights to arms control.
Kenneth Adelman, Reagan’s top arms control adviser at the time, eloquently described the interplay between human rights and arms control in a January 1987 speech. He argued that human rights advocacy is not a hindrance, but rather a contributor, to effective arms control agreements.
It is no surprise, said Adelman, that “a nation that makes no effort to abide by its human rights agreement commitments also violates its arms control agreements.” It also comes as no surprise, he added, when a nation “that systematically lies to its own people fails to comply fully with an arms agreement it signs with us.” Adelman concluded that “openness and arms control go together.”
Thus, lifting human rights and counterterrorism sanctions would actually decrease the prospects for Iran’s lasting and verifiable abandonment of its nuclear weapons ambitions. It would also weaken deterrence against further abuses, abandon victims, empower Iranian hardliners, and send a dangerous message to Putin and his henchmen.
Much as it did with Carter and Reagan, Congress should act to ensure that the United States continues to pursue an end not only to Iran’s nuclear program but also to its egregious human rights abuses and state sponsorship of terrorism.
Orde F. Kittrie is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a law professor at Arizona State University. He previously served as the U.S. State Department’s lead attorney for nuclear affairs. FDD is a Washington, DC-based nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy. Follow him on Twitter @OrdeFK.
Image: Reuters.
17. International Law Goes to War in Ukraine
Excerpts:
The decision of Ukraine and its supporters to rely on the UN Charter and on international legal institutions mark Putin’s actions not only as morally reprehensible but as illegal. That, in turn, serves to isolate Putin. This helps explain why only the international legal pariahs who are utterly dependent on, or at the mercy of, Russia voted with it in the UN General Assembly. Even authoritarian states that usually side with Russia find its legal position indefensible. Two of Russia’s own lawyers who had been defending the country at the ICJ in cases related to Crimea have quit, publicly stating that “it has become impossible to represent in forums dedicated to the application of the law a country that so cynically despises it.”
Even though there is little prospect that Putin will appear in the dock in the ICC courtroom in The Hague and slight chance that Russia will abide by a decision of the ICJ, international law remains one of Ukraine’s most powerful weapons against Russia. The law is helping states that agree on little else unify in opposition to the invasion. The law has brought together an unprecedented global coalition of states to oppose the Russian intervention and forge a program of sanctions that will raise the costs of the Kremlin’s aggression. And the law has led these same states to pour assistance into Ukraine, including by transferring massive amounts of weaponry to allow the country to defend itself. The law will hold this coalition of diverse states together by demonstrating again and again that Putin has no legitimate arguments on which he can rely.
Even if Ukraine’s government falls, the unified and sustained legal condemnation of the invasion is essential not only to sustaining hope for a future in which Ukraine is free and independent but also to maintaining an international legal order founded on the principle that might cannot make right.
International Law Goes to War in Ukraine
The Legal Pushback to Russia’s Invasion
March 15, 2022
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the most brazen illegal war waged by one sovereign state against another since World War II. The Kremlin launched the invasion in clear violation of the core obligation in the UN Charter, which prohibits the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently threatened that if Ukrainians continue to resist, they “risk the future of Ukrainian statehood.” And there is an avalanche of real-time evidence emerging from Ukraine that the Russian military is committing war crimes throughout the country—including by targeting civilians.
These extraordinary acts of law-breaking have been met with equally extraordinary acts of law enforcement. The most widely discussed response to the blatantly illegal war has been an unprecedented cascade of coordinated sanctions by the United States, Europe, and much of the rest of the world. Those sanctions have been applied specifically and directly in response to Russia’s violation of the UN Charter. As a result, the sanctions send a clear message: the invasion of Ukraine is a threat not just to Ukraine but to the international legal order as well. By joining the sanctions, states around the world are making clear that they, too, reject Russia’s illegal invasion and the violation it represents.
Contemporary international law demands that states respond to violations not with war but with what Scott Shapiro and I have termed “outcasting”—that is, sanctions that exclude a state that has broken the law from the benefits of global cooperation. In this case, outcasting involves not just economic sanctions but also barring Russian athletes from participating in international sporting events, banning Russian airplanes from European and U.S. airspace, and curtailing Russian media outlets’ access to European audiences.
But that is not all. Normally moribund international legal institutions have suddenly sprung to life in response to the illegal invasion. Just days into the war, the chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced that he was launching an investigation into possible Russian war crimes and crimes against humanity. Ukraine has also turned to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to intervene in the conflict. And, there are growing calls to create a special tribunal to consider whether there has been a crime of aggression. Although it’s too soon to know whether any of these efforts will succeed, the unprecedented response may have the unexpected effect of reviving and reinforcing the international legal order in ways that Putin did not anticipate. Indeed, Ukraine’s decision to rely on law even as Russia has relied on brute force has raised the stakes of the confrontation. The conflict is not simply about the future of Ukraine; it is about the future of the global legal order as we know it.
PUTIN’S CRIMINAL WAR
As the invasion began, the UN Security Council tried to pass a resolution deploring the Russian invasion and demanding the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine, but Russia vetoed it. Nevertheless, the UN has so far served as the epicenter of the international legal response to the war. Although Russia is able to exercise its veto power on the Security Council to prevent it from mandating any punitive action, the country’s almost complete isolation within the organization has been swift and thorough. Soon after Russia blocked the resolution, the Security Council, acting under the long-dormant Uniting for Peace Resolution, which does not permit a veto, referred the matter to the General Assembly, which soon voted overwhelmingly to demand that Russia “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” Only a small handful of states—Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, and Syria—voted with Russia against the resolution. The other countries that Russia might have hoped would support it, most notably China, chose instead to abstain. Russia, it is clear, is more isolated than ever.
The gears of the international criminal justice system also started turning quickly. On February 28, just four days after the invasion began, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan announced that he was seeking authorization to open an investigation as soon as possible. Neither Russia nor Ukraine is party to the Rome Statute, which created the ICC and gives it jurisdiction. But in 2013, Ukraine legally accepted the court’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes occurring on its territory. Still, Khan said the process would be expedited if an ICC member country referred the Ukraine crisis to his office. On March 2, Khan announced that he had received 39 such referrals and that he would immediately proceed. Never has the ICC responded so quickly to the outbreak of a conflict. The announcement means that combatants in the country and their commanders on both sides, including Putin himself, could potentially be prosecuted by the ICC for war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. Because the crime of aggression can only be brought in the ICC against states that are party to the Rome Statute, and Russia is not a party, there have been calls to establish a special tribunal to try Russians for waging an illegal war of aggression in Ukraine.
Not to be outdone, the usually slow-to-act International Court of Justice has also begun proceedings at lightning speed. On February 26, just two days after the invasion began, Ukraine submitted an application to the ICJ, beginning proceedings against Russia. The application takes Putin’s outrageous (and baseless) claims of genocide by Ukraine in the eastern regions of Ukraine and turns them against him. Russia, as a party to the Genocide Convention, has agreed that the ICJ is the forum at which disputed allegations of genocide may be resolved. In a brilliant act of lawyering, Ukraine seized on this fact and argued that Putin’s claims provide the ICJ grounds for jurisdiction to adjudicate whether, indeed, any such genocide has occurred. The ICJ immediately scheduled a hearing on the matter for March 7, but Russia was a no-show.
WHY THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT
By all reports, Putin was not expecting the extraordinary global response that his invasion of Ukraine has provoked. That is understandable. After all, Putin is using a playbook for destruction in Ukraine that he has been using for years in Syria with little reaction. And while his illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 was met with sanctions, the response was nothing compared to the economic tsunami that is hitting Russia today.
Putin failed to appreciate that neither Syria nor Crimea involved an open challenge to the core principle of the international legal order—the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. In Syria, Putin acted with the consent of the president of Syria, Bashar al-Assad. As a result, his actions, while horrific, did not violate the UN Charter’s prohibition on use of force. The annexation of Crimea, meanwhile, took place under a cloud of confusion and with little bloodshed. “Little green men,” whom Putin later admitted were Russian troops, mysteriously arrived on the peninsula. The government and population of Crimea, the longtime home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, largely supported succession from Ukraine and annexation by Russia. Leaders around the world called the annexation what it was—a clear violation of the UN Charter—but it took time for them to realize what was unfolding and to put together a program of sanctions. By then the annexation was largely a fait accompli.
Even authoritarian states that usually side with Russia find its legal position indefensible.
But this is different. Unlike in Syria, the leadership of Ukraine has not consented to Russia’s use of force. Instead, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has led the country in perhaps the most remarkable moment of resistance and national identity formation in recent memory. He has made Ukraine into a symbol of democracy and freedom in the face of the Russian onslaught. Ordinary Ukrainians have responded by fighting for their country against one of the most powerful and vicious armies on the planet. And they have inspired the world, even in the face of extraordinary loss.
Meanwhile, the global community, aided by outstanding real-time disclosures of intelligence from the United States regarding Russia’s true intentions, has demonstrated that it learned a lesson from Crimea and was ready to go with sanctions as soon as Russia invaded. Many countries in Europe see their own fates linked to Ukraine’s. And they recognize now, more than ever, how fragile the postwar peace has become—and how important the prohibition on the use of force is to their own future security.
ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE LAW
To be clear, no international legal institutions will be able to halt or turn back the Russian invasion. But they have power nonetheless. Together, these institutions are making it very difficult for Putin to muddy the legal waters and keep any remaining allies standing by him. Since the invasion began, the Russian leader has made many baseless claims—that Ukraine has committed genocide in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine, that economic sanctions are tantamount to a declaration of war, that Russia is simply responding to requests from people in the “independent” regions of Ukraine to come to their defense. But these have been sapped of any authority by the mounting evidence of war crimes by Russian forces as well as the unified response of international legal institutions to subject Putin’s claims to careful scrutiny. Ukraine and its allies are calling Putin’s bluff. And they are using international legal institutions to do so.
The decision of Ukraine and its supporters to rely on the UN Charter and on international legal institutions mark Putin’s actions not only as morally reprehensible but as illegal. That, in turn, serves to isolate Putin. This helps explain why only the international legal pariahs who are utterly dependent on, or at the mercy of, Russia voted with it in the UN General Assembly. Even authoritarian states that usually side with Russia find its legal position indefensible. Two of Russia’s own lawyers who had been defending the country at the ICJ in cases related to Crimea have quit, publicly stating that “it has become impossible to represent in forums dedicated to the application of the law a country that so cynically despises it.”
Even though there is little prospect that Putin will appear in the dock in the ICC courtroom in The Hague and slight chance that Russia will abide by a decision of the ICJ, international law remains one of Ukraine’s most powerful weapons against Russia. The law is helping states that agree on little else unify in opposition to the invasion. The law has brought together an unprecedented global coalition of states to oppose the Russian intervention and forge a program of sanctions that will raise the costs of the Kremlin’s aggression. And the law has led these same states to pour assistance into Ukraine, including by transferring massive amounts of weaponry to allow the country to defend itself. The law will hold this coalition of diverse states together by demonstrating again and again that Putin has no legitimate arguments on which he can rely.
Even if Ukraine’s government falls, the unified and sustained legal condemnation of the invasion is essential not only to sustaining hope for a future in which Ukraine is free and independent but also to maintaining an international legal order founded on the principle that might cannot make right.
18. Attack on Ukrainian base came from warplanes inside Russia, Pentagon says, underscoring limits of a no-fly zone
Excerpts:
That the attack originated in Russian airspace underscored the limitations of enforcing a no-fly zone in Ukraine, the senior defense official said. The Biden administration has refused repeated pleas from Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and some U.S. lawmakers who support using American warplanes to police the airspace. Others in Congress concur with the Pentagon’s assessment that such an operation would risk a direct confrontation between U.S. and Russian aircraft.
Attack on Ukrainian base came from warplanes inside Russia, Pentagon says, underscoring limits of a no-fly zone
The assault in Yavoriv, about 15 miles from Poland’s border, did not disrupt shipments of Western military aid, despite Russia’s claims, a senior U.S. official said
By Alex Horton
Yesterday at 2:23 p.m. EDT|Updated yesterday at 4:10 p.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Alex HortonToday at 2:23 p.m. EDT|Updated today at 4:10 p.m. EDT · March 14, 2022
Russia’s missile attack on a Ukrainian military base near the Polish border was launched from long-range bombers flying inside Russian airspace, the Pentagon said Monday, detailing its latest assessment of the strike that killed at least 35 people and marked a significant escalation in the nearly three-week war.
The attack Sunday in Yavoriv in western Ukraine, about 15 miles from NATO territory, did not disrupt shipments of Western military aid, despite Russia’s claims to the contrary, said a senior U.S. defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the Pentagon.
But it has amplified fears in the region, and in the United States, that a miscalculation could drastically widen the war. Thousands of U.S. troops have been sent to Poland and other countries along the alliance’s eastern edge, and President Biden and other Western leaders have maintained that a Russian attack on one would invite a ferocious response.
The senior U.S. defense official said Russia’s fusillade targeting the International Peacekeeping and Security Center has not altered the U.S. force posture in Poland. The official said that “more than a couple dozen” missiles were launched.
The facility has been used in the past by U.S. and NATO troops to provide training for the Ukrainian military and currently houses about 1,000 foreign volunteers who have traveled to Ukraine to aid in its war with Russia. The senior defense official said the Pentagon would “not have a way of knowing or tracking” whether any American citizens were among those killed or wounded in the attack, though he affirmed earlier statements indicating that no U.S. troops, government officials or defense contractors were at Yavoriv when the strike occurred.
The facility is not a transit point for Western military aid, the senior U.S. defense official said, contradicting Russian Defense Ministry claims that the base was used as a weapons and equipment depot. Russian officials have warned that they consider weapons shipments “legitimate targets.”
U.S. and European officials have not disclosed any shipment routes into Ukraine, so it is unclear whether the facility had been a hub for weapons in the past.
“I would just tell you that we have multiple routes to get security assistance into the hands of the Ukrainians,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told reporters during a news briefing Monday afternoon. “This was not one of them.”
That the attack originated in Russian airspace underscored the limitations of enforcing a no-fly zone in Ukraine, the senior defense official said. The Biden administration has refused repeated pleas from Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and some U.S. lawmakers who support using American warplanes to police the airspace. Others in Congress concur with the Pentagon’s assessment that such an operation would risk a direct confrontation between U.S. and Russian aircraft.
“A no-fly zone would not stop all of the air activity,” the senior defense official said Monday. “It would engender U.S. pilots in combat with Russia.”
Western Ukraine and its major city, Lviv, have become a transit point for civilians fleeing the war elsewhere in the country, but recent strikes have shattered the notion that the area will remain a refuge.
“This is the third now military facility or airfield that the Russians have struck in western Ukraine in just the last couple of days,” Kirby said Sunday. “So clearly, at least from an airstrike perspective, they’re broadening their target sets.”
The Washington Post · by Alex HortonToday at 2:23 p.m. EDT|Updated today at 4:10 p.m. EDT · March 14, 2022
19. The Biden administration is poised to hand Hezbollah a win in Vienna | Opinion
Excerpts:
As it considers all its options, made narrower and more urgent by the Biden team's new deal, Israel will also need to walk a tightrope with Russia—the U.S. administration's preferred partner in brokering the deal. Russia controls the airspace to Israel's north ever since it entered Syria in 2015, a consequence of Barack Obama's deal with Iran that year. Furthermore, the deal might include the removal or non-enforcement of U.S. sanctions aimed at preventing Russia from selling arms to Iran—which, under the 2015 deal, was to be allowed by October 2020, but which then-president Donald Trump blocked with an executive order just before the expiration of the arms embargo.
During Russia's war in Ukraine, Israel has had to maneuver very delicately to avoid antagonizing Moscow. Israel pointedly refused to go out too far against the Russians, and as a result has been attacked by administration surrogates in the media. Heightened Israeli-Russian tensions, the Israeli government understood, could constrain Jerusalem's options for action against Iran—unquestionably a Biden administration preference. Israel's leadership has wisely avoided this trap.
Still, the road ahead for Israel is littered with landmines. The Biden administration's Iran deal, the second act of Obama's catastrophic turn toward Iran, presents Jerusalem with a terrible choice: act alone or live under the threat of a nuclear Iran and its Hezbollah army, operating under a nuclear umbrella.
In other words, the Biden administration has sped up the countdown to a regional explosion.
The Biden administration is poised to hand Hezbollah a win in Vienna | Opinion
TONY BADRAN , RESEARCH FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
ON 3/14/22 AT 6:30 AM EDT
The Biden administration is on the verge of announcing a new nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Despite an eleventh-hour delay caused by Russian maneuvering, the agreement is reportedly ready. As part of that deal, the administration presumably will lift sanctions on a host of Iranian banks and companies involved in terrorism, even removing the the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the foreign terrorist organization list, releasing billions of dollars to the clerical regime that will finance its regional ambitions from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. In other words, the president and his team are planting a bomb in the Middle East and lighting the fuse.
A primary beneficiary of the deal's impending windfall will be Iran's most potent export: Hezbollah, the Lebanese legion of the IRGC. The terrorist group knows what's coming its way, because it has seen this play before. Back in 2015, on the eve of the first Iran deal, the group's leader Hassan Nasrallah gloated: "If Iran gets back this money, what will it do with it? A rich and strong Iran will be able to stand by its allies and friends...more than in any time in the past."
That is indeed what happened last time, and no doubt it will happen now, with horrible results. As the cash that will fill Iranian coffers trickles down to Hezbollah, the group will be able to further advance its arms buildup, especially in the production of precision-guided munitions (PGM) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). It was no coincidence that, as the trajectory of the talks in Vienna became obvious, Nasrallah highlighted in a speech his group's plan to enhance existing PGM and UAV capabilities.
Israel is watching these proceedings closely. Hezbollah's growing PGM capabilities are a primary threat to Israeli security. It's bad enough to have thousands of "dumb" rockets raining in randomly on civilian areas. It's another threat altogether if the IRGC unit on your border were able to hit strategic targets with precision. UAVs pose a complementary threat, as evident from how the Iranians deployed them against strategic targets and energy installations in Arab Gulf states. Hezbollah itself launched two drones into Israel the day after Nasrallah's boastful speech.
Given the Biden administration's determination to seal a deal with Iran, and thereby reaffirm former president Obama's legacy, Israel's choices have been clear for a while now—and they're not good. The administration's deal, negotiated in partnership with Iran's Russian patrons, reportedly guarantees Iran will become a threshold nuclear state. This offer is intended to function as a Sword of Damocles over the heads of those who oppose the administration's deal at home and abroad. Israel has been vocal that it is not bound by the new deal, and that it will take any action it deems necessary to prevent a nuclear Iran.
If Israel takes action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, an Iranian response likely will come through Hezbollah, potentially sparking a larger conflagration. Other scenarios ensuing from the deal likewise raise the real possibility of war on Israel's northern border. Increased transfer of strategic weapons from Iran to Lebanon, and accelerated local production of PGMs and UAVs, could quickly cross Israeli red lines. This buildup of Hezbollah capabilities is in part designed to protect Iran's nuclear infrastructure by deterring Israel. Team Biden, by paving Iran's path to a nuclear weapon, has dramatically raised the likelihood of conflict. More than ever, Israel cannot afford to let Hezbollah's buildup in Lebanon grow to the level of a strategic threat.
Fighters of the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah take part in a ceremony commemorating the memory of its fallen leaders, in the Ghobeiry neighborhood of southern Beirut on February 15, 2022. ANWAR AMRO/AFP/Getty Images
In Lebanon, too, Iran can count the Biden administration as an ally. Over the last two years, following Lebanon's 2019 financial meltdown, Washington has spent hundreds of millions of dollars stabilizing the Hezbollah-run order in Beirut. As part of this policy, the administration has been trying to resolve a maritime border dispute between Israel and Lebanon to open the door for European and Russian companies to begin energy exploration in Lebanese waters. Biden administration officials have even spoken about having U.S. companies invest as well.
The more the U.S. invests in Lebanon and treats it like an American protectorate, the more loath it will be to see Israel act against Hezbollah there. Israel would do well to disentangle itself from the administration's initiatives in Lebanon.
As it considers all its options, made narrower and more urgent by the Biden team's new deal, Israel will also need to walk a tightrope with Russia—the U.S. administration's preferred partner in brokering the deal. Russia controls the airspace to Israel's north ever since it entered Syria in 2015, a consequence of Barack Obama's deal with Iran that year. Furthermore, the deal might include the removal or non-enforcement of U.S. sanctions aimed at preventing Russia from selling arms to Iran—which, under the 2015 deal, was to be allowed by October 2020, but which then-president Donald Trump blocked with an executive order just before the expiration of the arms embargo.
During Russia's war in Ukraine, Israel has had to maneuver very delicately to avoid antagonizing Moscow. Israel pointedly refused to go out too far against the Russians, and as a result has been attacked by administration surrogates in the media. Heightened Israeli-Russian tensions, the Israeli government understood, could constrain Jerusalem's options for action against Iran—unquestionably a Biden administration preference. Israel's leadership has wisely avoided this trap.
Still, the road ahead for Israel is littered with landmines. The Biden administration's Iran deal, the second act of Obama's catastrophic turn toward Iran, presents Jerusalem with a terrible choice: act alone or live under the threat of a nuclear Iran and its Hezbollah army, operating under a nuclear umbrella.
In other words, the Biden administration has sped up the countdown to a regional explosion.
Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Lebanon, Hezbollah, Syria and the geopolitics of the Levant.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
20. Reconciliation of China bills in Congress could produce big cybersecurity wins
Excerpts:
Meanwhile, the most significant provision unique to the Senate bill creates a National Risk Management Cycle to “identify, assess, and prioritize cyber and physical risks to critical infrastructure.” Understanding these risks is the foundational step to properly resourcing U.S. government efforts to defend against, mitigate, and deter these threats. In its comprehensive March 2020 report on U.S. cyber strategy, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission noted that the U.S. government “lacks a rigorous, codified, and routinely exercised process” for identifying risk. Even where the government has identified critical infrastructure risks, a lack of sustained funding has limited the mitigation and management of the risks over time. A National Risk Management Cycle would begin to rectify this problem.
The Senate version also includes provisions to create regional technology hubs built on partnerships among industry, academia, and workforce groups to support domestic high-tech job growth in areas of the country that have not been historic innovation centers.
A successful bipartisan conference should result in numerous meaningful cybersecurity provisions enacted into law. While not as flashy as CHIPS, they collectively lead to more effective cybersecurity and more resilient critical infrastructure.
Reconciliation of China bills in Congress could produce big cybersecurity wins
The Hill · by Retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery and Annie Fixler, opinion contributors · March 14, 2022
Congress deserves mixed grades for its recent efforts to strengthen the nation’s cybersecurity and improve the resilience of its critical infrastructure. If Republicans and Democrats can find a path forward to integrate the Senate’s U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) with the House’s America COMPETES Act, Congress could make substantial, long-term investments in America’s technology future.
The two bills would build upon important but insufficient cybersecurity provisions in recent legislation. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which President Biden signed into law in November, contained $1 billion to enhance the cybersecurity of state and local governments and established a Response and Recovery Fund for major cyber incidents. Yet that law’s support to specific critical infrastructure sectors was inconsistent and missed some glaring weaknesses, such as those of the water sector.
Now, lawmakers get another bite at the cybersecurity apple as Congress sets up its conference committee to adjudicate USICA (which passed on a bipartisan basis last June) and the COMPETES Act (which passed last week on a nearly partly-line vote).
House and Senate lawmakers have a $52 billion starting point: Both bills contain $52 billion in funding for the CHIPS Act, which establishes a grant program to support domestic semiconductor production. Congress passed the CHIPS Act on a bipartisan basis as part of the FY2021 NDAA.
CHIPS funding is the most headline grabbing (and expensive) single issue in the two bills, but it is by no means the only important cybersecurity and critical infrastructure provision. The USICA and COMPETES bills have similar cybersecurity provisions in three arenas that House and Senate members can easily reconcile and embrace.
First, both bills seek to rectify dramatic shortages in the federal cyber workforce. They invest in STEM education and create rotational cybersecurity positions giving federal employees the flexibility to gain experience and skills. The House bill also expands “CyberCorps: Scholarship for Service,” a critical, ROTC-like program for the federal cybersecurity workforce, from its current $60 million annual budget to $90 million by fiscal year 2026. This will increase both the number of students (future federal employees) and the number of universities and community colleges involved. Such a provision would likely receive bipartisan support in the Senate.
Second, both bills invest in U.S. leadership in international technical standards-setting bodies like the International Telecommunication Union. This arena has become a crucial battlefront in the contest between Western values of a free and open internet and the authoritarian push for ever-greater state control and censorship. Beijing has aggressively sought to gain leadership positions and promote technically flawed proposals in these forums in order to distort and weaponize the bodies against the interests of America and its partners. Both bills thus strive to improve America’s response to Chinese maneuvering.
Third, both bills increase funding for the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, an important agency for battling foreign disinformation campaigns.
Next, the conference members should work to reach agreement in several other areas tackled only in one chamber’s bill.
The House bill, importantly, requires the executive branch to develop a strategy for “information and communication technology critical to the economic competitiveness of the United States.” Such a strategy would ensure that America is not dependent on untrusted vendors beholden to foreign powers or who otherwise have lax security.
Three other provisions of note: the House bill 1) designates “Critical Technology Security Centers to evaluate and test the security of technologies essential to national critical functions,” 2) creates international capacity-building programs to improve the cybersecurity of U.S. allies and partners, and 3) supports the software security and digital privacy work of the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Meanwhile, the most significant provision unique to the Senate bill creates a National Risk Management Cycle to “identify, assess, and prioritize cyber and physical risks to critical infrastructure.” Understanding these risks is the foundational step to properly resourcing U.S. government efforts to defend against, mitigate, and deter these threats. In its comprehensive March 2020 report on U.S. cyber strategy, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission noted that the U.S. government “lacks a rigorous, codified, and routinely exercised process” for identifying risk. Even where the government has identified critical infrastructure risks, a lack of sustained funding has limited the mitigation and management of the risks over time. A National Risk Management Cycle would begin to rectify this problem.
The Senate version also includes provisions to create regional technology hubs built on partnerships among industry, academia, and workforce groups to support domestic high-tech job growth in areas of the country that have not been historic innovation centers.
A successful bipartisan conference should result in numerous meaningful cybersecurity provisions enacted into law. While not as flashy as CHIPS, they collectively lead to more effective cybersecurity and more resilient critical infrastructure.
Retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (@FDD) and senior director of FDD's Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI). He previously served as a senior adviser to the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Annie Fixler is deputy director of CCTI. Follow the authors on Twitter @MarkCMontgomery and @AFixler. FDD is a Washington, D.C.-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
The Hill · by Retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery and Annie Fixler, opinion contributors · March 14, 2022
21. FDD | Russia's Putin looks to import Syrian mercenaries to do the 'dirty tricks' against Ukraine’s population
Excerpts:
Retired Col. Richard Kemp, who commanded British troops in Afghanistan, told Fox News Digital, “It’s not clear how many Syrians or other fighters from the Middle East are likely to answer Russia’s call. They will have to be paid significant amounts to volunteer to do so. There is no doubt that among them will be Islamic State jihadists who might be looking to stay in Russia or even travel on from there to Western Europe. They are likely to be disappointed if that is their aim, unless Putin is looking to help some of them infiltrate westwards.”
Kemp noted that “Middle Eastern fighters will be used to a completely different form of conflict than they will find in Ukraine. They are unlikely to be a match for well-armed and organized Ukrainian forces, but Putin will be happy to throw them away as cannon fodder.”
Rahal concluded with this warning: “As a Syrian general, I refuse to push the Syrians into that war that Putin declared against the peaceful people of Ukraine. Putin wants to achieve political and personal goals at the expense of the Ukrainian people, and this is what Putin did before here in Syria.”
FDD | Russia's Putin looks to import Syrian mercenaries to do the 'dirty tricks' against Ukraine’s population
Putin launches recruitment operation of Syrian armed forces
Ben Evansky
Fox News
Benjamin Weinthal
Research Fellow
fdd.org · by Benjamin Weinthal Research Fellow · March 14, 2022
As Russia’s war machine grinds into the third week of its brutal invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin has launched a recruiting operation in the Syrian Arab Republic in an effort to attract reinforcements for his armed forces.
Commentators believe the announcement is in part due to Russia’s poor planning of the war, which has led to many Russian soldiers being killed. Last week a U.S official told CBS News the number of Russian deaths could be between 5,000 and 6,000.
Putin and his defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, recently declared that as many as 16,000 combatants from the Middle East will enter the Ukrainian war on the side of Russia. The promised pay, according to news reports and anti-Assad organizations, is around $3,000 per month.
“It appears that Russia has opened 14 mercenary recruitment centers in Syria in territories controlled by the regime of Bashar al-Assad (Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor),” Theodore Karasik, a fellow on Russian and Middle Eastern Affairs at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, told Fox News Digital. “After a short training, the mercenaries will be transported to Russia through the Khmeimim Air Base by two Tu-134 (up to 80 passengers) and Tu-154 (up to 180 passengers) aircraft to the Chkalovsky Air Base, Moscow region.”
Karasik added that “We need to be aware that there is an information war ongoing regarding the recruitment of fighters by multiple parties to this conflict. There is some evidence that these fighters will enter into the battle space in greater numbers in the coming weeks.” The battle space, he continued, “is being prepared for partisan warfare and taking lessons learned from Grozny and Syria are going to be important for all actors. Recruitment drives are robust and supported by state actors.”
Grozny saw intensive urban warfare conducted by Russian forces during the initial stages of the First Chechen War in 1994-95 and the Second Chechen War in 1999-2000, with some military observers claiming they are now doing the same with Ukraine.
Karasik said the recruiting effort is about applying Syrian fighters’ capacity in another theater because of the experience they acquired in the long civil war. “I think it’s a mixed picture because of the multiple groups [in Syria] and how they’ve split and come back together again,” he said. “So really, it’s about the quality of the recruits, and what we need to look at next is who are they really sending? Who is signing up for this? How do they guarantee the quality of the fighters?”
Brig. Gen. Ahmad Rahal, who resigned in protest from the Syrian military in 2012 over the policies of President Bashar Assad and joined the opposition Free Syria Army, told Fox News Digital that the Russians will use the Syrian and other mercenaries to carry out the “dirty tasks” of fighting in the cities, which will lead to more civilian deaths and it will help them avoid being blamed for the war crimes.
“The Russian army is besieging most of the Ukrainian cities, and now it is taking the appropriate fighting arrangement around the cities, and the next stage will be military operations by storming the cities, and these mercenaries coming from Syria from Assad’s army and Assad’s mercenaries will perform a large part of those tasks,” Rahal said.
He added, “As a military observer, it is clear that the Russian army had to change its military plans. At first the Russians wanted a classic war, a war of armies, and the task assigned to the Russian army was a lightning and quick operation that President Putin called a ‘special operation’ through which the Ukrainian army would be crushed and then the leadership would collapse political in the capital Kyiv, but this did not happen.”
The brigadier general noted that, “It is clear that the Ukrainian military leadership was a good reader of the military reality and the great difference between the capabilities of the Russian army and the capabilities of the Ukrainian army, so the Ukrainian leadership succeeded in dragging the Russian army into a war of resistance around cities, a guerrilla war, a war of ambushes, and later a street war if the Russian army stormed the Ukrainian cities.”
Rahal said his information about the forces coming to fight in Ukraine included the following units: the 4th Division, commanded by Assad’s brother; the Syrian army’s special forces; the republican guard; the 25th division; the Russian backed 5th Corps; and “the Palestinian Al-Quds Brigade, which is fighting with the Assad army (their nationalities are Palestinian and Syrian); and the National Defense Forces militias (Syrian mercenaries who have been fighting alongside the army since the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011).”
The Assad regime has been engulfed in war since 2011, when the Syrian dictator launched a violent crackdown on citizens seeking democracy. Russian forces intervened in 2015 to crush the revolt. The Syrian civil war has resulted in over 500,000 deaths.
Retired Col. Richard Kemp, who commanded British troops in Afghanistan, told Fox News Digital, “It’s not clear how many Syrians or other fighters from the Middle East are likely to answer Russia’s call. They will have to be paid significant amounts to volunteer to do so. There is no doubt that among them will be Islamic State jihadists who might be looking to stay in Russia or even travel on from there to Western Europe. They are likely to be disappointed if that is their aim, unless Putin is looking to help some of them infiltrate westwards.”
Kemp noted that “Middle Eastern fighters will be used to a completely different form of conflict than they will find in Ukraine. They are unlikely to be a match for well-armed and organized Ukrainian forces, but Putin will be happy to throw them away as cannon fodder.”
Rahal concluded with this warning: “As a Syrian general, I refuse to push the Syrians into that war that Putin declared against the peaceful people of Ukraine. Putin wants to achieve political and personal goals at the expense of the Ukrainian people, and this is what Putin did before here in Syria.”
Ben Evansky reports for Fox News on the United Nations and international affairs. Benjamin Weinthal is a research fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow him on Twitter @BenWeinthal. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Benjamin Weinthal Research Fellow · March 14, 2022
22. US sends sizable contingent to Norway for giant NATO exercise in region rattled by Russia
US sends sizable contingent to Norway for giant NATO exercise in region rattled by Russia
U.S. Marines with the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division, load onto a CH-53E Super Stallion during training March 3, 2022, in preparation for Exercise Cold Response in Setermoen, Norway. (Jacqueline C. Arre/ U.S. Marine )
Several thousand U.S. Marines and sailors are among the roughly 30,000 troops from 27 NATO and partner countries taking part in Norway’s largest military exercise since the end of the Cold War.
The biennial Cold Response exercise kicked off Monday and includes land, sea and air drills. This year’s record number of attendees was confirmed months before Russia began its invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24.
“I think this exercise is a good counterpart, a good companion to the ongoing reinforcement of the (alliance’s) eastern flank that has been taking place since Russia’s invasion began,” Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said in a telephone interview.
The war is prompting fears of further Russian aggression in other parts of Europe, and some of the activities in the drill are planned for areas less than 200 miles from the Russia-Norway border.
U.S. Marine Cpl. Chance Morsch, a rifleman in the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division, checks radio connectivity March 3, 2022, ahead of Exercise Cold Response in Setermoen, Norway. (Jacqueline C. Arre/ U.S. Marine )
U.S. Marines with the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division, simulate engaging a target March 4, 2022, in preparation for Exercise Cold Response in Setermoen, Norway. (Jacqueline C. Arre/ U.S. Marine )
The II Marine Expeditionary Force is the largest American military unit participating in the exercise, Defense Department spokesman John Kirby said in a briefing last week, adding that some 3,000 Marines are taking part.
Elements of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, 2nd Marine Division, II MEF Information Group and 2nd Marine Logistics Group will conduct numerous field training exercises above and below the Arctic Circle, U.S. European Command told Stars and Stripes on Thursday.
A Marine with 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force walks toward a tent prior to Exercise Cold Response in Setermoen, Norway, on Feb. 17, 2022. (Jacqueline C. Arre/ U.S. Marine )
U.S. Marines Jared Curtis, left, and Dylan Shawver, both lance corporals, guard force sentries with 2nd Marine Expeditionary Support Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force in Bodo, Norway, on March 9, 2022, ahead of Exercise Cold Response. (Megan Roses/U.S. Marine Corps)
Third Battalion, 6th Marines will train with allies on the Dutch amphibious transport ship HNLMS Rotterdam, the command said.
Overall, about 220 aircraft and more than 50 ships are taking part in the drills, and the total number of participants has more than doubled from the last edition in 2020, making it the largest Norway-led exercise in over three decades, according to the Norwegian military.
Both American and Norwegian officials have attempted to assuage worries that the Cold Response exercise could exacerbate tensions between NATO and the Kremlin.
The U.S. and other NATO allies have so far refused to send troops into Ukraine, although they have been arming Ukrainians and have imposed harsh sanctions on Moscow. The U.S. has also sent thousands of troops to Eastern European NATO member states amid concerns that Russian forces may try to enter their territory.
Moscow declined an offer to observe the exercise this year despite acceptance of similar invitations in the past, Lt. Gen. Yngve Odlo, head of the Norwegian joint operations headquarters, told government broadcaster NRK earlier this month.
Norway is a long-standing member of NATO, whereas fellow Nordic countries Sweden and Finland are not, though they are considered security partners.
However, interest in NATO membership has markedly increased in both countries amid Russia’s latest attack. Under the alliance treaty’s Article 5, an attack on one ally is considered an attack on all members and calls for a collective defense.
Both Sweden and Finland are participating in Cold Response.
The events in Ukraine follow worries over possible Russian aggression in the Arctic that have grown over the past decade alongside the Kremlin’s military buildup in the region.
In a further sign of the region’s importance to Moscow, President Vladimir Putin last year upgraded the status of Russia’s Northern Fleet to a military district, a move that consolidated a large part of the country’s Arctic capabilities under one roof, and announced that it would be supplied with nuclear-capable Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles.
The Northern Fleet’s headquarters is about 90 miles from Russia’s border with Norway.
While analysts largely agree that a Russian attack in the Nordic region — be it overt and traditional or covert and hybrid — remains unlikely for the time being, the unpredictability displayed by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has put the region on edge.
“Unlike Norway, the main concern of Sweden and Finland is that they are not NATO members, and this puts them in a vulnerable position,” Jason Moyer, a program associate for the Global Europe Program at the Washington, D.C.-based Wilson Center, said in an email to Stars and Stripes.
Both Nordic countries have brushed aside Russian threats of “military and political consequences” if they were to join the bloc. Not only has Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine galvanized support for membership among Swedes and Finns, but it’s also “provided the alliance with purpose for decades,” Moyer said.
23. Three Critical Defense Reallocations for U.S. Strategic Competition with China
I am pleased to see the recognition of the importance of investment in the cognitive domain.
Excerpts:
The DoD must reduce the size of the active-duty Army to fund the Navy’s shipbuilding program, which is critical to meeting the challenge of the growing People’s Liberation Army Navy.
…this reduction in the Army’s budget must not come at the expense of collective defense requirements in Europe—an important secondary theater of geopolitical competition with the Russian Federation.
...
Rather than serve as a combat reserve—as it did in Kuwait at the height of the Global War on Terror—the Indo-Pacific rotational armored brigade would serve as a regional training force multiplier.
...
These two regional reallocations—one aircraft carrier and rotational armored brigade—would be minimal in financial cost, as they do not require an increase in force structure or capability. They simply require moving units already scheduled to deploy from one region of decreasing relative strategic importance—the Middle East—to the Indo-Pacific, the region of greatest strategic importance.
...
While technological innovation is paramount for military success, it is no replacement for the central tasks of thinking about warfare and integrating national power in competition and conflict.
...
…the U.S. military must prioritize U.S. naval funding at the expense of army force structure, transfer critical capabilities from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific, and reconstitute critical cognitive warfare institutions against expensive weapon investments.
...
Reallocation #1: From the Army to the Navy
Reallocation #2: From the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific
Reallocation #3: From Technology to the Cognitive
Three Critical Defense Reallocations for U.S. Strategic Competition with China
From America’s entry into the First World War through today’s state of strategic competition, preventing the rise of a malevolent hegemonic power on the Eurasian continent remains a central defense objective for the United States government.[1] For U.S. political leadership, the consolidation of the world’s industrial, technological, and demographic power centers in Eurasia under a hegemonic power poses a severe threat to the economy, state sovereignty, individual liberty, and physical security of the United States itself. Today, the United States recognizes the growing economic, military, and diplomatic power of the People's Republic of China as the primary strategic challenge capable of consolidating hegemonic power on the Eurasian continent.
The DoD must reduce the size of the active-duty Army to fund the Navy’s shipbuilding program, which is critical to meeting the challenge of the growing People’s Liberation Army Navy.
The U.S. military, as a critical arm of today’s strategic competition, acknowledges that budget allocations will be relatively inelastic. Budgets could even struggle to keep pace with growing inflationary challenges due to the challenges of federal debt, COVID-19, climate change, and competing strategic priorities.[2] Within these inelastic budgetary constraints, the U.S. military must reallocate funding internally—taking from lesser priorities to fund its greater ones. To meet the challenge of rising Chinese power, the Department of Defense (DoD) should implement three central allocations. The first is a service reallocation. The DoD must reduce the size of the active-duty Army to fund the Navy’s shipbuilding program, which is critical to meeting the challenge of the growing People’s Liberation Army Navy. The second is a regional reallocation, DoD must shift military and naval resources from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. The third reallocation is from the technical to the cognitive. Namely, DoD should reconsider its proclivity for costly arms races of questionable return. Instead, DoD should reinvest in institutions capable of planning and integrating all military arms and levers of power in the strategic competition against the People’s Republic of China.
Reallocation #1: From the Army to the Navy
The first reallocation for the DoD’s strategic competition with China consists of a service reallocation—namely a divestiture of U.S. Army force structure to fund U.S. Navy shipbuilding. While all warfighting domains serve an important role in the strategic competition between the United States and China, the maritime space is the central and most important. This is due to the Indo-Pacific’s central role in global trade and U.S. power projection. China’s so-called “9 dash line” claim in the South China Sea, coupled with its naval expansion to become the world’s largest navy in absolute numbers comes at a time of U.S. naval decline.[3] Indeed, the U.S. Navy itself predicts that it may be unable to meet China’s rising challenge in the broader Indo-Pacific region due to its decline in front-line naval vessels, naval construction facilities, and naval repair yards imposed by other DoD prioritizations during the Cold War and Global War on Terror.[4] The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act recently approved by Congress only allocates $22.6B for naval shipbuilding—less than the U.S. Navy received in 2021—while only maintaining the current fleet of 296 vessels.[5] To successfully compete with China, the U.S. Navy requires a substantial numerical and qualitative investment over time. The Navy estimates that this fleet would number between 398 and 512 crewed and unmanned vessels built over a 30-year period. To achieve this fleet, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding budget will have to grow by $2.4 to 10.4B each year. For DoD to maintain a flat budget, this budget increase will have to come from divestitures from one or more of the other services. While the Army may perform important supporting missions in competition against China, there appears to be few scenarios requiring the service to perform its core mission of large-scale ground combat against the People’s Liberation Army—apart from a worst-case scenario in Korea. Given the maritime domain’s predominance in strategic competition with China, the Army must be prepared to accept substantial budgetary reductions to support the Navy’s shipbuilding program over the next several decades.[6]
…this reduction in the Army’s budget must not come at the expense of collective defense requirements in Europe—an important secondary theater of geopolitical competition with the Russian Federation.
Importantly, this reduction in the Army’s budget must not come at the expense of collective defense requirements in Europe—an important secondary theater of geopolitical competition with the Russian Federation. To reduce the budget while maintaining the ability to defend U.S. interests in Europe, the U.S. Army should divest three of its active-duty Infantry Brigade Combat Teams and their supporting units. These lightly equipped units are the least capable of providing the firepower and tactical mobility required to defeat Russian armored forces when compared to the Army’s Armor and Stryker Brigades. At an annual unit cost of $2.71B, these three infantry brigade’s divestiture would provide DoD with an additional $8.13B to support the Navy’s shipbuilding requirements—representing a compromise between the $2.4B and $10.4B additional shipbuilding funds required.[7] To fund U.S. Navy expansion within a flat budgetary top line, DoD should strongly advocate for Congress to reduce the size of the Army. Eliminating three infantry brigades is a prudent measure to ensure the U.S. can compete with China in the Indo-Pacific in the following decades.
Reallocation #2: From the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific
The second department of defense reallocation to support U.S. competition with China is regional—transferring capability from the Middle East to the priority region of the Indo-Pacific. There are two significant military capabilities for this transfer. The first involves transferring the U.S. Navy’s one forward deployed aircraft carrier from duty in the Persian Gulf based 5th Fleet to service within one of the two Indo-Pacific fleets. This transfer would represent a 50% increase in naval aviation capability—with 80 additional combat aircraft and three total aircraft carriers in competition with and conflict against China. Despite the loss of naval aviation to Middle Eastern operations, the numerous U.S. regional airbases and remaining 5th Fleet surface vessels will likely provide enough strike capacity for the remaining U.S. military missions in the region.
Rather than serve as a combat reserve—as it did in Kuwait at the height of the Global War on Terror—the Indo-Pacific rotational armored brigade would serve as a regional training force multiplier.
The second regional transfer consists of exploring the tradeoffs for moving the one rotational armored brigade combat team from its enduring mission in Kuwait to the Indo-Pacific—weighing the current needs of Army forces within the Middle East to that of the Indo-Pacific. Should such a decision prove strategically favorable, DoD should explore options to move this armored brigade to Australia or Japan. Of course, such a move must come at the expressed interest of both states due to the political sensitivity of U.S. military basing. But there is reason to believe that a U.S. rotational armored brigade may potentially be appealing. Both governments have expressed interest in deepening their security relationship with the U.S. and are engaged in their own strategic competition with China.[8] Rather than serve as a combat reserve—as it did in Kuwait at the height of the Global War on Terror—the Indo-Pacific rotational armored brigade would serve as a regional training force multiplier. Regional allies and partners could send their army units to train with the U.S. Indo-Pacific rotational armored brigade—bolstering their capabilities as they compete and prepare for potential combat with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
These two regional reallocations—one aircraft carrier and rotational armored brigade—would be minimal in financial cost, as they do not require an increase in force structure or capability. They simply require moving units already scheduled to deploy from one region of decreasing relative strategic importance—the Middle East—to the Indo-Pacific, the region of greatest strategic importance.
The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) conduct a replenishment at sea with the Military Sealift Command fast combat support ship USNS Bridge (T-AOE 10). Carl Vinson and Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 are deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (PO2 James Evans/DVIDS).
These two regional reallocations—one aircraft carrier and rotational armored brigade—would be minimal in financial cost, as they do not require an increase in force structure or capability. They simply require moving units already scheduled to deploy from one region of decreasing relative strategic importance—the Middle East—to the Indo-Pacific, the region of greatest strategic importance. Most new infrastructure costs could be funded by the host nation, with comparatively little additional cost to DoD overall. Importantly, these reallocations must be paired with constructive diplomatic messaging to U.S. Middle Eastern partners. Senior U.S. military officers and diplomats must be able to explain the logic behind these moves while reinforcing America’s ongoing commitment to partnership, prosperity, and stability within the Middle East as the U.S. pivots to security challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
Reallocation #3: From Technology to the Cognitive
Lastly, DoD should limit the growth of costly technological investments of limited strategic viability and reinvest into institutions dedicated to critical thinking and innovations for modern war. This would be a reverse of the current paradigm. Namely, DoD has recently slashed funds for cognitive advancement to build expensive weaponry in the hopes that more technology can compensate for decreased intellectual fervor in modern war. Despite the potential hopes vested within modern weaponry, Clausewitz’s maxim that “the first…and most decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages” is powerfully resonant in this context.[9] The Army has made notable headway in this endeavor to decrease funding for cognitive advancement in modern war to make way for expensive and yet-unproven weaponry. In October of 2020 the Army announced its decision to eliminate the Asymmetric Warfare Group. This institution was dedicated to observing potential enemy asymmetric threats across the world and providing solutions to U.S. Army commanders prior to deployment.[10] Despite the unit’s success in helping the Army to defeat insurgent tactics and capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army decided this cognitive and practical institution was no longer worth funding, despite the institution's ability to observe conflicts between great powers. Importantly, this means that if China or Russia were to attack one of its neighbors tomorrow, there would be no large-scale U.S. military observation or lessons learned for U.S. forces to prepare with.
While technological innovation is paramount for military success, it is no replacement for the central tasks of thinking about warfare and integrating national power in competition and conflict.
3D Illustration visualizing how the Scramjet hypersonic weapon creates thrust. (Travis Burcham/DVIDS).
In a similar vein the Army also defunded the Red Team University, permanently closing its doors in October 2021. This institution provided a curriculum designed to train students from all service branches in a formal methodology for challenging their own thinking and stress-testing their own strategies against hypothetical adversaries. Students would return to their units thinking like the red team enemy, which allowed them to provide better solutions for friendly forces during training exercises.[11] The $98.5 million in combined savings from eliminating the time-tested capabilities within the Asymmetric Warfare Group and Red Team University institutions could not pay for one new Army hypersonic missile estimated to cost $106 million.[12] The hypersonic missile program and DoD’s push to spend $96 billion on modernized intercontinental ballistic missiles and $18 billion on ballistic missile interceptors portrays a service wide push for expensive weaponry that some analysts conclude are strategically dubious and potentially destabilizing in modern war.[13] While technological innovation is paramount for military success, it is no replacement for the central tasks of thinking about warfare and integrating national power in competition and conflict. In the current strategic competition against China, DoD would be wise to curtail the growth of this expensive and potentially problematic weaponry. This would provide more than enough savings to reinstate the timeless value of institutions dedicated to cognitive warfare.
Conclusion
…the U.S. military must prioritize U.S. naval funding at the expense of army force structure, transfer critical capabilities from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific, and reconstitute critical cognitive warfare institutions against expensive weapon investments.
Importantly, the three funding reallocations of service, region, and cognition within DoD must serve as pillars of an integrated whole-of-government effort. This effort must leverage all levers of national power, to include diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, and law to meaningfully apply the effects of military power reallocation. Additionally, DoD must be open to working with allies, partners, and multilateral institutions as a default, not as an exception as seen with recent withdrawal efforts in Afghanistan. A U.S. military out of sync with the efforts of the State Department or its allies will inevitably create more costly endeavors for itself in terms of time, finances, reputation, and mission accomplishment. This is even more important as flattening military budgets amid the ongoing COVID-19 crisis and escalating national debt means the U.S. military can no longer hope for increased funding to solve its strategic competition problems with China. This challenge in flattening budgets, however, invites a unique and critical opportunity for serious reallocation of resources and overall reform within the Department of Defense. Put simply, the U.S. military must prioritize U.S. naval funding at the expense of army force structure, transfer critical capabilities from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific, and reconstitute critical cognitive warfare institutions against expensive weapon investments. By doing so, DoD will be in a considerably stronger place to compete with China, now and in the coming decades.
H. Brandon Morgan is a U.S. Army Officer and a non-resident fellow at the Modern War Institute. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: Newly completed destroyer USS Lenah Sutcliffe Higbee (DDG-123) was christened at the Ingalls Ship Yard in Pascagoula, Miss. April 24, 2021. (Mr. Michael Duhe).
Notes:
[1] Elbridge Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021), 8.
[7] Congressional Budgeting Office “The U.S. Military's Force Structure: A Primer,” (CBO, July 29, 2016), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51535. Note: numbers adjusted for inflation as of January 2022.
[9] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 232
[13] For one analysis on the decreasing strategic viability of ICBMS see Garrett Hinck and Pranay Vaddi, “Setting a Course Away from the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,” War on the Rocks (War on the Rocks, February 18, 2021), https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/setting-a-course-away-from-the-intercontinental-ballistic-missile/ ; For one analysis on strategic problems with US ICBM defense see Joan Johnson-Freese and David Burbach, “The Best Defense Ever? Busting Myths about the Trump Administration's Missile Defense Review,” War on the Rocks (War on the Rocks, February 6, 2019), https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-best-defense-ever-busting-myths-about-the-trump-administrations-missile-defense-review/.
24. Before the Next Shock – How America Can Build a More Adaptive Global Economy
Conclusion:
The United States has been most successful when it has mobilized international coalitions that enabled other participants to pursue both national and systemic interests with Washington. The country will not become safer by retreating behind walls and borders, nor will it succeed by tearing down the existing order and pursuing chimeras. Washington needs to rediscover its ability to adapt pragmatically to dynamic conditions. As Helmut Schmidt, the West German chancellor, said in the late 1970s, “Those who have visions should see a doctor.”
Before the Next Shock
How America Can Build a More Adaptive Global Economy
During the coming decade, the world economy will confront a crisis. This forecast may sound rash, but the past half century revealed that disasters occur regularly. In recent times, policymakers have faced not just the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic trauma but also various eurozone crises. These dramas followed the global financial crisis of 2008 and the consequent recession, which were in turn preceded by the shock of 9/11. Before the terrorist attacks of that day, the world had coped with the Internet boom and bust at the turn of the millennium; the exchange-rate and debt travails of Russia, East Asia, and Latin America in the late 1990s; painful economic adjustments at the end of the Cold War; developing-country defaults in the 1980s following the petrodollar lending splurge of the 1970s; and stagflation. Crises have been the historical norm, not the exception.
The next exigency could stem from many sources. Financial markets may stumble during the transition from an era of government spending and debt, backed by a flood of monetary liquidity, to a period of less fiscal largess and higher interest rates. Interactions among wildlife, livestock, other domestic animals, and humans will probably result in the spread of more zoonotic viruses. Someday, a cyberattack will shut down critical infrastructure. Disruptive technologies are vying to transform traditional business models through new platforms and decentralized systems. The world is in the early stages of a vast and likely discontinuous energy transition that will match the Industrial Revolution in its hard-to-anticipate effects. The risk of war looms. Even old-fashioned natural disasters may destabilize societies.
Whatever its origins, the next crisis will strike an economic system already under strain. People around the world are frustrated and restless. Leaders everywhere, attentive to domestic politics, are turning toward national industrial policies and hardening their borders. Geopolitical competition has bred mistrust among major economies, and the world seems to be fragmenting into regions pulled by economic gravity toward local poles of power.
The legacy institutions of earlier economic orders are struggling to adjust to these changes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have to add climate and pandemic policies to their development missions. The World Trade Organization has been unable to modernize its rules through negotiations, and the United States has paralyzed the WTO dispute-settlement system by blocking appointees to appeals panels.
Whatever its origins, the next crisis will strike an economic system already under strain.
Today’s fashion demands junking the old. It yearns for big, bold change. In the United States, the Biden administration decided the moment was ripe for a new New Deal. Internationally, the cognoscenti deposed the old “Washington consensus” in favor of a new geoeconomics. Planners at the United Nations, the RAND Corporation, and the World Economic Forum have heralded new economic orders.
But would-be architects of fresh designs have a mistaken understanding of both economic behavior and effective policymaking. Economic systems develop through constant change, often precipitated by unpredictable and sporadic events. They are more likely to resemble evolutionary and ever-mutating processes than planned orders guided by governments. Policymakers should therefore adapt continually adjusting systems to new circumstances instead of inventing novel structures designed to suit the latest theories.
The economic diplomacy of the 2020s should aim to achieve resilience and foster adaptation. These concepts diverge from the geopolitical ideal of stability and balance, as well as from the hopeful vision of refashioning the world in an ideal image. Economic diplomacy should accept the reality of perpetual dynamism, which differs from the expectation of perpetual conflict and the dream of perpetual peace.
U.S. economic statecraft needs to guide the principal multilateral economic institutions—the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO—to adapt to a diverse mix of actors, states, and international challenges. The multilateral method of the 2020s must operate across a variety of public and private networks: regional, subnational, national, transnational, and global. Ironically, even though the United States led the creation of the major international organizations, Washington rarely reflects on their practical uses and devotes little effort to their renewal. They have persevered through past disasters, adjusting their mandates to help manage whatever crises have arisen. They have fostered prosperity for decades, and if properly revived, they can continue to do so for decades to come.
EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, political economists such as Thorstein Veblen and Joseph Schumpeter argued that economic behavior reflects complex motivations, emotions, events, cultures, histories, and technological changes. They believed that an evolutionary worldview based on biological science would help people better understand the resulting economic activity, including periodic shocks, crises, and revolutions in entrepreneurship. Schumpeter argued that the process led to “creative destruction,” in which new economic innovations and organizations replace older, outdated ones.
Instead, academic economists turned to mathematical models to translate behavior into systems of equations that produce equilibriums. Shocks—such as those that led to the Great Depression—might occur, but economists focused on intervening to restore stability. Proponents of “rational expectations” and “efficient markets” took the idea of rational equilibriums to its logical conclusion, arguing that although individuals might act irrationally, the market, in aggregate, would behave as if everyone were rational. Socialists, in turn, tried instead to direct markets through government planning and state ownership.
Yet during the 1970s, even as theories of rational and efficient markets were winning adherents, Charles Kindleberger, an economic historian, offered a counterpoint. Kindleberger contended that irrational behavior was an important feature of economic systems and that crises occurred with “biologic regularity.” He complemented this insight with the study of international interdependence and institutional behavior, drawing on his practical experience working on the Marshall Plan. That combination led Kindleberger to argue that the world needed systemic leadership that would press for cooperative solutions to achieve global public goods, especially during crises. The task of the leading economic power, according to Kindleberger, was to create and adapt to changing circumstances international regimes that would encourage and execute such adjustments. He synthesized an evolutionary economic outlook with ideas about how governments could act in concert to counter cross-border economic collapses. One of Kindleberger’s students, Robert Shiller, a winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics and the author of Irrational Exuberance, has researched behavioral economics, a psychological branch of biological thinking. Indeed, Shiller’s recent work draws from epidemiology to study the contagion effects of economic events—a fitting complement to thinking about pandemics.
The application of evolutionary economics should not be an excuse for policy complacency. Nor should it suggest a revival of social Darwinism. To the contrary, policymakers need to adapt systems and institutions to changes and disruptions. But rather than replace the paradigms of the prior order, they must make continual functional fixes that help both national and transnational actors handle shocks and adjust.
MISREADING HISTORY
The penchant for devising new international economic orders traces to Bretton Woods folklore. According to the appealing tale, a farsighted band of Americans, with some input from poorer but learned Britons, recognized the failures of the international economic system after World War I, in particular the Great Depression. In 1944, even as World War II still raged, the Bretton Woods visionaries laid the institutional foundations for a new international economic architecture. They established the IMF and the World Bank (officially, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) to manage exchange rates, support payment and capital flows, finance reconstruction, and encourage investment for development. They drew up plans for an international trade organization to facilitate commerce, but the negotiations collapsed over differences concerning the scope of regulations and controls.
The economic statesmen involved deserve respect. In facing vexing problems, they tried to learn from past mistakes. They sought to build the institutional pillars for a prosperous, peaceful international economy. They wanted to avoid the divisive and ultimately destructive policies of blocs and autarky.
Nevertheless—as the economist Benn Steil, a skillful historian of Bretton Woods, has pointed out—the architects of the conference drafted plans based on faulty assumptions. They supposed that the United States and the Soviet Union would cooperate, that Germany would be “pastoralized” after its economic dismantlement, that the British Empire would safely recede, and that the IMF’s modest balance-of-payments assistance would rebuild global trade. By 1947, each of those assumptions had proved incorrect. As a result, Europe faced economic and political collapse, and the world economy remained moribund.
Within a few years of the conference, another group of economic leaders, led by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton, had to devise a new approach. They produced the Marshall Plan, encouraged the integration of Western European economies (including a new Federal Republic of Germany), and negotiated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to lower tariffs and foster common rules. The Marshall Plan enabled the Western European countries to rebuild their economies in cooperation with one another. The reduction in trade barriers led to global opportunities for growth and export-led development.
BENDING, NOT BREAKING
Yet the post–World War II economic system had to keep changing. The fixed exchange rates of Bretton Woods lasted until 1971, when the United States eliminated the dollar-gold link. For a few years, the major economies tried to reestablish fixed exchange rates at different levels. But the search for a structured order of currencies gave way to another system, this time of flexible, floating exchange rates.
The transition to floating rates was long and difficult, especially because sharp changes in monetary and energy policies triggered vast shifts of capital. France and Germany, for different reasons, eventually decided to return to fixed exchange rates and then, later, to devise a shared currency as part of their drive to unite Europe. Many emerging markets suffered exchange-rate and debt crises. Some developing countries wanted to avoid currency and price volatility, so they built up big dollar reserves and resorted to “dirty floats,” allowing their currencies to fluctuate, but only within a certain range. But overall, flexible exchange rates freed governments to determine national macroeconomic policies without the fixed constraint of protecting the value of their currencies; they relied instead on markets to adjust each currency’s relative price.
To avoid political pressures for trade protection, the United States decided in the second half of the 1980s to foster cooperation among the finance ministers and central bankers of the G-7 countries to manage imbalances in trade flows and between exchange rates. As developing economies became more important and the G-7 lost influence, the G-20 became a more useful forum. For example, the 2009 G-20 summit, in London, organized a timely fiscal and financial regulatory response to the global financial crisis. Now, the influence of the G-20 has faded because of its size, differences among the parties, and bureaucratization.
The world’s legacy institutions have not been the principal problem.
The IMF and the World Bank adapted to meet changed circumstances, as well. The IMF focused on macroeconomic reforms—fiscal and monetary policies—and became the financial firefighter for economies facing balance-of-payments and debt crises. It branched out into structural economic reforms, especially for states in transition to market economies. The IMF also served as an expert partner for the G-7 and, later, the G-20 in their efforts to cooperate. Eventually, the IMF assumed the role—along with the Financial Stability Board, which was formed in 2009—of monitoring and advising on the strength of financial institutions.
The World Bank, in turn, adjusted to changes in development experience and thinking. At first, it largely existed to provide capital for reconstruction in the postwar period in Europe and Japan, as well as for infrastructure in developing countries. But over time, it shifted to helping fund antipoverty programs, advising on structural reforms, offering crisis support and debt restructuring, promoting private-sector development, providing public goods, assisting fragile and insecure states, supporting the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals, and sharing experience with middle-income economies. The World Bank then even shifted back to infrastructure development through new financing vehicles.
The GATT grew from 23 members to 164. The participants negotiated eight trade rounds, cutting tariffs, expanding the topics covered, and adding rules. The Uruguay Round, completed in 1994, transformed the GATT into the WTO, which established a disciplined dispute-settlement system and, supposedly, an ongoing agenda of negotiations. The WTO offers the principal example of a multilateral body that has agreed-on rules, backed by a process to settle disputes. The system preserves members’ sovereign rights to reject WTO decisions while authorizing counterparties to negotiate compensation or withdraw comparable trade benefits. The rules, backed by a neutral tribunal, have encouraged economies to lower barriers to trade.
Over the course of the 78 years since the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions, would-be architects have regularly proffered new international economic orders. Practical realities, however, have resulted in experiences that look more like those of the leaders of 1947—who recognized that the Bretton Woods system was not working as hoped. As the global economic system evolved, including through shocks and crises, policymakers experimented. Rather than search for a new constructed stability, pragmatic officials accepted that they had to continually navigate through dynamic conditions. The legacy institutions have not been the principal problem; people can adapt them to new needs. The system ossifies when leaders fail to adjust to the next phase of uncertainty.
AMERICAN INNOVATION
The most successful U.S. leaders anticipated—or at least recognized—shifting challenges. They adapted existing networks and institutions, or supplemented them with new ones, to solve novel problems. Leadership, they discovered, often required a mix of using old systems in new ways and devising innovative functional fixes. Schumpeter might have called it “the creative destruction of multilateralism.”
Policymakers today can mine the U.S. experience for lessons about how to build and maintain successful adaptive systems. The first, and most important, lesson is that systems need the flexibility to adjust to changes in technology, finance, and business models. Private sectors are continually innovating. Entrepreneurs’ experiments spark transformations. But disruptions also create costly adjustments.
Ironically, many U.S. foreign policy leaders have overlooked the United States’ innovative strengths. In the 1970s, President Richard Nixon and his adviser Henry Kissinger mapped out a new multilateralism to help manage what they perceived as the United States’ economic decline. Nixon designed his dramatic economic moves of August 1971, when he abandoned the dollar-gold link, to rebalance international economic responsibilities, just as the Nixon Doctrine called for sharing the burdens of security more equally. But in the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz had a more optimistic outlook about the U.S. economy’s ability to renew itself. Accordingly, in the aftermath of Nixon’s break with the fixed exchange rate tied to gold, Shultz favored flexible exchange rates instead of resetting currency prices at new levels. He believed markets had to be free to adjust.
Schultz and Kissinger at a UN Security Council meeting in New York City, September 2009
Kevin Lamarque / Reuters
Adaptive systems also recognize power shifts, whether driven by economics, technologies, demographics, or military strength. After World War II, the United States promoted recoveries in Europe and Japan. During the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. policy had to adapt to the larger size and influence of both. In the 1980s and 1990s, the United States began to recognize the continental opportunities—and risks—of changes in Mexico. Working with Canada, Washington created a new North American partnership, with the North American Free Trade Agreement as the cornerstone.
In recent decades, the United States has had to adapt to the growing influence—and problems—of emerging markets. China’s rising power has become Washington’s greatest external preoccupation, although the United States has yet to develop a clear concept of a system that can peacefully accommodate both countries. Americans recognize that India will be a place of power in the years ahead, but they have been slow to appreciate the changing economic patterns across Southeast Asia. The demographics of Africa loom over the future.
The final lesson from the U.S. experience is that successful adaptive systems have to be grounded in political support at home. From 1947 until today, presidents have kept a close eye on public support and built partnerships with Congress as they have developed foreign policies. Polls suggest that Americans recognize the value of global interconnections, but public backing for international commitments ebbs and flows. Dramatic events can seize voters’ attention, but their focus eventually turns to other issues. Successful political leadership has helped citizens perceive that domestic and international interests are different sides of the same coin. The U.S. government needs to help its citizens adapt to change without stifling innovation.
ANTICIPATION AND ADAPTATION
Policymakers find it hard to predict events, but they can and should anticipate developments. They should consider a number of evolving features of today’s global economy. First, the world is in the midst of a historic fiscal-monetary experiment. Since the global financial crisis, major central banks have vastly expanded money and credit. In response to the pandemic, major economies, especially in the developed world, have spent trillions of dollars while relying on monetary policies to buy even more government securities. Even without hazarding judgments about future inflation, pockets of excess, balance-sheet and macroeconomic risks, and the standing of the U.S. dollar, policymakers need to prepare for large, sharp shifts in expectations about economic conditions, in the valuations of assets, and in financial flows across countries and markets.
The finance ministers and central bankers of major economies need a small, informal forum where they can regularly monitor macroeconomic and financial conditions, share perspectives, and, when necessary, act in concert. To avoid jousts over leadership, the IMF could organize quarterly sessions among the principal actors in the global financial system, those whose currencies are in the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), an international reserve asset created by the IMF: China, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the eurozone countries (and the European Central Bank). When the next crisis hits, these economies will need to cooperate.
The IMF, as host and neutral ground, should offer independent outlooks. The managing director of the IMF could serve as an economic diplomat, quietly suggesting cooperative steps. The G-7, the G-20, and the wider IMF membership would continue their work, contributing to and expanding the reach of the core SDR group.
Such a forum might also build habits of cooperation and a sense of shared responsibility. That ethos could help these actors devise approaches to problems such as developing countries’ debts. Many poorer economies now rely on Beijing as their lender of first resort, but China’s lack of debt transparency inhibits improvements for all parties, including China itself. As the reserve-currency countries experiment with digital currencies and payment systems, the group could also consider questions of interoperability, confidence, and security. Although political constraints may limit or preclude cooperation, this forum could at least identify options for constructive action.
Many poorer economies rely on Beijing for loans.
Economic stability isn’t threatened just by fiscal policy and markets. As the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, external, noneconomic forces, such as diseases, can quickly create global economic crises, and the world is still learning how to prevent, recognize, and respond to dangerous viruses and other risks to biological security. The frequency and costs of viral disease outbreaks have been increasing as interactions among wildlife, livestock, other domestic animals, and people have expanded rapidly. Transportation networks accelerate global transmission. South Asia, Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa are especially intense hot spots. The slow pace of vaccination in developing countries creates opportunities for more variants, which might then roll across the world in ruinous waves. The economic effects of disease have hit the poorest people the hardest.
The UN agencies charged with strengthening the provision of global public goods—such as the World Health Organization (WHO)—do not have the resources or the authority to match their mandates. The nation-states that compose their governing boards make (or veto) the real decisions. Each body has its own peculiar political culture. The multilateral economic institutions should add their expertise, resources, and convening power to assist these agencies. Even though most of the same governments participate in the United Nations and the multilateral economic organizations, each body draws from different ministries, power centers, and advocates.
For example, as the finance ministries of the world struggled with the global financial crisis in 2008, food prices surged in developing countries. The World Bank customized support for the UN humanitarian agencies that handle food and agriculture and worked with the WTO and the G-20 to resist export bans and boost transparency in order to avoid panic and hoarding. When the economist Chad Bown reviewed the transparency initiative over a decade later, he concluded that the better information networks were still helping counter price spikes and export controls that could exacerbate food price problems.
COVID-19 has demonstrated that the WHO does not have the field capacity to counter a global pandemic. In the first decade of this century, the organization supported the creation of GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance—a public-private partnership with the Gates Foundation, UNICEF, pharmaceutical companies, and the World Bank that helps develop vaccines in poor countries. COVAX, GAVI’s initiative to fight COVID-19, has stumbled, but so have many national projects. The UN Economic Commission for Africa and the African Export-Import Bank adapted rapidly to coordinate vaccine providers, encourage African production of vaccines, build on national delivery systems, and find fast finance.
A new pandemic is just one way that nature could spark an economic shock.
A new international biological security agreement could enhance this institutional and financial cooperation. Both health and veterinary authorities need to gather and share better and more timely information about zoonotic viruses. Research funding could enable health authorities to map the DNA sequences of potentially dangerous diseases. The World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development should work with the WHO to ensure strong connections all along the vaccine delivery chain, especially through the health-care systems of poor countries. The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, which the United States devised to suppress the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa almost 20 years ago, offers an obvious but inexplicably untapped model.
But a disease outbreak is just one way that nature could help spark an economic shock. Climate change is prompting new environmental and carbon policies that will change energy markets and costs during a lengthy era of transition away from fossil fuels. Huge structural shifts in energy sources, production, transmission, and pricing will create disconnects. Some major developing economies, already struggling with COVID-19, will object adamantly to paying for the transition. The world economy will face sizable adaptation costs, as well.
The World Bank raised money for the new Climate Investment Funds in 2008. The CIF experimented with climate initiatives for developing countries in technologies, resilience, energy access, and forestation. The original $8.5 billion leveraged total investments of roughly $70 billion. As a practical matter, developed-country donors were willing to entrust the World Bank and its regional counterparts with innovative trust funds (and evaluation processes), but they were not ready to just write checks to developing countries.
The UN pressed for its own funding arm, leading to the creation of the Green Climate Fund. Over the course of a decade, the GCF has struggled to gain scale and confidence. Meanwhile, the World Bank’s CIF has been sidelined. Developing countries are complaining that higher-income states are not fulfilling their pledges to help fund the transition to low- or no-carbon energy. The United States and its partners need practical adaptations to overcome this impasse; they should be building on a successful record.
Arriving at a Green Climate Fund pledging conference in Paris, October 2019
Pascal Rossignol / Reuters
The new International Sustainability Standards Board, created by the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation, can help. It will draft climate disclosure criteria that should offer investors in 130 countries reliable, comparative environmental data. Investors, customers, and regulators are pressing companies to detail carbon net-zero commitments and energy transition plans. Almost 100 financial supervisors and the IMF are incorporating climate risks in their financial assessments of banks, other lenders, and countries. Taken together, these developments are creating the data infrastructure needed for carbon credit markets. The World Bank should connect development projects to institutional investors through new, large, liquid carbon finance markets, where carbon financial products will be tracked and traded like other commodities.
Energy markets are not the only sector that could disrupt the global economy or that would benefit from new monitoring and oversight. In the coming years, digital and data transfers will increasingly underpin the world economy. Even before the pandemic, growth in the trade of manufactured goods had slowed notably, but trade in services had jumped. Digital connectivity is enabling even more wide-ranging and numerous gains in services, and the pandemic economy has accelerated this trend. But the rules and standards for exchanges of data and digital products are ill defined. Conflicts will become more common. Cyberattacks will shut down vital information systems.
The United States has traditionally led in encouraging new international rules and standards, in part because U.S. firms have been in the forefront of cutting-edge activities. But today, economic and technological processes race ahead with little multilateral guidance. Washington should be preparing new rules for the digital trade, working first with like-minded partners. The rules should ease the transfer of digital services and data across borders, while giving countries the freedom to judge their own needs for security, safety, and privacy.
But implementing these new, U.S.-made rules across the world will prove tricky. The United States is continuously clashing with the planet’s second-largest economy: China. Both have been undermining the international economic system that enabled the former’s unparalleled power and the latter’s historic rise. Both have shown little inclination to sponsor systemic reforms.
The global economy is unlikely to evolve soundly if the U.S. and China are in conflict.
Washington will need to decide whether it can conceive of working practically with Beijing on topics of mutual interest. At times, U.S. policy now attempts to limit, contain, decouple the U.S. economy from, or penalize China’s economy. On other occasions, Washington demands that China purchase more U.S. exports and treat U.S. companies better—steps that would further integration. Sometimes, the United States wants China to adhere to rules, whether international or Washington’s, but other times, the United States acts as if China is too big, bullying, or untrustworthy to function reliably within a system of rules at all. U.S. policies also have to account for the preferences of U.S. allies and partners, who cannot envisage containment of, or a full decoupling from, China.
When Kindleberger analyzed the causes of the Great Depression, he pointed to the absence of a leading country that would act on the basis of systemic as well as national interests. In the 1930s, the United Kingdom had the experience but no longer the capacity to lead; the United States had the potential but not the disposition or experience. Kindleberger also warned that an abdication of or conflict over leadership would lead to stalemate and economic hardship. He would have eyed today’s U.S.-Chinese tensions with worry.
The United States will probably find its way toward a mixed approach with China: some combination of exclusion, participation, and perhaps even cooperation. In doing so, the United States will need to decide whether, as a general matter, it prefers to explore adaptive methods with China or to resist Chinese participation. The world economy is unlikely to evolve soundly and resiliently if the two biggest economies are in conflict.
The plight of the WTO typifies the challenge of adapting multilateral institutions to changing circumstances in an era when national governments find political posturing more tempting than negotiating useful, albeit imperfect, cooperative regimes. Globalization’s opponents have objected to the WTO’s rules even as they have demanded new international rules for their favored causes. Others have insisted that WTO rules should account for their preferences—with or without a negotiating process. Even though the United States has won the vast majority of the WTO cases it has brought—and used the leverage of litigation to gain results in other situations—some U.S. interests have objected to losing any cases at all. The U.S. government has blamed the WTO’s Appellate Body for adverse rulings and paralyzed the system by blocking appointments. So far, the Biden administration has joined the chorus complaining about the WTO instead of working to improve the organization.
AVOIDING EXTINCTION
The forces of globalization have not retreated. Consider the challenges of climate change, biological security, migration, and financial and data flows. But the governance of globalization has been fraying and fragmenting, and people across the world appear disconnected. These conditions explain the appeal of creating new, sweeping economic systems. But they won’t work.
Since the Great Depression, U.S. economic diplomacy has been most successful when officials have combined a sense of direction about an open, cooperative, mutually beneficial international economic system with a spirit of problem solving. Americans have adapted to a variety of forces and events through pragmatic adjustments. They have recognized implicitly that the world economy operates more like an evolutionary organism than a rational model, whether purely capitalist or socialist. The goal has been to foster economic resilience.
Resilient systems do not avoid risks; indeed, risk-taking produces economic progress. The principal aim of a resilient, adaptive system is to prevent tipping points or downward spirals that could lead to its extinction. Multilateral economic institutions and regimes can help national governments and private participants withstand blows and adapt. They can forecast developments, encourage cooperation, provide buffers, recommend redundancies, mobilize resources, offer expertise and continuous learning, encourage negotiations, and help manage conflicts. But they adapt incrementally and need the support of their member governments. Multilateral institutions should now extend their economic and development missions to encompass transnational challenges in partnership with specialized UN agencies for health, the environment, migration and refugees, and food and agriculture. They also can contribute to the economic, governance, and legal foundations for security in states and regions torn by conflict.
The world economy operates more like an evolutionary organism than a rational model.
As the economist Markus Brunnermeier has observed, resilient and adaptive economic systems are natural complements to free and open societies. Such systems flourish with transparency, open information, and solutions achieved through the combined efforts of many private and independent actors. Free-flowing information creates feedback loops that speed adjustment. Authoritarian countries, by contrast, deal with crises by seeking to suppress disruptions. They opt for controls, as Beijing has done with COVID-19. Open societies and economic systems appear shaky when shocked but are more likely to rebound through adaptations. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union developed world-class vaccines and treatments; they are likely to weather future pandemic waves through a combination of high-quality vaccines, natural immunity, and treatments. China will have to choose between strict controls and adapting to virus waves that must pass through its population. An overreliance on suppression will lead to China’s isolation.
The United States has been most successful when it has mobilized international coalitions that enabled other participants to pursue both national and systemic interests with Washington. The country will not become safer by retreating behind walls and borders, nor will it succeed by tearing down the existing order and pursuing chimeras. Washington needs to rediscover its ability to adapt pragmatically to dynamic conditions. As Helmut Schmidt, the West German chancellor, said in the late 1970s, “Those who have visions should see a doctor.”
25. The Terrifying Truth Putin Has Taught Us
I think this is folly. I think we cede the initiative to Putin and others if we adopt a no first use policy. And we put the homeland at risk.
Excerpt:
Although Russia is highly unlikely to adopt a “no first use” policy at the moment, MacDonald acknowledged that “even a unilateral U.S. declaration would still reduce the risk of a misunderstanding or miscommunication causing a conventional conflict to escalate to a nuclear exchange.”
The Terrifying Truth Putin Has Taught Us
The Russian leader’s actions have opened our eyes to how dependent we all are on the whims of one man and his nuclear arsenal.
By Uri Friedman
About the author: Uri Friedman is the managing editor at the Atlantic Council and a contributing writer at The Atlantic. He was previously a staff writer and the Global editor at The Atlantic, and the deputy managing editor at Foreign Policy magazine.
He threatened any country that interfered in his invasion of Ukraine with “consequences greater than any you have faced in history.” He placed his nuclear forces on high alert and held exercises with them. And then he proclaimed that Western sanctions amounted to a “declaration of war” against Russia.
The fate of humanity suddenly seems to be in the unsteady hands of an isolated, frustrated, and potentially unhinged Vladimir Putin. And people are understandably panicked about that prospect. “The fact that there’s a very short path from, say, Putin feeling humiliated to the end of life as we know it,” the sociologist Kieran Healy wrote, “is literally insane.”
At this point of the conflict over Ukraine, the odds are that the Russian president’s threats amount to a bluff intended to intimidate and coerce his opponents in the West. But regardless of whether the risk of nuclear war has actually increased, Putin’s actions have opened our eyes to how dependent we all are on the whims—or even the missteps or miscalculations that fallible, emotional, semi-rational human beings make when moving quickly in crisis—of one man and his nuclear arsenal.
Our current predicament should, in fact, open our eyes wider still to the more profound problem of a similar susceptibility in the United States and other nuclear-armed countries—and to how few checks there truly are on leaders who decide to use the world’s most destructive weapons.
The reactions to Putin’s threats remind me of 2017, when Donald Trump started unleashing nuclear threats against North Korea, and many Americans began to understand the U.S. president’s expansive power to use nuclear weapons. Be it with Putin now, Trump then, or a Watergate-addled Richard Nixon in the 1970s, the delicate nature of the world’s framework for deterring nuclear war typically dawns on people only when leaders of nuclear states start acting in extraordinary and seemingly reckless ways, even though the underlying condition of vulnerability is always present.
“The entire system of nuclear deterrence is and always has been incredibly dangerous and fragile,” Eryn MacDonald, a global-security analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists, told me. “We tend not to notice this—or, perhaps, are more able to push this knowledge far enough into the background to ignore how disturbing it is—until there is a crisis that brings the absurdity of the whole system into focus.”
We don’t know a lot about how exactly the authority to launch nuclear weapons works in Russia. This opacity is deliberate. All nuclear command-and-control systems, including America’s, have a “first rule of Fight Club”-like aspect to them: You don’t talk much about them, to keep your enemies guessing. But Pavel Podvig, an expert on Russian nuclear forces (who, even armed with all his knowledge, speaks about some of his assessments in terms of guesswork), has concluded that the Russian president can probably order the use of nuclear weapons on his own, even if the country’s policies aren’t necessarily designed that way.
The Russian system, which dates back to the 1970s and was crafted with Soviet-era collective, centralized decision making in mind, calls for the defense minister and the chief of the military’s general staff to be looped in on any orders by the country’s leader to use nuclear weapons, giving them an opportunity to influence the decision. (Experts think each of these figures possesses a Cheget, Russia’s rough equivalent of the American “nuclear football,” though whether all three briefcases are needed to transmit a nuclear-launch order is unclear.) If, as some speculate he might in the course of the conflict in Ukraine, Putin were to reach for his tactical nuclear weapons—a lower-yield, shorter-range variety that can be deployed on the battlefield—he would need to remove them from storage and prepare them for use in a relatively protracted process that would ostensibly involve more consultations.
But given the degree to which Putin has recently concentrated power, it appears that no actor in the Russian system would actually be able to veto a presidential decision to use nuclear weapons. Podvig told me that any Russian plan to employ nuclear weapons would likely have to first be developed by military officials, who would thus “have a chance to offer their opinion [and] raise objections.” Nevertheless, he added, “ultimately they are there to carry out orders, not to dispute them.”
Were Russia to come under attack, its system calls for solid confirmation of such an offensive to initiate retaliatory nuclear strikes, he explained, “but when it comes to a deliberate [Russian] first strike [with nuclear weapons], most safeguards could be circumvented.”
The U.S. nuclear-launch system has its own ambiguities, but one element is clearer than in Russia’s system: The American president has sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, without any need to consult with or obtain the assent of top military or civilian advisers.
It’s a reality rarely dwelled upon, even by those whose job is to dwell on it. In 2017, in the throes of Trump’s vows to rain down “fire and fury” on Kim Jong Un, I tuned in as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held the first congressional hearing on the subject in 41 years. I was shocked by how many members of Congress’s premier foreign-affairs committee seemed to be just getting up to speed on the commander in chief’s exclusive power in matters of nuclear war.
This concentrated executive authority—which contrasts with more collective decision making in nuclear states such as India and Pakistan, where nuclear-use powers are vested in councils—is in large part a legacy of the Cold War. During that period, the U.S. government chose to categorize nuclear weapons differently than other weapons and put them under the circumscribed civilian control of the country’s democratically elected political leader. The approach was informed by a prolonged nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union that placed a premium on enabling quick decisions, because an American leader might have only minutes to retaliate against a surprise nuclear assault.
Still, in both Russia and the United States, despite what Trump might have led us to believe, the proverbial “nuclear button” is a myth; even with the immense executive authority to launch nuclear weapons in each country, any such presidential order would necessarily need to pass through other individuals with varying degrees of agency. But based on what we know of the Russian and American systems, does Joe Biden actually have fewer checks on his power to wage nuclear war than Putin does?
The response when I posed that question to MacDonald and Podvig: It’s complicated.
In theory, they explained, the Russian system for launching nuclear weapons has more checks, because it seems to technically require the consent of others beyond just the president. But in practice, given Putin’s firm grip on power, the president’s underlings are unlikely to object to his order and liable to be easily replaced if they have the audacity to do so.
In the United States, by contrast, the obstacles to a president firing these weapons are theoretically fewer but practically perhaps greater than in Russia. Nuclear-strike options require legal review before they're presented to the U.S. president, for example, and those executing an order at least have the option of resisting a command they deem unlawful.
Whatever “the actual arrangements and safeguards” in both countries, Podvig noted, “ultimately, a determined commander in chief would be able to execute a first [nuclear] strike.”
MacDonald argued that certain policy reforms could reduce the risks associated with the world’s system of nuclear deterrence. She pointed to two proposals among the many that have been floated. One option would be to mandate that more people be involved in decisions to use nuclear weapons. (In recent years, the trend in nuclear states appears to be going in the opposite direction—toward greater centralization of launch authority in the chief executive.) Another would be to take the hotly debated step of declaring that the United States will never be the first actor to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. (Other nuclear experts such as my Atlantic Council colleague Matthew Kroenig have argued that adopting this policy would undermine deterrence and introduce different dangers, such as emboldening U.S. adversaries to use conventional force against the United States and its allies without concern about nuclear retaliation from Washington.)
Although Russia is highly unlikely to adopt a “no first use” policy at the moment, MacDonald acknowledged that “even a unilateral U.S. declaration would still reduce the risk of a misunderstanding or miscommunication causing a conventional conflict to escalate to a nuclear exchange.”
In my reporting on nuclear-weapons issues over the years, I have often found myself racing down rabbit holes of research and reckoning with the immense spectrum of possibilities only to emerge stupefied, wondering how anyone can be talking or writing about anything else. This might be why most people don’t talk about it much. And then, every so often, dramatic developments in the world have a way of awakening us from our collective slumber.
As Beatrice Fihn, the executive director of the Nobel Peace Prize–winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, told me during the “fire and fury” era, “If you’re uncomfortable with nuclear weapons under Donald Trump, you’re probably uncomfortable with nuclear weapons, because it means you recognize that [deterrence] won’t always hold up and things can go wrong.”
“Once you start thinking ‘this person is appropriate for this weapon but not that person,’” she said, “then maybe it’s the weapon that’s the problem.”
26. EXPLAINER: How plausible is Chinese military aid for Russia?
EXPLAINER: How plausible is Chinese military aid for Russia?
BEIJING (AP) — The U.S. says Russia has asked China to provide military assistance for its war in Ukraine, and that China has responded affirmatively. Both Moscow and Beijing have denied the allegation, with a Chinese spokesperson dismissing it as “disinformation.”
Still, the claims have generated conjecture over how far Beijing would be willing to go in backing its “most important strategic partner,” as China’s foreign minister recently described Russia.
WHAT DID THE U.S. SAY?
Following initial reports that Russia had asked China for military aid, unnamed U.S. officials said that Washington had determined that China had sent a signal to Russia: Beijing would be willing to provide both military support for the campaign in Ukraine and financial backing to help stave off the impact of severe sanctions imposed by the West.
At a meeting in Rome on Monday, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan warned senior Chinese foreign policy adviser Yang Jiechi against providing such support, even as the Kremlin denied requesting military equipment.
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The U.S. is wary of China’s intentions because the government of President Xi Jinping has refused to criticize the Russian invasion, even as it seeks to distance itself from the Kremlin’s war by calling for dialogue and reiterating its position that a nation’s territory must be respected.
WHAT MIGHT CHINA OFFER?
If anything, smaller items such as bullets and meals are more likely than fighter jets and tanks, experts said.
China “probably wants to avoid high-profile or big-ticket arms sales to Russia in the midst of a conflict which would expose Beijing to international sanctions,” said Drew Thompson, a former U.S. Defense Department official currently at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore.
Beijing would be more willing to provide spare parts, consumables, ammunition, and dual-use items that don’t contravene sanctions and could fall below the threshold of international reprisals, Thompson said.
For example, Russian helicopters are likely using up their flares to counter portable short-range missiles like the Stinger. China could conceivably sell Russia some of its flares, if they are compatible with Russian systems, Thompson said. China might also share surveillance and intelligence, he said.
Given Washington’s warnings, any Chinese aid would likely involve “very basic stuff,” such as ration packs for soldiers, said Sam Roggeveen, director of the International Security Program at Australia’s Lowy Institute.
He added that Russia would find it virtually impossible to integrate Chinese armaments into its armed forces on such short notice.
WOULD CHINA DO IT?
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While not impossible, both Chinese and non-Chinese experts say there are several factors working against it. For starters, it could look bad.
“China will be very careful trying its best to avoid its aid and other assistance being used on the battlefields of Ukraine,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing.
He added that China “has no motive to provide any assistance to Russia’s operation in Ukraine.”
Roggeveen concurred that there is no “obvious upside” for China in aiding Moscow, adding that a weakened Russia could work to China’s strategic and economic advantage.
Chinese officials have also said throughout the crisis that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries should be respected — though critics say its refusal to criticize Russia’s invasion is in fundamental contradiction to that position.
“Russia’s military operation in Ukraine has in nature become an invasion, and China will never provide arms to help a country attack another sovereign county and that is not in accordance with international law,” said Li Xin, director of the Institute of European and Asian Studies at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law.
China also does not want to see the conflict worsen or be dragged in as a co-belligerent, so any Chinese support “would be measured and carefully calibrated,” Thompson said.
27. An Airlift Could Save Ukraine
Will we be able to reapply Kyiv when it is under siege? Is a "Berlin airlift" feasible?
An Airlift Could Save Ukraine
As the West hesitates to set up a no-fly zone, here’s an alternative that would put pressure on Russia.
WSJ · by Douglas J. Feith and John Hannah
People fleeing Ukraine stand at the Humanitarian Aid Center near the border in Przemysl, Poland, March 13.
Photo: ALEKSANDRA SZMIGIEL/REUTERS
Russian forces are encircling Kyiv, and U.S. intelligence says the Ukrainian capital could run out of food and water in days. Having refused to establish a no-fly zone, President Biden needs more options to deal with enormous and urgent humanitarian needs. We propose an international airlift, organized and supported by the U.S.
The goal would be to provide food, medicine and other nonmilitary supplies for days, weeks and maybe longer. Countries viewed as not hostile to Russia—perhaps Brazil, Egypt, India and the United Arab Emirates—could take the lead in flying planes into Ukraine.
Such an effort would put international pressure on Russia, which claims (however disingenuously) to support humanitarian land corridors for Ukrainian refugees. Vladimir Putin would either consent and facilitate distribution of supplies or provoke more denunciations of Russia for its inhumanity. Even if criticism doesn’t move him, his top lieutenants may worry about their image and their vulnerability to war-crimes trials. This proposal may aggravate whatever divisions exist within Mr. Putin’s team and trigger further antiwar sentiment among ordinary Russians.
At the same time, an airlift would counter Russia’s strategy to besiege the Ukrainian people, boost Ukrainian morale, and increase international efforts to aid Ukraine. Countries around the world can contribute humanitarian supplies. This would give them more to do to help Ukraine than simply vote for United Nations resolutions.
The U.S. and Europe could provide the logistical infrastructure to gather global donations. Efforts should be made to get the U.N. secretary-general to endorse the airlift, along with the Vatican and recognized leaders of the world’s Jewish, Muslim and Orthodox Christian communities. An interfaith delegation could be on the first plane into Ukraine.
A humanitarian airlift would be an acceptable alternative to a no-fly zone. A no-fly zone would create huge risks of escalation and has been widely rejected by U.S. and European leaders. An airlift has much better chances of receiving bipartisan support and broad international backing. Instead of threatening to shoot down Russian planes, a humanitarian airlift would force Russia either to consent or threaten to shoot down planes from nonthreatening countries full of humanitarian goods.
There are many obstacles to implementing this proposal, but little to no downside in a U.S. effort to promote it. This proposal doesn’t preclude efforts to arm the Ukrainians better, or eventually to establish a no-fly zone, but because the airlift is far less risky it should be more readily doable.
It is damaging to allow Russia to bar the world from doing anything inside Ukraine no matter how outrageously Russian forces act. This proposal would show the world’s will and intention to act inside Ukraine, but not (yet) do something as dangerous as establish a no-fly zone.
Arguments for doing this could apply also to humanitarian supplies brought in by truck convoys, but an airlift suggests a greater sense of urgency. The cost of the effort would be low, the risks acceptable, the payoffs substantial. The idea deserves urgent U.S. leadership.
Mr. Feith is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. Mr. Hannah is a senior fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America. Both served as national-security officials in the George W. Bush administration.
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WSJ · by Douglas J. Feith and John Hannah
28. How Kyiv’s outgunned defenders have kept Russian forces from capturing the capital
As Bonaparte said, the moral is to the physical as three is to one.
How Kyiv’s outgunned defenders have kept Russian forces from capturing the capital
The Washington Post · by Sudarsan RaghavanToday at 9:00 p.m. EDT|Updated today at 8:08 a.m. EDT · March 15, 2022
IRPIN, Ukraine — The bodies of Russian soldiers were scattered by the wreckage of charred military vehicles and shelled buildings. Twenty feet away, behind tanker trucks, Ukrainian volunteers stood watch, their eyes on a cement mixer about 500 yards away. Behind it were Russian troops on the edges of Bucha, the next town over.
This front line in Irpin, on Kyiv’s northwest outskirts, had not moved in two weeks despite the Russian military superiority. That itself was a victory for Commander Casper and his fighters.
“The Russians were trying to push forward,” said the short, burly unit leader who did not give his full name for security reasons but goes by a nom de guerre. “But they didn’t expect that the Ukrainians were waiting for them.”
When Russian forces seized control of a military airport in Hostomel, a few miles north of Irpin, on the first day of the war, many military observers expected a rapid takeover of Kyiv. But more than two weeks later, Russian troops have struggled to advance.
A visit to two active front lines — Irpin and near Brovary, northeast of the capital’s center — offered insights into the strategies, tactics and capabilities of Ukrainian forces defending Kyiv as well as apparent Russian tactical errors and miscalculations of Ukraine’s resistance.
On Tuesday, Kyiv’s mayor, Vitali Klitschko, announced a citywide curfew until early Thursday in what he called a “difficult and dangerous moment” as Russian forces widened attacks.
The United States and as many as 20 other nations, mostly NATO and European Union members, have pledged to send Ukrainian forces significant shipments in weaponry, including Javelin antitank missiles, Stinger surface-to-air missiles, machine guns and sniper rifles. It’s unclear how many of these added arms have reached Ukrainian forces in Kyiv, leaving them to rely on the arsenal at hand and adapt their tactics in the field.
“The Russians were not ready for unconventional warfare,” said Rob Lee, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and an expert on Russian defense policy. “They were not ready for unconventional tactics. They are not sure how to deal with this insurgency, guerilla-warfare-type situation.”
To be sure, most military analysts and Western officials still predict that Russian forces will eventually encircle Kyiv and push into the capital, possibly aided by airstrikes. While this could prove true, it’s far from clear whether Russia will prevail.
For the Ukrainian forces, this war is one of attrition. They appear to be trying to slow and wear down the Russian military, creating conditions for a stalemate on the outer boundaries of Kyiv. That would buy the Ukrainians time for other pressures on Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Off the battlefield, these include tightening international sanctions on Russia and diplomatic efforts for Russian concessions. On the fronts, Putin’s forces face more Western heavy weaponry delivered to Ukraine, and a growing global outrage for killing civilians and bombing residential areas and hospitals — acts that could be potential war crimes.
In interviews, Ukrainian soldiers also said they capitalized on the Russians’ own flaws, including using predictable strategies, a lack of knowledge of local terrain and even a surprising unpreparedness for a grinding conflict. Reports have surfaced on social media and on battlefields of Russian soldiers running out of food, water and gas for their vehicles. Some have reportedly surrendered after they got lost or due to low morale. Russian military convoys have slowed down or halted due to mechanical failures.
“Ukraine’s main game is a game for time,” said Michael Kofman, director of Russian studies at the Center for Naval Analyses. “To try to do something else is going to waste a lot of military potential they have available. Are they in a position to drive Russians forces out of Ukraine? No. Are they in a position to win the war? Yes.”
Across the country, Ukrainian forces have fallen back to the cities, refusing to engage with Russian forces in rural areas, out in the open. While Moscow has gained control of southern cities such as Kherson and Melitopol, it is struggling to take over nearby Mariupol as well as other hubs across Ukraine such as Kharkiv, Chernihiv and Sumy.
That is also the case in the southern city of Mykolaiv where, for more than a week now, Ukrainian forces have prevented a major Russian advance west toward the strategic port Odessa.
In Kyiv, the seat of government, the stakes cannot be higher.
So far, Ukraine’s defenders have blocked Russia’s primary effort: encircle and seize the capital, using the airfield in Hostomel as an air bridge for more tanks, armored vehicles and other weaponry. Ukrainian forces have shot down several Russian helicopters and so far prevented a major Russian armored column from pressing into the capital. Meanwhile, a solid air-defense system has been mobilized against airstrikes and missile attacks.
“The biggest problem is that [Russia] didn’t organize a proper military operation,” Kofman said. “They thought they were just going to drive in and they weren’t going to get a fight. That led to a lot of disasters because they didn’t plan.”
Seesaw battles have unfolded in the areas of Hostomel, Bucha and Irpin — a possible harbinger of the urban, street-by-street warfare that could envelop the capital if Russian forces break through.
On Saturday, large plumes of black smoke rose above the town of Bucha amid the incessant thuds of shells landing. “We have planted antitank mines everywhere,” Casper said with a laugh.
Battle for Brovary
Roughly 40 miles away, on the other side of the capital, Russian forces tried to push into Kyiv from the northeast. A column of tanks moved down a main highway toward the town of Brovary. As they passed a cluster of houses, the Ukrainian forces saw an opportunity.
They pummeled the convoy with artillery shells and antitank missiles, destroying or disabling several tanks and armored personnel carriers. Russian soldiers fled their vehicles and ran into the woods, according to videos posted on social media by Ukraine’s military. One tank slowly rolled to a halt, engulfed in flames. (The videos could not be independently verified but fit with descriptions of the battle provided by Ukrainian fighters and doctors treating the wounded.)
The ambush unveiled the Russians’ ineffective and, at times, inexplicable tactics, military analysts said.
The tanks and other military vehicles were crawling slowly on the open highway, making them an easy target. They also were bunched up close to each other, which allowed a single artillery shell to knock out multiple vehicles. There were also no dismounted infantry troops moving parallel in the woods or alongside the column to detect potential ambushes.
What was also surprising, analysts said, is that some of the tanks were generations old and not well-equipped, including the T-72, a Soviet-era tank that first entered production more than 50 years ago.
“It’s kind of bizarre seeing this,” Lee of the Foreign Policy Research Institute said. “Kyiv is the decisive mission, the decision objective, and yet they are sending in some very old units to take it.”
The ambush also led to civilian casualties. The Russian soldiers who fled the convoy hid in nearby villages and shot anyone they deemed suspicious. Over the following two days, 23 civilians and soldiers arrived at the Brovary Central District Hospital, many with bullet wounds, said Valentin Baganyuk, the hospital’s director.
They included members of a family shot after they left their house. As the father drove, bullets hit his hand, blowing three fingers off, and wounded him in the head as well. His 14-year-old daughter was also struck. The father managed to drive to safety.
“The Russians targeted them as they tried to escape from their village,” Baganyuk said.
‘Line to defend’
Tucked inside the forests on the northwestern edges of Kyiv, Ukrainian artillery batteries have battered Russian positions inside Irpin and Bucha in attempts to slow a possible advance. The bridge connecting the capital to Irpin was demolished by Ukrainian forces to stop Russian armored vehicles from crossing.
As an added precaution, the road from the destroyed bridge into Kyiv’s center has been barricaded every 100 yards by large concrete blocks, tanker trucks, tires and sandbags.
On the other side of the bridge, at the entrance to Irpin’s center, volunteer armed groups have dug trenches on a hill with a commanding vantage point to strike Russian forces or attempt to ambush them.
In front of the hill, Ukrainian fighters wearing camouflage were positioned behind trees. Other fighters were inside buildings. They looked out on streets that Russians would need to move toward Kyiv.
“They have their own line to defend, and we have to keep our position,” said Igor Zadorozhny, 30, a former army officer now defending the city in an armed unit set up by Irpin’s mayor. “Right now, there is a stalemate.”
The conflict is a meld of small confrontations often at Ukrainian checkpoints, tit-for-tat artillery shelling and moments of heavy street battles.
“They attack our posts,” said Artiem, 34, a realtor-turned-soldier. “Then we attack them, and they run back.” Like all Ukrainian fighters interviewed by The Washington Post along the front lines, he declined to give his full name for security reasons.
He said Russian forces don’t know Irpin’s geography. At times, they make wrong turns or end up getting stuck on small streets in their tanks and armored vehicles. That has allowed Ukrainian fighters inside buildings to strike them.
“[The Russians] are disoriented in the city,” Artiem said.
Clutching a rifle, the former army officer Zadorozhny said Ukrainian forces were waiting for civilians to evacuate Irpin before “we start to clear the city” of Russians.
“They don’t have enough provisions, food, water,” he said, recounting reports from residents of Russian soldiers looting houses and stores. “They don’t have a lot of gasoline. They will get tired. And then we will go and drive them out.”
Local knowledge of the urban terrain was a major asset for Kyiv’s defenders, Zadorozhny said. “Everything, every stone, every tree is for us,” he said.
Another fighter, 32-year-old Roman, said residents have been providing intelligence to help target the Russians in areas where there is still cellphone reception.
“They are trying to take Kyiv, but they won’t,” Ramon said. “Everything is helping us.”
‘Defend our positions’
With Russian ground forces slowed down, another questions grows: Will Moscow escalate bombing Kyiv to pressure the government to surrender or flee? So far, the capital has largely escaped the barrage of airstrikes and shelling that have hammered cities such as Kharkiv and Chernihiv.
At Casper’s checkpoint, Russian forces have intensified their attacks. Tanks fired between 20 to 25 shells, demolishing a large blue house next to the Ukrainian’s base on Friday. The Ukrainians didn’t fire back.
“Our goal is to defend our positions, not to attack the Russians,” Casper said.
Such a tactic is smart, military analysts said.
Ukraine’s military can’t compete with the might of Russian weaponry and need to conserve a much smaller arsenal rather than waste resources on counteroffensives. Casper said they also wanted to keep the road from Bucha open to allow more civilians to flee. Firing back could turn the road into a battle zone, he said.
The Russians, he added, have sent teams to explode Ukrainian mines. So what if Russian tanks do roll down the road toward his checkpoint one day?
Casper smiled and walked to a warehouse. He came out with a British-supplied NLAW antitank missile and a rocket-propelled grenade.
“We know how to greet them,” he said, handling the weapons in his hands. “We have everything right here.”
The Washington Post · by Sudarsan RaghavanToday at 9:00 p.m. EDT|Updated today at 8:08 a.m. EDT · March 15, 2022
29. QAnon Thinks Trump Says ‘Chy-na’ to Send a Secret Message About Ukraine
You just cannot make this stuff up.
QAnon Thinks Trump Says ‘Chy-na’ to Send a Secret Message About Ukraine
QAnon followers believe they have uncovered some sort of high-level secret code. They have not uncovered some sort of high-level secret code.
Unraveling viral disinformation and explaining where it came from, the harm it's causing, and what we should do about it.
QAnon followers are boosting an unhinged new conspiracy theory that claims former President Donald Trump was purposely mispronouncing the word “China” for years, as part of a secret plot to alert the world that COVID-19 was manufactured in Ukraine.
The latest conspiracy theory being spread among QAnon adherents ties in with the wider conspiracy about U.S. biolabs in Ukraine and suggests that QAnon may be shifting its longstanding perception of China as the enemy.
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First, some enterprising QAnon sleuth claimed to have “discovered” that there was a place in Ukraine called “chy-na” and further claimed that Trump’s distinct pronunciation of “China” was the former president’s attempt to signal to his followers that what he was talking about was “chy-na” in Ukraine, and not China.
In recent days, the theory has grown, and many QAnon followers now argue that when Trump referred to COVID-19 as the “China virus,” he was secretly referring to the Ukrainian chy-na, and trying to tell the world that the virus was manufactured in Ukraine, a claim that ties in with the broader belief that Ukraine is home to some “deep state” plot to control the world.
Conspiracists found further “proof” of this theory when someone used Google Translate to figure out that in Ukrainian, “chy-na” means “price.” Combine that with the fact that Trump once said that China would “pay a big price” for spreading COVID-19, and QAnon followers believed they had uncovered some sort of high-level secret code.
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They have not uncovered some sort of high-level secret code.
The Ukrainian “chy-na” is in fact just part of the name of what appears to be a village on the outskirts of Lviv. In Ukrainian, it is called “Шпильчина,” but on Google Maps, it is referred to as “Shpyl’chyna.” Unfortunately, this is a bad transliteration: The ‘y’ is meant to represent a very soft ‘i’ sound that’s hard to transliterate, because it’s rarely used in English.
Also, in Ukrainian, the word term “chy-na” on its own has several meanings. One of them is “price,” but it can also mean “rank” and “tire,” which don’t fit quite as neatly into QAnon’s conspiracy theory.
To the uninitiated, this conspiracy would seem ludicrous – because it is – but consider the toxic cesspool where it’s being shared.
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In this world, it’s entirely plausible that Trump purposely mispronounced the word “China” for years in order to secretly signal that a war that began over a year after he left office was a cover for a secret plot to unmask the origins of COVID.
But this theory, which appears to remove all blame from China for the COVID-19 pandemic, is not an isolated incident.
In recent weeks, as the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, QAnon followers had to reassess what has always been a central pillar of its belief system: that China is evil.
From the very beginning, QAnon viewed China and the Chinese Communist Party as a pariah, driven first by Trump’s antagonism towards Xi Jinping’s administration, and then by the spread of COVID-19 around the world.
In recent days, some QAnon influencers have begun to attempt to reconcile these disparate worldviews by claiming that Xi is now also part of the secret Trump-Putin alliance that is fighting the “deep state.”
This theory is being posited in combination with the idea that, just as Ukraine is being “cleansed” by the Russian invasion, Taiwan needs to be “cleansed” by a Chinese invasion.
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So far there is no consensus among the QAnon community about the subject of China, but the claims about there being a “Chy-na in Ukraine” have gathered significant momentum in the last 24 hours.
The theory is already making its way from the fever swamps of QAnon channels on Telegram to more mainstream platforms like Twitter. One tweet over the weekend boosting the theory has racked up almost 2,000 likes already.
Twitter
Twitter
And if QAnon does fully embrace the idea that China is not the enemy – and that Trump is secretly working with Beijing – experts fear that just as Russia’s government did, Beijing could seek to exploit those beliefs.
“The main reason why I think this is worth paying attention to is because if QAnon and related groups do commit to a pivot to China, that would create an opportunity for Chinese state media to cultivate these audiences the way Russian state media has,” Elise Thomas, an open-source researcher at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, tweeted over the weekend.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
