Quotes of the Day:
"Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."
- Thomas Hobbes
"They are constantly trying to drive us into a corner because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and because we tell it like it is and don't engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our Western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally."
-- Vladimir Putin
I would never want Ukraine to be a piece on the map, on the chessboard of big global players, so that someone could toss us around, use us as cover, as part of some bargain.
-Volodymyr Zelensky
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 15
2. The US must help the resistance wage the 'other war' in Ukraine
3. Russia says Ukraine talks progressing as onslaught continues
4. CIA predecessor provides American know-how to Ukraine
5. Ukraine War Update - March 16, 2022 | SOF News
6. Without sending troops, the U.S. wages 'hybrid warfare' against Russia
7. U.S. defense secretary: 'We remain united in our support of Ukraine'
8. Zelensky’s address to Congress part of a tradition of foreign leaders speaking to lawmakers and the U.S.
9. Saudi Arabia reportedly considering accepting yuan instead of dollar for oil sales
10. U.S. Senate unanimously condemns Putin as war criminal
11. FDD | Surging COVID-19 Cases Undermine Xi’s Governance Narrative
12. FDD | For the U.S.-Saudi-Israel Triangle, Ukraine Is a Shocking Endorsement
13. FDD | Crypto-Fascists - Cryptocurrency Usage by Domestic Extremists
14. U.S. less effective at countering terrorist threats in Afghanistan and Somalia since troop withdrawal, generals warn
15. Pentagon May Boost Troop Presence In Somalia
16. Responsibility for war crimes of the Russian military is inevitable - address by the President of Ukraine — Official website of the President of Ukraine
17. Would Russia Use a Tactical Nuclear Weapon in Ukraine?
18. Do Not Miss the Opportunity to Topple Vladimir Putin
19. ‘I’m on the frontline in Mariupol’: the Chinese reporter embedded with Russian troops
20. Blinken sets a standard for lifting sanctions: an 'irreversible' Russian withdrawal
21. Does the War in Ukraine Prove Tanks Are Totally Obsolete?
22. Russia and Ukraine looking for compromise in peace talks
23. Zelensky says peace talks "more realistic" as Russian forces bombard Kyiv
24. Report: Russia asked China for MREs to feed troops invading Ukraine
25. ‘It’s the right thing to do’: the 300,000 volunteer hackers coming together to fight Russia
26. 2 little-known US and UK special-ops missions are influencing how Chinese military planners think about an attack on Taiwan
27. Odesa's Maze-Like Catacombs Could Be Bad News For Russian Invaders
28. Opinion | Chinese ambassador: Where we stand on Ukraine
29. Xi Jinping’s Faltering Foreign Policy - The War in Ukraine and the Perils of Strongman Rule
30. Opinion | This Is How World War III Begins
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 15
I would like to put an antiseptic comment in perspective. This is from the SITREP below: "Russian forces continue to shell civilian infrastructure and residential areas of Mariupol to force the city to capitulate.[22] DNR forces claimed to capture the towns of Rivnopil, Zlatoustovka, and Blyzhnje north of Mariupol on March 15.[23]"
I received this comment from a Ukrainian American friend who has been working hard supporting the effort in Ukraine. When we read the bland, technical, sterile, unemotional reporting we should consider these words that follow below. This describes what are just some of the brutal effects of targeting civilian infrastructure. This is Putin's counter to unconventional warfare and resistance.
Sir – targeting doctors, nurses, healthcare workers is a purposed tactic of Russian forces and national leadership. Targeting / eliminating doctors and nurses was tested, perfected, and incorporated into “normality” first in Aleppo and then broadly in Russian influenced Assad controlled Syria.
It is evil to its core, yet effective: without doctors and nurses, WIAs quickly become KIA. If that was the purpose, it would be evil, but not enough for Lucifer. The real target is the elimination of the population in order to drain the support in which the resistance hides and requires: Death increases in the civil population, and in quick time the people get the message and flee – causing secondary effect of eliminating the population who otherwise would support and hide the resistance, and with a tertiary effect of surrounding countries focusing on refugees and not interfering in the internal mass dislocation of resistance support. Russia has much experience in committing pogroms.
I understand if the West doesn’t understand this. This has been a Moscow tactic since Imperial Russia and then Moscow’s USSR. My relatives were forcibly uprooted from Lemkivshchyna along with the ENTIRE Ukrainian population there after WW2 in order to drain the region of support for UPA / OYN.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 15
Mar 15, 2022 - Press ISW
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 15
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 15, 5:30 pm ET
Local company- and battalion-level attacks by Russian forces northwest of Kyiv on March 14-15 likely indicate the largest-scale offensive operations that Russian forces attempting to encircle Kyiv can support at this time. Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations northeast of the city, around Sumy, and only limited (and unsuccessful) attacks southeast of Kharkiv. Russian force generation efforts, including reservist and conscript call-ups and the ongoing transport of Syrian fighters to Russia and Belarus, are unable to change the balance of forces around Kyiv within the coming week. Russian forces have not conducted simultaneous attacks along their multiple axes of advance across Ukraine since March 4 and are unlikely to do so in the next week.[1]
Russian forces in southeastern Ukraine continue to demonstrate the greatest capabilities to date and are steadily advancing in three directions: northeast from Kherson, taking territory in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, and reducing the Ukrainian pocket in Mariupol. Russian forces are unlikely to successfully encircle Mykolayiv and threaten Odesa in the near future but retain uncommitted Naval Infantry reserves that could conduct an amphibious operation or disembark to reinforce Russian ground operations, as Russia has employed Naval Infantry elsewhere. Russia may seek to encircle Zaporizhya by advancing northeast up the west bank of the Dnipro River after failing to break through Ukrainian forces directly south of the city on the east bank. Russian forces are making slow but steady progress against Ukrainian defenders on the line of contact in Donbas and likely seek to force them out of their prepared defensive positions.
With Russian forces likely unable to complete the encirclement of Kyiv or resume mobile offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine in the near future, the Russian capture of Mariupol will likely be the next key inflection in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian forces have successfully encircled Mariupol and are conducting daily assaults on the western and eastern outskirts of the city. Russian air, missile, and artillery strikes continue to target residential areas and civilian infrastructure to force the city to capitulate. Russian forces have encircled the city to a depth that will likely prevent the defenders from breaking out and prevent Ukrainian efforts to relieve the defenders. Russian forces will likely be able to capture Mariupol or force it to capitulate despite strong Ukrainian defenses. The Russian capture of Mariupol will free up Russian forces, likely including large portions of the 8th Combined Arms Army, to threaten Ukrainian defenders along the line of contact in Donbas with encirclement or alternatively reinforce a Russian offensive toward Mykolayiv and Odesa. This assessment assumes that the defenders in Mariupol will run out of ammunition and/or water at some point in the relatively near future. Mariupol has been heavily fortified for years, however, and it is possible that its defenders secured sufficient supplies in advance to hold out longer. The Russians will likely continue to escalate bombardments to the point of simply destroying the city if that appears to be the case, but the reduction of Mariupol in this way could take considerably longer.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces are unlikely to launch offensive operations to encircle Kyiv larger than the scattered Russian attacks observed northwest of Kyiv targeting Irpin on March 14 and Guta-Mezhyhirska on March 15 within the coming week but may launch further tactical attacks.
- Russian forces continued to assault Mariupol from the east and west.
- Russian forces did not conduct major offensive operations toward northeastern Kyiv in the past 24 hours.
- Russian forces attempting to encircle Kharkiv continue to face supply shortages, particularly regarding ammunition.
- The Russian military falsely claimed to have captured the entirety of Kherson Oblast on March 15 but did not conduct any major operations toward either Zaporizhya or Mykolayiv.
- Russia is unlikely to launch an unsupported amphibious operation against Odesa until Russian forces secure a ground line of communication to the city, but Russian Naval Infantry retain the capability to conduct a landing along the Black Sea coast.
Russian forces continue to face difficulties quickly mobilizing replacements for combat losses but are continuing efforts to leverage conscripts and international troops. Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russia has been forced to suspend the mobilization of certain categories of workers in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) to maintain local governance but continues to conscript some DNR/LNR residents to replace Russian losses.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 15 that Russia has established mercenary training centers in Smolensk, Russia, and Homel and Bobruisk, Belarus.[3]
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
- Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
- Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;
- Supporting effort 2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast; and
- Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east.
Russian forces conducted limited attacks against several towns close to the western bank of the Dnipro River on March 15. Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations east of Kyiv and continued to prioritize improving logistics and reinforcing combat units. Russian forces are unlikely to launch offensive operations to encircle Kyiv larger than the scattered Russian attacks observed northwest of Kyiv targeting Irpin on March 14 and Guta-Mezhyhirska on March 15 within the coming week but may launch further tactical attacks.
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
Russian forces conducted several unsuccessful limited attacks toward northwestern Kyiv on March 15. Ukrainian forces repulsed Russian attacks on Guta-Mezhyhirska and Lyutyszh, directly on the western bank of the Dnipro River, and on Makariv, directly west of Kyiv.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense falsely claimed Russian paratroopers captured Guta-Mezhyhirska late on March 14 and seized a cache of “Western” weapons from “nationalists and foreign mercenaries.”[5] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported ongoing fighting along the length of the Russian effort to encircle Kyiv from the west on March 15, but ISW assesses that Russian forces have not conducted any major attacks.[6] Russian forces continued to deploy replacements and reinforcements to the northern Kyiv axis.
Subordinate supporting effort—Chernihiv and Sumy axis
Russian forces did not conduct major offensive operations toward northeastern Kyiv in the past 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued to reinforce combat units and reinforce its logistics system around Chernihiv as of noon local time on March 15 in preparation for resumed attacks towards Brovary.[7] Ukrainian forces captured two Russian soldiers from an unidentified unit in Velyka Dymerka, northeast of Brovary.[8] Limited fighting occurred in Bohdanivka, Lukashi, and Slavutych on March 14-15, but Russian forces did not conduct any major offensive operations.[9]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces have not abandoned operations to surround Sumy and launched several unsuccessful local attacks late on March 14-15.[10] Independent Ukrainian media additionally reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces agreed to open several humanitarian corridors on March 15 to evacuate Ukrainian citizens from Sumy, Konotop, Shostka, Trostyanets, and Lebedyn.[11]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations toward Kharkiv or Izyum on March 15 and continue to face supply shortages, particularly of ammunition.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Russia will likely deploy additional reserves to the Kharkiv axis of advance.[13] The General Staff reported that Russia is forcing conscripts to sign contract service agreements to replenish units of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA), which is most likely active on the Kharkiv or Sumy fronts.[14] The continued ability of Ukrainian forces to carry out successful local counterattacks indicate Russian forces are unlikely to successfully bypass Kharkiv from the southeast to advance toward Dnipro and Zaporizhia in the near term.
Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast:
Russian forces conducted several unsuccessful attacks around Horlivka late on March 14.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces prioritized reinforcing their positions in the western outskirts of Severodonetsk on March 15.[16] Ukraine’s 24th Motorized Rifle Brigade reported destroying three Russian tanks and an armored personnel carrier (APC) in a Russian convoy in Luhansk Oblast on March 15.[17]
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast:
Russian and proxy forces conducted several assaults on Mariupol from the east and west on March 14 and 15.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Ukrainian forces repulsed a major Russian assault on an unspecified location in Mariupol on March 15, claiming to have inflicted 150 casualties and destroyed nine Russian vehicles.[19] The Azov Regiment reported defeating one of the “units” (likely a battalion or company) of the Russian 22nd Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade, a Spetsnaz unit.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported Ukrainian artillery and aviation destroyed 12 Russian vehicles in columns around Mariupol on March 15.[21] Russian forces continue to shell civilian infrastructure and residential areas of Mariupol to force the city to capitulate.[22] DNR forces claimed to capture the towns of Rivnopil, Zlatoustovka, and Blyzhnje north of Mariupol on March 15.[23]
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and west:
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations north and west of Kherson on March 15.[24] Russian forces attacked Hulyaipole, Orihiv, and Kamyanske late on March 14, resuming operations to advance directly north toward Zaporizhya.[25] The Russian Ministry of Defense falsely claimed on March 15 to have captured the entirety of Kherson Oblast.[26] Russian forces have conducted limited advances northeast of Kherson city on March 13-15 but have not captured the entire Oblast. Russian forces may intend to advance toward Kryvyi Rih to encircle Zaporizhya, but are unlikely to have the forces necessary to do so while Russian forces in the south remain committed to the encirclement of Mariupol.
Satellite imagery depicted 14 Russian vessels operating off the coast of Odesa early on March 15, though the Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that it has not observed any Russian preparation for an amphibious landing anywhere in the Black Sea.[27] Russian Naval Infantry likely retain the capability to conduct an amphibious landing along the Black Sea coast. However, Russia is unlikely to launch an unsupported amphibious operation against Odesa until Russian forces secure a ground line of communication to the city—which they are unlikely to do in the next week.
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will likely capture Mariupol or force the city to capitulate within the coming weeks;
- The Ukrainian General Staff continued to report that there is a high probability of Russian provocations aimed at involving Belarus in the war in Ukraine, though ISW continues to assess that Belarus is unlikely to open a new line of advance into Ukraine;
- Ukrainian counterattacks and operations by Territorial Defense Forces in northeastern Ukraine threaten Russia’s exposed line of communicating, requiring Russia to redeploy forces away from the offensive toward eastern Kyiv;
- Company and battalion-level attacks northwest of Kyiv likely represent the largest scale of offensive operations that Russian forces can currently undertake to complete the encirclement of the city;
- Russian troops may drive on Zaporizhya City itself within the next 48-72 hours, likely attempting to block it on both banks of the Dnipro River and set conditions for subsequent operations after Russian forces take Mariupol, which they are currently besieging.
[23] https://dnronline dot su/pod-kontrol-dnr-pereshli-eshhe-tri-naselennyh-punkta-2/.
[26] https://iz dot ru/1305208/2022-03-15/minoborony-rossii-soobshchilo-o-polnom-kontrole-khersonskoi-oblasti.
2. The US must help the resistance wage the 'other war' in Ukraine
It is great to see everyone getting on board with unconventional warfare and resistance. But there are few true believers out there. This too shall pass once Ukraine has successfully defended itself.
The paradox of unconventional warfare is that authoritarian regimes are vulnerable to UW/resistance but few in the US and democratic nations are willing to invest in the organization, capabilities, training, and education to conduct it effectively.
Very few are ready for well executed UW/resistance. The Ukrainians are giving the Russians a master class during Putin’s War. But we would all do well to finally take UW seriously as it will be an important component of warfare in the future (as it has long been despite the naysayers and no-believers)
UW is disrespected and discounted by most and is at best considered an irritating afterthought. Those who understand it and practice it are rarely taken seriously.
Just saying.
The US must help the resistance wage the 'other war' in Ukraine
The Hill · by Christopher P. Costa, opinion contributor · March 15, 2022
The good news is that advocating for armed Ukrainian resistance against Russian invaders is ‘pushing at an open door’ right now. By some accounts, an insurgency in Ukraine is quietly underway. This means that the Ukrainian government is setting the stage for underground and guerrilla operations against any long-term Russian occupiers or Putin proxies.
Supporting a resistance movement should not be a fraught proposition for NATO or for the Biden administration — the alternatives are much worse. After all, the Biden administration explicitly left the door open for unconventional warfare in its Interim National Security Guidance (INSG). So, I remain hopeful that the United States can see to enable shadowy ‘fifth column’ work — because our mission in Ukraine and elsewhere in the region is only just beginning.
On the spectrum of conflict, supporting an insurgency is a low-intensity alternative to Russia using its nuclear weapons in a high-intensity conflict. By no means is this approach risk-free. But the dangers of Ukraine not having Western support to its resistance efforts will only make other European nations more vulnerable. Consider Russia’s invasion of Ukraine analogous to a massively lethal reconnaissance-in-force, probing and testing U.S. and Western resolve for the next phase of Putin’s revisionist designs.
Demystifying unconventional warfare is relatively straightforward. Unconventional warfare is defined as “activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power through and with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.” Unconventional Warfare is the ‘bread and butter’ for U.S. special forces — Green Berets — and during the Cold War it was factored into NATO planning for general war in Europe against the Soviets. Importantly, unconventional warfare was famously successful in Afghanistan by overthrowing the Taliban government in the early months after the 9/11 attacks.
The unconventional warfare goal in Ukraine would be to work with President Zelensky’s government to exploit Russian vulnerabilities by organizing and sustaining indigenous Ukrainian resistance forces. None of this requires U.S. ‘boots on-the-ground’ in Ukraine: Unconventional warfare is a “classically indirect” local affair, meaning it would essentially be a homegrown Ukrainian approach to fighting Russians.
I served as an intelligence officer in the 10th Special Forces Group in the early 1990’s so what’s playing out in Ukraine is eerily familiar. There, I was mentored, coached, and schooled by special forces practitioners. We exercised, trained and studied unconventional warfare and the Soviet threat. It’s not a stretch to suggest that an inept version of the former Soviet Union playbook is happening in Ukraine today. Roads are clogged by fleeing refugees, civilians are being targeted, Russian convoys are bogged down and artillery is causing lethal effects. What’s more, a humanitarian crisis is looming. But special forces are not on-the-ground in Ukraine, NATO is not fighting and intelligence is being used publicly in ways we could not have foreseen during the Cold War. We only wargamed and exercised what a conflict in Europe might look like during the Cold War. Now, with no U.S. combat troops deployed in Ukraine, we’re seeing a 2022 version of those scenarios playing out in NATO’s backyard.
In time, Putin’s clumsy conventional invasion and misguided adventurism in Ukraine will tailspin into a messy counterinsurgency and a fight with the Ukrainian people. Put simply, Russians will be sucked into a costly campaign that they didn’t plan for. What’s more imperative right now is preparing to support Ukraine’s resistance activities — delivering the weapons and supplies President Zelensky needs — without triggering a conflagration.
NATO has to come full circle from its Cold War roots. In 1990, during an Italian parliamentary inquiry, the Italian Prime Minister publicly confirmed rumors about the existence of ‘Stay-Behind’ networks in place as a contingency for an invasion by Warsaw Pact forces. The repercussions of these Cold War revelations were widely reported. Many European governments tepidly admitted that similar networks had been set up in their own nations as well.
West European governments were so fearful of foreign invasion and occupation that they established and maintained ‘stay-behind’ networks throughout the Cold War, all the way to the 1990s. By 2014 those concerns no longer seemed academic or far-fetched. Russian adventurism in Georgia in 2008, Russia’s occupation of Crimea in March 2014, and now Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is evidence of reckless Russian expansionism. So, it would seem that past lessons of clandestine networks from the Cold War are very relevant today.
President Richard Nixon once commented that there is a “hidden timer” running when a president sends troops into a theater of war. To be sure, this metaphorical timer was indeed ticking when General Creighton Abrams announced that he was going to take some risks in Vietnam in terms of “really getting going with the guerillas, the local partners, all that stuff.” That “stuff” was the clandestine and shadowy ‘other war’ that Abrams effectively fused with a more conventional fight in 1968. In the end, the “timer” Nixon talked about proved to be decisive. Americans lost patience in its foreign war and the ‘other war’ came too late.
As the memories of Vietnam fade, there is still time now for the United States to press for the ‘other war’ in Ukraine and elsewhere, bearing in mind that the hidden timer is still ticking.
Christopher P. Costa, the executive director of the International Spy Museum and a former career intelligence officer, was special assistant to the president and senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council from 2017 to 2018.
The Hill · by Christopher P. Costa, opinion contributor · March 15, 2022
3. Russia says Ukraine talks progressing as onslaught continues
An easy prediction to make: Putin's war will never successfully crush the Ukrainian resistance.
I am reminded of some quotes from history:
“The general of a large army may be defeated, but you cannot defeat the mind of a peasant.” Confucius, 551-478, B.C.
"We thought that the dispatch of American forces to any of these threatened areas would, in fact, be self-defeating. The idea of strategic bombing as a weapon against communist infiltration and subversion would have been strange to us. What seemed to us desirable was to stimulate and encourage the rise of indigenous political resistance to communist pressures in the threatened countries. We believed that unless the people and governments of those countries operating through their own political systems, could be induced to pick up the great burden of this load, success was not likely. For us to attempt to carry that burden would have effects — such as the paralysis of local initiative and responsibility, or the negative impact which a great foreign presence inevitably has on the natives of a country — which would tend to defeat the purpose of the undertaking."
-George Kennan, 1967
"Ideas are more powerful than guns. We would not let our enemies have guns, why should we let them have ideas."
- Joseph Stalin
(headline in the email alert from AP is better than this edited one: Russian forces try to crush Ukraine defenses amid diplomacy)
Russia says Ukraine talks progressing as onslaught continues
AP · by ANDREA ROSA · March 16, 2022
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Russia’s military forces blasted Ukraine’s capital region and other major cities Wednesday as they tried to crush a Ukrainian defense that has frustrated their progress nearly three weeks after invading.
With Russia’s ground advance on Kyiv stalled despite the sustained bombardment, glimmers of optimism emerged that talks between the two sides could make progress. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said a neutral military status for Ukraine was being “seriously discussed” at the “businesslike” talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described Russia’s demands for ending the war as becoming “more realistic.”
Zelenskyy said Russian forces had been unable to move deeper into Ukrainian territory but had continued their heavy shelling of cities. Kyiv residents huddled in homes and shelters amid a citywide curfew that runs until Thursday morning, as Russia rained shells on areas in and around the city, A 12-story apartment building in central Kyiv erupted in flames after being hit by shrapnel.
“Efforts are still needed, patience is needed,” he said in his nightly video address to the nation. “Any war ends with an agreement.”
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British and U.S. intelligence assessments supported the Ukrainian leader’s view of the fighting, saying Russian ground forces were still about 15 kilometers (9 miles) from the center of Kyiv.
Hopes for diplomatic progress rose after Zelenskyy said Tuesday that Ukraine realized it could not join NATO, his most explicit acknowledgment that the goal, enshrined in Ukraine’s Constitution, was unlikely to be met. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long depicted Ukraine’s NATO aspirations as a threat to Russia, something the alliance denies.
Lavrov welcomed Zelenskyy’s comment and said “the businesslike spirit” starting to surface in the talks “gives hope that we can agree on this issue.”
“A neutral status is being seriously discussed in connection with security guarantees,” Lavrov said Wednesday on Russian channel RBK TV. “There are concrete formulations that in my view are close to being agreed.”
Russia’s chief negotiator, Vladimir Medinsky, said the sides are discussing a possible compromise idea for a future Ukraine with a smaller, non-aligned military.
Still, there was no immediate prospect of an end to the fighting. Zelenskyy was preparing to make a direct appeal for more help Wednesday in a rare speech by a foreign leader to the U.S. Congress, with President Joe Biden set to announce $800 million in new military assistance to Ukraine, according to a White House official.
Meanwhile, defense ministers from NATO member nations met in Brussels on Wednesday ahead of an emergency summit of the military alliance next week.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24 upended Europe’s post-Cold War security order and had driven millions from their homes. The U.N. says the number of people fleeing Ukraine amid Europe’s heaviest fighting since World War II has passed 3 million. The U.N.’s human rights body says 691 civilians have been killed and 1,143 injured, but acknowledges those numbers were likely an undercount.
The artillery shrapnel that hit the 12-story apartment building in central Kyiv on Wednesday obliterated the top floor and ignited a fire that sent plumes of smoke over the area. Residents carried possessions and pets from the building as firefighters doused the flames amid a sea of rubble. The Kyiv emergencies agency said there were two victims, without saying if they were injured or killed.
Russian forces have intensified fighting in the Kyiv suburbs, notably around the town of Bucha in the northwest and a highway leading west, regional leader Oleksiy Kuleba said.
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Twelve towns around Kyiv were reported to be without water and six without heat. Across the capital region, “kindergartens, museums, churches, residential blocks and engineering infrastructure are suffering from the endless firing,” Kuleba said.
He said Russian troops were trying to cut off transportation links to the capital and to destroy logistical capabilities while planning a wide-ranging attack to seize the capital.
Russian forces succeeded in occupying the city of Ivankiv, 80 kilometers (50 miles) north of Kyiv, and control the surrounding region on the border with Belarus, Kuleba said.
In addition to airstrikes and shelling by ground forces, Russian naval ships fired overnight on a town south of Mariupol on the Azov Sea and another near Odesa on the Black Sea, according to local officials.
Ukraine also appeared to have successes, with satellite photos from Planet Labs PBC analyzed by The Associated Press showing helicopters and vehicles ablaze at the Russian-held Kherson International Airport and Air Base after a suspected Ukrainian strike on Tuesday.
Zelenskyy’s office said Ukrainian forces thwarted Russian efforts to enter Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, which was pounded by almost non-stop strikes over the last 24 hours. A powerful explosion thundered across the city overnight.
Hospital workers found themselves on two frontlines, battling COVID-19 in intensive care units as war rages outside. Air raid sirens go off multiple times daily, forcing fragile patients into the the Kharkiv Regional Clinical Infectious Diseases Hospital’s makeshift bomb shelter, the hospital’s director, Dr. Pavel Nartov, said.
“Bombing takes place from morning into night. Thank god a bomb has not yet hit our hospital. But it could hit at any time,” Nartov told The Associated Press.
Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov claimed Russian forces have destroyed 111 Ukrainian aircraft, 160 drones and more than 1,000 tanks or other military vehicles since the start of what Russia calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine.
The Russian military’s daily public statements on the war focus almost exclusively on fighting in the separatist-held Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and on Ukrainian military targets, without acknowledging attacks on civilians.
Some relief came to the besieged southern city of Mariupol as 20,000 people managed to escape Tuesday in 4,000 vehicles, according to Zelenskyy’s office.
Mariupol, a strategic port city of 430,000 on the Sea of Azov, has been surrounded by Russian troops for two weeks and endured heavy shelling that local officials say has killed more than 2,300 people and left residents struggling for food, water, heat and medicine.
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk expressed dismay Wednesday at reports that Russian forces had taken hundreds of people hostage at a hospital in Mariupol. She said the Russians were using the hospital as a firing position.
Regional leader Pavlo Kyrylenko said Tuesday that Russian troops forced about 400 people from nearby homes into the Regional Intensive Care Hospital and were using them and roughly 100 patients and staff as human shields by not allowing them to leave.
Kyrylenko said shelling had already heavily damaged the hospital’s main building, but medical staff have treated patients in makeshift wards in the basement.
Doctors from other Mariupol hospitals made a video to tell the world about the horrors they’ve been seeing. “We don’t want to be heroes and martyrs posthumously,” one woman said. She also said it was insufficient to refer to the patients being treated as wounded: “It’s torn off arms and legs, gouged out eyes, bodies torn into fragments, insides falling out.”
The prime ministers of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia have returned to Poland on Wednesday after a visit to the embattled Ukrainian capital of Kyiv meant to show support for Ukraine as it faces heavy bombardment.
They went ahead with the hours-long train trip despite worries within the European Union about the security risks of traveling within a war zone.
Marina Ovsyannikova, an employee of Channel 1, walked into the studio during Monday’s evening news show with a poster saying “stop the war, don’t believe the propaganda, they are lying to you here.” In English, it said “no war” at the top of the poster and “Russians against the war” at the bottom.
Two journalists working for Fox News were killed in a vehicle hit by fire Monday on the outskirts of Kyiv. Fox identified them as video journalist Pierre Zakrzewski and Ukrainian journalist Oleksandra “Sasha” Kuvshynova, who was helping Fox crews navigate the area. Another journalist was killed Sunday in Ukraine.
___
Associated Press journalists around the world contributed to this report.
AP · by ANDREA ROSA · March 16, 2022
4. CIA predecessor provides American know-how to Ukraine
CIA predecessor provides American know-how to Ukraine
NEWS AND OPINION:
Some genuine American know-how has reached Ukrainians fighting for their nation’s very existence. The OSS Society has shared a valuable resource with those on the front lines.
The OSS Society?
This nonprofit organization honors the legacy of the Office of Strategic Services, the World War II-era predecessor to the CIA, the U.S. Special Operations Command and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
Under the direction of Army Gen. William J. Donovan, OSS also compiled the “Simple Sabotage Field Manual” for its personnel in 1944 — which emphasized the importance of “citizen saboteurs” using everyday items and “act of simple sabotage” to undermine their Nazi enemies.
Charles T. Pinck, president of the OSS Society, had the 23-page manual translated into Ukrainian and has made it available through online resources to those who could make use of it. The methods appear to be just as effective for those on the front lines now as they were eight decades ago.
“We have received a lot of positive feedback about translating the ‘OSS Simple Sabotage Manual’ into Ukrainian. It’s been widely disseminated within Ukraine. We hope it will help the Ukrainian resistance defeat the Russians,” Mr. Pinck tells “Inside the Beltway” in a written statement.
Find details about the unique OSS Society itself and the manual at OSSSociety.org.
5. Ukraine War Update - March 16, 2022 | SOF News
Ukraine War Update - March 16, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO.
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Russian Campaign Update. The Russian offensive seems to have stalled out due to logistics and other factors. It seems they don’t have the numbers of forces on the ground for a sustained offensive. In time, the necessary forces and supplies to renew the offensive will arrive in the operational area as Russia flows more equipment and personnel into the region. The Russians, in some areas, are channelized on main road due to ‘Rasputica‘ – the mud season. Putin has purged the higher echelons of Russian intelligence agencies blaming them for the poor performance of the Russian military.
Fight for the Skies. The Ukrainians managed to attack one of Russia’s forward operating bases at an airfield near Kherson. Several helicopters were destroyed. “Ukraine Strikes Back”, The Drive, March 15, 2022. There are some social media reports that the White House is considering providing Ukraine will some Switchblade drones currently used by U.S. special operations.
The Ground Fight. Much is made of the use of Russian tanks in the Ukraine War. The effectiveness of the tanks has been diminished due to muddy fields that channelize Russian vehicles, the use of numerous anti-armor weapons by the Ukrainian military, shortage of spare parts and fuel, and lack of proper operational planning and execution. Learn more about Russian tanks is a 8-minute video entitled Analyzing Russian Tanks in Ukraine: T80 “Flying” Tank, by Battle Order, March 13, 2022.
Kyiv. The capital city of Ukraine is considered the primary objective of the Russians. The Capture of Kyiv would allow Russia to put in place its puppet government. Over the past 24 hours the capital city has increased shelling. The encirclement of Kyiv by the Russians has yet to take place. The roads directly south and southwest in and out of Kyiv are open. There is a temporary restriction on movement of people.
Kharkiv. The second largest city of Ukraine is Kharkiv located in the northeast of the country. The Russian offensive to take this city seems to be on hold. Perhaps it doesn’t have the necessary forces to take the city, and then logistics could be a key factor as well.
Mariupol. Located on the Sea of Azov, the coastal city of Mariupol is under siege by the Russians. This city is situated along the coastal road network that would provide Russia with a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea. The capture of Mariupol will likely be the next key victory for the Russians. It is unlikely that the Ukrainian forces can break out of the city and also unlikely that the city can be relieved. The humanitarian convoy for Mariupol is still in Berdyansk – unable to get into the city. Thousands of people left the city on Tuesday (Mar 15) via a humanitarian corridor in 2,000 private vehicles. Another 2,000 are gathered in a location of the city to leave on Wed (Mar 16). There are around 350,000 people still remaining in the city. Read more in “In embattled Mariupol, glimpses of devastation and misery emerge”, The Washington Post, March 15, 2022.
Mykolayiv and Then Odessa. Located on the west bank of the Dnieper River close to the coast of the Black Sea, Mykolayiv is a strategic objective for the Russians that is on the road to Odessa located further west along the coast of the Black Sea. The Russian naval and air force conducted strikes in and around the city of Odessa on the Black Sea. A venture into Odessa by the Russians could subject them to the maze-like catacombs of the city – making for a difficult urban battle. Satellite images showed 14 ships approaching the coast of the Black Sea, one of the the 120-meter landing ship Pyotr Morgunov of Russia’s northern fleet.
Refugees. As of March 15, over 3,000,000 refugees have left Ukraine according to data provided by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR). Ukraine officials say that 7 of the 9 negotiated humanitarian corridors were open on Tuesday (Mar 15). The United Nations says that the Ukraine war is creating a child refugee almost every second. The United Nations Officer for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has published its Ukraine: Humanitarian Impact Situation Report for March 15, 2022, PDF, 10 pages.
General Information
UKR Legion. The International Legion for the Defense of Ukraine has members from all over the world. Over 20,000 foreigners from 52 different countries have already volunteered. What is the status of these volunteers in a legal sense? If captured, are they legitimate combatants or just ‘mercenaries’? “Status of Foreign Fighters in the Ukrainian Legion”, Articles of War, Lieber Institute West Point, March 15, 2022.
Volunteer Groups Assisting. Perry Blackburn, retired Special Forces officer, explains what his volunteer organization is doing to assist the people of Ukraine. “AFGFree Assists with Ukraine Evacuation”, Forum Daily (CA), YouTube, March 15, 2022. See also an article by Jeff Schogol of Task & Purpose about a U.S. Army veteran now serving with the Ukrainian forces.
Private Americans Training Ukrainians. U.S. combat troops have come out of retirement to train Ukrainians in the fight against Putin’s forces. Read about one of the many small groups of informal instructors and trainers who have made their way to Ukraine to help resist Russian aggression. “U.S. Veterans Start a “Resistance Academy” in Ukraine. Will it Backfire?”, The Rolling Stone, March 12, 2022.
Fox Camera Crew Killed. Two members of a Fox News crew were killed in Ukraine when their vehicle was struck by incoming fire a few kilometers outside Kyiv. War zone veteran Pierre Zakrzewski was killed along with a Ukrainian ‘fixer’ who helped facilitate the news crews work in Ukraine. Oleksandra Kuvshynova, a Ukrainian journalist who worked with Zakrzewski, was killed in the same attack. Reporter Benjamin hall ws injured in the attack as well and is currently hospitalized in Kyiv.
Council of Europe – Minus Russia. The Council of Europe was about to cast Russia out of the organization. But Russia said “I Quit” first. Read a statement from the CoE on the exclusion of the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe. (March 15). The expulsion means that Russian citizens will not be able to bring cases to the European Court of Human Rights.
Putin a War Criminal. The U.S. Senate on Tuesday unanimously passed a resolution condemning Russian President Vladimir Putin as a war criminal. (Reuters, Mar 15, 2022).
The Coming Resistance
Mini-Manual for the Urban Defender. John Spencer has been writing about combat in the urban environment for years. He is considered one of the leading authorities on the tactics and techniques of fighting in big cities. He has published (March 15, 2022, version 1, PDF) a 50-page document on how to fight in a city as a defender.
The Next Phase. Ideally, Ukraine would recapture Russian-controlled areas through a conventional counter-offensive. However, that is unlikely. The United States and NATO countries should begin planning for the possibility that unconventional tactics will be necessary to overcome conventional Russian military power. “Ukraine Isn’t Waging an Insurgency – Yet”, The Defense Post, March 15, 2022.
Cyber and Information Operations
Video Game Footage and Propaganda. Lauren Coontz explores has footage from video games are quickly rolled into video clips and posted on social media. One example is the online posting of videos about the “Ghost of Kyiv” where footage from Digital Combat Simulator World is used on TikTok and other social media platforms. “How Video Game Footage is Being Used in the Propaganda Wars”, Coffee or Die Magazine, March 14, 2022.
Russian Lies on Bio and Chem Wpns. The Russians are makin absurd claims about biological labs and chemical weapons in Ukraine according to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. There is concern that Russian is prepping the world for a false flag operations, possibly including chemical weapons. Russia has helped facilitate the use of chemical weapons in Syria over the past decade. “NATO Chief: There Will be “High Price to Pay’ for Russian Use of Chemical Weapons”, DoD News, March 15, 2022.
World Response
NATO’s Response Since 2014 and Now. After Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO renewed its focus on territorial defense and deterring Russian aggression. This response included the deploying ‘battlegroups’, increasing military exercises and training, and enhancing air patrols over the Baltic states, Bulgaria, and Romania. Since the February 2022 invasion NATO has more than doubled the alliance force presence in Eastern Europe. There are now more than 130 allied fighter jets on high alert in the eastern part of the alliance and more than 200 allied ships from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean. In addition, the NATO Response Force has been activated for deployment.
High Level Visit. On Tuesday (Mar 15) the Prime Ministers of Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovenia took a train to Kyiv to pay a visit to Ukrainian President Zelensky and offer their support to the Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion.
International Support . . . or Not. NATO countries continue to flow critical equipment to Ukraine to include anti-tank and air defense weapons, drones, ammunition, and fuel. Hungary has opted out of supporting Ukraine. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is a longtime Putin supporter and says that the country “must stay out of this war” and won’t support Ukraine with weapons. Israel is attempting to be neutral in this conflict and has failed to strike a just balance between morality and realpolitik.
Commentary
Video – Illusions of Peace . . . and Russia. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has upended many assumptions about the post-Cold War period in Europe. Most thought another major war was not possible. However, the belief of how economic interdependence, a growing NATO, and the impact of the European Union would contribute to an era of enduring peace are now in question. Stephen M. Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University, explores the liberal illusions amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. “Hard Power Still Matters”, Belfer Center, Harvard University, March 10, 2022, YouTube, 5 minutes.
Cordesman on ‘Lessons of Ukraine’. One certainty that can be understood from the Ukrainian War is that Putin will be a dangerous man for as long as he is in power – long after the Ukraine War has ended. Anthony Cordesman writes that the United States now faces two superpowers and that confrontation not cooperation is the future. Read “U.S. Strategy and the Real Lessons of Ukraine”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 14, 2022.
Ignoring the Signs. Edward Lucas writes on how many national security experts cite the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea and two sections of eastern Ukraine as the first indication that Russia’s aspirations in eastern Europe constituted a danger. He argues that some ‘western experts’ are echoing the Kremlin’s version of history. Lucas says that 2007 is a more accurate date – with the cyberattack in Estonia, the 2008 war in Georgia, and more. “Fog of War”, Europe’s Edge, Center for European Policy Analysis, March 14, 2022.
End of Hybrid Warfare? Seth Cropsey of the Yorktown Institute has relegated Russian hybrid warfare to the graveyard. He cites the ‘failures’ of 2014 and 2022 in Ukraine as examples. Hmmm. Read his thoughts in “Wither Hybrid War”, Real Clear Defense, March 15, 2022. (Editor’s note: Not buying it.)
Podcast – Russia’s Military. Retired Brig. Gen. Kevin Ryan, a senior fellow at Harvard University, discusses Russia’s military capabilities and how the war in Ukraine is unfolding. WBUR.org, March 11, 2022, 10 mins.
Upcoming Events
Zelensky to Address U.S. Congress. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will virtually address Congress today (Wednesday). He will undoubtedly press the argument for a no-fly-zone and fighter aircraft. The event is scheduled for 9:00 am ET. “Five things to watch for during Zelensky’s address to Congress”, The Hill, March 15, 2022.
Wed, Mar 16 – Special Forces in Great Power Competition. Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) will be the speaker in an upcoming session to be held online on Wednesday (Mar 16) about SF and GPC. Hosted by NSI, Inc.
Thu, Mar 17 – Countering Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. The topic will be what the key considerations for NATO allies and partners in assisting Ukraine. The panelists will discuss the sources of NATO unity and how the alliance will evolve as a result of the war. Truman National Security Project.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one
Maps of Ukraine
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation
Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.
Janes Equipment Profile – Ukraine Conflict. An 81-page PDF provides information on the military equipment of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. Covers naval, air, electronic warfare, C4ISR, communications, night vision, radar, and armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine Conflict Equipment Profile, February 28, 2022.
Arms Transfers to Ukraine. Forum on the Arms Trade.
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Photo: Ukrainian soldiers, courtesy of Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.
6. Without sending troops, the U.S. wages 'hybrid warfare' against Russia
The first prominent figure to talk about it publicly was James Mattis, the retired Marine Corps general and former U.S. defense secretary. He used the term in a 2005 speech, though he didn't go into detail.
That is because Frank Hoffman was writing and researching the concept and discussing the idea with General Mattis. Frank's ideas benefited from General Mattis' advocacy.
Excerpt:
Mark Galeotti, a British journalist who closely follows the Russian military, wrote a mea culpa in 2018 titled "I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine.' "
"To my immense chagrin," he wrote, "I coined the term 'Gerasimov doctrine,' though even then I noted in the text that this term was nothing more than 'a placeholder,' and 'it certainly isn't a doctrine.'"
Without sending troops, the U.S. wages 'hybrid warfare' against Russia
NPR · by Greg Myre · March 15, 2022
The Russian military's chief of general staff, Gen. Valery Gerasimov (right), speaks with Russian President Vladimir Putin last December in Moscow. Back in 2013, Gerasimov was the first Russian military official to talk about "hybrid warfare." The U.S. and NATO have not sent troops into Ukraine but are seeking to counter Russia through a variety of means outside the battlefield. Sergei Guneyev/AP
The U.S. and Russian militaries have both talked for years about "hybrid warfare" as the future of war. Yet it remains a fuzzy term with no fixed meaning. The general idea is waging unconventional war on multiple fronts and well beyond the traditional battlefield.
What's clear is the U.S. and its allies are doing this now — perhaps on a scale never seen before — as they attempt to counter Russia in the war in Ukraine.
Here's a look at what it means in the current conflict:
Q. How did "hybrid warfare" enter the military vocabulary?
The first prominent figure to talk about it publicly was James Mattis, the retired Marine Corps general and former U.S. defense secretary. He used the term in a 2005 speech, though he didn't go into detail.
Then in 2013, the Russian military's chief of the general staff, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, gave a speech on hybrid warfare that caught the attention of some Western journalists.
Gerasimov, it turns out, was not talking about a new Russian military doctrine. He was actually addressing what he believed the U.S. was doing to support uprisings around the world. Gerasimov speculated on how Russia might respond but wasn't proposing a new Russian approach.
But in 2014, Russia stealthily seized Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula using disinformation, cyberattacks and "little green men" in unmarked military uniforms. There was virtually no fighting. Some in the West described this as an example of the "Gerasimov doctrine," though there has never been evidence that such a game plan exists.
Mark Galeotti, a British journalist who closely follows the Russian military, wrote a mea culpa in 2018 titled "I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine.' "
"To my immense chagrin," he wrote, "I coined the term 'Gerasimov doctrine,' though even then I noted in the text that this term was nothing more than 'a placeholder,' and 'it certainly isn't a doctrine.'"
Q. How exactly are the U.S. and its allies waging this type of warfare?
The U.S. and its NATO allies haven't sent a single soldier into Ukraine, but they began their unconventional warfare before the first shot was fired.
The U.S. released intelligence in advance of the Russian invasion, "pre-bunking" Russian disinformation such as the claim that Ukraine is being run by Nazis.
President Biden's administration worked closely with Europe for months to ensure they would roll out a tough, unified sanctions package as soon as the war began.
The comprehensive sanctions continue to mount by the day. The U.S. on Tuesday announced sanctions against 11 Russian military leaders. The European Union and Japan both announced they were placing additional sanctions on Russian oligarchs.
One of the most important steps has been the U.S. sanctions on the Central Bank of Russia. This will keep President Vladimir Putin's government from getting access to roughly half of the $600 billion war chest it had amassed before the war.
Russia faces a cascade of bond payments that are due, starting Wednesday. If Russia defaults on any of these payments — considered a real possibility in the near future — it could become a pariah on international financial markets for years to come.
Q. These moves are being made at the government level. What else are we seeing?
On social media, the West is generating wave after wave of public support. Every day, sympathetic scenes of Ukrainian civilians are going viral.
Contrast this with Putin's crackdown on all forms of media, the arrests of thousands of protesters and swift punishment for those who stray from the Kremlin's version of the events in Ukraine.
"What we're seeing now is Russia failing dramatically at implementing its hybrid war objectives," said Dmitri Alperovitch, a Russia expert who heads the think tank Silverado Policy Accelerator. "In fact, they're prosecuting a conventional war on the ground in Ukraine and not doing a good job of it. They're just getting completely destroyed in the information sphere, with Ukrainians being much more adept at pushing their narratives globally."
In another major development, many iconic Western companies have already announced they are suspending operations or pulling out of Russia altogether. They include McDonald's, Apple, Starbucks, big airlines, big banks and big oil. Before the war, it was far from clear they would respond this way.
"Most of the impact is actually coming from Western companies that are unilaterally deciding to pull out of Russia," said Alperovitch. "They're not getting their marching orders from the CIA or the White House. They're doing this on their own. This is what the Russians truly underestimated. They thought that this would be all driven top down, and it's actually bottom up."
Q. Hybrid warfare may be widespread, but can it determine the outcome of the war?
The punishment for Russia is real. The country has been largely cut off from the world overnight. Russians are waiting in line at banks for hours to get money. The ruble has crashed; interest rates have doubled to 20%; the stock market is closed for a third week.
Collectively, this may be an unprecedented global pressure campaign against Russia.
But the single most important factor is still likely to be what happens on the ground between the Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukraine has put up strong resistance, but Russia has the advantage in sheer firepower, allowing it to grind down Ukraine's defenses over time.
"We have to determine how we change Putin's calculus," said Alperovitch. "I think that can only come with economic pressure — turning Russia into a new North Korea, completely isolated economically and diplomatically. Putin's all in now, so it's very difficult to actually get him to change course."
Greg Myre is a national security correspondent for NPR who was based in Russia from 1996 to 1999. Follow him on Twitter: @gregmyre1.
NPR · by Greg Myre · March 15, 2022
7. U.S. defense secretary: 'We remain united in our support of Ukraine'
I hope everyone will leave the NATO meeting today determined to call the "special military operation" in Ukraine what it is: Putin's War. These two words need to be the foundation of the narrative. Whileit feels good to call it that it is important for the future and after Ukraine successfully defends itself. We need to separate Russia from Putin and make sure all the blame for Putin's War is on Putin's shoulders the authoritarian political system he operated in Russia. This will be necessary for reconciliation with Russia after Putin leaves office (however he may do so).
U.S. defense secretary: 'We remain united in our support of Ukraine'
BRUSSELS, March 16 (Reuters) - NATO allies will continue to send defensive weapons to Ukraine and are unanimous in supporting Kyiv, U.S Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said on Wednesday as he arrived for a meeting with his NATO counterparts.
"We remain united in our support of Ukraine," he told reporters. "We condemn Russia's unprovoked and unjustified invasion ... We support their (the Ukrainians') ability to defend themselves and will continue to support them," he said, adding that NATO's pledge to defend all allies was "ironclad".
Ukraine is not a member of the alliance.
Russia calls its actions in Ukraine a "special operation".
Reporting by Robin Emmott; Editing by Andrew Heavens
8. Zelensky’s address to Congress part of a tradition of foreign leaders speaking to lawmakers and the U.S.
Zelensky’s address to Congress part of a tradition of foreign leaders speaking to lawmakers and the U.S.
When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky delivers a virtual address to the U.S. Congress on Wednesday, he will become the latest world leader in a long history of foreign and religious leaders to speak to the lawmaking body.
Joint meetings of Congress have historically been an opportunity for lawmakers to hear from an internationally respected figure. The gatherings became a standard part of foreign leaders’ visits to the United States after the end of World War II in 1945. Since then, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, South African President Nelson Mandela, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Pope Francis and Queen Elizabeth have all addressed Congress.
The most frequent speakers to address Congress have been from close allies France and the United Kingdom with nine and eight appearances. Leaders of Mexico and Israel have spoken seven times each.
The session Wednesday will give members another opportunity to show bipartisan support for Ukraine after Russia invaded the Eastern European country three weeks ago.
In a joint letter to their colleagues, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) said the virtual address will be broadcast in the Capitol Visitor Center’s Congressional Auditorium at 9 a.m. Eastern time and attended only by lawmakers.
“The Congress remains unwavering in our commitment to supporting Ukraine as they face Putin’s cruel and diabolical aggression, and to passing legislation to cripple and isolate the Russian economy as well as deliver humanitarian, security and economic assistance to Ukraine,” they wrote.
“We look forward to the privilege of welcoming President Zelensky’s address to the House and Senate and to convey our support to the people of Ukraine as they bravely defend democracy.”
9. Saudi Arabia reportedly considering accepting yuan instead of dollar for oil sales
This could have significant strategic effects. Likely a step toward the Chinese objective of replacing the dollar as the world's reserve currency.
Excerpts:
Nearly 80 percent of global oil sales are priced in dollars, and since the mid-1970s the Saudis have exclusively used the dollar for oil trading as part of a security agreement with the U.S. government, according to the Journal.
The talks are the latest in an ongoing effort by Beijing both to make its currency tradeable in international oil markets and strengthen its relationship with the Saudis specifically. China previously aided Riyadh in construction of ballistic missiles and consultation on nuclear power.
Saudi Arabia reportedly considering accepting yuan instead of dollar for oil sales
The Hill · by Zack Budryk · March 15, 2022
Saudi and Chinese officials are in talks to price some of the Gulf nation’s oil sales in yuan rather than dollars or euros, The Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday, citing people familiar with the matter.
The two nations have intermittently discussed the matter for six years, but talks have reportedly stepped up in 2022, with Riyadh disgruntled over the United States' nuclear negotiations with Iran and its lack of backing for Saudi Arabia's military operation in neighboring Yemen.
Nearly 80 percent of global oil sales are priced in dollars, and since the mid-1970s the Saudis have exclusively used the dollar for oil trading as part of a security agreement with the U.S. government, according to the Journal.
The talks are the latest in an ongoing effort by Beijing both to make its currency tradeable in international oil markets and strengthen its relationship with the Saudis specifically. China previously aided Riyadh in construction of ballistic missiles and consultation on nuclear power.
Conversely, the Saudi-U.S. relationship has been increasingly frayed in recent years. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman initially put forth a public image as a reformer, liberalizing the country’s policies on women’s rights and criminal justice.
However, the 2018 assassination of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi has been catastrophic for both the crown prince’s public relations offensive and relations with Washington. The rift intensified after President Biden, who has said the assassination should make the kingdom a “pariah,” took office.
During the same period, China’s economic relationship to Saudi Arabia has grown closer, with the kingdom providing 1.76 million barrels of oil a day to the country in 2021, according to the Journal, citing China’s General Administration of Customs. While the country plans to maintain the dollar for the majority of its oil trading, a shift by the Saudis could create a domino effect for China’s other major oil suppliers, such as Russia, Angola and Iraq.
Saudi Arabia previously threatened to sell in other currencies in 2019 if Congress passed a bill that would allow antitrust liability for OPEC members. The bill, which has been introduced numerous times over the years, failed again that year.
The report Tuesday also comes as the U.S. has appealed to the Saudis to pump more oil to offset soaring gas prices compounded by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the U.S. cutting off Russian oil imports in response.
The Hill · by Zack Budryk · March 15, 2022
10. U.S. Senate unanimously condemns Putin as war criminal
I wish they named it "Putin's War."
U.S. Senate unanimously condemns Putin as war criminal
WASHINGTON, March 15 (Reuters) - The U.S. Senate on Tuesday unanimously passed a resolution condemning Russian President Vladimir Putin as a war criminal, a rare show of unity in the deeply divided Congress.
The resolution, introduced by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham and backed by senators of both parties, encouraged the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague and other nations to target the Russian military in any investigation of war crimes committed during Russia's invasion of Ukraine. read more
"All of us in this chamber joined together, with Democrats and Republicans, to say that Vladimir Putin cannot escape accountability for the atrocities committed against the Ukrainian people," Democratic Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer said in a speech on the Senate floor ahead of the vote.
Russia calls its actions a "special military operation" to demilitarise and "denazify" Ukraine. Putin has also called the country a U.S. colony with a puppet regime and no tradition of independent statehood.
Moscow has not captured any of the 10 biggest cities in the country following its incursion that began on Feb. 24, the largest assault on a European state since 1945.
Reporting by Moira Warburton in Washington; Editing by Cynthia Osterman
11. FDD | Surging COVID-19 Cases Undermine Xi’s Governance Narrative
Excerpts:
These and other mounting economic disturbances further threaten to undermine Xi’s stewardship of the country. They also undercut Xi’s domestic credibility as he prepares to assume a once-unthinkable third term as CCP party secretary.
To bolster Xi’s standing, Chinese social media censors will likely increase efforts to suppress any information that portrays Xi or the CCP in a negative light. Chinese propaganda platforms, including China’s state-owned media, are expected to downplay coverage of the outbreaks while simultaneously championing the CCP’s mitigation strategy.
Beijing’s COVID-19 woes could also spill over to the United States, where supply chains are already strained, potentially leading to product shortages and higher prices for U.S. consumers. U.S. policymakers will quickly need to devise appropriate countermeasures to mitigate disruptions without adding to already record-high inflation.
FDD | Surging COVID-19 Cases Undermine Xi’s Governance Narrative
fdd.org · by Craig Singleton Senior Fellow · March 15, 2022
The number of confirmed COVID-19 cases has skyrocketed in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and a dozen other Chinese provinces in recent weeks, leading to mass lockdowns and record-high hospitalizations. The current crisis will likely weigh heavily on the country’s economic growth and could potentially undermine Chinese President Xi Jinping’s governance narrative in the lead-up to the 20th Party Congress this October.
The number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in China has remained relatively low throughout much of the pandemic, in large part because the Chinese government routinely imposed city- and province-wide lockdowns at the first sign of any mass infection. Chinese authorities also deployed sophisticated and highly intrusive pandemic surveillance tools, including real-time tracking of cellular handsets for contact tracing.
Nevertheless, while nearly 85 percent of Chinese nationals are reportedly vaccinated, China has repeatedly delayed the adoption of highly effective, Western-produced mRNA vaccines. Instead, the Chinese government has relied on two less effective domestic alternatives, Sinovac and Sinopharm. Moreover, in places such as Hong Kong, less than half of residents over age 70 have elected to get vaccinated, often citing concerns about the potential side effects and efficacy of the Chinese vaccines.
For several days in early March, Hong Kong maintained the highest COVID-19 mortality rate in the developed world. In one viral image published by the Hong Kong Free Press and later confirmed by the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Hong Kong, dead COVID-19 victims in body bags lay on the floor of a hospital ward filled with living COVID-19 patients on ventilators.
Record-high COVID-19 cases and mandatory lockdowns were subsequently reported in other parts of China, including in the northeastern city of Changchun, China’s car manufacturing hub, home to 9 million people. Chinese authorities also ordered factory closures in Guangdong province — China’s economic powerhouse and home to China’s Silicon Valley, Shenzhen. In China’s biggest city, Shanghai, authorities temporarily closed some schools, businesses, restaurants, and malls to prevent the spread. Chinese authorities have not ruled out mass lockdowns should the outbreak worsen.
More lockdowns and other extreme COVID-19 mitigation efforts would lead to further declines in China’s industrial output, exacerbating China’s already rapid economic slowdown. Lockdowns could also exacerbate China’s record-high unemployment rate, which has remained above 5 percent for several quarters despite the Chinese government’s aggressive attempts to stimulate the economy.
These macro-level pressures complicate the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) efforts to maintain “economic stability,” its priority for 2022, and could put China’s optimistic economic growth target of “around 5.5 percent” even further out of reach.
These and other mounting economic disturbances further threaten to undermine Xi’s stewardship of the country. They also undercut Xi’s domestic credibility as he prepares to assume a once-unthinkable third term as CCP party secretary.
To bolster Xi’s standing, Chinese social media censors will likely increase efforts to suppress any information that portrays Xi or the CCP in a negative light. Chinese propaganda platforms, including China’s state-owned media, are expected to downplay coverage of the outbreaks while simultaneously championing the CCP’s mitigation strategy.
Beijing’s COVID-19 woes could also spill over to the United States, where supply chains are already strained, potentially leading to product shortages and higher prices for U.S. consumers. U.S. policymakers will quickly need to devise appropriate countermeasures to mitigate disruptions without adding to already record-high inflation.
Craig Singleton, a national security expert and former U.S. diplomat, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s China Program. For more analysis from Craig and the China Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow Craig on Twitter @CraigMSingleton. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Craig Singleton Senior Fellow · March 15, 2022
12. FDD | For the U.S.-Saudi-Israel Triangle, Ukraine Is a Shocking Endorsement
Excerpts:
It’s not always a simple balancing act. It requires an unwavering focus on the largest threats and open lines of communication with allies on issues of strategy and values, including human rights.
This was, however imperfectly, how America handled its foreign policy in the Cold War. There were some very contested and frustrating compromises in that path too, depending on the severity of the perceived Soviet threat in each region. But the alternatives then, as now, were much worse.
FDD | For the U.S.-Saudi-Israel Triangle, Ukraine Is a Shocking Endorsement
With MBS declaring Israel is 'not an enemy' but a 'potential ally,' and Biden’s upcoming trip to Riyadh, the war in Ukraine is triggering the belated return of sober thinking about relations between Saudi Arabia, Israel and the U.S.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain
Research Fellow
Shany Mor
Adjunct Fellow
fdd.org · by Hussain Abdul-Hussain Research Fellow · March 15, 2022
Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has set out a clear marker indicating Saudi Arabia’s new thinking regarding relations with Israel, when he declared in a recent interview that Riyadh does “not look at Israel as an enemy but as a potential ally.”
The Saudi king-in-waiting clearly sees his country’s relations with America, similarly, as a two-way street based on pragmatism, an approach that President Joe Biden is now likely to adopt, likewise, in considering a visit to Riyadh in May, despite his pledge as a candidate to make MBS a “pariah.”
The war in Ukraine is just the most recent trigger for the return of realpolitik in the triangle of relations between Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States.
Gone are the days of tribal loyalties and dogmatic positions, often informed by religious views, in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has seen that Washington no longer has a clear sense of how its own interests depend on the balance of power in the Gulf, so Riyadh must be more flexible. Trusting Russia and Iran to manage a post-America Middle East has yielded results similar to every post-war American disengagement: Washington found its national interests and the world order under severe threat and was forced to come back.
Over the past decade, at least two American presidents downplayed the importance of the Gulf region as a source of energy, but still called Riyadh every few months asking for an increase in oil production in order to decrease global prices.
In an earlier era of American strategic thinking, Washington looked the other way on Riyadh’s human rights violations, given Saudi Arabia’s importance on the global energy market.
This became more difficult thanks to the post-9/11 freedom agenda, and it became even more tenuous in the past decade when some Washington politicians found it politically expedient to pound on Riyadh, taking America’s alliance with Saudi Arabia for granted and calculating that the Saudis have nowhere else to go. MBS has tried to dispel this American misconception.
Saudi Arabia is not a Jeffersonian democracy, but its repression and autocracy are shared by almost all U.S. allies who are not full democracies, whether in Egypt, Turkey or the Palestinian Authority. The U.S. should indeed nudge its allies to improve their human rights record, but it does not make participatory liberal democracy a condition for alliances, nor does the D.C. critique take account of MBS’ defanging of violent Islamism within the kingdom.
Like the Saudis, the Israelis face two inexorable facts about the superpower structure in the region. The first is that America has been retreating, or planning to retreat from the region, since at least 2005, when reality forced a drastic scaling down in the ambitions of the Iraq War. The second is that there is still no replacement for the U.S. in the security considerations of both Israel and Saudi Arabia, and no replacement for the mutual security guarantees, however informal, of the network of U.S.-aligned states in the region.
At the same time, U.S. policy elites recognize that there is no substitute for their traditional allies in the region. Dissenting voices argued throughout the Bush and Obama years that Turkey and Iran could replace America’s sometimes difficult allies in Cairo, Riyadh, and Jerusalem, but such views have largely faded under the weight of their own implausibility.
Nonetheless, for Israelis and the Saudis, a diversification of the regional portfolio is a strategic and economic imperative. The U.S. will remain the most important military and economic partner for both countries. But in a time of continued American retrenchment, the Israelis and Saudis will have to also engage, however warily, other regional powers such as Turkey and Russia. More than that, they will need to engage each other.
If Washington finds it in its national interest to ally with Riyadh, Saudi will reciprocate. If not, Riyadh will pursue its interests with which ever country is willing to make common cause, a policy that mimics how Israel tries to navigate a tough region in an ever-changing world.
Russia’s war on Ukraine is a human disaster, but the resulting shock, fear, and revulsion are also an opportunity for some overdue sobriety. Voices in Washington that have been blaming America’s global role for creating enemies out of what they characterize as otherwise peaceful autocracies, like Russia and Iran, might have discovered that tyrants will always be tyrants, whether America plays an active role on the world stage or retrenches.
The energy shortage resulting from Russia’s war on Ukraine has led Biden back to realpolitik, at least as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned. Biden might be landing in Riyadh soon. This is an opportunity for America to pursue its interests and its principles, rather than swinging from one pole to the other.
It’s not always a simple balancing act. It requires an unwavering focus on the largest threats and open lines of communication with allies on issues of strategy and values, including human rights.
This was, however imperfectly, how America handled its foreign policy in the Cold War. There were some very contested and frustrating compromises in that path too, depending on the severity of the perceived Soviet threat in each region. But the alternatives then, as now, were much worse.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. Follow Hussain on Twitter @hahussain. Shany Mor is at an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow Shany on Twitter @ShMMor.
fdd.org · by Hussain Abdul-Hussain Research Fellow · March 15, 2022
13. FDD | Crypto-Fascists - Cryptocurrency Usage by Domestic Extremists
FDD | Crypto-Fascists
Cryptocurrency Usage by Domestic Extremists
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
Senior Advisor on Asymmetric Warfare
Varsha Koduvayur
Valens Global
Samuel Hodgson
Valens Global
fdd.org · by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross Senior Advisor on Asymmetric Warfare · March 15, 2022
Introduction
According to data from the analytics firm Chainalysis, “domestic extremists have been receiving a steady stream of cryptocurrency donations since 2016.” However, since the notorious “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017, their use of cryptocurrency has spiked. That event spurred many financial services providers to “deplatform” certain extremist groups. Many of these providers, including credit card processors, banks, and payment providers such as PayPal and Venmo, have increasingly refused to serve white supremacist groups, particularly in the United States. Thus, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies present attractive digital alternatives. (Older technologies have also proven attractive; some white supremacist groups have resorted to asking for donations through the mail.)
Some white supremacist groups accept cryptocurrency donations to support content they produce, such as video streams, podcasts, and radio shows. In these cases, cryptocurrency can help protect the identities of both the content producers and the viewers. In other cases, groups take cryptocurrency as payment for merchandise they produce and sell, such as apparel, books, and various accessories. In these cases, cryptocurrency usage often exists alongside traditional payment methods, supplementing rather than supplanting debit cards, credit cards, and other forms of payment.
Cryptocurrency can also be used to pay for legal defense, purchase supplies (including VPNs), or provide general support to a group or to particular individuals. In addition to protecting the privacy of donors, cryptocurrency frequently lies beyond the grasp of courts that have imposed financial penalties on extremists. For example, the neo-Nazi publication The Daily Stormer accepts cryptocurrency donations allegedly in part to avoid paying off millions of dollars in civil judgments against publisher Andrew Anglin.
As Anglin’s case shows, domestic extremists may benefit from the lack of an adequate regulatory and compliance framework around cryptocurrency. Moreover, ongoing enhancements of user privacy in certain cryptocurrencies, notably the emergence of “privacy coins” such as Monero, can further insulate these groups from law enforcement and compliance professionals. Domestic extremists may also use techniques known as “mixing” and “coinjoining” to camouflage their transactions within larger flows of cryptocurrency trading activity.
To address the challenges posed by domestic extremists’ use of cryptocurrency, policymakers, private-sector firms, and civil society actors should become more vigilant. The U.S. government should designate more violent white supremacist groups as terrorist organizations, as today only one such organization (the Russian Imperial Movement) has been designated. Designating others would help to cut off their funding flows and other means of support. Policymakers should also enhance the regulation of the cryptocurrency industry. This should include establishing uniform standards for cryptocurrency exchanges and virtual asset service providers; bringing “stablecoins” and privacy coins, as well as decentralized finance, within the regulatory perimeter; and supporting global standards for virtual assets, among other measures. Blockchain analysis firms and nonpartisan watchdog groups should monitor extremists’ use of cryptocurrency and assess the risks associated with different exchanges. Extremists will continue exploiting cryptocurrency to support their illicit activities unless policymakers fill today’s regulatory gaps while the private sector and civil society amplify their efforts to expose the profits of hate.
14. U.S. less effective at countering terrorist threats in Afghanistan and Somalia since troop withdrawal, generals warn
Excerpt:
Townsend acknowledged that he had indeed submitted a recommendation regarding Somalia to his superiors — but categorically refused to characterize what it contained, noting they were “still considering that advice, and I’d like to give them space to make that decision.”
U.S. less effective at countering terrorist threats in Afghanistan and Somalia since troop withdrawal, generals warn
U.S. troops’ exit from Afghanistan and Somalia has limited the United States’ ability to conduct counterterrorism operations against groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the American generals in charge of the Middle East and Africa told senators Tuesday.
“In my view, we are marching in place at best,” Army Gen. Steven Townsend, who leads U.S. Africa Command, told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee of the security picture in Somalia. “We may be backsliding.”
For years, the United States has been trying to weaken the terrorist organization al-Shabab, which Townsend has called “the most lethal arm of al-Qaeda.” Those efforts were complicated in the last year, following the full exit of U.S. troops from Somalia, a departure ordered by President Donald Trump near the end of his tenure in the White House.
Townsend said that counterterrorism efforts have experienced reduced efficacy due in part to the fact U.S. troops have been “commuting to work” from neighboring Djibouti, where the U.S. military maintains a permanent base.
Monitoring al-Shabab from “over the horizon,” as the Pentagon characterizes the dynamic, means U.S. forces are unable to apply “sufficient pressure,” Townsend said, adding: “We really can’t get at the al-Shabab problems.”
It’s a warning akin to those voiced by U.S. Central Command leader Marine Corps Gen. Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie before the United States pulled out of Afghanistan last year. He had said in the lead-up to last summer’s withdrawal that monitoring terrorist groups once there was no U.S. presence in the region would be “extremely difficult” — though “not impossible.”
During Tuesday’s Senate hearing, McKenzie confirmed that the United States has not launched any strikes in Afghanistan since the last aircraft departed Kabul at the end of August as he predicted that Islamic State-Khorasan, the Islamic State’s affiliate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, was poised to have a resurgence.
McKenzie told senators that ISIS-K has managed to execute high-profile attacks “even in Kabul” in recent months.
“We’re coming out of the winter; traditionally, this would now begin the fighting season,” he added. “It is my expectation that ISIS attacks will ramp up in Afghanistan as we go into the summer.”
McKenzie projected confidence that the Taliban, a sworn enemy of the Islamic State, would attempt to quash ISIS-K, despite having freed an estimated thousand of their fighters when they released prisoners from jails that had been maintained by U.S. forces. But McKenzie noted that things were “much less firm” when it comes to al-Qaeda, which has historically enjoyed a relationship of convenience with the country’s ruling Taliban.
For now, it appears that the United States is largely in a mode of watching and waiting. The U.S. military relies heavily on Washington’s relationship with Pakistan to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions regarding Afghanistan. But there is no formal basing arrangement — nor is the Biden administration likely at any point to bless the reintroduction of U.S. troops into or over Afghanistan.
What may transpire regarding U.S. forces and Somalia, however, is an open question.
On Tuesday, the Senate Armed Services Committee’s ranking Republican, Sen. James M. Inhofe (Okla.), asked Townsend point-blank if he had recommended to his chain of command that the Defense Department reintroduce U.S. forces to Somalia on a full-time basis.
Townsend acknowledged that he had indeed submitted a recommendation regarding Somalia to his superiors — but categorically refused to characterize what it contained, noting they were “still considering that advice, and I’d like to give them space to make that decision.”
15. Pentagon May Boost Troop Presence In Somalia
Pentagon May Boost Troop Presence In Somalia
It’s “not effective” to try to deter terrorists there from bases in neighboring countries, U.S. Africa Command leader says.
The Pentagon may add troops in Somalia to control the growing al-Shabaab terrorist organization, the head of U.S. Africa Command told senators Tuesday.
In the final weeks of his presidency, President Donald Trump ordered “the majority” of American troops to leave Somalia, sending some members of the U.S. military to neighboring countries, including Kenya and Djibouti, and continue their counterterrorism mission from outside the country.
Gen. Stephen Townsend said that al-Shabaab, an Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group in eastern Africa, is “among the world’s fastest-growing, wealthiest, and deadliest terrorist groups” that poses a threat to Americans, and that a U.S military presence relegated to neighboring countries is insufficient to combat it.
“My view is that our periodic engagement, also referred to as commuting to work, has caused new challenges and risks for our troops,” Townsend said at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. “My assessment is that it is not effective, it’s not efficient, and it puts our troops at greater risk.”
Townsend said he’s provided advice to his chain of command that is still being considered. He declined to go into more detail in the open portion of the hearing, saying that he’d “like to give them space to make that decision.”
Officials have also asked the White House to send several hundred troops to Somalia, the Wall Street Journal reported last week.
Lawmakers on Tuesday expressed support for boosting the American troop presence in Somalia. Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said he opposed the Trump administration’s order to withdraw nearly all American troops from Somalia and rely on over-the-horizon capabilities for counterterrorism.
“We're seeing this play out on the ground in Somalia as things get worse and al-Shabaab gains strength,” Inhofe said.
Al-Shabaab, which was designated as a terrorist organization in 2008, has planned and executed a number of high-profile terrorist attacks across Africa, including one in 2019 against a hotel complex in Nairobi that killed 21 people. The group also claimed responsibility for a 2013 attack on a Nairobi mall that killed 67 people.
The Defense Department has continued its mission against the terrorist group from afar. On Feb. 22, U.S. Africa Command conducted an air strike that targeted al-Shabaab terrorists, the military announced in a press release. The strike, which was the first since August, killed more than 200 combatants, according to local reports.
16. Responsibility for war crimes of the Russian military is inevitable - address by the President of Ukraine — Official website of the President of Ukraine
President Zelensky is giving a master class in strategic communication and support to PSYOP. His PSYOP officers must be so grateful to see these kinds of messages. We can learn so much from him (except for putting Russian POWs on TV!). And UW practitioners advising and assisting resistance forces can learn a lot from this. This is how you want to advise the leader of the resistance and shadow government / government in exile to communicate. It would be a UW practitioner's dream to work "through, with, and by" a leader like him.
Excerpts:
Russian conscripts! Listen to me very carefully. Russian officers! You’ve already understood everything. You will not take anything from Ukraine. You will take lives. There are a lot of you. But your life will also be taken.
But why should you die? What for? I know that you want to survive. We hear your conversations in the intercepts, we hear what you really think about this senseless war, about this disgrace and about your state. Your conversations with each other. Your calls home to your family. We hear it all. We draw conclusions. We know who you are.
...
I am grateful to those Russians who do not stop trying to convey the truth. To those who fight disinformation and tell the truth, real facts to their friends and loved ones. And personally to the woman who entered the studio of Channel One with a poster against the war. To those who are not afraid to protest. As long as your country has not completely closed itself off from the whole world, turning into a very large North Korea, you must fight. You must not lose your chance.
...
Responsibility for war crimes of the Russian military is inevitable. Responsibility for a deliberate humanitarian catastrophe in Ukrainian cities is inevitable. The whole world sees what is happening in Mariupol. Kharkiv. Chernihiv. Sumy. Okhtyrka. Hostomel. Irpin. In all our cities.
Responsibility for war crimes of the Russian military is inevitable - address by the President of Ukraine — Official website of the President of Ukraine
Free people of a free country!
The 19th day of our resistance is over. Historical war. Another difficult day, which is still approaching our victory. Approaching peace for Ukraine.
As before, the enemy is confused. They did not expect such resistance. They believed in their propaganda, which has been lying about us for decades.They still can't recollect themselves. But they have already begun to understand that they will not achieve anything by war.
Their soldiers know this. Their officers are aware of this. They flee the battlefield. They abandon equipment.
We take trophies and use them to protect Ukraine. Today, Russian troops are, in fact, one of the suppliers of equipment to our army. They could not imagine such a thing in a nightmare.
And I want to tell the Russian soldiers. Those who have already entered our land. And who are just about to be sent to fight against us.
Russian conscripts! Listen to me very carefully. Russian officers! You’ve already understood everything. You will not take anything from Ukraine. You will take lives. There are a lot of you. But your life will also be taken.
But why should you die? What for? I know that you want to survive. We hear your conversations in the intercepts, we hear what you really think about this senseless war, about this disgrace and about your state. Your conversations with each other. Your calls home to your family. We hear it all. We draw conclusions. We know who you are.
Therefore, I offer you a choice. On behalf of the Ukrainian people, I give you a chance. Chance to survive. If you surrender to our forces, we will treat you the way people are supposed to be treated. As people, decently. In a way you were not treated in your army. And in a way your army does not treat ours. Choose!
Our brave defenders continue to inflict devastating losses on Russian troops.
Soon the number of downed helicopters of Russia will reach hundreds of units. They have already lost 80 warplanes. Hundreds of tanks and thousands of other units of equipment.
In 19 days, the Russian army has lost more in Ukraine than in two bloody and years-long wars in Chechnya. For what?
I am grateful to those Russians who do not stop trying to convey the truth. To those who fight disinformation and tell the truth, real facts to their friends and loved ones. And personally to the woman who entered the studio of Channel One with a poster against the war. To those who are not afraid to protest. As long as your country has not completely closed itself off from the whole world, turning into a very large North Korea, you must fight. You must not lose your chance.
The European Union has approved the fourth package of sanctions against Russia. The fourth - and I'm sure not the last.
We are working with partners on new restrictions that will be applied against the Russian state. Everyone who is responsible for the war. Everyone who is responsible for the destruction of democracy. Everyone who is responsible for repression against people. Everyone will get an answer. The answer of the world. And this is just the beginning.
Responsibility for war crimes of the Russian military is inevitable. Responsibility for a deliberate humanitarian catastrophe in Ukrainian cities is inevitable. The whole world sees what is happening in Mariupol. Kharkiv. Chernihiv. Sumy. Okhtyrka. Hostomel. Irpin. In all our cities.
All our partners are informed of the crimes of the invaders against civilians and local self-government in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. In the temporarily occupied areas. There will be an answer for that. Necessarily. For the disrupted humanitarian corridors. Necessarily.
During the day of March 14, 3,806 Ukrainians were evacuated from the cities and towns of the Kyiv and Luhansk regions.
Our convoy with one hundred tons of what is most necessary for Mariupol is still kept in Berdyansk. For three days already. But we will try. We will do everything to ensure that Mariupol residents receive food, water and medicine.
I provided full information about the actions of the invaders on the Ukrainian land in conversations with friends and partners of our state. Every aggressive action of the invaders only pushes the world to new sanctions.
I spoke with President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. With President of Poland Andrzej Duda. Prime Minister of Luxembourg Xavier Bettel. We have 100% mutual understanding.
The conversation with Prime Minister of Israel Bennett was also important. As part of a negotiation effort to end this war as soon as possible. With a fair peace.
Our delegation also worked on this in negotiations with the Russian party. Pretty good, as I was told. But let's see. They will continue tomorrow.
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine has agreed on a package of decisions to support our economy.
So that business works. So that people have jobs. Where security allows. Where people are ready for it.
First, we are starting tax reform. Instead of VAT and income tax we give a rate of 2 percent of turnover and simplified accounting. For small businesses - this is the first and second group of sole proprietors - we set a voluntary payment of a single tax. That is, if you can - pay. You can't - no questions asked.
The second is maximum business deregulation. We cancel all inspections for all businesses. So that everyone works normally. So that the cities come to life. So that life continues wherever there is no hostilities.
The only condition is that you ensure the normal operation of your business in the framework of Ukrainian law.
These are just the first two steps of our tax reform. To be continued.
And finally.
I have just signed a decree on awarding state awards of Ukraine to 234 servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine who showed personal courage and heroism in the fight for our land. For our independence. 59 of them posthumously.
May the memory of everyone who gave life for our state live forever!
Eternal gratitude to all our heroes!
Glory to Ukraine!
17. Would Russia Use a Tactical Nuclear Weapon in Ukraine?
From one of our best thinkers on WMD.
Conclusion:
Russia and China are both considering the practical application of these weapons in the context of regional conflicts. As a result, we need to accept the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons use. It is arguably folly to discuss military conflict with China and Russia that remains at the conventional level. We need to address the conventional-nuclear transition and establish processes to coordinate between geographic combatant commands and US Strategic Command, as well as with our allies. Within the government, the national security community is hampered by the excessive security classifications over nuclear weapons issues. While the DoD nuclear community can outline scenarios and develop plans, the majority of the policymakers and military staffs don’t engage in open discussions on what US nuclear capabilities are or how we might respond to limited nuclear warfare. This is not “thinking about the unthinkable” to steal a line from Herman Kahn. I am not promoting the idea of engaging in limited nuclear warfare with Russia as a result of its actions in Ukraine. However, we need to better understand the possibility of adversary use of such weapons and to discard the faulty assumptions that currently exist to prepare for and protect against that future. Tactical nuclear weapons are a threat to the United States and its alliance relationships. We need to deal with it.
Would Russia Use a Tactical Nuclear Weapon in Ukraine? - Modern War Institute
Recent nuclear saber rattling by Russian President Vladimir Putin is forcing the West to confront a question that even many national security professionals have been able to ignore for decades: Would Putin actually use tactical nuclear weapons? More specifically, would he order a tactical nuclear strike on Ukrainian military forces out of frustration that his military forces have failed to achieve their objectives? Assessing that possibility requires a reevaluation of certain assumptions that is long overdue.
Russian Nuclear Weapons, in Context
In the current context, Putin could view nuclear weapons use as necessary to ensure Russian national security interests are not derailed by overt Western military support to Ukrainian efforts—which would be in line with stated Russian doctrine. One course of action could be a so-called demonstration strike with a single low-yield nuclear detonation in Ukraine or over the Black Sea to serve as a dramatic warning that resistance to Russia’s military campaign must be ended, backed by the compellent threat of further tactical nuclear attacks. There is no question that Putin has already signaled the use of nuclear weapons as an option, and he has stated his (alleged) concern about nuclear weapons being stationed in Ukraine for use against Russia.
It is true that the Russian Federation did join the other four states designated by the Nuclear nonproliferation Treaty as “nuclear-weapon states” in a joint statement that affirmed “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” However, it is important to clarify that this statement does not represent a general call for disarmament or an assurance that nuclear weapons will never be used. It reflects the five nuclear-weapon states’ view that their continued sustainment of nuclear weapons serves as the basis for ensuring that a nuclear war—between nuclear states—will not be fought, rather than a moral condemnation of such a war. Russia has nearly two thousand tactical nuclear weapons and continues to modernize this capability, perhaps as a measure intended to augment its (demonstratively deficient) military forces as it develops more capable advanced conventional munitions. Clearly, Putin has defined a role for nuclear weapons within his worldview, and at the same time, Western politicians and strategists have not engaged the possibility of nuclear weapons being used in contemporary conflicts.
Flawed Assumptions
The Russian incursion into Ukraine has caused a flurry of commentary by nuclear weapons experts on Twitter as to the implications of a potential nuclear strike. These views are valuable and well worth reading to understand the deterrence dynamics in this scenario. At the same time, there are general national security analysts who are fixated on a number of hypotheses that are based in Cold War thought. Notable among them: that there is no such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon because all nuclear weapons are strategic; that any use of a nonstrategic nuclear weapon would inevitably lead to a full-scale nuclear war; and that Putin must be insane to think he could employ nuclear weapons in Ukraine and not face nuclear retaliation.
Let’s take these one at a time. The first assumption, that there is no such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon, is simply wrong and based more on emotional feeling than rational assessment. It is a function of how we define “tactical” and “strategic” and implicitly assumes that the detonation of any nuclear weapon, no matter the yield, would have a strategic effect. And of course any nuclear weapon event would have a strategic political effect, rippling throughout the international community. But strategic effects don’t only come from strategic weapons. There is a difference between nuclear weapons delivered by strategic military forces (missiles, bombers, and submarines) against a nation’s critical infrastructure and nuclear weapons delivered by operational military units in a theater of operations against adversarial military forces.
The US military has gone back and forth over the utility of tactical nuclear weapons since the beginning of the Cold War, and the debate continues today. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review report called out the requirement for a low-yield nuclear weapon as a deterrent against Russian tactical nuclear weapons use. The US Air Force is developing a “conventional-nuclear integration” concept that calls for theater forces to consider limited nuclear strikes during conventional combat operations against a nuclear-capable adversary. In recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Charles Richard, commander of US Strategic Command, noted that his command “has been preparing. . . for years along with other combatant commands” for scenarios that included “limited nuclear use in a conventional aggression scenario.” He noted, “There is a significant class of theater threats that we’re going to have to rethink potentially how we deter that.” One starting point is accepting that tactical nuclear weapons constitute a threat to US conventional superiority that may not be deterred by the blunt instrument of strategic nuclear forces.
The second assumption, that any use of a tactical nuclear weapon would inevitably cascade toward a strategic nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States, is a hypothetical left over from the Cold War. Models of escalation examine the process by which two peer competitors would move from conventional to nuclear warfare in the course of a direct conflict. Can a nuclear-weapon state dictate the pace of a crisis with another nuclear-weapon state and anticipate its adversary’s reactions, while avoiding a total war strategic exchange? It’s a theoretical construct that has not been tested. The Russian concept of strategic deterrence focuses on “escalation management,” which uses both military and nonmilitary measures to shape an adversary’s decisions. This is a different concept than US strategic deterrence theory, which relies on “calculated ambiguity” to cause doubt in the adversary’s mind as to future US actions.
A Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine would not directly target US or NATO forces, although certainly it would be a direct signal to nations supporting Ukraine’s conflict. Consider a scenario in which Russia detonates a low-yield (e.g., less than five kilotons) nuclear weapon as an airburst over a Ukrainian mechanized brigade outside of Kyiv. As a result, the long-term effects of fallout are avoided. Because Ukraine is not a member of NATO, there is no immediate trigger for a NATO retaliatory strike. The US government has no extended deterrence promise with the Ukrainian government. Would this singular event lead toward a strategic nuclear exchange? Would the United States trade New York City for Kyiv, to paraphrase General Charles de Gaulle? The Obama and Trump administrations had different approaches to exercises involving a Russian limited nuclear strike. At the least, there would be significant consequences that might include an increased US military presence in Europe, additional flights of US strategic bombers to Europe, as well as new diplomatic and economic sanctions against Russia. But it’s difficult to see how a limited nuclear strike in Ukraine leads to a total war scenario.
The third assumption centers on Putin’s rationality and the question of whether he would actually use tactical nuclear weapons, breaking the international taboo on their use. In particular, one might question Putin’s rationality in light of his eyebrow-raising claims that Ukraine was developing a WMD program, that its government was run by fascists, and that it was committing genocide against ethnic Russians in the Donbas. This view of his public statements misses the point of rational actor theory regarding state decisions involving nuclear weapons. A rational decision maker is one that examines the available information and makes a decision based on what course of action provides the greatest benefit, ideally at a lower cost than other options.
If Putin is a rational actor, could he still consider a limited nuclear strike as part of his plans? He may believe that this is a rational act if he sees some advantage toward accomplishing the goals of overcoming Ukrainian resistance, keeping NATO out of the conflict, and ultimately restoring Russia’s past glory. But he does still have time to play out other options—cutting off electrical power, food, and medical supplies to Ukraine’s cities, increasing attacks against civilian infrastructure, or just continuing to use his conventional superiority over Ukrainian forces (despite current setbacks). If conventional options fail, he may then reach to tactical nuclear weapons as a way to meet his political objectives. So yes, a rational actor could consider using a nuclear weapon against a nonnuclear adversary.
We Need to Talk About Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Given this information, it remains unclear whether Putin might order a limited nuclear attack—for instance, a single airburst with a low-yield warhead. But if he did, would the United States be prepared to respond? Admiral Richard’s recent testimony to Congress suggests that US Strategic Command has had a lot of time to look at this scenario and has a plan. Of course the policymakers have the final word as to military operations. Absent a direct attack against NATO, it seems unlikely that the US military would be called upon to retaliate with a proportional response against Russian forces. Rather, diplomatic actions will dominate as the United States consults its allies to determine what the next step would be. It may be escalatory; it is difficult to say what happens next because there is no contemporary precedent for a nation using tactical nuclear weapons. The US national security community has not openly discussed and debated what happens after the first nuclear bomb is used. We’ve had our minds elsewhere for the past twenty years.
Russia and China are both considering the practical application of these weapons in the context of regional conflicts. As a result, we need to accept the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons use. It is arguably folly to discuss military conflict with China and Russia that remains at the conventional level. We need to address the conventional-nuclear transition and establish processes to coordinate between geographic combatant commands and US Strategic Command, as well as with our allies. Within the government, the national security community is hampered by the excessive security classifications over nuclear weapons issues. While the DoD nuclear community can outline scenarios and develop plans, the majority of the policymakers and military staffs don’t engage in open discussions on what US nuclear capabilities are or how we might respond to limited nuclear warfare. This is not “thinking about the unthinkable” to steal a line from Herman Kahn. I am not promoting the idea of engaging in limited nuclear warfare with Russia as a result of its actions in Ukraine. However, we need to better understand the possibility of adversary use of such weapons and to discard the faulty assumptions that currently exist to prepare for and protect against that future. Tactical nuclear weapons are a threat to the United States and its alliance relationships. We need to deal with it.
Al Mauroni is the director of the US Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies and author of the book, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the U.S. Government’s Policy.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or any organization the author is affiliated with including the Air University and US Air Force.
Image: Russian 2S7M Malka nuclear-capable artillery systems during training exercise in 2022 (credit: mil.ru via Wikimedia Commons)
18. Do Not Miss the Opportunity to Topple Vladimir Putin
But be prepared for what comes next.
Conclusion:
Putin’s public humiliation of his foreign intelligence chief, Sergei Naryshkin, seems superficially unwise given his dependence on their protection. While nowhere near the lethal implications of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s televised purge of his immediate entourage, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s alienating cabinet hirings and firings ultimately led to her political ouster. Insulting an individual may have multiple purposes, but it generally leads to revenge, either by the individual, or their faction, fearing a loss of resources. Benjamin Valentino has argued convincingly of the critical ability of individual leaders to dominate policy and change resulting from accidents of history. Just as history may have changed had Winston Churchill been killed rather than injured in a New York City car accident in 1931, more than anything, the War in Ukraine is entirely the result of the imagination of Putin and its continued prosecution, dependent on his survival.
Do Not Miss the Opportunity to Topple Vladimir Putin
The war in Ukraine is the last best chance to topple Russian President Vladimir Putin before he further consolidates authoritarianism in Russia. Once Eastern Ukraine is conquered, given the poor display of Russian military performance, Putin will logically hedge towards a large-scale buildup of tactical nuclear weapons to ensure Russia's security. Russia was already increasing its doctrinal reliance on theatre nuclear weapons in the 1990s in response to China's ten-fold advantages over Russia in population and industrial production, with which it shares a 4,100 km long border. This is a major setback for the world's desperate effort to spread democracy faster than nuclear proliferation. The Cold War strategy of containment, with its side objective of regime change, will be far easier to achieve now that Russia is pursuing a naked nationalist agenda devoid of ideological inspiration.
The same resources that the West is providing Ukraine can also serve to topple Putin in Moscow, effecting regime change in the state with the world's largest and primarily strategic nuclear weapons arsenal. Putin miscalculated his political durability, estimating a military victory in Ukraine would cement his legacy, tenure, and post-tenure retirement, whereas he failed to evaluate the consequences of defeat. The prevailing evidence is that he has become dimly aware of the unfortunate track-record of prior defeated leaders of soft-authoritarian states: trapped between a divided population, absent reliable international allies, and facing a costly military stalemate, Putin has strong incentives to escalate. For Western democracies, the opportunity to inflict regime change sooner than later should be irresistibly tempting. But for the league of democracies, faced with the dilemma that if Putin wins in Ukraine, he will be emboldened to strike again in the future, perhaps at the Baltic States, Scandinavia, the Caucasus, or the Arctic, or to export Russian nuclear power to bases abroad.
Statistical evidence for the fate of semi-authoritarian leaders who lose wars, according to University of Rochester professor H.E. Goemans, is not comforting for any observer. Leaders of all regime types (democracies, dictatorships and semi-authoritarian regimes like Russia) are more likely to stay in power if they have achieved a victory in war. There are exceptions in democracies, due typically to poorly performing economies, like George H.W. Bush's electoral loss following the 1991 Iraq War. Totalitarian dictatorships are generally better able to sustain a wartime defeat, because the state security apparatus can effectively suppress dissent. In fact, Putin was motivated to invade Ukraine precisely because he is becoming increasingly unable to control his population, through propaganda, the police, or otherwise, particularly the emerging generation of youth.
Goemans found that as a baseline for semi-authoritarian regimes like Russia, even when leaders win their wars, they are out of power within a year, for whatever reason, about 26 percent of the time. However, when leaders suffer small defeats in wars, they are removed from power 46 percent of the time, and this jumps to 90 percent for major military setbacks. Even an eventual Russian victory in Ukraine could equate to a small defeat due to costs. In a study of 2,960 national leaders, New York University professor Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors found that leaders with narrow domestic political coalitions, like Putin, if they are able to survive the first few years in office and reshape legal, political and economic state institutions to their will, are able to secure considerable longevity. However, economic downturns and defeat in wars decrease this longevity. There is, therefore, a unique and closing window of opportunity for the league of democracies to foster the circumstances of his displacement.
An important consideration, specifically for Putin, is that if he loses the war and subsequently loses power, there is a high probability he will be punished by exile, imprisonment, or execution. Leaders of semi-authoritarian regimes like Putin suffered a 55 percent likelihood of punishment if defeated in a small war and a 72 percent chance of punishment if associated with a large defeat. The worrisome issue raised by Goemans is that while dictators and democrats suffer worse punishment as their defeat worsens, for leaders of semi-authoritarian regimes like Putin, there is little difference in the level of punishment, which gives them an incentive to gamble for resurrection or undertake extreme policies in wartime in order to survive. In other words, there is a high likelihood that Putin will resist defeat aggressively since his personal survival is at stake, even perhaps to the extent of resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.
The foreign-imposed regime change literature generally points out the difficulty in knowing the true strength of the domestic opposition and the high likelihood of a resulting civil war if the leader is ejected by a coup d'état. However, pursuing a policy of regime change by seeking to displace a leader is very dangerous because it backs the enemy leader into a corner, making a negotiated solution more difficult, and thereby escalates and lengthens the war. On the other hand, not seeking to displace Putin risks permitting Russia to evaluate its poor performance and to ready itself for its next adventurist foreign policy in the Baltic States or the Caucasus. The key difference between present circumstances and the Cold War confrontation, however, is that containment succeeded in planting a consumer class in Russia, imbued with a moderate temperament in foreign policy, who can act as an effective fifth column if properly activated and influenced. However, it is still not quantitatively clear how revolutions erupt and overthrow the incumbent leader. Nor is it clear what messaging a Western psychological warfare program can use that will overcome pervasive Russian nationalism.
At best, we can hope that the same effort to help Ukraine resist Russian conquest will somehow impose costs on those in Putin's inner circle to displace him. Therefore, the most efficient means to effect regime change is to assist the Ukrainians in setting up a costly quagmire since most wars do not result in victory or defeat but in long stalemates. The implication is that Ukraine, likely a rump Western Ukraine with a provisional government in Lviv or the Carpathian mountains, must be encouraged to continue to fight even when Russia tries to implement war termination by establishing an arbitrary ceasefire line a few hundred kilometers west of the Dnepr River. Putin, in desperation, will punitively bomb civilian areas to inflict costs and convince Ukraine to settle, but it must be incentivized not to. Any concession granted to Moscow will lead to the permanent partition of Ukraine, and peace will bring intolerable benefits to Putin, permitting his rearmament.
Interior Ministry troops and the Kremlin guard were instrumental power brokers in the immediate death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, whereas KGB involvement was decisive in Leonid Brezhnev’s displacement of Nikita Krushchev in 1964, the overthrow of Mikhail Gorbachov, and the failure to arrest Boris Yeltsin in 1991. The best prospect for toppling Putin is from his inner circle, specifically the intelligence services that protect him, or a mid-level military coup, thereby freeing the army to intervene into politics, which it does periodically to ensure the stability of the state. The army's subsequent refusal to attack Boris Yeltsin in 1991, and its support against the 1993 October Coup by Alexander Rutskoy, indicates its influence when the intelligence services are politically neutralized (incidentally, I was an acquaintance of Col. Y-Z of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence, who managed Rutskoy’s captivity in conjunction with the mujahideen, after his Su-25 Frogfoot was shot down in Afghanistan).
Putin’s public humiliation of his foreign intelligence chief, Sergei Naryshkin, seems superficially unwise given his dependence on their protection. While nowhere near the lethal implications of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s televised purge of his immediate entourage, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s alienating cabinet hirings and firings ultimately led to her political ouster. Insulting an individual may have multiple purposes, but it generally leads to revenge, either by the individual, or their faction, fearing a loss of resources. Benjamin Valentino has argued convincingly of the critical ability of individual leaders to dominate policy and change resulting from accidents of history. Just as history may have changed had Winston Churchill been killed rather than injured in a New York City car accident in 1931, more than anything, the War in Ukraine is entirely the result of the imagination of Putin and its continued prosecution, dependent on his survival.
Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchillis an associate professor of international relations at Concordia University (Montreal), former army engineer officer, and has written extensively on Pakistan, where he conducted field research for over ten years.
19. ‘I’m on the frontline in Mariupol’: the Chinese reporter embedded with Russian troops
I hope our intelligence community has one of their TVs tuned to Phoenix TV in the operations centers.
Excerpts:
The dispatches are unusual for their extraordinary access – Lu, a veteran war reporter for a Chinese news outlet, Phoenix TV, is perhaps the only foreign correspondent embedded with Russian troops as they continue the brutal invasion of Ukraine.
He has filed reports from cities under Russian attack since the invasion began almost three weeks ago, including in Mariupol where local authorities say thousands of people have been killed.
‘I’m on the frontline in Mariupol’: the Chinese reporter embedded with Russian troops
Lu Yuguang of Chinese news outlet Phoenix TV appears to have gained exclusive access to Moscow’s side of the invasion of Ukraine
In a flak jacket and helmet, the Chinese reporter Lu Yuguang stands on the side of a road as a Russian tank roars past. “I’m on the frontline in Mariupol,” he says into the microphone. He then interviews a Russian soldier who says he’s not nervous as he’s been “fighting for eight years”. In another shot, Lu talks with a group of Russian soldiers in the back of a military vehicle.
The dispatches are unusual for their extraordinary access – Lu, a veteran war reporter for a Chinese news outlet, Phoenix TV, is perhaps the only foreign correspondent embedded with Russian troops as they continue the brutal invasion of Ukraine.
He has filed reports from cities under Russian attack since the invasion began almost three weeks ago, including in Mariupol where local authorities say thousands of people have been killed.
Lu appears to have gained exclusive access to Russia’s side of the conflict. In one report on 2 March, he interviewed the leader of the self-proclaimed republic in Donetsk, Denis Pushilin. Lu said the Donetsk militia cannot compare to Ukrainian forces, “but with the help of Russian forces, eastern Ukraine militia have liberated 40 residential areas within the administrative line. The victory keeps expanding.”
The Guardian is not aware of any other foreign journalists reporting from such close quarters on the Russian side of the invasion. A long-running Russian government campaign against independent media has intensified since the war began, with foreign outlets among those forced to end operations after Vladimir Putin signed a law carrying 15-year prison terms for what the Kremlin considers “fake news”. As such, Lu’s unusual access to the Russian military stands in stark contrast to that of other reporters. It has also fuelled questions about the extent of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.
Since the two governments signed an “unlimited partnership” shortly before Russia went to war in Ukraine, Beijing has struggled to balance its support for Moscow with the global condemnation of the invasion and swaths of international sanctions. It has outwardly sought to maintain a neutral position in the conflict but refuses to label Russia’s act as an invasion or the fighting as a war, and has amplified anti-western narratives, blaming the US and Nato for the conflict.
Lu’s unusual access has fuelled questions about the extent of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. Photograph: Screengrab
Lu is a well-known journalist in China, and his career and background have been reported on by Tencent, Sohu and Sina.
His reports from Ukraine have included Russian disinformation such as claims of more than 1,000 people held hostage as human shields by Ukrainian militants. However, his interviews with Ukrainian civilian victims, and criticism of Chinese internet users objectifying Ukrainian women, have also drawn nationalistic and pro-Russia trolling, accusing him of creating pro-Ukraine “rumours” and being “crooked assed”, an internet slang term for having bias or lacking objectivity.
According to profiles on Phoenix TV’s website and news articles about Lu, the correspondent is a former navy officer in the People’s Liberation Army, who lived in Moscow for several decades and covered events including the Chechen war, where he reportedly had Russian military protection. He has received multiple awards from the Russian government and military for his reporting. He has previously said that his outlet has good relations with intelligence figures in Russia.
ProfSteve Tsang, the director of the Soas China Institute, said Lu could have gained access through his personal connection to Russia, or because of China’s general support for its government.
“They are not mutually exclusive. The only thing I think we know for sure is that Russia will not allow any foreign journalist to be embedded with Russian forces unless it is certain that the embedded foreign journalist will portray Russian forces and efforts in a positive light. The fact that Lu is embedded should show that the Russian authorities know him well enough to be certain he would not write negatively about the Russian war efforts.”
Phoenix TV did not respond to questions about how Lu was able to embed with Russian troops.
20. Blinken sets a standard for lifting sanctions: an 'irreversible' Russian withdrawal
Excerpts:
Blinken held out no prospect that Moscow is ready to consider any such terms. Russian negotiators have been meeting with their Ukrainian counterparts, but have made a variety of demands, including the explicit recognition of Russia's past seizures of Ukrainian territory.
A more likely scenario is continued war, and the top U.S. diplomat warned of further devastation of Ukrainian cities. "We've seen the brutality that Vladimir Putin has brought to this. We know his his track record in Chechnya. We know the track record of what he's aided and abetted in Syria. I think we have to expect the same."
Russian offensives toward Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities remain stalled, according to a senior defense official. Russian forces instead have bombarded the cities from afar. NPR's Leila Fadel, who was in Kyiv on Tuesday, reported waking to the sound of an explosion. Ukrainian authorities said multiple explosions struck a residential area
Blinken sets a standard for lifting sanctions: an 'irreversible' Russian withdrawal
NPR · by Steve Inskeep · March 16, 2022
In an interview with NPR, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken says U.S. sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine are "not designed to be permanent," and that they could "go away" if Russia should change its behavior. Olivier Douliery/Pool/AFP via Getty Images
Secretary of State Antony Blinken says that merely stopping the invasion of Ukraine may not be enough for Russia to gain relief from Western economic sanctions. The U.S. also wants an assurance that there will never be another such invasion.
In an interview with NPR, Blinken spoke of Western sanctions that cratered the Russian ruble, led global firms to shutter their Russian operations, and closed the Moscow stock market. He said the unplugging of much of Russia's economy from the West is beginning to wreak long-term effects that are "growing over time."
He insisted that U.S. sanctions against Russia are "not designed to be permanent," and that they could "go away" if Russia should change its behavior. But he said any Russian pullback would have to be, "in effect, irreversible," so that "this can't happen again, that Russia won't pick up and do exactly what it's doing in a year or two years or three years."
NPR via YouTube
Blinken held out no prospect that Moscow is ready to consider any such terms. Russian negotiators have been meeting with their Ukrainian counterparts, but have made a variety of demands, including the explicit recognition of Russia's past seizures of Ukrainian territory.
A more likely scenario is continued war, and the top U.S. diplomat warned of further devastation of Ukrainian cities. "We've seen the brutality that Vladimir Putin has brought to this. We know his his track record in Chechnya. We know the track record of what he's aided and abetted in Syria. I think we have to expect the same."
Russian offensives toward Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities remain stalled, according to a senior defense official. Russian forces instead have bombarded the cities from afar. NPR's Leila Fadel, who was in Kyiv on Tuesday, reported waking to the sound of an explosion. Ukrainian authorities said multiple explosions struck a residential area.
Blinken spoke with NPR as Ukraine's president prepared to address the U.S. Congress via video from Kyiv. Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to seek more help from his embattled country. The U.S. and its NATO allies continue to provide weapons for Ukraine, while avoiding the commitment of NATO troops.
The U.S. says it has been working to ensure that Russia receives no help to escape its military and economic predicaments. U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan met on Monday with his Chinese counterpart, discussing matters that ranged from Ukraine to Taiwan. Blinken did not characterize the meeting, but did offer a warning to Beijing.
"China's already on the wrong side of history when it comes to the Ukraine," he said. "If China actually provides material support in one way or another to Russia in this effort, that would be even worse, and that's something we're looking very carefully at."
Blinken did not disclose any direct U.S. contact with Russian leader Vladimir Putin. "There are always ways of communicating," he said. "Diplomacy ultimately is going to have to be part of the solution to this. But that really depends on Vladimir Putin engaging."
NPR · by Steve Inskeep · March 16, 2022
21. Does the War in Ukraine Prove Tanks Are Totally Obsolete?
I do not think so. As long as they are properly employed. Do not let Russian incompetence create false views of the capabilities.
Does the War in Ukraine Prove Tanks Are Totally Obsolete?
Are drones and anti-tank missiles making tanks obsolete?
You’ve seen the photos and videos that have documented the numerous mangled and destroyed Russian tanks that have littered the battlefield. The Bayraktar TB2 combat drone and the Javelin anti-tank missile have been devastating to Russian armor. The tank’s vulnerable turret is no match for missiles. Antitank systems are truly raining death from above.
1945 has chronicled attempts by the Russians to protect their tanks from these types of missiles. Vladimir Putin’s forces have built iron cages above tank turrets to block the downward trajectory of anti-tank munitions. These countermeasures have not been effective.
Astounding Russia Losses
Worth the Cost?
In 2020, Army Technology web magazine conducted a survey and asked whether tanks are a worthwhile investment. They asked over 6,000 respondents. 74 percent of those surveyed said that tanks indeed were a worthwhile investment while 26 percent said they were not.
The poll concluded that during counter-insurgency and counter-terror fights in Iraq and Afghanistan the main battle tank played less of a role, and it risked becoming obsolete. But due to the great power resurgence of Russia and China – both countries that have large-scale armored forces – the tank was seen as more important.
But Here Come the Ukrainian Forces
The Russian invasion of Ukraine may have changed that sentiment again. Russian tanks are being obliterated throughout the country. The use of stand-off missiles and drones by the Ukrainians have introduced a new wrinkle in armored maneuver warfare – one that has changed viewpoints on what it means to have a tank in combat.
Marines Ditch Their Armor
The U.S. Marine Corps was so sure that this change in warfare would make tanks expendable that they have retired many of their Abrams tanks and the force plans to go tankless to concentrate on their maritime amphibious mission. Marine tankers have been asked to leave the service, re-class into another military occupational specialty, or join the army.
Perhaps the marines are looking smart because the war in Ukraine is showing the tank and infantry fighting vehicle is becoming redundant. One reason for armored vehicles’ difficulty in Ukraine has been the Bayraktar TB2 combat drone.
Bayraktar Drone Making Piecemeal of the Russians
This unmanned system is proving deadly to the tank. The Bayraktar TB2 is Turkish-made, and the Ukrainians have about 50 of the drones with more on the way. Each aircraft has four laser-guided missiles.
The drone can fly for around 24 hours with a ceiling of 25,000 feet. Drone operators can be up to 185-miles away. The payload is 121 pounds with a 105 horse-power engine. Its top speed is around 80 miles per hour.
The Bayraktar is proving that it can avoid Russian radar and jamming equipment. But their success also is due to the questionable tactics from the Russian as the invaders do not always protect their armored columns with surface-to-air missiles and other types of air defense systems.
Despite the success of the Bayraktar, I don’t believe the tank should be given its last rights. Countries will learn lessons from the war in Ukraine and strengthen the armor along the top of the turret. Tactics will also improve. U.S. brigade combat teams will use their own drones to counter the enemy and better sniff out attacks from remotely-piloted vehicles. Thus, the tank will still remain a mainstay in modern combat.
22. Russia and Ukraine looking for compromise in peace talks
Is there some hope? Can we have any optimism?
Russia and Ukraine looking for compromise in peace talks
- Summary
- About 20,000 flee Mariupol in private cars-Ukraine
- Hundreds of thousands still trapped in city
- UK says Russian forces struggling to make progress
- Ukraine president says peace talks more 'realistic'
- U.S. President Biden to meet NATO leaders
KYIV/LVIV, Ukraine, March 16 (Reuters) - Russia and Ukraine both emphasised new-found scope for compromise on Wednesday as peace talks were set to resume three weeks into a Russian assault that has so far failed to topple the Ukrainian government.
Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said the talks were becoming "more realistic", while Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said there was "some hope for compromise", with neutral status for Ukraine - a major Russian demand - now on the table.
The Kremlin said the sides were discussing status for Ukraine similar to that of Austria or Sweden, members of the European Union that are outside the NATO military alliance.
Three weeks into the invasion, Russian troops have been halted at the gates of Kyiv, having taken heavy losses and failed to seize any of Ukraine's biggest cities in a war Western officials say Moscow thought it would win within days.
Ukrainian officials have expressed hope this week that the war could end sooner than expected - even within weeks - as Moscow was coming to terms with a lack of fresh troops to keep fighting.
Talks were due to resume on Wednesday by video link for what would be a third straight day, the first time they have lasted more than a single day, which both sides have suggested means they have entered a more serious phase.
"The meetings continue, and, I am informed, the positions during the negotiations already sound more realistic. But time is still needed for the decisions to be in the interests of Ukraine," Zelenskiy said in a video address overnight.
On Tuesday, Zelenskiy had hinted at a possible route for compromise, suggesting Ukraine would be willing to accept international security guarantees that stopped short of its longstanding hope for full admission to the NATO alliance.
Keeping Ukraine out of NATO was long one of Russia's main demands, in the months before it launched what it calls a "special operation" to disarm and "denazify" Ukraine.
"The negotiations are not easy for obvious reasons," Lavrov told media outlet RBC news. "But nevertheless, there is some hope of reaching a compromise."
"Neutral status is now being seriously discussed along, of course, with security guarantees," Lavrov said. "Now this very thing is being discussed in negotiations - there are absolutely specific formulations which in my view are close to agreement."
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said a demilitarised Ukraine with its own army, along the lines of Austria or Sweden, was being looked at as a potential compromise. They are the biggest of six EU countries that are outside NATO.
"This is a variant that is currently being discussed and which could really be seen a compromise," Peskov was quoted as saying by RIA news agency.
The head of Ukraine's negotiating team, Zelenskiy's aide Mykhailo Podlolyak, tweeted ahead of Wednesday's resumption of talks that Ukrainian military counteroffensives had "radically changed the parties' dispositions".
1/11
Rescuers work at a site of a warehouse storing products burned after shelling, as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues, in Kharkiv, Ukraine March 16, 2022. REUTERS/Vitalii Hnidyi
In an intelligence assessment released on Wednesday, Britain said Russian forces were trapped on roads, struggling to cope with Ukrainian terrain and suffering from a failure to gain control of the air.
"The tactics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have adeptly exploited Russia's lack of manoeuvre, frustrating the Russian advance and inflicting heavy losses on the invading forces," it said.
THREE MILLION REFUGEES
Europe's biggest invasion since World War Two has destroyed some Ukrainian cities and sent more than 3 million refugees fleeing abroad.
The streets of the capital Kyiv were largely empty on Wednesday after authorities imposed a curfew overnight. Several buildings in a residential area were badly damaged after what appeared to be a Russian missile was shot down in the early hours of Wednesday, residents and emergency workers said.
There was no immediate word on casualties as a specialist rescue team searched for signs of life amid the rubble. Surrounding streets were covered with broken glass from hundreds of windows shattered in a wide area. What appeared to be a motor from the missile lay twisted on the roadside.
Still, Ukrainian forces have withstood an assault by a much larger army. Zelenskiy said Ukrainian troops had killed a fourth Russian major general in the latest fighting. Reuters was not immediately able to verify his statement.
"The occupiers were not successful today, although they threw thousands of their people into battle, in the north, in the east, in the south of our state. The enemy lost equipment, hundreds more soldiers. A lot of dead Russian conscripts, dozens of officers."
Ukraine said about 20,000 people had managed to escape the besieged port of Mariupol in private cars, but hundreds of thousands remain trapped under relentless bombardment, many without heating, power or running water.
Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk said it was not clear whether the humanitarian corridor to the city would open on Wednesday. She said 400 staff and patients hostage were being held hostage at a hospital Russian forces had captured in Mariupol on Tuesday.
The prime ministers of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia were due home on Wednesday after an overnight journey out of Kyiv by train. They met Zelenskiy in the Ukrainian capital on Tuesday in the first visit of its kind since the war began, a symbol of the Ukrainian administration's success so far in withstanding the Russian assault.
Zelenskiy was due to address the U.S. Congress later on Wednesday by video link, having made similar appearances in parliaments across Europe. The White House said U.S. President Joe Biden would make his first visit to Europe since the invasion next week to discuss the crisis with NATO allies.
The conflict has brought economic isolation upon Russia and the economic cost was fully exposed on Wednesday, as its sanctions-ravaged government teetered on the brink of its first international debt default since the Bolshevik revolution.
Moscow was due to pay $117 million in interest on two dollar-denominated sovereign bonds it had sold back in 2013, but it faces limits on making payments and has talked of paying in roubles, which would trigger a default. read more
Reporting by Reuters bureaus; Writing by Peter Graff, Michael Perry; Editing by Lincoln Feast, Raju Gopalakrishnan, Alex Richardson and Philippa Fletcher
23. Zelensky says peace talks "more realistic" as Russian forces bombard Kyiv
I hope he is right. But is Putin ready to end Putin's War?
Zelensky says peace talks "more realistic" as Russian forces bombard Kyiv
Axios · by Rebecca Falconer · March 16, 2022
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Wednesday peace talks were beginning to "sound more realistic," as the war entered its third week with Russian forces intensifying attacks on Kyiv and Mariupol.
What they're saying: "Efforts are still needed, patience is needed," Zelensky said during a televised address. "Any war ends with an agreement," added Zelensky, who thanked the U.S. ahead of his congressional address later Wednesday for a $13.6 billion aid package.
-
Ukrainian presidential aid Mykhailo Podolyak, a member of the peace talks delegation, tweeted that "fundamental contradictions" remained as peace talks with Russian officials were expected to continue Wednesday. "But there is certainly room for compromise," he added.
-
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said it's too early to say how negotiations were progressing, but "in the current situation the very fact that [negotiations] are continuing is probably positive," per Reuters.
Worth noting: Zelensky indicated during a video-link to leaders of the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force Tuesday that he realized Ukraine couldn't soon become a NATO member, saying "we have heard for years that the doors were open, but we also heard that we could not join."
- "It's a truth and it must be recognised," he added. "I am glad that our people are beginning to understand this and rely on themselves and on our partners who assist us."
The big picture: Russian airstrikes on Kyiv Wednesday morning destroyed several residential buildings and killed at least two people, Ukraine's state emergency services said. Kyiv entered a 35-hour curfew on Tuesday night, hours after at least four people were killed in a Russian airstrike on a city apartment.
-
Fresh attacks were also reported in Mariupol, where local officials said Russian forces had seized a hospital and took some 500 people hostage.
- But Zelensky said during his address that despite Russia's military bombardment, its forces had failed to break through.
Situation report: U.S. and British officials also reported that Russian forces had in general stalled across Ukraine.
-
A U.S. Defense official told AP that Russian forces were about nine miles outside Kyiv and their long-range missiles were striking civilian targets in the capital "with increasing frequency." But Putin's ground forces were "making little to no progress around the country."
Meanwhile, the U.S. Ministry of Defense said in an intelligence update Wednesday that Russia's military has been "struggling to overcome the challenges posed by Ukraine's terrain."
- "Russian forces have remained largely tied to Ukraine’s road network and have demonstrated a reluctance to conduct off-road manoeuvre. The destruction of bridges by Ukrainian forces has also played a key role in stalling Russia’s advance," the defense ministry added.
- "Russia's continued failure to gain control of the air has drastically limited their ability to effectively use air manoeuvre, further limiting their options" in the face of Ukrainian resistance, according to the statement.
What to watch: "Russia is increasingly seeking to generate additional troops to bolster and replace its personnel losses in Ukraine," the U.K. Defense Ministry said Tuesday.
- The Kremlin "is redeploying forces from as far afield as its Eastern Military District, Pacific Fleet and Armenia. It is also increasingly seeking to exploit irregular sources such as Private Military Companies, Syrian and other mercenaries," the update added.
- "Russia will likely attempt to use these forces to hold captured territory and free up its combat power to renew stalled offensive operations."
Go deeper:
Editor's note: This article has been updated with new details throughout.
Axios · by Rebecca Falconer · March 16, 2022
24. Report: Russia asked China for MREs to feed troops invading Ukraine
I doubt those MREs agave sweet and sour pork or Kung Pao chicken.
Seriously though, does this indicate how inept is the Russian logistical system?
Report: Russia asked China for MREs to feed troops invading Ukraine
CNN reported two officials with knowledge of the matter said among the assistance Russia requested from China was pre-packaged, non-perishable military food kits, commonly referred to as “meals, ready-to-eat” or MREs. Russia’s request may indicate the Russian military’s struggles with keeping its invasion forces supplied.
— ELINT News (@ELINTNews) March 1, 2022
U.S. officials have provided few details about other requests Russia has made of China for support in its Ukraine invasion. U.S. officials who spoke to publications on Monday declined to specify what types of military equipment Russia is requesting, with one citing the need to protect their methods of information collection.
The U.S. has already warned China against sharing economic support for Russia’s invasion.
“We are communicating directly, privately to Beijing that there will absolutely be consequences for large-scale sanctions evasion efforts or support to Russia to backfill them,” National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan told CNN in an interview Sunday.
China is likely just as concerned about the consequences of providing military equipment to Russia.
One CNN source said the Russian request for food may be one China is willing to answer to, as it stops short of providing lethal assistance to Russia’s invasion forces.
One of the CNN sources said Chinese government officials have not yet reached an agreement on how to respond to Russia’s requests. Both CNN sources said China is still wary about meeting Russia’s requests for support.
Officials separately told CNN that Chinese President Xi Jinping has been unsettled by how the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine appears to have reinvigorated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance.
During a Monday press conference, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lijian Zhao was asked about the alleged Russian requests for military support from China.
Zhao responded by saying, “Recently, the US has been maliciously spreading disinformation targeting China. China’s position on the Ukraine issue is consistent and clear. We have been playing a constructive part in promoting peace talks. The top priority at the moment is for all parties to exercise restraint, cool the situation down instead of adding fuel to the fire, and work for diplomatic settlement rather than further escalate the situation.”
Zhao was asked a second time during the Monday press conference to specifically answer whether Russia had requested support from China. Zhao did not specifically deny whether Russia has made such requests.
“In my previous answer . . I already made it clear that the US has been spreading disinformation,” Zhao repeated. “China has elaborated on its position on China-Russia relations on multiple occasions.”
25. ‘It’s the right thing to do’: the 300,000 volunteer hackers coming together to fight Russia
Crowd souring the cyber fight.
Perhaps a new concept: Publicly release a list of targets for cyber attack and ask hackers to go after them. Obviously there is no way to control such operations. But if you are Ukraine you want to mobilize all capabilities.
‘It’s the right thing to do’: the 300,000 volunteer hackers coming together to fight Russia
Ukraine appealed for a global army of IT experts to help in the battle against Putin – and many answered the call. We speak to people on the digital frontline
Kali learned how to use technology by playing with his grandfather’s phone. Now, the Swiss teenager is trying to paralyse the digital presence of the Russian government and the Belarussian railway.
Kali – and many others who contributed to this article – declined to share his real name because some of the action he is taking is illegal and because he fears Russian retaliation. He one of about 300,000 people who have signed up to a group on the chat app Telegram called “IT Army of Ukraine”, through which participants are assigned tasks designed to take the fight to Vladimir Putin. In so doing, they are trying to level the playing field between one of the world’s superpowers and Ukraine as it faces bombardment and invasion.
The sprawling hacker army has been successful in disrupting Russian web services, according to NetBlocks, a company that monitors global internet connectivity. It says the availability of the websites of the Kremlin and the Duma – Russia’s lower house of parliament – has been “intermittent” since the invasion started. The sites for state-owned media services, several banks and the energy giant Gazprom have also been targeted.
“The crowdsourced attacks have been successful in disrupting Russian government and state-backed media websites,” says Alp Toker, the director of NetBlocks. He adds that Russia has attempted to mitigate the attacks and deter hackers by filtering access to certain websites, which has caused further disruption.
We are creating an IT army. We need digital talents. All operational tasks will be given here: https://t.co/Ie4ESfxoSn. There will be tasks for everyone. We continue to fight on the cyber front. The first task is on the channel for cyber specialists.
— Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo) February 26, 2022
Like many of his peers, Kali was directed to the Telegram group, which has Ukrainian- and English-language versions, by Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s vice prime minister and minister for digital transformation. Fedorov, 31, has been using his vastly expanded Twitter profile to plead with executives at the world’s biggest tech firms to cut ties with Russia. On 26 February, he posted a link to the Telegram group, which was set up by his ministerial department. “We need digital talents,” he said. “There will be tasks for everyone.”
While his home country has long maintained a policy of military neutrality, Kali was spurred to action when he saw Fedorov’s tweet. “I wanted to help and use my attacking skills to help Ukraine,” he says via Telegram. “I’m from Switzerland, but I’m a strong hacker and I’m so sorry for every Ukrainian. I do it because I stand with Ukraine and I want to help somehow. I think if we hack Russia’s infrastructure they will stop, maybe, because nothing will work any more.”
Kali says his parents aren’t especially keen on what he is doing, although he tries not to tell them much about it. And he is not the only one.
Caroline, a twentysomething from the New York metropolitan area, told her parents she had enlisted into the IT army just hours before we speak on the phone. “They’re starting to get concerned,” she says.
Having watched in horror as Twitter and Instagram videos revealed the devastating impact the conflict is having on Ukrainian civilians, Caroline felt compelled to act when she saw Fedorov’s tweet. She had seen how destructive the spread of disinformation had been during Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. “The 2016 election was an eye-opener to the unfortunate effects of these things, and how it really does affect some of our relationships out in the real world.”
Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s vice prime minister and minister for digital transformation. Photograph: Ukrinform/Rex/Shutterstock
There was just one problem: she didn’t know what Telegram was. Unlike Kali, the former preschool teacher isn’t much of a hacker. At first, she was concerned that the app – which was founded by the exiled Russian billionaires Pavel and Nikolai Durov – was a trap. But, after some research, she downloaded it and joined the group.
She felt out of her depth when the group’s administrators asked for hackers to bombard Russian state websites with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, by which websites are bombarded with traffic to make them unreachable. This is how many Russian government websites have been disabled since the invasion began.
But Caroline realised things were getting lost in the torrent of information. Messages in the Ukrainian-language version of the group, for instance, can rack up hundreds of comments in less than an hour. So, she has been helping the English-language group by collating information for a website on how to support Ukraine and fight Russian disinformation campaigns. “I enjoy acting as that filter – as that wind to push the sails in the right direction,” she says.
She spends hours every day sharing information in the Telegram chat to help the masses of subscribers. “I can’t explain it,” she says. “It’s just something that’s so innately human that has been inspiring me, the more involved I get. I recognise I’m not special by any means, so all I’m doing is gathering all this information to try to dismantle these campaigns of disinformation that are going on.”
Enrique is a Lithuanian IT expert in his mid-30s. He felt that joining the Telegram group was “the right thing to do”. “Growing up with your parents telling you stories about how they were exiled to Siberia lives with you your whole life,” he says. “We are scared that we will be next.”
He had largely overlooked the Russian occupation of the Donbas, an area in eastern Ukraine that Putin’s army invaded in 2014 and claimed as Russian territory. But as the news became more urgent on Lithuanian television, he couldn’t ignore the situation any longer. He is less focused on wrecking the Russian internet and more on co-opting ordinary Russians to rise up against their dictator.
“I hope the world can put pressure on Russian people so much that they would be willing to re-evaluate their upbringing, understand that people are asking them to help, look at what is really happening and perhaps they will rise up that way,” he says.
Enrique has been inspired by the bravery of the Ukrainian people. That includes those who have taken to the streets to defend their country – and those who have taken to their keyboards. Ukraine has 290,000 people who work in IT and is the world’s outsourcing tech desk. While many of them have given up their day jobs to fight for the army, others have signed up to the IT army.
I enjoy acting as a filter – as that wind to push the sails in the right direction
That includes Sam, who works for a global advertising-technology company. He has been using his expertise to send what he calls “counter-propaganda” to Russians through advertising platforms. “We’ve been in a hybrid war and a direct war with Russia since 2014,” he says. “It was the same, but on a smaller scale. We understand how Russia acts: they do propaganda here, then inside their country, then try to share their vision to the global community.”
The Ukrainian advertising industry has sent what Sam calls “aggressive” videos that show captured Russian soldiers pleading with their mothers and trying to convince them about the reality of war in Ukraine. Others highlight the impact of sanctions on Russia and the strength of the Ukrainian army. “They will move everyone to act,” says Sam.
About 100 advertising specialists from 50 agencies are designing and disseminating adverts to try to raise awareness within Russia and Belarus of what Russia is doing, ducking and diving around advertising bans and platform closures.
Enrique has been impressed by the teamwork of the volunteer IT army. “I have never seen so many people wanting to do something in my whole life,” he says. “You ask for participants to crash something [break it] or run something and you have it.” The immediacy of social media – and the thrill of seeing instantaneous results – has become intoxicating. “Everything is live,” he says. “Everything is being streamed to everybody. Everything is online and easy to understand how to damage.”
Alex, a Ukrainian software engineer, says the Telegram group is mostly used for DDoS attacks. “I wish there were more things to do in terms of helping the IT part [of the war].” He doesn’t want to cut off Russia from the internet, but rather find a way of showing Russians images of the war.
This is what Anonymous, a hacking collective, claimed to have done with Russian TV channels this month. “My ideal way would be to do something that will demonstrate the truth for [Russians],” says Alex. However, suggestions for DDoS attacks are eagerly carried out. When links for target websites go up in the Telegram group, he says, “all of them are down” within half an hour.
Some cybersecurity experts are worried, though. “There are some risks in having this volunteer army,” says Alan Woodward, a professor of cybersecurity at the University of Surrey. He is concerned about the lack of accountability regarding who is directing the battle plan and the overarching strategy. “At best, what they’re doing is running interference,” he says. “It may be a nuisance to the Russians, but the attacks we’ve seen so far haven’t really affected the Russian fighting capability to any decisive effect.”
Woodward says an army of 300,000 hackers will invariably include some bad seeds. “These volunteers might start attacking targets that are not really what the Ukrainian government wants,” he says. “This could be accidental. How often has ransomware spilled over and affected, say, a hospital? I don’t think anyone wants that.”
There is also a risk that such an open call could easily be co-opted by the Russians to generate negative headlines. “You never quite know who is in a volunteer group,” he says. “Not only could they do something unwanted in the name of Ukraine, but they could also do something that plays directly into the Russians’ rhetoric.”
The fear of infiltration is something that also concerns Agnes Venema, a national security and intelligence academic at the University of Malta. “How useful they are depends on how well you can vet them, how well you can coordinate them and how skilled they are,” she says. “Renaming Putin’s yacht is cute, but does the hacking of Russian television stations to play the Ukrainian anthem help the Ukrainians achieve their strategic goals?”
Despite her misgivings, Venema finds the corralling of volunteer forces remarkable. “I’m not one for throwing superlatives around, but I would say this level of civic engagement is unprecedented,” she says. Nonetheless, she says, it could quickly backfire. As soon as hackers start taking orders from the Ukrainian army, they drop their status as civilians and could be considered combatants, she says. “That means that these people are legitimate military targets,” she says.
Whether those defending Ukraine’s right to exist know or worry about that is another question. “I don’t care about it,” says Kali, who as we spoke was trying to DDoS a Russian news website that the Ukrainian IT army administrators had flagged as a source of disinformation. “I’ve never worried about it.”
26. 2 little-known US and UK special-ops missions are influencing how Chinese military planners think about an attack on Taiwan
Hmmm.. I would not have thought of Grenada but I guess there are various lessons to be learned, positive and negative.
2 little-known US and UK special-ops missions are influencing how Chinese military planners think about an attack on Taiwan
Chinese special-operations forces conduct nighttime anti-terrorism training in China's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, December 6, 2021.
Yu Haiyang/Costfoto/Future Publishing via Getty Images
- China has steadily ramped up its aggression toward Taiwan in recent years.
- Beijing is rapidly building a military capable of invading Taiwan, but it would still be challenged by such an operation.
- Chinese strategists have been studied how other countries carried out similar operations, and two US and British conflicts stand out.
China has steadily ramped up its aggression toward Taiwan in recent years.
Beijing has repeatedly declared its intention to bring the self-governed island under its control, either through peaceful means or military action. China tells the world that it seeks a peaceful reunification with Taiwan, but it has been preparing for an invasion of its neighbor.
While the Chinese military is rapidly getting more powerful and advanced, it still faces considerable challenges in conducting such an operation. So Chinese military strategists have been exploring other options, including the use of special-operations forces, to increase the likelihood of success.
The importance of special operations
Chinese Air Force special airborne operations troops during a drill in China, March 3, 2015.
Xinhua/Huang Hui
US special operators saw their earliest fighting in Korea and Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s, where they gained valuable experienced and created many tactics, techniques, and procedures for later generations of commandos.
The US's campaigns against terrorism in the Middle East have been modern demonstrations of the effectiveness and utility of special-operations forces. Whether it was the unconventional-warfare blitzkrieg in the opening days of Afghanistan or the surgical counterterrorism campaign in Iraq or the onslaught against ISIS, American special operators played an important — sometimes crucial — role, and their deeds did not go unnoticed by US adversaries.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) established its first commando unit in 1988 and created larger special-operations units in the 1990s. Lacking sustained and varied combat experience, China's military has invested more resources in these forces and is incorporating them into large-scale combined-warfare exercises.
Since at least the early 2010s, Chinese military strategists have studied other countries' special-operations forces and how they fight, trying to glean lessons for China's forces.
According to a review of Chinese military publications published the Chinese Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College, in an operation against Taiwan the PLA is likely to employ its special-operations forces in roles similar to those laid out in the US military's doctrine for amphibious operations.
The distinct roles for special-operations forces in island landings described by the Chinese include reconnaissance ahead of the landing and conducting strikes and raids at its outset.
Notably, according to the review, Chinese military strategists have focused on two conflicts where special-operations forces made important contributions in those roles: The Falklands War between the UK and Argentina in 1982 and the US's invasion of Grenada in 1983.
Retaking the Falkland Islands
A Royal Navy Sea King helicopter lifts off after transporting Royal Marines to Darwin in the Falkland Islands, June 1982.
Paul Haley/ Crown Copyright/Imperial War Museums via Getty Images
Lectures on the Science of Special Operations, a 2013 publication from China's Academy of Military Sciences, singles out the role the British Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) played in the Falklands War to "confuse and disrupt" Argentine forces.
The two commando units had infiltrated the occupied islands weeks before the main British invasion force arrived. During that time, they conducted special reconnaissance operations to map out the Argentine order of battle and positions.
They also carried out direct-action missions to degrade Argentine defenses and sap their will to fight — most of the Argentine troops deployed to the Falklands were conscripts.
For three weeks, SAS and SBS patrols learned everything they could about the terrain and about Argentine forces and transmitted that intelligence to the approaching conventional British forces. Once San Carlos Bay was chosen for the landings, the British special operators "worked" the area, preparing it for the incoming forces.
British special-operations units helped to "ensure the smooth landing" of British marines and paratroopers, according to the Chinese publication.
Invading Grenada
Children wave to a Marine backing a jeep onto a landing craft as US Marines pull out of Grenada, October 31, 1983.
Bettmann/Getty Images
Lectures on the Science of Special Operations also references the role of US special operators in Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada in 1983.
The operation was a big learning experience for US special-operations forces and the US military as a whole.
The US operation was a "joint" one, and several commando units had major roles. US Army Rangers stormed and captured the island's main airfield with a daring low-level parachute drop, but Delta Force failed to seize a key piece of terrain, while SEAL Team 6 secured the governor's residence but was almost overrun.
The campaign provided lots of lessons about how the US military conducted joint operations. It also prompted reforms that led to the creation of US Special Operations Command and helped it become the effective and efficient organization it is today.
The Chinese authors link the US's quick victory in Grenada to special-operations forces' success in securing government offices, TV broadcast facilities, and important infrastructure, such as major roads.
Chinese SOF vs. Taiwan
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen reviews an exercise by the 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, September 2016.
Taiwan's Presidential Office
In a potential invasion of Taiwan, Chinese special-operations forces will likely play roles similar to those of their British and American counterparts in the Falklands and Grenada. They would support the landing, air assault, or airborne operations of conventional units while sowing confusion through targeted attacks in Taiwanese supply and communication lines.
Chinese military strategists see special-operations units as useful during the initial stages of an invasion to "pin down and scatter the enemy's operational forces" by attacking and sabotaging important facilities, thereby sowing chaos and preventing an organized defense, according to a 2006 publication by China's National Defense University.
Lectures on Joint Battles, a Chinese military publication, also states that Chinese special operators could be useful by conducting unconventional warfare and sabotage operations and enabling strikes deep into enemy territory.
Undermining enemy communications would also contribute to another SOF role described by the Chinese publications: psychological-warfare operations for "disintegrating enemy resolve."
In the end, these are academic military publications, not official doctrine. They are useful for understanding how Chinese military strategists view special-operations forces and their role in a potential invasion of Taiwan but shouldn't be viewed as operational plans.
According to the review, the publications also say little about the role of special-operations forces after the initial landing, such as in counterinsurgency, which is seen as one of the biggest challenges China is likely to face in an attempt to capture Taiwan by force.
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate.
27. Odesa's Maze-Like Catacombs Could Be Bad News For Russian Invaders
Odesa's Maze-Like Catacombs Could Be Bad News For Russian Invaders
Odesa's catacombs could prove vexing for Russian invaders just as they have for other enemies in conflicts past.
Полищук Денис Анатольевич / Adam Jones / Motik20071 via Wikimedia / via via katakomby.odessa.ua
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From the very beginning of the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine nearly three weeks ago, there have been persistent fears that Russian forces might attempt to capture the strategic Black Sea port of Odesa. Indications that a flotilla of Russian warships, including large landing ships, has taken up positions offshore, together with Ukrainian authorities saying that dozens of missiles hit targets in and around the city just tonight, have prompted new concerns that some kind of ground assault may come sooner rather than later. Ukrainian officials have already taken a number of prudent steps to fortify the city against amphibious landings and other attacks. But should invasion come, it is Odesa's vast and ancient catacombs deep below the city that could prove particularly vexing for Russian invaders.
Officially, the Odesa Catacombs comprise at least 2,500 kilometers, or just over 1,550 miles, of generally interlinked tunnels running under the city, as well as into outlying areas. Portions of the Catacombs are known to exist at three different depths at least, with the deepest being 60 meters, or almost 197 feet, below sea level, and there are at least 1,000 documented entry points. It is one of the world's largest known underground networks.
via katakomby.odessa.ua
A map of just a portion of the Odesa Catacombs.
When construction of the first tunnels under Odesa began is not entirely clear, but they may date back to the 17th Century. Artwork can be seen on the walls of some parts of the Catacombs that is at least from the 19th Century. Their existence is largely linked to the demand for coquina, a kind of limestone that is made up in significant part by fossiled invertebrate shells. Coquina extracted from these underground quarries was key to the growth of the city prior to the 20th Century and was entirely unregulated, which helps account for the extent of resulting Catacombs.
Soviet authorities curtailed the extraction of coquina from underneath Odesa after the 1917 Revolution, but the Catacombs remained a fixture in Odesa. Smugglers and other criminal elements, who had already made use of the labyrinth over the years, continued to do so. During the ensuing Russian Civil War, civilians hid in the tunnels from the fighting, and it seems more likely than not that the tunnels had been used in this way before then, as well.
The catacombs continued to provide shelter for civilians during World War II. They gained more notoriety during that conflict for their use, in part, as a base of operations for Soviet partisans fighting Nazi forces in the region. In 1969, a Museum of Partisan Glory was established in a part of the Catacombs Nerubayske, a village some six miles northwest of the center of Odesa, to commemorate this period, and the activities of partisans under the command of Vladimir Molodtsov-Badaev, an official Hero of the Soviet Union, in particular.
Andrey Mironov via Wikimedia
A 2016 painting by Andrey Mironov, depicting some of Vladimir Molodtsov-Badaev's partisans in Odesa.
The partisan museum was the only part of the Catacombs officially open to the public during the Soviet era, which continued to be the case after Odesa became part of independent Ukraine following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, there remains plans to use the tunnels in case of attacks, including during a nuclear war.
There are remnants of activity, past and present, spread throughout the Catacombs. This includes old mining infrastructure, such as reinforced walls and tracks for minecarts. Weapons and other items that belonged to partisan forces, among other things, are still sometimes found in less explored areas.
Полищук Денис Анатольевич via Wikimedia
A derelict minecart on a track inside the Odesa Catacombs.
With Ukraine now again at war and the threats to Odesa being very real, the Catacombs may well take on these roles again. In a video posted on YouTube on March 12, The Washington Post interviewed individuals in the city who have at least been preparing portions of the tunnels to be used as shelters that civilians can hide in from attacks.
"I think we could accommodate around 300 people," Aleksandr Sadovnikov, one of the individuals who has been helping to organize the shelter, told The Washington Post. "At any rate, the nearby houses would easily fit in here."
"Of course, we have three floors of ground above us," he added. "I don't know what kind of projectile could penetrate this layer."
It's not clear whether any other portions of the Catacombs may be in the process of being converted into temporary shelters or if there are plans to make use of other sections for more active military purposes. There are certainly serious questions about the real utility of the underground network in the latter case. During World War II, the Nazis and their fascist allies sealed many entrance points deliberately in an attempt to either squeeze partisans out of the tunnels or entomb them. Many of those irregulars, including Molodtsov-Badaev himself, did not survive the conflict.
In 1995, a group set the record for the longest trek through these tunnels, which lasted 27 hours and saw them explore approximately 40 kilometers, or almost 25 miles, worth of the Catacombs. The network remains largely unmapped to this day and nature has conspired over the years to block access at many points.
"On a few occasions we found our path blocked altogether; where brittle layers of sandy rock had collapsed to form impenetrable walls ahead," writer and photographer Darmon Richter recounted on his website Ex Utopia back in 2013 after taking a tour of a less touristy area of the Catacombs. "I was alarmed to discover that even some paths once familiar to my guides were now impassable – these cave-ins were both recent and regular."
The labyrinth-like nature of these tunnels, combined with these routine cave-ins and flooding, can certainly make them dangerous and have long given rise to stories about people getting lost and dying in the Catacombs. At the same time, many of these stories may well be urban legends.
Some sections of these tunnels could still provide valuable cover, as well as routes for Ukrainian forces to move unobserved and protected from enemy fire, especially inside Odesa in the event that Russian forces move into the city. Points of entry could provide firing positions for friendly forces, who could then quickly retire back into the tunnels and relocate somewhere else. Any parts of the Catacombs that are robust enough to serve as bomb shelters might also be usable by military personnel as temporary living quarters. Even less livable areas could be used as weapons caches.
Мокрицький Павло via Wikimedia
An entry point into the Odesa Catacombs on the street of the city. This was sealed at least as of 2015, but it and others like it could potentially be reopened.
These potential benefits could fit well with the more traditional efforts that have been taken to fortify the city from attacks, including the erection of barricades and checkpoints, guarded in some cases by volunteer forces, and the placement of tank traps on key streets. Local authorities have covered a number of historic monuments with sandbags, hoping to protect them from what could be grueling street fighting, as has already emerged elsewhere in Ukraine.
At least some of Odesa's beaches, typically major tourist spots, have been mined. Pictures have shown tanks in positions near the water's edge to be able to fire on any Russian units that may attempt to conduct amphibious landings.
When Russian forces will ultimately launch a major offensive targeting Odesa, which the Catacombs and these other defenses could come into play, remains to be seen. Satellite imagery taken just today shows was is almost certainly a flotilla of 14 Russian warships, including amphibious warfare vessels, heading in the general direction of the city.
In addition, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has said that 90 missiles were fired at targets in and around Odesa tonight in what could very well be a prelude to an amphibious operation. Video footage had emerged on social media last night that appeared to show anti-aircraft batteries near Odesa attempting to intercept something incoming threats of some kind, as well.
Earlier today, a senior U.S. defense official today acknowledged the apparent Russian maritime activity near Odesa, but they said that there were no indications of any imminent amphibious landings. This would, of course, not preclude such an operation in the coming days following a sustained bombardment.
In addition, other Russian forces may be attempting to advance toward the Black Sea port city overland via the city of Mykolaiv to the east. The progress of those units, or lack thereof, might have an impact on how the Kremlin eventually decides to proceed.
No matter what, Ukrainian forces in Odesa, and the city's residents, have already been bracing for an assault of some kind for weeks now. It only looks increasingly likely now that the famous Catacombs will soon again provide shelter, and possibly much more, this time from invading Russian forces.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com
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28. Opinion | Chinese ambassador: Where we stand on Ukraine
In the immortal words of Dana Carvey on SNL" "Isn't that special?"
Excerpts:
China is committed to an independent foreign policy of peace. As a staunch champion of justice, China decides its position on the basis of the merits of the issue. On Ukraine, China’s position is objective and impartial: The purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter must be fully observed; the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, including Ukraine, must be respected; the legitimate security concerns of all countries must be taken seriously; and all efforts that are conducive to the peaceful settlement of the crisis must be supported.
Given this, threats against Chinese entities and businesses, as uttered by some U.S. officials, are unacceptable. Neither war nor sanctions can deliver peace. Wielding the baton of sanctions at Chinese companies while seeking China’s support and cooperation simply won’t work.
Opinion | Chinese ambassador: Where we stand on Ukraine
Qin Gang is the ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to the United States.
Many Americans are understandably trying to understand where China stands as the crisis in Ukraine unfolds, so I want to take this opportunity to explain fully and dispel any misunderstandings and rumors.
There have been claims that China had prior knowledge of Russia’s military action and demanded Russia delay it until the Winter Olympics concluded. Recent rumors further claimed that Russia was seeking military assistance from China. Let me say this responsibly: Assertions that China knew about, acquiesced to or tacitly supported this war are purely disinformation. All these claims serve only the purpose of shifting blame to and slinging mud at China. There were more than 6,000 Chinese citizens in Ukraine. China is the biggest trading partner of both Russia and Ukraine, and the largest importer of crude oil and natural gas in the world. Conflict between Russia and Ukraine does no good for China. Had China known about the imminent crisis, we would have tried our best to prevent it.
China is committed to an independent foreign policy of peace. As a staunch champion of justice, China decides its position on the basis of the merits of the issue. On Ukraine, China’s position is objective and impartial: The purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter must be fully observed; the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, including Ukraine, must be respected; the legitimate security concerns of all countries must be taken seriously; and all efforts that are conducive to the peaceful settlement of the crisis must be supported.
Given this, threats against Chinese entities and businesses, as uttered by some U.S. officials, are unacceptable. Neither war nor sanctions can deliver peace. Wielding the baton of sanctions at Chinese companies while seeking China’s support and cooperation simply won’t work.
Some people are linking Taiwan and Ukraine to play up the risks of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This is a mistake. These are totally different things. Ukraine is a sovereign state, while Taiwan is an inseparable part of China’s territory. The Taiwan question is a Chinese internal affair. It does not make sense for people to emphasize the principle of sovereignty on Ukraine while hurting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on Taiwan. The future of Taiwan lies in peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the reunification of China. We are committed to peaceful reunification, but we also retain all options to curb “Taiwan independence.” We hope the United States earnestly abides by the one-China principle and does not support “Taiwan independence” separatism in any form. To ensure long-term peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, China and the United States must work together to contain “Taiwan independence.”
In Ukraine, China has made huge efforts to push for peace talks and the prevention of a humanitarian crisis. In a phone call with President Vladimir Putin on the second day of the conflict, President Xi Jinping expressed China’s desire to see Russia and Ukraine hold peace talks as early as possible and received a positive response. When virtually meeting with leaders of France and Germany, Xi emphasized the need to jointly support peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.
Yang Jiechi, the director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, just met with national security adviser Jake Sullivan in Rome, and State Councilor Wang Yi has also maintained close communication with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other foreign ministers, exchanging views on the Ukraine crisis. China has also outlined a six-point initiative that calls for making sure that humanitarian operations abide by the principles of neutrality and impartiality; gives full attention to the displaced persons in and from Ukraine; ensures the protection of civilians; provides for safe and smooth humanitarian aid activities; provides for the safety of foreign nationals in Ukraine; and supports the United Nations’ coordinating role in channeling humanitarian aid, as well as the work of the U.N. crisis coordinator for Ukraine. The first tranche of emergency humanitarian supplies provided by the Red Cross Society of China to its Ukrainian counterpart has been shipped from Beijing.
As a Chinese proverb goes, it takes more than one cold day to freeze three feet of ice. The long-term peace and stability of Europe relies on the principle of indivisible security. There must be a balanced, effective and sustainable European security architecture. The priority now is to achieve a cease-fire to protect civilians from war. But as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and a responsible major country, China will continue to coordinate real efforts to achieve lasting peace. We stand ready to do whatever we can and work with other parties. Our ultimate purpose is the end of war and support regional and global stability.
29. Xi Jinping’s Faltering Foreign Policy - The War in Ukraine and the Perils of Strongman Rule
Conclusion:
The combination of an unconstrained and nationalist autocrat who harbors an increasingly bleak view of the external environment makes for a potentially volatile period ahead. China’s position in global affairs is far more consequential today than it was during the Mao era. The international environment in which Xi attempts to steer Chinese interests is also significantly different from what it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Without the relative predictability of Cold War–era bipolarity, competition today is more complicated and harder to navigate. To compensate, the United States and its allies must prioritize direct communication with Xi to ensure that alternative ideas puncture his leadership bubble. It will also be critical for the leaders of like-minded countries to convey consistent messages during their own separate interactions with China’s leadership. After all, it is one thing for Xi to dismiss Washington as stuck in a “Cold War mentality” but another to ignore a broad coalition of democratic allies. Over the past four decades, China has repeatedly shown that it can change course before it courts disaster. The question now is whether it can do so again under Xi.
Xi Jinping’s Faltering Foreign Policy
The War in Ukraine and the Perils of Strongman Rule
March 16, 2022
Regardless of whether Beijing had advance warning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s decision to issue a statement last month outlining a “no limits” partnership with Moscow was arguably the single biggest foreign policy blunder of his nearly ten years in power. Russian President Vladimir Putin will receive the overwhelming share of the blowback for his unprovoked assault on Ukraine, but Xi’s public declaration, coupled with Beijing’s continued diplomatic support for Moscow, has undermined China’s reputation and provoked renewed concerns over its global ambitions. Indeed, the intensifying war in Ukraine has already prompted calls for Taiwan to improve its defense capabilities and has given security partnerships such as NATO, the Quad, and AUKUS a renewed sense of purpose.
Xi’s ill-advised support for Moscow on the eve of Russia’s disastrous military campaign is not his first major foreign policy misstep. His decision to retaliate against EU officials last March in response to sanctions over human rights abuses in Xinjiang cost Beijing a long-coveted investment deal with Europe. His threats toward Taiwan are driving Washington and Taipei closer together and forcing other regional powers, such as Australia and Japan, to declare their own compelling interest in Taiwan’s security. And the Chinese military’s 2020 clash with the Indian army in the Galwan Valley galvanized hard-line opinion in New Delhi. These mounting failures highlight an increasingly evident trend: the more powerful Xi becomes and the more direct authority he exerts over Beijing’s foreign policy, the more adverse the outcomes are for China’s long-term strategic interests. After decades of relatively nimble and effective maneuvering by the post-Mao leadership, Xi has wrenched foreign policy in a new direction—one defined by a greater tolerance for friction with the United States, Europe, and neighboring powers and characterized by little internal debate or external input. What is taking shape is less China’s foreign policy than Xi’s.
With Xi set to assume a third five-year term as China’s leader at the upcoming 20th Party Congress, it is critical for the United States and its allies to understand not just the drivers and contours of his foreign policy but the political and bureaucratic ecosystem in which he makes decisions. As Putin’s reckless gambit in Ukraine has proved, an autocratic leader surrounded by sycophants and fueled by historical grievances and territorial ambitions is a menacing prospect. Xi is not Putin, and China is not Russia, but it would be unwise to ignore the growing parallels.
THE STRONGMAN
To say that Xi has consolidated power in China is to state the obvious. Few dispute that Xi holds a singular position within China’s bureaucratic apparatus, and it is increasingly hard to deny that something akin to a personality cult is developing in state media and other propaganda channels. Yet the implications of this reality are insufficiently appreciated, especially its impact on the behavior of the Chinese party-state.
Consider a pattern that has emerged across authoritarian political systems in which leaders remain in office far longer than their democratic and term-limited counterparts. The longer a leader stays in power, the more state institutions lose their administrative competence and independence as they evolve to fit that leader’s personal preferences. Successive rounds of purges and promotions shape the character of the bureaucracy, moving it incrementally in the same direction as the leader’s grand vision. What might begin as formal punishment for explicit opposition to the leadership eventually becomes a climate of informal self-censorship as members of the bureaucracy come to understand the pointlessness of dissent and grow better attuned to unspoken expectations of compliance. The leader also becomes more distant and isolated, relying on a smaller and smaller group of trusted advisers to make decisions. Most of those individuals remain at the table because they display absolute loyalty.
This small circle, in turn, acts as the leader’s window to the world, leaving much dependent on how accurate a depiction of external reality its members choose to provide. Such an opaque decision-making process makes it difficult for external observers to interpret signals from the central leadership. But even more crucially, it makes it hard for actors within these autocratic systems to anticipate and interpret their leaders’ actions. The result is an increasingly unpredictable foreign policy, with the leader formulating snap decisions in secret and the rest of the bureaucracy racing to adapt and respond.
Xi is not Putin, and China is not Russia, but it would be unwise to ignore the growing parallels.
The obvious parallel in the Chinese case is Mao Zedong, who oversaw a tortuous hollowing out of China’s nascent political and administrative institutions. Subservience to Mao defined the bureaucracy, and promotions were based on ideological correctness. Although other actors influenced Beijing’s foreign policy, notably Premier Zhou Enlai, the most important factor shaping China’s strategic behavior was Mao’s personal opinion. But identifying Mao’s dominance over China’s bureaucracy did not by itself provide clues about future foreign policy decisions. Mao’s belief in global revolutionary struggle led him to support armed movements in Southeast Asia, and his sense of realpolitik led him to normalize relations with the archcapitalist United States just a few years later. The key point with Mao’s foreign policy, as it is today with Xi’s, was that external observers needed to be attuned to his worldview, his ambitions, and his anxieties if they were to understand, anticipate, and survive his moves.
Xi, of course, is not Mao. He has no desire to foment global revolution, and his view of the proper domestic political order is far more conservative than Mao’s was. It is also important to note that internal opposition to Xi’s increasingly nationalistic and bellicose foreign policy clearly exists and is likely to grow as his decisions take their toll on China’s interests. But at the same time, there is little a would-be opponent can do to meaningfully constrain Xi—such is the level of overwhelming political and bureaucratic authority he now wields. His supporters occupy positions at the apex of all of the state’s power centers, including the military, the domestic security sector, and the state-owned economy. Xi does not run China’s political system alone, but as in Putin’s Russia, the consolidation of personalized authority over an extended period of time has rewired the decision-making processes in favor of the incumbent and his advisers. As a result, on issues ranging from Taiwan to Ukraine, the entire political system in China waits for Xi’s orders. Foreign policy in the 20th Party Congress period, which lasts from 2022 to 2027, will therefore be driven by Xi’s subjective view of international events and the increasingly isolated decision-making ecosystem that surrounds him.
A TEAM OF SYCOPHANTS
What might this new era look like? On a practical level, it will feature the continued marginalization of the government’s externally facing bodies. Consider the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On paper, the MFA should be a vital conduit for understanding the actions and the intentions of China’s senior leadership on foreign policy. Indeed, this is why the MFA’s daily press conference was historically seen as important, as it was one of the few windows outside observers had into Beijing’s thinking. In practice, however, the MFA is increasingly scrambling to interpret signals coming down from Xi’s office, as evidenced by its frequently shifting day-to-day talking points on the Ukrainian crisis. The same dynamic exists within the Taiwan Affairs Office, which is, on paper at least, responsible for cross-strait policy. It has become apparent in recent years that the TAO is often blindsided by Xi’s decisions and left scrambling to both interpret and then implement his policies. It will be important to understand the functional realities of such bureaucratic marginalization moving forward, as statements by the Chinese government may not always accurately reflect Xi’s views. More important than traditional bureaucracies will be opaque and secretive bodies such as the National Security Commission and the various “leading small groups” that Xi commands.
Xi’s circle of advisers will also continue to shrink. Although it is not uncommon for leaders in any political system to prize the counsel of a select few voices, effective decision-making demands that these advisers bring competing points of view. There is still much to learn about how Putin came to believe that he could achieve a quick victory over Ukraine, but early signs indicate that his military advisers misled him about the true state of the Ukrainian army. This is a tragic reminder of how critical accurate information is to any political organization, especially in more closed and authoritarian systems. From what analysts understand, Xi’s confidants, including Li Zhanshu, Ding Xuexiang, and Wang Huning, are formidable bureaucratic actors, but there is no indication that they challenge his judgments or priors. And as some of these senior officials retire, Xi will be increasingly surrounded by younger, more inexperienced, and more pliant senior leaders. What Xi needs is a team of rivals. What he has now and will likely have in the future is a group of yes men.
Xi’s outlook on China’s security environment in the coming decade is increasingly pessimistic.
Then there is the critical issue of Xi’s worldview. It is becoming clear from his speeches and articles that Xi’s outlook on China’s security environment in the coming decade is increasingly pessimistic. As he said recently, “the international situation continues to undergo profound and complex changes,” adding that “the game of major powers is increasingly intense, [and] the world has entered a new period of turbulence and change.” The United States, Xi believes, has formalized a policy of containment toward Beijing. When Washington speaks of working with “allies and partners,” Xi hears echoes of Cold War–era encirclement, enacted through what he calls “exclusive small circles [and] blocs that polarize the world.” This diagnosis arguably led Xi to draw closer to Putin and Moscow in the months leading up to their meeting in February and is why he will not abandon Russia moving forward.
But it is not just pessimism that animates Xi’s worldview; it is a strong sense of nationalism, fueled by his confidence in the Chinese Communist Party’s economic and military power and his dismissive attitude toward the cohesion and stability of the United States and other democracies. Although it is arguably true that Beijing has overemphasized a narrative of U.S. decline for domestic propaganda purposes, Xi’s actions nevertheless indicate that he is comfortable asserting Beijing’s interests even when they clash with the capabilities and resolve of the United States and its allies. There are numerous examples of this dynamic, from China’s evisceration of Hong Kong’s democratic institutions to its ongoing campaign of economic coercion against Australia. The point here is less that Beijing adopts these confrontational policies without paying a price (it does) but rather that Xi’s risk tolerance appears to have grown in response to his shifting assessments of the global balance of power.
The combination of an unconstrained and nationalist autocrat who harbors an increasingly bleak view of the external environment makes for a potentially volatile period ahead. China’s position in global affairs is far more consequential today than it was during the Mao era. The international environment in which Xi attempts to steer Chinese interests is also significantly different from what it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Without the relative predictability of Cold War–era bipolarity, competition today is more complicated and harder to navigate. To compensate, the United States and its allies must prioritize direct communication with Xi to ensure that alternative ideas puncture his leadership bubble. It will also be critical for the leaders of like-minded countries to convey consistent messages during their own separate interactions with China’s leadership. After all, it is one thing for Xi to dismiss Washington as stuck in a “Cold War mentality” but another to ignore a broad coalition of democratic allies. Over the past four decades, China has repeatedly shown that it can change course before it courts disaster. The question now is whether it can do so again under Xi.
30. Opinion | This Is How World War III Begins
Excerpts:
There is now a serious risk that these illusions could collapse very suddenly. There’s little evidence so far that Putin is eager to cut his losses; on the contrary, to do so now — after incurring the economic price of sanctions but without achieving a clear victory — would jeopardize his grip on power.
Bottom line: Expect him to double down. If he uses chemical weapons, as Bashar al-Assad did, or deploys a battlefield nuclear weapon, in keeping with longstanding Russian military doctrine, does he lose more than he gains? The question answers itself. He wins swiftly. He terrifies the West. He consolidates power. He suffers consequences only marginally graver than the ones already inflicted. And his fellow travelers in Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang take note.
Opinion | This Is How World War III Begins
Bret Stephens
This Is How World War III Begins
March 15, 2022, 7:00 p.m. ET
Claggett Wilson’s “Flower of Death — The Bursting of a Heavy Shell — Not as It Looks, but as It Feels and Sounds and Smells,” circa 1919.Credit...Smithsonian American Art Museum
By
Opinion Columnist
The usual date given for the start of World War II is Sept. 1, 1939, when Hitler invaded Poland after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. But that was just one in a series of events that at the time could have seemed disconnected.
Among them: Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. The remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 and the Spanish Civil War, which started the same year. Anschluss with Austria and the Sudeten crisis of 1938. The Soviet invasion of Poland weeks after the German one and Germany’s western invasions the following year. Operation Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor in 1941.
The point is, World War II didn’t so much begin as it gathered, like water rising until it breaches a dam. We, too, have been living through years of rising waters, though it took Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for much of the world to notice.
Before the invasion, we had the Russian invasions of Georgia, Crimea and eastern Ukraine; the Russian carpet bombing of Aleppo; the use of exotic radioactive and chemical agents against Russian dissidents on British soil; Russian interference in U.S. elections and massive hacks of our computer networks; the murder of Boris Nemtsov and the blatant poisoning and imprisonment of Alexei Navalny.
Were any of these sovereignty violations, legal violations, treaty violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity met with a strong, united, punitive response that could have averted the next round of outrages? Did Western responses to other violations of global norms — Syria’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, Beijing’s eradication of Hong Kong’s autonomy, Iran’s war by proxy against its neighbors — give Vladimir Putin pause?
In short, did Putin have any reason to think, before Feb. 24, that he wouldn’t be able to get away with his invasion?
He didn’t. Contrary to the claim that Putin’s behavior is a result of Western provocation — like refusing to absolutely rule out eventual NATO membership for Ukraine — the West has mainly spent 22 years placating Putin through a long cycle of resets and wrist slaps. The devastation of Ukraine is the fruit of this appeasement.
The Biden administration now faces the question of whether it wants to bring this cycle to an end. The answer isn’t clear. Sanctions have hurt the Russian economy, arms shipments to Ukraine have helped to slow the Russian advance, and Russia’s brutality has unified NATO. This is to the president’s credit.
But the administration continues to operate under a series of potentially catastrophic illusions.
Sanctions may devastate Russia in the long term. But the immediate struggle in Ukraine is short term. Insofar as one of the main effects of sanctions has been to send tens of thousands of middle-class Russians into exile, they actually help Putin by weakening a potent base of political opposition. As for the oligarchs, they might have lost their yachts, but they’re not about to pick up their guns.
Arming Ukraine with Javelin and Stinger missiles has wounded and embarrassed the Russian military. Providing Kyiv with MIG-29 fighter jets and other potentially game-changing weapon systems could help turn the tide. Refusing to do so may only prolong Ukraine’s agony.
Frequent suggestions that Putin has already lost the war or that he can’t possibly win when Ukrainians are united in their hatred for him or that he’s looking for an offramp — and that we should be thinking up ingenious ways to provide him with one — may turn out to be right. But they are grossly premature. This war is only in its third week; it took the Nazis longer to conquer Poland. The ability to subdue a restive population is chiefly a function of the pain an occupier is willing to inflict. For a primer on that, look at what Putin did to Grozny in his first year in office.
Refusing to impose a no-fly zone in Ukraine may be justified because it exceeds the risks NATO countries are prepared to tolerate. But the idea that doing so could start World War III ignores history and telegraphs weakness. Americans squared off with Soviet pilots operating under Chinese or North Korean cover in the Korean War without blowing up the world. And our vocal aversion to confrontation is an invitation, not a deterrent, to Russian escalation.
There is now a serious risk that these illusions could collapse very suddenly. There’s little evidence so far that Putin is eager to cut his losses; on the contrary, to do so now — after incurring the economic price of sanctions but without achieving a clear victory — would jeopardize his grip on power.
Bottom line: Expect him to double down. If he uses chemical weapons, as Bashar al-Assad did, or deploys a battlefield nuclear weapon, in keeping with longstanding Russian military doctrine, does he lose more than he gains? The question answers itself. He wins swiftly. He terrifies the West. He consolidates power. He suffers consequences only marginally graver than the ones already inflicted. And his fellow travelers in Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang take note.
How does the next world war begin? The same way the last one did.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.