Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Knowledge makes man unfit to be a slave.”

- Frederick Douglas

"Think not of the books you've bought as a "to be read" pile. INstead, think of your bookcase as a wine cellar. You collect books to read at the right time, the right place, and the right mood."

- Luc van Donkersgoed

Characteristics of the American Way of War (10 of 13)

10. Profoundly Regular. Few, if any, armies have been equally competent in the conduct of regular and irregular warfare. The U.S. Army is no exception to that rule. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have registered occasional successes in irregular warfare, while individual Americans have proved themselves adept at the conduct of guerrilla warfare. As institutions, however, the U.S. armed forces have not been friendly either to irregular warfare or to their own would-be practitioners and advocates of what was regarded as the sideshow of unconventional warfare or counterinsurgency. American soldiers have been overwhelmingly regular in their view of, approach to, and skill in, warfare. They have always prepared near exclusively for "real war," which is to say combat against a tolerably symmetrical, regular enemy. Irregular warfare--or low-intensity conflict (LIC) as denominated by the inclusive and therefore vague 1960s term-of-art--has been regarded as a lesser but included class of challenge. In other words, a good regular army has been assumed to be capable of turning its strengths to meet irregular enemies, whereas the reverse would not be true. It has not generally been appreciated that LIC is not simply a scaled-down version of "real war," but requires an entirely different mindset, doctrine, and training.

The United States has a storehouse of first-hand historical experience which should educate its soldiers in the need to recognize that regular and irregular warfare are significantly different. That educational process still has a distance to travel, but it will travel nowhere without steady endorsement from senior leadership, which appears to be forthcoming at present. Anyone in need of persuasion as to the extent of the regularity of the mindset dominant in America's military institutions need look no further than to the distinctly checkered history of the country's Special Operations Forces (SOF), as we observed earlier.

America's SOF have endured a Cinderella existence. They have prospered somewhat with episodic civilian political sponsorship, but not until very recent times have they been regarded and treated as an important element in the combined arms team. In the 1960s, for example, notwithstanding the enthusiasm of some "new frontiersmen" for the green berets in COIN, SOF efforts were accommodated all too well within the conventional grand designs of MACV. Also, in Vietnam and since, there is some tension between SOF as the expert practitioners of unconventional warfare, and SOF in the local liaison and training roles so vital for COIN. Even a very regular military mind can be attracted to SOF if their assigned tasks are aggressive offensive actions undertaken on a very small scale. In other words, some special operations can appear simply to be scaled-down versions of the traditional American style in war.

The SOF are America's irregular regulars. How they are permitted to operate, and how well or poorly their duties fit into a comprehensive grand design for COIN, for example, tell us how far America's regular military establishment has moved towards incorporating an irregular instrument in its toolkit.83 The jury is still out on whether today, really for the first time, the armed forces will succeed in making doctrinal and operational sense of their invaluable special warriors. On one hand, historical experience inclines one to be skeptical, but on the other, never before has the country elevated irregular enemies to the status of the dominant threat of an era.

- Colin Gray, 2006

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 15, 2023

2. James Zumwalt: China’s Doomsday Plan For America

3. The Kremlin’s Never-Ending Attempt to Spread Disinformation about Biological Weapons (Global Engagement Center)

4. China has a plan to lead the world. What's ours?

5. The Strange Case of Iraq Syndrome

6. How China Became a Peacemaker in the Middle East

7. Russian leadership approved actions of jets that damaged U.S. drone, officials say

8. Russia Wants a Long War: The West Needs to Send Ukraine More Arms, More Quickly

9. Why Sending F-16s to Ukraine Would Be a Mistake

10. A Solution for Japan’s Military Mismatch

11. Pentagon Creates Cell to Oversee Expansion of Weapon Production Lines

12. How the US plans to expand its submarine industrial base for AUKUS

13. Ideology is back, and it’s critical for understanding AUKUS v China

14. Exclusive: Chinese-made drone, retrofitted and weaponized, downed in eastern Ukraine

15. What Russia's possible collapse could mean for China

16. Blind Sided: A Reconceptualization of the Role of Emerging Technologies in Shaping Information Operations in the Gray Zone

17. Munitions Return to a Place of Prominence in National Security

18. Rebel youth risk life and limb in Myanmar’s cruel war

19. Eye on Taiwan, US-Philippines to stage largest-ever wargames

20. Michael Klare, Is War with China Inevitable?

21. Weaponizing Rights: An Untapped Tool for Special Operations Forces

22. New Baumholder special operations hub allocated $64 million in 2024 proposal

23. Interior Lines Will Make Land Power the Asymmetric Advantage in the Indo-Pacific

24. Violent Far-Right Movements Aren’t Just a ‘Western Problem’

25. Army Asks for Massive Cash Boost for New Barracks

26. CIA's Coming Tech Revolution

27. Why Won’t the West Let Ukraine Win Against Russia? By John Bolton

28. This Is What We Do in America. We Pause. We Forget. Then We Begin the Next War.

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 15, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2023

Key Takeaways

The overall pace of Russian operations in Ukraine appears to have decreased compared to previous weeks.
The overall Wagner Group offensive on Bakhmut appears to be nearing culmination.
International journalists reportedly obtained the Kremlin’s long-term strategy document for destabilizing and reintegrating Moldova back into the Russian sphere of influence by 2030.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin commented on the reports about the dismissal of the Russian Commander of the Airborne Forces Mikhail Teplinsky - likely revealing Teplinsky’s affiliation with Wagner.
The Russian State Duma adopted the law on punishment for “discreditation” of all participants of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on March 14 to foster self-censorship in Russian society.
Continued Russian efforts to portray the war in Ukraine as existential to Russian domestic security by establishing additional air defense installations in areas that will never see hostilities is reportedly sparking internal backlash.
Russian President Vladimir Putin used his March 15 meeting with the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office to continue to bolster his reputation as an involved and effective wartime leader.
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Moscow, Russia on March 15.
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks northwest of Svatove and conducted limited ground attacks on the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces continued advancing in and around Bakhmut and conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct offensive actions across the Kakhovka Reservoir in Kherson Oblast.
The Kremlin reportedly tasked the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to recruit 400,000 contract servicemen starting on April 1.
Ukrainian partisans killed a Russian collaborator in an IED attack in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 15, 2023

Mar 15, 2023 - Press ISW

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 15, 2023

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 15, 7:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The overall pace of Russian operations in Ukraine appears to have decreased compared to previous weeks. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Defense Forces, Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi, stated on March 15 that Russian offensive actions have decreased significantly over the last week and noted that daily Russian ground attacks have decreased from 90 to 100 attacks per day to 20 to 29 per day.[1] Dmytrashkivskyi reported that Russian forces have somewhat lost offensive potential due to significant manpower and equipment losses.[2] Dmytrashkivskyi’s statements are consistent with ISW’s general observation regarding the pace of Russian operations along the entire frontline in Ukraine. The Russian offensive operation in Luhansk Oblast is likely nearing culmination, if it has not already culminated, although Russia has committed most elements of at least three divisions to the Svatove-Kreminna line.[3] Russian forces have made only minimal tactical gains along the entire Luhansk Oblast frontline over the last week, and Ukrainian forces have likely recently managed to conduct counterattacks and regain territory in Luhansk Oblast.[4] ISW has been unable to confirm the commitment of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) to the offensive in Luhansk Oblast since certain unspecified elements reportedly deployed to Luhansk Oblast in January--the only large formation assessed to be operational but not yet engaged.[5] It is unclear if the 2nd Motor Rifle Division has already deployed and has not been observed or if it is waiting to deploy to either Luhansk Oblast or other areas of the front. The commitment of two or three of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division’s constituent regiments, however, is unlikely to significantly delay or reverse the culmination of the Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast, especially considering that at least five Russian regiments have definitely been fully committed in this area, likely along with several others, but Russian forces have still been unable to make substantial gains.[6]

The overall Wagner Group offensive on Bakhmut additionally appears to be nearing culmination. Ukrainian military sources have noted a markedly decreased number of attacks in and around Bakhmut, particularly over the last few days.[7] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has recently emphasized the toll that a reported lack of ammunition is having on Wagner’s ability to pursue offensives on Bakhmut and stated on March 15 that due to ammunition shortages and heavy fighting, Wagner has had to expand its encirclement of Bakhmut.[8] Prigozhin notably claimed that Wagner captured Zalizianske, a tiny rural settlement 9km northwest of Bakhmut on the east side of the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway, which indicates that Wagner forces are likely conducting opportunistic localized attacks on settlements further north of Bakhmut that are small and relatively easier to seize.[9] Recent Wagner gains north of Bakhmut suggest that manpower, artillery, and equipment losses in fights for Bakhmut will likely constrain Wagner’s ability to complete a close encirclement of Bakhmut or gain substantial territory in battles for urban areas. The capture of Zalizianske and other similarly small towns north of Bakhmut and east of the E40 highway is extremely unlikely to enhance Wagner’s ability to capture Bakhmut itself or make other operationally significant gains. It therefore is likely that Wagner’s offensive on Bakhmut is increasingly nearing culmination. Russian forces would likely have to commit significant reserves to prevent this culmination. They may be able to do so, as ISW has observed elements of Russian airborne regiments in and around Bakhmut that do not seem to be heavily committed to the fighting at the moment. The Russians might also commit elements of other conventional units, including possibly the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, or units drawn from elsewhere in the theater. But it seems that the Wagner offensive itself will not be sufficient to seize Bakhmut. Russian forces are not pursuing active or successful offensive operations elsewhere in theater, and as the pace of operations slows along critical sectors of the front, Ukrainian forces likely have an increased opportunity to regain the initiative.

International journalists reportedly obtained the Kremlin’s long-term strategy document for destabilizing Moldova and reintegrating it back into the Russian sphere of influence by 2030.[10] The Kyiv Independent, Yahoo News, and several other international news partners released details of the Moldova report, reportedly originating from the same document as the leaked Belarus annexation strategy document.[11] Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean reportedly saw the document and stated that it is consistent with Moldova’s assessments of Russia’s ongoing campaign to undermine Moldovan sovereignty.[12] ISW is unable to confirm the existence or authenticity of this document, but the document’s political lines of effort are consistent with recent Russian efforts to destabilize Moldova.[13]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin commented on the reports about the dismissal of the Russian Commander of the Airborne (VDV) Forces Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky (first reported on January 20) - likely revealing Teplinsky’s affiliation with Wagner. Prigozhin stated on March 15 that Teplinsky is an honest and competent commander whom he had met before the war in passing and during “tragic” operations near Berestove, Donetsk Oblast.[14] Prigozhin stated that one of the possible reasons behind Teplinsky’s dismissal was his refusal to lie about the situation on the frontlines. Prigozhin also claimed that Teplinsky expressed his ”honest opinion,” which had saved many paratroopers. Prigozhin stated that he hopes that commanders like Teplinsky and former theater commander in Ukraine, Army General Sergey Surovikin, would take senior positions in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Ukrainian intelligence previously linked Surovikin to Wagner, and Prigozhin’s praise for Teplinsky is similar to the praise he offered Surovikin in October 2022.[15] ISW previously observed Wagner-affiliated milblogger claims about Teplinsky’s dismissal on January 20 attributed to a reported disagreement with the Russian General Staff.[16] These claims emerged only nine days after Surovikin’s dismissal from the position of theater commander and his new subordination under Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on January 11.[17] Gerasimov may have removed Teplinsky as a result of his affiliation with Wagner, if the reports about his dismissal are true.

The Russian State Duma adopted the law on punishment for “discreditation” of all participants of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on March 14 to foster self-censorship within Russian society. Individuals found guilty of discrediting participants in combat operations will receive a fine of up to five million rubles ($65,530), up to five years of correctional or forced labor, or up to seven years in prison.[18] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin responded to a journalist’s question about the law on March 15 stating that while he initiated and supported this law, he expected that it would not protect Wagner commanders and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) from criticism.[19] Prigozhin noted that he is not worried about being accused of discrediting the Russian MoD because he ”only speaks the truth” and has lawyers review all of his ”carefully worded” social media posts. Prigozhin also implied that Russia cannot physically arrest 146 million Russians, further indicating that this law aims to encourage self-censorship among Russians and hinting that many Russians share his views critical of the MoD.

Continued Russian efforts to portray the war in Ukraine as existential to Russian domestic security by establishing additional air defense installations in areas that will never see hostilities is reportedly sparking internal backlash. Russian independent opposition outlet The Insider reported on March 14 that Russian forces are establishing additional S-400 air defense systems in residential areas and protected nature zones in Moscow, generating backlash for potentially endangering civilians and cutting down heavily forested areas for the installations.[20] The Insider reported that Kremlin-affiliated Telegram channels denied reports of the additional air defense installations.[21] The Bryansk Oblast Duma reported on March 9 that Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapolov proposed using public utilities payments to fund the installation of air defense systems to defend against ”terrorist attacks.”[22] The Bryansk Oblast Duma later removed this initiative from its website after the initiative garnered public attention on March 15 and blamed its publication on unspecified hackers.[23]

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his March 15 meeting with the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office to continue to bolster his reputation as an involved and effective wartime leader.[24] Putin identified several lines of the war effort for the Prosecutor General’s Office to regulate and improve upon, including timely payment and social support to Russian military personnel and their families, timely payment for defense industrial base (DIB) workers, proper usage of the DIB’s allocated funds, law enforcement efforts in occupied Ukraine, and measures to support and protect orphaned children. Putin praised the Prosecutor General’s Office for its ongoing efforts but emphasized throughout his speech that Russia needs more weapons and protection against external threats. Putin has attempted to reinvigorate his image as a wartime leader since late 2022 by framing himself as mobilizing the Russian DIB to a robust wartime footing.[25] He is also working to mobilize the DIB, but publicized meetings of this type are more likely staged for imagistic purposes than effective.

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Syrian President Bashar Assad in Moscow, Russia on March 15. NOTE: A version of this text will also appear in The Critical Threat Project’s (CTP) March 15 Iran Update.

Russian news outlet RIA Novosti claimed that Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov said that topics for discussion included Syria-Russian relations, Syrian post-war reconstruction, and Syrian-Turkish relations.[26] According to the Kremlin readout of the meeting, Assad thanked Putin for the Russian military’s ”decisive contribution” in Syria.[27] Putin likely used the meeting to foster relationships with international partner states such as Syria and maintain Russia’s stake in Levantine affairs. Assad regime officials used the meeting to discuss issues surrounding the attempted and struggling Ankara-Damascus rapprochement with their Russian counterparts. State-affiliated Syrian media refuted recent Turkish claims that ministerial-level Iran-Syria-Russia-Turkey quadrilateral rapprochement talks would occur in Moscow on March 15 and 16, as CTP previously reported.[28] The Assad regime’s decision to discuss rapprochement issues with Russian officials after refusing to participate in the quadrilateral meetings may be part of a negotiating strategy intended to strengthen the Syrian position with intentional ambiguity.

Key Takeaways

The overall pace of Russian operations in Ukraine appears to have decreased compared to previous weeks.
The overall Wagner Group offensive on Bakhmut appears to be nearing culmination.
International journalists reportedly obtained the Kremlin’s long-term strategy document for destabilizing and reintegrating Moldova back into the Russian sphere of influence by 2030.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin commented on the reports about the dismissal of the Russian Commander of the Airborne Forces Mikhail Teplinsky - likely revealing Teplinsky’s affiliation with Wagner.
The Russian State Duma adopted the law on punishment for “discreditation” of all participants of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on March 14 to foster self-censorship in Russian society.
Continued Russian efforts to portray the war in Ukraine as existential to Russian domestic security by establishing additional air defense installations in areas that will never see hostilities is reportedly sparking internal backlash.
Russian President Vladimir Putin used his March 15 meeting with the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office to continue to bolster his reputation as an involved and effective wartime leader.
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Moscow, Russia on March 15.
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks northwest of Svatove and conducted limited ground attacks on the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces continued advancing in and around Bakhmut and conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct offensive actions across the Kakhovka Reservoir in Kherson Oblast.
The Kremlin reportedly tasked the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to recruit 400,000 contract servicemen starting on April 1.
Ukrainian partisans killed a Russian collaborator in an IED attack in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks northwest of Svatove on March 15. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that six Russian assault groups of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) seized part of an unspecified industrial zone and unspecified Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction, but ISW is unable to confirm the MoD’s vague claim.[29]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line and south of Kreminna on March 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (26km south of Kreminna).[30] A Russian source claimed that the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Guards Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) is conducting positional battles along the Ploshchanka-Zhuravka gully line northwest of Kreminna and southwest of Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[31] Another Russian source claimed that Russian forces attacked Bilohorivka, Nevske (18km northwest of Bilohorivka), and Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna), and advanced towards Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna).[32] A Ukrainian source claimed that a Ukrainian tank used foggy weather to conduct a surprise indirect fire attack against Russian positions 20km away near Lysychansk.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued advancing in and around Bakhmut on March 15. Geolocated footage posted on March 14 shows Wagner Group forces fighting for new positions about 4km northwest of Bakhmut, indicating that Wagner has advanced northwest of Bakhmut towards the Bohdanivka-Khromove line.[34] Geolocated footage posted on March 15 additionally shows that Russian forces have advanced to new positions in northern Bakhmut, just east of the AZOM complex.[35] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner fighters captured Zaliznianske (9km northwest of Bakhmut) and are ”expanding the encirclement of Bakhmut,“ which was amplified by numerous milbloggers.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner made additional gradual advances northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka, Dubovo-Vasylivka, and Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and one milblogger suggested that these gains may allow Russian forces to open an avenue of advance towards Siversk (about 30km northeast of Bakhmut).[37] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Wagner fighters continue to fight in the tunnels of the AZOM complex in northern Bakhmut and have advanced across Korsunskoho Street towards the Bakhmut Industrial College in southern Bakhmut.[38] Russian sources reported fighting near Ivanivske (5km west of Bakhmut) and claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in this area.[39] One milblogger claimed that Russian troops completely cover the Bakhmut-Khromove route with ATGM fire.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (12km northwest), Yahidne (1km northwest), and Bohdanivka (6km northwest) and west of Bakhmut near Khromove (3km west).[41]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on March 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the Avdiivka area near Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka), Kamianka (4km northeast of Avdiivka), Severne (5km west of Avdiivka), and Novokalynove (13km northwest of Avdiivka); on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Vodyane; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka.[42] The spokesperson for the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Defense Forces, Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi, stated that Russian forces conducted five attacks against Ukrainian positions on the night of March 14 to 15 in this direction.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue to attack towards Ukrainian fortifications in Avdiivka and near Nevelske and Pervomaiske and are fighting in western Marinka, where geolocated footage shows Russian forces have made marginal advances toward Lesi Ukrainky street.[44] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia posted footage of the 5th Brigade of the 1st DNR Army Corps striking Ukrainian forces in Marinka.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on March 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Vuhledar, 30km southwest of Donetsk City.[46] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian troops in this area conducted unsuccessful attacks on Russian forward positions in unspecified areas on March 15.[47] A Russian milblogger posted footage of mortarmen of the 5th Separate Guards Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) firing on Ukrainian strongholds in the dacha area southeast of Vuhledar.[48] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense posted an image on March 14 reportedly of a Russian diary found near Vuhledar that shows huge losses during Russian assaults in the area.[49] The diary details that during assaults over the course of four days, 57 of the 434 Russian soldiers sent into battles survived, which is just over a 13% survival rate.[50] A milblogger affiliated with Southern Military District (SMD) tank elements discussed footage of elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade detonating a mine near Vuhledar and noted that this demonstrates that Russian forces are rushing operations and failing to employ sound mine-clearing practices.[51]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct offensive actions across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. The milblogger claimed on March 15 that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct an amphibious assault from Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast across the Kakhovka reservoir towards Russian positions along the east (left) bank of the reservoir in Zaporizhia Oblast.[52]

Russian forces continue constructing defensive fortifications in southern Ukraine. Satellite imagery posted on March 14 shows an increase in Russian fortifications near Chystopillia, Zaporizhia Oblast (just north of Tokmak) between December 4, 2022, and March 9, 2023. The satellite imagery also shows that Russian forces have increased the number of barriers and trenches along roads in Kherson Oblast leading into occupied Crimea over the past few months.[53] A Russian milblogger published footage on March 15 claiming to show Bashkort Regiment-built Russian fortifications along the Kakhovka Reservoir beach and claimed that Russian forces mined the beach.[54]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is in working order, despite recent international concern over the state of the plant.[55] The milblogger posted footage on March 14 allegedly visiting the ZNPP.[56] The milblogger claimed that Rosgvardia servicemen guard the ZNPP, Russian military chemists safely monitor radiation levels, and that there has not been a ”critical situation“ regarding the safe operation of the plant.[57] Russian forces continue to attempt to portray themselves as the only responsible body for operating the ZNPP despite continuing to militarize the plant.[58]

Russian forces conducted routine shelling in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on March 15.[59]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin reportedly tasked the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to recruit 400,000 contract servicemen starting April 1.[60] Kremlin-affiliated local outlet URA.Ru reported that different Russian federal subjects are receiving quotas for recruitment - with Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk oblasts each receiving orders for 10,000 contract servicemen, for example.[61] Military recruitment centers will carry out most of the preliminary work, and local governors will disseminate information regarding recruitment campaigns.[62] Media organizations and press services of municipalities will also advertise contract military service online and make public announcements in their communities. Some local administrations are preparing to offer additional enlistment bonuses to recruits of 300,000 rubles ($3,932). The Russian MoD did not issue a formal announcement of a contract service recruitment campaign, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that the Kremlin is not considering launching a second mobilization wave at this time.[63]

Russian military recruitment centers have reportedly begun advertising contract service in select regions. Civilian men in Lipetsk, Penza, and Voronezh oblasts reported receiving notices to appear in military recruitment centers to ”update their military records.”[64] ISW observed the distribution of similar summonses prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and during the summer volunteer recruitment campaign. The summonses are not mobilization or conscription notices, and Russian recruitment centers have been using these summonses to lure and coerce men into enlisting. The Kremlin’s renewed volunteer recruitment campaign is unlikely to recruit the desired number of contract servicemen – just as the previous contract recruitment campaigns failed to do before the full-scale invasion and during the summer of 2022. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced on December 21, 2022, that the Russian Armed Forces seeks to employ 521,000 contract servicemen by the end of 2023.[65]

Renewed volunteer recruitment campaigns are also unlikely to generate combat-effective forces, as Russian forces continue to lack competent junior officers and commanders and suffer from a general lack of professionalism within the ranks. A Russian milblogger reported that many of his acquaintances serving in Ukraine were rapidly promoted to lieutenant ranks.[66] The milblogger noted that Russian sergeants should undergo accelerated six-month lieutenant courses before becoming lieutenants.[67] Another Russian milblogger expressed surprise at commanders’ ”managerial illiteracy” when he visited the frontlines. The milblogger noted that the Russian MoD needs to teach commanders proper management and claimed that Russian commanders are not helping with the organization of volunteer elements into one unit.[68] The milblogger suggested that the Russian Armed Forces follow US tactics and incorporate civilian contractors to teach commanders management skills. Another milblogger claimed that commanders of an unnamed military unit in southern Russia sunk two combat vehicles and killed several servicemen when training a unit how to cross water barriers.[69]

Wagner Group continues to expand its recruitment campaigns to reach unusual audiences. Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin responded to a journalist’s question about Wagner advertising recruitment drives on adult entertainment websites and Telegram channels.[70] Prigozhin denied authorizing such ads but noted that it is a good idea to recruit forces on such websites.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans killed a Russian collaborator in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on March 14. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on March 14 and 15 that Ukrainian partisans used an IED to blow up the car of Russian collaborator Ivan Tkach in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, on March 14.[71] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated on March 15 that Tkach was one of the first collaborators to provide Russian forces with transportation in Melitopol, including co-opting bus lines to transport Russian forces to the frontlines.[72]

Russian forces and officials continue to deport Ukrainian children and other vulnerable people to Russia under the guise of rest and treatment. Deputy Ukrainian Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk stated on March 15 that Russian forces are resorting to gross deception of vulnerable people and are offering children rest and rehabilitation in Russia.[73] Vereshchuk stated that some Ukrainian parents give written consent for their children to travel to Russia but are later unable to retrieve their children.[74] Forced deportation of children under the guise of rest and rehabilitation schemes likely forms the backbone of a large-scale Russian campaign to depopulate areas of Ukraine that may amount to the violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and constitute a wider ethnic cleansing effort, as ISW has previously assessed.[75]

Russian forces and occupation authorities continue to intensify law enforcement measures as they suffer losses in occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 15 that Russian occupation authorities are intensifying law enforcement measures in individual settlements of Kherson Oblast after Ukrainian forces inflicted fire damage on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River on March 12 and 13.[76] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Russian occupation authorities are conducting counter-sabotage measures in an unspecified settlement in occupied Kherson Oblast after alleging that locals had murdered a Russian soldier in the settlement.[77]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian legal and administrative systems. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik announced on March 14 that he signed two laws to further define the administrative structure in occupied Luhansk Oblast according to Russian standards.[78] Pasechnik stated that the new laws regulate the internal structure of occupied Luhansk Oblast by establishing 11 city and 17 municipal districts.[79] Pasechnik claimed that the laws serve as the basis for organizing public authority in cities and districts, as well as allowing local residents to receive social support and medical services.[80]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Russian forces continue to train in Belarus. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 15 that Russian forces train on an unspecified training ground in Belarus.[81]

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued its March initiative to call up reservists for training as part of planned combat readiness checks. The Belarusian MoD claimed on March 15 that the military commissariat in the Oktyabrsky Raion of Minsk began calling up reservists as part of Belarusian measures to increase military readiness.[82]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/03/15/aktyvnist-nastupalnyh-dij-voroga-u-porivnyanni-z-mynulym-tyzhnem-znachno-znyzylasya/

[2] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/03/15/aktyvnist-nastupalnyh-dij-voroga-u-porivnyanni-z-mynulym-tyzhnem-znachno-znyzylasya/

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[4] https://focus dot ua/uk/voennye-novosti/554474-osvobodili-neskolko-sel-vsu-pokazali-kak-probivayutsya-k-svatovo-video; https://focus dot ua/voennye-novosti/554474-osvobodili-neskolko-sel-vsu-pokazali-kak-probivayutsya-k-svatovo-video; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1635971521914056707; https://twitte...

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[7] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/12/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-vidbuvsya-161-obstril/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/11/za-mynulu-dobu-53-boyezitknennya-ta-ponad-pivtory-sotni-artobstriliv-sergij-cherevatyj/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JWYwkfVD7zMgRMv6RU...

[8] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/591

[9] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/591

[10] https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-russias-secret-document-for-destabilizi... https://kyivindependent dot com/investigations/leaked-document-exposes-kremlins-10-year-plan-to-undermine-moldova; https://epl.delfi dot ee/artikkel/120158094/me-otsisime-ules-kremli-salajase-moldova-plaani-autori-ja-helistasime-talle; https://www.expressen dot se/nyheter/ny-lacka-inifran-kreml-avslojar-putins-hemliga-planer-for-moldavien/; https://dossier dot center/mld-gas/; https://frontstory dot pl/moldawia-rosja-putin-plan-tajny-dokument-kreml/; https://www.rise dot md/articol/planul-kremlinului-pentru-moldova/; https://www.sueddeutsche dot de/projekte/artikel/politik/russland-moldau-strategiepapier-e302625/; https://www1.wdr dot de/nachrichten/guten-morgen-112.html; https://www.ndr dot de/nachrichten/info/Internes-Strategiepapier-Russlands-Plan-fuer-Moldau,audio1339340.html

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[12] https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-russias-secret-document-for-destabilizi...

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[14] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/594

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[18] https://t.me/tvrain/63817; http://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-mar-13-...

[19] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/592

[20] https://theins dot ru/politika/259760

[21] https://theins dot ru/politika/259760

[22] https://archive.ph/0TTOU#selection-1795.95-1795.207

[23] https://t.me/rbc_news/70276; https://t.me/boduma32/1705; https://duma32 dot ru/events/8520/; https://meduza.io/news/2023/03/15/bryanskie-deputaty-predlozhili-vklyuch...

[24] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70678

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[26] https://ria dot ru/20230315/siriya-1858023809.html

[27] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70680

[28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-13-2023

[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/24826

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JWYwkfVD7zMgRMv6RU...

[31] https://t.me/rybar/44666

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/11395

[33] https://t.me/k_2_54/62

[34] https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1635775715819024384; https://twitt... https://t.me/Tsaplienko/28064

[35] https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1636039610437443588; https://twitter.com/herooftheday10/status/1636014850475188225

[36] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/591; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80489; https://t.me/rybar/44663; https://t.me/smotri_z/12303; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23280; https://t.me/readovkanews/54740; https://t.me/readovkanews/54734; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23273 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/54... https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80480; https://t.me/milchronicles/1669

[37] https://t.me/rybar/44663; https://t.me/readovkanews/54740; https://t.me/readovkanews/54734; http... https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80514; https://t.me/brussinf/5762; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/57067

[38] https://t.me/rybar/44663; https://t.me/milchronicles/1670; https://t.m... https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/57047

[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80514; https://t.me/brussinf/5762; https://t...

[40] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46112

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JWYwkfVD7zMgRMv6RU...

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JWYwkfVD7zMgRMv6RU... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cpjKpGaViPqCndK6MWx...

[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/03/15/aktyvnist-nastupalnyh-dij-voroga-u-porivnyanni-z-mynulym-tyzhnem-znachno-znyzylasya/

[44] https://twitter.com/mon_mon_1064552/status/1635937351498371072; https:/... https://t.me/wargonzo/11395; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46090

[45] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10009

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JWYwkfVD7zMgRMv6RU...

[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/24828; https://t.me/mod_russia/24829

[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80465

[49] https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1635610726734626816?s=20 ; https:/...

[50] https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1635610726734626816?s=20 ; https:/...

[51] https://t.me/grey_zone/17753 ; https://t.me/tankistrossii100/1044

[52] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7339

[53] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1635725244852838400?s=20; https://t.co/km9lFOldbe

[54] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7339; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7341

[55] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-150-iaea-director-g... https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-148-iaea-director-g... https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-144-iaea-director-g... https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-149-iaea-director-g... https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-148-iaea-director-g...

[56] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7336

[57] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7336

[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cpjKpGaViPqCndK6MWx... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JWYwkfVD7zMgRMv6RU... https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/2903;

[60] https://vot-tak dot tv/novosti/10-03-2023-nabor-kontraktnikov-minoborony

[61] https://www.svoboda.org/a/smi-v-rossii-nachinaetsya-novyy-nabor-kontrakt...

[62] https://vot-tak dot tv/novosti/10-03-2023-nabor-kontraktnikov-minoborony

[63] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/17264595

[64] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/03/15/v-regionah-rossii-nachali-rassylat-povestki-dlya-utochneniya-dannyh-kreml-govorit-chto-eto-obychnaya-praktika; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/9998; https://t.me/meduzalive/80289; https://t.me/govvrn36/9844; . https://... org/a/smi-v-rossii-nachinaetsya-novyy-nabor-kontraktnikov-tselj---400-tysyach-chelovek/32318394.html

[65] https://telegra dot ph/Tezisy-vystupleniya-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-na-rasshirennom-zasedanii-Kollegii-Ministerstva-oborony-12-21

[66] https://t.me/notes_veterans/8484

[67] https://t.me/notes_veterans/8484

[68] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/6534; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/19947

[69] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1635743193638551567?s=20;

[70] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/593

[71] https://t.me/vrogov/8146; https://t.me/vrogov/8148; https://t.me/ivan_...

[72] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1517; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_m...

[73] https://minre.gov dot ua/2023/03/15/dlya-deportacziyi-okupanty-zamanyuyut-ditej-iz-tot-na-terytoriyu-rf-na-vidpochynok-abo-likuvannya/

[74] https://minre.gov dot ua/2023/03/15/dlya-deportacziyi-okupanty-zamanyuyut-ditej-iz-tot-na-terytoriyu-rf-na-vidpochynok-abo-likuvannya/

[75] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[76] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JWYwkfVD7zMgRMv6RU...

[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JWYwkfVD7zMgRMv6RU...

[78] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/872

[79] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/872

[80] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/872

[81] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ExukqVrrGfWSjg6uL6J...

[82] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cpjKpGaViPqCndK6MWx...

James Zumwalt: China’s Doomsday Plan For America

“One Mountain Does Not Allow Two Tigers To Live Together” Wake Up Call

https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/james-zumwalt-chinas-doomsday-plan

AND Magazine

Mar 14

A Chinese “weather balloon” paid the ultimate price of destruction after violating U.S. airspace, transiting across America, and meeting its demise over U.S. territorial waters six miles off the South Carolina coast at the hands of an F-22 pilot firing an air-to-air missile on February 4, 2023. As additional balloons launched by China around the globe and over the U.S. are being detected and destroyed, a U.S. national security threat assessment is in order. Ironically, however, based on the contents of a 2003 speech delivered at a secret meeting in China, such an assessment could well have been done long before the first balloon was ever launched. Discussion on the contents of that speech is particularly important as China now demands an apology from the U.S.

U.S. Navy divers managed to recover remnants of the downed balloon which were then sent to the FBI for examination. That examination has revealed, contrary to Beijing’s claim, it was not a weather balloon that had simply veered off course. Instead, the balloon was equipped with several antennas and solar panels suggesting the presence of multiple intelligence collection systems, such as high-resolution photography and audio collection of both encrypted and public signals.

Interestingly, the balloon’s supposed “errant” path took it over several sensitive U.S. military sites. And, as it turns out, that balloon is apparently part of a much larger Chinese spying system conducting surveillance in forty countries.

The aforementioned 2003 speech was delivered by a senior Chinese military official who boasted about what fate was awaiting 21st-century America.

The speech was delivered by China’s then-defense minister, General Chi Haotian, who served in that position from 1992-2003. Chi laid bare the fate Beijing was planning for America – a fate so diabolical that Hollywood science fiction screenwriters would be hard-pressed to conceive of a similar scenario.

Before getting into details, it is important to remember that Chi was the operational commander who smashed the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests as the Chinese people briefly flirted with freedom. While Chi would later claim there were no casualties caused by his blitzkrieg-like effort to put the protests down, videos of the event strongly suggested otherwise. In fact, the U.K. believes at least 10,000 Chinese citizens lost their lives as the military ruthlessly restored order.

Chi’s speech was long and, at times, meandering. However, every point he raised sought to rationalize an agenda justifying China’s implementation of a diabolical doomsday plan designed to seal America’s 21st-century fate. While the specifics of that plan were shared towards the end of Chi’s remarks, it is important to understand China’s justification for it based on the numerous points he raised.

In addressing high-level Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials, Chi set forth his case.

1. The Willingness of the Chinese People to Kill Innocents in War Time.

To his audience, it must have seemed somewhat strange to raise this point at the outset of his speech but, as previously mentioned, it made more sense when Chi tied it into the plan he detailed at the end of his remarks. It was an intriguing observation to make, made proudly, about the willingness of the Chinese people to kill those whom international law protects in times of war.

Chi was clearly a man both feared and revered for his brutal Tiananmen Square reputation. But, perhaps in that respect, it provided his audience with a sense of where he might be going with his comments.

Chi expressed his excitement over a “large-scale online survey,” the results of which were recently received and, to him, were most promising. He reported that the survey revealed that the young people of China were overwhelmingly committed to continuing support for the CCP.

But to determine this, it was important to know their attitude toward a future war. Thus, they were asked: “Will you shoot at women, children, and prisoners of war?” Chi indicated the ensuing 80% affirmative response rate exceeded CCP expectations.

But, Chi explained, what the CCP leadership was really interested in assessing indirectly was this: If China’s global development hinged on the massive killing of those who are most vulnerable in wartime, would the Chinese people support the effort?

2. Transitioning from “Peace and Development” Phase to a “Modernization under the Saber” Phase to Include Seizing Territory Outside of China.

Chi then addressed China’s next phase on the world stage.

Whereas for the previous 20 years, the theme of “peace and development” for China had been touted, it was now time for Beijing to pursue the only option left – ”modernization under the saber.”

Chi explained that Chinese leaders have long understood that “development is our top priority.” But many comrades only understood this in a very narrow sense, “assuming it to be limited to domestic development. The fact is, our ‘development’ refers to the great revitalization of the Chinese nation, which, of course, is not limited to the land we have now but also includes the whole world.”

Chi added that these leaders have “repeatedly stressed the theory regarding the shift of the center of World Civilization. Our slogan of ‘revitalizing China’ has this way of thinking as its basis.” This “historical vision is a treasure our Party should cherish.” To understand this better, Chi addressed the topic of evolution.

3. The West’s Theory of Human Evolution from a Single Mother Conflicts with China’s Theory of Independent Evolution which Allows China to Claim “Racial Superiority.”

Chi then provided a “West versus China” history lesson on evolution.

Western scholars claim humanity as a whole originated from a single mother in Africa so that no one race can claim racial superiority, he lectured. But Chinese scholars disagree with this.

Chi said, “We did not originate in Africa. Instead, we originated independently in the land of China.” Thus, “the Chinese are different from other races on earth. While it was once thought, “Chinese civilization has had a history of five thousand years,” this is now refuted as it can be proven that “China’s rice-growing agricultural history alone can be traced back as far as 8,000 to 10,000 years.”

He added, “We can assert that we are the product of cultural roots of more than a million years…During our long history, our people have disseminated throughout the Americas…(and) became Indians in the Americas.” He credited China for this due to its “national superiority” and being “at the peak of the world” during the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD). “We were the center of the world civilization and no other civilization in the world was comparable to ours.”

But Chi then lamented how China lost direction due to “our complacency, narrow-mindedness, and the self-enclosure of our own country, we were surpassed by Western civilization and the center of the world shifted to the West.”

4. 21st Century China is Positioned to Shift the Center of World Civilization Back to China.

Rehashing history, Chi explained that while the 19th century may be referred to “as the British century and the 20th century as the American century, then the 21st century will be the Chinese century.” As such, the CCP is “to greet the advent of the Chinese Century” by establishing “national revitalization’ as our great objective.”

5. China Needs to Heed the Lessons of History Concerning “the Collapse of Communism in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well as the Defeats of Germany and Japan in the Past.”

Chi explained, while recognizing the advantage of surprise in warfare, Japan made egregious mistakes in not hitting vital U.S. targets and not keeping America neutral. He said, “history did not arrange them to be ‘lords of the earth’ (a phrase Germany’s Adolf Hitler often used in his book Mein Kampf), for they are, after all, not the most superior race.” He suggested, had Japan only awaited the technological development of nuclear weapons, it could have launched a successful surprise attack against the U.S. and Soviet Union.

Chi praised Germany for its efforts to educate its people, especially the younger generation, by means of propaganda and educational institutions spouting the government’s line. (This undoubtedly explains China’s effort to infiltrate many of America’s colleges.) The Nazi Party aimed at “instilling into people’s minds, from elementary schools to colleges, the idea that German people are superior and convincing people that the historical mission of the Aryan people is to become the ‘lords of the earth’ whose right it is to ‘rule over the world.’”

Chi boiled down the three fundamental causes for the Axis powers’ defeat. These lessons have been heeded in China’s doomsday plan for America:

“First, they had too many enemies all at once, as they did not adhere to the principle of eliminating enemies one at a time; second, they were too impetuous, lacking the patience and perseverance required for great accomplishments; third, when the time came for them to be ruthless, they turned out to be too soft, therefore leaving troubles that resurfaced later on.”

Chi noted that:

“Today’s China is alarmingly similar to Germany back then. Both of them regard themselves as the most superior races; both of them have a history of being exploited by foreign powers and are therefore vindictive; both of them have the tradition of worshiping their own authorities; both of them feel that they have seriously insufficient living space; both of them raise high the two banners of nationalism and socialism and label themselves as ‘national socialism;’ both of them worship ‘one state, one party, one leader, and one doctrine.’”

Just as quick as Chi was to make the comparison to Nazi Germany, he dings it by claiming the latter was “too trivial to be compared” due to China’s much larger population, vast territory, its historic achievement of eliminating eight million nationalist troops in just three years, and the fact China still exists while Nazi Germany has been relegated to the dustbin of history.

Chi further rationalized:

“Our theory of the shifting center of civilization is of course more profound than Hitler’s theory of ‘the lords of the earth.’ Our civilization is profound and broad, which has determined that we are so much wiser than they were.”

6. America’s Strength Over Adversity is Due to It Never Having to Fight on Its Own Territory.

Chi raised a point that the doomsday plan would address – i.e., why the U.S. today, despite its past wars, still remains a formidable challenge:

“It has never seen war on its mainland. Once its enemies aim at the mainland, these enemies would reach Washington before its congress finishes debating and authorizes the president to declare war. But for us, we don’t waste time on these trivial things. Comrade Deng Xiaoping once said, ‘The Party’s leadership is prompt in making decisions.’ Once a decision is made, it is immediately implemented. There’s no wasting time on trivial things like in capitalist countries. This is our advantage! Our Party’s democratic centralism is built on the tradition of great unity. Although fascist Germany also stressed high-level centralism, they only focused on the power of the top leader but ignored the collective leadership of the central group. That’s why Hitler was betrayed by many later in his life, which fundamentally depleted the Nazis of their war capacity.”

Michael P Senger

@MichaelPSenger

Xi Jinping has been officially reappointed for a third 5-year term as President of China by a vote of 2,952 to 0.

10:42 PM ∙ Mar 11, 2023

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7. China’s Great Strength Lies in Its Atheism.

Further praising China for its greatness lacked by other historically aggressive countries, Chi stated:

“Our Chinese people are wiser than the Germans because, fundamentally, our race is superior to theirs. As a result, we have a longer history, more people, and a larger land area. On this basis, our ancestors left us with the two most essential heritages, which are atheism and great unity. It was Confucius, the founder of our Chinese culture, who gave us these heritages.

“This heritage determined that we have a stronger ability to survive than the West. That is why the Chinese race has been able to prosper for so long. We are destined ‘not to be buried by either heaven or earth’ no matter how severe the natural, man-made, and national disasters. This is our advantage.”

Chi argues that success turns on atheism being fully embraced which was Hitler’s failing:

“What makes us different from Germany is that we are complete atheists, while Germany was primarily a Catholic and Protestant country. Hitler was only half atheist. Although Hitler also believed that ordinary citizens had low intelligence, and that leaders should therefore make decisions, and although German people worshiped Hitler back then, Germany did not have the tradition of worshiping sages on a broad basis. Our Chinese society has always worshiped sages, and that is because we don’t worship any God. Once you worship a god, you can’t worship a person at the same time, unless you recognize the person as the god’s representative as they do in Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand, once you recognize a person as a sage, of course you will want him to be your leader…. This is the foundation of our democratic centralism.”

Chi offered one final criticism of why believing in God undermines CCP rule:

“Maybe you have now come to understand why we recently decided to further promulgate atheism. If we let theology from the West into China and empty us from the inside, if we let all Chinese people listen to God and follow God, who will obediently listen to us and follow us? If the common people don’t believe Comrade Hu Jintao (who, as Chi spoke, was then the CCP’s General Secretary) is a qualified leader, question his authority, and want to monitor him, if the religious followers in our society question why we are leaving God in churches, can our Party continue to rule China?”

8. Setting the Stage: Either China Challenges America in the 21st Century or No One Does.

Having hit the above points, Chi summed it up for his audience in a single sentence:

“The bottom line is, only China is a reliable force in resisting the Western parliament-based democratic system.

9. Three Lessons Germany Ignored on How to Become “Lord of the Earth” that are important for China to Remember as It completes Its Historic Mission and Revitalizes Its Race.

Chi suggested there were three lessons Germany failed to grasp that doomed its mission to become the “lord of the earth” but which China, by remembering these lessons, will be successful. These include firmly grasping the country’s living space, the Party’s control over the nation and the general direction toward becoming the “lord of the earth.” He then addressed each of these individually.

Lesson One: Living Space.

Concerning living space, Chi noted it is “the biggest focus of the revitalization of the Chinese race” and “the source of the vast majority of wars in history.” It is here that he set the premise for China’s need for more living space. Because China has limited per capita resources, because its 20th century ending economic development had a negative impact, because climates are rapidly changing for the worse, because China’s environment is severely polluted, “not only our ability to sustain and develop our race, but even its survival is gravely threatened to a degree much greater than faced by Germany back then.”

Chi said a study showed that should China follow along the lines of the American style of consumption, its limited resources could not long support a population of 1.3 billion. This was causing China to become reliant upon imports.

Chi declared China has to explore the issue of acquiring more living space outside its borders while limiting open discussion on the matter and while avoiding any reference to it as “living space,” or “lebensraum,” as Nazi Germany called it, out of concerns China might then be labeled a 21st-century threat.

He suggested Western countries do not face the same problem as China does in this regard for the following reason:

“From the perspective of history, the reason that China is faced with the issue of living space is because Western countries established colonies ahead of Eastern countries. Western countries established colonies all around the world, therefore giving themselves an advantage on the issue of living space. To solve this problem, we must lead the Chinese people outside of China, so that they could develop outside of China.”

Second Lesson: Fortifying CCP Leadership.

Chi next tackled the second lesson–focusing on fortifying the leadership capacity of the ruling party. He explained that this was what Comrade Mao Zedong did immediately upon China’s conquest, developing the CCP and strengthening its leadership position and “stressing that our Party is the pioneer of the Chinese race, in addition to being the pioneer of the proletariat. Many citizens say in private, ‘We never voted for you, the Communist Party, to represent us. How can you claim to be our representatives?’”

There is no need for concern about this, Chi explained, because as long as the leadership can “lead the Chinese people outside of China, resolving the lack of living space in China,” it will have the support of the Chinese people. Thus, “Whether we can forever represent the Chinese people depends on whether we can succeed in leading the Chinese people out of China.” This then is “the most important determinant of the CCP’s leadership position.”

Starting to plant the seed for the doomsday plan, Chi declared, “we realized vaguely that as long as China’s economy is developed, people would support and love the Communist Party. Therefore we had to use several decades of peacetime to develop China’s economy…But at that time, we did not have mature ideas about how China would deal with international disputes after its economy becomes developed…the main themes in the world were peace and development. But the June 4 riot (Tiananmen Square protests) gave our Party a warning and gave us a lesson that is still fresh.”

The warning China received from the protests of its “peace and development” phase was that it was not an end-all solution. After all, “western oppositional forces always change the world according to their own visions; they want to change China and use peaceful evolution to overturn the leadership of our Communist Party. Therefore, if we only develop the economy, we still face the possibility of losing control.” The Tiananmen Square protests almost brought about a transition that would have marked the CCP’s end.

This was when the CCP’s leadership began to focus on how best to maintain its control:

“After some deep pondering, we finally come to this conclusion: Only by turning our developed national strength into the force of a first striking outward – only by leading people to go out – can we win forever the Chinese people’s support and love for the Communist Party. Our party will then stand on invincible ground, and the Chinese people will have to depend on the Communist Party. They will forever follow the Communist Party with their hearts and minds, as was written in a couplet frequently seen in the countryside some years ago: ‘Listen to Chairman Mao, follow the Communist Party!’ Therefore, the June 4 riot made us realize that we must combine economic development with preparation for war and lead the people to go out! Therefore, since then, our national defense policy has taken a 180-degree turn and we have since emphasized more and more ‘combining peace and war.’ Our economic development is all about preparing for the needs of war! Publicly we still emphasize economic development as our center, but in reality, economic development has war as its center!

We have made a tremendous effort to construct ‘The Great Wall Project’ to build up, along our coastal and land frontiers as well as around large and medium-sized cities, a solid underground ‘Great Wall’ that can withstand a nuclear war. We are also storing all necessary war materials. Therefore, we will not hesitate to fight a Third World War, so as to lead the people to go out and to ensure the Party’s leadership position. In any event, we, the CCP, will never step down from the stage of history! We’d rather have the whole world, or even the entire globe, share life and death with us than step down from the stage of history! Isn’t there a ‘nuclear bondage’ theory? It means that since nuclear weapons have bound the security of the entire world, all will die together if death is inevitable. In my view, there is another kind of bondage, and that is, the fate of our Party is tied up with that of the whole world. If we, the CCP, are finished, China will be finished, and the world will be finished.”

Not wishing to see the world, and obviously, China as part of it, perish in a nuclear global exchange, Chi reported another option existed. He said China would open its doors to overseas markets, “the profit-seeking western capitalists will invest capital and technology in China to assist our development so that they can occupy the biggest market in the world…Our numerous overseas Chinese help us create the most favorable environment for the introduction of foreign capital, foreign technology, and advanced experience into China. Thus, it is guaranteed that our reform and open-door policy will achieve tremendous success. China’s great economic expansion will inevitably lead to the shrinkage of per-capita living space for the Chinese people, and this will encourage China to turn outward in search of new living space…China’s great economic expansion will inevitably come with significant development in our military forces, creating conditions for our expansion overseas. Ever since Napoleon’s time, the West has been alert for the possible awakening of the sleeping lion that is China. Now, the sleeping lion is standing up and advancing into the world, and has become unstoppable!”

Lesson Three: The “Issue of America”

Chi asserted that a Party Central Committee report noted:

“The renaissance of China is in fundamental conflict with the Western strategic interest and therefore will inevitably be obstructed by the Western countries doing everything they can. So, only by breaking the blockade formed by the Western countries headed by the United States can China grow and move toward the World!”

If the U.S. is firm in blocking China, Chi rationalized, it will be difficult for Beijing to do anything significant concerning Taiwan, Vietnam, India, or Japan. However, even if China were to make such territorial acquisitions, they would provide “very trivial” living space to meet China’s needs. Chi added that only territorial acquisitions such as the U.S., Canada, and Australia “have the vast land to serve our need for mass colonization.” This makes solving the “issue of America” key to solving all other issues.

Chi proffered a justification for China’s colonizing the U.S.:

“America was originally discovered by the ancestors of the yellow race, but Columbus gave credit to the white race. We, the descendants of the Chinese nation, are entitled to the possession of the land! It is said that the residents of the yellow race have a very low social status in the United States. We need to liberate them…After solving the ‘issue of America,’ the Western countries of Europe would bow to us, not to mention Taiwan, Japan, and other small countries. Therefore, solving the ‘issue of America’ is the mission assigned to the CCP members by history…It is historical destiny that China and the United States will come to unavoidable confrontation on a narrow path and fight each other! The United States, unlike Russia and Japan, has never occupied and hurt China, and also assisted in its battle against the Japanese. But, it will certainly be an obstruction and the biggest obstruction! In the long run, the relationship of China and the United States is one of a life and death struggle.”

While China recognizes America’s obstructionist role will be a factor in this century, it also recognizes now “is not the time to openly break up with them yet. Our reform and opening to the outside World still rely on their capital and technology. We still need America. Therefore, we must do everything we can to promote our relationship with America, learn from America in all aspects, and use America as an example to reconstruct our country.”

Accordingly, in conducting its foreign affairs with America, Chi said it is important to put on “a smiling face in order to please them…The United States is the most successful country in the World today. Only after we have learned all of its useful experiences can we replace it in the future. Even though we are presently imitating the American tone ‘China and the United States rely on each other’…we must not forget that the history of our civilization repeatedly has taught us that one mountain does not allow two tigers to live together.”

Chi emphasized that to be successful in playing the US like a fiddle in naively helping China achieve its ultimate prosperity requires it must “Refrain from revealing ambitions and put others off the track. The hidden message is: we must put up with America; we must conceal our ultimate goals, hide our capabilities, and await the opportunity.” China will beat its drum concerning the Taiwan issue but will never openly acknowledge the “American issue” in accordance with the principle of “doing one thing under the cover of another.”

10. China’s Doomsday Plan for the Demise of the American People.

It is at this point that Chi finally addresses the deadly fate China has planned for America:

“To resolve the issue of America we must be able to transcend conventions and restrictions. In history, when a country defeated another country or occupied another country, it could not kill all the people in the conquered land because back then you could not kill people effectively with sabers or long spears, or even rifles or machine guns. Therefore, it was impossible to gain a stretch of land without keeping the (conquered) people on that land. However, if we conquered America in this fashion, we would not be able to make many people (Chinese) migrate there. Only by using special means to ‘clean up’ America will be able to lead the Chinese people there. This is the only choice left for us. This is not a matter of whether we are willing to do it or not. What kind of special means is there available for us to ‘clean up America?’”

Chi explained that neither conventional nor nuclear weapons will achieve such an end – the latter undoubtedly resulting in the U.S. causing as much destruction in China as China would cause in the U.S. He added:

“Only by using non-destructive weapons that can kill many people will we be able to reserve America for ourselves. There has been rapid development of modern biological technology and new bioweapons have been invented one after another. Of course, we have not been idle. In the past years, we have seized the opportunity to master weapons of this kind. We are capable of achieving our purpose of ‘cleaning up’ America all of a sudden.” He credited Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, who died in 1997, with foregoing funding to develop “aircraft carrier groups and focus instead on developing lethal weapons that can eliminate mass populations of the enemy country.”

Chi offered a momentary humanitarian thought, suggesting the U.S. first be given a warning to surrender land to the Chinese people “because America was first discovered by the Chinese,” but doubted it would accomplish the mission. No, China must “use decisive means to ‘clean up’ America and reserve America for our use in a moment (obviously suggesting the element of surprise in its use). Our historical experience has proven that as long as we make it happen, nobody in the World can do anything about us. Furthermore, if the United States as the leader is gone, then other enemies have to surrender to us.”

Chi acknowledged that “Biological weapons are unprecedented in their ruthlessness but if the Americans do not die then the Chinese have to die. If the Chinese people are strapped to the present land, a total societal collapse is bound to take place.” He cited the author of “Yellow Peril” in claiming more than half of China’s population would die and that “This yellow land has reached the limit of its capacity. One day, who knows how soon it will come, the great collapse will occur any time and more than half the population will have to go.”

In declaring that China must prepare itself for two scenarios, Chi expressed the callous opinion that the preservation of the Party takes priority over millions of lives being lost, even if some of those lives lost are Chinese:

“If our biological weapons succeed in the surprise attack, the Chinese people will be able to keep their losses at a minimum in the fight against the United States. If, however, the attack fails and triggers a nuclear retaliation from the United States, China would perhaps suffer a catastrophe in which more than half of its population would perish…Whatever the case may be, we can only move forward fearlessly, for the sake of our Party and State and our nation’s future, regardless of the hardships we have to face and the sacrifices we have to make. The population, even if more than half dies, can be reproduced. But if the Party fails, everything is gone, and forever gone.”

Recognizing the ruthlessness of this plan to deal with the “issue of America,” Chi still justified it with the claim that “good guys never win:”

“In Chinese history, in the replacement of dynasties, the ruthless have always won and the benevolent have always failed…We must emphasize the importance of adopting resolute measures. In the future, the two rivals, China and the United States will eventually meet each other in a narrow road, and our leniency to the Americans will mean cruelty toward the Chinese people.”

Accepting the brutality of killing millions of Americans, Chi lectured:

“But that is the only path that will secure a Chinese century in which the CCP leads the World. We, as revolutionary humanitarians, do not want deaths. But if history confronts us with a choice between the deaths of Chinese and those of Americans, we’d have to pick the latter as, for us, it is more important to safeguard the lives of the Chinese people and the life of our Party. That is because, after all, we are Chinese and members of the CCP. Since the day we joined the CCP, the Party, life has always been above all else. History will prove that we made the right choice.”

Almost as an afterthought, Chi explained that Chinese ruthlessness must have no limits, even when it comes to the millions of Chinese living in the United States who would perish as well:

“These comrades are too pedantic; they are not pragmatic enough. If we had insisted on the principle that the Chinese should not kill other Chinese, would we have liberated China? As for the several million Chinese living in the United States, this is of course a big issue. Therefore, in recent years, we have been conducting research on genetic weapons, this is, those weapons that do not kill yellow people. But producing a result with this kind of research is extremely difficult. Of the research done on genetic weapons throughout the World, Israel is the most advanced. Their genetic weapons are designed to target Arabs and protect the Israelis. But even they have not reached the stage of actual deployment. We have cooperated with Israel on some research. Perhaps we can introduce some of the technologies used to protect Israelis and remold these technologies to protect the yellow people. But their technologies are not mature yet, and it is difficult for us to surpass them in a few years. If it has to be five or ten years before some breakthrough can be achieved in genetic weapons, we cannot afford to wait any longer. Old comrades like us cannot afford to wait that long for we don’t have that much time to live.”

While voicing his discouragement that such technology will advance in the years he has left, Chi continued to downplay the loss of those Chinese living in the U.S.:

“The majority of those Chinese living in the United States have become our burden, because they have been corrupted by the bourgeois liberal values for a long time and it would be difficult for them to accept our Party’s leadership. If they survived the war, we would have to launch campaigns in the future to deal with them, to reform them…History has proved that any social turmoil is likely to involve many deaths.”

Thus, Chi promoted the argument that Chinese living in the U.S. would have to be considered a casualty of China’s war to cleanse America of its population.

Ironically, Chi, at age 93, is still alive and kicking today. The question, however, is whether the technology has advanced to the stage yet where genetic-specific biological weapons exist.

11. Connecting Opening and Closing Remarks.

With China’s doomsday plan concerning America’s 21st-century fate now explained, Chi referred back to his opening remarks about the willingness of the country’s young generation today to do whatever is necessary to achieve the goal of national revitalization:

“You probably understand why we wanted to know whether the (Chinese) people would rise against us (the CCP) if one day we secretly adopt resolute means to ‘clean up’ America. For over twenty years, China has been enjoying peace, and a whole generation has not been tested by war…The ideology of the West has come to dominate the World as a whole and the Western theory of human nature and Western view of human rights have increasingly been disseminated among the young people in China. Therefore, we were not very sure about the people’s attitude. If our people are fundamentally opposed to ‘cleaning up’ America, we will, of course, have to adopt corresponding measures…What turned out to be very comforting…(was the 80% support for the CCP)...This is excellent fruition of our Party’s work in propaganda and education over the past few decades. Of course, a few people under Western influence have objected to shooting at prisoners of war and women and children…Some others said, ‘The Chinese love to label themselves as a peace-loving people, but actually, they are the most ruthless people. The comments are resonant of killing and murdering, sending chills to my heart.’ Although there are not too many people holding this kind of viewpoint and they will not affect the overall situation in any significant way, we still need to strengthen the propaganda to respond to this kind of argument.”

Conclusion

Some of the points made by Chi in his speech give us ample pause for reflection. For example, is the emergence of COVID-19 tied in any way to China’s doomsday plan to exterminate Americans? Could it have been a trial balloon?

Chi’s reference to the quiet use of a biological weapon to eradicate the American population is obviously very disturbing. The fact that this kind of technology was of keen interest to China as early as 2003 and it has had the benefit of the intervening years to advance to new capability levels puts the spotlight, as COVID-19 raised its ugly head, on early expert opinions rendered concerning its source of origin.

Among these experts was Dr. Anthony Fauci who, as director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, played a key role in diagnosing and treating COVID-19. As the recognized “duty expert” on such issues, Fauci’s initial claim, supported by the World Health Organization (WHO), was that the disease most likely emanated from a natural occurrence, leaping from animals to humans through an emissary animal. The theory promoted was that an infected bat, sold at a Chinese wet market and subsequently consumed by a buyer, was a possible catalyst.

However, over time, other opinions emerged, pointing the finger at a research lab in Wuhan, China, known to have a faulty safety record and where gain-of-function research on bats was being conducted. Undermining Fauci’s credibility was the fact he had even helped fund the Wuhan lab’s research, although he failed to acknowledge this while giving congressional testimony.

The latter sourcing theory lends credence to Chi’s claim biological weapons research was being explored by the Chinese government with research perhaps already underway at labs such as Wuhan at the time of his speech in 2003.

If so, it also raises the question of whether the release was accidental or intentional – the latter to test its effectiveness as a biological targeting weapon. As COVID-19 has not proven to be genetic-specific in attacking victims, we know the ultimate biological weapon Chi described most likely does not yet exist, thus suggesting the release may have been accidental. This is further evidenced by the fact that not even China was spared from COVID-19’s spread and ultimate devastation.

But that does not mean China has stopped researching how to develop a biological genetic-specific weapon. In fact, with millions of Americans submitting DNA to private laboratories to learn more about their ancestors, China has been involved in purchasing much of the data for its research. Thus, the development of such a weapon may well be just around the corner.

Also in need of reflection is that a genetic-specific biological weapon is not the only way China can succeed in its mission to quickly kill hundreds of millions of Americans.

Ever since the development of nuclear weapons, we have known about the destructive capability created by a high-altitude detonation. While few victims would be killed outright by the initial blast, an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) would be released, knocking out electrical grids in an affected area – the size of which would be determined by the blast’s altitude.

But, as the grids operate on massive generators, most of which are manufactured abroad, it could well take months, or even years, to get replacements in order to bring electrical grids back online. It is estimated 290 million American lives could be lost in the interim as supply chain interruptions took their toll on the population.

The Chinese balloon shot down on February 4 by the U.S. could possibly have carried a nuclear payload to create an EMP. Thus, such a balloon’s flight into U.S. airspace, based on what is known about China’s doomsday plan for America, should have created a major concern for our leaders. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) not to have advised Biden to immediately shoot down the balloon suggests its members lacked familiarity with Chi’s speech and China’s sinister intentions. Had the JCS been knowledgeable about this, every effort should have been made to shoot it down first and ask questions later.

The content of Chi’s speech armed the U.S. with the right to destroy any such delivery system China might send into our airspace as Chi has forewarned us it has every intention of launching its attack by surprise. Accordingly, the balloon’s destruction should have occurred immediately upon its entry into U.S. airspace – not as it was preparing to exit, as was done. It is critical that this 21st-century threat by China be fully understood by our leaders, lest we find ourselves victims of a much more devastating Pearl Harbor-like attack.

Undoubtedly Chi, in delivering his speech as he departed office as defense minister in 2003, had no expectation that what he said that day would later be revealed in the West. As he stated in those remarks, the success of China’s plan for America rested upon deceiving the West – effectively smiling while stabbing it in the back. Yet, to date, no effort has been undertaken to impress upon the global community or even our own civilian and military leaders the dastardly threat China poses not just to the U.S. but to a future world order that would be dominated by Beijing alone.

Meanwhile, as China bides its time in developing a genetic-specific virus to put its doomsday plan into action, it is pressing forward on other fronts – at least one of which is effectively claiming lives on a daily basis.

In his speech, Chi failed to mention one negative history lesson about the West that has merit – one that heavily impacted upon China in the aftermath of its defeat by the British in the 19th century . It led to the victors reaping fortunes by selling addictive opium to the Chinese. So addictive was the drug that it literally caused Chinese society to collapse, suffering the humiliation for centuries of civil war, economic collapse, occupation, and loss of empire – all linked to the destruction of generations of Chinese leaders. Perhaps sensing that turnaround is fair play, China now is instrumental in feeding fentanyl to Mexican drug gangs who are smuggling the deadly drug across the border into the U.S. As a result, we are witnessing a fentanyl plague responsible for killing between 75,000 to 100,000 Americans annually. Biden’s open border policy effectively has become an opportunity both China and the Mexican drug cartels simply cannot refuse.

Another front upon which China is moving is the acquisition of land in the U.S. Historically, it has been one of the largest foreign buyers of residential real estate in the U.S. At $6.1 billion in housing purchases recently, it became the top foreign buyer. It has now turned its attention to farmland, increasing such farmland holdings outside of China by 1000%. Within the U.S., China controls approximately 383,000 acres of farmland, having grown more than twenty-fold from $81 million in 2010 to nearly $1.9 billion in 2021.

Perplexed by China’s U.S. land purchases but recognizing it cannot be anything good, some lawmakers worry the purchases represent a national security threat. Undoubtedly, not by coincidence, several of these purchases are near U.S. military bases which have set off alarm bells.

Of note too is China’s long-time interest in spreading its influence as well as tapping into banks of scientific and technical data. As Chi noted in his speech, Nazi Germany was to be commended for using propaganda in its educational system to influence young minds to think as it did. Recognizing some elite universities are breeding future generations of U.S. leaders, China contributes heavily to them. Harvard has benefitted from over $1 billion in donations from China. Schools like USC and Penn have also been major recipients of China’s foreign influencing campaign. In 2021, China-based entities, including the government, entered into $120 million in contracts with over two dozen U.S. universities. Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky) has alluded to the fact that China had worked with a U.S. university – funding for which was provided by the National Institutes of Health – to develop superviruses.

On yet another front, during the first four months of FY 2023 (October 2022-January 2023), U.S. Customs and Border Protection has reported a 719% increase in the number of illegal Chinese immigrants crossing our southwest border compared to the same time period last year. Why the sudden increased influx of Chinese coming across the border? Is the Chinese government complicit in this effort?

Rep. Ryan Zinke (R-MT) described the balloon incident as a “poke in the eye” of the U.S. by China. While we can only guess at the motivation, perhaps President Xi Jinping saw it as a deserved eye poke for the face he lost when Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-Ca) visited Taiwan over Beijing’s objections.

While the transit across the entire U.S. of the Chinese balloon shot down on February 4 is disturbing enough, a recent revelation by former CIA operative Sam Faddis about the three other unidentified objects that were also shot down is even more disturbing.

AND Magazine

The Benghazi Gambit – When In Doubt Lie

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23 days ago · 32 likes · 2 comments · Sam Faddis

Faddis claims that the “evaluation of the available data shows not just that these balloons were launched from China but also shows the time and date when they were launched.” He notes that China has long had an interest in developing such balloons and airships for surveillance work. In 2015, they boasted about a “near space” airship they developed, capable of monitoring activities on the ground – one that had circumnavigated the globe, passing over the U.S. undetected. He reports that all four of these aerial platforms were undoubtedly under the operational control of the Chinese Strategic Support Force (SSF)--a command tasked with strategic space, cyber, and electronic warfare missions.

The last three objects, which the Biden administration described as “benign,” were launched from a military facility in Mongolia. Faddis went on to explain:

“What the recent spate of balloon sightings exposes is that the Chinese are conducting extensive intelligence collection activities directed at our strategic missile and bomber bases. Given the tension between the United States and China generally and the current Chinese intense focus on Taiwan specifically, these collection activities ought to be highly concerning.

“We do not know that these actions are simply general strategic collection. They may be connected to impending Chinese actions or even to preemptive Chinese strikes on our forces.

“Acknowledging that would be inconvenient for an administration thoroughly coopted by the Chinese however. So, instead, they have opted to peddle the notion that nothing is happening and there is nothing about which to be concerned.

“It would be nice to see that ‘Intelligence Community’ assessment and the facts upon which it was based. It would be interesting to see the pictures of these ‘benign’ objects. It would be reassuring to know that there was any kind of factual basis for the spin emanating from the White House.”

The Benghazi Gambit, Sam Faddis

Faddis concludes no facts concerning the last three objects are likely to be released as the Biden administration will opt to play the “Benghazi gambit”- a reference to how the Obama administration covered up the real reason for the 2012 Islamic extremist attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, that killed four Americans, including the U.S. ambassador.

The above gives weight to the theory China is testing us to learn more about its enemy by gauging America’s reaction. If so, it is in keeping with the teachings of one of the world’s ancient military and political strategists who, ironically, was Chinese –Sun Tzu. He gave the following counsel 2500 years ago:

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

If Beijing’s numerous acts in violating U.S. airspace were trial balloons, flown to assess U.S. reaction to a doomsday initiative, China has heeded Sun Tzu’s sage advice. On the other hand, based on a doomsday plan we now know exists, should we choose to ignore what Chi’s speech reveals, we then are ignoring Sun Tzu’s counsel by refusing to accept the reality of that which our Chinese adversary is either fully, or soon to be fully, capable.

While delivering a speech recently, Sen. Josh Hawley (R- Missouri) was interrupted by a female protester who shouted “China is not our enemy! The climate crisis is!” Such naivete among Americans is just what China counts on, removing it from public scrutiny as our major threat. The best way we can lose a war is to not accept the fact that a war is quietly being waged against us. As Chi makes perfectly clear, China is fighting that war – one committed to our destruction.

With the destructive power of an EMP blast and the potential impact of an America-only man-made pandemic as potential options for a Chinese attack against the U.S., we need to heed both Sun Tzu’s wisdom and Chi’s warning. It mandates we treat anything bearing a “Made in China” label as suspect. It also necessitates forewarning China that their now, ”not-so-secret” actions have left us with no choice, in the face of any further act of aggression they undertake, in triggering a “shoot first and ask questions later” U.S. response policy. Sadly, this is the 21st-century state of affairs China has created.

Lt. Col. James Zumwalt is a retired Marine infantry officer who served in the Vietnam War, the 1989 intervention into Panama and Desert Storm. He is a senior analyst for Ravenna Associates and heads a security consulting firm named after his father: Admiral Zumwalt & Consultants, Inc.

3. The Kremlin’s Never-Ending Attempt to Spread Disinformation about Biological Weapons (Global Engagement Center)

Recognize, understand, EXPOSE, and attack our adversaries strategies.

Conclusion:

Moscow continues to push false information about biological weapons, without providing any credible evidence. Over a thousand members of the scientific community have signed a letter penned by Russian experts openly disputing the Kremlin’s claim, saying the work of peaceful biological research laboratories in Ukraine does “not imply any development of biological weapons or even the use of particularly dangerous pathogens in the laboratories. The list of destroyed strains published by RIA Novosti and other Russian media outlets contains not a single particularly dangerous strain.”

The United States’ peaceful cooperation and assistance activities comply with and help fulfill our obligations under the BWC. These cooperation and assistance activities have been transparent and designed to help countries detect, prepare for, and respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases. Russia seeks instead to cast peaceful research to prevent disease in Ukraine and around the world — and the U.S. cooperation and assistance to support it — as nefarious biological weapons programs. The Kremlin’s biological weapons disinformation campaign aims to deflect, distract, and misdirect. Russia has a history of accusing others of doing what it is doing itself, and its recent biological weapons claims related to Ukraine are no different. The United States assesses that Russia continues to maintain an offensive biological weapons program in violation of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.

The Kremlin’s Never-Ending Attempt to Spread Disinformation about Biological Weapons - United States Department of State

state.gov · by Global Engagement Center

Introduction

Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, has pushed false claims for decades about biological weapons in an attempt to create mistrust in the peaceful global efforts and public health institutions that counter biological threats. Since the February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem has increased the volume and intensity of its disinformation about biological weapons in an unsuccessful attempt to deflect attention from its invasion of Ukraine, to diminish international support for Ukraine, and to justify its unjustifiable war.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States, has been working with allies, partners, and international organizations to reduce legacy threats from the Soviet Union’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in former Soviet states, including Ukraine and Russia. The Kremlin now falsely presents this peaceful cooperation as alleged U.S. biological military activity abroad. Russia has repeatedly abused its position as a member of various international fora to further spread these lies . But the Kremlin fails to mention in its disinformation that Russia actively participated in these programs until it unilaterally ceased cooperation in 2014.

History of Spreading Biological Weapons Disinformation

Many experts have exposed both Russia’s and the Soviet Union’s historic dissemination of biological weapons disinformation as coordinated campaigns intended to create distrust in the United States and between our allies and partners. One particularly well-documented case occurred in 1951-1953 during the Korean War. The Soviet Union, North Korea, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) accused the United States of infecting animals with pathogens and releasing them into the PRC and North Korea. Soviet representatives raised these false charges at various international fora, including the United Nations (UN). Between mid-March and mid-April 1952, 25% of all Soviet media coverage focused on these false allegations. The intense coverage generated significant public attention on this issue, which resulted in millions of people protesting against the United States’ alleged use of biological weapons. Historians have identified at least 12 documents from the archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union proving the allegations were false. Despite the evidence, these fictitious narratives occasionally resurface, and in February 2023 the PRC repeated the false Soviet claim that the United States had used biological weapons in North Korea in the 1950s.

The most infamous example of Soviet biological weapons disinformation occurred in the 1980s, when the Soviet Union created a false narrative that the United States had genetically engineered the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) – the virus that causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). This disinformation campaign is popularly known as Operation Infektion , or Operation Denver . The Soviet Union’s Committee for State Security (KGB) spread this false narrative throughout the world by planting fake stories in international media. A 1985 KGB telegram stated, “the goal of these measures is to create a favorable opinion for us abroad that this disease is the result of secret experiments with a new type of biological weapon by the secret services of the USA and the Pentagon that spun out of control.” Multiple archival documents and on-the-record testimonies by former KGB officers conclusively proved it was a well-coordinated disinformation campaign directed by the Soviet intelligence services. The former leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, eventually apologized to former U.S. President Ronald Reagan for spreading this specific false narrative.

Russia’s War Against Ukraine

To justify its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin has recreated and promoted several fictitious narratives including some related to biological weapons. Within days of invading Ukraine, the Kremlin claimed the presence of “biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine” as one of its false pretexts for its attack. One Russian parliamentarian claimed one month after the invasion , that “it is obvious that the special operation aimed at protecting the residents of the DPR and LPR has revealed the facts of the dangerous activities of the United States of America on the territory of Ukraine.” Yet, one year later, the Kremlin has provided no credible evidence of these claims. Other baseless justifications included the need to “denazify” the government of Ukraine and an alleged NATO plot to dismember Russia.

Having failed to achieve a quick victory over Ukraine, and experiencing multiple battlefield setbacks, the Kremlin then further expanded its push of disinformation about biological weapons in a desperate attempt to portray Ukraine and the United States as aggressors. One of the Kremlin’s most notable false claims is that the United States worked with Ukraine to train an army of migratory birds, mosquitos and even bats to carry biological weapons into Russia. The Kremlin likely zeroed in on these false narratives because public health laboratories routinely study migratory animal species to assess and counter animal-borne pathogens. Russia’s allegations are absurd, not the least because such species, even if they could be weaponized, could not be restricted to stay within Russia’s territory and thus could also endanger Ukraine itself, as well as other countries in the region.

Other parts of Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem, such as Kremlin-funded media outlets and Russian Intelligence-linked websites , echo one another to spread the same false narratives around the world. The Kremlin also relies on so-called “experts” to speak to the press, using a variety of Russia-controlled or pro-Russia mouthpieces to create an amplifying effect. For example, since February 2022, Lieutenant-General Igor Kirillov, Commander of the Biological and Chemical Protection Troops of the Russian Armed Forces, has significantly increased his media engagement. In his statements, Kirillov regularly claims the United States was involved in the creation of Mpox and COVID, and that it is developing biological weapons able to selectively target ethnic groups , without ever providing proof of his claims. The U.S. Government is concerned that this false narrative may be a prelude for a false-flag operation where Russia itself uses biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons in Ukraine, and then attempts to blame it on Ukraine and/or the United States.

The Kremlin is also feeding these narratives to the people of Russia in an attempt to create a false reality in which the Kremlin was “forced” to intervene to defend Russia’s citizens from foreign enemies. Without the perception of an existential threat, the government’s military losses in Ukraine would be much harder to justify to its population. Russia does not adequately train new recruits before sending them to the front and does not provide sufficient safety equipment and well-functioning armaments . The military has gone as far as to ask recruits to pack tampons and pads for wound care, as the military does not have enough first-aid supplies for its troops. These false narratives about biological weapons facilities are intended to convince the people of Russia that their sacrifices for the war are still justified.

Russia’s Parliamentary Commission on the Investigation of U.S. Biological Laboratories in Ukraine

In March 2022, under the initiative of the Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin, the Russian government created the Parliamentary Commission on the Investigation of U.S. Biological Laboratories in Ukraine. This commission emerged one month after Russia launched its February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Deputy Federation Council Speaker Konstantin Kosachev and Deputy State Duma Speaker Irina Yarovaya co-chair the parliamentary commission, which also includes 14 senators and 14 Duma deputies.

Since the commission’s creation, it has served as a key Kremlin platform for spreading disinformation. Yarovaya regularly makes announcements claiming “proof obtained by the commission fully confirms the U.S.-created network of biological intelligence worldwide,” but she has never provided evidence. Over time, Yarovaya’s allegations have become increasingly sensational and have drifted into the realm of science fiction. In July 2022, Yarovaya claimed that the Kremlin had studied Ukrainian servicemen’s blood and their analysis showed the servicemen had been subjected to “secret experiments,” which transformed them into “the most cruel monsters.” Again, the commission provided no evidence supporting these preposterous claims.

The commission’s real role appears to serve as a platform from which to inject the information environment with a sustained drip of various false biological weapons disinformation narratives. The commission recently announced it will release a report in mid-April 2023, containing evidence proving the claims from its year-long disinformation campaign. The April report will likely feature recycled disinformation, interviews with Kremlin-linked so-called “experts,” and a number of documents already in the public domain that outline the United States’ peaceful cooperation and assistance to Ukraine. As with other examples of the Kremlin’s disinformation, the purpose of the commission’s report will not so much be to persuade the world that the Kremlin’s false claims are true, but rather to sow doubt and confusion in an attempt to undermine international solidarity with Ukraine.

Using Multilateral Organizations to Spread Disinformation

In addition to the commission outlined above, the Kremlin attempts to spread its false claims by abusing the public platform of multilateral organizations. Following the Soviet Union’s practice in the 1950s, Russia has promoted biological weapons disinformation at several multilateral fora. Shortly after launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022., and ever since, Russia repeatedly has abused its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to hijack the Council’s agenda and push its baseless claims regarding purported biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine. The majority of Security Council members have repeatedly and forcefully refuted and dismissed Russia’s claims. Izumi Nakamitsu, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, has even stated, “the United Nations is not aware of any biological weapons programs” in Ukraine. Since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has called numerous meetings at the United Nations to raise its biological weapons allegations, which U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield has called “a colossal waste of time,” and an attempt “to distract from the atrocities Russian forces are carrying out in Ukraine and a desperate tactic to justify an unjustifiable war.”

At a meeting of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in April 2022, all States Parties to the Convention, including Russia, were invited to an event held by the United States, Germany, and Ukraine describing the true, peaceful nature of our cooperation and assistance activities with Ukraine, which provided an opportunity for delegations to ask any questions about such activities directly to the individuals responsible for conducting them. Unsurprisingly, the Russian delegation chose not to attend this event. Just a few months later, and for only the second time in the history of the BWC, Russia requested a formal consultative meeting of States Parties pursuant to Article V of the Convention to consider these false allegations. When the consultative meeting failed to endorse Russia’s allegations, Russia for the first time in the history of the BWC lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council under Article VI of the BWC, alleging that the United States and Ukraine were in violation of the BWC. In this instance, too, Russia failed to support its baseless allegations. The resolution Russia proposed to establish a commission to conduct an investigation failed by a colossal margin with only Russia and the PRC voting in favor. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France opposed, and all ten elected UNSC members abstained.

At the Ninth BWC Review Conference held in late 2022, Russia again repeatedly tried to derail the important work of a multilateral disarmament forum in an attempt to spread disinformation and legitimize its fictitious narratives. Instead of working with other States Parties to meaningfully strengthen the implementation of the BWC, Russia repeatedly put forward proposals designed solely to thwart and delay the work of the Review Conference. Russia’s actions regarding the BWC amounted not only to spreading disinformation, but to directly hindering — and potentially weakening — the functioning of critical international instruments.

Conclusion

Moscow continues to push false information about biological weapons, without providing any credible evidence. Over a thousand members of the scientific community have signed a letter penned by Russian experts openly disputing the Kremlin’s claim, saying the work of peaceful biological research laboratories in Ukraine does “not imply any development of biological weapons or even the use of particularly dangerous pathogens in the laboratories. The list of destroyed strains published by RIA Novosti and other Russian media outlets contains not a single particularly dangerous strain.”

The United States’ peaceful cooperation and assistance activities comply with and help fulfill our obligations under the BWC. These cooperation and assistance activities have been transparent and designed to help countries detect, prepare for, and respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases. Russia seeks instead to cast peaceful research to prevent disease in Ukraine and around the world — and the U.S. cooperation and assistance to support it — as nefarious biological weapons programs. The Kremlin’s biological weapons disinformation campaign aims to deflect, distract, and misdirect. Russia has a history of accusing others of doing what it is doing itself, and its recent biological weapons claims related to Ukraine are no different. The United States assesses that Russia continues to maintain an offensive biological weapons program in violation of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.

state.gov · by Global Engagement Center

4. China has a plan to lead the world. What's ours?

The 5 steps.

Excerpts:

First, extend the Trump administration’s model of fair trade.

Second, reduce our dependence on China and secure our supply chains.

Third, stop U.S. companies from funding China’s military modernization, technological ambitions, and human rights abuses.

Fourth, stand up to the CCP by protecting American innovation and holding China accountable for its thievery and abuses.

Finally, look abroad—to our friends and allies—to out-innovate China.

OPINION Published March 15, 2023 8:00am EDT

China has a plan to lead the world. What's ours?

Retooling our relationship with China should begin with these 5 steps

foxnews.com · by David McCormick | Fox News

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China is an adversary, not a competitor: Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg

Retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg says Xi Jinping’s move to broker an Iran-Saudi pact sidelines the U.S.

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Editor's note: The following is an exclusive adapted excerpt from David McCormick's Superpower in Peril: A Battle Plan to Renew America.

After leaving the Army in 1992, I took an eight-month trip around the world. Along the way, I read Paul Theroux’s Riding the Iron Rooster, cataloging his journeys on the "Iron Rooster"—the dilapidated trains connecting cities across the Chinese countryside. The book captivated me. I had to see it for myself.

From Beijing, I rode the Iron Rooster to Nanking, then Shanghai, Guilin, and finally Guangzhou before crossing over to Hong Kong. Early morning runs took me down bicycle-laden streets, past low-slung buildings and crowds of elderly Chinese practicing tai chi in the dawn quiet. My presence was as foreign to them as theirs was to me.

Just over a decade later, I returned to Beijing, this time as a senior U.S. government official. From the state-of-the-art airport, we drove down ten-lane highways into a transformed city. Skyscrapers and cranes crowded the skyline. China had arrived. It was the most significant up and-coming power in the world — and a serious adversary.

In June of 2006, Saint Vincent College, outside Pittsburgh, invited me to speak about the rise of China. Most in Washington and the business community were salivating at the prospect of the massive Chinese market, but that day I issued an early warning about China’s pervasive intellectual property theft–from which China got roughly 90 percent of its software–and the price American innovators were paying.

CHINA ISSUES OMINOUS THREAT TO BIDEN, AUSTRALIA OVER NUCLEAR SUBMARINE DEAL

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For the next year, I pushed for aggressive controls on tech exports to guard against the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) theft, human rights abuses, and use of U.S. technologies to build up its military. We made incremental progress, but for successive administrations the status quo in Washington persisted. Beijing’s march to power continued.

Sixteen years later, the China threat exceeds what most could have imagined. Under Xi Jinping, the CCP built the world’s largest Navy, stole hundreds of billions of dollars of U.S. intellectual property, and forced companies to play by its increasingly unfair and coercive rules. But it also opened its capital markets and turned itself into an industrial and technological powerhouse at the center of global supply chains. In Xi’s words, China laid "the foundation for a future where" China would be a global power and the most serious external threat the American superpower has faced.

The Trump administration finally broke the status quo by shining the light on China’s unfair trade practices and earning bipartisan support for fair and reciprocal trade. Congress joined the fight with legislation to protect American technologies from Chinese theft and cooption. Investments in domestic semiconductor production and technology leadership have followed, but these steps, though necessary, are ultimately insufficient in isolation.

Therein lies a fundamental flaw of our posture: America still has no unifying strategy to win this competition and redefine our relationship with China.

Video

Looming before us is the risk of a crisis in Taiwan. As senior military and intelligence officials have warned, the CCP could assault the island by mid-decade, and we’re not ready. America must sprint to strengthen its military position immediately and make it clear to Xi Jinping and the CCP that invasion would be foolhardy.

However, while we address the possible near-term threat to Taiwan, we must not lose sight of the horizon, for beyond it lies a far greater danger: the potential end of America’s primacy.

To avert this crisis, we will need a battle plan to both confront China and rebuild our economic and military capability at home. Retooling the China relationship should consist of five steps.

First, extend the Trump administration’s model of fair trade.

Second, reduce our dependence on China and secure our supply chains.

Third, stop U.S. companies from funding China’s military modernization, technological ambitions, and human rights abuses.

Fourth, stand up to the CCP by protecting American innovation and holding China accountable for its thievery and abuses.

Finally, look abroad—to our friends and allies—to out-innovate China.

Video

We must make a simultaneous commitment to renewing America. The United States is caught in a cycle of stagnation and decline, marked by stalled productivity, increasingly inescapable poverty, decaying institutions, and a military losing its innovative edge. As American leadership falters, the national fabric is fraying. You and I can feel it, and so do the 80 percent of Americans who believe America is headed in the wrong direction.

Yet decline is not inevitable. We are no more bound to fall than we are to remain a superpower. What matters is what we do next.

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The battle plan to renew America begins with winning the races for talent, technology, and data supremacy. These are untapped areas of potential for America. Victory would get the economy moving again, revitalize the American dream, secure technological leadership, sharpen the military’s edge, and make possible a new era of American power. But victory requires leadership.

Communist China believes the sun is setting on America. It aspires to supplant us and impose its will around the world. The stakes could not be higher. If we don’t act, who else will stand up to Communist China? Who else will defend American values or uphold the peace, prosperity, and liberty we have enjoyed for generations? Without a plan to restore American strength, how will it be possible for us to practice and preserve our exceptionalism?

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Only by being strong in defense of American interests, can our nation create the space for each of us to exercise our liberty and to chase our American dream in peace.

Today’s leaders must relearn that lesson and answer the most pressing question: The Chinese Communist Party has a plan to lead the world. What’s ours?

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM DAVID McCORMICK

David McCormick is a former U.S. Army paratrooper in the 82nd Airborne Division, a veteran of the first Gulf War, and has been the CEO of two successful businesses. He is author of Superpower in Peril: A Battle Plan to Renew America.

foxnews.com · by David McCormick | Fox News

5. The Strange Case of Iraq Syndrome

It may not be the "syndrome" you are expecting.

Excerpt:

Politicians hoping to win over the public with isolationist platforms may be making a losing bet. True, U.S. policymakers have responded to frustrations in Iraq in a similar way that they responded to failure in Vietnam almost five decades ago: they have continued to engage in active military interventions but avoided large-scale ground deployments. Iraq syndrome is undoubtedly real, but it may be felt more intensely among elites than among the public. And just as U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush found it possible to rally the public behind military interventions even in the wake of Vietnam, Biden or his successors may find the public similarly persuadable after Iraq. The more things change, the more they stay the same.

The Strange Case of Iraq Syndrome

How Elites Misread Public Perceptions of the War

By Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, and Jason Reifler

March 15, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, and Jason Reifler · March 15, 2023

After the Vietnam War, a generation of U.S. leaders developed what became known as “Vietnam syndrome”—a pathological belief that public support for the use of force was too fleeting, and the U.S. military’s power too uncertain, for foreign military operations to be advisable. This syndrome bedeviled U.S. decision-making for years, but by the mid-1980s, its power had begun to wane. The United States’ swift victory in the Gulf War in 1991 would have seemed to banish it for good. But in reality, the success of Operation Desert Storm reinforced the idea that the public would tolerate only short, low-casualty conflicts.

Concerns about the Vietnam syndrome returned as U.S. President George W. Bush prepared to invade Iraq in 2003. Bush went ahead anyway, and the resulting war was the most significant and costly that the United States had conducted since the 1970s. Although the invasion initially enjoyed considerable public support, its popularity waned when it did not go as planned. Within a few years, the Bush administration faced the very real prospect of losing, and only the politically controversial move of changing the strategy and surging more troops and resources into Iraq altered the trajectory of the war. Bush handed over to his successor, U.S. President Barack Obama, an Iraq war that was more promising than it had been in 2006 but still a far cry from the rosy prewar predictions.

Two decades after the initial invasion, Iraq remains a security project in progress. Compared with the United States’ outright defeat in Afghanistan, the result of the U.S. campaign in Iraq looks like a modest success. It still might be possible to achieve some of the goals of the war—an Iraq that can govern and defend itself and that is an ally in the war against terrorists—albeit at a tragically high price. But compared with the expectations of the war’s advocates, Iraq looks like a fiasco in the mold of Vietnam. And the shock has had the same result: policymakers have developed Iraq syndrome and now believe that the American public has no stomach for military operations conducted on foreign soil.

Iraq syndrome holds that Americans are casualty-phobic: they will support a military operation only if the cost in American lives is minimal. As a consequence, U.S. policymakers who wish to use force must fight as bloodlessly as possible and be quick to abandon their commitments if the adversary proves able to fight back and kill U.S. soldiers. The politically expedient position, in a world afflicted by Iraq syndrome, is a quasi-isolationist one, since the public is not willing to underwrite the costs of lasting international commitments.

But as prevalent as it is among politicians, Iraq syndrome does not appear to be as widespread among the broader public. American voters are not nearly as allergic to military force as their leaders think. In fact, the public will continue to adequately support a military mission even as its costs mount, provided that the war seems winnable. That means policymakers do not need to abandon a national security commitment as soon as the costs start to mount, provided that the leaders are pursuing a strategy that will lead to success. Leaders should pay more attention to prospects for good outcomes rather than try for cost-free commitments, an impossible standard that the public does not demand and that only hobbles the United States in a dangerous world.

AN ELITE SYNDROME

There is little doubt that Iraq syndrome is common in policymaking circles. At key junctures, U.S. presidents have deliberately avoided making decisions similar to those made in Iraq. Obama avoided meaningful intervention in the Syrian civil war, for instance, despite the fact that the humanitarian costs of staying on the sidelines arguably dwarfed the costs of invading Iraq. He also delayed taking forceful action until the very last moment against the Islamic State, or ISIS, a formidable terrorist organization that quickly eclipsed al Qaeda and threatened to plunge the entire Middle East into chaos in 2015 and 2016.

Similarly, U.S. President Donald Trump, despite speaking in bellicose terms about North Korea, Iran, and ISIS, was careful to avoid direct confrontations with the first two and quick to declare victory, and then curtail operations, against the third. U.S. President Joe Biden likewise has been sensitive to criticism that U.S. support of Ukraine could devolve into an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces “like Iraq,” and he has been scrupulous about limiting U.S. involvement to intelligence sharing and the provision of arms. In every political debate since the 2004 presidential election, doves have had the advantage, ever ready to argue that any show of U.S. military might could become another Iraq.

But if politicians and policymakers are clearly afflicted, there is less evidence that the public at large has caught Iraq syndrome. For starters, even during the Iraq war, the public was not casualty-phobic. Contrary to the expectations of many, the U.S. public largely made reasoned and reasonable assessments of the war. To be sure, public support dropped somewhat as the death toll mounted, but such fluctuations depended more on expectations of the ultimate outcome of the war. When it looked as if the United States might win, the public was willing to continue the war. When it looked as if the United States might lose, casualties proved far more corrosive to public support. Even after public opinion shifted and most Americans began to see the invasion as a mistake, there were no widespread demands for an abrupt withdrawal. The Republican Party lost seats in the 2006 midterm elections in part because of Iraq, but Bush was nonetheless able to cobble together sufficient political support to implement the surge.

Polling suggests that the U.S. public makes reasoned trade-offs when deciding whether to support the use of force.

The public also proved surprisingly tolerant of continued U.S. military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan during Obama’s term. Although he campaigned against the war, Obama swiftly dropped his plan to immediately abandon Iraq, initially following the Bush-designed timetable for withdrawal instead. Obama eventually abandoned this timetable, deciding to leave Iraq altogether in 2012 rather than keep a small force there as originally planned. But he paid only a small political price when he reversed course yet again and sent combat troops back to Iraq to help fight ISIS in 2014. For his part, Trump faced no meaningful public pressure to stop the counter-ISIS campaign and received relatively little public credit for setting in motion the U.S. exit from Afghanistan.

Polling suggests that rather than reflexively opposing war, the U.S. public makes reasoned trade-offs when deciding whether to support the use of force. Polls taken before and after the Iraq war show that the public’s willingness to pay the human cost of war depends on both the importance of the mission for U.S. security and the likelihood that the mission will succeed. For example, in November 2021, we replicated a survey experiment that we initially conducted in 2004, which asked participants whether they would support a hypothetical conflict based on information supplied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 2021, as in 2004, both the likely number of casualties and the prospects of success had a significant impact on support for the hypothetical mission, suggesting that the U.S. public takes a rational approach to weighing the costs and benefits of using military force.

AN INTERNATIONALIST PEOPLE

Trump’s popularity may have stemmed in part from anti-Iraq sentiment within the Republican Party. But isolationism has not firmly gripped the broader public, which remains generally internationalist in orientation with a high level of confidence in the military, particularly in comparison with other institutions. According to a 2023 Gallup survey, 65 percent of Americans felt that the United States should take a leading or major role in world affairs—only a small decline from February 2001, when 73 percent of Americans held that opinion.

Moreover, the U.S. public continues to believe that the nation’s armed forces are exceptional. According to a 2022 Gallup poll, 51 percent of Americans agreed with the statement that the United States has the strongest military in the world, the same proportion that agreed in 2000. Although popular confidence in nearly every public institution has declined over the past several decades, confidence in the U.S. military remains high. A separate Gallup poll in 2022 showed that 64 percent of Americans have “a great deal” or “a lot” of confidence in the U.S. military. This is slightly lower than the levels of confidence Americans expressed in the years after 9/11 but similar to the levels they expressed in the 1990s and notably higher than those they reported in the 1970s and 1980s.

Some recent polls show a decline in confidence among Republicans, especially following Trump’s attacks on senior military figures and widespread claims that U.S. forces have gone “woke.” Yet the debate between pro-defense hawks and antimilitary isolationists within the Republican Party has hardly been settled in the latter’s favor. There is little evidence that Iraq turned the U.S. public away from international affairs or undermined its confidence in the use of force abroad.

The Iraq war was a sea change for many who were directly affected by the conflict—both inside and outside the United States. But it appears to have had less of an impact on the broader U.S. public, which remains solidly internationalist, confident in the nation’s military power and institutions, and able to make reasoned trade-offs between the likely costs (especially human cost) and potential security benefits of intervention, as well as the likelihood of success.

Politicians hoping to win over the public with isolationist platforms may be making a losing bet. True, U.S. policymakers have responded to frustrations in Iraq in a similar way that they responded to failure in Vietnam almost five decades ago: they have continued to engage in active military interventions but avoided large-scale ground deployments. Iraq syndrome is undoubtedly real, but it may be felt more intensely among elites than among the public. And just as U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush found it possible to rally the public behind military interventions even in the wake of Vietnam, Biden or his successors may find the public similarly persuadable after Iraq. The more things change, the more they stay the same.

PETER D. FEAVER is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University, where he directs the Program in American Grand Strategy. He is the author of Thanks for Your Service: The Causes and Consequences of Public Confidence in the Military.
CHRISTOPHER GELPI is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University. He is co-author of Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts.
JASON REIFLER is Professor of Political Science at the University of Exeter. He is co-author of Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts.
MORE BY PETER FEAVER MORE BY CHRISTOPHER GELPI MORE BY JASON REIFLER

Foreign Affairs · by Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, and Jason Reifler · March 15, 2023

6. How China Became a Peacemaker in the Middle East

Excerpts:

Washington’s response to the deal has been, on the one hand, to welcome the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement (praising “any efforts to help end the war in Yemen and de-escalate tensions in the Middle East region”) and, on the other, to downplay the importance of Chinese mediation. “What helped bring Iran to the table was the pressure that they're under, internally and externally—not just an invitation by the Chinese to talk,” stressed John Kirby, the spokesman for the National Security Council. Yet Saudi-Iranian talks on normalization have been ongoing for several years now, long before the protests in Iran broke out last year or the additional sanctions Biden has imposed on Iran since taking office.

At the end of the day, a more stable Middle East where the Iranians and Saudis aren’t at each other's throats also benefits the United States: If nothing else, instability jeopardizes the flow of oil from the region and adds a hefty risk premium to gas prices. But while not exactly worrying about China’s role, Washington should take it as a warning—and a lesson. If the United States continues to embroil itself in the conflicts of its regional partners, making itself part of the problem rather than the solution, its room for diplomatic maneuvering will become more and more limited, ceding the role of peacemaker to China. Instead, U.S. interests would be better served if Washington stopped taking sides in regional disputes, got back on talking terms with all key regional players, and helped develop a new security architecture in which a reduced American military presence encouraged Middle East powers to share the responsibility of their own security.

The United States should not leave Middle East states with the perception that the United States is an entrenched warmaker while China is a flexible peacemaker. Fortunately, it is entirely in Washington’s own hands to prevent such a scenario.

How China Became a Peacemaker in the Middle East

Washington’s Missteps Paved the Way for Beijing’s Saudi-Iranian Deal

By Trita Parsi and Khalid Aljabri

March 15, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Trita Parsi and Khalid Aljabri · March 15, 2023

While U.S. President Joe Biden’s Middle East team was focused on normalizing Saudi-Israeli relations, China delivered the most significant regional development since the Abraham Accords: a deal to end seven years of Saudi-Iranian estrangement. The normalization agreement signed last week by Riyadh and Tehran is noteworthy not only because of its potential positive repercussions in the region—from Lebanon and Syria to Iraq and Yemen—but also because of China’s leading role, and the United States’ absence, in the diplomacy that led to it.

Washington has long feared growing Chinese influence in the Middle East, imagining that a U.S. military withdrawal would create geopolitical vacuums that China would fill. But the relevant void was not a military one, created by U.S. troop withdrawals; it was the diplomatic vacuum left by a foreign policy that led with the military and made diplomacy all too often an afterthought.

The deal represents a win for Beijing. By mediating de-escalation between two archenemies and major regional oil producers, it has both helped secure the energy supply it needs and burnished its credentials as a trusted broker in a region burdened by conflicts, something Washington couldn't do. Chinese success was possible largely because of U.S. strategic missteps: a self-defeating policy that paired pressure on Iran with supplication to Saudi Arabia helped China emerge as one of few major powers with clout over and trust with both of these states.

Yet Washington does deserve some credit for the agreement—if not the kind of credit it would want to claim. In inadvertent ways, its conflicted approach to the region spurred Saudi Arabia’s shift from confrontation toward diplomacy with Iran and thereby opened the way to Chinese mediation. As long as U.S. partners such as Saudi Arabia believed they had carte blanche from Washington, they had little interest in regional diplomacy. Once Riyadh believed that the carte blanche had been withdrawn, diplomacy became their best option.

DESERTED

After four days of negotiations in Beijing last week, a joint trilateral statement announced an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran to reopen embassies and resume diplomatic relations within two months. The two countries affirmed respect for each other's sovereignty and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs and revived old security cooperation and trade agreements. The deal included a future meeting between the Saudi and Iranian ministers of foreign affairs to implement the agreement and discuss means of enhancing bilateral relations.

The shifts in Saudi Arabia’s approach to Iran can be attributed to two events. First, Saudi Arabia faced a moment of truth in September 2019, when a drone and missile attack carried out by Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen damaged Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. The attack was an apparent effort to inflict costs on the Saudi kingdom for supporting Washington’s “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran. The Saudis expected the United States to strike Iran in retaliation, given the longstanding U.S. policy of using military force to defend the oil resources of the Middle East, dating back to the presidency of Jimmy Carter. But President Donald Trump had no interest in risking war on behalf of Saudi Arabia. The Carter Doctrine was no more: Trump’s America First approach meant that all previous U.S. commitments and understandings were on shaky grounds.

Chinese success was possible largely because of U.S. strategic missteps.

The Iranian attacks on critical oil infrastructure and subsequent U.S. inaction represented a watershed moment for the Saudis, who realized they could no longer depend on Washington, even with a Saudi-friendly and anti-Iranian administration in office. According to Saudi insiders, the kingdom’s leaders felt personally “betrayed.” Only two years earlier, when the Saudis believed they had Trump and the United States entirely in their corner, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had told Saudi national television that it was “impossible to talk” to Iran and that he would take the fight against Tehran “inside Iran, not in Saudi Arabia.” But after realizing that Saudi Arabia could no longer hide behind U.S. military power, direct diplomacy with Iran suddenly became much more attractive, as evidenced by Riyadh's welcoming of the Iraqi government’s efforts to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iraq’s efforts to defuse Saudi-Iranian tensions began in 2020, after the Abqaiq attacks. At first, the Iraqis were passing messages between the two sides. By April 2021, Iraqi facilitation had turned into mediation, eventually yielding six face-to-face meetings in Iraq and Oman between Iranian and Saudi officials.

The American withdrawal from Afghanistan reinforced the message sent by U.S. inaction in 2019, confirming to most Middle Eastern actors that the United States was indeed leaving the region. Even if it kept troops and bases scattered around, the United States had lost its will to fight in or for the Middle East. When Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, toured the region after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, leaders expressed their frustration with erratic U.S. policy. United Arab Emirates President Mohammed Bin Zayed, doubting Washington’s commitment to the security of its partners, asked for a formal congressionally approved security pact.

ENTER BEIJING

While Trump’s gravitation away from the Middle East pushed Saudi Arabia toward diplomacy, Biden’s subsequent “back to basics” approach also helped pave the way for China’s emergence as the new peacemaker. Even as it sought to shift the focus of U.S. foreign policy to other challenges and pledged to make Saudi Arabia a “pariah” for the murder of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the Biden administration also set out to reassure regional partners that it remained committed to Middle East security. An earlier Biden plan to significantly reduce U.S. troop levels in the region was shelved. In large part, this was motivated by a global view of great-power competition, which reinforced the need to shore up partnerships that could counter Chinese influence. “Let me say clearly that the United States is going to remain an active, engaged partner in the Middle East,” Biden said in a speech during his visit to Saudi Arabia last year, adding, “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran.” As Defense Undersecretary Colin Kahl put it in a speech at the Manama Dialogue forum in Bahrain last November, the U.S.-China struggle “is not a competition of countries, it is a competition of coalitions.”

As a result, Washington believed it needed to keep its partners close lest they “defect’ to China or side with Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. With Saudi Arabia, Biden went from his “pariah” pledge and efforts to promptly end the war in Yemen to visiting the kingdom and pressing it to increase oil production. But in the wake of Trump’s lapsed security commitments and Biden’s abandoned promises of accountability, Saudi Arabia and other American partners were less than fully compliant. Saudi Arabia sided with Russia in its war on Ukraine when it led a two-million-barrel OPEC+ production cut, refused to join Western sanctions on Russia, and welcomed Chinese President Xi Jinping for a historic Chinese-Arab summit in Riyadh. Giving the Saudi crown prince more and rewarding his misbehavior did not make him more malleable; it backfired. (This should not come entirely as a surprise: Research by the political scientists Patricia Sullivan, Brock Tessman, and Xiaojun Li shows that “increasing levels of U.S. military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States.”) Washington was left in a worst-of-both-worlds position, not entirely trusted by its own partners but far too close to one to maintain any pretense of impartiality, leaving a vacuum that China has now begun to fill.

Beijing has worked to strengthen its relations with all regional powers without taking sides or getting entangled in their conflicts. It has managed to maintain good relations with Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia while remaining fully neutral on the squabbles among them. China has no defense pacts with any Middle Eastern power and does not maintain military bases in the region, relying on economic rather than military influence. This approach has enabled it to emerge as a player that can resolve disputes.

ABOVE THE FRAY

Washington’s response to the deal has been, on the one hand, to welcome the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement (praising “any efforts to help end the war in Yemen and de-escalate tensions in the Middle East region”) and, on the other, to downplay the importance of Chinese mediation. “What helped bring Iran to the table was the pressure that they're under, internally and externally—not just an invitation by the Chinese to talk,” stressed John Kirby, the spokesman for the National Security Council. Yet Saudi-Iranian talks on normalization have been ongoing for several years now, long before the protests in Iran broke out last year or the additional sanctions Biden has imposed on Iran since taking office.

At the end of the day, a more stable Middle East where the Iranians and Saudis aren’t at each other's throats also benefits the United States: If nothing else, instability jeopardizes the flow of oil from the region and adds a hefty risk premium to gas prices. But while not exactly worrying about China’s role, Washington should take it as a warning—and a lesson. If the United States continues to embroil itself in the conflicts of its regional partners, making itself part of the problem rather than the solution, its room for diplomatic maneuvering will become more and more limited, ceding the role of peacemaker to China. Instead, U.S. interests would be better served if Washington stopped taking sides in regional disputes, got back on talking terms with all key regional players, and helped develop a new security architecture in which a reduced American military presence encouraged Middle East powers to share the responsibility of their own security.

The United States should not leave Middle East states with the perception that the United States is an entrenched warmaker while China is a flexible peacemaker. Fortunately, it is entirely in Washington’s own hands to prevent such a scenario.

TRITA PARSI is Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
KHALID ALJABRI is an exiled Saudi cardiologist and health-technology entrepreneur.

Foreign Affairs · by Trita Parsi and Khalid Aljabri · March 15, 2023

7. Russian leadership approved actions of jets that damaged U.S. drone, officials say

Russian leadership approved actions of jets that damaged U.S. drone, officials say

One official said he had not gotten indications that the signoff went all the way up to President Putin.

NBC News · by Courtney Kube and Carol E. Lee

Three U.S. officials familiar with the intelligence said the highest levels of the Kremlin approved the aggressive actions of Russian military fighter jets against a U.S. military drone over the Black Sea on Tuesday.

The Russian jets dropped jet fuel on the MQ-9 Reaper, an unprecedented action, and two of the officials said the intelligence suggests the intent seemed to be to throw the drone off course or disable its surveillance capabilities.

It was “Russian leadership’s intention to be aggressive in the intercept,” said one of the officials.

One official said he had not gotten indications that the signoff went all the way up to Putin. Other officials declined to provide specifics beyond “highest levels.”

U.S. Reaper drone crashes into Black Sea after encounter with Russian jet

March 15, 202304:08

The Russian jet actually clipping the propeller of the drone — which the U.S. says occurred and Russia denies — was likely not intentional, said the officials, who believe it was pilot error, based on U.S. video of the incident.

Three defense officials and one Biden administration official also said the Russians have already reached the area where the MQ-9 Reaper crashed. The Russians are actively looking for the debris with ships and aircraft, but the U.S. hasn’t seen any indication that they’ve been able to recover any of it, officials said. One official said much of the debris sank into the Black Sea.

The U.S. is unlikely to try to recover the remnants of the crashed drone, according to the three U.S. officials familiar with the intelligence.

Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a news conference on Wednesday that there’s probably not a lot of debris to recover and noted the part of the Black Sea where the drone landed is as much as 5,000-feet deep.

He reiterated, as other U.S. officials have said, that the U.S. took steps to disable software on the drone so the Russians would not be able to glean any highly sensitive information from it if they were to recover pieces of it.

John Kirby, a spokesperson for the National Security Council, said in an interview with NBC News that the Russians were deliberately trying to get close to the drone.

“What we don’t know is how intentional the collision with the drone was,” Kirby said. “It is possible that this was just a reckless, incompetent piece of aviation by the pilot.”

In lieu of additional comment, a spokesperson for the National Security Council pointed to previous comments by Kirby, Milley and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

The U.S. has said the drone was flying in international airspace over international waters. Russia has warned the U.S. to stop coming so close to its borders.

Milley said the incident is part of a pattern of behavior by Russia that has recently gotten more aggressive.

NBC News · by Courtney Kube and Carol E. Lee

8. Russia Wants a Long War: The West Needs to Send Ukraine More Arms, More Quickly

Excerpts:

Unfortunately, the incremental pace with which arms have been provided, and the very public deliberations over which arms to provide and when, has given the Russian military time to adjust and learn. Flipping that approach on its head would see the West make an immediate and open-ended commitment to giving Ukraine whatever it needs to win, even if not all of those arms can be delivered today. The transatlantic alliance should take a cue from the United Kingdom and begin training Ukrainian forces now to use the full range of weaponry the West can provide—but that should be just the beginning. In the immediate term, the West should make a credible commitment now to providing Ukraine with all feasible military support in the shortest time frame possible.

Some things, to be clear, would remain permanently off the table—including nuclear arms, other weapons of mass destruction, and arms banned by international law, which have no legitimate place in this or any other conflict. For everything else, though, allies should lay in the logistics for supply and maintenance now, and deliveries should be preapproved, ready to go on a hair trigger. The message to Putin and his generals would finally be clear: there is no compromise solution available, no line of defense except the Russian border itself, and no limit to Western resolve.

Faced with the certainty of defeat, Putin’s calculus would shift. For the past 12 months, Western ambiguity has emboldened Putin to prolong this war, allowing him to believe that there may perhaps come a time when the flow of support will stop, and thus that he can outlast the West and Ukraine. Replacing that ambiguity with strategic clarity—robbing Putin of any viable option other than an organized retreat—can help bring this war to an end. To borrow a phrase from Biden’s State of the Union address in February, it’s time for the West to finish the job.

Russia Wants a Long War

The West Needs to Send Ukraine More Arms, More Quickly

By Sam Greene and Alina Polyakova

March 16, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Sam Greene and Alina Polyakova · March 16, 2023

U.S. President Joe Biden’s historic visit to Kyiv days before the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine sent an important message to Ukrainians and, indeed, to Russians. “Ukraine will never be a victory for Russia,” Biden proclaimed, adding that the United States will support Ukraine “as long as it takes.” Indeed, “as long as it takes” has become the new talking point for Ukraine’s allies, repeated by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. But “as long as it takes” also signals to many Ukrainians that the allies expect the war to drag out for years, with Ukraine bearing the brunt of it. And they are right: even as the United States and its allies have sent billions of dollars’ worth of military equipment to Ukraine, there remains one thing they seem unable to supply: a clear, united commitment to a rapid Ukrainian victory. Unless the United States wants to find itself embroiled in another forever war, on terms that very much suit Russian President Vladimir Putin, it’s time for that to change.

A clear pattern has emerged in the past year: the Ukrainians request a weapons system and Western governments refuse to provide it, only to change their minds a few months later after public debates and disagreement among allies. The news in January that German Leopard tanks and U.S. Abrams tanks would be delivered to Ukraine later this year was, of course, welcome. But it came after months of debates between allies, culminating in an ultimatum from Germany that it would allow its tanks to be sent to Ukraine only if the United States pledged to send its own at the same time. The same is true of Patriot missile defense batteries, which Washington saw as a redline for Putin at the beginning of the war, only to send them months later after thousands more lives had been needlessly lost. The multiple launch rocket system known as HIMARS, which has proved so effective in helping Ukraine regain territory, was delivered only after extensive pressure and lobbying by Ukraine.

The same debate is now playing out over fighter jets and long-range missile systems. The Ukrainians are asking for F-16s and ATACMS, the long-range surface-to-surface missile systems that they need to reach into Russian-occupied parts of the country such as Crimea. When asked on January 30 whether Washington would deliver F-16s to Kyiv, Biden said no, which his advisers later revised to “not now.” On the same day, at The Hague, Macron, asked whether France was considering sending fighter jets to Ukraine, said that nothing was excluded in principle. Speaking about providing Ukraine with military assistance on February 8, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said, “Nothing is off the table.”

By the same token, nothing is exactly on the table, either. This ambiguity has resulted in a Western policy of incrementalism, setting the United States and Ukraine’s other allies up for a protracted conflict. This approach is encouraging Putin to believe that time is on his side and that the United States will eventually tire, as it did in Afghanistan, especially as political winds shift with a U.S. presidential election on the horizon. The policy, while ostensibly seeking to avoid escalation, is laying the ground for something far more dangerous for the United States and its allies: a potential Russian win.

THE STAKES COULD NOT BE HIGHER

It is clear that Russia cannot win its war in Ukraine on the maximalist terms initially set out by Putin. Putin can never occupy or hold the entirety of Ukraine. He cannot impose a Russian-backed government on the Ukrainian people. And having set out to forestall Ukraine’s integration with the West, he has made it an inevitability. But it is equally clear that Putin can and will spin anything short of a complete military collapse into a victory for the domestic constituencies that keep him in power. In fact, Putin has given himself an increasing amount of rhetorical wriggle room over his war aims, and he speaks of demilitarizing and de-Nazifying Ukraine with waning enthusiasm. It must become clear to the West, however, that anything short of the full restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity will represent a catastrophic defeat for the United States and its European allies.

If Russia were allowed to keep any of its ill-gotten gains in Ukraine—whether via peace treaty, cease-fire, or stalemate—the deterrent power of the United States and the transatlantic alliance would be lost. No longer would any would-be aggressor need to consider the Western response before invading or even just threatening a neighbor. The United States’ nuclear deterrent would remain, but that extends only to those countries with whom the United States has a formal alliance. Even there, revisionist powers such as China, Iran, and Russia would soon begin to look for holes in NATO’s nuclear umbrella.

Ukrainians may themselves decide that they want to stop fighting, and that is their sovereign and democratic right. If that happens, Western governments should stand ready to support Kyiv in negotiating an agreement that would guarantee the country’s security and set it on a path toward NATO and EU membership and the ability to defend its own sovereignty and prosperity. But Western leaders and publics should be under no illusion about what would happen if that choice were forced on Ukraine simply because Western publics grew tired of a war they weren’t even fighting. It would be more than just an abdication of moral responsibility to support a people facing genocide and repression. In very short order, it would mean more war, not less.

If Russia’s invasion ends on anything other than Ukraine’s terms, Moscow will have been proved correct: might would be seen to make right. Regional powers will look at their neighborhoods with increasing appetites, confident that the consequences of aggression would be minimal. The message received by smaller states would be equally clear: the only way to avoid Ukraine’s fate is either to yield preemptively to the regional hegemon or, if they are lucky enough to have the right neighbors, to seek a formal alliance. The race to dominate or be dominated will be deadly. NATO, the EU, and the United Nations all emerged in response to the endless wars to which this logic gives rise. The order these institutions engendered has been far from perfect, but if Russia is allowed to undermine that order by procuring a favorable outcome in Ukraine, what comes next—an era of permanent border wars, regional conflict, arms races, refugee crises, and disrupted trade—will be far, far worse than anything faced since World War II.

ESCALATION EXAGGERATION

In practice, making a strategic commitment to victory on Ukrainian terms means flipping the logic of deterrence and escalation. The current slow-drip, reactive approach to providing Ukraine with additional weapons systems was designed in part to manage the potential that Putin might escalate the war. He could do so either through the use of weapons of mass destruction or by attacking NATO members themselves. Early on in the war, when Western leaders had very little data on which to gauge Russian intentions and strategies, this caution may have been justified. A year into the war, however, two truths are clear: first, the provision of increasingly powerful arms has not led to rampant Russian escalation; and second, relative Western restraint has not prevented Putin from bombing Ukrainian civilian targets.

Russia’s relentless war on Ukraine’s civilians is, in fact, the strategy that most analysts expected Moscow to pursue from the very beginning, replicating the tactics it used in Chechnya and Grozny in the 1990s, and more recently in Syria. The fact that it took Moscow months to begin its systematic bombardment of cities far from the front lines reflects the Kremlin’s initial, erroneous assumption that Ukrainian resistance would collapse more or less instantaneously. When that analysis itself collapsed, it took time for Russia to gear up for the brutality it has undertaken since September. To the extent that Russia escalated its attacks, then, it did so in response not to Western aid to Ukraine—and, indeed, Moscow hasn’t targeted the West or Western supply lines—but, rather, in response to Ukraine’s own resilience. As more and more Western aid has flowed into the country since September, the scope and scale of Russia’s assault has remained largely unchanged.

It is thus hard to argue that there is any causal relationship between Western arms supplies and Russia’s prosecution of the war—except in one respect. The West’s willingness to backstop the Ukrainian military has, in fact, reduced Russia’s war aims. Whatever the rhetoric, the size and shape of Russia’s unfolding spring offensive appears designed only to bolster its positions in the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine. Its current assault appears insufficient even to attempt to retake all of the territory Russia claims, illegally, to have annexed, to say nothing of threatening Kyiv and taking political control over the country as a whole. Militarily, then, Russia has responded to Western support for Ukraine not by upping its firepower but by reducing its de facto objectives.

The provision of increasingly powerful arms has not led to rampant Russian escalation.

Unfortunately, the incremental pace with which arms have been provided, and the very public deliberations over which arms to provide and when, has given the Russian military time to adjust and learn. Flipping that approach on its head would see the West make an immediate and open-ended commitment to giving Ukraine whatever it needs to win, even if not all of those arms can be delivered today. The transatlantic alliance should take a cue from the United Kingdom and begin training Ukrainian forces now to use the full range of weaponry the West can provide—but that should be just the beginning. In the immediate term, the West should make a credible commitment now to providing Ukraine with all feasible military support in the shortest time frame possible.

Some things, to be clear, would remain permanently off the table—including nuclear arms, other weapons of mass destruction, and arms banned by international law, which have no legitimate place in this or any other conflict. For everything else, though, allies should lay in the logistics for supply and maintenance now, and deliveries should be preapproved, ready to go on a hair trigger. The message to Putin and his generals would finally be clear: there is no compromise solution available, no line of defense except the Russian border itself, and no limit to Western resolve.

Faced with the certainty of defeat, Putin’s calculus would shift. For the past 12 months, Western ambiguity has emboldened Putin to prolong this war, allowing him to believe that there may perhaps come a time when the flow of support will stop, and thus that he can outlast the West and Ukraine. Replacing that ambiguity with strategic clarity—robbing Putin of any viable option other than an organized retreat—can help bring this war to an end. To borrow a phrase from Biden’s State of the Union address in February, it’s time for the West to finish the job.

SAM GREENE is Director of Democratic Resilience at the Center for European Policy Analysis and Professor of Russian Politics at King’s College London.
ALINA POLYAKOVA is President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis and Adjunct Professor of European Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
MORE BY SAM GREENE MORE BY ALINA POLYAKOVA

Foreign Affairs · by Sam Greene and Alina Polyakova · March 16, 2023

9. Why Sending F-16s to Ukraine Would Be a Mistake

Interesting analysis from a former fighter pilot now at the Heritage Foundation.

Conclusion:

If the war in Ukraine teaches us just one thing about airpower, it’s that fourth generation platforms have no place on the modern battlefield. The idea of providing Ukraine with F-16s is laudable, but it would be a costly mistake. A better strategy would give the Ukrainians more air-defense systems like the Patriot to deny Russian airpower, while continuing to supply them with the artillery, rockets and tanks required to take the fight to that enemy.

Why Sending F-16s to Ukraine Would Be a Mistake

By John Venable

March 16, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/16/why_sending_f-16s_to_ukraine_would_be_a_mistake_887679.html

The Ukrainian MiG-29 pilot known as the “Ghost of Kyiv” became legend during the first few months of the war in Ukraine. Video after video showed him popping up from low altitude to destroy Russian jets before diving back into the terrain to make his hasty escape.

The clips did a lot to garner global support for the Ukrainian people, but they were fakes -- computer-generated animations that created not just the Ghost legend, but an indelible myth about what well-flown, fourth-generation fighters can do in a high-threat environment like Ukraine.

In reality, there’s been little news about airpower’s effectiveness on either side of the war because it has been sorely absent from the battlefield. The Russian Surface to Air Missile (SAM) systems fielded on both sides are so effective that pilots rarely elect to attack enemy positions because the odds of either success or survival are so low. The threat has driven both sides to executing sporadic pop-up attacks that rarely leave a mark on their enemy.

To help counter the SAM threat in Ukraine, the U.S. has already given the Ukrainians High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), but to be effective, they must be launched within the missile’s max range at radars that are on/actively emitting. With no onboard system that can detect a SAM’s emissions or determine its location, hitting a SAM with a HARM launched from a MiG 29 is little more than blind luck.

Some believe that giving the Ukrainians F-16s will change that paradigm, but even our most advanced models are just as ill-suited for a high-threat environment as the fourth-generation MiG-29 and SU-27 fighters the Ukrainians are currently flying.

Originally fielded before either the MiG-29 or SU-27, the F-16 has gone through several block upgrades, although its fourth-generation airframe has remained basically the same for the last 45 years.

In the late 80s, F-16s with more advanced avionics (Block 30s and 40s) received targeting pods, allowing pilots to identify targets and employ short range, precision guided munitions.

In the early 1990s, even more advanced F-16s (Block 50s) received the HARM Targeting System (HTS) pod that allows teams of these fighters, known as “Weasels,” to triangulate active SAM radars, determine their location and attack them with HARMs.

Weasels are very capable, but they must have “line of sight” to the target, which means they can be shot down by the threats they’re trying to destroy.

The Russian’s are employing the S-400 SAM system in Ukraine. Fielded 15 years after the Block 50 F-16, it was designed specifically to outclass the Weasel and is one of the best SAM systems in the world.

In an all-out war, Weasel pilots could suppress those SAM systems, but it would require jets to fly close enough to bait S-400 operators into turning their systems on, allowing the Weasels to go to work.

More than a dozen operational Weasel pilots I interviewed in 2017 said the fighter losses from such a dual would be unsustainable. Each conveyed the belief that the only fighter capable of taking on the S-400 and avoiding those losses is the fifth-generation fighter designed specifically for that fight – the F-35.

On the surface, the idea of giving Ukraine F-16s is noble, but sending even our best fourth-generation fighters to face a fifth-generation SAM threat would be a very costly mistake – one that some well-informed members of Congress even recognize.

During a recent House Armed Services Committee meeting, Rep. Adam Smith said the F-16 is “not the right system” to send to Ukraine because it would “face of a ton of air defense.” He added: “A fourth-generation fighter in this particular fight is going to struggle to survive.”

While Smith is right about not sending F-16s to Ukraine, it’s hard to understand why he doesn’t extend that same logic to U.S. procurements. He has been one of the biggest supporters of buying the fourth-generation F-15EX over the less-expensive, fifth-generation F-35.

The threats our fighters would face in a fight with China far exceed those found in Ukraine. Even in the mythical hands of the Ghost of Kiev, the F-15EX would be a death trap for our pilots.

If the war in Ukraine teaches us just one thing about airpower, it’s that fourth generation platforms have no place on the modern battlefield. The idea of providing Ukraine with F-16s is laudable, but it would be a costly mistake. A better strategy would give the Ukrainians more air-defense systems like the Patriot to deny Russian airpower, while continuing to supply them with the artillery, rockets and tanks required to take the fight to that enemy.

A graduate of the U.S. Air Force Fighter Weapons Instructor Course with more than 3,300 hours in the F-16C and a veteran of three combat operations, John “JV” Venable is a senior research fellow for defense policy at The Heritage Foundation.

10. A Solution for Japan’s Military Mismatch

Excerpts:

More ambitious action is required if Japan is serious about achieving its defense goals. To that end, Tokyo should draw up a plan for transferring further army personnel into the navy. If necessary, it could also consider downgrading one or more army divisions to brigade size, which would provide approximately 3,000-9,000 additional personnel for the navy. The money saved and personnel added by this move will provide the navy with resources that are otherwise unavailable through recruitment alone. Personnel transfers should be staggered over an extended period to lessen the impact on the operative capabilities of affected army units. Since this process will be spread out over an extended period of time, it is imperative to start sooner rather than later.

Despite Kishida’s extremely low popularity, reassignment of Japanese military personnel does not require public approval and is unlikely to elicit any opposition. More challenging, however, will be the predictably fierce resistance to these reductions from army leadership. But if the Japanese government is serious about countering rising Chinese naval power, it must be prepared to face down any bureaucratic resistance that it will surely encounter. Failure to address the MSDF’s growing personnel problems means Japan’s maritime defense capabilities will remain severely misaligned with the challenges it faces.

A Solution for Japan’s Military Mismatch

Given that Japan’s primary threats are maritime, why has it invested so heavily in a land-based force?

By Samuel P. Porter, a historian of modern Japan and modern Japanese military history.

Foreign Policy · by Samuel P. Porter · March 15, 2023

If Japan fights a war in the near or distant future, it is likely to be against China. The Japanese government views a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as increasingly plausible, and judging by statements from senior Japanese government ministers in recent years, it’s likely the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) would join the United States in defending Taiwan. Such a scenario would mark only the second time since the Korean War that Japanese forces have deployed to an active combat zone to defend a neighboring nation from invasion.

Given that Chinese naval dominance in Taiwanese waters all but precludes the possibility of deploying troops to Taiwan’s aid, the fighting is likely to take place in the air and on the seas—not on land. Despite this reality, Japan’s navy—the key actor that would lead any potential intervention—is distressingly understaffed due to chronic recruitment shortfalls. Japan’s army also faces significant manpower shortages. But most worryingly, Japan’s military personnel numbers are disproportionate to its present security needs at a time when the Japanese mainland faces no realistic threat of invasion.

Tokyo has offered little justification for this perplexing mismatch, and its recently announced defense spending increases do not include any measures to address recruitment problems in the short term. Given Japan’s present demographic challenges and recruitment difficulties, the Japanese government should resolve the navy’s personnel shortages by reassigning service members from the army. If Japan fails to act quickly to rectify these problems, it risks undermining its defense capabilities at sea when it needs them most.

The Japanese army, officially known as the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), currently has 139,620 soldiers, comprising nearly 65 percent of the military’s 230,754 total service members. The navy, known as the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), has only 43,435 sailors, almost 2,000 less than its mandated strength of 45,307. It makes up just 19 percent of the overall force, despite being arguably the most important branch for defending Japan in its current security environment.

The roots of this situation are twofold, stemming from recruiting failures and an anachronistic force design that is out of step with Japan’s defense priorities.

Personnel shortfalls are not unique to the navy. Enthusiasm for serving in the military has never been particularly high in postwar Japan. But current recruitment difficulties go beyond the military’s struggle to disassociate itself from prewar Japanese militarism. As an all-volunteer force, the military does not offer competitive wages in Japan’s worker-starved economy. To make matters worse, Japan’s population is rapidly declining, while the number of Japanese between 18 and 26 years old, the ideal age range for recruits, has diminished to just 10.5 million from a peak of 14 million in 1994. Japan’s demographic decline and a number of other economic and social factors all but guarantee that it is unlikely Japan’s military will ever meet its legally authorized strength of 247,154 service members, established most recently by Japan’s Diet in 2020.

Compounding the current acute personnel shortage is that the sizes of each branch are holdovers from the late Cold War. In that period, fears of a Soviet invasion justified fielding a modestly sized land-based force. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Japanese government carried out its largest cut to date of army personnel. As Garren Mulloy cites in Defenders of Japan, numbers were reduced by almost 15 percent, alongside major cuts to inventories of the army’s tanks and artillery pieces.

These cuts have done little to change the fact that the GSDF’s basic structure is that of a conventional land force. Japan’s army is primarily composed of nine combat divisions, which vary in size between 6,000 and 9,000 soldiers. The nine units are ostensibly intended for repelling a large-scale invasion of Japan’s home islands. In recent years, the Japanese government has formed new, smaller brigade-sized units of 2,000 to 4,000 soldiers, which can rapidly deploy to defend Japan’s numerous small islands from a potential Chinese attack. In Japan’s present security environment, its army’s combat divisions lack an obvious purpose.

The Japanese government has not outlined a scenario in which it would even consider a large-scale overseas deployment of ground forces, and even if it did, the GSDF lacks the logistical sealift and airlift capacity needed to deploy and sustain more than a small portion of its combat divisions abroad. In any case, a deployment of Japanese ground forces to defend South Korea from a North Korean invasion, for instance, is almost inconceivable due to continued mistrust. So long as historical animosities endure between Japan and South Korea, Japanese soldiers will likely remain unwelcome—adding further futility to Japan’s overinvestment in combat divisions.

Since 2012, the steady rise of Chinese naval power has decisively shifted Japanese defense policy toward the maritime domain. During the Cold War, Japan focused primarily on defending Hokkaido from a Soviet amphibious invasion. But now, given the rising possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Japan’s strategic gaze has shifted south to the East China Sea and Japan’s southern islands, which control access to the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.

In order to secure this area, the Japanese navy has added new ships to its fleet over the past decade and intends for future ships to require fewer sailors. But these risky changes and rapid pace of naval construction cannot solve the more fundamental problem of the navy’s critical personnel shortages for operating existing ships and conducting regular maintenance work.

Tokyo’s desire to field an ever-larger fleet without increasing its number of sailors is not only an unsustainable plan, but a dangerous one. The navy’s shortage of sailors will undermine its capabilities to operate in combat. Undermanned ships are prone to accidents and may easily become overwhelmed in battle because crew members are exhausted from assuming extra duties. The navy plans on acquiring an expanding inventory of unmanned vessels, but they are no panacea to its personnel shortage. Even unmanned vessels require the training of specialized crews on land to maintain them and support their operations.

Last November, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida garnered global attention by announcing his plans to significantly increase Japan’s defense budget. The proposed plan would raise spending from 1 percent to 2 percent of Japan’s GDP by 2027, yet it seemingly does nothing to address the immediate personnel needs of the Japanese navy, as noted by former military officers. Instead, Tokyo plans to expand its cyberwarfare command and develop new offensive missile capabilities within the army, which will require new recruits or retraining of existing personnel.

Without any prospect of attracting new recruits, the Japanese military must use the manpower it already possesses to make up for personnel shortages within its navy and carry out its defense duties. Fortunately, the Japanese government appears to understand this reality. In December, the JSDF established a precedent for transferring personnel within different branches of the military when it announced that it intends to reassign 2,000 personnel from the army to the navy and Japan’s air force by 2025 to create a new electronic warfare and intelligence unit. This an important move for modernizing the MSDF’s capabilities, but it does not address the Japanese navy’s urgent need for additional sailors to supplement understaffed ships and form the crews of newly constructed vessels.

More ambitious action is required if Japan is serious about achieving its defense goals. To that end, Tokyo should draw up a plan for transferring further army personnel into the navy. If necessary, it could also consider downgrading one or more army divisions to brigade size, which would provide approximately 3,000-9,000 additional personnel for the navy. The money saved and personnel added by this move will provide the navy with resources that are otherwise unavailable through recruitment alone. Personnel transfers should be staggered over an extended period to lessen the impact on the operative capabilities of affected army units. Since this process will be spread out over an extended period of time, it is imperative to start sooner rather than later.

Despite Kishida’s extremely low popularity, reassignment of Japanese military personnel does not require public approval and is unlikely to elicit any opposition. More challenging, however, will be the predictably fierce resistance to these reductions from army leadership. But if the Japanese government is serious about countering rising Chinese naval power, it must be prepared to face down any bureaucratic resistance that it will surely encounter. Failure to address the MSDF’s growing personnel problems means Japan’s maritime defense capabilities will remain severely misaligned with the challenges it faces.

Foreign Policy · by Samuel P. Porter · March 15, 2023

11. Pentagon Creates Cell to Oversee Expansion of Weapon Production Lines

One of the positive outcomes of Putin's War in Ukraine hopefully will be to revitalize our defense industrial base.

Excerpts:

Defense officials have taken several steps over the past year to speed up weapons production. The Pentagon’s fiscal 2024 budget proposal, sent to Congress earlier this week, requests funding for some of those efforts, including buying several key weapons in bulk. In all, the Pentagon requested $30.6 billion for munitions.

“We cannot stop managing this once fighting in Ukraine ends—we need to change,” LaPlante said. “So to ensure we pace the threat posed by China throughout the Indo-Pacific, we cannot return to the feast or famine behavior which is typically employed as the crisis comes and goes.”

Pentagon Creates Cell to Oversee Expansion of Weapon Production Lines

The move comes as the military looks to increasingly bulk buy munitions.

defenseone.com · by Marcus Weisgerber

The Pentagon has created a new cell within its acquisition office to oversee the expansion of weapon production lines amid a growing need to replenish munition stockpiles given to Ukraine.

The organization, called the Joint Production Accelerator Cell, has been tasked with “building enduring industrial production capacity, resiliency, and surge capability for key defense weapon systems and supplies,” according to a March 10 memo establishing the office from Pentagon acquisition chief Bill LaPlante. Erin Simpson has been named executive director of the cell.

The so-called JPAC will aim to institutionalize earlier efforts by LaPlante’s office to boost munitions production, but also work to do the same with other types of weapons.

“The JPAC will focus on developing actionable recommendations to build production capacity for a specific set of weapons systems. These systems may evolve with the threat environment, and will be selected by USD(A&S) based on periodic deliberative processes with senior Department leaders,” LaPlante wrote.

The Ukrainian military’s demand for munitions to fend off invading Russian forces has illuminated supply chain and manufacturing limitations that prevent companies from quickly building new weapons.

The U.S. military shifted to a “just in time” mindset for weapons manufacturing at the end of the Cold War, LaPlante said Wednesday at the McAleese and Associates Defense Programs conference in Washington.

“Complex production lines simply can't be turned on or off based on the requirements of the day,” he said. “And of course, the same applies to the workforce.”

Companies have wanted the Pentagon to send a “clear, consistent demand signal” before making investments to expand weapon production lines,” LaPlante said.

Defense officials have taken several steps over the past year to speed up weapons production. The Pentagon’s fiscal 2024 budget proposal, sent to Congress earlier this week, requests funding for some of those efforts, including buying several key weapons in bulk. In all, the Pentagon requested $30.6 billion for munitions.

“We cannot stop managing this once fighting in Ukraine ends—we need to change,” LaPlante said. “So to ensure we pace the threat posed by China throughout the Indo-Pacific, we cannot return to the feast or famine behavior which is typically employed as the crisis comes and goes.”

defenseone.com · by Marcus Weisgerber

12. How the US plans to expand its submarine industrial base for AUKUS

Is AUKUS really only about submarines?

It seems like we could (and should) be doing so much more with this relationship than just submarines and technology.

How the US plans to expand its submarine industrial base for AUKUS

Defense News · by Megan Eckstein · March 15, 2023

WASHINGTON — Defense officials are optimistic that billions of dollars of investments in the U.S. submarine industrial base will increase capacity to and even above the required two-a-year attack sub construction rate, allowing the U.S. to build for Australia under a new international agreement without restricting the American fleet.

On Monday, the U.S., Australia and the United Kingdom unveiled new details about their partnership to produce for Australia its own nuclear-powered submarine by 2040, known as the SSN AUKUS. The U.S. is offering an interim capability of three to five Virginia-class submarines, either newly built or used, in the 2030s.

To meet the U.S. Navy’s undersea warfare needs under a 2021 force structure assessment, the submarine industrial base must sustain a minimum construction rate of two Virginia-class attack submarines and one Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine per year throughout this decade and into the next — without counting any additional submarines for Australia. So far, builders have not been able to keep up with that workload and are years behind schedule on some Virginia submarines.

This week, senior defense officials, granted anonymity to discuss sensitive matters, told Defense News a series of investments from Congress and Australia, with the AUKUS pact in mind, are meant to help industry “get to that 2.0 delivery cadence that we’re expecting” on the Virginia program and even achieve rates “north of 2.0″ while working on the Australian boat or boats.

However, one of those officials said the Navy was not expecting to see “sustained 3.0 production” of these attack submarines in the long run.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday on Wednesday said the investment would help the shipbuilders and their suppliers “sustain that 2.0 cadence, which by the way needs to go above 2.0 attack boats a year if we’re going to be in a position to sell any to the Australians.”

And Naval Sea Systems Command commander Vice Adm. Bill Galinis confirmed industry is still delivering about 1.2 submarines a year — reflecting that the Navy is buying two a year and industry is delivering them late.

At a Pentagon press conference Tuesday, the assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities, Mara Karlin, said the pact would “lift all three nations’ submarine industrial bases and undersea capability, enhancing deterrence and promoting stability in the region.”

“Australia’s acquisition of SSNs will bolster the capabilities of one of our strongest allies by increasing the Royal Australian Navy’s range, survivability and striking power, thus strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” Karlin said.

Before Australia acquires its own Virginia-class subs, a new collaborative entity known as Submarine Rotational Forces-West will establish a rotational presence of one UK Astute class submarine and up to four U.S. Virginia-class SSNs at Australia’s Stirling military base near Perth.

Amid the concerns of U.S. lawmakers that AUKUS will make it more difficult to meet U.S. submarine needs, defense officials say the industrial base investments will also cut maintenance timelines, making the submarines the U.S. Navy has more operationally available.

A history of industrial base challenges

The Navy was already ramping up its financial support of the submarine industrial base well before AUKUS was decided. The sea service spent more than $1 billion between fiscal 2018 and 2022 on bolstering the two nuclear shipbuilding yards and their thousands of suppliers, and kicked off another five-year, $2.4 billion investment in FY23 — on top of the annual cost of procuring submarines.

The Navy this year is also launching a separate $2.2 billion investment in Virginia-class maintenance and readiness, which will also benefit many of the same parts suppliers.

The industrial base is facing a range of challenges after shrinking by about 70% when the Navy took a break from buying submarines following the end of the Cold War. A smaller industrial base began Virginia-class construction in 1998 at a rate of one boat a year, but in FY11, the Navy moved to a two-a-year rate, and by 2019, it was clear industry had fallen behind.

Attack sub construction fell even further behind as the Navy asked industry to prioritize the growing Columbia-class workload. And the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent labor market disruption left the Virginia production line in a dire situation, with industry delivering no submarines to the Navy between April 2020 and February 2022.

The attack submarine fleet has shrunk to 49, compared to a 2021 assessment’s requirement for 66 to 72. For the fleet to reach that required size, industry would need to get back on track and then increase its production rate to something closer to three a year.

There was a time when Navy officials thought a couple-billion-dollar infusion into the submarine industrial base could help expand production from two Virginias a year to three. In June 2021, then-acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition Jay Stefany told senators it would take “a major investment of effort, capital and workforce” and cited an internal study that called for $1.5 billion to $2 billion – plus industry’s own investments – to get to that higher rate.

The Navy will ultimately spend more than that just to secure on-time production of two Virginias a year.

But AUKUS could change that.

A senior administration official told Defense News last week the Navy investments so far “are down payments on what needs to be done for the U.S. submarine industrial base,” adding the administration would “work with Congress to get very substantial lifts in the U.S. submarine industrial base, lifts that go significantly beyond the $4.6 billion we will have submitted with the president’s budget submission,” referring to the $2.4 billion effort that began last year and the $2.2 billion effort kicked off with this week’s FY24 request.

“In an unprecedented move, Australia has agreed to make a proportional contribution to the U.S. submarine industrial base to help lift our production and maintenance capabilities to offset the loss of those submarines,” the official added, noting this undisclosed sum would come on top of paying the “full and fair price” for the used and the new submarines.

The official called the American and Australian investments “generational” and said they would have “a huge impact on our overall defense posture.”

Though the senior administration official would not say the amount of Australia’s contribution to the industrial base, Reuters reported Australia would invest $3 billion in the U.S. and U.K. submarine industrial bases over the next four years. That includes funds for U.S. workers to help Australia set up its own nascent submarine industrial base in Adelaide and for their Australian counterparts to work in U.S. shipyards across the country.

Here’s a closer look at what’s been invested so far:

Submarine industrial base and workforce development

The Navy last year made the first payments of a five-year, $2.4 billion investment in industrial base and workforce development support, including nearly $750 million in FY23 for the submarine industrial base.

Rep. Joe Courtney, the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee’s seapower panel, noted the newly released FY24 budget proposal seeks $647 million more to expand the submarine industrial base.

Courtney’s Connecticut district includes the General Dynamics Electric Boat submarine construction yard, one of only two shipyards in the nation that build nuclear-powered submarines. (The other is HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia.)

“I’ve been in Congress now 17 years, we’ve never seen a number like that in terms of workforce, supply chain and facility” investments, Courtney told reporters on a Tuesday call, noting previous submarine capacity investments ranged from $100 to $200 million per year prior to FY23.

The FY23 funding included $541 million for supplier development, workforce development, shipyard infrastructure and strategic outsourcing to other shipyards – which Courtney noted benefitted not just the Connecticut and Virginia shipyards, but suppliers around the country.

For instance, Austal USA’s Alabama shipyard recently started to build Command and Control Systems Modules and Electronic Deck Modules for Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines.

“The strategic outsourcing like what’s happening down in Alabama can be replicated in other parts of the country to take some of the pressure off of man hours” at the construction yards that don’t have the workforce or the facilities to accept more work, said Courtney.

During the Tuesday interview, the senior administration official said some of these investments are aimed at vendors deep in the supply chain, for hard-to-get metals, machine tooling or, say, an air conditioning unit unique to nuclear-powered ships.

“The supplier base investment goes all the way down [the supply chain] to better access to the right types of alloys, the right types of metals for material procurement,” one senior administration official said.

Congress designated the remaining $207 million in FY23 submarine industrial base funding for workforce development initiatives to help the shipyards cope with labor shortages that have hindered production.

“The pursuit of people and investments is almost like The Hunger Games out there right now,” said Courtney, referencing the dystopian novels and movies. He noted Electric Boat made almost 4,000 new hires last year and has set an ambitious target to hire an additional 5,700 workers this year alone.

The Department of Labor has also funds a manufacturing pipeline program that trains the welders, mechanists and electricians that shipyards rely on in as little as eight to 10 weeks.

Virginia-class readiness spending

Another challenge stemming from the industry output is the lack of spare parts for in-service Virginia submarines, leading the Navy to have to cannibalize parts from one submarine to finish up another boat’s repairs.

In fact, a 2021 Congressional Budget Office report showed the number of parts taken from one Virginia submarine to complete maintenance on another skyrocketed in 2019 and remained high since.

That’s where the new $2.2 billion investment in Virginia-class spares and maintenance will come into play.

The Navy is asking for $541 million in FY24 for spare parts, according to Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for budget and director of fiscal management.

“This is a dramatic increase that we’ve never done before,” he said, noting the remainder of the investment will come across the next five years.

Gumbleton said the Navy did not want to wait to start fixing the problem. Even as Congress works through the FY24 budget process, the service will use its Navy Working Capital Fund to purchase $200 million to $350 million in spare parts so that they’re waiting on the shelves in FY24 and the Navy can use its appropriated funds to buy those parts for immediate use.

This funding is meant to give parts suppliers an increased but stable demand while also helping address widespread maintenance delays. These delays have led to 18 submarines in or awaiting maintenance, instead of what should be 10 under operations and maintenance planning assumptions.

This means the Navy has 31 attack subs available to conduct training, global operations and tactics development work, compared to 39 if today’s fleet saw on-time maintenance, or 53 to 58 if the submarine fleet was the required size.

About Megan Eckstein, Joe Gould and Bryant Harris

Megan Eckstein is the naval warfare reporter at Defense News. She has covered military news since 2009, with a focus on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations, acquisition programs and budgets. She has reported from four geographic fleets and is happiest when she’s filing stories from a ship. Megan is a University of Maryland alumna.

Joe Gould is the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He served previously as Congress reporter.

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

13. Ideology is back, and it’s critical for understanding AUKUS v China

I had an excellent exchange with a friend and an expert on influence operations who took me to task for my emphasis on ideology. He made the case that it is overemphasized from a historical perspective, to including during the Cold War. He has caused me to reflect and re-evaluate my thinking on this. Perhaps he will weigh on this article.

Excerpt:

But understanding the ideological clash between democratic allies and China’s neo-authoritarianism is critical to understanding the motivations of the AUKUS partners, Australia, Britain and the United States.

Ideology is back, and it’s critical for understanding AUKUS v China

watoday.com.au · by Lydia Khalil · March 16, 2023

Opinion

By Lydia Khalil

March 16, 2023 — 10.18am

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It comes with an eye-watering price tag of $368 billion for Australia, but this week’s headline-grabbing AUKUS security pact should prompt some deeper questions about why our leaders – across the political divide – are so convinced it will be value for money.

It’s out of fashion these days, when assessing global power politics, to focus on ideology. Foreign policy realists will highlight the primacy of “interests” over values. Australia’s national interests, on that calculation, might tilt pragmatically to the commercial realities and towards China, our biggest trading partner.

Joe Biden, Anthony Albanese and Rishi Sunak.Credit:Artwork Stephen Kiprillis, photography Alex Ellinghausen

But understanding the ideological clash between democratic allies and China’s neo-authoritarianism is critical to understanding the motivations of the AUKUS partners, Australia, Britain and the United States.

Clearly, AUKUS – and with it, Australia’s colossal investment in nuclear-powered submarines – demonstrates a commitment to lean even more heavily into the strategic alliance with the US, instead of hedging our bets more evenly between the US and China. Given China’s stated anger at Australia’s historic announcement this week, it is worth reflecting on what this strategic security pact is attempting to accomplish.

I’d argue it’s got a lot to do with ideology – specifically, democracy and its protection. Ideology informs values and values inform interests. We need to appreciate, too, how much ideology drives China’s strategic actions.

“To grasp the Chinese challenge,” as Michael Beckley and Hal Brands write in the Journal of Democracy, “we must grasp its ideological dimensions.”

Post-Trump, US President Joe Biden has made a big show of his administration’s attempts to reinvigorate American democracy. He has also worked to build a coalition of democracies through major security pacts such as AUKUS, but also and the Quad – aligning the US, Japan, India and Australia – and by convening the global Summit for Democracy, a virtual meeting hosted by Washington “to renew democracy at home and confront autocracies abroad”.

A renewed focus on democracy in Australia includes the creation of the Democracy Taskforce and the ASIO director-general highlighting foreign-interference threats from China. Consolidating and protecting our democracy is a goal in and of itself, but it has clear implications for how Australia, the US and the UK, along with other democratic allies, respond to China.

China’s “chief ideologue” and most important political theorist is Wang Huning. A high-ranking member of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee, Wang was instrumental in developing modern China’s ideological underpinnings, arguing the case for its neo-authoritarianism and against democracy. In the early 1990s, he wrote a book, America Against America. Its dissection of America’s crisis of democracy proved to be highly influential – and now it’s back in heavy circulation.

Wang argues the US, and democracies in general, will ultimately be felled by inequalities, polarisation and liberty running amok. Wang’s argument has captured China’s leadership, and Xi Jinping in particular. China’s perception of democracy’s weakness influences its confidence and its assessment of its prospects of successfully pursuing its strategic interests.

China, under Xi, fiercely believes in and promotes its own system of governance – what it calls “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, but which is basically an authoritarian Marxist-Leninist political system. The CCP promotes this as superior to democracy. It is certainly a system that safeguards its own grip on power. However, China’s commitment to authoritarianism is not relegated to its own domestic governance; it informs how it moves through the world.

China has pursued actions in an attempt to make the world safer for autocracies such as itself to exist, and to blunt the influence, spread and consolidation of democracies. Liberal democratic values form the underpinnings of the current rules-based order, which AUKUS seeks to protect but which constrains China’s ambitions.

In this pursuit, China has often exercised “sharp power”, a term coined to express how authoritarian states project their influence internationally through the undermining, manipulating and distorting of open societies such as democracies. We’ve witnessed its suppression of democracy in Hong Kong and its militarisation of the South China Sea.

It will apply in China’s consideration of whether to invade and attempt to claim Taiwan as its own. It also influences how actively it will challenge the international liberal rules-based order that underpins our own national security.

The AUKUS security pact is a strong signal to China from like-minded democracies that it should think twice. Simplistic efforts to downplay ideological considerations can no longer be sustained. Ideology may be back in fashion.

Lydia Khalil is a Research Fellow on Transnational Challenges at the Lowy Institute. She manages the Digital Threats to Democracy Project.

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watoday.com.au · by Lydia Khalil · March 16, 2023

14. Exclusive: Chinese-made drone, retrofitted and weaponized, downed in eastern Ukraine

Video a the link: https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/16/europe/china-made-drone-downed-eastern-ukraine-hnk-intl

Is this why Russia harassed our Reaper? Are they trying to deflect attention from the use of Chinese made drones iby Russia?

Exclusive: Chinese-made drone, retrofitted and weaponized, downed in eastern Ukraine | CNN

CNN · by Rebecca Wright,Ivan Watson,Olha Konovalova,Tom Booth · March 16, 2023

Eastern Ukraine CNN —

Driving deep into the forest, the hush between the towering pine trees and the clear blue skies was splintered every few seconds by the sound of distant explosions from the frontline battles for eastern Ukraine.

Guiding us through the woodland on foot, Ukrainian soldiers eventually brought us to a clearing where they showed us the wreckage of a weaponized drone which they said they shot down with their AK-47 automatic weapons over the weekend.

A Mugin-5, a commercial unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) made by a Chinese manufacturer, is seen downed in eastern Ukraine.

Rebecca Wright/CNN

The drone was a Mugin-5, a commercial unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) made by a Chinese manufacturer based in the port city of Xiamen, on China’s eastern coast.

Some tech bloggers say the machines are known as “Alibaba drones” as they have been available for sale for up to $15,000 on Chinese marketplace websites including Alibaba and Taobao.

Mugin Limited confirmed to CNN that it was their airframe, calling the incident “deeply unfortunate.”

It’s the latest example of a civilian drone being retrofitted and weaponized since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a sign of the rapidly shifting patterns of warfare.

“Along the frontlines, basically all the time we’re conducting aerial reconnaissance,” said Maksim, a 35-year-old territorial defense fighter who wanted to go only by his first name.

Low altitude

Overnight Friday into Saturday, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) told CNN that their agents based in Russian-held territory alerted them that a UAV had been launched from there, heading towards a Ukrainian target.

The SBU then raised the alarm with military units based in eastern Ukraine, near the city of Sloviansk.

At around 2 a.m. Saturday, fighters from the 111th Brigade of the Territorial Defense Forces of Ukraine heard the drone overhead, and even saw a light blinking on the aircraft.

“From the sound, from the signal light, the troops fired a lot at it and knocked down the UAV,” Maksim said.

Maksim said the UAV was flying at very low altitude – close enough to bring it down with hand-held weapons.

Ukrainian fighters said the Mugin-5 they downed had been retrofitted to carry a bomb

Rebecca Wright/CNN

Now lying on the forest floor, a bullet hole was visible on the nose of the machine, which had broken apart and sustained significant damage.

Nearby, the soldiers also showed us a small crater in the earth which was created by the payload on the UAV – a bomb of approximately 44 pounds (20 kilograms), which was later safely detonated by the fighters.

In a video shared with CNN, the Ukrainian fighters showed how they hooked up a US-made demolition charge and then sprinted through the forest to their truck, before driving away at speed.

At a distance of around 1,640 feet (500 meters), they then stopped their vehicle and turned to film the powerful impact of the blast – a reminder of the potential damage it could have caused had it met its intended target on Ukrainian soil.

CNN reached out to Russia’s Ministry of Defense for comment on the incident, but has not yet received a response.

‘Crude, unsophisticated’

The weaponized commercial drone did not have a camera fitted, which means it could not have been used for surveillance, and essentially makes it similar to a “dumb bomb,” according to Chris Lincoln-Jones, a retired British Army officer and specialist in drone warfare.

“This particular drone that we’ve been looking at would be much more effective if it had a decent camera in it,” Lincoln-Jones said.

He added that the machine adds more evidence to the theory that Russia is not the military superpower that the world might have expected.

“This seems to be a very crude, unsophisticated, not very technologically advanced way of conducting operations,” he said, adding that the price of the machines is very cheap in military terms.

Ukrainian fighters said they downed the low-flying drone with small arms fire

Rebecca Wright/CNN

“The Ukrainians have to do whatever they can,” he added, so he would expect them to use “much more makeshift weapons.”

In January, officials in the Russian-held Luhansk region in eastern Ukraine claimed in a Telegram post that they had shot down a Mugin-5 launched by Ukrainian forces.

Ukrainian officials did not comment on this particular incident, but experts said that there is evidence that both sides of the conflict have utilized this technology.

“Both Russia and Ukraine have used commercially available Chinese platforms such as this during the course of the conflict, including in armed roles,” said N. R. Jenzen-Jones, an arms and munitions intelligence specialist, and director of the consultancy Armament Research Services.

“In this case, the Mugin-5 Pro was likely being used in a ‘bomber’ role, and not as a one-way attack (OWA, also called ‘sacrificial’) UAV,” Jenzen-Jones said.

The munition loaded onto the drone was likely to be a “high explosive fragmentation” design, which was “simple and not very aerodynamic,” he said.

Jenzen-Jones added that the release mechanism for the bomb appeared to be made with 3D-printed components, which would “suggest that the UAV has been rapidly retrofitted.”

‘We are not happy about it’

As weaponry evolves in real time on the battlefields of Ukraine, the civilian companies behind the technology that is being armed to kill are now scrambling to find ways to stop their products from entering the military supply chain.

“We do not condone the usage. We are trying our best to stop it,” a spokesperson for Mugin Limited told CNN.

In a previous statement posted on the company’s website on March 2, Mugin Limited said they “condemn” the use of their products during warfare, and said they ceased selling products to Russia or Ukraine at the start of the war.

CNN also reached out to half a dozen other companies whose electronic parts were visible in the downed UAV.

That includes servos made by MKS, a Taiwanese manufacturer of electronic devices.

“Some UAV manufacturers may adopt MKS servos on their finished products for military usage, we are not happy about it, and it is against our company’s mission and vision,” a company spokesperson said in an email to CNN.

The MKS website disclaimer also states that their products are “forbidden” for any illegal or military utilization.

A sensor on the retrofitted circuit board on the UAV was made by Novatel, part of the Hexagon group based in Canada, which supplies industries including “agriculture, construction and automotive.”

“For all export-controlled products we have extensive control processes in place to ensure they are provided in compliance with applicable export laws,” a Hexagon spokesperson told CNN via email.

“In April 2022, we also took the decision to freeze all business activities in Russia.”

Despite the signs that the use of UAV technology in this conflict is ramping up, Ukrainian fighter Maksim denies that this has become a war of the drones.

“It’s not a war of technology,” he said. “The war is firstly a war of people.”

CNN · by Rebecca Wright,Ivan Watson,Olha Konovalova,Tom Booth · March 16, 2023

15. What Russia's possible collapse could mean for China

Excerpts:

The Russian Federation is not likely to disintegrate in the eyes of international law. But it will morph into a very different player. It will be ruled by increasingly predatory regional elites, and its main hallmark will be that the state monopoly on violence is decentralised and privatised, at a time when hundreds of thousands of embittered and hardened soldiers are returning from the war in Ukraine.

In the Russian Far East, this could entail the emergence of a de facto Chinese protectorate. Nominally, it would still be part of the Russian Federation, but in practice, it would be Chinese officials that rule via Russian proxies, and it would be Beijing that foots the bill for keeping order.

The returns would not be limited to a free hand in exploiting the region’s vast natural resources, ranging from hydrocarbon extraction to predatory logging. The real prize would be to place the Russian Pacific Fleet at the mercy of support from Beijing, and thus in the hands of the PLA. In the mounting standoff over Taiwan, that would be a real asset.

What Russia's possible collapse could mean for China

thinkchina.sg · March 14, 2023

Swedish academic Stefan Hedlund points out that China is weighing its options very carefully as to how much it should intervene to ensure a stalemate or renewed freezing of conflict in the Ukraine war. From China's point of view, while there are certain gains to Russia being further weakened, Russia's total fall would also spell trouble for China.

By Stefan Hedlund

Emeritus Professor of Russian and East European Studies, Uppsala University

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has placed renewed emphasis on the nature of Sino-Russian relations. The optics remain as good as ever, if not better. At their last meeting before the Russian full-scale invasion, President Xi Jinping went out of his way to assure President Vladimir Putin of their “no-limits” friendship.

Beijing has since doubled down on its support, causing growing alarm in the West. On 22 February, two days before the anniversary of the assault, China’s top diplomat Wang Yi met Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow, and President Xi himself is scheduled to visit “in the coming months” or even weeks.

Behind the happy facade, matters are less rosy. With Moscow pushing hard for serious military support, Beijing is forced into a delicate balancing act. As the crisis over Taiwan deepens, the need for a strategic partnership with Russia is becoming more accentuated. Yet, as the war in Ukraine drags on, the reputational damage from being on the side of the aggressor is piling up, threatening Chinese exports.

Beijing’s recently presented “peace plan” reflects a mounting concern that Russia may indeed be looking at military defeat.

Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and China's director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission Wang Yi enter a hall during a meeting in Moscow, Russia, 22 February 2023. (Alexander Nemenov/Pool via Reuters)

More than 140 countries have openly supported condemnations of Russia in the United Nations, and even some of its closest friends have broken ranks. During a recent visit to Kazakhstan, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken secured a strategic deal with Russia’s oldest and staunchest ally. Moscow has said it is “deeply concerned” that even Serbia, a traditional Slavic brother, is allegedly providing munitions for Ukraine, and the pressure is building on India to speak out against Russia.

How much should China do

Beijing’s recently presented “peace plan” reflects a mounting concern that Russia may indeed be looking at military defeat. The core question concerns how far it is willing to go to ensure a stalemate, and a renewed freezing of the conflict. To date, its assistance has been limited to support for Russian propaganda, such as the trope that it was the US that blew up the Nord Stream pipelines. That may no longer be enough.

Secretary Blinken is presently leading a Western charge to dissuade Beijing from providing lethal military aid to Russia. China doing so would not only jeopardise its projection of being a neutral party interested in promoting peace, but also cause serious damage to its current ambition of courting the European Union for improved business relations. The implied tradeoff is made even more delicate by the fact that it arrives at a time when the Chinese economy is in dire need of traction to pick up after the Covid lockdowns.

For President Xi, this development represents a true watershed. During his time in power, he has been increasingly successful in exploiting Russian estrangement from the West. Modernisation of the Chinese military has profited from gaining access to Russian top-of-the-line military hardware, including stealth fighters, and hard-nosed bargaining has secured good deals on Russian oil and gas.

The looming downside is that allowing Russia to be pushed too hard may drive it into state collapse, which would have seriously negative consequences also for Beijing.

A woman walks past a house destroyed in recent shelling in the course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Donetsk, Russia-controlled Ukraine, 12 March 2023. (Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters)

As the war enters its second year, the Western sanctions regime is pushing Russia ever deeper into dependence on China, the Middle Kingdom. Russian reserves are being depleted and the outlook is dismal. Export earnings are constrained by the combined facts that the market for Russian gas in Europe is dead, and that export of oil can only take place at heavily discounted prices. By alienating countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, Moscow adds to its own isolation by providing room for Turkey and Azerbaijan to emerge as big energy players.

This is where the Middle Kingdom will need to tread very gently. It may be tempting to allow Western sanctions to throttle the Russian economy. This would avoid the damage to its business prospects in the West that would follow from trying to help its strategic partner. And it would enhance the prospects of deriving added economic gain from Russian weakness. If Siberia and the Far East are reduced to a true bargain basement, Beijing may realise its old vision of Russia as its “northern resources territory”.

The looming downside is that allowing Russia to be pushed too hard may drive it into state collapse, which would have seriously negative consequences also for Beijing.

The reason on all counts is that Russia has never developed autonomous institutions that may step into the breach when the state fails.

Russia on the brink of collapse could be to China’s gain

There has been much recent speculation about a possible disintegration of the Russian Federation and/or a fully-fledged state collapse. While these notions are marred by conceptual confusion, they are not entirely without merit. Russia does have a powerful historical legacy of defeat in war leading to state collapse. It happened in 1598, when Muscovy collapsed; in 1917, when the Russian Empire collapsed; and in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed.

The reason on all counts is that Russia has never developed autonomous institutions that may step into the breach when the state fails. Russian autocracy has traditionally rested on unaccountable power based on vertical communication. It has never developed the form of horizontal relations that combine to form a society. Russia in consequence has remained a house of cards — when the strongman at the top fails, the whole edifice collapses.

This aerial photograph shows a destroyed Russian tank sitting in a snow-covered wheat field in Kharkiv region on 22 February 2023, amid Russia's military invasion of Ukraine. (Ihor Tkachov/AFP)

There is presently a slight risk of what is known as a russkyi bunt — a senseless eruption of mass violence without leadership and/or purpose. But this outcome is not very likely. What in contrast is highly likely is that an accelerating erosion of the federal centre will trigger regional and local scrambles to take over resources, in the process further undermining the central power.

The real prize would be to place the Russian Pacific Fleet at the mercy of support from Beijing, and thus in the hands of the PLA.

The Russian Federation is not likely to disintegrate in the eyes of international law. But it will morph into a very different player. It will be ruled by increasingly predatory regional elites, and its main hallmark will be that the state monopoly on violence is decentralised and privatised, at a time when hundreds of thousands of embittered and hardened soldiers are returning from the war in Ukraine.

In the Russian Far East, this could entail the emergence of a de facto Chinese protectorate. Nominally, it would still be part of the Russian Federation, but in practice, it would be Chinese officials that rule via Russian proxies, and it would be Beijing that foots the bill for keeping order.

The returns would not be limited to a free hand in exploiting the region’s vast natural resources, ranging from hydrocarbon extraction to predatory logging. The real prize would be to place the Russian Pacific Fleet at the mercy of support from Beijing, and thus in the hands of the PLA. In the mounting standoff over Taiwan, that would be a real asset.

thinkchina.sg · March 14, 2023

16. Blind Sided: A Reconceptualization of the Role of Emerging Technologies in Shaping Information Operations in the Gray Zone

Download the 91 page report at this link from the Irregular Warfare Center.: https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/03142023_Blind_Sided.pdf

March 14, 2023

Blind Sided: A Reconceptualization of the Role of Emerging Technologies in Shaping Information Operations in the Gray Zone

https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/2023/03/blind-sided-a-reconceptualization-of-the-role-of-emerging-technologies-in-shaping-information-operations-in-the-gray-zone/

Authors: Ashley Mattheis, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Varsha Koduvayur, Cody Wilson

Download the PDF by clicking the button to the right.

The Gray Zone Information Context

Methodology: Applying Evolutionary Theory to Gray Zone Information Operations

Propagation of Perspective

Information Operations Methods in the New Media Sphere

Mobilization Repertoires

Implications

Glossary

affordances: In the new media sphere context, affordances are sets of features specific to particular software or platforms. Users often utilize these features in ways that developers did not plan.

bots: Short for robots, bots are automated programs that perform repetitive tasks and can be designed to mimic the online activity of humans.

disinformation: Media that contains false or misleading information that is created and shared to intentionallyharm a specific target.

gamification: The process of adding “game” elements, such as leaderboards and rewards systems, to non-game environments.

gray zone competition: The gray zone is the space between war and peace. Gray zone competition can be thought of as competition between actors (state or non-state) that exceeds normal peacetime competition but does not meet the threshold of a declared war.

hashtag hijacking: Using an existing popular hashtag to circulate unrelated content.

information environment: The full spectrum of actors and systems that share and use information.

information operations (IOs): Information operations use information to target an audience with a specific message to create a desired change within that audience.

malinformation: Information that is based on truth but is exaggerated or otherwise taken out of context to cause harm.

meme: A term describing how small bits of cultural information are passed between people, replicated over and over, and spread widely.

memeification: The process of turning a piece of content (e.g., taglines, images, song snippets, cultural icons) into a meme.

misinformation: Media that contains false or misleading information but that is not intentionally shared to cause harm. Often the sharer is unaware that the media contains false or misleading information.

new media ecosystem: Traditional, digital, and social media in an interrelated ecosystem that allows participants to be sources, producers, and consumers of information, often simultaneously.

polluted information: A catch-all term for disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation.

sockpuppet accounts: Fake social media accounts that are meant to appear real to other users.

17. Munitions Return to a Place of Prominence in National Security

As they should. Can't win a war without beans and bullets. Especially bullets.

Conclusion:

There is no one silver munition to resolve the current crisis, but a number of concrete steps could go a long way. The government should put forward a policy package that eases contracts, includes allies in the manufacturing base, expands and modernizes existing government-owned, contractor-operated facilities, and encourages research to save costs and incentivize private reinvestment.

Such a multi-faceted prescription would set the United States up for longer-term success with regards to ensuring its own military effectiveness, building transportable defensive capabilities, and ensuring timely and effectively support for partners like Taiwan. Whatever contingencies may arise in the future, Washington will want to have enough ammunition for them.

Munitions Return to a Place of Prominence in National Security - War on the Rocks

VASABJIT BANERJEE AND BENJAMIN TKACH

warontherocks.com · by Vasabjit Banerjee · March 16, 2023

Munitions are the currency of exchange in armed conflicts. The existing acquisition and procurement process exposes the defense industrial base to significant short- and long-term risks: hampering America’s capacity to surge production and impairing military effectiveness in a sustained peer or near-peer conflict. At present, the availability of ammunition is becoming a key determinant of which side has the advantage in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Wargames conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies call into question the ability of the United States and its partners to sustain high rates of fire because of significant equipment losses, limited munition inventories, and low munition production rates.

The U.S. government’s investment in munition manufacturing, storage, inspection, and maintenance ebb and flow has been based on conflict engagements, a cycle consistently leaving the defense industrial base unable to immediately meet production surges. The health of the U.S. defense industrial base was also undermined by decades of consolidation, inconsistent funding, capital diversification, supply chain fragility, labor limitations, and disruptions — raising concerns amongst analysts about its ability to rise to challenges.

Scholars have warned that pursuit of innovation under growing security demands may produce gaps in existing military capacities. Thus, limitations in U.S. and allied munition production — just to satisfy Ukraine’s ammunition demand — is a precursor of industrial limitations that may hamper U.S. military effectiveness if engaged with an adversary, such as China, that inflicts severe equipment and personnel losses. The acute inability to manufacture munitions is typified by the U.S. defense industrial base’s lack of manufacturing capacity to supply NATO rounds like 155 mm artillery ammunition, buying South Korean ones, and shipping U.S. stockpiles stored in Israel to Ukraine. Given its existing commitments and preparations for eventualities in Asia, the United States is also running low on stockpiled missiles from the Stinger to the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System.

Munition manufacturing is a concern in the United States and across NATO allies. NATO’s initiative to coordinate allied ammunition warehousing will not overcome current production limitations, which for the United States, according to analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, may stretch into 2027 and beyond for multiple critical systems. Additional congressional funding for production of artillery shells is emblematic of Ukrainian demand instead of U.S. strategic industrial policy. Furthermore, Soviet/Russian rounds like the 122 mm and 152 mm, as well as anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles — which are still primarily used by Ukraine — are increasingly scarce on the international arms market. It is also clear that Eastern European manufacturers of these types of ammunition and missiles will take a couple of years to ramp up production.

Increasing munitions production is key to supporting U.S. grand strategy, specifically with regards to great-power competition. Our analysis and policy prescriptions divide munitions into two types — high-tech and low-tech — to demonstrate that current efforts to shore up munition production, such as additional funding, multi-year contracts, and no-bid contracts — which may reduce military effectiveness — are necessary but insufficient changes to ensure rapid increases in both high-tech precision and lower-tech munitions.

Besides supporting prior recommendations regarding easing contracts, we also recommend that the United States expand industrial collaboration with allied nations on advanced munitions (e.g. precision-guided munitions) and include allies’ manufacturing bases as part of the U.S. defense industrial base itself. With regards to low-tech munitions manufactured in government-owned, contractor-operated facilities overseen by the Joint Munitions Command, the Department of Defense should fund modernization efforts at facilities. The government should also secure the entire supply chain (particularly metal fabrication supplies), increase audits and formulate specific quality and efficiency data analytics. Finally, it should fund the sustainment of production facilities even after current demand inevitably declines.

Why is the United States Facing a Shortfall?

For the United States, the current shortfall in munition production necessary for sustained, attritional warfare is the result of two decades-long trends. The first cause was the absence of a rival at the Cold War’s conclusion, leading to the drawdown of the U.S. military, defense industry consolidation, and budget realignment necessitated by new funding priorities. Second were decisive conventional military victories, such as in Iraq in 1991, and the post-9/11 prioritization of counter-terrorism operations wherein the U.S. military enjoyed overwhelming superiority in weapons and ammunition. The conflicts during the 1990s and 2000s seemed to confirm the “revolution in military affairs” and its prioritization of technology over rate-of-fire concerns.

As noted by Col. Harry F. Ennis in 1980, even at the peak of the Cold War, budget constraints hindered production and maintenance of the ammunition stockpile, and despite drops in the production rate, the reduced defense industrial base was expected to supply military demands. Another study notes how U.S. stockpiles of air-delivered ammunition were dangerously lowered by resupplying Israel via Operation Nickel Grass during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

The trend lines of post-Cold War munition production difficulties were evident after the first Gulf War. In 1993, Lt. Col. David Whitfield warned that the characteristics of ammunition production — industry consolidation, expensive startup costs, dangerous manufacturing processes, and monopsony demand — would create a scenario where there would be insufficient numbers of private companies to surge production when needed. When coupled with government policy changes, these production hurdles produced an industrial base with limited surge capacity. For example, the Clinton administration’s Bottom-Up Review identified sufficient ammunition stockpiles for two major regional contingencies and changes in military focus. The Obama-era defense budget cuts justified by the strategy of one regional contingency, counter-terrorism, as well as deterring Iran and China, did the same.

Second, America’s military and technological dominance over adversaries’ conventional forces perhaps elevated the view that technology, organization, doctrines, and initial firepower can lead to quick victories. One has only to look at the plethora of analysts, think tanks, and others’ predictions of a quick Russian victory in Ukraine to see the major flaws in Russia’s military. Many analysts expected an insurgency to develop in Ukraine, but Russia’s failure to win the conventional war re-confirms that conventional military capabilities are a combination of arms, doctrine, and belligerents’ national will, and other factors.

As a result of this historical context, production of significant munitions and components is now managed by the U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command’s government-owned, contractor-operated facilities. Limited market competition, constricted demand to the U.S. government and partners, and industry consolidation eroded U.S. munition manufacturing capacity. Now-retired Maj. Gen. John Ferrari argued in 2009 that these market dynamics prioritize contractor interests over production capacity. Yet, in a 2004 report, RAND recommended full industry privatization.

What Can Be Done?

There is broad agreement among policymakers and analysts that a primary lesson of the Russo-Ukrainian War is that the United States and its allies should invest in the manufacturing of ammunition and precision-guided missiles. A recent Heritage Foundation report summarizes three core areas of improvement: rebuilding the manufacturing base to raise production levels by offering multi-year contracts; bypassing time-consuming contract competition requirements; and simplifying the Foreign Military Sales process to encourage rapid co-production. However, such policy recommendations do not account for the organization of ammunition manufacturing.

While we believe that the broad suggestion is correct, we divide munition and component manufacturing into two broad categories: sophisticated precision-guided munitions and unguided munitions. We make these broad distinctions because the markets for sophisticated and unsophisticated munitions are different, and the government should adopt different policies. Sophisticated munitions and the development of future capabilities require market competition and innovation. Precision-guided munitions are capital and technology intensive with opportunities for market-based competition between manufacturers. The private sector, through contractor-owned, contractor-operated facilities, will continue to manufacture the more research-intensive and higher profit margin precision-guided munitions, such as those for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (made by Lockheed Martin) and the Javelin (made by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon).

Thus, improving the production of high-tech munitions will require adjustments to export regulations, facilitating licensing agreements, and increasing the capacity to modify systems to suit U.S. policy objectives. Specifically, we propose that the defense industrial bases of NATO member states and treaty allies should be considered as part of the U.S. defense munition manufacturing industrial base for planning purposes. This proposal is similar to current thinking regarding the United Kingdom and Australia as instantiated by the AUKUS agreement. This can be accomplished by licensing agreements to internationalize production of currently limited munitions such as Javelin and other anti-tank missiles, howitzer rounds, and some other missiles. The ability to license production by allied countries, such as Turkey, expands the industrial base to states with the technical sophistication to manufacture components or systems and comparative advantages provided by lower labor costs, all without threatening U.S. jobs.

Congressional support to modify the Industrial Traffic in Arms Regulations is necessary to expedite arms exports and enable industrial collaboration. These regulations are designed to protect U.S. intellectual property and ensure that U.S. technology advantages are maintained. The munitions and systems demanded in Ukraine have relatively limited exposure to advanced U.S. technology but are nevertheless still covered by bureaucratic red tape. Other policy changes such as sunset clauses on certain systems and ammunition would facilitate contractors establishing vertically integrated production chains. Congressional support would be more forthcoming if these modifications to existing laws came with safeguards for the intellectual property rights of U.S. firms, which in turn require updates to the U.S. legal system to address existing and future concerns of the digital era.

Improvement in low-tech munitions manufacturing, like Ukraine’s insatiable use of 155 mm shells, requires mobilization and expansion of the existing government-owned, contractor-operated facilities — among others — overseen by the Joint Munitions Command. In addition to the Government Accountability Office’s recent recommendations for the Army to revise its governing documents to enable more effective decision-making and establish mechanisms to collect, analyze, validate, and share common lessons learned, we make four additional specific recommendations.

First, the Department of Defense should fund planned facility modernization. The government should also provide additional specific and directed funding to replace outdated equipment and upgrade manufacturing processes, even if existing contracts place the responsibility on the contractor to do so. Munition manufacturing is essential to U.S. national security and the additional investment does not unfairly favor specific firms. Competition to operate government-owned, contractor-operated facilities does occur — several of the facilities have changed contractors through competitive awards over the last 20 years. Government investment in contractor-operated facilities is essential for safety and efficiency. For example, updating World War II-era facilities at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant is not simply replacing Department of Defense civilian-mixed explosives with robotic capabilities, but also upgrading the transportation and storage facilities on base. Upgrades at government-owned, contractor-operated facilities, which may unfairly benefit the current contractor, are also necessary. For example, there is modernization underway at the Lake City facility to manufacture the 6.8 mm ammunition for the Next Generation Squad Weapons. The recent modernization of the nitrocellulose manufacturing facility at the Radford Army Ammunition Plant is another example.

Second, the Department of Defense should internationalize aspects of low-tech munition production by securing the entire supply chain of necessary materials. Low-tech munitions are manufactured at the “speed of steel,” a reference to the idea that metal fabrication is the constraint on production. The U.S. government should explore and utilize international partners for part components to develop multiple lines of production. These additional international partners would add resiliency to existing U.S. supply chains while bolstering surge capacity. Because transportation costs are significant, final assembly, inspection, and testing could all be completed at U.S. facilities. In this vein, the Department of Defense should also secure the supply chain of machine tools needed to manufacture such ammunition. In addition to the United States, four out of the top six producers of machine tools are allies, with two being NATO members: namely Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Italy.

Third, the Department of Defense should increase audits of government-owned, contractor-operated facility operators. Existing contracting processes include audits and reviews. Comprehensive analysis of ammunition quality, efficiency, and delivery necessitates significant improvement in data-collection efforts and design to enable internal and external experts in strategy, management accounting, and logistics to improve production processes. Unfortunately, responsibilities and documentation remain opaque. Ensuring a capacity to surge production will require different contract vehicles and standardization of the operating contracts known as Performance Work Statements across all government-owned, contractor-operated facilities.

Finally, the Department of Defense should consider the costs of idling production if and when demand for munitions declines. Maintaining capacity and supporting salaries when not in demand is politically unpopular, and history suggests that munition production is a frequent target of budget cuts. Current efforts to surge supply — including competition between General Dynamics and American Ordnance for a nearly billion-dollar contract and a prior $522 million contract to manufacture artillery rounds — should not disrupt future efforts to sustain the existing government owned, contractor operated production model. As noted by the Government Accountability Office, contractors operating government-owned facilities sell ammunition to third parties: Additional policies governing how much profit beyond existing minimums must be re-invested in facility infrastructure are necessary. The United States would be well served in remembering the difficulty in supplying munitions in support of Ukraine, not even as a combatant, in a war of attrition.

Conclusion

There is no one silver munition to resolve the current crisis, but a number of concrete steps could go a long way. The government should put forward a policy package that eases contracts, includes allies in the manufacturing base, expands and modernizes existing government-owned, contractor-operated facilities, and encourages research to save costs and incentivize private reinvestment.

Such a multi-faceted prescription would set the United States up for longer-term success with regards to ensuring its own military effectiveness, building transportable defensive capabilities, and ensuring timely and effectively support for partners like Taiwan. Whatever contingencies may arise in the future, Washington will want to have enough ammunition for them.

Vasabjit Banerjee is an associate professor of political science at Mississippi State University.

Benjamin Tkach is an assistant professor of political science at Mississippi State University.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Vasabjit Banerjee · March 16, 2023

18. Rebel youth risk life and limb in Myanmar’s cruel war

A major irregular war few are following.

note the reference to the Free Burma Rangers. The world of Dave Eubank and his family is pretty incredible. (https://www.freeburmarangers.org/)

And we have other Americans doing great work as well, such as retired SF officer Tim Heinemann and his Worldwide Impact Now (WIN) (https://worldwide-impact-now.org/) NGO and retired CIvil Affairs officer Kristine Gould, among others.

Rebel youth risk life and limb in Myanmar’s cruel war

Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance is composed of youth who had their democratic aspirations dashed by the military’s seizure of power

asiatimes.com · by Thierry Falise · March 16, 2023

Renowned photojournalist Thierry Falise recently returned from a month in Myanmar’s Kayah state, a front line in the nation’s raging civil war. This is the first article of a two-part series.

KAYAH, Myanmar – Maui is a chubby man with a thick goatee and a mischievous smile. Yet the 29-year-old fighter’s affability and ease belie the severity of his combat fatigues and lethal weaponry.

Maui is the commander of the rebel Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), which maintains a temporary headquarters in an abandoned village close to Demoso, a town in Kayah state held by the Myanmar military.

“We have to go now, my guys have started to attack the enemy on the other side of the road,” he says in an interview while walking to a pickup truck camouflaged under a tree.

Like tens of millions of other Myanmar citizens, his life dramatically turned on February 1, 2021, the day the military staged a democracy-suspending coup. “I was running an NGO specializing in organic farming in northern Kayah state,” he recalls.

“We had plantations of vegetables, tomatoes, mangos and avocados. We also helped local farmers. Everything was going well and smoothly. At night I enjoyed sitting on my porch with a good glass of wine to watch the sunset over the hills.”

On his mobile phone, Maui swipes pictures of this seemingly long-gone life of peace and tranquility. One shows him with dreadlocks; another shows him standing in front of posters of Bob Marley and Che Guevara.

In many ways, he is symbolic of Myanmar’s youth who between 2011 and 2020 experienced freedom and hope that their parents never had during previous decades of repressive military dictatorship.

The coup and the military’s violence against peaceful demonstrators drove thousands of young people into the jungle and mountains, where many took shelter in areas controlled by long-standing ethnic armed groups.

In Kayah state, Maui and other young activists created a new anti-military army, initially out of frustration towards the National League of Democracy (NLD), the ruling party that won the November 2020 election but was toppled and repressed by the coup.

Maui, the 29-year-old commander of the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF), stands in a rear base near the frontline. The KNDF, mostly constituted of local young civilians, claims to have a force of 7,500 men and women divided into 21 battalions. Photo: Thierry Falise

“During anti-junta demonstrations in Loikaw and other cities in Kayah state, we were gutted to see some NLD leaders telling us to soften our demands and stop requiring the abolition of the 2008 Constitution (written and applied by the military before the coup), so we decided to join the armed movement.”

Maui and his followers did not want to create another People’s Defense Force (PDF) unit, the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG), which they felt would be an off-shoot of the NLD. “I was invited by a northern ethnic group to get basic military training and then I learned on the spot,” he adds.

Young women and men, mostly students and farmers from Kayah state, quickly gathered around the new force that was founded in May 2021 under the name of KNDF. Funding to acquire weapons and ammunition came from the sale of private properties and individual donors sympathetic to the cause.

Officially, the KNDF is under the umbrella of the Karenni Army (KA), the armed wing of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), one of the oldest ethnic armed groups created in 1957. “I am second in command under General Bee Htoo (KA’s commander-in-chief). The KA brought their experience and provided us with some weapons,” adds Maui.

The KNDF, which claims a force of 7,500 women and men, mostly ethnic Karennis, is divided into 21 battalions (in reality there are 20; Battalion 13, for superstitious reasons, does not exist). On the field, the KNDF is operating alongside KA and PDF units.

It can also rely on temporary although untrustworthy collaboration with local groups used for years as proxies by Myanmar security forces such as the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF) and the Karenni National Solidarity Organization (KNSO).

The KNDF’s young fighting force is a militant microcosm of the national revolution movement, which is being driven by young people from all ways of life and ethnicities. They have transformed Kayah state, one of Myanmar’s smallest and least populated administrative divisions, into one of the main hotbeds of the armed resistance.

People’s Defense Force (PDF) Demoso members practice at a jungle training camp. Photo: Thierry Falise

Maw Kue Myar, a 23-year-old Karenni who goes by Kuku, was a nurse at the Yangon hospital before the coup. She’s now on the frontlines treating injured combatants.

“The army shattered our dreams,” she says with a melancholic smile. “After witnessing security forces killing people during protests, I joined the resistance.”

On many occasions she has amputated soldiers on the spot on the battlefield, sometimes helping to carry the wounded and the dead. “In 2022, particularly, (KNDF) soldiers were injured and killed everywhere by airstrikes, snipers, mortars, bullets. It was relentless, horrible.”

More recently, another young woman, Bamar ethnic Ming Nge, has joined the resistance medical staff. “I was a first-year student at Yangon University of Medicine 1. In March 2021, a friend from my class was killed by the police during a protest. I only wanted to fight back,” said the 19-year-old.

She reached a Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) camp along the Thai border where she received basic military training and then registered in a humanitarian program conducted by the Free Burma Rangers (FBR), a relief group founded in 1997 and one of the rare organizations to work inside the war zone with displaced populations.

During a recent FBR mission in Kayah state, she learned from a volunteering American dentist how to extract and fill in teeth, a blessing for many local people who otherwise would probably never receive proper dental treatment. This new life helped her to reflect on her previous “privileged conditions.”

“I realized that we Bamar had made our life comfortable for ourselves. I had no idea how ethnic people have been suffering under the Burmese army and I had no ethnic friends.”

On the battlefield, the war has taken a discernible shift from last year. In 2022, the boldness and rage motivating young KNDF, KA and PDF combatants to follow an all-war strategy turned out to be very costly. According to an official count by the KNDF, 174 combatants (KNDF, KA and PDF) lost their lives in 2021 and 2022.

“This toll is probably well short of the reality,” comments a FBR observer who was present during months of heavy fighting in 2022. “There are cases of young combatants who were rushing towards enemy lines despite being ordered by their commander to get back, they were shouting ‘we want to kill Burmese, we want to kill Burmese’… and they died,” the observer said.

Joe Phyu, a 41-year-old carpenter and the commander of the PDF Demoso B1102 Unit, acknowledges that he “lost 39 soldiers out of a contingent of 300.”

Field hospitals run by resistance groups are filled with young people recovering from severe injuries. At the Phoenix Rehabilitation Center, a facility built on a hilltop near a Kayan village (one of the Karenni sub-groups), Poe Reh, a 31-year-old KNDF Battalion 10 fighter is sitting on a bed. Five months ago, he lost both legs to a landmine.

“Soon I will get a prosthesis and I hope to start a new life as a farmer,” he says with a smile and his girlfriend at his side.

A soldier from the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) who lost both legs during a military operation against the Myanmar army sits in a field hospital alongside his partner. Photo: Thierry Falise

In view of last year’s mistakes and losses, resistance strategists seem to have shifted their operations to more classic guerrilla warfare. Everyone acknowledges the supremacy of the Myanmar Army’s weaponry, particularly its rising use of deadly airstrikes.

“The Burmese Army is in control of the main cities and roads, but we are stronger in the forest and the hills,” says 26-year-old Khu Reedu, Maui’s second in command, a Karenni former law student who in 2019 made a name for himself when he was jailed for six months for protesting against the then-NLD-led government’s plan to erect a statue of independence leader General Aung San in Loikaw, Kayah state’s capital.

Dragon, the 31-year-old KNDF strategy officer, says “contrary to a widespread opinion, Burmese soldiers can be quite brave, even though sometimes in a naïve way when they charge against us to their death without much thinking. Many of them feel strong and can stay awake for long periods of time because they use yah baa (methamphetamine), which costs only 500 kyats (US$ 0.24) per tablet.”

Maui’s arrival on the frontline underlines this shift to guerrilla warfare. A short distance away, from a field nearby another deserted village, the sound of pounding mortars and the repetitive crackling of machine guns and rifles can be heard.

At their closest, only 50 meters separate KNDF-PDF combatants and Myanmar military soldiers. A KNDF soldier hit by shrapnel in the back is brought inside a house where medics provide first aid on the cement floor.

Medics treat a soldier from the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) who was injured in the back during a military operation against the Myanmar army. Photo: Thierry Falise

After hours of exchanging fire interrupted by long moments of silence, orders are given to the resistance to withdraw.

“Last year, we would have kept on shooting and tried to advance towards the enemy. Today, having realized that we can avoid senseless deaths and injuries, we are more cautious in our approach,” Maui says.

Still, even though casualties have dwindled, the situation remains highly hazardous. A week before, nearby this frontline, four KNDF soldiers were torn apart by a Myanmar military-fired mortar that fell in a trench.

Despite the lethal danger, the KNDF and PDF continue to attract new recruits. Jacinta, a 19-year-old female Karenni, is sitting on the dusty ground of training camp with 90 other newcomers, listening to an instructor’s speech. She joined the KNDF after volunteering in an internally displaced people (IDP) camp.

“I saw so much suffering over there,” she says with a shy smile, adding: “I am a little bit afraid of weapons, but it will do.”

While armed resistance groups can still count on reinforcing their ranks, they still lack weapons and ammunition. This shortage is felt most acutely during Myanmar military airstrikes.

While resistance leaders say they dream of a kind of an “Afghan war turning point” – when in 1988 the delivery of surface-to-air Stinger missiles by the US government to the Afghan resistance shifted the course of the war against Russia – they know for now such deliveries are unrealistic.

Soldiers from the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) walking in a forest on their way to a military operation against the Myanmar army in Southern Shan state. Photo: Thierry Falise

No Western government is going to risk fueling an armed conflict on China’s doorstep and in a country that is still low on their priority list.

The resistance’s weapons and ammunition are in part seized from government soldiers or provided by other ethnic armed groups such as the Karen, the Kachin or the Palaung. As with any unconventional war, they are also procured from border black markets, albeit at a very high cost.

“Since the beginning of the war,” says a KNDF officer, “intermediaries have multiplied and increased their commission. On the Thai border, a M16 or a AK47 can cost up to 130,000 THB (US$3,800).”

Still, resistance groups make up for these shortfalls through improvisation and creativity. The KNDF has set up a few clandestine weapon factories in its operating zones. Deep inside an unhospitable and arid jungle area, a few makeshift bamboo huts accommodate 60mm mortar production.

A dozen young people, engineers, chemists and other technicians are busy working on a full production cycle, which runs from the fabrication of explosives to the formatting of the final shell on massive machine tools powered by generators.

They use scraps from motorbike engines, fragments of electric poles and other scrap metal with a preference for aluminum. The results are relatively well-crafted mortars that will be used in launchers and homemade drones against Myanmar military positions.

A member of the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) makes a 60mm mortar on a machine tool in a clandestine weapons factory set up deep in a jungle. This factory also produces landmines. Photo: Thierry Falise

In other secret workshops, resistance supporters assemble makeshift M16 and other types of rifles, mixing original pieces often dating from the Vietnam war with copies and other parts produced by 3D printers. “Sometimes we also use Airsoft parts to incorporate in our rifles, particularly handguards,” adds a KNDF officer.

Both the KNDF and KA have established some kind of administration in the vast areas that they control and where a large number of the 200,000 to 300,000 IDPs have settled while waiting and hoping for normalcy to return to their besieged villages.

“We try to maintain education and health structures in these areas. It’s not perfect, but it’s much better than nothing,” says Maui.

KNDF and PDF units operating in Kayah state are largely self-reliant because they cannot count on their chief official ally, the anti-coup National Unity Government. Every young activist in Kayah state interviewed for this report asked the same question: “Where is the NUG?”

“We see and hear the NUG a lot online, but not in the field,” said Kuku, the nurse, in summing up the opinions of many of her companions on the perceived disconnect between the NUG’s official objectives and the reality on the ground.

Joe Phyu, the PDF Demoso commander adds: “Only 1% of the help I get from outside sources comes from the NUG. If we had to rely on the NUG, we could not fight at all.”

Khu Reedu, the KNDF’s second in command, goes further: “I think that the NUG, which is reputed to get a lot of resources from foreign entities, hands out its assistance as a priority to PDF groups operating in (ethnic majority) Bamar areas such as Sagaing and Magwe regions. I believe that NUG leaders think that groups like us operating in ethnic areas can rely on the traditional ethnic guerrilla movements.”

People’s Defense Force (PDF) members are ridding in a truck on their way to a military operation against the Myanmar army. Photo: Thierry Falise

If so, it’s a sad and dramatic expression of perceived Bamar chauvinism in which, even though formally allied with ethnic groups against a common enemy, they still consider minority groups as second-rate partners. As for the Burmese military, says a PDF officer, “in the middle and long term, they bet on a gradual loss of impetus within the resistance groups.”

Indeed, the coming years will be decisive in answering a crucial question: how long can a generation of young people maintain its determination and commitment amid massive suffering, a lack of resources and a rising sense of abandonment?

In conversations and interviews, some revolutionaries – as they call themselves – acknowledge that they probably only have a couple of years before they opt for other paths if their democratic aspirations aren’t achieved, either returning to their previous lives in military-occupied areas or starting new ones abroad as exiles.

Theirry Falise is a long-time photojournalist based in Bangkok, Thailand. The text and photos in this report are his copyright and may not be reproduced in any form without his express permission.

asiatimes.com · by Thierry Falise · March 16, 2023

19. Eye on Taiwan, US-Philippines to stage largest-ever wargames

Again I would like to sit in the PLA situation room/joint operations center (JOC) and observe how they are tracking three major exercises taking place near simultaneously - Balikatan in the Philippines, CObra Gold in Thailand, and Freedom Shield in Korea. I wonder what their real assessment is about these exercises (versus their public rhetoric)?

Are they receiving the "clear signal?" Is the clear signal described by these journalists the one we intend to send?

Eye on Taiwan, US-Philippines to stage largest-ever wargames

In clear signal to China, Balikatan drills will simulate sinking a hostile vessel using HIMARS and include Patriot missile air-defense exercises

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · March 16, 2023

MANILA – Barely a month after granting the Pentagon extensive access to key Philippine bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), Manila kicked off major wargames with its sole treaty ally that promise to raise China’s ire.

Earlier this week, the Philippines and the United States conducted their largest army exercises ever, with a special focus on fending off a potential full-scale invasion of the Southeast Asian island nation by a hostile power.

As many as 3,000 troops from the Philippine Army and the US Army Pacific took part in the Salaknib Exercise, first launched in 2014 and meaning “shield” in the northern Philippine language of Ilocano, in Fort Magsaysay in Central Luzon that had a particular emphasis on live-fire and artillery drills.

Philippine military authorities underscored the importance of the exercises due to the usage of “new tactics” to “face adversaries from out of the country”, drawing particularly on Ukraine’s so far successful resistance to Russia’s invasion based on the deployment of relatively limited, cutting-edge military technology.

For the first time, Tokyo has also sent observers to the high-profile exercises amid ongoing plans to establish a new tripartite Japan-Philippine-US (JAPHUS) alliance.

The Philippines also announced this week that it will conduct its largest-ever wargames with the US next month. The annual Balikatan (“shoulder-to-shoulder” in Filipino) exercises are expected to feature as many as 17,000 troops, almost twice as many as previous drills.

Crucially, the two sides will be conducting their first Patriot missile air-defense exercise, underscoring the growing focus on modern warfare interoperability between the allies.

Another drill will simulate the sinking of a hostile vessel 22 kilometers off Zambales, which is located just 100 nautical miles from the China-controlled Scarborough Shoal. China and the Philippines were locked in a months-long standoff over the feature in 2012 in which the US opted against intervening.

US and Philippine troops arm and arm in a joint military exercise. Photo: AFP

According to Balikatan spokesperson Colonel Michael Logico, the joint drill involving multi-domain coordination among air and naval forces will focus on “sinking a target vessel using a combination of artillery naval gunfire and aviation weapons” utilizing the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) that has been used to devastating effect in Ukraine.

Former Philippine Navy vice-admiral Rommel Jude Ong characterized the exercises as primarily focused on “enhanc[ing] strategic deterrence posture of the Armed Forces of the Philippines” in the South China Sea.

Other Philippine military officials have characterized the massive wargames as a crucial step in enhancing the country’s “maritime defense, coastal defense and maritime domain awareness.”

According to one senior Philippine military official who spoke on the condition of anonymity, the massive drills have an even more immediate crisis in mind. “It has a lot to do with Taiwan,” the AFP official said, emphasizing how the wargames were meant to enhance the country’s “deterrence [capability], not provocation of China.”

Both Japan and Australia are also expected to participate in the exercises. Last month, Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles announced that his country would be sending its largest contingent yet to the Balikatan wargames. Both US allies would play key roles in any Taiwan contingency.

In recent months, the Philippines has emerged as America’s new star ally in the region. In a major departure from his predecessor’s pro-Beijing foreign policy, President Marcos Jr has doubled down on his country’s defense relations with traditional allies, especially the US and Japan, in the past month.

Last week, US State Department Undersecretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland visited Manila to coordinate the implementation of EDCA, which faces growing opposition in the Philippines including from governors of frontier provinces close to Taiwan where military bases are situated.

US Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson has publicly argued that the expanded American presence in the country won’t provoke tensions with or retaliation from China.

“I don’t see the EDSA sites as a magnet for that and, in fact, I see EDCA sites are a way for provincial authorities, local authorities to enhance their ability not only to defend themselves from a security perspective but to grow their economies,” the US top envoy said in an interview with the local GMA Network.

The policy pivot and scale and emphasis of the joint exercises, however, has triggered a hot debate at the highest levels in Manila, with former president Rodrigo Duterte and presidential sister Senator Maria Imelda “Imee” Marcos warning of unwanted escalation in regional tensions vis-à-vis China.

Chinese President Xi Jinping shows the way to then-Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte in a file photo. Photo: AFP

In a television interview last week, Duterte said “we are being made a platform for [American weapons]” and this would “make the Philippines vulnerable” to Chinese retaliation in the event of a conflict over Taiwan or in the South China Sea.

“It’s going to be missiles coming in from the South China Sea or wherever from the land base facing the Philippines. Missiles will rain upon us. If it were up to me, I would have rather not [pressed ahead with the EDCA decision],” Duterte added in a mixture of English and Filipino, underscoring the threat of an expanded US presence in bases close to Taiwan’s shores.

Similarly, Senator Imee Marcos has warned that “If these EDCA sites are used as staging areas for US military intervention in Taiwan, then we may be dragged into [a potential Taiwan conflict].”

Buoyed by the high-profile opposition to expanded Philippine-US defense cooperation, the Chinese Embassy in Manila released a strongly-worded, if not colorful, statement warning against joining “US efforts to encircle and contain China.”

“To bundle the Philippines into the chariots of geopolitical strife will seriously harm Philippine national interests and endanger regional peace and stability,” the statement said.

Several senators, however, publicly backed the government’s EDCA decision by emphasizing its largely defensive nature while criticizing China’s behavior.

“If they want us to trust them, they have to respect our sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Senator JV Ejercito told the media. “They have already harassed a lot of our fishermen so many times. And now, they are doing it to our Coast Guard and Navy (personnel),” he added.

Similarly, Senator Francis Escudero called on Beijing to “look in the mirror” before accusing the US or the Philippines of raising regional tensions.

“Isn’t what China [is] doing [in] Taiwan and the West Philippine Sea also ‘undermining the stability of the region?’ We have every right… to pursue a foreign policy that serves our national interest and should not be cowed by such threats,” he said in an interview.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @richeydarian

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · March 16, 2023

20. Michael Klare, Is War with China Inevitable?

Excerpts:

It’s difficult for outsiders — let alone most Chinese — to know what goes on in Beijing’s closed-door CCP leadership councils and, of all state secrets, that leadership’s calculations about a possible invasion of Taiwan are probably the most guarded. It’s certainly possible, in other words, that Xi and his top lieutenants are prepared to invade at the earliest sign of a drive towards independence by Taiwan’s leaders, as many U.S. officials claim. But there’s no evidence in the public realm to sustain such an assessment and all practical military analysis suggests that such an endeavor would prove suicidal. In other words — though you’d never know it in today’s frenzied Washington environment — concluding that an invasion is not likely under current circumstances is all too reasonable.

In the belief that Beijing is prepared to mount an invasion, the United States is already providing Taiwan with billions of dollars‘ worth of advanced weaponry, while bolstering its own capacity to defeat China in any potential conflict. Sadly, such planning for a future Pacific war is likely to consume an ever-increasing share of taxpayer dollars, result in ever more military training and planning in the Pacific, and as Rep. Gallagher and Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy suggested recently, ever more belligerent attitudes toward China. Given the reasonable probability that Chinese leaders have decided against an invasion, at least in the immediate future, doesn’t it make sense to consider alternative policies that will cost all of us less and make all of us safer?

Imagine, in fact, adopting a less antagonistic stance towards Beijing and seeking negotiated solutions to some of the issues dividing us, including China’s militarization of contested islands in the South China Sea and its provocative air and sea maneuvers around Taiwan. Reduced tensions in the Western Pacific might, in turn, make it possible to avoid massive increases in the Pentagon budget, thereby permitting increased spending on domestic priorities like health, education, and climate action.

If only…

Michael Klare, Is War with China Inevitable?

POSTED ON MARCH 14, 2023

News flash! Ten thousand Marines and other U.S. troops recently invaded southern California and captured Twentynine Palms in the Mojave Desert — 1,200 square miles of desert seized! Oh, wait, my mistake! Those were just a series of war games in which U.S. bases took the place of islands in the Pacific, while our military began preparing to fight its next war against… yes, China. Meanwhile, tensions with that country continue to rise as Republican House leader Kevin McCarthy plays out his own war scenario by inviting Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen to meet him in California. (If you think the Chinese went nuts over former House leader Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, just wait for this one!)

Yes, imagine (as Michael Klare has already done) that the U.S. military is now preparing to fight an updated version of World War II in the Pacific, island by island, with the Chinese military. How cheery! Indeed, the Marines are planning to retrofit several regiments for just such an island campaign, equipping them with new anti-ship missiles and drones, while renaming them “littoral” (no not literal, but as in islands and shorelines) regiments.

Exactly what this world needs right now: the two greatest greenhouse-gas-emitting countries preparing for a potential war against each other. Honestly, if that doesn’t help the state of this planet, what will? And while Chinese leader Xi Jinping has started to angrily use the old American Cold War term “containment” for this country’s strategy toward his, the Republicans are already entering a warlike state in relation to China (which will undoubtedly mean more money for the Pentagon!) — and so is the Biden administration. Peace, what is it good for? Absolutely nothing!

In that context, let TomDispatch regular Michael Klare offer you a look at the unlikelihood that China will actually invade Taiwan, while considering what might lie ahead for us all. I mean, what could possibly go wrong? Tom

Is a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan Imminent?

tomdispatch.com · by Andy Kroll · March 14, 2023

Or Is Washington in a Tizzy over Nothing?

Is China really on the verge of invading the island of Taiwan, as so many top American officials seem to believe? If the answer is “yes” and the U.S. intervenes on Taiwan’s side — as President Biden has sworn it would — we could find ourselves in a major-power conflict, possibly even a nuclear one, in the not-too-distant future. Even if confined to Asia and fought with conventional weaponry alone — no sure thing — such a conflict would still result in human and economic damage on a far greater scale than observed in Ukraine today.

But what if the answer is “no,” which seems at least as likely? Wouldn’t that pave the way for the U.S. to work with its friends and allies, no less than with China itself, to reduce tensions in the region and possibly open a space for the launching of peaceful negotiations between Taiwan and the mainland? If nothing else, it would eliminate the need to boost the Pentagon budget by many billions of dollars annually, as now advocated by China hawks in Congress.

How that question is answered has enormous implications for us all. Yet, among policymakers in Washington, it isn’t even up for discussion. Instead, they seem to be competing with each another to identify the year in which the purported Chinese invasion will occur and war will break out between our countries.

Is It 2035, 2027, or 2025?

All high-level predictions of an imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan rest on the assumption that Chinese leaders will never allow that island to become fully independent and so will respond to any move in that direction with a full-scale military assault. In justifying such claims, American officials regularly point to the ongoing modernization of China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and warnings by top Chinese officials that they will crush any effort by “separatist elements” in Taiwan to impede unification. In line with that mode of thinking, only one question remains: Exactly when will the Chinese leadership consider the PLA ready to invade Taiwan and overpower any U.S. forces sent to the island’s relief?

Until 2021, U.S. military officials tended to place that pivotal moment far in the future, citing the vast distance the PLA needed to go to duplicate the technological advantages of U.S. forces. Pentagon analysts most often forecas t 2035 for this achievement, the date set by President Xi Jinping for China to “basically complete the modernization of national defense and the military.”

This assessment, however, changed dramatically in late 2021 when the Department of Defense published its annual report on the military power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). That document highlighted a significant alteration in China’s strategic planning: whereas its leaders once viewed 2035 as the year in which the PLA would become a fully modern fighting force, they now sought to reach that key threshold in 2027, by accelerating the “intelligentization” of their forces (that is, their use of artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies). If realized, the Pentagon report suggested, that “new milestone for modernization in 2027… would provide Beijing with more credible military options in a Taiwan contingency.”

Still, some Pentagon officials suggested that the PLA was unlikely to achieve full “intelligentization” by then, casting doubt on its ability to overpower the U.S. in a hypothetical battle for Taiwan. That, however, hasn’t stopped Republicans from using the prediction to generate alarm in Congress and seek additional funds for weaponry geared toward a future war with China.

As Representative Mike Gallagher (R-WI) put it in 2022, when he was still a minority member of the House Armed Services Committee, “China’s just throwing so much money into military modernization and has already sped up its timeline to 2027 for when it wants the PLA to have the capability to seize Taiwan, that we need to act with a sense of urgency to tackle that threat because that is something unlike anything we’ve seen in modern history.” And note that he is now the chairman of the new China-bashing House Select Committee on China.

A potential 2027 invasion remained common wisdom in U.S. policy circles until this January, when the head of the Air Force Mobility Command, General Michael Minihan, told his troops that he suspected the correct date for a future war with China was 2025, setting off another panic attack in Washington. “I hope I am wrong,” he wrote to the 50,000 Air Force personnel under his command. “My gut tells me we will fight in 2025. Xi secured his third term and set his war council in October 2022. Taiwan’s presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a reason. The United States’ presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a distracted America. Xi’s team, reason, and opportunity are all aligned for 2025.”

Though his prediction was derided by some analysts who doubted the PRC’s capacity to overpower the U.S. by that date, Minihan received strong backing from China hawks in Congress. “I hope he’s wrong as well, but I think he’s right, though, unfortunately,” said Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in an interview on Fox News Sunday.

At this point, official Washington continues to obsess over the date of the presumptive Chinese invasion, with some figures now suggesting 2024. Strangely enough, however, nowhere in official circles is there a single prominent figure asking the most basic question of all: Does China actually have any serious intention of invading Taiwan or are we manufacturing a crisis over nothing?

China’s Invasion Calculus

To answer that question means investigating Beijing’s calculus when it comes to the relative benefits and perils of mounting such an invasion.

Buy the Book

To start off: China’s top leadership has repeatedly stated that it’s prepared to employ force as a last resort to ensure Taiwan’s unification with the mainland. President Xi and his top lieutenants repeat this mantra in every major address they make. “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan,” Xi characteristically told the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) last October. “We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.”

In addition, vigorous efforts have gone into enhancing the PLA’s capacity to invade that island, located 100 miles across the Taiwan Strait from the Chinese mainland. The PLA has substantially expanded its naval arm, the PLA Navy (PLAN), and especially its amphibious assault component. The PLAN, in turn, has conducted numerous amphibious exercises up and down the Chinese coast, many suggesting practice for a possible invasion of Taiwan. According to the Pentagon’s 2022 report on Chinese military power, such maneuvers have increased in recent years, with 20 of them conducted in 2021 alone.

Exercises like these certainly indicate that Chinese leaders are building the capacity to undertake an invasion, should they deem it necessary. But issuing threats and acquiring military capabilities do not necessarily signify intent to take action. The CCP’s top leaders are survivors of ruthless intraparty struggles and know how to calculate risks and benefits. However strongly they may feel about Taiwan, they are not inclined to order an invasion that could result in China’s defeat and their own disgrace, imprisonment, or death.

Weighing the Risks

Even under the best of circumstances, an amphibious assault on Taiwan would prove exceedingly difficult and dangerous. Transporting tens of thousands of PLA troops across 100 miles of water while under constant attack by Taiwanese and (probably) U.S. forces and depositing them on heavily defended beachheads could easily result in disaster. As Russia discovered in Ukraine, conducting a large-scale assault against spirited resistance can prove extremely difficult — even when invading by land. And keep in mind that the PLA hasn’t engaged in significant armed combat since 1979, when it lost a war with Vietnam (though it has had some border skirmishes with India in recent years). Even if it managed to secure a beachhead in Taiwan, its forces would undoubtedly lose dozens of ships, hundreds of planes, and many thousands of troops — with no assurance of securing control over Taipei or other major cities.

Just such an outcome emerged in multiple war games conducted in 2022 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank. Those simulations, performed by figures with “a variety of senior governmental, think tank, and military backgrounds,” always began with a PLA amphibious assault on Taiwan accompanied by air and missile attacks on critical government infrastructure. But “the Chinese invasion quickly founders,” a CSIS summary suggests. “Despite massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese ground forces stream to the beachhead, where the invaders struggle to build up supplies and move inland. Meanwhile, U.S. submarines, bombers, and fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense Forces, rapidly cripple the Chinese amphibious fleet. China’s strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the result: Taiwan remains autonomous.”

Those like General Minihan who predict an imminent Chinese invasion usually neglect to mention such hardcore assessments, but other military analysts have been less reticent. Buried deep in the Pentagon’s 2022 report on Chinese military power, for example, is the following: “An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition… these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party.”

Surely Xi’s generals and admirals have conducted similar war games and reached comparable conclusions. Chinese leaders are also painfully aware of the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine and recognize that an invasion of Taiwan would automatically result in similar penalties. Add in the potential damage to Chinese infrastructure from U.S. bombers and the country’s economic prospects could be crushed for years to come — a likely death sentence for the Chinese Communist Party. Why, then, even think about an invasion?

There’s No Hurry

Add in one other factor. China’s leaders seem to have concluded that time is on their side — that the Taiwanese people will, eventually, voluntarily decide to unite with the mainland. This approach is spelled out in Beijing’s recent white paper, “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” released last August by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC’s State Council. As China grows increasingly prosperous, the paper argues, the Taiwanese — especially young Taiwanese — will see ever greater benefits from unification, diminishing the appeal of independence, or “separatism.”

“China’s development and progress, and in particular the steady increases in its economic power, technological strength, and national defense capabilities, are an effective curb against separatist activities,” the paper states. “As more and more compatriots from Taiwan, especially young people, pursue their studies, start businesses, seek jobs, or go to live on the mainland… the economic ties and personal bonds between the people on both sides run deeper… leading cross-Straits relations towards reunification.”

And keep in mind that this is not a short-term proposition but a strategy that will take years — even decades — to achieve success. Nevertheless, most of that white paper’s content is devoted not to military threats — the only parts of the paper to receive coverage in the West — but to bolstering bilateral trade and increasing China’s economic appeal to young Taiwanese. “Following the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the mainland has improved its governance and maintained long-term economic growth,” it asserts. “As a result, the overall strength and international influence of the mainland will continue to increase, and its influence over and appeal to Taiwan society will keep growing.”

In such a take-it-slow approach surely lies a recognition that military action against Taiwan could prove a disaster for China. But whatever the reasoning behind such planning, it appears that Chinese leaders are prepared to invest massive resources in persuading the Taiwanese that reunification is in their best interests. Whether or not such a strategy will succeed is unknown. It’s certainly possible that a Taiwanese preference for political autonomy will outweigh any interest in mainland business opportunities, but with Beijing banking so heavily on the future in this manner, a military assault seems far less likely. And that’s something you won’t hear these days in an ever more belligerent Washington.

Considering the Alternatives

It’s difficult for outsiders — let alone most Chinese — to know what goes on in Beijing’s closed-door CCP leadership councils and, of all state secrets, that leadership’s calculations about a possible invasion of Taiwan are probably the most guarded. It’s certainly possible, in other words, that Xi and his top lieutenants are prepared to invade at the earliest sign of a drive towards independence by Taiwan’s leaders, as many U.S. officials claim. But there’s no evidence in the public realm to sustain such an assessment and all practical military analysis suggests that such an endeavor would prove suicidal. In other words — though you’d never know it in today’s frenzied Washington environment — concluding that an invasion is not likely under current circumstances is all too reasonable.

In the belief that Beijing is prepared to mount an invasion, the United States is already providing Taiwan with billions of dollars‘ worth of advanced weaponry, while bolstering its own capacity to defeat China in any potential conflict. Sadly, such planning for a future Pacific war is likely to consume an ever-increasing share of taxpayer dollars, result in ever more military training and planning in the Pacific, and as Rep. Gallagher and Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy suggested recently, ever more belligerent attitudes toward China. Given the reasonable probability that Chinese leaders have decided against an invasion, at least in the immediate future, doesn’t it make sense to consider alternative policies that will cost all of us less and make all of us safer?

Imagine, in fact, adopting a less antagonistic stance towards Beijing and seeking negotiated solutions to some of the issues dividing us, including China’s militarization of contested islands in the South China Sea and its provocative air and sea maneuvers around Taiwan. Reduced tensions in the Western Pacific might, in turn, make it possible to avoid massive increases in the Pentagon budget, thereby permitting increased spending on domestic priorities like health, education, and climate action.

If only…

Featured image: 210407-N-MQ442-2010 by U.S. Pacific Fleet is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0 / Flickr

Follow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on Facebook. Check out the newest Dispatch Books, John Feffer’s new dystopian novel, Songlands (the final one in his Splinterlands series), Beverly Gologorsky’s novel Every Body Has a Story, and Tom Engelhardt’s A Nation Unmade by War, as well as Alfred McCoy’s In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power, John Dower’s The Violent American Century: War and Terror Since World War II, and Ann Jones’s They Were Soldiers: How the Wounded Return from America’s Wars: The Untold Story.

tomdispatch.com · by Andy Kroll · March 14, 2023

21. Weaponizing Rights: An Untapped Tool for Special Operations Forces

Graphics at the link: https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/weaponizing-rights-an-untapped-tool-for-special-operations-forces/

As I have written, human rights are not only a moral imperative, they are a national security issue as well. However, I am not sure I would use the phrase "weaponizing rights," but the author provides some very interesting ideas. Obviously in his influence operation he is using weaponization in order to appeal to warfighters so that they can grasp his concepts.

Excerpts:

Rights structure our societies, fuel debate, and serve as powerful forces that motivate, or constrain, our actions. Unsurprisingly, weaponized rights are thus more than capable of “influenc[ing], disrupt[ing], corrupt[ing], or usurp[ing] the decisionmaking of target audiences to create a desired effect to support the achievement of an objective,” a fundamental aspect of information operations and a key component of irregular warfare.

The ways rights are weaponized can be categorized as one of three potential lines of effort, each with associated rights tactics. First, rights as weapons prepare for conflict through rallying cries, shields, and parries; second, rights as weapons contend with foes through spears, dynamite, calls to action, and seizures; and third, rights as weapons thwart rival movements through blockades, wedges, and confiscations. Rights can also serve to camouflage other non-rights-centric actions. These rights tactics are not sequential, can occur intermittently throughout a struggle, and complement one another when synchronized.

Conclusion:

The global competition for influence shows no signs of slowing down, and the rights as weapons framework offers ARSOF, the first to influence and compete, an opportunity to leverage their unique skills to dominate the information environment, inspire partners to action, and potentially win the battle before the first shot is fired.

Weaponizing Rights: An Untapped Tool for Special Operations Forces - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Joseph Bedingfield · March 15, 2023

Joseph Bedingfield

In September, after the death of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, at the hands of the morality police, demonstrations broke out across Iran. In response, the government has arrested thousands and killed hundreds. The bedrock grievance fueling the protestors’ narrative is a 1981 law mandating that women wear a hijab, and the right not to wear a hijab has served as a powerful weapon for the protestors, garnering international support and mobilizing the largest social movement in Iran since the 1979 revolution.

The concept of using a right as a weapon was explored by Dr. Clifford Bob’s 2019 book Rights as Weapons: Instruments of Conflict, Tools of Power. While the theory may be new, in practice states and movements have used rights as weapons for centuries. Today, weaponizing rights offers US Army special operations forces (ARSOF) an innovative option to gain an advantage in irregular warfare and strategic competition.

Historically, rights have been framed as the honorable ends or objectives of noble conflicts, releasing people from the bonds of servitude, oppression, and inequality. However, rights can also be leveraged and manipulated as the means (resources) or ways (methods) within greater struggles for power. In other words, rights are weaponized any time they serve as the means or ways to achieve another objective.

The concept of rights as weapons is an inherently controversial union of two contradictory ideas. Rights are quite different from weapon systems like rifles, missiles, or cannons designed to destroy a physical aspect of an adversary’s means to fight. Instead, rights strike closer to an adversary’s will, something Clausewitz long ago argued is at least as important as its physical means. However, kinetic means of destruction and rights do share one characteristic: actors can mobilize either to seize or preserve power. Where tanks accomplish this through destroying the enemy, rights as weapons seize, redistribute, and alter the balance of power within a society.

Before introducing the rights as weapons framework, it is necessary to define what exactly a right is. In Wesley Hohfeld’s definition, rights are claims that obligate another to something and are enforced by an official organ or body of authority. This definition effectively captures a wide range of rights categories, including natural, human, and legal rights. And it highlights that something can only be a right if something capable of enforcing it stands behind it, such as a court, society, or even the board of a homeowners’ association.

History is replete with examples of nations and governments weaponizing rights to achieve their goals. For a modern-day example of the impact of rights as weapons, look no further than Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.

In 1999 Russia’s Federal Assembly signed the State Policy toward Compatriots Living Abroad into law. The compatriot policy is a national instrument of soft power that obligates and authorizes Russia to protect the rights of all Russian compatriots, loosely defined as “Russian Federation citizens living abroad; former citizens of the USSR; Russian immigrants from the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation; descendants of compatriots; and foreign citizens who admire Russian culture and language.” In other words, it provides de facto justification for Russia to militarily protect or preserve the rights of any “compatriots” whose rights Russia deems are being infringed. For over a decade, Russia has been exploiting this policy to conduct irregular warfare in nations along its periphery. More recently, the compatriot policy played an important role in Russia’s attempt to justify its 2014 and subsequent 2022 invasions of Ukraine.

Thankfully, nations are getting smart to this tactic. Kazakhstan’s government, increasingly worried about how Russia may exploit the compatriot policy to justify military intervention, is fighting back by directly combating narratives of Kazakh oppression of Russian compatriots.

Rights as Weapons: A Framework

Rights structure our societies, fuel debate, and serve as powerful forces that motivate, or constrain, our actions. Unsurprisingly, weaponized rights are thus more than capable of “influenc[ing], disrupt[ing], corrupt[ing], or usurp[ing] the decisionmaking of target audiences to create a desired effect to support the achievement of an objective,” a fundamental aspect of information operations and a key component of irregular warfare.

The ways rights are weaponized can be categorized as one of three potential lines of effort, each with associated rights tactics. First, rights as weapons prepare for conflict through rallying cries, shields, and parries; second, rights as weapons contend with foes through spears, dynamite, calls to action, and seizures; and third, rights as weapons thwart rival movements through blockades, wedges, and confiscations. Rights can also serve to camouflage other non-rights-centric actions. These rights tactics are not sequential, can occur intermittently throughout a struggle, and complement one another when synchronized.

Figure 1 depicts this framework and associated tactics in an ends-ways-means model. The model also describes the potential target audiences of each way and tactic, which is essential as rights are not only weaponized against opponents but against everyone engaged in the information environment, including allies, potential rivals, and third parties. This distinction illuminates how rights as weapons are a strategy of choice when stakeholders are not interested in escalating a conflict with certain opponents but nonetheless need to disrupt or neutralize their influence within a struggle for power. The following definitions describe each rights tactic present in Figure 1 along with their typical effects. These tactics and associated definitions draw on Clifford Bob’s research, aside from the final three, which are attributed to this author.

Camouflage: The use of rights to serve a purpose unrelated to the rights being leveraged.

Rallying Cry: The use of rights within a conflict to mobilize support among a movement’s members and potential third-party allies.

Shield: The use of rights to protect individuals, groups, or whole societies from an opponent or to gain power under the protection of the exercised right.

Parry: The reframing of an opponent’s rights tactic to serve the parrying party’s own ends.

Spear: The narrow use of rights to undermine a single policy or law.

Dynamite: The use of rights in a direct and immediate attempt to undermine or destroy a targeted culture or community, often by forcing changes in key values, ideas, or institutions.

Blockade: The use of rights to prevent a subordinate or weaker rights movement from accomplishing its goals.

Wedge: The use of rights to weaken an opposing group by creating divisions in its rights ideology.

Calls to Action: The use of rights to inspire people to real action such as protest, strikes, and violence.

Confiscate: The confiscation of a right formally provisioned to a party to prevent its ability to leverage the right to achieve its goals and to open the door to prosecute otherwise accepted and/or legal actions.

Seize: Forcefully exercising a right otherwise denied by a governing body to strengthen a movement and provide freedom of action.

How can ARSOF apply this framework? Units should start by identifying a desired effect (the ends) they want to achieve in the operational environment and then identify whether or not a specific tactic, right, or organ of enforcement can serve as the means or way of achieving that objective. If an ARSOF cross-functional team is seeking to inspire support for a movement, motivate a movement to real action, or protect an ally from an adversary, among other examples, rights may serve as a viable means or way to achieve those effects.

Take Taiwan as an example. Taiwanese governance includes robust subgovernmental governance structures at the local community level. In effect these structures provision a right to Taiwanese citizens to directly engage in the political process. ARSOF units looking to strengthen Taiwanese resilience against Chinese attempts to “manufacture and amplify civil discontent aimed at Taipei” would do well to strengthen access to these local Taiwanese governance structures. In essence, ARSOF should design an operational approach that normalizes both the right and the organ protecting the right. This would make China’s attempts to co-opt Taiwan’s citizens inherently more difficult.

Rights as an Asymmetric Advantage over Autocracy

There are two critical elements remaining to establish the relevancy and value proposition of this framework: understanding its role within irregular warfare and strategic competition, as well as how autocratic regimes tend to respond to their opponents’ rights tactics.

The common element within irregular warfare and strategic competition is their focus on the importance of influence within target audiences. Rights tactics are viable tools to motivate, dissuade, influence, disrupt, coerce, and shape the perceptions or actions of target audiences. As the premier US unconventional and irregular warfare force, ARSOF that see and exploit opportunities to weaponize rights broaden their capability and capacity to generate asymmetric advantages. Weaponizing rights to control the narrative and shape the information environment compels an adversary to respond and forces it into a reactive posture.

The potential effects are even more profound when rights are weaponized against autocratic regimes. Through the author’s historical research that evaluated how weaponized rights influenced the Russian revolution, a distinct pattern emerged. Autocracies retain absolute power by limiting the rights of their citizens, choosing instead to keep social, economic, and political power at the seat of national government. When revolutionary movements weaponized rights against the autocratic government, the government responded in one of three ways: it made concessions, ignored the movement, or suppressed the movement. Figure 2 depicts each of these options and the observed associated short- and long-term effects. As depicted in Figure 2, in the short-term the only option that yielded a positive outcome for the autocracy was to make concessions, and in the long-term none of the options yielded beneficial outcomes for the autocracy.

The Russian revolution ended over a century ago, but modern autocracies continue to respond similarly to movements weaponizing rights against them. Understanding the second- and third-order effects of how autocracies react to rights tactics may help ARSOF identify opportunities when facing situations similar to China’s response to the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests, Venezuela’s response to the Juan Guaidó protests in 2019, Iran’s response to the Mahsa Amini protests, or Russia’s continued weaponization of the compatriot policy to justify military operations in Ukraine.

While this article describes opportunities the United States may use to gain an advantage over autocratic adversaries, those adversaries can also weaponize rights against the United States, its allies, and partner forces. Liberal democracies are not immune to having rights weaponized against them. Indeed, even a cursory historical survey of rights tactics reveals a common theme: regardless of the target audience of a rights tactic, the target must respond. As such, it is imperative we understand not only how to weaponize rights offensively, but how to defend ourselves and our allies from rights weaponized against us.

The global competition for influence shows no signs of slowing down, and the rights as weapons framework offers ARSOF, the first to influence and compete, an opportunity to leverage their unique skills to dominate the information environment, inspire partners to action, and potentially win the battle before the first shot is fired.

Major Joseph Bedingfield is an active duty US Army civil affairs officer currently attending the Advanced Military Study Program at SAMS. He has served with the 45th Infantry Brigade, the Army National Guard Warrior Training Center, and the 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion (SO) (A) with various deployments to the Middle East and Europe. Joseph holds a bachelor of arts from the University of Oklahoma, a master of business administration from Fayetteville State University, and a master of military art and science as a member of the Art of War Scholars program from the US Army Command and General Staff College. This article is a synthesis of the author’s research thesis conducted at the Command and General Staff College, which analyzed how and to what effect rights were weaponized through the Russian revolution from 1893 to 1917.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Photo: Demonstration in Amsterdam against the Islamic regime in Tehran—Persian Dutch Network

22. New Baumholder special operations hub allocated $64 million in 2024 proposal

Is this in the Army's MILCON budget or US Army Europe or is this in the SOCOM budget request?

New Baumholder special operations hub allocated $64 million in 2024 proposal

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · March 14, 2023

Special operators speed away during an exercise hosted by the U.S. Special Operations Command Europe at Baumholder, Germany, in 2014. A push to transform Baumholder into a special operations hub is slated to get a $64 million funding boost in the Defense Department's 2024 budget. (Michael Abrams/Stars and Stripes)

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The transformation of a rural Army garrison in western Germany into a special operations hub would move forward under the military’s 2024 budget, which calls for $64 million in various upgrades.

It allocates $41 million for a special operations company operations facility at the Army’s garrison in Baumholder and $23 million for a joint parachute rigging site.

The moves build on other recent special operations projects in Baumholder, which eventually will serve as a home for hundreds of Green Berets and SEALs.

Last year, about $78 million was directed toward buildings and facilities to support special operations teams headed to the area.

Special operators descend from a Czech MI-171 helicopter during an exercise hosted by the U.S. Special Operations Command Europe at Baumholder, Germany, in 2014. The military’s 2024 budget calls for expenditure of $64 million on various upgrades at Baumholder. (Michael Abrams/Stars and Stripes)

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While a precise timeline hasn’t been announced for the relocation of special operators from the congested metropolitan region of Stuttgart to the more remote Baumholder, the move is a long time coming.

Army and special operations leaders have advocated for the shift, which would give troops easy access to Baumholder’s large training ranges.

The move also would provide relief to a German community in the Stuttgart area that has long complained about the crackle of gunfire at ranges within earshot of well-to-do neighborhoods.

The looming influx of special operators to Baumholder, along with other projects supporting soldiers already based there, are a boost to an area that not long ago was on the Army’s chopping block as part of a long post-Cold War drawdown.

A U.S. Special Operations Command soldier parachutes in during an exercise in Renningen, Germany, on Feb. 16, 2022. A joint parachute rigging site that was allocated $23 million in the military’s 2024 budget is part of a transformation of the Army’s installation in Baumholder, Germany, into a special operations hub. (Anthony Whipple/U.S. Army)

The uncertainty of the Army’s future in Baumholder meant that for years, little funding was put into the garrison’s aging facilities. As a result, troops and their families lived in old, rundown barracks and stairwell-style housing buildings.

However, over the past several years, tens of millions of dollars have been pumped into public works projects.

In the Army’s 2024 budget, $78.7 million was earmarked for new family housing at Baumholder.

That follows the expenditure of $130 million in the 2023 budget on various housing improvements.

Baumholder American High School and some base housing is seen from downtown Baumholder, Germany, in July 2022. The military’s plan is to transform Baumholder into a new special operations hub. (Alexander Riedel/Stars and Stripes)

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John Vandiver

John covers U.S. military activities across Europe and Africa. Based in Stuttgart, Germany, he previously worked for newspapers in New Jersey, North Carolina and Maryland. He is a graduate of the University of Delaware.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · March 14, 2023

23. Interior Lines Will Make Land Power the Asymmetric Advantage in the Indo-Pacific

Ah... the old discussion between interior and exterior lines. Bonaparte and Clausewitz and Mahan and Corbett must be smiling in their graves. (as well as living CGSC, War College, and SAMS professors)

Where you stand determines where you sit as to whether the lines are interior or exterior.

Interior Lines Will Make Land Power the Asymmetric Advantage in the Indo-Pacific

The Army is building compact lines of maneuver, communications, and logistics.

defenseone.com · by Gen. Charles Flynn

A key vulnerability in the People’s Republic of China’s anti-access/area defense makes conventional land forces—U.S. Soldiers and Marines—the joint force’s asymmetric advantage in a theater named for two oceans. The A2/AD system was built to find and destroy large, fast-moving ships and planes and to disrupt space and cyber capabilities. It was not designed to track distributed groups of mobile land forces inside its protective bubble.

Turning AirLand Battle on its head, land forces will become essential to getting air and naval assets into the fight, especially if space and cyber are contested. In the words of former Indo-Pacific commander Adm. Harry Harris, land forces will “sink ships, neutralize satellites, shoot down missiles, and hack or jam the enemy” to punch holes in the A2/AD network. These softening attacks will provide windows for the Air Force and Navy to conduct bursts of operations, from offensive attacks to transporting forces and equipment into theater.

The key is creating interior lines—essentially, compact lines of maneuver, communications, and logistics. Interior lines provide options for military and national leaders by positioning ground forces. The Marine Corps’ Stand-In Forces concept, for example, relies on interior lines to help hold positional advantage and physically control important terrain such as maritime chokepoints. Interior lines also underwrites operational endurance – the military’s ability to fight the successive battles of a war—by positioning foundational protection, collection, command and control, and sustainment needed in conflict.

In Europe, NATO’s interior lines are built on a backbone of posture left from the Cold War. Permanently stationed forces, stockpiles, and logistics networks that include bases, airports, and seaports are already in place and prepared to support massive military operations.

In the Indo-Pacific, however, the U.S. military lacks the interior lines it needs to fight and win. Its forces and equipment are concentrated in Korea and Japan, and the United States is perennially challenged to secure pre-conflict agreements for posture elsewhere in Asia. To oppose a PLA force with the advantages of magazine depth and its own interior lines, the U.S. military must adopt creative, practical approaches to develop the interior lines it lacks, from Southeast Asia to Australia through the first and second island chains.

Building interior lines

So the U.S. Army has reshaped the annual Defender Pacific exercise into Operation Pathways, an effort to build joint interior lines along its five foundational roles in a future high-end conflict.

One early focus is sustainment—the cornerstone of operational endurance and an acknowledged vulnerability in future conflict. The joint force as a whole is increasing its stores of supplies and equipment west of the International Dateline through diplomatic advancements such as December’s AUSMIN agreement. Such prepositioning saves time, money, and—significant in conflict—space on ships and planes outbound from the United States. The Army is adding to these stores by creating “activity sets” in Southeast Asia during Operation Pathways. Less contentious than combat-focused prepositioned stocks, activity sets hold multi-purpose equipment and stores. In the Philippines, for example, a collapsible 6,000-person housing area is stored alongside food, water, engineering assets, airfield repair kits, and medical supplies.

But prepositioning solves only part of the problem. In-theater sustainment requires extensive development of logistics networks, as well as extensive rehearsal, so Operation Pathways will collaborate with Air Mobility Command’s Operation Mobility Guardian in 2023. For the first time, the Army’s 8th Theater Sustainment Command will direct six continuous months of logistical and sustainment operations across the first and second island chains and Southeast Asia. Army watercraft based in Japan will transport U.S. equipment across the island chains. Forces will use equipment stored on ships for crisis since the 1990s, something the U.S. Army began practicing only last year. These efforts will culminate in July and August with complex over-the-shore logistics operations during Talisman Sabre, the largest U.S.-Australia exercise.

Another early focus of Pathways is reshaping its military exercises toward high-end conflict, normalizing the presence and use of multi-domain capabilities and doctrine with allies and partners. In Japan, for example, last year’s bilateral Orient Shield exercise moved south to the country’s strategically significant southwestern islands, where HIMARS deployed to Amami Island for the first time and a multi-domain task force exercised with the Japanese Self-Defense Force. Months later, U.S. and Japanese two- and three-star headquarters paired up to work through Japan’s cross-domain operations and the U.S. Army’s multi-domain operations.

An unexpected but welcome development is that several bilateral exercises in the region have quickly become multilateral. For example, Garuda Shield, a historically army-to-army exercise with Indonesia, rapidly grew last year to a joint exercise with 4,000 troops from 14 nations.

All these exercises thicken the joint force’s interior lines organically, by moving more than 20,000 rotational troops through the region each year, expanding access to training sites in Southeast Asia, and extending exercise windows that keep U.S. forces and equipment in the region for longer periods.

Strategic implications

These tactical actions have already begun to produce strategic gains. Exercises that strengthen the ties between U.S. and regional militaries help thwart a PRC strategy for regional hegemony that depends on fracturing alliances and partnerships. The India-U.S. army exercise Yudh Abyhas 2022 shows how building interior lines helps advance regional relationships. It also gives U.S. policymakers insight into regional trends and countries’ security concerns, including shifting defense priorities and fleeting opportunities.

Most significantly, the persistent presence and investment inherent in building interior lines signals U.S. commitment. This is critical in a region that is carefully monitoring U.S. support for Ukraine. Demonstrated commitment provides a rationale for countries to change position over time on weightier policy issues. In turn, successive diplomatic advancements like the recent 2+2 talks with Japan and Australia, unthinkable even five years ago, yield compounding opportunities as the security situation across Asia continues to sharpen.

And should conflict come, the presence built by rotational forces building interior lines may make all the difference. A country that does not already host U.S. forces may not, for example, agree to U.S. requests to launch missiles or aircraft from within its borders. A recent CSIS report argued, for example, that the Army’s multi-domain task forces and Marine Corps’ marine littoral regiments would play no significant role in an Indo-Pacific crisis because they would be hard-pressed to gain access to nations where U.S. forces do not already sit.

But ally and partner decision-making changes if the U.S. already has forces on the ground—say, for an exercise. A partner government may initially approve less visible or escalatory operations—collection, sustainment, command and control, or protection—by these forces. And if the country further changes its position, each U.S. capability on the ground would expand options available to military and national leaders.

Combined with allies’ posture and capabilities and Marine Corps stand-in forces, the Army’s Operation Pathways thickens interior lines and lays the foundation for early joint operations. Individually, these efforts might appear insignificant. Together, they form a joint campaign of preparation and rehearsal that positions the U.S. military with tools to counter PLA aggression. Interior lines underwrite the U.S. military’s contributions to integrated deterrence, and in doing so, they further strengthen the network of allies and partners that bind the region’s security architecture together.

No one knows just what it would take to win a future war in the Indo-Pacific, but one fact is clear. PLA capabilities and CCP ambitions do not afford the United States the liberty of a World War II repeat: ceding the Pacific, then spending years of blood and treasure to fight back in. Asia is a joint theater with problems that require joint solutions. Working together is the only way to win, and it begins with interior lines.

Gen. Charles Flynn has commanded U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) since June 2021. Previous leadership positions (including 25th Infantry Division commander, USARPAC deputy commanding general) influence his understanding of and approach to the Army's role in joint operations in USINDOPACOM.

Lt. Col. Sarah Starr is an Army Strategist at USARPAC. She has served on the Army Staff and holds degrees from the Harvard Kennedy School, University of North Georgia, and Gonzaga University.

defenseone.com · by Gen. Charles Flynn

24. Violent Far-Right Movements Aren’t Just a ‘Western Problem’

Violent Far-Right Movements Aren’t Just a ‘Western Problem’

The focus on jihadist violence has often prevented states from finding and fixing other things that fuel violent extremism in the Global South.

By TANYA MEHRA and NAUREEN CHOWDHURY FINK

MARCH 15, 2023

defenseone.com · by Tanya Mehra

Published in coordination with the 2023 Global Security Forum, of which Defense One is a media partner.

Violent far-right movements are hardly confined to the “Global North,” as attested by the 2020 New Delhi attacks in which 53 Muslims were killed, the 2021 arrest of a young man in Singapore attempting to carry out attacks against Muslims, the ongoing intimidation of the Muslim minority in Sri Lanka, and the foiled attacks by Neo-Nazi groups in Brazil. As the recently released U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism note, “Violent white supremacists and like-minded individuals continued to promote violent extremist narratives, recruit new adherents, raise funds, and conduct terrorist activities — both online and offline — across Australia, Brazil, Canada, Europe, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States.”

Several multi-ethnic countries where religious pluralism is part of the fabric of society are witnessing the mainstreaming of far-right ideologies. In Asia, for example, several countries seeing spikes of violence and intimidation against minorities, whether Christian minorities in Pakistan and India, Muslim minorities in India, or Chinese minorities in Malaysia. The common aspect is the desire to create a pure society based on a singular ethnic-religious identity whereby the minorities are considered outsiders, visitors or the “other.” Such rhetoric echoes those used in Western countries by violent far-right groups and, in particular, white-supremacist extremists, who push acceleration theory to promulgate often-racist disinformation narratives and justify attacks on minorities they believe will eventually overtake their societies. The quest for a racially or ethnically pure society is thus an important common element in the narratives of these groups.

The COVID-19 pandemic and, more recently, the war in Ukraine are events that are being exploited and used to accelerate the spread of far-right ideologies in Asia. In India, supporters of Hindutva groups spread disinformation narratives in WhatsApp groups and on social media accusing Muslims of being Covid-19 “super spreaders” and implicating the Muslim community in a plot to infect Hindus. As journalist Maya Mirchandani described it, “Worst of all, deliberately crafted disinformation campaigns targeted India’s Muslim minorities, an already vulnerable group targeted by bigoted discourse on many levels in the state and community.” The narratives proved so effective that Muslim patients and caregivers were denied from some hospitals and residential settlements unless they could prove they were Covid-free. The cross-fertilization of far-right ideologies in particular through the internet and adaptation to local needs and grievances should not be underestimated.

The stark rise of far-right violent extremism has correlated with a rise in populist narratives and challenges to pluralist democracies in many states, including the Global South. Histories of tension with minorities and colonial pasts have often been exploited for political gain and parties in power have had to reckon with established religious political parties in order to secure majority rule, thus risking the institutionalization of exclusionary ethno-nationalist religious narratives. In an era of unprecedented access to information—and disinformation—via the internet, combined with instances of the use of counterterrorism legislation to quell opposition or even criticism—has exacerbated the threat. According to Freedom House indicators, several countries in the Global South, including India, Brazil, and Malaysia, are seeing a decline in freedom of the press—with governments restricting the access of media outlets to public events, publicly attacking the press, and sometimes arresting and pressing charges against journalists who reporting stories unfavorable to the government. These dynamics often help empower and embolden more extremist positions in media and communications platforms.

Understanding the far-right in the global south requires looking beyond the notion that it is merely a response to jihadism, but acknowledging the historical roots, and understanding how individual and far-right movements communicate both off-line and online across the region and across countries, reinforcing the extremist ideology.

For example, research has shown how Indian diaspora have not only contributed to Hindutva ideology in India but also promoted these far-right ideologies in the countries they are settled and engage with far-right groups in Western societies. Furthermore, there are reports that various pan‐Asian far-right movements are forming an online eco-system promoting ‘Asia for Asians’ inspired by Western right-wing ideologies.

The self-radicalized man in Singapore that plotted an attack against two mosques was inspired by the Christchurch attacks and shooting by a Hindu extremist at 72th death anniversary of Mahatama Gandhi was broadcasting live from his Facebook minutes before the shooting demonstrate the role social media plays and how are influenced by far right attacks by others.

Deconstructing how right-wing extremism has evolved in the Global South also requires a critical look at how the governments respond to the attacks against minorities. In several countries the governments are turning a blind eye and impunity for these crimes carried out by far-right extremists has become the norm. A lack of meaningful accountability prevails, can lead to further radicalization of marginalized minorities and fuel cycles of violence. Several of the governments in the Global South are consolidating powers while at the same time curtailing the human rights of minorities, including limiting their political representation, The crackdown on journalists, human-rights defenders and activists, the dismantling of independent institutions and influencing of the judiciary all erode the rule of law and pluralist democracy.

So long as far-right movements are considered a “Western problem,” their threat in Global South will be underestimated. Worse still, it inhibits international cooperation in fora like the United Nations and the Global Counterterrorism Forum. If the threat is considered only the purview of selected states and not one that requires a collaborative approach, especially in terms of prevention.

This is especially critical as many of the tools and approaches developed to prevent and combat violent extremism related to groups like ISIS or al Qaeda, especially those focused on combating terrorist narratives, incitement, or financing, for example, can be applied to violent far-right threats. The role of governments also requires accounting for the region’s historical ties with fascism. For example, the Hindutva ideology was inspired by fascism in Mussolini's Italy and Nazi Germany. The rise of the far-right in Asia is not simply a national problem, but can easily have regional impact considering the presence of different ethnic minorities across the region and diaspora communities outside the region, notably across the United States, Canada and Europe, as some of these far-right ideologies are fostered and nurtured.

The international community must address the widespread human-rights violations and abuses of minorities—sometimes cloaked in the language of politics or religion, and worse, sometimes legitimized by internationally agreed counterterrorism frameworks. The singular focus on jihadist violence has often prevented states from identifying and addressing the wider range of ideologies that fuel violent extremism, and a more nuanced understanding of the current threat landscape should inform bilateral and multilateral efforts by states to prevent and respond to terrorism and threats to their own democratic systems. It is time for the UN and other international institutions, including those dealing with terrorism and violent extremism, to recognize the global nature of the far-right threat and meaningfully address terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations,” translating that rhetoric so often used in resolutions and meetings into meaningful action.

Tanya Mehra is a Senior Research Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism—The Hague, where she coordinates the rule-of-law projects.

Naureen Chowdhury Fink is the Executive Director of The Soufan Center. She previously served as senior policy adviser on counterterrorism and sanctions at the United Kingdom’s Mission to the United Nations.

defenseone.com · by Tanya Mehra

25. Army Asks for Massive Cash Boost for New Barracks

Army Asks for Massive Cash Boost for New Barracks

military.com · by Steve Beynon · March 13, 2023

The Army is seeking a massive boost in funds to construct new barracks as moldy and otherwise substandard living conditions for young enlisted soldiers continue to make news headlines.

The Pentagon's largest service is requesting $288 million to fund barracks construction in 2024, a huge increase from the $49 million set for new construction this year.

The spike could be one of the most dramatic boosts in the Army's budget request for next year, outpacing growth in weapons programs and training that are all part of the wish list service planners are sending to Congress for lawmakers' approval.

"If we want to be an employer of choice and recruit and retain the nation's best talent, we also need to make significant investments in quality of life," Gabe Camarillo, the Army undersecretary, told reporters Monday.

The funding for 2024 would be used to build five new barracks: one each at Fort Wainwright, Alaska; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; and the Army Natick Soldier Systems Center in Massachusetts; and two at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Military.com was first to fully detail the scope of the dilapidated conditions of Bragg's living quarters, as deteriorating living conditions were not properly tracked by senior garrison leaders, leaving base officials scrambling for a response when the issue gained media attention last year.

After Military.com's reporting on moldy conditions at Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart, Georgia, the service ordered a quality audit of all of its active-duty facilities, which was completed in January, though Army officials have not yet shared those details publicly.

Twelve barracks buildings are set to be demolished at Fort Bragg this year, roughly five years ahead of schedule.

The boost also comes as Army Secretary Christine Wormuth has been openly lobbying for more money and brought the issue up with President Joe Biden in a closed-door meeting last year, according to two officials with direct knowledge of the situation. In total, the Army aims to spend $10 billion on barracks this decade -- about $1 billion total each year across the active duty, National Guard and Reserve for construction, repair and sustainment.

A report last year from the Congressional Budget Office found that to fix up just two installations with the greatest need for new barracks -- Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and Fort Bragg -- would cost $11.2 billion.

Even with the budget boost, it will still be an uphill battle for the Army to replace its aging living quarters and effectively maintain the ones it plans to keep.

Service planners have long pointed to a relatively small budget for new barracks and the logistical challenges of housing soldiers during their construction -- a process that can take as long as five years -- as complicating efforts to improve housing.

This year, the Army finished an $18.8 million project for new barracks at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, and wrapped up the bulk of a 10-year, $500 million project building new living quarters and restoring two dozen barracks at Fort Polk, Louisiana, but those projects reflect just a fraction of what officials say the service needs to make housing better for soldiers.

-- Steve Beynon can be reached at Steve.Beynon@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @StevenBeynon.

military.com · by Steve Beynon · March 13, 2023

26. CIA's Coming Tech Revolution

This is such a BFO (blinding flash of the obvious) and important and astute observation, yet I forget this often as I think there must be a better way to do things.

"Bureaucracies like the IC are designed for stability and are consumed by a focus on security."

Excerpts:

Bureaucracies like the IC are designed for stability and are consumed by a focus on security. This impacts their ability to identify, accept and introduce innovative technology. Emerging and early-stage companies attempting to do business with the IC are frustrated by the time, effort, and contractual friction they experience when attempting to bring their technology or unique proprietary information into the IC. These innovation driven startups, unlike traditional corporate IC partners, do not have the resources, funding, and extensive timeline necessary to spend the months and often years it takes to get their technology assessed, reviewed and ultimately purchased by the IC.

In March 2023, CIA Director William Burns stated the revolution in technology is “the main determinant of [CIA’s] future as an intelligence service.” This immense burden cannot only be borne by the private sector. The IC needs to intentionally partner with and invest in the innovative patriots and mission-driven ventures in our private sector who are just as focused on ensuring the global primacy of the United States now and in the future.

CIA's Coming Tech Revolution

thecipherbrief.com

Expert View

March 15th, 2023 by Jules Metivier Easter, |

Jules Metivier Easter spent fourteen years working in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations where she focused on counterterrorism. Her service included overseas assignments in the Middle East and Asia. She is currently a Senior Vice President at Grist Mill Exchange. [...] Read more

View all articles by Jules Metivier Easter

OPINION — Like many Americans who came of age in the 1980s, I have lasting childhood memories of the Space Shuttle program. The Shuttle program was a source of national pride. Designed and manufactured in the United States, the Shuttles represented the ingenuity of our country, and they served as a beacon of hope, strength, dedication to purpose, and, of course, innovation. It was only as a young adult when I came to understand the impetus of the Space Shuttle program – the U.S. Government accelerating the race to space against the Soviet Union through continued innovation.

I saw this mission imperative again when I worked in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Operations, focusing on counterterrorism in a post-9/11 world. Reeling from the devastating attacks against our homeland, the CIA was driving a mission to identify and eliminate terrorists on a global scale. In pursuit of this mission, paradigms were shifted. Partnerships – domestic and foreign – were born, and tradecraft used by intelligence collectors was transformed.

This became the CIA’s primary focus for the next fifteen years and generations of officers were recruited, trained, and deployed overseas under this mandate. This crisis and resulting mission defined the CIA for many years. The CIA – and the entire Intelligence Community (IC) – expended all resources in this national promise to defeat terrorism. Over time, institutional barriers were overcome. A steadfast commitment to purpose resulted in alliances being built and relationships being formed. Underpinning all this was wide scale innovation in the development and use of specific technologies that very much enabled operations – lethal and otherwise.

As the CIA and the IC were focused on terrorism, the world was changing.

We are engaged in a different fight now. Many of the IC’s tried and true techniques for dealing with terrorist threats are not applicable against nation state actors. Much of what we did in our counterterrorism fight in terms of innovation and the development of technology was started in-house in the USG, within CIA and the IC. Working behind government walls without direct and constant private sector innovation is no longer enough.

As Americans living in 2023, we are of course familiar with the existential threat presented by China. So too has Russia re-emerged as a strategic foe. These nation state threats are immensely challenging. Although we can now see these nations as adversaries, for years the IC did not react as such. And because of this – the absence of a specific crisis, war or emergency – the IC has been slow to pivot against these newer threats. The IC does not respond with urgency to behavior it sees as a constant. History shows if there is no looming threat or physical battlefield, there is no competitive impetus and no pressing need to innovate.

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Nation states are not terrorists. The challenges involved in using technology against terrorists and nation states differ. Terrorists have typically used technology to evade detection and conduct deadly attacks, which means that, for decades, the IC was primarily focused on developing technology to track, locate, and eliminate terrorist targets.

Nation states, however, have sophisticated cyber capabilities and are able to exploit vulnerabilities in foreign technology to their advantage. These countries are peer competitors, and they use their governments, commercial sectors, economic statecraft, and educational institutions against us.

Both the Chinese and the Russians have very effectively exercised cyberattacks, intellectual property theft, misinformation/disinformation efforts, and wholesale data stealing operations directed against swaths of the USG and US commercial entities. Both nations have stolen, procured, and invested in technology and, by extension, cyber, as their primary offensive collection and disruption mechanism to achieve their national security goals directed against the United States and our allies. It is only in the last few years that the IC has started to view other nations’ technological advancements and successful efforts to steal intellectual property and commit economic espionage as a crisis.

Establishing a new paradigm with innovation driven ventures and bold startups.

To counter nation states, the IC must use a nuanced and adaptive approach, which includes going outside the IC for technology and thought leaders. The U.S. technology sector is recognized globally as the gold standard and working closely with U.S. industry is essential for the U.S. to defeat these nation state adversaries. The IC has attempted to reorganize itself internally numerous times in order to enhance its competitiveness against adversaries. However, the solution is to establish broad strategic partnerships with industry, not to reorganize. The IC must focus on real-time sharing and relationships, whether it be with regard to data, technology, or unique access. These efforts need to be done more effectively, more securely, and with purposeful intensity.

The private sector offers unique technologies, capabilities and defensive measures that the IC needs to apply to national security efforts. The IC must leverage currently available technology and future technology coming out of the U.S. private sector. Efficient cooperation and sharing of commercially available information from greater corporate America and academia needs to be a foundational to US intelligence strategy.

The IC must constantly incorporate the latest technology into its own systems, processes, and even methodology and tradecraft. The IC must join forces with private industry to protect the integrity of the U.S. supply chain. The IC must utilize advanced software and technology to counter efforts of malign actors. The IC must partner with private industry to obtain commercially available information gathered using unique proprietary methods. The IC must rely on specialists within private industry to monitor social media, conduct sentiment analysis, and evaluate disinformation campaigns by nation states. The IC must allocate resources to safeguard the competitive advantage of industries in the United States. The IC must find ways to allow and even encourage its officers to work in the private sector and then return to government service, bringing with them expertise, experience, and a relevant network of contacts.

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China and Russia have relied on their ability to require private companies within their respective borders to support their nation state goals. They have created compelling partnerships with external innovation engines through these “forced marriages.” In the United States, the IC cannot rely only on the patriotism of U.S. companies. The IC needs to establish deep partnerships based on significant investment of resources at the foundational level. These partnerships need to move beyond the traditional technical or corporate partners that the IC has relied on for decades. True transformational innovation and technology is being developed and driven by startups that are small, nimble, and focused on a very specific issue or technology like AI/ML, quantum, micro-electronics, and the development of unique cyber capabilities.

Starting the technology revolution is a new mission imperative.

Bureaucracies like the IC are designed for stability and are consumed by a focus on security. This impacts their ability to identify, accept and introduce innovative technology. Emerging and early-stage companies attempting to do business with the IC are frustrated by the time, effort, and contractual friction they experience when attempting to bring their technology or unique proprietary information into the IC. These innovation driven startups, unlike traditional corporate IC partners, do not have the resources, funding, and extensive timeline necessary to spend the months and often years it takes to get their technology assessed, reviewed and ultimately purchased by the IC.

In March 2023, CIA Director William Burns stated the revolution in technology is “the main determinant of [CIA’s] future as an intelligence service.” This immense burden cannot only be borne by the private sector. The IC needs to intentionally partner with and invest in the innovative patriots and mission-driven ventures in our private sector who are just as focused on ensuring the global primacy of the United States now and in the future.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Expert View

View all articles by Jules Metivier Easter

27. Why Won’t the West Let Ukraine Win Against Russia? By John Bolton

Excerpts:

One thing is plain: Fears of Russian escalation are unwarranted. Our prewar intelligence vastly overestimated Russian combat-arms capabilities, and the passing months show those capabilities steadily diminishing. Where is the hidden Russian army that threatens NATO? If it exists, why isn’t it already deployed in Ukraine? Mr. Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling also has deterred NATO, but for no good reason. Moscow’s threats to date have been bluffs. Only in the most extreme circumstances—total Russian battlefield collapse, or Mr. Putin’s own regime on the verge of ouster—would using nuclear weapons realistically be an option. Accordingly, we should focus on deterring Mr. Putin in those scenarios, including threatening his own demise, rather than let his bluffing deter us.

The Biden administration may not intend it, but its doubt and hesitation both impede the war effort and open the door politically to those who oppose U.S. aid entirely. Hence the urgent need to state our war objectives clearly. Failure to do so exposes Ukraine’s supporters to claims they are granting Kyiv a “blank check” or that we are in another “endless war” (after 13 months and no U.S. casualties). While this is a domestic political problem, it also reflects national-security leadership failures. Mr. Biden needs to get his act together.

Why Won’t the West Let Ukraine Win Against Russia?

Its defense would be more effective if it didn’t have to fight with one hand behind its back.

By John Bolton

March 15, 2023 3:43 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-wont-the-west-let-ukraine-win-nord-stream-deterrence-putin-munitions-stockpiles-bluff-objective-a70d956c?SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

New intelligence suggesting that a “pro-Ukraine group” sabotaged the Nord Stream pipelines in September triggered surprising political blowback in Europe. Spurred by potential economic disruption, speculation arose that Ukrainian involvement, direct or indirect, would undercut support for Kyiv’s resistance to Russia’s 2022 invasion. Ukraine denied any responsibility. German authorities suggested it might be a Kremlin “false flag” operation, scripted to throw suspicion on Kyiv.

But even if Ukraine masterminded the raid, why would successfully disrupting Nord Stream imperil foreign assistance? Such a potentially harmful reaction exposes a larger problem, which has repeatedly manifested itself since Russia’s unprovoked aggression. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been spooked by Moscow’s threats to “escalate” the conflict if Ukraine isn’t kept on a tight leash. Although President Biden failed, indeed barely tried, to deter Russia’s war, Vladimir Putin has masterfully deterred NATO from responding robustly enough to end the conflict promptly and victoriously. Time to solve this problem is growing short.

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The threats to global stability and the US homeland are growing. How will the war in Ukraine end? Can China and the US develop a less combative relationship? Join historian and Journal columnist Walter Russell Mead and editorial page editor Paul Gigot for an interactive conversation on the threats to US security.

Moscow’s successful intimidation highlights Washington’s failure to state clear war objectives and forge a strategy to achieve them. Mr. Biden wants Russia to “lose,” but seems afraid of Ukraine actually “winning.” If he believes America’s official position—restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity—he should reaffirm it, and craft a plan to do so. If not, he should say so. We can then at least have an intelligible debate.

Instead, ambiguous goals and fear of Russian escalation have led to today’s military gridlock. Just before the invasion, Mr. Biden ruled out U.S. military force, with no reciprocal Kremlin response. Days later, he said “no one expected the sanctions to prevent anything from happening.” In May 2022, his defense secretary and national security adviser asked their Russian counterparts to consider a cease-fire, signaling weakness and irresolution.

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Russia’s deterrence and NATO’s lack of strategy are further evidenced by internal NATO debates about what weapons to supply Ukraine, whether Polish MiGs, Himars rocket artillery, Abrams tanks, ATACMS munitions, or F-16s. Such disputes over weaponry, when it is needed and where, and Ukraine’s own capabilities, reflect a disjointed strategy, which leads to confusion (or worse) on the battlefield, pretty much where we are. And, to say the quiet part aloud, a prolonged military stalemate can only benefit the much larger aggressor, aided by China and others, as the West aids Ukraine.

Much of NATO’s wrangling over weapons tracks Washington’s insistence that Kyiv not attack targets inside Russia or even Crimea, notwithstanding U.S. recognition of Crimea as sovereign Ukrainian territory. Under this bizarre reasoning, NATO pressures Ukraine not to strike inside Russia, and to spare key assets like Nord Stream, whereas the Kremlin can strike anywhere within Ukraine. Observers, recalling America’s catastrophic Afghanistan withdrawal, could conclude Washington either doesn’t know its own mind or is eager to avoid pressing Moscow too hard militarily. Russia’s deterrence works.

Today, White House policy is essentially: We support Ukraine’s defending itself, but not enough to be too effective. This formula for protracted, inconclusive war ignores risks to America as well as Ukraine. Critical U.S. munitions supplies are being depleted, and our current capacity to restock is insufficient, mirroring concerns about replacing our aging nuclear-powered submarine fleet while also supplying Australia under the Aukus deal. Although it is better we experience these problems now, before America itself comes under fire, shortfalls in U.S. stockpiles buttress isolationists who don’t want to assist Ukraine in the first place.

One thing is plain: Fears of Russian escalation are unwarranted. Our prewar intelligence vastly overestimated Russian combat-arms capabilities, and the passing months show those capabilities steadily diminishing. Where is the hidden Russian army that threatens NATO? If it exists, why isn’t it already deployed in Ukraine? Mr. Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling also has deterred NATO, but for no good reason. Moscow’s threats to date have been bluffs. Only in the most extreme circumstances—total Russian battlefield collapse, or Mr. Putin’s own regime on the verge of ouster—would using nuclear weapons realistically be an option. Accordingly, we should focus on deterring Mr. Putin in those scenarios, including threatening his own demise, rather than let his bluffing deter us.

The Biden administration may not intend it, but its doubt and hesitation both impede the war effort and open the door politically to those who oppose U.S. aid entirely. Hence the urgent need to state our war objectives clearly. Failure to do so exposes Ukraine’s supporters to claims they are granting Kyiv a “blank check” or that we are in another “endless war” (after 13 months and no U.S. casualties). While this is a domestic political problem, it also reflects national-security leadership failures. Mr. Biden needs to get his act together.

Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06.

WSJ Opinion: Ukraine Fatigue Is Not an Option

This Is What We Do in America. We Pause. We Forget. Then We Begin the Next War.

thewarhorse.org · by M. Tabar · March 15, 2023

My stepfather, brother, and I served in Afghanistan and Iraq. We are still there, frozen in the suck—a boomer, a Gen Xer, and a millennial—ducking mortars, mourning dead colleagues, and waiting for care packages curated by Mom. For seven years, I was an aid worker outside the wire and embedded with the U.S. military inside the wire. In the mid-2000s, I overlapped with one or both of my family members in each war zone. We rarely speak of it.

In my multigenerational, vast military family, “the suck” strained the bonds of love and commitment. Our individual experiences, worldview, and the impact of the wars upon us differed such that only silence maintains family cohesion. In sleep, we cry out what we cannot express in daylight, fighting our way out of the same village, the same valley, the same unarmored aid project pickup truck, again and again.

M. Tabar works inside a mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle while serving as an aid worker in Iraq. Two decades after the U.S. invasion of that country, she writes, “I am not over it. My family is not over it. The United States is not over it.” Photo courtesy of the author.

In the summer of 2021, bearded Taliban fighters swaggered from the shadows where they’d been governing secretly for decades and into the presidential palace to make their takeover official. Commentators in America lamented, “How did we come to this?” I didn’t ask that question. I sat alone in the dark sipping bourbon, staring out the window of my house in the African country where I now work. No one I served with asked that question as we texted our heartbreak. How else could the suck have possibly concluded? Yet still, the callouses of our collective cynicism didn’t buffer the gut punch of watching it unfold in real-time.

The two halves of the war blur together in a sandy haze of beige frustration. Iraq was bonkers, but Afghanistan was a special kind of hell. Iraq wore me down with unceasing explosions so regular the coffee tasted like plastic explosives by the time I departed. Afghanistan made me rethink my own nationalism and question the cognitive abilities of our elected officials. I arrived there in 2010 hoping that rural provinces were somewhat permissive, hoping that aid projects could have more success than in Iraq.

A USAID-funded project needed an aid worker to assist military personnel on a joint U.S.-Afghan army outpost in Nangarhar province, on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. I had completed an 18-month tour on an embedded provincial reconstruction team in Iraq, so they selected me for the job in Afghanistan. My task at the Nangarhar outpost was to cover for a colleague who departed on an extended absence. I didn’t ask why, but I suspected the kidnapping of aid worker Linda Norgrove pushed my colleague’s mental resilience to the limit, necessitating a break.

“We Were So Hungry We Ate Our Fear”–Those Without Freedom Risk Their Lives For Change

My helicopter transport to the outpost included a U.S. Army personnel recovery team on a search mission for Norgrove, who’d been employed on another American USAID-funded project when she was taken. Fresh from Iraq, I wasn’t surprised. Aid workers are easy to kidnap. I hoped Linda would be found alive, and I wondered if this helo ride would finally be the one that killed me. Too many deployments made a person paranoid—each helo or convoy could be the last. But in my military family, I couldn’t show my face at Thanksgiving or survive my own mirror test if fear prevented me from completing an assignment.

The voyage began at Bagram Airfield and progressed to the outpost in Nangarhar. As we lifted off, soldiers barked instructions familiar to me from many years in Iraq—do not move, talk, complain, make noise, pass out, get in the way, demonstrate a need for any bodily function, or act like a fragile civilian female snowflake. I acknowledged with a smile. “Roger that.”

M. Tabar in Iraq. For seven years, Tabar was an aid worker in Iraq and Afghanistan, overlapping with one or both of her military family members in each war zone. Photo courtesy of the author.

As we flew toward Nangarhar province, we dropped in on mountain villages. The soldiers searched for Norgrove and distributed pamphlets. Rooted in my designated seat, each time the unit leaped from the open doors and sprinted off, I counted minutes. I scanned mountainsides and brush for hairy, bearded mujahideen with Kalashnikovs or rocket-propelled grenade launchers. When the unit jumped back into the Black Hawks, I counted soldiers. After six nerve-bending hours of mountaintop sorties without locating Norgrove, the Black Hawks touched down for half a minute on an empty gravel landing zone at a Nangarhar combat outpost. A soldier kicked my pack out behind me and shouted, “Thanks for not being a shitty civilian. Don’t get kidnapped,” then lifted off.

Within days I discovered the aid project that brought me to this remote outpost couldn’t move the needle forward in rural Afghanistan any more than we could move needles forward in Iraq. I reread 30 pages of handover notes. Our aid projects couldn’t brand materials or equipment as American taxpayer-funded. There could be no sticker with the handshake and quote “from the American people.” Association with America meant a swift, guaranteed death of project grantees and beneficiaries.

When I inquired about local municipal approval and improving community participation in projects, my Afghan counterparts said—in a tone indicating How many times do I have to explain this to ignorant Americans venturing outside of Kabul—that the municipal government had no real control over the area. The “shadow government,” the Taliban’s parallel governance structure, needed to “allow” any project to take place in any area, or they’d attack the project site, the grantee, and the community beneficiaries. I put my head down on the plywood desk, defeated. Shadow government? Awesome. Same shit, different war zone.

When soldiers and I ventured out of the rural Nangarhar outpost on foot to meet with Afghan officials, they received us with polite rudeness, commanding painted tea boys to serve chai as they scowled at us across a low table. As in Iraq, visits from Americans marked Afghan counterparts for reprisal. We talked in circles through an interpreter whom they refused to look in the eye.

While we were hiking to a nearby town with soldiers to discuss the rehabilitation of local government buildings, kids threw rocks at us until I let down a waist-long braid from under my Kevlar helmet, my femaleness providing cover for the soldiers closest to me. Those in the rear took rocks in the face until we exited the town. At another meeting, the “shadow government” stepped into the day shift when the mayor looked at the Army captain to my right and asked why he brought a woman and a piece of shit (our Afghan interpreter’s eyes were slanted, his accent wasn’t local).

Two thoughts occurred to me in that moment. Go fuck yourself, Mr. Taliban—and, If a soldier and an aid worker meet Taliban shadow government officials like it’s cool, we’ve lost the whole damn war.

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The Taliban shadow government, like the militias in Iraq, circled our aid projects and military outposts like sharks, sinking in their teeth on occasion, reminding us of their presence. Every project and village we assessed and placed on our stability continuum charts fell back into the red one after the other. In Nangarhar, the Taliban collected a protection tax from the population, surveilled aid projects, and took control of, or ruined, most of what any project managed to accomplish. The Taliban, like militias in Iraq, happily claimed new wells, rehabilitated clinics, and better roads, and blew up girls’ schools and women’s nursing colleges. Back in Iraq, soon, the black flags of ISIS would fly over many other USAID project locations.

In Nangarhar, locals unleashed their fury on the first American they could. For every Afghan grateful for the assistance provided, others spat at us because a drone strike or military operation killed their family members at a wedding, in their fields, at a funeral, or while they were driving down the road. Afghan kids had a name for our drones—buzzbuzzak. If children heard that unmistakable buzzing sound, they became inconsolable. Walking back to the outpost from one meeting, while kids shouted “buzzbuzzak” at us and chucked rocks, I asked the soldier ahead of me, “Captain. What the actual fuck are we doing here?”

Never taking his eye off the path ahead, he said, “Ma’am, I was gonna ask you the same thing.”

At the outpost in Nangarhar, we received incoming rockets or mortars every other night, with no sign of the glossy Kabul-like progress, no women graduating from colleges on the nearby Afghanistan-Pakistan border, no cappuccinos in cafes. One night, I bear-crawled from the female shower latrine to a bunker during a rocket attack, soaking wet and fully clothed because I always washed myself and my clothing in the shower. Covered in soap, I clutched a switchblade given to me by my Marine stepfather under my jacket sleeve, blade against my soapy wrist. Next to me, a shaking Army boot lieutenant, smooth-cheeked and barely out of college, held his weapon at low ready. A senior enlisted soldier, older and insubordinate under fire, commanded the young lieutenant to stay put and guard me, the only female civilian in the outpost, while all remaining soldiers manned the outpost perimeter. I contemplated suicide instead of captivity. I sure as hell wasn’t going to accept an extended slumber party with the Haqqani All-Stars.

Linda Norgrove didn’t survive. Aid workers died when captured in the suck, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and later, Syria. I’d given Iraq seven years of my youth. I decided not to waste what remained in Afghanistan. I completed my duties and refused follow-on assignments to Kandahar. I supported the program from Washington, D.C., and conducted the project close-out after-action review years later. I didn’t return to Afghanistan. But our military counterparts, like my stepfather and brother, cousins, uncles, and family friends, didn’t get to choose to go home. For our men and women in uniform, refusing a bullshit assignment or asking our leaders to take responsibility led to losing rank, clearances, jobs, and benefits.

I know the havoc endless war with no outcome wreaks on a military family. Born the year after the Vietnam War ended, I suffered its aftermath in fists across my four- and five-year-old face. My mother, a veteran herself, cried many nights, broken on the floor, both of us at the mercy of an enraged two-tour Vietnam veteran. A few years later, I watched a stepfather, a towering hulk of a Marine, crying in front of the television as his fellow Marines pulled body parts from rubble in Beirut less than a day after he left that same barracks to catch a flight home. During the Gulf War and Somalia, I watched my mother anguish, my brothers act out, while yet another stepfather packed his gear in the garage. The divorces, wars, and military bases blurred together as they do in military families. In Afghanistan and Iraq, I wasn’t surprised to see the familiar suicide watch posters plastered everywhere. I’ve known since childhood that when people return from a deployment, military or civilian, they’re different. Some don’t make it.

As I continue to process the heinous conclusion of the forever wars, rage and nightmares haunt me, as distracting and painful as the weeks and months after my deployments ended. I’ve lost hours and days in emotional emails with colleagues and family members or overthinking our American anomalies. I’ve woken up yelling and thrashing as I held my infant daughter. I struggle with our American habit of turning victory upside down and the decades spent squandering our legacy and mind-fucking the men and women who fought for it. Now that it is over, and America has gained nothing for the effort, I check military suicide rates. There are no statistics for the aid workers and other civilians who deployed. I hear by word of mouth that they are dying, too.

Khogyani District, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, where M. Tabar spent time as an aid worker during the “forever wars.” Photo courtesy of the author.

Like my family and me, many of those who served bounced between forever war zones. We lost spouses, legs, custody of children, memories, and bits of skull. We returned to find we had less freedom than when we deployed. While we wasted our youth in the suck, the Supreme Court and certain state governments showed their appreciation with an epic Thanks for your service, but fuck you by gutting the Civil Rights Act, reducing rights and access to voting, and eliminating reproductive independence. Those of us who served represented America in the best way we could. We returned to a budding authoritarian state at war with itself, upending a lifetime of American ideals and freedoms that we carried with us into war because we believed them to be everlasting. When we returned, we didn’t recognize our own country.

The anger this generates is such that when anyone says “Thank you for your service” to anyone who served in the suck, resisting the urge to throat punch them is difficult. At best, it sounds like they are saying, “Thank you for a bit of lucky success, thank you for volunteering to be trapped in a nasty ideological-political experiment.” Thank you for surviving a 20-year bipartisan shitshow so they could stay home and train with a government-hating militia or play with the newest smartphone and eat avocado toast. The worst is a “thank you” with indifference from the politicians we voted for, who can’t bear to face mangled bodies, the twitch of trauma, or the poverty of a veteran.

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Civilians like me—the aid workers, diplomats, intelligence officers, and defense contractors—we box up our traumas, hide them behind a game face like military kids. We aren’t veterans; therefore, we aren’t permitted a sloppy PTSD breakdown or suicide. But we didn’t evade despair. We know the sum of loss from the 20-year forever wars is immeasurable, and contemplating it bends the brain into psychosis. All the years sacrificed, dead and disappeared Afghan and Iraqi colleagues, battle buddies and youth lost, wasted money, and squandered American reputation and global leverage.

It’s been 21 years since the invasion of Afghanistan, 20 years since the invasion of Iraq. I am not over it. My family is not over it. The United States is not over it. America’s been fighting the same war in different iterations since Vietnam, wrecking military personnel and federal employees along the way like we’re all expendable deep-state trash. Because this is what we do in America. We pause. We forget. Then we begin the next war.

M. Tabar

M. Tabar worked as a Peace Corps volunteer in Gabon and then on USAID and State Department-funded assistance projects in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Jordan, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Cameroon, Sri Lanka, Togo, and Haiti. She is an alumnus of the Universities of Oregon and Georgetown, where she studied anthropology, communications, and foreign languages, with a focus on the Middle East and Francophone Africa. She lives in West Africa with her family, where she is working on an aid program and revising a memoir on the forever wars.

thewarhorse.org · by M. Tabar · March 15, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

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Editor, Small Wars Journal

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If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 15, 2023

Tags

James Zumwalt: China’s Doomsday Plan For America

“One Mountain Does Not Allow Two Tigers To Live Together” Wake Up Call

The Kremlin’s Never-Ending Attempt to Spread Disinformation about Biological Weapons - United States Department of State

Introduction

History of Spreading Biological Weapons Disinformation

Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Russia’s Parliamentary Commission on the Investigation of U.S. Biological Laboratories in Ukraine

Using Multilateral Organizations to Spread Disinformation

Conclusion

OPINION Published March 15, 2023 8:00am EDT

China has a plan to lead the world. What's ours?

Retooling our relationship with China should begin with these 5 steps

The Strange Case of Iraq Syndrome

How Elites Misread Public Perceptions of the War

By Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, and Jason Reifler

AN ELITE SYNDROME

AN INTERNATIONALIST PEOPLE

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DESERTED

ENTER BEIJING

ABOVE THE FRAY

Russian leadership approved actions of jets that damaged U.S. drone, officials say

U.S. Reaper drone crashes into Black Sea after encounter with Russian jet

Russia Wants a Long War

The West Needs to Send Ukraine More Arms, More Quickly

By Sam Greene and Alina Polyakova

THE STAKES COULD NOT BE HIGHER

ESCALATION EXAGGERATION

Why Sending F-16s to Ukraine Would Be a Mistake

A Solution for Japan’s Military Mismatch​

Given that Japan’s primary threats are maritime, why has it invested so heavily in a land-based force?

By Samuel P. Porter, a historian of modern Japan and modern Japanese military history.​

Pentagon Creates Cell to Oversee Expansion of Weapon Production Lines

How the US plans to expand its submarine industrial base for AUKUS

A history of industrial base challenges

Submarine industrial base and workforce development

Virginia-class readiness spending

Ideology is back, and it’s critical for understanding AUKUS v China

Opinion

Exclusive: Chinese-made drone, retrofitted and weaponized, downed in eastern Ukraine | CNN

Low altitude

‘Crude, unsophisticated’

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What Russia's possible collapse could mean for China

Blind Sided: A Reconceptualization of the Role of Emerging Technologies in Shaping Information Operations in the Gray Zone

Table of Contents

Glossary

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Rebel youth risk life and limb in Myanmar’s cruel war

Eye on Taiwan, US-Philippines to stage largest-ever wargames

Michael Klare, Is War with China Inevitable?

POSTED ON MARCH 14, 2023

In that context, let TomDispatch regular Michael Klare offer you a look at the unlikelihood that China will actually invade Taiwan, while considering what might lie ahead for us all. I mean, what could possibly go wrong? Tom

Is a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan Imminent?

Or Is Washington in a Tizzy over Nothing?

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Interior Lines Will Make Land Power the Asymmetric Advantage in the Indo-Pacific

Violent Far-Right Movements Aren’t Just a ‘Western Problem’

The focus on jihadist violence has often prevented states from finding and fixing other things that fuel violent extremism in the Global South.

Army Asks for Massive Cash Boost for New Barracks

CIA's Coming Tech Revolution

Why Won’t the West Let Ukraine Win Against Russia?

Its defense would be more effective if it didn’t have to fight with one hand behind its back.

This Is What We Do in America. We Pause. We Forget. Then We Begin the Next War.

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Our Journalism Depends on Your Support

M. Tabar

A Solution for Japan’s Military Mismatch

By Samuel P. Porter, a historian of modern Japan and modern Japanese military history.