Quotes of the Day:
“Guerrilla warfare is not dependent for success on the efficient operation of complex mechanical devices, highly organized logistical systems, or the accuracy of electronic computers. It can be conducted in any terrain, in any climate, in any weather; in swamps, in mountains, in farmed fields; its basic element is man and man is more complex than any of his machines.”
- Brig Gen S.B. Griffith in the Introduction to Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare, 1961.
“In a national insurrection the center of gravity to be destroyed lies in the person of the chief leader and in public opinion; against these points the blow must be directed.”
- Clausewitz, 1833.The Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-century Land Warfare: An Illustrated World View By Byron Farwell, page 424.
"Now — now, I want to be honest with you: This could be a long and difficult battle. But the American people will be steadfast in our support of the people of Ukraine in the face of Putin’s immoral, unethical attacks on civilian populations. We are united in our abhorrence of Putin’s depraved onslaught, and we’re going to continue to have their back as they fight for their freedom, their democracy, their very survival. And we’re going to give Ukraine the arms to fight and defend themselves through all the difficult days ahead."
- President Joe Biden
1. N. Korea silent about apparent missile launch failure
2. Yoon officials mull construction of presidential residence in Yongsan
3. First meeting between Moon and Yoon canceled after election
4. Both Moon and Yoon want to fill empty top posts
5. Relocating the presidential office emerges as ‘tall order’
6. Kim Jong-un views US military presence as ‘bulwark’ against China threat: Pompeo
7. Defense minister visits US military base to check combined readiness
8. Cheong Wa Dae stresses Moon's right to personnel appointments until end of term
9. The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for South Korea
10. Li Ning refutes US claim of using North Korean forced labour in its supply chain as his sports goods are banned in America
11. Column: Despite nasty campaign, South Korean voters reconfirm merits of law-abiding democracy
12. North Korea courts disaster with missile tests from international airport: Analysts
1. N. Korea silent about apparent missile launch failure
No surprise. Perhaps they are trying to figure out a way to explain this to people to put the blame on the ROK or US for the fallen debris. Do they want to go so far as to say that it is a foreign projectile? Can they say they shot it down?
Or are they just waiting to see an "overreaction" by the ROK and US and international community?
N. Korea silent about apparent missile launch failure | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's state media stayed mum Thursday on the country's latest suspected missile test, a day after the South Korean military said the launch appeared to have failed.
The North fired a projectile from the Sunan area in Pyongyang that appeared to have exploded in midair at an altitude below 20 kilometers, according to informed sources.
The North's tightly controlled official media, including the Korean Central News Agency and the Rodong Sinmun newspaper, did not carry any reports on the launch Thursday morning.
They usually report on such tests, if presumed successful, the next morning
The North's latest projectile launch came as the secretive Kim Jong-un regime has stated plans to develop "reconnaissance satellites," which South Korea and the United States regard as a disguise for the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. Yoon officials mull construction of presidential residence in Yongsan
This one really caught me by surprise when we heard this on Korean news last evening.. Having presidential offices at the MND site and the residence on Yongsan will certainly radically alter the Yongsan area.
Yoon officials mull construction of presidential residence in Yongsan | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 17 (Yonhap) -- President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol is considering building a new presidential residence in Seoul's central district of Yongsan, officials said Thursday, as Yongsan's defense ministry compound is talked about as a key candidate site to relocate the presidential office to.
Yoon pledged during the presidential campaign that if elected, he would set up his office in the Seoul government complex in Gwanghwamun and open the Cheong Wa Dae compound to the public.
The defense ministry compound has recently been mentioned as an alternative to the Gwanghwamun complex because of its advantages in terms of security and other issues.
"The option of building a new residence in Yongsan is being discussed in tandem," an official on the task force handling Cheong Wa Dae's relocation told Yonhap News Agency.
Under the scenario of the presidential office moving into the defense ministry compound, options for the president's official residence included the current residences of the defense minister, foreign minister and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of which are located nearby.
But some officials raised concern that the roads leading from the defense ministry to the nearby residences are too narrow, which could cause major traffic disruptions during the president's commute to work.
If a new presidential residence is constructed in Yongsan, it would be located near a major park under construction and bring the president closer to the people in line with Yoon's stated aim.
But one official noted that if the president works in the same space as the military, it could invite accusations of the new administration being a "military regime."
The task force plans to report the relocation options to Yoon as early as later Thursday.
"The will of the president-elect will be very important in deciding the location of the office and residence," a senior official on the transition team said.
Critics have viewed Cheong Wa Dae as a symbol of an "imperial" presidency due to its location on a secluded compound on the foothills of a mountain just north of Gwanghwamun.
Yoon's predecessors, including President Moon Jae-in, made similar pledges to relocate the presidential office but withdrew them over logistical and security issues.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. First meeting between Moon and Yoon canceled after election
It does not appear the transition is off to a good start.
First meeting between Moon and Yoon canceled after election
Posted March. 17, 2022 07:52,
Updated March. 17, 2022 07:52
First meeting between Moon and Yoon canceled after election. March. 17, 2022 07:52. .
The meeting between President Moon Jae-in and President-elect Yoon Seok-youl, scheduled for Wednesday, was canceled. Four hours before the scheduled meeting, Cheong Wa Dae said the two sides agreed to rescheduled the meeting as working-level discussions have not been completed. The Yoon’s side also announced the postponement of the meeting, saying the two sides agreed not to disclose the reason. The two sides said they will continue to hold working-level discussions and set a new date for the meeting.
Disputes between old and new powers during transition period are inevitable, but this is the first time that a scheduled meeting between incumbent and incoming presidents has been abruptly canceled. Although it is just a ceremonial event, where incumbent and incoming presidents meet and exchange words of congratulations, and vow smooth transition of power, such meeting has been an indicator showing democratic maturity of our politics. It is regrettable that the two sides revealed hard feelings even before their first meeting after the election.
Although the two sides did not disclose the reason for the cancellation, it is likely due to their differences over various agendas, such as pardon of former President Lee Myung-bak and appointment of public officials. Prior to the meeting, Cheong Wa Dae and the president-elect had pointless disputes with everything. President-elect Yoon put pressure on President Moon to pardon former President Lee Myung-bak even though it is the privilege of the president to grant a pardon. Regarding Cheong Wa Dae’s right to appoint public officials at the end of President Moon’s term, the Yoon’s side asked for prior consultation. In response, Cheong Wa Dae said it is only natural that they exercise the right to appoint public officials until May 9. As for the president-elect’s announcement to abolish the office of senior secretary for civil affairs, Cheong Wa Dae expressed their displeasure, saying the Yoon’s side is using something Cheong Wa Dae did not do as grounds.
Against this backdrop, the scheduled meeting between Moon and Yoon would have been a disgraceful and unpleasant event. It would have been enough if the two sides had vowed smooth transition of power during the meeting. Instead of putting their pride aside, the Yoon’s side stressed winner’s right to exercise rights while Cheong Wa Dae emphasized the ruling party’s majority in the National Assembly. The two sides will have to bear greater political burden due to the postponement of the meeting. If they cannot restrain themselves and make concessions and as a result fail to meet half way, there will be bleak future for our politics.
A message the March 9 presidential election gives was clear. It was a stern judgment against the current government. At the same time, a razor-thin victory of the People Power Party was a message calling for humility. Both Cheong Wa Dae and the president-elect vowed to achieve unity and cooperation after the presidential election. However, the retreating power is not looking back on the past five years and the incoming power is not looking ahead into the future. If the two sides do not change, the unfortunate history of former presidents will only repeat itself.
4. Both Moon and Yoon want to fill empty top posts
This makes no sense to me. There can be only one president. I think President-elect Yoon should back off here.
That said, Moon should have filled these positions prior to now. I suppose he assumed Lee would win and he was just holding off allowing him to select the people for the positions.
Thursday
March 17, 2022
Both Moon and Yoon want to fill empty top posts
President Moon Jae-in, left, and President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, prosecutor general at the time, face each other at the Blue House in central Seoul on Nov. 8, 2019. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
The president and his successor are butting heads on filling important positions like the central bank governor.
A first meeting between President Moon Jae-in and President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol on Wednesday was canceled at the last minute, with both sides saying prep work for the meeting hadn't been completed.
It later came out that the Blue House and Yoon's transition team are clashing over appointments to public institutions, with some key posts opening up before Moon leaves office on May 9.
"It is not right to argue over the president's right to personnel appointments," Park Soo-hyun, senior secretary for public communication, told MBC radio Thursday.
Park stressed the president has the exclusive right to make personnel appointments until his term ends.
Yoon's side reportedly wants to get involved in some appointments, such as the next head of the Bank of Korea (BOK). BOK Gov. Lee Ju-yeol's second term expires at the end of this month. Senior posts at the National Election Commission and Board of Audit and Inspection are also opening up before May 9.
Park brushed off media reports that the Blue House decided to allow Yoon to nominate the next BOK governor, calling them "not true."
"President Moon Jae-in's term runs until May 9, so who else would have the right to personnel appointments?" said Park. "It's only common sense."
Yun Ho-jung, interim head of the ruling Democratic Party (DP), said in an interview with KBS radio on the canceled meeting between Moon and Yoon, "I am aware that there was great disrespect on the president-elect's side in the preparatory consultation process."
He added, "I believed it was canceled because of the way [Yoon's team] was acting like an occupying force."
Yun said in a MBC radio interview later Thursday morning, "It is extremely unreasonable to ask the president not to exercise his right to personnel appointments, as it is the same as ordering him to violate the current law."
From the other side, Kim Gi-hyeon, floor leader of the main opposition People's Power Party (PPP), accused the Moon administration of "parachute appointments," accusing it of giving plum jobs to loyalists to the very end.
In a PPP supreme council meeting at the National Assembly Thursday, Kim said, "It is very unusual to see an administration that is focused on taking care of its own people until the very end."
He added, "The people have chosen a new president, so obviously someone who will implement the new president's approach to government should be appointed to head public institutions."
The two sides are also colliding over the issue of special pardons and Yoon's plans to transform and slim down the Blue House.
The president-elect's spokesperson indicated Tuesday that Yoon was expected to ask for a special pardon for former President Lee Myung-bak in the planned meeting with Moon Wednesday.
Some PPP lawmakers speculated that Moon would want a package deal so that former South Gyeongsang Gov. Kim Kyung-soo may also be granted a special pardon alongside Lee. Kim, a close aide to Moon, was sentenced to two years in prison for conspiring to manipulate online opinion ahead of the 2017 presidential election.
The first meeting between the president and the president-elect is usually supposed to be light in atmosphere, an occasion for the incumbent head of state to offer congratulations to his successor. However, the proposed agenda this time around included politically sensitive issues.
PPP Chairman Lee Jun-seok wrote on Facebook Thursday, "In a democratic country, a presidential transition is a process of the transfer of power, and the former administration has an obligation to cooperate with the establishment of the succeeding government."
Both the Blue House and the transition team said that the meeting is being rescheduled and have officially refrained from any outright insults.
Kim Eun-hye, Yoon's spokesperson, said in a briefing Thursday regarding the canceled meeting with Moon that there is "close and continuous communication and coordination" to reschedule it.
The president and president-elect had tensions from Yoon's days as Moon's hand-chosen prosecutor general. Their relations curdled after Yoon sanctioned a probe into former Justice Minister Cho Kuk and his family. Yoon also protested the Moon administration's plans to weaken prosecutorial powers.
Yoon, appointed by Moon to the position in July 2019, resigned as prosecutor general in March 2021 with four months left in his two-year tenure. In June, he announced his presidential bid.
Moon and Yoon publicly clashed last month after the PPP presidential nominee said in an interview that he would launch a probe into alleged corruption of the current administration if elected.
In a rare direct response to a candidate during a campaign, Moon expressed "strong resentment" over Yoon's remarks and demanded an apology.
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
5. Relocating the presidential office emerges as ‘tall order’
And what will happen to real estate prices in the Yongsan area?
Relocating the presidential office emerges as ‘tall order’
President-elect wants the presidential office moved out of Cheong Wa Dae, but many hurdles are in the way, including attacks from unhappy opponents
Published : Mar 17, 2022 - 15:55 Updated : Mar 17, 2022 - 17:59
South Korea’s presidential office, Cheong Wa Dae, also known as the Blue House in Jongno, Seoul.(Yonhap)
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol is pushing hard with his plan to relocate the presidential office, with transition committee officials now saying there is zero possibility of him going to the current Cheong Wa Dae, also known as the Blue House due to its iconic blue-tiled roof.
From the start of his presidential campaign, Yoon has vowed to relocate the presidential office for “better communication” with the public, seeing Cheong Wa Dae as closed off from the public and a symbol of emperor-like presidential power.
Several sites are being considered as likely locations for the presidential office, with the Defense Ministry compound in Yongsan-gu, Seoul rising as a strong candidate. But wherever it would be, the plan is raising questions on feasibility -- as many hurdles of security, expense, and traffic efficiency -- are in the way.
Security of the president
One of the biggest concerns raised is the security of the president. Yoon inititally said he would move his presidential office to the Seoul Government Complex in the central Gwanghwamun area, not far from Cheong Wa Dae.
But a lack of the security facilities to protect the president emerged as a problem, and the president-elect has turned to the Defense Ministry compound in Yongsan-gu, near Samgakji Station in Seoul, as a plausible option.
The Defense Ministry compound, as a security facility itself, is expected to resolve the problem of the president’s safety. It already has protection facilities such as underground bunkers, according to Yoon’s aides.
For convenient transport, the compound also has helicopter takeoff and landing areas readied nearby.
However, as a divided nation with North Korea launching provocative missiles now and then, whether it is efficient for South Korea to transfer all of Cheong Wa Dae’s security features for Yoon’s relocation plan stands as a major question that needs to be addressed.
Cheong Wa Dae has an underground bunker stocked with top protection and intelligence equipment. National Security Council meetings are held at times of emergencies in this bunker.
Following the relocation plan, the president would have to either travel to Cheong Wa Dae from the Defense Ministry compound to attend an NSC meeting, or have it inside an underground bunker connected to the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
A former director-general and former Justice Party lawmaker Kim Jong-dae has pointed out that the underground bunker inside the headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs in the Defense Ministry compound is too small to accommodate the president and all related figures for an NSC meeting.
“In the case of an emergency, do they plan to kick out all the soldiers? Do they plan to hold the NSC meeting with everyone standing up?” Kim said on his Facebook on Wednesday.
The ruling Democratic Party of Korea also released a statement on Thursday, denouncing Yoon Suk-yeol’s push on relocation as “hasty and impellent,” and also causing a threat to national security.
“Not only is it preposterous to decide on the relocation in such hasty manner just two months before inauguration, it will also create many side effects and unnecessary chaos when they move the presidential office inside the Defense Ministry compound,” the ruling party lawmakers affiliated with the parliamentary committee for National Defense said in a statement.
The Ministry of National Defense headquarters in Yongsan, Seoul (Yonhap)
Cost and inconvenience
The cost of relocation has also become a subject of criticism from opponents. Only the prospects are laid out of the relocation costs, but it is estimated that it would cost some hundreds of billions of won.
The Ministry of the Interior and Safety has reported to Yoon’s presidential transition committee that it would cost about 50 billion won ($41 million) for the presidential office to be moved to the Defense Ministry compound in Yongsan. If the office moved to Seoul Government Complex to take the place of the Foreign Ministry in central Gwanghwamun, it would reportedly cost about 100 billion won.
On Thursday, an online presidential petition was posted to criticize Yoon’s plan as “wasting an enormous amount of tax money.”
“President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol is talking of establishing a new presidential office all for his own satisfaction, and is forcing relocation of the security facilities and systems of the Defense Ministry that have been optimized for national security,” the anonymous petitioner wrote on the presidential petition site operated by the government.
“The presidential term lasts only for five years. The people can never agree to Yoon’s impellent demand to take over the Defense Ministry’s compound for his five years as the president, and also to spend tens of thousands of won to waste the taxpayer’s precious money.”
There is also the problem of serious traffic congestion, as the presidential residence would also be moved, but not at a walking distance.
Yoon’s transition team is reportedly looking into several options for the presidential residence, including the official residences of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Army, Navy or Air Chief of Staff, and building a new residence nearby.
This would require adjustment to the traffic system in the area where the new presidential office would be located in, as the roads would have to be cleared off every time the president commutes to his office from the residence, or travels to another region.
Is relocation the answer?
Yoon is adamant that his initiative to relocate the presidential office is for better communication with the public, and describes Cheong Wa Dae as an “isolated royal palace.”
In fact, Yoon is not the first one to try to relocate the presidential office out of Cheong Wa Dae.
The incumbent president Moon Jae-in had also pledged to move the presidential office to Gwanghwamun, to “eradicate the authoritative presidential culture,” and to “open the Gwanghwamun era,” as said in his first presidential bid in 2012.
After Moon came into office in 2017, the government carried out the discussion quite far -- even forming a presidential committee dedicated to the relocation project.
But the administration had to give up after a year and a half of review, after learning that they could not find adequate space for other affiliated facilities, such as a reception hall to accommodate VIPs from abroad, the headquarters, and heliports sites nearby.
Disputes remain over whether moving the presidential office to the Defense Ministry or other places is really the way to bring the president and the public closer together.
As for the example of the Defense Ministry compound, offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military facilities that would remain, even if some of the defense ministry offices are relocated to other venues.
This means that the envisioned presidential office inside the Defense Ministry compound would still be considered a military facility, with civilians prohibited from entering.
As Yoon has insisted that he would hold his inauguration ceremony not at Cheong Wa Dae, but at a new presidential office on May 10, it has created rumors that the strong drive behind the seemingly hurried relocation is based on Yoon’s belief in feng shui, or the geomantic evaluation of the land where Cheong Wa Dae is situated.
The feng shui evaluation of Cheong Wa Dae site appears to be divided. And the theory that the site has back luck has surfaced from time to time, as former presidents have all come to meet bad ends -- impeachment, corruption trials and more.
6. Kim Jong-un views US military presence as ‘bulwark’ against China threat: Pompeo
With all due respect to Secretary Pompeo we need to be careful in interpreting these remarks from Kim Jong-un. First, every country, to include China, is a threat to north Korea. We should also understand the regime 's nature, objectives, and strategy. We must understand the regime's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy. We must understand the objective to split the alliance. Kim has also "committed" to denuclearization but there are no party or regime documents that indicate any intention of denuclearization. In fact regime documents and policy statements describe the exact opposite - north Korea is and will always be a nuclear state. We also hear similar words from Kim Jongil as well. But we cannot take the regime at its word and most importantly we cannot allow ourselves to be duped by Kim.
Kim Jong-un views US military presence as ‘bulwark’ against China threat: Pompeo
Pompeo says Kim is aware that Xi “threatens his sovereignty”
Published : Mar 17, 2022 - 14:20 Updated : Mar 17, 2022 - 17:27
Then-US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attend a working lunch in Pyongyang on October 7, 2018. (State Department)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un views US forces stationed in South Korea as a counterweight and “bulwark” against China’s “real threat” to his sovereignty, former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Wednesday.
The former top US diplomat underscored that a critical lesson he learned from nuclear talks with Pyongyang is Kim’s perception of the United States Forces Korea, although the Trump administration “didn’t get all the way to try to convince Chairman Kim that his nuclear weapons pose more of a threat to him than they did a security blanket.”
Pompeo, who also previously served as the director of the CIA and visited Pyongyang multiple times, said Kim declined to give an explicit answer when asked about the implications of the withdrawal of US forces on the Korean Peninsula for his regime, recalling his in-person meetings with Kim.
“Chairman Kim, I would say, tell me what it would look like if America pulled its troops from South Korea. … He would smile and say, ‘I’m not particularly interested in that,’ suggesting somehow that he didn’t want to tell me how important it really was,” Pompeo said in an annual B.C. Lee Lecture on US policy in the Indo-Pacific hosted by the Washington-based Heritage Foundation.
But Pompeo said the North Korean leader’s stance on US forces came to the fore as the Trump administration proceeded with nuclear negotiations.
“As we developed our relationship more fully, what became very clear is he (Kim Jong-un) views the United States of America on the Korean Peninsula as a bulwark against his real threat, which came from Xi Jinping,” Pompeo said.
“He knew that having American troops … (was) the counterbalance not only for the South Koreans, not only for the Japanese, not only for the United States and our Western interests, but for him as well.”
Pompeo went on to say that the summits between Kim and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, which were held in the run-up to three Trump-Kim meetings, do not necessarily evince their close coordination.
“I think a more nuanced, better analysis is that Chairman Kim knows, just like the rest of us in the world now, that Xi Jinping threatens his sovereignty as well,” Pompeo told participants at the event.
The former US secretary of state warned that China would be the one that could topple the Kim Jong-un regime.
“If he is to lose power, it is most likely not to come from the United States, not likely to come from South Korea, but because Xi concludes that a little more territory, a little more real estate, and a little less freedom on the Chinese border is something that the Chinese Communist Party needs,” Pompeo said.
“We need to look no further than Hong Kong or Tibet or Xinjiang to know that what Xi Jinping will demand of Chairman Kim is total and complete subservience.”
But it is also crucial to note that there have been discrepancies between the North Korean leader’s stance on the USFK indirectly conveyed by South Korean and US officials and the country’s position on the matter in public statements.
After his visit to Pyongyang, then-national security adviser Chung Eui-yong in September 2018 said Kim viewed there was no correlation between an end-of-war declaration and the withdrawal of the US forces.
North Korea’s pronouncements have, on the other hand, shown different opinions on the matter. A North Korean government spokesperson’s statement, which was issued in July 2016, elucidated that pulling out US troops from South Korea was one of the five major preconditions for achieving “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
The party regulations, which were revised in January 2021 at the Eighth Party Congress, still stipulate its goal to make “aggressive forces of US imperialism withdraw from South Korea and eventually terminate the US political and military domination over South Korea.”
The most recent example is another press statement released last August under the Party Central Committee’s Vice Department Director Kim Yo-jong, with authorization from the North Korean leader.
Kim Yo-jong explicitly said the “root cause that periodically aggravates the situation on the Korean Peninsula will never be eliminated as long as US forces are stationed in South Korea.”
7. Defense minister visits US military base to check combined readines
Defense minister visits US military base to check combined readiness
Defense Minister Suh Wook, center, Gen. Paul LaCamera, second from left, and other officials pose during Suh's visit to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, 70 kilometers south of Seoul, Wednesday. Courtesy of Ministry of Defense
South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook on Wednesday visited a key U.S. military base south of Seoul to inspect the allies' combined defense posture, his office said, hours after North Korea's apparently botched missile launch.
During his visit to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, 70 kilometers south of the capital, Suh met with Gen. Paul LaCamera, the chief of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), and other senior officials of the CFC and the U.N. Command.
Earlier in the day, the North fired an apparent ballistic missile, but it apparently exploded in midair, military sources here said.
"Under the grave security situation, I call on you to focus on the CFC's core mission of defending the Republic of Korea based on the solid combined defense posture," Suh was quoted by his ministry as saying.
He also stressed the importance of maintaining military readiness based on cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. at a time when Seoul is undergoing a presidential transition.
LaCamera said that the CFC will continue to maintain "unwavering" readiness based on close cooperation between the allies, as well as the spirit of the alliance's motto, "We go together," according to the ministry.
During the visit there, Suh was also briefed on progress in the project to relocate the CFC headquarters to Camp Humphreys later this year and met South Korean and U.S. troops stationed there. (Yonhap)
8. Cheong Wa Dae stresses Moon's right to personnel appointments until end of term
It seems to me the Blue House should be able to make appointments. But it also should be that when the current president leaves. office the new president should be able to make his own appointment.
Cheong Wa Dae stresses Moon's right to personnel appointments until end of term | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 17 (Yonhap) -- President Moon Jae-in has the right to make personnel appointments until his term ends, a senior official said Thursday, amid speculation the issue is one of the reasons for the cancellation of Moon's planned meeting with his successor-elect Yoon Suk-yeol.
"It is not right to argue about the president's right to personnel appointments," Park Soo-hyun, senior secretary for public communication, told MBC radio, a day after Moon's first meeting with Yoon was called off.
Park also denied as "groundless" media reports that Cheong Wa Dae may allow Yoon to nominate the next head of the Bank of Korea (BOK). Park said it would be "nonsense" if Moon does not exercise his given right to personnel appointments.
BOK Gov. Lee Ju-yeol's term ends at the end of this month, while Moon's term ends on May 9.
Moon and Yoon had planned to hold a meeting Wednesday, their first encounter since Yoon's election last week. However, the meeting was called off at the last minute as working-level, pre-meeting discussions had not been completed yet
Cheong Wa Dae and Yoon's side said they were rescheduling the Moon-Yoon meeting.
Both sides did not provide details on why the planned meeting did not take place.
But a disagreement over whether to pardon imprisoned former President Lee Myung-bak could be among them, along with the issue of personnel appointments.
In the lead-up to the planned meeting, aides to Yoon had said Yoon would ask Moon for a special pardon for Lee, now serving a 17-year prison term for embezzlement and bribery.
Yoon's side has also asked Cheong Wa Dae to make consultations before making appointments for key posts.
kdh@yna.co.kr
(END)
9. The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for South Korea
Conclusion:
These situations suggest that South Korea needs to establish itself as the U.S.’ reliable partner in the aspects of 'competition' and 'cooperation'. South Korea’s national interests lie in striking a well-calibrated balance between U.S. and China and, thus, its deep involvement in the U.S.-China confrontations over democratic values and political systems collides with the vital interests. The Biden administration seeks to strategically take advantage of all the elements of 'competition, confrontation, and cooperation' to effectively check the rise of China and manage its relations with China in a responsible manner. Australia and Japan are playing supporting roles for the U.S. in terms of 'confrontation' and 'competition' based on their own national interests. Therefore, South Korea’s efforts at positioning itself as a trustworthy partner of the U.S. in the aspects of 'competition' and 'cooperation' could work for the strategic interests of both U.S. and South Korea. It will also make a contribution that South Korea will form consensus and cooperate with major middle powers such as India, Germany, and ASEAN. When South Korea consistently makes strategic decisions rooted in the consistent pursuit of its national interests, it will be able to win support and prime its way toward strategic autonomy amid the U.S.-China rivalry in the coming years.
IFANS Focus
The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for South Korea
MIN Jeonghun Upload Date 2022-03-16 Hits 59
IFANS Focus The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for South Korea MIN Jeonghun Upload Date 2022-03-16 Hits 63
Ⅰ. The Main Content of the Indo-Pacific Strategy
Ⅱ. Implications for South Korea
On Februrary 11, the Biden administration unveiled its Indo-Pacific Strategy. It is the first time that the administration has released a document dedicated to its Indo-Pacific strategy. The Indo-Pacific Strategy is the first regional strategy published by the Biden administration since the release of the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in March 2021, underscoring the Indo-Pacific region’s strategic importance for the U.S. in mapping out its global strategy.
The primary focus of the document is on laying out the Biden administration’s plans to work with allies and partners to achieve the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific that is more connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient, to check the rise of China and maintain U.S. leadership in that vital region. The document also includes an action plan that the administration will pursue in the next 12 to 24 months.
Ⅰ. The Main Content of the Indo-Pacific Strategy
The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy begins with a statement that the United States has long recognized the Indo-Pacific as vital to its security and prosperity. In its document, the administration points out that Indo-Pacific governments grapple with major challenges like the
PRC’s growing influence, North Korean nuclear weapons, and missile programs, climate change, COVID-19, natural disasters, resource scarcity, internal conflict, and governance challenges, and that left unchecked, these forces threaten to destabilize the region.
The new strategy document stresses the intensifying American focus on the Indo-Pacific, which due in part is to the fact that the region faces mounting challenges, particularly from the PRC. It notes that collective efforts over the next decade will determine whether the PRC succeeds in transforming the rules and norms that have benefited the Indo-Pacific and the world. The document adds that the U.S. is investing in the foundations of the country’s strength at home, aligning its approach with those of allies and partners abroad, and competing with the PRC to defend the interests and vision for the shared future. The administration clearly states that its objective is not to change the PRC but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States, allies and partners, and shared interests and values. It states that the U.S. will seek to manage competition with the PRC responsibly.
The document shows that the United States will pursue an Indo-Pacific region that is free and open. It notes that the country’s vital interests and those of its closest partners require a free and open Indo-Pacific, and a free and open Indo-Pacific requires that governments can make their own choices and that shared domains are governed lawfully. It plans to advance a free and open region, including by investing in democratic institutions, a free press, and a vibrant civil society; improving fiscal transparency in the Indo-Pacific to expose corruption and drive reform; ensuring the region’s seas and skies are governed and used according to international law; and advancing common approaches to critical and emerging technologies, the internet, and cyber space.
Secondly, the document states that a free and open Indo-Pacific can only be achieved by building collective capacity for a new age, and the alliances, organizations, and rules that the United States and its partners have helped to build must be adapted. The U.S. vows to build collective capacity within and beyond the region, including by deepening the five regional treaty alliances with Australia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand; strengthening relationships with leading regional partners, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands; contributing to an empowered and unified ASEAN; strengthening the Quad and delivering on its commitments; supporting India’s continued rise and regional leadership; partnering to build resilience in the Pacific Islands; forging connections between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic; and expanding U.S. diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.
Third, the U.S. stresses that it will drive Indo-Pacific prosperity by proposing an Indo-Pacific economic framework through which it will develop new approaches to trade, create a new digital economy framework, and make shared investments in decarbonization and clean energy. It notes that other ways to achieve prosperity include promoting free, fair, and open trade and investment through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and closing the region’s infrastructure gap through Build Back Better World.
Fourth, to deter aggression against U.S. territory and against our allies and partners and bolster Indo-Pacific security, the U.S. vows to advance integrated deterrence; deepen cooperation and enhance interoperability with allies and partners; maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait; innovate to operate in rapidly evolving threat environments, including space, cyberspace, and critical- and emerging-technology areas; strengthen extended deterrence and coordination with the ROK and Japan and pursue the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; continue to deliver on AUKUS; expand U.S. Coast Guard presence and cooperation against other transnational threats; and work with Congress to fund the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the Maritime Security Initiative.
Fifth, the document lays out the Biden administration’s plans to build regional resilience to 21st-century transnational threats like the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change, which include: working with allies and partners to develop 2030 and 2050 targets, strategies, plans, and policies consistent with limiting global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius; reducing regional vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation and; ending the COVID-19 pandemic and bolstering global health security.
Ⅱ. Implications for South Korea
The Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy reflects its foreign policy stance toward the Indo-Pacific region. It gives shape to the contours of the Biden administration’s thinking on the Indo-Pacific region. The administration announced in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance released in March 2021 that it aims to restore U.S. leadership by working together with allies and partners that share values with the United States. The Guidance emphasizes the U.S.’ commitment towards working with like-minded allies and partners to revitalize democracy to counter challenges from authoritarian powers like China and Russia. The Guidance also states the U.S. will promote shared norms and forge new agreements on emerging technologies, space, cyberspace, health and biological threats, climate and the environment, and human rights. Since its launch, the Biden administration strived to advance cooperation with key allies and partners such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, and India to check the rise of China and maintain U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific, a region of vital importance to the United States.
The U.S. expects South Korea, a key ally in the region, to actively participate in its efforts to maintain the regional leadership. The Biden administration, which vowed to rebuild trust among allies, largely focuses on encouraging each ally to make a maximum contribution to its policy efforts, rather than forcing its allies to align their actions with its stance to advance the national interests. Since the launch of the Biden administration, South Korea and the U.S. have intensified cooperation on areas in which South Korea has a competitive advantage and where the strategic interests of the two countries converge, such as semiconductors, large-capacity batteries, artificial intelligence, and vaccine supply. This is the result of a compromise between the Biden administration, which wants to enhance trust with its allies and prioritizes building stable U.S.-led supply chains in core items and industries, and South Korea, which possesses advanced technologies and manufacturing capabilities and seeks to maintain its strategic autonomy between the U.S. and China. In light of these circumstances, the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy could have some important implications for the future direction of South Korea and the U.S. cooperation.
First, it is expected that South Korea's participation and active roles will be required in forming minilateral or multilateral consultative bodies on the basis of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The Indo-Pacific Strategy report offers a plan to work in flexible groupings that pool the collective strength of U.S. allies and partners to face up to the defining issues of our time through the Quad. It also states that the U.S. will continue to strengthen cooperation on global health, climate change, critical and emerging technology, infrastructure, cyber, education, and clean energy through the Quad. The Biden administration defines the Quad as an open, transparent platform, which is designed to increase cooperation across a range of issues, and wants to take advantage of the Quad as a mechanism to work closely with like-minded countries on non-traditional security issues such as vaccine supply, climate change, and emerging technologies.
The use of Quad is likely to be 'Quad Plus (Quad members – X + α),' which is a mini or multilateral consultative body composed of all or some of the Quad member countries as well as other prospective members. The Quad Plus will be developed in a complex manner by issue in various areas, and countries with entangled interests in specific issues will participate in each Quad Plus. Accordingly, the composition of participating countries will be different for each issue.
South Korea's participation in the Quad Plus for the development and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region is expected to have positive impacts on enhancing trust between South Korea and the U.S. and increasing South Korea's influence in the region and improving its international status as a global leading country. Considering South Korea's capabilities and strategic interests, it would be appropriate and beneficial for the country to participate in and play an active role in the Quad Plus on non-traditional security areas such as vaccine supply, emerging technology, climate change, infrastructure, maritime security, and cyber security.
Second, it is necessary for South Korea to take its positions to the U.S.-led efforts to rebuild supply chains through the Indo-Pacific economic framework (IPEF). IPEF began to draw attention in October 2021 when the Biden administration proposed it as a vehicle to bring together regional allies and partners such as South Korea, Japan, and India to forge a stronger partnership. At that time, the Biden administration said it had no intention of joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and suggested it would leverage the IPEF to strengthen strategic cooperation among allies and partner countries in areas such as supply chains, digital economy, and semiconductor. In February 2022, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy stated it would launch, in early 2022, a new partnership that would promote and facilitate high-standards trade, govern the digital economy, improve supply-chain resiliency and security, catalyze investment in transparent, high-standards infrastructure, and build digital connectivity—doubling down on economic ties to the region while contributing to broadly shared Indo-Pacific opportunity.
Such developments clearly show that the IPEF will play a central role in the U.S.-led efforts to rebuild supply chains during the Biden presidency. More specifically, the IPEF will likely serve as an equivalent of the Quad in the economic sphere. The U.S. and China competition in the Biden administration is rapidly unfolding over rebuilding global supply chains in the high-tech and strategic industries, where the gap between the two countries has been rapidly closing in recent years. Therefore, it would be more effective for the Biden administration to take the initiative in developing international norms and standards by forming flexible and ad hoc groups on trade, technology, supply chains, and digital connectivity than opting for a comprehensive consultative body covering the entire trade sector to check the rise of China.
It is anticipated that cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. through the IPEF will take shape in the form of South Korea’s participation in the issue-specific multilateral consultative bodies on trade, technology, supply chains, and digital connectivity. Furthermore, considering that the U.S. remains superior over China in most cases for possessing foundational technologies and capabilities in the high-tech and strategic industries, it seems necessary for South Korea to pursue a strategy that advances its national interests and capabilities by deepening cooperation with the U.S. in compliance with the U.S.-led efforts to rebuild supply chains and develop international norms and standards in the high-tech and strategic industries while keeping the door open for cooperation with China.
Thirdly, the intensifying U.S.-China competition vying for the technological hegemony calls for South Korea to maintain its strategic autonomy by pursuing “principled diplomacy centered on national interests.” With the growing importance of economic security in the overall national security areas, it is not easy to effectively reflect South Korea’s national interests with the dichotomy of separately seeking security cooperation with the U.S. and economic cooperation with China. Accordingly, it is necessary for South Korea to take its positions based on the universal principles of cooperation such as “openness, inclusiveness, and transparency” with the goal of maximizing its national interests at the center. In particular, as the high-tech industry involving semiconductors, high-capacity batteries, and artificial intelligence forms the backbone of South Korea’s future growth engine, calibrating South Korea’s positions in the technology sector requires more deliberations that prioritize its national interests than any other sector. South Korea will be able to receive domestic and international support for its positions when it consistently places its national interests at the center in making decisions. Moreover, South Korea needs to galvanize support for its decisions by playing a more active role in expanding multilateral cooperation with leading countries in the high-tech industry. When South Korea continues developing and expanding various forms of cooperation with major players based on the universal principles of cooperation, it will be able to safeguard its national interests and preserve its strategic value as a leading country in the international arena.
The Biden administration utilizes all the elements of 'competition, confrontation, and cooperation' to check the rise of China. As it has scaled up pressure on China, U.S.-China competition has intensified in high-tech and strategic industries. Moreover, the two countries have been pitted against each other over democratic values and political systems involving human rights violations in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. These developments have left scant room for cooperation to address global challenges such as climate change and health security.
These situations suggest that South Korea needs to establish itself as the U.S.’ reliable partner in the aspects of 'competition' and 'cooperation'. South Korea’s national interests lie in striking a well-calibrated balance between U.S. and China and, thus, its deep involvement in the U.S.-China confrontations over democratic values and political systems collides with the vital interests. The Biden administration seeks to strategically take advantage of all the elements of 'competition, confrontation, and cooperation' to effectively check the rise of China and manage its relations with China in a responsible manner. Australia and Japan are playing supporting roles for the U.S. in terms of 'confrontation' and 'competition' based on their own national interests. Therefore, South Korea’s efforts at positioning itself as a trustworthy partner of the U.S. in the aspects of 'competition' and 'cooperation' could work for the strategic interests of both U.S. and South Korea. It will also make a contribution that South Korea will form consensus and cooperate with major middle powers such as India, Germany, and ASEAN. When South Korea consistently makes strategic decisions rooted in the consistent pursuit of its national interests, it will be able to win support and prime its way toward strategic autonomy amid the U.S.-China rivalry in the coming years.
* Attached the File
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10. Li Ning refutes US claim of using North Korean forced labour in its supply chain as his sports goods are banned in America
Li Ning refutes US claim of using North Korean forced labour in its supply chain as his sports goods are banned in America
- Li Ning said his company has “zero tolerance” for misconduct, according to a statement to the Hong Kong stock exchange
- US statutes carry “rebuttable presumption” that all goods from the target area are tainted, unless there is “clear and convincing evidence” otherwise
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Published: 4:03pm, 17 Mar, 2022
By Lam Ka-sing South China Morning Post3 min
Signage of Li Ning Company Limited’s store in Shanghai on Feb. 10, 2022. Photo: Bloomberg
Li Ning, the triple-gold Olympic medallist in gymnastics, said his namesake company has not found any forced labour in its supply chain, defending one of China’s largest athletic brands after its exports were banned this week by US customs.
“During the operation and review process, the group has not discovered any cases of forced labour in the supplier management system,” Li said in a statement to Hong Kong’s stock exchange, where the shares of Li Ning Company Limited are traded. The company “strictly prohibits and opposes any form of forced labour employed by its suppliers,” and “always upholds human rights and legal rights of labour”, Li said, adding that these are the “basic principles” for his company’s cooperation with all partners.
The US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) this week banned Li Ning’s products from entering the American market, citing “unless the importer provides clear and convincing evidence” that there was no forced labour involved, according to a statement.
Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), goods manufactured wholly or in part by North Koreans anywhere in the world are banned in the US, unless clear and convincing evidence is provided that they were not made with forced labour.
“This has been an ongoing investigation for several months involving numerous offices within CBP who independently reached the same conclusion,” a CBP spokesperson said in an emailed reply to South China Morning Post, three days after the ban on Li Ning’s products took effect. “CAATSA is a sanction, and is already imposed on Li-Ning until … the company can provide a rebuttal to CBP’s presumption of North Korean labour in their supply chain.”
The ban on Li Ning is the latest dust-up between the US and China, as the worst bilateral relations in decades spilled over into punitive actions on companies that are maintaining commerce between the two largest economies on the planet.
The CAATSA carries a “rebuttable presumption” that all goods made by North Koreans are the result of forced labour, similar to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) signed into law in December 2021, that also presumed that everything that originates in western China’s Xinjiang region is tainted by forced labour.
Under both statutes, companies will be able to appeal the prohibition only if they can provide “clear and convincing evidence” that their supply chains are free of forced labour.
Hong Kong’s Esquel Group, the apparels producer for such US brands as Tommy Hilfiger and Nike, which operates a factory in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi, sued in the United States to be removed from the UFLPA’s banned list. The case was rejected by a US judge in October, pending an appeal by Esquel.
The ban on Li Ning applies to new imports from its effective date, leaving the brand’s products that are already in the US market unaffected.
In its defence, Li said his board could not respond to “speculation” or “allegations” of abuse without knowing the source of the information. The company “applies zero-tolerance policy” for misconduct, and “all suppliers are treated equally,” Li said.
The CBP declined to provide any information that “may reveal law enforcement techniques or expose individuals or parties involved in referrals,” the spokesman said. Still, “CBP is committed to fairly and expeditiously working to review information Li Ning believes is appropriate to meet this rebuttal requirement,” he said.
“CBP is actively investigating other instances of North Korean labour and thus other CAATSA violations,” he said. “Additional CAATSA enforcement actions may occur on companies around the world who utilise North Korean labour in violation of US sanctions.”
Lam Ka-sing is a business reporter who covers property affairs and results. He joined the Post in 2017 and has a degree in international journalism from Hong Kong Baptist University.
11. Column: Despite nasty campaign, South Korean voters reconfirm merits of law-abiding democracy
Democracy prevailed in South korea.
Column: Despite nasty campaign, South Korean voters reconfirm merits of law-abiding democracy
South Korea’s voters have elected Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative People Power Party their next leader. He will take office in May, succeeding President Moon Jae-in, after defeating Lee Jae-myung of the governing Democratic Party. Under the constitution, the president serves a single five-year term and cannot run for reelection.
The run-up to voting on March 9 involved intense, dirty campaigning. Negative ads and personal invective relentlessly defined the contest, crowding out more serious policy discussion.
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South Korea is a global leader in advanced telecommunications and computer technologies of all sorts. Average internet speeds are among the fastest on Earth
Bizarre computer-generated imagery, termed “deepfakes,” were prominent, used by supporters and opponents of the candidates. Trendy young political staffers spearheaded these new efforts, unusual compared to traditional political media.
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Thanks to technology, the conservative, intimidating prosecutor Yoon appeared flexible, literally animated. This may have deflected some opposition criticism, including that he is anti-feminist.
In the end, the election was the closest since South Korea achieved truly representative government in the 1980s. Yoon won 48.56% of the vote, Lee 47.83%.
The Democratic Party alliance retains a large legislative majority, and Yoon will have to compromise in order to have any significant policy success. In the campaign, he promised a harder line toward North Korea, and closer relations with the United States. These are changes in degree, not in kind.
Media emphasis on the nasty nature of the campaign overlooks the more important fact that voters collectively reconfirmed South Korea’s law-abiding democracy. Considerable credit for this continuity goes to the leadership of South Korea’s outgoing president.
At the end of 2018, the influential Asia News Network named Moon “Person of the Year.” South Korea’s chief executive rightly receives praise for initiating dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea during Donald Trump’s presidential term.
This accomplishment is too easily oversimplified and minimized. At the end of 2017, Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un were trading crude and personal insults via the global media.
Moon’s work behind the scenes not only restrained — but also reversed — that sad, silly situation. He insisted on meeting with the North Korea delegation to the Winter Olympics held in February 2018 in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The group included Kim’s sister, an influential figure in the regime.
General Park Chung-hee’s dictatorship imprisoned Moon for anti-regime activism. Later, he pursued a career in human rights law. He also served in the Republic of Korea (ROK) army special forces, and saw action at the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) along the 38th Parallel
Military ties between South Korea and the United States are of vital importance, and are often also overlooked. Collaboration is particularly close and long-term between the armies of our two nations. During the long Vietnam War, South Korea maintained approximately 50,000 troops in South Vietnam.
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A large percentage of that total were combat troops. ROK Army soldiers developed a deserved reputation for combat effectiveness. South Korea at the time had no substantial economic investment in South Vietnam.
This commitment to the United States dates from the Korean War of 1950-1953. That war made the Cold War global, no longer focused only on divided Germany.
President Harry Truman acted decisively at once to commit the U.S. to defending South Korea when North Korea’s forces invaded in June 1950. President Dwight Eisenhower acted skillfully, and ruthlessly, in escalating bombing to achieve the 1953 armistice.
The courage of these American presidents resonates today.
Arthur I. Cyr is author of “After the Cold War.”
12. North Korea courts disaster with missile tests from international airport: Analysts
North Korea courts disaster with missile tests from international airport: Analysts
By Hermes Auto The Straits Times2 min
People watch a news broadcast of a North Korean missile test at a railway station in Seoul, South Korea, on March 16, 2022. PHOTO: AFP
SEOUL (REUTERS) - North Korea's decision to use the international airport near its capital city as a site for test-firing large missiles is "absolutely bonkers" and may be a way for leader Kim Jong Un to keep a close eye on his most prized weapons, analysts said.
There was no immediate confirmation of damage or casualties.
The launch underscored the danger behind North Korea's decision to use the airport as a major site for test firing large missiles.
The airport is in Sunan, about 17km northwest of the North Korean capital.
"The idea of placing a dedicated facility to support developmental missile testing at North Korea's major international airport is absolutely bonkers," Dr Jeffrey Lewis, a missile researcher at the James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), said in a report on Sunday.
"This is a very strange airport," he added. "And it's been getting progressively stranger all the time."
With the construction of what analysts believe is a ballistic missile support facility, the airport could take on a major role as North Korea prepares to potentially conduct its first full-scale ICBM test since 2017.
Even before the Covid-19 pandemic ended international travel in and out of North Korea, the airport was hardly busy, with a handful of flights operating to cities in China and Russia.
But North Korea appears to be the only country to have conducted missile tests from its primary international airport, and could be planning to use the site to develop technology specifically related to its ICBMs, Dr Lewis said.
In 2016, North Korea began constructing a facility next to the airport that appeared to be for ballistic missiles.
A high-bay building within the facility is tall enough to allow for North Korea's largest ICBMs on launch vehicles to be easily elevated into the firing position to allow for testing of both, as well as the training of maintenance and ground crews, the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said in a 2020 report, citing satellite imagery.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
