Quotes of the Day:

“We can disagree and still love each other, unless your disagreement is rooted in my oppression and denial of my humanity and right to exist.”

– James Baldwin

“There is something that will survive and prevail, there is a tiny and brilliant light in the heart of man that will not go out no matter how dark the world becomes.”

– Leo Tolstoy

"Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to it. But I will be mild and benevolent towards every man and even to him, ready to show him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless indeed he only assumed it. For the interior [parts] ought to be such, and a man ought to be seen by the gods neither dissatisfied with anything nor complaining. For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now doing what is agreeable to thy own nature and art satisfied with that which at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, since thou art a human being placed at thy post to endure whatever is for the common advantage?"

– Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 11.13

1. ‘Bodyguard of Lies’ Review: Looking for Truth in Afghanistan

2. Army Special Forces in Strategic Competition

3. Who We Are, What We Do: Framing the Special Forces Identity Debate

4. What about a Department of Peace?

5. Evening Brief: Trump Eyes Reclaiming Bagram Base, Ukraine Launches Push in Donetsk, China Renews Threat to Take Taiwan

6. Britain could station troops in South China Sea under deal with Philippines

7. Inside Rubicon, The Elite Russian Drone Unit Wreaking Havoc On Ukraine's Troops

8. 4 special ops soldiers missing after Black Hawk helicopter crash

9. Trump nixed $400 million in Taiwan military aid, pushing future arms sales

10. Why Asia’s Gen Z Is Angry With Its Leaders

11. The Shifting Ideology Behind Political Violence

12. How Xi Is Using a TikTok Tradeoff to Court Trump

13. Trump and Xi Set to Finalize TikTok Deal

14. How the rapid pace of AI connects to China’s threats toward Taiwan

15. AFSOC exercise brings concept created for great-power conflict to the Caribbean

16. The PKK’s Disarmament and Turkey’s Fragile Search for Peace: Transitional or Transactional Justice?

17. Beyond Resilience: A Nuanced Framework for Conceptualizing Resistance Networks

18. Adaptation War by Mick Ryan

19. What is the US Military Preparing For? Force Design and the Pathology of Lessons Learned

20. The Limits of Rapprochement Between India and China

21. Fixing Europe's Firepower

22. What China Doesn’t Want – Beijing’s Core Aims Are Clear—and Limited

23. As Russian drones circle, NATO must learn Ukraine's lessons

24. Trump says US wants Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan back

25.  Renaming the ‘Defense Department’ Is a Good First Step

26. Does U.S. need Euro-Atlantic allies to help defend the Indo-Pacific?

27. US Foreign Policy Is Restructuring the World Order to China’s Benefit

28. Kimmel's suspension for Kirk comments sparks furor over free speech and censorship

29. Americans Must Remain Committed to Free Expression After the Assassination of Charlie Kirk

30. reflecting on passion - actions and consequences from a personal view By Dr. Cynhia Watson

1. ‘Bodyguard of Lies’ Review: Looking for Truth in Afghanistan

Bodyguard of Lies

Tuesday, Paramount+

‘Bodyguard of Lies’ Review: Looking for Truth in Afghanistan

Featuring interviews with a wide range of American officials, this documentary on Paramount+ explores the frustrations and outrages of the post-9/11 conflict.

https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/television/bodyguard-of-lies-review-looking-for-truth-in-afghanistan-d87d4f87

By John Anderson

Sept. 18, 2025 5:25 pm ET

Donald Rumsfeld speaking to reporters. Photo: CBS/Paramount+

“I don’t do quagmires,” a smiling Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says early in the scathing “Bodyguard of Lies,” responding at a press conference early in the Afghanistan war. Rumsfeld knew where the questioner was going. So does Edward M. Reeder, commander of U.S. Army Special Forces during much of the Afghan conflict. “I never did see the light at the end of the tunnel,” he tells the documentary’s director, Dan Krauss. The Vietnam echoes are everywhere. The vocabulary is mere embellishment.

No one escapes blame in this autopsy of our post-9/11 response to al Qaeda or the subsequent conflict with the Taliban—not the Bush, Obama, Trump, Biden or Trump administrations, the Trump travel ban still preventing refugees who may have helped us there from coming here. What continues to outrage the people Mr. Krauss consults—who include veterans of the CIA, military and media and, in the case of John Sopko, a special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction—involve the futility of the endeavor, and the corruption of the people who were supposed to be helping Americans. Or were Americans: Reconstruction didn’t do anything for Iraq or Afghanistan, says former State Department official Matthew Hoh, who served in both countries. But it was a bonanza for Northern Virginia and Maryland. Thomas Creal, a forensic accountant, still seems amazed by the audacity of the theft he uncovered, and which involved cooked-up construction projects and duffel bags of cash heading back to the U.S.

There are several themes repeated in various ways by various speakers in “Bodyguard of Lies,” a title taken from Winston Churchill (“In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies”). One message is that if you don’t know what winning looks like, you’re probably not going to win. Churchill was referring to D-Day. George W. Bush may have declared that our enemies in Afghanistan embodied “a new kind of evil,” but separating the benevolent from the satanic was not something U.S. soldiers were trained to do. The most unnerving sequence captured by Mr. Krauss doesn’t involve battle footage or scenes of bombs dropping, but former Marine Peter Lucier, recalling his internal debate about whether to kill, at long range, a civilian who climbed out of the wreckage of a U.S. attack. His words are sobering. His demeanor spells trauma.

But no one reflects happily on the conflict, certainly not former Gen. David McKiernan, who was fired as commander of the international forces in Afghanistan by then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates under Barack Obama, the official line being that the conflict was being conducted with “a new strategy, a new mission” and that “new military leadership” was needed. But the implication in “Bodyguard of Lies” is that Mr. McKiernan was simply too honest about the future of the action. As the interviewees contend, anyone who offered an honest appraisal of the Afghan war was cut loose.

Mr. Krauss, who made the excellent hybrid documentary “The Anthrax Attacks” in 2022, has created a kind of complement to the Ken Burns epic “The Vietnam War,” an account of fraud dependent on complicity. Mr. McKiernan, in 2009, said a satisfactory outcome would take 14 years. Others contend that the boondoggle aspect of our Kabul-based conflict was a compelling reason to continue, as was the political damage that would result from us ending a war before we could win. But again, per “Bodyguard of Lies,” no one ever seemed to know what that meant.

Bodyguard of Lies

Tuesday, Paramount+

Mr. Anderson is the Journal’s TV critic.

2. Army Special Forces in Strategic Competition

I believe @VAberet is Mark Haselton.

The Old and Bold

@vaberet

Retired operator, Independent, and wildly Constitutionalist!

A long important read for discussion:

Conclusion: Why SF is Indispensable

The future battlefield will punish carelessness and reward adaptability. LSCO remains possible, but the more immediate and insidious danger lies in irregular campaigns already underway—where adversaries contest U.S. influence daily without firing a shot. These are not peripheral distractions; they are the main arena of modern strategic competition.

In this environment, no armored brigade, carrier strike group, or precision weapon can deliver the irregular effects required to preserve legitimacy, reassure partners, and provide options short of escalation. Meeting those demands requires a force deliberately designed for irregular warfare—and that force is Special Forces. Properly resourced, the Regiment’s defining missions—unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, preparation of the environment, support to resistance, and special reconnaissance—map directly against the enduring operational requirements of modern conflict.

Afghanistan in 2001 underscored this truth: a handful of ODAs, working by, with, and through the Northern Alliance and backed by U.S. airpower, toppled the Taliban in weeks. That model—leveraging partners, shaping the environment, and linking irregular action to conventional power—remains the clearest proof of Special Forces’ enduring relevance in modern warfare.

The choice now lies with the Army. Without deliberate reinvestment, Special Forces risk becoming redundant—another trigger-pulling formation in an institution already bristling with kinetic power, too expensive to justify when resources are scarce. With reinvestment, the Regiment reclaims its rightful place as America’s asymmetric edge: the force that creates freedom of action in contested environments, disrupts adversary kill chains, sustains partners through protracted conflict, integrates across all instruments of power, and delivers the legitimacy on which coalitions and campaigns depend.

Special Forces’ ability to operationalize irregular warfare is not a substitute for LSCO—it is the capability that ensures LSCO occurs on favorable terms, or is deterred altogether. With the right investments, Special Forces prove their worth not as a relic of counterterrorism, but as the indispensable connective tissue between America’s overwhelming conventional strength and the irregular contests where strategic competition will ultimately be won or lost.

The Old and Bold

Army Special Forces in Strategic Competition

https://substack.com/home/post/p-172509070

Indispensable or Irrelevant?

The Old and Bold

Sep 18, 2025

BLUF: The Department of Defense’s fixation on large-scale combat operations (LSCO) threatens to sideline Special Forces, who are often viewed by outsiders and bespoke capabilities unsuited for wars in the future. Yet adversaries are already waging irregular warfare (IW) as their strategy of choice, an arena for which the Special Forces are uniquely organized and trained. Unless Special Forces can clearly articulate and demonstrate how they bridge IW and LSCO, the Army risks losing its most effective instrument for competition below the threshold of war and for shaping conditions before high-end conflict.

This article seeks to address that challenge. It explains the current strategic transition, highlights how adversaries integrate conventional modernization with irregular approaches, and shows why IW and LSCO are not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing. It then frames the conundrum facing Special Forces: a force born of irregular warfare now confronting an Army culture dominated by LSCO and modernization imperatives. By analyzing the future operational environment, identifying enduring requirements, and offering concrete imperatives for reinvestment, this paper makes the case that Special Forces are not an anachronism but an indispensable asymmetric edge.

It is important to note that this article does not simply restate Special Forces’ history or legacy, but it provides a forward-looking argument for their relevance in great-power competition. It seeks to shape the narrative within the Department of Defense and the Army, ensuring that Special Forces are understood not as a luxury capability, but as the connective tissue that binds America’s conventional deterrent to the irregular contests where strategic outcomes will be decided. From the Jedburghs of WWII to Afghanistan in 2001, history shows that irregular warfare repeatedly shapes outcomes in conflicts defined by mass and maneuver.

Introduction

The United States military is navigating one of the most difficult transitions in its modern history. After twenty years of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, the Department of Defense has shifted its focus toward strategic competition with peer and near-peer adversaries. That competition is framed largely through the lens of high-intensity, large-scale combat operations (LSCO): divisions massing under fire in Eastern Europe, fleets maneuvering in the Pacific, and long-range strike networks battering adversary formations. Training, doctrine, and procurement are now geared toward a return to wars of mass and maneuver.

Yet America’s adversaries are not betting solely on direct confrontation. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are modernizing their conventional forces to project parity with the United States—capabilities meant to signal strength, impose caution, and make Washington think twice about escalation. At the same time, they recognize the danger of a head-on clash. Their real strategy lies in the gray zone, where irregular warfare (IW) provides a safer, more effective path to achieving objectives while managing escalation. Proxy networks, disinformation campaigns, cyber intrusion, lawfare, economic coercion, and covert action are not peripheral activities; they are central tools for contesting the United States continuously while remaining below the threshold of open war. Conventional modernization provides visible deterrence, but irregular warfare delivers the day-to-day gains. For America’s rivals, the two are complementary, not in tension.

This dual approach creates a false dichotomy for the United States. If IW remains the dominant form of competition—where adversaries maneuver for advantage below the threshold of conflict—then current capital investments risk preparing brilliantly for LSCO while ceding the ground of everyday competition. IW and LSCO are not mutually exclusive; they are mutually reinforcing. Conventional capabilities deter by making open war unwinnable, while IW ensures adversaries cannot win without one. Together, they form a seamless deterrence ecosystem, contesting aggression from the shadows of gray-zone competition to the blunt force of large-scale combat. Treating them as rivals for resources or attention misunderstands the nature of modern conflict: deterrence is strongest when irregular and conventional capabilities are deliberately integrated.

The Special Forces Conundrum

This reality places the U.S. Army Special Forces Regiment at a crossroads. Born of irregular warfare and validated in conflicts from Southeast Asia to the Middle East, the Green Berets now face an institutional climate dominated by great-power competition and LSCO. Inside the Pentagon, the future appears to belong to multi-domain formations bristling with long-range fires, precision effects, contested logistics, and cyber capabilities. In such a vision, Special Forces risk being cast as anachronistic—a low-density capability shaped by counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, misaligned with wars of mass and maneuver. The challenge for the Regiment is to tell a new story: one that shows how its unique contributions reinforce, rather than compete with, the Army’s vision for LSCO.

The dilemma is stark. Every dollar invested in a Special Forces Group is a dollar not spent on artillery, armor, or air defense—capabilities the Army sees as central to deterring and defeating peer adversaries. History offers a cautionary precedent. During the Korean War, Ranger companies were hastily reconstituted to conduct raids, reconnaissance, and infiltration against a capable adversary. They performed effectively but were disbanded as the Army shifted back toward conventional formations, leaving a critical gap in unconventional expertise. Special Forces emerged soon afterward to fill that void, but the lesson endures: when the institution prioritizes mass at the expense of specialized capability, it risks discarding precisely the tools required to contest irregular approaches. The Regiment today faces a similar danger if its unique contributions are not clearly articulated and institutionally preserved.

Internally, the Regiment struggles with its identity. Some argue SF has drifted from its irregular roots, chasing raids and duplicating other SOF units instead of focusing on long-duration, partner-centric campaigns. Others contend SF is not in crisis but in evolution, with adaptability and mission diversity proving its resilience. Both views miss the deeper risk: if Special Forces are perceived merely as elite direct-action teams, their institutional future will remain precarious.

Timing compounds the challenge. After two decades of counterinsurgency, the Army has pivoted hard toward LSCO—preparing to survive massed fires in Europe and precision strikes in the Pacific, not cultivating resistance networks or working with indigenous partners. Against this backdrop, Special Forces risk being dismissed as a luxury—useful in niche contexts but secondary to conventional modernization. Without a clear and compelling case for relevance, the Regiment may find itself marginalized just as adversaries are doubling down on irregular approaches.

And that is the paradox. While Washington debates whether Special Forces belong in the future fight, America’s rivals have already decided that irregular warfare is decisive. Russia’s hybrid campaigns in Ukraine, China’s “three warfares,” Iran’s proxy militias, and North Korea’s illicit networks all reflect strategies built on irregular foundations. History underscores the danger of sidelining SF: when conventional campaigns bogged down, from Vietnam to Afghanistan, it was Special Forces’ cultural fluency, partner development, and ability to operate in denied areas that proved indispensable. The challenge now is not simply for SF to preserve its identity, but to make the case that irregular warfare is central to great-power competition.

The Future Operational Environment

The operational environment in which Special Forces must prove their relevance will be a blend of LSCO and IW. Future conflicts will unfold in contested theaters where great-power adversaries employ advanced surveillance, precision strike, and electronic warfare to deny U.S. freedom of maneuver, while simultaneously leveraging proxies, disinformation, and economic coercion to shape the battlespace below the threshold of open war. In such environments, SF must demonstrate value on two fronts: enabling LSCO by building resilient resistance networks, securing access in denied areas, and shaping conditions for conventional maneuver; and contesting IW by countering adversary influence, training and advising partners, and conducting operations that erode enemy confidence without escalating into full-scale war. The Regiment’s relevance will rest on its ability to bridge these domains, providing commanders with flexible options in an environment where the line between competition and conflict is increasingly blurred.

Six realities define that environment: (1) persistent multi-domain transparency, where concealment is fleeting; (2) democratization of precision strike, which pushes lethal fires down to the lowest echelons; (3) fragile command and control in contested spectrums; (4) compressed decision cycles, where time becomes decisive terrain; (5) industrial, informational, and political depth as critical sustainment factors; and (6) democratic constraints that adversaries exploit as battlespace. Together, these realities impose enduring operational requirements:

Preserve Freedom of Action in a Transparent Battlespace

Strategic: Protect decision-making, infrastructure, and communications from exploitation via cyber, satellites, and global networks.

Operational: Maneuver and mass under constant ISR and AI-driven analytics; deception and dispersion are essential.

Tactical: Survive when concealment is fleeting—dispersion, deception, and emissions control are prerequisites for survival.

Build and Maintain Resilient Kill Chains

Strategic: Safeguard global C4ISR while degrading adversary sensor-to-shooter links.

Operational: Integrate ISR, targeting, and fires across domains while fighting through jamming, spoofing, and cyber attack.

Tactical: Operate in degraded environments using decentralized mission command, improvisation, and rapid exploitation of vulnerabilities.

Sustain the Force in Protracted Conflict

Strategic: Mobilize industrial capacity, secure supply chains, and sustain political will for campaigns measured in years.

Operational: Defend contested lines of communication against interdiction, cyber disruption, and economic coercion.

Tactical: Improvise resupply, maintain combat effectiveness in austere conditions, and adapt logistics under pressure.

Integrate Effects Across DIME-FIL

Strategic: Orchestrate diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and legal tools as one campaign.

Operational: Synchronize operations with interagency and coalition partners across domains.

Tactical: Understand how even small-unit actions influence legitimacy and strategic outcomes.

Maintain Legitimacy and Cohesion

Strategic: Legitimacy sustains industrial power, political will, and alliances.

Operational: Preserve coalition cohesion against adversary disinformation and wedge campaigns.

Tactical: Conduct operations that respect populations, minimize civilian harm, and reinforce credibility through host-nation partners and rule of law.

Meeting the Operational Requirements: The Special Forces Contribution

Special Forces and the Enduring Operational Requirements

• Freedom of Action in a Transparent Battlespace
• Whether avoiding massed fires in LSCO or operating under constant surveillance in IW, freedom of action is decisive. Special Forces thrive in low-signature environments, leveraging cultural immersion, human networks, and deception to create maneuver space where conventional formations are exposed.
• Resilient Kill Chains
• In LSCO, victory depends on protecting U.S. decision cycles and disrupting those of the adversary. In IW, kill chains extend beyond missiles and radars to include proxies, logistics, and influence networks. Special Forces contribute in both contexts—sabotaging adversary nodes, enabling partner fires, conducting reconnaissance, and injecting friction into enemy systems that precision strikes alone cannot replicate.
• Sustainment in Protracted Conflict
• LSCO demands industrial depth and resilient supply lines; IW requires persistence and local endurance. Special Forces extend both by cultivating indigenous capacity, leveraging partner sustainment networks, and enabling operations in austere environments where conventional logistics cannot reach.
• Integration Across DIME-FIL
• Whether synchronizing combat power in LSCO or shaping influence in IW, unity of effort across all instruments of power is essential. Special Forces operate at the intersection of military, diplomatic, informational, and economic tools, serving as connective tissue between tactical actions in the field and strategic objectives at home.
• Legitimacy and Cohesion
• LSCO campaigns cannot be sustained without allied cohesion, just as IW campaigns cannot succeed without local legitimacy. Special Forces are uniquely positioned to deliver both. By working by, with, and through partners, they reinforce coalition credibility, strengthen host-nation sovereignty, and ensure that U.S. power is seen as enabling rather than imposing.

This pattern is not new. During World War II, the Jedburgh teams parachuted into occupied Europe to link up with resistance movements, disrupt German logistics, and prepare the environment for Allied advances. Their ability to operate clandestinely, build local trust, and synchronize guerrilla activity with conventional campaigns gave the Allies freedom of maneuver and reinforced the legitimacy of liberation efforts. The Jedburghs demonstrated precisely the kind of low-signature, partner-centric operations that remain indispensable today, proving that irregular warfare can decisively shape large-scale combat outcomes.

These contributions reinforce the notion that Special Forces are indispensable regardless of conflict type. They are uniquely designed to meet the enduring operational requirements of modern warfare—making campaigns not only effective in battle, but sustainable, legitimate, and strategically decisive in both competition and conflict. This is the story Special Forces must tell: that their relevance is not confined to counterterrorism or niche irregular operations, but rooted in the very requirements that define success in modern war, whether large-scale combat or gray-zone competition. If Special Forces fail to articulate this clearly, they risk being dismissed as an exquisite but expendable capability at a time when resources are flowing toward conventional modernization.

The burden, therefore, falls on the Regiment and its leaders to make the case for reinvestment in SF’s core missions. Language proficiency, cultural expertise, partner development, unconventional warfare, and preparation of the environment are not relics of past wars but essential capabilities for the future fight. By demonstrating how these missions directly support deterrence, shape the battlespace for LSCO, and contest adversaries in IW, the command can secure the commitment of the Army and DoD to sustain—and expand—the unique edge that Special Forces provide.

Reinvesting in Special Forces

If irregular warfare is the decisive arena of strategic competition, then Special Forces must be its primary practitioners. Yet two decades of emphasis on counterterrorism and direct action have dulled the Regiment’s unique edge: languages atrophied, networks neglected, doctrine ossified, and identity blurred. This drift has fueled the perception that SF is redundant—just another tactical strike force—rather than the Army’s specialists in irregular competition. To counter that perception, the Army must deliberately reinvest in Special Forces, not as a peripheral adjunct to LSCO but as the connective tissue that binds U.S. conventional strength to the irregular campaigns where adversaries seek advantage every day.

That reinvestment requires five institutional commitments:

• Rebuild the human edge. The Army must resource and prioritize deep language training, cultural immersion, and long-duration partner engagement as hard skills, not “nice-to-haves.” These attributes provide access and influence in contested environments that no conventional formation can achieve.
• Train for the transparent battlefield. The Army should invest in SF’s ability to master deception, dispersion, and emissions discipline. In a world where every movement is visible, the low-signature profile of Special Forces is a survival requirement, not a luxury.
• Integrate technology without eroding identity. Institutional modernization must ensure SF has access to cutting-edge ISR, cyber, and AI-enabled tools, but always in a way that amplifies human networks rather than replacing them. The Army’s investment should treat SF as the bridge between high technology and human access.
• Redefine doctrine for competition. The Army must elevate irregular warfare in its doctrine and planning, recognizing that influence, resilience, and environment preparation are strategic campaigns in their own right—not just “pre-conflict” shaping activities. This requires institutional backing, not just internal advocacy from SF.
• Build enduring partnerships. The Army should resource Special Forces to invest in relationships that persist across rotations and crises. Just as adversaries build long-term proxy networks, SF must have the continuity and institutional support to cultivate allies, resistance movements, and civil-military ties that endure.

Taken together, these investments represent the Army’s commitment to ensuring Special Forces are not treated as a relic of the counterterrorism era, but as its premier force for irregular warfare. They align the Regiment with the enduring operational requirements of modern conflict and secure its role as the indispensable bridge between LSCO and IW.

Conclusion: Why SF is Indispensable

The future battlefield will punish carelessness and reward adaptability. LSCO remains possible, but the more immediate and insidious danger lies in irregular campaigns already underway—where adversaries contest U.S. influence daily without firing a shot. These are not peripheral distractions; they are the main arena of modern strategic competition.

In this environment, no armored brigade, carrier strike group, or precision weapon can deliver the irregular effects required to preserve legitimacy, reassure partners, and provide options short of escalation. Meeting those demands requires a force deliberately designed for irregular warfare—and that force is Special Forces. Properly resourced, the Regiment’s defining missions—unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, preparation of the environment, support to resistance, and special reconnaissance—map directly against the enduring operational requirements of modern conflict.

Afghanistan in 2001 underscored this truth: a handful of ODAs, working by, with, and through the Northern Alliance and backed by U.S. airpower, toppled the Taliban in weeks. That model—leveraging partners, shaping the environment, and linking irregular action to conventional power—remains the clearest proof of Special Forces’ enduring relevance in modern warfare.

The choice now lies with the Army. Without deliberate reinvestment, Special Forces risk becoming redundant—another trigger-pulling formation in an institution already bristling with kinetic power, too expensive to justify when resources are scarce. With reinvestment, the Regiment reclaims its rightful place as America’s asymmetric edge: the force that creates freedom of action in contested environments, disrupts adversary kill chains, sustains partners through protracted conflict, integrates across all instruments of power, and delivers the legitimacy on which coalitions and campaigns depend.

Special Forces’ ability to operationalize irregular warfare is not a substitute for LSCO—it is the capability that ensures LSCO occurs on favorable terms, or is deterred altogether. With the right investments, Special Forces prove their worth not as a relic of counterterrorism, but as the indispensable connective tissue between America’s overwhelming conventional strength and the irregular contests where strategic competition will ultimately be won or lost.

3. Who We Are, What We Do: Framing the Special Forces Identity Debate

Fascinating read. It is a very interesting analysis of the history through the pages of Special Warfare Magazine/Journal. I think a valid critique is that SW did not capture all the relevant history. I would offer one key period that is overlooked and that is the period of BG Toney’s command of (then) USASFC and his single focus on preparing SF for UW in 2000-2001. I offer this: https://www.19fortyfive.com/2021/09/unconventional-warfare-9-11-and-the-future-of-u-s-military-power/. The legacy of BG Toney is not captured in Special Warfare Magazine/Journal but his legacy is that he prepared the only military force that was ready for the type of mission required after 9/11.

There is only a two letter answer to who we are and what we do: UW.

And if you want more there are the two SF trinities:

1) The missions:

• Irregular warfare
• Unconventional warfare
• Support to political warfare

2) The comparative advantage of SF (and ARSOF)

• Influence
• Governance
• Support to indigenous forces and populations

But holy sh*t, I did not know I was a "white beard."

Excerpts:

There are multiple generations within the broader Special Forces community, each bringing distinct perspectives to this debate. The “White Beards” are the earliest generation, who spent the bulk of their active careers before 9/11. The “Gray Beards” knew the pre-9/11 Army only as junior enlisted or company-grade officers. The “Black Beards” came of age during the GWOT, with those campaigns defining their formative years. The “Beardless” may have entered after 9/11, but Afghanistan, Iraq, and even Syria played only fleeting roles in their careers.

These groups map loosely onto American generational cohorts—Boomers, Generation X, Millennials, and Generation Z—yet their shared Special Forces experiences diverge sharply. White Beards are long retired, and Gray Beards fill the senior leadership roles. Both can recall a pre-9/11 Regiment and for these generations, the legacy of Special Forces is paramount. By contrast, the Black Beards and Beardless see little resonance in pre-9/11 references. For the Black Beards, there is only the GWOT and the post-GWOT. They knew the highs of extraordinary autonomy and purpose in the Middle East, and the lows of realizing the war could not be “won,” however great their personal effort. For the Beardless, the war was something they missed—sometimes regretfully, especially for those who joined expecting to fight in Afghanistan, and sometimes indifferently, as background rather than motivation.

News | Sept. 18, 2025

Who We Are, What We Do: Framing the Special Forces Identity Debate

https://www.swcs.mil/Special-Warfare-Journal/Article/4307425/who-we-are-what-we-do-framing-the-special-forces-identity-debate/

By Lt. Col. Gordon Richmond, U.S. Army Goodpaster Scholar at UC San Diego Special Warfare Journal

“Our nation will require answers without even knowing

the questions—but answer you will.”

Command Sgt. Maj. Dave Waldo, addressing a graduating Special Forces Regimental First Formation in 202401

Introduction

Over the past year, a public debate has emerged over the Special Forces Regiment’s identity: who Green Berets are, what missions define us, and how we remain relevant in great-power competition. The conversation is occurring beyond official channels in LinkedIn® posts, podcasts, and professional journals—an indicator that the community is wrestling with foundational questions.

In 2020, during his senior service college fellowship at Duke University, retired Colonel Ed Croot surveyed active-duty Green Berets to capture how they saw their missions and identity. He publicized his findings upon completion of the fellowship, appearing on multiple podcasts with the endorsement of 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne)—including a joint interview alongside then-commanding general Maj. Gen. John Brennan, who expressed support for his conclusions.02 Despite this initial publicity, and the obvious relevance to the Special Forces Regiment, the results were never addressed openly through Special Forces professional forums. Four years later, Croot’s research reemerged in his 2024 Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) monograph There Is an Identity Crisis in Special Forces, which contends that Special Forces drifted from its foundational mission, producing three competing sub-identities and a measurable decline in commitment to unconventional warfare.03  The JSOU publication prompted three written replies in less than a year’s time.

The identity conversation in Special Forces is less about choosing sides in the debate than about sustaining a professional discourse on who we are and what we contribute in service to the nation. That discourse should be inclusive, drawing on voices from across the Special Forces community, and vigorous, welcoming professional disagreement. This article offers three considerations to help frame it in ways that are both productive and relevant to today’s challenges.

An identity crisis: A literature review

Croot’s study used law, doctrine, and policy to generate 27 archetypes for Green Berets—a series of traits, skills and tasks, which he converted into survey questions. Croot found that respondents fit into three categories: a modern category, where respondents broadly agreed with all the archetypes; a direct action category, where Green Berets saw the greatest value in unilateral missions versus partnered ones; and a legacy category with an alignment toward pre-9/11 missions and lesser interest in contributing to either deterrence or competition. Croot found that 46% of the survey respondents fit the modern category, with 26% and 28% fitting the direct-action and legacy categories, respectively.04

Croot argued that this dissonance over mission implied a broken system of socialization, internal to the Regiment. As Special Forces recruits enter the Regiment, either from the civilian world or from the Army, they undergo a socialization process that conditions their expectations toward their role as Green Berets. Broad disagreement across experiences in recruiting, training, and operational phases blurs organizational purpose and produces what Croot calls an identity crisis.

Retired Sgt. Maj. David Shell argues that Croot broadly fails to substantiate the existence of an identity crisis. Shell argues that Croot assumes Special Forces culture to be monolithic when, in reality, each Special Forces group’s culturally-distinct area of operation and different set of missions allowed for significant variation across the Regiment.05 However, a deep reading of Croot’s paper shows that he does account for Special Forces Group membership, and that the ‘identity crisis’ that Croot was measuring was present within all five Regular Army Special Forces Groups, and not just between them.06 Finally, even if deep-seated disagreement about purpose exists, Shell argues that Croot does not provide support for his linkage between an identity crisis and ethical and moral failings by members of the Regiment.07

Retired Col. Greg Metzgar situates today’s argument in a much longer arc, showing that doctrinal ambiguity and role shifts have followed every major strategic transition since the Cold War.08  Dr. Siamak Naficy and Chief Warrant Officer 5 Maurice DuClos add yet another frame: that Special Forces’ problem is not “mission creep” but “meaning creep”—a slow erosion of the shared culture centered around a common definition of unconventional warfare that once unified the Regiment.09  All three broadly concur with Croot that Special Forces must re-center on unconventional warfare to unify its culture. For Metzgar this means clear doctrine for the sake of both high-performance standards and the ability to communicate the value of Special Forces to key decision makers. For Naficy and DuClos culture itself is the immediate objective, and creating a unified regimental culture with unconventional warfare at its center will ensure Special Forces’ continued viability.

Adding a sharper edge to this critique, retired Chief Warrant Officer 3 Sal Artiaga warns in a series of LinkedIn® posts that, due to the influence of Joint Special Operations Command alumni in leadership positions, Special Forces is drifting toward a different operational model that privileges high-tech solutions such as AI, robotics, cyber capabilities, and rapid direct action over the slower, relationship-based, and traditionally Special Forces work in the human domain. Unlike the doctrinal framing of Metzgar or the cultural lens of Naficy and Duclos, Artiaga’s intervention is rooted in first-hand concern that these priorities, if left unchecked, will erode the Regiment’s comparative advantage in influence and access.10

Though they may not agree on the particulars, Metzgar, Naficy, and Duclos are in broad agreement that Special Forces is confronting a cultural crisis. While Shell contests specifics of Croot’s design and findings, both he and Artiaga identify the prevalence of other SOF-alumnus leadership as a threat to what they see as core Special Forces culture. Taken together, these perspectives show that today’s dispute is not just about doctrine or culture in the abstract, but is about which skills, missions, and attributes define a Green Beret. While their conclusions differ, all agree that the stakes are high, and more introspection is required. What follows are three considerations—drawn from these authors’ work, past Special Forces debates, and my own review of Special Warfare Journal archives—for both Special Forces senior leaders and the broader community.

1. Historical precedent: The Special Forces Regiment has faced identity crises before

A 1960s recruiting poster highlights the 12-solider Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA). (Image provided by USASOC History office, Veritas 2022)

Whether today’s disagreements mark a true “crisis” or simply a period of doctrinal recalibration depends on perspective, but the debate is not unprecedented. Metzgar traces how Special Forces, born in the Cold War as a strategic unconventional warfare force, repeatedly adapted to shifting strategic conditions and demands from senior leaders. The post-Cold War drawdown of the 1990s triggered sustained internal debates over whether unconventional warfare remained relevant without a great-power adversary.

Those debates were neither brief nor peripheral. “Our force has lost sight of its purpose,” wrote the 3rd Special Forces Group commander in 1999. “Our teams today are more comfortable conducting a long-range surveillance mission (disguised as special reconnaissance) or a Ranger-platoon raid (disguised as direct action) than they are of assessing and developing a unconventional warfare operational area and creating havoc in a denied area.”11

While the post-Vietnam experience is often used as a parallel for the challenge that today’s military confronts, a better analogy might be the 1990s Special Forces community. The end of the Cold War stripped the U.S. military of its immediate purpose. Civil wars in Somalia, the Balkans, and Colombia demonstrated that conflict was not going anywhere, but clarity of purpose for Special Forces was fleeting. Issues of Special Warfare Journal up until 9/11 are replete with articles debating how deeply Special Forces should invest in unconventional warfare, and whether the mission was even relevant in an era without a great power adversary. The parallels to Croot’s allegations of ‘mission drift’ are hard to miss—and should remind us that today’s sense of uncertainty is not unique.

However, the 1990s fault lines over Special Forces’ core purpose were never truly resolved. Instead, 9/11 papered over any differences, handing the Regiment two regimes to topple and 20 years of counterinsurgency to fight. As those wars have finally receded, the unresolved questions of the 1990s have resurfaced again.

The implication: Identity debates seem to surface cyclically after major strategic shifts. Leaders should view them not as aberrations but as predictable inflection points, moments that deserve doctrinal clarity and conscious stewardship. While we can disagree with Croot’s conclusions, his survey data is extensive and we must recognize that there is considerable disagreement over Special Forces’ purpose, even if some of that disagreement coheres to each Special Forces Group’s cultural norms.

2. Encouraging internal debate and diverse voices

In the 1990s, Special Warfare Journal regularly published attributional articles and letters to the editor questioning the branch’s direction. This openness reflected either a command climate that welcomed dissent or the personal courage of contributors—or both. One of the key elements of the current debate described above is that it is occurring outside the purview of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and away from traditional branch channels. While platforms like LinkedIn® or JSOU Press might increase candor, they are unlikely to broaden participation within the Regiment. As Naficy and Duclos note, fragmentation of meaning accelerates when there is no shared forum for storytelling, mythmaking, and identity reinforcement.12 Without official channels for constructive debate, the conversation risks becoming narrow and disconnected from the Regiment’s multigenerational ranks.

Croot’s paper was not the first to raise concerns about the appropriateness of unconventional warfare as Special Forces’ principal mission or about how the Regiment interpreted that mission. During the latter stages of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), articles on these themes appeared in multiple non-official outlets.13 Yet Croot’s work was distinctive in moving beyond anecdote, providing systematic insight into how a broad cross-section of active members of the Regiment perceived its role. While Special Warfare Journal carried multiple articles debating definitions of unconventional warfare in the first quarter of the 21st century, it did not host challenges to the command’s vision in the way external outlets did. Even after Croot’s 2020 paper revealed what appeared to be deep internal disagreements, the branch journal remained silent, and senior leaders declined to invite debate. Those subsequent debates unfolded outside official venues and diminished the influence of USASOC leadership in shaping the conversation. Had they occurred in Special Warfare Journal, leaders could have signaled support for dialogue and nudged it to serve the Regiment’s broader interest.

The identity of the recent contributors to this debate is also important. Croot is notable in publicizing his original paper as a junior colonel in 2020, at significant professional risk. Other than Naficy, who is a civilian professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, the contributors to the recent debate are either long-retired (Metzgar), recently retired (Artiaga and Shell), or soon-to-retire (DuClos and Artiaga’s anonymous command sergeant major) Green Berets. This implies that authors with more to lose professionally are less likely to contribute to public discourse that questions either the status quo or the direction of the Regiment. The choice of publishing venues and the profile of the authors should be a concern to leadership. If only those insulated from career risk are contributing, we risk mistaking a partial picture for the whole.

The Special Warfare Journal archives suggest the journal’s heyday was in the 1990s, when each year issues carried active and retired voices openly challenging the Regiment’s direction. By the mid-2000s, such pieces had largely disappeared, replaced by safer, topical articles that informed but rarely questioned the broader status quo. This retreat into caution was laid bare in 2020: even as Croot’s survey findings sparked discussion, Special Warfare Journal carried no response, and soon afterward the branch journal stopped publishing. There was no correlation—Special Warfare Journal did not cease publishing to avoid Croot’s study. However, as a publication in decline, producing increasingly sparse issues on an irregular basis, inviting debate over Croot’s article might have revitalized the branch journal in 2020.

The implication: Senior leaders must actively cultivate forums, whether in Special Warfare Journal or elsewhere, where Special Forces members of all ranks and experiences can engage in sustained, professional dialogue about the Regiment’s future. The return of Special Warfare Journal to regularly producing content as part of the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Harding Project provides an opportunity to reframe debate as positively contributing to the fabric of our Regiment’s culture. Even if senior leaders themselves do not heed the content of the debate, they can clearly signal that debate is healthy, encouraged, and comes without professional consequence to the participants.

3. Recognizing distinct generations within Special Forces

Image depicts the Special Forces Patch from the different generations of the force. (Image provided by USASOC History office, Veritas Vol.3 No 3)

There are multiple generations within the broader Special Forces community, each bringing distinct perspectives to this debate. The “White Beards” are the earliest generation, who spent the bulk of their active careers before 9/11. The “Gray Beards” knew the pre-9/11 Army only as junior enlisted or company-grade officers. The “Black Beards” came of age during the GWOT, with those campaigns defining their formative years. The “Beardless” may have entered after 9/11, but Afghanistan, Iraq, and even Syria played only fleeting roles in their careers.

These groups map loosely onto American generational cohorts—Boomers, Generation X, Millennials, and Generation Z—yet their shared Special Forces experiences diverge sharply. White Beards are long retired, and Gray Beards fill the senior leadership roles. Both can recall a pre-9/11 Regiment and for these generations, the legacy of Special Forces is paramount. By contrast, the Black Beards and Beardless see little resonance in pre-9/11 references. For the Black Beards, there is only the GWOT and the post-GWOT. They knew the highs of extraordinary autonomy and purpose in the Middle East, and the lows of realizing the war could not be “won,” however great their personal effort. For the Beardless, the war was something they missed—sometimes regretfully, especially for those who joined expecting to fight in Afghanistan, and sometimes indifferently, as background rather than motivation.

Croot opens his paper with a survey response that underscores this divide: “At the heart of the Green Berets’ identity crisis… is a generation only knowing the GWOT, with the next generation recruited on the promise of door-kicking raids, dynamic entries, and kill/capture methodologies.” Yet his analysis never fully engages with the generational dynamics that quote makes plain. None of the solutions offered by Metzgar, DuClos, or Maficy are inherently objectionable, but any attempt to rebuild a monolithic Special Forces culture must speak across both unit and generational lines. The generational divide is not just about perspective but also about which missions and experiences are seen as defining what it means to be a Green Beret.

The implication: Bridging generational and subcultural divides requires more than revising doctrine. It demands deliberate efforts that expose members to the full spectrum of Special Forces’ missions. Furthermore, senior leaders must cultivate cross-generational trust. One way to help build this is to carve out space in institutional mediums like Special Warfare Journal, and to demonstrate that their voices are heard and their perspectives valued.

Conclusion

Debates over Special Forces' identity are not signs of decline, but they are signs of a profession wrestling with its future. Special Warfare Journal editions from less than 30 years ago demonstrate that puzzling over our purpose is nothing new—on the contrary, it is likely a sign of organizational health. These past debates remind us that identity crises and questions over modernization are cyclical. They also show us that open and accessible forums only strengthen the Regiment. Just as the 1990s branch was shaped by Green Berets representing Vietnam, post-Vietnam, and post-Cold War generations, tomorrow’s Special Forces regiment will be shaped by generations reconciling their experiences with the GWOT. Current debates over missions, culture, and technology are not separate threads of the same underlying question: What does it mean to be a Green Beret in the 21st century?

Future debate might carry forward some questions that the authors cited here opened: How might Special Forces strike a balance between adopting more complex technical capabilities without losing a focus on the human domain? How do differences in Special Forces Group culture influence the orientation toward, and execution of, Special Forces missions? What are the consequences—positive and negative—of other SOF-alumni in leadership across echelons?

Senior Special Forces leaders must cultivate the quality of our internal discourse, the breadth of participation, and our ability to bridge generational divides. However, leaders cannot carry this burden alone. The Regiment must speak–everyone from our junior-most enlisted and company-grade officers to those long retired. Silence cedes the narrative, and if we do not define ourselves, others will. Leaders should throw down the gauntlet, but the community’s response will decide the future. Our nation will continue to challenge us by demanding answers from Special Forces, even when the questions are unclear. Whether or not we rise to that challenge will define not just the Regiment’s relevance, but our very identity.

Author’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Richmond is a Regular Army Special Forces Officer who served in 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne). Currently assigned to the Army's Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program (ASP3), he is a graduate student in political science at UC San Diego.

References

01 U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Director). (2025, January 23). Iron sharpens Iron. [Video recording].

02 Granieri, R. (2020, August 4). The Turmoil of Identity Crisis: Special Forces Organizational Culture (No. 220) [Podcast]. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/sfcom-culture/

03 Croot, E. C. (2024). There is an Identity Crisis in Special Forces: Who are the Green Berets Supposed to Be? (JSOU Report 24-5). Joint Special Operations University.

04 Croot, E. C. (2024), 33-34.

05 Shell, D. (2025). Special Forces Does Not Have an Identity Crisis. SOF Has a Special Forces Identity Problem: A Response to Colonel Croot (JSOU Report 25-11). Joint Special Operations University.

06 Croot, E. C. (2024), 35, 38-39.

07 Shell, D. (2025).

08 Metzgar (2025)

09 Naficy, S. T., & DuClos, M. K. (2025). Mission or Meaning? Rethinking the Identity Crisis in U.S. Army Special Forces (JSOU Report 25-17).

10 Artiaga, S. (2025, August 9). The Drift from the Human Domain: How JSOC Thinking is Reshaping USASOC | LinkedIn. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/drift-from-human-domain-how-jsoc-thinking-reshaping-usasoc-artiaga-mbmyc/?trackingId=As0Bk6OqynhJ9%2BLZh5vkZw%3D%3D and an anonymous SF CSM, posting via Artiaga, S. (2025, July 26). A Response from an SF CSM in the Regiment | LinkedIn. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/response-from-sf-csm-regiment-sal-artiaga-byrfc/.

11 Jones, G. M., & Tone, C. (1999). Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces. Special Warfare, Summer 1999, 4–15.

12 Naficy & DuClos (2025).

13 See Livermore, D. (2017, October 6). It’s time for special operations to dump “unconventional warfare.” War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/its-time-for-special-operations-to-dump-unconventional-warfare/ and Walton, D. & Long, J. (2019, February 8). Green Berets: Rebuilding the guerrilla leader identity. Small Wars Journal. https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/green-berets-rebuilding-guerrilla-leader-identity for examples.

4. What about a Department of Peace?

Long read.

Some excellent history here from Matt Armstrong. 

What about a Department of Peace?

If we have a department to wage war, what about a department to wage peace?

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/what-about-a-department-of-peace?utm

Matt Armstrong

Sep 18, 2025

Without commenting on the lack of wisdom, implications, or performative nature of the rebranding (not renaming) of the Department of Defense as the “Department of War,” this effort to be retro could lead someone to wonder, “If we have a Department of War, should we have a Department of Peace?” Funny you should ask.

Back on June 27, 1945, a Wednesday, by the way, Senator Alexander Wiley (R-WI) spoke in the Senate about the need to establish a Department of Peace. This cabinet-level department, the first “since 1913, when the Departments of Commerce and Labor were created,” would sit alongside the Departments of War and the Navy. The timing was not random. The day before, in San Francisco, the United Nations Charter was signed by fifty countries to establish the UN.

On that momentous day (the signing of the Charter, not Wiley’s speech), syndicated columnist David Lawrence wrote that, “Billions are spent for war and war preparations, but virtually nothing is spent to prevent war except when a crisis arises.” Sure, there was the State Department, but it was “in charge of our relations with foreign governments” and supported “a multitude of business chores to do for American business and the individual with interests abroad.” The result, argued Lawrence, was that “there is no department of the Government which gives it undivided attention to the subject of peace.”1

Lawrence recalled Wiley’s earlier proposal, calling it a “good idea,” writing that Wiley “made a speech about it in the Senate a year ago” (actually, his speech was two years prior, in 1943).

He suggested that a department of peace be established, to concentrate and specialize on the maintenance of peace. Nothing came of it because at the time America was engrossed in war. Now the United Nations has setup an organization and the time has come for America to take the lead in establishing a special department of Government to carry on the all-important work of our participation in such a league.

Lawrence similarly wanted his creation to be headed by a cabinet-level appointment, which he said should be Edward Stettinius, the Secretary of State until the day after the signing of the Charter.2 And by creation, I mean a Frankenstein’s monster that would never get off the ground, to mix metaphors. Instead of a department, it would be a commission, the “American Commission to Preserve Peace,” consisting of “not merely representatives of the State Department, but also of the Treasury and Commerce Departments, as well as both Houses of Congress.” Lest you think there might be duplication and a new bureaucracy, the commission would “have a special staff in the interest of efficiency.” Fear not the State Department’s role, as all communications “should clear through the State Department.” Moving on.

Though Wiley reacted quickly to Lawrence’s piece, it doesn’t seem the Senator was given a heads-up. Two days later, on Friday, Rep. Jennings Randolph (D-WV) introduced a bill to create the Department of Peace, with Wiley introducing his bill the following Monday.3

Wiley’s and Randolph’s bills were generally aligned on the result but differed in the details. Wiley’s proposal lacked detail while leaning heavily into the UN. The new department “would help to breathe the spirit of life into the United Nations Charter. Of itself, that Charter has no vitality.” Wiley’s Secretary of Peace would be the ex officio US representative on the UN Security Council, and “shall have the duty (a) of concentrating and specializing on the maintenance of world peace; (b) of promoting better understanding of the other peoples of the world and better understanding of the fundamental principles of international relations… and (c) of using the full weight of moral force in encouraging international freedom of the press, in removing fristions and misunderstandings which make for war.”

Randolph’s bill clearly had more thought behind it. His Secretary “shall have the duty—”

(a) Of formulating and publicizing educational programs for promoting better understanding of the other peoples of the world and better understanding of the fundamental principles of international relations and of cooperation among nations;

(b) Of encouraging the interchange of ideas and persons between colleges, churches, civic organizations, and other institutions, organizations, and groups in the United States, on the one hand, and other similar institutions, organizations, and groups in other countries, on the other hand; and

(c) Of assisting educational institutions and religious organizations in the United States in formulating educational programs dealing with international relations, international cooperation, and the problems of peace.

Wiley played catch-up with “A Department of Peace for the American Government,” a nearly three-page article published in the September 1945 edition of Free World. This wartime magazine, published in multiple languages and distributed to quite a number of countries, was pro-United Nations and pro-international cooperation, with many influential writers appearing in its pages. For example, picking a random issue from my archive — September 1944 — includes over twenty articles, including by Orson Welles (“American Leadership”), Norman Angell (“Robot Bombs and Robot Minds”), Henry Morganthau (“A Money Plan for World Peace and Plenty”) John F. Wharton, founding partner of a large law firm recently in the news4 (“The U.S.A. Needs a Realistic Foreign Policy”), Ray Josephs (“Argentina's New World Nazis”),5 and a collection of essays under the banner “Symposium on Freedom of Information” with contributions from Under Secretary of State Sumner Wells (“Pillar of Human Rights”), Christopher Chancellor, head of Reuters (“Truth in News”), and Kent Cooper, head of the Associated Press (“Free News—First Step in Peace”). Plus three book reviews. If you get excited reading a foreign policy magazine today, imagine reading this. The publisher leaned toward the Soviet Union and, soon after the war, was not permitted back into the US due to his perceived ties to Moscow.

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on the Department of Peace in November 1945. In his opening remarks, Randolph cast not-so-subtle shade on three executive branch agencies:

I believe that billions of dollars would have been saved, disastrous duplication eliminated, and that greater efficiency would have resulted if we had consolidated prior to the present war the War and Navy Departments into a Department of Defense. That, however, is not the subject matter for our immediate consideration, but I inject it here as an indication that in the past we have had two departments concentrating their attention on building devices and systems which would operate during the tragedies of war. Certainly, if we do away with one such department, we would have given a very nice niche for the Department of Peace. In this unit, the money expended certainly would be infinitesimal compared with the expenditures which have been made for war.

The third, and unnamed, agency was, of course, the State Department.

During that hearing, Members of the committee asked if Randolph was aware of the past and current efforts by the State Department to expand its role in the areas the Congressman was proposing for a Department of Peace.

I come back, however, to the earlier assumption that we can concentrate within the framework of a Department of Peace the special means of doing this task of maintaining closer understanding and relationship between our country and the peoples of the earth. We need more editorials written, and more public speeches given on this subject.

The Congressman then submitted for the record a recent column by another syndicated columnist, Drew Pearson, suggesting a Department of Peace.

Why not, for instance, really begin working at the job of getting along with other nations and people? Why not, for instance, establish a Department of Peace… If, for instance, we spent a small fraction of the amount we spent for war on good neighborliness, it couldn’t hurt, and it might help… Take, for example, what we did in Latin America. There, Nelson Rockefeller [the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs6] did a pretty good job—until he made the mistake of patting Argentina on the back7… So the problem is partly getting the Russians to like us and trust us, and to understand that we’re not such bad people… We have a great country and hospitable people live in it, but we are woefully lacking in selling ourselves to the world… A Department of Peace could arrange to get several thousand Russian students over here on a scholarship exchange basis, sell them on the USA. The same could be done with professors. We need to study the Russian language and they the English. In other words, there is no use doing a lot of wishful thinking about peace unless we out and practice it.

Notwithstanding Pearson’s false hopes and flawed assumptions concerning Russia, his fundamental argument aligned with Randolph’s and Wiley’s prescription.

The idea that a free flow of information, ideas, and experiences between people would foster peaceful relationships was anchored to the notion that such flows formed a bulwark against disinformation and the manipulation of information.

There was, at the time, a bill before the Foreign Affairs Committee to authorize the State Department to do precisely—and a lot more—what Randolph’s and Wiley’s bill, and also supporting the arguments of Lawrence and Pearson, recommended. Well, except for the bit about the UN Security Council. Randolph admitted that he was “not cognizant with the provisions of the bill” but was aware there was such a pending measure to “broaden, perhaps, the scope of the Department of State.”

The Foreign Affairs Committee had held extensive hearings on what was then known as the Bloom bill in October (on the 16th, the 17th, the 18th, the 19th, the 23rd, and on the 24th, followed by an executive session of the committee devoted to the bill on the 25th; imagine a non-military national security bill having this much discussion today!). That bill, introduced initially by Rep. Karl E. Mundt (R-SD) in January, was far broader than exchanges and information efforts.8 (A week before these hearings, Mundt and other members of the committee returned from an extensive two-month “European Study Trip” to study the political and economic conditions across Europe and the Mediterranean Area with representatives from the State and War Departments. Mundt’s group focused on seven countries in Eastern Europe, seven in the Balkans, and ten countries or territories in the Near East. Keep in mind that Congressional staff, either for committees or personal offices, did not resemble anything like the present. Most staff were clerical. Not until the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was there an established permanent, professional committee staff that we recognize today.)

In July, the Bloom bill was expanded, at the State Department’s request, to further the government’s ability to detail employees to foreign governments for assistance in various work areas, authorizing existing and new technical, educational, and scientific exchanges. Also at the department’s request, it increased funding and the latitude of State Department staff abroad to spend on what was broadly termed as “entertainment” expenses.

In September, President Truman sent the international information programs of the Office of War Information and the Office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs to the State Department, resulting in a tiny update to the October edition of the Bloom bill. (Truman had instructed the State Department to come up with a plan for the information programs by the end of the year—four months, to the day, after his executive order, for those keeping track—so there was little need to rush a fleshed-out international information provision into the bill for the October hearings.)9

Since the Bloom bill contained nearly everything in the Department of Peace proposals, except, again, the UN Security Council bit, and because the Secretary of State was directly tied to these programs, obviating a need for an additional cabinet officer, the Department of Peace fell by the wayside as unnecessary.10

But the idea wasn’t dead.

Randolph lost his seat when the Republicans swept the House and Senate in the 1946 mid-term election. On January 6, 1947, three days into the new 80th Congress, Melvin Snyder (R-WV), who beat Randolph, introduced a bill for a Department of Peace. His bill went to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments (since renamed the Committee on Government Operations), of which Snyder was a member. Testifying at June 1947 hearing on Snyder’s bill were mostly West Virginians, including Raymond M. David, president of a coal company interested in international politics;11 a student from Webster Springs (then a WV town with about 1,200, today it is under 800); another student from a larger WV town; a professor of political science from the University of West Virginia; and, a pastor from Morgantown, WV (which is where Davis’s company was based, the University of West Virginia is located. By the way, Snyder graduated from the UWV law school). The exception was Paul Douglass, president of American University (though perhaps he had a connection to WV that I missed).

By the time the hearing took place, the Bloom had been reintroduced and was now known (or known again to be pedantic) as the Mundt bill. In March, nine days after Truman stood before a special joint session of Congress to ask for the necessary authorizations and appropriations for aiding Greece and Turkey, Dean Acheson, as Acting Secretary, sent to the House a “Proposed International Interchange and Information Act,” which was “practically the same” as the Bloom bill, with “no substantial changes.” In May, that bill was introduced in the Foreign Affairs Committee by Mundt, with a Senate cosponsor named Smith. Various elements of the bill, or, rather, a few bits of the vast array of programs and activities and support to other governments it enabled, were in the papers almost daily. Discussions over the radio program, aka Voice of America, took up most of the air, but there were concerns over the exchange programs, such as John Rankin’s (D-MS) comment that Russian professors would result in “poisoning the minds of the students of this nation,” which Clare Hoffman (R-MI) agreed with. Lest you think all was fine with West Virginia, Hubert Ellis (R-WV) called the Mundt bill (actually, he called it the “Voice of America bill”) an “immigration bill” since it granted, he argued, the Secretary of State the authority “to permit an endless number of persons. They can come into this country outside of quotas and the immigration laws of this country.”12

Recognizing the Mundt bill, Snyder tried to make his bill special enough to be still worth considering. He added trade to the Secretary of Peace’s portfolio a clause that likely just increased resistance to the effort by catching the attention of the Department’s Commerce and the Treasury: “To propose to the President such plans in the general field of economics as will tend to break down barriers to trade and remove tensions between the United States and other nations.”

Six days after the hearing, the House passed the Mundt bill, 272-97. And yet, the Department of Peace idea still didn’t die.

In 1948, John Foster Dulles, later President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, called for a new executive department “dedicated to the task of non-military defense, just as the Secretary of Defense heads military defense.” (He later walked that back in his 1950 book, War or Peace: “Most of the non-Communist countries operate on the theory that they are either at peace or at war. The United States, for example, has governmental departments manned for peace. The State Department is one… Soviet Communism has invented an intermediate stage, a twilight zone between war and peace. The descriptive phrase ‘not war, not peace’ is said to have been first uttered by Trotsky in connection with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.”) In 1953, however, Dulles embraced the idea of ejecting most of the programs that would have fallen under the Department of Peace because, he argued then and repeated later in 1957 when the separation was questioned, they distracted the Secretary of State from his core diplomatic duties. This led to the US Information Agency, despite each recommendation requiring the agency to have a seat in the cabinet or a defined and not merely by-invitation seat on the National Security Council, would never enjoy such an official position.

Though the Department of Peace was a sideshow by Members of Congress not close to or generally familiar with the foreign policy apparatus, they recognized a problem: that the State Department had little to no interest outside of traditional diplomacy. The lack of interest was briefly suspended from 1945 to around 1949, when the department’s antibodies began kicking in to reject the transplant, leading now-Secretary of State Dean Acheson to create the International Information Administration within the department in 1951, which Dulles blew up.

And, you guessed it, the idea still wasn’t dead. Why would it be? A dozen years later, the idea that the State Department still lacked the organizational and leadership ability to meet the needs of a great twentieth-century power had not subsided. In 1960, Averell Harriman suggested there should be a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, a lesser secretary (not an under secretary) to the Secretary of State.

In 1961, Rep. Harley Orlin Staggers introduced a bill to establish a Department of Peace with a Secretary of Peace. Staggers was a Democrat from—wait for it—West Virginia. He took Snyder’s seat.13 Instead of my commenting on the bill, here is the reaction from USIA’s policy office sent to the agency’s leadership:

The bill leaves me cold.

It is so nebulous in its intent that on the one hand, one wonders what functions it could find to perform, and on the other, whether or not in search of purpose, it might well flow over into and duplicate the legitimate functions of many other agencies.

From the start, and with each new iteration, the Department of Peace was gut reaction to fill a gap its sponsors felt existed. They were too far removed from the relevant discussions to know. These proposals did not inquire into why there the real or perceived gap existed, nor did they look into how the capability-gap, as perceived, could be closed. They just leapt to creating a new bureaucracy.

To be fair, the underlying idea made sense, particularly in 1945 with a new future with the United Nations in the wings. That’s the reason the State Department and Congress embraced Mundt’s bill weeks after he introduced in January 1945, and the House passed it later on. The bill was resurrected in 1947 because the requirements still made sense and the needs still needed the basic authorizations to continue.

The link to the UN also made sense. The Mundt bill in 1947, by the way, included the provision that “In carrying out the objectives of this Act, information and the United Nations, and about the participation of the United States as a member thereof, shall be constantly emphasized.”

In an oblique way, if you squint really hard, USIA was sort of a Department of Peace. But it really wasn’t. The core of the Department of Peace proposal was exchanges, not the information programs, and exchanges stayed within the State Department, though USIA largely managed them in the field. Further, USIA never had a seat at the proverbial table even remotely near to that envisioned for the Secretary of Peace. But if you accept USIA was sort of a DoP, then the 1961 resurrection of the idea—those crazy West Virginians—can be problematic.

I don’t know why West Virginia was the apparent hot spot for the Department of Peace. Perhaps someone at the University of West Virginia was behind it?

I would be remiss if I didn’t mention an iteration of the Department of Peace concept that didn’t stem from either Wiley’s or Randolph’s vision. In 1952, as the US international information programs were placed under greater scrutiny due to the cold war, an independent model of a Department of Peace surfaced. In this instance, it was more clearly a Department of Not-War operating in the gray area between war and peace. The proposal wasn’t really a cabinet department but an enhanced and broadened Psychological Strategy Board, then largely a coordinating body, that would make plans and recommendations, test for the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of different courses of action, and present them to the cabinet and the White House. It was loosely envisioned to be a kind of Joint Chiefs, as they were organized and operated then, but focused on defending against (primarily) and waging political warfare (secondarily), in other words, warfare below the threshold of armed conflict.

Lastly, if you’re still here, if thought of the US Institute of Peace as you read this, there’s a reason. In the 1980s, now Senator Randolph help pass the legislation that established USIP, making for a connection between Randolph’s Department of Peace proposal in 1945 to the US Institute of Peace established nearly four decades later.

1

Lawrence also published United States News, similar to today’s Politico in its focus on DC politics. In 1946, he launched a weekly magazine called World Report. In 1948, he merged the two to form US News & World Report.

2

Stettinius was Secretary for about 7 months after serving as Under Secretary of State for just over a year. He ran the Lend-Lease program for over two years. Before the war, he had been the chairman of US Steel, then the largest corporation in the country. In 1946, Truman appointed him to be the US’s first Ambassador to the UN, getting him to the UN as Wiley, Lawrence, and Jennings Randolph wanted.

3

Interestingly, the Wikipedia entry for Randolph incorrectly says he introduced the Department of Peace bill in 1946. The entry also doesn’t mention Wiley.

4

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison.

5

By the way, check out Josephs’s 1944 book, Argentine Diary (available in its entirety at the Internet Archive). The foreword by Allan Chase starts: “We are winning the war in Europe, holding our own in Asia, and losing the peace in Latin America. Under our uplifted Anglo-Saxon noses, more than one Latin-American nation has already taken the fascist plunge, and others are getting set to follow.”

6

Fun fact(s): Rockefeller came up with the idea of the Office of Inter-American Affairs with several friends at the Greenwich Village townhouse of Beardsley Ruml in 1938. “The Group,” as they creatively called their collective, met several times. Among its members was Robert Hutchins, the president of the Rockefeller-financed University of Chicago, and William Benton, a vice president at the University of Chicago. At the time of this hearing on the Department of Peace, Benton was the Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Relations, which he renamed a few months later to “for Public Affairs” partly (if not primarily) because “culture” was a lightning rod in Congressional discussions.

7

See Josephs’s book above.

8

After Archibald MacLeish, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Public and Cultural Relations, expressed interest in the bill, Bloom took over Mundt’s bill, which sought to authorize Pan-American exchanges of student-teachers, with his own in July. Mundt had introduced a similar bill in 1943, but not many people were keen on sailing between ports at the time, and with air travel prioritizing war goods and personnel, the State Department halted exchanges.

9

The programs were sent to the Assistant Secretary for Public and Cultural Relations. This position, created in December 1944, was charged with leading the department’s cultural affairs (an overarching label that included education, since it was acknowledged that education was a reflection of a nation’s culture), exchanges (of kinds, not just education), and information policies and activities at home and abroad (no firewall there). This office also led relevant discussions within the department and with other agencies and departments in the government. For those paying attention, this position had a greater role over a greater portfolio than the USIA Director and any subsequent equivalent ever enjoyed.

10

Not everyone felt that way. Four days after the hearing on the Department of Peace, Rep. Louis Ludlow (D-IN) introduced a bill “To create a Department of Peace and Good Will.”

11

His 1946 book, The World Begins to Live, “designed and written for high school youth,” examined the League of Nations (he declared that it failed because of the nations), and looked at “Planning for Peace.” Helpfully included was his draft for a constitution for the United Nations.

12

Mundt pointed out that with regard to the exchange programs, the bill “would require the deportation of any visitor who engaged in political activities or activities inconsistent with this country’s security.”

13

Riley Moore, a Republican, now has the seat. If anyone introduces a similar bill, it should be him.

Recommend Arming for the War We're In to your readers

Discussing the past and present of political warfare and public diplomacy

5. Evening Brief: Trump Eyes Reclaiming Bagram Base, Ukraine Launches Push in Donetsk, China Renews Threat to Take Taiwan

Evening Brief: Trump Eyes Reclaiming Bagram Base, Ukraine Launches Push in Donetsk, China Renews Threat to Take Taiwan

sofrep.com · Guy D. McCardle · September 18, 2025

Top headlines for Thursday evening, September 18, 2025.

Trump Says He Seeks to Reclaim Bagram Air Base to Counter China

President Donald Trump said he is working to reestablish a US military presence at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, four years after the US withdrawal left it in Taliban control.

Speaking at a press conference with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Trump tied the move to countering China, citing the base’s proximity to Chinese nuclear facilities. He claimed the Taliban may agree to the return because they need US support, though the White House and Pentagon have not confirmed any plans.

Trump criticized President Joe Biden’s handling of the 2021 withdrawal, calling it a disaster that emboldened Russia to invade Ukraine.

JUST IN: President Trump on Bagram Air Base:

“We’re trying to get it back, by the way, okay. That could be a little breaking news. We’re trying to get it back, because they need things from us.”

“We want that base back.”

“It’s an hour away from where China makes its nuclear… pic.twitter.com/jrDho9X7Ns

— Fox News (@FoxNews) September 18, 2025

The US and Taliban have no formal diplomatic ties but have held talks on hostage releases and prisoner exchanges.

Trump Says US Would Help Secure Peace After Russia-Ukraine War Ends

President Donald Trump said the United States would help secure peace once Russia’s war in Ukraine is settled, acknowledging the conflict has been harder to resolve than he expected.

In a press conference, Trump sounded very disappointed in Russian President Vladimir Putin, saying “He’s really let me down,” and noted his earlier belief that the war would be easier to end due to their past relationship.

He said lowering Russia’s oil revenue by stopping European purchases could push Moscow toward a settlement.

“He’s really let me down”

US President Donald Trump says Vladimir Putin has disappointed him, as Russia’s war in Ukraine continues https://t.co/3AmbWsakmO pic.twitter.com/l4wIItk90P

— Bloomberg (@business) September 18, 2025

Trump previously hosted Putin at a peace summit in Alaska but failed to secure concessions.

​....

China Repeats Threat to Take Taiwan at Beijing Security Forum

Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun reiterated that China will take control of self-ruled Taiwan, calling its “restoration” an essential part of the post-war international order, during the Beijing Xiangshan Forum.

He warned China would block any attempts at Taiwanese independence and resist “external military interference,” while indirectly criticizing US influence.

Beijing claims Taiwan as its territory and has increased military activity around the island, while Taiwan’s government rejects China’s claims and asserts its sovereignty.

The 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum opened at the Beijing International Conference Center on the morning of September 18. “Historical and legal facts that Taiwan is part of China are beyond doubt,” Dong Jun, China’s minister of National Defense, attended and spoke at the opening… pic.twitter.com/fpOL6sei71

— Global Times (@globaltimesnews) September 18, 2025

Dong also said China aims to uphold the current UN-centered global system and promote stability, not create a new international order.

Sources: News Agencies

sofrep.com · Guy D. McCardle · September 18, 2025

6. Britain could station troops in South China Sea under deal with Philippines

​The silk web of friends, partners, and allies.

Britain could station troops in South China Sea under deal with Philippines

Yahoo

b'

1809 the South China Sea nine dash line

'

British troops could be deployed to the South China Sea under a deal with the Philippines.

The announcement from Manila comes amid China’s increasing aggression in the South China Sea, where it claims virtually every feature as its own despite staunch opposition from a number of countries, including the Philippines.

Gilberto Teodoro Jr, the Philippines defence secretary, said: “That is the clearest expression that a country might have to support our claim in the West Philippine Sea” – referring to the South China Sea by the name preferred in Manila.

Lord Coaker, a British defence minister, presented a letter from John Healey, the Defence Secretary, conveying interest in negotiating this agreement, known as a Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA), to Mr Teodoro.

Territorial disputes over islands in the South China Sea have seen Chinese Coast Guard ships clash with Filipino vessels - HANDOUT/Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)/AFP via Getty Images

A SOVFA is a type of defence treaty that provides a legal framework for the Philippines to host foreign troops, whether that’s for joint military drills or other types of activity.

While discussion of the agreement has been focused on deterrence in the South China Sea, the deal could also place the UK on Beijing’s doorstep in the event of a war over Taiwan.

China claims Taiwan as its own, which the democratically elected government in Taipei strongly rejects, and has not ruled out the use of force in bringing the country under its control.

If China were to stage an attack, the Philippines, which has islands located fewer than 200 kilometres south of Taiwan, would almost certainly be pulled into the conflict.

Filipino troops risk being drawn into a conflict with China over territorial disputes in the South China Sea and Beijing’s claim on Taiwan - Ezra Acayan/Getty Images

For this reason, the Philippines and the US have focused on these islands, the closest of which are called the Batanes chain, in their joint military drills.

More in World

During recent drills held in May, the US Marine Corps deployed the NMESIS missile system, known as a “ship-killer,” to Batanes, as a major show of force.

While the US and the Philippines have a decades-old defence treaty, the SOVFA could signal that the UK is taking a step towards a similar partnership.

Britain would be only the second country in Europe to pursue this agreement, after France, which initiated talks around a similar deal earlier this year.

A view from HMS Queen Elizabeth on patrol in the Philippines Sea in 2021. A deal with Manila could bolster Britain’s presence in the region - LPhot Unaisi Luke

The agreement would be similar to those already in effect between the Philippines and the US, as well as Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

In 2024, Britain and the Philippines signed a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation over the next five years as an effort to increase bilateral cooperation in the defence sector, including conducting joint maritime exercises.

The UK has pivoted towards the Indo-Pacific in recent years as the threat from China has increased.

Earlier this year, it kicked off Operation Highmast, an eight-month deployment led by the UK’s carrier strike group, the HMS Prince of Wales, through the region, joining allies and partners along the way.

Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 1 month with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more.

Yahoo

7. Inside Rubicon, The Elite Russian Drone Unit Wreaking Havoc On Ukraine's Troops

​It is good to see Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty still reporting news.

Inside Rubicon, The Elite Russian Drone Unit Wreaking Havoc On Ukraine's Troops

September 17, 2025 12:43 CET

• By Mark Krutov,
• Sergei Dobrynin and
• Yauhen Lehalau

rferl.org · Mark Krutov · September 17, 2025

Russia

Drones have transformed how the Ukraine war is being fought. Russia has set up an elite drone unit called Rubicon, which is now causing major problems for Ukrainian forces.

Share

Inside Rubicon, The Elite Russian Drone Unit Wreaking Havoc On Ukraine's Troops

share

Months after their surprise invasion of Kursk in August 2024, Ukrainian forces were struggling to hold their lines in the Russian border region, facing intensifying pressure from a combination of Russian regular units and North Korean troops.

Then, a newly formed, little-known elite Russian drone unit turned up the pressure in a major way.

Part of a secretive, larger organization called Rubicon, the unit worked methodically, hammering the lines that supplied Ukrainian positions in the village of Sudzha, and making their holdout untenable.

Finally, in March, Ukraine pulled out of Kursk.

Ukrainian soldiers fly a drone near the front line in the southern Zaporizhzhya region. (file photo)

Nearly 44 months into Russia’s all-out invasion, Ukraine has relied on ingenuity and speed to devise new weapons and tactics to counter Russia’s bigger military. Moscow has responded in kind, slowly changing its tactics and ramping up its own technology.

Rubicon is causing major problems across the 1,100-kilometer front line, and Ukraine is struggling to find ways to counter it. New findings from RFE/RL’s Russian Service now shed more light on the unit and how it could be structured.

“Russia had several strong strike [drone] units in Kursk, but Rubicon was the main one there. Because of this, Ukraine was unable to supply its troops normally,” said Rob Lee, a former US Marine officer who is now a military analyst with the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

SEE ALSO:

Kursk Ambush: Did Russia Pull Off Another Pipeline Sneak Attack On Ukrainian Troops?

"They were a key reason why Russia was able to take back essentially all of Kursk Oblast in February and March,” he told RFE/RL’s Russian Service.

Rubicon has become “Russia's best technological unit,” said Maria Berlinska, head of the Ukrainian Aerial Reconnaissance Support Center, a nongovernment group that assists the military.

“Rubicon has brilliant management, works systematically, selects the best personnel, provides training, and supplies all necessary resources. They pour money into it,” Berlinska said in a Facebook post on August 21. “Everyone who knows how Rubicon works agrees on one thing: It is very effective. It is a system, while most of [Ukraine’s] front lines are still in a state of chaos.”

Rubicon, a secretive elite drone unit, was set up shortly after Andrei Belousov became Russia's defense minister. (file photo)

Who Commands Rubicon?

Established in the summer of 2024, possibly on the orders of newly appointed Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, the secretive unit is formally known as the Rubicon Center of Advanced Unmanned Systems, though it does not appear in Russian legal databases and its affiliation with the Defense Ministry is unclear.

Its commander, according to findings by RFE/RL’s Russian Service, appears to be Colonel Sergei Budnikov, a 37-year-old former artillery and marine infantry officer.

Budnikov appears in a video published in early February by Vladimir Solovyov, a Russian state TV host notorious for amplifying Kremlin propaganda and conspiracies.

A photograph from a now-deleted social media account of the wife of Colonel Sergei Budnikov, the commander of Russia's Rubicon drone organization.

Budnikov’s name also appears on two letters of gratitude published in July 2025 on the website of Brotherly Heart, a charitable organization that helps Russian veterans of the Ukraine war and whose board consists of former Russian intelligence officers.

Other photos of Budnikov appear on his wife’s now-deleted VK social media account.

A recruiter vetting Rubicon candidates told RFE/RL that signing bonuses for the unit were on par with bonuses paid by other military units in the Moscow region: up to 3 million rubles ($36,000).

SEE ALSO:

Fiber-Optic Drones The New Must-Have In Ukraine War

Rubicon appears to be a hybrid organization that not only acquires and develops new drone technologies, but also tests new tactics and trains drone operators themselves. As of spring 2025, there were seven known Rubicon units, each with approximately 130-150 personnel, said Lee, who frequently travels to Ukraine’s front lines.

One of Rubicon’s main bases or training centers appears to be located at the Patriot Park Exhibition and Congress Center, according to the video published by Solovyov and other videos released by the Defense Ministry, including one featuring Belousov touring the center.

The sprawling facility on Moscow’s western suburbs, which has hosted major military exhibitions in the past, was hit by a Ukrainian attack drone on May 22; the scale of damage was unclear. Three days later, workers appeared to begin construction of a tower for a Pantsir air defense system.

Budnikov did not respond to e-mail inquiries from RFE/RL’s Russian Service.

SEE ALSO:

How Ukraine Uses Net-Firing Drones To Snag Russian UAVs

Measure. Countermeasure. Counter-Countermeasure

Military analysts have closely scrutinized the evolution of warfare as both sides rush to pioneer new technologies and new systems. The dominance of drones has shifted battlefield tactics substantially, in some cases entirely away from traditional artillery.

Both sides have also rushed to develop countermeasures.

For example, a growing number of roads on Ukrainian-controlled territory are now lined with tunnels of netting, designed to thwart drones going after moving vehicles. Ukrainian drone operators have experimented with drones that drop nets from above, to entangle Russian drones.

Russian soldiers install netting on the faсade of a nursery in the Belgorod border region, to protect it from Ukrainian drone attacks. (file photo)

Ukraine and Russia have moved fast to build fleets of fiber-optic drones that spool out kilometers of filament as they fly, allowing drone operators to attack and surveil enemy locations without being electronically jammed.

“Ukraine had and still has an advantage in the development and high-quality use of unmanned technologies, but largely thanks to Rubicon, this gap has narrowed,” Lee said.

"What really surprised me was how the Russians improved, how they were employing their drones," Konrad Muzyka, a Polish-based military analyst, told RFE/RL after traveling to Ukrainian forward positions in July. "Rubicon is wreaking havoc on the Ukrainian second lines and the third lines [of defense] and they are just doing it in a very systematic, very methodical way."

SEE ALSO:

Gradually, Then Suddenly: A Russian Breakthrough Near Pokrovsk Sets Ukrainian Alarm Bells Ringing

Within Rubicon, each unit specializes in one aspect of Ukrainian drone warfare: some target first-person-view drones, others hunt reconnaissance drones, others focus on heavy-lift drones that might carry multiple explosives or small drones.

Rubicon also specializes in electronic-warfare and radio-signal reconnaissance, which helps to effectively locate Ukrainian drones and their operators.

Since February, Rubicon units have been systematically targeting Ukrainian drone operators who fly drones from positions far back behind the front lines. In one location, one Ukrainian brigade reported losing up to 70 percent of its drone operators in one week due to Rubicon targeting, Lee said.

As of September, according to statistics compiled by LostArmour, a pro-Kremlin open-source tracking site, more than 25 percent of all Rubicon strikes targeted drones, with another 15 percent targeting various radar, communications, and electronic warfare systems.

Lieutenant Colonel Kyrylo Veres, who commands a Ukrainian drone regiment, called Rubicon’s operations “top-notch.”

“The places where they’re operating, where they’re working; I don't envy [the Ukrainian] units,” Veres told Ukrayinska Pravda in July. “They are the best. Top guys. Let’s hope they don't scale up.”

Denys Mishchenko, a soldier with the Azov 12th Special Forces Brigade, said the Rubicon units “need to be studied, analyzed; countermeasures need to be found.”

“This is a very powerful enemy that needs to be given more attention,” he said in a post to X. “If you’ve met them, you’ll know what I’m talking about.”

With reporting by Current Time and Systema, RFE/RL’s Russia investigative unit

• 
  
• Mark Krutov is a correspondent for RFE/RL's Russian Service and one of the leading investigative journalists in Russia. He has been instrumental in the production of dozens of in-depth reports, exposing corruption among Russia's political elite and revealing the murky operations behind Kremlin-led secret services. Krutov joined RFE/RL in 2003 and has extensive experience as both a correspondent and a TV host.

8. 4 special ops soldiers missing after Black Hawk helicopter crash

U.S. News Sept. 18, 2025 / 8:36 AM / Updated Sept. 18, 2025 at 7:08 PM

4 special ops soldiers missing after Black Hawk helicopter crash

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2025/09/18/authorities-responding-to-a-possible-helicopter-crash-in-washington/5531758197337/

By Andrew Sookdeo & Mike Heuer

U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters operate in Iraq in August 2006. First responders are focusing efforts on aiding four special operations soldiers aboard a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter that crashed Wednesday evening in Washington state. Their status is unknown. File Photo by Russell Lee Klika/U.S. Department of Defense | License Photo

Sept. 18 (UPI) -- The status is unknown for four special operations soldiers aboard a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter that crashed Wednesday evening in Washington state.

The Thurston County Sheriff's Office said deputies were dispatched to respond to the crash in the Summit Lake, Wash., area and had located the scene of the crash.

The local sheriff told USA Today that "the scene is on fire," with about an acre burned following the crash that occurred at about 9 p.m. PDT.

The four soldiers are assigned to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, according to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Related

• 3 officers killed, 2 in critical condition after Pennsylvania shooting
• Plane crashes in Wyoming, killing 13-year-old girl
• Appeals court says U.K. asylum-seekers can stay at hotel

The crew was on a "routine training flight" when air traffic controllers lost contact with them, which suggested something had gone wrong, a U.S. Army spokesperson told ABC News.

The accident's cause is under investigation.

Thurston County Sheriff Derek Saunders said the crash site is about 15 miles from Joint Base Lewis McChord.

"Deputies have located the crash site but have been unable to continue rescue efforts as the scene is on fire and is starting to overheat their footwear," Saunders said. "Special operation rescue units are responding."

Joint Base Lewis-McChord is located in the Puget Sound region and is home to I Corps and the 62 Airlift Wing. According to the base's website, there are 40,000 active-duty troops at the base, plus their families and thousands of contractors.

The Military Times reported that the weather was good at Olympia Regional Airport on Wednesday night, with clear skies and a visibility of 10 miles.

This is a breaking news story. Check back for developments.

9. Trump nixed $400 million in Taiwan military aid, pushing future arms sales

​Excerpts:

“This would be exactly the wrong time for the U.S. to take the foot off the gas pedal,” said Dan Blumenthal, a former Pentagon official who now works at the American Enterprise Institute.

The Trump administration has broadly tempered U.S. competition with China in an effort to reach a wide-reaching trade deal with Beijing — easing export controls on high-end semiconductors and declining to enforce a congressional ban on the social media app TikTok. Some of the concessions have alarmed members of the first Trump administration and Republican lawmakers, who have also voiced concerns about insufficient support for Taiwan’s overstretched defenses.

The fastest way to fortify Taiwan’s military is by directly shipping U.S. arms, a process known as Presidential Drawdown Authority, or PDA. The Biden administration approved three such packages for Taiwan while in office, alongside another round of long-term military aid, totaling more than $2 billion.

Trump nixed $400 million in Taiwan military aid, pushing future arms sales

President Donald Trump declined to approve a package of weapons to Taiwan this summer, as he tries to negotiate a trade deal and potential summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/09/18/trump-taiwan-arms-sales-military-aid/

Updated

September 19, 2025 at 4:10 a.m. EDTtoday at 4:10 a.m. EDT

A Taiwanese fighter pilot takes part in night drills out of Hualien Air Base in Taiwan’s southeastern Hualien county in 2022. (Johnson Lai/AP)

By Noah Robertson and Ellen Nakashima

President Donald Trump declined to approve more than $400 million in military aid to Taiwan this summer, as he tries to negotiate a trade deal and potential summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, according to five people familiar with the matter.

The decision, which may still be reversed, marks a U-turn in U.S. policy toward the self-governing island that China claims as its own territory, said the people, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

Two people familiar with the matter said the package was worth more than $400 million and would have been “more lethal” than past rounds of aid to Taiwan, including munitions and autonomous drones.

In a statement, a White House official said the decision on the aid package had not yet been finalized.

Follow Trump’s second term

Follow

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not directly comment on The Post’s reporting Friday, noting only that Taiwan and the United States “have close cooperation on various issues, including security issues, and it is ongoing.”

“The U.S. has long supported Taiwan in strengthening its defense capabilities,” the ministry said in a statement. “As a responsible member of the region, Taiwan is determined and will continue to strengthen its self-defense capabilities, cooperate with the United States and other friendly allied countries, jointly deter aggression, and ensure regional peace and stability.”

America’s military has long committed resources to Taiwan’s defense, as China’s People’s Liberation Army rapidly builds up forces and stages more elaborate drills around the island. Xi has instructed the PLA to be capable of seizing Taiwan by 2027, according to U.S. military and intelligence officials, who stress that the date is not a deadline for an invasion.

“This would be exactly the wrong time for the U.S. to take the foot off the gas pedal,” said Dan Blumenthal, a former Pentagon official who now works at the American Enterprise Institute.

The Trump administration has broadly tempered U.S. competition with China in an effort to reach a wide-reaching trade deal with Beijing — easing export controls on high-end semiconductors and declining to enforce a congressional ban on the social media app TikTok. Some of the concessions have alarmed members of the first Trump administration and Republican lawmakers, who have also voiced concerns about insufficient support for Taiwan’s overstretched defenses.

The fastest way to fortify Taiwan’s military is by directly shipping U.S. arms, a process known as Presidential Drawdown Authority, or PDA. The Biden administration approved three such packages for Taiwan while in office, alongside another round of long-term military aid, totaling more than $2 billion.

Trump has promised a more transactional U.S. foreign policy and does not support sending weapons without payment, a preference also on display with Ukraine. Rather than continue providing security aid to Kyiv, the president has pushed a program in which European countries would buy American weapons and then donate them to the Ukrainian military.

Congress grants the administration $1 billion in annual authority to send security aid to Taiwan, a total that resets at the end of the fiscal year in September. The Biden administration approved a $571 million package shortly before leaving office.

The Trump administration’s view is that Taiwan, which has a large, prosperous economy, should purchase its own weapons, similar to countries in Europe — a sentiment shared by some Democrats in Congress.

In a meeting between U.S. and Taiwanese defense officials in Anchorage last month, the sides agreed to a massive package of weapons sales, four people familiar with the talks said. Taiwan plans to pay for the new round of arms, which could total in the billions of dollars, by passing a supplemental defense spending bill now under debate in its legislature.

The package would consist almost solely of “asymmetric” equipment, such as drones, missiles and sensors to monitor the island’s coastline, the people said. Still, these next-generation weapons may take years to deliver. Taipei is already waiting on billions of dollars’ worth of weapons — including F-16 fighter jets and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

Taiwan plans to spend 3.3 percent of its GDP on defense next year, a number it has sought to increase as Trump calls for a 10 percent benchmark. President Lai Ching-te said in August that the island will spend 5 percent of GDP by 2030.

The U.S. government has for years urged Taiwan to buy more low-cost weaponry to counter China’s massive advantage in ships, planes and missiles, but doing so will also make it harder to reach such drastic increases in defense spending. Under the first Trump administration, the U.S. approved almost $20 billion in weapons sales to Taiwan, most of which went toward expensive platforms such as F-16 fighter jets and Abrams tanks.

Since returning to office, Trump has sent conflicting signals toward China and Taiwan — from launching an abrupt trade war with Beijing in April to accusing Taipei of stealing America’s semiconductor industry. The administration canceled meetings between senior U.S. and Taiwanese defense officials and discouraged Lai from making a planned trip to New York and Dallas in August.

Trump has repeatedly said China will not invade Taiwan during his time in office.

This week, the administration informally alerted Congress of a potential $500 million arms sale to Taiwan, according to a congressional aide who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters and declined to specify the equipment being purchased.

Meanwhile, top Trump officials have held calls with Chinese counterparts in recent weeks as the president prepares for a potential summit with Xi this fall.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who spoke this month with China’s defense minister, Adm. Dong Jun, “made clear that the United States does not seek conflict with China nor is it pursuing regime change or strangulation of the PRC,” according to the Pentagon readout, referring to the People’s Republic of China.

Rudy Lu contributed reporting from Taipei, Taiwan.

10. Why Asia’s Gen Z Is Angry With Its Leaders

​The human domain. We neglect understanding the human domain at our peril.

Grievances. In the latent or incipient phase of any insurgency (which every country almost always is in), the only way to prevent escalating to the guerrilla or stalemate phase is through political and economic accommodations to satisfy demands to solve grievances. And those who seek to exploit the population and create instability will use "exaggerated grievances communicated well" to do so. But those exaggerated grievances are still grievances that must be solved or the population may revolt.

Excerpts:

Earlier this month, Nepali Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli became the third South Asian leader to be toppled by a popular rebellion in as many years, following his counterparts in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Smaller protest movements have popped up in Southeast Asia and forced concessions from politicians. These include East Timor lawmakers and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, who responded by removing a series of official perks, and the speaker of the Philippines’ House of Representatives, who resigned on Wednesday amid allegations of stolen public funds.

...

Protest movements led by Gen Z and young millennials are emerging in countries that for years had been promised the payoffs of a “demographic dividend,” in which an unusually numerous cohort of young people was meant to supercharge economic growth. In South Asia alone, one million people are due to enter the labor market every month between 2025 and 2030, according to the World Bank. The dynamics are similar in parts of Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-most populous country.

Instead, economists are now talking about a “demographic deficit.” Many Asian countries aren’t creating enough jobs to keep up. Data from the International Labor Organization shows that the share of people aged 15 to 24 that isn’t in any form of employment, education or training was 33% in Nepal last year, 30% in Bangladesh and 21% in Indonesia. Those are some of the highest rates in the world outside of countries with active conflicts.

At the same time, two-thirds of the workforce in the Asia-Pacific region—some 1.3 billion people—are still informally employed, according to the United Nations. That means they lack the protections and benefits that come with more stable jobs that allow people to get ahead, instead of just getting by.

Why Asia’s Gen Z Is Angry With Its Leaders

Perks for political elites contrast with lack of opportunities for young people entering labor market

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/why-asias-gen-z-is-angry-with-its-leaders-13cea194

Demonstrations against alleged corruption and proposed social media restrictions in Kathmandu, Nepal. Photo: Amit Machamasi/ZUMA Press

By Gabriele Steinhauser

Follow

 in Singapore and Krishna Pokharel

Follow

 in New Delhi

Sept. 19, 2025 5:30 am ET

Quick Summary

• Protests are erupting across Asia due to perceived privileges of political elites amid a lack of economic opportunities for young people.View more

In Nepal, it was a politician’s son posing next to a Christmas tree made from designer shopping bags. In Indonesia, it was a lavish housing allowance for lawmakers amounting to 10 times the minimum wage. In East Timor, it was a multimillion-dollar plan to buy new SUVs for parliamentarians.

The perceived privileges enjoyed by an entrenched political elite have sparked a wave of protests across several Asian countries, where a large generation of young people is feeling deprived of economic opportunities.

Earlier this month, Nepali Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli became the third South Asian leader to be toppled by a popular rebellion in as many years, following his counterparts in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Smaller protest movements have popped up in Southeast Asia and forced concessions from politicians. These include East Timor lawmakers and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, who responded by removing a series of official perks, and the speaker of the Philippines’ House of Representatives, who resigned on Wednesday amid allegations of stolen public funds.

“On one side there are nepo babies flaunting corruption and on the other side there are common young Nepali people who are forced to leave their beloved country and families for studies and work abroad,” says Samip Paudel, a 22-year-old mobile-app developer who joined the protests outside parliament in Kathmandu.

Paudel said he carried a pamphlet he made using artificial intelligence depicting Oli eating bundles of money. “The nepo babies issue became a tipping point for our age group to rise up,” he says.

Youth-led protests have targeted governments in Indonesia, Nepal and the Philippines.

Juni Kriswanto/AFP/Getty Images; Pedro Pardo/AFP/Getty Images; Ezra Acayan/Getty Images

Protest movements led by Gen Z and young millennials are emerging in countries that for years had been promised the payoffs of a “demographic dividend,” in which an unusually numerous cohort of young people was meant to supercharge economic growth. In South Asia alone, one million people are due to enter the labor market every month between 2025 and 2030, according to the World Bank. The dynamics are similar in parts of Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-most populous country.

Instead, economists are now talking about a “demographic deficit.” Many Asian countries aren’t creating enough jobs to keep up. Data from the International Labor Organization shows that the share of people aged 15 to 24 that isn’t in any form of employment, education or training was 33% in Nepal last year, 30% in Bangladesh and 21% in Indonesia. Those are some of the highest rates in the world outside of countries with active conflicts.

At the same time, two-thirds of the workforce in the Asia-Pacific region—some 1.3 billion people—are still informally employed, according to the United Nations. That means they lack the protections and benefits that come with more stable jobs that allow people to get ahead, instead of just getting by.

In the weeks before the protests, young Nepalis started sharing images taken from the social-media accounts of politicians’ children, tagging them #nepobaby or #nepokid. Among those that went viral were photos of Saugat Thapa, the son of Bindu Kumar Thapa, a businessman and provincial minister, wearing expensive clothes in high-end hotels or exotic travel destinations. In one photo, Saugat Thapa stands next to a Christmas tree made of bags and boxes from brands such as Louis Vuitton, Cartier and Gucci.

Young Nepalis, some in school uniforms, took to the streets after the government banned the use of several social-media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp. The day after 21 protesters died in clashes with the police, crowds looted Bindu Kumar Thapa’s house in Pokhara, setting it on fire along with the national parliament in Kathmandu and the capital’s five-star Hilton Hotel.

“We realized with the government’s social-media ban that they were trying to silence us just when we started to raise our voice against corruption,” says Paudel, the app developer. 

Oli, who resigned on Sept. 9, said Friday that his government hadn’t ordered the police to shoot at protesters and that Nepal had been on a path of economic progress. Bindu Kumar Thapa and his son didn’t respond to requests for comments. In an Instagram post, Saugat Thapa said outrage over the designer Christmas tree was an “unfair misinterpretation,” while his father said on Facebook that his properties had been reduced to ashes over baseless corruption accusations.

In Indonesia, last month’s demonstrations fizzled out after President Subianto canceled some parliamentary privileges and security forces detained protest leaders. The ruling coalition also revoked the seats of several lawmakers who were seen to have made insensitive remarks about the protesters. 

A vigil for a student who was killed in clashes between police and demonstrators in Indonesia. Photo: Devi Rahman/AFP/Getty Image

In recent days, an Instagram account with the handle @cabinetcouture_idn has started tracking what it says are pricey designer items worn by politicians and their families, such as the minister of tourism and the wife of a prominent member of parliament. It has picked up over 174,000 followers since it began posting on Sept. 10. The lawmaker’s wife, herself a member of a regional legislature, declined to comment. The tourism ministry didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Indonesian politics, such as those of other Asian countries, have become increasingly dynastic, says Yoes Kenawas, a postdoctoral research fellow at Atma Jaya Catholic University of Indonesia in Jakarta. In the current parliament, for instance, nearly one in four members has at least one relative involved in politics, according to the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 

That figure still limps behind the Philippines, where 71 out of 82 provincial governors selected in midterm elections in May were members of political dynasties, according to the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Martin Romualdez, the house speaker who resigned this week, is the cousin of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who himself is the son of the country’s former, eponymous dictator. 

Kenawas says many young people without political and family connections feel locked out from opportunities they see as accessible mostly to the rich and powerful.

“What we have right now is an educated youth, who are connected through social media,” he said. “And when they graduate from high school or from universities, they cannot get proper jobs.”

Graffiti painted by local artists during protests in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Photo: DEVI RAHMAN/AFP/Getty Images

Write to Gabriele Steinhauser at Gabriele.Steinhauser@wsj.com and Krishna Pokharel at krishna.pokharel@wsj.com

11. The Shifting Ideology Behind Political Violence

​"Get worse before it gets better?" An ominous and sober warning.

In the words of an SF brother. "Exaggerated grievance communicated well."

Excerpts:

The federal government doesn’t comprehensively track data on political violence and domestic terrorism. Various groups and academics do, but differ on the types of data collected and the definitions. They generally find that right-wing and jihadist violence has been more prevalent in the U.S. than left-wing violence in recent decades. But some see an evolving landscape.

“Now we have substantial political violence from both the left and the right,” said University of Chicago researcher Robert Pape, a political-science professor who heads the university’s Chicago Project on Security and Threats. Pape said he and staff researched decades of events to document motivations for political violence to come to conclusions.

Political violence has waxed and waned in the U.S. since its founding, and the political orientation of those perpetrating such violence—if one exists—has swung back and forth on the left-right spectrum over time as well.

...

As attacks surge, understanding what drives violence against political figures becomes more urgent. Trump survived one assassination attempt in July 2024 and was the target of an apparent second one months later, while authorities said a gunman with lists of prominent abortion-rights supporters killed a Democratic Minnesota lawmaker and her husband in June.

The government did fund efforts to look at the trend. Until last week, the Justice Department’s National Institute of Justice had posted a study on domestic terrorism on its website. The report, called “What NIJ Research Tells Us About Domestic Terrorism,” said that since 1990 far-right extremists have committed more ideologically motivated homicides than far-left extremists: more than 520 compared with 78. The study can no longer be found on the government’s website but can be found on an internet archive. It appears to have been taken down after last week’s shooting. The Justice Department declined to comment.

In one of the nation’s most comprehensive surveys of political extremism and violence, researchers using data from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, College Park, found that between 1948 and 2018 right-wing extremists and jihadists were about twice as likely to engage in violent behavior when compared with left-wing extremists. The researchers found 560 individuals from the far-right involved in ideologically motivated violence compared with 120 from the far left over that time period.

The Shifting Ideology Behind Political Violence

As attacks surge, understanding what drives them becomes more urgent. ‘This era of violent populism will get worse before it gets better.’

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/political-violence-killings-charlie-kirk-shooting-c96e7560?st=EhwiyL&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Cameron McWhirter

Follow

 and Zusha Elinson

Follow

Sept. 19, 2025 5:30 am ET

An American flag hangs at Utah Valley University after the killing of Charlie Kirk. Photo: Chet Strange/Getty Images

For decades, right-wing extremists and jihadists have been responsible for the bulk of America’s deadly political violence and domestic terrorism, from the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing to the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting, according to researchers.

But those tracking such violence say more acts are being committed by those holding either explicitly leftist views, no dominant political views or a mix of fringe ideologies, including the alleged gunman in the fatal shooting of a UnitedHealthcare executive in December and the suspect in the killing of two Israeli diplomats in Washington in May.

Tyler Robinson, the 22-year-old Utah man charged Tuesday with murdering conservative activist Charlie Kirk, had grown political and left-leaning over the past year, “becoming more pro-gay and trans-rights oriented,” his mother, a registered Republican, told authorities, according to Utah County Attorney Jeffrey Gray.

Robinson allegedly texted his romantic partner, a male who is transitioning to female, saying he killed Kirk because “the guy spreads too much hate.” 

“The murder of Charlie Kirk is an American tragedy,” Gray said.

The federal government doesn’t comprehensively track data on political violence and domestic terrorism. Various groups and academics do, but differ on the types of data collected and the definitions. They generally find that right-wing and jihadist violence has been more prevalent in the U.S. than left-wing violence in recent decades. But some see an evolving landscape.

“Now we have substantial political violence from both the left and the right,” said University of Chicago researcher Robert Pape, a political-science professor who heads the university’s Chicago Project on Security and Threats. Pape said he and staff researched decades of events to document motivations for political violence to come to conclusions.

Political violence has waxed and waned in the U.S. since its founding, and the political orientation of those perpetrating such violence—if one exists—has swung back and forth on the left-right spectrum over time as well.

Thousands of people marched at a funeral procession for slain civil-rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968. Photo: Bettmann Archive/Getty Images

The Weathermen claimed credit for a bombing at the Pentagon in 1972. Photo: Bettmann Archive/Getty Images

The turbulent 1960s saw the killings of civil-rights workers and assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Sen. Robert Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X. In 1972, a man shot presidential candidate George Wallace, crippling him.

Pape found that in this volatile period, more acts of political violence were committed by left-wing extremists, although right-wing extremists were violent as well. Then, starting around 1972, right-wing extremists were behind most such acts, until about 2017 or 2018. Today, he said, such violence is increasingly committed by those from both ends of the political spectrum. “This era of violent populism will get worse before it gets better,” Pape told The Wall Street Journal late last week. “We’re headed for more trouble.”

As attacks surge, understanding what drives violence against political figures becomes more urgent. Trump survived one assassination attempt in July 2024 and was the target of an apparent second one months later, while authorities said a gunman with lists of prominent abortion-rights supporters killed a Democratic Minnesota lawmaker and her husband in June.

The government did fund efforts to look at the trend. Until last week, the Justice Department’s National Institute of Justice had posted a study on domestic terrorism on its website. The report, called “What NIJ Research Tells Us About Domestic Terrorism,” said that since 1990 far-right extremists have committed more ideologically motivated homicides than far-left extremists: more than 520 compared with 78. The study can no longer be found on the government’s website but can be found on an internet archive. It appears to have been taken down after last week’s shooting. The Justice Department declined to comment.

In one of the nation’s most comprehensive surveys of political extremism and violence, researchers using data from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, College Park, found that between 1948 and 2018 right-wing extremists and jihadists were about twice as likely to engage in violent behavior when compared with left-wing extremists. The researchers found 560 individuals from the far-right involved in ideologically motivated violence compared with 120 from the far left over that time period.

Gary LaFree, a co-author on the study and a University of Maryland criminologist, said left-wing extremists became less violent after the 1970s, when groups such as the Weather Underground were active. Movements like antifa, a loose network of antifascist protesters, have been implicated in widespread property damage, but haven’t been tied to many violent attacks, he said.

Emergency vehicles and personnel at the scene of the Oklahoma City bombing of a federal building in 1995. Photo: DAVID J. PHILLIP/Associated Press

Mourners held a memorial service for the victims of the Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, Fla., in 2016. Photo: Drew Angerer/Getty Images

“The data since 9/11 shows that lethal left-wing violence has been a much smaller problem than right-wing terrorism,” said Peter Bergen, vice president for global studies & fellows at New America, a liberal-leaning think tank. “But it’s been part of the American story before in the 1970s so it can come back.”

The day after the Kirk shooting, the libertarian Cato Institute published data showing that politically motivated killings in the U.S. are rare. It stated that from Jan. 1, 1975, to this month, politically motivated terrorist attacks killed 3,599 people in the U.S., with 81 of those deaths occurring after 2020. The institute, which includes international terrorist attacks on America, estimated that 87% were committed by Islamic radicals; 11% were committed by right-wing extremists, and 2% by left-wing extremists.

Excluding the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, right-wing attacks accounted for 63% of killings and left-wing for 10%.

Cato defined right-wing terrorists as those driven by white supremacy, antiabortion views, involuntary celibacy and other ideologies. Left-wing attackers included those motivated by Black nationalism, antipolice sentiment, animal rights, communism and other views.

“Politically motivated murder is unacceptable and inherently bad, like all murder, and doubly so because of how socially corrosive it is,” wrote Alex Nowrasteh, the vice president for economic and social policy studies at Cato. He acknowledged that statistical analyses are fragile, and that “the motivated reader can slice and dice these numbers in different ways, count marginal hate crimes as politically motivated terrorist attacks,” or “assign different ideological motivations to the individual attacker.”

Utah Gov. Spencer Cox, a Republican, has joined Colorado Democratic Gov. Jared Polis in launching an effort to tone down political rhetoric.

“We can return violence with fire and violence; we can return hate with hate,” Cox said last Friday. “And that’s the problem with political violence, is it metastasizes, because we can always point the finger at the other side, and at some point we have to find an off-ramp, or it’s going to get much, much worse.”

The caskets of Melissa Hortman, a Minnesota Democratic state representative, and her husband Mark lie in state at the Minnesota Capitol after they were killed in June. Photo: tim evans/Reuters

Write to Cameron McWhirter at Cameron.McWhirter@wsj.com and Zusha Elinson at zusha.elinson@wsj.com

12. How Xi Is Using a TikTok Tradeoff to Court Trump

​Excerpts:

TikTok may have always been a bargaining chip for China. The fate of the app in the United States, where it is deemed a national security threat, pales in comparison to Beijing’s other problems like U.S. export controls and tariffs, which could constrain China’s own economic and technological development.

TikTok’s recommendation algorithm is also less novel and therefore less important to the Chinese leadership than it was five years ago when the saga over the app began.

All that makes TikTok “an expendable concession,” according to Dimitar Gueorguiev, director of Chinese studies at Syracuse University. “Chinese officials have let the issue fester for years, holding it in reserve as a problem they could one day solve to defuse pressure from Washington,” he said. “A deal now costs Beijing less than when negotiations started, while still yielding the maximum optics of compromise.”

In Beijing’s calculus, the moment to use the TikTok card is now when China, with its chokehold over critical minerals, believes that it holds maximum leverage that it can use in a meeting with Mr. Trump. China processes nearly 90 percent of the world’s rare earth metals magnets needed to produce cars, wind turbines, jets and more.

“The Chinese side is much more experienced and has much more tolerance and is much more tactical,” said Li Daokui, a prominent economist at Tsinghua University in Beijing. “They know what the U.S. wants and they understand Trump’s negotiating style.”

How Xi Is Using a TikTok Tradeoff to Court Trump

Agreeing to a deal suggests that the fate of TikTok matters less to Beijing than gaining leverage on issues it cares most about, like tariffs, technology and Taiwan.​

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/19/world/asia/tiktok-xi-trump-china.html

Listen to this article · 7:23 min Learn more

• Share full article
• 
  

President Donald Trump reaching out to shake hands with China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, during the G20 Summit in Osaka, Japan in 2019.Credit...Erin Schaff/The New York Times

By Lily Kuo

Sept. 19, 2025

Updated 2:32 a.m. ET

For years, Chinese officials denounced U.S. demands that TikTok’s Chinese owner sell its American operations as daylight robbery. Now Chinese state media are hailing what might be an agreement to do just that as a win-win. And on Friday, China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, and President Trump are expected to speak by phone to bless the deal.

For China, the apparent reversal would be a way to offer the American president the semblance of a win on an issue close to his heart — saving the hugely popular video app that he credits for helping him connect with young voters and win re-election. In exchange, Beijing is able to buy itself more room to negotiate on the matters it cares about most: tariffs, technology and Taiwan.

“There’s much bigger fish to fry,” said Yun Sun, the director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington. “If China can use these small concessions to trade for a positive atmosphere, better U.S.-China relations, they will want to do it,” she said, referring to TikTok.

The TikTok deal and the phone call could pave the way for a potential summit next month, their first in-person meeting of Mr. Trump’s second term. Beijing would prefer to host Mr. Trump, but the two leaders could also meet on the sidelines of an upcoming regional summit in South Korea.

TikTok may have always been a bargaining chip for China. The fate of the app in the United States, where it is deemed a national security threat, pales in comparison to Beijing’s other problems like U.S. export controls and tariffs, which could constrain China’s own economic and technological development.

TikTok’s recommendation algorithm is also less novel and therefore less important to the Chinese leadership than it was five years ago when the saga over the app began.

Image

Shou Zi Chew, TikTok’s chief executive, during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in 2019.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times

All that makes TikTok “an expendable concession,” according to Dimitar Gueorguiev, director of Chinese studies at Syracuse University. “Chinese officials have let the issue fester for years, holding it in reserve as a problem they could one day solve to defuse pressure from Washington,” he said. “A deal now costs Beijing less than when negotiations started, while still yielding the maximum optics of compromise.”

In Beijing’s calculus, the moment to use the TikTok card is now when China, with its chokehold over critical minerals, believes that it holds maximum leverage that it can use in a meeting with Mr. Trump. China processes nearly 90 percent of the world’s rare earth metals magnets needed to produce cars, wind turbines, jets and more.

“The Chinese side is much more experienced and has much more tolerance and is much more tactical,” said Li Daokui, a prominent economist at Tsinghua University in Beijing. “They know what the U.S. wants and they understand Trump’s negotiating style.”

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in China and Taiwan? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

To entice Mr. Trump, China could commit to buying more U.S. soybeans — something the president has publicly said he hopes would happen — or buy Boeing aircraft.

But Beijing would need to act quickly to make good on any such promise. It is late to bid on this year’s soybean crop and Boeing’s order book is quickly filling up. China’s leaders also face real risks in negotiating with someone as unpredictable as Mr. Trump.

“They understand that there needs to be a trade deal to pave the ground for Trump to come to China, and they want to make sure this is not retractable — that they don’t put their hearts on the table and the U.S. just stabs it with a knife,” Dr. Sun said.

Trump Administration: Live Updates

Updated 

Sept. 18, 2025, 8:11 p.m. ETSept. 18, 2025

• Trump pressures broadcasters over critical coverage, escalating an attack on speech.
• Here’s how broadcasters can keep or lose their licenses.
• 11 elected officials are arrested while trying to access N.Y.C. ICE facility.

“They cannot predict whether or not that will happen again, but they know if it does that will be humiliating for the Chinese leader.”

Still, Mr. Xi will likely go into Friday’s call with confidence. Far from being alienated by U.S. pressure, he has shown that Beijing has many friends. Earlier this month, he presided over an elaborate military parade in Beijing, flanked by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. Days before that, he hosted other leaders including Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India at a security summit in Tianjin.

Image

Mr. Xi was flanked by President Vladimir Putin of Russia and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in September.Credit...Rao Aimin/Xinhua, via Associated Press

The image of Mr. Trump as the latest in a long line of world leaders traveling to Beijing to pay their respects to China’s most powerful leader in decades would bolster Mr. Xi’s credibility at home, where officials are struggling to revive the economy. Such a trip would also convey the idea of the Chinese leader being courted by the U.S. president.

“China will want to demonstrate that the U.S. needs it more,” said Ali Wyne, senior research and advocacy adviser for U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group.

Perhaps more important, a state visit gives Beijing the ability to control the optics and try to avoid the kind of public upbraiding by Mr. Trump that President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine faced at the White House in February.

“They are unwilling to take the risk that their leader goes to the U.S. and gets yelled at,” Dr. Sun said.

Image

President Trump sitting next to the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, in the East Room of the White House, in FebruaryCredit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

Momentum has been building for a meeting. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have spoken with their Chinese counterparts in recent weeks, and Mr. Trump has for months signaled his interest in meeting the Chinese leader, whom the president describes as a “good friend” and has repeatedly said he admires.

Beijing will likely push for relief from tariffs imposed by Mr. Trump over what he says is its failure to stop chemicals used to make fentanyl from reaching his country. China also wants Washington to loosen export controls on advanced chips and to cut back its support of Taiwan, which Beijing claims is part of China.

Friday’s conversation would be an opportunity for the leaders to see whether they can agree on more deals that both can claim as wins, in order to make a summit worthwhile.

“This call will help determine whether the two sides are there, or whether they opt for a less consequential engagement” on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in South Korea, said Amanda Hsiao, the China director for the Eurasia Group, a firm that advises investors.

Chinese officials have said that the outlines of an agreement struck in Madrid earlier this week with their U.S. counterparts goes beyond TikTok and includes lowering investment barriers and improving trade and economic cooperation topics that are also likely to come up during the call.

Image

A news conference with Chinese officials on the day of U.S.-China talks on trade, economic and national security issues, in Madrid in September.Credit...Louiza Vradi/Reuters

Mr. Xi may also urge Mr. Trump to strike his own path and ignore more hawkish voices in his administration that the Chinese leader sees as seeking to contain China. The last time the two leaders spoke by phone, in June, Mr. Xi compared the relationship between the United States and China to a large ship kept on course by two powerful helmsmen. He warned Mr. Trump to “steer clear of various disturbances or even sabotage.”

“There are important differences of opinion between Trump and his advisers. China will likely to seek to probe and exploit those differences,” said Mr. Wyne of the International Crisis Group.

The fact that the two leaders are speaking at all suggests to some that the relationship is steadying. Whether that continues depends on how the in-person meeting between the two leaders goes.

“Until then we cannot say for sure, OK, this is a relatively stable and predictable relationship,” said Wu Xinbo, the dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. “I can tell we are moving in that direction but the major indicator will be the forthcoming summit.”

Pei-Lin Wu contributed to this report.

Lily Kuo is a China correspondent for The Times, based in Taipei.

13. Trump and Xi Set to Finalize TikTok Deal

Trump and Xi Set to Finalize TikTok Deal

The two leaders are expected to speak Friday to discuss a deal to keep the wildly popular app from going dark in the United States.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/19/business/media/trump-and-xi-set-to-finalize-tiktok-deal.html

President Trump and President Xi in Beijing in 2017.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Emmett Lindner

Sept. 19, 2025, 12:00 a.m. ET

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

President Trump and China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, are expected to speak on Friday by phone about the hugely popular video app TikTok. The two are expected to confirm the outline of a deal that would separate the app from its Chinese owner, ByteDance, to avoid a ban in the United States.

“We have a deal on TikTok. I’ve reached a deal with China. I’m going to speak to President Xi on Friday to confirm everything up,” Mr. Trump told reporters outside the White House on Tuesday.

TikTok’s future has been in limbo in the United States since January, when a federal law took effect requiring the company to find a non-Chinese owner or face a ban in the United States. The law was intended to address national security concerns that the app’s ownership could give Beijing a channel to spread propaganda or to collect sensitive data about Americans. Mr. Trump has extended the deadline four times.

Details of the deal have not been announced, but ByteDance has for months been in talks to spin out the app’s American operations into a new company, and to bring in new U.S. investors, like the software giant Oracle, to dilute its Chinese ownership. The list of other potential investors has been in flux, two people familiar with the talks said.

Mr. Trump on Thursday added another detail: The United States would be receiving a “tremendous fee” for putting the deal together. If that occurs, it would be the latest example of the government’s incursion into corporate deal making. In recent months, the Trump administration has negotiated and obtained a 10 percent stake in Intel, and a “golden share” in U.S. Steel as part of its sale to Nippon Steel.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent first announced that the United States had a “framework” for a deal to keep TikTok operational in the United States at a news conference in Madrid on Monday.

Chinese officials had previously vowed to oppose a forced sale of TikTok, and in 2020 it amended its export control list to include technology like algorithms and source codes.

China decided to reach an agreement with the United States on TikTok because “this consensus serves the interests of both sides,” Li Chenggang, China’s vice minister of commerce, said in Madrid on Monday after meeting with American officials, according to a readout published in Chinese state media.

On Tuesday, one day before a deadline for TikTok to separate from ByteDance, Mr. Trump issued an extension — the fourth this year — to mid-December. On Friday, it could prove to be the final one.

Lauren Hirsch and Meaghan Tobin contributed reporting.

Emmett Lindner is a business reporter for The Times.

14. How the rapid pace of AI connects to China’s threats toward Taiwan

​Excerpts:

If China’s government, which has already dedicated the country to ambitious AI goals, expects AGI within four years, the country’s increasing harassment of Taiwan takes on an even more menacing dimension.

At the hearing, Hammond said a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would spark a “global depression,” because Beijing would choke off the flow of advanced computer chips from the island. That echoes warnings from former Biden Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, the conservative Heritage Foundation, and others. Chips made in Taiwan, particularly by world leader TSMC, are key to the world’s manufacturing and economic activity—and will only grow more so in an era dominated by advanced artificial intelligence.

How the rapid pace of AI connects to China’s threats toward Taiwan

A hearing Wednesday explored why Taiwanese chips are more prized than ever.

defenseone.com

How the rapid pace of AI connects to China’s threats toward Taiwan - Defense One

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor

September 19, 2025 01:12 AM ET

Ten years ago, if you said artificial intelligence might surpass human-level intelligence by the year 2029, no one in Washington would have taken you seriously. A Wednesday hearing showed how dramatically that has changed.

During the hearing, dubbed “Shaping Tomorrow: The Future of Artificial Intelligence,” the House Oversight Committee and its witnesses grappled with several trends: the rapid advance of AI, Beijing’s determination to dominate the field, and China’s increasingly threatening posture toward Taiwan.

“Current trend lines suggest” that Ray Kurzweil—inventor, author, and current Google executive—”was dead on” when he predicted human-level AI by 2029, Samuel Hammond, chief economist at the Foundation for American Innovation, said at the hearing. 

Kurzweil’s projection for the arrival of artificial general intelligence, or AGI, has been a staple of Silicon Valley cocktail parties for more than two decades. The prediction is not universally endorsed by technologists; dissenters include Meta’s Yann LeCun and Google Brain founder Andrew Ng. But fans of AGI-by-2029 include Elon Musk and Google DeepMind creator Demis Hassabis—and increasingly, state-run Chinese media.

Technologists have typically discussed it with a sort of gleeful fascination. But the hearing was anything but optimistic, especially when the subject focused on the AI race with China.

If China’s government, which has already dedicated the country to ambitious AI goals, expects AGI within four years, the country’s increasing harassment of Taiwan takes on an even more menacing dimension.

At the hearing, Hammond said a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would spark a “global depression,” because Beijing would choke off the flow of advanced computer chips from the island. That echoes warnings from former Biden Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, the conservative Heritage Foundation, and others. Chips made in Taiwan, particularly by world leader TSMC, are key to the world’s manufacturing and economic activity—and will only grow more so in an era dominated by advanced artificial intelligence.

Hammond made the connection: “Over the last 40 years…we’ve shifted all our industries into services, entertainment, law, finance, all things that are about to be deflated by AI. So there’s a world where we build artificial general intelligence, but China is the one that puts it in factories and has the growth benefits.” 

He suggested the U.S. redouble its efforts to improve its domestic chip manufacturing with a “CHIPS Act 2.0,” referring to the 2022 law that laid out $52 billion in incentives (including tax breaks) to encourage chip manufacturing in the United States.

He also wants the U.S. government to work harder to keep advanced chips from China. Hammond pointed to the proposed GAIN Act, which would require chipmakers—those in the United States and those selling to the United States—to offer chips to U.S. companies before selling them to China. The language was dropped from the House version of the 2026 defense policy bill, but the Senate is considering adding it to theirs, which means its fate would turn on negotiations and the U.S. president. 

Hammond called the act “the least we could do.”

Unmentioned in the hearing were recent moves by the Trump administration to keep chips flowing to China. In July, the White House allowed chipmaker Nvidia to sell its advanced H20 chips, useful in AI work, to China. More recently, the administration has pushed to scuttle the GAIN Act. 

Taken together, these indicators suggest a takeover of Taiwan might give China's leaders an enduring advantage in developing and deploying AI. A global depression is a price they might be willing to pay, if they emerge far stronger from it. 

​15. AFSOC exercise brings concept created for great-power conflict to the Caribbean

​Rehearsals or messaging? Both?

Excerpts:

Experts said that the timing and location of the exercise—held just days before the first airstrike on an alleged drug-running boat in the Caribbean—shows neighboring countries in the region how the U.S. military could be used in its campaign against so-called narco-terrorists.

“Another intent, obviously, could be to signal to the region that we have these capabilities and we are ready to act in a serious way,” said Jennifer Kavanagh, a senior fellow and director of military analysis at the Defense Priorities think tank. “This is not just a deployment for show, these are not just threats of force. We are ready to use combat capabilities and combat strategies in the theater.”

Air Force Special Operations Command officials made it clear that the demonstration was meant to send a message that the ACE concept was fast and adaptable, including in the Caribbean.

“AFSOC stands ready to deliver decisive airpower anytime, anywhere, against any threat to national security,” said command spokesperson Rebecca Heyse.

Another AFSOC exercise in the Caribbean saw special operations airmen travel 75 nautical miles “to conduct reconnaissance and targeting operations on a nearby island held by simulated enemy forces,” the command said.

AFSOC exercise brings concept created for great-power conflict to the Caribbean

Last month, U.S. forces “seized” a St. Croix airport in a demonstration of the Agile Combat Employment maneuver scheme.

defenseone.com · Thomas Novelly

A recent special-operations exercise in the Caribbean showcased an Air Force operating concept designed to counter near-peer militaries—and, experts said, might be a message to unfriendly governments and criminal groups in the Americas.

On Aug. 30, special operations airmen from the Kentucky National Guard stormed the Henry E. Rohlsen Airport on the island of St. Croix. Troops parachuted into the Caribbean Sea with an inflatable boat and more pararescuemen floated onto the airfield; together, they quickly took over the grounds and established a U.S.-controlled base for cargo planes to land and deliver resources.

“Within minutes, the Airmen had cleared the runways, established perimeter security and implemented air traffic control, allowing the C-130 to land and offload crucial assets,” Air Force Special Operations Command detailed in the release earlier this month.

The mock takeover—part of AFSOC’s larger, long-planned Emerald Warrior exercise— showcased the service’s Agile Combat Employment scheme of maneuver. Under ACE, airmen rapidly set up small operating bases in combat zones anywhere at a moment’s notice to evade long-range missile attacks. Service leaders and doctrine have described ACE as a necessary counter to anti-access and area-denial tactics developed by China, Russia, and others. Its rollout has seen hiccups; a Rand Corporation report earlier this year detailed “confusion” among airmen and units working to implement the concept.

Related articles

Returning the Air Force to its expeditionary roots

Experts said that the timing and location of the exercise—held just days before the first airstrike on an alleged drug-running boat in the Caribbean—shows neighboring countries in the region how the U.S. military could be used in its campaign against so-called narco-terrorists.

“Another intent, obviously, could be to signal to the region that we have these capabilities and we are ready to act in a serious way,” said Jennifer Kavanagh, a senior fellow and director of military analysis at the Defense Priorities think tank. “This is not just a deployment for show, these are not just threats of force. We are ready to use combat capabilities and combat strategies in the theater.”

Air Force Special Operations Command officials made it clear that the demonstration was meant to send a message that the ACE concept was fast and adaptable, including in the Caribbean.

“AFSOC stands ready to deliver decisive airpower anytime, anywhere, against any threat to national security,” said command spokesperson Rebecca Heyse.

Another AFSOC exercise in the Caribbean saw special operations airmen travel 75 nautical miles “to conduct reconnaissance and targeting operations on a nearby island held by simulated enemy forces,” the command said.

Heyse said AFSOC “remains ready to execute the priorities of senior leaders without delay.”

After those boots-on-the-ground exercises and the controversial airstrike on the Venezuelan boat earlier this month, the U.S. military began increasing its footprint in the area. MQ-9 Reaper drones and Marine Corps F-35Bs arrived in Puerto Rico after the Pentagon decried a "highly provocative move” by Venezuela after the country flew two of its F-16 fighter jets near U.S. Navy vessels.

Other supporting aircraft spotted in the area this week include C-5 and C-17 military transports and KC-46 and KC-135 tankers, an open-source tracking account reported. There have been at least two U.S. military attacks on alleged Venezuelan drug boats this month, killing a total of 14 people, according to White House statements.

Kavanagh said that the military response in the region is overblown.

“Cartels are powerful. Military groups in Latin America have military capabilities, but are not military capabilities that can strike U.S. airbases in the region, so it seems like a little bit of overkill,” she said. “The force the United States has used so far in Latin America has been disproportionate to the threat.”

AFSOC’s Heyse said the command has no exercises planned in the Caribbean in the near future, but that they’re prepared to project more force in the region.

“This does not rule out future potential exercises in the region as AFSOC relentlessly refines its capabilities and sharpens its edge to ensure unmatched lethality on future battlefields,” she said.

defenseone.com · Thomas Novelly

16. The PKK’s Disarmament and Turkey’s Fragile Search for Peace: Transitional or Transactional Justice?

E​xcertps:

Ultimately, building trust and talking of democratic peace in an increasingly authoritarian context makes it no easier. Government officials have hinted at the possibility of amnesty for Kurdish prisoners. The release of figures like Selahattin Demirtaş, the jailed former co-chair of the HDP, would send a strong positive message about the government’s intentions. Yet, the stalemate on the issue highlights the contradiction between what appears to be more of a political than a peace process. If it is true that the Kurdish question has long prevented Turkey from being a full democracy, it is also true that a democratic solution is hard to imagine in a context of ongoing repression of opposition voices.

Paradoxically, a long list of opposition mayors, including Istanbul’s mayor Imamoglu, was arrested with initial charges of connection with terrorist organizations. A similar practice of dismissing and replacing city mayors has not stopped in Kurdish majoritarian areas. Overall, following the March 2025 wave of protests, the government has increased its grip on power, curbing the media and further restraining the space for dissent. This contradiction may limit the legitimacy of the peace initiative, particularly if it appears driven more by political calculus than by a genuine commitment to reconciliation, especially in a context where the Turkish public remains generally skeptical.

If the process unfolds positively, the consequences would be far-reaching. The state would no longer be locked into a costly and politically polarizing conflict. Funds and energy currently devoted to security operations could be redirected to economic and social priorities. Relations with neighbors could improve. Turkey’s global image, particularly among Western partners, could benefit from a more constructive and less securitized domestic agenda.

Once again, the Kurdish movement has reemerged as a pivotal actor in shaping the political future of the Levant. The current moment may offer a more favorable alignment of interests than in the past. But much remains uncertain, especially with the possibility of early elections in Turkey as soon as 2027. This makes the months ahead critical. Whether this becomes a historic breakthrough or another missed opportunity will depend on the choices made now.

The PKK’s Disarmament and Turkey’s Fragile Search for Peace: Transitional or Transactional Justice?

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/19/the-pkks-disarmament-and-turkeys-fragile-search-for-peace-transitional-or-transactional-justice/

by Riccardo Gasco, by Samuele C.A. Abrami, by Bahar Baser

|

09.19.2025 at 06:00am

July 11, 2025, may come to represent a historic moment for Turkey and its neighborhood. During a symbolic ceremony in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, a small group of fighters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) laid down their weapons after four decades of a conflict that killed over 40,000 people. This hardly foreseeable scene followed a public appeal by the group’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan. Broadcasted via video from the Imrali prison, where he has been jailed since 1999, his first message in over twenty-five years reiterated his recent call for the complete disbandment and disarmament of the PKK.

The magnitude of the moment is also demonstrated by the same Kurdish leaders who, 10 years ago, declared the end of the previous attempted peace process and the continuation of the armed fight. Now, figures like senior PKK member Cemil Bayik and co-chair of the Kurdistan Communities Union Hülya Oran (aka Bese Hozat), reiterated Ocalan’s message by stressing that the time for reforms has now come. Although suspicion and hope are intertwined at the grassroots level, the overall reaction of Kurds worldwide has been largely positive.

This is not the first attempt at peace, but many people in and outside Turkey hope it will be the last. Numerous overt and covert efforts have failed in the past, leading many to question whether the time is truly ripe for a new peace process —one that can bring sustainable peace not only to Turkey but also to the broader region. With a cauldron full of their weapons set ablaze, the return of PKK fighters to their camps metaphorically sends the ball back into the hands of the Turkish government, leaving many questions open on what lies ahead for a full-fledged resolution of the conflict. This implies that the government is now expected to go beyond pure military and security confrontations by paving the way for several reforms to meet some of the Kurdish requests at the sociopolitical level. A new parliamentary commission is yet to be set to oversee the process. Yet, the timing, context, and actors involved suggest that something has shifted, and that, potentially, this time, there might not be a way back.

An end to the armed conflict would undoubtedly benefit Turkey domestically and bolster its confidence in pursuing a more assertive role in the region. The broader regional dimension cannot be overlooked, let alone Turkey’s preoccupation with the uphill prospects of Kurdish integration into the new transitional government in Syria. What is clear is that developments across Turkish domestic politics, Syria’s state-building efforts, and the presence of other groups in challenging Iraq’s sovereignty are converging into a new and complex political moment. Whether this marks a genuine turning point or another short-lived opening remains uncertain. The pace of change has surprised many. But the real test lies ahead. The ceremony in Sulaymaniyah and Öcalan’s appeal are rich in symbolism. But symbolism alone is not enough. The real test lies in implementation. Will the PKK leadership follow Öcalan’s call? Will Ankara match its promises with consistent policy steps? And will both sides be willing to engage society in the process rather than managing it from behind closed doors?

A Long War, a New Message. But Why Now?

When Abdullah Öcalan called for the PKK to disarm on February 27, it was more than a symbolic gesture. Not only was it communicated through the so-called Imrali delegation, composed of members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), but his statement also challenged the ideological legacy that once legitimized the PKK’s armed struggle. Founded in the late 1970s as an independentist movement, the group was shaped by the political turbulence of the post-1980 coup in Turkey and had its roots in Cold War Marxism. Over the decades, it adapted to changing conditions and found ways to survive despite all odds. Indeed, several overlapping factors explain the reasons behind the group’s dismantling.

A critical watershed was the failure of the previous peace process in 2015, when urban warfare resumed in southeastern Turkey. In the years that followed, Ankara significantly intensified and sophisticated its military operations against Kurdish militancy, considerably weakening the PKK and its organizational capacity. Turkish military superiority also coincided – or even prompted – the emergence and popularity of more moderate pro-Kurdish parties within Turkish politics’ electoral competition. As such, the PKK itself also gradually shifted from a demand for independence to calls for cultural rights and regional autonomy based on the concept of democratic confederalism.

In a sense, today, Öcalan’s message acknowledged that the ideological and geopolitical foundations of the PKK no longer hold. He described the group’s Cold War-era logic as obsolete and called for a transition from armed resistance to political dialogue. This is not the first time that the PKK has shifted its axis or transformed its strategy according to the needs of time. Already in the 1990s, the PKK had shifted to a more human rights-based framing of their needs and gave the signals that an independent state could not be the ultimate goal. In the 1990s, there were multiple ceasefires, which made it clear that the PKK might consider a negotiated solution over a military one. During the previous peace process, which collapsed in 2015, the Kurdish movement was promoting democratic autonomy and was already ready to rebrand the PKK. Throughout the years, there was a strategic axis shift from secessionist nationalism to grassroots democracy and minority rights while keeping Turkey’s existing borders. Öcalan’s recent appeal, however, was remarkable not only for its content but for how it resonated across a regional environment that has changed dramatically in a decade. Today, the PKK operates across several fronts. It maintains networks in Iraq, Syria, and Europe, and exercises indirect influence through affiliated movements such as the People Protection Units (YPG) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Over the years, Ankara has spent billions of dollars in its fight against the PKK, dedicating substantial resources not only in economic terms but also in logistics, politics, and intelligence operations. Any attempt to dismantle or transform the PKK, as well as to address the Kurdish question more broadly, is undoubtedly the result of dynamics operating both within and outside Turkey.

A Region in Flux: Peace Abroad, Peace at Home

Everything comes in the same week that the pro-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces and the new Syrian transition government led by Ahmed Al-Sharra held another round of negotiations, mediated by the US and France, aimed at the integration of Kurdish fighters into the emerging Syrian National Army. This agreement, first reached in March, is still unfolding and keeps representing one of Turkey’s main concerns at its borders. Ultimately, questions remain open about whether the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government’s support for this process will cement or split Kurdish demands in Iraq.

Amid uncertainty, much depends on the role and next moves of the United States. In recent years, Washington has begun reducing its military footprint in Syria, with an impulse after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The prospects of a power vacuum created uncertainty for Kurdish groups like the SDF and the YPG, who previously relied on Washington’s protection, particularly in the northeast. Thanks to their decisive role in the international coalition against ISIS, they earned the respect of several international governments. Yet, Ankara’s view of the YPG as an extension of the PKK terrorist network has long been a source of tension with its Western partners and other regional actors.

Second, the regional order is in flux after the October 7 attacks by Hamas. The subsequent escalation between Israel, Iran, and the United States has increased Turkish concerns about domestic and cross-border security. In this climate, internal stability becomes a strategic asset for Ankara to prevent spillover effects. A functioning peace process with the Kurds could allow Turkey to reallocate political and military resources to other pressing fronts and pursue a more assertive policy in the region with boosted self-confidence and capacity. As a matter of fact, this time, pressure from Washington could work in its favor. The US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria, Thomas Barrack, seems uneasy with the lack of progress in the talks between al-Shara and the SDF. As such, this also presents an opportunity for Turkey to mend its relations with the US and, consequently, increase its leverage in Syria and beyond.

In such a context, Kurdish actors may now be more inclined to seek political accommodation rather than risk military confrontation. Yet only their full sociopolitical and military integration within the new Syrian government can represent a real step forward. Otherwise, this risks fomenting disengagements among Kurdish groups about whether to seek dialogue or split into new armed formations to maintain independence from central governments.

The Delicate Calculations at Home

At home, the political atmosphere has also shifted quickly. Although Turkish politics never cease to surprise, the handshake in parliament between Devlet Bahçeli, the ultranationalist MHP leader and Erdogan ally, and members of the DEM Party earlier last year caught everyone by surprise. There is no doubt that such a move by a figure with a long record of staunch anti-Kurdish positions opened a window that few could have anticipated. For those who are familiar with peace processes worldwide, it is no surprise that secret talks might have taken place behind closed doors.

Surely, having Bahçeli on the forefront was strategic for Erdogan to maintain a more cautious approach. The fact that the initiative was initially labeled only as “Terror-free Turkey” is quite telling about his bet: in case of success, taking full political credit for resolving the most contentious issue in Turkey’s history; in case of failure, being ready to pull out and increase nationalistic tones, or even a resort to securitization. Lately, seeing Öcalan’s call closer to materializing, Erdogan softened his rhetoric and began referring to a broader social peace, acknowledging the state’s historical failures in addressing the Kurdish issue.

However, considering the current political context in Turkey, it is difficult to view his recent moves as purely genuine. Instead, they seem driven by necessity. Faced with shrinking electoral support, growing opposition momentum, and the limits imposed by the constitution on his political future, Erdoğan appears to be recalibrating his strategy. It comes as no surprise that experts ask for a more cautious approach while underlining that the peace process should not become a smokescreen for deepening authoritarianism.

It is now clear that, after more than two decades in power, President Erdoğan is facing the most serious political crisis since 2003, the year his party first came to power on the promise of stability and reform. Back then, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), offered hope to a country weary of coalition governments, economic instability, and political uncertainty. The rest, from the 2013 Gezi Park protests — a nationwide wave of demonstrations sparked by environmental concerns but quickly expanding into a broader challenge to Erdoğan’s rule — to the 2016 failed coup attempt, is well known. The coup’s failure triggered a sweeping purge of perceived opponents, a drastic centralization of power, and an ensuing period of accelerating authoritarianism and democratic backsliding. Today, the crisis is tangible, and Erdoğan’s struggle to retain control appears to be pushing him to reconsider even the most sensitive issues, first among them, the Kurdish question. Some argue that Erdoğan has always had an interest in resolving the Kurdish issue through peaceful means, as evidenced by the 2015 peace initiative.

However, the reality tells that over the years, Erdoğan and his party have gradually lost popular support, culminating in the 2019 local elections, which saw the oppositional Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) win the country’s largest cities for the first time. The 2024 local elections confirmed this shift when, for the first time, the CHP surpassed the AKP in absolute terms at the national level. These events marked the beginning of new opposition leaders and practices in Turkish politics, where, despite its authoritarian outlook, electoral competition kept existing. Above all, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu rose to national prominence as a figure many viewed as the only serious challenger to Erdoğan, at least until his imprisonment in March on charges of corruption and terrorism.

That is why, facing growing pressure and possibly looking to amend the constitution to remain in power beyond 2028, President Erdoğan has opened to dialogue with the Kurdish movement. His approach towards the peace process seems not as enthusiastic as it was during the Kurdish Opening before the failed peace process in 2015. Yet, he might perceive the resolution of the armed conflict as beneficial for his party as well as his own standing. Indeed, for any constitutional reform, support from the DEM is the only possible way to achieve a constitutional amendment. This reality creates a shared, if fragile, interest in engagement. Whether this leads to a lasting resolution or merely serves short-term political survival remains an open question.

As the process has not been fully transparent, the jury is out whether the negotiations overlap with the topics that were previously covered in the Dolmabahce meetings and were supposed to constitute a roadmap. The public has still not been fully informed about what kind of peace is on offer. Is Turkey moving towards transitional justice — a topic that has been widely discussed between 2013 and 2015? Will the negotiations end with a meaningful settlement that comes with a genuine reckoning with past violence, inclusion of Kurdish political voices in mainstream politics, and, more importantly, a much demanded and needed institutional reform? Or, are the sceptics right about interpreting the process as a transactional interaction between the two sides without embedded approaches toward justice and reconciliation? In other words, are we witnessing transactional justice, or partial peace, where both sides are focusing on short-term gains without really addressing the root causes of the conflict?

Blind Spots and Stakes for Turkish Democracy

The core question remains: what does the Kurdish side gain in exchange for the PKK’s disarmament?

Erdogan announced the formation of a parliamentary commission to oversee the legal steps of the peace process, suggesting a more institutionalized and transparent approach than in previous attempts. This is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, these commissions are key legislative bodies that can propose legal reforms and provide oversight on sensitive political processes, such as the ongoing process. Secondly, unlike the informal wisemen commissions of the previous process, this new commission will form a more formal approach as it is embedded within the Turkish Grand National Assembly. It can produce a more institutionalized and less haphazard approach.

By August 5, it became clear that the process is elite-driven and there is not much room for grassroots-level interventions. This is not to say that the process is doomed to fail due to a lack of civil society interventions at these early stages. Many peace processes in the world, from Colombia to South Africa, benefited from parliamentary interventions, cross-party commissions, or special legislative commissions for peace. These tools and implementation methods, which fast-tracked and oversaw laws, opened up platforms for debates surrounding peace and reconciliation. By including elected members of the parliament, they created trust and a sense of democratic legitimacy among the people, who also need to be persuaded for sustainable peace.

On August 5, 2025, the Turkish Parliament launched a 51-member committee, officially named the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Committee,” to oversee the peace initiative. It includes representatives from nearly all major parties, including the opposition. Among these parties, attention centers on those with greater representation, as they have the potential to alter the balance of power during voting. The CHP has joined, demanding overall democratization measures in the process. Despite a potential backlash from its nationalist constituencies by joining the committee, the CHP made a brave move, and it can be said that its participation lends the process a degree of national consensus that previous efforts lacked. Moreover, its participation in the committee also makes it harder for opponents to frame the initiative as purely an Erdoğan/AKP–DEM (pro-Kurdish) pact. The CHP members also underlined that their focus is on the rule of law, separation of powers, and press freedom, which in the long run unpacks the issues related to democratic backsliding in Turkey. The nationalist-secular Good Party (IYI) declined participation and organized numerous meetings all around Turkey to criticize the process. However, as it stands, it does not have enough leverage to spoil the process. The DEM made declarations stating that they support a democratic framework, including collective rights for Kurds (such as education in their mother tongue and steps toward strengthening self-local governance) as well as demands for revisiting Öcalan’s sentence. The committee’s second session was held on August 8 under closed-door conditions — all proceedings have been classified as state secrets for at least the next decade, and the transcripts of the meetings will be sealed until at least 2035. This move aims at protecting negotiators from domestic pressure and paves the way for giving room for compromise.

What Lies Ahead

One could think of this as a period of transitional justice, characterized by incremental reforms. Yet, at the constitutional level, there are limits to what can be negotiated. Foundational articles such as those defining the name of the Republic or the status of the Turkish language are unlikely to be amended. However, other provisions, including Article 66 on citizenship and Article 42 on education rights, may be brought to the table. These changes could serve as legal entry points for a new, more inclusive framework of political belonging, but are less likely to address the core sociopolitical cleavages embedded in Turkey’s history.

Second, there are concerns about selective communication and a lack of transparency in the process. The fact that the talks are managed by Turkey’s intelligence agency (MIT) and that Öcalan remains the key interlocutor, evidences the absence of a real political and inclusive roadmap. Some reports suggest that not all members of the İmralı delegation are fully informed of the steps being taken. Such a top-down approach leaves little clarity about who speaks for the Kurds beyond the PKK and makes it difficult to see any role for civil society actors. Ankara may believe that secrecy is necessary to avoid sabotage. However, such an approach could create mistrust and limit the chances of building lasting public support for any final agreement.

Ultimately, building trust and talking of democratic peace in an increasingly authoritarian context makes it no easier. Government officials have hinted at the possibility of amnesty for Kurdish prisoners. The release of figures like Selahattin Demirtaş, the jailed former co-chair of the HDP, would send a strong positive message about the government’s intentions. Yet, the stalemate on the issue highlights the contradiction between what appears to be more of a political than a peace process. If it is true that the Kurdish question has long prevented Turkey from being a full democracy, it is also true that a democratic solution is hard to imagine in a context of ongoing repression of opposition voices.

Paradoxically, a long list of opposition mayors, including Istanbul’s mayor Imamoglu, was arrested with initial charges of connection with terrorist organizations. A similar practice of dismissing and replacing city mayors has not stopped in Kurdish majoritarian areas. Overall, following the March 2025 wave of protests, the government has increased its grip on power, curbing the media and further restraining the space for dissent. This contradiction may limit the legitimacy of the peace initiative, particularly if it appears driven more by political calculus than by a genuine commitment to reconciliation, especially in a context where the Turkish public remains generally skeptical.

If the process unfolds positively, the consequences would be far-reaching. The state would no longer be locked into a costly and politically polarizing conflict. Funds and energy currently devoted to security operations could be redirected to economic and social priorities. Relations with neighbors could improve. Turkey’s global image, particularly among Western partners, could benefit from a more constructive and less securitized domestic agenda.

Once again, the Kurdish movement has reemerged as a pivotal actor in shaping the political future of the Levant. The current moment may offer a more favorable alignment of interests than in the past. But much remains uncertain, especially with the possibility of early elections in Turkey as soon as 2027. This makes the months ahead critical. Whether this becomes a historic breakthrough or another missed opportunity will depend on the choices made now.

Tags: Kurdish militias, PKK, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey

About The Authors

• 
  
• Riccardo Gasco
• Riccardo Gasco is a PhD, Researcher at Bologna University and Foreign Policy Program Coordinator at IstanPol Institute. His research focuses on Turkish foreign and domestic politics, Europe, and the Middle East.
• View all posts 
• 
  
• Samuele C.A. Abrami
• Samuele C.A. Abrami is a Researcher at CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs). He has a PhD from UCSC in Milan, with a project about Turkish foreign policy. After years of fieldwork, he was selected as a Mercator-IPC Fellow (2024/25) at the Istanbul Policy Center (Turkey) to research Turkey-EU security relations.
• View all posts 
• 
  
• Bahar Baser
• Bahar Baser is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Durham University. Her research focuses on diasporas, transnational politics, conflict transformation, and the international relations of the Middle East.

17. Beyond Resilience: A Nuanced Framework for Conceptualizing Resistance Networks

This is a reprise of the original from Strategy Central. If it is good enough to share and read once, it should be shared and read twice.

​Excerpts:

Beyond academic interest, these conceptual distinctions profoundly affect national security policy and defense planning. For smaller nations facing threats from conventionally superior neighbors, the difference between resilience, robustness, and antifragility may determine whether resistance capabilities serve as a credible deterrent. When potential aggressors recognize that occupation will trigger not merely persistent resistance but resistance that systematically strengthens during occupation, delaying consolidation and increasing costs, the strategic calculus fundamentally changes.

This framework demands reconsideration of defense resource allocation as a matter of policy. Traditional deterrence based primarily on conventional capabilities may be supplemented—or partially replaced—by investments in robust, resilient, and antifragile networks. Such investments may prove cost-effective for nations with limited defense budgets facing adversaries holding significant conventional advantages.

Incorporating these distinctions into defense planning enables more precise capability development and burden-sharing for alliances such as NATO. Nations with geographical vulnerability to rapid occupation might prioritize robustness and antifragility, while allied partners focus on supporting resilience through external assistance capabilities.

Future research should explore the practical implementation of this framework across different regional contexts and threat scenarios. Identifying additional metrics to assess network component attributes and measure improvement would provide valuable tools for resistance planners to prepare the environment and identify capability gaps. Examining how these qualities interact in specific historical and contemporary resistance movements would offer insights into their relative importance under different occupation scenarios.

For nations facing the threat of external aggression, particularly those concerned with territorial defense against conventionally superior adversaries, these distinctions may determine whether resistance efforts succeed or fail. By adopting this more precise framework, resistance planners can develop preparation strategies that address the qualities of effective networks rather than focusing exclusively on resilience. This approach recognizes that effective resistance demands not just the will to resist but the organizational capabilities to translate that will into sustained, effective opposition against superior conventional forces—capabilities that must be deliberately cultivated through distinct development strategies tailored to each attribute’s unique requirements.

As irregular warfare and limited territorial encroachments become increasingly significant features of the international security landscape, this refined understanding offers both practitioners and scholars a more nuanced framework for analyzing and developing resistance capabilities that match the complexity of contemporary conflicts.

Beyond Resilience: A Nuanced Framework for Conceptualizing Resistance Networks

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/19/resilience-robustness-antifragility-resistance-planning/

by Duc Duclos, by Chad Machiela

|

09.19.2025 at 06:00am

Editor’s note: This article was originally published on Strategy Central on March 16, 2025. This article is republished here with the expressed consent of the editor at Strategy Central.

“The bamboo that bends is stronger than the oak that resists.”

— Japanese Proverb

“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change.”

— Charles Darwin

“That which does not kill us makes us stronger.”

— Friedrich Nietzsche

Introduction:

The Resistance Operating Concept (ROC), published by the United States Special Operations Command Joint Special Operations University (USSOCOM JSOU) and the Swedish Defense University in 2020, advanced resistance planning discourse. However, its conceptualization of building resilience as primarily a preparatory activity presents critical limitations. While the ROC provides essential frameworks for understanding how societies can prepare for and carry out resistance operations when conventional deterrence and defense measures fail, it offers an incomplete picture for assessing and preparing the operational environment through network development.

The language used to describe resistance capabilities shapes how capabilities are evaluated, developed, and employed. When planners and practitioners lack precise terminology to distinguish between organizational qualities, strategies may be incomplete, and valuable resources may be misaligned. A more nuanced vocabulary and assessment framework enables a more effective assessment of strengths and vulnerabilities, precise development of specific capabilities, and more effective employment of resistance networks. Critical gaps may remain unaddressed without precision, and scarce resources may be allocated to redundant capabilities.

Some planners equate resilience solely with a society’s psychological “will to resist” occupation. While societal determination and a population at the mobilization threshold certainly contribute to resistance potential, assessing resilience primarily as a psychological measure overlooks the structural and operational capabilities required of resistance networks. Rather than a precondition to resistance, societal resilience should be evaluated as a resource that can simultaneously support deterrence, defense, and resistance efforts. The will to resist must be evaluated further to distinguish between psychological resilience or readiness and the practical capabilities needed for resistance networks to function effectively under pressure. While assessing the will to resist is essential, the resulting measures will not address resilience operational requirements, which must be evaluated separately.

Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion (where resistance occurs in concert with conventional defense) and ongoing tensions in regions like the South China Sea (where nations face incremental territorial encroachment rather than violent seizure) demand a more sophisticated analytical framework for measuring and developing resilience. Russia’s “creeping annexation” in Georgia, China’s island-building in the South China Sea, and Russia’s tactics in eastern Ukraine, where specific territories are occupied rather than complete national conquest, demonstrate the requirement for nations to develop resistance capabilities to complement conventional military defense.

These “gray zone” activities short of war, or what may be termed “micro-occupations,” involve the capture of strategically valuable territory, critical infrastructure, or terrain from which to exert further influence. In this context, resistance should not be viewed merely as the final phase in a linear progression. Instead, nations must cultivate multidimensional capabilities encompassing the entire spectrum of conflict, with resistance elements potentially activating before or alongside conventional operations or in areas where traditional defense has faltered.

Resilience should not be viewed as merely a preparatory phase for resistance, nor as a catch-all term for the varied organizational attributes required for resistance networks to survive and thrive under pressure. Biology, sociology, and other fields provide concepts useful in assessing network characteristics ranging from individual psychology to group behavior in complex adaptive systems and provide valuable parallels that can enhance understanding of how resistance networks function, adapt, and even strengthen through adversity.

Effective resistance requires three distinct qualities: resilience, robustness, and antifragility. Each quality describes a distinct network quality requiring different development requirements. Organizational theory, complex adaptive systems research, and historical resistance case studies demonstrate how distinguishing between these critical attributes may give scholars and practitioners more precise conceptual tools for resistance planning.

Theoretical Foundations

While resilience, robustness, and antifragility are sometimes used interchangeably in security literature, for network and social movement theorists, these terms carry significantly different implications for how resistance networks should be designed, trained, and operationalized.

In ecology, Holling defined resilience as a system’s ability to absorb change while maintaining its essential function and structure. This concept was later expanded by Walker and Salt, who distinguished between engineering resilience (the speed of return to equilibrium) and ecological resilience (the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed). Organizational theorists like Weick and Sutcliffe explored resilience as high-reliability organizations’ capacity to maintain operations during crises through mindfulness and adaptation. In military contexts, resilience traditionally focuses on a force’s ability to absorb attacks, recover quickly, and continue functioning despite adversity.

Robustness, often conflated with resilience, has distinct characteristics relevant to resistance planning. Jen defines robustness as a system’s ability to maintain its basic functionality across various conditions without the requirement to adapt or recover. In network theory, Albert, Jeong, and Barabási demonstrated how some network structures exhibit robust characteristics against random and targeted attacks through redundancy and distributive properties. Doyle et al. further distinguished robustness from resilience by noting that robust systems “do not change significantly under perturbation,” whereas resilient systems may change substantially while maintaining core functions. In defense planning, robustness emphasizes hardened systems that resist compromise through structural characteristics rather than recovery capabilities.

Antifragility, introduced by Nassim Nicholas Taleb in Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder, describes systems that endure stress and benefit and improve. Robust networks endure stress without fragmentation, and resilient networks recover quickly from stress and damage. Antifragile systems strengthen and grow when subject to stressors. Weightlifting exercises, for example, stress the human body by tearing muscle fibers, which recover and grow to make the body capable of lifting more weight. Antifragile systems thrive in disorder. Johnson and Gheorghe applied antifragility to complex adaptive systems, recommending a process for measuring antifragility in systems of systems. Antifragility offers a groundbreaking approach for resistance movements encountering conventional superiority, where pressure from occupying forces becomes a catalyst for organizational strengthening rather than degradation.

These three qualities describe a network’s reaction or vulnerability to external pressure: robust systems resist shock, resilient systems recover from shock, and antifragile systems improve after shock (if these systems have sufficient robustness to survive the shock). Each represents a distinct organizational characteristic that resistance network planners must cultivate to operate effectively against often better-equipped conventional forces. Understanding these distinctions enables resistance planners to develop comprehensive preparation strategies that address all three qualities rather than focusing exclusively on the ability to recover quickly.

Resilience: Adaptation and Recovery

Resilience in resistance networks manifests as the capacity to recover quickly from shocks, adapt to changing conditions, and recover operational effectiveness following setbacks. This attribute focuses specifically on flexibility and regenerative capabilities—how networks reconstitute themselves after significant disruption.

European resistance movements during World War II demonstrated resilience while recovering from devastating security breaches. The Norwegian resistance rebuilt itself multiple times following Gestapo penetrations in 1942-43, developing increasingly sophisticated compartmentalization protocols after each wave of arrests. Similarly, Danish resistance networks reconstituted their leadership structures and communication channels following the German roundup of resistance leaders in 1944, resuming sabotage operations within weeks.

More recently, Syrian opposition networks demonstrated remarkable resilience during the civil war, reconstituting command structures and adapting operational methods following the effective regime targeting of leadership figures in 2012-2013. Despite losing entire command cells in Damascus and Homs, these networks reestablished operational capabilities through pre-planned succession mechanisms and distributed decision-making authority.

Resilient resistance networks develop specific mechanisms that enable recovery from disruption:

1. Reorganization protocols allow networks to restructure compromised cells while preserving unaffected components, often through decentralized decision-making units that activate after leadership losses and information-sharing processes that connect specific knowledge of changing tactical conditions with decision-makers.
2. Alternative capabilities include backup systems, redundant communication channels, and contingency plans that provide operational continuity during organizational stress.
3. Learning processes that extract lessons from failures and translate this knowledge into adapted tactics, techniques, and procedures.

For resistance planners, increasing resilience requires establishing distributed leadership development programs, creating effective information sharing systems, and implementing regular “stress test” exercises that simulate network disruption and practice recovery procedures. These investments must occur during peacetime to ensure recovery mechanisms function effectively under occupation. Planners must, however, balance the increased effectiveness of responsive communication systems against the decreased operational security inherent in centralized networks. Too many connections between cells increase the vulnerability of all cells if one resistance cell is compromised.

The French Resistance exemplified resilience after the catastrophic arrests of key leaders in 1943. Rather than collapsing, the movement reorganized into smaller, more distributed networks, adapted communication procedures, and ultimately emerged with improved operational security. Similar patterns appeared in the Lithuanian Forest Brothers’ resistance against Soviet occupation, where the movement repeatedly adapted its structure and tactics despite overwhelming pressure.

Robustness: Structural Integrity Under Pressure

While resilience describes recovery and adaptation after shock or disruption, robustness describes a resistance network’s ability to withstand pressure without fragmentation and continue functioning. Planners building resilience assume that damage to a network will occur and create recovery processes. Planners building robustness create processes, structural design, and redundant systems, allowing a network to maintain function despite shocks.

Robust networks maintain their core functionality through structural characteristics that minimize vulnerability to disruption. These networks can be assessed through several metrics, including the number of nodes that must be neutralized to disable critical functions, the degree of redundancy in command and communication systems, and the network’s ability to maintain operational tempo despite adversary operations.

The cellular structure pioneered by communist underground movements and refined by numerous resistance organizations demonstrates robustness in practice. These networks create inherent protection against cascading failure following security breaches by compartmentalizing information and limiting connections between cells. This organizational design ensures that the compromise of one cell does not automatically lead to the exposure of others, enabling continued operations despite partial network penetration.

Redundant systems—duplicating leadership, communication channels, and resource caches—prevent single points of failure from compromising the entire network. This redundancy appears in physical resources and capability distribution, where multiple cells possess similar operational skills, allowing the network to maintain functionality even when specific units are neutralized.

Since 2014, Ukrainian volunteer networks have demonstrated exceptional robustness through their decentralized logistics systems, which continued delivering critical supplies to frontline units despite Russian targeting efforts. Their use of multiple, independent supply chains with minimal central coordination created inherent robustness against disruption. Similarly, Hezbollah’s development since the 1980s illustrates organizational robustness. Its layered security measures, distributed command structure, and redundant communication systems allowed it to maintain operational continuity despite intensive Israeli targeting efforts.

Physical manifestations of robustness include the extensive tunnel complexes and dispersed supply caches maintained by the Viet Cong, which provided material robustness that sustained the movement through years of American offensives. These hardened infrastructures—both physical and organizational—reduce vulnerability to detection and neutralization.

Robustness is particularly crucial during the initial phases of occupation when counterinsurgency forces typically launch their most intensive efforts to prevent resistance from establishing itself. Without inherent structural protection, nascent resistance networks may be eliminated before developing the resilience mechanisms needed for long-term survival and effectiveness.

The distinction between robustness and resilience carries significant implications for resistance planning. While resilience involves developing procedures for recovery after disruption, robustness requires fundamental structural decisions about network architecture, communication protocols, and resource distribution that must be implemented before a crisis occurs. Procedures for developing resilience and robustness must consider associated changes in operational security and network efficiency. Resistance networks require both qualities, but planners must recognize that resilience and robustness require balanced approaches.

Antifragility: Converting Adversity to Advantage

Ideal resistance networks exhibit antifragility—not merely withstanding or recovering from disruption but leveraging it to become stronger. A resilient network will recover quickly from an adversary’s disinformation attack. A robust network will maintain operations despite an adversary’s disinformation attack. An antifragile network will incorporate the adversary’s disinformation into its information operations and use its messages to mobilize support from the populace and target the adversary’s delivery method. An antifragile network converts adversary pressure into organizational advantages.

Antifragile resistance networks develop four critical capabilities that transform adversity into strength. First, they implement rapid tactical learning cycles that allow innovations to emerge and disseminate throughout the network in response to enemy actions. Second, they utilize staged escalation protocols that activate increasingly sophisticated capabilities as pressure intensifies. Third, they establish stress-triggered growth mechanisms where recruitment, popular support, and operational legitimacy increase during heightened repression. Finally, they maintain a distributed innovation system where tactical and strategic improvements emerge organically from field units rather than relying solely on centralized authority.

History offers many examples. The mujahideen in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation demonstrated remarkable antifragility, developing increasingly sophisticated tactics and weapons systems in response to Soviet operations. Each Soviet offensive generated new tactical innovations that spread throughout the resistance. Initial Soviet armor attacks prompted the development of advanced ambush techniques; subsequent Soviet air mobility operations triggered new counter-helicopter tactics; and later, Soviet counterinsurgency sweeps accelerated the mujahideen’s transition to more mobile operational structures. Rather than degrading the resistance, each Soviet adaptation inadvertently strengthened it.

Similarly, the Irish Republican Army’s evolution during the Troubles demonstrated organizational antifragility, as British security measures paradoxically accelerated the IRA’s transformation into a more secure, cell-based structure. The introduction of internment without trial in 1971 dramatically increased recruitment and popular support, while enhanced surveillance operations prompted the development of counterintelligence capabilities that significantly improved operational security. By 1977, British pressure had transformed the IRA from a conventional military structure into a sophisticated cellular organization with greatly enhanced resilience and robustness.

The Taliban’s evolution against NATO forces provides a compelling contemporary example. Rather than being degraded by coalition operations, the movement continually adapted and improved over two decades. Coalition targeting of leadership figures accelerated their development of distributed command systems. Surveillance and signals intelligence operations drove innovations in communications security. Counter-IED efforts prompted the development of more sophisticated explosive devices and trigger mechanisms. By 2021, the Taliban possessed greater tactical sophistication and improved command and control systems. They exercised more territorial influence than before NATO’s intervention, demonstrating that pressure can paradoxically strengthen resistance movements with antifragile characteristics.

Antifragility is the most challenging quality to cultivate, as it depends upon organizational culture and information-sharing processes rather than easily codified hierarchical structures. However, its potential strategic value is immense—the ability to systematically convert adversary pressure into organizational advantage fundamentally alters the traditional calculus of asymmetric conflict. While conventional wisdom suggests that superior forces should eventually degrade resistance movements, antifragile networks invert this assumption by growing stronger through adversity.

Nietzsche observed, “What does not kill me makes me stronger,” a principle that applies as much to resistance organizations as to individuals. By developing antifragile characteristics, resistance movements can transform the strategic landscape, converting the occupier’s primary advantage—superior conventional force—into a potential liability that inadvertently strengthens the resistance it aims to defeat.

Implications for Resistance Planning

These distinctions between resilience, robustness, and antifragility carry significant practical implications for nations developing resistance frameworks. Rather than focusing exclusively on resilience as conceptualized in the ROC, planners must cultivate network attributes through distinct preparation strategies that balance network effectiveness against operational security and distributed decision-making against effective mission command and resource management.

Developing resilience requires investing in leadership succession planning, distributed knowledge management, and systematic learning processes. Training programs should emphasize adaptability to rapidly changing circumstances and procedures for reconstitution following network disruptions. Exercises must regularly practice recovery from simulated network compromise, allowing operators to develop experiential knowledge of how to rebuild damaged organizational components. Most importantly, resilience development requires creating an organizational culture that expects disruption rather than being paralyzed by it—one that views recovery as a standard operational function rather than an exceptional circumstance.

The Norwegian Home Guard’s creation of “stay-behind” networks during the Cold War exemplifies effective resilience planning. These networks established multiple leadership succession plans, distributed operational knowledge across numerous independent cells, and conducted regular exercises simulating network penetration scenarios. Similarly, Baltic resistance preparations include detailed planning for leadership continuity and knowledge preservation under occupation conditions.

Building robustness requires careful consideration of organizational design, especially cellular structures with connections between units that balance effectiveness against operational security. Centralized, well-connected networks often operate more quickly and effectively than decentralized networks, with efficient resource allocation. This effectiveness and efficiency come at a cost: vulnerability to detection and interdiction. Network architecture must maximize effectiveness while managing the network’s vulnerability to cascading failure. Effective implementation of security protocols, counterintelligence capabilities, and redundant systems necessitates significant investment during peacetime. Physical infrastructure, including secure communication systems, resource caches, and covert facilities, must be established before a crisis occurs. This infrastructure requires time to develop, test, and rehearse securely and cannot be rapidly created during occupation.

The Swiss resistance preparation model demonstrates effective robustness planning through its distributed resource caching, redundant communication systems, and carefully designed organizational compartmentalization. Finland’s comprehensive security approach emphasizes robustness through physically hardened infrastructure and distributed command capabilities.

Cultivating antifragility may pose the most significant challenge to military planners due to their familiarity and comfort with their own units’ hierarchical structure and processes. Counter to standard US mission command, where authority is often maintained at the operational level to manage risk and resources rather than delegated to tactical commanders, resistance planners must create an environment where innovation, hazard mitigation, and risk acceptance are implemented at the tactical level. Planners must develop systems to capture and share successful adaptations across the network and establish recruitment mechanisms that trigger during increased pressure to take advantage of rising anti-occupation sentiment within the populace and external actors. Perhaps most importantly, antifragility requires developing leaders who view pressure as an opportunity for organizational evolution rather than merely a hazard to be mitigated.

Taiwan’s whole-of-society resistance preparations incorporate elements of antifragility by emphasizing dispersed innovation capacity and mechanisms to accelerate capability development under crisis conditions. Similarly, Ukrainian territorial defense planning includes provisions for expanding recruitment and capability development in response to occupation pressures.

Resistance preparation requires the intentional development of resilience, robustness, and antifragility, recognizing the complementary nature of these attributes. Resilience without robustness creates recovery-dependent networks that waste resources on continuous reconstitution. Robustness without resilience produces brittle networks that collapse without recovery capability once compromised beyond their inherent protection thresholds. Robust, resilient networks without antifragility condemn resistance movements to gradual degradation against persistent adversaries.

Conclusion: A More Sophisticated Framework

The language and conceptual frameworks used to understand resistance preparation require greater precision than the broad term “resilience” allows. By distinguishing between resilience, robustness, and antifragility, planners can develop more sophisticated resistance frameworks tailored to the complex challenges of modern conflict. This refined vocabulary facilitates more targeted capability development, more accurate vulnerability assessment, and more effective preparation and operational deployment of resistance networks.

The Resistance Operating Concept has contributed to our understanding of resistance preparation, particularly by highlighting the criticality of pre-crisis planning. To build on this foundation, we must expand our conceptual framework to address the complex organizational needs of effective resistance networks. The network attributes discussed in this analysis provide complementary yet distinct strategies for maintaining operational effectiveness under pressure: resilience allows recovery from disruption, robustness averts disruption through structural characteristics, and antifragility transforms disruption into organizational advantage.

Recent conflicts highlight the critical importance of a more nuanced understanding of networks. Russia’s operations in Ukraine have shown how resistance functions alongside conventional defense rather than merely supporting it. China’s gray zone activities in the South China Sea demonstrate how territorial encroachment and loss of territory occurs through limited “micro-occupations” instead of full-scale conquest. In both scenarios, resistance requires capabilities beyond mere resilience; it demands strong operational security against sophisticated surveillance and the antifragile ability to turn escalating pressure into improved capabilities.

Assessing Capabilities: Practical Metrics

For resistance planners seeking to evaluate their current preparedness, specific metrics can provide valuable assessment tools for each attribute:

Resilience can be measured through:

• Recovery time following leadership compromise (how quickly can command functions be restored)
• Knowledge retention rate after network disruption (percentage of operational knowledge preserved)
• Adaptation speed (time required to implement new tactics following adversary countermeasures)

Robustness can be assessed via:

• Network fragmentation threshold (percentage of nodes that must be compromised before critical function loss)
• Communication redundancy ratio (number of alternative communication pathways per critical connection)
• Resource distribution index (geographical distribution of caches versus operational requirements)

Antifragility indicators include:

• Innovation diffusion rate (speed at which tactical innovations spread throughout the network)
• Pressure-triggered recruitment ratio (increase in recruitment during periods of heightened repression)
• Tactical adaptation frequency (rate at which new techniques emerge in response to adversary actions)

These metrics provide concrete starting points for resistance planners to evaluate their capabilities and identify areas requiring further development.

Limitations and Challenges

While the three-part framework offers valuable analytical tools, several challenges merit acknowledgment. First, deliberately cultivating antifragility is difficult, as this quality is created by setting conditions rather than structured development. Resistance planners may find that antifragile characteristics appear unexpectedly or cannot be reliably generated through training alone.

Second, tension may exist between optimizing different attributes in resource-constrained environments. Investments in robustness (physical infrastructure, redundant systems) may limit resources available for resilience development (training, leadership succession). Balancing these competing priorities requires careful consideration of specific threat scenarios and operational contexts while further balancing gains in network resilience or robustness against the potential decreased operational security resulting from the same network refinements.

Finally, antifragility is hard to measure quantitatively without stress; ideally, network stressors are consistent with what the adversary might impose. While resilience and robustness lend themselves to quantitative assessment by counting discrete infrastructure or assessing performance measures during exercises, antifragility’s emergent nature makes precise measurement difficult without specific knowledge of the adversary’s capabilities and intentions. Developing applicable models of adversarial capabilities, intentions, and indicators is essential for developing antifragility.

Strategic Implications and Policy Relevance

Beyond academic interest, these conceptual distinctions profoundly affect national security policy and defense planning. For smaller nations facing threats from conventionally superior neighbors, the difference between resilience, robustness, and antifragility may determine whether resistance capabilities serve as a credible deterrent. When potential aggressors recognize that occupation will trigger not merely persistent resistance but resistance that systematically strengthens during occupation, delaying consolidation and increasing costs, the strategic calculus fundamentally changes.

This framework demands reconsideration of defense resource allocation as a matter of policy. Traditional deterrence based primarily on conventional capabilities may be supplemented—or partially replaced—by investments in robust, resilient, and antifragile networks. Such investments may prove cost-effective for nations with limited defense budgets facing adversaries holding significant conventional advantages.

Incorporating these distinctions into defense planning enables more precise capability development and burden-sharing for alliances such as NATO. Nations with geographical vulnerability to rapid occupation might prioritize robustness and antifragility, while allied partners focus on supporting resilience through external assistance capabilities.

Future research should explore the practical implementation of this framework across different regional contexts and threat scenarios. Identifying additional metrics to assess network component attributes and measure improvement would provide valuable tools for resistance planners to prepare the environment and identify capability gaps. Examining how these qualities interact in specific historical and contemporary resistance movements would offer insights into their relative importance under different occupation scenarios.

For nations facing the threat of external aggression, particularly those concerned with territorial defense against conventionally superior adversaries, these distinctions may determine whether resistance efforts succeed or fail. By adopting this more precise framework, resistance planners can develop preparation strategies that address the qualities of effective networks rather than focusing exclusively on resilience. This approach recognizes that effective resistance demands not just the will to resist but the organizational capabilities to translate that will into sustained, effective opposition against superior conventional forces—capabilities that must be deliberately cultivated through distinct development strategies tailored to each attribute’s unique requirements.

As irregular warfare and limited territorial encroachments become increasingly significant features of the international security landscape, this refined understanding offers both practitioners and scholars a more nuanced framework for analyzing and developing resistance capabilities that match the complexity of contemporary conflicts.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Special Operations Command, Joint Special Operations University, or the Naval Postgraduate School.

Tags: irregular warfare, IW, Resilience, resistance, Resistance Operating Concept, Resistance Operating Concept (ROC), SOF

About The Authors

• 
  
• Duc Duclos
• CW5 Maurice "Duc" DuClos currently serves as a Guest Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. His professional background includes various positions at the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) and 2/75th Ranger Battalion.
• View all posts 
• 
  
• Chad Machiela
• Chad Machiela is a faculty research associate at the Naval Postgraduate School. He retired from the Army as a Special Forces warrant officer with over 30 years of special operations experience working throughout the Indo-Pacific, Central, and European Commands.

​18. Adaptation War by Mick Ryan

​The full 7 page paper can be downloaded here: https://www.scsp.ai/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Mick-Ryan_Defense-Paper-Series.pdf

​Excerpts:

However, military institutions of all types experience bureaucratic inertia and other human factors that impedes change. This has been observed and documented in all western military institutions as well as in Russia and China. For example, obstacles to reform in the Russian military have been assessed by some as the result of imbalances in civil-military relations and dysfunctional civilian control. Others have pointed to a highly centralised bureaucracy, widespread corruption and an over-emphasis on theory over implementation.

China too has experienced challenges in military reform. The historical dominance of the ground forces and inter-service rivalry has impeded change. Other issues for the reform of the People’s Liberation Army have been identified as corruption and distrust between the Chinese president and his military forces. The imperative for political indoctrination and conformity in the People’s Liberation Army may also conflict with the ability of commanders to lead the development of a learning culture and military innovation. Therefore, while human agency plays a central role in learning and adaptation, it can also lead to obstacles in the innovation process. This, like uneven learning, provides targetable vulnerabilities

Speed. What makes this new global Adaptation War more challenging to respond to, is the speed at which authoritarian actors are learning, adapting and sharing lessons among themselves. As the British Future Operating Environment 2035 report notes, “the rate of technological change will accelerate out to 2035, serving to highlight inadequacies in less adaptable procurement processes within Defence. Civil companies will be able to raise revenue far more quickly, driving technology development in new directions and at faster rates.”

Since 2022, both Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the ability to learn how to learn better, and to do this learning and adaptation at a faster pace over time.

Adaptation War

My new paper, published by the Special Competitive Studies Project, on confronting an adversary learning and adaptation bloc.

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/adaptation-war?utm

Mick Ryan

Sep 18, 2025

To overcome the challenge of the Adaptation War will take deeper learning collaboration within the Department of Defense, and between the military, intelligence and other national security agencies of other allies and partner nations. Most importantly, sustained and visible leadership from political and military leaders to build and sustain adaptation cultures will be crucial. Adaptation in technology, organisations and ideas is now moving at a speed that challenges legacy approaches and thinking on the conduct of conflict. This must change.

I recently had the opportunity to contribute to the Special Competitive Studies Project’s series of papers designed to inform the next U.S. National Defense Strategy. This short paper was the result. In the near future, a longer report will be published that explores the key subjects of this paper in much more detail.

When writing the next National Defense Strategy (NDS), the most important priority to emphasize will be the need to cultivate a culture of adaptation across the Department of Defense. Without such a transformation, none of the other urgent problems facing the Department – such as preparing for great power competition against China, reforming the acquisition process, harnessing emerging technologies, or modernizing the force, will be achievable.

A defence enterprise that remains risk-averse, rigid, and bureaucratic will struggle to implement even the most well-conceived strategies, while one that embraces adaptation and innovation will be capable of turning strategic intent into operational reality. In this sense, cultural change is noT simply another priority; it is the essential precondition for success across every other dimension of national defence.

American adversaries have already learned this lesson. During the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Russia has learned to learn more quickly and to disseminate lessons throughout their military and industrial systems with increasing speed. While Ukrainian forces often outpace Russian innovation, Russian forces have learned to be fast followers.

This learning and adaptation enterprise spawned by the war in Ukraine, as well as the different wars in the Middle East, has now metastasised into an international learning and adaptation competition. A new adversary learning and adaptation bloc has emerged. While not a formal alliance, China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have developed a mesh of different agreements and strategic partnerships that have allowed them to construct a connected knowledge market on 21st century strategic competition and conflict. This forms the basis of a larger Adaptation War against America. Investigating, understanding and responding to this Adaptation War should be the highest priority for the Department of Defense.

Characterizing the Adaptation War

Understanding the character of the Adaptation War can provide insights into the strategic strengths and vulnerabilities of potential adversaries. These insights can inform the prioritisation of the kinds of learning and adaptation required by America and its allies. Like the character of war, the character of the modern adaptation war will evolve over time. However, the current character of the Adaptation War is described in the following paragraphs.

Concurrency. Learning and adaptation are occurring at many different levels, in many different organisations across multiple geographic regions concurrently. It is a multi-domain learning and adaptation environment, with efforts underway in the ground, air, space, maritime, cyber and information domains. This parallel learning and adaptation can complicate understanding the entirety of all dimensions of the adaptation war. But the enormous complexity of concurrent learning at multiple levels of organisations and nations, because of the human nature of learning and adaptation, will also unveil many gaps and vulnerabilities in adversaries and in our allies.

One Learns, All Can Learn. For the first time in human history, the adaptation war has spawned the potential for a real-time, global knowledge market among authoritarians and potentially, among America’s allies and security partners. In previous eras, learning took time to be absorbed into organisations, and even longer to share between organisations and nations. Now, there is the potential for all members of an adaptation community, regardless of their location, to access lessons almost as soon as one member can collect and analyse them. This means that among America’s competitors, when one learns a lesson about America’s weaknesses or vulnerabilities, all of them can benefit from the lesson.

Uneven Learning. Notwithstanding the potential for the global knowledge market in the Adaptation War, learning and adaptation is ultimately a human endeavour. Organisations might seek to automate collection, analysis and dissemination through AI, but this system still requires humans at the point of learning and collection and for humans to accept and implement lessons at different organisational levels and in different cultures and nations. This human dimension of the adaptation war can be a strength but also provides many vulnerabilities.

Military institutions, and the different agencies in a nation’s security apparatus, rarely compromise a monoculture. Individual services within each military organization possess their own cultures and even sub-cultures. Different cultures arise within individual organisations and this can provide targetable ‘seams’. As such, different learning cultures differ between adversary institutions and nations is a vulnerability. Understanding this uneven learning underpins vulnerability assessments.

Imperfect Insight. It is unlikely that full visibility is achievable about what the adversary learning and adaptation bloc is doing, as individual nations or collectively. Just as war is full of uncertainty, knowledge of adversary learning and adaptation endeavours will also be rife with uncertainty. The efforts of military attaches, intelligence agencies, open-source collection, business intelligence and luck will all provide insight into how adversaries learn and adapt, but there will always be gaps.

Not a Technological but an Intellectual Competition. Learning and adaptation is a human trait. While insights about technology play a role in learning and adaptation, human decision-making, energy, and creativity are critical elements. Even if AI becomes more central to learning and adaptation, the adaptation war will remain a largely human endeavour. Providing the right purpose and incentives for learning and adaptation, and undertaking the right training, educational and organization reform to improve friendly learning and adaptation is vital.

However, military institutions of all types experience bureaucratic inertia and other human factors that impedes change. This has been observed and documented in all western military institutions as well as in Russia and China. For example, obstacles to reform in the Russian military have been assessed by some as the result of imbalances in civil-military relations and dysfunctional civilian control. Others have pointed to a highly centralised bureaucracy, widespread corruption and an over-emphasis on theory over implementation.

China too has experienced challenges in military reform. The historical dominance of the ground forces and inter-service rivalry has impeded change. Other issues for the reform of the People’s Liberation Army have been identified as corruption and distrust between the Chinese president and his military forces. The imperative for political indoctrination and conformity in the People’s Liberation Army may also conflict with the ability of commanders to lead the development of a learning culture and military innovation. Therefore, while human agency plays a central role in learning and adaptation, it can also lead to obstacles in the innovation process. This, like uneven learning, provides targetable vulnerabilities

Speed. What makes this new global Adaptation War more challenging to respond to, is the speed at which authoritarian actors are learning, adapting and sharing lessons among themselves. As the British Future Operating Environment 2035 report notes, “the rate of technological change will accelerate out to 2035, serving to highlight inadequacies in less adaptable procurement processes within Defence. Civil companies will be able to raise revenue far more quickly, driving technology development in new directions and at faster rates.”

Since 2022, both Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the ability to learn how to learn better, and to do this learning and adaptation at a faster pace over time.

You can read the full paper on the challenges of the new adversary adaptation and learning bloc at this link.

19. What is the US Military Preparing For? Force Design and the Pathology of Lessons Learned

​As an aside, the author's bio makes me ask, has the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Strategic Thinkers Program at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University survived DOGE? Is it still in operation?

​Excerpts:

In 2006, Jonathan Bailey published “Military History and the Pathology of Lessons Learned: the Russo-Japanese War, a Case Study,” a chapter in an edited volume on history and the military profession. 

....

If nothing else, Bailey’s piece should be a reminder of Alexander Pope’s warning that a little bit of learning can do more harm than none at all. In examining the Russo-Japanese War in full, Bailey provides a thirty-five-year perspective to explain a conflict that lasted less than two years.

Lessons often comprise an agreed historical perspective, the current received wisdom, the addition of some recent experiences, predictions about technological development, and an extrapolation about a possible future. These contend with mandated lessons foretold, the prescribed view discussed previously, because military leaders often distort and contort new evidence to sustain their views of the future as they wish it to be.

Force designers, leaders, and operators at all levels should, if they wish to mitigate the most painful lessons history implies are inevitable, consider consistently examining themselves against the antagonists Bailey identifies. Particularly during an interwar period and amid controversial modernizations, who is committing the same prewar sins as Major General John Headlam?

Bailey’s examination of the pathology of lessons learned provides valuable insights for force design. The process of making accurate acquisition choices is fraught with challenges, including resisting biases, accepting ambiguity, understanding escalation, and anticipating changes in the character of war. Furthermore, making the proper decisions in force design is only half the battle: To ensure that inevitable failures are as limited as possible, military cultures must also accept changes and ensure that tactical biases do not limit operator flexibility. These are nigh impossible standards, but the humility to understand Bailey’s analysis and the difference between lessons learned and lessons observed is a laudable start.

What is the US Military Preparing For? Force Design and the Pathology of Lessons Learned - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · Shane Praiswater · September 19, 2025

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

In 2006, Jonathan Bailey published “Military History and the Pathology of Lessons Learned: the Russo-Japanese War, a Case Study,” a chapter in an edited volume on history and the military profession. Bailey, a historian and retired British Army general, focused on why militaries failed to incorporate lessons learned during the 1904–05 conflict into pre–World War I planning. Nearly two decades later, his work is worth revisiting as militaries struggle to modernize and balance the potential need to “fight tonight” with the imperatives of future force design. Planners reasonably consider peer competitors and expected challenges when making acquisition decisions, but Bailey’s work suggests that technology and threats are not the only pieces of the modernization puzzle. Lessons learned via humble introspection and debrief in service of rapid innovation is a sacrosanct pillar of modern militaries; by equating the concept with pathology and disease, Bailey takes a controversial stance. Militaries often excel at identifying mistakes and adapting under fire, but evolving in peacetime for future conflicts is far more difficult.

To avoid the pitfalls of the past and repeating another instance of lessons observed over lessons learned, force design must account for technological, cultural, and tactical biases. Furthermore, even an unbiased and non-parochial force design might fall short if it does not consider two distinct observations: first, that escalation is a tactical—not just strategic—paradigm, and second, that militaries must have the humility to anticipate ambiguity and wars of attrition.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) was a pivotal conflict between Russia and Japan over rival regional ambitions. Marked by modern weaponry, trench warfare, and industrialized logistics, it foreshadowed key aspects of World War I, including the deadly effectiveness of machine guns and artillery. Japan’s victory shocked the world and demonstrated the rise of non-Western powers in global affairs. The war also exposed the decline of tsarist Russia, contributing to domestic unrest and the 1905 Russian Revolution. It signaled (in retrospect) a transition from nineteenth-century limited wars to twentieth-century total wars, where technology, public opinion, and industrial capacity became increasingly significant factors in warfare.

In “Military History and the Pathology of Lessons Learned,” Bailey describes the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, in which foreign military observers and journalists seemingly identified every applicable tactical lesson. These observers published their findings and, in many cases, lobbied their respective militaries to adapt accordingly. However, Bailey argues, observers viewed those lessons through “the distorting lenses of political intrigue, social attitude, military orthodoxy, and wishful thinking.” Additionally, “military organizations of the time often ignored the lessons identified,” and as a result, “clear auguries of the future of warfare (1914–18) generally went unheeded.”

The most catastrophic example of lessons unheeded revolved around the British use of artillery. In the aftermath of observing the devastating effects of a new technology—indirect fire—and how it necessitated a change in tactics, younger British officers fought in vain to have the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) embrace indirect fire in World War I. Senior officers, scornful of a less honorable way of fighting, overruled them. In a single paragraph that hits a little too close to home for modern officers (either experienced with toxic leaders or terrified of becoming one), Bailey describes the deadly effects of lessons merely observed:

Colonel John Headlam played a key [prewar] role in preventing its [indirect fire] adoption. On August 26, 1914, Brigadier General Headlam, commanding the artillery of 5th Division, deployed five brigades of guns in exposed positions at Le Cateau, between 50 and 200 meters from the infantry’s front line. Two battery commanders who believed their positions untenable moved their guns to covered positions. Headlam immediately ordered them to return to their forward position. . . . After eight hours of bombardment, the British had lost the battle. . . . The History of the Royal Artillery covering the period 1860–1914 does not examine the reasons for the failure to adopt indirect fire before 1914. It merely notes that prior to 1914, indirect fire was impractical. The author of the history was Major General John Headlam.

Headlam was not, however, an overtly malicious actor. He was a decorated officer who served with distinction in South Africa and was—perhaps with some karma—wounded at Le Cateau. Despite a lack of accountability in The History of the Royal Artillery, Headlam was part of the team that quickly updated artillery methods in 1915. The BEF’s prewar artillery failures were hardly the result of the hubris of a single senior officer.

Colonel E. S. May and a cadre of other senior officers fought vociferously against the younger generation of officers who were urging the BEF to adopt indirect fire. However, a deeper examination of history and prewar Britain reveals that these officers were operating in a context that left the BEF ill-prepared for the realities of World War I. It was not just Britain: “When war broke out in Europe in August 1914,” Sir Michael Howard (perhaps the most respected historian in military circles) wrote, “every major belligerent power at once took the offensive.” Militaries truly believed they had compensated for the changes in the character of war, and the spirit of the offensive remained paramount for victory, even if leaders expected severe losses.

At the risk of overemphasizing historical correlations, modern observers should note the political context Bailey provides regarding the events leading up to 1904. The turn of the century saw several thinkers convinced that a battle between the East and West was inevitable: Naval historian and strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan envisioned an unavoidable clash, and Japan wondered how racially based struggles would test nations. In a separate work, Bailey argued that the failure to understand the Russo-Japanese War and ensuing conflicts still results in miscalculations between the East and West today.

A few pre–World War I theorists did conclude that war between great powers was becoming suicidal, but in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, military leaders continued to embrace attacks en masse and high morale as the keys to breaking defensive firepower. In Bailey’s opinion, the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War and its “tantalizing insights” should have resulted in “revolutionary change.” However, despite a French study that concluded that “it is almost impossible for a front protected by really powerful weapons and field defences to be broken through even by troops of undaunted courage willing to sacrifice any number of lives,” military leaders continued to believe in the decisiveness of the offensive.

Sir Michael concludes, however, that the “worst losses were those due not to faulty doctrine but to inefficiency, inexperience, and the sheer organizational problems of combining fire and movement on the requisite scale.” This claim might be a slight exaggeration; historian Elizabeth Greenhalgh, for example, explains how, during the Battle of the Somme, British soldiers adhered to close-rank attacks even though their French allies, fighting parallel to them in the same battle, had already adopted more effective tactics. Regardless, whether the Somme was another example of faulty doctrine due to lessons merely observed or a failure of coalition relations (or both), there was no avoiding attrition during World War I, just as there was not during the Battle of Normandy in World War II. The Allies had to attack, and the Germans were dug in. The Allies could replace their losses; the Germans could not.

Cumulatively, these readings teach us some troubling facts. First, mastering new technologies and acquiring the correct weapons is not enough; even if the BEF had mustered the proper number of long-range artillery pieces, their senior officers did not know how to use them effectively. Second, perfecting doctrine, even if it were possible, will likely do little to change the complex realities of a large-scale, peer-on-peer conflict. No military seeks attrition as a preferred method, but history implies it is a realistic outcome.

Perhaps the real lesson from Bailey and Sir Michael is that interwar periods are inherently challenging, and that acknowledging this reality implies that force design should encompass much more than a military deciding which new technologies to acquire. It should include difficult cultural conversations about whether the character of war is changing and whether innovative adjustments are necessary. Force design should also include a healthy dose of self-skepticism to recognize when personal biases may be interfering with decision-making.

Above all, force design must not assume a theoretical conflict is certain or that the military can quickly end a war without resorting to attrition. These are laudable goals, and a proper force design should make them feasible, but a military not prepared for escalation is one not prepared for war. Sir Michael points out that during World War I, “professional soldiers . . . were trying to adjust themselves to the new realities of the battlefield.” Bailey’s concept of “revolutionary change” did come, but only after the most painful of early-war lessons.

How then might planners, tacticians, and senior leaders approach force design and the inherent challenges of interwar periods? An unpacking of Bailey’s “Military History and the Pathology of Lessons Learned” reveals four main themes that militaries can consider when navigating interwar periods: technology, culture, tactical bias, and escalation.

Technology

Exciting new technologies, as Bailey makes painfully clear, are only as good as the operators willing to employ them (or the senior leaders who allow their use). He describes how, regarding cavalry:

There were larger problems than simply cost in the way of reform. The practical, informed, and prescient thinking of many junior commentators was far removed from the reality of the debate in the corridors of power, where institutional obstruction and vested interest predominated.

In 1907, two years after the well-documented lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, traditionalists in Britain reintroduced the lance, and (future commander of BEF forces) Douglas Haig believed that dismounting to use firearms would injure the morale of the cavalry. When World War I arrived, Headlam, Haig, and all belligerents rapidly adapted: Planes and tanks, for example, went from dismissed technologies to revolutionary tools. Pilots went from dropping bombs by hand to employing multiple weapons with relatively advanced bombing racks. And yet during the years ahead of the war, despite the growing movement to adapt to the changing character of war, these leaders and operators were serious about not reforming.

Technological changes resulting from lessons learned under fire are simple: Adapt or die. Minimizing the pain of those inevitable lessons in peacetime is far more difficult.

The US Air Force might be approaching a similar imperative for peacetime adaptation regarding the B-21. Perhaps the recent successes of the B-2 in Iran and the overwhelming number of B-21s will be sufficient to change how the United States uses airpower, or maybe it will be difficult for operators to accept bombers filling unprecedented roles in the suppression of enemy air and ground defenses. Similarly, if the establishment of the Space Force results in the weaponization of space, will leaders be ready to use it? Will those technologies replace or augment traditional airpower, and if it is the former, will operators embrace such a capability before sacrificing its direct fire artillery parallels?

For landpower services, it is comforting to see a wide range of ranks debating the future of tanks, but it is also discomforting to see arguments that Russian tank failures in Ukraine are to be blamed primarily on tactics, potentially mirroring those Russo-Japanese War observers who saw artillery’s effectiveness but also drew the wrong lessons from Japan’s offensives. Tank enthusiasts might well be correct, but whatever technology the US Army eventually adopts, acquisitions are only half of the battle.

The more obvious technological parallel that forces are struggling with is the use of drone technology. On one hand, drones have accounted for 70 percent of casualties in the Ukraine-Russia war; on the other, the conflict has settled into a brutal attritional fight with trench warfare, deep strategic strikes, and Russian bombing of civilians. Some theorists have argued that the US military’s late embrace of drones is akin to the US Army’s reticence to move on from the musket, while current officers have pushed back against the idea that small drones will replace the US Air Force.

Regardless of the role drones eventually play in a conflict, it seems undeniable that their advocates face an uphill battle in convincing their respective services to embrace them should they replace a treasured and proven weapon. Additionally, whatever form drone proponents expect their role to eventually take, they must avoid overpromising: Indirect fire was a revolutionary update for World War I, but it did not replace the role of the infantry any more than tanks or aircraft.

Culture

Perhaps the most striking section of Bailey’s work describes one way in which Western nations reacted to Japan’s victory in 1905: by denigrating their own societies as too weak for modern combat. Even before World War II’s greatest generation, President Theodore Roosevelt—who won the Nobel Peace Prize for mediating the Russo-Japanese War’s end—maintained that “the nation that has trained itself to a career of unwarlike and isolated ease is bound, in the end, to go down before other nations which have not lost the manly and adventurous qualities.” French General Oscar de Négrier, who had served as an observer during the Russo-Japanese War, blamed education and upbringing for turning Frenchmen into “timid and poltroons,” the Russians saw wars as contests between nations, not armies, and the German Colonel Wilhelm Balck opined that urban degeneracies were undermining the human species. A British captain, Bailey notes, “described the British nation as being in a ‘wild debauch of so-called freedom’” in need of “a new discipline.” All told, it is a remarkable collection of these damn kids sentiments one could easily find on sensationalist programs today. These were not pundits, however: These were the sentiments of defense experts of their era.

Like anything, readers should consider these quotes in context. The pre–World War I era was politically tumultuous and polarized; the Progressive Era in the United States and the Dreyfus affair in France are just two examples of societies fragmenting amid rapid modernization. Bailey does not examine how the Progressive Era framed the responses of those concerned about youths. Still, considering the fractured state of modern politics, it is reasonable to assume that culture wars might come to affect force design. However it manifests, militaries are not immune to polarization. Officers might be wise to revisit how Congress addressed US veterans’ issues post–World War I, the French military’s role in Vichy France, or even how German militarism contributed to the outbreak of World War I.

Interwar decisions driven by threat and international assumptions are problematic enough. If militaries do not recognize that the intertwined phenomena of domestic politics and culture can affect even the future tactical level, they are not learning from the mistakes of pre–World War I experts.

High politics aside, service-specific cultural wars are ongoing as militaries modernize in tight fiscal environments. How well leaders and operators reconcile these arguments and employ new technologies will likely have a profound impact on how the next conflict unfolds. In the United States, the Marines have argued incessantly about force structure, new equipment, and the organization’s proper role in great power competition. The Army has struggled to define its role in the Pacific, while urging leaders to remember that Europe remains a significant theater. Meanwhile, the Air Force has canceled and restarted programs as it grapples with the future of air superiority. For every proponent of traditional naval power, an antagonist argues that aircraft carriers are a relic of the past, all while the Navy struggles to build submarines, a technology that few question.

Too frequently, however, advocates center these arguments around new technologies and threats instead of culture. As Bailey and other historians remind us, interwar periods are challenging and often marked by a division between those who believe the past is a prologue and those eager to transition to the next great thing. The BEF struggled in the opening days of World War I because even though a new technology—indirect artillery fire—was ascendant, the British military culture had not resolved its internal issues.

How exactly militaries should address the cultural aspects of their force design is a difficult question. In the Air Force, one approach to addressing interwar cultural struggles might be to embrace questioning whether new technologies can provide effective mass, but that is a relatively niche acquisition concept that will not address the issues Bailey identifies. Insisting on chasing air superiority, for example, might to some call to mind a cult of the offensive and reliance on elan that doomed the BEF; clearly, there needs to be a balance between the cultural desire to win—not just compete—and a recognition that wars might turn attritional, and the embrace of new enabling technologies. The BEF certainly had the spirit, but did not pair it with the necessary tools and tactics.

Tactical Bias

Even in the most obvious of observations, Europeans struggled to reconcile the tactical lessons of 1904 with their preconceived biases. Few battles are simple, but in the context of militaries still unaware of the massive shift in the character of war, the Russo-Japanese battles were challenging to comprehend. The Japanese, after all, won the war primarily through offensive charges, having learned about the “Banzai” charge from German military instructors. However, as Bailey describes, this was a superficial reading of the war:

The Japanese were only successful where the Russians suffered a moral rather than material collapse. This led some observers to note the power of defense, while others reported that the defense was doomed to succumb eventually to the will of the attacker. Here lay the seed of postwar controversies that set the offensive style in which European armies would go to war in 1914.

Observers, echoing Robert Jervis’s research on perception, saw what they wanted to; in truth, the Russo-Japanese War proved that a strong defense, indirect fire, and morale were all important variables in the new character of war. The Japanese did not simply rush the Russians to death; they learned, in the hardest way possible, to adopt offensive tactics “more akin to German stormtroop tactics of 1917 rather than those of 1914.”

Adopting what has always worked is a reasonable human response, but how do military leaders and operators find the proper balance between lessons learned and recognizing that the character of war has changed? Bailey emphasizes cultural biases, but it is troublesome how little personal and team biases factor into decision-making, whether in acquisitions or at the tactical level. Jervis understood that it was “difficult or impossible to explain states’ policy choices and associated outcomes without making reference to decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others,” but those making significant choices are rarely, if ever, challenged to prove their bias. Bailey’s work on the pathology of lessons learned is replete with examples of Jervis’s cognitive consistency concept, in which leaders often interpret information in a way that confirms existing beliefs, even if, to a more neutral observer, such an interpretation is highly contradictory.

Drones are an interesting case study in this regard because, given the war in Ukraine, the military ecosphere has seen a whiplash of opinions ranging from drones change everything to drones are already obsolete. The rhetoric will continue to rage, even though a seemingly infinite number of drones have failed to drastically reshape the battlefield or, at most, have neutralized ground forces into a static war of attrition.

In the recent Middle Eastern conflict, Iran relied on standoff weapons, while Israel dominated the skies and struck targets at will. That conflict might be troublesome to those in the US Air Force pursuing long-range kill chains and standoff-centric forces, but such an observation discounts how limited Iran’s options were after Israel spent over a year decimating the proxy forces that might have stood to make Iran’s ballistic missiles more effective. While the US Air Force is currently pursuing a mixed stand-in/standoff force, those decisions must withstand potential budget issues and avoid creating a service biased toward either tactic (or both), depending on the conflict. If the late 2030s bring a fleet of 145 or more B-21s or an armada of AI collaborative combat aircraft, that does not mean operators must use stand-in tactics, or conversely, that standoff weapons controlled postlaunch by air battle managers will be sufficient.

Tactical controversies are nothing new to the Army, particularly in the context of maneuver warfare. As former US Marines Frank Hoffman and Pat Garrett recently stated: “Maneuver warfare is a fraud, and maneuver as a warfighting function is dead. At least, that is what some scholars and military analysts claim. We disagree.” The contentions continue, budgets evolve, and tactical biases remain problematic. Throughout force design and training, leaders and operators must avoid becoming overly biased toward the tactics they intend to use. Otherwise, a repeat of Headlam’s sins is likely.

Where these various arguments conclude before an ensuing conflict, if Bailey’s work is any indication, will determine how militaries will fight, unless leaders and operators account for their biases toward a given tactic. This concept applies to force design when making acquisition choices, but also to operators once a conflict begins, who must choose between being beholden to decisions made years earlier or rapidly adapting to a changing character of war. It is a humbling calculus, particularly when history suggests that conflicts are often difficult to anticipate.

Tactical Escalation

Questions of cultural biases and the struggles of interwar periods closely relate to a separate issue critical for planners to consider: unexpected conflicts. Force design aims to account for the most likely or severe strategic conflicts; however, overly restrictive parameters will limit how much a force can account for unforeseen circumstances and compounding risks. There also continues to be an unrealistic expectation in the military that the Huntingtonian model, reinforced by doctrinal wishcasting, will result in a linear process in which static political ends drive predictable military means. The US military, in the eyes of several commentators, learned the wrong lessons from Operation Desert Storm: Some hold up the first war with Iraq as an example of doctrine done well, but a deeper reading reveals a stunning amount of internal political and military chaos. This is not a criticism, but merely an acknowledgment of war’s inherent difficulties, even against a subpar opponent.

Anecdotally, US military officers seem reluctant to acknowledge that in all the major twentieth-century conflicts, the United States was initially against becoming involved until events forced its hand. President Woodrow Wilson campaigned on keeping the United States out of World War I, just as President Franklin D. Roosevelt did for World War II (with significant qualifiers). Korea was explicitly not included in containment, and Vietnam slowly evolved into a severe conflict that President Lyndon B. Johnson felt he could not extricate himself from, even though he desperately wanted to focus on domestic issues.

Those are, however, strategic-level observations, and whole fields of game theory and international relations exist to explain how those conflicts evolved. They are valuable lessons for planners trying to anticipate the next conflict and design a force, but at a more tactical level, a theater’s circumstances can drive events without the presence of a clear strategic purpose or guidance. If force design does not account for this type of escalation, the ramifications could be dire.

Recent events in the Middle East emphasize how tactical escalation can drive events. The same month that a Pentagon memo known as the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly declared a significant pivot to the Indo-Pacific, the United States was launching a “decisive and powerful” effort against the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. One might argue that ensuring the safety of shipping through the Red Sea was a strategic motive, but in the months after the height of the campaign, shipping has failed to return to levels seen prior to the increased Houthi strikes targeting commercial vessels, and the group has launched additional attacks against shipping and Israel.

That pivot, however, was hardly the first effort to shift US priorities to the Pacific, and according to recent reports, the Pentagon memo’s focus on deterring China was seemingly superseded by a draft National Defense Strategy placing more emphasis on homeland defense. Strategic focuses routinely shift dramatically, even within months, and regardless, international events driving US military action are not beholden to a document like the National Defense Strategy.

Even more significantly, the US effort against the Houthis, anecdotally, included tactical considerations that suddenly required the use of B-2 strategic bombers. Employing the B-2—a limited and strategic asset—against nontraditional threats is not unprecedented, but no combat sortie is without risk, especially when the Houthis had proven some limited surface-to-air capabilities. There was no strategic demand for risking the B-2; however, at the tactical level, the pertinacious Houthi threat was driving commanders to accept more risk to be effective.

Mere days after an alleged pivot, tactical-level realities had influenced a relatively severe escalation. The complex web of security challenges in the Middle East then cascaded into a conflict between Iran and Israel, where once again, in the service of a laudable strategic goal—not allowing Iran to have a nuclear bomb—B-2s and other US assets struck Iranian nuclear facilities.

These observations are not a criticism of US actions; they are just evidence of a reality in which prewar planners build a force amid yet another pivot to the Pacific (or homeland defense), only for events in the Middle East to drive decision-maker actions. History and recent events should remind us that when considering force design, one must plan for both the war you expect and the one you do not, at both the strategic and tactical levels.

Dismissing the realities of escalation is problematic for force designers, as inevitably, we will never be allowed to do that types of statements begin to emerge during difficult discussions about which programs to retain and which to eliminate. The B-2 strikes on Iran are a perfect example: In no small part because of the doubt that a president would ever accept such a risk, the massive ordnance penetrator funding was not always secure. If mission effectiveness requires higher risk, operators will have to bear that burden. The weight of that penalty depends on how well militaries design forces and ensure their cultures properly utilize those decisions.

Ultimately, the realities of escalation and inherent interwar struggles reveal a buried lede within this paper: namely, that despite the good work militaries and leaders do to prepare for future conflicts, an inevitable hubris creeps into force design, which could affect an ensuing conflict. This author, borrowing heavily from the works of historians such as Dan Marston and Sir Hew Strachan, has taken a potentially extreme stance in the past by arguing that strategy truly begins only when a conflict turns violent. Whether that is an accurate stance depends on one’s perspective, but the core point remains that force design should, at a minimum, have a healthy sense of skepticism regarding its expectations for conflict.

Returning to the cultural fights within the services, are the Marines prepared to storm beaches in a major conflict against a peer adversary? Is the Army equipped to invade and occupy large swaths of enemy territory? Can the Navy destroy a peer fleet and break hostile blockades? Can the Air Force win a war of attrition and establish air superiority in a contested environment? These might not be the wars that the United States wants to fight, but should escalation occur in a historically consistent manner, is its military prepared?

If nothing else, Bailey’s piece should be a reminder of Alexander Pope’s warning that a little bit of learning can do more harm than none at all. In examining the Russo-Japanese War in full, Bailey provides a thirty-five-year perspective to explain a conflict that lasted less than two years.

Lessons often comprise an agreed historical perspective, the current received wisdom, the addition of some recent experiences, predictions about technological development, and an extrapolation about a possible future. These contend with mandated lessons foretold, the prescribed view discussed previously, because military leaders often distort and contort new evidence to sustain their views of the future as they wish it to be.

Force designers, leaders, and operators at all levels should, if they wish to mitigate the most painful lessons history implies are inevitable, consider consistently examining themselves against the antagonists Bailey identifies. Particularly during an interwar period and amid controversial modernizations, who is committing the same prewar sins as Major General John Headlam?

Bailey’s examination of the pathology of lessons learned provides valuable insights for force design. The process of making accurate acquisition choices is fraught with challenges, including resisting biases, accepting ambiguity, understanding escalation, and anticipating changes in the character of war. Furthermore, making the proper decisions in force design is only half the battle: To ensure that inevitable failures are as limited as possible, military cultures must also accept changes and ensure that tactical biases do not limit operator flexibility. These are nigh impossible standards, but the humility to understand Bailey’s analysis and the difference between lessons learned and lessons observed is a laudable start.

Lieutenant Colonel Shane “Axl” Praiswater, USAF, PhD, is a graduate of the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Strategic Thinkers Program at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and earned his doctorate through Pepperdine University. He is currently a B-21 Initial Cadre command pilot with over two thousand hours in multiple platforms, including during Operation Inherent Resolve, where he led mission planning for all bomber sorties and flew combat missions. His most recent peer-reviewed publications can be found in the Royal United Services Institute Journal, the Journal for Deradicalization, and ThePalgrave Encyclopedia of Leadership and Change.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Giancarlo Casem

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

mwi.westpoint.edu · Shane Praiswater · September 19, 2025

20. The Limits of Rapprochement Between India and China

​Excerpts:

India and China thus remain locked in a “frenemy” dynamic, compelled to cooperate yet bound to confront, with the border dispute at the heart of these tensions. Economic interdependence coexists with a strategic rivalry in which border disputes perpetuate cycles of escalation. India’s real dilemma, then, is not whether it can “manage” China but whether it can escape becoming a permanent crisis manager, locked into reacting to Beijing’s moves rather than shaping the strategic environment itself.

Economic interdependence has proven illusory, serving as a lever of coercion rather than stability, while U.S. support cannot substitute for India’s own structural transformation. New Delhi should therefore develop an economic resilience that reduces its dependence from Chinese trade and technology, while strengthening its alliances with other influential countries to gain leverage. Simultaneously, India should upgrade its border infrastructure, enhance surveillance and reform its crisis management mechanisms to anticipate rather than simply containing standoffs, while pursuing diplomacy selectively.

The future trajectory at the border remains uncertain, and several developments could exacerbate tensions. The acceleration of Chinese infrastructure along the disputed sectors, increased troop deployments, and domestic nationalism further limit room for compromise. Conversely, progress could be possible should the two countries institutionalize military-to-military communications, clarify and codify rules of engagement beyond the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility, and establish a long-term framework that reduces strategic risk. Until then, gestures of rapprochement, such as the recent ones displayed at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, will remain symbolic, and India risks drifting into a future where its China policy is defined not by strategy but by survival.

The Limits of Rapprochement Between India and China

Chiara Boldrini

September 19, 2025

warontherocks.com · September 19, 2025

Those expecting a solid rapprochement between India and China may be misreading the situation, as structural frictions between the two countries endure. Among these, the unresolved border dispute remains at the core of their mistrust.

India and China appear to be reviving their dialogue of cooperation against a backdrop of turbulence given by the imposition of U.S. tariffs and broader shifts in the international order. Recent months have seen signs of a softening in Sino-Indian relations, despite contradictory pressures. The latter include China’s support for Pakistan during its latest confrontation with India in May 2025, the initiation of the controversial Yarlung Zangbo dam, and intensified economic coercion through new regulations on critical minerals, agricultural inputs, equipment for the construction of a high-speed rail, and electronics. Paradoxically, these pressures coincided with engagement efforts such as Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s amicable visit for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization foreign ministers meeting, government advisors proposing that Chinese firms would be allowed up to 24 percent stakes in Indian companies without prior approval, resumption of tourism visas and direct flights, and optimistic bilateral statements on managing boundary disputes.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China on Aug. 31 — the first in seven years — to attend the two-day meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was received as a symbolic moment of goodwill. Modi affirmed the two powers should be partners and not rivals, while equally positive statements were made by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, noting that it is the “right choice for China and India to be good and neighborly friends.”

For many, the statements and images generated optimism that the two Asian giants might finally move towards a more stable relationship. Yet, such optimism risks overlooking deeper, unresolved tensions. The same Shanghai Cooperation Organization embodies this “frenemy” reality: For Beijing, this platform is a means to showcase regional leadership; while for New Delhi, it might be more of a necessity to maintain a seat at the table.

Hence, beyond gestures, is a friendly partnership between India and China truly possible or realistic? While both countries have strong incentives to cooperate, unresolved disputes and enduring mistrust raise doubts about the durability of any rapprochement. Trump’s strategy has arguably altered the political context. However, Modi’s absence from Beijing’s military parade a few days after the summit suggests limits to the warmth displayed. Ultimately, a normalization of relations may be fragile at best, as structural tensions, most notably their unresolved border dispute, continue to undermine trust, and India faces the risk of being increasingly vulnerable to Chinese regional influence.

BECOME A MEMBER

Spotlight on the Border Dispute

As two critical nodes in the Asian power structure, India and China have a complex relationship characterized by phases of cooperation and competition. On the surface, several factors push for cooperation. The economic relationship between the two is significant, with China being one of India’s largest trading partners, which has acted as an anchor preventing relations from veering completely into hostility. At the global level, both countries share a preference for a multipolar order, resisting the hegemony of any single power, even if their visions differ in practice. However, beneath these points of convergence lies a more complicated reality.

Against this backdrop, the border issue provides one of the most consistent sources of confrontation, explanatory of a core dynamic in Sino-Indian relations. The strategic dilemma at the Himalayan boundary has deep historical roots. Indeed, since its independence in 1947, India’s northern borders have remained theaters of recurring clashes. Among these, the Sino-Indian War in 1962 marked the deepest rupture, with China’s offensive leaving India militarily defeated and psychologically scarred. This conflict shaped New Delhi’s view of Beijing as a long-term adversary. The following near-war in 1987 underscored the volatility of their relations, though it also paved the way for the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control, which aimed to institutionalize de-escalation mechanisms on the border.

Despite this framework, the strategic challenge remained. By the early 2000s, China embarked on an infrastructure development project in Tibet, the Qinghai-Tibet railway line, which would have significantly enhanced Beijing’s military logistics and troop mobility along the Line of Actual Control. This infrastructure would have allowed China to rapidly deploy its troops to the frontline, effectively altering the strategic balance in the area. In response, amid a growing assertiveness of Beijing in the broader region, India undertook a defense buildup in 2007, in the pursuit of a greater military posture that would be able to credibly deter Chinese temptations to undertake territorial incursions. Interestingly enough, during this period of undergoing military reinforcement on the border, both countries increased their bilateral trade.

By mid-2009, there were public signs of frustration over the unequal benefits from the general policy of engagement. A perception gained ground in New Delhi that China was the only major power seemingly unreconciled to India’s rise. The feeling in India was, and still is, that China is not willing to give due weight to India on global or regional matters. Furthermore, Beijing’s economic engagement through the development of infrastructural projects and its increasing presence in the Indian Ocean heightened these anxieties. As C. Raja Mohan observed, China’s infrastructure buildup in Tibet increased India’s strategic vulnerabilities, while its global initiatives appeared to bypass or undermine India’s interests.

In this context, efforts to manage the border continued, including the establishment of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination in 2012, but it did little to shift the perception that China sought to constrain India’s strategic space. In 2013, the Depsang standoff marked a revival of tensions. When the Bharatiya Janata Party won an absolute majority in 2014 and Narendra Modi became prime minister, he initially expressed willingness to engage constructively with Beijing, especially through deepening economic ties. However, Modi also invoked rhetoric about China’s “expansionist mindset” during his election campaign. In his efforts, India’s prime minister balanced the pursuit of trade and investment with an assertive response to Chinese actions. During Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit to India, Modi directly raised concerns over Chinese incursions at Chumar, signaling willingness to confront Beijing more robustly. The instability over the border and of broader conflicting views thus set the stage for the crises that followed, from Doklam in 2017 to Ladakh in 2020.

Cycles of Escalation and De-Escalation

The Doklam standoff of 2017 is a rampant example of the recurring cycle of escalation and de-escalation between New Delhi and Beijing. The Doklam plateau is a disputed patch of land between Bhutan, China, and India. In mid-June 2017, Chinese military road crews began to extend a road in this area, reaching closer to India’s Siliguri Corridor, also called the “Chicken’s Neck,” a narrow, strategic passage connecting India’s northeast to the rest of the country. This action was a relatively cheap and clear way for Beijing to advance its claims in the dispute, while also establishing infrastructure for further intelligence gathering on Indian military troops.

However, India quickly deployed its troops into the disputed territory, under the 2007 India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, impeding the roadwork. Both sides engaged in risky confrontation, testing each other’s resolve, before ultimately retreating through diplomatic channels. The statements issued by Beijing echoed historical confrontations such as the 1962 war, and both sides relied on heavy and tense tones. The standoff, while bearing no actual disclosed combat, was one of the most serious engagements between India and China in almost 55 years, igniting fears of another military clash between the two countries. Furthermore, it signaled an even more dangerous trend: the normalization of high-risk confrontation. Indeed, if military posturing increased and diplomatic retaliation relied on tense tones, in parallel, the economic ties between India and China were growing.

Only after over two months of standoff, through the established working mechanisms, both sides agreed to withdraw troops to their original positions. The disengagement in Doklam enabled Modi to travel to Xiamen in China for the BRICS summit in September 2017. The wave of de-escalation was further welcomed with multiple signs of improvements, such as the informal summit between Modi and Xi in Wuhan and the parallel foreign ministers meeting at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In their first bilateral meeting the following year, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit at Bishkek in June 2019, Modi told Xi that there had been “a new momentum and stability’” in Sino-Indian relations as a result of an improvement in the strategic communication between the two sides, and this would make them “more sensitive towards each other’s concerns and interests.”

The wave of de-escalation proved to be fragile. The abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian constitution in August 2019, which made Ladakh a separate union territory to be administered directly from New Delhi, created a new bone of contention between India and China. In an effort to support Pakistan to internationalize the Kashmir issue at the United Nations, China criticized India’s actions as directly affecting its interests. As its attempt failed, China began enhancing its military deployments along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh, particularly near Galwan Valley, Hot Springs, and Pangong Lake in April 2020. As a response, India countered Chinese positioning in May 2020, which led to a series of standoffs between Indian and Chinese troops in different areas along the Line of Actual Control. Whilst both governments attempted to downplay tensions, the stand-off escalated into a violent confrontation in Galwan Valley in mid-June 2020.

The clashes of 2020 marked an even sharper turning point: Unlike Doklam, the Galwan Valley confrontation resulted in fatalities on both sides, the first ones in decades. In Ladakh, China’s surprise move to militarily occupy key positions at multiple points forced India to mobilize quickly. Yet, India’s response was stronger than in the earlier 2017 episode. Despite the diplomatic effort, China continued strengthening positions at Pangong Tso, Depsang, and Hot Springs with new bunkers, roads, and fortifications. India responded by mirroring China’s troop presence. Ultimately, the Indian Army launched Operation Snow Leopard at the end of August 2020, w aiming to take control of the strategic heights in the Pangong Lake area and other friction points. This military operation arguably brought the two sides to the edge of conflict in the most acute way. Meanwhile, as the diplomatic stalemate persisted, military reinforcement was coupled with economic countermeasures, such as further restrictions on Chinese investments and apps. These actions, while primarily protectionist against economic vulnerability, might have also aimed at demonstrating resilience as, while Beijing may have enjoyed an initial advantage in the confrontation, India signaled its determination not to be caught off guard again.

An attempt to intensify efforts to disengage and de-escalate occurred when Modi and Xi met briefly on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in 2023. Yet, it proved to be unsuccessful. Only in the summer of 2024 did momentum pick up, and in September 2024, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar said that about 75 percent of the “disengagement” problems at India’s border with China had been resolved.

Even so, the resolution was partial at best. Beijing continues to expand strategic infrastructure and enhance military deployments, including the Hotan-Shigatse railway line paralleling friction zones in eastern Ladakh, with plans to extend toward Yadong near Doklam Valley. Since June 2025, discussions between India and China on clarifying and demarcating the long-disputed boundary have become more ambitious, signaling potential progress, though substantive change remains limited. The management of confrontations on the border has thus remained a “management” as such, rather than achieving a long-lasting restoration of trust.

In light of the above, several factors nurture this cycle. First, the Himalayas are not a settled frontier but a historically “contested geography,” producing constant frictions. Each new road, bridge, or troop deployment shifts the tactical balance, making confrontation nearly automatic. Second, each time the two powers engage at the border, they manage to de-escalate, making these standoffs become normal tools of statecraft. In this dynamic, asymmetry matters: China, the stronger power, sees little incentive to concede, while India cannot accept perpetual disadvantage. Third, nationalism is a political resource on both sides. Chinese leaders invoke territorial integrity to project strength. Indian leaders highlight toughness against China, partly to avoid looking weak and partly because any change in the Indian territory requires parliamentary approval. This allows border incidents to be politicized, narrowing room for compromise. Fourth, standoffs serve as cost-effective signals: China reminds India of its vulnerability, while India demonstrates resilience. Each confrontation thus also becomes about credibility and deterrence. Finally, existing mechanisms manage rather than resolve disputes. The main issue, however, is that most of these mechanisms are activated only once the crisis has begun. They are crisis control valves, not conflict prevention tools, and hence every flare-up is “contained” but never fundamentally solved. Furthermore, as the border dispute has deeper historical legacies and political stakes, the two sides might even avoid using them at the right time to maintain domestic credibility or wait until the one side has demonstrated enough restraint.

Strategic Implications: India’s Dilemma and Imperatives

The persistence of crisis management at the border without resolution underscores a structural nature of the Sino-Indian rivalry. What appears as normalization is often a fragile truce, which is again easily jeopardized by localized confrontations. Meanwhile, China’s multifaceted influence, through military pressure, economic leverage, diplomatic isolation, and technological dominance, places India on the defensive.

The stakes extend beyond bilateral engagements at the border. The same economic ties, rather than stabilizing the relationship, have become a source of friction. India faces a massive trade deficit with China, while disputes over market access and resource competition persist. Beijing’s recent use of economic tools, from export controls on rare earth minerals, which are critical for India’s technology sector, to restrictions on fertilizers and machinery, has reinforced India’s vulnerabilities. Rather than offering reassurances of a more balanced future, China’s approach has underlined India’s acute dependencies, deepening mistrust. While India and China cooperate publicly, they remain economically interdependent and strategic rivals, highlighting the fragility of the “win-win” narrative that often frames the relationship.

On the broader level, there is little alignment as well. China’s long-time partnership with Pakistan is seen as an affront, including the Belt and Road Initiative’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, as well as broader efforts to project its influence into other countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives. In turn, India seeks to convince other countries in the region to halt or reduce Beijing’s strategic footprint in their territories. Additionally, New Delhi has sought to build its own relationships with China’s neighbors. For instance, India cooperated with Vietnam in its exploration for minerals in the South China Sea and took steps toward selling BrahMos missiles to the Philippines. The Trump factor further complicates India’s strategic calculus with China, and despite U.S. tariffs, the reality is that New Delhi may not afford to move away from Washington either.

India and China thus remain locked in a “frenemy” dynamic, compelled to cooperate yet bound to confront, with the border dispute at the heart of these tensions. Economic interdependence coexists with a strategic rivalry in which border disputes perpetuate cycles of escalation. India’s real dilemma, then, is not whether it can “manage” China but whether it can escape becoming a permanent crisis manager, locked into reacting to Beijing’s moves rather than shaping the strategic environment itself.

Economic interdependence has proven illusory, serving as a lever of coercion rather than stability, while U.S. support cannot substitute for India’s own structural transformation. New Delhi should therefore develop an economic resilience that reduces its dependence from Chinese trade and technology, while strengthening its alliances with other influential countries to gain leverage. Simultaneously, India should upgrade its border infrastructure, enhance surveillance and reform its crisis management mechanisms to anticipate rather than simply containing standoffs, while pursuing diplomacy selectively.

The future trajectory at the border remains uncertain, and several developments could exacerbate tensions. The acceleration of Chinese infrastructure along the disputed sectors, increased troop deployments, and domestic nationalism further limit room for compromise. Conversely, progress could be possible should the two countries institutionalize military-to-military communications, clarify and codify rules of engagement beyond the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility, and establish a long-term framework that reduces strategic risk. Until then, gestures of rapprochement, such as the recent ones displayed at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, will remain symbolic, and India risks drifting into a future where its China policy is defined not by strategy but by survival.

BECOME A MEMBER

Chiara Boldrini is a final-year Ph.D. candidate at the University of Bologna. Previously, she has been a Fulbright Visiting Researcher at Boston College and Visiting Fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research in New Delhi.

Image: Indian Prime Minister’s Office via Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · September 19, 2025

21. Fixing Europe's Firepower

​Excerpts:

Finally, the EU should fund joint defense spending with joint financing. Together, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European Defense Fund, and national central banks and ministries of defense could seek to raise around $950 billion, the amount Draghi recommended (800 billion euros) to revive European growth. Joint borrowing has long been controversial in Europe; member states have varying risk tolerance when it comes to debt, which led to clashes among Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain during the eurozone crisis. But it is the best way for the continent to raise money quickly without assuming the same financial risks that individual countries would shoulder in borrowing the same amount themselves. Previous EU-level debt instruments, such as the eurozone bailout fund established in 2012 or the EU’s post-pandemic recovery fund, have historically received the highest possible credit rating, and there is no reason to think a European defense bond would be any different. The interest from this bond could be kept at a manageable level, too, given that many investors are looking for safe assets amid a period of global economic uncertainty.

Introducing such a bond would add to the newly available capital and private-sector investment enabled by the creation of the Savings and Investment Union. Together, these steps would help defense companies scale up production and help innovators commercialize their products. Defense companies across Europe would even have incentives to join forces to attract more investment, reducing the fragmentation in the sector.

Together, a common defense bond and reforms in Europe’s banking and financial industries would allow for a rebuilding of the continent’s defenses. For years, limited EU-level coordination of defense policy and member states’ reluctance to increase defense budgets have held the continent back. Now, European leaders must recognize that bold action is the only way to keep Europe safe and united in the dangerous times that lie ahead.

Fixing Europe's Firepower

Foreign Affairs · More by Dalibor Rohac · September 19, 2025

Fixing Europe’s Firepower

How the EU Can Funnel Its Wealth Into Its Defense

Dalibor Rohac and Eduardo Castellet Nogués

September 19, 2025

Polish soldiers taking part in military exercises near Orzysz, Poland, September 2025 Kacper Pempel / Reuters

Dalibor Rohac is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Eduardo Castellet Nogués is the author of the newsletter Critical Supply.

• More by Eduardo Castellet Nogués

Print Subscribe to unlock this feature or Sign in.

Save Sign in and save to read later

Share

Fixing Europe’s Firepower

How the EU Can Funnel Its Wealth Into Its Defense

Dalibor Rohac and Eduardo Castellet Nogués​

​European leaders know by now that they need to invest more in security. They know that the continent needs bigger defense budgets to fund more military capabilities and larger armies. Some of their motivation comes from Washington, which this year pushed European NATO members to commit to military spending targets of five percent of GDP (including 3.5 percent for outlays on core defense needs such as hardware). But Europe needs to spend for its own sake, too, to ensure the continent’s safety in a world in which it can rely less and less on the protection of the United States.

The challenge is executing an effective military buildup. Many European countries carry large debt burdens and struggle to bring spending on welfare and pensions under control, limiting their room for fiscal maneuvering. Increased budgets, moreover, do not translate automatically into greater capabilities. Simply purchasing more U.S. defense systems, for instance, might please Washington but would be an inefficient and perhaps imprudent way to bolster European security. The U.S. defense industry suffers from significant backlogs: the wait time for a new Patriot missile defense system is seven years, for example. Relying on a foreign industrial base is also risky: if the United States were embroiled in a conflict elsewhere, it would be unlikely to prioritize maintenance for U.S.-made systems in Europe.

A serious buildup therefore requires investment in European defense production, but this presents obstacles, too. Europe’s defense industry is fragmented and ridden with wasteful redundancy. With multiple firms in different countries producing different types of the same equipment, the continent has ended up fielding roughly six times as many major weapons systems—such as fighter jets, battle tanks, and attack helicopters—as the United States. Many governments have nurtured defense companies as national champions, and joint production across borders is rare. As a result, few European firms are among the largest defense companies in the world—a list that is dominated by American and, to a lesser extent, Chinese manufacturers. Even the large European defense players, such as France’s Thales, Italy’s Leonardo, and Germany’s Rheinmetall, look like modest operations compared with their U.S. counterparts.

A large and coordinated increase in defense budgets, combined with expanded access to capital across European borders, is necessary to expand and to reduce fragmentation in the European defense industry. The U.S. Department of Defense spends more than $800 billion every year, including close to $300 billion on acquisitions. Meanwhile, the European Union’s Readiness 2030 defense initiative, unveiled in March, is seeking to leverage around $175 billion in EU-facilitated borrowing by member states to mobilize up to $940 billion in investment, most of it private, in Europe’s defense industry. The European Commission’s next budget proposal allocates an additional $150 billion for defense over seven years. These pledges are still not big enough, and they do not address the underlying obstacles to industrial consolidation. Without resolving both problems, Europe stands little chance of making up for its decades of underspending on defense.

To give European industry the boost it needs, the continent’s leaders must unlock its vast capacity for investment. The EU is home to $39 trillion in private savings—more than three times as much as in the United States—predominantly held in currency and deposits. Turning these resources into defense capacity will require European leaders to remove barriers to investment, establish a common regulatory framework for a European capital market, and provide joint financing for military projects. There is no quick solution to the continent’s defense deficit. But the right reforms can help make European security something Europe can afford.

Shoulder to Shoulder

European rules that require investors to factor environmental, social, and governance considerations into their business decisions do not explicitly ban investment in defense companies, but many investors are wary of doing so anyway. The defense industry carries a reputational stigma among European bankers, financial institutions, and their clients, who may choose to exclude these companies from their portfolios to avoid public scrutiny. Europe does have more outright restrictions than the United States, too. According to the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, 14 percent of professionally managed assets in Europe were subject to restrictions on weapons-related investment as of 2021, compared with less than one percent in the United States.

Private investment in European defense firms should be encouraged, not discouraged. A private investor cannot be mandated to spend on security but might be more inclined to do so if influential public institutions such as the European Investment Bank lead the way. For more than two decades, the bank has banned defense- and security-related investment. It relaxed that restriction in March to allow investment in projects that qualify as dual-use, but it still prohibits direct investment in weapons and ammunition production. Many of these restrictions are self-imposed, in coordination with the European Commission, and can be changed with sufficient political will. If the bank, which has a balance sheet of more than $640 billion, were to prioritize spending on EU-wide defense projects such as the Eurofighter combat aircraft or the Main Armoured Tank of Europe, it could show private investors that putting money into European defense is nothing to be ashamed of.

Scaling up defense spending will also require an integrated European financial market. The continent already has a common currency, but member countries regulate their own banking systems and retirement funds. As a result, savings accumulated in a given European country tend to stay there rather than flowing organically to places with higher rates of return. This stagnation limits the size and depth of Europe’s capital market. In the United States, private companies are mostly funded through the capital market (around 75 percent) rather than bank loans (around 25 percent), providing a quicker way to raise cash while limiting exposure. In the EU, that balance is reversed, and European startups and defense firms struggle to secure financing to grow their businesses as a result.

A lack of access to capital also hampers European startups’ potential. As Ukraine has shown with its drone industry, a flexible and decentralized procurement system and rapid innovation cycle are essential to producing the weapons of modern war. Those structural conditions are not present in Europe. Nor does Europe have a large enough venture capital industry to support this type of innovative market. Startups have similar early success rates in the EU and the United States, but because the U.S. venture capital industry is six times as large as the European sector, European startups have more difficulty accessing significant, reliable financing and thus have lower chances of long-term survival.

European leaders must unlock the continent’s vast capacity for investment.

Establishing the EU Savings and Investment Union, which would create a single regulatory regime in Europe, would make it easier to finance both legacy and startup defense companies. This project was originally proposed in 2015 and was reanimated by a 2024 report on the state of European competitiveness by the former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi. The European Commission introduced a plan in March to make it a reality. Although it is not a silver bullet that will turn Europeans into risk-taking venture capitalists, the union would remove obstacles to investment by European citizens, funds, and banks to invest in projects beyond their national borders, and allow them to range continent-wide. There is now political momentum to realize the union, fueled by Draghi’s report and a 2024 report by another former Italian prime minister, Enrico Letta, both of which identified underinvestment as the main factor contributing to the EU’s sluggish growth. The European Central Bank has pushed for the union, too. Now, the EU’s principal institutions must work together with the finance industry to deliver the Savings and Investment Union in the next year.

Finally, the EU should fund joint defense spending with joint financing. Together, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European Defense Fund, and national central banks and ministries of defense could seek to raise around $950 billion, the amount Draghi recommended (800 billion euros) to revive European growth. Joint borrowing has long been controversial in Europe; member states have varying risk tolerance when it comes to debt, which led to clashes among Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain during the eurozone crisis. But it is the best way for the continent to raise money quickly without assuming the same financial risks that individual countries would shoulder in borrowing the same amount themselves. Previous EU-level debt instruments, such as the eurozone bailout fund established in 2012 or the EU’s post-pandemic recovery fund, have historically received the highest possible credit rating, and there is no reason to think a European defense bond would be any different. The interest from this bond could be kept at a manageable level, too, given that many investors are looking for safe assets amid a period of global economic uncertainty.

Introducing such a bond would add to the newly available capital and private-sector investment enabled by the creation of the Savings and Investment Union. Together, these steps would help defense companies scale up production and help innovators commercialize their products. Defense companies across Europe would even have incentives to join forces to attract more investment, reducing the fragmentation in the sector.

Together, a common defense bond and reforms in Europe’s banking and financial industries would allow for a rebuilding of the continent’s defenses. For years, limited EU-level coordination of defense policy and member states’ reluctance to increase defense budgets have held the continent back. Now, European leaders must recognize that bold action is the only way to keep Europe safe and united in the dangerous times that lie ahead.

Foreign Affairs · More by Dalibor Rohac · September 19, 2025

22. What China Doesn’t Want – Beijing’s Core Aims Are Clear—and Limited

​Conclusion:

Dealing effectively with China requires understanding China as it actually exists, not the China that U.S. policymakers of both parties have imagined and come to accept as fact. It is neither unrealistic nor unfairly sympathetic to China to examine what the country wants and realize that its aims are far less expansionary, confrontational, or threatening to U.S. interests than most policymakers believe. China is telling the world—and itself—what it wants. If Washington wants to deal with China effectively, it would do well to listen.

​Is this what we want to hear? Is this what China wants us to hear? Is this wishful thinking?

What China Doesn’t Want

Foreign Affairs · More by David C. Kang · September 19, 2025

David C. Kang, Jackie S. H. Wong, and Zenobia T. Chan

Beijing’s Core Aims Are Clear—and Limited

September 19, 2025

Waving flags ahead of a military parade in Beijing, China, September 2025 Go Nakamura / Reuters

DAVID C. KANG is Maria Crutcher Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California.

JACKIE S. H. WONG is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the American University of Sharjah.

ZENOBIA T. CHAN is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University.

• More by Jackie S. H. Wong
• More by Zenobia T. Chan

Print Subscribe to unlock this feature or Sign in.

Save Sign in and save to read later

It is now considered common knowledge in Washington policymaking circles that China aims to replace the United States as the dominant global superpower and to aggressively expand its territory. Democrats and Republicans alike have embraced this consensus. Elbridge Colby, who advises the Pentagon as President Donald Trump’s undersecretary of defense for policy, has written that if China took control of Taiwan it would serve as a steppingstone to extending its reach into the Philippines and Vietnam. Rush Doshi, the deputy senior director for China and Taiwan on the National Security Council under President Joe Biden and one of the architects of Biden’s China policy, argues that China has been playing a long game to displace the United States as world leader. This bipartisan understanding has shaped the United States’ China policy, which now focuses on warfighting, military deterrence, and decoupling.

The problem is that this understanding of China is incorrect. A careful review of what China says it wants reveals a very different picture: China is a status quo power with limited global aims, not a revisionist state seeking to dramatically expand its power and reshape the world order. China’s leaders are much more focused on internal challenges and regime stability than on expanding the country’s external reach. China does have foreign policy demands and often bullies its neighbors, but it does not seek to invade or conquer them. It is extremely sensitive about its control of territories that the rest of the world has agreed, at least diplomatically, are Chinese, including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. But China’s ambitions rarely stretch further.

China is becoming stronger and richer, but its increasing power is not fundamentally reshaping its concerns or aspirations. China’s main objectives, including its specific territorial claims, are consistent with what it wanted in the mid-twentieth century, when the country was weak and poor. In fact, they date back even further: political authorities since the Qing dynasty, which ruled China from the seventeenth century to the early twentieth century, made similar claims.

If China is a status quo power with clear and limited aims, not a grave threat to U.S. dominance, the United States is taking the wrong approach to the world’s most important bilateral relationship. Washington’s emphasis on military deterrence and preparing for war risks creating exactly the type of military confrontation where none need exist and threatens to isolate the United States from East Asia. Rather than view China as a dangerous threat, the United States needs to understand China’s core interests so that it knows where China may be willing to compromise and where it will not. U.S. policymakers who want to effectively influence Beijing would be better served engaging China economically and diplomatically rather than trying to isolate and contain China with a military-first grand strategy.

SAY IT LOUD

The best way to understand what China wants is to listen to what its leaders, journals, and media outlets say it wants. Although many observers deride public statements as cheap talk or propaganda, there is good reason to think that China says what it means. Leaders and regimes take great care to communicate their goals, methods, and governing logics to both their own people and the outside world. And even if much of this is propaganda designed to flatter the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or push a particular narrative, studies have shown that even the most exaggerated propaganda can provide valuable clues to what leaders are thinking. At the very least, it reveals what Chinese leaders want their citizens to believe.

China has stated its core interests clearly and consistently. In September 2011, before Xi Jinping was inaugurated as China’s leader, Beijing published its first official foreign policy white paper that defined China’s core interests. These included internal political stability, national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the primacy of the CCP, and economic and social development. Under Xi’s rule, the party’s core interests have not changed. The same topics and messages have been enshrined in copious volumes of Xi’s collected works and used in national educational curricula for students starting as early as primary school.

What is largely absent in China’s description of itself and its interests is any grandiose ambition to be a global or even regional leader. In a major speech on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, in 2021, Xi did not call for Chinese hegemony or global leadership. The only mention of foreign policy was to reiterate China’s opposition to aggressive actions overseas. If there were ever an opportunity to declare that China had greater ambitions, it would have been on the anniversary of the CCP’s founding, but Xi’s speech omitted the issue entirely.

China does not seek to replace the United States as the dominant global power.

Xi and other Chinese leaders frequently call for China to play a larger role in global governance, but this does not mean that China seeks to replace the United States as the dominant global power. Xi’s recent proposal for a so-called Global Governance Initiative, which he unveiled in early September, is explicit that it seeks to preserve the United Nations–based international system rather than to overturn it. Nor does China want to be the sole power in charge of these institutions. Instead, China is clear—and has been since the beginning of the Cold War—that the goal is multilateralism. China’s increasing influence in multilateral bodies such as the UN is also a consequence of its growing economy and the U.S. retreat from these institutions. As U.S. financial contributions dry up, China is inevitably taking on a larger role.

In its global actions, China seeks to boost both economic growth and political influence. But these international efforts are aimed internally, and they stem from domestic issues. China launched the Belt and Road Initiative, for instance, to alleviate excess capacity in industries linked to infrastructure construction. Chinese leaders frame the BRI as a tool to build international support for China’s development and governance models—but the goal is not to spread Chinese values or to encourage other countries to adopt China’s political and economic systems. Instead, the BRI and other programs aim to use China’s economic leverage to garner international support for its specific sovereignty claims, especially over Taiwan.

In contrast to what China says it wants, U.S. foreign policy rhetoric is replete with references to global primacy, the United States’ indispensability as a nation, and aspirations to maintain its status as a global hegemon. Both Democratic and Republican leaders, from Nancy Pelosi to Mitch McConnell, agree that the United States should pursue primacy. Trump has shown that he wants to reorient the United States’ role in the world, but he still appears to view the world as one in which the United States must and should dominate—and his actions so far, such as the use of tariffs and threats to force concessions even from longtime U.S. allies, make this apparent. No equivalent type of rhetoric or action at this scale can be found in anything from the CCP, which is explicit in its desire for multipolarity at most. While China often threatens and coerces other countries, such as in disputes with South Korea and Australia, its actions are often triggered by events that China feels directly threaten its core interests.

A LIMITED RISE

Critics often point to new phrases in Chinese rhetoric as evidence that China seeks to expand its power and potentially displace the United States. Since 2021, for instance, Xi has invoked the phrase “the East is rising and the West is declining.” But this phrase is descriptive, not aspirational: it reflects Beijing’s perception that China’s power is increasing while that of the United States and Europe is decreasing. Moreover, when Xi uses the phrase, it is often followed by another—and mostly overlooked—sentence: “China has no intention to change the United States, nor to replace it.”

The phrase is also far less common than is commonly believed. Despite the attention it has drawn in Western media and among policymakers in Washington, the phrase has appeared in only 32 articles in the People’s Daily, the CCP’s flagship newspaper, which serves as a gauge of the official party line. When leaders say “the East is rising and the West is declining,” it is largely to justify the need to further strengthen state capacity to address internal and developmental challenges, not to suggest displacing the United States’ global role. In an internal speech delivered in 2023, for instance, Xi invoked the phrase to hail China’s successful domestic policy agenda and portray it as a model for how to accelerate economic growth among developing countries while emphasizing that such a model could not be exported.

More broadly, Chinese leaders do not propose replacing the United States in their speeches or documents, regardless of their target audience. Quantitative analysis of the 176 speeches Xi delivered between 2012 and 2024 that referred to the United States reveals that the dominant theme is cooperation, not displacement. Even when addressing sensitive issues, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea, Xi focuses on China’s historical mission to defend its borders, not a desire to expand its territory. Mentions of the United States are most frequently paired with ideas such as engagement, cooperation, and development rather than confrontation.

Qualitative assessments to unpack the nuance and context of the language that Chinese leaders use tell a similar story. Our close reading of the 290 speeches by Xi and his foreign ministers Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi from 2012 to 2025—in both their original Chinese and English translations—found no mention of China’s desire to be a hegemon that can unilaterally set global rules. The leaders highlight cooperation and the desire for the United States and China to avoid a so-called Thucydides trap in which the two countries would inevitably clash.

BACK TO THE FUTURE

Beijing’s focus on domestic politics, worries about internal sovereignty, and concerns about immediate borders and regional stability are not new. Rhetoric about Taiwan, the most prominent flash point for Chinese sovereignty, is an example of the historical origins of the issue. In 1895, Li Hongzhang, the Qing negotiator for the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which marked the end of the first Sino-Japanese war, wrote in reply to a Japanese draft of the treaty, “Taiwan has been established as a province and cannot be ceded to other countries.” In 1958, less than a decade after coming to power, Mao Zedong sounded a similar note, declaring, “Taiwan is ours, and we will never compromise on this issue.”

Although some scholars suggest that China wants Taiwan because of its semiconductor factories or its strategic location, China’s claims are deeply rooted in a national narrative that has endured for centuries. Chinese rulers considered Taiwan part of their territory long before 1949, when the Nationalist Party, or KMT, fled to Taiwan and retained control of the island after the CCP defeated its forces on the mainland. Leaders in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) focused on combating pirates and handling trade across the strait as Chinese settlers increasingly moved to the island. The Qing dynasty, whose Manchu rulers took control of China from the Ming in 1644, administered the island as part of coastal Fujian Province beginning in 1683 and redefined it as a separate province in 1683.

The Qing dynastic efforts to integrate Taiwan into the empire were not about wealth or conquest. There was no pre-Qing Taiwanese kingdom that could be defeated, nor did the island have tribute relations with any country. Instead, China’s incorporation of Taiwan was part of a process of closing off a frontier area, managing trade with Chinese on the island, and combating piracy. After the Qing dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895 following the first Sino-Japanese war, subsequent rulers of China considered Taiwan territory that should be regained. KMT leaders representing China (then called the Republic of China) during and after World War II made this clear. At the Cairo Conference of 1943, which sought to determine the postwar future of Asia, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed that the “territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese,” including the island of Taiwan and the offshore Penghu Islands (now part of Taiwan), should be restored to Chinese control. With the surrender of Japan to Allied Forces in 1945, the ROC regained sovereignty over Taiwan in what is known as “retrocession,” which, rendered in Chinese as the word guangfu, means “honorably recovering lost territory.”

China’s claims over Taiwan are rooted in a national narrative that has endured for centuries.

After 1949, both the KMT in Taipei and the CCP in Beijing claimed to be the legitimate ruler of all of China—including both Taiwan and the mainland. It was only with Taiwan’s transition to democracy in the 1990s that a change in Taiwan’s sovereign status entered the discussion. Thus, diplomatically, the existence of a sovereignty dispute is only 30 years old, while Chinese concerns about Taiwan predate the contemporary military or economic value of Taiwan by more than 100 years. Chinese leaders would want unification with Taiwan even if it held no military or economic value.

China’s other territorial concerns also date back at least a century. Hong Kong and Macau, which were under British and Portuguese colonial rule starting in 1841 and 1557, respectively, were returned to China in the late 1990s. China’s rule over Tibet, Qinghai, and Xinjiang dates back to the Qing dynasty, which conquered some former Ming tributaries in northwestern China and Central Asia and reorganized them as new provinces. The Qing took over Tibet in 1720 and ruled it until 1912, when it became de facto independent until CCP leaders forcibly annexed it again in 1950.

In contrast, control of the East China and South China Seas has been less important to China. Disputes over maritime claims are rooted in the chaos of the first half of the twentieth century rather than in enduring Chinese claims. When leaders at the 1943 Cairo Conference settled postwar land disputes in Asia and insisted that both Vietnam and Korea should become independent countries, they failed to specify how to determine sovereignty over maritime islets and borders.

The origin of the so-called nine-dash line, which China uses to demarcate its claims in the South China Sea, is instructive. The nine-dash line encompasses much of the South China Sea, including waters near the coastlines of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Although many observers believe such claims are new, the nine-dash line was originally an eleven-dash line, which was first shown on an official ROC map published in 1948. The demarcation may even predate that: historians have connected the 1948 map to an earlier “Map of Chinese Islands in the South China Sea,” published in 1935 by an ROC government agency. Yet in 1957, the CCP removed the two dashes that extended into the Gulf of Tonkin, the body of water separating northern Vietnam from southern China—a move widely interpreted as a gesture to improve diplomatic ties with North Vietnam. Although China will not budge on Taiwan or other long-standing sovereign claims, it has shown a willingness to compromise on other borders.

STAYING PUT

Analysts and observers have also misinterpreted China as an expansionist power. In fact, China’s aims are not increasing in scope or ambition. At its height, the Qing dynasty encompassed 13 million square kilometers of territory, far larger than the 9.42 million square kilometers that China comprises today. China’s willingness to clearly codify almost all its current borders is evidence that it views other states’ claims as legitimate. China is not making irredentist claims over almost four million square kilometers of territory—that is, it is not trying to reincorporate every single piece of lost territory in present-day Mongolia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, among others.

China has often given up disputed territory to settle claims and establish firm borders when its core interests are not in question. To settle disputes with North Korea, for example, in 1962 and 1964 China relinquished the peak of Mount Baekdu and more than 500 square kilometers of nearby territory. And although hawkish observers believe that China may eventually have aims on Vietnam, the trend has been toward China resolving its border disputes, not expanding its claims. After China and Vietnam normalized their relationship in 1991, the countries took steps to resolve border discrepancies, some of which dated back to the nineteenth century. China and Vietnam signed bilateral treaties codifying their borders in 1999 and 2000. There is no indication that China has any intention of attempting to renegotiate or renege on any of these previous agreements with Vietnam. Indeed, despite contention in the South China Sea, Chinese-Vietnamese ties have improved: Chinese army troops recently marched in two Vietnamese military parades, held in April and September.

Although China has aggressively built military outposts on islands in the South China Sea and flexed its muscle against smaller Southeast Asian neighbors, China is neither the only cause nor is it the only solution to the competing border disputes in the South China Sea. But China’s bullying—or any country’s island reclamation projects in the area—is not an attempt to threaten another country’s existence. What is at stake are historical disputes that will require skilled diplomacy to resolve. China will not give up its claims, but it may be willing to compromise on managing the commons. Most important, China’s solution is unlikely to be led by its military.

THE REAL THREAT

Because Washington has misunderstood what China wants, U.S. policy toward China has been misdirected. Current policies aimed at isolating China diplomatically and economically, and U.S. withdrawal from multilateral economic institutions such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, are designed to combat a revisionist power that seeks to displace the United States and to act aggressively to expand its territory. But these will do little to engage a country that is much more focused on preserving the status quo and maintaining its internal stability. U.S. policymakers should view China not as a grave threat but as a normal competitor. Healthy competition in technology, business, and even education can be good for both sides without triggering fear-driven responses stemming from the view that the other side is an existential threat.

This means that the U.S. military buildup in the Pacific is unnecessary and counterproductive. An aggressive military-first policy toward China and the rest of East Asia wastes resources preparing for low-probability contingencies, which weakens U.S. military strength in the long term. It also increases the possibility of escalating tensions with China rather than lowering them. It is quite possible to reassure allies, maintain a military presence in the Pacific, and safeguard American security without a massive military presence in the region.

The U.S. military buildup in the Pacific is unnecessary and counterproductive.

Trying to use force to shape the future status of Taiwan is even more misguided. Because China’s claims to Taiwan are ideological and historical, not purely strategic, attempting to deter is more likely to provoke. The goal should be to preserve the status quo, which has worked for the past four decades. U.S. policymakers can do more of what George W. Bush and other presidents did: strongly emphasize to China that Taiwan’s unilateral change of the status quo would be unacceptable, which is the most likely way of ensuring the status quo continues. China is clear that it will not compromise on Taiwan, but its fundamental bottom line is Taiwanese independence. Any actions the United States can take to reassure Beijing on this front respects China’s clear core interests and increases the likelihood of preserving the status quo for longer.

The focus on war is counterproductive because the major issues are not military in nature. U.S. companies often find it difficult to work with Chinese firms, the Chinese government can be pushy and stubborn, and U.S. and Chinese interests do not align on many key issues. But this is a normal state of affairs in world politics and the issues at stake are standard components of healthy competition. Relying on diplomacy, rather than military posturing, can reduce tensions and solve global problems. The United States and China have room to cooperate on energy transitions, environmental protection, and preventing the next pandemic, to name a few. None of these global issues can be solved through a military-first approach by the United States.

Dealing effectively with China requires understanding China as it actually exists, not the China that U.S. policymakers of both parties have imagined and come to accept as fact. It is neither unrealistic nor unfairly sympathetic to China to examine what the country wants and realize that its aims are far less expansionary, confrontational, or threatening to U.S. interests than most policymakers believe. China is telling the world—and itself—what it wants. If Washington wants to deal with China effectively, it would do well to listen.

Foreign Affairs · More by David C. Kang · September 19, 2025

23. As Russian drones circle, NATO must learn Ukraine's lessons

​Excerpts:

First among them is the importance of mass armies. Western military doctrine seeks to overcome the question of mass through technological innovations that promote maneuver on the battlefield to overcome larger armies.

Unfortunately, technological innovations in the war in Ukraine — whether they’ve involved drones or advanced sensors — have reinforced attrition versus the maneuver tactics favored by Western countries. In such a war, the size of one’s army and its capacity to produce munitions are of paramount importance.

Second, the Western experience of peace has distorted collective perceptions of war. Ukraine has shown us that disinformation campaigns, often considered by the West to be a form of warfare, are simply not on par with the destruction and harm a conventional war inflicts on people.

Western countries have spent too much energy preparing for disinformation campaigns and other forms of hybrid warfare versus the traditional-style war Ukraine faces against Russia.

This distortion has contributed to the West’s slow response time in Ukraine. European states, three years after the current phase of the conflict, are still coming up short. Armaments production in the European Union is not sufficient to support Ukraine, let alone the continent’s needs.

Throughout its war with Russia, Ukraine is providing a formula: Large armies and certain new technologies are what European and other states require for a contemporary war. The question remains, however, if these states will heed these lessons.

As Russian drones circle, NATO must learn Ukraine's lessons - Asia Times

Ukraine shows that army size, drone adaptability and munitions production are key to winning a modern war

asiatimes.com · James Horncastle, Samuel Zilincik · September 19, 2025

Russian drones recently violated Polish and Romanian airspace.

These intrusions, whether intentional or not, caused Poland to shut down airports and both Polish and Romanian officials deployed their air forces. The Polish air force, ultimately, succeeded in downing 19 drones while Romania monitored but did not engage for fear of collateral damage.

The media focus in the aftermath of these incursions is on the political ramifications. Both Poland and Romania are NATO members, and Poland has invoked Article 4 of the NATO treaty. It’s one of only eight times a country has invoked it.

Article 4, the shortest of the NATO treaty’s 14 articles, states that:

“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

‘Here we go!’

American President Donald Trump wrote about the incursions on social media: “What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones? Here we go!”

This statement stoked hopes among Ukraine’s supporters that Trump would either increase his support for Ukraine or boost sanctions on Russia. Besides stating that he would impose harsh sanctions if NATO countries stop importing Russian oil, Trump has so far done nothing.

The political ramifications are important. Noted war theorist Carl von Clausewitz, after all, defined war as a political act. What’s missing from recent analyses, however, is how Ukraine’s struggle over the last three years has yielded valuable lessons for Europe’s defense.

An ongoing peace

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, in the aftermath of the intrusion, declared in parliament that “this situation brings us the closest we have been to open conflict since World War II.” Tusk’s statement highlighted the political significance of Russia’s actions and underscored the seriousness of the incident.

It also highlights how many European countries have had little engagement with direct conflict since the Second World War. There are notable exceptions to this point, specifically for the United Kingdom and France – but for many European countries, engagement with war has been more theoretical and less practical.

Even in the case of the UK and France, the military operations they’ve engaged in are not similar to those Ukraine faces against Russia. France and Britain have fought either insurgency campaigns or in wars against states that lacked their military capabilities, like Iraq.

These actions, while useful from a military standpoint, could be distorting perceptions about their capabilities when it comes to engaging against a competitor with similar military strength.

Fighting the ‘last war’

Militaries face a constant problem in their preparations as they determine what tools will be needed for the next war. This question is complex.

The interaction between new technologies and human beings can create unique dynamics that can alter the balance of warfare. Germany’s ability to combine radio, mobility and mission tactics in the form of the Panzer tank, for example, initially shifted the balance of the Second World War.

Some technologies, however, can end up being a proverbial dead end and cost a state significantly for no appreciable gain. The British Royal Navy’s First Sea Lord Admiral John Fisher, at the start of the 20th century, believed a vessel known as the battle cruiser would revolutionize warfare. Battle cruisers were ships with the weapons of a battleship and the armour and speed of a cruiser.

The concept of the battle cruiser, one that would outrun a battleship and destroy any lesser ship, was sound. Human nature and a lack of creativity, however, meant that British admirals frequently used them against battleships. Deploying battle cruisers against targets they were not designed to fight ended in tragedy.

The result of such deployments was disaster at the Battle of Jutland off the coast of Denmark in the First World War, and further calamity when the German battleship Bismarck sank the British battle cruiser HMS Hood during the Second World War.

In other words, armed forces can spend large sums of money on technological innovations and end up with no appreciable gain. In fact, a country can place itself at a distinct disadvantage if it invests incorrectly.

Battle cruiser HMS Hood, with the HMS Repulse behind it, at anchor during a visit by the Royal Naval Fleet to South Australia in January 1924. Photo: State Library of South Australia / CC BY

Finding the right tools and practices

Russia’s incursion into Polish and Romanian airspace has the potential to expose the vulnerability of both countries, and more broadly NATO as well.

Although Poland succeeded in eliminating the drones, it needed to employ aircraft to do so. Ukraine’s experience demonstrates that there are much cheaper and more efficient ways of eliminating enemy drones than employing expensive aircraft.

Ukraine continues to develop a multi-layered air defense system to protect its soldiers and civilians from Russia’s nightly drone bombardment. These methods range from interceptor drones to electronic warfare jammers.

In the aftermath of Russia’s incursion into Poland, in fact, European nations are looking for guidance from Ukraine on practices and technology to combat drone attacks.

Dealing with drones in contemporary warfare is just one facet of what observers can learn from the enduring war in Ukraine. But there are other lessons that could have an even greater impact on what European countries should consider in their defence policies.

Learning from Ukraine

First among them is the importance of mass armies. Western military doctrine seeks to overcome the question of mass through technological innovations that promote maneuver on the battlefield to overcome larger armies.

Unfortunately, technological innovations in the war in Ukraine — whether they’ve involved drones or advanced sensors — have reinforced attrition versus the maneuver tactics favored by Western countries. In such a war, the size of one’s army and its capacity to produce munitions are of paramount importance.

Second, the Western experience of peace has distorted collective perceptions of war. Ukraine has shown us that disinformation campaigns, often considered by the West to be a form of warfare, are simply not on par with the destruction and harm a conventional war inflicts on people.

Western countries have spent too much energy preparing for disinformation campaigns and other forms of hybrid warfare versus the traditional-style war Ukraine faces against Russia.

This distortion has contributed to the West’s slow response time in Ukraine. European states, three years after the current phase of the conflict, are still coming up short. Armaments production in the European Union is not sufficient to support Ukraine, let alone the continent’s needs.

Throughout its war with Russia, Ukraine is providing a formula: Large armies and certain new technologies are what European and other states require for a contemporary war. The question remains, however, if these states will heed these lessons.

James Horncastle is an assistant professor and the Edward and Emily McWhinney professor of international relations, Simon Fraser University, and Samuel Zilincik is an assistant professor of strategic studies, Royal Danish Defence College.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Thank you for registering!

An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.

asiatimes.com · James Horncastle, Samuel Zilincik · September 19, 2025

24. Trump says US wants Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan back

Trump says US wants Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan back

“We’re trying to get it back, because they need things from us,” President Donald Trump said in London on Thursday.

Jeff Schogol, Matt White

Published Sep 18, 2025 1:30 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · Jeff Schogol, Matt White

Bagram Airfield was the gateway to Afghanistan for a generation of U.S. service members. The last U.S. troops quietly withdrew from the base in July 2021, shortly before the Taliban took control of the entire country.

Now the United States may be seeking to reclaim Bagram Airfield from the Taliban, President Donald Trump said on Thursday.

“We were going to keep Bagram, the big air base, one of the biggest air bases in the world,” Trump said. “We gave it to them for nothing. We’re trying to get it back, by the way, okay? That could be a little breaking news.”

The topic came up as President Trump spoke with reporters during a news conference with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer in London. Trump described the U.S. military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 as a “total disaster.”

“We’re trying to get it back, because they need things from us,” Trump continued. “We want that base back. But one of the reasons we want the base is — as you know — it’s an hour away from where China makes its nuclear weapons. So, a lot of things are happening.”

Taliban has not responded to Trump

A Pentagon spokesperson had nothing to add to Trump’s comments and referred questions to the matter to the White House.

The Taliban has not yet issued a statement in response to Trump’s remarks, a Taliban government official told Task & Purpose.

For veterans of the Afghanistan War, the prospect of reopening Bagram Airfield is likely to bring back an avalanche of memories, given the prominence of the base in the U.S. military’s efforts during 20 years of war. With the largest and best-defended runway in the country, the base was where a generation of troops from every service arrived in Afghanistan and from where they later departed the country.

The U.S. military’s decision to hand over Bagram Airfield to Afghan security forces in July 2021 remains controversial. Once American troops had left the base — which they did with almost no notice — only Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul was available as the staging area for the massive evacuation of Americans and Afghans as the Taliban overran the country.

Trump did not elaborate on exactly how the U.S. government might secure Bagram Airfield or if the United States has opened negotiations with the Taliban on the matter. It is also unclear how exactly reopening Bagram would allow U.S. troops to counter China’s nuclear weapons program.

Trump has linked Bagram to China in past

Thursday was not the first time that Trump linked Bagram to the U.S.’s increasingly hostile relationship with China.

In May, he brought up Bagram during a speech at the National Day of Prayer event at the White House.

“Now, China occupies Bagram,” Trump said. “So sad. So crazy.”

Get Task & Purpose in your inbox

Sign up for Task & Purpose Today to get the latest in military news each morning.

Sign Up

By signing up you agree to our Terms of Service and Privacy Policy.

It’s also unclear what facility Trump is referencing in his claim that China “makes its nuclear weapons” an hour from the base. China has dramatically increased the size of its nuclear weapons program in the last decade, according to both U.S. military and civilian disarmament and nonproliferation experts, but nearly all of China’s nuclear weapons facilities are in the center or eastern part of the country, roughly as far from Bagram as the base is from Europe.

One testing facility, known as Lop Nur, is in western China, about 2,000 kilometers from Bagram. Lop Nur was a major testing site for China in the 1960s and 1970s, but was shuttered in recent decades. However, the Pentagon’s 2024 “Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China” report confirmed the view of many civilian experts that the facility is being put back in service.

“The PRC’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur nuclear test site year-round and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities have raised concerns regarding its adherence” to test ban treaties, the report said.

Task & Purpose Video

Each week on Tuesdays and Fridays our team will bring you analysis of military tech, tactics, and doctrine.

Watch Here

Jeff Schogol

Senior Pentagon Reporter

Jeff Schogol is the senior Pentagon reporter for Task & Purpose. He has covered the military for nearly 20 years. Email him at schogol@taskandpurpose.com; direct message @JSchogol73030 on Twitter; or reach him on WhatsApp and Signal at 703-909-6488.

Matt White

Senior Editor

Matt White is a senior editor at Task & Purpose. He was a pararescueman in the Air Force and the Alaska Air National Guard for eight years and has more than a decade of experience in daily and magazine journalism. He also teaches news writing at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill’s Hussman School of Journalism and Media where he is frequently referred to as a “very tough grader” on Rate My Professor. You can reach Matt at matthew.white@taskandpurpose.com

taskandpurpose.com · Jeff Schogol, Matt White

25. Renaming the ‘Defense Department’ Is a Good First Step

​I was surprised to see this from Doug Bandow based on the headline until I read the subtitle (and the rest of his essay)

Excerpts:

Still, the president’s task is not complete. First is the admittedly superficial name issue. He can direct his own officials to use DoW rather than DoD. However, despite his exalted opinion of presidential authority, he cannot overrule Congress and formally change the Pentagon’s official name. For that, he needs to win Capitol Hill’s approval.

Second is the substantive issue of going to war. The president presents himself as something of a peacenik, but he has shown no reluctance to use the U.S. military, usually for purposes distressingly far from defense or otherwise putting America first. Even as he calls the Pentagon the Department of War, he should reject war except in America’s defense. War is sometimes necessary, but virtually never in the case of the U.S., which is the most secure great power ever. It is time to make war rarer still as a policy tool of Washington.

Changing the Pentagon’s formal name to the Department of War would be a great step forward in truth in advertising. Better still would be to stop going to war absent the most compelling justification. If Donald Trump makes that his legacy he would be a worthy recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Renaming the ‘Defense Department’ Is a Good First Step

Doug Bandow

Sep 18, 2025

12:01 AM

The Pentagon has little to do with America’s defense.

The Pentagon has little to do with America’s defense.

The American Conservative · The American Conservative · September 18, 2025

Loading the Elevenlabs Text to Speech AudioNative Player...

President Donald Trump often functions like a broken clock. Twice a day he gets an issue right. In a recent case, he struck true gold with his decision to rename the Department of Defense the Department of War, the original name for what we now often simply call the Pentagon, the massive building that houses much of the military’s vast bureaucracy.

America’s war-making cabinet post was originally created as the Department of War in 1789 and operated with that name until 1949. The latter change was clumsy propaganda. Explained historian Richard H. Kohn: “It was to communicate to America’s adversaries and the rest of the world that America was not about making war but defending the United States.” During the Cold War there was at least a pretense that the armed forces were deployed for America’s “defense,” though the country’s military interventions grew increasingly dubious, culminating in the Vietnam debacle.

However, as is his wont, Trump’s decision had little to do with reality and everything to do with illusion. He called “Department of Defense” politically correct and opined that the new name “just sounded better.” He got the politically correct charge right, but otherwise his rationale, expressed in his executive order, was almost entirely wrong. He contended: “The name ‘Department of War,’ more than the current ‘Department of Defense,’ ensures peace through strength, as it demonstrates our ability and willingness to fight and win wars on behalf of our Nation at a moment’s notice, not just to defend. This name sharpens the Department’s focus on our own national interest and our adversaries’ focus on our willingness and availability to wage war to secure what is ours.”

In fact, the problem with the previous name is simply that it had proved to be increasingly false, essentially disguising activities almost completely disconnected from protecting America and Americans. Even when the military’s activities can be characterized as “defense,” it usually involves a response to threats created by earlier misbegotten, counterproductive, and aggressive interventions that often are not only practically foolish but morally monstrous. The true “national interest” that the president spoke of would be to avoid such conflicts entirely.

In America’s early years, “Department of War” was an accurate description. Although the War of 1812 began as defense against British naval depredations, Americans avidly pursued the conflict in a frankly imperialistic effort to conquer London’s Canadian possessions. The U.S. barely escaped with a draw after its invasion attempts were disastrously repulsed.

President James K. Polk triggered the Mexican–American War by stationing U.S. military forces in disputed territory to back a highly dubious claim made by Texans seceding from Mexico. In truth, his ambitions were much greater, to seize the vast territories that today make up much of the western United States. In victory Washington annexed half of Mexico, and some imperialists wanted to grab it all. Declared the New York Herald: “Like the Sabine virgins, she will soon learn to love her ravisher.”

The War Department’s biggest battle was against its own people. Known as the Civil War, it wasn’t actually one, since the southern states fought to secede, not to control the entire union. Some 750,000 Americans died, equivalent to about eight million or so if a similar proportion of the population died today. Slavery was a terrible crime, but few joined Washington’s military to liberate those in bondage. While that would have offered a moral cause, forcing people at gunpoint to remain in the union—and killing them if they resisted—was not. The War Department saved Washington’s authority, not the country, which was ravaged by the conflict.

The Spanish–American War was openly imperialistic. The U.S. had conquered North America’s heartland and west, suppressing native Americans with great force, yet pretended moral outrage at Spain’s brutal war against Cuban insurgents. While Washington could at least plausibly, though not convincingly, claim its intervention in Cuba to be motivated by high-minded humanitarianism, the conquest of the Philippines and ruthless suppression of the preexisting Filipino independence movement was the worst form of callous and cruel imperialism. The U.S. behaved with greater barbarity than the Spanish, causing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Filipino civilians. Even Republican politicians were appalled by the military’s ostentatious criminality.

For decades, the U.S. was openly imperialistic in Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine did not affirm neighborly independence. Rather, it ordered the Europeans to stay out, allowing Washington to replace them as de facto colonial masters. President Woodrow Wilson, ever prone to misuse his authority and the U.S. military, was among the worst abusers. He ordered a brief war and the occupation of Veracruz to force Mexico to, ludicrously, salute the American flag after a convoluted dispute involving U.S. merchant sailors. So much for his grand and much-inflated reputation as a liberal statesman.

Even more disconnected from America’s defense was World War I, with U.S. involvement initiated by the same obnoxiously pompous, vainglorious, and sanctimonious Wilson. He ran for reelection, citing his refusal to enter the idiotic imperial slugfest—in which no combatant looks good in retrospect—that prodigiously consumed European lives. He then abandoned those he was supposed to serve and took the country into the war on the preposterous argument that Americans were entitled to immunity when booking passage on British liners, even if armed, designated as reserve cruisers, and carrying munitions through a war zone. For this, along with a contemptibly haughty desire to reorder the globe, he callously sacrificed 100,000 American lives and ruthlessly suppressed civil liberties. Then he bungled the peace, putting his name on the Versailles Treaty, which prepared the ground for another, far worse war a generation later. America’s “defense” was the last issue on his mind.

After fighting all these dubious conflicts, only in World War II did the Department of War finally act to protect America, and even then, only after the Roosevelt administration recklessly provoked a Japanese strike by cutting off Tokyo’s supplies of steel and oil and waged an undeclared, unprovoked naval war against Germany. At least in this case the adversaries were truly evil and America’s victory left the world in a better, though badly divided, state.

Four years after the end of that struggle, Congress changed the bureaucracy’s name to the Department of Defense. Since then, most of America’s wars also had nothing to do with defense. In the Korean War the U.S. obviously was not threatened. Until then no one considered the Korean peninsula to be a strategic American interest. Even Gen. Douglas MacArthur had previously dismissed the security importance of what had been a Japanese colony. The best argument for U.S. intervention was that Washington helped set up the conflict—dividing the peninsula, creating a semi-puppet regime, accepting rule by an aggressive nationalist—but failed to then prepare its Korean state for the war to come.

Vietnam, the nation’s costliest post-World War II conflict, was a bizarre attempt to salvage what had been France’s Southeast Asian empire. The extended imbroglio offered no serious defense rationale. Most of the potpourri of later, smaller interventions—Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti—appeared to reflect Washington’s continuing imperial pretensions, especially in the post-Cold War era. The initial assault on Afghanistan’s Taliban regime could be justified as a response to Al Qaeda’s attack on 9/11, but 20 years of conflict and the dishonest and disastrous invasion of Iraq could not be. Nor could subsequent support for Saudi and Israeli aggression against their neighbors, or the Trump administration’s attack on Iran and threats against Venezuela. In all of these, the Pentagon acted as the Department of War, not the Department of Defense.

Still, the president’s task is not complete. First is the admittedly superficial name issue. He can direct his own officials to use DoW rather than DoD. However, despite his exalted opinion of presidential authority, he cannot overrule Congress and formally change the Pentagon’s official name. For that, he needs to win Capitol Hill’s approval.

Second is the substantive issue of going to war. The president presents himself as something of a peacenik, but he has shown no reluctance to use the U.S. military, usually for purposes distressingly far from defense or otherwise putting America first. Even as he calls the Pentagon the Department of War, he should reject war except in America’s defense. War is sometimes necessary, but virtually never in the case of the U.S., which is the most secure great power ever. It is time to make war rarer still as a policy tool of Washington.

Changing the Pentagon’s formal name to the Department of War would be a great step forward in truth in advertising. Better still would be to stop going to war absent the most compelling justification. If Donald Trump makes that his legacy he would be a worthy recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.

The American Conservative · The American Conservative · September 18, 2025

26. Does U.S. need Euro-Atlantic allies to help defend the Indo-Pacific?

​An important discussion/debate. Andrew provides some insights I have not read elsewhere.

 I am stunned by this as well:

Excerpts:

According to reports that were not refuted, Mr. Colby told British officials in May that their carrier strike group was not wanted in the Indo-Pacific.

Britons were apparently stunned: The eight-month, ongoing tour by the Royal Navy’s flagship is a high-prestige global mission for London.

Does U.S. need Euro-Atlantic allies to help defend the Indo-Pacific?

Quiet controversy brews between U.S., Europe over defense strategy in Pacific

washingtontimes.com · Andrew Salmon

By - The Washington Times - Thursday, September 18, 2025

SEOUL, South Korea — Britain’s King Charles III told President Trump during his state visit Wednesday, “Our AUKUS submarine partnership with Australia sets the benchmark for innovative and vital collaboration.”

Australian media reported that remark as a “kaboom” moment.

Under AUKUS — shorthand for the trilateral security agreement among Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States — Britain and the U.S. agreed to supply Australia with nuclear attack submarines.

The king’s reference is considered a not-too-subtle reminder to Mr. Trump, who has been noncommittal about delivering on a Biden administration pledge, that the British aren’t simply ceding the defense of their allies and interests in the Indo-Pacific to the Americans.

Disagreements between the Europeans and the U.S. over Ukraine’s defense are widely known, but a quieter controversy is brewing between the U.S. and its Western allies over the sense that the Americans are asking the Europeans to take a back seat on leadership and defense in the Pacific.

Some Washington figures have argued that NATO nations should aim their limited capabilities at Russia, puncturing European egos accustomed to global influence, but growing global skepticism about Mr. Trump’s “America First” policies has some Indo-Pacific capitals linking hands with Europe on defense partnerships and arms deals.

“The United States is historically Europe’s closest ally, and the Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly important to European strategy,” the German Marshall Fund wrote on Sept. 11. “However … differing views and approaches within the U.S. administration, and uncertainty about Washington’s approach to China, make it particularly challenging for Europe to carve out room to maneuver as a security actor.”

From CRINK to CRNK?

Advertisement

Chinese President Xi Jinping, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin were among the leaders who made up the front rank at Beijing’s military parade on Sept. 3 to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific.

Conspicuously absent from prestige positioning was visiting Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Iran is commonly lumped into the authoritarian bloc of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, sometimes referred to as CRINK but also known as “The Axis of Upheaval” or “The Axis of Authoritarianism.”

Iran’s military humiliation at the hands of U.S. and Israeli forces in June has shaken up the status quo.

“They got the hell knocked out of them recently,” said Grant Newsham, a former U.S. Marine officer and diplomat with wide experience in the Indo-Pacific.

Tehran proxies Hamas and Hezbollah have been degraded, and its air defenses were shattered, leaving nuclear sites at the mercy of Israeli and U.S. bombers, which sustained no losses in their operations.

Although Iran has been defanged for now, nuclear-armed China, North Korea and Russia represent a formidable triad.

All are Indo-Pacific powers with global presence.

Though Russia is fighting a bloody war on its European border, it maintains a significant military presence in the Far East.

Beijing also deploys a world-ranging naval fleet that has conducted drills with Russia as distant as the Indian Ocean.

Pyongyang has fought in Russia’s war against Ukraine and is receiving military, including maritime, technologies from a grateful Moscow.

Democracies struggle to respond

With its Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, America maintains a massive presence in the Indo-Pacific and has allies in Australia, Japan, the Philippines and South Korea. It also unofficially underwrites Taiwan’s defense.

Euro-Atlantic NATO members have small but active presences in the Indo-Pacific.

The U.S.-led U.N. Command, the free world states that defended South Korea in the 1950-1953 Korean War, includes representatives from Europe, including France and Britain.

Germany joined in 2024, a European officer said, “to get a bootprint in Indo-Pacific.”

Yet, barring the U.S., no U.N. Command states have mutual defense treaties with South Korea, nor do they have on-ground units.

Under the Proliferation Security Initiative, European warships have patrolled regional waters to oversee sanctions on North Korea.

Drills are another eastward call. Europe is increasingly sending forces to join regional exercises, such as Australia’s Pitch Black and Talisman Saber.

In recent years, midsize powers France, Italy and Britain have deployed carrier strike groups. These voyages are not just operational. Flight deck cocktail parties generate diplomatic/commercial public relations.

“Efforts at defense diplomacy — sending CSGs to demonstrate capabilities but also to boost potential weapons sales — show that Brits and Europeans have skin in the game,” said Alex Neill, a regional security expert at Pacific Forum. “But maybe the U.S. thinks it is a complicating effort and they would be better using those assets to defend closer shores.”

Whether European militaries deter Beijing’s or Pyongyang’s huge forces is questionable.

“I doubt Europeans have much to offer when it comes to Asia-Pacific since their militaries are just too small,” said Mr. Newsham. “They’re hard-pressed to take care of their own area, much less farther afield.”

European carrier strike groups could “backfill” U.S. strike groups departing the Euro-Atlantic for the Indo-Pacific. Some might fight, as the Royal Navy did alongside U.S. forces in World War II and the Korean War.

However, Defense Undersecretary Elbridge Colby has deprioritized the Atlantic for the Pacific.

He sought to delay shipments of weapons needed by Ukraine, but Mr. Trump overturned the decision.

Europe’s limitations

According to reports that were not refuted, Mr. Colby told British officials in May that their carrier strike group was not wanted in the Indo-Pacific.

Britons were apparently stunned: The eight-month, ongoing tour by the Royal Navy’s flagship is a high-prestige global mission for London.

The British carrier strike group has cooperated effectively with regional forces from India to Japan and with the U.S. Navy. On Sept. 12, a British frigate and a U.S. destroyer angered Beijing by transiting the Taiwan Strait.

The regional deployment exposed limitations.

“The Royal Navy can’t even put up a full CSG; it needs assistance from partner nations,” said Mr. Neill, referencing shortfalls in F-35s and surface escorts. “And you read about assets breaking down along the way.”

London may have caved to U.S. pressure.

In July, one of the lead drafters of Britain’s Strategic Defense Review told Parliament that “the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command … does not see much value in U.K. forces being based in the region,” leading to a British refocus on “the Atlantic bastion.”

Paris has stronger claims to regional presence and may be more resistant to Washington.

“The Brits and the EU constantly bang the drum about maintaining global order and freedom of navigation in Indo-Pacific,” said Mr. Neill. “France argues that they are a resident power in Indo-Pacific and has 2 million citizens living in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.”

Mr. Colby placed the 2021 AUKUS under review in June with the logic that the U.S. Navy needed all the submarines U.S. yards could build.

If Washington quashes AUKUS, it would humiliate London and Canberra. Both have staked political and financial capital on the agreement.

However, a source familiar with regional security told The Washington Times that “Bridge [Colby] is losing steam.”

American and Australian media report that Secretary of State Marco Rubio has assured Australian officials that AUKUS will proceed.

Even so, “America First” is testing nerves among allies, and former U.S. collaborations are developing.

“Trump, perhaps unwittingly, has acted as a catalyst for greater European and Asian innovation by liberal democratic states in foreign and security policy,” said John Nilsson-Wright, an Asia expert at Cambridge University.

New partnerships

In 2023, Japan and Britain signed a legal-military deal enabling the swift, seamless deployment of troops and arms between the two nations.

Japan is working not with a U.S. defense contractor but with British and Italian partners to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter.

Japan and South Korea are benefiting from their alliances with the U.S., which required them to use NATO-standard gear. This means their weapons firms can increasingly compete with the U.S. military-industrial complex.

Although neither Seoul nor Tokyo has armed Kyiv, Korean arms firms have benefited massively from the Russia-Ukraine war by selling arms worth tens of billions of dollars to NATO nations, including Estonia, Norway, Poland, Romania and Turkey.

Mr. Nilsson-Wright said multilateral defense linkages must be maintained or upgraded.

“A global commitment is required from middle-ranking powers,” he said, to “compensate for the long-term decline in U.S. influence.”

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

washingtontimes.com · Andrew Salmon

27. US Foreign Policy Is Restructuring the World Order to China’s Benefit

​Another view from India. And a scathing critique of a view it is.

Excerpts:

All this sounds like a restructured U.S. imperialism that extracts surplus from clients in exchange for protection. However, the clients are beginning to question these forced investments that sound like tithes. Further, unlike when the U.S. held unipolar power, times have changed and other options are available.

That option is China, and the BRICS countries that are busy constructing a non-militarized multipolarity. They are encouraging global trade on a fair basis without the pressure, and the embargoes. 

US Foreign Policy Is Restructuring the World Order to China’s Benefit

Unlike when the U.S. held unipolar power, times have changed as China and the BRICS countries begin fashioning a non-militarized, multipolar world. 

https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/us-foreign-policy-is-restructuring-the-world-order-to-chinas-benefit/

By Anuradha Chenoy

September 18, 2025

Credit: Wikimedia Commons / Lula Oficial

For the first time in its modern history, the U.S. faces a formidable rival – a China that is fast outpacing it. 

For years, the U.S. has out-produced and out-innovated other rivals such as Germany, Japan (pre-World War II), and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the U.S. emerged as the supreme superpower. Not surprisingly, the global system was designated as being “unipolar.”  

That is no longer the case. 

Policymakers in the U.S. are divided over how to regain its lost primacy. Current policies under Trump 2.0 are confusing friends and foes alike, even as they are escalating the restructuring of international relations.  

Enter China – there’s enough data to show why the U.S. calls it a “pacing threat.”

Although the GDP of the United States is higher than China’s, according to IMF projections for 2025, China’s Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 1.33 times that of the U.S. Despite its significantly lower GDP than that of the U.S., its annual rate of growth is much higher.

Chinese manufacturing output in 2024 stood at 27.7 percent of the global share, surpassing the U.S.’ 17.3 percent. The U.S. Federal Reserve says that over the past two decades, China has become a manufacturing powerhouse. Its global trade volume surpasses the U.S., it has the world’s largest trade surplus, and it is the largest trade partner for over a 100 countries. 

It is not just the economy, though. 

According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the Chinese navy is the largest in the world with over 370 platforms, with its mine warfare, aircraft carriers and fleet auxiliaries outcompeting the U.S. The Chinese air force and unmanned aerial systems are comparable to the U.S. Air Force. 

China is ahead of the U.S. in the technology race in 37 out of 44 key areas, and possesses monopoly in several fields. 

Its strategic partnership with Russia is viewed by the U.S. as a major threat. And Trump 2.0 sees multilateral forums like BRICS as challenging U.S. dominance. 

U.S. policymakers and strategic elite are divided on how to deal with this, leading to a slew of often contradictory statements and policies. The chaos has evoked responses from nations that appear to favor China, Russia, and the multipolar restructuring already in process. 

A section of U.S. policymakers argue that the U.S. is militarily overstretched across the world with far too many commitments and wars. It is taking too much of the burden of the Ukraine war, and it is time to share it. This approach advocates that the U.S. turn to isolationism. Advocates of this position are Donald Trump, his Vice President J.D. Vance, the America First/Make America Great Again (MAGA) Republican lobby, and the Republican base as well as others who oppose the U.S.’ interventionist wars. 

The opposing position comes from the neocons or neoconservatives who had influenced former President Joe Biden’s policy toward China and multipolarity. Many in Trump’s current Cabinet also share this position – Marco Rubio and Elbridge Colby, for instance. Think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), RAND Corporation, the Atlantic Council and others are also proponents of this argument. 

This faction calls for strengthening NATO, increasing alliances in the Indo-Pacific, continuing support for the Ukraine war, economic coercive measures against countries that do not conform with U.S. strategic interests, and opposing authoritarian states. In other words, containment of China, support for Ukraine, and restraints on BRICS and other anti-West forums. 

Trump appears to be using both strategies – essentially shifting from one to the other as needed.

Thus, he has levied tariffs on a hundred countries, many of whom view this as hostile economic pressure. Each of these countries have been negotiating with the U.S. but are also diversifying their trade and value chains to save themselves from Washington’s erratic behavior.

Trump and Vance have warned NATO European countries that they have to increase their defense expenditure and can buy weapons from the U.S. to sustain the war in Ukraine as it gradually eases itself out. The U.S. president has engaged in direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska and his trusted friend Steve Witcoff negotiates with the Russians. At the same time, they have also promised more missiles for Ukraine.

U.S. backing of the genocidal policies of Israel, and its own bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities, support for Israel’s bombing in Doha, Qatar, which is a major U.S. ally in the region and hosts one the biggest airbases in the region, show that the U.S. is not becoming “isolationist” by any stretch. 

At the same time, U.S. allies in the Middle East/West Asia are now exposed to its irrationality, its backing for Israel in expanding its territories, seeking control of West Asian airspace, desiring regional hegemony, and claiming that it is “re-structuring” the Middle East. These West Asian allies will look for long term alternatives in the times ahead.

Trump’s negotiated deals with Japan, South Korea and EU countries have meant that these countries have had to commit to big investments in the U.S. South Korea, for example, will re-build the U.S. shipping industry. The EU countries will buy U.S. gas and help industrialize the U.S. at their own cost. 

All this sounds like a restructured U.S. imperialism that extracts surplus from clients in exchange for protection. However, the clients are beginning to question these forced investments that sound like tithes. Further, unlike when the U.S. held unipolar power, times have changed and other options are available.

That option is China, and the BRICS countries that are busy constructing a non-militarized multipolarity. They are encouraging global trade on a fair basis without the pressure, and the embargoes. 

Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.

Authors

Guest Author

Anuradha Chenoy

Anuradha Chenoy is Adjunct Professor, O. P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat Haryana, India.

View Profile

28. Kimmel's suspension for Kirk comments sparks furor over free speech and censorship

​I do not want to get into a partisan discussion (though absolute defense of our First Amendment rights is not partisan).

But I think Tucker Carlson puts to bed the argument on censorship in the 53 second video that is circulating on social media. 

But his message on censorship is clear - the anti Nike: "Just don't do it."

I recommend watching. Is this a deep fake or actually Tucker Carlson expressing the most fundamental of American values: freedom of expression. Can anyone disagree with this video?

https://x.com/i/status/1968381745407082967

Kimmel's suspension for Kirk comments sparks furor over free speech and censorship

NPR · Domenico Montanaro

Demonstrators hold signs as they rally to protest the suspension of the "Jimmy Kimmel Live!" show outside the studio from where the show is broadcast in California on Sept. 18, 2025. Kimmel's late-night show was pulled from the air on September 17 hours after the U.S. government threatened to cancel broadcasting licenses because of comments the host made about the killing of conservative influencer Charlie Kirk. Chris Delmas/AFP via Getty Images

Comedian Jimmy Kimmel being pulled off the air has taken the conversation around freedom of speech to a new level after the killing of conservative activist Charlie Kirk on Sept. 10 as he spoke to a crowd of mostly students at Utah Valley University.

It's a pivotal moment with a lot of layers and important questions facing the country. They center on power, money, charges of hypocrisy and the direction of American democracy itself.

In the wake of Kirk's death, powerful people on the right, including in the White House, seem to be making lists and taking names.

Sponsor Message

"I have read someplace that the networks were 97% against me, again, 97% negative," President Trump told reporters traveling with him Thursday, "and yet I won and easily, all seven swing states" in the 2024 presidential election. "They give me only bad publicity, press. I mean, they're getting a license. I would think maybe their license should be taken away."

Licenses for use of public airwaves are given to local broadcast stations. Those can be stations owned and operated by the big networks — ABC, CBS and NBC. Others are owned by chains or private companies. Cable news and podcasts do not use the public airwaves, are not federally licensed and, therefore, not subject to the same federal regulations.

Conservatives have long been frustrated with what they see as a liberal bias in the media — whether it's movies, television or the news — and many Republican officials see what Trump is doing as comeuppance and support stronger regulatory efforts.

Others, though, see Trump as abusing his power. They charge that he's leveraging the federal government in ways no past president has, using Kirk's death to operationalize a retribution campaign, rebalance the media and squash speech and dissent.

They also see hypocrisy in the push, not only because Kirk argued for the right to say even "outrageous" things, but also because of years of conservatives chafing at what they saw as "cancel culture."

Sponsor Message

What did Kimmel say?

The comments at issue came during Monday night's episode of "Jimmy Kimmel Live!"

"We hit some new lows over the weekend," Kimmel said, "with the MAGA gang desperately trying to characterize this kid who murdered Charlie Kirk as anything other than one of them and doing everything they can to score political points from it."

There was more – about how the president is mourning Kirk's death more like a 4-year-old mourns a goldfish than an adult; he poked fun at FBI Director Kash Patel for his early social media posting after Kirk was killed, as well as saying he looks like he "got hit by a Volkswagen"; he used a derogatory term to refer to Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, R-Ga.

Kimmel has not responded to NPR interview requests and has not commented on ABC's suspension of his show.

It was that implication that the alleged shooter had ties to the right that really rankled conservatives.

Immediately after Kirk's assassination, the motives were not well known. There was discussion in some corners of the Internet about inscriptions on the bullets, the meme and gamer culture around them, and how they may have been prevalent with some who didn't like Kirk from the right.

This week, the prosecutor in the case laid out text messages – and relayed what the alleged shooter's parents told them – that show a left-wing orientation.

The Trump administration's role

Enter: Federal Communications Commission Chairman Brendan Carr.

FCC Chairman Brendan Carr testifies before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government on May 21 in Washington, DC. John McDonnell/Getty Images

Carr called Kimmel's comments the "sickest conduct possible" on The Benny Show, a podcast hosted by conservative, right-wing commentator Benny Johnson.

"In some quarters," Carr said, "there is a very concerted effort to try to lie to the American people about the nature, as you indicated, of one of the most significant newsworthy public interest acts that we've seen in a long time."

Sponsor Message

He said Kimmel appeared to be playing into that and noted that the FCC would not stand idly by as, he said, the agency had in the past.

"They have a license granted by us at the FCC," Carr said of local broadcast stations, "and with that, comes with it an obligation to operate in the public interest. And we can get into some ways that we've been trying to reinvigorate the public interest and some changes that we've seen, but frankly when you see stuff like this, I mean, look, we can do this the easy way or the hard way. These companies can find ways to change conduct, to take action, frankly, on Kimmel, or there's going to be additional work for the FCC ahead."

Others disagree with how Carr is applying that public-interest standard.

"The FCC is weaponizing its licensing authority in order to bring broadcasters to heel, and to really think twice about what they say about this administration," FCC Commissioner Anna Gomez, the only Democrat on the commission, said about the Kimmel suspension and other broadcasters who have faced off with the Trump administration while she attended the Axios Media Trends Live conference on Thursday.

"It's not because of the content of the broadcast, whether the Jimmy Kimmel show or CBS, is actually inciting violence or breaking the law when all they are doing is speaking about this administration in a way that it does not like. That is contrary to the First Amendment. It's contrary to the Communications Act, which prohibits the FCC from censoring broadcasters. So, any pressure on these broadcasters to alter their broadcasts because of their content is in fact inappropriate. And this is important to keep in mind, the FCC doesn't have the authority, the ability, or the constitutional rights to revoke licenses because of content."

Trump paid Carr arguably the highest compliment that can come from the president, calling him a "tough guy," and Carr made media rounds after his podcast appearance.

But Carr had very different things to say in recent years.

"Should the government censor speech it doesn't like? Of course not," Carr wrote on X in 2019 in a response to a proposed FCC crackdown on e-cigarette ads. "The FCC does not have a roving mandate to police speech in the name of the 'public interest.'"

Sponsor Message

Perturbed by the banning of a conservative parody site from what was then Twitter, Carr wrote in 2022: "Political satire is one of the oldest and most important forms of free speech. It challenges those in power while using humor to draw more people in to the discussion. That's why people in influential positions have always targeted it for censorship."

A marriage of politics and money

For the Trump administration, getting a critic off the air is a political win. But as with any story, it's important to follow the money.

Nexstar Media owns a lot of local broadcast stations across the country. It is on the verge of a $6.2 billion merger with competitor Tegna.

But there's a problem.

FCC rules put a limit on how wide the reach is supposed to be for local broadcasters, and with this merger, Nexstar would exceed that reach.

FCC Chairman Carr has said he's open to changing the rule, calling it "arcane" and "artificial." There's some question as to whether the FCC can do that on its own or if it needs Congress. Nevertheless, Nexstar is banking on the Trump administration to lift the cap.

And this deal may be at the heart of why Kimmel was pulled off the air. Follow what happened Wednesday – Carr went on Johnson's podcast, then hours later, Nexstar announced it would be preempting "Jimmy Kimmel Live!" on all of its stations. Later, ABC takes Kimmel off the air.

It's not a far leap to see a lot of companies are doing what they can to stay in the good graces of the Trump administration because there's a lot of money at stake.

Ironies abound

The entire GOP apparatus campaigned for years against "cancel culture" and what it saw as the censoring of conservatives, particularly on social media.

After the siege at the U.S. Capitol by a pro-Trump mob on Jan. 6, 2021, Trump was banned from Twitter and Facebook. Twitter cited the "risk of further incitement of violence."

So Trump made "free speech" a cornerstone of his presidential campaign. It was a regular feature in his stump speeches, and when he became president, he pledged to fight for it.

Sponsor Message

"After years and years of illegal and unconstitutional federal efforts to restrict free expression," Trump said during his inaugural address earlier this year, "I will also sign an executive order to immediately stop all government censorship and bring back free speech to America."

He has since made similar pro-free speech pledges more than a dozen times.

But that's changed. His attorney general, Pam Bondi, went so far as to say that her Justice Department would "absolutely target you, go after you, if you are targeting anyone with hate speech."

After pushback from conservatives, Bondi walked that back.

Among the conservative voices drawing a sharp line saying that speech should not and could not be prosecuted was Carr himself.

Here's what he said Tuesday, the day before his podcast appearance.

"I think you can draw a pretty clear line, and the Supreme Court has done this for decades, that our First Amendment, our free speech tradition, protects almost all speech," Carr said at Politico's AI & Tech Summit. He added that there was only "a relatively small category of speech" that is not protected – speech that incites violence.

There is also an irony to liberal protestations about free speech, considering the policing of speech, particularly on social media, that went on for years. Lots of conservatives felt targeted.

Progressives would say they were targeting hateful rhetoric, that the speech was protected by the First Amendment, but that there were consequences for that speech. Conservatives would say the same about their efforts in the aftermath of Kirk's death.

The difference is Trump is now using the full force of the federal government to punish political enemies. Trump argues Democrats and the Biden administration did the same through "weaponization" of the Justice Department.

Of course, that was not for speech, but alleged criminal behavior.

NPR · Domenico Montanaro

29. Americans Must Remain Committed to Free Expression After the Assassination of Charlie Kirk

​We absolutely must remain committed to freedom of speech, expression, a free press and all our First Amendment rights. There should be no debate on this.

September 18, 2025 11:48AM

Americans Must Remain Committed to Free Expression After the Assassination of Charlie Kirk

https://www.cato.org/blog/americans-must-remain-committed-free-expression-after-assassination-charlie-kirk?utm

By David Inserra

SHARE

Listen to this article

Generated with ElevenLabs AI technology.

Americans are grappling with the horrific assassination of conservative activist Charlie Kirk. Kirk was killed during an event while engaging in civil discourse and debate. This heinous act of violence was not just the murder of a man, father, and husband, but also an assault on the premise and practice of free expression in a liberal democracy. But as we all process such a moment of political violence and the concerning attack on free expression it represents, we should not pursue policies that would also undermine free expression.

Kirk had been an advocate for free expression and rejected the idea of hate speech laws, posting online that even ugly and evil speech “ALL of it is protected by the First Amendment. Keep America Free.” He frequently defended greater free expression in his discussions on college campuses, even if his organization, Turning Point USA, wasn’t perfect on issues of speech.

Likewise, some may admire Kirk’s political positions, while some find them terrible. But the point is that Kirk rejected giving the government power to police non-violent speech and practiced what he preached every time he showed up for a discussion or a debate.

Many are struggling with how to respond to acts of political violence. Notably, in response to his murder, many political leaders have taken this moment to denounce political violence while affirming the importance of vibrant and even uncomfortable discussions. Governor of Utah Spencer Cox implored all Americans to stop the cycle of violence. “We can return violence with violence, we can return hate with hate … at some point we have to find an off-ramp, or it’s going to get much, much worse.” Political opponents of Kirk, like Bill Maher, Cenk Uygur, Bernie Sanders, and others, have issued real, heartfelt, and personal observations on how reprehensible this act was. Ezra Klein commented that he found himself “grieving” for Kirk “because we have to be able to see that the bullet that tore into him was an act of violence against us all.”

Unfortunately, we’ve also seen ugliness in many conversations, especially those online. Too many on the left have taken to celebrating Kirk’s murder, saying he deserved it because of the “hateful” nature of his views. And too many on the right view this as a turning point, a Reichstag fire moment, to declare war on their political enemies.

One of the results has been an eruption in efforts to fire or cancel those who support the death of Kirk. To be clear, we must reject support for political violence, regardless of who the perpetrator is and who the victim is. Political violence is incompatible with a free society. But it is equally clear that ugly and nasty speech must be protected, and the mob should not be empowered to fire anyone for holding a bad view.

But now, a week later, the more concerning responses are those seeking to change policy in ways that would undermine free expression and restrict speech. These solutions will neither diminish the threat of political violence nor further civic discourse. Attorney General Pam Bondi stated in an interview that “there’s free speech, and then there’s hate speech. And there is no place—especially now, especially after what happened to Charlie.… We will absolutely target you, go after you, if you are targeting anyone with hate speech.” 

While Bondi tried to walk back those statements and clarify she was only talking about speech that crossed the line into unlawful incitement, in a separate interview, she stated that businesses “have an obligation to get rid of people. You need to look at people who are saying horrible things. And they shouldn’t be working with you. Businesses cannot discriminate. If you want to go in and print posters with Charlie’s pictures on them for a vigil, you have to let them do that. We can prosecute you for that.”

President Trump also expressed support for cracking down on hate speech. In response to a question from ABC’s Jonathan Karl about Bondi’s statements, Trump answered, “She’ll probably go after people like you, because you treat me so unfairly. You have a lot of hate in your heart. Maybe they will come after ABC.”

Other Republicans have also joined in the effort to use government power to silence speech. Representative Clay Higgins (R‑LA) wrote a public letter to the major social media companies, “Please be advised that your platforms are rightfully expected to expeditiously remove all posts that have celebrated the political assassination of Charlie Kirk. Further, the authors of these posts are to be identified and banned from your platform.… I have initiated a Congressional effort to force accountability. If you shield these offenders, Section 230 will not protect your platform from vigorous exposure.” Higgins continues that as a subcommittee chairman, he will be leading a “righteous endeavor” to ensure “appropriate behavior” online.

And then FCC Chairman Carr joined the fray, threatening ABC for Jimmy Kimmel’s unfunny jokes that some have interpreted as saying that Kirk’s shooter was a MAGA supporter. During an interview, Carr stated, “We can do this the easy way or the hard way. These companies can find ways to take action on Kimmel, or there is going to be additional work for the FCC ahead.” Carr cited the public interest and news distortion rules of the FCC to say that the “FCC could make a strong argument that this is sort of an intentional effort to mislead the American people about a very core fundamental fact,” thus threatening the licenses of broadcasters. ABC shelved Kimmel’s show hours later, and Trump praised the move.

All of this is just so wrong. Hate speech has no legal definition in the US and is protected by the First Amendment. Unless speech is an imminent incitement to violence or a true threat, offensive speech is protected—because, as this case shows, Americans radically disagree about what is hateful. While in this case the right is upset about nasty speech online, many on the left have argued for hate speech laws to stop conservative speech on matters of race, religion, and sexuality. Indeed, many on the left believe Charlie Kirk was constantly engaging in hate speech. This is why Charlie Kirk and other conservatives reject the idea of hate speech laws—because allowing the government to police non-violent speech simply makes us all less free by subjecting our speech to the whims of the current government. 

We can see this running amok in Europe and other democracies around the world—why follow them down that dark path? And rather than silencing ugly speech that celebrates violence, shouldn’t we want to know more about the beliefs of our fellow citizens? If some large segment of society supports the use of political violence, it is better that we let them speak so that we know the challenges our society faces.

And similarly, government officials using their position to demand social media platforms moderate content in a certain way, “or else,” is unacceptable jawboning. We should not tolerate the party in power leaning on private platforms or media institutions to remove constitutionally protected speech. And the FCC should not have a news distortion policy because it, as my colleagues and I have argued, “is hopelessly subjective and liable to abuse for political ends.”

In the wake of this tragedy, it is deeply concerning to see leaders embracing the siren song of censorship to silence speech they view as hateful and ugly. No matter whose speech it is, no matter how offensive we find it, we must reject the urge to have the government silence speech we dislike.

Instead, we must make the choice to embrace civic discourse, as Kirk himself championed, to find our shared humanity. Our solutions should rely on more speech, not less, to better understand each other and face the real challenges in our society.

30.reflecting on passion - actions and consequences from a personal view By Dr. Cynhia Watson

​Dr, Cynhtia Watson and Dr. Bud Cole (CAPT, USN RET) are two of my decades long mentors. I am sure every important lesson that I have learned about China, maritime operations, Latin America, and strategy have come from them.

It is great to see Dr. Cole honored with this award.

reflecting on passion

actions and consequences from a personal view

https://cynthiawatson.substack.com/p/reflecting-on-passion?utm

Cynthia Watson

Sep 19, 2025

The U.S. Naval Institute was established in the nineteenth century to provide an independent forum for non-partisan, objective analyses and debates on national security, primarily from a maritime perspective.

Today, the Institute celebrates, coinciding with a Navy history meeting at the Academy, where I hope the Midshipmen learn to appreciate the value of history. Someone who has continued to respond to its invitation to wrestle with national security challenges, whether by pen or on the stage. The Institute website cites a ceremony it will hold for presenting "[T]he Commodore Dudley W. Knox Naval History Lifetime Achievement Award," which was established by the Naval Historical Foundation in Washington, D.C., to honor the memory of the naval historian Commodore Dudley W. Knox and to recognize the lifetime achievements of historians of the United States Navy.

The award remembers the contributions of Commodore Dudley Wright Knox (1877–1960). A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and the Naval War College, Knox had a distinguished career as a naval officer, serving in the Spanish-American War, Boxer Rebellion, Great White Fleet, and World War I. But it was his abilities as a historian, librarian, and archivist that earned him respect and admiration among his peers and later generations.

Transferred to the Retired List of the Navy on 20 October 1921, Knox served as Officer-in-Charge, Office of Naval Records and Library, and as Curator for the Navy Department. The publication of his clarion-call article "Our Vanishing Naval History" in the January 1926 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings led to the establishment of the Naval Historical Foundation. Knox would serve as secretary of the organization for decades and was its president at the time of his passing in 1960."

My husband, Bernard D. Cole, will receive the Dudley Knox Award for more than half a century of research, debate, and engagement in the preeminent publications in his field. Naval History, October 2025, announced his award with the following citation, which I expect I will also hear this afternoon.

"Dr. Bernard D. Cole's career is marked by excellence in both military service and academia. He served in the U.S. Navy for 30 years as a surface warfare officer, including the command of a frigate and a destroyer squadron. He also served as a naval gunfire liaison officer with the 3d Marine Division in Vietnam. After retiring from active duty, he became a professor at the National War College in Washington, D.C.

Dr. Cole's contributions to naval strategy, Sino-American relations, and maritime security have had a lasting impact in the field. Through his teaching, writing, and research, he has shaped the understanding of maritime power and its role in global affairs. His work as a historian and strategist continues to influence discussions on naval policy and security worldwide.

He is a prolific writer, having authored eight books and numerous articles on naval strategy and security issues. His works include Gunboats and Marines: The U.S. Navy in China, Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects, and Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters. His research has provided valuable insights into China's naval modernization and its implications for global security. His book The Great Wall at Sea (Naval Institute Press, second edition 2010), is particularly notable for its analysis of China's evolving naval capabilities and strategic ambitions."

A proud graduate of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University of Washington, and Auburn University, he embodies the benefits we taxpayers receive by support ROTC and mid-career professional development programs. The Naval Institute Press named him Author of the Year a little over a decade ago, but today's award celebrates a lifetime of work.

The selection committee could not know of his forthcoming book Goin' to 'Nam (in final preparation for publication later this month or in early October. Nor would they know he began yet another project in late July on sea stories from his career. He remains focused on the maritime domain, strategy questions, and studying history, as he did for thirty years in the Navy and continues to do so since his retirement from active duty. This subject is his passion.

I am lucky enough to witness this passion every day. It is humbling to watch someone who thinks so deeply about subjects that matter to each of us every day, as he brings vast experience to consider the contemporary problems stymying us. He is unafraid of calling a spade a spade in a field where decisions have profound effects. Generations of students at the National War College, where he is a Professor Emeritus, and at Georgetown University's Security Studies program benefited from his incisive thinking as they carried forward the responsibility of national security practice he loved.

I can't adequately express my feelings of joy and pride for him today.

Thank you for taking the time to read Actions Create Consequences. I appreciate your time, responses, queries, and involvement in my humble effort to expand measured, reasoned, and civil discourse on the many issues of our contemporary world.

Thank you to the subscribers who provide me with resources to access sources I would not otherwise be able to read.

Be well and be safe. FIN

“Bernard D. Cole and David Alan Rosenberg Named 2025 Knox Recipients”, Naval History, October 2025, retrieved at https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history/2025/october/naval-historians-cole-rosenberg-named-2025-knox-award

Photo credit to J. Scott Watson photography

Recommend Actions create consequences to your readers

Politix, trials, tribulations & gratitude

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com