Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Half the world is composed of people who have something to say and can’t, and the other half who have nothing to say and keep on saying it.”

- Robert Frost

“To a disciple who was forever complaining about others, the Master said, ‘If it is peace you want, seek to change yourself, not other people. It is easier to protect your feet with slippers than to carpet the whole of the earth.’”

- Anthony de Mello

Characteristics of the American Way of War (12 of 13)

12. Logistically Excellent. American history is a testament to the need to conquer distance. Americans at war have been exceptionally able logisticians. With a continental-size interior and an effectively insular geostrategic location, such ability has been mandatory if the country was to wage war at all, let alone wage it effectively. Recalling the point that virtues can become vices, it can be argued that America not infrequently has waged war more logistically than strategically, which is not to deny that in practice the two almost merge, so interdependent are they.85 The efficient support of the sharp end of American war-making can have, and has had, the downside of encouraging a tooth-to-tail ratio almost absurdly weighted in favor of the latter. A significant reason why firepower has been, and remains, the long suit in the American way of war, is that there repeatedly has been an acute shortage of soldiers in the infantry. A large logistical footprint, and none come larger than the American, requires a great deal of guarding, helps isolate American troops from local people and their culture, and tends to grow as it were organically in what has been pejoratively called the "logistical snowball."86 Given that logistics is the science of supply and movement, America's logistical excellence, with its upside and its downside, of necessity has rested upon mastery of "the commons." Borrowing from Alfred Thayer Mahan, who wrote of the sea as a "wide common," Barry Posen has explained how and why the United States is master not only of the wide common of the high seas of Mahan's time, but also of the new commons of the air, space, and cyberspace.87 Should this mastery cease to be assured, the country would have difficulty waging war against all except Mexicans and Canadians.

Those who might doubt the historical reality of a distinctive American way of war are hereby invited to compare with other countries the amount of materiel and the quantity and quality of support deemed essential to keep American soldiers tolerably content in the field. Many critics of General Westmoreland's strategy in Vietnam failed to notice that he was always painfully short of fighting soldiers. The U.S. military presence under his command may have totaled some 550,000, but no more than 80,000 of those soldiers were "fighting men."88 There is a crossover point where logistical sufficiency, in any kind of war, regular or irregular, can slip into an excess that is counterproductive. In regular warfare, the traditional American way provides the infrastructure and depth of materiel that permit sustained combat. By way of the sharpest of contrasts, for example, Hitler's Luftwaffe was always in more or less desperate straits because of a lack of spare parts. In World War II, both Germany and Japan fielded flashy "shop window" forces that lacked staying power. The American way is the reverse of that. But in the conduct of irregular warfare, which almost invariably is waged on foreign soil, America's traditional way with abundant goods and services for the troops does have a rather obvious downside. The American logistical footprint is heavy, and it grows organically. The American way of war entails large bases that require protection. Those bases, dumps, and other facilities help isolate Americans from the local people and their culture, and, indeed, they create a distinct economy which signals the political fact that America has taken over. Naturally, it is difficult to envisage serious measures to lighten the logistical footprint, given concerns about reenlistment, political pressures from soldiers' relatives, and soldier-citizens' notions of their rights. To succeed in COIN in particular, as it has been discussed in this monograph, the Army needs to adapt in the direction of lighter, more agile forces, a process that is already underway. Furthermore, in gauging the extent of its material necessities in the field, it should give far greater weight to the irregular perspective than has been the case heretofore.

- Colin Gray, 2006

1. Unchecked and Uncooperative: How the Pentagon Has Thwarted Congressional Oversight of Security Cooperation Programs

2. Deconstructing the Bipartisan Consensus on the China Threat

3. Russian attacks continue in wake of Putin arrest warrant

4. U.S. Reaches Deep Into Its Global Ammunition Stockpiles to Help Ukraine

5. War crimes, indiscriminate attacks on infrastructure, systematic and widespread torture show disregard for civilians, says UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine

6. Russia disinformation looks to US far right to weaken Ukraine support

7. Is China Winning the Information Race?

8. Ukrainian commander reveals true scale of losses – and pays the price

9. New Data Links Pandemic’s Origins to Raccoon Dogs at Wuhan Market

10. Why Won’t the West Let Ukraine Win Against Russia?

11. The US-Russia drone collision is sign of increasingly unfriendly skies

12. Air Force F-22 Raptors make their first appearance at Clark Air Base, Philippines

13. How America Can Win the Information War

14. Why Arms Control Will Not Come Back Any Time Soon

15. Interests, Not Ideology, Should Drive America's Approach to China

16. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 17, 2023

17. With a duty to learn from and support our colleagues in Ukraine

18. The SVB Collapse Shows U.S. Vulnerabilities Amid Great Power Competition

19. The Biden administration overestimates radiological terrorism risks and underplays biothreats

1. Unchecked and Uncooperative: How the Pentagon Has Thwarted Congressional Oversight of Security Cooperation Programs

A lot of allegations in this. Yes, we do need transparency and proper oversight.

At the heart of this is a not so veiled attack on special operations employed in irregular warfare.

I have to take exception to her critique of US operations in the Philippines - She cites a single Al Jazeera article from 2011 that accuses the US of violating the Philippine Constitution which has been shown time and again that we have not done so.

Excerpt:

The executive branch still abides by its dubious interpretation of the War Powers Resolution. Among other things, the White House has routinely refused or neglected to report low-intensity combat that takes place by, with, or through foreign partners. As the Brennan Center report details, US forces have gotten into firefights with a broad range of groups in the Philippines, in the course of training Philippine partners on undertaking counterterrorism operations. And in the context of the war on drugs, US forces deployed to train Colombian partners on conducting counternarcotics operations have faced situations where an attack on their base by the FARC, a guerrilla group, was “imminent.” Yet these confrontations were not reported to Congress as new or imminent hostilities.

The author's conclusion:

The Department of Defense officials contacted for the Brennan Center report were quick to blame Congress for any breakdown in war powers oversight. Officials accused lawmakers of being “asleep at the wheel,” failing to pay attention to the steady metastasis of US combat outward from Iraq and Afghanistan to places as distant as Mauritania, Kenya, and the Philippines.

But the truth is, Congress has enacted and repeatedly updated a broad range of oversight mechanisms to help it understand how US forces are engaging in combat. These mechanisms have been ignored or neutered by executive branch policymakers and lawyers, across Democratic and Republican administrations. Through this secrecy, a handful of White House and Department of Defense officials have removed US hostilities across Africa and Asia from democratic debate and have frustrated Congress’s constitutional role of deciding when, where, and against whom the country is at war. Congress, the public, and especially our service members—who swear to support and defend the Constitution—are owed more. If the executive branch refuses to report its hostilities by, with, and through foreign partners, Congress must reform or repeal the Department of Defense’s security cooperation authorities.

Unchecked and Uncooperative: How the Pentagon Has Thwarted Congressional Oversight of Security Cooperation Programs - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Katherine Yon Ebright · March 17, 2023

When the administration of President Joe Biden redeployed US forces to Somalia in May 2022, it promised that those forces would not be “directly engaged” in combat operations. They would instead support their Somali partners to “enable a more effective fight” against al-Shabaab, a regional al-Qaeda affiliate.

Since the redeployment, however, US forces have conducted a steady stream of airstrikes against al‑Shabaab fighters. By January, the Department of Defense was reporting multiple strikes each week.

It should come as no surprise that the Department of Defense’s work by, with, and through foreign partners, or “security cooperation,” has again embroiled US forces in Somalia’s conflict. In a recent report by the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law, I detail how security cooperation—under authorities like 10 U.S.C. § 333, 10 U.S.C. § 127e, and § 1202 of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)—can enable or involve hostilities, including those that are not authorized by Congress.

The only surprising thing about US forces’ renewed hostilities in Somalia is the extent to which the Department of Defense has disclosed them to the public.

As the Brennan Center report explains, the Department of Defense has typically failed to notify the public, as well as key decisionmakers in Congress, when US forces end up in security cooperation–enabled hostilities. In interviews conducted for the report, congressional staffers expressed frustration that they were not even told the full range of countries in which the Department of Defense engages in security cooperation. The transparency regarding Somalia is the exception, not the rule.

The public and especially Congress need better visibility into the Department of Defense’s security cooperation programs and the hostilities they may enable. This information is critical to informed debate on US involvement abroad and Congress’s constitutional role in deciding when, where, and against whom the country is at war. Congress has made efforts to engage in relevant oversight, particularly in recent years. But the White House and Department of Defense have not fully complied with, and in some cases have simply ignored, congressional reporting requirements that apply to the conduct of hostilities, sensitive military operations, and security cooperation under §§ 333, 127e, and 1202.

Hostilities Reporting

For decades, Congress has required the executive branch to notify lawmakers when US forces engage in hostilities or are put in situations where hostilities appear imminent. In 1973, toward the end of the Vietnam War, lawmakers learned that the executive branch had secretly expanded the reach of the conflict into Cambodia and Laos. A bipartisan supermajority in Congress responded by enacting the War Powers Resolution over President Richard Nixon’s veto. The War Powers Resolution sought to curb US forces’ unauthorized and undisclosed combat. It mandated that the White House promptly notify lawmakers of any new or imminent hostilities conducted without prior congressional approval. It also required that the White House give lawmakers biannual updates on the status of ongoing hostilities, including those already approved by Congress.

But neither of the War Powers Resolution’s reporting requirements has had its desired effect. Shortly after the enactment of the War Powers Resolution, the executive branch issued an interpretation of the law that excluded from its scope “sporadic military or paramilitary attacks” and incidents in which US forces are “simply acting in self-defense.” According to executive branch lawyers, combat of this nature would not rise to the level of an “introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities,” as covered by the law. No matter that Congress carefully crafted the law’s language, pointedly using the word “hostilities” instead of “armed conflict” to cover a broad range of circumstances that involve or could involve combat—even “a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired” or when US forces “accompany [partner] units on combat patrols.”

The executive branch still abides by its dubious interpretation of the War Powers Resolution. Among other things, the White House has routinely refused or neglected to report low-intensity combat that takes place by, with, or through foreign partners. As the Brennan Center report details, US forces have gotten into firefights with a broad range of groups in the Philippines, in the course of training Philippine partners on undertaking counterterrorism operations. And in the context of the war on drugs, US forces deployed to train Colombian partners on conducting counternarcotics operations have faced situations where an attack on their base by the FARC, a guerrilla group, was “imminent.” Yet these confrontations were not reported to Congress as new or imminent hostilities.

The executive branch also underreports its ongoing hostilities pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). Although the White House submits the biannual reports required by the War Powers Resolution, the reports often omit details about when, where, and against whom US forces are engaging in combat operations with foreign partners. In June 2017, for instance, President Donald Trump’s administration reported that US forces were deployed to Niger “to provide a wide variety of support to African partners conducting counterterrorism operations.” In preceding reports, the administration of President Barack Obama had told Congress that US forces in Niger were supporting “counterterrorism intelligence collection and … intelligence sharing.”

It is no surprise, given this characterization, that lawmakers were taken aback when Green Berets were ambushed and killed in Niger in October 2017. The Green Berets had been out in the field on a kill-or-capture mission with their Nigerien military partners, despite the White House’s failure to indicate that US forces in Niger were directing or engaging in combat.

The Niger incident led lawmakers to wonder what else they had not been told about the executive branch’s far-flung hostilities. It showed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that War Powers Resolution reporting was broken. So Congress tried to plug the gaps.

In the years following, Congress enacted additional reporting requirements, ranging from provisions mandating one-off reports to those mandating regular updates on the executive branch’s interpretation and implementation of its use-of-force authorities. As the Brennan Center report explains, the executive branch’s compliance with these new requirements has been lackluster. To name a few examples, the White House and Department of Defense have delayed or otherwise failed to submit reports about operations conducted under the 2001 AUMF, collective self‑defense, execute orders directing military operations, and the relationship between use-of-force authorities and §§ 333 and 127e.

The reports that have been submitted are often deficient. The White House’s reports on the legal and policy frameworks for using force, for instance, have been short and incomplete; the most recent report listed Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Somalia as the only countries in which the United States had used force in 2021 and 2022, omitting any combat that occurred by, with, through, or on behalf of foreign partners elsewhere—such as in Mali, where US forces reportedly came under attack in 2022 while supporting a French-led counterterrorism effort.

Sensitive Military Operations Reporting

Even before the Niger incident, lawmakers had reason to believe they were receiving an incomplete accounting of US hostilities. In a 2012 article, University of Texas professor Bobby Chesney identified serious oversight gaps caused by the “ongoing process of convergence” between Department of Defense operations and CIA covert action. Chesney explained that the Department of Defense had moved toward conducting “unacknowledged operations functionally equivalent to covert action” that, because they were conducted by US forces rather than the CIA, “escape[d] categorization as covert action” and thus escaped disclosure to Congress. If the CIA directed proxy forces into combat, it would need to report to the congressional intelligence committees. If the Department of Defense did the same thing, commanding foreign proxies created through § 127e’s predecessor statute (§ 1208 of the 2005 NDAA), it would not need to report to anyone.

Lawmakers were quick to respond. In 2013, Congress enacted a new reporting regime for sensitive military operations, 10 U.S.C. § 130f. The law originally required the Department of Defense to provide the congressional defense committees with prompt notice of any “lethal operation or capture operation conducted . . . outside a theater of major hostilities.”

But, like the War Powers Resolution, § 130f did not provide the information Congress anticipated. In 2019, a congressional hearing revealed that the Department of Defense had failed to submit timely and complete notifications under § 130f. One lawmaker outright said that the Department of Defense “hasn’t complied consistently” with the law.

Although § 130f notifications are highly classified, we can infer the nature of the Pentagon’s noncompliance from Congress’s repeated amendments to the law. In 2016, Congress specified that it needed information on combat operations “conducted by a foreign partner in coordination with [US] forces,” as well as combat operations “conducted by [US] forces outside a declared theater of active armed conflict in self-defense or in defense of foreign partners”—in other words, security cooperation–enabled hostilities. In 2018, Congress emphasized that it was asking for notice of all such operations conducted outside of Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria. In 2021, Congress clarified that the Department of Defense must submit notice of combat operations “conducted by [US] forces to free an individual from . . . hostile foreign forces.”

This legislative history suggests that the Department of Defense has withheld the same information on low‑intensity combat that the White House has refused to report under the War Powers Resolution—even though the purpose of § 130f was to ensure that Congress would get this information. The Department of Defense has evidently chosen to read “lethal operation” narrowly, to avoid reporting a range of operations in which US forces and their partners can end up in hostilities. Given that the Department has split hairs between what constitutes a lethal operation versus a defensive or rescue operation, it is probable that its reading of § 130f still omits some classes of operations that motivated Congress to enact the law in the first place.

Security Cooperation Reporting

Finally, each security cooperation authority has its own reporting regime. Based on this, and the fact that §§ 333, 127e, and 1202 are public authorities rather than secret laws, it may be tempting to assume that Congress and the public are getting the information they need about security cooperation–enabled hostilities. But the reporting regimes for §§ 333, 127e, and 1202 provide incomplete information on how the authorities are being used. Moreover, §§ 127e and 1202 materials are highly classified and distributed in a manner that prevents key lawmakers from even knowing that notifications exist.

Briefly, nothing in the reporting regime for § 333—the global train-and-equip authority—would give Congress a sense of whether US forces deployed to run a § 333 program are likely to encounter adversaries while helping their foreign partners. To be fair, Congress shares some blame for this deficiency: Section 333 does not require the Department of Defense to disclose its partner forces’ adversaries, the location where US forces are stationed, or any overlapping execute orders allowing US forces to undertake combat operations on top of training on a base. But even when § 333 requires relevant information, like the identity of the specific partner that US forces will train, the Department of Defense has on occasion omitted the information from submissions to Congress. All of this information could have helped Congress foresee the Niger incident—which involved US forces deployed to conduct a § 333 train-and-equip program. Lawmakers, however, were left in the dark.

By comparison, the reporting requirements for § 127e—an authority that allows US forces to command foreign partners as surrogates for conducting counterterrorism operations—are fairly comprehensive. In the wake of the Niger incident, they were amended to ensure that Congress would receive information on where, with whom, against whom, and on what legal basis US forces might be engaging in combat. (The Niger incident also involved a § 127e team, which was supposed to join the § 333 team but was delayed by poor weather conditions.)

Nevertheless, § 127e oversight falters. Although Congress expanded the scope of the reporting requirements, it did not fix a critical issue with how § 127e materials are distributed: Under the law, reports and notifications are submitted only to the congressional defense committees, not the foreign affairs committees that have jurisdiction over matters of war and peace. And even if Congress had required submission to the foreign affairs committees, the Department of Defense often designates § 127e materials as “sensitive compartmented information,” which prevents the vast majority of legislative offices from actually accessing them. There is little reason for these materials, which cover basic details like where, with whom, and on what legal basis § 127e programs are run, to be so heavily classified to the point of frustrating congressional oversight. Reporting for § 1202—another surrogate force authority, though for great power competition—suffers from the same distribution problem, largely nullifying any value that § 1202 reporting would otherwise have.

Reform or Repeal

The Department of Defense officials contacted for the Brennan Center report were quick to blame Congress for any breakdown in war powers oversight. Officials accused lawmakers of being “asleep at the wheel,” failing to pay attention to the steady metastasis of US combat outward from Iraq and Afghanistan to places as distant as Mauritania, Kenya, and the Philippines.

But the truth is, Congress has enacted and repeatedly updated a broad range of oversight mechanisms to help it understand how US forces are engaging in combat. These mechanisms have been ignored or neutered by executive branch policymakers and lawyers, across Democratic and Republican administrations. Through this secrecy, a handful of White House and Department of Defense officials have removed US hostilities across Africa and Asia from democratic debate and have frustrated Congress’s constitutional role of deciding when, where, and against whom the country is at war. Congress, the public, and especially our service members—who swear to support and defend the Constitution—are owed more. If the executive branch refuses to report its hostilities by, with, and through foreign partners, Congress must reform or repeal the Department of Defense’s security cooperation authorities.

Katherine Yon Ebright is a counsel in the Liberty & National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Photo: US Army Special Forces soldiers train Senegalese troops in Tahoua, Niger. Credit: US Africa Command.

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irregularwarfare.org · by Katherine Yon Ebright · March 17, 2023

2. Deconstructing the Bipartisan Consensus on the China Threat

Excerpts:

Setting aside Gallagher’s historically inaccurate version of both the goal of engagement and its relative success, his diagnosis of the China threat (that the CCP seeks to “maneuver us into submission”) and his prescription for dealing with it risk even greater “mistakes” than those he attributes to U.S. engagement with Beijing. The mistakes that his approach risks include escalating U.S.-China hostility, inviting another cold war (or worse), and thwarting U.S.-China cooperation on a wide range of global issues—which most of the rest of the world is eager to see.

The Biden administration is risking some of the same mistakes. In his State of the Union speech, Biden said “we seek competition, not conflict” with China. Various administration officials have now incorporated this into the policy mantra. But we need not, and did not, seek competition with China; it has inevitably been thrust upon us. While girding for the competition, what Washington needs to actively seek is cooperation and dialogue: sustained diplomatic interaction with Beijing, whether we choose to call it “engagement” or not. If the bipartisan consensus on China adopts both the select committee’s characterization of the threat and its strictly confrontational approach to dealing with it, U.S.-China relations are going to keep getting worse before there is a chance for them to get better.

Deconstructing the Bipartisan Consensus on the China Threat

Bipartisan consensus—on the scope of the threat—needs to be reconsidered because the wrong diagnosis could yield the wrong, or even dangerous, prescriptions.

by Paul Heer

The National Interest · by Paul Heer · March 16, 2023

The debate in Washington over U.S. policy toward China appears to have turned a corner in the wake of the first hearing on February 28 of the new House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). One of the benchmarks of the hearing was Chairman Mike Gallagher’s assertion in his opening statement that the threat posed to America by the CCP represents “an existential struggle over what life will look like in the twenty-first century,” a struggle in which “the most fundamental freedoms are at stake.” No one on the committee or among the witnesses at the hearing challenged this assertion, reinforcing the presumption that it reflects a bipartisan consensus on the nature and scope of the threat from China.

Multiple observers, however, have raised alarm about the potential implications of this judgment, questioning not just the committee’s agenda but also the validity of the premises upon which its agenda is based. One prominent commentator characterized the apparent agreement about the “allegedly existential danger posed by the CCP” as “a classic example of groupthink” that was “forged out of paranoia, hysteria and, above all, fears of being branded as soft” on China. Some detractors responded that it was an earlier consensus in support of “engagement” with China that was misguided groupthink—overlooking (and proving) that “groupthink” is largely a pejorative critique of whatever one disagrees with. Another foreign policy writer speculated that the agreement between the Republicans and Democrats on the committee “could mean they are falling prey to a collective delusion.”

Believers in an “existential” threat from China tried to claim validation from public remarks last week by Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Qin Gang on the margins of Beijing’s annual legislative session. Xi reportedly said that “Western countries headed by the United States have contained, encircled, and suppressed China”—a rare if not unprecedented direct public criticism of Washington. He then issued what appears to be an aggressive new foreign policy mantra—eclipsing Deng Xiaoping’s perennial guidance for China to “hide its capabilities and bide its time”—that included the phrase “dare to struggle.” This was widely characterized as a Chinese call to arms, as was Qin’s statement that “If the United States does not hit the brake but continues to speed down the wrong path, no amount of guardrails can prevent derailing, and there will surely be conflict and confrontation.”

Neither Xi’s nor Qin’s remarks contained much that was substantively new to those familiar with Beijing’s longstanding views. But the public debate was further fueled by Western commentary asserting that Xi and Qin were speaking accurately. A writer in the Financial Times said Xi was “not technically wrong” about a US containment strategy. And an article in the Daily Beast observed that “everything Xi said was true. The US is actively seeking to contain China and impede its ability to develop key technologies.” Regarding Qin’s observation that “there will surely be conflict and confrontation” if Washington does not adjust its China policy, the same article said, “That too, as it happens, is true.”

All of these commentators were widely criticized for either understating or—more seriously—failing to recognize the magnitude and immediacy of the threat from the CCP. One of the emerging counterarguments is that the bipartisan consensus on the nature and extent of that threat is reliably and well-established; where disagreement remains is over what policies should be pursued in responding to it. If this is correct, that bipartisan consensus (on the scope of the threat) needs to be reconsidered because the wrong diagnosis could yield the wrong—or even dangerous—prescriptions.

China does pose a profound and unprecedented strategic challenge to the United States. But this is not an “existential struggle” in which “the most fundamental freedoms are at stake.” A more measured and empirical appraisal of the challenge that China represents was published last week in the Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) of the U.S. intelligence community (IC). The IC’s analysis does not support many of the characterizations of the China threat that have emanated from the select committee and have appeared more broadly in the public discourse about China.

For example, Gallagher stated that “the CCP is laser focused on its vision for the future: a world crowded with totalitarian states.” And Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi said in his opening statement, Xi wants to ensure that China “leads the world in terms of composite national strength and international influence” by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But this is how the ATA characterizes China’s global ambitions:

China’s Communist Party (CCP) will continue efforts to achieve President Xi Jinping’s vision of making China the preeminent power in East Asia and a major power on the world stage. . . . Beijing will try to expand its influence abroad and its efforts to be viewed as a champion of global development . . . [It will also seek] to promote a China-led alternative to often U.S. and Western-dominated international development and security forums and frameworks . . . [and] modifications to international norms to favor state sovereignty and political stability over individual rights.

This does not reflect the pursuit of “a world crowded with totalitarian states.” Moreover, Krishnamoorthi’s assertion that China seeks to “lead the world” appears to quote from Xi’s speech to the CCP’s 19th Congress in 2017, which scholars have more reliably translated to refer to China aspiring to be “a global leader” rather than “the global leader.” Indeed, the IC assesses that China seeks to be “a major power on the world stage” by maximizing its relative power and influence while working to reshape global multilateralism in directions that are more conducive to and tolerant of Chinese interests, preferences, and values. This does not imply or require the establishment of unipolar Chinese global hegemony, nor of Chinese efforts to dictate how other countries govern themselves.

None of this is meant to minimize the comprehensive and relentless competitive challenge that China poses to the United States. The ATA outlines the many elements of that challenge. The IC judges that Beijing is determined “to erode US influence across military, technological, economic, and diplomatic spheres.” It will seek to “drive wedges between Washington and its partners”; use “whole-of-government tools” to “compel neighbors to acquiesce to its preferences”; and continue “building a world-class military” in a bid to “establish its preeminence in regional affairs, and project power globally while offsetting perceived U.S. military superiority.” At the same time, “China will remain the top threat to US technological competitiveness” and will try to “leverage its dominance [in markets and supply chains] for political or economic gain.” The CCP is also “attempting to sow doubts about US leadership, undermine democracy, and extend Beijing’s influence, particularly in East Asia and the western Pacific.” And it will “continue expanding its global intelligence and covert influence posture to better support the CCP’s political, economic, and security goals.”

Regarding China’s threat to the U.S. homeland, the CCP will use “a sophisticated array of covert, overt, licit, and illicit means to try to soften US criticism, shape US power centers’ views of China, and influence policymakers at all levels of government.” It is also trying to “actively exploit perceived US societal divisions” and is “intensifying efforts to mold US public discourse,” especially on Chinese sovereignty issues like Taiwan and Hong Kong.

This clearly is a formidable and ruthless opponent, and one that requires a comprehensive, whole-of-government competitive U.S. response. But it still does not add up to an “existential” winner-take-all threat to U.S. global power and influence, or to the American way of life, requiring a wholly adversarial cold war U.S. response. Beijing is working across the board globally to score points against Washington and to blunt the United States’ ability to do China harm, and it will use all of its levers and sources of power in pursuit of those goals. But the intelligence community does not assess that Beijing seeks to supplant the United States as global hegemon, or destroy American democracy and the American economy. If the evidence supported such judgments, they would have been included in the ATA.

In this regard, the ATA includes two important caveats to the IC’s assessment of Beijing’s competitive challenge. The first is that China’s leaders, despite their adversarial posture, “will seek opportunities to reduce tensions with Washington when they believe it suits their interests.” The second is that China is responding symmetrically to what to it perceives as a comparable US challenge: “Beijing sees increasingly competitive US–China relations as part of an epochal geopolitical shift and views Washington’s diplomatic, economic, military, and technological measures against Beijing as part of a broader US effort to prevent China’s rise and undermine CCP rule.” In short, Beijing sees the United States as an existential challenge to the PRC. If we reject that notion as an irrational and inflated Chinese threat perception, we must consider the possibility of irrational and inflated US threat perceptions, along with the possibility that the Chinese are no less interested in peaceful coexistence than we are.

Washington’s approach going forward would benefit from greater attention to the IC’s empirical assessment of the China threat than to the exaggerated version presented by Gallagher and others. This is because an accurate assessment of the problem can help avoid misguided policy solutions that would be costly and counterproductive. It would also avoid an exclusively adversarial approach to China that comes at the expense of opportunities for cooperation and mutual understanding. Washington and Beijing need a more accurate appraisal of each other’s strategic goals and intentions—instead of the prevailing U.S. view of a China determined to destroy America’s “fundamental freedoms,” and the Chinese view of a United States determined to obstruct China’s development and overthrow its regime.

This gets to the bipartisan consensus on how to respond to the China threat (once it is correctly assessed). Gallagher’s approach would seemingly proscribe any pursuit of constructive relations with Beijing. In his opening statement at the committee’s first hearing, he renounced “engagement” with China:

We must learn from our mistakes. For much of the past half century, we tried to win the CCP over with honey, with engagement, believing that economic engagement in particular would lead to reforms in China. Both parties made the same bet. The only problem is it didn’t work out. We were wrong. The CCP laughed at our naivete and took advantage of our good faith. But that era of wishful thinking is over. The Select Committee will not allow the CCP to lull us into complacency or maneuver us into submission.

Setting aside Gallagher’s historically inaccurate version of both the goal of engagement and its relative success, his diagnosis of the China threat (that the CCP seeks to “maneuver us into submission”) and his prescription for dealing with it risk even greater “mistakes” than those he attributes to U.S. engagement with Beijing. The mistakes that his approach risks include escalating U.S.-China hostility, inviting another cold war (or worse), and thwarting U.S.-China cooperation on a wide range of global issues—which most of the rest of the world is eager to see.

The Biden administration is risking some of the same mistakes. In his State of the Union speech, Biden said “we seek competition, not conflict” with China. Various administration officials have now incorporated this into the policy mantra. But we need not, and did not, seek competition with China; it has inevitably been thrust upon us. While girding for the competition, what Washington needs to actively seek is cooperation and dialogue: sustained diplomatic interaction with Beijing, whether we choose to call it “engagement” or not. If the bipartisan consensus on China adopts both the select committee’s characterization of the threat and its strictly confrontational approach to dealing with it, U.S.-China relations are going to keep getting worse before there is a chance for them to get better.

Paul Heer is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015. He is the author of Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia (Cornell University Press, 2018).

Image: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Paul Heer · March 16, 2023

3. Russian attacks continue in wake of Putin arrest warrant

What will be the effect of the ICC arrest warrant for Puttin? I think it is too soon to tell but I suspect it will be along the lines of this report.

Russian attacks continue in wake of Putin arrest warrant

AP · March 18, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Widespread Russian attacks continued in Ukraine following the International Criminal Court’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights.

Ukraine was attacked by 16 Russian drones on Friday night, the Ukrainian Air Force said in the early hours of Saturday. Writing on Telegram, the air force command said that 11 out of 16 drones were shot down “in the central, western and eastern regions.” Among areas targeted were the capital, Kyiv, and the western Lviv province.

The head of the Kyiv city administration, Serhii Popko, said Ukrainian air defenses shot down all drones heading for the Ukrainian capital, while Lviv regional Gov. Maksym Kozytskyi said Saturday that three of six drones were shot down, with the other three hitting a district bordering Poland. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the attacks were carried out from the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov and Russia’s Bryansk province, which borders Ukraine.

The Ukrainian military additionally said in its regular update Saturday morning that Russian forces over the previous 24 hours launched 34 airstrikes, one missile strike and 57 rounds of anti-aircraft fire. The Facebook update said that falling debris hit the southern Kherson province, damaging seven houses and a kindergarten.

Kyiv

According to the Ukrainian statement, Russia is continuing to concentrate its efforts on offensive operations in Ukraine’s industrial east, focusing attacks on Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Marinka and Shakhtarsk in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk province. Pavlo Kyrylenko, regional Gov. of the Donetsk province, said one person was killed and three wounded when 11 towns and villages in the province were shelled on Friday.

Further west, Russian rockets hit a residential area overnight Friday in the city of Zaporizhzhia, the regional capital of the partially occupied province of the same name. No casualties were reported, but houses were damaged and a catering establishment destroyed, Anatoliy Kurtev of the Zaporizhzhia City Council said.

The International Criminal Court said Friday that it has issued an arrest warrant for Putin for war crimes, accusing him of personal responsibility for the abductions of children from Ukraine, together with Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova.

It is the first time the global court has issued a warrant against a leader of one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

The move was immediately dismissed by Moscow — and welcomed by Ukraine as a major breakthrough.

Its practical implications, however, could be limited as the chances of Putin facing trial at the ICC are highly unlikely because Moscow does not recognize the court’s jurisdiction or extradite its nationals.

U.K. military officials said Saturday that Russia is likely to widen conscription. In its latest intelligence update, the U.K. defense ministry said that deputies in the Russian Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, introduced a bill Monday to change the conscription age for men to 21-30, from the current 18-27.

The ministry said that, at the moment, many men aged 18-21 claim exemption from military service because they are in higher education. The change would mean that they would eventually still have to serve. It said the law will likely be passed and come into force in January 2024.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · March 18, 2023

4. U.S. Reaches Deep Into Its Global Ammunition Stockpiles to Help Ukraine

Photos the link. If I were Russia and China I would welcome Putin's long war in Ukraine to try to deplete US ammunition stocks and equipment. What happens when we recognize we cannot sustain a war against a near peer adversary? It seems like we could be a global game of "Go."

U.S. Reaches Deep Into Its Global Ammunition Stockpiles to Help Ukraine

As Kyiv prepares for spring offensive, the Pentagon is seeking more artillery from countries with large inventories but is greeted with reluctance

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-reaches-deep-into-its-global-ammunition-stockpiles-to-help-ukraine-8224d985

By Gordon LuboldFollow, Nancy A. YoussefFollow and Brett ForrestFollow

Updated March 16, 2023 9:11 am ET

WASHINGTON—Ukraine’s insatiable demand for artillery has for months outpaced Western forecasts, setting off a global hunt for more ammunition and forcing the U.S. to raid its stocks abroad to help Kyiv prepare for its counteroffensive later in the spring.

With some U.S. allies unwilling or unable to supply enough ammunition for Ukraine, the U.S. military is pulling from its munition supplies in a number of locations, including in Israel, South Korea, Germany and Kuwait. These sites, known as prepositioned stocks, are where the U.S. stores everything from trucks to bandages to support American forces around the world.

The first drawdown of munitions from these sites was late last year, U.S. and congressional officials said.

The pressure on the U.S. to take more ammunition from its overseas stocks comes as some of Washington’s allies with the biggest stores of artillery rounds have shied away from supplying Ukraine for fear of being seen by Russia as a party to the fight in Ukraine.

Russia has repeatedly warned countries not to supply arms to Ukraine. In January, Russian State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said that supplying weapons to Kyiv “would lead to a global disaster,” and alluded to Moscow’s potential retaliation.

The U.S. has provided Kyiv with about 160 howitzers, which use 155-millimeter artillery ammunition. The howitzer artillery round—a roughly 2-foot cylinder weighing about 100 pounds—has been critical for Ukraine in pushing back Russian forces.

A photo provided by the Air Force last year shows personnel preparing weapons and other equipment bound for Ukraine.

PHOTO: U.S. AIR FORCE/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

At a plant in Scranton, Pa., 155mm artillery shells being packed for shipment.

PHOTO: BRENDAN MCDERMID/REUTERS

The U.S. has sent Ukraine more than one million rounds of 155mm ammunition, and allies have contributed more on top of that.

The conflict has largely been an artillery war consuming large amounts of ammunition at a rate that has surprised even the most seasoned gunner. Ukrainian troops are using more than 90,000 rounds a month of 155mm ammunition, Defense Department officials say.

The U.S. is now scrambling to ensure Ukraine has enough in stock for the next phase of the war, since artillery rounds will help Kyiv’s forces take back territory from Russia in what many see as a make-or-break moment in the conflict.

WHAT’S NEWS

Poland to Send Ukraine Fighter Jets in Western First

16:06

“If we don’t supply them with enough artillery, this whole thing is an intellectual exercise,” Michael Kofman, director of Russia Studies at CNA, said of the spring offensive.

To date, much of the ammunition has come from U.S. military stocks, pushing inventories to levels that were too low, according to some military planners.

The Pentagon declined to comment on the specifics of stockpiles it has drawn from to supply Ukraine.

“The Department has stocks that are located all around the world and we do not withdraw them without the support and consultation from our allies and partners,” Sabrina Singh, deputy press secretary, said in a statement.

U.S. Weapons Pledge to Ukraine Exposes Cracks in Defense Supply Chain

War crimes, indiscriminate attacks on infrastructure, systematic and widespread torture show disregard for civilians, says UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine

ohchr.org

GENEVA/ VIENNA (16 March 2023) – Russian authorities have committed a wide range of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in various regions of Ukraine, many of which amount to war crimes, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine said in a new report Thursday.

The war crimes include attacks on civilians and energy-related infrastructure, wilful killings, unlawful confinement, torture, rape and other sexual violence, as well as unlawful transfers and deportations of children.

The Commission’s evidence shows that in areas that came under their control, Russian authorities have committed wilful killings of civilians or persons not involved in fighting (hors de combat), which are war crimes and violations of the right to life.

Russian armed forces have carried out attacks with explosive weapons in populated areas with an apparent disregard for civilian harm and suffering, failing to take the required precautions. The attacks were indiscriminate and disproportionate, in violation of international humanitarian law. The use of explosive weapons in populated areas has been one of the main causes of civilian casualties. The Commission was struck by the extent of the destruction it has observed during its visits.

The waves of attacks by Russian armed forces on Ukraine’s energy-related infrastructure from 10 October 2022, may amount to crimes against humanity, according to the Commission, which said that this should be investigated further. The disruption of energy-related infrastructure led to entire regions and millions of people being left for periods without electricity or heating, particularly during freezing temperatures.

The Commission established a pattern of widespread unlawful confinement in areas controlled by Russian armed forces, targeting broad categories of men, women and children. Confinement in dedicated facilities across Ukraine and in the Russian Federation was accompanied by consistent methods of torture against certain categories of persons by Russian authorities. A former detainee underwent beatings as a “punishment for speaking Ukrainian” and for “not remembering the lyrics of the anthem of the Russian Federation”. This pattern of torture may amount to crimes against humanity, according to the Commission, and should be investigated further.

The Commission found numerous instances of rape and sexual and gender-based violence committed by Russian authorities as they undertook house-to-house visits in localities that came under their control and during unlawful confinement. Sexual violence amounting to torture and the threat of such against women and men have been important aspects of the torture exercised by Russian authorities.

While looking into transfers of children from Ukraine to the Russian Federation, the Commission found, with concern, that violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed. Situations concerning the transfer and deportation of children which it has examined amount to war crimes. Witnesses told the Commission that many of the younger children transferred were not able to establish contact with their families and might lose contact with them indefinitely. Delay in the repatriation of civilians may also amount to a war crime.

The Commission also documented a small number of violations committed by Ukrainian armed forces, including likely indiscriminate attacks and two incidents qualifying as war crimes, where Russian prisoners of war were shot, wounded and tortured.

Beyond sharing their deep loss and trauma with the Commission, survivors highlighted the importance of identifying those responsible and holding them accountable. One man, whose father was executed by Russian armed forces in the Izium region, told the Commission: “They punished innocent people; now those who are guilty, if they are still alive, need to be punished to the fullest extent.”

The Commission recommends that all violations and crimes be investigated and those responsible be held accountable, either at the national or the international level. It calls for a comprehensive approach to accountability that includes both criminal responsibility and the victims’ right to truth, reparation, and non-repetition.

For the report, the Commission visited 56 localities and interviewed 348 women and 247 men. Its investigators inspected sites of destruction, graves, places of detention and torture, as well as weapon remnants, and consulted a large number of documents and reports.

ENDS

The full report can be found here.

The Members of the Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine are available for interviews.

Background: The United Nations Human Rights Council created the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to investigate violations and abuses of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law, and related crimes that may have been committed in the context of the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The Commission is required to present its findings and recommendations, including on accountability of those responsible for the violations, to the UN Human Rights Council in March 2023. The Commission comprises Erik Møse (Chair), Jasminka Džumhur and Pablo de Greiff.

ohchr.org

6. Russia disinformation looks to US far right to weaken Ukraine support

And it is apparent that many of the far right have fallen into the Russian trap. The best propaganda always aligns with groups' preconceived notions and supports those groups' version of the "truth."

Excerpts:

In another twist, Bret Schafer, who leads the Alliance’s information manipulation team, told the Guardian: “In response to restrictions and crackdowns by major tech platforms, accounts and channels affiliated with Russian state media outlet RT, which has been banned entirely on YouTube, have fanned out across alternative social media and video sharing platforms like Rumble and Odysee that have less restrictive content moderation policies and that allow RT to operate without labels or restrictions.

“Those platforms also tend to cater to audiences who are not necessarily pro-Russian, but are certainly more apt, based on the other videos found on those platforms, to oppose continued support for Ukraine.”

Despite Moscow’s disinformation offensive and the $100bn plus in military and financial assistance that has flowed to Ukraine in one year, the ex-Republican House member Charlie Dent of Pennsylvania said that “most GOP members still support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression”.

But Dent stressed that “the hardest edge of the Bannon-Carlson wing of the Maga movement in Congress is more sympathetic to Russian arguments and has an isolationist view of American foreign policy. There are some members who are less willing to push back against autocrats. There are others too who find common cause with Russia’s professed socially conservative orientation.”

Those voices are especially loud in the Freedom Caucus which is wielding growing influence with the House speaker, Kevin McCarthy, who has said he will not support a “blank check” for Ukraine and this week declined the invitation of the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, to visit Kyiv.

Russia disinformation looks to US far right to weaken Ukraine support

The Kremlin is deploying new tactics by drawing on favorite themes and conspiracy theories of rightwing Republicans

The Guardian · by Peter Stone · March 16, 2023

As Russia’s ruthless war against Ukraine has faced major setbacks since it began a year ago, the Kremlin has deployed new disinformation themes and tactics to weaken US support for Kyiv with help from conservative media stars and some Republicans in Congress, according to new studies and experts.

Moscow’s disinformation messages have included widely debunked conspiracy theories about US bioweapon labs in Ukraine, and pet themes on the American right that portray the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, as an ally in backing traditional values, religion and family in the fight against “woke” ideas.

Further, new studies from thinktanks that track disinformation have noted that alternative social media platforms such as Parler, Rumble, Gab and Odysee have increasingly been used to spread Russian falsehoods since Facebook and Twitter have imposed more curbs on Moscow’s propaganda.

Rightwing Republicans rail against US aid for Ukraine: ‘We’ve done enough’

Other pro-Russian messages focused on the economic costs of the war for the US have been echoed by Republicans in the powerful far-right House Freedom Caucus such as Marjorie Taylor Greene, Scott Perry and Paul Gosar, who to varying degrees have questioned giving Ukraine more military aid and demanded tougher oversight.

Since Russia launched its invasion last February, the Fox News host Tucker Carlson and Trump ally – turned influential far-right podcaster – Steve Bannon have promoted some of the most baseless claims that help bolster the Kremlin’s aggression.

For instance, Bannon’s War Room podcast in February 2022 featured an interview with Erik Prince, the wealthy US founder of Blackwater, where they both enthused that Putin’s policies were “anti-woke” and praised Putin’s homophobia and transphobia.

Last month too on the anniversary of Moscow’s invasion, Carlson revved up his attacks on US support for Ukraine claiming falsely that Biden’s goal had become “overthrowing Putin and putting American tanks in Red Square because, sure, we could manage Russia once we overthrow the dictator”.

Analysts who track Russia’s disinformation see synergies between the Kremlin and parts of the US right that have helped spread some of the biggest falsehoods since the start of the invasion.

“Russia doesn’t pull even its most outlandish narratives out of thin air – it builds on existing resentments and political fissures,” Jessica Brandt, a policy director at the Brookings Institution who tracks disinformation and foreign interference, told the Guardian.

She added: “So you often have a sort of harmony – both Kremlin messengers and key media figures, each for their own reasons, have an interest in dinging the administration for its handling of the Ukraine crisis, in amplifying distrust of authoritative media, in playing on skepticism about the origins of Covid and frustration with government mitigation measures.”

“That was the case with the biolabs conspiracy theory, for example, which posits that the Pentagon has been supporting the development of biological weapons in Ukraine. The Charlie Kirk Show and Steve Bannon’s War Room podcast, among others, devoted multiple segments to the claim. It’s not so much that we’re witnessing any sort of coordination, but rather an alignment of interests.”

Brandt also noted that Russia had an “interest in promoting authentic American voices expressing views that align with the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals. And that’s why you often see them retweet Americans that make these arguments.”

Likewise, two reports issued separately last month by the Alliance for Securing Democracy and the Atlantic Council, reveal how Russian state media have shifted some messaging themes and adopted new tactics with an eye to undercutting US backing for Ukraine.

Putin aiming to divide US public opinion with nuclear treaty pullout, experts say

The Alliance report documented a shift in messaging in the US and Europe from directly defending Russia’s invasion to stressing the energy and economic impacts that it was having, themes that seem to be resonating with some Republican politicians.

In the first six months of the war, Alliance data revealed that Russia-linked accounts on Twitter mentioned “Nazi” in more than 5,800tweets.

But in the following six months from August 2022 through January 2023, “the number of ‘Nazi’ tweets dropped to 3,373 – a 42% decline”. Likewise, mentions of Nato by Russian-linked accounts on Twitter dropped by roughly 30% in the second six-month period.

By contrast, in the most recent six-month period the report said that “tweets mentioning both ‘energy’ and ‘Ukraine’ increased by 267%, while tweets mentioning ‘cost of living’ increased 66%” compared to the first six months of the war.

In another twist, Bret Schafer, who leads the Alliance’s information manipulation team, told the Guardian: “In response to restrictions and crackdowns by major tech platforms, accounts and channels affiliated with Russian state media outlet RT, which has been banned entirely on YouTube, have fanned out across alternative social media and video sharing platforms like Rumble and Odysee that have less restrictive content moderation policies and that allow RT to operate without labels or restrictions.

“Those platforms also tend to cater to audiences who are not necessarily pro-Russian, but are certainly more apt, based on the other videos found on those platforms, to oppose continued support for Ukraine.”

Despite Moscow’s disinformation offensive and the $100bn plus in military and financial assistance that has flowed to Ukraine in one year, the ex-Republican House member Charlie Dent of Pennsylvania said that “most GOP members still support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression”.

But Dent stressed that “the hardest edge of the Bannon-Carlson wing of the Maga movement in Congress is more sympathetic to Russian arguments and has an isolationist view of American foreign policy. There are some members who are less willing to push back against autocrats. There are others too who find common cause with Russia’s professed socially conservative orientation.”

Those voices are especially loud in the Freedom Caucus which is wielding growing influence with the House speaker, Kevin McCarthy, who has said he will not support a “blank check” for Ukraine and this week declined the invitation of the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, to visit Kyiv.

Freedom Caucus member Greene from Georgia at the recent CPAC conference said flatly: “We’ve done enough.”

Democrats are especially worried about the embrace of pro-Kremlin disinformation by the American right.

The Democratic senator Chris Murphy blasted US conservatives for echoing Kremlin propaganda and traced its roots back to ex-president Donald Trump, who at the start of Russia’s invasion lauded Putin as “savvy” and a “genius”. Murphy said Trump’s “admiration for Putin” has “turned into a collective rightwing obsession”.

How big a threat does the hard right pose to US support for Ukraine?

Murphy noted that among the obsessed on the right are Donald Trump Jr, whom he follows on social media, and who is “relentlessly making fun of Zelenskiy online”.

Meanwhile, Putin’s own words and propaganda have lately shifted as he has tried to influence opinion in the US and the west, and blunt Russian dissent.

“Millions of people in the west understand they are being led to a real spiritual catastrophe,” Putin railed last month in a wildly hyperbolic speech that homed in on “the destruction of families”, and related themes.

Russia experts warn that Putin’s rhetoric and Kremlin messaging on these themes is far removed from the reality in Russia.

“One of the glaring mistakes of far-right propagandists is to view Vladimir Putin as some kind of defender of Christendom, of family values and as a protector of the white race,” said Ariel Cohen, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. “They repeat the Kremlin talking points and get excited about the Russian ‘gay propaganda’ law. Nothing could be further from reality.

“Today Russia is the leader in Europe of high divorce rates, HIV infections, and low church attendance and practice.”

Senator Murphy expects Putin to count “on the [American] right wing to advance Russian propaganda and exploit our internal divisions.”

The Guardian · by Peter Stone · March 16, 2023

7. Is China Winning the Information Race?

Excerpts:

Heilbrunn: What course of action, if any, should Washington adopt in response to Chinese efforts?

Kurlantzick: Improve digital literacy among citizens, starting with kids. This is good not just for dealing with Chinese propaganda but good on its own to help kids better understand truth from fiction online.

Apply high scrutiny to foreign investments in media and communications companies in the United States—the same level of scrutiny that might be applied to foreign investments in companies that produce things that could also have defense uses. Not just Chinese investors, but any foreign investors.

Invest in independent media abroad, especially in Asia. Continue investing in Voice of America and Radio Free Asia.

Figure out some way to not ban TikTok but to force it to keep all Americans’ data on servers in the United States without any backdoors. It does store data in the United States but that data has also been accessed from China many times.

Is China Winning the Information Race?

TNI editor Jacob Heilbrunn interviews Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of Beijing’s Global Media Offensive.

by Jacob Heilbrunn

The National Interest · by Jacob Heilbrunn · March 16, 2023

Jacob Heilbrunn: Is there an information race and should America be concerned about China’s attempt to construct its own global media?

Joshua Kurlantzick: There is an information race, to be sure—in terms of state media; Chinese control of Chinese-language media in many countries; control of information “pipes” like 5G networking, etc.; and the growing power of Chinese social media platforms, like WeChat and, most notably, TikTok. However, my book is called Beijing’s Global Media Offensive: China’s Uneven Campaign to Influence Asia and the World, and that subtitle is there for a reason. In many respects, and in particular with much of its big state media (China Global Television Network, China Radio International, China Daily), Beijing has not reached much of an audience—the figures for viewership or listenership to these channels are minimal. Xinhua has been much more effective at reaching a global audience, by signing content-sharing deals with local media in a wide range of countries, and thus getting picked up (translated) in a wide range of news outlets all over the world. China has, however, had great success in gaining control of nearly all of the Chinese language media around the world, whether by having actual Chinese state firms buy into the media or by having local owners, in countries with Chinese language media, who happen to be pro-Beijing (for business reasons, or other reasons), buy up the outlets and basically end any independent reporting on Beijing and China’s actions. So, from Australia to Malaysia to the United States to Canada, there is little independent Chinese-language media left, even in places with large numbers of people who read or watch Chinese-language media as their primary source of news.

Heilbrunn: Are China’s efforts to influence its image abroad effective or are they a waste of money?

Kurlantzick: I think I answered some of this in the first question. They’ve wasted a ton of money on much of their state media, which mostly remains turgid, propagandistic, and little-watched. Xinhua, however, has gained a foothold in many global news outlets, so that hasn’t been a waste of money, and neither has taking control of Chinese language media outlets around the world. In terms of soft power not directed by the state—in the United States that would be Hollywood, the music industry, artists, writers, the Kardashians, baseball, basketball, whatever—China has virtually none of this soft power not directed by the state. It did have the potential to have it: China has in the past boasted great artists, writers, musicians, etc. And it has some soft power via TikTok, Tencent and its games, etc. But its non-state-directed soft power has been limited by the intense crackdown on artists and by Xi’s crackdown on even highly globally successful private sector companies.

Heilbrunn: Is China achieving success in attaining dominance over what you call the “pipes” that information travels through—web browsers, mobile phones, social media platforms, and so on?

Kurlantzick: It is mixed. China has been building out a lot of infrastructure “pipes” that carry information in developing countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, and other regions, but it has failed to win such contracts (or been banned from getting such contracts) in much of North America, Europe, Northeast Asia, and some other regions. Interestingly, China has cost itself a fairly warm relationship with Central and Eastern Europe, where it has been building a lot of pipes, over the Ukraine-Russia War. However, TikTok is another story. It is becoming the dominant global app, and every country, including the United States, is going to have to figure out how to deal with it; Its parent company, despite all their claims to the contrary, is based in China, and has a seat on its board held by the Chinese government. Countries like the United States need to make sure that all users’ data on TikTok is held on servers inside the United States, or whatever country is dealing with TikTok. So, China has a powerful weapon in TikTok but at the same time, I don’t think most democracies are going to go along with a situation in which data from TikTok is held outside their borders or can be leaked outside their borders. WeChat is also a powerful Chinese social media platform, particularly in Southeast Asia, and has been valuable for China in that a wide range of pro-Beijing news circulates on WeChat, which is heavily monitored and censored.

Heilbrunn: How do China’s misinformation efforts compare to America’s?

Kurlantzick: Certainly, the United States does use misinformation in countries like Iran, Cuba, and Russia, places with whom the United States has poor relations. And during the Cold War there was no doubt that U.S. state media like Voice of America were to a significant extent propaganda outlets, not too far from the propagandistic nature of China’s state media today. But after the end of the Cold War, limits were placed on U.S. state media, giving them editorial independence—and other state actors like the BBC, etc., also enjoy editorial independence. China’s state media do not, and this is a huge difference. Look at the BBC or Voice of America and they run articles on the problems of America or Britain, etc. The BBC even ran an extensive interview (though I am not defending the methods by which the journalist got the interview) with Princess Diana, the Princess of Wales at the time, slamming the royal family. Nothing like this is imaginable in Chinese state media.

Heilbrunn: To what extent is China trying to meddle in American elections?

Kurlantzick: I think China began by extensively trying to meddle in elections in its near region—Taiwan, Southeast Asia, then Australia, and perhaps New Zealand. It is now expanding. There is considerable discussion in Canada now about the possibility that China intervened extensively in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections in Canada, and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau recently ordered an investigation into the alleged meddling—although his opponents are asking him for a more public inquiry, which I think would make more sense. China has meddled somewhat in U.S. elections—somewhat in a congressional primary in New York in the 2022 midterms, perhaps somewhat in some local elections, and is increasingly trying to become more sophisticated in using disinformation to affect U.S. elections. But its disinformation is still pretty sloppy compared to that of other actors, and it hasn’t been as full bore in influencing U.S. elections as it has in other places. However, that is likely to change, and the FBI director has warned that China is going to be a major player in influencing U.S. elections going forward.

Heilbrunn: Are you worried that China will eventually become a behemoth in the information wars?

Kurlantzick: Well, in some ways—control of Chinese language media everywhere in the world, Xinhua becoming a tool to spread propaganda all over the world, China’s increasingly sophisticated disinformation, etc.—it is becoming more powerful. That said, a lot of Beijing’s actions have led to powerful backlashes in countries where what China has been doing has been exposed, and stepped-up legislative and investigatory efforts to probe Chinese influence efforts. In addition, China’s influence efforts, combined with its overbearing diplomacy in many places, growing authoritarianism at home, and other problems, have led it to have a fairly negative image in a lot of places—not just places one would imagine, like the United States, Japan, or Australia, but even places where China enjoyed relatively warm feelings in the past. So, right now, China hasn’t been super successful in all aspects of information warfare, but it is likely Beijing will adapt, become more skilled, and do better down the road. Beijing has proven adaptable in other realms, so why not in this realm?

Heilbrunn: What course of action, if any, should Washington adopt in response to Chinese efforts?

Kurlantzick: Improve digital literacy among citizens, starting with kids. This is good not just for dealing with Chinese propaganda but good on its own to help kids better understand truth from fiction online.

Apply high scrutiny to foreign investments in media and communications companies in the United States—the same level of scrutiny that might be applied to foreign investments in companies that produce things that could also have defense uses. Not just Chinese investors, but any foreign investors.

Invest in independent media abroad, especially in Asia. Continue investing in Voice of America and Radio Free Asia.

Figure out some way to not ban TikTok but to force it to keep all Americans’ data on servers in the United States without any backdoors. It does store data in the United States but that data has also been accessed from China many times.

Jacob Heilbrunn is editor of the National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Jacob Heilbrunn · March 16, 2023

8. Ukrainian commander reveals true scale of losses – and pays the price

Excerpts:

Ukraine and Russia guard their casualty numbers closely, believing that they could undermine morale, although military commanders still hint at the high death tolls at their evening briefings when they boast of killing hundreds of enemy soldiers.

On Sunday, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, said that Ukrainian forces had killed more than 1,100 Russian soldiers in the past week. Russia’s ministry of defence said that day that it had killed 220 Ukrainian soldiers in the past 24 hours.

It is not possible to independently verify these numbers. Thousands of Ukrainian civilians have also been killed.

On the battlefield, the British ministry of defence has said that Russian fighters led by Wagner mercenaries have broken over the river in the centre of Bakhmut, in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, but that their advance had stalled because they were exhausted.

Oleksiy Danilov, secretary of Ukraine’s Security Council, said that Mr Zelensky was determined to defend the city despite growing pressure to withdraw.

“This is our land, and we have no right not to defend it,” he told Radio Free Europe.

Ukrainian commander reveals true scale of losses – and pays the price

Yahoo · by James KilnerMarch 17, 2023, 10:11 AM·4 min read

Battalion commander, known by his call sign Kupol, gave an unusually frank assessment of Ukrainian losses in an interview - The Washington Post

Ukraine has demoted a top battlefield commander after he admitted his unit had been decimated in fighting around the city of Bakhmut.

The battalion commander, known by his call sign Kupol, gave an unusually frank assessment of Ukrainian losses in an interview from the front lines earlier this week.

He revealed that all of the original 500 soldiers in his unit had either been killed or injured, a rare acknowledgement from inside the Ukrainian ranks, where losses are kept strictly confidential.

The Ukrainian high command is at pains to present a positive spin on the increasingly bloody defence of the east of the country. US officials have estimated that the Ukrainian army may have taken 120,000 casualties compared with 200,000 by the Russian army.

Kupol told the Washington Post this week that the Ukrainian army training was often poor and that some of the rookie replacements didn’t know how to throw a hand grenade or fire a rifle.

Others had abandoned their positions shortly after arriving at the front line, he said.

Members of a Ukrainian army tank crew check the vehicle at a military base in Zaporizhzhia - Kateryna Klochko/PA

“I get 100 new soldiers,” he said. “They don’t give me any time to prepare them. They say, ‘Take them into the battle.’ They just drop everything and run. That’s it. Do you understand why? Because the soldier doesn’t shoot. I ask him why, and he says, ‘I’m afraid of the sound of the shot.’ And for some reason, he has never thrown a grenade. … We need Nato instructors in all our training centres, and our instructors need to be sent over there into the trenches. Because they failed in their task.”

Kupol said what was left of his unit was also facing ammunition shortages.

“You’re on the front line,” he said. “They’re coming toward you, and there’s nothing to shoot with.”

Thousands of Ukrainian soldiers are being trained by the British Army and other Nato countries but thousands more receive more rudimentary training in Ukraine.

Kupol said that he had been motivated to speak out to try to improve training levels but furious Ukrainian generals instead demoted him. The Washington Post said he had consented to have his picture taken but admitted he could face “personal blowback” for his honest assessment.

Kupol told the Washington Post this week that the Ukrainian army training was often poor - The Washington Post

Valentin Shevchenko, a spokesman for the Ukrainian military, accused Kupol of “disseminating false information”. “The losses announced in the unit of which he had command are significantly overestimated,” she told Ukrainian media.

Shortly after his demotion, Kupol quit the Ukrainian army.

Within hours of his reassignment to a training camp, dozens of Ukrainian soldiers, politicians and journalists had voiced their support for the battalion commander.

“One of the armed forces finest commanders has just been removed,” Yuriy Butusov, a well-known Ukrainian war correspondent, wrote on Facebook.

“Instead of analysing mistakes that will defeat the Russian army, honest comments are suppressed and those who make them are punished.”

The leak on casualty numbers will be deeply embarrassing for the Ukrainian military which has diligently built up a narrative of its outnumbered but highly motivated and well-trained army taking on hordes of Russian soldiers and convicts.

It also undermines confidence in its much-talked-up counteroffensive planned for spring.

The attritional nature of the war in Ukraine has killed and injured hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Both sides have admitted that they are running out of artillery shells and ammunition.

Ukraine and Russia guard their casualty numbers closely, believing that they could undermine morale, although military commanders still hint at the high death tolls at their evening briefings when they boast of killing hundreds of enemy soldiers.

On Sunday, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, said that Ukrainian forces had killed more than 1,100 Russian soldiers in the past week. Russia’s ministry of defence said that day that it had killed 220 Ukrainian soldiers in the past 24 hours.

It is not possible to independently verify these numbers. Thousands of Ukrainian civilians have also been killed.

On the battlefield, the British ministry of defence has said that Russian fighters led by Wagner mercenaries have broken over the river in the centre of Bakhmut, in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, but that their advance had stalled because they were exhausted.

Oleksiy Danilov, secretary of Ukraine’s Security Council, said that Mr Zelensky was determined to defend the city despite growing pressure to withdraw.

“This is our land, and we have no right not to defend it,” he told Radio Free Europe.

Yahoo · by James KilnerMarch 17, 2023, 10:11 AM·4 min read

9. New Data Links Pandemic’s Origins to Raccoon Dogs at Wuhan Market

Raccoon dog? I have never heard of such a dog.

This will certainly send the conspiracy theorists into a high hover.

New Data Links Pandemic’s Origins to Raccoon Dogs at Wuhan Market

The New York Times · by Benjamin Mueller · March 16, 2023

Genetic samples from the market were recently uploaded to an international database and then removed after scientists asked China about them.

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Members of the Wuhan Hygiene Emergency Response Team leaving the closed Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market on Jan. 11, 2020.

Ben Mueller has been covering the coronavirus, including its toll, treatment and origins, since it emerged in early 2020.

March 16, 2023

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An international team of virus experts said on Thursday that they had found genetic data from a market in Wuhan, China, linking the coronavirus with raccoon dogs for sale there, adding evidence to the case that the worst pandemic in a century could have been ignited by an infected animal that was being dealt through the illegal wildlife trade.

The genetic data was drawn from swabs taken from in and around the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market starting in January 2020, shortly after the Chinese authorities had shut down the market because of suspicions that it was linked to the outbreak of a new virus. By then, the animals had been cleared out, but researchers swabbed walls, floors, metal cages and carts often used for transporting animal cages.

In samples that came back positive for the coronavirus, the international research team found genetic material belonging to animals, including large amounts that were a match for the raccoon dog, three scientists involved in the analysis said.

The jumbling together of genetic material from the virus and the animal does not prove that a raccoon dog itself was infected. And even if a raccoon dog had been infected, it would not be clear that the animal had spread the virus to people. Another animal could have passed the virus to people, or someone infected with the virus could have spread the virus to a raccoon dog.

But the analysis did establish that raccoon dogs — fluffy animals that are related to foxes and are known to be able to transmit the coronavirus — deposited genetic signatures in the same place where genetic material from the virus was left, the three scientists said. That evidence, they said, was consistent with a scenario in which the virus had spilled into humans from a wild animal.

A young raccoon dog at the Chapultepec Zoo in Mexico City in 2015.

A report with the full details of the international research team’s findings has not yet been published. Their analysis was first reported by The Atlantic.

The new evidence is sure to provide a jolt to the debate over the pandemic’s origins, even if it does not resolve the question of how it began.

In recent weeks, the so-called lab leak theory, which posits that the coronavirus emerged from a research lab in Wuhan, has gained traction thanks to a new intelligence assessment from the U.S. Department of Energy and hearings led by the new Republican House leadership.

But the genetic data from the market offers some of the most tangible evidence yet of how the virus could have spilled into people from wild animals outside a lab. It also suggests that Chinese scientists have given an incomplete account of evidence that could fill in details about how the virus was spreading at the Huanan market.

More on the Coronavirus Pandemic

Covid Origins: The debate about what might have caused the coronavirus pandemic has re-emerged, with Republicans in Congress pushing the theory that a laboratory leak was to blame. But it might be hard to find definitive answers.
Covid Testing: The Biden administration appears to be planning to end a requirement that travelers coming from China present a negative Covid-19 test before entering the United States.
Long Covid: A large study found that Covid patients were significantly more likely to experience gastrointestinal problems a year after infection than people who were not infected.
New Drug’s Long Odds: A promising new treatment quashes all Covid variants, but regulatory hurdles and a lack of funding make it unlikely to reach the United States market anytime soon.

Jeremy Kamil, a virologist at Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center Shreveport who was not involved in the study, said the findings showed that “the samples from the market that had early Covid lineages in them were contaminated with DNA reads of wild animals.”

Dr. Kamil said that fell short of conclusive evidence that an infected animal had set off the pandemic. But, he said, “it really puts the spotlight on the illegal animal trade in an intimate way.”

Chinese scientists had released a study looking at the same market samples in February 2022. That study had reported that samples were positive for the coronavirus but suggested that the virus had come from infected people who were shopping or working in the market, rather than from animals being sold there.

At some point, those same researchers, including some affiliated with the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, posted the raw data from swabs around the market to GISAID, an international repository of genetic sequences of viruses. (Attempts to reach the Chinese scientists by phone on Thursday were not successful.)

On March 4, Florence Débarre, an evolutionary biologist at the French National Center for Scientific Research, happened to be searching that database for information related to the Huanan market when, she said in an interview, she noticed more sequences than usual popping up. Confused at first about whether they contained new data, Dr. Débarre put them aside, only to log in again last week and discover that they held a trove of raw data.

Virus experts had been awaiting that raw sequence data from the market since they learned of its existence in the Chinese report from February 2022. Dr. Débarre said she had alerted other scientists, including the leaders of a team that had published a set of studies last year pointing to the market as the origin.

An international team — which included Michael Worobey, an evolutionary biologist at the University of Arizona; Kristian Andersen, a virologist at the Scripps Research Institute in California; and Edward Holmes, a biologist at the University of Sydney — started mining the new genetic data last week.

One sample in particular caught their attention. It had been taken from a cart linked to a specific stall at the Huanan market that Dr. Holmes had visited in 2014, scientists involved in the analysis said. That stall, Dr. Holmes found, contained caged raccoon dogs on top of a separate cage holding birds, exactly the sort of environment conducive to the transmission of new viruses.

The swab taken from a cart there in early 2020, the research team found, contained genetic material from the virus and a raccoon dog.

“We were able to figure out relatively quickly that at least in one of these samples, there was a lot of raccoon dog nucleic acid, along with virus nucleic acid,” said Stephen Goldstein, a virologist at the University of Utah who worked on the new analysis. (Nucleic acids are the chemical building blocks that carry genetic information.)

After the international team stumbled upon the new data, they reached out to the Chinese researchers who had uploaded the files with an offer to collaborate, hewing to rules of the online repository, scientists involved with the new analysis said. After that, the sequences disappeared from GISAID.

It is not clear who removed them or why they were taken down.

Dr. Débarre said the research team was seeking more data, including some from market samples that were never made public. “What’s important is there’s still more data,” she said.

Scientists involved with the analysis said that some of the samples had also contained genetic material from other animals and from humans. Angela Rasmussen, a virologist at the Vaccine and Infectious Disease Organization at the University of Saskatchewan in Canada, who worked on the analysis, said that the human genetic material was to be expected given that people were shopping and working there and that human Covid cases had been linked to the market.

Dr. Goldstein, too, cautioned that “we don’t have an infected animal, and we can’t prove definitively there was an infected animal at that stall.” Genetic material from the virus is stable enough, he said, that it is not clear when exactly it was deposited at the market. He said that the team was still analyzing the data and that it had not intended for its analysis to become public before it had released a report.

“But,” he said, “given that the animals that were present in the market were not sampled at the time, this is as good as we can hope to get.”

The New York Times · by Benjamin Mueller · March 16, 2023

10. Why Won’t the West Let Ukraine Win Against Russia?

Peace through strength.

Strategy includes making assumptions. The major assumption for Ambassador Bolton's strategy is that Putin will not escalate the war.

Excerpts:

One thing is plain: Fears of Russian escalation are unwarranted. Our prewar intelligence vastly overestimated Russian combat-arms capabilities, and the passing months show those capabilities steadily diminishing. Where is the hidden Russian army that threatens NATO? If it exists, why isn’t it already deployed in Ukraine? Mr. Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling also has deterred NATO, but for no good reason. Moscow’s threats to date have been bluffs. Only in the most extreme circumstances—total Russian battlefield collapse, or Mr. Putin’s own regime on the verge of ouster—would using nuclear weapons realistically be an option. Accordingly, we should focus on deterring Mr. Putin in those scenarios, including threatening his own demise, rather than let his bluffing deter us.

The Biden administration may not intend it, but its doubt and hesitation both impede the war effort and open the door politically to those who oppose U.S. aid entirely. Hence the urgent need to state our war objectives clearly. Failure to do so exposes Ukraine’s supporters to claims they are granting Kyiv a “blank check” or that we are in another “endless war” (after 13 months and no U.S. casualties). While this is a domestic political problem, it also reflects national-security leadership failures. Mr. Biden needs to get his act together.

Why Won’t the West Let Ukraine Win Against Russia?

Its defense would be more effective if it didn’t have to fight with one hand behind its back.

By John Bolton

March 15, 2023 3:43 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-wont-the-west-let-ukraine-win-nord-stream-deterrence-putin-munitions-stockpiles-bluff-objective-a70d956c?page=1

New intelligence suggesting that a “pro-Ukraine group” sabotaged the Nord Stream pipelines in September triggered surprising political blowback in Europe. Spurred by potential economic disruption, speculation arose that Ukrainian involvement, direct or indirect, would undercut support for Kyiv’s resistance to Russia’s 2022 invasion. Ukraine denied any responsibility. German authorities suggested it might be a Kremlin “false flag” operation, scripted to throw suspicion on Kyiv.

But even if Ukraine masterminded the raid, why would successfully disrupting Nord Stream imperil foreign assistance? Such a potentially harmful reaction exposes a larger problem, which has repeatedly manifested itself since Russia’s unprovoked aggression. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been spooked by Moscow’s threats to “escalate” the conflict if Ukraine isn’t kept on a tight leash. Although President Biden failed, indeed barely tried, to deter Russia’s war, Vladimir Putin has masterfully deterred NATO from responding robustly enough to end the conflict promptly and victoriously. Time to solve this problem is growing short.

The threats to global stability and the US homeland are growing. How will the war in Ukraine end? Can China and the US develop a less combative relationship? Join historian and Journal columnist Walter Russell Mead and editorial page editor Paul Gigot for an interactive conversation on the threats to US security..

Moscow’s successful intimidation highlights Washington’s failure to state clear war objectives and forge a strategy to achieve them. Mr. Biden wants Russia to “lose,” but seems afraid of Ukraine actually “winning.” If he believes America’s official position—restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity—he should reaffirm it, and craft a plan to do so. If not, he should say so. We can then at least have an intelligible debate.

Instead, ambiguous goals and fear of Russian escalation have led to today’s military gridlock. Just before the invasion, Mr. Biden ruled out U.S. military force, with no reciprocal Kremlin response. Days later, he said “no one expected the sanctions to prevent anything from happening.” In May 2022, his defense secretary and national security adviser asked their Russian counterparts to consider a cease-fire, signaling weakness and irresolution.

Russia’s deterrence and NATO’s lack of strategy are further evidenced by internal NATO debates about what weapons to supply Ukraine, whether Polish MiGs, Himars rocket artillery, Abrams tanks, ATACMS munitions, or F-16s. Such disputes over weaponry, when it is needed and where, and Ukraine’s own capabilities, reflect a disjointed strategy, which leads to confusion (or worse) on the battlefield, pretty much where we are. And, to say the quiet part aloud, a prolonged military stalemate can only benefit the much larger aggressor, aided by China and others, as the West aids Ukraine.

Much of NATO’s wrangling over weapons tracks Washington’s insistence that Kyiv not attack targets inside Russia or even Crimea, notwithstanding U.S. recognition of Crimea as sovereign Ukrainian territory. Under this bizarre reasoning, NATO pressures Ukraine not to strike inside Russia, and to spare key assets like Nord Stream, whereas the Kremlin can strike anywhere within Ukraine. Observers, recalling America’s catastrophic Afghanistan withdrawal, could conclude Washington either doesn’t know its own mind or is eager to avoid pressing Moscow too hard militarily. Russia’s deterrence works.

Today, White House policy is essentially: We support Ukraine’s defending itself, but not enough to be too effective. This formula for protracted, inconclusive war ignores risks to America as well as Ukraine. Critical U.S. munitions supplies are being depleted, and our current capacity to restock is insufficient, mirroring concerns about replacing our aging nuclear-powered submarine fleet while also supplying Australia under the Aukus deal. Although it is better we experience these problems now, before America itself comes under fire, shortfalls in U.S. stockpiles buttress isolationists who don’t want to assist Ukraine in the first place.

One thing is plain: Fears of Russian escalation are unwarranted. Our prewar intelligence vastly overestimated Russian combat-arms capabilities, and the passing months show those capabilities steadily diminishing. Where is the hidden Russian army that threatens NATO? If it exists, why isn’t it already deployed in Ukraine? Mr. Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling also has deterred NATO, but for no good reason. Moscow’s threats to date have been bluffs. Only in the most extreme circumstances—total Russian battlefield collapse, or Mr. Putin’s own regime on the verge of ouster—would using nuclear weapons realistically be an option. Accordingly, we should focus on deterring Mr. Putin in those scenarios, including threatening his own demise, rather than let his bluffing deter us.

The Biden administration may not intend it, but its doubt and hesitation both impede the war effort and open the door politically to those who oppose U.S. aid entirely. Hence the urgent need to state our war objectives clearly. Failure to do so exposes Ukraine’s supporters to claims they are granting Kyiv a “blank check” or that we are in another “endless war” (after 13 months and no U.S. casualties). While this is a domestic political problem, it also reflects national-security leadership failures. Mr. Biden needs to get his act together.

Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06.

WSJ Opinion: Ukraine Fatigue Is Not an Option

The US-Russia drone collision is sign of increasingly unfriendly skies

The proliferation of drones in conflict zones is a game-changer.

Joshua Keating

Global Security Reporter

March 17, 2023

grid.news · by Joshua Keating

After viewing the video released on Thursday of the downing of a U.S. drone by Russian fighter jets over the Black Sea, Brynn Tannehill, a former U.S. Navy aviator, told Grid, “I’ve been intercepted numerous times, flying P-3 [surveillance planes] and SH-60 [helicopters] in the Gulf, and I can tell you that this was incredibly aggressive in ways that I’ve never personally witnessed.”

According to the U.S. account of the incident that took place over the Black Sea on Tuesday, two Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighter jets buzzed and dumped fuel on an American MQ-9 Reaper drone. Making another pass, one of the jets collided with the drone, forcing the U.S. to bring the drone down in the water. The Kremlin denies this account, claiming the drone was intercepted after flying close to Russian airspace, was never hit by the planes and crashed “as a result of sharp maneuver.” The U.S. government’s release of the video seemed intended at least in part to bolster its own version of the story.

National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told reporters on Thursday that the U.S. could not determine if the Russians intended to destroy the drone but called their conduct “reckless and unprofessional.” Tannehill, now an analyst at the Rand Corporation, agreed with that assessment and said the intentional dumping of fuel on another aircraft was not a tactic she’d seen before. “That’s not just hot dogging. That’s taking it to a different level,” she said.

But while the specifics of the Black Sea collision may have been unusual, close encounters between Russian and U.S. aircraft are not; they have a long history dating back to the early days of the Cold War. Other nations have had close calls as well. And while militaries generally have guidelines and best practices for avoiding aerial collisions, the widespread proliferation of drone aircraft has changed the equation. And experts told Grid that some of the old rules of the game may need to be updated.

The not-so-friendly skies

Air intercepts are a relatively common feature of modern military aviation. The idea is either to identify and photograph the aircraft, or send a warning if it’s somewhere you don’t think it should be. During the 1950s, particularly during the heightened tensions of the Korean War, intercepts often involved U.S. and Soviet planes actually firing on one another, but these encounters became more routine — and less combative — over time. In a ritual repeated thousands of times during the Cold War, U.S. fighter jets would scramble and fly in close formation with Soviet aircraft approaching North American airspace, shadowing them until they left. The idea was to get close enough to send a message but not so close as to risk collision were one plane to suddenly change course. At times, the pilots were even having fun: U.S. fighter pilots would sometimes perform barrel rolls at the request of the Soviet crews.

Over time, such intercepts became less common. One likely reason is that satellite imagery has made aerial surveillance less important. Another may have been the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), under which Moscow and Washington agreed to certain rules of the road for military encounters in international waters and airspace, and set up a regular process to discuss these incidents. Among other provisions, the agreement specified that “Commanders of aircraft of the Parties shall use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other Party.” (Of particular relevance to this week’s incident, INCSEA prohibits “dropping various objects” on other craft, though it seems to have in mind aircraft dropping things on ships rather than on other aircraft.)

INCSEA remained in effect between Russia and the United States after the end of the Cold War, and the two countries’ navies held meetings to discuss its implementation as recently as 2021.

Midair incidents have been rare — but deadly. In 1983, for instance, during a moment of heightened Cold War military tension, Soviet fighter jets shot down a Korean Air Lines 747 that had drifted off course and was mistaken for a spy plane. Two hundred and sixty-nine people were killed.

In a 2001 incident involving the U.S. and China, a Chinese navy interceptor jet collided with a U.S. surveillance plane near the island of Hainan in the South China Sea. The Chinese pilot was killed while the U.S. plane made an emergency landing on Hainan, setting off a diplomatic incident between the two countries. And in 2020, U.S. F-15s intercepted an Iranian passenger plane that had flown close to a U.S. air base in Syria, forcing it to make an emergency landing and injuring several passengers.

But the conflict in Ukraine — dating to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 — has led to a notable uptick in intercept-related incidents. Most of these took place over the Baltic Sea, but incidents over the Black Sea and the Arctic have also increased. Since 2017, there have been more than 150 such “air incidents” each year — mostly intercepts — according to a report by the arms control group Global Zero.

Still, NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, Gen. Tod Wolters, assured an audience in 2019 that “well over 99 percent of the intercepts that occur in the air are actually safe.”

The risks may be even higher around Taiwan, where Taiwanese air intercepts involving Chinese, Taiwanese and U.S. aircraft are increasingly common. In an incident in December of last year, the U.S. accused China of flying a fighter jet dangerously close to a U.S. reconnaissance plane, risking a repeat of something like the Hainan Island incident.

Close encounters of the unmanned kind

Though air intercepts involving manned aircraft may be relatively common, incidents involving drones, like this week’s Black Sea collision, are a new phenomenon.

Paul Lushenko, a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and Cornell University PhD candidate who studies drone warfare, told Grid that until recently, drones were deployed in less-contested skies.

“They’ve mainly been used against terrorists in places where air superiority and air dominance was never in question — Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,” Lushenko said. “We haven’t really seen these capabilities used in interstate wars as much, and we haven’t seen it between great powers like this.”

The main difference when drones are involved is that they are, for obvious reasons, considered more expendable than manned aircraft, and therefore their destruction is less escalatory. Increasingly, there are also simply more of them.

“If a Russian Sukhoi had hit my helicopter, it would have killed everybody on board the helicopter, and the Sukhoi pilot would probably also have had to bail out,” said Tannehill. “A significant portion the American public would be demanding retribution for our dead, brave airmen. You’d have state funerals, and Biden showing up at Arlington. It creates a very different set of diplomatic and military problems.”

This logic was put to the test by the incident in 2019 when Iran shot down a U.S. drone over the Strait of Hormuz. The arguments then were similar to this week’s U.S.-Russia claims; the U.S. said the drone was in international airspace; Iran claimed it had strayed into its own maritime territory. Then-President Donald Trump reportedly approved military strikes against Iran but called them off at the last minute.

The fact that drones carry no human beings reduces the likelihood than any particular air-to-air incident will result in World War III, but it also means militaries are more likely to take risky actions against them. Tannehill said that if the Russian downing of the drone was intentional — which, again, has not been confirmed — “there is probably a political calculus there, that there’s nothing that the U.S. can, or is willing to, do about it.”

On Thursday’s call, Kirby would not comment on whether there are plans to provide armed escorts to U.S. drones flying in the region, but he reiterated that there would no scaling-back of the surveillance flights. “It ain’t gonna deter us from flying these things again,” he said.

A world in which militaries consider it consequence-free to blow their adversaries’ drones out of the sky carries with it a whole range of risks. Last month’s incursion by a Chinese balloon into U.S. airspace showed that an unmanned craft can easily set off a political and military crisis. This has led a number of experts to conclude that Cold War-era agreements and norms about air-to-air encounters need to be updated for the drone era.

“What you’re seeing here is the natural lag between emerging capabilities and the policies and international regimes to account for these situations,” said Lushenko.

A $32 million aircraft, even an unmanned one, sitting at the bottom of the Black Sea is not something the Pentagon or White House are thrilled about, and in the context of the Ukraine War, it’s a reminder of the risks that the conflict could escalate or draw in the U.S. military more directly. But given the seemingly unstoppable proliferation of military drones and the lack of guidelines around their use, what happened this week could be a preview of more serious confrontations to come.

Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.

grid.news · by Joshua Keating

12. Air Force F-22 Raptors make their first appearance at Clark Air Base, Philippines

Clark AB is not like the Clark AB in days of old.

Air Force F-22 Raptors make their first appearance at Clark Air Base, Philippines

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · March 17, 2023

An Air Force F-22 Raptor, left, parks beside another jet at Clark Air Base, Philippines, in this photo tweeted by the. U.S. Embassy, Thursday, March 16, 2023. (U.S. Embassy in the Philippines)

U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor stealth aircraft have been training out of a Philippine air base that was once part of America’s largest overseas military community.

Photographs of the Raptors – the first deployed by the Air Force to Clark Air Base – were tweeted Wednesday and Thursday by numerous accounts in the Philippines, including by the U.S. Embassy in Manila.

“For the first time in history, two F-22 ‘Raptor’ stealth fighter jets from @PACAF (Pacific Air Forces) landed at Clark Air Base to reinforce commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty,” the embassy tweeted Thursday.

U.S. and Philippine pilots discussed training, aircraft capabilities and future collaboration, the embassy wrote.

The planes belong to the 525th Fighter Squadron at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, PACAF spokeswoman Capt. Allison Delury wrote in an email Friday to Stars and Stripes.

“This exchange emphasizes the strong military relationship between historic allies and confirms our commitment to our partnership with the Philippines,” she said.

The visit to Clark was not the first time F-22s have been in the Philippines, Delury said, without providing details of the earlier visits.

The fifth-generation fighters are worth $143 million each and can fly more than twice the speed of sound with a range of more than 1,850 miles, according to the Air Force. Its inventory includes 183 of the air superiority fighters.

U.S. and Philippine airmen pose with an Air Force F-22 Raptor at Clark Air Base, Philippines, in this photo tweeted by the U.S. Embassy, Thursday, March 16, 2023. (U.S. Embassy in the Philippines)

Clark and nearby Subic Naval Base formed the largest U.S. overseas military community before both were damaged in the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo and, soon after, returned to the Philippines.

Late last year, a pair of Japanese F-15J Eagle fighters visited Clark, the first time the Japan Air Self-Defense Force deployed its fighters to a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the service said in a Dec. 8 tweet.

Raptors from Tinian, near Guam, also took part in the Agile Reaper exercise, which recently concluded, according to an Air Force news release Wednesday.

The exercise, on Guam and Tinian, involved airmen from the 673rd Air Base Wing and 3rd Wing at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, the release said.

The training focused on agile combat employment, the ability to move aircraft rapidly to a network of smaller airfields in the Western Pacific to avoid being targeted by Chinese missiles in the event of war.

“I've told all the Wing Commanders, the numbered Air Force commanders and PACAF that I expect them to take risk,” Gen. Ken Wilsbach, Pacific Air Forces commander, said in the release. “I expect them to get better and better. They've got to be able to meet the mission taskings, all the communication, all that's required to be in the right place, at the right time, with your airpower. That’s why we have Raptors at Tinian, so that they can practice those skills.”

The F-22s involved in Agile Reaper were assigned to the 525th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, which is deployed to Kadena Air Base, Japan, according to the news release.

The Air Force on Nov. 1 began a two-year phased withdrawal of two squadrons of F-15 Eagle fighters from Kadena. Alaska-based Raptors began a rotation at the base on Nov. 4.

The presence of advanced aircraft in the region demonstrates their potentially wider role, and the possibility of a permanent presence expressed in June by the head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. John Aquilino.

“I would envision that that capability is certainly — well, it’s certainly desirable, but we would like to get to that,” he told the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a think tank in Washington, D.C. “That ability to, like I said, operate in contested space, fifth-generation capabilities, whether they be F-22, F-35, are critically important to the ability to deliver deterrence.”

A permanent contingent of Air Force fifth-generation fighters west of the International Date Line is a “desirable” option as the U.S. seeks to deter an increasingly assertive China, Aquilino said.

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · March 17, 2023

13. How America Can Win the Information War

I expect a comment from Matt Armstrong on the reference to USIA. . But more importantly the former Senators confirm what Matt has been writing about for months (or years) about the lack of priority for public diplomacy which is indicated by the long history of empty desks in Public Diplomacy.

I do agree with the excerpted statement:

...the U.S. must employ every tool of national power. Regrettably, one of the most forceful and inexpensive weapons has withered over the last 20 years: advocacy—the marshaling of truth and fact to persuade foreign audiences.

Excerpts:

The office of undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs hasn’t had a Senate-confirmed occupant in more than five years, which speaks volumes about the neglect of the power of advocacy. To leave so important a national-security post filled by a series of short-term, temporary acting officials is unacceptable.

The U.S. invented the internet and virtual private networks that defy most censorship. Until it gets serious about advocacy it will continue to lose the information war by default. The price is the continuation of a 17-year-long decline in the number of free nations and, ultimately, a sharp decline in the West’s security, freedom and prosperity.

How America Can Win the Information War

Confirm Elizabeth Allen, whose office produced a brilliant video called ‘To the People of Russia.’

By Joe Lieberman and Gordon Humphrey

March 17, 2023 2:55 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-america-can-win-the-information-war-advocacy-elizabeth-allen-persuasion-social-media-russian-people-china-iran-voa-ea497cf

When Xi Jinping visits Moscow next week, Vladimir Putin will doubtless ask for weapons to replenish his badly depleted arsenal. Whatever scheme they concoct will further endanger U.S. national security and that of our allies.

A broader danger confronts us in the new axis of evil that spans Europe, the Middle East and Asia. China and Russia have combined with Iran. All three are determined to replace U.S. leadership in the world and to destroy freedom wherever it exists. China’s threats to take Taiwan by force, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Iran’s threats to “annihilate” Israel raise the possibility of simultaneous aggression. Together, this axis may confront us with one of the most serious challenges ever to our security, values and prosperity.

To prevail, the U.S. must employ every tool of national power. Regrettably, one of the most forceful and inexpensive weapons has withered over the last 20 years: advocacy—the marshaling of truth and fact to persuade foreign audiences. Recall the important part played by the U.S. Information Agency in winning the Cold War. Its Voice of America broadcasts persuaded Soviet citizens that life on our side of the Iron Curtain was better than theirs.

VOA didn’t rely on news alone; it employed editorial writers and even contracted for made-in-Hollywood films. If sole reliance on news sufficed, today’s war criminal and serial violator of human rights, Mr. Putin, wouldn’t stand high in Russian polls. Instead, the U.S. must bring back advocacy meant to persuade. That’s where wits come in.

Defeating propaganda with truthful advocacy is more difficult than in USIA’s heyday. Our adversaries outspend us by orders of magnitude and, using bots and social media, dump disinformation into millions of computers, eyes, ears and brains every day. They have massively stepped up their game. So must we.

Overtaking adversaries requires the president to order explicitly the development of a long-term program of advocacy surpassing that of our adversaries in budget, creativity and technology. Leading such an effort requires an official who is highly experienced in communications and public relations and who has the heft to overcome bureaucratic timidity and inertia. President Biden has nominated precisely such a person, Elizabeth Allen, to be undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs.

Ms. Allen served as deputy communications director at the White House when Mr. Biden was vice president. That background indicates she’ll have the ear of the president whenever the bureaucracy needs a push. That’s vital to success.

The office is charged by law with “detecting and countering disinformation emanating from abroad” and actively advocating the “values and policies of the United States.” The Senate would serve the nation well by speedily confirming Ms. Allen with a bipartisan vote.

While public diplomacy is on the minds of senators, they should join with their colleagues in the House to review thoroughly all aspects of our messaging of foreign citizens. To quote a recent Heritage Foundation paper: “The State Department’s public diplomacy programs abroad are skewed toward fringe aspects of U.S. domestic social issues and away from core, enduring U.S. values. ‘Woke’ diplomacy does not fit within the State Department’s own strategic plan and does not advance U.S. national security.”

As a prototype demonstrating the kind of advocacy that should be produced at scale, consider the first-of-its-kind video made recently by the undersecretary’s office, “To the People of Russia.” It echoes Mr. Biden’s assurance to the Russian people: “You are not our enemy.”

It’s a masterpiece of advocacy, richly illustrated, that begins by recalling the time when as allies the U.S. and Russia won World War II. It speaks of our cooperation in space and compliments the Russian people for their great contributions to the arts and sciences. Toward the end, a clip of Mr. Putin’s war appears, accompanied by the words: “We do not believe this is who you are. We stand with each of you who seeks to build a more peaceful future.” The video played on Telegram, the platform widely used by Russians seeking alternatives to Moscow’s propaganda.

Dmitry Medvedev, a former Russian president and now deputy chairman of the Security Council, was outraged after viewing the video, labeling the U.S. government “sons of bitches” for what he called use of the techniques of Joseph Goebbels. That Mr. Medvedev found the video offensive attests to the Kremlin’s fear of a popular uprising like that in Iran.

The office of undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs hasn’t had a Senate-confirmed occupant in more than five years, which speaks volumes about the neglect of the power of advocacy. To leave so important a national-security post filled by a series of short-term, temporary acting officials is unacceptable.

The U.S. invented the internet and virtual private networks that defy most censorship. Until it gets serious about advocacy it will continue to lose the information war by default. The price is the continuation of a 17-year-long decline in the number of free nations and, ultimately, a sharp decline in the West’s security, freedom and prosperity.

Mr. Lieberman was the Democratic vice-presidential nominee in 2000 and a U.S. senator from Connecticut, 1989-2013. Mr. Humphrey was a Republican U.S. senator from New Hampshire, 1979-90.

WSJ Opinion: Responding to Russia's U.S. Drone Provocation

Why Arms Control Will Not Come Back Any Time Soon

By Robert Peters

March 18, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/18/why_arms_control_will_not_come_back_any_time_soon_888123.html

Vladimir Putin’s announcement on 21 February that Russia was suspending its participation in the New START treaty was unexpected, but unsurprising. As relations between the United States and Russia deteriorate as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the Russian announcement that it would no longer limit its nuclear arsenal shocked no one. Indeed, this was simply the latest in a series of announcements over the past two decades by Moscow or Washington that one of the two sides was withdrawing from arms control treaties.

In 2020, the United States withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty due to Russia repeatedly restricting overflight access to Kaliningrad, Moscow, and the Russian-Georgia border. In 2019, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty due to Russia’s repeated failure to comply with the treaty by fielding the very types of nuclear weapons the treaty prohibited. In 2015, Russia further pulled back from and suspended all participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, calling it anachronistic.

The impending demise of the New START treaty means that (aside from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT))we are entering a world without any nuclear arms control agreements—and that is unlikely to change anytime soon. While there were hopes among the arms control community that a treaty after New START was possible in 2026, that is hard to believe now.

Why such pessimism? There is little trust, great enmity, and a disparity of desires and interests over what to negotiate between the United States and Russia. China’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal also gives the United States particular reason to insist in Chinese inclusion in a future treaty.

After years of both sides claiming the other was cheating on arms control treaties (with the United States consistently making the better case) by blocking inspection and verification efforts or fielding systems that were in violation of both the spirit and the letter of the treaty, there is little trust of the other in Washington or Moscow.

Next, it is hard to overstate the enmity which both sides have, due to a variety of slights over the past two decades, from Putin’s 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia to concerns over Russia’s meddling in and disinformation campaigns during American elections. This enmity reached a boiling point with the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

All indications are that bad blood exists not just among the political class, but around the country as well. Bumper stickers and yard signs and t-shirts sporting the Ukrainian flag are seen not just on Capitol Hill and northern Virginia, but in towns across the country. When the Russians invaded Ukraine they also crossed a redline in the psyche of the American people. That action solidified their image as “the bad guys” in the American consciousness.

Most importantly, there is a real disparity in interests for a future arms control regime. The United States is concerned about the estimated 2000-plus non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Russia’s arsenal—a number significantly higher that the approximately 200 American NSNW. It is hard to imagine the United States engaging in yet another nuclear arms control treaty that does not take NSNWs into account—particularly given that many of those weapons are theater range weapons that hold Europe at risk.

Given Russia’s embarrassingly poor showing in Ukraine, Moscow may believe that it must now rely even more heavily on its NSNW arsenal to deter the perceived threat from NATO. If somehow both sides were able to overcome the enmity for one another and trust that the other side will abide by treaty obligations and comply with treaty inspection and verification measures (all of which must happen before negotiations could even begin), what would the United States be willing to put on the table in order to induce Russia to consider giving up its NSNWs?

This is a hard question to answer, but it almost assuredly would include some combination of reduced American force presence in Europe and NATO, deep cuts to the American military’s precision guided munitions, and potentially capabilities in space. These cuts would not only undermine America’s ability to deter further Russian aggression but would undoubtedly hamper the ability to project force globally.

It is hard to believe that any American administration, Republican or Democrat, would agree to a nuclear arms control treaty that made significant cuts to these capabilities in exchange for dubious promises by Moscow to reduce Russian NSNWs, particularly given their penchant for cheating on arms treaties.

Even if an administration were to reach an agreement with the Russians on nuclear arms control, one that may require America to “give up the farm” to get Russia to dismantle the vast majority of its NSNW arsenal, how would that administration find the sixty-seven senators necessary to ratify that treaty? Convincing two out of every three senators to support such a treaty would prove a daunting endeavor.

While some might argue that multilateral arms control is a better venue for a more comprehensive reduction in global arsenals, the Chinese are unambiguous in their rejection of nuclear arms control discussions.

Finally, until there is a new regime in Moscow, one that is truly different and wants to work with the West and is not simply a “Putin2.0” regime, any nuclear arms control agreement is unlikely.

This is not to say that the sky is falling—while arms control can be a useful tool, particularly for strengthening strategic stability—arms control is not a goal in and of itself. Therefore, until there is a change of regime in Moscow, the United States should make a meaningful effort to understand the implications of a world without nuclear arms control.

The United States must consider the implications of a world without arms control for allied assurance. What does such a world mean for American force posture, conventional and nuclear, in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe? What should an American strategic (and non-strategic) nuclear arsenal look like?

Understanding these questions is critical as the United States enters a protracted period of global instability and challenges to the American led international order. In such a world, one must ask the question, is arms control even wise? Perhaps focusing on the building of an effective deterrent, both strategic and theater, is time better spent than trying to lay the groundwork for the treaty after New START.

Indeed, the idea that there is some path where the United States can bring Putin back to the negotiating table to hash out a mutually beneficial nuclear arms treaty is quixotic, at best.

The nation has more pressing issues to attend.

Bob Peters is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He previously spent a career at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, National Defense University, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

15. Interests, Not Ideology, Should Drive America's Approach to China

Are they mutually exclusive? Or are they complementary? Does it have to be either/or?

Excerpts:

There is no guarantee that one or both leaders will embrace the framework of competitive interdependence for understanding the nature of the relationship, either now or in the future. There are significant risks in choosing not to do so, however. The current downward trajectory of the relationship, if not arrested, will continue to generate sharp incidents of growing intensity. Expecting that U.S. and Chinese leaders would manage all such future incidents wisely and calmly requires the triumph of hope over reason.

The stakes of the U.S.-China relationship now are too high for flimsy ideological arguments about America triumphing over China. What is needed now is clear-eyed, evidence-based, interest-driven thinking about how the world’s two most powerful countries can compete without resort to conflict, both now and in the future.

Interests, Not Ideology, Should Drive America's Approach to China - Yale University Press

yalebooks.yale.edu · by ceb95 · March 16, 2023

Ryan Hass—

Ideologues prefer to understand the U.S.-China relationship as a contest between good versus evil. They take comfort in clean divisions between democracies versus autocracies. They like parallels between the current U.S.-China great power contest and the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War. The United States triumphed over the Soviets in the Cold War, after all, so why not repeat the cycle again now with China, they ask.

To be clear, there is much to find reprehensible about the Chinese government’s gross human rights abuses at home and its growing assertiveness abroad. Even so, outrage is an ineffective emotion for advancing strategic objectives. Distilling the relationship down to a morality play between good versus evil does not bring solutions to challenges posed by China’s actions and ambitions within closer reach. Similarly, invoking Cold War analogies misdiagnoses the nature of the U.S.-China relationship and creates a false hope that the United States has the capacity to compel the collapse of China. After all, the Soviet Union was a military power with an anemic economy. China, by contrast, is both a military power and a global economic power who is determined not to repeat Moscow’s mistakes.

Any American attempt to treat China as its existential enemy (a la the Soviet Union during the Cold War) would isolate the United States from its friends and allies, none of whom have any enthusiasm for joining an anti-China containment coalition. If the United States travels down a new Cold War path on its own, it will struggle to resist the temptation to view its relationships with partners through the prism of great power competition. Countries will come to be seen as either with the United States in seeking to undermine China’s rise or against us by resisting such requests. And if the United States seeks to silo the global economy into an American-led order versus an authoritarian-led economic system, it will undermine its own strength and expose the limits of its appeal. Not even America’s closest partners in Europe or Asia would sign up for a role in erecting such a global economic partition.

Meanwhile, China certainly is advancing efforts to increase its self-reliance and reduce vulnerabilities to outside pressure. Trade data does not support arguments that China is seeking to bifurcate the global economy, though. Over 150 countries view China as their largest trading partner, making China the world’s largest trading power. Even as Beijing pursues more statist economic policies at home, it continues to look for opportunities to gain leverage by locking in other countries’ dependence upon China for future economic growth.

Looking beyond ideological caricatures to evaluate the deeper structures of the U.S.-China relationship requires analysts to hold two competing thoughts in their head at once. The first is a recognition that the bilateral relationship is deeply competitive. There are near-daily reminders of this reality, from images of Chinese spy balloons penetrating American airspace to news of near collisions between U.S. and Chinese military planes in international airspace over the South China Sea. Both countries also are battling each other to dominate the frontiers of innovation in technological fields that will define the coming century, such as quantum computing, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and clean energy.

At the same time, the U.S.-China relationship also is deeply and inescapably interdependent. In spite of mounting bilateral tensions and growing calls in the United States for “decoupling” from China’s economy, bilateral trade in goods hit a record in 2022, nearing $700 billion. Similarly, by virtue of their positions as the world’s two most powerful countries, the United States and China also face planetary interdependence. From climate change to the global economy and pandemics, they both are harmed or helped by their (in)ability to pool capabilities to confront shared threats.

The sooner leaders in Washington and Beijing embrace the framework of competitive interdependence for understanding the nature of U.S.-China relations, the better they will be able to compete without resort to conflict. The framework pushes both sides to coexist within a heightened state of competition, not out of amity but rather a sober recognition of the parameters within which the relationship operates. The hard truth is that neither the United States nor China would be able to achieve their national ambitions if they end up in conflict with each other.

Ultimately, the goal of strategy is to minimize risks and maximize benefits. The current trajectory of U.S.-China relations is moving in the opposite direction. Risks of conflict are rising, while benefits from the relationship for American and Chinese citizens are receding.

A different path for the relationship is available. Realizing it would require leaders in Washington and Beijing to take a long-term view of their national requirements and how the U.S.-China relationship relates to them. It would require a degree of strategic maturity that has been in short supply in recent years. It also would require shared buy-in from leaders in both countries to view their interests as best served by a competitive coexistence, where the goal is to outperform the other on a level playing field, rather than focusing on hindering the other’s progress to protect one’s own gains. Each side will run its own race. The goal is to run your own race better.

There is no guarantee that one or both leaders will embrace the framework of competitive interdependence for understanding the nature of the relationship, either now or in the future. There are significant risks in choosing not to do so, however. The current downward trajectory of the relationship, if not arrested, will continue to generate sharp incidents of growing intensity. Expecting that U.S. and Chinese leaders would manage all such future incidents wisely and calmly requires the triumph of hope over reason.

The stakes of the U.S.-China relationship now are too high for flimsy ideological arguments about America triumphing over China. What is needed now is clear-eyed, evidence-based, interest-driven thinking about how the world’s two most powerful countries can compete without resort to conflict, both now and in the future.

Ryan Hass is the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy and the Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at the Brookings Institution. He is a nonresident affiliated fellow in the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. He is also a senior advisor at the Scowcroft Group and McLarty Associates.

yalebooks.yale.edu · by ceb95 · March 16, 2023

16. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 17, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2023

Key Takeaways

Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a state visit to Russia from March 20 to 22 likely to discuss sanctions evasion schemes and Chinese interest in mediating a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko confirmed that Belarusian industry is supplying Russia electronic components, potentially supporting previous ISW assessments that Belarus may assist Russia to evade Western sanctions.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s rhetoric about Belgrade’s refusal to sanction Russia is softening.
The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova on March 17 for alleged war crimes involving the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.
Russian outlet Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that it did not submit a press request to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin concerning a rumored plot by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev against him.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks across the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City.
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces along the front line in southern Ukraine.
The Kremlin continues to call up reservists throughout Russia.
Russian authorities reportedly detained three Ukrainian partisans in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 17, 2023

Mar 17, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 17, 2023

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 17, 6:25pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a state visit to Russia from March 20 to 22 likely to discuss sanctions evasion schemes and Chinese interest in mediating a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin stated that Putin and Xi plan to sign unspecified bilateral documents and discuss topical issues in Russia’s and China’s comprehensive partnership.[1] Chinese companies have reportedly sold rifles, drone parts, and equipment to Russian entities that could be used for military purposes, and Western intelligence agencies have stated that Chinese leadership is considering the provision of lethal equipment to Russia.[2] Xi likely plans to discuss sanctions evasion schemes with Putin and Russian officials to support the sale and provision of Chinese equipment to Russia. ISW previously assessed that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Xi signed a package of 16 agreements on March 1 that may facilitate Russian sanctions evasion by channeling Chinese products through Belarus.[3] Xi also likely aims to promote Chinese efforts aiming to position China as an impartial third-party mediator for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. China released a broad 12-point peace plan for the war in Ukraine on February 24, although it remains unclear what more definitive Chinese proposals for a negotiated settlement to the war would encompass. Xi may seek to parlay his success in mediating the restoration of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia into a larger effort to mediate in this war.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko confirmed that Belarusian industry is supplying Russia with electronic components, potentially supporting previous ISW assessments that Belarus may assist Russia in evading Western sanctions. Lukashenko stated on March 17 that Belarus and Russia signed an agreement on establishing a joint Belarusian-Russian center for the development and production of photomasks (an intermediate good used in the production of integrated circuits), that the two states have developed a list of critically important electronic components, and that Belarusian industry has already begun shipping unspecified microelectronics to Russian enterprises.[4] ISW previously assessed that Belarus might facilitate sanction evasion for Russia and that China might clandestinely transfer goods and/or equipment to Russia via Belarus.[5] The US State Department sanctioned several additional Belarusian defense entities and tightened existing export controls to Belarus as of February 24, 2023, but these sanctions may not be comprehensive enough to prevent Belarus from sending Russia electronic components used in weapon systems and other dual use technologies.[6] Lukashenko made this announcement at the Belarusian Planar Joint Stock Company technological enterprise, which the US does not appear to have sanctioned.[7]

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s rhetoric about Belgrade’s refusal to sanction Russia is softening. Vucic refused to promise that Serbia will not sanction Russia, acknowledged that Belgrade’s decision not to join European sanctions against Russia has brought Serbia “tough [economic] circumstances,” and stated that he will evaluate "when we are in a deadlock and when our policy has to change” on March 17.[8] Serbian Economy Minister Rade Basta called on the Serbian government to impose sanctions on Russia and stated that Serbia is paying a "high price" for not doing so on March 14.[9] Politico previously reported that Vucic is seemingly reconsidering Serbia’s close ties with Russia, spurred in part by ongoing Wagner Group recruitment and subversion efforts in Serbia and demonstrating the international economic and informational costs imposed on Putin by his invasion of Ukraine.[10]

The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova on March 17 for alleged war crimes involving the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[11]

Russian outlet Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that it did not submit a press request to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin concerning a rumored plot by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev against him. Nezavismaya Gazeta suggested that someone responsible for fabricating the request is actively engaged in fomenting conflict between different siloviki structures, which may support ISW’s March 16 assessment that Prigozhin likely promoted the alleged plot to support informational campaigns against the Russian military establishment.[12] ISW initially assessed on March 16 that Prigozhin might have fabricated the alleged plot to support these informational campaigns, but ISW failed to observe that a Russian milblogger had posted rumors about the alleged plot on March 13.[13] Prigozhin’s press service was involved in a fabrication of some kind given the Nezavisimaya Gazeta denial, but Prigozhin does not appear to have fabricated the rumor itself. Prigozhin’s press service may have received a fabricated press request or may have fabricated the press request itself. Prigozhin chose to give prominence to the rumored plot whoever fabricated the press request. ISW continues to assess that Prigozhin promoted the rumored plot to identify Patrushev and the Russian Security Council as enemies of the Wagner Group, set conditions to blame Patrushev for Wagner’s failures in Ukraine, and support ongoing informational campaigns against the traditional Russian military establishment.[14]

Key Takeaways

Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a state visit to Russia from March 20 to 22 likely to discuss sanctions evasion schemes and Chinese interest in mediating a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko confirmed that Belarusian industry is supplying Russia electronic components, potentially supporting previous ISW assessments that Belarus may assist Russia to evade Western sanctions.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s rhetoric about Belgrade’s refusal to sanction Russia is softening.
The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova on March 17 for alleged war crimes involving the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.
Russian outlet Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that it did not submit a press request to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin concerning a rumored plot by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev against him.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks across the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City.
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces along the front line in southern Ukraine.
The Kremlin continues to call up reservists throughout Russia.
Russian authorities reportedly detained three Ukrainian partisans in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Hryanykivka (17km northeast of Svatove), Kreminna, Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna), Verkhnokamianske (7km east of Siversk), and Spirne (11km southeast of Spirne).[15] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces drove Ukrainian forces near Hryanykivka across the Oskil River to the western (right) bank.[16] Former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia Spokesperson Eduard Basurin claimed that positional battles continue northwest of Kreminna near the Zhuravka gully and south of Kreminna near the Serebrianska forest area.[17] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[18] Another Russian source claimed that Russian forces gained territory along this line and near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna), however.[19]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful ground attack near Chervonopopivka on an unspecified recent date and are accumulating forces for a future counteroffensive push.[20]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut on March 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut, within 11km northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Hryhorivka, and within 6km southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and Klishchiivka.[21] Russian mibloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters attacked Ukrainian positions near Khromove (2km west of Bakhmut) and Bohdanivka (6km west of Bakhmut).[22] Geolocated footage published on March 17 indicates that Russian forces secured marginal gains in northern Bakhmut.[23] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin claimed that Russian forces advanced deeper into the AZOM complex in northern Bakhmut, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces are operating on the territory of the complex.[24] Ukrainian State Border Guards reported that Ukrainian forces engaged in combat with Wagner fighters in an industrial zone in Bakhmut but did not specify whether it was the AZOM complex.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued assaults in the southern parts of Bakhmut and that Wagner fighters reached the T0504 highway on Bakhmut’s southwestern outskirts and severed a Ukrainian supply line.[26] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Wagner Group forces have interdicted the T0504 highway on the southern outskirts of Bakhmut as of this publication. Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut would still be able to access sections of the T0504 highway through country roads between Khromove and Ivanivske, even if the current Russian claims are true.

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City on March 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian offensive operations near Avdiiivka, Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka), and within 27km southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, Nevelske, and Marinka.[27] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces have captured Krasnohorivka (8km north of Avdiivka), although ISW has still not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces started an offensive from Krasnohorivka in the direction of Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka) and are attempting to capture a section of a local railroad that leads into Avdiivka.[29] A prominent Russian milblogger assessed on March 16 that Russian forces are unlikely to advance quickly north of Avdiivka following the claimed capture of Krasnohorivka and that it is premature to talk about the possibility of Russian forces encircling Ukrainian forces in Avdiivka.[30] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults on the northern outskirts of Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka) and attempted to advance towards Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka).[31]

A Russian official claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks in an unspecified area of western Donetsk Oblast on March 17. Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces spokesperson Alexander Gordeev claimed that elements of unspecified Russian naval infantry brigades of the Pacific Fleet repelled elements of three Ukrainian brigades that attempted to counterattack and conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations in an unspecified area of western Donetsk Oblast.[32] The 155th and 40th Naval Infantry Brigades of the Pacific Fleet are currently operating in the Vuhledar area, but ISW has not observed other Russian claims about Ukrainian counterattacks around Vuhledar in recent days.

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces along the front line in southern Ukraine. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Polohy and Orikhiv on the Zaporizhia Oblast front line.[33] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that the Ukrainian attacks were successful because Russian mines failed to halt Ukrainian vehicles.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group that attempted to cross the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[35]

Russian forces continue to struggle with logistics across the Kerch Strait Bridge despite claiming to have fully repaired the bridge’s road spans. Russian news outlet Vesti Crimea posted footage of a large traffic jam on the bridge on March 17 and claimed that waiting time to pass through the checkpoint to Russia is over an hour.[36]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitsky stated on March 17 that Russian forces created a defense grouping in occupied Crimea in preparation for a defensive operation.[37]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues conducting reservist call ups throughout Russia. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev held a meeting in a St. Petersburg military recruitment center on March 16 regarding contract service recruitment.[38] Penza Oblast military recruitment officer Andrey Surkov announced that the oblast is distributing summonses to call up men with previous military experience for annual 30-day training. Surkov claimed that men without prior military experience will not be called up for such training and noted that as of March 16 the military recruitment center had already achieved its target of 140 people for this call-up.[39] Mari El Republic also announced a call up of reservists for military training on March 16, citing an unpublished presidential decree from February 22.[40] Under Russian law the Russian President must approve any decree calling reservists for training and Putin had not publicly issued any such decree as of this publication.[41] Russian opposition outlets also reported on instances of military recruitment centers wrongfully delivering summonses to deceased men.[42]

Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on March 16 that over 40 Russian regions began distributing summonses to ”clarify military registration documents.”[43] The head of the ”Agora” international human rights group, Pavel Chikov, stated that while these summonses do not indicate that the Kremlin is covertly conducting a second mobilization wave at this time, Russia may be planning an involuntary reservist call up in April.[44] Chikov noted that he observed indicators for an involuntary call up in appeals he is receiving from men of conscription age. Chikov reported that some students and men who had applied for alternative service are receiving subpoenas to appear in front of the conscription committee in May or June instead of during the designated spring conscription period beginning on April 1. Chikov noted that it is unclear why Russian military recruitment centers began distributing summonses in March to appear at the military recruitment centers and hypothesized that Russian officials may be planning mobilization and conscription events or may be setting conditions to recruit contract servicemen. Chikov stated that Russia did not previously call up men to clarify their military registration information before the war. The Kremlin may be attempting to make full use of its training capacities by mobilizing some reservists alongside the spring conscripts, but this effort remains unlikely to generate effective combat forces for many months.

Kremlin officials and veterans' organizations are continuing to advocate for greater social benefits for servicemen and their families, likely in an effort to incentivize and promote volunteer recruitment. Secretary of the General Council of the United Russia Party Andrey Turchak announced that the Russian State Duma will soon adopt bills on providing legal assistance to veterans, removing administrative fees for veterans when filing for documents, reducing the period necessary to declare a serviceman legally dead to claim benefits, and granting veterans benefits to servicemen who fought in Donbas since 2014.[45] Turchak added that the presidential committee on addressing problems with the ”special military operation” is considering new provisions on forgiving debts for parents of servicemen and allocating additional payments to conscripts training on the border with Ukraine. The Union of Belgorod Veterans also sent letters to all municipal assemblies in Belgorod Oblast proposing to issue additional benefits to war veterans such as abolishing land tax and allowing free travel on municipal and suburban public transportation.[46]

The BBC and Russian independent outlet Mediazona confirmed the identities of at least 1,000 convicts who have died in Ukraine since January 2023. The investigation noted that 400 of the confirmed deaths occurred in the first two weeks of March 2023 largely around Bakhmut.[47] The BBC and Mediazona confirmed the names of 2,092 convicts killed in action since the war began.[48] US officials previously estimated that Wagner Group had suffered over 30,000 casualties over the course of the war, most of whom were likely convicts.[49]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian forces reportedly detained three Ukrainian partisans in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on March 17. Russian military spokesman Roman Kodryan claimed on March 17 that Russian forces seized two weapons caches and arrested three Ukrainian partisans accused of planning to conduct a “terrorist” attack in an unspecified location in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[50]

Russian officials continue sending Ukrainian children to camps in Russia as part of Russia’s larger assessed ethnic cleansing campaign against Ukraine. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Head Yevheny Balitsky claimed on March 17 that a group of 35 schoolchildren from the Kamianka-Dniprovska Raion, Zaporizhia Oblast, are taking part in a “Day After Tomorrow” camp in Moscow Oblast.[51] Balitsky claimed that Zaporizhia Oblast occupation authorities and Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Maria Lvova-Belova had previously transported 155 children to Russia to participate in the "Day After Tomorrow” camp.[52] ISW has previously reported that the “Day After Tomorrow” organization announced that it will begin conducting “rehabilitation” tours in Crimea with children who need special psychiatric assistance.[53] ISW continues to assess that Russian officials and occupation authorities are using the guise of psychiatric services and medical rehabilitation to bring children deeper into Russian-controlled territory within Ukraine or deport them to Russia.[54]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. Unspecified elements of the Grodno-based Belarusian 6th Mechanized Brigade deployed to an unspecified area for exercises on March 17.[55] Multiple Belarusian artillery units from at least four brigades participated in an unusually large joint exercise at the Osipovichsky Training Ground in Mogilev, Belarus, on March 17.[56] Artillery elements of the 19th Mechanized Brigade, 120th Mechanized Brigade, 231st Artillery Brigade, and 51st Artillery Brigade participated in this exercise.[57] The head of Belarus’ Missile Troops and Artillery Forces, Colonel Ruslan Chekhov, presided over this exercise.[58] The Belarusian military typically does not conduct such large exercises frequently.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70696

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar02272023 ; http...

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[4] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/belarus-i-rossija-sformirovali-perechen-kriticheski-vazhnoj-komponentnoj-bazy-nachaty-pervye-postavki-555934-2023/; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/17294331; https://t.me/bbbreaking/150765

[5]https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive... https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive...

[6] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0607; https://www.feder...

[7] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/17294331; https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/

[8] https://tass dot com/world/1586783; https://www.republicworld dot com/world-news/europe/serbian-president-aleksandar-vucic-to-only-sanction-russia-if-belgrade-left-with-no-choice-articleshow.html; https://tass dot com/economy/1589977

[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-serbia-is-under-western...

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[11] https://www.icc-cpi dot int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and

[12] https://www.ng dot ru/news/762223.html

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[15]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XmcREn9beboWGKSrUKd... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02stC8tTL14g7FuRT2PA...

[16] https://t.me/rybar/44755

[17] https://t.me/basurin_e/230

[18] https://t.me/wargonzo/11440

[19] https://t.me/rybar/44755

[20] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36084; https://t.me/readovkanews/54874;... https://t.me/epoddubny/15189

[21]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XmcREn9beboWGKSrUKd...

[22] https://t.me/wargonzo/11440 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/230

[23] https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1636752183327707136; https://twitter.com/small10space/status/1636745133948321793

[24] https://t.me/readovkanews/54899 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/17297921

[25]https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/pfbid028t3zPvh4xR2RT3A7BeV8QpL...

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/11440 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/230

[27]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02stC8tTL14g7FuRT2PA...

[28] https://t.me/basurin_e/230 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/11440 ; https://t...

[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/11440

[30] https://t.me/readovkanews/54852

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/11440

[32] https://t.me/readovkanews/54872

[33] https://t.me/vrogov/8194;

[34] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11037; https://t.me/bayraktar1070/904

[35] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80645

[36] https://t.me/vesticrimea/8665/

[37] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiia-hotuietsia-do-oboronnykh-dii-u-krymu.html

[38] https://t.me/bbbreaking/150707

[39] https://stolica58 dot ru/news/obcshestvo/andrej-surkov-nazval-kategorii-muzhchin-kotoryh-ne-prizovut-na-sbory

[40] https://t.me/horizontal_russia/20721

[41] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/03/16/zhitelyam-rossiyskih-regionov-nachali-prisylat-povestki-v-voenkomat-dlya-utochneniya-dannyh-vse-vtoraya-volna-mobilizatsii-po-tihomu-nachalas-i-mozhno-li-prosto-proignorirovat-povestku; https://t.me/horizontal_russia/20721

[42] https://t.me/horizontal_russia/18247; https://t.me/horizontal_russia/10...

[43] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/03/16/zhitelyam-rossiyskih-regionov-nachali-prisylat-povestki-v-voenkomat-dlya-utochneniya-dannyh-vse-vtoraya-volna-mobilizatsii-po-tihomu-nachalas-i-mozhno-li-prosto-proignorirovat-povestku

[44] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/03/16/zhitelyam-rossiyskih-regionov-nachali-prisylat-povestki-v-voenkomat-dlya-utochneniya-dannyh-vse-vtoraya-volna-mobilizatsii-po-tihomu-nachalas-i-mozhno-li-prosto-proignorirovat-povestku

[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/11436

[46] https://t.me/union_of_veterans31/3729; https://t.me/notes_veterans/8531

[47] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/03/17/zhurnalisty-podtverdili-chto-s-nachala-goda-na-voyne-pogibli-ne-menee-1000-rossiyskih-zaklyuchennyh ; https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-64984414

[48] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2023/2/18/russias-wagner-forces-suffered-30000-casualties-in-ukraine-us

[49] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/18/russias-wagner-forces-suffered-...

[50] https://radiosputnik.ria dot ru/20230317/terakt-1858484700.html; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/6413f6e09a79474c24b1e348

[51] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/879

[52] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/879

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://glavcom dot ua/country/incidents/danilov-povidomiv-jak-ukrajina-hotujetsja-do-jmovirnoji-masovanojiataki-rf-na-23-24-ljutoho-908840.html; https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-64635206

[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[55] https://t.me/modmilby/24577

[56] https://t.me/modmilby/24607

[57] https://t.me/modmilby/24607

[58] https://t.me/modmilby/24624

Ukraine is fighting for all of us

Finally, the hospitality shown by our Ukrainian colleagues despite terrible circumstances, and the gratitude they showed for our visit and more importantly for the support provided by Sweden and the international community creates mixed emotions. One the one hand pride and joy in our accomplishments that are very real and appreciated and that will hopefully provide for both complete victory in the war, but also the full reconstruction and integration of Ukraine in the European family. On the other hand, a feeling that the gratitude should be ours, and that there is so much more that we can and should do. Ukraine is bravely fighting not only for their own survival, but for the rest of us – a secure and democratic Europe and a rules-based international order.

Thus, all I have left to say is “Slava Ukraini” – and may we never give up on their struggle!

With a duty to learn from and support our colleagues in Ukraine

Publicerad den 13 mar, 2023 av Robert Egnell

fhs.se

The Swedish Defence University, as a leading university in defence, security and crisis management, has the responsibility, duty even, to learn from and adapt not least our officer education to the lessons from Russia’s invasion and war in Ukraine. We also have a duty to support our Ukrainian friends. To find out how we can work closer together, I visited Ukraine beginning March. This is an attempt at some initial reflections.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we have all been enormously impressed by the Ukrainian armed forces’ ability to fight back the Russian forces, as well as the general resilience of Ukrainian society and its people. We could witness for ourselves that they are at all levels completely determined not only fight and resist, but to win, and then to build a stronger, better Ukraine as a worthy member of the EU and Nato.

Needed to see for ourselves, on the ground

To get a better grasp of the driving forces behind the Ukraine people’s resilience and perseverance, we decided to visit Ukraine and engage our friends and colleagues on the ground. We wanted to understand where this general resilience comes from, but also get an insight into the tactical, operational and strategic lessons of both military operations and civil defence. The decision to make the trip was not taken lightly given the risks. Even more importantly, we did not want to cause extra work and stress for our partners in Ukraine. However, I felt that gaining the necessary understanding could only really be done on the ground by meeting with people, listening to their stories and perspectives and by witnessing the activities with my own eyes. I also felt that the best way to gain the trust to develop mutually beneficial partnerships with organizations and people in Ukraine, was to meet them, show an honest will to both listen and learn, as we well as support them, and to mutually find ways of working together towards common goals.

Together will a small delegation from SEDU I travelled to Ukraine and visited the National Defence University in Kiev, the Military Academy in Odessa, the Kiev Mohyla Business School, and also held meetings with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, the ICRS, the National Security Council, the Ukrainian and Swedish Red Cross, representatives from think tanks and different embassies in Kiev, the territorial defence forces and more.

Ukraine generously sharing their experience

What is very clear from our meetings is that as Sweden rebuilds its total defence – learning from the Ukrainian experience will be absolutely necessary and that partnering will not only send a strong signal of support to Ukraine, but also strengthen Sweden as well. There is a tremendous wealth of experience and lessons learned in Ukraine, and also a generosity and willingness to share them to strengthen our mutual efforts to increase security in Europe and the world. We hope to welcome a delegation in Stockholm quite soon for the sharing of this knowledge.

Long list of ideas for support och collaboration

The second reason why we travelled to Ukraine was indeed to identify all the ways in which the Swedish Defence University, and more broadly, the Swedish education sector and beyond, can support Ukraine in its effort to win the war and to rebuild and transition into the country they both want and deserve. The many meetings have not only produced a signed formal cooperation agreement with the National Defence University in Kiev, but also a long list of concrete ideas and possible initiatives in close cooperation with NDU and many other actors in the country. The Swedish Defence University will immediately start turning these ideas into action.

The visit has made quite the impression and we have a lot to digest. Beyond the many meetings and visits, it was also with rather mixed feelings that we experienced both the normality and abnormality of life in Ukraine. Despite very limited time, we paid tribute to Ukrainian history by visiting Maidan square and the Wall of the fallen. We also had the opportunity and honor of hosting a “Vice-chancellor’s reception” for all our hosts and potential partners, thereby providing the same sort of civil-military meeting place that we pride ourselves in being at home. The idea of the meeting place also turned out to be a great success with many important actors meeting for the first time.

A night in the shelters

When finally in bed after our longest and most intense day of the visit, the air alarms quickly brought us to the shelters under the hotel and a mostly sleepless night of Russian air raids and severe destruction across the entire country. The next morning, we visited the Myhola business school as life in Kiev continued more or less uninterrupted.

The many personal meetings and the many stories we have heard have provided us with information that will take a long time to digest, but let me quickly share a few brief stories from some of our new friends.

First, the commandant of the Military Academy in Odessa who as a matter of fact highlighted that both their students and teachers have performed heroic acts on the battlefield, but that many also have been killed in the war. He said that for every dead student they constantly asked themselves if they could have done something different, or prepared them better, to avoid the tragedy. The photos of their dead colleagues and students were on the wall as a constant reminder. This was certainly a sobering reminder of the importance of what we do – both at home, but also to support Ukraine.

Horrendous stories about Wagner group and drug-induced soldiers

Second, my colleague and new friend at the National Defence University in Kiev had more to share than I could possibly take in. The last three months he has been in charge of the Ukrainian defence of Bakhmut where the fighting has been incredibly intense for a long time. He shared horrendous stories about the Wagner group’s complete disregard for human life, and the difficulty of fighting what he felt was a strange combination of very experienced and competent officers alongside drug-induced criminals as soldiers with no normal human or soldierly behavior. Fighting these units meant that there were no standard operating procedures or modes of operandi, it was a completely different form of war, of fighting that requires very well-trained soldiers and officers with great mental flexibility and problem-solving capability.

Heroes decorated on site by president Zelenskyj

At the same time he also shared the very moving story of when president Zelensky showed up unannounced on the front lines of Bakhmut and what it meant to the soldiers, officers, and of course to him personally. You have probably seen the symbolic gesture of the president as he presented Ukrainian battle flag to the US congress signed by the troops in Bakhmut. This flag was handed over, after a few rather funny debacles, to the president by my colleague. Battle awards and decoration were also handed out to the most heroic soldiers and officers directly on site by the president.

As we know from history, war has the possibility to bring out both the best and the worst in us – and this requires careful thought and preparation to land on the right side. When the enemy disregards the laws of war, it is even more important to show restraint and to maintain the humanity, dignity and societal values that we fight to defend.

Education continues – at double speed

Third, the many stories of adaptation during the war highlighted the incredible resilience of Ukrainian society. At a societal level, the transformation processes needed for membership processes in the EU and NATO is taking place at great pace and determination. Officer education, and many university programs continues at double speed and with more cadets than ever. Teaching takes place in secret locations near the front or online to allow the cadets to study while conducting important other tasks. The civilian university we visited had built lecture and seminar rooms in the shelters powered by diesel generators to be able to continue teaching despite the disruption of air alarms or blackouts. The inspiration for us as a university is obvious, but also for our society in general.

Ukraine is fighting for all of us

Finally, the hospitality shown by our Ukrainian colleagues despite terrible circumstances, and the gratitude they showed for our visit and more importantly for the support provided by Sweden and the international community creates mixed emotions. One the one hand pride and joy in our accomplishments that are very real and appreciated and that will hopefully provide for both complete victory in the war, but also the full reconstruction and integration of Ukraine in the European family. On the other hand, a feeling that the gratitude should be ours, and that there is so much more that we can and should do. Ukraine is bravely fighting not only for their own survival, but for the rest of us – a secure and democratic Europe and a rules-based international order.

Thus, all I have left to say is “Slava Ukraini” – and may we never give up on their struggle!

fhs.se

18. The SVB Collapse Shows U.S. Vulnerabilities Amid Great Power Competition

The most vital interest is protecting the US economy and financial system.

Conclusion:

A healthy and stable U.S. financial system is a prerequisite for the Biden Administration to realize its proposed industrial policies. Recently, U.S. lawmakers have expended both their time and energy devising a new outbound investment screening regime and improving the existing inbound investment screening effort. These aim to prevent U.S. capital from funding foreign research and development in strategic competitor countries while also denying those countries the ability to invest in strategic industries in America. However, an investment screening regime is rendered obsolete if U.S. financial markets lose their attraction due to the perception of not being safe due to excessive financial deregulation. Not all deregulation is bad, and it should be welcomed when it means improving market efficiency and strengthening financial stability and security. However, if deregulation means debilitating financial regulators, creating market inefficiency, and debasing U.S. financial stability, then the Biden Administration and U.S. lawmakers should strongly guard against it. Another round of financial crisis brought about by deregulation will severely lessen the appeal of U.S. financial markets and assets, including Treasury debt. The weakening of U.S. financial leadership will decrease the ability of the United States to exercise financial statecraft. The fastest way for the United States to cede ground in the present era of great power competition is to debase its domestic financial system and relinquish its global financial leadership position.

The SVB Collapse Shows U.S. Vulnerabilities Amid Great Power Competition

The collapse of SVB is a reminder that the fastest way for the United States to cede ground in the present era of great power competition is to debase its financial system and relinquish its global financial leadership position.

Blog Post by Zongyuan Zoe Liu

March 16, 2023 4:47 pm (EST)

cfr.org ·

Bank failures in the United States happen more often than one might think. According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, there have been 563 bank failures in the United States between 2001-March 2023, or about 25 per year. The fall of the sixteenth largest bank, the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), is another piece of evidence for Minsky’s financial instability thesis—more about that in a bit. However, the timing of SVB’s collapse could not be worse. As the Joe Biden Administration focuses on winning the great power competition between major strategic rivals, the last thing America needs is the perception of a weakening U.S. financial system.

About fifteen years ago, Washington Mutual’s implosion and Lehman Brothers’ collapse sent shock waves across the global financial system. As economists and investors worldwide tried to make sense of the market turmoil, they discovered the work by Hyman Minsky, a financial economist described by his colleagues as “radical as radical, if not crackpot.” Minsky disbelieved the mainstream efficient market theory and devoted much of his career to developing the Financial Instability Hypothesis. According to Minsky, financial systems are inherently susceptible to bouts of speculation that, if they last long enough, end in crisis.

The fall of SVB is not exactly a “Minsky Moment” in the U.S. financial system because the bank’s forced asset sales were caused by the flight of depositors rather than the bank being over-leveraged. However, the affair sends a clear reminder that the combination of a lack of risk management and weak regulatory oversight is a toxic brew that can overflow quickly. Still, much information is needed for the general public to understand why SVB’s management made such fundamental mistakes. SVB failed to reduce its enormous interest rate risk while the Federal Reserve loudly communicated that rates were on an upward trajectory. The collapse of SVB is a sobering reminder that during the low-interest rate environment of the last decade, there has been a buildup of asset-liability mismatch and duration mismatch on the books of many U.S. financial institutions. For U.S. policymakers, the fall of SVB is a reminder that the erosion of financial oversight and the resultant financial instability has the potential to decrease the attractiveness of U.S. financial markets, which may eventually cost the United States its privileged position in the global financial system.

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Ideas and initiatives for renewing America’s economic strength.

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The timing of SVB’s implosion complicates the Fed’s fight against inflation by straining the market’s belief in the Fed’s commitment to tame inflation by hiking interest rate hikes much further. The fall of SVB adds to a series of recent financial scandals, such as fraud at FTX and misused PPP loans. These events diminish the image of the U.S. financial system when there are already big doubts about America’s financial governance capacity at home and its ability to wage financial statecraft internationally.

The fall of SVB has much to do with its astonishing lack of risk management as the collective lobbying of the financial services industry to erode financial regulators’ supervision capacity. A 2011 paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that lobbying activities by financial institutions played a role in the accumulation of risks and contributed to the 2008 global financial crisis. Under the Donald Trump Administration, some of the most hard-fought rules meant to prevent another spate of bank collapses were rolled back, marking a significant victory for the intense lobbying efforts of the financial industry. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the tighter capital and liquidity requirements known as “enhanced prudential standards” were applied to all banks with consolidated assets of $50 billion or more. Almost as soon as the rules came into effect, smaller banks began to lobby for an exemption. In 2015, SVB President Greg Becker submitted a statement to a Senate panel pushing legislators to exempt more banks — including SVB — from the tighter oversight rule. In 2018, the lobbying paid off, with former President Donald Trump signing into law the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA), which raised the asset threshold for enhanced oversight to $250 billion. Such regulatory loosening due to lobbying was why Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) drew a straight line from the 2018 deregulation effort to the 2023 failure of SVB.

While the U.S. government under the Trump Administration focused on easing financial regulation, China was engaged in exactly the opposite. Chinese leaders have become highly aware of the importance of financial security to national security since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. President Xi Jinping, in particular, has prioritized financial security and has vowed to strengthen the party-state’s financial governance and regulatory capacity. Since he came to power in 2012, he has implemented a series of policies aimed at tightening the state’s supervision over China’s financial markets and institutions. Most recently, the state launched a new State Administration of Financial Supervision (SAFS) to strengthen state oversight of the nation’s financial system and reduce risk at subnational levels. Creating a centralized SAFS is the latest evidence that Chinese leaders are committed to strengthening financial regulation to safeguard China’s financial stability in defense of volatility in global markets and international geopolitical tensions.

A healthy and stable U.S. financial system is a prerequisite for the Biden Administration to realize its proposed industrial policies. Recently, U.S. lawmakers have expended both their time and energy devising a new outbound investment screening regime and improving the existing inbound investment screening effort. These aim to prevent U.S. capital from funding foreign research and development in strategic competitor countries while also denying those countries the ability to invest in strategic industries in America. However, an investment screening regime is rendered obsolete if U.S. financial markets lose their attraction due to the perception of not being safe due to excessive financial deregulation. Not all deregulation is bad, and it should be welcomed when it means improving market efficiency and strengthening financial stability and security. However, if deregulation means debilitating financial regulators, creating market inefficiency, and debasing U.S. financial stability, then the Biden Administration and U.S. lawmakers should strongly guard against it. Another round of financial crisis brought about by deregulation will severely lessen the appeal of U.S. financial markets and assets, including Treasury debt. The weakening of U.S. financial leadership will decrease the ability of the United States to exercise financial statecraft. The fastest way for the United States to cede ground in the present era of great power competition is to debase its domestic financial system and relinquish its global financial leadership position.

cfr.org · by Lindsay Maizland

19. The Biden administration overestimates radiological terrorism risks and underplays biothreats

Excerpts:

The United States also needs to update the global framework for combating WMD terrorism to address new threats. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 prohibits states from providing support to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorism and requires the adoption and enforcement of laws to prevent proliferation—but says nothing about the drone, nanotech, or cyber threats. Although it’s unclear whether the resolution is the right vehicle for addressing emerging WMD concerns given a lack of appetite to expand the resolution’s scope, the approach of encouraging countries to adopt legal controls on WMD-related material remains a good one. Similarly, the United States needs to adopt new measures to restrict the proliferation of new, WMD-related technologies, such as requiring new approvals on the production, purchase, and export of pesticide-delivery drones.

The reality is that terrorists do not require WMD to cause major, even existential harm. Terrorist attacks to incite or prevent the de-escalation of a conflict between the United States and China, for instance, may only require a bomb or a well-placed bullet. Moreover, the United States and the global community should not treat WMD terrorism as an isolated threat. Virtually all forms of WMD terrorism require significant financial resources and technical expertise. Degrading, disrupting, and destroying general terror organizational capacity is of tremendous value in reducing the threat.

WMD terrorism remains a serious threat to the country and the globe, but the American approach needs to be aligned with genuine risks to ensure security today and tomorrow.

The Biden administration overestimates radiological terrorism risks and underplays biothreats

thebulletin.org · by Matt Field · March 17, 2023

Zachary Kallenborn

Zachary Kallenborn is a research affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of... Read More

A piece of evidence from the Amerithrax investigation into anthrax-laced postings. Credit: FBI.

President Joe Biden earlier this month signed a new national security memorandum to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism. The memorandum is classified, but a publicly accessible fact-sheet sets out the American strategy to combat WMD terrorism, including by preventing terrorists from accessing WMD material, detecting and deterring threats, and enhancing domestic and international capabilities to counter WMD terrorism. In particular, the plan emphasizes the safeguarding of nuclear and radiological material, which could be diverted into weapons. In one crucial respect, however, the administration gets it wrong.

Although the anti-terror strategy’s focus on nuclear security is somewhat justified given the potential for massive harm, the radiological security emphasis is not. Rather, the emphasis should have been on biological terrorism. Among WMD terrorism modes, bioterrorism risks are increasing most, even if the overall likelihood remains low. At the same time, new mass casualty terror threats are emerging that do not neatly fit into the WMD terrorism framework. The administration’s memorandum can be compared to a police department that prioritizes serial killers and jaywalkers. One priority can be defended, but does not capture the full scope of concerns; the other is, frankly, a bit odd.

An insignificant threat? In a radiological attack, a terrorist might use an explosive like dynamite to contaminate a target with radioactive material. So-called “dirty bombs” are different from nuclear weapons like atomic bombs, which, by splitting atoms, release a huge amount of explosive energy. Of all the forms of WMD terror—usually conceived of as attacks that use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons—radiological terrorism attacks are easily the lowest risk.

There have been basically no successful examples of radiological terrorism, and attempts are rare, even for already-rare WMD terrorism. START’s Global Terrorism Database, which documents over 200,000 terrorist attacks domestically and internationally, includes only 13 incidents of radiological terrorism, none of which caused any injuries or deaths. And one man carried out 10 of the attacks: Tsugio Uchinishi, a Japanese man who mailed monazite powder, which contains the radioactive element thorium, to various Japanese agencies to warn the government about exports of uranium to North Korea. Although reports that the Islamic State acquired 40 kilograms of uranium generated plenty of media attention, uranium is not actually all that radioactive and would have caused minimal harm, especially compared to other Islamic State attacks. The reality is radioactive material does not add much to a terror attack, except a tad bit more economic harm and unwarranted media attention.

Even theoretically, the consequences of radiological terrorism are quite low. In a dirty bomb, most of the harm comes from the explosion. The radioactive material creates an increased risk of cancer while adding to potential clean-up costs. Even in the most extreme forms, the primary harm is as a weapon of mass disruption: closing an important port, say, until a costly clean-up can be completed. Although inciting a nuclear meltdown could conceivably cause mass harm, it’s extraordinarily difficult due to existing protections and the administration’s “radioactive material security” program does not appear to do anything for nuclear power plant security anyway. Compare the radiological terror consequence to a nuclear terrorist attack that could destroy a city, or an extreme bioterrorism attack that could conceivably kill more people than have died in the COVID-19 pandemic. The difference is stark.

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In fairness, the accessibility of radiological material drives the risk. Blood transfusion devices in many hospitals use highly radioactive cesium-137, for example. Even household smoke detectors can have very small amounts of radioactive material, though a massive amount would be required to make a dirty bomb of any consequence. The memorandum, therefore, is useful in risk reduction, even if radiological terrorism does not deserve such a high priority in the administration’s anti-terror plans.

Emerging WMD threats. Among WMD terrorist threats, the barriers to bioterrorism are going down the most. Synthetic biology provides a pathway for terrorists to acquire highly controlled pathogens, such as the variola virus (the causative agent of smallpox). 3-D printing enables printing materials for lab equipment and potentially easier access to harmful pathogens, too. Online marketplaces also offer an avenue to acquire laboratory equipment usable in biological weapons programs with limited oversight. Plus, ubiquitous drone technology could be relatively easily used for the dispersal of chemical and biological weapons agents. Of particular concern are agricultural drones for dispersing pesticides, which are practically purpose-built to deliver biological weapons agents. These developments are leading to a broader de-skilling (or at least a shift in the type of skills required) of the expertise needed to develop and use biological weapons agents.

This is not to say bioterrorism is easy. Even if a terrorist used synthetic biology to acquire a pathogen, acquired pesticide drones to deliver the aerosol, and used 3-D printing and online markets to acquire lab supplies and equipment, the terrorist would still need to mass produce the pathogen and weaponize it without a lab accident or discovery by law enforcement. Consequently, successful bioterror attacks are rare, and, despite alarms, COVID-19 is unlikely to change that possibility much.

But unlike radiological terrorism, terrorists have pulled off major biological weapons attacks and attempted extreme forms. The START Global Terrorism Database documents 38 incidents of bioterrorism, most significantly the Rajneeshee cult attack that sickened 751 in the Dalles, Oregon in 1984. And, of course, in the so-called Amerithrax attacks in 2001, mailed letters containing bacillus anthracis (the causative agent of anthrax) killed five and injured 17. There have also been major attempts, such as Aum Shinrikyo’s failed attempts to use biological weapons to ignite an apocalyptic war, and the radical environmentalist group RISE’s attempt to wipe out humanity and re-populate the Earth with environmentally sensitive revolutionaries.

At the same time, new WMD terrorist threats are emerging. Drone swarms are a new WMD, given their ability to cause mass harm and lack of reliability. Although terrorists still face considerable difficulty in acquiring true drone swarms with intra-swarm communication, the risk is trending upward. At the same time, developments in nanotechnology—a branch of technology interested in manipulating matter at the nano-scale (1 to 100 nanometers)—offer terrorists a new means to acquire chemical and biological-terrorism-like weapons. Cyberterrorism is also plausible, with the growth of the internet of things offering new vulnerabilities for hostile actors to cause harm.

What should have been done? Overall, the Biden administration plan does provide a good baseline for addressing the continued threat of WMD terrorism. Despite the focus of US security policy moving away from terrorism to counter the rise of China, WMD terrorism still deserves serious attention, especially as governmental pressure on disrupting terror organizations wanes. But the policy specifics should align more directly with the threat landscape, current and future.

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Given the growing risks of bioterrorism risks, US officials should have a particular focus on searching for and sharing information about radicalized experts. Access to relevant technical expertise still remains a major barrier, and building biological weapons requires significant tacit knowledge, the subtle knowledge that comes from working in a lab for a long time that cannot be explained. The best example is Aum Shinrikyo; despite being incredibly well-resourced, its biological weapons program struggled. In one case, a cult member fell into a fermenting tank of clostridium botulinum, the bacteria that produce the botulinum toxin that is lethal in microgram amounts—and emerged unharmed. The cult had over $1 billion in assets, yet was unable to acquire the necessary skills for a successful bioattack.

In addition, the United States should undertake national and global efforts to improve biosecurity and biodefense, especially concerning synthetic biology. For example, the United States might focus on facilitating and encouraging discussion between different scientific disciplines and global regulators concerning genetic engineering regulations, domestically and globally. Similarly, a recent US Government Accountability Office (GAO) review found 21 of 29 long-standing recommendations to improve US biodefense remain unimplemented. The United States could also encourage transparency, education, and risk reduction around the global proliferation of biosecurity level 3 and 4 (BSL-3 and BSL-4) laboratories that handle the world’s deadliest pathogens.

The United States also needs to update the global framework for combating WMD terrorism to address new threats. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 prohibits states from providing support to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorism and requires the adoption and enforcement of laws to prevent proliferation—but says nothing about the drone, nanotech, or cyber threats. Although it’s unclear whether the resolution is the right vehicle for addressing emerging WMD concerns given a lack of appetite to expand the resolution’s scope, the approach of encouraging countries to adopt legal controls on WMD-related material remains a good one. Similarly, the United States needs to adopt new measures to restrict the proliferation of new, WMD-related technologies, such as requiring new approvals on the production, purchase, and export of pesticide-delivery drones.

The reality is that terrorists do not require WMD to cause major, even existential harm. Terrorist attacks to incite or prevent the de-escalation of a conflict between the United States and China, for instance, may only require a bomb or a well-placed bullet. Moreover, the United States and the global community should not treat WMD terrorism as an isolated threat. Virtually all forms of WMD terrorism require significant financial resources and technical expertise. Degrading, disrupting, and destroying general terror organizational capacity is of tremendous value in reducing the threat.

WMD terrorism remains a serious threat to the country and the globe, but the American approach needs to be aligned with genuine risks to ensure security today and tomorrow.

Together, we make the world safer.

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Keywords: COVID-19, bioterrorism, radiological incident

Topics: Biosecurity

thebulletin.org · by Matt Field · March 17, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: [email protected]

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: [email protected]

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

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