Quotes of the Day:

"Let no man imagine that he has no influence. Whoever he may be, and wherever he may be placed, the man who thinks becomes a light and a power." 

– Henry George

"If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be. The functionaries of every government have propensities to command at will the liberty and property of their constituents. There is no safe deposit for these but with the people themselves; nor can they be safe with them without information. Where the press is free, and every man able to read, all is safe." 

– Thomas Jefferson

"Being powerful is like being a lady. If you have to tell people you are, you aren't." 

– Margaret Thatcher

1. OPEN LETTER TO A USSOCOM COMMANDER – Bureaucratically Dominate to Operationally Dominate

2. Special Ops Builds on Strengths as it Charts Future

3. Blinken Warns of Disinformation Threat to Democracies

4. It’s not just a theory. TikTok’s ties to Chinese government are dangerous.

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 18, 2024

6. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 18, 2024

7. Israel Sending Delegation to Washington to Discuss U.S. Concerns Over Rafah Invasion

8. Taiwan’s Tough Call on How to Stop China: Bigger Weapons or Lots of Cheap Ones

9. Biden Weakens America’s Global Clout

10. Israeli forces raid Gaza City hospital; U.S. confirms death of top Hamas leader

11. SASC chair anticipates push for ‘significant reforms’ in 2025 NDAA to help Pentagon acquire new tech

12. Army aims to equip a division with hand-held counter-drone gear

13.The Leaked Russian Nuclear Documents and Russian First Use of Nuclear Weapons

14. Ukraine’s Impossible Choice: Conceding Territory or Lives

15. Vladimir Putin Says He Is Ready for Peace in Ukraine, but Only on His Terms

16. Friends in Low Places? Behind South Africa's New Genocide Case Against Israel

17. Congress Needs to Do More Than Just Exercise Its War Powers

18. Combatant commanders head to Capitol Hill to face budget questions

1. OPEN LETTER TO A USSOCOM COMMANDER – Bureaucratically Dominate to Operationally Dominate

A very thoughtful (and thorough) letter that addresses many of the USSOCOM issues, in particular the USSOCOM bureaucracy.

Here are the recommendations for the J5 but there are also recommendations for the Chief of Staff, J2, J3. and J8 (I am partial to plans , policy, and strategy)

Develop and annually update a joint SOF strategy going five years into the future.

Establish a system to analyze geopolitical and technological trends. The system must also identify and integrate shortfalls and new requirements into the strategy.

The J5 must inform the J8 what requirements are unfunded (informed by the Components) and outline environmental changes that force investment adjustments.

The J5 must be able to assess the environment, determine how joint SOF operations impact the global geo-political environment, and compare it to the IMOs and objectives of the strategy.

Assess the sufficiency of the global joint SOF to execute the Defense Strategy.

The J5 must develop a Joint SOF Future Operating Concept that ASD SO/LIC will find acceptable and that the J8 can use for POM development.

The J5 must conduct at least annual war gaming of the strategy and FOC. The results must be shared with the J8.

Objectively assess the effects of applying global joint SOF against the strategic objectives and adjust the following strategy as appropriate.

I received some feedback from LTG Cleveland:

Interesting write-up. He misses one key point - SOCOM’s offensive IW requirements. We are in an age that the U.S. must choose to go on offense in the competition space. SOF has a key role - if it can make its TSOC’s IW campaign competent and operationalize appropriate CONUS based capabilities to support the web of IW efforts that we should be undertaking while supporting and being supported by the GCCs.

OPEN LETTER TO A USSOCOM COMMANDER

Bureaucratically Dominate to Operationally Dominate

By Monte Erfourth

March18, 2024

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/open-letter-to-a-ussocom-commander?utm

A SHORT INTRODUCTION

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) must adapt and evolve to enhance its effectiveness as a significant contributor to the Joint Force’s approach to strategic competition and counterterrorism today and beyond 2040. The Commander of USSOCOM plays a pivotal role in steering the SOF enterprise towards future success. In the short term, this means aligning with the objectives set forth in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). In the long term, it means preparing a joint special operations force to succeed in a future context beyond our imagination. This transformation requires a comprehensive approach that embraces technological innovation, reformed processes, and changes in the future operating environment.

Ironically, the path forward for USSOCOM involves leveraging a concept often viewed as antithetical to the ethos of special operations: bureaucracy. While bureaucracy is typically associated with inefficiency and rigidity, a well-functioning bureaucracy can also provide a structured, integrated, and repeatable framework to implement wide-ranging reforms and innovations. For the SOF community, a carefully calibrated bureaucratic approach can help focus strategic planning, resource allocation, and the integration of cutting-edge technologies and capabilities for the strategic environment ahead.

THE ISSUE

Since the founding of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987, every Commander has aimed to maintain SOF’s edge in a rapidly changing world by focusing on human capital and integrating new technologies. Until 9/11, SOF was orientated to provide unique access and capabilities in low-intensity conflict. After 9/11, counterterrorism (CT) became the primary focus of Special Operations (SOF). This focus on CT remained dominant until the release of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which demanded the DoD shift to great power competition and relegated CT to being one of five significant threats to the homeland and US interests. The new approach by Secretary of Defense Mattis directed the Department to prepare for competition and conflict with great powers, to expand capabilities to counter cyber and space threats, and to leverage the extensive counterterrorism experience gained over the past twenty years to train and equip allies and partners. Responding to this Departmental shift, USSOCOM Commanders posit that SOF will be prepared to navigate the complexities of great power competition effectively by leveraging SOF’s people-centric approach and a commitment to tactical and technological innovation, which will, in turn, ensure readiness and resilience of the force to meet the challenges posed by diverse global threats.

The current USSOCOM Commander, GEN Fenton, has proposed two conceptual approaches to achieve the end states demanded by the NDS. The first is to find the answer to "what winning looks like." The General has proposed winning is deterring our pacing and acute threats of China and Russia and keeping "X-Ops" outside the borders of the homeland.[JM1] [ME2] [1] The second concept is summarized in the traditional USSOCOM axiom, "Win, Transform, People,"[2] establishing command priorities to Win on the battlefield, Transform the force, and train our People. General Fenton adopted the long-established approach but now arranges the order as “People, Win, Transform.” The former addresses the General’s vision for operations in the geopolitical space, and the latter addresses the intent to develop the SOF enterprise.

Do General Fenton’s concepts properly orient the transformation of US Special Operations to become the great power competitor and counter-terror force we will need in the near term? How about the operating environment from 2035 to 2040? By what process does Headquarters USSOCOM manage the implementation of these concepts? How is US SOF’s progress along this transformational journey (which will last well beyond General Fenton’s tenure) codified, resourced, assessed, and adjusted? Some background is necessary to answer these questions.

How to transform will be a primary focus of this article. It is important to note that transformation can run in only a few directions. SOF can transform into a slightly better version of its current self or something completely different. USSOCOM probably needs to split the difference, but the pace of technology powered by AI may require something completely different sooner rather than later. That said, even this AI-generated image of “future SOF” illustrates an unimaginative linear evolution of SOF into better “trigger pullers.” However, this future is most likely not the revolutionary capability that the situation and the Joint Force will require. It is a linear progression of capabilities and force design optimized for the bygone era of CT. Congress has empowered USSOCOM with authorities and resources to innovate on the leading edge of the Joint Force, not just progress the status quo. USSOCOM can do better.

The reader may be forgiven for being a bit confused about the multi-directional nature of USSOCOM. The events and assessments that led to the consolidation of SOF into the singular command structure of USSOCOM clearly illustrate how failure and criticism can serve as powerful catalysts for change within military institutions. Operation Eagle Claw, the botched 1980 mission to rescue American hostages in Iran, exposed glaring deficiencies in the U.S. military's command and control structures for special operations. This debacle underscored the complexity and difficulty of coordinating actions among different branches of the military's special operations units. At the time, each operated independently from one another, often with little to no interoperability or joint planning capabilities.

Through the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the subsequent Nunn-Cohen amendment of 1987, Congress mandated a structure to provide unified command and dedicated resourcing for all Army, Navy, and Air Force special operations forces under the oversight of a new four-star-level headquarters. This groundbreaking move transformed the fragmented, uncoordinated structure of the late 1970s to the more integrated and effective unified command of USSOCOM, establishing the first true joint force. It also created a command, and a commander, who wears two hats.

Section 167 of Title 10 U.S. Code establishes USSOCOM as the unified combatant command for Special Operations Forces, granting the command “service-like” responsibilities. [3] Section 167 addresses USSOCOM's organizational responsibilities, including SOF integration, budgeting and programming, force development, doctrine development, education, and training. 167 also establishes the command’s unique acquisition authority.

Under Section 167, USSOCOM commands four subordinate service components: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command, U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, and (added in 2006) U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command. Each command brings unique capabilities and expertise to the joint special operations portfolio [4] and enables the U.S. SOF with a broad range of specialized skills, capabilities, and equipment necessary for conducting various clandestine, covert, and overt operations across all warfighting domains. Headquarters USSOCOM is responsible for ensuring the integration and interoperability of these component capabilities and maintaining the jointness of SOF.

Section 164 of Title 10 U.S. Code details the Commander's other hat. Section 164 establishes USSOCOM as a Functional Combatant Command (FCC). It outlines the Commander’s authority, roles, and responsibilities.[5]In this capacity, USSOCOM operates across geographic boundaries and provides unique capabilities to geographic combatant commands (GCC). The command does this via seven Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), the operational arms of SOF. Each TSOC is aligned to a GCC and is responsible for overseeing the planning and management of SOF operations in a particular region. USSOCOM also oversees the training and doctrine development function of the Joint Special Operations Command. As an FCC, USSOCOM is responsible for ensuring SOF can support the Department of Defense's priorities:[6]

• Defend the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC;
• Deter strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners;
• Deter aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary – prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe; and,
• Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.

Though USSOCOM has administrative and resourcing control of the operational elements, TSOCs fall under operational control (OPCON) of the Geographic Combatant Commands. In short, this means the USSOCOM Commander’s primary role, even wearing the operational hat, is oriented towards his service-like responsibility.

Eight of the thirteen USSOCOM Commanders thus far served previously as the Commander of JSOC, with five of seven since 9/11. It's a difficult move for any commander to go from leading a pinnacle operationally focused unit to becoming the head of a sprawling resourcing-oriented bureaucracy. This may cause Commanders to be more comfortable wearing their operational Section 164 hat and realize too late that their real power lies in the grinding, bureaucratic, annual resourcing cycle of their Section 167 responsibilities.

ANALYSIS OF THE RESOURCING PROCESSES

Upon assuming command, every USSOCOM Commander must immediately become familiar with the Defense Department’s Program, Planning, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) process. This process is how US military bureaucracies obtain funding, the lifeblood of force transformation. The annual Commander’s Posture Statement to Congress is, in part, a formal recurring validation of SOF’s existence to Congress, who in turn authorizes and appropriates resources requested in the command’s annual Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission. The POM describes a 5-year Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and presents the Services and Defense Agencies’ proposal to balance their available resource allocation. The POM includes an analysis of missions, objectives, alternative methods to accomplish objectives, and allocation of resources.

The PPBE/POM cycle is an annual process with set events that occur at generally the same time each year. In the planning phase, USSOCOM must generate strategies and plans supporting larger national strategic objectives. These plans should extend out at least five years to cover the FYDP to justify both current and future FY requirements. Major budget issues between the services and GCCs are worked out by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the White House, and Congress approves the final appropriations bill.

As presented here, the “SOCOM Annual Transform and Win Process”[7] is the historical and notional process USSOCOM has sometimes followed. The depiction above lays out the basic steps for the annual process necessary to move from ideas to plans of action that get resourced by Congress. In this process, the USSOCOM Commander analyzes higher guidance, determines ways to achieve tasks and objectives, codifies them in concepts, plans, and strategies, works out resourcing, and then examines the results.

USSOCOM should have an annual battle rhythm like any other military enterprise to govern a routine process. As the saying goes, “Do routine things routinely.” Each directorate should work in concert to develop the products necessary to inform the next step in the process on an established, recurring timeline. The process should hinge upon participation from each staff directorate, working collaboratively and with full appreciation of who that directorate is producing a product for and why. The Commander must understand and oversee the process and ensure the headquarters is aligned to implement his vision of joint SOF transformation.

Transformation happens only through process and resourcing. Resourcing, development, and integration of joint SOF are also USSOCOM’s fundamental Section 167 responsibility, as well as the primary reason for the existence of USSOCOM. However, resource and bureaucratic process management are skills that most (but not all) SOF general officers do not have expertise in. They are historically promoted for tactical and operational success (via JSOC, lately) vs bureaucratic acumen. This operationally focused background leads them to spend much of the first part of their command focused on Section 164 responsibilities: the command and control of SOF, despite this role being of secondary importance and likely least consequential of the USSOCOM Commander’s Title 10 obligations. If the USSOCOM Commander is not focused on building the next-generation joint special operational forces, then who is? This is not the function of the services as they are focused on building the next generation of service-tailored SOF, not joint SOF.

When a new USSOCOM Commander takes command, he inherits the POM decisions of the commanders before him. At this point, the budget for the upcoming FY is nearly locked, so his ability to impact the command’s budget request will be limited until the following year’s POM submission. In his second year of command, the USSOCOM Commander wholly owns the POM process and the decisions for the POM, with more ability to shape the more distant budget timeframe. In his third (and usually final) year in command, the Commander solidifies those longer-term budget decisions with which the next Commander must live. If the Commander serves the standard three years in command, he will have only two opportunities to steer the transformation of the SOF enterprise through resourcing.

The annual steps from guidance to resourcing are essentially identical from one commander to the next. Nothing is inventive about the process, but the Commander must direct and lead it to establish the best budget for the next guy. Future USSOCOM Commanders must realize their limited window of opportunity and act accordingly if they wish to truly and effectively transform the enterprise.

WINNING TOOLS OF A JOINT FORCE PROVIDER

The reason for USSOCOM 's existence is to provide joint, integrated SOF to support the larger joint force. To do this, USSOCOM, as a service-like institution, must perform mundane tasks like writing joint doctrine, overseeing manpower issues, providing education and training, developing new weapons, supporting existing platforms, and making calculated investments through budgeting. Each subordinate SOF service component builds, manages, trains, equips, partially funds, and prepares its special operators to support operations mission sets that are particular to their service. SEALs swim, Green Berets advise, etc.

Each SOF service Component Commander must answer to two masters, USSOCOM and their respective service, and they receive resources and direction from both. Without integration guidance from USSOCOM, SOF service components will develop an element of SOF aligned with its service’s particular vision for the future. SOF Components are also partly at the mercy of strategic resourcing decisions made by their respective services. Yet the USSOCOM Commander must drive integration and answer to Congress about how joint special operations will collectively achieve the military ends prescribed by national strategy – without having complete control of how that formation will be constructed. It can be a challenging position for a Commander to be in.

Current events bear this out. The US Army faces two major contextual shifts: a decline in active-duty soldiers by approximately 30,000 from 2021 to 2024 due to recruiting challenges and a strategic pivot towards countering China's military rise. The Army views this second challenge as a call to bolster its capability to conduct major (conventional) combat operations. However, the first challenge of available human resources is driving the Army to divest the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities that defined the post-9/11 era. Consequently, Army leaders plan to reduce special operations forces by 3,000 slots, reallocating resources towards capabilities deemed more critical for great power competition.[8] [9] [10]

Absent a compelling narrative for how SOF can support the joint force (the Army and Navy in particular) in this new age of strategic competition, OSD and Congress have no reason to support long-term investment in “legacy” special forces.

Again, USSOCOM can – and must – do better.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army sees no distinction between conventional and irregular warfare. The PLA and their Chinese Communist Party masters are currently employing a Fabian strategy[11], attacking US interests asymmetrically, incrementally, and with the intent to avoid a major military confrontation until the conditions are weighted heavily in their favor. They intend to soften targets and sap any will to resist, intimidate, exploit, and subjugate rivals without fighting a major conflict.

Special operations are ideally suited to compete with China in this context by reinforcing partnerships, bolstering resistance capabilities, undermining Chinese illegal actions on the periphery without retribution, and creating strategic dilemmas.[12] And yet, the Army found USSOCOM’s argument unconvincing. Why? Certainly, the Defense Department’s institutional bias toward planning major conventional combat operations, supported by large and expensive acquisition programs, is a factor. However, the more likely reason is USSOCOM’s inability to put forward a compelling narrative for how SOF can support the joint force in this context (and, in turn, serve to protect the Army’s interests).

As stated, it is a tough position. However, USSOCOM’s budget must be defended to avoid another Operation Eagle Claw moment. What are the Commander’s tools to wage this fight? The Commander must provide a long-term vision, a resource-oriented strategy, and clear and compelling operating concepts, just as the services have done. In short, he must embrace the power of his bureaucracy.

General Fenton has asked, “What does winning look like?” This is an appropriate way to frame his Commanders’ Guidance. His intent is for SOF to conduct special operations that will support integrated deterrence and prevent “X-Ops” from conducting a strike on the homeland in accordance with national strategic objectives.[13] This idea could be the basis for a global joint special operations strategy that points the way to five years of successful campaigning. However, USSOCOM has not expanded or tested the idea nor developed it into a strategy intended to inform resourcing, resulting in the lack of a compelling argument for why the services should support investment in (vs divestment from) SOF. Yet the POM cycle continues, leaving the Commander few opportunities to change the ship's course. The lack of a coherent and multi-directorate effort also means that a few very stressed personnel in the J8 are left to figure out the future of joint SOF operations and what should be funded.

Optimally, when a new Commander arrives, he (or she) should aim to make the most of his (or her) limited time by focusing on the power granted by Section 167. This starts by producing an institutional vision to guide the development of the force – an interim “end state” to serve as a North Star for the command[JM4] . Then, complete a strategy that extends five years into the future (FYDP) to demonstrate how SOF activities translate into real-world effects. The headquarters can build a campaign that illustrates SOF creating effects and dilemmas for peer rivals across theaters and time. This strategy could be completed by combining each TSOC theater support plan, incorporating JSOC capabilities, adding what winning looks like, and then synchronizing the details. The strategy should be paired with a Future Operating Concept (FOC) that extends out ten to fifteen years in the future to demonstrate what SOF can do operationally and point the way to what SOF will become in future warfare.

Beyond an operational strategy, USSOCOM requires an institutional one. USSOCOM has cited “Win, Transform, People” for many years as its raison d'etre. Winning is basically covered with a strategy, and people are the focus of training and human development. What exactly should SOF transform into? A fully developed FOC supplies the institutional answer to this question. A FOC attempts to imagine future operating conditions (10-15 years in the future) and then develop the competencies needed to operate in that environment. This is the lodestar for the future development, training, testing, war gaming, procurement, and budgets each service uses to prepare for the future. All services have them. The Army went so far as to set up an entire command to take on this challenge.[14]

Concepts have much to do with budgeting, but each service must be prepared to fight with the right capabilities in all future conditions, or it will put our homeland at risk. Our budget and procurement pipeline produce the next ship, plane, or tank. SOF produces people, and it does that exceptionally well. However, the world is arguably at the beginning of a massive acceleration in computing power that will put powerful weapons and capabilities in our warrior’s hands and those of our rivals.[15] How is the USSOCOM headquarters preparing for that?

The right FOC paired with a strategy would have given USSOCOM the ammunition it needed to explain to the Army what SOF can do in more realistic terms. Although having these documents may not convince the Army to invest in special forces, the probability of winning such an argument would improve significantly. Given the likelihood of human resources shortages over the next several years, it will not be the last time a service asks to cut special operational forces. USSOCOM must be prepared to have these conversations.

A strategy would also have other tangible benefits. Besides its role as the joint SOF leader, USSOCOM has a global responsibility. This is akin to a superpower. It allows for objective evaluation and analysis of each theater and an opportunity for comparative analysis between theaters that no GCC can match. With a global understanding and a strategy developed to achieve national security-driven priorities, USSOCOM would be ideally situated to make well-informed resourcing decisions and offer advice on the best use of special operational forces. The strategy-FOC combination provides a way to set priorities, move towards objectives, and measure the effects created by SOF activities.

Measuring the impact of special operations in the Joint Force's environment is vital to quantitatively demonstrate value.[16] The key is linking Intermediate Military Objectives (IMO) to the desired ends of the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Theater Combatant Command Plans. Just registering activity is not helpful. SOF must link activity to an empirical result, or the conventional force will never understand SOF’s contribution to strategic competition. By developing measures for IMOs and the impact of SOF activities, the SOF enterprise can understand their effects and gauge that impact relationship to national strategic objectives. It will also avoid the misapplication of scarce resources and offer a recorded history of results that will inform future decisions. Budget allocation decisions could be targeted to the most critical requirements. Equally as necessary, the decision to end legacy programs would be substantiated by data analysis. Perhaps most importantly, SOF could quantitatively demonstrate value in competition to Congress and the services.

Combined with the right measurements, a strategy could be a powerful tool in the USSOCOM Commander’s kit. If “What does winning look like?” yields a robust integrated deterrence, what does SOF’s contribution look like? Beyond opinion, how can SOF validate its contribution to the Joint Force efforts across the theaters? Without good data and knowing what you want to achieve year in and year out, how do you adjust forces or recommend different ways to compete? All too often, TSOCs and other SOF entities across the enterprise report activities, not results.

To dominate future joint operations, USSOCOM must dominate bureaucracy today. Working with the Special Operations Component Commands, the TSOCs, GCCs, and interagency, USSOCOM can manage its process and develop game-changing strategies and FOCs. The command can win resourcing battles and prepare the force necessary for great power competition and counterterror operations. Ironically, it will require great warriors to become great process leaders where the battles they fight are on the whiteboard, in conference rooms, and in the halls of Congress. Win there, then dominate threats to our nation with a joint SOF force ready-made for the challenge.

USSOCOM: THE COMBATANT COMMAND

Joint doctrine states a campaign is a series of related military operations to accomplish a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. If China and Russia operate globally, a global SOF campaign that coordinates effects in time and space will be the most effective way to achieve integrated deterrence while advancing U.S. national security interests. Strategy does not have to be a straitjacket; it can be reviewed annually, updated, or adjusted whenever the Commander thinks conditions have changed.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act streamlined the military chain of command, which now runs directly from the President through the Secretary of Defense to Combatant Commanders. It also gave us the current Combatant Command divided into six theaters of operation.[17] With six theaters developing campaign plans that are not coordinated or aligned with the others, DoD has no way to campaign globally under a single, united plan. There is no Global Commander who answers to the SecDef or President. What results are six “soda straw” views of local campaigns that only marginally coordinate in time and space across theaters, do not coordinate effects, and cannot capitalize on the United States’ global reach capabilities. China and Russia are well aware of this fact.

USSOCOM could provide the TSOCs with a better sense of global conditions, what operations are being conducted, where, and with what results, and assist in operational coordination across GCC boundary lines. Our pacing and acute threats have no such borders, and SOF has the means to see beyond them through USSOCOM. Whatever makes the command and joint SOF operations better at developing coordinated effects and achieving objectives should be considered and established. New technologies will soon make this achievable in ways never previously provided.

A SHORT LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

This article is not meant to bash any one person or directorate at USSOCOM. It is to present hard-earned knowledge of what USSOCOM could be. The command is staffed with incredible human talent. There is so much wasted and disconnected effort, that daily HQ life can sometimes be hard to witness. It would not take a superhuman or mystical act to change this situation. It can be done by better-defining command functions, officially recognizing the basic annual process and associated products, implementing a battle rhythm, and following through.

Under USSOCOM’s Title 10, Section 164, and 167 requirements, it might be fair to say that winning and transforming joint special operations is accomplished through bureaucratic domination by the USSOCOM headquarters. Of course, this must be done in full coordination with the SOF enterprise, OSD's civilian leadership, and other national power elements. The staff and Command leadership can dominate the future from tomorrow to 2040 through guidance, a battle rhythm, staff planning, conferences, war gaming, analysis of future trends, and harnessing technology. This can be done, and the headquarters does not have to grow to do it. If the HQ can divest its numerous extraneous tasks and streamline its core processes, it could theoretically realize human resources and time savings, which could be used to bolster the TSOC staff.

In order of importance and by Directorate, here are key changes that must be adopted:

Office of the Chief of Staff – Deputy Chief of Staff

• Develop and enforce an annual staff battle rhythm that coordinates staff actions, provides guidance, drives product requirements, enables vital decision points for the Commander and senior leaders, and ensures the right actions and products are produced on time.
• In line with the Battle Rhythm, establish when products from the Directorates and Components must be published to support the annual process cycle. The Chief should also insist the process produces quality results and informs the enterprise.
• Promulgate senior leader guidance on Joint SOF requirements.
• Aid and empower the staff to work together throughout the annual cycle.

The J5 Directorate – Policy, Plans, and Strategy

• Develop and annually update a joint SOF strategy going five years into the future.
• Establish a system to analyze geopolitical and technological trends. The system must also identify and integrate shortfalls and new requirements into the strategy.
• The J5 must inform the J8 what requirements are unfunded (informed by the Components) and outline environmental changes that force investment adjustments.
• The J5 must be able to assess the environment, determine how joint SOF operations impact the global geo-political environment, and compare it to the IMOs and objectives of the strategy.
• Assess the sufficiency of the global joint SOF to execute the Defense Strategy.
• The J5 must develop a Joint SOF Future Operating Concept that ASD SO/LIC will find acceptable and that the J8 can use for POM development.
• The J5 must conduct at least annual war gaming of the strategy and FOC. The results must be shared with the J8.
• Objectively assess the effects of applying global joint SOF against the strategic objectives and adjust the following strategy as appropriate.

Some of these systems were in place in the past to help USSOCOM register budget shortfalls and identify new technology that could make a strategic difference. One such system was the Operational Exchange Meeting (OEM), used from 2018 to 2021. Unfortunately, this process was dismantled without a replacement. Another system was the analysis and assessment team of J5, which evaluated the impact of SOF operations from 2018 to 2022, but it was also dismantled without a replacement. Assessments and analysis can help in making resource decision-making fact-based rather than guesswork. This worked in conjunction with the Campaign Plan – Global Special Operations (CP-GSO) to lay out a global understanding of SOF actions and priorities over time that could be measured. CP-GSO has not been revised since 2020, and the last USSOCOM Strategy was published in 2021.

J8 Directorate - Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment

• The J8 must be involved in strategy development, oversight, unfunded requirement data collection, technology analysis, and future concepts.
• The J5 and J8 should work closely to identify gaps, budget shortfalls, and emergent technologies impacting future operations and unprogrammed requirements.
• Improve the Capabilities-Based Process.
• Provide early joint capability development guidance to the components.
• Review and assess Component programs to ensure integration of Joint Warfighting capabilities.
• Participate in strategic and future concept wargaming.
• Assess programs' efficacy, proficiency, and optimization to determine their alignment with the command’s strategy.

J4 Directorate - Logistics

• The J4 should write a robust joint SOF logistics annex for the strategy or campaign plan and participate in technology analysis and future operating concept development.
• Doctrine must be pushed to support the entire effort.
• Participate in strategic and future concept wargaming.

J3 Directorate - Operations

• To better guide a demand-based force allocation system, proactive force allocation requirements based on the J5-produced Global SOF Strategy/Campaign Plan and assessments should be determined.
• Assist TSOCs in preparing and planning their Operations and Activities submissions to maximize the annual allocation of limited SOF assets.
• Embrace AI to develop a real-time global Common Operating Picture for the entire SOF enterprise.
• Write Annex C of the Strategy or Campaign Plan as the annual manpower guidance to the force to ensure thorough coordination.
• Lead operational and global wargaming.

J2 Directorate - Intelligence

• The J2 should support the J5 and J8 by producing longer-term geo-political trends and analysis.
• Publish a Joint Operating Environment at least annually. Provide a more in-depth analysis of areas where SOF should anticipate conducting operations.
• Synchronize the future geo-political and technical environment depiction with J5 and J8.
• Participate in operational, strategic, and future concept wargaming.
• 
  

The collective effect of the staff getting guidance, working together, producing documents that others need to do their job on time, and involving and informing the Commander throughout would be transformative. This cannot be overstated. At present, there is no requirement for any Directorate to work with another. There is no timetable to know if what one Directorate does is needed by others at a specific time. Directorates can also decline to support other Directorates without penalty. This is a recipe for cylinders of mediocrity, not a unified team of excellence. 

Staff turnover is a significant factor in the creation, atrophy, and abandonment of essential processes at USSOCOM. Few staff officers report to USSOCOM with a good understanding of how the Headquarters works. Most of the long-term employees have never seen it function properly. There is confusion and many differing opinions on what the command should do.

The need for clarity on what should happen at USSOCOM and its priorities can be blamed on how Sections 164 and 167 are written. [JM5] There is overlap in what they cover for responsibilities, some caveats, and stark differences between Service-Like and Functional Combatant Command. Repeated readings of these sections of law can be an exercise in confusion. Those who take the time to study these laws can infer a wide array of interpretations. Each new staff generation should take the time to read the law and debate its meaning, then act in a way that comports with the law and best serves the enterprise. The sooner the USSOCOM Commander understands the difference in responsibilities between a service and functional command, the better. Working with Congress to revise the legal language could be a worthy cause. Being uniquely established and directed leads to staff paralysis and a much longer lead time in understanding what can and should be done by the staff and flag-grade officers.

The USSOCOM Commander can fix this quickly. The way to do that is probably personally unpalatable: becoming a top-tier bureaucrat. He must become a dedicated bureaucratic warrior and push the USSOCOM headquarters to live up to its mandate as a service. He can leave a proud legacy by focusing on staff integration, demanding quality products that lead to transformation, and ensuring the right investments are made in joint capabilities. By dominating the bureaucratic space today, joint SOF operations will dominate the competition in the 2030s.

FINALLY A CONCLUSION

This open letter calls for USSOCOM to embrace strategic and bureaucratic innovation to ensure SOF readiness for the future security environment's multifaceted challenges. SOF capable of competition, counter-terror, and other missions are critical for the United States to maintain its global strategic edge. This letter outlines recommendations to improve USSOCOM's routine processes, strategic planning, resource management, and operational effectiveness. These include embracing bureaucratic processes for effective resource allocation, developing a joint SOF strategy and FOC, enhancing integration and interoperability within the SOF community, and preparing for future operational environments through rigorous planning, war gaming, analysis, and technological adaptation.

The main thrust of the argument is the paradoxical need for USSOCOM to leverage bureaucracy—a concept usually at odds with the ethos of special operations—for structured, integrated, and repeatable frameworks to implement transformation and innovation. USSOCOM must move beyond a linear progression of capabilities designed for counterterrorism to revolutionary capabilities that address the broader strategic challenges posed by great power competitors and emerging technologies. It points out the necessity for USSOCOM to harness its unique authorities, resources, and capabilities to innovate and lead within the Joint Force rather than maintaining the status quo.

USSOCOM exists to provide joint, integrated SOF to support the larger joint force. As a service-like institution, USSOCOM must perform mundane tasks with a sense of unity, urgency, and agency. As unpalatable as it is, the USSOCOM Commander must transform from a warrior to a great process leader where the battles are won on the whiteboard, in the gaming center, in conference rooms, at the desks of action officers, and in the halls of Congress. The USSOCOM staff must be the physical means of transformation, from top to bottom. It must transform itself and then transform joint special operations through the humble method of routine process. Dominate this process, and joint SOF will dominate future operations. Failure to do this will mean a slightly better SOF will face a world of shrinking manpower and budgets and ever more capable competitors armed with nothing more than a hope and a prayer.

About the Author:

Monte Erfourth (Colonel, USA Ret.) was the former USSOCCENT J5 Director and the USSOCOM Chief of Plans before retiring at the end of 2020. Since then, he has supported consulting and academic efforts for or with USSOCOM. He is the co-founder and Editor-in-Chief of Strategy Central.

[1] The SOFCAST Season 4, Episode 13 podcast with GEN Fenton, where he explains what winning looks like. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OnD0SAIfb3g

[2] USSOCOM Vision and Strategy. https://www.USSOCOM.mil/Documents/SOF%20Vision%20and%20Strategy.pdf

[3] 10 U.S.C. 167 - Unified combatant command for special operations forces. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2011-title10/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap6-sec167

[4] USSOCOM celebrates its 30th Anniversary. USSOCOM Public Affairs. 4/19/2017. https://www.USSOCOM.mil/USSOCOM-celebrates-its-30th-anniversary#:~:text=U.S.%20Special%20Operations%20Command%20was,Special%20Operations%20Command%27s%20first%20commander.

[5] 10 U.S. Code § 164 - Commanders of combatant commands: assignment; powers and duties. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2011-title10/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap6-sec164

[6] National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, govinfo,(January 1, 2005), https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GOVPUB-D-PURL-LPS59037.

[7] Note: This process was never followed with any kind of regularity and the title of “SOCOM Annual Transform and Win Process” is provided as a way for the reader to understand the focus of the process relative to the Win and Transform aspects of the axiom “People, Win, Transform.”

[8] Association of the United States Army. (n.d.). Forging Ahead: Wormuth Oversees a Hard-Pressed Force in Transition. AUSA. Retrieved February 28, 2024, from https://www.ausa.org/articles/forging-ahead-wormuth-oversees-hard-pressed-force-transition

[9] Livieratos, C. (2024, January 9). Cutting Army Special Operations Will Erode the Military’s Ability to Influence the Modern Battlefield. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/cutting-army-special-operations-will-erode-the-militarys-ability-to-influence-the-modern-battlefield/

[10] South, T. (2023, November 1). Personnel cuts and force redesign ahead for Army special operations. Army Times. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2023/11/01/personnel-cuts-and-a-force-redesign-ahead-for-army-special-operations/

[11] Erfourth, M. (2024, March 7). Lessons of the Fabian Strategy: History, Application, and the China – United States Competition. Strategy Central. https://www.strategycentral.io/post/lessons-of-the-fabian-strategy-history-application-and-the-china-united-states-competition

[12] Miller, J., Erfourth, M., Monk, J., and Oliver, R. (2019 February 7). Harnessing David and Goliath: Orthodoxy, Asymmetry, and Competition. https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/harnessing-david-and-goliath-orthodoxy-asymmetry-and-competition

[13] The SOFCAST Season 4, Episode 13 podcast with GEN Fenton, where he explains what winning looks like. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OnD0SAIfb3g

[14] Army Futures Command. https://www.army.mil/futures

[15] Mustafa Suleyman & Michael Bhaskar. The Coming Wave: Technology, Power, and the Twenty-first Century's Greatest Dilemma. Crown. September 5, 202

[16] Hendrickson, S., & Post, R. (2020). “A Blue-Collar Approach to Operational Analysis: A Special Operations Case Study.” Joint Force Quarterly, (96), 50-57. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-96/JFQ-96_50-57_Hendrickson-Post.pdf

[17] Every CRS Report. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Proposals for Reforming the Joint Officer Personnel Management Program (1986). https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30609.htm

2. Special Ops Builds on Strengths as it Charts Future

Good words from the Command Sergeant Major.

Excerpts:

"I think there [are] still folks that just relate SOF to counterterrorism," Shorter said. The prominent role that Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, Marine reconnaissance units, Army Rangers and more had in combat against terrorists in the years after the attacks on the U.S. after September 11, 2001, has skewed perceptions of the capabilities of these operators, the senior enlisted leader said.

"SOF was formed long before the global war on terror and long before 9-11," he said. "Great power competition is in our roots from the [Office of Strategic Services] in World War II." 

Special operators played crucial roles in counterinsurgency during the Vietnam War, but operators were also in Europe during the Cold War, filling gaps in that great power confrontation that conventional forces couldn’t fill.

...

The work with partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe go back decades, Shorter said, and that demonstrates the first special operations truth; "Humans are more important than hardware and things."

The relationships that special operators develop over these years pay dividends for all countries involved. But this takes time. "You can’t mass produce SOF in times of crisis," the command sergeant major said. "It takes time to develop these skill sets." 

...

In short, people will always make the difference in SOCOM, he said. "In SOCOM, we don't think one more platform or thing is going to win the war," he said. "I think that creative thinking humans with the ability to interact with our partners and allies will make the difference." 

...

But today, deploying teams take the rucksack, the weapon, their smarts and 15 or 20 different computer systems, the sergeant major said. "Yes, the human is the most important, but if we can fold the technology around that individual, then that individual is much more proficient and that much more of a powerful weapons system," he said.

Special Ops Builds on Strengths as it Charts Future

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

The strengths of the U.S. special operations community have always been agility, adaptability and innovation its service members demonstrated as they approached a mission. Special ops leaders are working to continue this process as the Defense Department drives forward, Army Command Sgt. Maj. Shane W. Shorter said.

Coin Ceremony

A U.S. Army corporal assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command Africa receives a coin from Command Sgt. Maj. Shane W. Shorter, Command Senior Enlisted Leader, U.S. Special Operations Command, at Manda Bay, Kenya, July 25, 2023. Shorter and Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, (right) the Socom commander, met with U.S. Special Operations Forces advising Kenya Defense Forces to assess ongoing operations and discuss future regional security efforts.

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Shorter, the senior enlisted leader of U.S. Special Operations Command, sees special operators playing key roles across the military spectrum and using new domains, new technologies and new processes to do their crucial jobs better.

Shorter accompanied Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, the Socom commander, to meet with Congressional leaders. Fenton will testify before the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday.

He said many people are still unclear about the role special operations forces play in the National Defense Strategy. They do not understand what role these "quiet professionals" have in great power competition.

"I think there [are] still folks that just relate SOF to counterterrorism," Shorter said. The prominent role that Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, Marine reconnaissance units, Army Rangers and more had in combat against terrorists in the years after the attacks on the U.S. after September 11, 2001, has skewed perceptions of the capabilities of these operators, the senior enlisted leader said.

"SOF was formed long before the global war on terror and long before 9-11," he said. "Great power competition is in our roots from the [Office of Strategic Services] in World War II."

Special operators played crucial roles in counterinsurgency during the Vietnam War, but operators were also in Europe during the Cold War, filling gaps in that great power confrontation that conventional forces couldn’t fill.

Beret Jump

An Army Green Beret jumps out of a U.S. Air Force MC-130J Commando II for a joint military free fall with Greek special operations forces during exercise Trojan Footprint 24, over Greece, March 5, 2024.

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Today, the National Defense Strategy calls China the pacing challenge for the department, with Russia an "acute threat." Special operators are working throughout the Indo-Pacific, building partners’ military capabilities and working with allies to deter aggression.

In Europe, special operators worked with the Ukrainian military years before the Russian invasion. Shorter said the first teams worked with the Ukrainian military in the 1990s. The pace of training, obviously, picked up following Russia’s first invasion in 2014 when Russian President Vladimir Putin illegally annexed Crimea.

Spotlight: Support for Ukraine

In addition to teaching Ukrainian forces about new technologies, new tactics and new procedures, special forces personnel worked with the Ukrainians to develop an empowered NCO corps in their military, an effort that was instrumental in stopping the Russian forces when they first moved into the nation in 2022, Shorter said.

Today, there are no boots on the ground in Ukraine, but special operators maintain contact with their Ukrainian friends and advise them remotely. "It’s not ideal," Shorter said. "But it’s been working."

The work with partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe go back decades, Shorter said, and that demonstrates the first special operations truth; "Humans are more important than hardware and things."

The relationships that special operators develop over these years pay dividends for all countries involved. But this takes time. "You can’t mass produce SOF in times of crisis," the command sergeant major said. "It takes time to develop these skill sets."

Casualty Evacuation

A U.S. Air Force airman with the 26th Special Tactics Squadron rappels off a building during technical rescue casualty evacuation training during Justified Accord 2024 in Kenya Feb. 29, 2024.

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He said it is harder to build special operations forces today than in the past because "of the plethora of wide-ranging roles that technology plays."

Shorter sees technology playing a key role, but not the key role for SOCOM. "It’s always going to come down to a special operator talking to a partner," he said. "The special operator has to know the culture, the language, the likes and dislikes and more. It’s going to be relationships."

In short, people will always make the difference in SOCOM, he said. "In SOCOM, we don't think one more platform or thing is going to win the war," he said. "I think that creative thinking humans with the ability to interact with our partners and allies will make the difference."

Combining that with what he calls the special operations-space-cyber nexus "is going to be very, very important for the future fight," Shorter said. "In the old days when a Special Forces [Operational Detachment-Alpha] went to Vietnam, they took their rucksacks, their weapons and their smarts."

But today, deploying teams take the rucksack, the weapon, their smarts and 15 or 20 different computer systems, the sergeant major said. "Yes, the human is the most important, but if we can fold the technology around that individual, then that individual is much more proficient and that much more of a powerful weapons system," he said.

This has changed training in the special operations community and changed the focus. "Does it mean that SOF will be less proficient in their weapons system, or less proficient in their physical capabilities or less proficient in their cognitive abilities," he said. "Absolutely not. It just means that they need to be cloaked with the technology, and they need to train in that technology."

Underwater Training

Naval Special Warfare operators use a submarine exploration diver propulsion vehicle during underwater training in the waters near Virginia Beach, Va. Training evolutions like this allow Naval Special Warfare personnel to refine their interoperability with fleet assets to extend their operational reach in the maritime domain.

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Working with allies and partners is second nature to special operators, and that will continue in a world of integrated deterrence, Shorter said. "For the past 20-plus years, we did a lot of work with our partners and allies, and they helped us immensely. It got to the point where you could intermix some of our partners and allies with U.S. SOF forces on operations and you couldn't tell the difference."

Shorter said this experience is invaluable. "You can’t surge relationships, you can’t surge trust," he said. "That’s just the human element. It’s constantly deploying to that same area. It’s understanding the culture. It’s drinking the cups of tea, eating the dinners, singing karaoke."

In addition to its role in great power competition, the counterterrorism mission did not go away. Terrorists still operate in shadowy areas around the world, and SOF personnel must be ready to confront them. "We can’t drop the ball on the CT fight," Shorter said. "What it means for us is that we have to modernize our CT efforts as well."

For the CT fight, SOF personnel must continue to work with conventional forces, interagency partners and counterterrorism forces from other nations. The command sergeant major said U.S. forces have been able to fold in technology that wasn’t available three years ago. And it is making a difference. "It allows us to sense, see and strike anywhere on the planet," he said.

U.S. special operations forces have a full plate, Shorter said, and they are approaching the various aspects of it with the same enthusiasm and morale that they have approached problems throughout their history. "It’s in our DNA," he said. "We will do what the country asks of us. The DOD’s main effort has always been SOCOM’s main effort."

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

3. Blinken Warns of Disinformation Threat to Democracies

Excerpts:

The U.S. promotes “digital and media literacy” programs abroad to help news consumers judge the reliability of content, Mr. Blinken said. But he cautioned that American adversaries were clever about laundering their propaganda and disinformation. China, for instance, has purchased cable television providers in Africa and then excluded international news channels from subscription packages, he said.

And increasingly powerful generative A.I. programs, Mr. Blinken said, can “fool even the most sophisticated news consumers.”

The State Department has urged social media platforms to take more action, including by clearly labeling A.I.-generated content. Meta, the parent company of Facebook, announced such a plan last month for content posted on Facebook and Instagram.

But experts at the conference said the challenge was enormous. Speaking on the subject later in the day, Oliver Dowden, the deputy prime minister of Britain, cited the example of an A.I.-generated image of Pope Francis in a puffer jacket that drew wide attention last year.

Mr. Dowden said that even though he understood that the image was fake, he retains a mental association between the pope and puffer jackets. Such images “influence your perceptions” subconsciously, he said.

Mr. Blinken spoke days after a new report commissioned by the State Department and released last week warned that artificial intelligence presents the world with “catastrophic risks.” The report said that an A.I. system “capable of superhuman persuasion” could undermine the democratic process.

Blinken Warns of Disinformation Threat to Democracies

At an international forum, the secretary of state said artificial intelligence’s ability to disrupt the global flow of information could prove politically perilous during a year of elections.

• https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/18/world/asia/blinken-artificial-intelligence-threat.html

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke about threats to global security posed by A.I.-generated disinformation at the Summit for Democracy in Seoul on Monday.Credit...Anthony Wallace/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Michael Crowley

Michael Crowley is traveling in Asia with the secretary of state.

March 18, 2024, 

6:28 a.m. ET

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Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken warned on Monday that a malicious “flood” of disinformation was threatening the world’s democracies, fueled in part by the swift rise of artificial intelligence, which he says sows “suspicion, cynicism and instability” around the globe.

Mr. Blinken spoke in Seoul at the Summit for Democracy, a global gathering organized by the Biden administration, which has made countering the authoritarian models of nations like Russia and China a top priority.

Mr. Blinken, who as a young man worked briefly as a journalist, said that changes to the international flow of information may be “the most profound” that he has experienced in his career, and that anti-democratic forces were exploiting those changes.

“Our competitors and adversaries are using disinformation to exploit fissures within our democracies,” he said.

He noted that countries totaling nearly half of the world’s population, including India, will hold elections this year under the threat of manipulated information. He did not mention the United States’ presidential election in November, which many analysts say could be influenced by foreign-directed information campaigns like the one Russia waged in 2016.

The U.S. promotes “digital and media literacy” programs abroad to help news consumers judge the reliability of content, Mr. Blinken said. But he cautioned that American adversaries were clever about laundering their propaganda and disinformation. China, for instance, has purchased cable television providers in Africa and then excluded international news channels from subscription packages, he said.

And increasingly powerful generative A.I. programs, Mr. Blinken said, can “fool even the most sophisticated news consumers.”

The State Department has urged social media platforms to take more action, including by clearly labeling A.I.-generated content. Meta, the parent company of Facebook, announced such a plan last month for content posted on Facebook and Instagram.

But experts at the conference said the challenge was enormous. Speaking on the subject later in the day, Oliver Dowden, the deputy prime minister of Britain, cited the example of an A.I.-generated image of Pope Francis in a puffer jacket that drew wide attention last year.

Mr. Dowden said that even though he understood that the image was fake, he retains a mental association between the pope and puffer jackets. Such images “influence your perceptions” subconsciously, he said.

Mr. Blinken spoke days after a new report commissioned by the State Department and released last week warned that artificial intelligence presents the world with “catastrophic risks.” The report said that an A.I. system “capable of superhuman persuasion” could undermine the democratic process.

It also cited an unnamed prominent A.I. researcher’s concern that “the model’s potential persuasive capabilities could ‘break democracy’ if they were ever leveraged in areas such as election interference or voter manipulation.”

Mr. Blinken discussed the threat of commercial spyware, which he said several governments had used to monitor and intimidate journalists and political activists. He said that six countries — Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Poland and South Korea — were joining a U.S.-led coalition to ensure that commercial spyware “is deployed consistent with universal human rights and basic freedoms.”

President Biden issued an executive order a year ago barring the U.S. government from using commercial spyware, though not similar tools built by U.S. intelligence agencies.

This week’s Summit for Democracy is the third installment of a forum started in 2021 by Mr. Biden, who said during his State of the Union address this month that “freedom and democracy are under attack both at home and overseas.” The meetings are intended to help other nations promote best civil society practices and defend against political sabotage.

Mr. Blinken’s visit to Seoul occurred as North Korea conducted its latest test launch of several short-range ballistic missiles. The launches came days after joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises that North Korea denounced as provocative.

Mr. Blinken did not mention the launches in his public remarks, although the State Department condemned them.

Matthew Miller, a department spokesman, also said in a statement that Mr. Blinken and the South Korean foreign minister, Cho Tae-yul, discussed “Pyongyang’s military support for Russia’s war against Ukraine” and North Korea’s “increasingly aggressive rhetoric and activities.”

Michael Crowley covers the State Department and U.S. foreign policy for The Times. He has reported from nearly three dozen countries and often travels with the secretary of state. More about Michael Crowley

4. It’s not just a theory. TikTok’s ties to Chinese government are dangerous.

It’s not just a theory. TikTok’s ties to Chinese government are dangerous.

A forced sale to a U.S. company would curtail China’s ability to use TikTok to promote disinformation or meddle in the upcoming U.S. elections.

Craig SingletonOpinion contributor

https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2024/03/18/tiktok-sale-ban-chinese-government-us-security/72988111007/

0:15

1:14

The House of Representatives last week delivered a clear ultimatum to Chinese technology giant ByteDance: Sell TikTok to American owners or see it removed from U.S. app stores. This bold, bipartisan move signals a new chapter in the intensifying standoff between Washington and Beijing, with lawmakers aiming to protect U.S. national security while fostering technological innovation.

By a vote of 352-65, the House overwhelmingly approved the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which critics have mischaracterized as an outright ban on TikTok. In fact, the bill provides the popular app with a legal lifeline to continue thriving − provided that an American entity takes the reins, ensuring adherence to U.S. laws and regulations.

The House’s objective is to limit the Chinese government’s control over TikTok’s content and blunt Beijing’s access to sensitive American data. A forced sale to a U.S. company would curtail China’s ability to use TikTok to promote disinformation or meddle in the upcoming U.S. elections, real-world risks recently underscored by U.S. intelligence officials.

Social media is addictive by design.We must act to protect our kids' mental health.

To the casual observer, TikTok might seem like just a hub for content and commerce, but it’s far more than that.

Beneath the veneer of viral dances and trends, the app also plays a significant role in advancing China’s larger geopolitical ambitions, marrying the Chinese Communist Party’s quest for narrative influence with its push for artificial intelligence supremacy.

Chinese government has seat on ByteDance board

Chinese national security laws require that all Chinese companies, including ByteDance, acquiesce to Beijing’s demands for intelligence, in effect blurring the lines between China’s so-called private sector and state surveillance. The Chinese government doesn’t just influence ByteDance from the intelligence shadows either; it has a seat on ByteDance’s board, which provides the Chinese government with direct influence over corporate decisions and, consequently, access to U.S. user information.

These threats are not theoretical. In 2022, ByteDance admitted its China-based employees brazenly accessed sensitive TikTok geolocation data to monitor American journalists.

This and subsequent revelations make clear that TikTok and other Chinese technology platforms are morphing into full-fledged state instruments of surveillance.

ByteDance's military entanglements further fan the flames of concern. With Beijing’s backing, ByteDance founded an AI academy charged with aiding China’s military. ByteDance’s partnerships with sanctioned Chinese firms, like iFLYTEK and SenseTime, both implicated in Chinese human rights atrocities, and Sugon, a Chinese company linked to China’s nuclear weapons program, underscore ByteDance’s dangerous entrenchment in China’s defense sector.

Meanwhile, divesting TikTok from ByteDance provides a path to balance innovation with security, enabling millions of American users and businesses to continue leveraging TikTok without subjecting their data to the whims of the Chinese government.

Sale of TikTok is best solution

Because current laws cannot prevent the complex security threats posed by Tiktok’s Chinese ownership, divesture emerges as the only viable solution that allows the app to continue contributing to America’s digital ecosystem without compromising democratic values and free speech in the U.S.

More specifically, the bill the House passed precisely targets only social media platforms, like TikTok, under the control of foreign adversaries, including China, Russia and Iran.

Pick your presidential waffling:Trump flip-flops on TikTok ban, Biden plays both sides.

The bill would have no impact on U.S. social media companies. This narrowly defined scope provides a clear, actionable framework for policymakers to protect America’s digital landscape from hostile countries intent on undermining our digital sovereignty, particularly with the looming threat of Chinese, Russian and Iranian interference in the 2024 U.S. elections.

Additionally, pending legislation would not in any way monitor or regulate free speech on social media, whether it be on TikTok or other platforms.

Rather, the House-passed bill seeks to reclaim TikTok’s algorithm from a government that research indicates has exploited the app to disseminate propaganda, impose censorship and circulate antisemitic content. Doing so will greatly reduce China’s ability to covertly shape U.S. public opinion or, worse, sow societal discord.

Despite passing the House with an overwhelming majority, ByteDance and Beijing are already gearing up to challenge the bill in the Senate, where its final passage is anything but certain.

What is clear is that the bill’s outcome will have far reaching implications beyond TikTok’s fate; it will signal America’s resolve to guard its cyber domain from hostile influence.

This is not about enacting a ban. It's about affirming commonsense boundaries in our new digital world.

Craig Singleton is a senior fellow at the nonpartisan Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former U.S. diplomat.

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 18, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin illegally annexed occupied Crimea 10 years ago, setting conditions for the full conquest of Ukraine Putin still seeks.
• Russian occupation authorities have consistently oppressed Ukrainians on the peninsula — the same charge of which Putin accused the Ukrainian government to justify his invasion — and Russia has since militarized Crimea to support its broader territorial ambitions against Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to use claimed record levels of voter turnout and support for his presidential candidacy to set informational conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine.
• Putin responded to French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent proposals to send Western troops to Ukraine by claiming that NATO personnel are already in Ukraine.
• Putin reemphasized the idea of a “sanitary zone” in Ukraine in a manner congruent with Russian Security Council Deputy Chair Dmitry Medvedev’s recent call for the total elimination of Ukrainian statehood and absorption into the Russian Federation.
• Putin admitted that the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteer forces are comprised of Russian citizens amid the continuation of cross-border raids into Belgorod Oblast on March 18.
• Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova baselessly accused Ukraine of conducting the reported March 17 drone strike against a military base in Transnistria, the pro-Russian breakaway republic of Moldova, likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin hybrid operation aimed at destabilizing Moldova.
• Russian forces recently made a marginal confirmed advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia needs to form a veteran-led Russian “Administrative Corps” as part of the “Time of Heroes” initiative, which will incorporate Russian veterans into the Russian workforce.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 18, 2024

Mar 18, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 18, 2024

Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 18, 2024, 8:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on March 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin illegally annexed occupied Crimea 10 years ago, setting conditions for the full conquest of Ukraine Putin still seeks. Putin signed an illegal annexation treaty with Crimean occupation officials on March 18, 2014, after Russian soldiers without identifying insignia (also known colloquially as “little green men” and, under international law, illegal combatants) swiftly and quietly invaded Crimea in February 2014.[1] Russian occupation officials staged a false and illegitimate referendum in Crimea on March 16, 2014, calling on Russia to annex Crimea.[2] Putin delivered an annexation speech to the Russian government on March 18, 2014, establishing the same false narratives he later used to set information conditions to justify and launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Putin falsely claimed that Russia was protecting Crimeans from the “oppressive“ Ukrainian government, that Ukraine is not a real state, and that Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians shared the same culture, civilization, and human values.[3] Putin celebrated the 10th anniversary of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2024, during which he attempted to justify his continued occupation of parts of Donbas and southern Ukraine and to set conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine.[4]

Russian occupation authorities have consistently oppressed Ukrainians on the peninsula — the same charge of which Putin accused the Ukrainian government to justify his invasion — and Russia has since militarized Crimea to support its broader territorial ambitions against Ukraine. Putin militarized Crimea for eight years and used it to launch a large-scale invasion of southern Ukraine in February 2022.[5] Russia also began efforts in 2014 to materially change the ethnic demographics of Crimea by resettling thousands of Russians in the peninsula and sought to eradicate both the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar national identities to further integrate Crimea into Russia and secure Russia’s control over the peninsula.[6] Amnesty International released a report commemorating the 10th anniversary of Crimean occupation on March 18 stating that Russian authorities have systematically tried to eradicate the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar national identities in Ukraine over the past 10 years by interrupting, limiting, and prohibiting the use of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages.[7] Amnesty International also reported that Russian occupation authorities have suppressed religious and cultural rights in Crimea, and extensively restricted freedom of speech. ISW has previously assessed that Russia is using a similar occupation playbook to establish permanent control over newly occupied territories in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[8] Putin’s aims were never limited to the annexation of Crimea, and his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 under the amorphous stated goals of “demilitarizing,” “denazifying,” and rendering Ukraine “neutral,” indicates that Putin sought nothing less than regaining full Russian control of Ukraine and still maintains this objective today. The conditions of occupied Ukraine suggest, however, that prolonged Russian occupation of already occupied territories or the rest of Ukraine will be accompanied by oppression and ethnic cleansing to consolidate permanent Russian control.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to use claimed record levels of voter turnout and support for his presidential candidacy to set informational conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine. The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) claimed on March 18 that Putin won the presidential election with 87.28 percent of the votes.[9] Russian CEC Chairperson Ella Pamfilova claimed that the Russian election had a record voter turnout of 77.44 percent.[10] The CEC claimed that the 2018 Russian presidential election had a 67.47 percent voter turnout and that Putin won with 76.67 percent of the vote.[11] Putin and senior Russian officials claimed that the reported record voter turnout and high public support for Putin demonstrated Russia’s unity and trust in Putin.[12] The CEC claimed that Putin won 88.12 to 95.23 percent of the vote in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, and Crimea.[13] Russian occupation officials have likely falsified record high support for Putin in occupied Ukraine and likely coerced Ukrainian citizens to participate in the elections, which were inherently coercive given the large number of Russian forces operating in occupied Ukraine.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that 99.8 percent of the personnel in the Russian armed forces voted in the presidential election of whom 97.27 percent voted for Putin.[15] Putin claimed that he did not expect such high election results in occupied Ukraine and that the results demonstrate that people in occupied Ukraine are “grateful for Russian protection” and, therefore, he said that Russia will do everything to ensure the “protection” of occupied Ukraine.[16] Putin is likely continuing efforts to set informational conditions to justify a protracted conflict and long-term occupation of Ukraine under the guise of “protecting” civilians in occupied Ukraine who are only in danger because of the Russian invasion.[17]

Putin responded to French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent proposals to send Western troops to Ukraine by claiming that NATO personnel are already in Ukraine. Putin stated on March 18 that military personnel from NATO member countries are already in Ukraine, including personnel who speak French and English, and acknowledged Macron’s claim that Western personnel would perform “secondary functions.”[18] Putin also reiterated Kremlin talking points about the possibility of full-scale conflict between Russia and NATO and Russia’s feigned interest in peace negotiations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and convincing Western countries to push Ukraine into negotiations that would ultimately undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.[19] Politico recently reported that France is prepared to build a coalition of countries that are open to sending Western military personnel to Ukraine following Putin’s recent claims that "Western escalations,” such as sending NATO military contingents to Ukraine, could risk nuclear conflict.[20] Putin’s claim that Western military personnel are already operating in Ukraine suggests that Putin believes that the West has already violated this purported “red line,” and thus that Western concern over Russia’s response to the violation of the “red line” (if it ever existed at all) is baseless. ISW previously noted that Ukrainian forces and Western assistance to Ukraine have crossed Russia’s supposed “red lines” several times over the course of the war without drawing a significant Russian reaction, indicating that many of Russia’s “red lines” are most likely information operations designed to deter Ukrainian and Western actions.[21]

Putin re-emphasized the idea of a “sanitary zone” in Ukraine in a manner congruent with Russian Security Council Deputy Chair Dmitry Medvedev’s recent call for the total elimination of Ukrainian statehood and absorption into the Russian Federation. Putin responded to a media question on March 18 on whether Russia needs to occupy Kharkiv Oblast to ensure security of Belgorod Oblast, stating that he does “not rule out” the idea of establishing a demilitarized “sanitary zone” in Ukrainian-controlled areas in response to recent “tragic events” along the Ukrainian-Russian international border. Putin was likely referring to recent pro-Ukrainian Russian cross-border raids in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts.[22] Putin called the depth of this demilitarized zone a “separate issue” and refused to discuss which areas Russia needs to occupy and when, but noted that Russia may need a demilitarized zone that is difficult for Ukraine to “overcome” using “primarily foreign made” weapons.[23] Putin has previously emphasized the idea of a demilitarized zone that would push Russia and Russian-occupied of Ukraine out of range of both Ukrainian and Western-provided weapons, a goal that is unobtainable as long as Ukraine remains independent with any capability of fighting because Putin would likely lay claim to any Ukrainian territory in the demilitarized zone.[24] Putin’s demilitarized zone narrative is subtler than Medvedev’s direct calls for the total annihilation of the Ukrainian state but is still congruent with the goals outlined in Medvedev’s sardonically-named seven point “peace plan.”[25] Medvedev reiterated the Kremlin’s calls for Ukrainian “demilitarization,” “denazification,” and total defeat that Putin has highlighted as the Kremlin’s war aims since February 2022, and Medvedev’s seven points have a strong ideological basis in Putin’s 2021 essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” as ISW has previously reported.[26]

Putin admitted that the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteer forces are comprised of Russian citizens amid the continuation of cross-border raids into Belgorod Oblast on March 18. Putin stated on March 18 that “four groups of traitors” (likely referring to the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), Siberian Battalion, and Ichkerian volunteers) are conducting cross-border raids into Russia and insinuated that Russia will execute the traitors.[27] Putin claimed that Russian forces have destroyed 800 of the 2,500 all-Russian pro-Ukrainian personnel he estimated to be involved in conducting the attacks into Russia.[28] Putin previously accused “Ukrainian forces” of conducted the cross-border raids on March 12 to 15.[29] Russian milbloggers praised Putin and agreed that Russian “traitors” need to “eliminated,” despite previously also claiming that “Ukrainian forces“ were conducting the raids into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts.[30] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the volunteer forces continued limited ground attacks near Spodaryushino and Kozinka, Belgorod Oblast and the Siberian Battalion posted a photo claiming to show volunteer forces operating in Kozinka.[31] The Russian MoD recently added a section to its daily situational report to account for the “Belgorod direction,” suggesting concern within the Russian MoD regarding how long these cross-border raids will continue.[32] Pro-Russian all-Ukrainian volunteer forces conducted isolated cross-border raids into Belgorod Oblast on March 22, June 1, and June 4–5 in 2023.[33] The previous raids appear to have been more limited than the current raids, which began on March 12 and have continued over the past six days.[34]

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova baselessly accused Ukraine of conducting the reported March 17 drone strike against a military base in Transnistria, the pro-Russian breakaway republic of Moldova, likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin hybrid operation aimed at destabilizing Moldova. Zakharova claimed on March 17 that the drone strike in Transnistria was a Ukrainian “attempt to shake [up] the situation in Transnistria and sow panic among Russian voters in Transnistria.”[35] Zakharova additionally claimed that official Moldovan statements denying Ukraine’s involvement in the strike are "ridiculous,” and Transnistrian authorities accused Moldovan authorities of an “inadequate reaction” to the strike and previous “terrorist attacks” in Transnistria.[36] The Moldovan Bureau of Reintegration previously stated that the drone strike was deliberately meant to spread fear and panic in Transnistria, implying that the strike was part of an adversarial information operation targeting Moldova, and the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation accused Russia of conducting the strike to manipulate the information space.[37] ISW cannot independently verify the details of the singular drone strike in Transnistria or identify the responsible actors, but it is unlikely that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike given the limited means used in the strike and the insignificance of the target. Russia or Russian-linked actors could benefit from the strike in order to further the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to set information conditions to justify a variety of Russian hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing Moldova.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin illegally annexed occupied Crimea 10 years ago, setting conditions for the full conquest of Ukraine Putin still seeks.
• Russian occupation authorities have consistently oppressed Ukrainians on the peninsula — the same charge of which Putin accused the Ukrainian government to justify his invasion — and Russia has since militarized Crimea to support its broader territorial ambitions against Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to use claimed record levels of voter turnout and support for his presidential candidacy to set informational conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine.
• Putin responded to French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent proposals to send Western troops to Ukraine by claiming that NATO personnel are already in Ukraine.
• Putin reemphasized the idea of a “sanitary zone” in Ukraine in a manner congruent with Russian Security Council Deputy Chair Dmitry Medvedev’s recent call for the total elimination of Ukrainian statehood and absorption into the Russian Federation.
• Putin admitted that the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteer forces are comprised of Russian citizens amid the continuation of cross-border raids into Belgorod Oblast on March 18.
• Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova baselessly accused Ukraine of conducting the reported March 17 drone strike against a military base in Transnistria, the pro-Russian breakaway republic of Moldova, likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin hybrid operation aimed at destabilizing Moldova.
• Russian forces recently made a marginal confirmed advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia needs to form a veteran-led Russian “Administrative Corps” as part of the “Time of Heroes” initiative, which will incorporate Russian veterans into the Russian workforce.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly unsuccessfully attacked along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and west of Kreminna near Terny.[39] Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) and the Chechen “Aida” detachment of the 204th “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna).[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces reportedly unsuccessfully attacked in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) on March 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled two Russian attacks near Rozdolivka (southwest of Siversk).[41]

Positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on March 18, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and in the direction of Chasiv Yar; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[42] Elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating northwest of Bakhmut; and elements of the “Vostok” Volunteer Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade are reportedly operating in the direction of Chasiv Yar.[43]

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Avdiivka on March 18, but there are no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced several hundred meters northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi and Orlivka and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[44] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured several positions near Novokalynove (north of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[45] Positional engagements continued northwest of Bakhmut near Oleksandropil, Berdychi, Semenivka, and Orlivka; west of Avdiivka near Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[46]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 18 that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces is deployed and operates along two main directions: Toretsk (northwest of Horlivka) and Pokrovsk (northwest of Avdiivka).[47] Mashovets specified that the Central Grouping of Forces includes Russian elements of the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Army Corps, and 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA), 41st CAA, and 90th Tank Division (all Central Military District [CMD]). Mashovets stated that the Russian elements of the 1st DNR Army Corps including five regiments and four battalions are operating in the direction of Toretsk. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd CAA, 41st CAA, 90th Tank Division, and 1st DNR Army Corps consisting of up to 23 regiments, 13 battalions, and four detachments — including some Storm (likely referring to Russian convict assault units) and BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) units — are operating in the Pokrovsk direction. Mashovets stated that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces is prioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction but could regroup to focus its offensive efforts in the Toretsk direction.

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 18, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda.[48] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[49]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 18, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske, and southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Vodyane.[50] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 5th CAA, 29th CAA, 36th CAA (all Eastern Military District [EMD]), and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are operating in the Velyka Novosilka area and amount to at least nine separate brigades, 11 regiments, and six battalions.[51]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional fighting in the area on March 18. Geolocated footage published on March 17 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced east of Luhivske (northeast of Robotyne).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 17 that Russian forces have captured half of Robotyne.[53] Positional fighting continued near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Myrne (northeast of Robotyne).[54] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army ([CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), and 7th and 76th airborne (VDV) divisions are fighting as part of the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces in the Orikhiv direction in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Mashovets stated that the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces consists of two separate motorized rifle brigades and “combined brigade tactical groups of military bases“ (presumably brigade-sized tactical formations created from one or more bases outside of doctrinal unit structures); up to 19 motorized rifle and VDV regiments; and at least 18 battalions and battalion-sized units of different types.[55] Elements of the Russian 291st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) and the 38th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) also continue operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[56] Elements of the Russian 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) continue operating near Robotyne.[57]

Positional fighting continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky on March 18.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions near the Antonivsky bridge, likely referring to the Antonivsky roadway bridge.[59]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched missile and drone strikes targeting Ukraine overnight on March 17 and March 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five S-300/400 missiles against Kharkiv Oblast and two Kh-59 cruise missiles against Sumy Oblast.[60] Ukrainian military officials also reported that Russian forces launched 22 Shahed 136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and that Ukrainian forces shot down 17 Shaheds over Kyiv, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhia, and Rivne oblasts.[61] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down one Shahed over Zaporizhia Oblast and two Shaheds over Kryvyi Rih area in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, but that an unspecified number of Shaheds struck and damaged private industrial facilities and residential buildings in Kirovohrad Oblast.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that explosions were heard in Volyn Oblast and that Russian forces struck the Svitlovodsk Oil Depot in Svitlovodsk, Kirovohrad Oblast.[63]

Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces likely adopted a new missile strike tactic targeting Ukrainian emergency personnel who respond to the aftermath of Russian missile strikes. Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk assessed that Russian forces likely paused between two Iskander-M missile strikes against the same location in Mykolaiv City on March 17 to strike Ukrainian emergency personnel who would have arrived at the scene after the first strike.[64] Humenyuk added that Russian forces employed a similar tactic when launching missile strikes on Odesa City on March 15.

Russian forces have reportedly dropped over 16 times more aerial bombs in the first months of 2024 than in all of 2023. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havryliuk stated that Russian forces have dropped more than 3,500 aerial bombs on Ukraine since the beginning of 2024.[65]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia needs to form a veteran-led Russian “Administrative Corps” as part of the “Time of Heroes” initiative, which will incorporate Russian veterans into the Russian workforce.[66] Putin stated during his post-election press interview overnight on March 17 and March 18 that Russia must prepare veterans who fought in Ukraine by providing them with higher education to pursue careers in medicine, national defense and security, or government. The “Time of Heroes” initiative may be part of ongoing Russian efforts incentivizing Russians to sign military service contracts in an exchange for promises of compensation and state benefits.

The Russian State Duma approved the second reading of a bill on March 18 that will free individuals of criminal liability if they sign contracts for military service.[67] The bill, which is likely to pass, will allow Russian authorities to expand their recruitment efforts beyond existing prisoner recruitment schemes.

South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik reported that North Korea shipped has about seven thousand containers with ammunition and other military equipment to Russia since unspecified timeframe in 2023.[68] Shin stated that North Korea likely received over 9,000 containers with aid from Russia.[69] South Korean officials and private experts stated that North Korea may have received food and economic aid and military assistance in upgrading its forces in exchange for its weapon deliveries to Russia.[70]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian state media claimed that Russian company “Kaysant” developed a system to shield Russian armored vehicles from first person vision (FPV) drones.[71] A Kaysant representative stated that the company developed a dome-type drone jammer that is designed for installation on vehicles and weighs only two kilograms. The system reportedly jams drones at 800 and 900 megahertz frequencies, and Kaysant plans to develop similar systems that will operate on three to four frequencies. Kaysant reportedly began production of these systems and had received orders from the Moscow government, and there are currently talks about mass deliveries of these systems to the frontlines.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine’s partners continue providing military assistance to Ukraine, including through the Czech artillery ammunition initiative. Bulgarian Defense Minister Todor Tagarev stated on March 14 that Bulgaria is sending 100 armored personnel carriers (APCs) built in the 1960s and 1970s to Ukraine and that the first batch of 30 APCs arrived on March 7.[72] German defense giant Rheinmetall announced on March 14 that it intends to open at least four factories in Ukraine.[73] The Portuguese government announced that it will allocate 100 million euros (about $108.7 million) to the Czech artillery ammunition procurement initiative.[74] Greek outlet Kathimerini reported on March 15 that Greek officials stated that Greece and the Czech Republic are negotiating a deal in which the Czech government will buy weapons from Greece and Greece will ship these weapons directly to Ukraine.[75] The deal includes 2,000 Zuni rockets, 75mm rocket ammunition, 90,000 rounds of anti-tank ammunition, four million small arms ammunition cartridges, and 70 155mm M114A1 howitzers. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz met with French President Emmanuel Macron and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and they discussed supplying more artillery ammunition to Ukraine through the Czech initiative and providing more long-range rocket artillery systems through a possible long-range artillery coalition.[76]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin officials and mouthpieces condemned Western leaders who refused to recognize Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rigged victory in the Russian presidential election and widely amplified congratulatory messages from other foreign leaders. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Germany of Russophobia in response to the German MFA’s statement that Russia’s “elections” in occupied Ukraine are invalid and violate international law.[77] Russian milbloggers also ridiculed the German government for not congratulating Putin.[78] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on March 18 that a number of former Soviet and authoritarian leaders friendly with Russia congratulated Putin on the election.[79]

Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov reiterated Kremlin narratives on March 18 intended to undermine Western support for Ukraine and additional US aid to Ukraine.[80] Antonov claimed that the US has abandoned restrictions on the supply of weapons to Ukraine and accused the US of directly participating in the war — a narrative that Kremlin officials routinely use to discourage further military aid to Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

6. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 18, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-18-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces conducted a "high-precision operation" at al Shifa Hospital based on intelligence that Hamas was using it for militant activity.
• Syria: Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas traveled to Tehran to discuss military cooperation with senior Iranian officials.
• West Bank: Israeli police have conducted training exercises in recent weeks to prepare for possible Palestinian militia attacks into Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a one-way drone attack targeting an unspecified Israeli airbase in the Golan Heights.
• Yemen: Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted 10 airstrikes targeting two Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 18, 2024

Mar 18, 2024 - ISW Press

Iran Update, March 18, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Anne McGill, Talia Tayoun, Kelly Campa, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Israeli forces conducted a "high-precision operation" at al Shifa Hospital on March 18 based on intelligence that Hamas was using it for militant activity.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that they had intelligence that senior Hamas officials were using the area to conduct and direct attacks in the Gaza Strip.[2] Israeli ground forces advanced to the hospital with bulldozers and tanks and detained more than 200 Palestinians.[3] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, engaged Israeli forces around al Shifa Hospital during the operation.[4]

Israeli forces killed Faiq al Mabhouh, who is a senior official in the Hamas-run Interior Ministry, during the operation.[5] The IDF said that Mabhouh was the head of Hamas’ “Operations Directorate of the Internal Security Service,” while Hamas said that he was the “director of central operations of the Palestinian Police in Gaza.”[6] The Civil Police and the Interior Ministry‘s Internal Security Forces both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[7] The IDF has warned that all members of “the Hamas apparatus,” including Hamas police officers, are legitimate targets during IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[8] Mabhouh’s brother, Mahmoud Mabhouh, was a prominent figure in Hamas’ military wing, and Israel likely killed him in 2010.[9]

Hamas' infiltration into the al Shifa Hospital area after Israel’s initial clearing operation highlights Hamas’ efforts to reestablish itself in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces initially expanded clearing operations to al Shifa Hospital in November 2023, targeting a Hamas tunnel network underneath the hospital.[10] Hamas has sought to reconstitute militarily and rebuild its governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip since Israeli forces reduced their presence there in December 2023. Israeli Army Radio reported in January 2023 that the Israeli military establishment believes that Hamas is trying to restore its control over the civilian population in the northern Gaza Strip partly by rehabilitating local police there.[11]

Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas traveled to Tehran on March 16 to discuss military cooperation with senior Iranian officials. Abbas met with Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Brig. Gen. Ali Akbar Ahmadian, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri from March 17 to 18.[12]

Abbas may have discussed Iran transferring air defense systems to Syria during his meetings. Abbas discussed recent Israeli airstrikes in Syria and how to counter them, among other issues. Iranian leaders have sought in recent years to build an integrated air defense network in Syria that could repel Israeli airstrikes and thereby help Iran entrench itself militarily in Syria.[13] The meetings with Ashtiani and Bagheri are particularly noteworthy in this context. Ashtiani, as defense minister, is primarily responsible for managing arms procurement and sales as well as the Iranian defense industrial base. Bagheri has previously pursued expanding air defense cooperation with Syria.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces conducted a "high-precision operation" at al Shifa Hospital based on intelligence that Hamas was using it for militant activity.
• Syria: Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas traveled to Tehran to discuss military cooperation with senior Iranian officials.
• West Bank: Israeli police have conducted training exercises in recent weeks to prepare for possible Palestinian militia attacks into Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a one-way drone attack targeting an unspecified Israeli airbase in the Golan Heights.
• Yemen: Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted 10 airstrikes targeting two Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation orders for parts of Rimal neighborhood and around al Shati Hospital in Gaza City on March 18.[14] The order requested residents immediately evacuate to the al Mawasi humanitarian zone in the southwest Gaza Strip.

The United States confirmed on March 18 that Israel killed Hamas military wing deputy commander Marwan Issa.[15] US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters that the rest of Hamas’ “top leaders are in hiding, likely deep in Hamas’ tunnel network.”[16] Issa worked closely with Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar and Hamas military wing commander Mohammad Deif to plan the October 7 attack.[17]

An unspecified Israeli official told Reuters on March 18 that Israel will send a high-level delegation to Doha for mediated negotiations with Hamas.[18] The official estimated that negotiations could take at least two weeks, noting the difficulties that Hamas’ delegation has in communicating with Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip. An unspecified Israeli political official told Israeli media that the current negotiations are between Israel and Hamas’ leader for the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, rather than Hamas officials abroad who have “neither power nor decision-making ability.”[19] Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Israel Katz noted in reference to the Israeli delegation that Israel will not be able to fight Hamas if Palestinian civilians return to the northern Gaza Strip.[20] Hamas has demanded that the IDF allow civilians to return to the northern Gaza Strip as part of ceasefire negotiations.[21] CTP-ISW previously reported how Hamas could use the return of civilians to the north to bring its own fighters back into the area.[22]

Unspecified US officials told NBC News on March 15 that Israel is considering using international private security contractors to protect aid convoys in the Gaza Strip.[23] The officials said that Israel has already approached several security companies but did not specify which ones. Israeli media reported on March 8 that Israeli officials have discussed arming civilians in the Gaza Strip to provide security for aid convoys.[24] The United States has warned Israel that a “total breakdown of law and order” is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the strip.[25] The absence of a local security force contributes to this issue.[26]

The US officials also noted that the United States is considering using unspecified Palestinian security providers, that are unaffiliated with Hamas, to distribute humanitarian aid.[27] The United States plans to construct a temporary pier on the coast of the Gaza Strip to facilitate the arrival and distribution of humanitarian aid.[28] The United States has stressed that US service members will not operate on the ground in the Gaza Strip.[29]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh and other Hamas officials met with a Chinese delegation in Qatar on March 17.[30] The Chinese ambassador to Qatar led the Chinese delegation. The two sides discussed the current situation in the Gaza Strip and ways to end the war.

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 18.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters at least twice in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 17.[31]

Israeli police have conducted training exercises in northwestern Israel in recent weeks to prepare for possible Palestinian militia attacks from Jenin and other areas in the West Bank into Israeli settlements.[32] The Israeli Lowland Police Division commander said that Israeli police are ”prepared for any scenario and intrusion.” Israeli forces have conducted numerous operations against Palestinian fighters in Jenin since the Israel-Hamas war began, including a three-day operation in the Jenin refugee camp in December 2023.[33]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 17.[34]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a one-way drone attack targeting an unspecified Israeli airbase in the Golan Heights on March 18.[35] The group also claimed that it will “double” its attacks during the month of Ramadan, which began on March 10 and ends on April 9.[36] Jordanian air defenses detected “suspicious aerial movements” along the Jordan-Syria border on March 18.[37] A regional security source told Western media that the movements were likely missiles fired from Iraq by Iranian-backed militias.[38]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi military spokesperson Major General Yahya Rasoul stated on March 18 that Iraq has sent military delegations to several unspecified countries to purchase anti-aircraft weapons.[39] Iraqi officials have called for strengthening Iraq’s air defense systems in recent weeks, particularly in response to US airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. A member of the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee, which is controlled by the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, claimed in early February 2024 that Iraq’s lack of advanced air defenses enables foreign airstrikes in Iraqi territory.[40] The committee member further claimed that the United States “refuses” to supply air defense systems to Iraq so that it can continue its “aggression” against Iraq.[41]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi in Baghdad on March 18 to discuss the IAEA’s efforts to help Iraq develop a peaceful nuclear program.[42] Sudani and Grossi discussed Iraq’s previous efforts to establish nuclear reactors.[43] Sudani emphasized that nuclear energy should be a “source of prosperity” and should not be used to develop lethal weapons.[44] Grossi invited an Iraqi delegation to visit the IAEA headquarters in Vienna to “set out a road map for the Iraqi peaceful nuclear program.”[45] Grossi also invited Sudani to attend the Nuclear Energy Summit in Brussels on March 21.[46] Iraq faces a power shortage and needs more energy to produce electricity.[47] Iraq currently imports electricity from neighboring countries, such as Iran, which supplied approximately 25 percent of Iraq’s electricity in 2022.[48]

Local Syrian opposition media reported on March 18 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) seeks to expand its military infrastructure at al Hamdan Airport in eastern Syria.[49] This reporting is consistent with Iran’s long-standing efforts to secure a permanent presence there. The IRGC has previously conducted training exercises at the airport.[50] The same Syrian opposition source claimed that the Lebanon-based construction company Jihad al Binaa will help the IRGC expand its operations at the airport.[51] Jihad al Binaa is a Lebanese Hezbollah-run and Iranian-funded construction company subject to secondary sanctions as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity.[52] Iran uses military infrastructure in eastern Syria to secure a safe route through which it can facilitate Iranian weapons shipments to its proxies and partners in the region.

Houthi-affiliated media claimed on March 18 that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted 10 airstrikes targeting two Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.[53] The Houthi source said that the strikes occurred in al Fazah and al Jabanah in Hudaydah Governorate. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom have confirmed the strikes at the time of this writing.

The Wall Street Journal reported on March 17 that Niger ended its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States after US officials accused Niger of secretly exploring a deal to allow Iran access to its uranium reserves.[54] Niger is the seventh largest uranium producer in the world.[55] Pentagon spokesperson Sabrina Singh stated that a US delegation traveled to Niger last week to express numerous concerns, including regarding Niger’s potential relations with Iran and Russia.[56]

CTP previously assessed that it is possible, though unlikely, that Iran attempts to obtain Nigerien uranium.[57] The Nigerien junta has not indicated that it intends to replace the French- and Canadian-based mining companies that currently own the majority shares in nearly all Nigerien uranium mines, including the only active one.[58]

7. Israel Sending Delegation to Washington to Discuss U.S. Concerns Over Rafah Invasion

Excerpts:

“What the president said today was, ‘I want you Mr. Prime Minister, to understand exactly where I am on this. You need a strategy that works…There is a better way,’” Sullivan said.

As an example of the flaws in Israel’s strategy, Sullivan cited its military raid on the Al-Shifa Hospital in northern Gaza early Monday, which Israeli troops first cleared of Hamas operatives months ago before withdrawing. But Hamas operatives returned to the hospital, requiring another Israeli operation.

“Israel cleared Shifa once and Hamas came back into Shifa, which raises questions about how to ensure a sustainable campaign against Hamas, so that it cannot regenerate, cannot retake territory,” Sullivan said.

Israel Sending Delegation to Washington to Discuss U.S. Concerns Over Rafah Invasion

U.S. worries that a full-scale operation to dislodge Hamas could worsen Gaza humanitarian crisis

By Vivian SalamaFollow, Omar Abdel-BaquiFollow and Summer SaidFollow

Updated March 18, 2024 9:48 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-raids-gaza-hospital-where-it-says-militants-regrouped-1a26205a?mod=hp_lead_pos3

WASHINGTON—Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has agreed to send a team of officials to Washington to discuss U.S. concerns over its planned military operation in southern Gaza that would potentially put over a million civilians at risk, the White House said, as Israel and Hamas began a key round of talks over hostages and a cease-fire proposal.

President Biden warned Netanyahu against an offensive in the city of Rafah in a frank phone call on Monday, escalating his pressure on Israel to rethink its war strategy and insisting it could still accomplish its goal of defeating Hamas, the U.S.-designated terror group whose attack last October sparked the war.

“A major ground operation there would be a mistake, it would lead to more innocent civilian deaths, worsen the already dire humanitarian crisis, deepen the anarchy in Gaza, and further isolate Israel internationally,” national security adviser Jake Sullivan said, describing Biden’s message to Netanyahu.

“More importantly, the key goals Israel wants to achieve in Rafah can be done by other means,” Sullivan added, not specifying further.

Mapping Refugee Movement in Gaza as Israel's Rafah Offensive Looms

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Mapping Refugee Movement in Gaza as Israel's Rafah Offensive Looms

Play video: Mapping Refugee Movement in Gaza as Israel's Rafah Offensive Looms

The majority of Gaza’s displaced population is sheltering in Rafah after Israeli forces gradually forced them south. Satellite images show there are few options in Gaza where they can go if Israel proceeds with a ground operation. Illustration: Annie Zhao

The White House salvo underscored Biden’s deep disagreements with Netanyahu—and the administration’s willingness to air the differences publicly, in hopes of swaying Israel and as a response to domestic critics who say Biden hasn’t done enough to rein in Netanyahu.

It comes after other recent steps by Biden and his allies to pressure Netanyahu’s government to increase the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza as signs of widespread hunger mount and to sign on to a U.S. postwar plan that includes a new diplomatic push for an independent Palestinian state.

Biden earlier this month declared that he might withhold U.S. weapons deliveries unless Israel takes steps to protect civilians in Rafah. But Sullivan said that the president had not made threats to Netanyahu on Monday.

“What the president said today was, ‘I want you Mr. Prime Minister, to understand exactly where I am on this. You need a strategy that works…There is a better way,’” Sullivan said.

As an example of the flaws in Israel’s strategy, Sullivan cited its military raid on the Al-Shifa Hospital in northern Gaza early Monday, which Israeli troops first cleared of Hamas operatives months ago before withdrawing. But Hamas operatives returned to the hospital, requiring another Israeli operation.

“Israel cleared Shifa once and Hamas came back into Shifa, which raises questions about how to ensure a sustainable campaign against Hamas, so that it cannot regenerate, cannot retake territory,” Sullivan said.

White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan briefs the press at the White House on Monday. PHOTO: ANDREW HARNIK/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Netanyahu’s office said that the two leaders discussed developments in the war, including Israel’s objective of eliminating Hamas, freeing the remaining hostages, humanitarian aid and “ensuring that Gaza never constitutes a threat to Israel.” It didn’t mention Israel’s commitment to send an interagency delegation. Israel didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Biden told Netanyahu there needed to be an “immediate ceasefire” lasting several weeks, to free hostages held by Hamas and permit more aid into Gaza, the president said in a post on X, the social-media site formerly named Twitter.

Netanyahu has argued that Hamas militants have burrowed themselves among the civilian population in Rafah and has vowed to proceed with invasion plans, in defiance of the growing international outcry over the soaring civilian death toll and concerns over the potential for famine.

Sullivan said the large numbers of people who have taken refuge in Rafah, have “nowhere else to go,” adding that most major cities in Gaza have “largely been destroyed.” An Israeli military operation would disrupt aid deliveries, given that Rafah is a major entry point for supplies coming via Egypt, which borders Gaza, he added. Finally, he said, Egypt has voiced “deep alarm” over any impending operation and has raised questions about its future relationship with Israel if a military operation were to take place.

“The president has rejected and did again today the straw man that raising questions about Rafah is the same as raising questions about defeating Hamas,” Sullivan said. He added that it is the administration’s expectation that Israel wouldn’t proceed with a major military operation in Rafah before the delegations have their coming strategy discussion.

Sullivan on Monday also confirmed that Hamas’s third-ranking operative, Marwan Issa, was killed in an Israeli operation last week, the highest-ranking Hamas official yet killed. Israel accused Issa of helping plan Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack. Israel’s military declined to comment on Issa’s status.

Palestinians rush for cover as smoke billows after Israeli bombardment in central Gaza City on Monday. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

A Palestinian woman cradles a wounded boy in central Gaza City. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Meanwhile, Israel and Hamas began a key round of talks in Qatar on Monday after an Israeli military raid on Gaza’s largest hospital showed the challenge of dismantling Hamas.

International mediators have told Israel that this is the final stage of negotiations, and if no deal is reached, the talks will end. 

An Israeli delegation led by intelligence agency Mossad’s chief, David Barnea, landed in Qatar, where the mediators—from the U.S., Egypt and Qatar—were expected to hold intense negotiations for as long as two weeks because of large gaps in their positions, an Israeli official said. It can also take 24 to 36 hours for messages to be sent back and forth to Hamas’s chief in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, who is believed to be in a tunnel inside the enclave.

The framework for a deal is around six weeks of cease-fire for some 40 hostages, according to the Israeli official. Key sticking points for Israel are Hamas’s demand that Israel allow Gazans to return to the north of the enclave, as well as control over which Palestinian prisoners will be released as part of the deal. Any deal will need to pass a vote in Israel’s cabinet.

During the last cease-fire from Nov. 24 to 30, Hamas released 105 of the more than 240 hostages abducted on Oct. 7. Israel released 240 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons.

Israel returns to Al-Shifa

The raid on Al-Shifa Hospital occurred after “concrete intelligence that demanded immediate action,” according to military spokesman Daniel Hagari. The Israeli military said it took control of a part of Al-Shifa after a five-hour battle, apprehended about 80 people, and killed a Hamas commander. One Israeli soldier was also killed.

Hagari said that senior Hamas militants had re-entered the hospital and were using it to direct attacks against Israel. Israel released a video that it said showed its troops coming under fire from militants at the complex. The Israeli military urged people present in and around the hospital to leave. Palestinian health officials said the raid threatened the lives of patients and thousands of displaced people at the hospital.

The raid on the hospital shows how Hamas militants have, according to the Israeli military, returned to places that had already been cleared by Israeli troops in northern Gaza, posing a challenge for Israel even as its forces continue operations it says are aimed at rooting out the group in the south. 

Family members break their fast during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan outside their destroyed home in Rafah, Gaza. PHOTO: FATIMA SHBAIR/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Palestinians in Gaza City gather to receive aid outside a United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees warehouse. PHOTO: MAHMOUD ISSA/REUTERS

Israel at the peak of its military operations had about 10 brigades in northern Gaza, a figure now reduced to two brigades, said retired Israeli Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland. The drawback in forces, Eiland said, has enabled militants to trickle back into areas previously cleared by Israel. “This is more or less what happened in the Shifa hospital,” he said.

If senior Hamas operatives have returned to the area around Al-Shifa, that throws into question the level of control the Israeli military has over the northern part of Gaza, said Mouin Rabbani, a nonresident fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, an independent research center based in Qatar. Israel’s military said it had previously destroyed militant infrastructure at and around Al-Shifa, which should have prevented the re-emergence of senior Hamas militants, he said.

“The claim is not that there were a bunch of cadres with light weapons—they are claiming that there are senior Hamas militants there,” Rabbani said. “That’s inconsistent with previous assertions that the military has been able to crack the movement in the northern Gaza Strip, and that senior leaders either fled south or were eliminated.”

Footage shared by the Ministry of Health in Gaza showed smoke rising around the hospital, with the sound of gunfire and aircraft buzzing overhead. Health officials said Israeli military vehicles were around the complex where they said a fire broke out and that several deaths and injuries occurred.

Amr Fawzi, a vascular surgeon at Al-Shifa, said because of shots and strikes fired toward the hospital, doctors were forced to shelter and were unable to treat patients, and that people were unable to leave the complex.

“We don’t know how to move around without the risk of being hit,” Fawzi said in an interview as he sheltered in the hospital. He added that Israeli military bulldozers destroyed parts of the complex used by ambulances.

Ahmed Almaqadma, a plastic surgeon at Al-Shifa, said only a few doctors remained at the hospital and nurses in recent months have mostly been volunteers rotating through. Almaqadma estimated that thousands of displaced people and hundreds of patients are still on Al-Shifa’s campus.

An injured Palestinian man waited for medical attention at Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on Friday. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Within the hospital, the Israeli military detained Al Jazeera correspondent Ismail Alghoul as he performed his journalistic duties, the network said. The reporter was beaten and taken to an unknown location, said Al Jazeera, citing what it said were witnesses, while camera equipment was destroyed. The Israeli military didn’t respond to a request for comment. The Committee to Protect Journalists said it was alarmed by the report and called for Alghoul’s release.  

The Ministry of Health in Gaza called on the United Nations to protect the hospital. World Health Organization Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said in a social-media post that hospitals should never be battlegrounds.

“Any hostilities or militarization of the facility jeopardize health services, access for ambulances, and delivery of lifesaving supplies,” he said. “Hospitals must be protected. Ceasefire!

Hospitals are protected under international law, but they can lose their special status when they are actively being used for hostile acts toward the enemy. Hamas said its forces were engaged in clashes with Israeli forces near Al-Shifa Hospital, and that they targeted Israeli military vehicles. Hamas released a statement calling the Israeli military operation “a new crime.”

Al-Shifa Hospital was at the center of contention between the Israeli military and Hamas in November. The military alleged that Hamas was operating a command and control center from Al-Shifa. While many security analysts had agreed that there was evidence released by the Israeli military of a Hamas armed presence at the hospital, most said they had not seen something that constitutes a smoking gun showing it was a major command center. The hospital’s director, Mohamed Abu Salmiya, has been missing since he was detained by Israeli forces in November, according to former and current Al-Shifa staff.

Those operations late last year effectively knocked the hospital out of service for a period and led to the evacuation of patients and displaced people. The hospital slowly restored some services in the weeks following the Israeli military’s withdrawal, with the facility being used to treat scores of Palestinians injured in a deadly aid convoy incident last month. 

Previous Israeli military raids into Al-Shifa took hours to build up. This time, it happened in a matter of minutes, said Fawzi, the surgeon, who says he has worked at Al-Shifa throughout the war.

The Israeli military said that past operations within the hospital complex were geared toward uprooting militant infrastructure, whereas Monday’s raid was focused on targeting militants.

Dov Lieber, Chao Deng and Carrie Keller-Lynn contributed to this article.

Write to Vivian Salama at vivian.salama@wsj.com, Omar Abdel-Baqui at omar.abdel-baqui@wsj.com and Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com

8. Taiwan’s Tough Call on How to Stop China: Bigger Weapons or Lots of Cheap Ones

What is the right balance?

Excerpts:

Taiwan fears the same plight if China amasses forces around the island in a blockade, or if Beijing’s military establishes a firm beachhead on Taiwan. In such scenarios, small, short-range weapons could be less effective at degrading the enemy, and Taiwan would need bigger hardware, Taiwanese defense officials and analysts say.

“The asymmetrical approach advocated by some people would put the whole of Taiwan into a meat grinder,” said I-Chung Lai, a former ruling-party foreign-affairs official now at Taiwan Thinktank, a research organization.

Figuring out the right weapons mix is among the most challenging tasks for Taiwan’s next president, Lai Ching-te, who takes office in May.

For the past few years, Taiwan’s procurement, under U.S. pressure, has put more emphasis on asymmetrical weapons such as Harpoon antiship missiles, Himars rocket launchers and mines.

The Taiwanese military has long favored heavy weapons such as tanks and jet fighters in preparation for a longer conflict against Beijing. If he agrees, President-elect Lai could push the U.S. to deliver more quickly on previously agreed orders for weapons such as M1 Abrams tanks, howitzers and F-16s.

...

Lai, the former ruling-party official at Taiwan Thinktank, said unless Taiwan has powerful naval vessels and updated jet fighters to break through the blockade, it would be effectively ceding its waters to China. A shoulder-mounted Stinger missile would be little use trying to breach a Chinese armada amassed off the coast, he said.

“We can’t just wait for them to arrive on the beaches,” Lai said.

A direct analogy to Ukraine could come if Chinese forces succeed in landing on Taiwan. American military strategists generally assume Taiwanese forces could hold out for a few months at most without outside support. But with U.S. intervention, the battle might shift to an effort to dislodge the Chinese military.

In that scenario, Taiwan would need the same equipment Ukraine is urgently requesting, strategists in Taiwan say. 

“Asymmetrical weapons are necessary but not sufficient for the challenges Taiwan faces,” said Guermantes Lailari, a former U.S. Air Force officer who is now a research fellow at National Chengchi University in Taiwan.

Taiwan’s Tough Call on How to Stop China: Bigger Weapons or Lots of Cheap Ones

U.S. has pushed less-expensive asymmetrical tactics to resist possible Chinese invasion

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/taiwans-tough-call-on-how-to-stop-china-bigger-weapons-or-lots-of-cheap-ones-fb85f81e?mod=hp_lista_pos3

By Alastair Gale

Follow

March 18, 2024 9:00 am ET

Military personnel prepare for a missile-loading exercise at Hualien air base in the Taiwan’s east. PHOTO: JOHNSON LAI/ASSOCIATED PRESS

TAIPEI—David shouldn’t rely too much on slingshots to repel Goliath. He’ll need plenty of tanks and jet fighters too.

That is the takeaway for defense officials and scholars in Taiwan from the latest developments in Ukraine, where Kyiv has struggled to block Russian advances while waiting for allies to deliver more powerful hardware.

The need for heavy weapons has been a point of contention between Taipei and Washington in discussing how Taiwan would blunt a Chinese attempt to seize the island.

For more than a decade, U.S. officials have encouraged Taiwan to invest in small, relatively cheap weapons such as shoulder-fired missiles, drones and sea mines. The goal would be to bring a Chinese amphibious invasion force to a halt at close range with thousands of small strikes.

Such asymmetrical warfare is a favorite tactic of guerrillas and weaker nations facing big rivals. Ukraine’s initial successes in using asymmetrical weapons such as Javelin missiles in destroying Russian tanks and severing supply convoys showcased the tactic.

More recently, however, Ukraine has felt the want of America’s most powerful big-ticket weapons—from F-16 jets to M1 Abrams tanks, delivered so far in only small quantities. Ukraine had trouble last year breaking through fortified positions established by Russian troops, giving Moscow time to build its strength before a possible spring offensive this year.

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A conflict between the U.S. and China over Taiwan has become a commonplace discussion in the national security community. A military strategist lays out the outcome of a potential war in the Taiwan Strait based on recently conducted war games.

Taiwan fears the same plight if China amasses forces around the island in a blockade, or if Beijing’s military establishes a firm beachhead on Taiwan. In such scenarios, small, short-range weapons could be less effective at degrading the enemy, and Taiwan would need bigger hardware, Taiwanese defense officials and analysts say.

“The asymmetrical approach advocated by some people would put the whole of Taiwan into a meat grinder,” said I-Chung Lai, a former ruling-party foreign-affairs official now at Taiwan Thinktank, a research organization.

Figuring out the right weapons mix is among the most challenging tasks for Taiwan’s next president, Lai Ching-te, who takes office in May.

For the past few years, Taiwan’s procurement, under U.S. pressure, has put more emphasis on asymmetrical weapons such as Harpoon antiship missiles, Himars rocket launchers and mines.

The Taiwanese military has long favored heavy weapons such as tanks and jet fighters in preparation for a longer conflict against Beijing. If he agrees, President-elect Lai could push the U.S. to deliver more quickly on previously agreed orders for weapons such as M1 Abrams tanks, howitzers and F-16s.

Preparing weapons and munitions in sufficient quantities is vital for Taiwan because it would be harder to deliver supplies during a conflict. While Ukraine can receive supplies by road and rail across its western border, shipments to Taiwan would have to come through air and sea lanes patrolled by China.

The U.S. is deeply intertwined in the discussion because it provides much of Taiwan’s military equipment and helps to train its air, land and sea forces.

Under the current president, Tsai Ing-wen, Taipei edged closer to U.S. thinking about asymmetrical weapons. It stepped up orders for several types of them such as 400 land-launched Harpoon missiles, although the U.S. has struggled to deliver them quickly. Taiwan is also ramping up its own missile production, including Hsiung Feng antiship missiles that are similar to Harpoon missiles.

The U.S. pressure didn’t mean Taipei stopped buying big-ticket items. During the Trump and Biden administrations, Taiwan signed contracts to buy $4.4 billion in asymmetrical weapons, including the Harpoon missiles, compared with $11.7 billion in orders for conventional weapons, according to a tally last year by the Cato Institute, a Washington, D.C., think tank.

Those conventional weapons include 66 F-16s and 108 M1 Abrams tanks, big orders made during the Trump administration that are due to reach Taiwan in the next few years.

U.S. officials and military scholars have long believed that the expensive hardware is apt to get wiped out by China’s much larger military, the People’s Liberation Army, in the early stages of attack. Simulations of an all-out Chinese invasion run by American think tanks assume most of the Taiwanese air force or navy would be quickly destroyed by Chinese missile strikes.

Without shifting to a full asymmetrical defense approach, Taiwan risks a quick defeat if invaded, said Michael Hunzeker, a security scholar at George Mason University in Virginia. He and others observe that the Taiwanese military’s penchant for pricey weapons limits funds for what the skeptics see as more effective tools such as shoulder-fired missiles.

“For those of us who are critical of the Taiwanese military, if we see what we see, the PLA sees it even better,” he said.

Some in Taiwan are also giving Lai similar advice. They say the self-governing democracy of 23.5 million people has no chance of winning a head-to-head battle with Beijing and its two million active-duty military service members.

Lee Hsi-min, Taiwan’s top military officer from 2017 to 2019, started a program to deploy tiny assault boats that could hide in fishing harbors and make hit-and-run style missile attacks on any Chinese invasion force. The program was scrapped after Lee left office.

Lee said Taiwan’s $14 billion military budget wasn’t enough to bring the fight to Beijing in all domains, and the focus should lie in countering the amphibious invasion force that China would ultimately need to seize Taiwan’s beaches and airfields. “We have to prioritize our existence,” Lee said.

Those on the other side of the debate say that missing in this picture is consideration of other scenarios in which traditional weaponry would play an important role. One such scenario is a blockade, a strategy documented in Chinese military texts and viewed as more likely than a sudden invasion in a recent survey of 52 American and Taiwanese scholars.

A Chinese blockade would use ships and aircraft to cut Taiwan off from fuel and other supplies, seeking to pressure it to submit without a fight.

Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s president-elect, could push the U.S. to speed up the delivery of previously agreed weapons. PHOTO: LOUISE DELMOTTE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Lai, the former ruling-party official at Taiwan Thinktank, said unless Taiwan has powerful naval vessels and updated jet fighters to break through the blockade, it would be effectively ceding its waters to China. A shoulder-mounted Stinger missile would be little use trying to breach a Chinese armada amassed off the coast, he said.

“We can’t just wait for them to arrive on the beaches,” Lai said.

A direct analogy to Ukraine could come if Chinese forces succeed in landing on Taiwan. American military strategists generally assume Taiwanese forces could hold out for a few months at most without outside support. But with U.S. intervention, the battle might shift to an effort to dislodge the Chinese military.

In that scenario, Taiwan would need the same equipment Ukraine is urgently requesting, strategists in Taiwan say. 

“Asymmetrical weapons are necessary but not sufficient for the challenges Taiwan faces,” said Guermantes Lailari, a former U.S. Air Force officer who is now a research fellow at National Chengchi University in Taiwan.

Beach defenses on the Taiwanese island of Kinmen, with the city of Xiamen, China, in the background. PHOTO: ALEX WONG/GETTY IMAGES

Write to Alastair Gale at alastair.gale@wsj.com

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the March 19, 2024, print edition as 'Taiwan Faces Tough Call Over Weapons Choice'.

9. Biden Weakens America’s Global Clout

Excerpts:

The administration’s declining power to deter our adversaries is the biggest problem for American foreign policy, for world peace and, potentially, for Mr. Biden’s re-election. Like a scarecrow that no longer keeps hungry birds from pecking at the corn, Team Biden is losing the ability to prevent hostile powers from picking at the foundations of the American-led world order.

It isn’t all Mr. Biden’s fault. American foreign policy has been on a losing streak since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and some bills for past foolishness are coming due on his watch. Under presidents of both parties, we haven’t kept pace with China’s military buildup even as we allowed the industrial infrastructure that supports our military power to decay. Mr. Putin attacked Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. The U.S. and its European allies failed to respond effectively in either case.

Internal American politics continue to diminish America’s global clout. The possibility that Donald Trump will return to the White House in 2025 and reverse many Biden-era policies undercuts Team Biden’s credibility with friends and foes alike. And polls pointing to rising isolationist sentiment in the U.S. have many foreign leaders believing that America is a diminishing force in global affairs.

Biden Weakens America’s Global Clout

Step one for renewed respect is a serious defense budget. Step two: Kill some crows.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-weakens-americas-global-clout-defense-budget-deterrence-failure-44d13d14?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

By Walter Russell Mead

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March 18, 2024 4:43 pm ET

PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES/ISTOCKPHOTO

With Niger’s gross domestic product at a miserable $545 per person in 2022, the United Nations ranks the landlocked country as one of the five least-developed nations on the planet.

Over the weekend Niger’s government responded to American accusations that it was negotiating to sell uranium to Iran by ending military cooperation with the U.S. The decision is another win for Vladimir Putin’s effort to extend Russian power, a welcome boost to Iran, and a serious blow to America’s plans for combating the return of jihadist violence across a swath of Africa.

It is also one more sign that the Biden administration is losing its ability to shape international events.

In blowing off President Biden, Niger’s military junta is joining a global trend. Mr. Putin renews his threats of nuclear use, rejects talk of diplomacy and hints at even greater ambitions as he grinds out bloody conquests in Ukraine. Iran is helping one of its proxies close the Red Sea while another fires missiles and rockets into Israel. North Korea is beefing up its nuclear and conventional forces. China is massively boosting defense spending while pressing its advantages across the Indo-Pacific and into the Western hemisphere. From Haiti to Sudan, warlords and gang bosses thumb their noses at American diplomatic efforts to restore stability.

The administration’s declining power to deter our adversaries is the biggest problem for American foreign policy, for world peace and, potentially, for Mr. Biden’s re-election. Like a scarecrow that no longer keeps hungry birds from pecking at the corn, Team Biden is losing the ability to prevent hostile powers from picking at the foundations of the American-led world order.

It isn’t all Mr. Biden’s fault. American foreign policy has been on a losing streak since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and some bills for past foolishness are coming due on his watch. Under presidents of both parties, we haven’t kept pace with China’s military buildup even as we allowed the industrial infrastructure that supports our military power to decay. Mr. Putin attacked Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. The U.S. and its European allies failed to respond effectively in either case.

Internal American politics continue to diminish America’s global clout. The possibility that Donald Trump will return to the White House in 2025 and reverse many Biden-era policies undercuts Team Biden’s credibility with friends and foes alike. And polls pointing to rising isolationist sentiment in the U.S. have many foreign leaders believing that America is a diminishing force in global affairs.

But if the erosion of America’s deterrent power isn’t all Mr. Biden’s fault, his policies aren’t reversing the decline. From the catastrophically bungled withdrawal from Afghanistan to the delay in sending advanced weapons to Ukraine in the face of Mr. Putin’s threats, Mr. Biden’s White House takes step after step that cumulatively teach friends and foes to see the U.S. as a declining power that is easily cowed and in retreat.

The shockingly inadequate fiscal 2025 defense budget request the administration released last week is an incitement to our enemies to step up their war plans. Team Biden is telling the world that America is cutting defense in real terms even as threats of war mount on every side. In his most recent State of the Union address, Mr. Biden compared 2024 to 1941 as a year of critical danger for freedom worldwide. In 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt more than quadrupled defense spending. Nothing could be further from the Biden plan.

A declining real defense budget is one of many signals of retreat the White House is broadcasting to the world. We have made clear to Mr. Putin that his nuclear threats over Ukraine weaken our resolve rather than stiffen our spine. North Korea believes it has nothing to fear from the U.S.

Then there is the Middle East. The Red Sea is nearly closed. Gaza is in flames. A quasi-war simmers on Israel’s northern border. Iranian militias gather strength in Iraq as Iran’s ally Bashar al-Assad tightens his grip on Syria. Iran aids Russia’s aggression in Ukraine while simultaneously strengthening ties with criminal groups and rogue regimes in the Western hemisphere.

As China thinks about the consequences of blockading Taiwan, it is carefully watching how Team Biden handles Iran. So far, it sees little to fear.

Crows cluster where scarecrows fail. If Team Biden wants a world with fewer challenges to the American order, it must restore respect for American power, competence and will. Step one would be to submit a serious defense budget to the Congress, one that demonstrates American resolve to support our friends and deter our adversaries in key global theaters.

Step two is to kill some crows.

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Speaking at the 2024 AFA Warfare Symposium, Gen. James Hecker described what the U.S. has learned from unmanned aerial vehicles—or UAVs—in Ukraine, and how they will change warfare. Images: AFP/Getty Images/U.S. Air Force via AP Composite: Mark Kelly

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Appeared in the March 19, 2024, print edition as 'Biden Weakens America’s Global Clout'.

10. Israeli forces raid Gaza City hospital; U.S. confirms death of top Hamas leader

Israeli forces raid Gaza City hospital; U.S. confirms death of top Hamas leader

By Miriam Berger, Louisa Loveluck and Hajar Harb

March 18, 2024 at 5:43 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Miriam Berger · March 18, 2024

JERUSALEM — Israel’s army said Monday it had killed a Hamas official inside Gaza City’s al-Shifa medical complex, an operation that unfolded as experts warned that the northern part of the enclave may already be in the grip of famine.

The White House, meanwhile, confirmed that Marwan Issa, the deputy commander of Hamas’s military wing, was killed in an Israeli strike earlier this month in central Gaza.

The highest-ranking militant commander to be killed in more than five months of war, Issa was believed by Israel to have played a central role in Hamas’s day-to-day military operations and to have helped plan its attack on Oct. 7.

“The rest of the top leaders are in hiding, likely deep in the Hamas tunnel network,” national security adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters Monday. “And justice will come for them, too.”

The news of Issa’s death was overshadowed by the operation at al-Shifa — the latest Israeli attack on hospitals, which the Israel Defense Forces has said are used by Hamas as a cover for military activities. The assaults have damaged or shuttered a number of major medical facilities and, according to humanitarian groups, put Gaza’s health system on the verge of collapse.

Israel’s claims about the military significance of the operation at al-Shifa were swiftly contested by Palestinian officials, who identified the target of the raid as a police official. Civilians in the hospital said they were trapped by the fighting.

The IDF said in a statement that the raid had “eliminated” Faiq Mabhouh, a senior official within Hamas’s internal security division who was responsible for coordinating the group’s militant activities across the Gaza Strip. The Hamas-run Al-Aqsa TV network said that Mabhouh was a director of police operations who coordinated and protected aid deliveries. The Washington Post could not independently confirm his role.

Overall, 20 militants were killed in “various engagements” around the hospital, the IDF said, adding that money and weapons had been recovered from one of the buildings.

Once the enclave’s largest hospital, al-Shifa had “only recently restored minimal health services” after an Israeli raid on the facility in mid-November, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, director general of the World Health Organization, posted Monday on X. “Hospitals must be protected,” he said, warning that fighting was “endangering health workers, patients and civilians.”

In going after Mabhouh, Israel appeared to continue a pattern of attacks on members of Gaza’s police force. Civil servants under Hamas’s prewar government, police officers played a key role guarding international aid convoys until last month, when Israel began targeting them.

The subsequent withdrawal of police from the aid delivery process, according to humanitarian groups and U.S. officials, left convoys open to looting by desperate civilians and criminal gangs, and made it nearly impossible to get assistance to starving families in the north.

Israel asserts that all Hamas members are legitimate military targets. Last week, the IDF struck a U.N. food distribution center in Rafah, in the south, killing a U.N. staffer and injuring more than 20. Israel said the attack killed a Hamas commander; Hamas described the dead man as the deputy head of police operations in Rafah.

The Gaza Health Ministry, which does not distinguish between civilians and combatants, says more than 31,000 Palestinians have been killed in Israel’s military campaign to end Hamas rule — launched after the militant group led an ambush on Israeli border communities on Oct. 7, killing about 1,200 people and taking more than 250 hostages. The IDF estimates it has killed between 11,500 and 13,000 militants.

Civilians across the enclave, particularly the estimated 300,000 people trapped in the north, are struggling to survive. On Monday, a U.N.-backed report said that famine may already have reached the northern region, and that more than half of Gaza’s 2.2 million residents were facing catastrophic levels of hunger.

“Starvation is used as a weapon of war,” Josep Borrell, the European Union’s most senior foreign policy official, said Monday. “Let’s dare to say by whom. By the one that prevents humanitarian support entering into Gaza.”

Israel denies that it is limiting the flow of aid into Gaza, blaming the United Nations for failing to distribute aid and Hamas militants for diverting it from those in need.

The Biden administration has continued to supply its closest Middle Eastern ally with weapons and diplomatic support, even as it urges the Israeli military to do more to limit the bloodshed and allow aid to flow freely.

Amid growing strain in their relationship, President Biden spoke Monday with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the first time since Feb. 15. According to Sullivan, Biden told Netanyahu he was “deeply concerned” by Israel’s plans for a ground invasion of Rafah, where some 1.4 million displaced Palestinians have sought refuge.

But Sullivan also backed the latest Israeli raid on al-Shifa: “Israel states that it was going after senior Hamas commanders and Hamas militants, and it is clear that Hamas fired back at Israel from that hospital,” he said.

While much about what transpired inside the hospital remained unclear, videos posted online and verified by The Post provided clues about how the raid unfolded outside. In a video posted to X at 9:38 a.m. Monday in Gaza, at least two tanks are visible on al-Qassam Road, directly outside the southeastern gates of al-Shifa, the hospital’s primary entrance. The video is filmed overlooking the complex’s courtyard, around which several of its key medical buildings are located.

A military bulldozer is shown tearing up the pavement of the courtyard in another video posted to X at 12:43 p.m. local time, filmed near the emergency unit building.

A third video, posted later Monday, appeared to show about half of the courtyard had been bulldozed. Several vehicles, including at least two ambulances visible in the earlier footage, appeared to have been destroyed, mashed together in a heap of soil, cars and pavement.

Reached by phone inside the hospital, Duaa, 43, told The Post she was among a large group of people who had been trapped in the facility’s waiting room since late Sunday night. She spoke on the condition she be identified by only her first name, fearing reprisals for speaking to the media.

“No one can come in and out,” she said. “There is no one who is armed or a terrorist. We are all innocent and civilians.”

One of Duaa’s sons was hospitalized in al-Shifa after a leg amputation, she said. She was a single mother — her husband was killed early in the war, she said — and was desperate to get him better treatment and a prosthetic leg. Those gathered inside the hospital had little to no access to food, water or bathrooms for hours on end, she said.

Another patient at the hospital, Mohammed Hassan, 29, also reached by Duaa’s phone, said that loud noises had startled the patients there Sunday evening.

“They closed the doors and we don’t know anything,” he said. “We just hear the sound of gunfire and shelling.”

The IDF described the raid as a “precise operation” targeting senior Hamas militants who had “regrouped inside al-Shifa Hospital and are using it to command attacks against Israel,” according to spokesman Daniel Hagari.

But the role of Faiq Mabhouh, the only named target, was shrouded in conflicting claims.

He was the brother of former Hamas military commander Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, who was assassinated in Dubai in 2010, according to Michael Milshtein, a former head of the Palestinian division of Israeli military intelligence. Unlike his brother, Mabhouh had been an important figure in upholding law and order in the enclave, Milshtein said, and his death would have a limited impact on the “military capabilities of Hamas.”

Senior police officials often wear “double hats” and are involved with the military wing, he said, but added that Mabhouh’s role in the police was probably enough to make him a target for Israel. “He represents Hamas and he’s a senior figure,” he said. “This was the main problem.”

Gaza’s Civil Defense spokesman, Mahmoud Bassal, also linked Mabhouh to the aid apparatus serving north Gaza, calling him “the Director of Operations at the Ministry of Interior and the coordinator of aid operations with other agencies such as UNRWA and the tribes.” But UNRWA, the U.N. agency for Palestinians, denied having any connection to Mabhouh.

The IDF said late Monday that 200 “terror suspects” had been arrested for questioning inside al-Shifa and that the operation was ongoing.

An Al Jazeera correspondent, Ismail Alghoul, was among a number of journalists detained at the scene, the network said. The Qatari-owned network said that Alghoul was released after 12 hours, during which time he was beaten and his recording equipment was destroyed. The IDF said it was looking into the claims.

Loveluck and Harb reported from London. Loveday Morris in Berlin, Jarrett Ley in New York, Hazem Balousha in Amman, Jordan, and Cate Brown in Washington contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Miriam Berger · March 18, 2024

11. SASC chair anticipates push for ‘significant reforms’ in 2025 NDAA to help Pentagon acquire new tech

Excerpts:

A commission on reforming defense planning, programming, budgeting and execution recently delivered its final report to Congress, a nearly 400-page document that recommends a slew of changes in these areas.

“We are thinking … very seriously about that. The PPBE panel was extremely well done, the report was excellent,” Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., told reporters Monday during a Defense Writers Group meeting. “Frankly, we have been trying to reform the acquisition and budget system of the Department of Defense since I got here, and we make incremental progress. But we’re recognizing now that time is really not on our side, that we have to move much more aggressively. We have to be more responsive and flexible. And so … you’ll see a much more keener interest in trying to streamline how DOD develops and acquires equipment, how they deal with these new emerging technologies, which are changing so quickly. So we’re really interested in moving forward with significant reforms.”

SASC chair anticipates push for ‘significant reforms’ in 2025 NDAA to help Pentagon acquire new tech

defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · March 18, 2024

Trying to improve acquisition processes to help the Pentagon modernize its forces isn’t a new item on Congress’ agenda. But the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee told reporters that he expects lawmakers to move more aggressively to institute major reforms in the fiscal 2025 defense policy bill.

A commission on reforming defense planning, programming, budgeting and execution recently delivered its final report to Congress, a nearly 400-page document that recommends a slew of changes in these areas.

“We are thinking … very seriously about that. The PPBE panel was extremely well done, the report was excellent,” Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., told reporters Monday during a Defense Writers Group meeting. “Frankly, we have been trying to reform the acquisition and budget system of the Department of Defense since I got here, and we make incremental progress. But we’re recognizing now that time is really not on our side, that we have to move much more aggressively. We have to be more responsive and flexible. And so … you’ll see a much more keener interest in trying to streamline how DOD develops and acquires equipment, how they deal with these new emerging technologies, which are changing so quickly. So we’re really interested in moving forward with significant reforms.”

On Wednesday, the Senate Armed Services Committee will be holding a hearing with leaders of the PPBE commission to discuss their findings and recommendations.

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“The U.S. risks losing more of its already diminishing technological edge without immediate transformational changes in resourcing, especially in the year of execution. The Commission’s recommendations include much-needed changes to the period of availability of funds, account structures, reprogramming processes, and data sharing with Congress. These reforms also leverage modern business systems and data analytics to better manage resourcing and communications,” the report stated.

“One of the most consistent concerns the Commission heard over the past two years is that the current PPBE process lacks agility, limiting the Department’s ability to respond quickly and effectively to evolving threats, unanticipated events, and emerging technological opportunities,” it noted.

The panel’s recommendations for changes to help foster innovation and adaptability include allowing new-start programs and increased program quantities in certain cases when the Pentagon is operating continuing resolutions.

“The CRs generally include a provision prohibiting new start activities, which can slow efforts to insert innovative technology in both new and current programs,” the report noted.

The commission also called for increasing the availability of operating funds and raising dollar amount thresholds for so-called below threshold reprogramming (BTR), among other recommendations.

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“Ultimately the Commission proposes eliminating BTRs and allowing a small percentage of an entire appropriation to be realigned with appropriate congressional briefings and oversight,” per the report.

Reed did not identify which of the recommended reforms he wants to implement, but he said including some of them will be a top priority when his committee takes up work on drafting the fiscal 2025 National Defense Authorization Act.

The SASC wants to move forward in its quest to streamline the acquisition process and enable promising capabilities and technologies to cross the so-called “valley of death” between research and development and large-scale production, he said.

Reed noted that he’s visited Ukraine and seen how Ukrainian forces have been able to quickly adapt commercial, dual-use technologies for military purposes in their fight against Russian invaders.

“We have to have the same type of resiliency. So that’s one thing we want,” he said.

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Tech from the commercial sector, such as artificial intelligence and cyber capabilities, can help fuel military modernization in areas such as robotics. However, current budgeting and execution processes don’t give the Pentagon sufficient agility in adopting them, the PPBE commission said.

Meanwhile, the department last week submitted its fiscal 2025 budget request to Congress, which lays out plans for its modernization programs.

On Monday, Reed was asked to comment on the budget submission.

“Every budget is a work in progress. And we’re going to look very carefully at what the services need. We’re particularly waiting for their unfunded priority list so we can take a look at them. And then we’re going to make judgments, some of them independent of the administration’s proposal. But generally, I believe the … proposal sent out was thoughtful. It emphasized the need for innovation and it put pressure on the Congress to retire some systems that are no longer as functional as necessary. And we have to take our [legislative] responsibility too. And so I think we’re in a good position to begin this debate and get it done — hopefully this year, not next year,” he said.

Pentagon officials suggested that the DOD trimmed some of its requests for research, development, test and evaluation efforts — such as the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve — due to budget caps stemming from the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act.

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“The Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) caps are mandatory and, if disregarded or exceeded, would be enforced by sequestration. Understanding those fiscal constraints, the Department made responsible choices to prioritize readiness and take care of people but make targeted reductions to programs that will not deliver capability to the force until the 2030s, preserving and enhancing the Joint Force’s ability to fight and win in the near term,” a DOD spokesperson said in an email to DefenseScoop.

Reed was asked how politically feasible it would be to lift the FRA caps, which set limits for defense and non-defense discretionary spending that vary depending on whether Congress passes full-year appropriations bills or CRs.

“We’re stuck with them right now. And it was really a quid pro quo for saving the country from an economic collapse if we hadn’t increased the debt ceiling. And now, it’s somewhat ironic that many of the folks that were insisting on that are now saying that the ceiling is terrible,” Reed said.

He noted that funding for border security has been one of the major sticking points in recent budget negotiations.

However, Reed suggested that he sees a potential opportunity to reach a deal on increasing spending for the Pentagon and other agencies in the future.

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“I think what could drive an increase is recognizing that our national security is not simply the DOD budget, that there are other aspects [such as] our research in the sciences, our education activity, or health care activities,” he said.

“To me, one of the recruiting problems we’ve had in the military is because some young people would like to serve, but their education is such they can’t pass this very straightforward test to get in. That’s the reflection of our education system, not the military. We have a problem with obesity in our country that reflects on our public health care system. But if we had more fit young people, we’d have more recruits. So this is all one effort,” he added. “If there is a breakthrough, I think we would have to recognize, too, both sides of the agenda — both the defense and also domestic.”

Written by Jon Harper

Jon Harper is Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, the Scoop News Group’s newest online publication focused on the Pentagon and its pursuit of new capabilities. He leads an award-winning team of journalists in providing breaking news and in-depth analysis on military technology and the ways in which it is shaping how the Defense Department operates and modernizes. You can also follow him on Twitter @Jon_Harper_

In This Story

• 2025 budget
• 2025 NDAA
• Acquisition reform
• Sen. Jack Reed

defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · March 18, 2024

12. Army aims to equip a division with hand-held counter-drone gear

Excerpts:

The Army also wants to beef up its air defense with larger counter-drone weapons, according to the fiscal year 2025 budget.

The service is seeking more jammers, including $82.5 million to buy the Mobile-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System (M-LIDS) and $26.4 million for the Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated Defeat System, or FS-LIDS.

The Army also asked for more money to buy systems that destroy drones outright, including $117 million for Coyote drone interceptors, and $88 million in research and development for the directed-energy variant of the Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) vehicle, $204 million for increment three of the M-SHORAD, and $22 million for increment one of the M-SHORAD.

As U.S. military bases in the Middle East face continuing drone attacks, Army leaders have praised Coyote interceptors as one of the most successful counter-drone systems. In January, the Army bought 600 Coyote 2C Interceptors for $75 million, at a cost of around $125,000 per interceptor.

Ukrainian troops use thousands of hand-held drone jammers and detectors, providing a much higher density of hand-held anti-drone devices than the U.S. Army currently fields. But the use reflects a battlefield reality—troops on both sides of the war use tens of thousands of drones each month for strikes and observation.

Army aims to equip a division with hand-held counter-drone gear

But one expert said the service may have underestimated just how much that will cost.

BY SAM SKOVE

STAFF WRITER

MARCH 18, 2024 03:35 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

The Army’s 2025 budget request includes $13.5 million for hand-held anti-drone devices to equip a division and $54.2 million for backpack-size jammers, an Army spokesperson said Thursday.

The $13.5 million will buy 20 Modi devices, 10 Smart Shooter devices, 10 Bal Chatri devices, and 20 Dronebuster devices.

But equipping a division may require more, said Samuel Bendett of the Center for Naval Analysis, an expert on Ukraine and Russia’s use of drones in Ukraine.

“At the very least, each platoon should probably have [a hand-held anti-drone device], based on what we’re seeing in Ukraine so far,” he said.

The Modi and Dronebuster are both jamming systems, while the Bal Chatri detects the signals of potential enemy drones overhead. The Smartshooter, by contrast, is a rifle scope that calculates where to aim to take down fast moving drones.

The backpack jammers are the Terrestrial Layer System Manpacks, a system that provides both signals intelligence and jamming capabilities.

The Army previously said it was equipping two divisions with hand-held counter drone weapons: the 82nd Airborne and 1st Cavalry.

The 82nd Airborne and 1st Cavalry received the same types of hand-held counter-drone devices the Army requested for fiscal year 2025: the Modi, Smart Shooter, Bal Chatri, and Dronebuster. The 1st Cavalry trained 80 soldiers on the equipment, out of its force of 19,500. It is unclear how many sets the units received.

The Army also wants to beef up its air defense with larger counter-drone weapons, according to the fiscal year 2025 budget.

The service is seeking more jammers, including $82.5 million to buy the Mobile-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System (M-LIDS) and $26.4 million for the Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated Defeat System, or FS-LIDS.

The Army also asked for more money to buy systems that destroy drones outright, including $117 million for Coyote drone interceptors, and $88 million in research and development for the directed-energy variant of the Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) vehicle, $204 million for increment three of the M-SHORAD, and $22 million for increment one of the M-SHORAD.

As U.S. military bases in the Middle East face continuing drone attacks, Army leaders have praised Coyote interceptors as one of the most successful counter-drone systems. In January, the Army bought 600 Coyote 2C Interceptors for $75 million, at a cost of around $125,000 per interceptor.

Ukrainian troops use thousands of hand-held drone jammers and detectors, providing a much higher density of hand-held anti-drone devices than the U.S. Army currently fields. But the use reflects a battlefield reality—troops on both sides of the war use tens of thousands of drones each month for strikes and observation.

Even so, Russian first-person-view racing drones fitted with explosives regularly breach Ukrainian defenses, forcing Ukrainian troops to reduce their activity during the day to avoid being targeted.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

13. The Leaked Russian Nuclear Documents and Russian First Use of Nuclear Weapons

Excerpts:

Conclusion

It is clear from the leaked Russian documents and other open source information that the Russian threshold for nuclear employment is lower than previously thought and the United States cannot depend upon Russia’s observance of the so-called “nuclear taboo” to protect the West from Russian nuclear attack. Moscow will employ nuclear weapons when deemed necessary to serve Russian national interests.

Only credible nuclear deterrence can safeguard the West, yet nuclear deterrence is under attack by the disarmament groups globally. The context of this is a Russian nuclear modernization program which according to Putin has already achieved 95% and will continue even after 100% is achieved. Currently, the comparable U.S. strategic nuclear modernization number is zero.

Despite the clear and present danger of Russian aggression and even nuclear escalation, as Dr. Keith Payne has pointed out, the Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review “appears frozen in the naively-optimistic post-Cold War years; it suggests no urgency with regard to U.S. responses to mounting threats.” The October 2023 report of the bipartisan U.S. Strategic Posture Commission (SPC) reported that three of the four American strategic modernization programs are behind schedule. By 2030, the United States will likely be forced to retire deterrent systems before their replacements can be deployed. In February 2024, STRATCOM Commander General Anthony Cotton warned that the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine “must achieve its first strategic deterrent patrol by 2030 to avoid an unacceptable capability gap.” A capability gap is very likely because the notional availability date for the first Columbia class submarine is 2031 and it is behind schedule.

The bipartisan SPC report repeatedly emphasized the urgency with which the United States must respond to these looming nuclear threat developments. The leaked Russian documents serve to confirm the need for that urgency.Conclusion

It is clear from the leaked Russian documents and other open source information that the Russian threshold for nuclear employment is lower than previously thought and the United States cannot depend upon Russia’s observance of the so-called “nuclear taboo” to protect the West from Russian nuclear attack. Moscow will employ nuclear weapons when deemed necessary to serve Russian national interests.

Only credible nuclear deterrence can safeguard the West, yet nuclear deterrence is under attack by the disarmament groups globally. The context of this is a Russian nuclear modernization program which according to Putin has already achieved 95% and will continue even after 100% is achieved. Currently, the comparable U.S. strategic nuclear modernization number is zero.

Despite the clear and present danger of Russian aggression and even nuclear escalation, as Dr. Keith Payne has pointed out, the Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review “appears frozen in the naively-optimistic post-Cold War years; it suggests no urgency with regard to U.S. responses to mounting threats.” The October 2023 report of the bipartisan U.S. Strategic Posture Commission (SPC) reported that three of the four American strategic modernization programs are behind schedule. By 2030, the United States will likely be forced to retire deterrent systems before their replacements can be deployed. In February 2024, STRATCOM Commander General Anthony Cotton warned that the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine “must achieve its first strategic deterrent patrol by 2030 to avoid an unacceptable capability gap.” A capability gap is very likely because the notional availability date for the first Columbia class submarine is 2031 and it is behind schedule.

The bipartisan SPC report repeatedly emphasized the urgency with which the United States must respond to these looming nuclear threat developments. The leaked Russian documents serve to confirm the need for that urgency.

Mark B. Schneider, The Leaked Russian Nuclear Documents and Russian First Use of Nuclear Weapons, No. 579, March 18, 2024 – Nipp

nipp.org

The Leaked Russian Nuclear Documents and Russian First Use of Nuclear Weapons

Dr. Mark B. Schneider

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commission. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

In February 2024, in an illuminating and alarming report, the Financial Times revealed, “The [Russian] classified papers, seen by the Financial Times, describe a threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons that is lower than Russia has ever publicly admitted, according to experts who reviewed and verified the documents.” The revelations in the article were picked up by numerous publications. Typically, Western press reporting on Russian nuclear issues involves interviewing the normal coterie of left-wing “experts” who are more interested in reducing the U.S. nuclear deterrent than understanding Russian nuclear strategy and its implications. In contrast, the Financial Times presented an insightful analysis concerning the meaning of the Russian documents. Still, the analysts who historically have been most accurate in their assessment of Russian nuclear weapons policy were not among them (e.g., Dr. Stephen Blank, Dr. Keith Payne, and Mr. Dave Johnson).

Russian Nuclear Policy

Russian nuclear weapons policy is very dangerous; it is closely tied to military aggression and repeated high-level nuclear threats. In 2015, in the time frame of the leaked Russian documents, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg observed, “Russia’s recent use of nuclear rhetoric, exercises and operations are deeply troubling… Russia’s nuclear sabre-rattling is unjustified, destabilizing and dangerous.” Since then, the situation has clearly gotten worse.

The Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review also noted that:

The Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unlawful invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is a stark reminder of nuclear risk in contemporary conflict. Russia has conducted its aggression against Ukraine under a nuclear shadow characterized by irresponsible saber-rattling, out of cycle nuclear exercises, and false narratives concerning the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In brandishing Russia’s nuclear arsenal in an attempt to intimidate Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia’s leaders have made clear that they view these weapons as a shield behind which to wage unjustified aggression against their neighbors. Irresponsible Russian statements and actions raise the risk of deliberate or unintended escalation.

Russian nuclear doctrine is very permissive with regard to nuclear escalation. In 2023, Putin’s Deputy at the Russian National Security Council (and former President) Dimitri Medvedev declared, “The Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk) republics and other territories will be accepted into Russia….Russia has announced that not only mobilisation capabilities, but also any Russian weapons, including strategic nuclear weapons and weapons based on new principles, could be used for such protection.” Medvedev even threatened “the further existence of the entire human civilization” if Russia ends up defeated in Ukraine by the West.

The Russian documents revealed in the Financial Times relate to Russian officer training and wargaming, and, as such, were never intended to be made public. This factor alone gives them great importance. The documents, dating from 2008 to 2015, according to the Financial Times “…summarise the [nuclear first use] threshold as a combination of factors where losses suffered by Russian forces ‘would irrevocably lead to their failure to stop major enemy aggression’, a ‘critical situation for the state security of Russia.’ Other potential conditions include the destruction of 20 per cent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines, 30 per cent of its nuclear-powered attack submarines, three or more cruisers, three airfields, or a simultaneous hit on main and reserve coastal command centres.” The documents provide further evidence that Russia has the lowest nuclear weapons use threshold in the world.

The Leaked Russian Nuclear Documents and Russian Nuclear Doctrine

These leaked documents date from the period in which Russia was, apparently falsely, claiming publicly that it would use nuclear weapons first only in the event of “aggression against us with the use of conventional weapons that threaten the very existence of the state.” President Putin’s June 2020 decree on Russian nuclear deterrence contained much more detailed information concerning the Russian nuclear first use threshold. Paragraph 19 of the document states:

The conditions specifying the possibility of nuclear weapons use by the Russian Federation are as follows:

a) arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies;

b) use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies;

c) attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions;

d) aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.

Each of these subparagraphs allows for the first use of nuclear weapons. Paragraph 4 of Putin’s nuclear deterrence decree links Russian nuclear weapons use to “sovereignty” and “territorial integrity.” This is potentially very permissive. Indeed, in 2022, President Putin delivered a major speech outlining his views on Russian sovereignty which is well-worth reading. It contains some amazing assertions concerning the meaning of sovereignty. Moreover, in 2024, Putin stated his war against Ukraine would result in “ensuring the country’s [Russia’s] global sovereignty.” A more accurate description of what Putin means might be “domination.” In his February 2024 speech to the Russian Federal Assembly, President Putin threatened to use “nuclear weapons [causing] the destruction of civilization” should the West deploy troops in support of Ukraine. The political role of Russian nuclear weapons is clearly coercion which is supported by Russia’s low nuclear use threshold.

Keep in mind that the use of the word “aggression” in the Russian formulations is meaningless in light of President Putin’s ability to distort history. For example, just after the leaked documents appeared, President Putin claimed that Russia had not started his war against Ukraine. As the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review rightly observed, Russia considers nuclear weapons as a shield for its “aggression.“

The content of the leaked Russian documents is generally consistent with sub-paragraphs 19c and 19d of President Putin’s June 2020 nuclear decree. But the specific details added by the documents clearly indicate that the planning threshold for nuclear first use is significantly more permissive than the plain meaning of the decree would suggest.

For example, “30 per cent of its nuclear-powered attack submarines, three or more cruisers, three airfields, or a simultaneous hit on main and reserve coastal command centres” would be losses, but surely would not constitute a threat to “the very existence of the state…” Similarly, the loss of 20% of the Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarine force, again, while significant, would not be a critical loss of Russian nuclear capability, particularly when seen in the context of the rest of its strategic nuclear deterrent. The leaked documents are apparently consistent with paragraph 19c of the official nuclear decree which allows nuclear strikes in response to conventional attack on almost any military facility in Russia because of the universal dual capability (nuclear and conventional) of Russian non-strategic delivery vehicles.

The leaked Russian training materials display remarkably permissive assumptions concerning Russian initiation of nuclear weapons first use. The Russia first use criteria describe events and combat losses that would inevitably happen very early in any high intensity conflict. It is tantamount to assuming as a planning factor that Russia would initiate tactical nuclear weapons first use almost immediately after the outbreak of any war with NATO.

The Leaked Russian Documents and the Russian Navy

The planning assumptions in the leaked Russian documents for the use of nuclear weapons in support of the Russian Navy appear to be completely outside of Article 19 but may be partially covered by Article 4 of President Putin’s nuclear deterrence decree. Naval officers, according to the leaked documents, were reportedly being trained that the criteria for nuclear first use include “…an enemy landing on Russian territory, the defeat of units responsible for securing border areas, or an imminent enemy attack using conventional weapons.” Again, “…an enemy landing on Russian territory” or “the defeat of units responsible for securing border areas…” would not obviously constitute a threat to the very existence of Russia. Responding with nuclear weapons to “an imminent enemy attack using conventional weapons” is not covered by anything in Putin’s nuclear deterrence decree. It constitutes pre-emptive nuclear war. While not in the official Russia documents, the conditions described in the documents resemble a 2008 statement by General of the Army Yuri Baluyevskiy, then-Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister, who said, “We do not intend to attack anyone, but we consider it necessary for all our partners in the world community to clearly understand… that to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and its allies, military forces will be used, including preventively, including with the use of nuclear weapons.” In September 2014, then-retired, Baluyevskiy stated that the “…conditions for pre-emptive nuclear strikes…is contained in classified policy documents.” Thus, the leaked Russian documents appear consistent with Baluyevskiy’s revelation of Russian classified plans for “pre-emptive nuclear strikes.” Other open source information suggests that what General Baluyevskiy said was correct.

The Declining Russian Nuclear Weapon Use Threshold

Today, the Russian nuclear use threshold is likely lower than it was from 2008 to 2015. In September 2020, noted Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer wrote, “First, the nuclear threshold is becoming lower: in any serious skirmish, the Russian Navy would either need to go nuclear or risk being sunk.” Russian Navy performance in the war against Ukraine suggests he was correct. The leaked documents provide more substantiation that Russia sees naval nuclear weapons as a way of “making Russia’s navy ‘more effective.’”

Russian naval nuclear weapons policy, as ordered by President Putin in a 2017 directive, goes beyond deterrence to focus further on nuclear warfighting. It stated, “Indicators of the effectiveness of measures undertaken to execute the State Policy on Naval Operations are: …the capability of the Navy to damage an enemy’s fleet at a level not lower than critical with the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons.” This must constitute warfighting because Russia does not face a significant non-strategic naval nuclear threat from the United States and NATO. The following 2020 NATO graphic illustrates the non-strategic nuclear capability of Russia, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.

Source: The NATO Secretary General’s Annual Report 2020.

There is no NATO anti-ship nuclear weapon. The French nuclear cruise missile is a land-attack missile. The only conceivable weapon that could be used against ships is a nuclear bomb.

The Biden Administration has warned that Russia is lowering its nuclear weapons use threshold. The Director of National Intelligence’s (DNI’s) 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community provides a stark warning about the Russian nuclear threat. It states, “Heavy losses to its ground forces and the large-scale expenditures of precision-guided munitions during the conflict have degraded Moscow’s ground and air-based conventional capabilities and increased its reliance on nuclear weapons.” The Biden Administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy recognized that, “Russia’s conventional military will have been weakened [as a result of its war with Ukraine], which will likely increase Moscow’s reliance on nuclear weapons in its military planning.”

Russia’s apparent increasing reliance on tactical nuclear weapons poses a serious problem for the United States and NATO. The vast reduction in the U.S. and NATO in-theater nuclear capabilities after the demise of the Soviet Union may have created a “gap” in the West’s deterrence posture. As Professor Matthew Kroenig wrote in The Wall Street Journal, “The U.S., which lacks commensurate tactical nuclear weapons, could retaliate with one of its big ballistic missiles or strategic bombers, risking a full-scale nuclear exchange and a global holocaust. Or the U.S. could back down, losing the war and shredding the credibility of its defense commitments.”

Russian Nuclear Escalation and Communist China

The leaked documents also revealed Russia’s assessment of a potential threat from China. While Russian nuclear war planning and wargaming against China came as a surprise to many, it should not have. While it is not politically correct in Moscow to speak about a Chinese threat to Russia, the Russian military clearly believes this is the case. However, ironically, Russia is still selling arms to China. Russia’s low nuclear use threshold allows it to rationalize selling arms to China. Moreover, there are press reports of Russian nuclear exercises directed against China in the time period of the leaked documents.

The Russian Vostok-2010 Far East military exercise, reportedly simulated against China, provided evidence that actual Russia nuclear policy involves a much lower nuclear use threshold than what is contained in public documents. One of a number of reports of Russian nuclear weapons simulated use in Vostok-2010 exercise appeared in the official newspaper of the Far East Military District which said, “To suppress a large center of the separatists’ resistance and to achieve minimal losses of the attacking troops a low-yield ‘nuclear’ attack was mounted against the enemy.” This, again, is hardly a threat to the very existence of the Russian state which was supposed to be Russian nuclear doctrine at the time. Reportedly, during the Vostok-2014 exercise (also reportedly simulated against China), “the Russian Strategic Missile Forces in the Central Military District exercised an escalation from conventional to nuclear war.” Noted British expert on Russia Roger McDermott, wrote that, “Vostok 2014, much like its earlier incarnation in 2010, contains strong evidence that the Russian General Staff continues to consider China a potential threat to Russia.”

There is a significant difference between the criteria for Russian first use of nuclear weapons against NATO and China. According to the Financial Times, “The order has been given by the commander-in-chief…to use nuclear weapons…in the event the enemy deploys second-echelon units and the South [China] threatens to attack further in the direction of the main strike.” This is interesting because the exercise threshold of nuclear weapons use against China is obviously higher for China than against NATO. What is being described is a Russian nuclear response to a major invasion by China as distinct from a minor incursion by NATO. On the surface, the opposite should be true. In the 2008-2015 time frame, China had a much smaller nuclear weapons capability than that possessed by NATO nations. While Russia apparently believes that China has many more nuclear weapons than Western estimates, this alone does not explain the disparity in the nuclear first use threshold.

The difference in Russian nuclear strategy between NATO and China likely reflects the human element in deterrence. Not all national leaderships are the same or are perceived to be the same. A key part of Russia’s nuclear strategy is “escalate to de-escalate” or an “escalate to win” strategy. The assumption behind this strategy is that United States and NATO have weak leadership that will not respond in-kind to Russia’s introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict. In light of China’s Maoist legacy of irresponsible rhetoric concerning nuclear war (willingness to accept hundreds of millions of deaths in a nuclear war), no one would make the same assumption about China.

The Importance of the Leaked Russian Documents

The importance of the leaked Russian documents is that they provide more detail concerning the Russian nuclear use threshold and confirm previous reports that it is well below the publicly announced version of Russian nuclear doctrine. For example, in 2014, Russian expatriate Nikolai Sokov reported “…all large-scale military exercises that Russia conducted beginning in 2000 featured simulations of limited nuclear strikes.” The January 2016 report of NATO’s Secretary General noted that Russia “…simulated nuclear attacks on NATO Allies (e.g., ZAPAD) and on partners (e.g., March 7 2013 simulated attacks on Sweden)…” Russian nuclear exercises against non-nuclear Sweden are particularly important because Sweden, like Ukraine (against which Russian nuclear threats are frequent), is not supposed to be subject to nuclear attack under Russian negative assurances (i.e., Russia’s pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.) Yet, in March 2022, “Swedish TV4 Nyheterna has reported that Russian bombers ‘armed with nuclear warheads’ entered EU airspace before being intercepted by Swedish fighter jets.” While Russian nuclear intimidation bomber flights are common, flights by aircraft armed with nuclear weapons are much less frequent. Violation of sovereign airspace by Russian bombers is rare. Russia apparently has never before combined an overflight and carrying live nuclear weapons as reported in the Swedish incident.

Conclusion

It is clear from the leaked Russian documents and other open source information that the Russian threshold for nuclear employment is lower than previously thought and the United States cannot depend upon Russia’s observance of the so-called “nuclear taboo” to protect the West from Russian nuclear attack. Moscow will employ nuclear weapons when deemed necessary to serve Russian national interests.

Only credible nuclear deterrence can safeguard the West, yet nuclear deterrence is under attack by the disarmament groups globally. The context of this is a Russian nuclear modernization program which according to Putin has already achieved 95% and will continue even after 100% is achieved. Currently, the comparable U.S. strategic nuclear modernization number is zero.

Despite the clear and present danger of Russian aggression and even nuclear escalation, as Dr. Keith Payne has pointed out, the Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review “appears frozen in the naively-optimistic post-Cold War years; it suggests no urgency with regard to U.S. responses to mounting threats.” The October 2023 report of the bipartisan U.S. Strategic Posture Commission (SPC) reported that three of the four American strategic modernization programs are behind schedule. By 2030, the United States will likely be forced to retire deterrent systems before their replacements can be deployed. In February 2024, STRATCOM Commander General Anthony Cotton warned that the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine “must achieve its first strategic deterrent patrol by 2030 to avoid an unacceptable capability gap.” A capability gap is very likely because the notional availability date for the first Columbia class submarine is 2031 and it is behind schedule.

The bipartisan SPC report repeatedly emphasized the urgency with which the United States must respond to these looming nuclear threat developments. The leaked Russian documents serve to confirm the need for that urgency.

Max Seddon and Chris Cook, “Leaked Russian Military iles Reveal Criteria for Nuclear Strike,” Financial Times, February 28, 2024, available at https://www.ft.com/content/f18e6e1f-5c3d-4554-aee5-50a730b306b7.

Stephen Blank, “Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s War against Ukraine,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Autumn 2022), pp. 1-26.; Keith B. Payne and John S. Foster Jr., A New Nuclear Review for a New Age (Fairfax VA: National Institute Press, April 2017), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/A-New-Nuclear-Review-final.pdf.; and, Dave Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, February 2018), available at https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Precision-Strike-Capabilities-report-v3-7.pdf.

Mark B. Schneider, Russian Use of Nuclear Coercion against NATO and Ukraine (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, May 2, 2022), Information Series, Issue No. 521, available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/521-final.pdf.

Jens Stoltenberg, “Adapting to a Changed Security Environment,” NATO.int, May 27, 2015, available athttps://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_120166.htm.

Mark B. Schneider, “Threats of War and Nuclear War: Putin’s Effort to Revive the Soviet Union,” Real Clear Defense, January 18, 2022, available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/01/18/threats_of_war_and_nuclear_war_putins_effort_to_revive_the_soviet_union_812521.html.

Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2022), pp. 1-2, available at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

“Russia’s Medvedev: New Regions can be Defended with Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Reuters, September 22, 2022, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-medvedev-strategic-nuclear-weapons-can-be-used-defend-new-regions-2022-09-22/.

“Ex-Russian President Warns of Nuclear ‘Apocalypse,’” RT, February 27, 2023, available at https://www.rt.com/russia/572117-medvedev-nuclear-ukraine-apocalypse/.

Seddon and Cook, “Leaked Russian Military Files Reveal Criteria for Nuclear Strike,” op. cit.

The President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, December 26, 2014, available at https://london.mid.ru/en/press-centre/gb_en_fnapr_1947/.; The President of the Russian Federation, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, February 5, 2010, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf.

The President of the Russian Federation, “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” MID.ru, June 8, 2020, available https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/.

Ibid.

“Meeting with Young Entrepreneurs, Engineers and Scientists,” Kremlin.ru, June 9, 2022, available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68606.

“Expanded Meeting of Defence Ministry Board,” Kremlin.ru, December 19, 2023, available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73035.

Alexandra Sharp, “Putin Threatens Nuclear War if Foreign Troops Deploy to Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, February 29, 2024, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/29/putin-threat-nuclear-weapons-nato-warning-war-russia/.

Mark B. Schneider, “Recent Developments in Russian Nuclear Forces,” Real Clear Defense, January 16, 2024, available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/01/16/recent_developments_in_russian_nuclear_forces_1005120.html.

Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” Kremlin.ru, February 29, 2024, available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73585.

Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, op. cit., p. 9.

Seddon and Cook, “Leaked Russian Military Files Reveal Criteria for Nuclear Strike,” op. cit.

Mark B. Schneider, “Will Russia Further Lower Its Nuclear Weapons Use Threshold?,” Real Clear Defense, September 19, 2020, available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/09/19/will_russia_further_lower_its_nuclear_weapons_use_threshold_577995.html.

Alexander Mladenov, “Best in the Breed,” Air Forces Monthly, May 2017, p. 51.; Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds, op. cit., pp. 39, 57.; and, Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, op. cit., p. 9.

Seddon and Cook, “Leaked Russian Military Files Reveal Criteria for Nuclear Strike,” op. cit.

Ibid.

“Russia says could use nuclear weapons,” NBC News, January 20, 2008, available at https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna22743091.

“Russia classifies information on pre-emptive nuclear strikes – military,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, September 5, 2014, available at https://infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-view?p=WORLDNEWS&docref=news/15026981A8DD9FC8.

Mark B. Schneider, “Putin’s Plan to Send Russians to Heaven,” Real Clear Defense, December 1, 2018, available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/12/01/putins_plan_to_send_russians_to_heaven_113995.html.; and, Mark B. Schneider, “Russian Nuclear ‘De-escalation’ of Future War,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 37, No. 5 (2018), pp. 361-372.

Pavel Felgenhauer, “The Hypersonic Hype and Russia’s Diminished Nuclear Threshold,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 17, No.116 (August 6, 2020), available at https://jamestown.org/program/the-hypersonic-hype-and-russias-diminished-nuclear-threshold/.

Christian Richer, “Struggle in the Black Sea: The Russian Navy’s Frailty in the Russo-Ukrainian War,” Proceedings, Vol. 149/6/1,444 (June 2023), available at https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/june/struggle-black-sea-russian-navys-frailty-russo-ukrainian-war.

Seddon and Cook, “Leaked Russian Military Files Reveal Criteria for Nuclear Strike,” op. cit.

Mark B. Schneider, “Escalate to De-escalate,” Proceedings, Vol. 143/2/1,368 (February 2017), available at https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/february/escalate-de-escalate.

President of the Russian Federation, Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030 (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2017), translation by Anna Davis, U.S. Naval War College, p. 16, available at https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=rmsi_research.

The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2020 (Brussels, BE: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020), available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/3/pdf/sgar20-en.pdf.

“Air-Sol Moyenne Portée (ASMP/ASMP-A),” Missile Threat, July 28, 2021, available https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/asmp/.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 6, 2023), p. 14, available at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reportspublications/reports-publications-2023.

The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 2022), p. 26, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.

Matthew Kroenig, “The Case for Tactical U.S. Nukes,” The Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2018, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-case-for-tactical-u-s-nukes-1516836395.

Mark B. Schneider, The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2006), p. 19, available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Russian-nuclear-doctrine-NSF-for-print.pdf.; Dimitri Simes, “Russia up in arms over Chinese Theft of Military Technology,” Nikkei Asia, December 20, 2019, available at https://asia.Nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Russia-up-in-arms-over-Chinese-theft-of-military-technology.

John W. Parker, Russia’s Revival: Ambitions, Limitations, and Opportunities for the United States (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, January 2011), p, 23, available at https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-3.pdf.

Roger McDermott, “Vostok 2014 and Russia’s Hypothetical Enemies (Part One),” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 11, No. 167 (September 23, 2014), available at https://jamestown.org/program/vostok-2014-and-russias-hypothetical-enemies-part-one/.

Katarzyna Zysk, “Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Military Strategy,” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 163, No. 2 (2018), p. 6.

McDermott, “Vostok 2014 and Russia’s Hypothetical Enemies (Part One),” op. cit.

Seddon and Cook, “Leaked Russian Military Files Reveal Criteria for Nuclear Strike,” op. cit.

Mark B. Schneider, The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People’s Republic of China (Fairfax VA: National Institute Press, November 2007), pp. 7, 14, 17, 28, 29, 32, available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/China-nuclear-final-pub.pdf.; Mark B. Schneider, “The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission’s Report and the Chinese Nuclear Threat,” Real Clear Defense, December 6, 2023, available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/12/06/the_congressional_strategic_posture_commissions_report_and_the_chinese_nuclear_threat_997085.html.; and, Mark B. Schneider, “The Chinese Nuclear Breakout and the Biden Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review,” Real Clear Defense, August 28, 2021, available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2021/08/28/the_chinese_nuclear_breakout_and_the_biden_administrations_nuclear_posture_review_792021.html.

Robert Work and James Winnefeld, Statement of Robert Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Admiral James Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.: House Committee on Armed Services, , June 25, 2015), p. 4, available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20150625/103669/HHRG-114-AS00-Wstate-WorkR-20150625.pdf.; Peter Huessy, “Could Putin’s ‘Escalate to Win’ Nuclear Threat Strategy Work?,” Warrior Maven, April 10, 2023, available at https://warriormaven.com/global-security/could-putins-escalate-to-win-nuclear-threat-strategy-work.; Schneider, “Escalate to De-escalate,” op. cit.; Russian Ministry of Defense, The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Moscow, RU: The Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, 2003), p. 70.; and, Schneider, “Russian Nuclear ‘De-escalation’ of Future War,” op. cit.

Jacob W. Kipp, “Russia’s Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,” Military Review, May-June 2001, available at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/russiasnukes/russiasnukes.htm.; and, U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018), p. 8, available at https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.

Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China’s Strategy in the Nuclear Era, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 1-3.; Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao The Unknown Story (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), pp. 368, 413-415.; and, Schneider, The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People’s Republic of China, op. cit., pp. 5, 6, 8, 9, 19.

Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De-escalation’,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 13, 2014, available at https://thebulletin.org/2014/03/why-russia-calls-a-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation/.

Jens Stoltenberg, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015 (Brussels, BE: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2016), p. 18, available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160128_SG_AnnualReport_2015_en.pdf.

Schneider, “Russian Use of Nuclear Coercion against NATO and Ukraine,” op. cit.

Francesca Giovannini, “Negative Security Assurances After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2022, available at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-07/features/negative-security-assurances-after-russias-invasion-ukraine.; and, George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, “Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,” The Nonproliferation Review Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 1993), pp. 11-20.

Henry Jones, “RAF Scrambles Typhoon Jets as Undisclosed Aircraft Located,” The Standard, February 2022, available at https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/raf-russian-scotland-raf-brize-norton-mod-b980458.html.; and, Charlie McCarthy, “Russian Planes Carrying Nuclear Weapons Violated Swedish Airspace,” Newsmax, March 30, 2024, available at https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/russia-sweden-airspace-nuclear-weapons/2022/03/30/id/1063617/.

“Expanded Meeting of Defence Ministry Board,” op. cit.; Schneider, “Recent Developments in Russian Nuclear Forces,” op. cit.

Schneider, “Recent Developments in Russian Nuclear Forces,” op. cit.

Keith B. Payne, The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission’s Report: What the Biden Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review Should Have Been (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, February 20, 2024), Information Series, No. 577, p. 6, available athttps://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/IS-577.pdf.

Madelyn R. Creedon and Jon L. Kyl, Chair and Vice Chair, America’s Strategic Posture (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2023), p. 44, available at https://www.ida.org/research-and-publications/publications/all/a/am/americas-strategic-posture.

Anthony J. Cotton, Statement of Anthony J. Cotton, Commander, United States Strategic Command (Washington, D.C.: Senate Armed Services Committee, February 29, 2024), p. 11, available at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/cotton_statement.pdf.

The Congressional Research Service, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: The Congressional Research Service, March 1, 2024), p. 6, available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41129/263.; Creedon and Kyl, America’s Strategic Posture, op. cit., p. 44.

The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for the generous support that made this Information Series possible.

The views in this Information Series are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 |Fairfax, VA 22031 | (703) 293- 9181 |www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/national-institutepress/informationseries/.

© National Institute Press, 2024

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14. Ukraine’s Impossible Choice: Conceding Territory or Lives

Blood, treasure, and territory.

Ukraine’s Impossible Choice: Conceding Territory or Lives

With military worn down and U.S. aid stalled, leaders confront how to hold off larger and better-equipped Russian army

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraine-impossible-choice-conceding-territory-or-lives-4f432d75?mod=hp_lead_pos7&utm

By Isabel ColesFollow, Ievgeniia Sivorka and Matthew LuxmooreFollow

March 19, 2024 12:01 am ET

Russian forces were closing in when Sgt. Ivan Zhytnik made a desperate call to his family from a bunker on the front line in eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainian defenses in the city of Avdiivka were crumbling and Zhytnik’s brigade had pulled out to avoid being overrun, leaving him and five other soldiers behind.

“Four of us are wounded—seriously wounded—we can’t walk. One can, but barely,” said 31-year-old Zhytnik in the video call on the morning of Feb. 15, adding the sixth man stayed to help them. “All the officers are gone—all of them. They left us at our positions.”

The plight of the men demonstrates the conundrum for Ukrainian leaders this year as they confront mounting Russian offensives with dwindling resources: when to cut their losses.

Ukrainian leaders say every inch of territory is worth fighting for, but their military is worn down after a failed counteroffensive last year and with a much-needed additional aid package stuck in Congress. Russia, with a larger army and a war economy clunking into gear, is pressing forward against its smaller neighbor.

That leaves Ukraine facing a year on the defensive, picking its battles in an effort to limit territorial losses while outlasting the Russian army. Kyiv needs to buy time to rebuild its own forces with the aim of retaking some of the roughly 20% of its territory occupied by Russia.

A view from a car shows destruction in Avdiivka on Saturday. PHOTO: ALEXANDER ERMOCHENKO/REUTERS

It is a delicate calculus that requires weighing precious land against scarce resources, including lives—and morale.

At first Zhytnik hoped for rescue. Then he counted on mercy. In the last of several video calls recorded by his relatives, he turned to exchange words with someone off camera.

“Are they there?” asked his brother-in-law, Dmytro Shubin.

“Yes,” Zhytnik responded.

The Russians had arrived.

Zenit

As Ukraine’s counteroffensive stalled last fall, Russia seized the initiative and launched massed assaults on Avdiivka. The target, a small industrial city, revealed the shrunken reach of Russia’s invasion, which began in February 2022 with a failed attempt to seize Ukraine’s capital and overthrow its government. 

Ukraine blunted Russia’s initial thrusts on Avdiivka, destroying dozens of armored vehicles and killing hundreds. But the relentlessness of Moscow’s assaults demonstrated a resolve to press on regardless in an effort to grind Ukraine into submission.

Russian troops claim full control of Avdiivka

Russian forces March 17

Russian forces Dec. 31, 2023

UKRAINE

Area of

detail

5 miles

5 km

Avdiivka

Donetsk

Sources: Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project

Andrew Barnett/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Zhytnik, a former taxi driver who had been drafted into the army just weeks after Russia invaded, had been deployed as part of the 110th Mechanized Brigade in a Soviet air force bunker complex called Zenit, a critical defensive position about one mile south of the city. 

Like many soldiers, he used humor to cope with the grim realities of war. In a video posted on TikTok he pretended to be on the phone with his mother while standing in a crater large enough to fit a car in. “What shelling? Everything is fine,” he said. Other videos featured a pet capybara that Zhytnik fed carrots and made a bath for out of an empty ammunition box. In one clip, he joked that it might be a Russian spy.

Mykola Savosik, another soldier serving with Zhytnik, often received care packages from his cousin containing essentials and goodies such as nuts, candy and socks.

As winter set in, Moscow’s firepower advantage was growing as political deadlock in the U.S. held up key aid for Kyiv. Low on artillery rounds, Ukrainian forces in Avdiivka couldn’t prevent Russian infantry from creeping forward and engaging them at close range. President Volodymyr Zelensky visited in December, noting shortages, but signaled the intent to hold on.

Zenit was particularly vulnerable as Russian forces squeezed tighter. In January, Savosik told his cousin to stop sending care packages as it was almost impossible for supplies to reach them. When she asked how he was, he responded: “Alive.”

These satellite images show the Ukrainian Zenit position near Avdiivka before, on July 13, 2022, and after, on Feb. 26.

July 13, 2022

Feb. 26, 2024

PLANET LABS/AP

Pvt. Heorhiy Pavlov had always shielded his mother, Inna Pavlova, from the dangers he faced in Avdiivka, but the burly 29-year-old struggled to stay upbeat as the situation deteriorated. Ukraine’s shortage of artillery shells was so acute that Russian forces were operating out in the open without fear of being targeted, he complained. Many of Pavlov’s fellow soldiers had been in Avdiivka for nearly two years and were exhausted, he said. The need for fresh recruits was increasingly acute, but Kyiv stalled over a politically sensitive decision to expand the draft. 

Railing against his commanders, Pavlov talked of earlier battles in which Ukrainian forces held out until it was too late to conduct an organized withdrawal. When Pavlova asked if they were encircled, he said everything was fine. But his outburst had unnerved her. And on Deep State—an app that maps front-line positions using open-source data—the red area denoting Russian advances appeared to be swallowing the city. “If I can see it on Deep State, how come your commanders can’t?” she recalled asking her son.

‘Pray for me’

By early February, the 100 soldiers remaining inside Zenit had almost no food left. Hunkered down under relentless shelling, many appealed to their commanders to withdraw. Russian troops were advancing on the flanks of Avdiivka, threatening to cut the position off. Still, Ukrainian commanders told them to hold on. 

Several soldiers who stepped outside the bunker for fresh air were shot by Russian snipers or killed by mortar strikes guided by Russian drones, said Pvt. Viktor Biliak, who had been in Zenit since the start of Russia’s invasion. Only a handful of men from his company were still alive. Biliak said half the unit had been killed, elevating him, a junior serviceman, to company commander.

Viktor Biliak, a junior serviceman, become company commander after many in his unit were killed. PHOTO: SERHII KOROVAYNY FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

On the night of Feb. 13, Sgt. Andriy Dubnytskiy, another soldier in Zenit, called his wife, Lyudmyla Dubnytska, to say he was preparing to leave Avdiivka. The couple’s first child was born several months into the war, but 25-year-old Dubnytskiy had hardly seen his daughter because he had been on the front line in Avdiivka almost nonstop since the start of the war.

“I’ll be in touch whenever I get the chance,” he wrote to Dubnytska on Facebook messenger.

“Promise me everything will be fine,” she said.

“Pray for me,” he replied.

Hours later, Dubnytskiy set out in a group of seven soldiers including Zhytnik and Pavlov, attempting to reach Ukrainian lines in Avdiivka. They had given up waiting for orders to retreat. “Our commanders…wanted us to dig in and keep defending,” Biliak said. “Holding on to a set of ruins without ammunition or food was suicidal.”

The group didn’t get far. Russian reconnaissance drones had been flying over Zenit for days, waiting for the Ukrainians to break cover. A Russian mortar strike immediately killed half the group, Biliak said. He wasn’t in the group but helped bring the wounded back to the bunker, carrying Zhytnik himself. Dubnytskiy and Pavlov were also wounded.

Those who could still walk, including Biliak, set out on foot later the evening of Feb. 14 with Ukrainian drones guiding them to a rendezvous point where an armored vehicle was waiting.

The route to Avdiivka was strewn with the corpses of Ukrainian soldiers, Biliak said. As they reached the evacuation point, he heard a radio exchange that shocked him. A Ukrainian officer from the 110th Brigade asked his commander about evacuating the wounded men who remained in Zenit.

“Leave the wounded,” Biliak heard the commander reply. “And burn everything left behind.”

Distress calls

Around 8 a.m. the following morning, Savosik called his cousin Kateryna to say goodbye. Clutching a grenade, Savosik told her that they were unlikely to see each other again. “He had a wild look on his face,” Kateryna recalled.

The rest of the brigade had withdrawn from Zenit, leaving five wounded men, he told her. Savosik wasn’t injured himself, but had chosen to stay with them. “On a human level I couldn’t leave those boys,” she recalled him saying.  

Mykola Savosik’s cousin Kateryna, shown at a fallen heroes memorial in Lviv, Ukraine, spoke to Savosik in Zenit as the Russians closed in. PHOTO: SVET JACQUELINE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The commanders had promised to send a vehicle to evacuate them, but there was no sign of it—and Russian forces were almost upon them.

Around the same time, Pavlov called his mother in distress. One of his legs was broken. His back and neck were riddled with shrapnel. Pavlova begged him to surrender for the sake of his 5-year-old son. He still hoped to be rescued by the powerful 3rd Assault Brigade, which had been sent in to shore up Ukrainian positions and beat the Russians back, according to a deputy commander. Large parts of the city had already fallen under Russian control, however, and the brigade ended up covering Ukraine’s retreat.

Dubnytskiy also rang his wife to say he hadn’t made it out of Avdiivka. He was wounded in the groin but tried to make light of it. They would still have a son with his remaining testicle, he joked. There wasn’t much food or water, he said, but a soldier who hadn’t been wounded had stayed behind to care for them.

“Looks like we’ll be taken captive,” he messaged her at noon. 

Beside him, Zhytnik was speaking to his own relatives in Zaporizhzhia. “My legs are done for,” he said in a recorded video call.

Dubnytskiy reasoned the vehicle that commanders had promised to send for them might still come, seeking to reassure Zhytnik—and himself.

“The car can’t reach here,” Zhytnik said. “That’s it.”

Savosik’s cousin showed her text messages with him near the end of the Avdiivka siege. PHOTO: SVET JACQUELINE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Not long after midday, Zhytnik’s brother-in-law, Shubin, called with good news. The Ukrainians had contacted the Russians and struck a deal: The wounded men would surrender to Russian forces and be freed in a prisoner exchange.

The 110th Brigade later said it hadn’t been possible to go back for the men after the withdrawal from Zenit, but that it asked the authorities responsible for negotiating prisoner swaps with the Russians to seek assurances they would be treated “in accordance with the international customs of war and the laws protecting prisoners of war.” The Russians agreed, the brigade said in a statement.

Zhytnik hung up when the Russians arrived, but Shubin called him back. There was another person in the room now. The Russian soldier looked about 50 and had a short beard, Shubin said. 

Zhytnik urged the Russian soldier to speak with his brother-in-law over the phone so they could reach an understanding. “No. Turn off your phone. I’m not talking to anyone,” Shubin heard the Russian soldier say before the call cut off.

Tattoos

The day after Russian troops reached Zenit, a 40-second video appeared on one of Moscow’s propaganda channels. It showed several dead soldiers lying in the mud alongside a Ukrainian flag. Dubnytska immediately recognized a tattoo on one of the men’s hands: It looked identical to the one her husband and two other soldiers had got, symbolizing their faith and brotherhood.

She had reported Dubnytskiy missing earlier that day, taking their nearly 2-year-old daughter to the police station to provide a DNA sample. Returning home, she was scrolling through Russian Telegram channels in search of evidence he had been captured when she saw the clip.

“Everything inside me died,” she said. After contacting another of the soldiers with the tattoo, there was no room for doubt. “It was him.”

A photo of Andriy Dubnytskiy, provided by his wife, shows the tattoo she recognized. PHOTO: DUBNYTSKIY FAMILY

The following day, Ukraine announced it had withdrawn from Avdiivka to preserve lives. The Biden administration said the fall of the city was the price of Congress’s failure to send more aid to Ukraine. It was the biggest victory for Moscow in months. 

Ukraine’s leadership said the fight had been worth it to grind down Russian forces, although commander-in-chief Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrskiy acknowledged “certain miscalculations” by commanders. 

“If we had retreated in an organized way we could have burned the position without our people there,” said Biliak days after the city fell. He was in a hospital receiving treatment for injuries sustained during the withdrawal, including a cheek half torn open by a piece of shrapnel.

The men’s relatives believe they were killed by Russian forces shortly after being captured after midday on Feb. 15. But they also blame the Ukrainian commanders who left them behind for their deaths, calling it an unnecessary sacrifice. Their priority now is to recover their loved ones’ remains.

In a video released by Russian state-controlled channel RT days after Avdiivka’s capture, a reporter walks through the bunkers of Zenit, rifling through what Ukrainian forces left behind, including several boxes of ammunition and laundry on a line. 

Outside, the men’s bodies lay in a heap dusted with snow. 

A chemical plant in Avdiivka on Feb. 15. PHOTO: ALEXANDER ERMOCHENKO/REUTERS

Kate Vtorygina contributed to this article.

Write to Isabel Coles at isabel.coles@wsj.com and Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com

15. Vladimir Putin Says He Is Ready for Peace in Ukraine, but Only on His Terms

Excerpts:

Ukraine is outmanned and outgunned, its forces so depleted that they now only fire around two shells for every 10 Russia fires at them, according to Western intelligence estimates. Putin’s bare minimum in any peace deal now would be to ensure that the Crimean Peninsula, which Moscow seized 10 years ago, would stay under its control, along with four areas Ukraine’s east and south that it claimed in 2022.

...

In a statement provided to The Wall Street Journal, the Kremlin Monday denied suggestions that Putin had used intimidation and repression to swing the election in his favor, calling such accusations “baseless” and saying the outcome reflected what it called “the unique level of public support for the president.”

In his postelection remarks Monday, Putin cautioned the West against continuing to interfere in the war by backing Ukraine, saying, without providing evidence, that Russia was already aware that military personnel from U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries were present in Ukraine, and he claimed they were dying there in large numbers. He warned that a full-scale conflict between Russia and NATO “cannot be ruled out in the future” and if such were to occur, “the world will be one step away from a Third World war,” which hardly anyone wants, he said.

It was the third time in less than a month that Putin used the possible threat of nuclear confrontation with the West to emphasize his insistence that the U.S. and Europe should keep out of the conflict in Ukraine. Analysts have suggested he is trying to provoke a reaction from the West so as to convince the Russian population they need a strong leader to protect them.

Vladimir Putin Says He Is Ready for Peace in Ukraine, but Only on His Terms

Russian leader’s predictable election landslide allows him to prosecute his war in Ukraine how he wants

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/vladimir-putin-says-he-is-ready-for-peace-in-ukraine-but-only-on-his-terms-0926a0ef?mod=Searchresults_pos7&page=1

By Ann M. Simmons

Follow

Updated March 18, 2024 2:08 pm ET

Why Putin Needed Another Presidential Election to Legitimize His Power

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Why Putin Needed Another Presidential Election to Legitimize His Power

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Russian President Vladimir Putin has secured six more years in power and addressed the death of Alexei Navalny. WSJ’s Ann Simmons explains how the vote has revealed a major split in society. Photo: Natalia Kolesnikova/Pool/Shutterstock

Fresh from an election in which he was the only viable contender, Russia’s Vladimir Putin came out swinging against the West, vowing that peace in Ukraine would come only on his terms, and warning that if NATO put boots on the ground, it could mean nuclear war.

Putin’s landslide victory in the weekend’s carefully-choreographed vote was widely anticipated. Credible rivals have either been jailed or barred from the ballot, or are dead. But the aftermath has seen him kick up his rhetoric a little higher, and he is using it to suggest that only an outright victory in Ukraine would be acceptable to the Russian people—or, failing that, a lopsided peace with Moscow dictating the terms.

“We are for peace negotiations…but it is not because the enemy is running out of ammunition,” Putin told a news conference in the early hours of Monday, after election officials said he won an unprecedented 87% of the vote. “We are for it, if they are truly serious [and] in the long term they want to build peaceful, good neighborly relations between the two states, and not take a pause for 1½ to two years to rearm.”

Political analysts said that with Western nations dithering on supplying continuing aid to Ukraine and support for Kyiv becoming a partisan issue in the U.S., Putin has dangled the prospect of a cease-fire, calculating that he would be bargaining from a position of power.

Vladimir Putin’s image is displayed at a concert in Moscow on Monday after his victory in the latest Russian presidential election. PHOTO: ALEXANDER ZEMLIANICHENKO/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Ukraine is outmanned and outgunned, its forces so depleted that they now only fire around two shells for every 10 Russia fires at them, according to Western intelligence estimates. Putin’s bare minimum in any peace deal now would be to ensure that the Crimean Peninsula, which Moscow seized 10 years ago, would stay under its control, along with four areas Ukraine’s east and south that it claimed in 2022.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has rejected the start of any peace talks until Russia removes troops from his country and has warned that any cessation of hostilities would simply allow Russia to rearm and better attack Ukraine further down the line.

Western governments condemned Moscow’s move to expand the presidential election to Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine. The European Union said Monday that it “does not and will never recognize either the holding of these so-called elections in the territories of Ukraine or their results. They are null and void and cannot produce any legal effect whatsoever.”

A woman posed with a frame reading ‘I chose a president’ at a mural of Russian President Vladimir Putin at a polling station in Donetsk, Russian-controlled Ukraine, on Friday. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

The U.S. on Sunday described the overall election process as “obviously not free nor fair.”

In a statement provided to The Wall Street Journal, the Kremlin Monday denied suggestions that Putin had used intimidation and repression to swing the election in his favor, calling such accusations “baseless” and saying the outcome reflected what it called “the unique level of public support for the president.”

In his postelection remarks Monday, Putin cautioned the West against continuing to interfere in the war by backing Ukraine, saying, without providing evidence, that Russia was already aware that military personnel from U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries were present in Ukraine, and he claimed they were dying there in large numbers. He warned that a full-scale conflict between Russia and NATO “cannot be ruled out in the future” and if such were to occur, “the world will be one step away from a Third World war,” which hardly anyone wants, he said.

It was the third time in less than a month that Putin used the possible threat of nuclear confrontation with the West to emphasize his insistence that the U.S. and Europe should keep out of the conflict in Ukraine. Analysts have suggested he is trying to provoke a reaction from the West so as to convince the Russian population they need a strong leader to protect them.

A military breakthrough looks out of reach for both countries for now, and Putin has little incentive to stop. Western sanctions have failed to bring Russia’s economy to its knees, with China extending an important economic lifeline and Iran providing Moscow with drones to be used in Ukraine. Russia has also tapped allies North Korea and Belarus for supplies and has ramped up its own production of weapons.

The capture of Avdiivka, an eastern Ukrainian town, in February is an incremental battlefield success for Russia. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Meanwhile, incremental battlefield successes, such as the capture of the eastern Ukrainian town of Avdiivka in February, following months of grinding combat and huge manpower losses, have helped convince Putin to keep the fight going to try to force an outcome in Russia’s favor, analysts say.

Overnight Putin boasted of the military advantage now enjoyed by his soldiers, who he said were advancing “every day, gradually, carefully, but every day” and in some areas, were “simply cutting the enemy to pieces right now.”

The gains, though modest, also allowed him to put on another show of bravado later Monday, this time with a concert and rally on Moscow’s Red Square to mark the annexation of Crimea.

“Crimea is not only a strategically important territory, it is not only our history, our traditions and the pride of Russia. Crimea is, first and foremost, people,” Putin told thousands who had gathered to listen to artists sing patriotic songs, dance and recite poetry, waving flags. “Residents of Sevastopol, Crimeans—they are our pride. They never separated themselves from Russia, and this is what allowed Crimea to return to our common family,” he said.

A woman posed for pictures with art featuring the map of Crimea in the colors of the Russian tricolor flag earlier this month. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Flanked on stage by a small group, including young people and the three candidates who challenged him in the election, the Russian president vowed to continue to develop the peninsula. He said he had gotten word Monday that the railway that runs from the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, near the Ukrainian border and through the Russian-occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, had been renovated and would soon be connected with Sevastopol, the largest city in Crimea and the headquarters of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

This, he said, would provide another alternative route to the Crimean bridge—the target of repeated sabotage attacks since the start of the invasion, which Moscow has blamed on Kyiv.

“Together, hand in hand, we will move forward. And this is precisely what, not in words, but in deeds, makes us eminently stronger,” Putin said, as the crowd erupted with chants of “Russia, Russia!”

Write to Ann M. Simmons at ann.simmons@wsj.com

16. Friends in Low Places? Behind South Africa's New Genocide Case Against Israel

Conclusion:

As Ramaphosa’s ANC faced the prospect of electoral defeat, critics of South Africa’s foreign policy suggest the revved-up anti-Israel actions were aimed at boosting its sagging stature on the international stage and distracting its population from domestic economic woes. The Pandor visit may be aimed at seeking to shore up support from Washington. The foreign minister may face challenges because Washington formally designates Hamas as a terrorist entity and Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism – and has called the ICJ case “baseless.” 

Friends in Low Places? Behind South Africa's New Genocide Case Against Israel

https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2024/03/18/friends_in_low_places_behind_south_africas_new_genocide_case_against_israel_1018752.html

Above, President Cyril Ramaphosa next to a statue of Nelson Mandela in Cape Town in 2020. His new genocide case against Israel in international court looks to some like South Africa's latest example of honoring the human rights icon's legacy in the breach.

By Toby Dershowitz and Max Friedman, RealClearInvestigations

March 18, 2024

Shortly before South Africa accused Israel in the International Court of Justice of committing genocide in its post-Oct. 7 counteroffensive against Hamas, the South African ruling party, the African National Congress, suddenly resolved its longstanding and crippling debt issues.

Naledi Pandor: South Africa’s foreign minister is scheduled to visit Washington in the coming days.

AP

The court action in December – committing tens of millions of dollars to accuse a nation thousands of miles from South Africa’s borders – appeared less an act of probity than one of cynical collaboration with one of Israel’s fiercest enemies: Iran. 

Israel has forcefully denied the South African allegations, asserting that it is acting to defend itself and is “fighting Hamas, not the Palestinian population.”

Although there is no direct proof that Iran colluded with South Africa in its submission to the international court, it would not be a surprise if they did. Pretoria and Tehran have been diplomatically and financially close since long before fighters from Hamas, one of Iran's terrorist proxies, invaded southern Israel last Oct. 7 in a rampage of rape and killing, leaving an estimated 1,200 people dead and taking hundreds of others hostage. More than 130 remain in captivity in Gaza, including Americans.

Since 2015, South Africa and Hamas have signed two memorandums of understanding to cooperate in pressuring Israel diplomatically and economically.  

And South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, appears to have a sordid pecuniary interest in Iran stretching back further – at least two decades, when the company he was leading was implicated in an alleged bribery and influence-peddling scheme between Iran and his telecommunications giant.

The South Africa-Iran relationship fits a larger pattern in which the nation famed for Nelson Mandela’s championing of human rights has become an ally of some of the most oppressive regimes in the world. In the years since Mandela’s death in 2013, South Africa has increasingly refrained from holding accountable pariah regimes and groups – including Russia, Syria, Sudan and Hamas – and has been flagged for systemic illicit financial practices. In February 2023, for example, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global anti-money laundering watchdog that sets international standards aimed at preventing such activities, placed the country on its “grey list,” which signals to the financial community that the country is a haven for money laundering and terrorist financing. 

Paul Hoffman: Is South Africa's move "a principled stand by a government that truly takes its human rights obligations seriously?"

Accountability Now

Paul Hoffman, head of Accountability Now, a South Africa-based human rights watchdog, wondered in a recent interview whether the country’s submissions to the court against Israel represent "a principled stand by a government that truly takes its human rights obligations seriously and seeks to enforce anti-genocide laws, or whether it is a ploy on the part of those who would see Israel destroyed and Hamas and indeed its sponsors, like Iran, prevailing.”

South Africa’s ties to Iran and Hamas will be thrown into sharp relief in the coming days when South Africa’s foreign minister, Naledi Pandor, is scheduled to be in Washington, D.C.

Before October 7, Tehran sought to derail the peace agreements known as the Abraham Accords and other efforts to stabilize relations between Arab states and Israel.  A network of organizations and front companies, "using accounts housed in major local South African banks: Standard Bank, Nedbank, and Absa,” have reportedly facilitated contributions to Hamas through Al-Quds, an organization sanctioned by the U.S., according to the Jerusalem Post. 

Far apart geographically. Yet close.

Wikipedia

A chronology of diplomatic activity illustrates how the two nations appear to have worked hand-in-glove since Oct. 7:

Oct. 17: Ten days after Hamas’ massacre, Foreign Minister Pandor spoke by telephone with Hamas’ political bureau chief, Ismail Haniyeh. Pandor denied it was a solidarity call, calling it merely an expression of support for Palestinians.  

Iran's foreign minister: “The world is witnessing the genocide committed by the Israeli apartheid regime against the oppressed and resisting people of Gaza."

Wikimedia

Oct. 22: Five days later, Pandor traveled to Tehran to meet with President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. During Pandor’s visit, Iran’s foreign minister may have telegraphed what would be coming when he said at a joint press conference: “The world is witnessing the genocide committed by the Israeli apartheid regime against the oppressed and resisting people of Gaza. [Pandor and I] discussed the ongoing war crimes of the [Israeli] regime. We are thankful for the strong positions of the people and government of South Africa in their support of Palestine and the fight against [Israel's] apartheid. Tehran and Pretoria have joint positions and views on international matters.” 

Nov. 13: Pandor flew to Qatar and met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani in preparation for President Ramaphosa’s visit the following day to the wealthy emirate. It was Ramaphosa’s first visit as South Africa's President to Qatar, a major financier of Hamas, where several of its leaders reside. 

Nov. 14: Pandor published an opinion piece in an Iran-backed news outlet, calling for the arrest of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and only briefly referring to Hamas taking of hostages.  

Dec. 5: The ANC in Pretoria welcomed a three-member Hamas delegation, including Khaled Qaddoumi, Hamas’s representative to Iran, and Bassem Naim, a member of Hamas’s political bureau in Gaza.

Suspicions that South Africa was reaping financial rewards for its support of Hamas and its Iranian benefactor surfaced on Dec. 29, when it filed its case with the ICJ. The move raised eyebrows because South Africa, whose government is essentially broke, was spending millions in preliminary application fees to the court and preparation and argument costs of $10.5 million for an eventual trial expected to cost taxpayers about $80 million, sources told the authors.

Under Ramaphosa, South Africa has the highest unemployment rate and the third highest crime rate in the world. Fitch assigns a BB- (junk) rating to South Africa. It cites, among other factors, weak GDP growth outlook; large, persistent fiscal deficits; rising government debt; and a widening current-account deficit. 

The Ramaphosa-led ANC reportedly had the equivalent of only $5,000 in its bank account in November 2023 and has been unable to pay its own employees for months at a time.

A Sudden Settlement

Among the ruling party’s debts are $5.3 million owed to the South African company Ezulweni Investments for ANC campaign banners, not paid since the May 2019 elections. Trucks about to seize assets were recently spotted outside the ANC’s offices, ready to load up the party’s computers, desks and other property with the goal of being sold by public auction to recoup the money owed. 

One week before launching its ICJ case, however, the ANC announced on Dec. 22 the sudden settlement of the multi-million-dollar debt with Ezulweni Investments. 

Accountability Now’s Hoffman observed in a widely quoted interview with the country’s BizNews: “If you look at the interaction between Iran and South Africa since the Hamas attack on Israel, we have had a lot of interaction, not only with Iran but also with the Hamas leadership, which actually visited Pretoria. The Minister of International Relations visited Iran and out of that has come the application that has been made in the ICJ by South Africa.”

The ANC would not discuss the agreement publicly. Soon after, the ANC’s treasurer-general, Gwen Ramokgopa, announced that its finances were stabilized following the settlement with Ezulweni. According to South Africa’s Daily Maverick, Pandor denied that Hamas funded the case but said she “had not checked with the ANC on whether Iran was providing it with finance.” Others denied the sudden cash injection came from foreign sources. 

A South African opposition political party, ActionSA, has initiated legal proceedings to obtain the debt agreement between the ANC and Ezulweni, arguing that “the likelihood of any debt settlement being lawful under these circumstances are almost impossible.” 

If Iran defrayed the costs of South Africa’s ICJ genocide case against Israel, Pretoria may have new problems. Pretoria has a list of deficiencies it needs to address before the FATF removes it from the grey list. If there are revelations of additional illicit activities in connection with its filing of the ICJ case, this could further complicate its efforts. It also wouldn’t be the first time the Islamic Republic may have been involved in questionable financial matters with Ramaphosa. 

Twenty years ago, the telecommunications company he headed, MTN, secured a lucrative contract to provide the first private GSM mobile phone service license in Iran. In 2013, a competing company that believed it had legitimately secured the contract, Turkcell, filed suit seeking $4.2 billion in damages from MTN, alleging impropriety surrounding the Iranian government’s decision. 

Ramaphosa's 'Project Snooker'

Salacious details of how MTN allegedly used bribes and front companies to snatch the contract were revealed in Turkcell’s lawsuit, identifying Ramaphosa’s alleged direct role. The scheme was dubbed “Project Snooker.”

The suit alleged that MTN had committed to help Iran procure military equipment that it was prevented from buying due to international sanctions, as well as facilitating installation of eavesdropping technologies on MTN devices were the contract to be awarded, so that Iran could surveil its people.

The suit, which remains before the courts, also included bribery allegations, some of which have been found to be true. MTN has since admitted that under Ramaphosa’s leadership, MTN Irancell paid an Iranian official through a front company $400,000 to politically undermine Turkcell’s position, while another official was allegedly paid $200,000 to “help MTN deliver pro-Iran votes from South Africa at the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

South Africa’s relationship with Iran has become closer since Ramaphosa was elected the country’s president in 2018. 

In August 2023, for example, Iran asked South Africa to help pave the way for its membership in BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) – a group of emerging economies largely in competition with the United States. Within days, Iran was invited to become a member.  

It was at the BRICS meeting in Johannesburg that South Africa and Iran inked a deal under which Tehran would develop and equip five oil refineries for Pretoria. 

South Africa’s domestic woes have weakened prospects for the ANC to win the next election on May 29. According to a 2023 Ipsos poll, 83% of South Africans said the country was on the wrong track. Nearly a third of the country is unemployed. Ramaphosa’s approval rating was at an all-time low of 40%, and the ANC was expected to fall below 50% of the vote for the first time in a national election.

A recent analysis by Transparency International says corruption in South Africa has become “entrenched” and “involves many people with political power.” 

Although post-apartheid South Africa is still associated with Nelson Mandela’s unflinching courage and commitment to human rights, it has protected from accountability or in some cases embraced a string of leaders accused of genocide since his death in 2013, making its case against Israel suspect:

Sudan: In June 2015, South Africa welcomed Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to Johannesburg despite his indictment by the International Criminal Court for genocide in a campaign of mass killing, rape, and pillage against civilians in Darfur. South Africa refused to execute the ICC’s arrest warrant for the Sudanese leader. 

Bashar al-Assad: South Africa would not condemn him over chemical weapons.

Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service

Syria: South Africa in 2020 declined to support a U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad regime’s human rights abuses, including the “deliberate targeting of civilians, starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, and the use of chemical weapons, including sarin and chlorine gas, and sulfur mustard.” In 2021, South Africa voted against the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon’s decision to hold Assad accountable for his use of chemical weapons against his own population. 

Russia: Ramaphosa said South Africa would withdraw from the ICC after the court, in March 2023, charged Russian president Vladimir Putin with war crimes and issued a warrant for his arrest. Ramaphosa’s statement had to be walked back because it was contrary to the ANC’s position.

Hamas: Hamas’ intent to commit genocide against Israel and Jews is clear from its 1988 charter, which openly calls for the murder of Jews and annihilation of the State of Israel, and its deliberate attacks on Israeli civilians since the 1990s. Yet the ANC signed the two memorandums of understanding with Hamas, in 2015 and 2018. 

As Ramaphosa’s ANC faced the prospect of electoral defeat, critics of South Africa’s foreign policy suggest the revved-up anti-Israel actions were aimed at boosting its sagging stature on the international stage and distracting its population from domestic economic woes. The Pandor visit may be aimed at seeking to shore up support from Washington. The foreign minister may face challenges because Washington formally designates Hamas as a terrorist entity and Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism – and has called the ICJ case “baseless.” 

Toby Dershowitz is Managing Director at FDD Action, a non-partisan 501(c)(4) organization established to advocate for effective policies to promote U.S. national security and defend free nations. Max Friedman is a research intern there. Follow Dershowitz on Twitter/X @tobydersh

17. Congress Needs to Do More Than Just Exercise Its War Powers

Excerpts:

Conclusion

In fairness, there are several members of Congress who are trying to push the debate forward. For example, Sen. Tim Kaine has stated plainly that the Houthi violence is connected to Gaza and there is no reason to believe that bombings, rather than addressing and de-escalating the situation in Gaza, will deter them. Rep. Barbara Lee voted alone against the post-9/11 authorization in the first place, and has been working tirelessly to repeal it and end the resultant “endless wars” since then.

But these members should not be in the minority. The entire reason that Congress, and not the president, holds such fearsome constitutional responsibilities over warmaking is not simply to check a procedural box but because it is supposed to be difficult to resort to the use of force. The task is not to give the administration whatever they ask for, or scramble to backfill authorization for what they are already doing. Rather, it is to critically interrogate the consequences of that force and determine if it is the right course of action. Taking up political space and legislative time to focus on process without substance crowds out the core essential debates that Congress should actually be conducting.

Quite obviously, it is better as a matter of constitutional compliance and democracy itself for Congress and the public to get a say in matters of warfare. But doing the constitutional minimum is not enough to ensure good policy or restrain the use of force. Thus, it is far past time for Congress to go beyond simply denouncing unauthorized wars. What is needed is a truly co-equal branch of government that makes it harder to unleash the destructive power of the military without robust debate. Elected leaders should go beyond asking to be included in these decisions, and instead start opposing failed strategies on the merits utilizing every tool in their legislative toolbox.

Congress Needs to Do More Than Just Exercise Its War Powers - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Elizabeth Beavers · March 19, 2024

When it comes to bombing Yemen, Congress seems more interested in being consulted than in the substance of that consultation. When the Biden administration began striking Houthi positions earlier this year, members of Congress from across the ideological spectrum took to social media to decry these strikes — but their criticism focused almost entirely on the fact that no-one asked for their permission first. “President Biden must come to Congress and ask us to authorize this act of war,” tweeted Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL). “The White House must work with Congress before continuing these airstrikes in Yemen,” added Rep. Mark Pocan (D-WI).

These members are exactly right that Congress is the branch of government tasked by the Constitution with approving warfare, not the president. The problem is that this is only the latest example of Congress focusing on the wrong question. The debate should not be, “Has this use of force been properly authorized?” The missing conversation is: “Should these bombings even be happening?”

Of course, many of these same members see the procedural and substantive fights as one and the same. They believe the best way to force a debate and potentially restrain the unjust use of force is to insist that presidents come to Congress for authorization. But there is still a risk in focusing too much on process at the expense of substance. At worst, this could lead Congress to offer a resolution for the use of force in Yemen as an ex post facto authorization for what the administration is already doing. Indeed, Sen. Chris Murphy indicated in a recent hearing that he would like to do exactly that, saying, “an authorization is important to legalize the existing operations but also to guard against an unauthorized mission creep.”

Become a Member

But congressional war powers don’t begin and end with authorization processes. Members of Congress who oppose the executive’s use of force should say so and utilize their considerable platforms to critically move the debate forward. All members should deeply interrogate each case for war by holding hearings, grilling administration witnesses, and demanding evidence for underlying claims. And when the executive is unable to convincingly make the case for the use of force on the merits, Congress should have the political courage to stop them from proceeding by denying or revoking authorization and funding.

The Limits of Retroactive Authorization

Consider the impact of a retroactive authorization along the lines of what Murphy suggested. Congress could well use such an authorization process to vigorously debate this use of force on the merits. Perhaps in that process they would note that President Joe Biden himself has said the strikes are ineffective. Maybe they would use this opportunity to point out that the Houthi attacks are clearly connected to the crisis in Gaza, as evidenced by the Houthis’ own statements and the fact that they backed away from their attacks during the short ceasefire in November. Perhaps this would lead Congress to pass a strictly limited authorization that gives the administration tight barriers, or deny authorization altogether. Maybe all these things would happen! But even in this best-case scenario, such an approach would fall short.

For one, textual limits alone are insufficient to restrain the executive. The original post-9/11 “War on Terror” authorization explicitly targets those involved with the Sept. 11 attacks. Yet successive administrations have simply interpreted it to also authorize force against “associated forces.” This term is not present in the text yet has been invoked to justify force against groups that did not even exist at the time of those attacks in the more than two decades since. Similarly, the 2002 Iraq War authorization was quite obviously specifically intended to target the Saddam Hussein regime. Yet it has still come in handy 20 years later for presidents to cite when targeting Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. And, of course, presidents seem to find enormous inherent authority in their own Article II commander-in-chief constitutional powers if statutory authority appears incomplete. So textual limits could be useful, but only if someone enforces them.

Additionally, a congressional authorization process will not necessarily have the effect of restraining the executive’s use of force. It certainly could, and in fact there is some precedent. Perhaps the best example is from 2013, when the Obama administration indicated it planned to bomb Bashar al Assad’s government in Syria but then backtracked after Congress insisted on voting first, and it became clear that the vote may fail amidst heavy constituent opposition.

But there is also the counterexample of the 2003 Iraq War, in which Congress had every opportunity to investigate the facts and debate the merits of the invasion before it took place. Even amidst a flimsy war case from the Bush administration and a massive swell of grassroots anti-war pressure, Congress easily passed an authorization. And when the Obama administration requested authorization from Congress for its counter-Islamic State campaign that enjoyed broad bipartisan support but was clearly not contemplated by existing authorizations, Congress found itself unable to agree on the details and declined to engage. This did not result in any pause in the campaign — the administration simply found a way to argue that its existing authorities were sufficient after all.

Finally, it is also entirely possible that hawks in the administration or Congress elect to place an authorization for military force on the congressional floor that includes no meaningful limits on the Yemen bombing campaign and risks paving the way for another futile and costly U.S. war in the region. Unless the same members calling for an authorization have also built a coalition big enough to vote down a bad authorization, such a result would at best reduce the legislature’s war powers role to a mere rubber stamp for what the administration has already decided to do of its own volition. At worst, it would entrench and empower the very thing Congress seeks to restrain.

Post-9/11 Precedent

Nowhere is this dynamic more clear than in the seemingly endless authorization debate over the seemingly endless “Global War on Terror.” Although it has taken on other names and largely faded from public attention, sprawling U.S. military operations in the name of countering terrorism continue in dozens of countries more than two decades after the post-9/11 invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. There are only two congressional authorizations underpinning these operations in part or in whole: the resolution passed in 2002 authorizing force against Saddam’s Iraq, and the 60-word green light to use force against those responsible for Sept. 11, 2001, passed just days after those attacks.

These aging authorizations are clearly inappropriate to the current moment and have required a healthy mix of creative lawyering and delusion to argue otherwise over the years. On a bipartisan basis, a long succession of presidents, members of Congress, and civil society advocates have seemed to agree on this fact for more than a decade. Hearings have been held, legislation has been introduced, and ink has been spilled on the op-ed pages. As recently as last year, a bipartisan working group in Congress committed to finally addressing the issue.

But take careful note of where the energy is focused in these efforts. The internal wrangling appears to be entirely over questions like which armed groups the authorization will target, whether there should be any geographic boundaries on the use of force, if ground troops should get involved, and when the authorization should sunset, if ever. These are the exact same debate contours that have dragged on for more than a decade. Various members of Congress have proposed updated authorizations that get mired in this same debate spiral before ultimately going nowhere.

As one of the lead negotiators said of the working groups’ efforts, “This isn’t something that is being raised by anti-war or anti-use of military force individuals. This is something that is a constitutional issue that many of us have felt has been abused for a long time.” This is an honest admission: The entire conversation occurring in the Washington policy space seeks to ensure that ongoing global counterterrorism efforts are supported with the proper paperwork, as opposed to tackling the difficult question of whether such operations should even still be occurring.

It is in fact astounding just how absent that debate is in the halls of Congress. After more than 20 years, more than $8 trillion, and hundreds of thousands if not millions of dead bodies, armed groups engaging in terrorism have only proliferated and spread. “Counter-terrorism” has helped that happen. The destabilization and unrest that has resulted from U.S. military operations in the name of countering terrorism has fueled displacement, human rights abuses, and destruction. The fundamental theories underpinning the War on Terror have been proven incorrect over and over. It is time to recognize this reality and end the charade, not debate the contours of how to reauthorize and entrench it.

Conclusion

In fairness, there are several members of Congress who are trying to push the debate forward. For example, Sen. Tim Kaine has stated plainly that the Houthi violence is connected to Gaza and there is no reason to believe that bombings, rather than addressing and de-escalating the situation in Gaza, will deter them. Rep. Barbara Lee voted alone against the post-9/11 authorization in the first place, and has been working tirelessly to repeal it and end the resultant “endless wars” since then.

But these members should not be in the minority. The entire reason that Congress, and not the president, holds such fearsome constitutional responsibilities over warmaking is not simply to check a procedural box but because it is supposed to be difficult to resort to the use of force. The task is not to give the administration whatever they ask for, or scramble to backfill authorization for what they are already doing. Rather, it is to critically interrogate the consequences of that force and determine if it is the right course of action. Taking up political space and legislative time to focus on process without substance crowds out the core essential debates that Congress should actually be conducting.

Quite obviously, it is better as a matter of constitutional compliance and democracy itself for Congress and the public to get a say in matters of warfare. But doing the constitutional minimum is not enough to ensure good policy or restrain the use of force. Thus, it is far past time for Congress to go beyond simply denouncing unauthorized wars. What is needed is a truly co-equal branch of government that makes it harder to unleash the destructive power of the military without robust debate. Elected leaders should go beyond asking to be included in these decisions, and instead start opposing failed strategies on the merits utilizing every tool in their legislative toolbox.

Become a Member

Elizabeth Beavers is an adjunct law professor and foreign policy writer based in Washington, D.C.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Elizabeth Beavers · March 19, 2024

18. Combatant commanders head to Capitol Hill to face budget questions

Combatant commanders head to Capitol Hill to face budget questions

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · March 18, 2024

Key defense leaders will testify on Capitol Hill this week on the White House’s fiscal 2025 budget request, even as the fiscal 2024 military appropriations plan still needs to be completed.

Seven combatant commanders are scheduled to appear at hearings on Wednesday and Thursday, with all expecting to face questions about their respective sections of the budget ask. Lawmakers hope to have work on that spending plan done ahead of Oct. 1, the start of the new fiscal year.

But the House and Senate also need to finalize a partial government funding plan — including the Department of Defense’s appropriations — for fiscal 2024. Most federal agencies have been operating on short-term budget plans for the last five months, but lawmakers hope to pass a full-year plan by the end of this week.

If they fail to adopt those plans by Friday, it could trigger a partial government shutdown, one which could halt military paychecks for several weeks and furlough tens of thousands of Defense Department civilian employees.

Tuesday, March 19

House Foreign Affairs — 1 p.m. — 2172 Rayburn

Afghanistan Withdrawal

Former Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley and former head of U.S. Central Command Gen. Kenneth McKenzie Jr. will testify on decisions leading up to the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan in 2021.

Wednesday, March 20

Senate Foreign Relations — 9:30 a.m. — Capitol S-116

Nominations

The committee will consider several pending nominations, including Michael Sfraga to be Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs.

House Armed Services — 10 a.m. — 2118 Rayburn

Indo-Pacific Region

Adm. John Aquilino, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and Gen. Paul LaCamera, head of U.S. Forces Korea, will testify on current challenges and the fiscal 2025 budget request.

House Homeland Security — 10 a.m. — 310 Cannon

Iran

Outside experts will testify on the security threat posed by Iran.

House Foreign Affairs — 10:15 a.m. — 2172 Rayburn

Pakistan

State Department officials will testify on the future of democracy in Pakistan.

House Veterans' Affairs — 10:30 a.m. — 360 Cannon

Pending Legislation

The subcommittee on economic opportunity will consider several pending bills.

House Appropriations — 10:30 a.m. — 2362-A Rayburn

Military Quality of Life

Senior enlisted leaders from each of the services will testify on potential military quality of life changes in the fiscal 2025 budget request.

House Foreign Affairs — 12 p.m. — 2172 Rayburn

Pending Legislation

The committee will consider several pending bills.

House Veterans' Affairs — 1 p.m. — 360 Cannon

VA Disability Claims

Department officials will testify on disability claim case appeals and potential improvements to the system.

Senate Armed Services — 2 p.m. — 222 Russell

Defense Acquisition Systems

Members of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform Commission will present their findings to the committee.

House Armed Services — 3:30 p.m. — 2118 Rayburn

Special Operations Forces

Gen. Bryan Fenton, head of U.S. Special Operations Command, and Christopher Maier, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, will testify on current challenges and the fiscal 2025 budget request.

Thursday, March 21

Senate Foreign Relations — 9:30 a.m. — Capitol S-116

Pending Business

The committee will consider several pending bills and nominations.

House Foreign Affairs — 10 a.m. — 2172 Rayburn

Chinese Military Technology

State and Commerce Department officials will testify on Chinese military use of American technology.

House Armed Services — 10 a.m. — 2118 Rayburn

Middle East/North Africa

Gen. Michael Kurilla, head of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Michael Langley, head of U.S. Africa Command, and Gen. Paul LaCamera, head of U.S. Forces Korea will testify on current challenges and the fiscal 2025 budget request.

Senate Foreign Relations — 10:30 a.m. — 419 Dirksen

U.S. Anti-Corruption Strategy

State Department officials will testify on anti-corruption strategies and challenges in foreign countries.

House Veterans' Affairs — 11 a.m. — 360 Cannon

Toxic Exposures Fund

Department officials will testify on toxic exposure disability claims and how the Toxic Exposures Fund is handled in the White House’s fiscal 2025 budget request.

House Veterans' Affairs — 2 p.m. — 360 Cannon

Pending Legislation

The subcommittee on health will consider several pending bills.

House Armed Services — 3:30 p.m. — 2212 Rayburn

Strategic Forces Posture

Members will hear testimony from Gen. Anthony Cotton, head of U.S. Strategic Command; Gen. Stephen Whiting, head of U.S. Space Command; and Gen. Gregory Guillot, head of U.S. Northern Command on strategic forces posture for fiscal year 2025.

House Veterans' Affairs — 4:30 p.m. — 360 Cannon

Pending Legislation

The subcommittee on oversight will consider several pending bills.

Friday, March 22

House Armed Services — 9 a.m. — 2118 Rayburn

Military Technology and Artificial Intelligence

John Sherman, Chief Information Officer for the Department of Defense, and Lt. Gen. Robert Skinner, director of the Defense Information Systems Agency, will testify on military priorities for digital modernization, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com