|
Quotes of the Day:
"The greatest evils in the world will not be carried out of men with guns, but by men in suits sitting behind desks."
– C.S. Lewis.
"All things are subject to interpretation. Whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth."
– Friedrich Nietzsche
"The only reason people do not know much is because they do not care to know. They are incurious. Incuriosity is the oddest and most foolish feeling there is."
– Stephen Fry.
1. Trump’s Next Deal Should Be With Kim Jong Un
2. Korea joins NATO science and technology body partnership
3. N. Korea's Mount Paektu to be designated as UNESCO Global Geopark
4. USS Carl Vinson arrives in S. Korea in show of force
5. Trump orders national security impact probe on lumber imports, could target Korean kitchen cabinets
6. FMs of S. Korea, China expected to hold talks on sidelines of trilateral meeting in Tokyo
7. Hyundai, Kia post record sales in U.S. in Feb.
8. Concern grows in Washington, Seoul about China's disinformation campaign
9. North Korea, Kursk strike deal on boosting ties as DPRK troops fight in region
10. In Shipbuilding, the U.S. Is Tiny and Rusty
11. U.S. Navy's $30-billion plan to upgrade warship fleet could benefit Korea's shipbuilders: Kotra
12. The 2 Koreas Share Experience in Foreign Wars
13. “Doors Won’t Open”: Critical Flaw in Russian Armored Vehicles Used by North Korean Troops
1. Trump’s Next Deal Should Be With Kim Jong Un
From an international relations theory perspective this essay makes eminent sense. This really identifies most of the key issues.
It then takes Kim Jong Un's statements and spins them in a way that would seem to support international relations theory and most importantly the author's primary recommendation to engage and negotiate using an arms control process to achieve what the author has noted are Kim Jong Un's words to achieve regional balance. He thinks POTUS can negotiate a deal.
Excerpt:
But he also said that his country “does not want unnecessary tension of the regional situation but will take sustained countermeasures to ensure the regional military balance.”
But theory is one thing and reality is another. I do not think we can apply traditional international relations theory. The author is correct that Kim will not give up his nuclear weapons. But to make concessions, recognize Kim as a nuclear power, and enter into arms control agreements will only allow Kim to believe that his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy are working.
There will be no lasting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula nor can there be denuclearization of the north as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. We must not be afraid to talk about and address the heart of the problem: The existence of the Kim family regime.
We must also understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Kim is using political warfare and blackmail diplomacy for survival and to create conditions for domination.
Yes, regime survival is the key objective. But the regime believes the key to long term survival is to dominate the peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
And the nature of the regime includes this paradox: the regime has a greater fear of the Korean people in the north armed with information than of the combined ROK and US militaries.
Trump’s Next Deal Should Be With Kim Jong Un
Washington’s North Korea policy is at a dead end, and it’s time for something new.
By Bilahari Kausikan, the chairman of the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and a former Singaporean diplomat.
Foreign Policy · by Bilahari Kausikan
- U.S. Foreign Policy
- Geopolitics
- North Korea
- South Korea
February 26, 2025, 10:16 AM
Ongoing reports and analysis
Should the United States restart talks with North Korea? In his press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba on Feb. 7, U.S. President Donald Trump stressed his good personal relationship with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, saying that “it’s a very big asset for everybody that I do get along with him.”
At the press conference with Ishiba, Trump also claimed that his talks with Kim during his first term had stopped a war on the Korean Peninsula. Regardless of whether this is true, Trump certainly dealt better with North Korea than his predecessor. Former President Barack Obama made pretty speeches but came across as weak to many countries in East Asia, including U.S. allies and partners. For eight years, he did nothing about North Korea and called it a policy of “strategic patience.” This eroded deterrence and allowed Pyongyang to advance its missile and nuclear weapon programs.
In August 2017, Kim threatened Guam, a U.S. territory and major military base in the Pacific, with missiles. Trump responded by promising to rain “fire and fury” on Pyongyang. To my knowledge, North Korea has never tested a long-range missile since then on any trajectory that would bring it anywhere near Guam.
Deterrence restored, Trump met with Kim three times: in Singapore in 2018, in Hanoi in 2019, and in the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Korea, also in 2019.
These meetings failed because they were poorly prepared and set an unrealistic goal of “denuclearization.” That train left the station long ago and will not return. To expect what U.S. officials call “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization” of North Korea’s nuclear program is a fool’s errand.
There is zero possibility of North Korea giving up its nuclear weapon or missile programs. Regime survival is an existential issue, and Pyongyang regards these programs as absolutely indispensable for assuring this goal. There is no incentive that can be offered to Pyongyang—or cost that can be imposed—that can persuade or compel it to give them up, because to do so is tantamount to opening the door to regime change.
The United States’ denuclearization goals are an obstacle to dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program in a practical and realistic manner. Earlier this year, Trump called North Korea a “nuclear power.” Nonproliferation purists criticized him for doing so, since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty only recognizes Britain, France, China, Russia, and the United States as official nuclear powers. What Trump said, however, was just a simple description of a fact.
North Korea is rational and can be dealt with in the same way as all nuclear-weapon states: by strong deterrence and adroit diplomacy. The first Trump administration was strong but not adroit. Still, trying diplomacy was not wrong, and trying again would not be a mistake.
Despite its habitually inflammatory rhetoric, North Korea is highly unlikely to start another war of reunification, as it did in 1950. War would put regime survival in jeopardy. Notwithstanding the battle experience North Korean troops are now gaining in the Russia-Ukraine war, the South Korean military is technologically superior to its neighbor’s conventional forces, and an invasion of South Korea could draw in additional forces from the United States, Japan, and perhaps Australia.
In January 2024, Kim renounced peaceful reunification as a policy goal and demolished the Arch of Reunification in Pyongyang. Rather than assuming that he seeks reunification by war instead, we should take this as a likely recognition that the two Koreas are here to stay—and the beginning of a healthy move out of the deep shadows of his father’s and grandfather’s legacies.
We tend to focus on North Korea’s military programs. But Kim’s signature policy has been Byungjin (“parallel development”), which places equal emphasis on military and economic development, unlike his father’s Songun (“military-first policy”). When I last visited Pyongyang in 2013, two years after Kim came to power, there were tangible signs of development—undoubtedly only token showcase projects affecting only a few places in the capital, but nevertheless real.
In February 2024, North Korean media reported that Kim said he was “ashamed and sorry” for neglecting economic development outside Pyongyang and called for a “rural industrial revolution.” He acknowledged that achieving this along with military spending on nuclear weapons “won’t be easy.”
We need not take what he said at face value to recognize that any sort of apology from any North Korean leader is such a rare event that it should not be lightly dismissed. With Kim likely satisfied with his country’s progress on nuclear weapons and missiles, will he return to diplomacy in order to further his economic agenda? We will not know unless the possibilities are explored.
Neither North Korea nor South Korea is really interested in reunification. To reduce the risk of miscalculation, it is better that they deal with each other as separate, sovereign states. This will require the United States, Japan, and South Korea to officially recognize North Korea and conclude a peace treaty with it.
Some will argue that a peace treaty will reward and thus encourage bad behavior. But this is unconvincing; rewarding bad behavior is hardly unknown in international relations, including the treatment of North Korea. What else was the 1995 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization agreement but an attempt to bribe Pyongyang to stop behaving badly?
The energy agreement did not stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. But now that Pyongyang has developed such a capability, however rudimentary, its calculations of interests could change, particularly when it develops a minimally credible second-strike capability vis-à-vis the United States, which will boost its confidence in regime survival.
Regime survival is a relatively modest ambition to accommodate. This may lead to discussions on arms control and nonproliferation to third countries, which are the only realistic goals for diplomacy with North Korea. In any case, what are the alternatives? Sanctions clearly have not worked. It is too late for a war.
The Biden administration lumped China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea into one ideological category and contrasted it with the West. Trump 2.0 will not look at these countries in such ideological terms.
Former President Joe Biden’s simplistic binary categorization was not a policy. It ignored differences in how these four countries define their interests, the degree of their integration into the world economy, and the scope of their ambitions. These differences should be the starting point for U.S.-North Korean diplomacy.
Importantly, it is pointless to try to enlist China’s help. Beijing is not enamored with Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programs, but China and North Korea are two of only five surviving Leninist systems in the world. Beijing’s most vital interest is to preserve the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. On this, Beijing is completely risk-adverse; indeed, it remains continually insecure. Beijing will therefore never be complicit, however indirectly, in anything that might lead to regime change in North Korea, because it could give the Chinese people inconvenient ideas about their own system. To Beijing, tolerating North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs is the lesser evil.
Only Washington has any chance of shifting Pyongyang. North Korean officials are extremely clear-headed about this. Since the United States is the only country that can effect regime change, they know they need to deal with the United States. Pyongyang is not desperate and will not pay any price for a deal, but we will not know the cost unless the possibility is explored.
Speaking at the North Korean Ministry of National Defense on Feb. 8, Kim reaffirmed North Korea’s commitment to developing nuclear capabilities and criticized the United States for creating a military imbalance in Northeast Asia. But he also said that his country “does not want unnecessary tension of the regional situation but will take sustained countermeasures to ensure the regional military balance.”
Talking about “balance” and “imbalance” is intriguing. It is something less than wanting the United States out of the region. Is Kim open to a deal on an appropriate balance? Again, there is no way to be sure unless the two sides talk.
Many uncertainties remain. What is an appropriate balance? Will it require trading off Pyongyang’s long-range missiles, which are Washington’s chief concern, for U.S. acceptance of the short- and medium-range missiles that threaten Japan and South Korea?
These uncertainties—as well as China’s own nuclear modernization program—raise fundamental questions about the United States’ so-called nuclear umbrella, as well as Japanese and South Korean security.
During his 2016 campaign, Trump suggested that Japan and South Korea acquire their own nuclear weapons. Obviously, Washington will not sacrifice Los Angeles or San Francisco to save Tokyo or Seoul. It may no longer be a question of whether—only when—Japan and South Korea will develop their own independent nuclear deterrents.. The inherent logic of their circumstances next to nuclear-armed China and North Korea will inexorably push them in this direction.
In South Korea, there is already considerable public support for acquiring nuclear weapons. For Japan, the only country ever to suffer a nuclear attack, the road to an independent nuclear deterrent will be more difficult.
But at least twice since the 19th century, Japan has shown itself capable of fundamentally changing direction when national survival was at stake. The alternative to an independent nuclear deterrent is subordination to China. This subordination would be such a painful redefinition of the core meaning of being Japanese that any other option becomes preferable. The late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe already laid the groundwork by breaking decisively with the last vestiges of his country’s strictly pacifist post-World War II doctrine.
Regardless of their decisions on independent nuclear deterrents, Seoul and Tokyo would be well advised to open their own diplomatic channels to Pyongyang as well, rather than leaving that crucial relationship entirely in the hands of a more transactional and less predictable Washington. As the Europeans are learning with regards to Russia and Ukraine, U.S. interests on North Korea are different from Japan’s and South Korea’s.
This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration. Follow along here.
This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump transition. Follow along here.
2. Korea joins NATO science and technology body partnership
Strands of the silk web of alliances.
Silk Web of Alliances: Trump’s Legacy and the Indo-Pacific’s Future
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/01/silk-web-of-alliances-trumps-legacy-and-the-indo-pacifics-future/
Korea joins NATO science and technology body partnership
The Korea Times · March 1, 2025
President Yoon Suk Yeol meets with Sir Keir Starmer the new British prime minister, during the Korea-UK summit at the Washington Convention Center in Washington, D.C., July 11, 2024. Korea Times photo by Wang Tae-suk
Korea joined the science and technology body of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a partner country in a move to strengthen cooperation with the Western military alliance, the defense ministry said Saturday.
As part of the partnership with the NATO Science and Technology Organization, Korea is expected to engage in joint research and development with other members and plan projects under the alliance's science and technology committee, according to the ministry.
The science and technology group serves as a platform for cooperation in advanced defense technologies among its members. With its entry, Korea becomes the organization's third partner country after Japan and Australia.
"Korea's entry into the partnership lays the groundwork for multilateral defense science and technology cooperation with Europe for the first time and marks a milestone in development in Korea-NATO cooperation," it said in a release.
Korea is not a member of NATO but is one of the alliance's four partners in the Indo-Pacific region, alongside Australia, Japan and New Zealand. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · March 1, 2025
3. N. Korea's Mount Paektu to be designated as UNESCO Global Geopark
Does this resolve the border dispute between China dn Korea?
N. Korea's Mount Paektu to be designated as UNESCO Global Geopark | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 2, 2025
SEOUL, March 2 (Yonhap) -- The North Korean side of Mount Paektu, an active stratovolcano on the North Korean-Chinese border, is expected to be designated as a UNESCO Global Geopark next month, sources said Sunday.
UNESCO said its executive board is set to meet from April 2-17 to review 16 sites for Global Geopark designation, including Mount Paektu.
The session follows the UNESCO Global Geopark Council's proposal to endorse those sites as Global Geopark networks.
The executive board typically endorses Geopark designations as proposed by the council, making it almost certain that Mount Paektu will be listed as North Korea's first UNESCO Global Geopark.
UNESCO Global Geoparks are single, unified geographical areas where sites and landscapes of international geological significance are managed with a holistic concept of protection, education and sustainable development, according to UNESCO.
Its executive board designated the Chinese side of the mountain as Mount Changbaishan UNESCO Global Geopark under its Chinese name last year.
North Korea sought the UNESCO listing for the mountain in 2019, a year before China, but China secured the designation first as an on-site inspection in North Korea was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
"The Geopark is marked by spectacular volcano-geological heritage and landscapes made up by volcanic eruptions," the UNESCO said of the mountain.
"The territory demonstrates well-developed glacial geography, with cirques made by glacial erosion and other topographical features such as moraine hills, moraine plains and outwash plains by glacial depositions," according to UNESCO.
It also said the mountain is regarded as a volcano with high potential for further eruptions.
In the coming session, the executive board is also expected to add South Korea's Danyang and Gyeongbuk Donghaean to its Global Geopark networks, bringing the country's total Geoparks designations to seven.
This file photo, taken June 11, 2024, shows Mount Paektu on the North Korean-Chinese border. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 2, 2025
4. USS Carl Vinson arrives in S. Korea in show of force
5 acres of US sovereignty territory projected anywhere in the world.
The korean press should write General Brunson serves the Commander and the ROK/US Combined Forces Command (ROK/US CFC) and also as the commander of the UN Command (UNC) and US Forces Korea (USFK). Koreans should take pride in their co-equal ownership of the ROK/US CFC that is responsible for deterring war and defending the ROK. The UNC and USFK will only be force providers to the actual warfighting command.
But instead Korean journalists write this. The ROK/US CFC should not be an "also" and "after-thought."
U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson, who also serves as commander of the U.N. Command and the Combined Forces Command, underscored the importance of such operations in maintaining regional security.
(LEAD) USS Carl Vinson arrives in S. Korea in show of force | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · March 2, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS remarks, details in paras 8-10, 12; CHANGES photos)
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, March 2 (Yonhap) -- The USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier arrived at a key naval base in the southeastern city of Busan on Sunday, South Korea's Navy said, reaffirming the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence against continued North Korean threats.
The nuclear-powered vessel of Carrier Strike Group 1 entered the naval base in Busan, about 320 kilometers southeast of Seoul, in what marked the first such visit by a U.S. aircraft carrier to South Korea since U.S. President Donald Trump's return to the White House in January.
It was also accompanied by the guided missile cruiser USS Princeton and Aegis-equipped destroyer USS Sterett, according to the South's Navy.
The USS Carl Vinson arrives at a key naval base in the southeastern city of Busan on March 2, 2025. (Yonhap)
The Navy described the visit as part of efforts to implement an "ironclad" U.S. extended deterrence pledge, which Washington recently reaffirmed, and display the robust South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture against persistent North Korean threats.
The allies will seek to bolster their interoperability and hold friendly activities between their naval forces on the occasion of the visit, it added.
"Our military will powerfully retaliate against any North Korean threat, and the South Korea-U.S. alliance will support peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region through close cooperation," Rear Adm. Lee Nam-gyu, director of the maritime operation center at the ROK Fleet, was quoted as saying.
ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, the official name for South Korea.
This photo, released by the U.S. Navy, shows U.S. Army Gen. Xavier Brunson (C) -- commander of the U.N. Command, Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea -- observing flight operations on the flight deck aboard the USS Carl Vinson on March 1, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson, who also serves as commander of the U.N. Command and the Combined Forces Command, underscored the importance of such operations in maintaining regional security.
"The Carl Vinson's carrier strike group operations demonstrate our commitment to bolster the defense of allies and partners, and strengthen our ability to 'fight tonight and win.'" Brunson was quoted as saying as he observed flight operations aboard the flight carrier the previous day.
"This visit, especially when coupled with realistic all domain, joint and combined training, increases interoperability and ensures we build the readiness posture to deter aggression and maintain stability in the Republic of Korea and the region," the USFK commander said.
The USS Carl Vinson arrives at a key naval base in the southeastern city of Busan on March 2, 2025. (Yonhap)
The USS Carl Vinson last visited South Korea in November 2023, just hours before North Korea successfully placed its first military spy satellite into orbit after two failed attempts.
The latest visit comes about eight months after the USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier visited Busan to take part in the inaugural Freedom Edge multidomain exercise conducted among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan in June last year.
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · March 2, 2025
5. Trump orders national security impact probe on lumber imports, could target Korean kitchen cabinets
(LEAD) Trump orders national security impact probe on lumber imports, could target Korean kitchen cabinets | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 2, 2025
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES throughout)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, March 1 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order Saturday to launch an investigation into the impact of lumber and timber imports on America's national security, a move that could lead to a new tariff imposition.
Trump directed Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick to initiate the probe, saying the United States faces "significant" vulnerabilities in the wood supply chain from imported timber, lumber and their derivative products being dumped onto the U.S. market.
A White House official mentioned South Korea and China as he stressed the probe will also target derivative products, including kitchen cabinets. It is to proceed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 that allows the president to impose import restrictions if an import threatens to hurt national security.
On the same day, Trump also inked an executive order designed to increase domestic timber production and help reduce construction and housing costs in the U.S. Timber refers to unprocessed trees or tree parts, while lumber refers to processed wood.
"Our disastrous timber and lumber policies, the legacy of the previous administration, trigger wildfires and degrade our fish and wildlife habitats," the official told reporters in a telephonic press briefing.
"They drive up construction and housing costs, and impoverish America through large trade deficits that result from exporters like Canada, Germany and Brazil dumping lumber into our markets at the expense of both our economic prosperity and national security."
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks with reporters as he signs executive orders in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington on Feb. 13, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
The official underscored that the administration is also zeroing in on ramifications from derivative products.
"We have situations, for example, where we're exporting our logs, and they're coming back from China in particular, and South Korea does this too ... very heavily subsidized things like kitchen cabinets and the like," he said.
Asked why lumber imports pose a threat to national security, the official said that the Pentagon is a major consumer of lumber and derivative products.
"The whole issue of having a reliable source is critical. If you look at kind of the military needs, we are not building, obviously, aircraft with it, but we are certainly building all the ancillary structures that the military needs," he said.
"And it's simply a danger to this country to get increasingly dependent on a foreign supply chain or a product that we could be almost self-sufficient in."
Last month, Trump said he was weighing a 25 percent tariff on lumber and wood products.
According to the Korea International Trade Association, South Korea's furniture exports to the U.S. were tallied at US$30 million last year. Some observers say U.S. tariffs on timber imports, if imposed, might have a limited impact on Asia's fourth-largest economy.
The latest action came after Trump signed an executive order Tuesday to investigate how copper imports threaten America's national security and economic stability, in a move that could lead to the imposition of new tariffs on the metal used to produce aircraft, vehicles, ships and other military hardware.
Since taking office in January, Trump has made a series of tariff announcements, including a plan to start imposing 25 percent tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports March 12 and the threat to roll out "reciprocal" tariffs and new duties on cars, chips and pharmaceuticals.
He has been using tariffs to reduce America's trade deficits, boost domestic manufacturing and achieve other policy goals, including preventing the inflow of undocumented migrants and drugs, such as fentanyl.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 2, 2025
6. FMs of S. Korea, China expected to hold talks on sidelines of trilateral meeting in Tokyo
FMs of S. Korea, China expected to hold talks on sidelines of trilateral meeting in Tokyo | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 2, 2025
SEOUL, March 2 (Yonhap) -- The top diplomats of South Korea and China are expected to hold talks later this month on the sidelines of their trilateral meeting with the Japanese foreign minister, according to sources Sunday.
The three neighbors are in the final stages of arranging talks among their foreign ministers on March 22 in Tokyo, the first such meeting in 16 months, according to the diplomatic sources.
On the sidelines of the trilateral talks, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, are expected to hold a separate meeting.
Seoul and Beijing have been discussing Wang's visit to South Korea on the occasion of his Tokyo trip, but it reportedly remains unclear whether he will visit South Korea.
If no progress is made, Cho and Wang are likely to hold talks in the Japanese capital.
The meeting, if held, would mark the first since September last year when they met on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly.
A number of diplomatic issues between the two countries could be discussed during the meeting.
After Cho and his U.S. and Japanese counterparts expressed joint "support for Taiwan's meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations" in a joint statement last month, China lodged a complaint, calling it interference with its sovereignty.
The meeting could also delve into the tariff increases by U.S. President Donald Trump's administration, anti-Chinese sentiment among South Korea's conservative forces and a potential visit to South Korea's ancient city of Gyeongju by Chinese President Xi Jinping for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November.
South Korea's Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul (L) shakes hands with China's Foreign Minister Wang Yu in Laos, in this file photo taken July 26, 2024. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · March 2, 2025
7. Hyundai, Kia post record sales in U.S. in Feb.
Hyundai, Kia post record sales in U.S. in Feb. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · March 2, 2025
SEOUL, March 2 (Yonhap) -- Hyundai Motor Co., South Korea's top automaker, saw its sales in the United States climb 3 percent from a year ago in February, marking its biggest sales for the month, the company said Sunday.
Hyundai Motor's U.S. sales reached 62,032 units last month, compared with 60,341 units sold in the same month last year, according to the automaker.
The figure marked the largest for any February, the company added.
The growth was driven by a 194 percent surge in sales of the Santa Fe hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) and a 12 percent increase in sales of the Ioniq 6 EV.
Kia Corp., Hyundai's sister company and South Korea's second-largest carmaker, also set a U.S. sales record for the month, according to the company, with sales rising 7.2 percent on-year to 63,303 units.
The company attributed the increase in sales to its lineup of sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and solid sales of the new K4 sedan.
This photo, provided by the U.S. unit of Hyundai Motor Co., shows the Santa Fe XRT. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
brk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · March 2, 2025
8. Concern grows in Washington, Seoul about China's disinformation campaign
China's Unrestricted Warfare. Political Warfare. Legal Warfare (lawfare). Media or Public Opinion Warfare.
Concern grows in Washington, Seoul about China's disinformation campaign
February 28, 2025 10:34 PM
https://www.voanews.com/a/concern-grows-in-washington-seoul-about-china-s-disinformation-campaign-/7993410.html
By Christy Lee
Supporters of impeached South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol attend a rally to oppose his impeachment near the Constitutional Court in Seoul, South Korea, Feb. 25, 2025. The letters read, "The people's president."
Share
Print
WASHINGTON —
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in the closing statements of his impeachment trial this week said that a Chinese-backed disinformation campaign is threatening South Korea's democracy.
The United States has acknowledged Beijing's global disinformation campaign amid growing concerns in Seoul and Washington about China's alleged interference in South Korean politics and elections.
"It's well known that the Chinese Communist Party deploys vast information manipulation campaigns around the world," a State Department spokesperson said in a statement emailed Wednesday to VOA's Korean Service.
"Fake news, propaganda and disinformation are tools frequently employed as a part of Beijing's diplomacy," the statement said, using a long-standing practice of anonymity.
The comments were made in response to remarks by China's ambassador to Seoul, Dai Bing, who criticized South Korean conservative groups for speaking out about what they view as Beijing's interference in South Korean politics and elections.
On Tuesday, Dai told journalists gathered at the Chinese Embassy in Seoul that the groups' "strong disruptive influence could significantly impact the development of China-South Korea relations."
Dai continued, "We remain committed to noninterference in South Korea's internal affairs, but we will also take appropriate measures depending on the severity of the situation."
Anti-Chinese sentiment has been growing in South Korea, along with opposition to the impeachment of Yoon, who is now waiting for the Constitutional Court to rule on his brief martial law decree in December.
Yoon, facing separate charges for insurrection associated with his martial law decree, was impeached by the opposition-controlled National Assembly on Dec. 14, for what they saw as taking an extreme measure designed for times of war.
A TV screen shows footage of impeached South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's address at the final hearing of his trial during a news program at a bus terminal in Seoul, South Korea, Feb. 25, 2025
Alleged election interference
Thousands of protesters took to the streets in support of arguments made at weekslong court hearings by Yoon's attorneys, who alleged that China and North Korea interfered in South Korean politics and elections to undermine national security.
The court wrapped up its impeachment hearings on Tuesday after Yoon made his final statement defending his decree.
Yoon said foreign entities have been collaborating with anti-state forces in South Korea in undermining the system of liberal democracy, threatening its national security and driving the country into a state of emergency.
"They have driven the country into the state of conflict and chaos through fake news, manipulation of public opinion and propaganda," Yoon said.
The court's impeachment ruling is expected in mid-March. If the court rules to impeach Yoon, an election will be held within 60 days to select a new president. The leader of the main opposition Democratic Party (DP), Lee Jae-myung, known for his pro-China views, is considered a strong candidate.
Supporters of impeached South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol stage a rally to oppose a court having issued a warrant to detain Yoon, near the presidential residence in Seoul, South Korea, Jan. 3, 2025. The letters read, "Oppose Impeachment."
"China has been actively interfering in South Korea's politics for decades, and recent evidence suggests that Beijing has even been helping the South's leftists rig elections," said Gordon Chang, senior fellow at the Gatestone Institute and the author of Plan Red: China's Project to Destroy America.
Dai's remarks suggest that "China's communists think no one should ever complain about their brazen meddling," Chang told VOA on Thursday.
Chang and others raised concerns about China's interference in South Korean politics and elections at the Conservative Political Action Conference, or CPAC, held last week in Washington.
At a forum held Friday at CPAC, Fred Fleitz, vice chair of the America First Policy Institute's Center for American Security, said, "South Korea plays a crucial role in promoting security in the Asia Pacific, and it is a key strategic ally of the United States.
"That obviously gives strong motivations to China and North Korea to undermine South Korea, to create domestic instability, knowing that it will advance their interests and undermine American and global security," he continued.
"So this election fraud issue is part of a much bigger security challenge," Fleitz said.
Disinformation campaign
China has been accused of attempting to interfere in elections in other democratic countries, including the U.S. and Australia. It is also accused of operating campaigns to influence politics and alter public opinion through media in European countries, including the U.K. and Germany.
"There is certainly Chinese influence to shape [South] Korean public opinion in a direction that would favor PRC interests," said Andrew Yeo, the SK-Korea Foundation Chair at the Brookings Institution's Center for Asia Policy Studies, using China's official name, the People's Republic of China.
"This includes support for South Korean candidates who might adopt a more conciliatory approach to China. But I have not seen direct evidence of how China has been directly involved in election interference. If the allegations of Chinese interference are true, those allegations would be troubling and a violation of South Korean sovereignty," Yeo told VOA on Thursday.
Robert Rapson, who served as charge d'affaires and deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul from 2018 to 2021, said, "I don't think there will be any concern on the part of the Trump administration about a transition to a new ROK government should the Constitutional Court uphold Mr. Yoon's impeachment by the National Assembly." South Korea's official name is the Republic of Korea.
He said the U.S. "can effectively and reliably conduct our two nations' pressing business, regardless of whether that government is led by the DP or PPP" [the ruling People's Power Party].
Jiha Ham contributed to this report.
9. North Korea, Kursk strike deal on boosting ties as DPRK troops fight in region
Sister cities?
North Korea, Kursk strike deal on boosting ties as DPRK troops fight in region
Chambers of commerce for Pyongyang and Russian region repelling Ukraine incursion agree to expand economic cooperation
https://www.nknews.org/2025/02/north-korea-kursk-strike-deal-on-boosting-ties-as-dprk-troops-fight-in-region/
Anton Sokolin February 28, 2025
Alexey Belodurov, head of the Kursk chamber of commerce, and his officials in a meeting with representatives of the Pyongyang chamber of commerce on Feb. 27, 2025 | Image: Kursk chamber of commerce
Business associations for North Korea’s capital city and the Russian region of Kursk have sealed a deal on expanding economic cooperation, as DPRK soldiers fight alongside Russia forces to repel Ukraine’s incursion into the territory.
The Pyongyang and Kursk chambers of commerce (COC) reached the agreement to boost “bilateral economic ties and expand opportunities for businesses” on Thursday, the Kursk-based organization said in a statement.
Alexey Belodurov and Chong Un Hye, the heads of the respective chambers, signed the deal during an online meeting that included representatives of companies in Kursk and Pyongyang.
The North Korean and Russian participants of an online meeting between the Pyongyang and Kursk chambers of commerce on Feb. 27, 2025. Chong Un Hye who heads the DPRK organization at the center left | Image: Kursk Chamber of Commerce and Industry
1
2
3
Belodurov reportedly stressed that his organization sees a “growing demand for expanded cooperation,” touting his region’s industrial sectors, including metallurgy, construction materials, electrical equipment manufacturing and the chemical industry.
“In grain, sugar beet, meat production, and other agricultural goods, Kursk ranks among the leading regions not only in the Central Federal District but across the country,” the official added.
The North Korean entrepreneurs also presented their products and “prospective projects,” with the two sides outlining key areas of cooperation in “industry, agriculture and food processing.”
The organizations also agreed to promote exchanges of business delegations and participation in international exhibitions, as well as cooperation in “joint logistics and transportation projects.”
Among the Russian participants in the Zoom meeting were the head of Kursk’s export promotion center, representatives of Russia’s largest manufacturer of autonomous power sources Elektroagregat, other entrepreneurs and lawmakers.
The North’s COC has previously hosted similar “video conferences” with Russian regional chambers of commerce and local companies to “find Russian markets for domestic products and cooperate in various fields of the economy,” according to the Jan. 2024 issue of the DPRK’s Foreign Trade magazine.
The DPRK chamber made trips to Moscow, St. Petersburg and the breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia in 2018.
The news follows South Korea’s assessment that North Korea has carried out a new round of troop deployments to the Kursk region, meant to reinforce DPRK units that have suffered heavy losses in recent months.
Kyiv has maintained a foothold in the region since last August, when it staged an incursion into Russia proper.
Moscow and Pyongyang have remained silent on the presence of North Korean soldiers at the front lines, although multiple reports by Ukrainian and ROK authorities have confirmed the dispatch.
The new business deal appears to underscore Pyongyang’s interest in deepening cooperation with Russia, including in areas impacted by the war. North Korea previously discussed plans to send workers to help rebuild infrastructure in the separatist Ukrainian republics of Donetsk and Luhansk.
Last year, Russian official migration data showed an unprecedented influx of nearly 8,000 North Korean nationals into the country “for education,” although experts suggest their real purpose was to work on construction sites across Russia.
Edited by Bryan Betts
10. In Shipbuilding, the U.S. Is Tiny and Rusty
See the graphic at the link. If I was in American shipbuilding I would be embarrassed by the graph. I am not in shipbuilding and I am embarrassed.
What jumps out at me is that perhaps we should create a "JAROKUS" shipbuilding consortium based on our two most important alliances in Asia.
In Shipbuilding, the U.S. Is Tiny and Rusty
Trump seeks to revive production of boxships and tankers that left America long ago
https://www.wsj.com/business/logistics/in-shipbuilding-the-u-s-is-tiny-and-rusty-03fb214e?st=8iViCF&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
A shipyard in Nanjing, China. Photo: Cfoto/DDP/Zuma Press
By Inti PachecoFollow
and Costas ParisFollow
March 2, 2025 5:30 am ET
Asian shipyards churn out hundreds of big boxships and oil tankers a year. The U.S. is lucky if it can finish more than one each year.
It has been that way for decades. Few major American shipyards remain and they now mostly build or repair vessels for the U.S. Navy. Those that do produce new commercial ships mostly make small vessels for U.S. companies operating on domestic routes, not the giant containerships and ocean vessels that underpin global trade.
Shipbuilding tonnage, select countries
33M
Source: United Nations Trade & Development
SOUTH
KOREA
CHINA
U.S.
JAPAN
18M
10M
64,809
2014
’23
2014
’23
2014
’23
2014
’23
The Trump administration has floated a proposal that would seek to reverse the trend by imposing port fees on Chinese-built ships and requiring some U.S. exports to move on U.S.-built ships. The idea faces both labor and financial challenges.
American shipyards employed more than one million people during World War II, but in the decades that followed the U.S. ceded much of the market to other countries. The number of welders, engineers and other people building boats and ships hasn’t reached 200,000 since the early 1980s, though the numbers have ticked up in recent years thanks to military contracts.
In the 1970s, U.S. yards were building about 5% of the world’s tonnage, equating to about two dozen new ships a year. But the number of ships coming out of these yards has slowed to a trickle. The U.S. accounted for about 0.1% of the world’s tonnage in 2023. The few U.S.-made commercial ships now come from just two shipyards: one in Philadelphia and another in San Diego.
A U.S. Navy vessel under construction at a shipyard in the San Pedro area of Los Angeles, in 1982. Photo: Bill Nation/Sygma/Getty Images
China now dominates the shipbuilding industry, accounting for more than half of world tonnage in 2023 and 74% of orders for new ships last year. The biggest shipping lines, such as MSC, Maersk and CMA CGM, now rely on hundreds of Chinese built ships to move goods around the world. They would face new fees to enter U.S. ports under the Trump proposal.
The U.S. shipyards aren’t competitive with foreign rivals in terms of the size of ships they produce, how long they take to build or how much they cost.
Take a look at a pair of recent boxship orders placed with the same company: Hanwha, a South Korean conglomerate that acquired the Philly Shipyard last year and operates shipyards in South Korea.
In September, the Philly Shipyard secured an order from Matson Navigation, a U.S. operator, for three small boxships (capable of holding the equivalent of 3,600 20-foot shipping containers). The cost per ship: $355 million. A similar ship at a Chinese yard would cost around $55 million, according to shipowners.
Around the same time, Maersk ordered six much larger boxships (capable of holding the equivalent of 16,000 20-foot containers) from Hanwha’s South Korean operations. The average price for these ships was about $200 million.
Write to Inti Pacheco at inti.pacheco@wsj.com and Costas Paris at costas.paris@wsj.com
11. U.S. Navy's $30-billion plan to upgrade warship fleet could benefit Korea's shipbuilders: Kotra
Sunday
March 2, 2025
dictionary + A - A
U.S. Navy's $30-billion plan to upgrade warship fleet could benefit Korea's shipbuilders: Kotra
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-03-02/business/economy/US-Navys-30billion-plan-to-upgrade-warship-fleet-could-benefit-Koreas-shipbuilders-Kotra/2253177
Published: 02 Mar. 2025, 17:44
Updated: 02 Mar. 2025, 18:17
- SHIN HA-NEE
- shin.hanee@joongang.co.kr
The U.S. Navy vessel Wally Schirra undergoes maintenance in Hanwha Ocean’s Geoje shipyard in South Gyeongsang on Sept. 3, 2024. [HANWHA OCEAN]
Korea could capitalize on the U.S. Navy’s 30-year plan to spend $30 billion annually to expand its warship fleet, a report from the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (Kotra) suggests, as the country's export-driven economy continues to seek a breakthrough amid rising trade barriers and slowing export momentum.
However, the report also warned against the potential risks of Washington imposing tariffs on domestic shipbuilders over their usage of Chinese steel products.
Related Article
Published on Sunday, the Kotra report highlighted potential opportunities for domestic shipbuilders offered by recent U.S. bills aiming to strengthen naval capabilities, including the Ensuring Naval Readiness Act and the Ensuring Coast Guard Readiness Act.
The bills aim to permit the U.S. Navy to construct military vessels, or key components, in a foreign shipyard located in a NATO member country or an Indo-Pacific country that has signed a mutual defense agreement with the United States.
The U.S. Congressional Budget Office estimated in January that the U.S. Navy would allocate an average of $30 billion per year until 2054 to bring the number of its warships from the current 296 to 381.
A view of HD Hyundai Heavy Industries' Ulsan shipyard [HD HYUNDAI]
Considering the number of ships set to be retired during this period, the U.S. Navy will need to build a total of 364 new ships over the next three decades, averaging 12 new ships per year.
Moreover, demand for commercial vessels could also surge as the Ships for America Act proposes to expand the United States’ commercial ship fleet from the current 93 vessels to 250 by 2034.
The bills could open new markets for Korean companies, the report said, especially given China’s expanding presence in the shipbuilding industry for both commercial and military vessels.
“Cooperation with allies and partner nations will be one of the key focuses in this year’s upcoming National Maritime Strategy [by the Department of Transportation],” the report said, indicating that the renewed emphasis on alliances could nudge Washington toward expanding naval collaboration with Korea and Japan.
The Korean government said in February that it would sign a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement with the United States, which could further benefit Korean arms suppliers by providing an exemption from the Buy American Act.
Kotra suggested that the maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) market should be the primary focus for now, as Korea and Japan are vying for new MRO contracts with the United States.
Hanwha Ocean, which signed two MRO contracts with the U.S. military last year, aims to clinch up to six MRO contracts this year, and HD Hyundai is targeting two to three contracts.
Korean shipbuilders are looking to secure U.S. production sites to tap into government incentive measures as well. Hanwha Ocean jointly acquired Philadelphia-based shipbuilder Philly Shipyard with Hanwha Systems in June for $100 million. It is the first time a domestic shipbuilder has acquired a U.S. shipyard.
However, Kotra warned of tariff uncertainty, as U.S. tariffs on Chinese steel products could affect domestic shipbuilders given the rising market share of Chinese steel plates in the industry. If the Trump administration devalues the dollar, the weak greenback could also hurt shipbuilders’ revenue, considering the two to three year gap between orders and the materialization of revenue.
The report added that weak shipbuilding infrastructure in the United States could hamper Korean shipbuilders’ production if they decide to relocate their shipyards to American shores.
BY SHIN HA-NEE [shin.hanee@joongang.co.kr]
12. The 2 Koreas Share Experience in Foreign Wars
The nKPA will only be transformed by its Russia/Ukraine experience if it can transform its training and bring the lessons of modern warfare to the majority of nKPA forces. Having combat experience only among 12,000 or even 20,000 troops is not transformative unless their experiences can be transformed into a major training program. And training is perishable. The longer these forces go without sustained training the less valuable will their combat experience be.
Combat experience does not create a trained military. Only training can do that. And hard realistic training is far superior to combat experience. When north Korea decides to attack the South, on day one 12,000 or 20,000 soldiers may have some combat experience. But on day two the troops on the north and South side of the DMZ will both have combat experience. And the victory will go to the side that has conducted the best training.
Excerpts:
Sending soldiers to fight in the Vietnam War fundamentally transformed South Korea. The deployment of North Korean soldiers to the Russian-Ukraine War will likely do the same – critically altering North Korea, peninsular relations, and East Asian regional security. While results will take time to play out, drawing from history the likelihood that this experience has a profound impact looks all but certain.
thediplomat.com
Sending soldiers to fight in the Vietnam War fundamentally transformed South Korea’s economy. The deployment of North Korean soldiers to the Russian-Ukraine War will likely do the same.
By Scott Sigmund Gartner
March 01, 2025
Credit: Depositphotos
Subscribe for ads-free reading
North and South Korea could not be more different. North Korea (officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) is a dictatorship, with one of the world’s poorest economies and largest, nuclear equipped, militaries, and a population isolated from literally everyone. South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea, ROK) is a robust democracy, with a smaller, non-nuclear military, and companies like Samsung and Hyundai that drive a rich and open economy with a globally connected population.
It was not always like this. At the start of the Korean War, North Korea was the wealthier and more industrialized of the two. Things began to change for South Korea in the late 1960s and 1970s. Critical to South Korea’s skyrocketing economic growth was the act of sending troops to fight in a major power war, a decision that North Korea is currently emulating.
More than 300,000 South Korean troops fought alongside the U.S. and South Vietnam (more than all their other Vietnam War allies combined), with 50,000 deployed in 1967 alone. Known as fierce fighters, many of the Korean soldiers had lost family members to the communists in the Korean War. About 4,700 South Koreans died in the conflict. The U.S. government paid South Korean troops around 24 times more per day than they would have normally earned, while rewarding their government with grants, loans, wartime purchases, and technology transfers.
That the Korean troops were costly was fully appreciated at the time, as seen in a declassified discussion of the U.S. National Security Council’s Senior Review Group, January 15, 1971, between General Westmoreland, the Army chief of staff and the former head of U.S. forces in Vietnam; Dr. Henry Kissinger, the national security adviser; and U. Alexis Johnson. the under secretary of state for political affairs, when discussing the need for more troops along the North/South Vietnam Demilitarized Zone (DMZ):
Gen. Westmoreland: Of course, whether you can expand Vietnamese forces generally is debatable. Considering the economic and manpower base, I have some doubts about this. …If we wanted to pay the price (which would probably be a big one), we could get a Korean division deployed along the DMZ.
Mr. Johnson: Would there be a price?
Gen. Westmoreland: Yes. Korean inertia is great. It would cost us perhaps $100 million. They would demand all sorts of things.
Dr. Kissinger: Like what?
Gen. Westmoreland: Additional equipment, tanks, APCs, an accelerated modernization program for the ROK forces in Korea. It could be done, however, and I think it would be worth the price.
In total, South Korea gained about a billion dollars (plus advanced technology and critical trade relationships) for sending troops to fight in the Vietnam War. Many see these financial benefits as essential and instrumental to South Korea’s economic transformation, known as the Miracle on the Han River.
Today, North Korea is also serving as a proxy for a major power, sending about 10,000 troops to the Russia-Ukraine War (with plans for more), in addition to providing key weapon systems like artillery and drones (military production is the bright spot in their economy). While employing dated tactics and suffering heavy losses in their deployment to Kursk, the North Korean troops also quickly gained a reputation for ferocity.
What does North Korea get for deploying its troops? First, the country gains invaluable combat experience in one of the world’s deadliest and most innovation-driven conflicts. Second, its forces will be exposed to different people and ideas – even in Russia. Third, North Korea strengthens its relationship with Russia – especially important given its lack of allies. Fourth, North Korea may receive technology transfers circumventing current U.N. sanctions. Finally, North Korea will receive significant cash, including an estimated salary (paid to the government) of $2,000 per month per soldier or $20 million per month for 10,000 soldiers (whose actual pay is miniscule) – a lifeline for a poor country trying to support an enormous military.
Sending soldiers to fight in the Vietnam War fundamentally transformed South Korea. The deployment of North Korean soldiers to the Russian-Ukraine War will likely do the same – critically altering North Korea, peninsular relations, and East Asian regional security. While results will take time to play out, drawing from history the likelihood that this experience has a profound impact looks all but certain.
Authors
Guest Author
Scott Sigmund Gartner
Dr. Scott Sigmund Gartner is a professor of defense analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) where he recently served as the 16th provost, vice president, and chief academic officer.
Subscribe for ads-free reading
thediplomat.com
13. “Doors Won’t Open”: Critical Flaw in Russian Armored Vehicles Used by North Korean Troops
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
“Doors Won’t Open”: Critical Flaw in Russian Armored Vehicles Used by North Korean Troops
WASHINGTON-JIN-GUK KIM kimj@rfa.org
https://www.rfa.org/korean/listen/2025/03/02/north-korea-fpv-bmp3-btr80-apc/
2025.03.02
A tank moves during a military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean regime (September 9) at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, on September 9, 2018. (AP)
Russian soldiers' 'reasonable defiance' as they refuse to board armoured vehicles
(Host) We will accurately grasp the current state of the military standoff on the Korean Peninsula and seek a path to peace. This is Kim Jin-guk, presenting 'Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula' from Washington D.C., USA. We will connect with Lee Il-woo, Secretary General of Korea's 'Independent Defense Network.'
Russian armored vehicles BMP, BTR “cannot ride” complaints pour in
(Host) As military cooperation between North Korea and Russia expands, and the North Korean military gains practical experience in the Kursk battlefield, there are growing concerns that North Korea is acquiring modern warfare know-how through its dispatch of troops to Russia. It seems like there is a lot to learn from the Russian military as they fight alongside them, but there are also complaints about Russian military doctrine and tactics within the Russian military?
(Lee Il-woo) In late February, there was a war of words over the armored vehicle issue for several days, with online media outlets and bloggers in Russia publishing articles and posts criticizing the Russian Ministry of Defense, and the Russian Ministry of Defense releasing a video refuting them.
Russian online media and bloggers have been citing problems recently pointed out by soldiers on the battlefield, saying that “the design of the Russian army’s armored vehicles is fundamentally flawed.” The armored vehicles in question are the BMP-3, one of the main infantry fighting vehicles currently in use by the Russian army, and the BTR-80 series models that are being used in large numbers by motorized rifle units.
The BMP-3 is a model that the South Korean military has used until recently, and the BTR-80 series is a wheeled armored vehicle that is a derivative of this and is used by the North Korean military. However, these armored vehicles have recently been unable to function as armored vehicles at all on the Ukrainian battlefield.
An armored vehicle is literally a vehicle with a certain thickness of armor that can block enemy bullets. And the basic function of such an armored vehicle is to safely transport infantry from the attack line to the point where the battle is taking place, and to provide fire support to the infantry with the main gun or machine gun mounted on it. However, armored vehicles such as the BMP-3 or BTR-80, which have been problematic this time, are not able to play this role at all.
Armored vehicles, which are generally classified as infantry fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers, are designed to have a rectangular body, with the cockpit and engine placed parallel to each other at the front, a turret or gun tower in the middle, and a space for troops to board and disembark at the rear, along with a large door for them to get on and off. However, the BMP-3 has the engine at the rear of the vehicle, and is designed for infantry to crouch above the engine room. The door is not at the back but at the top of the vehicle, so infantry have to pop out as if opening a lid to get off. The BTR-80 has small doors on both sides of the vehicle, just big enough for one person to fit through.
The problem is that the doors of these armored vehicles slide from the inside out. Recently, Russian armored vehicles have been welding various structures to the outside of the vehicle to survive attacks from Ukrainian FPV drones, and these structures have made the doors unable to open. The armored vehicles are made for infantry to ride in, but with the doors blocked for getting in and out, the armored vehicles have lost their function as infantry transporters. This is exactly what Russian experts are pointing out, but absurdly, the Russian Ministry of Defense is receiving even more criticism for filming and releasing a video of training in armored vehicles, saying that if the door is blocked, instead of getting inside, you can sit outside and ride.
'Knowing it wouldn't work', the Russian military asked the armored vehicle 'why on earth did that?'
(Host) Listening to the stories of Russian military experts, it is certainly strange. If such problems had been raised in actual combat since the Cold War, it would have been enough to change the design of the armored vehicle, but why on earth has Russia stuck to such a strange design for decades?
(Lee Il-woo) To understand why Russia is sticking to such an absurd armored vehicle design, you must first understand the doctrine of the Russian military and the Soviet military before it. The Soviet Union, which had a vast territory, placed great importance on long-distance mobility, so it placed great importance on mechanization and motorization from early on. In the Soviet military organization, mechanized is an organization composed of tracked armored vehicles and tanks with considerable armament, and motorized is an organization centered on wheeled armored vehicles that can be procured in large quantities at low cost.
Mechanized units are designed to deliver powerful firepower and impact power, and motorized units are designed to get infantry units onto the battlefield as quickly as possible, but this is where the problems start.
The infantry fighting vehicles deployed to the mechanized units are in the BMP-1, BMP-2, and BMP-3 lineage. As mentioned earlier, the mechanized units focused on firepower and impact power. These armored vehicles prioritized powerful firepower projection, with infantry transport as a secondary function. If infantry transport had been the primary function, the interior would have been designed so that infantry could ride comfortably for long periods of time, but since infantry transport was not the primary purpose, the BMP series were designed to be much smaller than Western armored vehicles, and naturally, the troop boarding space and doors were small. Up to the BMP-1 and BMP-2, you could at least squat down to get in and out, but the BMP-3 had a very small entrance that required you to open the top hatch to get out.
The BTR series of armored personnel carriers deployed to the motorized units were even worse. The early model, the BTR-60, had its engine mounted at the back, so when infantrymen got on and off, they had to climb up onto the armored vehicle, open the hatch, and get on and off. When this issue was raised, the successor model, the BTR-70, had a very small door between the wheels on the left and right sides of the vehicle, so they had to get on and off through this. Although the door was slightly larger in the BTR-80, it was still too small for people to get on and off, so in the past, during the Afghanistan War and the Chechen War, soldiers would not get on the armored vehicle but would sit outside and move around. This was because they were afraid that if they got hit by a rocket while inside an armored vehicle that was not structured to get off quickly, they would not be able to get out and would burn to death inside. When you look at Soviet or Russian armored vehicles being used in the Ukrainian War, the Middle East, or African civil wars, most infantrymen were riding outside the armored vehicle, as if they had made a pact.
The reason the Soviet Union and Russia maintained this absurd design was because of cost issues. The Soviet Union once had over 100 motorized rifle divisions, and to arm them all, they produced over 25,000 BTR-60s. Once they were produced, they had to continue to use them, so the doctrine did not change, and the higher-ups did not think that the design needed to be changed because they would not be entering and exiting through those narrow entrances. That is why the BTR-80 was designed with the same structure and was mass-produced, but when problems arose during the Afghanistan War, there were calls for installing a rear door, but since the engine was in the back, there was no other solution than to completely redesign and produce a new one. However, because it costs a lot of money, they kept putting it off until they reached the current situation.
For this reason, the Russian army's latest infantry fighting vehicle, the Kurganets-25, has a large door that opens all the way to the rear of the vehicle like Western armored vehicles, but this armored vehicle is expensive and is not yet in production.
Related Articles
[Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula] North Korea's Storm Corps 'Storm-fallen' by U.S. Drones
[Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula] Ukraine's 'Witch Drone' and North Korea's 'Juche Cannon' 200 in danger of being destroyed
North Korea Receives Armored Vehicles from Russia, Also Hands Over 100% of Problems
(Host) The armored vehicles used by the North Korean military are either imported from the former Soviet Union, or models made by China in imitation of Soviet models, or models made by North Korea based on Soviet or Chinese models. The new armored vehicles that North Korea is producing and deploying also have the same problems that Russia recently raised?
(Lee Il-woo) The North Korean military has a large number of the problematic BTR-60 wheeled armored vehicles mentioned above, and is using the Sinheung-ho and Seungri-ho armored vehicles, which are copies of the Chinese Type 63 armored vehicle, as their main tracked armored vehicles. Of these, the BTR-60 armored vehicle has an entrance on top, as mentioned above, so you have to jump on it and be prepared to get shot in a battlefield where bullets are flying. Although the Type 63 armored vehicle has a rear entrance, it is still inconvenient to get in and out because of its small size.
The problem is that the new armored vehicles that North Korea is developing and producing all have the same chronic problems as the Russian armored vehicles mentioned above. North Korea is developing and deploying the Junma armored vehicle as a tracked armored vehicle, and the BTR-80 and the M2010 armored vehicle, which are six-wheeled and eight-wheeled versions that were redesigned based on the BTR-80.
The Junmaho armored vehicle, which is only operated by the 105th Guards Seoul Ryugyongsu Tank Division, the most elite unit of the North Korean military, is a modernized model based on the Shinhungho armored vehicle, but the rear entrance of the Shinhungho was removed. Instead, a hatch was installed on the rear roof of the vehicle, so the soldiers must open this hatch, jump out, and disembark from the armored vehicle. Since they cannot use the armored vehicle body as cover, there is a very high possibility of being hit while jumping out.
North Korean BTR-80 without rear door (Korean Central News Agency)
The BTR-80, which North Korea introduced in small quantities, also does not have a rear entrance, and the two types of six-wheeled and eight-wheeled armored vehicles based on it also have side entrances instead of rear entrances, making quick boarding and disembarkation impossible. The design problems of armored vehicles that are currently being raised by the Russian military are also appearing in the new North Korean armored vehicles.
If the 'Jangna-ddaeng' armored vehicle comes out, thank you, North Korean armored vehicle "It's better not to use it in actual combat"
(Host) From North Korea's perspective, it's a headache because, despite being fully aware of the problems with their armored vehicles through this war in Ukraine, they are unable to resolve this problem. If war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, what will happen to the North Korean armored vehicle unit members?
North Korean BTR-80 armored vehicle (Korean Central News Agency)
(Lee Il-woo) The reason why normal countries design infantry-mounted armored vehicles with a large door at the back of the vehicle is that the front of the vehicle is often hit in battle, and if the front is hit and a fire breaks out, the personnel inside can quickly escape through the door at the back.
For this reason, if you look at the combat doctrine of a mechanized, motorized infantry unit in a normal country, when an armored vehicle carrying infantry arrives in front of the enemy lines, smoke grenades are fired and machine guns or machine guns are fired to provide cover, while the infantry quickly disembark through the doors at the back of the vehicle and immediately lie down around the armored vehicle and assume a firing position.
However, because the entrance is very small, North Korean infantrymen who have to get off from the side or up are very likely to be hit by enemy bullets during the disembarkation process. Since they cannot get off quickly if they are hit by South Korean machine guns or anti-tank weapons, once they are hit, most of the 10 or so soldiers inside will not be able to escape and are likely to die or be seriously injured.
To solve this problem, a complete redesign is needed, or a major remodeling is needed, or new armored vehicles are needed, but North Korea’s financial situation makes this impossible. In other words, if war breaks out, North Korean mechanized infantry and motorized infantry will refuse to ride inside armored vehicles and will ride outside, just like Russian or African soldiers do now. This means that South Korean soldiers can suppress North Korean mechanized and motorized infantry with rifle fire. In this situation, the North Korean leadership may feel a sense of shame about having to spend a lot of money to maintain armored vehicles.
(Host) That was Lee Il-woo, the director of the Korea Independent Defense Network. Now, we're back with Kim Jin-guk from RFA in Washington.
Editor Lee Jin-seo, Web Editor Lee Gyeong-ha
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
