Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"What is done cannot be undone, but one can prevent it from happening again"

~ Anne Frank

“If it is not right do not do it; if it is not true do not say it”

– Marcus Aurelius

"If we believe that we, as Americans, are bound together by a common concern for each other, then an urgent national priority is upon us. We must begin to end the disgrace of this other America.

And this is one of the great tasks of leadership for us, as individuals and citizens this year. But even if we act to erase material poverty, there is another greater task, it is to confront the poverty of satisfaction - purpose and dignity - that afflicts us all. Too much and for too long, we seemed to have surrendered personal excellence and community values in the mere accumulation of material things. Our Gross National Product, now, is over $800 billion dollars a year, but that Gross National Product - if we judge the United States of America by that - that Gross National Product counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our doors and the jails for the people who break them. It counts the destruction of the redwood and the loss of our natural wonder in chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and counts nuclear warheads and armored cars for the police to fight the riots in our cities. It counts Whitman's rifle and Speck's knife, and the television programs which glorify violence in order to sell toys to our children. Yet the gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country, it measures everything in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. And it can tell us everything about America except why we are proud that we are Americans."

Robert Kennedy, March 18,1968

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 19, 2023

2. THE IRAQ WAR AT 20’ Losing Iraq Worse Than We Had To

3. Elon Musk’s new Twitter verification system helped pro-Kremlin voices spread misleading claims after the Ohio train disaster

4. [Yoon Young-kwan] How China lost Asia to the US

5. Twenty Years After U.S. Invaded Iraq, Congress Wants Its War Powers Back

6. As Xi visits Russia, Putin sees his anti-U.S. world order taking shape

7. Nuclear nightmare: reckless leaders push the world back to the brink

8. Was The Iraq War Worth It?

9. Anti-Russia guerillas in Belarus take on 'two-headed enemy'

10. From Georgetown to Langley: The Controversial Connection Between a Prestigious University and the CIA

11. Is a ban on TikTok possible — and what would happen if it disappeared?

12. The West Can't Afford Hubris About Russia's War in Ukraine

13. America Is Still Reeling from The Consequences of The Iraq War

14. Joint Concept for Competing: The Best Way for the Pentagon to 'Compete' with China?

15. How the Aukus pact could cripple Xi Jinping’s imperial dreams

16. Gordon Chang: China Is the 'Fuel' Behind Putin's War in Ukraine

17. Kremlin already searching for Putin's replacement: Intelligence official

18. First wave of tech to defend Guam from newer threats due in 2024

19. US, Philippines to announce new sites for U.S. military as soon as possible - U.S. official

20. Quad 2.0: In latest move against China and Russia, Canada proposes alliance with Japan, South Korea, US

21. The Real Risk of the China Select Committee

22. Is “The Chinese World” the Future? Confucianism and Xi Jinping

23. Iraq, 20 Years Later: A Changed Washington and a Terrible Toll on America

24. Compare Iraq with Ukraine. It’s clear the era of US global supremacy is over

25. Why the Press Failed on Iraq

26. The Case for a Security Guarantee for Ukraine

27. Online Sleuths Untangle the Mystery of the Nord Stream Sabotage

28. US, Philippines Tout Perks of Military Deal Opposed By China

29. What does Xi Jinping want from Vladimir Putin?

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 19, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2023

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on March 19:

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[28]
Russian forces likely secured marginal gains near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) amidst continued Russian offensive operations in and around Bakhmut.[29]
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City and may have advanced towards Berdychi, about 10km northwest of Avdiivka.[30]
Russian forces continued erecting defensive fortifications throughout southern Ukraine.[31]
Unknown actors killed a Russian occupation Ministry of Internal Affairs Patrol Service platoon commander with a car bomb in occupied Kherson Oblast.[32] Ukrainian media hypothesized that the attack may have been a partisan attack or a result of Russian infighting.[33]
Russian federal communication supervisor Roskomnadzor blocked a website that helped Russians escape mobilization in continued crackdowns against resistance to mobilization.[34]

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 19, 2023

Mar 19, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 19, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 19, 5 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, March 19. This report discusses growing Russian concern about a prospective Ukrainian counteroffensive near Bakhmut or in southern Ukraine, and Russian efforts to prepare mitigations for these claimed efforts. The tempo of Russian offensive operations across the theater has slowed in recent weeks, suggesting that the Russian spring offensive in Donbas may be nearing culmination. Ukrainian officials have indicated that significant Russian losses near Vuhledar are severely inhibiting Russian forces’ capacity to conduct further offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin used his first visit to recently-occupied Ukraine to portray himself as an involved wartime leader amid exaggerated responses in the Russian nationalist information space over fears of a possible future Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a localized counterattack southwest of Bakhmut amid growing Russian discussion about a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Bakhmut area. Geolocated footage published on March 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful counterattack southwest of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and pushed Russian forces further away from the T0504 highway in the area.[1] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russian forces conducted 25 attacks in the Bakhmut area on March 19, but Russian forces likely only secured marginal gains.[2] Russian sources amplified footage on March 18 alleging to show a column of Ukrainian armored vehicles along the T0504 southwest of Kostyantynivka (22km southwest of Bakhmut) and speculated that Ukrainian forces are preparing to launch counteroffensive operations southwest of Bakhmut.[3] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are currently capable of intensifying counterattacks to stabilize the front line around Bakhmut.[4] The growing Russian discussions about an imminent Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Bakhmut area suggest that Russian sources are increasingly uncertain about the Russian military’s ability to maintain the initiative around Bakhmut.

Statements made by Ukrainian military officials on the pace and prospects of current Russian offensive operations may suggest that the overall Russian spring offensive may be nearing culmination. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on March 19 that Russia was unable to gather sufficient forces for the anticipated major offensive in Donbas and noted that current Russian offensive actions cannot be called a “major strategic operation.”[5] Cherevaty emphasized that Russian forces cannot even complete the tactical capture of Bakhmut, which supports ISW’s assessment that the Wagner Group offensive near Bakhmut is likely nearing culmination.[6] Russian forces are also notably struggling to secure operationally significant gains elsewhere along the frontline, particularly in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City and Vuhledar areas. Ukrainian Tavriisk Defense Forces spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi noted on March 19 that Russian forces have been desperately attacking Avdiivka to restart offensive operations on Vuhledar, likely suggesting that continued Russian attacks in the Avdiivka area are meant partially to pull Ukrainian reserves away from western Donetsk Oblast to the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.[7] Dmytrashkivskyi stated that this renewed offensive focus on Avdiivka has recently led to major Russian losses around Avdiivka amounting to the equivalent of one company, on which ISW has previously reported.[8]

Ukrainian military officials additionally continue to indicate that massive Russian losses in the Vuhledar area are severeley degrading Russian offensive capacity in Donetsk Oblast. Dmytrashkivskyi stated that Russian forces have reinforced elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (currently heavily committed in the Vuhledar area) with reserve forces of the 98th Guards Airborne Division.[9] The 155th Naval Infantry Brigade suffered catastrophic manpower and equipment losses during continued failed attacks on Vuhledar in November 2022 and February 2023, and Russian military leadership is likely heavily relying on reserve elements from the 98th Airborne Division to offset and compensate for the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade’s losses.[10] The 98th Airborne Division is at least partially committed in the Kreminna area in Luhansk Oblast, and commitment of some of its constituent elements to the Vuhledar area is likely indicative of a level of desperation on the part of the Russian military command trying to reconstitute battered units and restart offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff similarly noted that the Russian military leadership is in a hurry to send reinforcements to Vuhledar and has been creating a ”Shtorm” detachment within the 37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District), which will presumably deploy to the Vuhledar area on March 24.[12] The ad hoc reconstitution of existing units for deployment to Vuhledar, as well as the apparent creation of sub-brigade echelon special formations, suggests that Russian combat capabilities in western Donetsk Oblast are greatly degraded.

The overall Russian spring offensive is thus likely approaching culmination. Ongoing Russian offensives along the Svatove-Kreminna line, around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City and Vuhledar frontlines have failed to make more than incremental tactical gains in the first few months of 2023. Russia has committed the approximately 300,000 mobilized soldiers, called up by partial mobilization in September 2022 for the purpose of pursing exactly such a spring offensive, to these various offensive efforts. If 300,000 Russian soldiers have been unable to give Russia a decisive offensive edge in Ukraine it is highly unlikely that the commitment of additional forces in future mobilization waves will produce a dramatically different outcome this year. Ukraine is therefore well positioned to regain the initiative and launch counteroffensives in critical sectors of the current frontline.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited occupied Mariupol on March 19, likely to project the image of invulnerability and to continue efforts to portray himself as an involved wartime leader. Putin’s visit to Mariupol included highly staged meetings with residents, a bizarre drive around the city with Putin supposedly driving the car himself, and a briefing from Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin about restoration efforts in the city.[13] The Kremlin likely framed Putin’s first visit to occupied Ukraine outside of Crimea as a spontaneous jaunt in order to portray Putin as an invincible wartime leader who can visit the zone of hostilities without concern.[14] Putin likely chose to visit Mariupol because it is a city seized since May 2022 that is far away from the frontline, where Russian forces and occupation officials have already instituted stringent security measures. Putin also likely meant his visit to be a response to the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for his involvement in war crimes connected to the deportation of Ukrainian children, at least 1,000 of whom Russian officials deported from Mariupol alone.[15] Putin likely sought to portray his role in the deportation of children and the destruction of Mariupol as beyond the jurisdiction of the international community and himself as safe from the Ukrainian military 80km to the north. Putin also visited the headquarters of the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don, Krasnodar Krai, and received briefings from Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and other Russian military commanders.[16] Russian media publicized Putin’s meetings with Gerasimov and previous theater commander Army General Sergey Surovikin to portray Putin as highly involved in the management of the war in Ukraine as well as possibly to signal that Gerasimov currently has Putin’s favor and that Survoikin, with his former Wagner Group connections, is now firmly subordinated under Gerasimov.[17]

Putin’s Mariupol visit likely also aimed to assuage a longstanding and pervasive fear in the nationalist space about a prospective Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine. Russian milbloggers that ISW tracks claimed en masse on March 19 that Ukrainian forces conducted a limited and localized counterattack near Novodanylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, a disproportionate response to a frequent occurrence on other areas of the front.[18] Many of these milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to prepare for a future counteroffensive on the Zaporizhia Oblast front line, which milbloggers have been claiming with varying degrees of urgency since October 2022.[19] Some milbloggers specifically linked Putin’s March 19 visit to Mariupol to a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[20] One milblogger claimed that Putin’s visit shows he is not a cowardly leader who is too afraid to leave Moscow Oblast out of fear of Ukrainian intelligence and claimed that the Russian ”surrender of the south [of Ukraine] will be Putin’s personal defeat.”[21] The milblogger added that Russian forces would have to work harder to defend against a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Former Russian officer and convicted war criminal Igor Girkin instead sarcastically claimed that Russian forces would ”do everything to be defeated” in order to ”blame everything on Putin,” noting that Putin appointed and kept in power all the Russian military commanders responsible for Russia’s performance in the war thus far.[22] The Russian occupation administration declaring Melitopol rather than Zaporizhzhia City as the capital of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast also likely reflects a desire to ease the palpable fear in the nationalist and domestic information space by portraying Russian occupation as long term and certain.[23]

Former Russian officer, convicted war criminal, and prominent critical nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin indicated that there are likely deepening fractures within the top levels of Russian military leaderships. In a 12-point hyper-critical and sarcastic essay on how Russia can lose the war, Girkin remarked that never changing the leadership of the state, intelligence, and armed forces who “have already demonstrated blatant incompetence” is a sure-fire way to lose the war, and that Russia has already committed this cardinal sin.[24] Girkin called for leadership changes in the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the 5th Service of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, political advisors, and representatives of military industry.[25] Girkin’s omission of the broader FSB organization (the FSB’s 5th Service is a distinct but subordinate FSB entity concerned with intelligence targeting of Russia’s foreign neighbors in the post-Soviet space) and FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov is noteworthy because it suggests that Girkin views the FSB as distinct from the failing Russian military, intelligence, and security apparatus.[26] The FSB‘s 5th Service was also responsible for laying the groundwork for the invasion by paying off Ukrainian collaborators.[27] Girkin’s comments may indicate that there are considerable tensions between the Russian military command and the FSB, as well as within the FSB itself. Girkin’s acerbic commentary continues to provide insight into growing inner circle frictions.

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on March 19:

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[28]
Russian forces likely secured marginal gains near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) amidst continued Russian offensive operations in and around Bakhmut.[29]
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City and may have advanced towards Berdychi, about 10km northwest of Avdiivka.[30]
Russian forces continued erecting defensive fortifications throughout southern Ukraine.[31]
Unknown actors killed a Russian occupation Ministry of Internal Affairs Patrol Service platoon commander with a car bomb in occupied Kherson Oblast.[32] Ukrainian media hypothesized that the attack may have been a partisan attack or a result of Russian infighting.[33]
Russian federal communication supervisor Roskomnadzor blocked a website that helped Russians escape mobilization in continued crackdowns against resistance to mobilization.[34]

[1] https://twitter.com/War_cube_/status/1637407855367143424?s=20 ; https:...

[2] https://suspilne dot media/418320-sankcii-proti-rosijskogo-vpk-obstril-kramatorska-389-den-vijni-onlajn/ ; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1637391127299891203 ; https://twitt...

[3] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46194 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/54999

[4] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80787 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46195

[5] https://suspilne dot media/418320-sankcii-proti-rosijskogo-vpk-obstril-kramatorska-389-den-vijni-onlajn/

[6] https://suspilne dot media/418320-sankcii-proti-rosijskogo-vpk-obstril-kramatorska-389-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031523

[7] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/03/19/pid-avdiyivkoyu-j-maryinkoyu-vorog-vysnazhenyj-ta-zaznaye-serjoznyh-vtrat-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[8] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/03/19/pid-avdiyivkoyu-j-maryinkoyu-vorog-vysnazhenyj-ta-zaznaye-serjoznyh-vtrat-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[9] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/03/19/pid-avdiyivkoyu-j-maryinkoyu-vorog-vysnazhenyj-ta-zaznaye-serjoznyh-vtrat-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021323; https://isw.pub/UkrWar03012023

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rSsCgHkAPqRixo3xVk...

[13] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70742 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/17309183; https://tass dot ru/politika/17308961 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80833 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80832 ; ... ; https://t.me/youlistenedmayak/25828 ; https://t.me/youlistenedmayak/25829

[14] https://t.me/youlistenedmayak/25828 ; https://t.me/youlistenedmayak/25829 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/17309183; https://tass dot ru/politika/17308961

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70742

[17] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80840

[18] https://t.me/vrogov/8223; https://t.me/vrogov/8221 ; https://t.me/rybar/44805 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/11256; https://t.me/milchronicles/1682; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/11916; https://t.me/readovkanews/55026; https://t.me/rybar/44807; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/40888; https://t.me/basurin_e/251; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80841 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80843 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/80856; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20061 ; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20071; https://t.me/south0wind/2956 ; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20062; ttps://t.me/z_arhiv/19739; https://t.me/milinfolive/98237

[20] https://t.me/donrf22/17515; https://t.me/donrf22/17517; https://t.me/donrf22/17537; https://t.me/donrf22/17518; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23381; https://t.me/strelkovii/4251; https://t.me/strelkovii/4252

[21] https://t.me/donrf22/17515; https://t.me/donrf22/17517; https://t.me/donrf22/17537; https://t.me/donrf22/17518; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23381

[22] https://t.me/strelkovii/4251; https://t.me/strelkovii/4252

[23] https://ria dot ru/20230303/melitopol-1855757173.html

[24] https://t.me/strelkovii/4229; https://t.me/strelkovii/4230; https://t.me/strelkovii/4231

[25] https://t.me/strelkovii/4229

[26] https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-th...

[27] https://www.ft.com/content/80002564-33e8-48fb-b734-44810afb7a49?accessTo...

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rSsCgHkAPqRixo3xVk... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPr7nc6RpDPVWrBVedZ...

[29] https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1637391127299891203 ; https://twitt... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPr7nc6RpDPVWrBVedZ...

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPr7nc6RpDPVWrBVedZ...

[31] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7383; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1613;

[32] https://t.me/sledcom_press/5881; https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0qzDkBJ8R9RD5R3XhgoxEEg... https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1637448781242200065?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1637187793867685888?s=20 ; https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/6206; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46206; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1637461904556797953 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1637441873689169920 ; https://t.me/sledcom_press/5881

[33] https://focus dot ua/uk/voennye-novosti/555840-telo-razorvalo-popolam-pod-hersonom-likvidirovali-kollaboranta-moskalenko-smi-video

[34] https://zona dot media/news/2023/03/17/iditelesom

Elon Musk’s new Twitter verification system helped pro-Kremlin voices spread misleading claims after the Ohio train disaster

BYKEVIN FREKING AND THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

March 18, 2023 at 10:40 AM EDT

Fortune

The accounts, which parroted Kremlin talking points on myriad topics, claimed without evidence that authorities in Ohio were lying about the true impact of the chemical spill. The accounts spread fearmongering posts that preyed on legitimate concerns about pollution and health effects and compared the response to the derailment with America’s support for Ukraine following its invasion by Russia.

Some of the claims pushed by the pro-Russian accounts were verifiably false, such as the suggestion that the news media had covered up the disaster or that environmental scientists traveling to the site had been killed in a plane crash. But most were more speculative, seemingly designed to stoke fear or distrust. Examples include unverified maps showing widespread pollution, posts predicting an increase in fatal cancers and others about unconfirmed mass animal die-offs.

“Biden offers food, water, medicine, shelter, payouts of pension and social services to Ukraine! Ohio first! Offer and deliver to Ohio!” posted one of the pro-Moscow accounts, which boasts 25,000 followers and features an anonymous location and a profile photo of a dog. Twitter awarded the account a blue check mark in January.

Regularly spewing anti-US propaganda, the accounts show how easily authoritarian states and Americans willing to spread their propaganda can exploit social media platforms like Twitter in an effort to steer domestic discourse.

The accounts were identified by Reset, a London-based nonprofit that studies social media’s impact on democracy, and shared with The Associated Press. Felix Kartte, a senior advisor at Reset, said the report’s findings indicate Twitter is allowing Russia to use its platform like a bullhorn.

“With no one at home in Twitter’s product safety department, Russia will continue to meddle in US elections and in democracies around the world,” Kartte said.

Twitter did not respond to messages seeking comment for this story.

The 38-car derailment near East Palestine, Ohio, released toxic chemicals into the atmosphere, leading to a national debate over rail safety and environmental regulations while raising fears of poisoned drinking water and air.

The disaster was a major topic on social media, with millions of mentions on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, according to an analysis by San Francisco-based media intelligence firm Zignal Labs, which conducted a study on behalf of the AP.

At first, the derailment received little attention online but mentions grew steadily, peaking two weeks after the incident, Zignal found, a time lag that gave pro-Russia voices time to try to shape the conversation.

The accounts identified by Reset’s researchers received an extra boost from Twitter itself, in the form of a blue check mark. Before Musk purchased Twitter last year, it’s check marks denoted accounts run by verified users, often public figures, celebrities or journalists. It was seen as a mark of authenticity on a platform known for bots and spam accounts.

Musk ended that system and replaced it with Twitter Blue, which is given to users who pay $8 per month and supply a phone number. Twitter Blue users agree not to engage in deception and are required to post a profile picture and name. But there’s no rule that they use their own.

Under the program, Twitter Blue users can write and send longer tweets and videos. Their replies are also given higher priority on other posts.

The AP reached out to several of the accounts listed in Reset’s report. In response, one of the accounts sent a two-word message before blocking the AP reporter on Twitter: “Shut up.”

While researchers spotted clues suggesting some of the accounts are linked to coordinated efforts by Russian disinformation agencies, others were Americans, showing the Kremlin doesn’t always have to pay to get its message out.

One account, known as Truth Puke, is connected to a website of the same name geared toward conservatives in the United States. Truth Puke regularly reposts Russian state media; RT, formerly known as Russia Today, is one of its favorite groups to repost, Reset found. One video posted by the account features ex-President Donald Trump’s remarks about the train derailment, complete with Russian subtitles.

In a response to questions from the AP, Truth Puke said it aims to provide a “wide spectrum of views” and was surprised to be labeled a spreader of Russian propaganda, despite the account’s heavy use of such material. Asked about the video with Russian subtitles, Truth Puke said it used the Russian language version of the Trump video for the sake of expediency.

“We can assure you that it was not done with any Russian propagandist intent in mind, we just like to put out things as quickly as we find them,” the company said.

Other accounts brag of their love for Russia. One account on Thursday reposted a bizarre claim that the U.S. was stealing humanitarian earthquake relief supplies donated to Syria by China. The account has 60,000 followers and is known as Donbass Devushka, after the region of Ukraine.

Another pro-Russian account recently tried to pick an online argument with Ukraine’s defense department, posting photos of documents that it claimed came from the Wagner Group, a private military company owned by a Yevgeny Prigozhin, a key Putin ally. Prigozhin operates troll farms that have targeted U.S. social media users in the past. Last fall he boasted of his efforts to meddle with American democracy.

A separate Twitter account claiming to represent Wagner actively uses the site to recruit fighters.

“ Gentlemen, we have interfered, are interfering and will interfere,” Prigozhin said last fall on the eve of the 2022 midterm elections in the U.S. “Carefully, precisely, surgically and in our own way, as we know how to do,” Prigozhin said at the time.

Fortune

4. [Yoon Young-kwan] How China lost Asia to the US

A view from Korea,

[Yoon Young-kwan] How China lost Asia to the US

koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · March 16, 2023

Since the dawn of international politics, smaller states have faced the formidable challenge of navigating great-power rivalries. Today, it is the geopolitical contest between the United States and China that has compelled countries to balance their competing national interests. Toward which side they gravitate depends on domestic and external circumstances.

Consider the Philippines, which has an interest in maintaining both its growing economic ties with neighboring China as well as its half-century-old security alliance with the US. The Philippines’ last president, Rodrigo Duterte, placed greater emphasis on the former, turning sharply away from the US and toward China after his election in 2016.

In exchange for effectively siding with China in the escalating great-power competition, Duterte sought Chinese investment in his pet project -- the “Build! Build! Build!” infrastructure program -- and moderation of China’s aggressive behavior in the West Philippine Sea, particularly its seizure of islets and outcroppings claimed by the Philippines. But China did not oblige. When Duterte’s presidency ended last June, China had delivered less than 5 percent of the $24 billion it had pledged to invest in the Philippines, and its provocations in the West Philippine Sea, which comprises part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, continued unabated.

Duterte’s successor, President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., has so far taken a more prudent strategic approach. Deeply concerned about the territorial disputes fueled by Chinese claims in the South China Sea, Marcos has decided to reaffirm and enhance his country’s partnership with the US.

To this end, the Philippines has decided to grant the US access to four more military bases -- for a total of nine -- some of which are located near disputed areas of the South China Sea. American troops rotate regularly through the designated bases. The US and the Philippines have also agreed to resume joint patrols in the South China Sea, which, under Duterte, were suspended for six years.

Beyond the US, the Philippines and Japan recently agreed to deepen defense ties, with Japanese troops securing greater access to Philippine territory for training and logistics. Moreover, the Philippines is pursuing greater maritime cooperation with the United Kingdom. The two countries held their inaugural Maritime Dialogue on Feb. 7. Two weeks later, the Philippine defense minister agreed with his Australian counterpart to formalize their “strategic” defense engagement -- potentially including joint patrols in the South China Sea.

So, the Philippines is gradually becoming a key hub of military cooperation among Southeast Asia’s democracies. This affords the US important strategic benefits -- for which China has only itself to blame. China’s efforts to bully its neighbors into acquiescing to its demands and preferences have not only failed; they have led to the emergence of a kind of anti-China coalition in the Indo-Pacific.

This has certainly been the case in South Korea. After the country agreed in 2016 to deploy a US Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system on its territory -- a response to escalating threats from North Korea -- China imposed heavy economic sanctions. With that, public opinion in South Korea turned sharply against China: measured on a scale of 1 (most negative) and 100 (most positive), South Korean sentiment toward China now stands at 26.4 -- two points less favorable than sentiment toward North Korea (28.6), according to a Hankook Research poll conducted in 2021.

Partly in response to public opinion, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, like Marcos, has sought to strengthen its alliance with the US. He is also working to improve long-strained relations with Japan, not least by announcing a plan to compensate Koreans who performed forced labor under Japanese colonial rule during World War II.

China’s aggressive sanctions against Australia -- imposed in 2020 as punishment for the Australian government’s call for an independent inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 -- spurred a similar foreign-policy reorientation. In September 2021, Australia formed an “enhanced security partnership,” known as AUKUS, with the US and the United Kingdom. And Australia, India, Japan, and the US have sought to strengthen the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

All of these steps aim to bolster security, but they also carry risks. In his 1995 book Diplomacy, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argued that it was Imperial German leaders’ combination of “truculence” and “indecisiveness” that “hurled their country first into isolation and then into war.” In his view, World War I erupted partly because leaders were “swayed by the emotions of the moment and hampered by an extraordinary lack of sensitivity to foreign psyches.” A similar dynamic may be at play today.

Ensuring that the dark history of the 20th century does not echo today will require sound judgment from both sides. China must recognize the fear it has incited with its bullying, and democracies across the Indo-Pacific must take care to ensure that their responses do not heighten tensions excessively. Otherwise, we may well sleepwalk into catastrophe.

Yoon Young-kwan

Yoon Young-kwan, a former minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Korea, is professor emeritus of international relations at Seoul National University. -- Ed.

(Project Syndicate)

By Korea Herald ([email protected])

koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · March 16, 2023

5. Twenty Years After U.S. Invaded Iraq, Congress Wants Its War Powers Back

Then take it back. Do your job congress.

Twenty Years After U.S. Invaded Iraq, Congress Wants Its War Powers Back

Senate is set to vote on rescinding authority given to President George W. Bush; some House Republicans may balk

https://www.wsj.com/articles/twenty-years-after-u-s-invaded-iraq-congress-wants-its-war-powers-back-bd36c29

By Lindsay WiseFollow

and Eric Bazail-EimilFollow

Updated March 19, 2023 11:32 am ET

WASHINGTON—Two decades ago, the House and Senate voted to give President George W. Bush the authority to use military force in Iraq.

With the 20th anniversary of the 2003 Iraq invasion this week and the fighting long over, lawmakers now are weighing whether to repeal that authorization, with proponents saying the measure has outlived its initial intent and Congress needs to claw back some power from the White House on waging war. Critics say ending the authorization is unnecessary and could send a message of weakness abroad.

A repeal bill is expected to clear the Senate soon. Sponsored by Democratic Sen. Tim Kaine of Virginia and Republican Sen. Todd Young of Indiana, it would revoke the October 2002 authorization along with an even older one from the 1991 Gulf War. The measure easily passed an initial procedural hurdle on Thursday, with 19 Republicans joining with Democrats to open debate. A final Senate vote could come this week, but its fate in the GOP-led House is uncertain.

The outcome will hinge in large part on whether enough House Republicans side with Democrats on retiring the measure. The Republican Party once championed aggressive post-9/11 military actions. But now it is torn over foreign policy, following the costly and ultimately unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the influence of former President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine of limiting U.S. engagement abroad.

Sen. Tim Kaine (D., Va.), at lectern, with Todd Young (R., Ind.), sponsors of the measure that would repeal the authorizations.

PHOTO: J. SCOTT APPLEWHITE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D., N.Y.), who supports the bill that advanced Thursday, said repealing the authorizations is a necessary step toward leaving the remnants of the war in Iraq squarely in the past.

“Americans are tired of endless wars in the Middle East,” Mr. Schumer said.

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.) has warned that repeal would weaken the authorities that support the U.S. military’s overseas operations. Some Republicans who oppose the bill said they worried that revoking the authorizations would telegraph retreat to America’s allies and adversaries abroad, especially after the military’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.

“At a time when people are wondering whether they can depend on the United States, I think that sends a wrong message,” said Sen. John Cornyn (R., Texas).

Sen. John Cornyn (R., Texas) says rescinding the military-force authorization would send the wrong signal abroad.

PHOTO: AMANDA ANDRADE-RHOADES/ASSOCIATED PRESS

In the House, the bill has support from both the far-right Freedom Caucus wing of the party—Rep. Chip Roy of Texas is a sponsor—and from some members close to GOP leadership, such as House Rules Chairman Tom Cole (R., Okla.). Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R., Calif.) said at a press conference Sunday that the bill has a “clear opportunity to come to the floor.” His office didn’t respond to questions about the bill last week.

Backers of repeal say presidents have stretched authorizations far beyond their original purposes. The October 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force, or AUMF, was put into action with Mr. Bush’s invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Since then, the authorization has been cited by the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations—along with the 2001 authorization passed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks—to use force in Iraq and Syria against al Qaeda, Islamic State and other militant groups.

Authorizations “afforded a president the power to address a specific threat posed by a named enemy for a limited time,” said Deborah Pearlstein, co-director of the Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy at Yeshiva University. “They were never meant to be a blank check for endless war."

Congress has tried and failed in recent years to repeal some of the authorizations.

In June 2021, the Democratic-controlled House voted 268-161 to revoke the 2002 Iraq war authorization. At the time, 49 Republicans and 219 Democrats voted for the repeal. Among those who voted no was Mr. McCarthy. That bill never came up for a vote in the Senate.

President Biden has said he backs the repeal effort, and that it would have no effect on U.S. operations overseas. The U.S. today maintains a small force in Iraq but has no continuing military activities that rely solely on the 2002 authorization.

President Biden on Friday with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R., Calif.).

PHOTO: CHIP SOMODEVILLA/GETTY IMAGES

Under the Constitution, the president is the commander in chief, but only Congress has the power to declare war, last used during World War II. Since then, presidents have become more assertive in taking military action.

“You have to wonder what purpose is served by repealing the 2002 AUMF in isolation,” said Saikrishna Prakash, a law professor at the University of Virginia and expert on presidential powers. “By the time you get to Vietnam and beyond, the executive branch believes that it has constitutional authority to use massive amounts of military force without going to Congress,” he said.

Sens. Young and Kaine say that repealing the measures is a gesture of goodwill toward the current Iraqi government and demonstrates America’s resolve to stand with them as partners, not as enemies.

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Major General Yehia Rasool, a military spokesman for Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani, called the proposal “an important step by the United States of America after 20 years of war.” He said ending the AUMF would strengthen Iraq’s partnership with the U.S. and contribute to peace and stability in the region.

Many lawmakers have come to regret their 2002 vote, after U.S. claims that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction proved to be false and the Iraq war turned into a yearslong quagmire. Some are now eager to formally roll back the authorization and reassess the balance of power when it comes to waging war.

Sen. Susan Collins (R., Maine) remembered Secretary of State Colin Powell calling her the night before the vote to persuade her to support the authorization. She now favors repealing it.

Sen. Jerry Moran (R., Kan.), then serving in the House, also voted in favor of it. “One of my perspectives in looking back,” Mr. Moran said, “is that it should have been a vote on what the Constitution says is a declaration of war.”

Republican lawmakers who favor a more muscular leadership role for America overseas still hold a majority within their party. More than half of the Senate GOP caucus voted against advancing the repeal bill Thursday, including the top-ranking Republicans on the Senate’s Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, and key McConnell allies in Senate GOP leadership.

To Sen. Josh Hawley (R., Mo.), the Iraq and Afghanistan wars are a warning for Republicans. He said most of the party’s voters have already abandoned the nation-building policies known as neoconservatism, and it’s time for members of Congress to abandon it as well.

“It’s a cautionary tale for conservatives about a war that started out obviously defensive in nature…and then became a war of transformation of entire societies,” Mr. Hawley said.

Some lawmakers also hope to repeal or replace the 2001 AUMF, which focused on combating terrorism. That would be a heavier lift politically, since it is broader and more frequently used than the 2002 or 1991 authorizations. It gives the president authority to use “all necessary and appropriate force” to go after any persons or groups associated with or linked in any way to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

“They all say, ‘Not the time or place,’ ” said Sen. Rand Paul (R., Ky.), referring to supporters of the 2001 AUMF. “It’s like, when the hell is the time and place to end a war that’s now over?”

David S. Cloud contributed to this article.

Write to Lindsay Wise at [email protected] and Eric Bazail-Eimil at [email protected]

Appeared in the March 20, 2023, print edition as 'Lawmakers Consider Rescinding War Power'.

6. As Xi visits Russia, Putin sees his anti-U.S. world order taking shape

Sio Xi is going to go through with it and consort with an accused war criminal.

Excerpts:

Xi’s support further legitimizes Putin’s position in Russia, where the population still supports his war, and signals to leaders in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America that Putin is a man with whom it is worth continuing to do business.

In Moscow, officials are playing down Putin’s supplicatory position. But Russia’s weakened hand only stands to worsen in years to come as its economy stagnates under sanctions, cut off from global technology and supply chains.

Such a decline suits Chinese interests, but Beijing also wants to prevent a Russian collapse in the war that could trigger the fall of Putin’s regime, thereby strengthening the United States and perhaps ushering in a period of chaos and uncertainty along the 2,600-mile-long China-Russia border.

Alexey Maslov, director of the Moscow State University Institute of Asian and African Studies, said the new confrontational era “will be a long-lasting cold war between different camps.”

The fragmentation and disruption will hamper not just China, Russia and Iran but also the United States and Europe, he said: “The world will be less comfortable for trade, for education, for any kind of negotiations, for the next 20 or 25 years.”

As Xi visits Russia, Putin sees his anti-U.S. world order taking shape

The Washington Post · by Robyn Dixon · March 19, 2023

RIGA, Latvia — For Vladimir Putin, the state visit to Russia by Chinese President Xi Jinping, which begins on Monday, provides a giant morale boost and a chance to showcase the much-vaunted new world order that the Russian leader believes he is forging through his war on Ukraine — in which the United States and NATO can no longer dictate anything to anyone.

Xi’s visit to Russia, just after cementing his precedent-breaking third term in power, brings together two men who have positioned themselves as leaders for life — and it sets the scene for global confrontation, with Beijing willing to use its partnership with Moscow to counter Washington, even if that means granting tacit approval to Putin’s brutal, destabilizing war.

“The grim outlook in China is that we are entering this era of confrontation with the U.S., the gloves are off, and Russia is an asset and a partner in this struggle,” said Alexander Gabuev, an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Whether this confrontation will heat up, pushing three nuclear powers to the brink of World War III, or merely marks the opening chords of Cold War 2.0, remains to be seen. But Xi’s visit shows sides being taken, with China, Russia and Iran lining up against the United States, Britain and other NATO allies — in a competition for global influence and for alliances with nations like South Africa and Saudi Arabia, which seem ambivalent but up for grabs.

Xi’s trip, billed in Russia as the signature diplomatic event of 2023, could hardly come at a more useful moment for Putin. With his invasion largely stalled, military casualties mounting, and his personal reputation newly stained by an arrest warrant for war crimes issued by the International Criminal Court, Putin is in desperate need of a distraction that props him up.

For the Russian domestic audience, the ceremonial pomp of hosting the Chinese leader will reinforce Putin’s image as a modern-day czar. Crowning the visit, a state dinner will be held in the spectacular 15th-century stone Faceted Chamber in the Kremlin, Moscow’s oldest building, constructed by Ivan III, the grand prince of Moscow, whose reputation as a “gatherer of lands” for annexing neighboring territories inspires Putin.

Given rampant second-guessing of Putin’s military strategy, the display of China and Russia as allies against the United States will also lend credibility to Putin’s assertions that the Ukraine war is the crucible by which Russia is creating the new, post-American order.

As the Chinese president lands in Russia, amid Putin’s feverish anti-Western rhetoric, the world is at a dangerous crossroads. The Russian leader has suspended New START, the only remaining arms control treaty with Washington, and has staked his country’s future on what is now likely to be a long, unpredictable war, despite the staggering economic costs and misgivings of his own elite. The West, in turn, is sending more powerful arms to Ukraine, including tanks and fighter jets.

The alignment of authoritarian leaders may see the world divided into opposing camps for decades, stymieing cooperation on climate change, choking global action on human rights abuses, paralyzing international institutions and increasing tensions in contested regions.

But while Putin is searching for allies who can send weapons, boost trade or at least support him in global forums, the visit for Xi seems more about positioning Beijing globally than about Russia or Ukraine, said Aleksei Chigadayev, China analyst at Leipzig University and former lecturer at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics who left Russia because of the invasion.

“It’s a demonstration to the world, ‘We can mediate in international conflicts and we are a reliable partner,’” Chigadayev said of Xi’s visit.

It is also a warning, he said, to Washington on the need to negotiate with Beijing and to Europe on China’s importance as a major global power. He added that the visit sends a message to Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East that China is a more viable source of support than the United States.

Xi may also be intent on demonstrating to Putin that if there is a new world order, then China will lead it.

China recently displayed rising global influence by mediating a diplomatic rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, amid Washington’s annoyance with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman over his support for Putin’s efforts to keep oil prices high so that he can bankroll the war.

Although China portrays itself as a neutral party when it comes to Putin’s war in Ukraine, the Kremlin sees Xi as its strongest tacit supporter.

Beijing refuses to condemn the invasion, has blamed the United States for the war, and criticizes Western sanctions designed to starve Putin’s war machine of funds. With Russia’s economy under intense pressure, China last year kept it afloat, boosting trade with Russia — including a sharp increase in Chinese exports of electronic chips that Moscow needs for weapons production — and a steep rise in purchases of Russian oil.

Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov boasted on Friday that Russia and China would reach their 2024 target for $200 billion in trade turnover a year early, in 2023, and he extolled the two leaders’ “especially warm and trusting personal relationship.”

One key question, as part of the growing global confrontation, is whether Beijing will offer Putin weapons, potentially via a clandestine route such as North Korea. The United States has warned Beijing not to do so, stirring outrage among senior Chinese officials who accuse Washington of glaring “hypocrisy” given the huge flow of U.S. weapons to Kyiv.

China has called for a cease-fire between Ukraine and Russia and the opening of peace talks as part of a 12-point proposal, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has expressed willingness to speak to Xi. But the plan seems to have no chance at success, largely because it does not address Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory.

The Kremlin claims to be giving the proposal “great attention” while insisting there can be no peace until Ukraine accepts “new realities,” an apparent reference to Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Zelensky, in turn, has pledged to retake all occupied lands, including Crimea.

“All of Moscow’s demands are well known. The de facto situation and new realities are also well known,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Tuesday.

No matter how thin the plan, Xi can posture globally by noting that China is the only member of the U.N. Security Council with a peace plan, while echoing Putin’s line that NATO weapons supplies to Ukraine will only exacerbate tensions.

Xi’s visit comes as Moscow and Tehran have drawn much closer, with Russia relying on Iran for self-detonating drones to attack Ukrainian cities. Meanwhile, hope has faded for a resuscitation of the Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, raising a risk that Iran will soon acquire nuclear weapons, further destabilizing global security.

Putin and Xi have much in common: their own self-serving definitions of democracy and market economics; a disdain for human rights; a fear of civic engagement by the general public; and, most of all, a desire to end U.S. global dominance and to reshape international organizations and norms to suit Chinese and Russian interests.

The dinner in the Faceted Chamber will highlight how, three decades after the Cold War ended, a new ominous era seems at hand. In that same room in 1988, Ronald Reagan exchanged toasts with Mikhail Gorbachev while on a state visit in which the U.S. president declared the Cold War over and dismissed his 1983 description of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” as words spoken in “another time, another era.”

Washington and Moscow now seem to have come full circle. But unlike the last Cold War, when there was a Sino-Soviet split over ideological differences, China now looks set to confront the United States and Europe with Russia by its side.

China is increasingly pessimistic about relations with Washington, Gabuev said, and with growing leverage over a weakening Russia, has decided to cement the relationship.

Beijing observed Washington’s red lines on Western sanctions on Russia, Gabuev noted, only to see Washington slap on export controls restricting China’s ability to obtain high-end semiconductors, while also sending Taiwan more weapons.

As Putin faces an arrest warrant over war crimes charges in the International Criminal Court, Xi’s visit is an important symbolic boost, demonstrating that he retains a powerful friend, despite being shunned by the West.

Xi’s support further legitimizes Putin’s position in Russia, where the population still supports his war, and signals to leaders in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America that Putin is a man with whom it is worth continuing to do business.

In Moscow, officials are playing down Putin’s supplicatory position. But Russia’s weakened hand only stands to worsen in years to come as its economy stagnates under sanctions, cut off from global technology and supply chains.

Such a decline suits Chinese interests, but Beijing also wants to prevent a Russian collapse in the war that could trigger the fall of Putin’s regime, thereby strengthening the United States and perhaps ushering in a period of chaos and uncertainty along the 2,600-mile-long China-Russia border.

Alexey Maslov, director of the Moscow State University Institute of Asian and African Studies, said the new confrontational era “will be a long-lasting cold war between different camps.”

The fragmentation and disruption will hamper not just China, Russia and Iran but also the United States and Europe, he said: “The world will be less comfortable for trade, for education, for any kind of negotiations, for the next 20 or 25 years.”

The Washington Post · by Robyn Dixon · March 19, 2023

7. Nuclear nightmare: reckless leaders push the world back to the brink

Russia, north Korea, China and.....Israel?

Nuclear nightmare: reckless leaders push the world back to the brink | Simon Tisdall

It’s not just Putin or the refusal of the major powers to disarm. Unstable regimes in Israel and North Korea are also raising global nuclear tensions

The Guardian · by Simon Tisdall · March 19, 2023

Leaders of unstable nuclear-armed states do dangerous and foolish things when under stress. They miscalculate, provoke, overreach. Given the febrile state of bilateral relations, last week’s aerial military clash between Russia and the US over the Black Sea inevitably intensified fears of nuclear escalation. The incident dramatised how dangerous Vladimir Putin, cornered by his existential Ukraine blunder, truly is – and the risks he is increasingly prepared to run. But he’s not the only one.

As often the case over the past year, Putin relied on American restraint. US forces could easily have gone after the offending Su-27 fighter at its Crimea base. Each time Russia’s president darkly hints at going nuclear, that once unthinkable prospect becomes a little less outlandish – and western leaders must steel their nerves. Russia’s repeated bombing of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant fits this pattern of minacious brinkmanship.

Russia possesses about 1,600 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, out of a military stockpile of about 4,500. Like the US and other nuclear weapons states, it is modernising and adding new systems. At the same time, a vital safety net of arms control treaties dating from the Soviet era is shredding. Last month, Putin ditched New Start, which caps deployed strategic nuclear arsenals. It was Russia’s last such treaty with the US.

In other words, at the very moment when the Kremlin is under unprecedented pressure and US-Russia relations are at their most tense since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the political channels, agreed mechanisms and binding limits that could help avoid a nuclear collision are less robust and dependable than ever before. While the risk of unintended nuclear confrontation is ever-present, Putin’s recklessness makes it infinitely worse.

Israel is another nuclear-armed state under extreme stress, mostly due to its volatile rightwing prime minister. Benjamin Netanyahu’s perceived attempt to avoid jail by destroying judicial independence, and with it Israel’s democracy, has caused uproar. Significantly, his “coup” is under fire from serving members of the military and former defence ministers as well as much of civil society.

If this destabilising nationwide upheaval were taking place in Pakistan, for example, loud international expressions of concern about the security of its secretive nuclear arsenal would be heard. So the comparative silence over the safety and control of Israel’s 90 or so undeclared warheads is disturbing. Amid an extraordinary standoff between Netanyahu and US president Joe Biden, Israel’s president, Isaac Herzog, fears civil war. “The abyss is within touching distance,” he said last week.

There is good reason to worry about what Netanyahu may do, Putin-like, to escape his self-made troubles. He has threatened to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities in the past. Israeli media suggest he may now be planning an attack. Netanyahu warned this month of a “horrible nuclear war” unless Tehran’s uranium enrichment programme was halted. Would he start a Middle East conflict to save his skin? Past experience suggests he might.

If the US and its allies were not so distracted by Ukraine, they might pay more attention to Netanyahu’s antics. Much the same may be said of the developing crisis in nuclear-armed North Korea, where inherent weakness is compounded by looming famine. New doubts surround dictator Kim Jong-un’s health and a problematic succession. Stirring the pot, China and Russia back him against the west despite the danger he poses.

Kim spent last week firing off nuclear-capable ballistic missiles like there’s no tomorrow – and there may not be if he carries on like this. Analysts anticipate another underground atomic test. Kim regularly threatens the US – and South Korea and Japan, which met last week to ponder what to do. Earlier this month he ordered his military to prepare for “real war”. Is Kim waving or drowning, seeking attention or waxing desperate? Ignoring North Korea, which is unspoken western policy, stores up trouble.

It’s difficult to tell from his lugubrious appearance but Xi Jinping, China’s newly anointed president for life, is a leader under severe pressure, too. His zero-Covid policy damaged a struggling economy and sparked something close to popular revolt. His aggressive foreign policy, debt diplomacy and rights abuses have produced a global anti-China backlash. By vowing to conquer US-backed Taiwan come what may, Xi has created another rod for his back.

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which CIA director William Burns predicts may happen by 2027, is a probable nuclear flashpoint – especially if it goes badly for Xi. It’s estimated China has about 400 operational nuclear warheads, rising to approximately 1,000 by 2030. American nuclear-armed ships, submarines and bombers constantly patrol the western Pacific.

For his part, Xi can point to continuing US and UK nuclear weapons modernisation, and to last week’s deal to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines. China complained at the UN that the deal breached the nuclear non-proliferation treaty by transferring fissile material and nuclear technology to a non-nuclear weapons state.

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In an arrogant riposte, the US claimed it would actually strengthen non-proliferation efforts – without explaining how. Iran and others will register this double standard.

The longstanding refusal of the main powers to disarm is the root cause of rising nuclear tensions – but irresponsible present-day political leaders greatly exacerbate the danger. “The United States and its allies … are faced with a choice,” wrote Lt Col Brent Stricker of the US Naval War College in a bleak assessment of the changing nuclear world order. They could either “restart arms limitation discussions to include both Russia and China, or restart the arms race”.

The former course is wildly improbable at this juncture. So the old cold war-era nuclear helter-skelter ride towards mutually assured destruction looks set to resume and accelerate – under new, stressed-out management. Assuming no one presses the button first.

Kim is firing off nuclear-capable ballistic missiles like there’s no tomorrow – and there may not be if he carries on like this

The Guardian · by Simon Tisdall · March 19, 2023

8. Was The Iraq War Worth It?

Was The Iraq War Worth It?

timothynoah.substack.com · by Thomas E. Ricks

With the twentieth anniversary of the American invasion of Iraq coming up, you may see Bush Administration veterans and even others arguing that it was all worthwhile after all, and that American motives were honorable.

When you see such assertions, here are four questions to keep in mind:

How many Iraqis died? (They won’t know.)
How many Americans, including contractors, died? (Ditto.)
How did the invasion strengthen Iran and how will that change the region?
How did the invasion undercut Americans’ belief in the competence and honesty of their own government?

A guest post by

Thomas E. Ricks

Thomas E. Ricks is a former military correspondent for the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal. His most recent book is "Waging a Good War: A military history of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968."

timothynoah.substack.com · by Thomas E. Ricks

9. Anti-Russia guerillas in Belarus take on 'two-headed enemy'

What kind of external support is being provided?

Anti-Russia guerillas in Belarus take on 'two-headed enemy'

ABC.net.au · March 18, 2023

After Russia invaded Ukraine, guerillas from Belarus began carrying out acts of sabotage on their country's railways, including blowing up track equipment to paralyse rails that Russian forces used to get troops and weapons into Ukraine.

Key points:

A guerilla movement has sprung up on the ground and online to disrupt the Kremlin's operations in Belarus
Guerillas have posted Russian military movements online as well as sabotaging railways and aircraft
Belarus's President has introduced the death penalty for attempted terrorist attacks

In the most recent sabotage to make international headlines, they attacked a Russian warplane parked just outside the Belarusian capital.

"Belarusians will not allow the Russians to freely use our territory for the war with Ukraine, and we want to force them to leave," Anton, a retired Belarusian serviceman who joined a group of saboteurs, told The Associated Press.

"The Russians must understand on whose side the Belarusians are actually fighting," he said, speaking on the condition that his last name be withheld for security reasons.

Belarus continues to host Russian troops, warplanes and other weapons. (AP: Russian Defense Ministry Press Service)

More than a year after Russia used the territory of its neighbour and ally to invade Ukraine, Belarus continues to host Russian troops, warplanes, missiles and other weapons.

The Belarusian opposition condemns the cooperation, and a guerilla movement sprang up to disrupt the Kremlin's operations, both on the ground and online.

Meanwhile, Belarus' authoritarian government is trying to crack down on saboteurs with threats of the death penalty and long prison terms.

Activists say the rail attacks have forced the Russian military to abandon the use of trains to send troops and material to Ukraine.

Guerillas say the war is proving costly for Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko (second from left).(AP: Andrei Stasevich/BelTA pool)

The retired serviceman is a member of the Association of Security Forces of Belarus, or BYPOL, a guerilla group founded amid mass political protests in Belarus in 2020. Its core is composed of former military members.

During the first year of the war, Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko realised that getting involved in the conflict "will cost him a lot and will ignite dangerous processes inside Belarus," said Anton Matolka, coordinator of the Belarusian military monitoring group Belaruski Hajun.

The Russian Beriev A-50 had been monitoring the Belarusian border. (AP: Alexander Zemlianichenko, pool, file)

Last month, BYPOL claimed responsibility for a drone attack on a Russian warplane stationed near the Belarusian capital.

The group said it used two armed drones to damage the Beriev A-50 parked at the Machulishchy Air Base near Minsk.

Belarusian authorities said they requested the early warning aircraft to monitor their border.

Mr Lukashenko acknowledged the attack a week later, saying that the damage to the plane was insignificant but it had to be sent to Russia for repairs.

Belarusian guerillas attacked the A-50 in an attempt to "blind Russian military aviation" in their country.(AP: State TV and Radio Company of Belarus, file)

The iron-fisted leader also said the perpetrator of the attack was arrested along with more than 20 accomplices and that he has ties to Ukrainian security services.

Both BYPOL and Ukrainian authorities rejected allegations that Kyiv was involved.

Unpicking the white-hot anger Ukrainians feel towards Russia

The most striking sentiment I came across during a recent trip to Ukraine was the absolute determination of Ukrainians to fight to the end, whatever that end may be.

BYPOL leader Aliaksandr Azarau said the people who carried out the assault were able to leave Belarus safely.

"We are not familiar with the person Lukashenko talked about," he said.

The attack on the plane, which Azarau said was used to help Russia locate Ukrainian air defence systems, was "an attempt to blind Russian military aviation in Belarus."

He said the group is preparing other operations to free Belarus "from the Russian occupation" and to free Belarus from Lukashenko's regime.

"We have a two-headed enemy these days," said Mr Azarau, who remains outside Belarus.

Former military officers in the BYPOL group work closely with the team of Belarus' exiled opposition leader, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who ran against Lukashenko in the 2020 presidential election that was widely seen as rigged.

The disputed vote results handed him his sixth term in office and triggered the largest protests in the country's history.

The activity of Russian troops in Belarus is posted by guerillas on a Telegram blog. (AP: Russian Defense Ministry Press Service)

In response, Mr Lukashenko unleashed a brutal crackdown on demonstrators, accusing the opposition of plotting to overthrow the government. Mr Tsikhanouskaya fled to Lithuania under pressure.

With the protests still simmering a year after the election, BYPOL created an underground network of anti-government activists dubbed Peramoha, or Victory. According to Mr Azarau, the network has some 200,000 participants, two-thirds in Belarus.

"Lukashenko has something to be afraid of," Mr Azarau said.

Belarusian guerillas say they have already carried out 17 major acts of sabotage on railways.

The first took place just two days after Russian troops rolled into Ukraine.

A month later, then-Ukrainian railways head Oleksandr Kamyshin said there "was no longer any railway traffic between Ukraine and Belarus", and thanked Belarusian guerillas for it.

Another group of guerillas operates in cyberspace. Their coordinator, Yuliana Shametavets, said some 70 Belarusian IT specialists are hacking into Russian government databases and attacking the websites of Russian and Belarusian state institutions.

"The future of Belarus depends directly on the military success of Ukraine," Ms Shametavets said. "We're trying to contribute to Ukraine's victory as best we can."

Last month, the cyber guerillas reported hacking a subsidiary of Russia's state media watchdog, Roskomnadzor.

They said they were able to penetrate the subsidiary's inner network, download more than two terabytes of documents and emails, and share data showing how Russian authorities censor information about the war in Ukraine.

Police block a Misnk street during an opposition rally in 2020.(Reuters: Stringer, file)

They also hacked into Belarus' state database containing information about border crossings and are now preparing a report on Ukrainian citizens who were recruited by Russia and went to meet with their handlers in Belarus.

In addition, the cyber guerillas help vet Belarusians who volunteer to join the Kastus Kalinouski regiment that fights alongside Kyiv's forces.

Ms Shametavets said they were able to identify four security operatives among the applicants.

Mr Lukashenko has attempted to clamp down on sabotage by introducing the death penalty for terrorist acts.(AP: Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service)

Belarusian authorities have unleashed a crackdown on guerillas.

Last May, Mr Lukashenko signed off on introducing the death penalty for attempted terrorist acts.

Last month, the Belarusian parliament also adopted the death penalty as punishment for high treason. Mr Lukashenko signed the measure on Thursday.

Spies and sabotage in eastern Europe

As the main corridor of aid heading into Ukraine and a hub for American troops, the Polish city of Rzeszów is now on high alert for "acts of sabotage".

"Belarusian authorities are seriously scared by the scale of the guerilla movement inside the country and don't know what to do with it, so they chose harsh repressions, intimidation and fear as the main tool," said Pavel Sapelka of the Viasna human rights group.

Dozens have been arrested, while many others have fled the country.

Siarhei Vaitsekhovich runs a Telegram blog where he regularly posts about Russian drills in Belarus and the deployment of Russian military equipment and troops to the country.

He had to leave Belarus after authorities began investigating him on charges of treason and forming an extremist group.

Mr Vaitsekhovich said his 15-year-old brother was recently detained in an effort to pressure him to take the blog down and cooperate with the security services.

Belarusian court sentences Nobel Peace Prize winner to 10 years in prison

Ales Bialiatski, a pro-democracy activist and founder of the Viasna human rights group, was convicted of financing protests and smuggling money.

The Russian Federal Security Service "is very unhappy with the fact that information about movements of Russian military equipment spills out into public domain," Mr Vaitsekhovich said.

According to Mr Viasna, over the past 12 months at least 1,575 Belarusians have been detained for their anti-war stance, and 56 have been convicted on various charges and sentenced to prison terms ranging from a year to 23 years.

Anton said he understood the risks. On one of the railway attacks, he worked with three associates who were each sentenced in November to more than 20 years in prison.

"It is hard to say who is in a more difficult position — a Ukrainian in a trench or a Belarusian on a stake-out," he said.

ABC.net.au · March 18, 2023

10. From Georgetown to Langley: The Controversial Connection Between a Prestigious University and the CIA

Wow. As an aside I did spend 6 and a 1/2 years as the Associate Director of Center for Security Studies and Security Studies Program at Georgetown.

Graphics and photos at the link. https://www.mintpressnews.com/georgetown-langley-controversial-connection-cia/284004/

While there are a lot of facts in this piece, some are taken out of context and some have some interpretation that might reveal the author's bias.

From Georgetown to Langley: The Controversial Connection Between a Prestigious University and the CIA

mintpressnews.com · March 15, 2023

If you have ever wondered, “where do America’s spies come from?” the answer is quite possibly the Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) at Georgetown University. It is only a modestly-seized institution, yet the school provides the backbone for the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, State Department, and other organs of the national security state.

From overthrowing foreign governments and conducting worldwide psychological operations to overseeing drug and gun smuggling and a global torture network, the CIA is perhaps the world’s most controversial and dangerous organization. All of which begs the question, should an educational institution have any formal relationship with it, let alone such a storied school as Georgetown?

Yet, with more than two dozen ex-CIA officials among its teaching staff, the school tailors its courses towards producing the next generation of analysts, assassins, coup-plotters and economic hitmen, fast-tracking graduates into the upper echelons of the national security state.

The CIA has also quietly funded the SFS, as journalist Will Sommer revealed. The agency, based in Langley, VA, secretly donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to fund the department’s work, despite Georgetown insisting on its website that this money came from anonymous donations from individuals.

Spy Factory

Any number of “how to join the CIA” articles suggest studying at the School of Foreign Service, and the university itself leans into its reputation as a spy factory. “We have global thinkers in Georgetown… They are attractive to the intel community in both the public and private sectors,” Anne Steen, then-executive director of the SFS’ graduate career center, told CNBC in 2018, adding, “There are elements to intelligence that didn’t even exist ten years ago whether it is cyber or artificial intelligence, and our students are on the cutting edge.”

There were 377 SFS graduates in academic year 2021, pursuing courses in security studies, foreign service, or a range of area-specific degrees, including Arab, Asian, Latin American or Eurasian and East European Studies.

Perhaps the most CIA-specific degree on offer is security studies, with Georgetown itself claiming that “we offer a multidisciplinary master’s degree designed to prepare graduates for positions within the defense and security fields” and that the staff “recognize the benefit of having students who are currently working or interning in the security field.” In other words, CIA agents often go back to Georgetown to acquire skills that an academic environment can offer.

According to Georgetown’s own reports, 47% of security studies graduates “quickly go into the public sector,” the lion’s share finding work in intelligence or the military. The CIA is the number one public employer of security studies grads, followed by the Department of Defense, Department of State, the Army and the Navy. The top private-sector employers are largely military contractors, including Booz Allen Hamilton, SAIC and Northrop Grumman. The report claims that those working in the world of intelligence and security consider a School of Foreign Service security studies degree to be a “must have” credential.

A breakdown of the most common career paths of Georgetown Security Studies graduates. Source | Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

This Georgetown-to-Langley pipeline is so well-established that the university even published a guide to applying to the agency on its website, filled with useful lists of dos and don’ts. Meanwhile, the School of Foreign Service offers its students the opportunity to hold one-to-one meetings with CIA recruiters, although it notes that these interviews are reserved for students who are not already in contact with the agency themselves.

Last month, the SFS invited current CIA Director William J. Burns to campus, where it presented him with the Trainor Award for Excellence in the Conduct of Diplomacy. Burns turned the event into a recruitment drive, stating in his speech: “Nothing has ever given me greater pride than to serve my country with honor. It’s a lesson that I’ve learned and relearned over the past four decades, and I hope all the students in this audience will explore its promise.”

Burns’ words echoed those of his CIA predecessor Leon Panetta, who, in addition to being the agency’s chief, was also Secretary of Defense. During a speech at Georgetown, Panetta praised the institution’s “leadership in the study of global security.” As he explained,

I have had a deep and abiding respect for Georgetown throughout the almost 40 to 50 years that I’ve been involved in public service. And I have a deep respect for the generation of leaders that have gone forward from this campus to serve our nation.”

Panetta added that, throughout his time in the national security state, he was surrounded by Georgetown graduates, describing them as:

Talented, young individuals who have been at my side every day for the last four years, at both the CIA and the Pentagon, and I am deeply grateful for their work on behalf of me and on behalf of the nation. And I’m deeply grateful to Georgetown for training such extraordinary public servants.”

In addition to training spies, the SFS also produces many of the country’s top journalists, including alternative media host Saagar Enjeti. When Enjeti left his job as host of The Hill’s show, “Rising,” he was replaced by another SFS graduate, Emily Miller. Interestingly, Enjeti himself was a replacement for original host Buck Sexton, a former CIA analyst.

Spooks and students

It is not just the students, however, that are associated with the Central Intelligence Agency. Studying the faculty, MintPress found at least 25 staff at the School of Foreign Service alone who once worked for or with the agency. There were many other former CIA agents in other departments, while other SFS staff also worked at different institutions within the national security state.

Although the full extent of their activities remains classified and unknown to the public, many of these academics’ biographies hint at a dark past. For example, Michael Walker spent 29 years at the CIA before joining the SFS’ Center for Security Studies (CSS) as an adjunct professor,

During the 1980s, Walker was stationed in Afghanistan, where he presumably played a role in Operation Cyclone, the CIA’s arming and training of Osama bin Laden and the Mujahideen to oppose the Soviet invasion. Bin Laden would later use his skills to attack the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Walker would later return to Afghanistan to help the CIA oversee the U.S. occupation of the country. He eventually became the CIA’s Near East and South Asia Director, putting him directly in charge of CIA operations across the region.

Around six million people have been killed and between 37 and 59 million displaced as a result of American actions in the region in the past two decades.

Another CSS academic with a similarly dark past is Douglas London. London enjoyed a 34-year stint at the CIA, where he worked as a senior operations officer, a chief of station, and the agency’s counterterrorism chief for South and Southwest Asia.

During London’s time in that region, the CIA was involved in attacking Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria and the bombing of Pakistan and Yemen. Perhaps most infamously, however, it also oversaw the notorious Abu Ghraib prison, where CIA officers routinely tortured and raped victims, including children.

Douglas London (left), now a Georgetown professor, was CIA Counterterrorism Chief during the infamous Abu Ghraib torture scandal, which saw CIA agents brutally torture captives in Iraq

Manadel al-Jamadi was beaten and tortured to death inside the prison. His identity and fate were completely unknown until 2004 when images of grinning U.S. officials posed with their thumbs up beside his body.

While there is no evidence that London was directly involved with Abu Ghraib, the fact that he was a CIA leader during the darkest days of the post-9/11 wars in the Middle East should be a black mark against him, not an asset that gets him a job at one of America’s most prestigious universities.

Other CIA-linked academics at the School of Foreign Service include:

• Paula Doyle. Currently an adjunct professor of practice at the SFS’ Center for Security Studies (CSS), in 2016, Doyle retired from an 18-year career at the agency, where she rose to become associate deputy director of operations. Between 2012 and 2014, she was deputy national counterintelligence executive and oversaw the U.S. response to the Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning leaks.

• Burton Gerber. Another CSS professor, Gerber spent 39 years in the CIA. His work focussed on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He was the CIA chief of station in three former Warsaw Pact countries.

• Scott Modell. In his 13-year career, which saw him become a senior officer in the CIA’s National Clandestine Service, Modell specialized in Iran and Latin America, where he served multiple tours. After leaving the agency, he worked as a special advisor to U.S. Special Operation Command and as a fellow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a hawkish Washington think tank. An SFS graduate himself, since 2019, he has taught security studies at Georgetown.

• Sue Terry. Another former CSIS fellow, Terry was a senior analyst for the CIA between 2001 and 2008, specializing in Korean issues. She later joined the National Security Council and was deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia and Oceania. Today, she teaches Asian Studies at the SFS.

• Dennis Wilder. Wilder spent more than 30 years working in intelligence, the culmination of which came in 2015 when the CIA appointed him deputy assistant director for East Asia and the Pacific. A Georgetown graduate, he now teaches at the SFS.

• David Robarge. Robarge joined the CIA in 1989 and became a political and leadership analyst on the Middle East. He was appointed chief historian of the agency in 2005. He is now an adjunct professor within the CSS.

• Paul Pillar. Currently a non-resident senior fellow at the CSS, professor Pillar spent 28 years in the U.S. intelligence community, serving in a number of senior roles, including as the executive assistant to the CIA director William Webster.

• Paul Miller. Not to be confused with Paul Pillar, Paul Miller is a Professor in the Practice of International Affairs at the SFS. A White House staffer under both the Bush and Obama administrations, he also worked for the National Security Council, as an intelligence analyst for the CIA and in military intelligence for the U.S. Army.

• Joseph Gartin. After a long career, Gartin retired from the CIA in 2019, where he served as deputy associate director for talent and as chief learning officer. To this day, however, he is the managing editor of Studies in Intelligence, the CIA’s in-house journal. At Georgetown, he is a practitioner in residence of the university’s master of science in foreign service program.

• Matthew Kroenig. Before joining academia, Kroenig held a wide range of senior positions in the U.S. national security state, including in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and at the CIA. In addition to being a professor in the SFS, he is a senior member of the Atlantic Council, a NATO think tank.

• Anand Arun. With nearly two decades of experience in the field, Arun is a senior intelligence officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency and an adjunct assistant professor at the CSS. Between 2018 and 2020, he worked at CIA headquarters in Langley, VA, as the President’s Daily Briefer to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

• Kenneth Pollack. Pollack began his career as a Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA and was later Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs and Director for Persian Gulf Affairs. He currently teaches at the CSS.

• Andrew Borene. In addition to being a CSS adjunct assistant professor, Borene is currently the associate vice president of research at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence University. His Georgetown biography notes that he worked as an advisor to leaders at the CIA.

• Catherine Lotrionte. Lotrionte is the director of the Institute for Law, Science and Global Security and a visiting assistant professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown. Prior to that, she was Assistant General Counsel at the CIA’s Office of General Counsel and a counsel on the president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board at the White House.

• Laura Manning Johnson. Early in her national security career, Manning Johnson was a biological warfare analyst at the CIA. After 9/11, she was detailed to the White House as the first Director of Central Intelligence Representative to the Office of Homeland Security, as well as a member of Vice-President Dick Cheney’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Review. She is now an adjunct professor at the SFS.

• John Gentry. Gentry teaches an undergraduate course at Georgetown on the U.S. intelligence community. He has extensive experience in the subject, having spent 12 years at the CIA working as an intelligence analyst.

• Jonathan Massicot. In addition to his role at the CSS, Massicot is the senior political-military advisor on Russia for the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Between 2008 and 2021 worked as a senior analyst at the CIA.

• Bruce Hoffman. A tenured professor at the SFS, Hoffman was scholar-in-residence for counterterrorism at the Central Intelligence Agency between 2004 and 2006 and also an advisor on counterterrorism to the Office of National Security Affairs.

• Russell Rumbaugh. Rumbaugh left his position at the CSS in January to become Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller). Between 2004 and 2005, he was a military analyst at the CIA.

• William Costanza. Now an adjunct assistant professor at the CSS, Costanza came to Georgetown after a 25-year career as a CIA case officer, where he specialized in targeting and intelligence collecting.

• Candice Frost. Colonel Frost completed a war college fellowship at the CIA and then served as the Director of Foreign Intelligence for the Army G-2 at the Pentagon. She currently teaches at the CSS.

• Richard Schroeder. After a long career as a CIA officer, Schroeder became an adjunct associate professor at Georgetown, teaching a number of graduate and undergraduate courses within the SFS.

• Marie Harf. Harf began her career with the CIA in 2006, first serving as a Middle East analyst, then as the agency’s media spokesperson. Between 2013 and 2017, she worked as the State Department’s deputy media spokesperson. Today, she is the executive director of external relations and marketing for the SFS.

The biographies of many of these individuals suggest that they were intimately involved in many of the CIA’s most infamous operations. Added to that, the sheer number of spies teaching at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service suggests that their role is to train, oversee and select the next generation of operatives, all done in the rarefied confines of an elite university campus.

A bloody history

Although Georgetown presents the organization as a respectable group defending freedom and advancing liberty, since its founding in 1947, the CIA has repeatedly been implicated in many of the worst modern-era crimes against humanity. The agency has played a central role in countless U.S. attempts to overthrow foreign governments, many of them democratically elected ones.

In Iran in 1953, the CIA successfully overthrew the secular reformist government of Mohammad Mosaddegh and installed the Shah as a dictator. Twenty years later, in Chile, it helped to overthrow the democratically elected socialist government of Salvador Allende and shored up the brutal rule of fascist military dictator Augusto Pinochet. More recently, the organization has been implicated in numerous regime change attempts against the government of Venezuela.

Maintaining America’s place as a global hegemon is no easy task and often relies on extreme cruelty. To this end, the CIA operates a worldwide network of “Black Sites” – prison camps where captives are tortured. Some of the agency’s torture techniques were directly copied from the Nazis, many of whom the CIA assisted in escaping punishment after the Second World War.

Acting CIA Director William Burns speaks about threats from China at a Georgetown University event on Feb. 2, 2023. Photo | Kyodo via AP

Gun- and drug-running are also key parts of the CIA’s repertoire. During the 1980s, the agency worked closely with its Pakistani counterpart, the ISI, to funnel $2 billion worth of arms and assistance to Afghan militants, including the now-infamous Osama bin Laden. The agency also sold weapons to Iran and used the proceeds to fund death squads in Nicaragua that would go on to carry out countless massacres against peasants, women, schoolchildren and other “soft targets.”

The CIA allegedly helped fund this dirty war against the Nicaraguan people through the sale of crack cocaine in black neighborhoods across the United States, linking far-right paramilitary armies with U.S. drug kingpins like Rick Ross. In this light, then, some might see so many ex-CIA officials at Georgetown training the next generation in their craft as deeply problematic.

Another key CIA role is to spread disinformation. Investigators in the 1970s found that over 400 American journalists were secretly either CIA agents or on its payroll, and the agency had secretly set up a wide array of magazines, newspapers and journals and published a huge number of books. This penetration of the media has likely only become more extensive in recent times.

MintPress News investigations have found the presence of dozens of “former” CIA agents working in key positions in big tech companies such as Google and Facebook, effectively deciding what the entire world sees in its newsfeeds.

A longtime partnership

The cozy relationship between Georgetown and the CIA is not a new phenomenon. In 1980, a student magazine, The Georgetown Voice, published an article discussing what it called a “special relationship” and an “unholy alliance” between the university and the CIA. In the eyes of Father Richard McSorley, a Jesuit priest and professor of Peace Studies at Georgetown, this partnership was a “disgrace,” and it was “harmful for Georgetown University to have persons on campus who represent an organization guilty of severe violations of law, morality and human dignity.” McSorley wrote the CIA off as nothing more than a “club of assassins, saboteurs and coup directors.” Despite McSorley’s denunciations, the relationship persevered. A 1986 New York Times article noted that Georgetown was the number one school for agency recruits.

Going even further back, President Nixon was known to grumble about his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger and his “Georgetown set.” Kissinger was a professor at the School of Foreign Service and filled the White House and the State Department with handpicked students he had taught.

To this day, the national security state is filled with Georgetown graduates. This includes no less than five living former CIA directors, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, current Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, former White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon, ex-White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany, and arch neoconservative war planner Frank Gaffney (although not all of them attended the SFS). In 2020, Politico reported that Georgetown was also the top feeder school to the State Department.

If Georgetown is CIA-U, then it is perhaps unsurprising that In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s venture capitalist wing, is full to the brim with its graduates as well. In-Q-Tel was set up to nurture and sponsor new hi-tech companies that will work with the CIA to provide them with cutting-edge technology.

Searching through employment databases and social networks such as LinkedIn shows dozens of individuals who have gone through the Georgetown-to-CIA pipeline. These include Vishal Sandesara, In-Q-Tel VP of Operations, Deputy General Counsel Jeremy Joseph, Senior Partner Brian Smith, Vice President Russel Ross, and Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice President Matt Strottman.

Washington, D.C., is full of spies; the D.C.-based International Spy Museum estimates that there are 10,000 in the city. Locals and tourists alike can even book a walking tour called “the spies of Georgetown,” led by a former CIA officer. Like so many before them, a good deal of these individuals will have started their professional careers at the School of Foreign Service. While some may balk at such a prestigious institution being used as a spy school, Georgetown has found a lucrative niche, and it is sticking to it.

Georgetown University did not respond when asked to comment on this article.

Feature photo | Illustration by MintPress News

Alan MacLeod is Senior Staff Writer for MintPress News. After completing his PhD in 2017 he published two books: Bad News From Venezuela: Twenty Years of Fake News and Misreporting and Propaganda in the Information Age: Still Manufacturing Consent, as well as a number of academic articles. He has also contributed to FAIR.org, The Guardian, Salon, The Grayzone, Jacobin Magazine, and Common Dreams.

mintpressnews.com · March 15, 2023

11. Is a ban on TikTok possible — and what would happen if it disappeared?

Today I saw a TV commercial for TikTok on one of the streaming services. It had a father teaching his young daughter to read based on instructions from TikTok and she was outperforming her fellow students in reading.

There are many who think TikTok provides a "public good." You can learn everything from how to cook dinner to how to put on makeup to how to treat illnesses and how to lose weight. And then the connection to Amazon is very interesting . The influencers make money by advertising the clothes they are wearing and providing links to amazon so followers can buy the same outfits as their favorite influencers.

Is a ban on TikTok possible — and what would happen if it disappeared?

Some U.S. lawmakers want to ban TikTok. It may not be that simple.

Richard Leiby

March 19, 2023

grid.news · by Richard Leiby

Can TikTok really be banned, as many politicians are now proposing? And what would be lost or gained by a prohibition of the wildly popular video-sharing platform — which is used by millions of Americans and billions of people worldwide?

For some answers, Grid turned to David Greene, an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a San Francisco nonprofit that promotes online users’ rights and supported a court challenge to efforts by the Trump administration to shut down TikTok. That effort ultimately floundered. The latest government threat to the social media behemoth comes from a bipartisan bill that gives President Joe Biden the power to ban TikTok, although so far the methodology of any ban is unclear.

It could mean stopping app stores from distributing downloads. It could mean forcing the sale of TikTok to a domestic company. The latest idea surfaced Wednesday from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States: force Chinese owners to divest their shares in TikTok. But according to experts, none of these approaches would do away with the app itself. And it beggars the imagination to think that the government would demand that everyone with TikTok on their phones simply stop using it.

Underpinning the regulatory zeal is the presumption that the Chinese-owned company ByteDance, which owns TikTok, would supply user data to the Chinese government — or is already doing so. U.S. and European officials have cited national security risks, but so far, as Greene points out, the specifics of that risk have been kept from the public. So we don’t know what the Chinese might be looking for or would get from users’ accounts. Greene and other First Amendment champions are quick to point out that the U.S. government must show a compelling interest to limit free speech as enjoyed by TikTok users, whether they are posting videos of their favorite Friday night outfits or engaging in political advocacy.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Grid: Let’s assume that TikTok goes away. Beyond the First Amendment concerns, what do you feel would be lost in terms of users’ rights and the whole cultural experience that it is brought to the country, particularly young people?

David Greene: TikTok is a major social influence at this particular moment. So its loss would be significant. I’m not saying we would never recover; it hardly existed a few years ago. It’s used by students. It’s used by journalists, especially student journalists, quite broadly. It has academic uses. So it has very quickly become very embedded in our society.

G: Its so-called influencers can drive trends and commerce. TikTok content can be both serious and frivolous. User videos show everything from cute chipmunks, to gum-smacking and lip-syncing teens, to kids who change their outfits five times in one brief video. Beyond that, how would cultural exchange suffer?

DG: Any communications tool that allows people to reach a broad audience around the world, with very little technical skill and very little financial investment, is going to have an impact. There is also a great thirst for cultural exchange — for organizing, for advocacy, around rights and around interests, or efforts at democratizing. So as we’ve seen with every social media platform that gains wide acceptance, these are very beneficial uses and effects that you would expect with people who very easily communicate and spread their ideas and identify community around the world.

G: Let’s say the Chinese are hoovering up all this stuff. What is the value to anybody? Or is it a matter of getting embedded data that we don’t even know about?

DG: Well, we don’t know what the data will be useful for. But it could be a lot of things: People’s social media habits tell a lot about their interests, and who they associate with, what things they’re likely to buy, what things are likely to catch their attention — all of which can be beneficial for companies in terms of directing advertising and finding people were also recommending other content. And you can see how that could be useful to foreign actors, especially if they were trying to influence public opinion and want to make sure that certain people receive certain messages.

G: But TikTok users and other social media users are voluntarily giving this information away. So should the government do more regulation to prevent data mining by all social media companies?

DG: I don’t want to downplay the importance of data privacy with respect to governance. Privacy is a human right, and people have a right to autonomy over their private information. I take that part of it very seriously. That being said, each person also has the role of threat modeling; they can determine to what extent, if they have enough knowledge about how their data is used, whether the threat that using the app poses is something that’s acceptable for them. For many, many people, it might be a completely reasonable decision to say, you know, “I understand that my data is being sucked up and it may end up in the hands of the Chinese government — or might end at the hands of other governments.” Others would say, “I don’t want to see it happen.”

The important thing is giving them the autonomy to make that choice. And that’s why if the government is really concerned about this, it should look at data privacy more broadly and enact more comprehensive data-privacy regulation that would restrict how all companies, not just TikTok, collect and retain and use user data. And so far, in Congress there seems to be bipartisan support for banning TikTok. And then not a lot of support for that type of comprehensive data privacy regulation

G: How could TikTok be effectively “banned”?

DG: I think the answer is, it depends on what the ban is. But if there were a total ban — one of the things commonly discussed is banning the app stores from selling the app — I think that would be making it less safe for users to use than more safe. One thing is that apps automatically set updates; if there are user privacy and data privacy vulnerabilities in the app, the company would correct that. Users who already had it on their devices get those updates.

The second thing that pretty likely happens is called using the “side door.” People will just find a way to install it from a website or otherwise not through the app store. And then you get the same problem that if there are security updates, they won’t automatically get to the phones of those people. So you end up with a less-secure service, not a more-secure service. Another thing that could happen is just make it illegal to possess it. And I certainly don’t see arresting people who have TikTok on their phone.

G: What else is possible?

DG: One other thing would be to force the sale of the company to U.S. interests. That doesn’t necessarily solve data privacy problems, either, although maybe conceivably, it would address issues about closed or open channels with the Chinese government. It could potentially close that. But it doesn’t actually mean that you’re denying the Chinese government access to user data. So it’s very hard to see what a ban contributes. And obviously, when you’re forcing a sale, that raises a lot of other issues. So it is hard to see exactly how you are putting in a ban.

G: I was talking to another First Amendment lawyer who said, roughly, this is all a publicity stunt by politicians. Would you agree with that?

DG: You know, I don’t guess what people’s motives are for doing it. The way I see this is that the First Amendment does require that if you’re going to say that U.S. people can’t communicate with each other in a certain way, then that restriction, no matter what form it takes — if it’s a ban on the app stores or making it illegal for the company to operate or a decision by Congress that they need to divest from foreign ownership — whatever form it takes, that decision is going to have to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny. But no matter what level of scrutiny, the government is going to have to show that there’s a real problem that they are trying to address and that this is an appropriately narrow approach. It has to be a real problem and not just be a suspicion or concern. Is this just political theater or is it xenophobia against all things China? Is it to score political points? We have to know what the basis for the restriction is.

G: One congressman described TikTok as a weather balloon into your phone. In other words, spyware.

DG: We don’t know, right? We as American consumers don’t know. Congress may know; they get a lot more information about spying and national security things. But you would think if they do know something they’d actually tell us instead of just dancing around it. But anyway, we do know there’s a pretty legitimate concern for not just TikTok but the way all companies collect user data, and share it both among each other and in commerce, as well as it being available to governments. And this is a serious concern. There are a lot of things that you point to — that a lot of social media apps and things we put on our phones could look like spy balloons.

G: The primary point people often jump on is the First Amendment concern, like you said, restricting speech of Americans. And you said there’s a strict scrutiny of that. So how does that get resolved in a court?

DG: Presumably, what would happen is that TikTok itself or users would sue to invalidate the law. And some of these laws aren’t specific to TikTok — for example the Restrict Act [the “Restricting the Emergence of Security Threats that Risk Information and Communications Technology Act”] creates a process that’s not limited to TikTok. But whoever is subject to the law would come in and sue. It’s true that what they could come in and say is, “Look, we have a really, really serious important governmental interest.” They could say, “Look, there’s a real interest, but we can’t explain in open court because of national security concerns.” They will likely be able to then submit their recommendation to the judge. So the judge can see it even if other parties don’t get it or the general public.

G: Do you use TikTok?

DG: I haven’t actually been on TikTok myself. I don’t have an account. I’ve seen TikTok videos posted in other places. There’s a lot of things that are funny. There are things that are very political. There are some things I think are stupid and uninteresting to me. As far as I can tell, it has the full range of content.

G: How old are you?

DG: Fifty-eight. But I also want to say the trend with a lot of technology in general is that young people tend to adopt it and drive it into popularity. My choice not to download the app — I don’t know how much has to do with my age; I certainly know plenty of people my age and older than me who are on TikTok. It’s just my personal choice to limit the social media that I spend time on.

G: So once the olds start using it, maybe it will just go away?

DG: If they always see “my parents are on it, my grandparents, my third-grade teacher’s on it,” they stop using it — or at least stop using it in the way they did before — and they find a platform where their peers are on it and people who they don’t mind sharing different information with. That’s the trend we’ve seen with many services.

Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.

grid.news · by Richard Leiby

12. The West Can't Afford Hubris About Russia's War in Ukraine

Hubris brings failure to all policy and strategy.

Excerpts:

We should derive comfort from the fact that in many regions of the world, while large minorities proclaim hostility to the West, majorities remain supportive. America, more than any other country, is where a large part of the earth’s people say they would like to live, if not in their own birthplaces.

It is also cause for celebration that the alliance of western democracies in support of Ukraine has held together so well through the past year and shows no sign of fragmenting now. Our citizens see Russia for what it is — an embittered ex-Great Power, that offers to the world only oil, gas and extreme violence.

It might help our politics, however, to acknowledge how many others resist entanglement in our crusade. In the new world order that Lavrov believes to be evolving, the autocracies and democracies pit themselves against each other as adversaries. But many nations in between are determined to remain neutral, both from self-interest and skepticism about absolute virtue.

The West Can't Afford Hubris About Russia's War in Ukraine

Western nations might fare better in foreign policy if we tried harder to understand why many don’t support our campaign for Ukraine’s freedom.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-03-19/the-west-can-t-afford-to-hubris-about-russia-s-war-in-ukraine?sref=hhjZtX76

ByMax Hastings

March 19, 2023 at 3:00 AM EDT

A military friend of mine recently visited a relatively honestly governed African state. He asked its president why he does not support the West on Ukraine. His host answered: “I can’t see what’s different between what Russia is doing there and what the West did in Iraq.”

We could suggest responses to that, starting with an assertion of American good intentions in Iraq — the desire to make its people free, rather than to enslave them as Russia seeks to do with Ukraine. In the eyes of much of the world, however, such stuff lacks conviction. Yes, 141 states supported last month’s UN vote condemning Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. But 85% of the world’s population do not participate in the Western sanctions imposed on Moscow, which still leak prodigiously.

The West Can't Afford Hubris About Russia's War in Ukraine

Western nations might fare better in foreign policy if we tried harder to understand why many don’t support our campaign for Ukraine’s freedom.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-03-19/the-west-can-t-afford-to-hubris-about-russia-s-war-in-ukraine?sref=hhjZtX76

ByMax Hastings

March 19, 2023 at 3:00 AM EDT

America Is Still Reeling from The Consequences of The Iraq War

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · March 19, 2023

The United States and a coalition of allies invaded Iraq twenty years ago this week. Although the war (mostly) ended several years ago, memory of the conflict, its preparation, and its aftermath continue to color (and to some degree poison) American politics.

It’s worthwhile to compare and contrast the Iraq experience with the immediately previous example of a catastrophically disastrous American military intervention, the Vietnam War. The war on Iraq was deeply consequential for American politics, arguably more consequential than the war in Southeast Asia.

America Today

To be sure, the Iraq War did not inflict the same kind of physical and demographic damage to the United States as the conflict in Vietnam. The death toll of the war was a fraction of that of the Vietnam War, although the overall casualty totals are somewhat closer because of advances in medical technology, protective equipment, and tactical doctrine. In terms of damage to equipment and the material foundation of the US military, the Iraq War was also less devastating than the war in Vietnam.

But politically the Iraq War was central to the elections of 2004, 2008, and even 2016. In 2004 George W. Bush defeated John Kerry on a strongly pro-war platform, with Kerry arguing for a negotiated, staged withdrawal of US forces. In 2008 the Iraq War was again the centerpiece of the campaign, with Barack Obama touting anti-Iraq War credentials against a hawkish John McCain. Iraq took a backseat in the 2012 election although it again gained salience with the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

In 2016, Donald Trump used his ambiguous record on the war to defeat hawkish candidates in the GOP primary, then turned that argument against Hillary Clinton, one of the most hawkish members of the Democratic Party. Joe Biden slow-motion repudiated his support of the Iraq War between 2005 and 2020, and the issue had largely lost salience by the 2020 election.

Still, the contrast with the Vietnam War here is extraordinary; in 1980 the United States elected an extremely hawkish President who had strongly advocated participation in and the escalation of the Vietnam War. Running on a pro-Iraq War platform today would be considered suicidal in either party.

More broadly, the Iraq War contributed to a general loss of faith in the institutions of US governance. The Bush administration clearly misled the country as to the strength of evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and to the threat that such weapons would pose. In fairness this is difficult to parse, because there are many sources of this loss of faith, some of them (Watergate, the Vietnam War, Iran-Contra) preceding Iraq by decades.

The 2008 Financial Crisis also dealt a devastating blow to public confidence in America’s political and economic elite. Nevertheless, the claim that Bush lied and people died remains a potent rejoinder on both the right and the left to the idea that government can be trusted.

The Iraq War spurred opposition within the United States, although this opposition never reached the size and intensity of opposition to the Vietnam War, perhaps because the Democratic Party itself shifted to an anti-war position by 2006. However, the war had a big impact on anti-system politics on both the right and the left. On the nominal left, critique of the war blossomed into a general critique of American capitalism, represented in part by the Occupy Wall Street movement (taking its name from how the government and media characterized the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan).

On the right the Iraq War helped catalyze (if it did not cause) a shift against the internationalist, hawkish, and free market proclivities of the Republican Party, inciting a fight that continues to this very day in the GOP. The Iraq War was not the only cause of this shift; the Financial Crisis and the global pandemic also contributed. Perhaps because of the lack of conscription, the Iraq War did not cause the same kind of collapse in esteem for the military as its Southeast Asian predecessor.

Culturally, the Iraq War has not come close to having the footprint of the Vietnam conflict. Vietnam movies began to win Academy Awards as early as 1978, when Deer Hunter and Coming Home took very different approaches to the war. These were followed over the next decade by such monumental films as Apocalypse Now, Platoon, and Full Metal Jacket. The Iraq War has not received anything close to the same treatment; Oscar winner The Hurt Locker is now lightly regarded and rarely watched, with 2014’s American Sniper receiving much the same treatment. The fact that far fewer people served in Iraq than served in Vietnam may explain the diminished degree of cultural relevance.

The Iraq War Aftermath

Arguably, the Iraq War has left fewer scars on American politics than the war in Southeast Asia; the polarization of American society today still holds not a candle to the violent disruption the US experienced in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Americans are still in Iraq today, staying only with the grudging compliance of the Iraqi government and with no serious political engagement from the American public.

The idea that the United States might willingly do something like the Iraq War, involving the conquest of a distant country and the reconstruction of its political institutions, seems altogether absurd. That said, in the 1980s and 1990s it seemed absurd that the United States might once again undertake a war similar to the one it conducted in Vietnam.

Author Expertise and Biography

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · March 19, 2023

14. Joint Concept for Competing: The Best Way for the Pentagon to 'Compete' with China?

Another useful critique of the JCC to complement the recent one from Anthnoy Cordesman.

A question some of us are wondering is who is the champion of the JCC that will make the services institutionalize, internationalize, and operationalize it?

And the second question (because the JCC correctly notes that competition goes well beyond the military and that there has to be an interagency approach to competing) who is the champion to dirce integration of the JCC within what interagency and beyond - whole of government and whole of society?

Excerpts:

Strategic assessment sounds rather sterile and bureaucratic. Officialdom needs to go beyond it and instill a competitive culture in the armed services. Everything lies downstream of culture. Get that right and the rest will follow. Every soldier, sailor, aviator, and marine is an implement of U.S. foreign policy, especially in a cumulative endeavor like strategic competition. Service folk need to grok that reality. Once they embrace the new normal an enterprising culture will take hold, and efforts to achieve competitive advantage will prosper.

Expanding the competitive mindset, then, is about more than knowledge. It’s about drive and determination, and thus about attitude. Carl von Clausewitz proclaims that an excellent military leader is possessed of an “inward eye” able to peer through the fog of human competition and discern what to do, and the “inward fire” to inspire others to see a martial undertaking through to its conclusion under often-frightful circumstances.

Yep. Let’s get our game face on.

Joint Concept for Competing: The Best Way for the Pentagon to 'Compete' with China?

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · March 19, 2023

The framework seems sound; now let’s see what substance the Pentagon and Biden administration hang on it. Last month the Joint Chiefs of Staff published a directive entitled Joint Concept for Competing, aimed at defining strategic competition and explaining how the U.S. armed forces will go about it. But because the concept’s framers define it as “adversary agnostic,” it’s hard to judge how commanders and their political masters will put it into effect at particular places and times.

Presumably a family of documents tailored to specific competitors and theaters will follow. One hopes so. By itself the Joint Concept for Competing is on the abstract and vague side. Strategy accomplishes little if ripped out of its geographic, political, and social context. And of course there’s the opponent. The opponent is not a potted plant. It is a living, thinking, impassioned competitor with its own interests, methods, and desire to win. Competition is a collision of living forces.

With those preliminaries aside, there is much goodness here. Strategic competition seems to be a curious beast. Competitors play for high stakes. Sometimes a competitor even hopes to bring about its opponent’s downfall, meaning it entertains what strategists call “unlimited” aims. For the most part, though, rivals seem to see averting hot war between them as the paramount goal. So they keep the competition beneath the threshold of armed conflict, consciously limiting the means they apply to a struggle for strategic advantage.

This is warlike strategy without the war.

Capping the means put into competing means settling for a drawn-out struggle. The Joint Concept for Competing explicitly avows that it will take fifteen to twenty years to shift the competitive balance with major antagonists. That’s doubly true in the case of the U.S.-China strategic competition. After all, America is playing from behind vis-à-vis Communist China. China resolved to make itself Asia’s dominant power back during the 1990s, when the United States was partially disarming following the Cold War and Americans were telling one another geopolitics was no more.

Beijing was a first mover in the competition; Washington is a late joiner.

Admiral J. C. Wylie would nod knowingly. In his parlance there are no “sequential” campaigns in peacetime that rumble step by step toward decisive victory. Strategic competition is what Wylie calls a “cumulative” mode of international interaction. It’s a scattershot mode of competition in which adversaries constantly take individual actions that may not be connected in time or space, in hopes of amassing a competitive advantage. Small gains add up. Competitors strive to make themselves strong at home and rally others to their cause, all while enfeebling their rival and loosening its alliances.

Cumulative undertakings are characteristically long, they seldom yield decisive or clear-cut results, and thus they’re often frustrating. In a sense strategic competition is virtual war. The contestant that convinces its opponent and third parties it would prevail should open war break out “wins” in peacetime competition. After all, people love a winner. But since there are no battles or engagements in peacetime, it’s possible for a perceived loser to change its fortunes for the better, over time, in the war for perceptions.

The Joint Concept for Competing is worth your time, but it leaves one huge question open and underwhelms in some respects. The open question is this: the concept’s drafters repeatedly—almost incessantly—remind readers that the Pentagon will usually be the “supporting” rather than the “supported” agency in U.S. strategic competition. That means the armed forces will be an enabler rather than the main policy implement for Washington.

That being the case, one wonders whether there’s a parallel effort underway within the administration—say, at the White House’s National Security Council (NSC)—to compile a parent, whole-of-government concept for competing. During the early Cold War the council formulated such a concept to govern competitive efforts against the Soviet Union and its allies. Is there an an NSC-68 in the making for competition with China, Russia, and other denizens of the hive of scum and villainy? If not, it’s unclear who will be orchestrating the use of the policy implements available to the administration.

One underwhelming aspect of the concept could prove critical. The directive vows to “expand the competitive mindset,” and that is essential. But as it turns out, the regards expanding the competitive mindset as “strategic assessment of the competitive environment.” In other words, it means fathoming the setting where the competition will play out. Broadening our perspective on the competitive space is necessary but insufficient.

Strategic assessment sounds rather sterile and bureaucratic. Officialdom needs to go beyond it and instill a competitive culture in the armed services. Everything lies downstream of culture. Get that right and the rest will follow. Every soldier, sailor, aviator, and marine is an implement of U.S. foreign policy, especially in a cumulative endeavor like strategic competition. Service folk need to grok that reality. Once they embrace the new normal an enterprising culture will take hold, and efforts to achieve competitive advantage will prosper.

Expanding the competitive mindset, then, is about more than knowledge. It’s about drive and determination, and thus about attitude. Carl von Clausewitz proclaims that an excellent military leader is possessed of an “inward eye” able to peer through the fog of human competition and discern what to do, and the “inward fire” to inspire others to see a martial undertaking through to its conclusion under often-frightful circumstances.

Yep. Let’s get our game face on.

A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · March 19, 2023

15. How the Aukus pact could cripple Xi Jinping’s imperial dreams

How the Aukus pact could cripple Xi Jinping’s imperial dreams

British-designed submarines threaten to destroy China's ambitions of global domination

The Telegraph · by Lewis Page

In sunny San Diego last Monday, Anthony Albanese, Rishi Sunak and Joe Biden shook hands on the Australia-UK-US (Aukus) deal.

Often reported as if it were simply a big industrial deal to equip Australia with nuclear submarines, it is in fact far more strategic.

Aukus represents a major step towards limiting China’s ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region, as Beijing increasingly turns its attention beyond its borders.

Why is China looking out to sea?

At heart, it is a matter of both strategic importance and national pride. Beijing sees control of the waters around it as crucial to maintaining its sovereignty and economic strength.

The West, however, fears that growing naval strength is part of a long term plan for China to invade Taiwan, an ambition that would hand Beijing potentially devastating economic leverage.

China's path to global domination

To understand China’s growing focus on the seas that border it to the east, look first at its demographics and economy.

China is a gigantic nation with 1.4 billion people, more than any other on Earth, and a likewise gigantic $18 trillion industrial economy which is only outmatched by one other: the USA.

However, China does not have anything like sufficient energy supplies to run that economy, nor enough home grown food to feed its people. Vital imports of both come by sea.

Prime Minister Rishi Sunak signed the Aukus security pact with Joe Biden and Australian PM Anthony Albanese Credit: Leon Neal/Pool via AP

The Middle Kingdom is powered overwhelmingly by coal (55pc of primary consumption), oil (19pc) and gas (9pc). China has to import half of its gas and more than half of its oil. Even though it is a gigantic coal producer, China also has the largest coal imports in the world.

The great bulk of the coal comes from Indonesia and Australia; the oil from many places, but primarily the Middle East. A third of the gas comes by pipeline from elsewhere in Asia, but the rest is in LNG tankers that cross the sea.

Even China’s own production is often offshore: the Bohai oil field, China’s biggest, is in the Yellow Sea.

Some people suggest that oil and gas fields might be a key issue in the South China Sea, where China has been increasingly aggressive, but in truth there aren’t enough resources there to seriously interest Beijing.

That doesn’t mean China is uninterested in the stretch; far from it. Control of the South China Sea is of great strategic importance.

Supertankers carrying millions of barrels of crude oil move into the Sea through the Singapore Strait every day, carrying vital supplies not only to China but onwards to the similarly energy-hungry industries of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

It’s a similar picture with LNG gas tankers and Australian and Indonesian coal shipments.

Australia is one of China’s most important trading partners, not just for fuel but for food too.

Despite China’s vast size and tracts of fertile land, it has one of the lowest amounts of arable land per head of population in the world.

South China Sea – Days patrolled by the China Coast Guard in 2022

Australia, by contrast, has the world’s highest area of arable land per head of population. It produces more than three times as much wheat as it consumes, much of which is exported to China.

Demand for meat has also soared in China in recent decades. Australia produces a lot of beef, a fact that has not gone unnoticed.

In 2015 and 2016, Chinese firms attempted to buy Australia’s largest cattle business, Kidman and Co, which owns 2.5 percent of the total Australian land area: about the same area as South Korea. The Australian government nixed those plans, but even so China remains the second-biggest foreign landowner in Australia (the first and third are the UK and US.)

China is also heavily dependent on Australian iron ore to supply all its mighty heavy industry and construction.

Indeed, iron ore may be an issue on which Australia holds the whip hand. Not only does Australia supply 60pc of China’s massive iron ore requirement, Australia has the largest global supply of the metal at present.

This picture may change – for instance a massive China-backed iron ore project in Guinea, on Africa’s west coast, may now be lumbering forward after many years mired in corruption scandals – but this will take time.

For now, China relies on Australia but it is a somewhat uneasy trading relationship, one in which the power balance is constantly being measured.

War threatens microchip crisis

Elsewhere, across the Yellow Sea lies South Korea, another important global manufacturing powerhouse, and beyond that Japan.

And of course to the south, the potential flashpoint: the Switzerland-sized island of Taiwan, just 80 miles across the water from the Chinese mainland.

Taiwan is where the old Republic of China (ROC) government fled to in 1949 after the rise of the communist People’s Republic. Beijing refuses to acknowledge Taiwan’s independence, but it is a practical fact.

Taiwan is nowadays a tremendously important place. This is primarily because of its huge semiconductor industry.

In money terms only 20pc of the global chipmaking industry is in Taiwan, but this takes no account of the decoupling that has taken place between chip design and manufacture.

China semiconductor

Taiwan is far and away the world leader in actual fabrication of semiconductors. It makes around 50pc of the global supply, no matter that the lucrative design work may well have been done somewhere else – quite likely in the UK, given the popularity of designs from Cambridge-based Arm.

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is the world’s biggest player in chip foundries and makes huge numbers of Arm chips, to the great benefit of the UK economy (the other world foundry giant is Samsung of Korea: again, a short sea trip from China.)

Taiwan is particularly important to the People’s Republic. Much as everyone has grown accustomed to seeing “made in China” stamped on electronic goods, the People’s Republic cannot make the chips inside the hardware.

It’s generally estimated that China has to import 80pc of the chips it needs. Even Chinese factories that do make chips import the machinery needed for manufacturing.

Some observers have gone so far as to say there is a “Silicon Shield” in place: China would not dare to invade Taiwan in case the vital chip factories were damaged or destroyed, thus crippling China’s own lucrative manufacturing.

That argument has not been heard so much lately, especially since the US placed a fairly damaging stranglehold on chip supplies to China as part of the ongoing trade war. The US has done this by insisting that anyone using US technologies cannot do business with Chinese firms.

The effect is often felt in places like Taiwan and Korea, where a chip factory is prevented from selling US-designed chips, or chips made using US machinery, to China.

It would seem that Xi Jinping may be thinking of seizing the means of production intact. Even if an invasion does damage TSMC’s output, this would hurt the West at least as much as China. The semiconductor supply crisis we have seen from 2020 onwards would be minor by comparison.

A battle for democracy

Vladimir Putin’s aggression in Ukraine has broken the taboo and made it clear that invasion is an option.

Fear of economic disruption from any invasion of Taiwan is one reason for the Aukus pact: a good, if selfish, reason.

Yet there is also a moral issue: democracy must be defended.

Taiwan started out as a one-party totalitarian state like the People’s Republic, but in the 1980s a transition to democracy began, with elections and opposition parties.

In 2016 the opposition finally won control of the legislature from the incumbent KMT party. This, and judicial reform, caused analysts at The Economist to upgrade Taiwan in their grading system from a “flawed democracy” to a “full democracy”.

Putin's destructive invasion of Ukraine has stoked fears that China may follow the same path and invade Taiwan Credit: Alexei Druzhinin, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP,

Ironically they dropped the USA from “full” to “flawed” the same year. Meanwhile, the UK and Australia are both “full democracies” like Taiwan. The People’s Republic is “Authoritarian”, the lowest possible grade democracy-wise.

Two realms - democracy and authoritarianism - are clearly defined. Neither side will tolerate incursion into the other.

In simple terms, Taiwan and Aukus are the good guys, if occasionally flawed. Xi Jinping’s regime – though not the Chinese people themselves – are the bad guys.

It’s worth being clear on that, as there is often a fatal temptation to make friends with the People’s Republic for the purpose of doing business with China: and not just in Taiwan or Australia either.

If China should attempt to invade Taiwan, this would be something every bit as worthy of fighting against as Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, perhaps even more so given the vital importance to Britain of Taiwanese semiconductors. Aukus should stand ready to repel a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Against today’s background of war in Ukraine and sabre rattling in Beijing, the Aukus deal might seem a little slow-moving. The central element of it, the nuclear-powered submarines for the Australian navy, will not even start to arrive until the 2030s.

But the truth is that Beijing, despite its posturing, will not be ready to invade Taiwan until then – if so soon. Right now, for instance, it’s hard to imagine any invasion scenario which would not see Australia cut off supplies of iron ore: that on its own would be a body blow for China.

It would hurt Australia too, but much of the pain would be passed on to the largely overseas owners of Australian iron mines. In this context it’s pleasing to note that the largest single shareholder in Rio Tinto, biggest mining operator in Australia, is actually the Chinese government.

Are Xi's forces ready for war?

Even if Xi doesn’t care about Australian ore, or coal or wheat or beef either, China would need to be able to move troops across the Taiwan Strait safely. This would require at least partial control of the sea and the sky above it.

This is unlikely to be a matter of warships, at least in the Strait itself, and at first it may not be a matter of aircraft either. Both the People’s Republic and Taiwan have substantial armouries of long-ranging missiles.

Taiwan has the capacity to resist a Chinese invasion thanks to its huge supply of cruise missiles and highly advanced military Credit: Shioro Lee/Taiwan Presidential Office

To give just one example, as far back as 2008 Taiwan was putting its own Hsiung Feng 2E cruise missiles into sustained production. HF-2Es can strike targets hundreds of miles into mainland China, and Taiwan has at least hundreds – possibly more than a thousand – of them.

The new Yun Feng supersonic cruise missile is probably operational in small numbers by this point: it could hit targets across most of China’s developed regions, including Beijing. Taiwan also has hundreds of anti-shipping missiles threatening the Strait.

Not many countries can produce this kind of high-tech weaponry themselves: but Taiwan, as we have seen, is in some respects more advanced than leading Western nations. Its missiles probably work just as well as theirs.

Any invasion campaign would likely commence with a massive missile bombardment, with Beijing seeking to knock out Taiwan’s missiles and air bases.

However, the bulk of Taiwan’s weapons are mounted on mobile launchers which are kept parked in hardened facilities. This would be no simple matter.

Are Xi’s forces truly ready for this sort of thing?

The People’s Republic has put its armed services through many reorganisations and modernisations over the decades, transforming them from the enormous peasant army of the early days.

But it was only in 2015 that the air force and navy stopped being subordinate departments of the army: Western analysts still tend to speak of the People’s Liberation Army (Navy), Plan, and the People’s Liberation Army (Air Force), Plaaf.

The communist structure has only recently started to seriously get its head around the idea that a huge land war against Russia or Vietnam is not the primary scenario.

China under Xi - military spending

Shortly after the military shake-up, which acknowledged the importance of sea and air power, a further change saw the Chinese heavy missile force become a branch in its own right, like the new independent navy and air force. This is the PLA Rocket Force, or Plarf.

Plarf controls China’s small force of land-based intercontinental nuclear missiles. More to the point for invading Taiwan, it also has around 2,000 conventionally armed weapons: not so many as to offer a really crushing superiority over the Taiwanese arsenal, especially as many are based on old Soviet technology.

It seems fairly unlikely that today’s Plarf alone will be able to fully suppress Taiwan’s mobile ship-killer batteries and make a crossing of the Strait practical.

China's air force will need to play its part here. Will it be able to win control of the skies above Taiwan and the Strait, as Russia’s air force has not been able to above Ukraine?

On paper it should be able to, with almost 3,000 combat aircraft against Taiwan’s 470-odd. A dozen or two of these are the vaunted Chengdu J-20s, claimed to be a genuine fifth-generation stealth fighter like those of America. There are larger numbers of supposedly dangerous fourth-gen Russian Sukhois and Chinese licence- built versions of them.

Far too many of China’s planes, though, are licence-built Mig-21s: 1950s technology. China’s air force, then, mostly has no better equipment than Russia’s and often has worse.

Aukus could tip the balance of power

It seems likely that, as with Russia, China’s air force is not yet capable of complex combined-air-ops fighting of the sort that has let US-led alliances to dominate the skies above Iraq and Libya.

It was only in 2019 that the Plaaf started to get serious about advanced pilot training, setting up dedicated Top Gun-style academy units rather than carrying out all operational training in front line squadrons. The Plaaf itself says its current transformation will not be complete until 2035.

Taiwan’s air force is a lot, lot better than Ukraine’s. It has a mixed force of decent US-supplied F-16 Falcons and indigenous Ching Kuo jets and proper US-supplied radar planes. It has a force of US-supplied maritime surveillance P-3s, a vital capability for an island nation.

Submarine deployment lanes

Many of these planes are kept in largely invulnerable bases dug into the sides of mountains: it will be very hard to knock them out on the ground. China may well damage air base runways, but runways are easy to repair quickly and all military air bases have specialist teams dedicated to that job.

Taiwan also has hundreds of high-end US Patriot surface-to-air missiles, which would take a fearsome toll of Plaaf aircraft and might even knock down inbound Chinese ballistic missiles. Then there are many hundreds more American Sparrows, not as advanced but still very dangerous.

If Russia couldn’t dominate Ukrainian skies, it’s very clear that China has little chance of dominating Taiwanese ones: not yet, anyway. It’s very unlikely that China would be able to make the Strait safe enough to mount an amphibious crossing – today. And this is before we even consider US intervention.

That’s why Aukus is all about the future. The day may very well come in the 2030s when China’s missile and air forces will be strong enough to reach out and dominate Taiwan and the seas around it. China may well establish its own iron mines in Africa and a blue-water navy able not only to take control of the South China Sea but the waters around Korea, Japan and even Australia.

But by then, there will be a new base at Perth with Aukus nuclear-propelled submarines operating from it.

Nuclear propulsion is critical. Conventionally powered submarines are almost useless if radar-equipped enemies are operating against them. Conventional subs must run on the surface to move at any speed, but this means they are easily detected and sunk.

Standard diesel-electric subs must extend “snort” air-intake masts above the surface to cover any distance while submerged. This slows them down even more and makes them almost as easily detected as if they hadn’t bothered to go under.

There are various “air independent” conventional propulsion options which offer some fully submerged range, but they too mean very slow travel and troublesome topping up with exotic fuels after any prolonged use.

First-rank navies don’t bother with conventional subs: in the age of radar they are of very limited usefulness.

The nuclear-powered Aukus subs will be able to avoid detection by conventional radar Credit: BAE/PA

A nuclear sub is a completely different beast. It can stay fully submerged for months, going as fast as a speedy surface ship the whole time.

The Aukus nuclear subs of the future will be a terrible problem for the possible advanced Plan and Plaaf of the future. To be safe from them, any Chinese naval task force will need to move inside an expensive, advanced bubble of anti-submarine escorts and aircraft: even in China’s own waters, let alone on blue-water operations.

Such a bubble would need to be extended over the Strait in the event of any Taiwan invasion: yet another huge, expensive capability for the now-faltering Chinese economy to pay for.

Without this support, unseen Aukus subs might suddenly launch weapons from almost any piece of sea at almost any target ashore or afloat, anywhere across the Asia-Pacific region.

Aukus doesn’t totally transform the picture, but it does tip the balance of power in the region back towards the West and its democratic allies in Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.

It will let Australia trade with China from a stronger position, reassured that the possible future blue-water Chinese navy will not have things all its own way.

And Aukus will push the possibility of a Taiwan invasion even further into the future. At any rate, it will be avoided altogether.

The Telegraph · by Lewis Page

16. Gordon Chang: China Is the 'Fuel' Behind Putin's War in Ukraine

Gordon Chang: China Is the 'Fuel' Behind Putin's War in Ukraine

19fortyfive.com · by Gordon Chang · March 19, 2023

What happens when the world’s two most dangerous humans meet?

We are about to find out. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are going to get together for their 40th in-person chat Monday. The conversation, in Moscow, is scheduled to run until Wednesday.

Xi’s timing confirms the closeness to his Russian counterpart. The summit, for one thing, is being held much earlier than expected. The Wall Street Journal on the 21st of last month reported the pair might get together “in April or in early May.”

As it turned out, the announcement of the meeting occurred just hours before the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant for the arrest of the Russian president for the deportation of Ukrainian children. Beijing and Moscow had to know the warrant would be announced soon, so the trip could be China’s way of signaling support for Russia’s alleged war crimes, including genocide, in Ukraine.

During the three-day meeting, Xi and the war criminal suspect—there’s little doubt that Putin is both guilty as charged and the perpetrator of other horrific acts—will undoubtedly issue expressions of support for the other. They are also expected, at least according to Russian media, to sign significant agreements.

There will certainly be discussions about Beijing’s 12-point peace plan, titled “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis,” released February 24. Xi Jinping will undoubtedly press acceptance of his proposal in order to leverage the success of the Iran-Saudi deal Chinese diplomats brokered this month.

China’s Ukraine proposal was “essentially ignored” as the Associated Press put it. And for good reason. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby correctly termed Beijing’s call for an immediate cease-fire a “ratification of Russian conquest.” A halt to the fighting, he said, would allow Russia’s forces to recover “so that they can restart attacks on Ukraine at a time of their choosing.”

China Back Russia in the Ukraine War: The Facts

Observers say that at this time, Ukraine has the advantage on the battlefield. Beijing knows that. Allowing Russia to regroup is not in the interests of anyone but the Russians.

And the Chinese. In reality, Ukraine is a superpower proxy war, and China is backing Russia.

Russia and China know the stakes. Vladimir Putin is obviously all-in on Ukraine, and the Chinese are in full support. It’s apparent, for instance, that China greenlighted the invasion of Ukraine. Russia and China issued their 5,300-word joint statement after Putin met Xi in Beijing on February 4 of last year, just 20 days before Russia’s attack. That’s when they declared the “no-limits” partnership.

“No limits” is not much of an exaggeration. China, with elevated commodity purchases, effectively finances Russia’s war. Furthermore, Beijing has been offering financial services to Russia as America and partners cut Russian banks and institutions off. Beijing is putting diplomats in service of Moscow. Chinese central government and Communist Party media have been amplifying Russian war disinformation.

Moreover, China has been providing lethal assistance. In the opening moments of the war, there is data to suggest China fed location data, obtained from the Chinese-made drones that Ukraine had been operating, to Russia so that it could take out the drone operators.

More recently, there is also evidence to suggest China has been selling drones to Russia’s Wagner Group.

Indeed, Beijing has been supplying urgently needed items. In November, Defense Express, a Ukrainian site, reported that almost every day an An-124 cargo plane ferried military products from China’s Zhengzhou to Russia. The Russian planes turned off their transponders when they departed. The Washington Free Beacon in January reported that the flights carried, among other things, ammunition.

The Biden administration for the longest time refused to acknowledge China’s lethal assistance, saying only that Beijing was contemplating providing it. Now, Washington has had to make an admission. In the middle of this month, according to Kyodo News, the U.S. confirmed the presence of Chinese ammunition littering battlefields in Ukraine.

Now that it’s clear that China’s regime has crossed President Joe Biden’s “red line,” the Chinese leadership is probably worried about what happens next. That could also explain the timing of Xi’s excursion to Moscow.

In any event, Xi and Putin are clearly coordinating policies, dividing the international system into camps and in the process forming the core of a new axis. The war in Ukraine, therefore, looks like the first conflict of a divided world, what some are calling “Cold War 2.”

As Henry Kissinger declared last May to the Financial Times, “We are now living in a totally new era.”

Joe Biden Dithers

In the first phase of that era, China and Russia have grabbed the initiative. President Biden, on the other hand, so far doesn’t know what to do. The free world needs a Reagan, not a Carter. Biden at the moment, resembles Carter.

In broad outline, this time resembles the late 1930s, when the West’s great democracies were in disarray.

China and Russia, on the other hand, are driving events. The Chinese foreign ministry characterized the Xi visit to Moscow as “a trip for friendship.” “It will,” the ministry said, “further deepen mutual trust and mutual understanding between China and Russia and cement the political foundation and public support for the long-standing friendship between the two peoples.”

Xi Jinping and Russian President Putin.

Beijing believes the new era is going to last a long time. What the American president does at this moment, therefore, will affect generations.

Author Expertise and Biography

A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Gordon G. Chang is the author of The Coming Collapse of China and The Great U.S.-China Tech War. Follow him on Twitter @GordonGChang.

19fortyfive.com · by Gordon Chang · March 19, 2023

17. Kremlin already searching for Putin's replacement: Intelligence official

Some wishful thinking here?

Kremlin already searching for Putin's replacement: Intelligence official

Newsweek · by Andrew Stanton · March 18, 2023

The Kremlin is searching for Russian President Vladimir Putin's replacement amid growing dissatisfaction with the Ukraine war, according to a Ukrainian intelligence official.

Putin launched his "special military operation" on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, aiming for a quick victory against the Eastern European country, which at the time was perceived to have a much weaker military. However, Kyiv's stronger-than-expected defense, which has been bolstered by Western military aid, blunted Russian military gains.

After more than a year of combat, Russia's invasion continues to stagnate, with Ukraine retaking thousands of square miles of formerly occupied territory last fall. Fighting remains concentrated in the most eastern part of the country, where Russia's attempt to take control of Bakhmut have slowed in recent days.

Russia has generally stood behind Putin throughout the war, though there have been signs that some individuals have grown weary of it amid mounting losses. The widely-condemned war prompted the West to issue sanctions weakening Moscow's economy and has resulted in the deaths of more than 160,000 Russian troops, according to Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks in a meeting in Moscow on Wednesday. Ukrainian intelligence official Andriy Yusov recently said the Kremlin is searching for Putin’s replacement amid growing dissatisfaction over the Ukraine war. Contributor/Getty Images

Amid growing dissatisfaction, Ukraine now believes the Kremlin is searching for Putin's successor.

Andriy Yusov, a spokesperson for Ukraine's military intelligence directorate, said in recent remarks that the search comes as "the circle around Putin is narrowing." Putin is becoming "more and more toxic," even within Russian borders, according to Yusov.

"Within the Kremlin, there is more and more dissatisfaction with what is happening," Yusov said. "There is an increasingly gloomy understanding of the prospects, specifically the geopolitical catastrophe of the Putin regime. Thus, the search for Putin's successor is already underway."

He added that Putin is no longer involved in selecting his eventual successor. Yusov's remarks were first posted to Twitter on Saturday and translated by Anton Geraschenko, an adviser to the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. Yusov did not name any potential candidates to follow Putin.

Search for Putin's successor is already in progress, and it's not Putin doing it - Andrii Yusov of @DI_Ukraine.

He added that people around Putin are growing increasingly dissatisfied with him and realize the perspectives of the geopolitical catastrophe. pic.twitter.com/RfGnEpj7aX

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) March 18, 2023

Russia has not publicly commented on Yusov's remarks, and it remains unclear whether or not replacing Putin would solve the issues within the Russian military. Some critics have chided Putin for classifying the invasion as a "special military operation" rather than a "war," thus limiting the military's ability to launch a full mobilization.

Experts, however, point to other issues for the floundering invasion, including challenges retaining well-motivated soldiers, particularly amid the cooler winter months, and issues with military leadership.

Questions about Putin's future also come as the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Putin on charges of war crimes on Friday. Although Putin is unlikely to be arrested, the warrant will greatly limit his ability to travel, as most counties recognize ICC sovereignty.

Newsweek reached out to the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry via email for comment.

Newsweek · by Andrew Stanton · March 18, 2023

18. First wave of tech to defend Guam from newer threats due in 2024

What happens in the interim?

First wave of tech to defend Guam from newer threats due in 2024

Defense News · by Jen Judson · March 17, 2023

WASHINGTON — The first wave of defenses designed to counter complex missile threats against Guam will include radars, launchers, interceptors, and a command-and-control system, and they’ll be place on the island next year, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency director said this week.

The MDA asked for more than $800 million in its fiscal 2024 budget request, released Monday, to develop and begin constructing its architecture to defend Guam against a range of threats including ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles. Nearly half of that money would continue the design and development of the architecture.

Another $38.5 million would upgrade the MDA’s Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications program to support Guam’s defense.

The agency is investing in the architecture, but it is also partnered with the Army and Navy. The sea service will provide technology and capability from its Aegis weapon system and has jurisdiction over the land where the assets will be placed.

The Army could not readily provide a top line of its portion of the FY24 funding needed to supply its share of the equipment to Guam, but it will deliver three Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensors, or LTAMDS, as well as an assortment of Mid-Range Capability missile launchers and Indirect Fires Protection Capability launchers, or IFPC, along with the Northrop Grumman-built Integrated Battle Command System designed to connect the right sensors to the right shooters on the battlefield, according to the Army’s budget office.

The Army plans to procure five total LTAMDS in FY24; the other two will be test assets, the Army’s acquisition chief, Doug Bush, said this week.

While the MDA waits for the Army’s capability to arrive, it is adapting the Aegis system to work specifically on the challenging terrain of Guam, Vice Adm. Jon Hill, the agency’s director, said this week. The system will be differ from what is found on an Aegis ship and from the configuration of Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland, he said.

FY24 funding will cover the installation of four high-end, solid-state, mobile AN/TPY-6 radars, which are new sensors that use technology from the Long Range Discrimination Radar in Clear Space Force Base, Alaska, along the periphery of the island. These radars will provide a 360-degree capability to see threats, Hill said, which is a requirement coming straight from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

The agency is grappling with the mechanical engineering required to take radars that would typically be positioned on a deckhouse of a ship or in a big facility like that in Alaska and put them in an erectable trailer so they can be moved around, Hill said March 15 at the McAleese & Associates conference.

MDA is also developing a command suite using Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications system technology that integrates IBCS and Aegis C2 for ballistic and hypersonic missile threat detection and tracking.

While the first stream of capability will get to the island in 2024, Hill said development will continue to evolve as technology becomes available. Hill stressed there will never be an initial operational capability for the architecture because capability will always evolve.

For example, once the MDA fields a hypersonic glide phase interceptor, it will get incorporated into the architecture. That effort is in a very early stage and won’t be delivered until the early 2030s, Hill said. For now, there is a capability to defeat hypersonic missiles in the terminal phase of flight using current radars and U.S. Navy capability.

Tough territory

The agency faces abundant challenges as it begins to build the architecture on Guam.

“The challenge right now is siting,” Hill said. “We have all the sites identified on the island, and today we know which are the Army sites, we know which are the MDA sites. It’s a Navy island.”

But, he said, there are environmental considerations. “When you think about what we have to do for environmental assessments, just to go land this gear, it puts time into the equation. … Guam is a tourist island.”

Clearing the sites is also difficult, including the need to clear bamboo and flatten land, Hill explained. “Guam has a boatload of expended ordnance on it from World War II,” so part of the effort includes digging down to ensure there’s no ordnance buried, he added.

Other challenging considerations include considering the electromagnetic interference that is possible on the island as well as what the effect land radars might have on, for example, air operations, including medevac helicopters coming to and from the area.

The agency has also committed to beautification as part of the installation on Guam. “We’re going to make launchers look beautiful, and we’re going to put big bubbles over the radars to keep them from looking so lethal because it is a tourist area,” Hill said.

The Port of Guam is seen in June 2021. (U.S. Coast Guard)

Banking on the Army

Much of the architecture is also riding on Army capability that is in the development process. The service is close to approving full-rate production for IBCS after years of delay.

The Army’s LTAMDS has also struggled through development and has seen several schedule slips. Raytheon Technologies ran into problems building its first prototypes designed to replace the Patriot air defense radars. The LTAMDS program had to adjust the schedule based on system integration challenges and supply chain issues caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

As of last fall, the service was still aiming to deliver four of them by the end of 2023.

The MRC capability that will be fielded in 2023 has made more progress, and Lockheed Martin delivered the first Typhon launcher to the Army late last year, which uses a Navy MK41 Vertical Launching System that will fire both ground-launched SM-6 missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The Army chose Leidos-owned Dynetics to build IFPC prototypes for an enduring system designed to counter both drone and cruise missile threats in 2021.

At the time of the award to Dynetics, the Army wanted the company to deliver prototypes by the fourth quarter of FY22 and a complete system that can integrate with IBCS by the third quarter of FY23.

Dynetics has been quiet about progress, but according to the FY24 Army budget request, the service plans to deliver IFPC to the first platoon at some point in the year. A production decision for IFPC is also due in FY24, according to FY23 budget documents.

For now, Guam has protection against threats that exist today, Hill said. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system is deployed on the island as well as Patriot systems, which protect against ballistic missile threats. Aegis ships are patrolling the area, but that is not a persistent solution.

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

19. US, Philippines to announce new sites for U.S. military as soon as possible - U.S. official

The Philippines: still a key geostrategic location.

US, Philippines to announce new sites for U.S. military as soon as possible - U.S. official

Reuters · by Karen Lema

BASA AIR BASE, Philippines, March 20 (Reuters) - The United States and Philippines will announce new sites as soon as possible for an expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which gives the Western power access to military bases in the Southeast Asian country.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr last month granted the United States access to four military bases, on top of five existing locations under the 2014 EDCA, which comes amid China's increasing assertiveness towards the South China Sea and self-ruled Taiwan.

Speaking at the Basa Air Base in Manila, one of the existing EDCA sites, visiting U.S. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said the defence agreements between the two countries were "not focused on any particular issue."

EDCA allows U.S. access to Philippine bases for joint training, pre-positioning of equipment and building of facilities such as runways, fuel storage and military housing, but it is not a permanent presence.

While the Philippines has yet to formally identify the sites, a former military chief has publicly said the United States had asked for access to bases in Isabela, Zambales and Cagayan, all on the island of Luzon, facing north towards Taiwan, and on Palawan in the southwest, near the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

Leaders of local governments at the potential EDCA sites have backed the government's decision to allow the United States greater access to the bases, Philippines' defence chief, Carlito Galvez, said in a joint news conference with Kendall.

Galvez and Kendall were leading a groundbreaking ceremony for the rehabilitation of the Basa Air Base's runway.

"Today's event is a physical manifestation of our Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, a key pillar of the U.S.-Philippine alliance," Kendall said in a speech, adding it built on a seven-decade-old Mutual Defense Treaty that applied anywhere in the South China Sea.

"We are at an inflection point in history and our cooperation will help ensure we stay on the path to peace and stability," he added.

The runway rehabilitation is part of $82 million the United States has allocated for infrastructure investments at the existing five EDCA sites.

"Moving forward we hope the U.S will consider more EDCA projects," Galvez said.

Reporting by Karen Lema, Poppy McPherson; Editing by Kanupriya Kapoor, Martin Petty

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Karen Lema

20. Quad 2.0: In latest move against China and Russia, Canada proposes alliance with Japan, South Korea, US

We could have quite a web of interconnected alliances in the Asia Pacific .

Quad 2.0: In latest move against China and Russia, Canada proposes alliance with Japan, South Korea, US

firstpost.com · by Chandan Prakash · March 20, 2023

World

Japan believes the expansion of the existing trilateral mechanism involving the United States and its key Asian allies will help boost ties among countries belonging to the liberal democratic camp in the Pacific Rim region.

March 20, 2023 13:24:56 IST

Representative Image

New Delhi: As part of efforts to counter China and Russia, Canada has proposed creating a quadrilateral cooperation framework with Japan, South Korea and the United States.

Canada conveyed the idea directly to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida when he visited Ottawa in January, The Japan Times quoted sources as saying, adding that it believes the expansion of the existing trilateral mechanism involving the United States and its key Asian allies will help boost ties among countries belonging to the liberal democratic camp in the Pacific Rim region.

U.S. diplomats said Washington favours Ottawa’s plan to deepen cooperation with Tokyo and Seoul, whose bilateral ties have been quickly improving in recent weeks, it said.

In early March, South Korea unveiled a plan to end a long-standing dispute with Japan over wartime labour issues, raising hopes for better ties between the two U.S. allies and broader trilateral collaboration, especially in the area of defence, as North Korea also remains a security challenge.

The proposed move is taken following the Quad partnership of Indo-Pacific democracies formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to China’s growing influence in the region.

Like the Quad countries, Canada wishes to promote universal values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and tackle climate change and other global issues, by working closely with Japan, South Korea and the United States, The Japan Times quoted sources as saying.

Canada, Japan and the United States are members of the Group of Seven. Kishida will host this year’s summit of the group of major democratic economies in May in Hiroshima, with the Japanese government inviting South Korea’s Yoon as a guest to the discussions.

However, Japan has told the Canadian government that it would take time to realize the concept, if at all, according to the sources.

Relations between Canada and China have been frosty since the detention of Huawei Technologies’ chief financial officer in late 2018 in Vancouver on a U.S. warrant for bank fraud, and Beijing’s subsequent arrest of two Canadians on espionage allegations.

Canada announced a new Indo-Pacific strategy in November last year in which it characterized China as an “increasingly disruptive global power.”

China’s expansionist moves in the Indo-Pacific region have propelled in no small measure the tightening embrace between India and Australia. The ties between various anti-China blocs have gathered further momentum to counter the growing concern of Chi9na in the region.

The momentum for rapprochement became more evident after Japan and South Korea agreed to resume regular visits between their leaders and take steps to resolve a trade dispute during a long-awaited summit earlier this month.

Japan’s prime minister called their meeting a “big step” to rebuilding the two nations’ security and economic ties as they try to overcome a century of difficult history.

The summit could revise the strategic map of northeast Asia. The two U.S. allies, who have long often been at odds over their history, are seeking to form a united front, driven by shared concerns about a restive North Korea and a more powerful China.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol both stressed the importance of improved ties as they had opened the summit, hours after a North Korean missile launch and encounters between Japanese and Chinese vessels in disputed waters.

With inputs from agencies.

Read all the Latest News, Trending News, Cricket News, Bollywood News,

India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.

Updated Date: March 20, 2023 13:24:56 IST

World

Man charged with dangerous driving after 'premeditated' killing of two in Canada

Nine other people were injured when suspect Steeve Gagnon drove the vehicle into people walking along a road in Amqui, 650 km (400 miles) northeast of Montreal, on Monday.

World

From Colombia or Haiti, migrants' long road ends in Canada

In a hurry to get into their new country, Haitians, Venezuelans, Colombians and Turks hasten their pace as they step out of a car with their heads down to finally cross the last border of their journey: one separating Canada and the United States, between New York state and Montreal.

World

Two pedestrians in Canada killed, nine injured as truck runs them over

Witnesses told local media a truck hit several people on a sidewalk, then continued for another 400 to 500 meters along the road, striking more people

firstpost.com · by Chandan Prakash · March 20, 2023

21. The Real Risk of the China Select Committee

Excerpts:

The problem with the “who lost China” debate of the 1950s was not that the Senate got the answer wrong, though its misguided attempts at attribution did cause great suffering, but rather that it was a bad question to begin with. China was never the United States’ to lose. It seems possible that today’s congressional China select committee is also asking a misguided question—namely: “Who helped China rise?” But if the committee’s hearings are spent looking for domestic culprits, they will necessarily ignore the fact that those culprits took their cues from several decades of Washington policy that supported China’s growth.

The primary concern here is not that academics will be tried for perjury, as Lattimore was in 1952, but rather that the political climate in Washington will alienate the people whose expertise and connections might help Congress understand the Chinese government and its posture toward the United States. As was the case in the 1950s, it seems likely that in the process of investigating China, Congress could come to know less about the country.

The Real Risk of the China Select Committee

Why alienate the very people whose expertise and connections might help Congress understand the Chinese government?

By Anatol Klass, a doctoral candidate in Chinese history at the University of California, Berkeley and an Ernest May fellow in history and public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School.

Foreign Policy · by Anatol Klass · March 20, 2023

There has been no shortage of think pieces comparing the current trajectory of U.S.-China relations to the Cold War conflict between Washington and Moscow. The historical analogy has become so omnipresent that some have begun to denounce it either as tired or else as dangerous. Yet, the validity of that analogy aside, as a new congressional committee vows to investigate China and root out a pervasive Communist Party conspiracy, another parallel comes to mind: the hearings on Capitol Hill that followed then-leader Mao Zedong’s 1949 victory in the Chinese civil war. During those hearings, academics and foreign-policy experts who had come into contact with the Chinese Communist Party in the decades before 1949 became scapegoats for a historical event far outside their control. Were this scapegoating to happen to China specialists this time around, the consequences for U.S. foreign policy would be serious.

Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, the U.S. Senate held a series of hearings to determine “who lost China.” These hearings attempted to sort out how the United States had failed to prevent a communist takeover in China and who exactly was responsible for the failure. Marking the start of high McCarthyism in American politics, the congressional investigation quickly devolved into a witch hunt for corrupt officials in the United States who had supposedly enabled Mao’s victory by subverting American support for Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Party, the losing side of the civil war.

The stories of these persecuted individuals, particularly scholar Owen Lattimore and U.S. State Department official John Service, are well documented and reasonably well known within the annals of Cold War history. Yet the severity of the U.S. government’s campaign against some of its own leading experts on China has gained less public traction.

In 1953, the U.S. Embassy in Taiwan contacted its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ask whether the Nationalist Chinese government’s secret police had collected any information on Lattimore, Service, and a host of other researchers who had spent time in China before the civil war, most notably Harvard University professor John King Fairbank. (This is according to documents in the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives at Academia Sinica.)

The U.S. State Department was interested in any information on these individuals’ interactions with members of the Chinese Communist Party, particularly if it would demonstrate that they had perjured themselves before Congress. In the name of investigating China, the Senate enlisted the support of a foreign government’s secret police to discredit some of the leading American experts on China and prove that they were untrustworthy because they had firsthand knowledge of the individuals who now ran the Chinese government.

The newly established Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has only held one hearing, and it may still correct course, but its early activities suggest that there is reason to fear that it will fall into these traps from the past, prioritizing political theater over substantive inquiry and inviting testimony from individuals who confirm the members’ hawkish assumptions about China rather than offering nuanced assessments.

Many pundits and researchers who support a strategy of engagement with China have expressed concern that policy initiatives like the China select committee, given its explicitly hawkish agenda, may accelerate the deterioration of U.S.-China relations, antagonize Beijing, and push Washington toward increasingly confrontational stances. Others have warned that the committee’s activities may contribute to the wave of anti-Asian hate that has endangered Asian American communities across the country. And inaugural comments from committee leaders suggest that, as in the 1950s, Congress may focus more on U.S. citizens with professional or personal ties to China than on the Communist Party itself.

On Feb. 28, U.S. Rep. Mike Gallagher opened the first hearing of the committee, which he was appointed chair of, with a warning: “The CCP has found friends on Wall Street, in Fortune 500 C-suites, and on K Street who are ready and willing to oppose efforts to push back. This strategy has worked well in the past and the CCP is confident it will work again. Our task is to ensure that it does not.”

Gallagher’s remarks, delivered in the same Capitol hearing room where a select committee of the previous Congress had investigated the Jan. 6, 2021, riots not two months prior, kicked off a three-hour session on the manifold dangers to the United States posed by the Chinese government, complete with a video montage of human rights abuses and testimony from a series of Trump administration appointees (now fellows at the Hoover Institution).

His rhetoric toward Wall Street and K Street suggests that Gallagher wants to use the committee to investigate so-called friends of the Chinese Communist Party in and from the United States.

Already, the committee has launched an inquiry into the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, scrutinizing the chamber’s chair, Geoffrey Siebengartner, for appearing in a promotional video produced by the Hong Kong government. Siebengartner’s participation in the video may have been ill-advised, but the committee’s letter of inquiry, demanding that he make a statement on the erosion of democratic institutions and civil liberties in the city, will accomplish little. It will only serve to warn other U.S. citizens that they run the risk of censure from their own government when they engage with Chinese counterparts—even when such engagement is their explicit purview.

Indeed, the committee’s letter seems designed to elicit a response from Siebengartner that will estrange him from Hong Kong authorities. Either he can denounce the Hong Kong national security law and incur the wrath of local officials or he can refuse to comply with the China select committee’s inquiry and confirm their suspicions that he is in the pocket of a foreign, hostile government. Siebengartner is being punished for doing his job, albeit clumsily, and the result may well be that his job becomes untenable. One wonders if such an outcome—all sparked by a video that highlights Hong Kong’s legal system alongside its fine dining institutions as reasons for foreign businesses to base operations in the city—is really an American victory in the “strategic competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.”

This historical comparison with the 1950s is not meant as yet another warning against the increasingly hawkish tone of U.S. policy toward China. Whatever one’s personal opinions may be on the shift, the era of engagement is clearly over. Instead, the China select committee must understand that a wide range of nuanced, well-informed views on the Chinese Communist Party will inform better policy, whether it be hawkish or engagement-oriented. The committee may well make progress in investigating the security risks of U.S.-China trade and bilateral investment. Chinese state actors have infiltrated U.S. institutions in the past, and preventing them from doing so in the future will indeed boost American security. But only seeking a narrow range of perspectives and shunning those who have affiliations with China will make those objectives more difficult.

The problem with the “who lost China” debate of the 1950s was not that the Senate got the answer wrong, though its misguided attempts at attribution did cause great suffering, but rather that it was a bad question to begin with. China was never the United States’ to lose. It seems possible that today’s congressional China select committee is also asking a misguided question—namely: “Who helped China rise?” But if the committee’s hearings are spent looking for domestic culprits, they will necessarily ignore the fact that those culprits took their cues from several decades of Washington policy that supported China’s growth.

The primary concern here is not that academics will be tried for perjury, as Lattimore was in 1952, but rather that the political climate in Washington will alienate the people whose expertise and connections might help Congress understand the Chinese government and its posture toward the United States. As was the case in the 1950s, it seems likely that in the process of investigating China, Congress could come to know less about the country.

Foreign Policy · by Anatol Klass · March 20, 2023

22. Is “The Chinese World” the Future? Confucianism and Xi Jinping

Excerpts:

For Xi, Chinese identity goes beyond nationalist and territorial borders and intentions. Xi views the “Chinese blood” of the millions of huaqiao (Chinese citizens residing abroad) and huaren (ethnic Chinese abroad) part of the “great Chinese family”—essential in bolstering the revitalization of the “Chinese Dream.” This dream portrays the “harmony” experienced during China’s dynastic history to convince the region of the benefits of a Pax Sinica in Asia. In fact, during the 19th National Congress, Xi explained that the “Chinese Dream” was meant to be shared by the rest of the international community. Yet while it tries to show its ascent to power is benign, China hides that it is a revisionist power, fermenting authoritarianism abroad and exporting its model for economic development. And it understands that to change the system, it must do so from the periphery, which will allow it to transform Western hegemony.

Back in 2005, China, under then-president Hu Jintao, unveiled the concept of a “harmonious world.” That same year, Chinese philosopher Gan Yang delivered a lecture in Beijing in which he advocated unifying Confucianism, Maoism, and Xiapoing’s reforms, while the philosopher Zhao Tingyang initiated the debate over the concept of tianxia and its application to our contemporary world—the system that allowed dynastic China to harmoniously rule over its local tributaries could thus be expended outwards. The CCP and Chinese intellectuals, in other words, are attempting to justify their own power and present a benevolent image of China.

Yet despite Zhao Tingyang’s objections that tianxia holds no “outsiders,” it is clear that the “Chinese center” uses dynamics of exclusion and inclusion to marginalize others like the West or even periphery nations. While Confucian thought supports the use of force only to restore political and moral order, it promotes a paternalistic diplomacy of a tributary character.

For those wondering what a Chinese international order would look this, this is something to keep in mind.

Is “The Chinese World” the Future? Confucianism and Xi Jinping

To better understand Xi’s grand ambition and vision for a Chinese international order, it is necessary to better understand its philosophical underpinnings.

by Carlo J. V. Caro

The National Interest · by Carlo J. V. Caro · March 19, 2023

When Xi Jinping, now in an unprecedented third term, first came to power back in 2012, he indicated his intention to replace the Western international order with a “Community of Common Destiny.” Backed by China’s tremendous economic growth and political stability, Xi has sought to reorder “chaos” like the Chinese philosopher Confucius attempted more than two thousand years ago. Xi himself frequently alludes to Chinese classical thought in his aim to construct what he believes would be a more “inclusive” and “just” order.

In order to understand Xi’s grand ambition and vision for a Chinese international order, it is necessary to better understand its philosophical underpinnings—especially both Xi’s and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) fixation with Confucian thought. This, in turn, also requires understanding the context through which such came about, necessitating a dive into Chinese history.

The Early Dynasties and the Emergence of Confucius

In ancient times, before the rise of China’s famous dynasties, the central plain of China was inhabited by several tribes who did not share a common leader. According to tradition, even though there was fighting between them, a mechanism existed called shanrang that ensured succession based on moral virtue and behavior rather than blood lineage. Via this, King Yu the Great succeeded Emperor Shun by earning the respect of other tribes. His son Qi established the first dynasty, the Xia. But there was no centralized power during the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties. Instead, these periods were marked by disorder and chaos, due to the multitude of states and their relative autonomy.

It was around this time period that Confucius, whose teachings would mold Chinese civilization and political thinking for millennia, emerged.

Key to understanding Confucian philosophy is its understanding of “heaven”—the source for all humans and the origin of all social values. Chinese heaven is paternalistic, but rather than creating or destroying its purpose is to guarantee order and harmony. Likewise, Confucius did not see humans as isolated, but rather inserted in a hierarchical system that begins with the family, part of a tribe, and was the first step towards the state. The supremacy of the collective interest over the individual is the fundamental characteristic of social order, and what Chinese thought considers its moral superiority.

Confucian society is thus composed of individuals who respect and obey a clear line of authority. Because traditional Chinese society saw the family as the basic unit, Confucius argued that good government should be based on a bond with the family. According to this idea, if the principles that govern a family are applied to the relations between members of society, then the result is a harmonious society.

The Zhou dynasty embarked on a campaign to create and maintain order between the other states. But the Zhou were not the largest of these, leading them to realize that coercive force alone would not be sufficient to become the dominant state. This is what drove the Zhou, drawing from Confucius, to establish tianxia (“all under heaven”), creating an effective system where many independent states recognized the mandate of the “son of heaven.”

In this system, the “son of heaven” grants lords rights over territory, the collection of taxes therein, and the authority to establish their own legal systems in exchange for their obligation to pay tribute and obey him during times of war. The lords recognized the “son of heaven” as the representation of the morality of heaven, therefore superseding the personal connection of feudalism in Europe. The Chinese “mandate of heaven” is thus not divine right, as the European kings enjoyed, but rather the acceptance of the legitimacy of the government for as long as governance is moral and just, and it fulfills its obligations to them.

However, during the second part of the Zhou dynasty, known as the Eastern Zhou dynasty, powerful lords kept the tribute meant for the “son of heaven” and abandoned their titles, effectively regaining independence, leading to the dynasty’s eventual overthrow by King Zhaoxiang of the Qin. His descendant, Qin Shi Huang, conquered the other six states through military means and legalism, establishing the first dynasty to rule over a united China: the Qin.

The Qin dynasty’s preference to obtain the mandate of the “son of heaven” through badao (the way of the hegemon) rather than wangdao (the kingly way to govern), as advised by Mencius, created a struggle between both philosophies in tianxia. Later on, the Han dynasty formally adopted Confucian doctrine and promoted it as the moral foundation for all human conduct, even though there was a great diffusion of Buddhism and Taoism. But it was only until the Song dynasty at the turn of the millennium that Confucian doctrine came to regulate all social, political, and philosophical systems in China.

The Evolution of Tianxia

The fact that tianxia is not based on “nature” but on “relationship” means that one is subjected to another and this relationship is what defines them. The objective of tianxia is the transformation of the “Other.” Historically, all that was alien to Chinese culture was considered yi, or barbarian, and had to undergo a process of sinicization, hua. In fact, China’s ability to adapt itself has allowed it to maintain its identity in the most adverse of circumstances.

It is difficult to ascertain whether the idea of China as an immutable entity from ancient times until today has ever existed. But what is clear is that Confucian doctrine was able to assimilate the dynasties of ethnic minorities which completed their conquests after becoming “Chinese”—the later Chinese dynasties, established by non-Han peoples invading from Mongolia or Manchuria, exemplify this. This point is most significant, as it signals that Confucian doctrine is not merely a system for ethics, but also an essential issue of political legitimacy. Moreover, it can be extended outward. The submission of a state to tianxia allows China to become the center of this structure, transferring over characteristics of its civilization to the rest of the system.

Under tianxia, this Confucian method of thinking about relationships and obligations is applied to the international system, to reflect the idea of a broader family. Tianxia, therefore, places China above any other political, cultural, or military group. This system prioritizes Chinese order, rule, and governance by elites—including over Western notions of liberty, freedom, human rights, and democracy, which would arrive later.

As such, for a long time, the international system of East Asia—which was forged during the long period of China’s unification, through which diverse tribes fused into a broader structure of power and eventually came under the mandate of the emperor, personified as the “son of heaven.”—was based on tianxia. But rather than being a divine mandate superior to the human condition, the mandate of the “son of heaven” possessed a civil responsibility in maintaining harmony between its subjects, including those who later came under its mantle. From the Ming dynasty until the First Opium War, the Chinese tributary system created political stability in the region.

During the Ming dynasty, Confucianism spread to Korea and Vietnam. In Japan, Confucian classical literature became a fundamental part of the education of the nobility and the elite. These countries thus became part of the tributary system which came to constitute the international system of the region.

The tributary system was not labeled as such by the Chinese; rather, the name comes from the Europeans who discovered China and its neighbor’s relationship and originally reflected Western ideas about the obligations of tributary states. But the payment of tribute, rather than being one of primarily coercive obligation as in the West’s popular conception of the system, recognized the cultural superiority of the Chinese emperor, and the exchange of gifts and favors maintained a balance in the East Asian regional system. The Chinese emperor would always give more than what he would receive and this loss was meant to guarantee the functioning of the regional order.

China, as such, became the hegemon of East Asia during the tributary system, and its hegemony via tianxia was not so different from hegemony in the West’s own conception, as in both cases the question of power, both cultural and material, remains crucial. However, Chinese hegemony was distinct in that it possessed a higher degree of a moral character than Western hegemony. China was a peaceful hegemon for nearly six centuries before the Opium Wars, primarily because due to Confucian ideas of obligation and responsibility, originating in the relationship between a father and son, which extended to the regional system. This helped to create a positive image of the Chinese emperor, both inside and outside China.

China regulated the regional system and assured the functioning of all commercial activities by allocating privileges to its actors according to the degree of cultural assimilation that they demonstrated. Korea, Vietnam, and the Ryukyu kingdom were the tributary states that showed the highest degree of cultural assimilation and were therefore given more privileges, including more tributary missions. This was a system meant to differentiate between the “barbarian” and the “civilized” according to the assimilation of Chinese culture.

It was the Opium Wars that changed the Chinese hierarchical system into one of direct colonialism until the end of World War II, while gradually extending Western ideas to East Asia. During the Cultural Revolution, Confucian doctrine suffered greatly, as Maoism became the new ideology of China. But after the death of Ma Zedongo, the CCP’s Five Disciplines, Four Graces and Three Loves policy began the process to (re)civilize China and consolidate the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Once again the doctrine of filial piety would promote obedience and regulate relations, and thus re-establishing the precedent for Xi’s “Chinese Dream.”

How the CCP Draws from Confucianism

From its foundation in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) concern has been to seek legitimacy in order to transform China. With the introduction of the “socialist market economy,” the CCP aimed to achieve this by improving China’s average standard of living. When Xi became the secretary general of the Party, he invoked the Confucian thinker Liu Xiang to underline the connection between power and the needs of the people.

While the West tends to be critical of the current Chinese one-party state as illegitimate, for a vast number of Chinese people it is not abnormal. For over two thousand years, China has been ruled by a unified Confucian elite through an imperial examination system designed to provide proportional representation in tianxia. The one-party state resembles more the Chinese tradition of a meritocracy than the ideal of Western democracy. The Chinese imperial examination system, known as keju, was not only meant to recruit talented people to administer the state, but also to counterbalance the power of the military and the sovereign. This system led to social mobility, along with political and social stability, especially as the number of officials was proportional to the population of each province. The keju was the standard model for an ethical man to prove his virtues, with the hope of becoming a bureaucrat. Today, Chinese parents place an important focus on the education of their children, and the influence of the Chinese education model is reflected by the high performance of Korean, Japanese, and Vietnamese students. The keju’s descendants in modern-day China, the gaokao for entrance to university and the examination for the civil service, are possibly the least corrupt institutions in the state; allowing access to leadership to all social classes and assisting to legitimize the system.

In addition, China uses history and culture to construct a linear narrative that replaces Western modernity, whose success represents its failure. On occasions, Xi alludes to the Qing dynasty, criticized by both Chinese nationalist and communist historiography. While the Qing dynasty extended control to Taiwan, Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, it is blamed for China losing control of its economy and ports, due to Western, Russian, and Japanese imperialism. Wang Qishan, known as Xi’s right-hand man, delivered a speech at the New World Economic Forum in Singapore in 2018, where he alluded to 1840, the “hundred years of national humiliation,” and the determination of the millenarian Chinese civilization to retake its place in the world with “Chinese characteristics.” This view of history is ingrained in the ideals of the CCP, whose legitimacy rests on recovering the historical status China once held.

For Xi, Chinese identity goes beyond nationalist and territorial borders and intentions. Xi views the “Chinese blood” of the millions of huaqiao (Chinese citizens residing abroad) and huaren (ethnic Chinese abroad) part of the “great Chinese family”—essential in bolstering the revitalization of the “Chinese Dream.” This dream portrays the “harmony” experienced during China’s dynastic history to convince the region of the benefits of a Pax Sinica in Asia. In fact, during the 19th National Congress, Xi explained that the “Chinese Dream” was meant to be shared by the rest of the international community. Yet while it tries to show its ascent to power is benign, China hides that it is a revisionist power, fermenting authoritarianism abroad and exporting its model for economic development. And it understands that to change the system, it must do so from the periphery, which will allow it to transform Western hegemony.

Back in 2005, China, under then-president Hu Jintao, unveiled the concept of a “harmonious world.” That same year, Chinese philosopher Gan Yang delivered a lecture in Beijing in which he advocated unifying Confucianism, Maoism, and Xiapoing’s reforms, while the philosopher Zhao Tingyang initiated the debate over the concept of tianxia and its application to our contemporary world—the system that allowed dynastic China to harmoniously rule over its local tributaries could thus be expended outwards. The CCP and Chinese intellectuals, in other words, are attempting to justify their own power and present a benevolent image of China.

Yet despite Zhao Tingyang’s objections that tianxia holds no “outsiders,” it is clear that the “Chinese center” uses dynamics of exclusion and inclusion to marginalize others like the West or even periphery nations. While Confucian thought supports the use of force only to restore political and moral order, it promotes a paternalistic diplomacy of a tributary character.

For those wondering what a Chinese international order would look this, this is something to keep in mind.

Carlo J.V. Caro is a political and military analyst. He has a graduate degree from Columbia University.

Image: Unsplash.

The National Interest · by Carlo J. V. Caro · March 19, 2023

23. Iraq, 20 Years Later: A Changed Washington and a Terrible Toll on America

American hubris or ignorance or a combination of both? But I guess Rumsfeld was kind of right. We \did not spend "a billion dollars of our money" - we spent so much more, more than a trillion dollars as I recall.

Excerpts:

Mr. Rumsfeld’s reply to retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, the American tasked with overseeing Iraq’s postwar reconstruction, would constitute a towering moment of hubris in a foreign policy misadventure tragically replete with them.

“My friend,” General Garner remembered Mr. Rumsfeld saying, “if you think we’re going to spend a billion dollars of our money over there, you are sadly mistaken.”

Iraq, 20 Years Later: A Changed Washington and a Terrible Toll on America

The New York Times · by Robert Draper · March 20, 2023

The White House, Congress, the military and the intelligence agencies see the war as a lesson in failed policymaking, one deeply absorbed if not thoroughly learned.

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President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney meeting with national security leaders at the White House in 2001.Credit...Stephen Crowley/The New York Times

March 20, 2023, 3:00 a.m. ET

WASHINGTON — A month before President George W. Bush first sent American troops into Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was warned that the war might end up costing the United States billions of dollars.

Mr. Rumsfeld’s reply to retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, the American tasked with overseeing Iraq’s postwar reconstruction, would constitute a towering moment of hubris in a foreign policy misadventure tragically replete with them.

“My friend,” General Garner remembered Mr. Rumsfeld saying, “if you think we’re going to spend a billion dollars of our money over there, you are sadly mistaken.”

Today, 20 years after the president ordered the airstrikes that rained down on Baghdad on the night of March 20, 2003, the war is widely seen in Washington’s power centers as a lesson in failed policymaking, one deeply absorbed if not thoroughly learned.

The United States spent an estimated $2 trillion in Iraq over the two decades, a price tag that barely begins to express the toll it has taken on both countries. Roughly 8,500 American military personnel and contractors lost their lives there, according to Brown University’s Costs of War project, and as many as 300,000 others returned home suffering from post-traumatic stress disorders. Iraq lost nearly half a million civilians in the war and the subsequent eight-year American occupation, which Mr. Rumsfeld vowed would never occur.

Fallout from the failures has shaped a generation of politicians and policymakers. The war deeply damaged the reputation of the intelligence agencies and heightened skepticism of military leaders. It empowered politicians willing to harness that skepticism — from Nancy Pelosi, who was first elected speaker of the House in a surge of antiwar sentiment in 2007, to Donald J. Trump, who in 2015 denounced the war as “a tremendous disservice to humanity” and slammed its Republican architects.

Marine Capt. Lisa Doring at her husband’s grave in Arlington National Cemetery. Capt. Nathanael Doring was killed in Iraq.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

Relatives mourning at a funeral on the outskirts of Baghdad in March 2003. Iraq lost nearly half a million civilians in the war and years of occupation.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

But the greatest legacy of the Iraq war is a desire to never do it again, there or anywhere. Two decades later, there is a growing aversion to intervening overseas, among not only Democrats but also Republicans.

“Last year, we had a vote on humanitarian aid to Ukraine,” said Fred Upton, a Republican from Michigan who retired two months ago after serving 36 years in the House. “Now, we’ve always had an element of isolationism in my party. But on this vote: 57 Republicans saying no to humanitarian aid? Oh, my goodness.”

The isolationism is now the position of the two leading choices for the Republican presidential nomination, Mr. Trump and Gov. Ron DeSantis of Florida, who has not yet announced a campaign but said in a statement last week that “while the U.S. has many vital national interests,” a “territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia is not one of them.”

In his 2016 campaign for president, Mr. Trump could and did point to the highly experienced Bush war team — including Mr. Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser — and credibly question what good all that expertise brought the United States.

American soldiers inside a palace that belonged to Saddam Hussein’s son Uday in Baghdad in April 2003.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

“I think distrust and rejection of Washington culture after Iraq opened the opportunity for outsiders to make their case,” said retired Lt. Gen. Gregory S. Newbold. “And if nothing else, Trump was the quintessential outsider. Not only did Trump not have experience, he rejected experience as being irrelevant.”

General Newbold, who was the director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the run-up to the war, was a rare dissenting voice at the time. He argued to no avail that the Iraq regime had been badly weakened by sanctions and posed no threat to the United States.

Two decades later, General Newbold said, the investment in the war has come at the expense of America’s current military preparedness. “Spending all that money on wartime operations left us with less money to budget for future technologies,” he said. “You look at the Chinese military’s capabilities with hypersonic missiles, and the size of their forces, versus our decline in the number of Navy ships and Air Force squadrons and Army brigades. You can’t help but get a feeling that we aren’t as capable as we were in 2003.”

“Spending all that money on wartime operations left us with less money to budget for future technologies,” retired Lt. Gen. Gregory S. Newbold said.Credit...Mike Belleme for The New York Times

During the run-up to the war, General Newbold, at the time the director of operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was a rare dissenting voice.Credit...Mike Belleme for The New York Times

Still, for a momentous event that Martin Indyk, an assistant secretary of state and a U.S. ambassador to Israel in the Clinton administration, describes as “a complete disaster on every level,” the Iraq war has prompted little in the way of fulsome discussion among members of Congress who are empowered with deciding whether to authorize the use of military force.

“I think Iraq was forgotten as soon as we withdrew,” said Peter Meijer, who was deployed there in 2010 as an Army reserve officer and who later served in Congress for a single term. Mr. Meijer said that he seldom engaged in lessons-learned discussions about Iraq with his colleagues, some of whom voted to authorize the war in 2002. “I’ve become skeptical that Congress can function in any way that isn’t reactive,” he said.

Perhaps no institution has been as hurt by the Iraq failures as the American intelligence agencies, led by the C.I.A., which provided ammunition to the Bush administration’s case for war that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.

As weapons inspectors scouring Iraq were already discovering in the months before the invasion, those assessments were based on speculation and outdated intelligence. The authors of the assessments made clear to their superiors at the C.I.A. that their information was far from conclusive, but those distinctions were seldom conveyed to Bush administration officials who had made clear their determination to overthrow Mr. Hussein.

“What I found frustrating after it was discovered that Iraq didn’t have W.M.D. was that the agency blamed all its mistakes on the analysts,” said Jane Green, at the time the chief of the C.I.A.’s Iraq group, which assessed the country’s political, military and economic activities. “It wasn’t the analysts who were pushing to help the administration find grounds for its political decision to go to war.”

After the C.I.A.’s determination in 2004 that Iraq had neither an illicit weapons stockpile nor an active weapons program — facts that many administration officials, including Mr. Bush, took years to accept — the chastened agency moved to adopt more sophisticated measures for situations when hard evidence was in short supply. But, Ms. Green said, “advanced analytic techniques don’t matter when policymakers are determined to strip out the nuance and demand a short, clear, yes-or-no bottom-line judgment.”

“Advanced analytic techniques don’t matter when policymakers are determined to strip out the nuance and demand a short, clear, yes-or-no bottom-line judgment,” Jane Green said.Credit...Jacob Langston for The New York Times

Ms. Green cited two postwar examples of U.S. elected officials continuing to misrepresent equivocal, nuanced intelligence judgments, just as had been the case before the invasion of Iraq. The first, in January 2017, was the assessment that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential election with the aim of helping to elect Mr. Trump.

The C.I.A. and the F.B.I. had “high confidence” in the assessment, while the National Security Agency had “medium confidence,” a lower level. Offended by the insinuation that his victory over Hillary Clinton was somehow not legitimate, Mr. Trump falsely maintained that the intelligence community had concluded that Russian interference had zero impact on the electoral outcome.

A more recent example of how post-Iraq intelligence reforms have proved ineffectual, Ms. Green said, is the Energy Department’s assessment last month that the coronavirus originated from an accidental laboratory leak in Wuhan, China, rather than from that city’s outdoor market. Intelligence officials at the department stipulated that this was a “low confidence” assessment — with which the C.I.A. and nearly every other intelligence agency did not concur — but those caveats did not stop a number of Republicans from calling it proof of malice on the Chinese government’s part.

“It’s easy to see how even sophisticated intelligence assessments, such as the one on the origins of Covid, can be turned into political footballs,” Ms. Green said, “especially when confidence levels are low and intelligence agencies disagree with each other.”

Perhaps the most poignant measure of the toll the war has taken on America can be seen in military service. After the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, U.S. military recruitment spiked to a level not seen since the attack on Pearl Harbor, coinciding with the sense of national unity that pervaded the country.

Ultimately, 1.5 million Americans would serve in Iraq. The casualties and disillusionment of that wartime experience have been followed by steady declines in recruitment. Last year’s numbers fell 25 percent below the Army’s goal.

Among those who had heeded the call was a wayward Alaska resident, Mark Jalone, who was ambling through Anchorage one day in late 2001 when he heard an Army advertisement on the radio and impulsively drove to a recruiting office. Mr. Jalone became a staff sergeant and served three tours in Iraq, until severe injuries in July 2006 from a roadside bomb brought his combat duties to an end.

What followed, Mr. Jalone recalled recently, “was a roller coaster, to be honest. After coming home, the burn marks and scars slowly faded, but what didn’t were the PTSD and the traumatic brain injury.”

He began taking as many as 18 medications at a time. The erosion of his short-term memory, Mr. Jalone said, led to outbursts of frustrated anger. His marriage broke up. He spoke a language of alienation and pain that only fellow veterans in his Facebook chat group understood. A close friend he had served with in Iraq committed suicide. Mr. Jalone acknowledged having such thoughts himself.

Mark Jalone, a retired Army staff sergeant, spent years dealing with the effects of PTSD and a traumatic brain injury.Credit...Christopher Lee for The New York Times

The flag that was presented to Mr. Jalone when he retired after three tours in Iraq.Credit...Christopher Lee for The New York Times

Recently, however, Mr. Jalone — now 46, retired from the military and living off disability payments — said he had begun to turn a corner.

“I started to understand through intensive therapy, from writing down my feelings and separating them from facts, what was triggering my PTSD,” he said. “It was that I’d been holding against myself the fact that the I.E.D. went off, and I and my team members got hurt. I’d been the one in charge. I’d convinced myself that it was my fault.”

Of course, the facts said otherwise.

Mr. Jalone realized, he said, that he was among the last to blame for what happened that day in Iraq.

General Garner, who ran Iraq’s postwar construction from March to May 2003 as civil order broke down and violence escalated, recalled Mr. Rumsfeld’s early plans in an interview last week, just after returning from a trip to see old friends in the Kurdish-dominated northern part of Iraq. “His thinking was that we would liberate Iraq and then just walk away,” he said of Mr. Rumsfeld, who died in 2021.

General Garner’s own assessment of the country that Mr. Bush was bent on liberating from Mr. Hussein is, with the benefit of hindsight, brutal.

“We overthrew Saddam and handed the country over to Iran,” he said, lamenting how Iraq’s neighbor now exerts its influence. “The whole thing’s been a disaster. You had to be blind not to at least suspect that this would happen.”

The New York Times · by Robert Draper · March 20, 2023

24. Compare Iraq with Ukraine. It’s clear the era of US global supremacy is over

Compare Iraq with Ukraine. It’s clear the era of US global supremacy is over | Jonathan Steele

Washington’s power is suddenly threatened by a newly confident China and disquiet among leaders in the global south

The Guardian · by Jonathan Steele · March 20, 2023

It’s a useful coincidence that the 20th anniversary of George W Bush and Tony Blair’s illegal attack on Iraq falls only a matter of weeks after the anniversary of Vladimir Putin’s illegal attack on Ukraine. Neither war was authorised by the UN. Both are marked by massive destruction and huge loss of life.

The Bush/Blair invasion and occupation of Iraq, and its chaotic consequences, have taken the lives of more than a million Iraqi civilians, according to one survey. US forces committed innumerable war crimes, not least the torture of captured soldiers. At the Abu Ghraib detention centre near Baghdad, US officers humiliated Iraqi prisoners in violation of the Geneva conventions. The invasion provoked widespread resistance, but US counter-insurgency tactics involved raids on villages that led to massacres of unarmed civilians.

The world reacted to the Bush/Blair war with disapproval, but almost no action was taken against them. There were no state-imposed sanctions on the US or Britain. No investigators from the international criminal court took evidence to substantiate prosecutions for war crimes. A few individuals and some human rights organisations called for Blair to be indicted on the charge of committing the crime of aggression, but no government approached the UN with a resolution to open a criminal case against them.

Now consider the very different reaction to Vladimir Putin’s illegal war on Ukraine. Virtually every western government, following the US’s lead, has slapped sanctions on Russia’s exports. Russia’s financial holdings in US banks have been frozen. Putin’s friends have had their yachts and other property impounded – and then a few days ago the international criminal court issued an arrest warrant for Putin for war crimes involving the illegal deportation of children from Ukraine.

The contrast in the global reaction to the two wars is instructive. Nothing better illustrates the differential between Russia’s meagre international authority and that of the US. For Putin it is humiliating. He may like to think of his country as a superpower, but in reality, beyond holding a massive nuclear arsenal, Russia has little global clout and few foreign friends. Putin is widely criticised for trying to recreate an old-fashioned empire by seizing land and intimidating states on Russia’s western and southern borders.

The invasion of Iraq was a turning point on to a path that led towards Ukraine | Peter Beaumont

The US, for its part, runs a new style of non-territorial empire with great success. It enjoys enormous political and economic influence on every continent, dominates the international financial system, and operates 750 military bases in more than 80 countries. Most of the world dare not oppose Washington’s writ.

Some analysts argue that if Russia is defeated in its current war on Ukraine, Europe will be able to enjoy a post-imperial system of peaceful relations and autonomy on the continent for the first time in history. They forget Nato. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization began in 1949 and still continues in part as an instrument for US hegemony in Europe. Allies may decline to participate in US military operations, as France and Germany boldly did over Iraq in 2003, but they do not publicly denounce them as illegal or call for sanctions.

Europeans and some Americans, including past and present senior officials, who argued against the expansion of Nato after the demise of the Soviet Union – or even advocated the alliance’s dissolution now that the enemy was gone – were never going to achieve their goals. The Baltic states and Poland craved the protection of the imperial American umbrella, which the US military-industrial complex was not going to give up in any case.

Equally unattainable was the proposal that Nato should invite the Russian Federation to join, thereby promoting post-cold war reconciliation. It was not to be. Even though Russian leaders, both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, were keen to end the division of Europe, Washington would not open the alliance to a new member who could match the US’s nuclear potential and might question its political priorities.

Now, 30 years after the demise of the Soviet Union, there are signs that the unipolar world of US dominance may be coming to an end. The main challenger is not Putin’s Russia, but an increasingly confident China. Leaders in the global south are also stirring. In the first flush of shock over Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February last year, more than 140 UN states voted to condemn it. But only around 40 countries in total have joined the US in imposing sanctions on Russia. As the west floods Ukraine with military hardware, the notion that it is merely helping to defend Ukraine looks questionable to many Asian, African and Latin American states who suspect the end goal to be regime change in the Kremlin.

A survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) reveals a significant shift in public opinion in several key countries. People want to see a quick end to the war in Ukraine, even if it means Ukraine giving up western-supported aspirations to victory and accepting the temporary loss of some territory. It is not only citizens of authoritarian China who think this way. So do citizens in India and Turkey.

Josep Borrell, the EU’s foreign policy chief, told the Munich Security Conference last month: “I see how powerful the Russian narrative is, its accusations of double standards.” France’s Emmanuel Macron said he was “shocked by how much credibility we are losing in the global south”.

Some fear a new cold war, this time between the west and China. Looking 10 years ahead, others expect to see a multipolar world in which states will not be pressured to align themselves with one side or the other. Either way, in spite of the resurgence of US power in Europe as a result of the war in Ukraine, the era of US supremacy in the rest of the world may soon be over.

Jonathan Steele is a former chief foreign correspondent for the Guardian and the author of Defeat: Why They Lost Iraq

The Guardian · by Jonathan Steele · March 20, 2023

25. Why the Press Failed on Iraq

Excerpts:

Today, laudable efforts are underway to bolster basic investigative reporting and quiet the increasingly frantic quest for attention, too often in the form of official leaks and sensational stories touted as “scoops” with half-lives now measured in seconds. After all, the latest outburst from former President Donald Trump or Republican Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia, however ludicrous, and the latest Harry and Meghan gossip are guaranteed to attract an audience.

Some newspapers and magazines, including The New York Times, continue to do commendable work, increasingly in partnership with outfits that specialize in investigative reporting, such as ProPublica and the nonprofit Investigative Reporters and Editors. At the same time, though, the country’s press corps continues to shrink, most importantly at the local, regional, and international levels. I was sent to Washington in 1975 as the junior reporter in the Bergen Record’s two-person bureau. This month, the Gannett chain laid off Jonathan Salant, the last New Jersey reporter in the nation’s capital. For those who wonder where Knight Ridder went: The McClatchy Co. bought Knight Ridder in 2006, filed for bankruptcy in 2020, and was purchased by the hedge fund Chatham Asset Management later that year. An archive of Knight Ridder Iraq stories is available — behind a paywall.

In addition to eroding public trust in the media, the declining number of local reporters covering the U.S. government is depriving young reporters of the best places to learn and veterans of the best places to teach that basic lesson of Afghanistan and Iraq: If you want to know the local crime situation, ask the residents and the cops on the beat, not the police chief or the mayor.

Why the Press Failed on Iraq

And How One Team of Reporters Got It Right

By John Walcott

March 19, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by John Walcott · March 19, 2023

Twenty years ago, the George W. Bush administration invaded Iraq to topple Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and eliminate the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) officials said he had. Getting the American public to support a war against a country that had not attacked the United States required the administration to tell a convincing story of why the war was necessary. For that, it needed the press.

I was Knight Ridder’s Washington, D.C., bureau chief at the time, and among other duties handled our national security coverage. This gave me a front-row seat to Washington’s march to war and the media’s role in it. As the Bush administration began making its case for invading Iraq, too many Washington journalists, caught up in the patriotic fervor after 9/11, let the government’s story go unchallenged. At Knight Ridder’s Washington bureau, we started asking questions and publishing stories that challenged the Bush administration’s claims that Iraq had an active WMD program and ties to al Qaeda. One thing that set Knight Ridder’s coverage apart was our sourcing—forgoing senior officials in Washington for experts and scientists inside and outside the Beltway and more junior staffers and military officers much closer to the relevant intelligence.

Such an approach also would have helped U.S. policymakers. The failed wars in Afghanistan and Iraq show what happens when top officials ignore their subordinates or assemble their own teams of analysts to confirm their biases—and when journalists become stenographers for them. Unfortunately, 20 years on, there is little evidence that the Washington press corps has learned this lesson. If anything, today’s bleak media environment has only made it harder to get the story right.

IS THIS TRUE?

On the morning of September 11, 2001, as a pillar of smoke rose from the Pentagon across the Potomac, Knight Ridder’s Washington bureau set out, like our competitors, to confirm what we all suspected—that al Qaeda was behind the attacks. We were an experienced group of journalists, with years spent developing sources in the intelligence community and the military. I had reported and edited for Newsweek, The Wall Street Journal, and U.S. News and World Report.

Knight Ridder also had two superb national security reporters in Jonathan Landay and Warren Strobel, who later were reinforced by Joe Galloway, arguably the greatest war correspondent of the Vietnam era. Other news organizations also had formidable talent, along with larger staffs, bigger budgets, better reputations, and broader reach. Yet in the early days after 9/11, they didn’t seem to be noticing the red flags that the Knight Ridder team already had started seeing.

The first flag appeared just days after the attacks, when Strobel came back to the office and reported that Bush administration officials had been discussing not only the al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his Taliban hosts in Afghanistan, but also Iraq. That made little sense. Saddam’s history of supporting terrorism was less compelling than that of the dictators Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya or Hafez al-Assad of Syria, not to mention Iran’s ayatollahs. Saddam had given Abu Nidal, one of the most notorious Palestinian terrorists, limited support—but had expelled him in 1983. Abu Nidal returned to Iraq in 2002, only to die under mysterious circumstances. Some U.S. intelligence officials thought Saddam ordered his death in an attempt to deprive the United States of one casus belli.

Although some senior administration officials began trying to link Saddam to al Qaeda, their more knowledgeable subordinates in the intelligence community and the State Department were questioning why bin Laden, a Salafi extremist, would link arms with Saddam, a secular ruler whose likely heirs were his two booze-swilling, skirt-chasing sons, Uday and Qusay.

In the days and weeks after the attacks, there were early warnings that something was amiss. They were easy to spot if you were looking for them, but few people in the upper levels of the Bush administration or at other major news organizations, riding the patriotic wave sweeping the country, were looking.

Too many Washington journalists let the government’s story go unchallenged.

We were. On September 22, 11 days after the attacks, Strobel reported that some administration officials and outside experts were skeptical that Iraq had played any role in them. On October 11, he reported that nevertheless, Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy U.S. secretary of defense, had dispatched a former CIA director, James Woolsey, to Wales to search for evidence that Saddam was linked to an earlier attack on the World Trade Center. A senior U.S. official told Strobel that Wolfowitz and others at the Pentagon were “seized” with the idea that Iraq was behind the attacks.

That same month, Washington reporters covering the story began receiving appetizing nuggets from a new source: Ahmed Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress, an exile group whose eagerness to take control of Iraq and its oil wealth was obvious. I had first met Chalabi with a friend at a Georgetown townhouse years before 9/11, and when we left, I told my friend: “If he gave me change for a quarter, I’d count it.”

Chalabi’s camp fed me two pieces of information in October and early November that were knocked down immediately by the U.S. intelligence officers with whom I spoke. So I ignored them rather than print impotent "he said/she said” stories.

According to the Chalabi team, Farouk Hijazi, the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey and a former head of Iraqi intelligence, had traveled to Afghanistan, met with bin Laden, and offered him sanctuary in Iraq. That much was true, two U.S. intelligence officers said, but the story didn’t end there. A friendly Arab power, the intelligence officers said, had inserted an agent in bin Laden’s camp, and he had reported that after Hijazi left, bin Laden had turned to his second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and said they would not move to Iraq because if they did, al Qaeda’s agenda would become Saddam’s, not theirs. The real story reinforced our belief that bin Laden and Saddam were in no way natural allies.

Undeterred, Chalabi’s camp came back to me with a report that Iraq was operating a terrorist training facility at Salman Pak, some 15 miles south of Baghdad, using an airplane fuselage to instruct hijackers. When asked about it, U.S. and foreign intelligence officers told me off the record that they had been keeping an eye on the facility but that they could find no evidence that foreign terrorists were training there. More likely, these sources said, it was a counterhijacking training facility. When I asked who the Iraqis were afraid might try to hijack one of their airliners, one of the officers responded, “Oh, probably Osama.”

I decided not to write anything about the supposed training facility, even a story that presented the allegation and the knockdown of it. It made no sense to publish a story that would inject a falsehood into the public debate. Other outlets, including The New York Times, ran the story.

Today’s bleak media environment has only made it harder to get the story right.

Both the administration and some major news outlets continued to rely on information from Chalabi, who cunningly pivoted from positing an Iraq–al Qaeda connection to providing dubious intelligence about Saddam’s alleged WMD programs. Chalabi often fed the same information to the Pentagon and to the press, which made some journalists think they had two sources when they had only one. Landay and Tish Wells, the bureau’s researcher, later exposed how successful the Iraqi National Congress had been at getting major news outlets to run bogus intelligence.

By late November and early December 2001, U.S. military and intelligence officers in Afghanistan—along with those supporting them at U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida—were asking me off the record why officials back in Washington were diverting resources from their efforts. On February 13, 2002, Strobel and I wrote a story that answered their question: “President Bush has decided to oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from power and ordered the CIA, the military and other agencies to devise a combination of military, diplomatic and covert steps to achieve that goal, a senior U.S. official said Tuesday.”

For most of 2002 and early 2003, the Bush administration’s main public relations task was to sell the war, and too many news organizations were buying it. Still, basic reporting discredited—but failed to silence—some of the administration’s sales pitches. On September 6, 2002, Landay reported that the lack of hard evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was worrying some U.S. officials. “There is no new intelligence that indicates the Iraqis have made significant advances in their nuclear, biological or chemical weapons programs,” a U.S. intelligence official told Landay.

The administration’s claim that Iraq had ordered aluminum tubes to enrich uranium was conveniently leaked to The New York Times, allowing Bush administration officials to discuss publicly what otherwise would be classified information. The story, however, fell victim to simple fact-checking by Landay. He called experts at the Energy Department’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. They said the tubes could not be used to enrich uranium.

It made no sense to publish a story that would inject a falsehood into the public debate.

Four days later, Strobel reported that some administration officials had misgivings about Bush’s Iraq policy. On October 24, 2002, Landay and Strobel revealed the feud between administration hard-liners determined to oust Saddam and intelligence professionals and experts at the CIA, the State Department, and other agencies who distrusted the information coming from Chalabi and his associates.

Galloway, who was awarded a Bronze Star for risking his life trying to save a wounded American soldier in Vietnam in 1965 and had unrivaled access to senior military officials, contributed to many of these stories, but we kept his name off most of them because his friendships were well known. Nevertheless, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld became so infuriated by Galloway’s reporting that he summoned him to his Pentagon office for a one-on-one meeting. When Galloway got there, Rumsfeld had summoned reinforcements. He accused Galloway of relying on retired generals as his sources. Galloway replied that many of his sources were still on active duty. “Hell," he said. "Some of them might even be in this room.” When we returned to our office, Landay, Strobel, and I asked him if that was true. “No,” Galloway replied. “But it was fun watching ‘em sweat."

Our reporting might have been getting under officials’ skin, but it did not slow the administration’s march to war. Some Knight Ridder papers even ignored what their own Washington bureau was writing and instead printed New York Times stories (which the paper later admitted were wrong). One Knight Ridder editor even assigned reporters from his local paper to see if what we were writing was accurate because the Times and The Washington Post were not reporting the same things.

We were undeterred by these legitimate local decisions not to run our coverage and by the Bush administration’s decision to ignore our stories rather than call attention to them by disputing them, and we continued reporting. After all, we never sought to influence U.S. policy, much less derail the invasion planning, but only to air the debate inside the government as best we could.

When the invasion began, in March 2003, little went according to plan. Many in the administration and the media were surprised. Not Landay, Strobel, Galloway, or me. In 2004, Landay, Wells, and others on our team reported that there had been no proper post-war planning.

OUTSIDE THE BUBBLE

What distinguished the Knight Ridder Washington bureau from its peers in the Washington press corps was its remove from power and politics. Knight Ridder’s Washington team worked for daily newspapers across the United States. Our readers were not in Washington and New York, but scattered around the country from Anchorage, Alaska, to Miami, Florida. More important, Knight Ridder papers served some 30 military communities, including Fort Benning and Fort Bragg; Fort Lewis and Fort Riley; and Grand Forks and Shaw Air Force Bases. I once told an all-hands staff meeting: “We’re not The New York Times. We’re not The Washington Post. We’re not CBS or ABC or CNN. We report for the people whose sons and daughters and husbands and wives get sent to war, not for the people who send them.”

As a corollary to that, we did not see ourselves as part of the Washington elite, nor did we crave to climb from the fourth estate to become town criers for the first. The entire 9/11 team was well connected, but Landay, Strobel, and Galloway saw no need to curry favor with—much less rely on—high-ranking officials in the Pentagon, Vice President Dick Cheney’s office, or anywhere else. They spent their time earning the trust of people closer to the ground and further from the politics. It became a standing joke how much time I was spending meeting still-unnamed sources in the paint aisles of the Lowe’s store and the Cracker Barrel out in Manassas, Virginia, rather than at embassy parties in Washington.

Last, and perhaps most important, we had the unflinching support of our bosses: Tony Ridder, Knight Ridder’s CEO; the late Jerry Ceppos, the vice president of news; and Clark Hoyt, the Washington editor and my immediate supervisor. Not until much later did I learn that advertisers had called Ridder and asked that he tell them when the latest in our series of “unpatriotic” articles would appear so they could pull their ads. He told them they would see it at the same time he did—when it hit newsstands.

THIS TOWN

After we reported how successful the Iraqi National Congress had been at planting news stories, newspapers that got Iraq wrong issued corrections, retractions, and apologies. The New York Times published its on May 26, 2004—on page 10. But there is little evidence that much has changed in the culture of Washington or in the way it is covered. Some members of the Bush administration still refuse to acknowledge their mistakes. Indeed, one of the main lessons from Iraq—the importance of listening to experts rather than hearing only what you want to hear and disregarding the rest—has been ignored or forgotten.

This was clear as the Biden administration rushed the last American troops and contractors out of Afghanistan in August 2021. The White House, much of Congress, and the news media once again were caught off guard. This time, it was by the rapid collapse of the American-backed Afghan government and security forces, which has left tens of thousands of Afghan allies and their families still stranded.

Once more, officials had ignored the people who were on the ground and made decisions that were shaped more by domestic politics than by professional expertise and firsthand experience. The folly of the U.S. nation-building mission in Afghanistan had been evident to U.S. military officers two decades earlier, when they began trying to teach their Afghan counterparts how to fly, drive, and maintain American military equipment. As one U.S. Air Force officer told me in 2005, “It’s hard to teach people how to fly when you find out they can’t read.”

In early June 2021, two months before Biden’s rapid withdrawal, I wrote:

Despite months of talk and interagency meetings, White House officials have made no decisions about how to get tens of thousands of Afghans who supported the international effort to establish a stable democracy in Kabul out of harm’s way. Some military officials and diplomats say it already may be too late to prevent a humanitarian and political disaster. . . Although the administration has doubled its effort to issue Special Immigrant Visas to the 18,000 Afghans who’ve applied for them, military officials privately warn that a collapse of Ghani’s government could endanger three times that number, and perhaps as many as 150,000 Afghans.

The article I wrote containing that bleak assessment was offered to multiple publications, but no one wanted it.

Today, laudable efforts are underway to bolster basic investigative reporting and quiet the increasingly frantic quest for attention, too often in the form of official leaks and sensational stories touted as “scoops” with half-lives now measured in seconds. After all, the latest outburst from former President Donald Trump or Republican Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia, however ludicrous, and the latest Harry and Meghan gossip are guaranteed to attract an audience.

Some newspapers and magazines, including The New York Times, continue to do commendable work, increasingly in partnership with outfits that specialize in investigative reporting, such as ProPublica and the nonprofit Investigative Reporters and Editors. At the same time, though, the country’s press corps continues to shrink, most importantly at the local, regional, and international levels. I was sent to Washington in 1975 as the junior reporter in the Bergen Record’s two-person bureau. This month, the Gannett chain laid off Jonathan Salant, the last New Jersey reporter in the nation’s capital. For those who wonder where Knight Ridder went: The McClatchy Co. bought Knight Ridder in 2006, filed for bankruptcy in 2020, and was purchased by the hedge fund Chatham Asset Management later that year. An archive of Knight Ridder Iraq stories is available — behind a paywall.

In addition to eroding public trust in the media, the declining number of local reporters covering the U.S. government is depriving young reporters of the best places to learn and veterans of the best places to teach that basic lesson of Afghanistan and Iraq: If you want to know the local crime situation, ask the residents and the cops on the beat, not the police chief or the mayor.

JOHN WALCOTT is an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He headed Knight Ridder’s Washington, D.C., bureau and eight international bureaus from 2002 to 2009.

Foreign Affairs · by John Walcott · March 19, 2023

26. The Case for a Security Guarantee for Ukraine

Excerpts:

At some point later in 2023, or perhaps 2024, war may begin to seem futile to Moscow and Kyiv, as some variant of a stalemate settles in. Or Ukraine might succeed in pushing Russian forces out of its territory. In either case, Western policymakers need to be ready with a new security vision for the region. The issues are too complex to be improvised on the spot if and when peace talks begin. Moreover, a new security vision may improve the prospects for peace by showing how both Ukraine and post-Putin Russia can see their core interests protected and upheld. Debates must begin now, so that concepts can be discussed and developed before negotiations begin. Otherwise, they will have little chance of success. Ending this war will require a clear and cogent vision for a new security architecture for the region. It must be ready for when the opportunity to end the shooting arises.

The Case for a Security Guarantee for Ukraine

How to Protect the Country—Without NATO Membership

By Lise Morjé Howard and Michael O’Hanlon

March 20, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Lise Morjé Howard and Michael O'Hanlon · March 20, 2023

All wars end. Eventually, the war between Russia and Ukraine will, too. The time to begin preparing for peace is not after the last gun falls silent but now, as the conflict rages. Long before they had triumphed in World War II, Allied leaders began to contemplate the shape of the future peace. At conferences in Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam, and elsewhere, they discussed proposals and made plans to create international institutions that could prevent another war. Today, a similar effort is needed. Western leaders must develop security mechanisms and consider strategies to assist Ukraine and manage future relations with Russia.

Ukraine must be brought into the democratic world and strengthened so that it can resist future Russian aggression. It also needs some type of Western military protection. But policymakers need to think more broadly about Russia’s role in the postwar order, as well. The nation needs a constructive vision, not just a plan to rein in its worst impulses. If after the war ends Russia is permanently banished from the international community, it will emerge, furious and humiliated, as a renewed threat. Putin, his war machine, and his imperial mindset must be defeated, and Ukraine must be hardened against any possible future aggression. At the same time, however, the West must also try to secure a long-term peace with Moscow.

Such an outcome will require both deterring Russia and simultaneously offering it a path to redemption—or at least to peaceful coexistence. One way to do so would be to create a new security community—call it the Atlantic-Asian Security Community—composed of many NATO members, as well as Ukraine, its allies, and any neutral states that wished to join. Once Putin’s regime falls and is replaced by a government committed to peace, Russia should be eligible to join, as well.

The AASC could have a long-term purpose similar to NATO’s, but in the short term its main task would be to supervise and legitimize the indefinite presence of Western military troops on Ukrainian soil. These troops—from NATO and non-NATO countries alike—would monitor Russian troop activity, help train Ukraine’s armed forces, assist with demobilization, monitor any future peace deal, and act as a tripwire to prevent fresh Russian aggression. This mission could be led by a non-NATO officer, perhaps from India or another country seen as neutral, but it must include U.S. troops. Nothing short of American boots on the ground can ensure Ukraine’s democratic future.

THE END OF THE BEGINNING

An end to the war is likely a long way off, in large part because both Russia and Ukraine are confident that victory is still possible. Russia believes that the resolve of Ukraine’s Western backers will break before its own, which will deprive Kyiv of the materiel and money that it needs to continue the conflict. Ukraine disagrees, believing that the steadfastness of its citizens and its partners in the West—combined with the popularity and persuasiveness of President Volodymyr Zelensky—will enable it to retake the land that Russia illegally seized. With neither side ready to compromise, the fighting is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

But things can change fast, and the world needs to be ready. To the extent that Western policymakers are discussing a strategy for ending the war, they are largely focused on NATO expansion, as well as Russian containment through economic isolation. The former is wrongheaded and the latter is insufficient. Further extending NATO would virtually guarantee an antagonistic relationship not just with Putin but with all plausible future Russian leaders. Both the pro-NATO diplomat George Kennan and the pro-Western Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev warned against expanding the alliance when new countries began joining in the 1990s. CIA Director William Burns made a similar warning about Ukraine in particular in 2008, when he was serving as the U.S. ambassador to Russia, writing in a diplomatic cable that “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.” A stable peace in which Moscow is truly invested cannot be built on this option.

The United States and its allies and partners need to think creatively about how to guarantee Ukraine’s security beyond the paper promises that have been made in the past and trashed by Moscow, and beyond proposals to turn Ukraine into a “porcupine” by arming it to the teeth. Some type of Western and non-Western military presence on Ukrainian soil is needed to ensure the nation’s defense. The question is how to structure it, embed it within existing or new security organizations, and ensure its efficacy.

NATO’s original purposes were summarized by its first secretary-general, Lord Hastings Ismay, in the alliance’s early days. It was designed, he said in 1949, “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The world now needs an agile body that keeps Putin out—but that can eventually draw reform-minded Russians in, alongside the Americans, to keep Ukraine and its neighbors safe. To clearly distinguish it from NATO, the AASC should not be called a treaty organization and should not obligate members to come to one another’s defense in case of attack. Yet it should still strive to deter Russian aggression by deploying international military personnel to Ukraine as long as Moscow remains hostile.

The AASC would need to carry out strategic planning, conduct regular military exercises, and share classified materials among its members. In addition to safeguarding Ukraine in the event of renewed war, it could be tasked with other missions, should its members elect to do so. For instance, it might help enforce a future peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, assist with migrant crises, or address terrorist threats.

In time, the AASC could perhaps even come to exceed NATO’s importance for European security.

But in the near term, the AASC’s main purpose should be to supervise and coordinate the deployment of at least several thousand international troops as trainers and monitors on Ukrainian soil. These troops would hail from the United States and other European and Asian AASC members. The presence of Western military personnel in Ukraine is essential for deterrence. Troops from the United States and other NATO countries should deploy as a part of the international force, and the United States should be prepared to come to their—and thus Ukraine’s—defense in the event of attack.

Two approaches to forming such a force might be considered. One would be to create a peace implementation force, approved by the UN General Assembly rather than the UN Security Council, that Moscow could neither veto nor stonewall. The force might be given a multiyear mandate to assist with demobilization, patrol the Russian-Ukrainian border, perhaps also monitoring the fair treatment of minorities on Ukrainian soil to reassure Moscow and prevent conflict.

An alternative approach would be to place the international force directly under the AASC. The force would deploy only with the approval of the Ukrainian government, and its day-to-day tasks would be training Ukraine’s military and police. It should be deployed throughout much of the country, so as to deter Russia from encroaching on Ukrainian territory. The training forces should also be in regular contact with NATO combat forces based in the eastern regions of member states’ territory. This would ensure that rapid-reaction forces could be sent to protect trainers if need be. Any probing attacks against training personnel would be investigated and, if Moscow was complicit, punished either with economic measures or potentially by stationing Western combat forces in Ukraine until tensions subside. This force would ideally be headed by a general from a nation such as India that has managed to maintain passable relations with Western countries as well as with Russia.

As soon as Putin departs the Kremlin and is replaced by a nonthreatening leader, Russia would become eligible to join the AASC. NATO’s eastern members might be skeptical of Russia and seek to block an invitation. But the United States has often had to convince reticent allies to accept more members—for instance, during the rounds of expansion to eastern Europe under U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Notable exceptions to this rule include France’s and the United Kingdom’s opposition to accepting Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 and Turkey’s current objection to Sweden’s membership. But the Baltic states and Poland, which are highly dependent on U.S. security guarantees and interested in good relations with the United States, would be unlikely to take a page from Erdogan’s playbook, especially since they would be consulted about the purpose of the AASC at its creation.

Should Moscow apply for membership, AASC countries should consider Russia’s military posture near Ukraine’s borders, its willingness to recognize unconditionally the sovereignty of Ukraine, and its territorial disputes with other countries when making its decision. The AASC would not replace or weaken NATO, even if Russia ultimately joined. Moscow would have to understand that reality. Its aggression against Ukraine and recent history of violent behavior make NATO’s continued existence in its current form nonnegotiable. That said, if Russia is on the road to postimperial rule, the AASC would take pains not to exclude the country’s new leadership or to reopen old wounds. In time, the AASC could perhaps even come to exceed NATO’s importance for European security. But that day would have to be seen as decades off.

WAR WITH RUSSIA

An AASC-led international force would both harden Ukraine’s defenses and seek to deter any revival of Russian imperial aggression. The force’s mission would not be to defeat Russia militarily but to uphold the sanctity of international borders. If necessary, reinforcements from NATO members could help to defend Ukraine. By dint of its makeup—composed of U.S. and other Western troops—the training force would virtually guarantee that the United States and the rest of NATO would enter any future war if Russia were to renew its to attacks on Ukraine or its other neighbors. It would thus be a highly credible tripwire.

At some point later in 2023, or perhaps 2024, war may begin to seem futile to Moscow and Kyiv, as some variant of a stalemate settles in. Or Ukraine might succeed in pushing Russian forces out of its territory. In either case, Western policymakers need to be ready with a new security vision for the region. The issues are too complex to be improvised on the spot if and when peace talks begin. Moreover, a new security vision may improve the prospects for peace by showing how both Ukraine and post-Putin Russia can see their core interests protected and upheld. Debates must begin now, so that concepts can be discussed and developed before negotiations begin. Otherwise, they will have little chance of success. Ending this war will require a clear and cogent vision for a new security architecture for the region. It must be ready for when the opportunity to end the shooting arises.

LISE MORJÉ HOWARD is Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Resident Scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace, and author of Power in Peacekeeping.
MICHAEL O’HANLON is Phil Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy at the Brookings Institution and the author of Military History for the Modern Strategist: America’s Major Wars Since 1861.

Foreign Affairs · by Lise Morjé Howard and Michael O'Hanlon · March 20, 2023

27. Online Sleuths Untangle the Mystery of the Nord Stream Sabotage

Conclusion:

Ultimately, there is still very little hard public evidence—either from governments or publicly available online—about who may have been behind the attacks. Behind closed doors, intelligence agencies likely have more data and theories on the potential culprits. However, investigators in Sweden and Denmark refused to comment on their progress, while Germany’s Office of the Federal Prosecutor confirmed it had searched a yacht and is continuing to examine for explosives. German officials have also said there could be a chance of a “false flag” operation to smear Ukraine. And when the countries complete their investigations, there’s no guarantee they will publish their findings or evidence to back them up. The mystery continues.

Online Sleuths Untangle the Mystery of the Nord Stream Sabotage

Open source intelligence researchers are verifying and debunking opaque claims about who ruptured the gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea.

By Matt Burgess WIRED6 min

March 20, 2023

Wired · by Condé Nast · March 20, 2023

It’s been six months since the Nord Stream gas pipelines were ruptured by a series of explosions, leaking tons of methane into the environment and igniting an international whodunit. Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and an unnamed pro-Ukrainian group have all been accused of planting explosives on the Baltic Sea pipelines in recent months. But half a year since the sabotage took place, the mystery remains unsolved.

Digital sleuths are stepping in to help provide clarity around bombshell claims about who was behind the attacks. Open source intelligence (OSINT) researchers are using public sources of data in their efforts to verify or debunk the snippets of information published about the Nord Stream explosions. They’re providing a glimpse of clarity to an incident that’s shrouded by secrecy and international politics.

Since early February, multiple media reports have claimed to provide new information about who could have attacked the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines on September 26. However, the reports have largely been based on anonymous sources, including unnamed intelligence officials and leaks from government investigations into the attacks.

First, American investigative journalist Seymour Hersh published claims that the US was behind attacks in a post on Substack. This was followed by reports in The New York Times and German publication Die Zeit claiming a pro-Ukrainian group was responsible. (European leaders have previously speculated Russia could be behind the attacks, and Russia has blamed the United Kingdom.) No country has claimed responsibility for the blasts so far, and official investigations are ongoing.

Each of the recent reports has provided little hard evidence to show what may actually have happened, while helping to fuel speculation. Jacob Kaarsbo, a senior analyst at Think Tank Europa, who previously worked in Danish intelligence for 15 years, says the claims have been “remarkable” but also “speculative” in nature. “In my mind, they don’t really alter the picture,” Kaarsbo says, adding the attacks look highly complex and would likely be “very hard to pull off without it being a state actor or at least with state sponsorship.”

In the absence of official information, OSINT researchers have been trying to plug the gaps by examining the claims of the new reports with public data. OSINT analysis is a powerful way to determine how an event may have unfolded. For instance, flight- and ship-tracking data can reveal movements around the world, satellite images show Earth in near real-time, while small clues in the backgrounds of photos and videos can reveal where they were taken. The techniques have uncovered Russian assassins, spotted North Korea evading international trading sanctions, identified potential war criminals, and documented pollution.

For the Nord Stream blasts, there was little OSINT available. Researchers identified “dark ships” in the area. But underwater, there are obviously limited data sources that can be tapped into—cameras and sensors don’t monitor every inch of the pipelines. “OSINT probably won’t break this case open, but it can be used to verify or strengthen other hypotheses,” says Oliver Alexander, an analyst who focuses on OSINT and has been closely looking at the Nord Stream blasts. “I do think that it’s more of a verification tool.”

Alexander and others have been examining the claims made so far. The New York Times and Die Zeit both published stories on March 7 claiming a Ukrainian group was behind the sabotage. (Ukraine has denied any involvement.) Die Zeit published more details, claiming German investigators searched a yacht rented from a company based in Poland, knew where the yacht sailed from, and that six people were involved in the operation, including two divers. All of them used forged passports, the publication reported.

The details were enough for OSINT researchers to start tracking down which yacht could have been used. Alexander, as well as contributors to the open-source investigative outlet Bellingcat, started following the breadcrumbs, narrowing down potential vessels. A follow-up report soon named the boat under suspicion as the Andromeda, a 15-meter-long yacht. Webcam footage from the harbor where it is believed the Andromeda was docked shows the movement of a boat around the time reported by the publications. (The Andromeda is reportedly too small to be required to use ship-tracking systems.) Years-old videos and photos of the boat have surfaced. The sleuthing adds public details to the reports.

Similarly, OSINT has been used to debunk Hersh’s story claiming the United States was behind the explosions. (Hersh has defended his article, while US officials have said it was false.) Alexander has used, among other things, ship-tracking data to show Norwegian ships were “accounted for” and not in a “position to have placed the explosives on the Nord Stream pipeline, as claimed by Hersh.” Another detailed article from Norwegian journalists has similarly poured cold water on Hersh’s claims, partly using satellite data.

The sabotage was always likely to be controversial and surrounded by rumors: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has heated global tensions and put pressure on diplomats around the world. There has been a whirlwind of disinformation around the blasts, further muddying the waters. Mary Blankenship, a disinformation researcher at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, who has analyzed online conversations around the war, says the “high uncertainty and high stakes” of the incident help to fuel the spread of disinformation.

“This is an issue that exploits existing worries, tensions, and grievances within European audiences,” Blankenship says. Initially, the earliest disinformation on Twitter about the explosions came from conspiracy theorists, Blankenship says, who shared a pre-war statement from US president Joe Biden, where he said there would be an “end” to Nord Stream 2 if Russia invaded Ukraine. Since then, Russia and China have taken to sharing unproven theories about the sabotage, the researcher says.

“Disinformation actors, but also official representatives of the [Russian] regime, stepped up their efforts on every news story that was published on this—however contradictory about the origins of the blast—be it a blog post by Seymour Hersh or a New York Times article,” says Peter Stano, an EU spokesperson, adding most disinformation narratives have circled around the idea that “the US is to blame.” The EU’s disinformation monitoring project, EUvsDisinfo, has flagged more than 150 pieces of disinformation linked to the Nord Stream explosions, including those building on Hersh’s story. “EUvsDisinfo experts also found that Moscow considers the recent materials in German-language media a hoax,” Stano says.

While OSINT is helping to provide bits of extra detail on the claims about the Nord Stream attacks, it is likely that reports debunking dubious claims reach fewer people than disinformation or claims that are hard to verify. “It does not nearly get the same level of engagement,” Blankenship says. “You can have a book’s worth of evidence for it, and they would still find a way to discount it.”

And while OSINT research can answer some questions, it has its limits and can also raise new ones. Kaarsbo, the former Danish intelligence official, and other experts have pointed out that the Andromeda is a relatively small yacht, and it may have been unable to carry the amount of explosives needed to blow the pipelines. “The Andromeda is quite likely a piece of the puzzle, but I don’t think it’s a bigger piece of the puzzle that everyone makes it out to be,” Alexander says. “I think there are a lot of the big pieces missing.” Detailed sonar imagery of the damaged pipes would help people to understand what happened underwater, Alexander adds.

Ultimately, there is still very little hard public evidence—either from governments or publicly available online—about who may have been behind the attacks. Behind closed doors, intelligence agencies likely have more data and theories on the potential culprits. However, investigators in Sweden and Denmark refused to comment on their progress, while Germany’s Office of the Federal Prosecutor confirmed it had searched a yacht and is continuing to examine for explosives. German officials have also said there could be a chance of a “false flag” operation to smear Ukraine. And when the countries complete their investigations, there’s no guarantee they will publish their findings or evidence to back them up. The mystery continues.

Wired · by Condé Nast · March 20, 2023

28. US, Philippines Tout Perks of Military Deal Opposed By China

Excerpts;

The $24-million plan that will enable the runway to host bigger aircraft and to operate at night is “EDCA in action” and “the latest project to strengthen” the two nations’ alliance, US Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson said at the event. The expanded US access in the Southeast Asian nation is meant to benefit both countries, according to US Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall.

The military deal will also help the Philippine economy by utilizing local companies and materials, the US envoy said, touting gains from the rapprochement that’s worrying some communities and politicians including Senator Imee Marcos, the elder sister of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

The US last month secured access to four more Philippine military sites, as tensions with Beijing over Taiwan and the South China Sea persist. The move is part of a 2014 pact which allows the US to rotate its troops for prolonged stays as well as build and operate in Philippine bases. The four military locations will be announced by the two nations as soon as they can, Kendall said.

US, Philippines Tout Perks of Military Deal Opposed By China

Latest project strengthens US-Philippines alliance: US envoy
Four defense cooperation sites to be named as soon as possible

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-20/us-philippines-showcase-military-deal-perks-with-runway-repair?sref=hhjZtX76

ByAndreo Calonzo

March 20, 2023 at 1:56 AM EDTUpdated onMarch 20, 2023 at 4:36 AM EDT

The US and the Philippines highlighted the benefits of a recently expanded defense deal, as America’s push for greater presence in the Southeast Asian nation faced opposition from China and local politicians.

US and Philippine officials showcased the US-funded rehabilitation of the runway inside Basa Air Base north of Manila, among the five sites previously chosen to implement the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The repair is targeted for completion later this year, Philippine Defense Secretary Carlito Galvez said at the groundbreaking Monday.

The $24-million plan that will enable the runway to host bigger aircraft and to operate at night is “EDCA in action” and “the latest project to strengthen” the two nations’ alliance, US Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson said at the event. The expanded US access in the Southeast Asian nation is meant to benefit both countries, according to US Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall.

The military deal will also help the Philippine economy by utilizing local companies and materials, the US envoy said, touting gains from the rapprochement that’s worrying some communities and politicians including Senator Imee Marcos, the elder sister of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

The US last month secured access to four more Philippine military sites, as tensions with Beijing over Taiwan and the South China Sea persist. The move is part of a 2014 pact which allows the US to rotate its troops for prolonged stays as well as build and operate in Philippine bases. The four military locations will be announced by the two nations as soon as they can, Kendall said.

Basa Air Base in Pampanga province is among the five original sites to implement a key US-Philippine defense deal.

The implementation of EDCA “is now in full swing” and that “moving forward, we hope the US will consider more projects” that will strengthen the Philippines’ capability to protect its sovereignty, Galvez said in his speech. The repair will make the runway an ideal site for joint exercises, he added.

The US and the Philippines’ moves to strengthen ties are “not directed to anybody,” the defense chief said at a briefing that followed. Local leaders from Cagayan — a province near Taiwan that’s believed to be among the locations for expanded US access — have already agreed to abide by the government’s decision to boost EDCA’s implementation, Galvez said.

Weeks ago, Cagayan province Governor Manuel Mamba said US troops are “not welcome” in his turf, favoring stronger ties with China “that has been good to us.” Beijing has also criticized the deal, with its embassy in Manila describing it as part of US’ attempt to “encircle and contain.” Senator Marcos is worried the Philippines might be embroiled if US-China tensions over Taiwan escalate.

READ MORE STORIES ON GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONSUS Troop Expansion Near Taiwan Revives Old Debate in Philippines

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The Philippines under Marcos has been ramping up the rhetoric against China on territorial dispute while bolstering longstanding defense ties with the US that languished during the term of his predecessor. Manila is expanding military exercises with American troops and plans to restart patrols with the US in the disputed waters. Their annual joint exercises will begin on April 11.

For Major General Ramon Guiang, acting commanding general of the Philippine Air Force, the runway repair project supports the nation’s defense modernization and enhances its interoperability with the US. Washington has so far allocated $83.1 million to implement EDCA, with 15 projects in different phases, said Galvez.

Philippine envoy to the US Jose Manuel Romualdez earlier on Monday described EDCA as “a key pillar of our bilateral defense and military cooperation.”

— With assistance by Siegfrid Alegado

(Updates with US Air Force Secretary comments in third and fifth paragraphs.)

29. What does Xi Jinping want from Vladimir Putin?

Excerpts:

If Mr Xi does decide to arm Russia, he may do so covertly. China has a long history of clandestine arms exports. In the 1980s it secretly supplied Chinese-made variants of the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle to CIA-backed mujahideen insurgents in Afghanistan. Providing Russia with artillery shells would be easy: Chinese arms-makers produce similar models and can remove markings, or add ones suggesting they originate elsewhere, says Dennis Wilder, a former CIA officer who used to track Chinese arms exports. China could also supply weaponry via third countries, like North Korea or Iran, or provide them with incentives to ship their own arms to Russia. America might detect such moves, but proving them will be harder. “All China needs is plausible deniability,” says Mr Wilder.

But the quiet approach has limits. To truly alter the course of the war might require China to supply bigger, more sophisticated weapons, such as attack drones. Those would be harder to conceal, especially if any were to fall into Ukrainian hands. And public exposure would significantly undermine Mr Xi’s efforts to present himself as a peacemaker and to undermine relations between Europe and America.

In the end Mr Xi’s decision could depend on how the war plays out, and especially on the outcome of the expected Ukrainian counter-offensive in the coming months. It could hinge, too, on the level of tensions between China and America over Taiwan, suggests Alexander Korolev, who studies China-Russia relations at the University of New South Wales in Australia. “If, by sending weapons to Ukraine, China can control the level of escalation and keep Russia going for as long as needed, then it can keep the West busy,” he says. “That makes it more feasible to deal with Taiwan.”

What does Xi Jinping want from Vladimir Putin?

Big questions loom as the Chinese leader heads to Moscow

Mar 19th 2023

The Economist

EVER SINCE the second world war geopolitics have been moulded by the “strategic triangle” between China, Russia and America. Co-ordination between Mao Zedong and Josef Stalin in the early 1950s fuelled American determination to halt the spread of communism. That led to America fighting wars in Korea and Vietnam, its commitment to defend Taiwan, and multiple proxy conflicts elsewhere.

A decade later Mao’s schism with Nikita Khrushchev laid the ground for an American rapprochement with China. That brought covert Chinese assistance in the fight against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which helped to end the cold war. It also underpinned the decades-long run of economic growth that has transformed China into a global power—and a geopolitical rival to America.

Now another shift of the triad looms. Xi Jinping, China’s leader, is due in Moscow on March 20th for a three-day visit: his first since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year. At the very least it will be an emphatic display of solidarity with Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president. It may be more, too: American officials believe Mr Xi is weighing Russia’s request to supply it with lethal weapons, including artillery shells and attack drones, for use in Ukraine. If Mr Xi agrees, it would draw China into a proxy war with NATO.

In China’s telling, Mr Xi heads to Moscow as a peacemaker, and with no offer of arms. He is likely to use his trip to repeat his call for an end to the war, and to promote a 12-point peace plan first proposed by China in February. Mr Xi will echo recent Chinese statements urging respect for all countries’ territorial integrity and opposing any use of—or talk of using—nuclear weapons.

As evidence of Mr Xi’s peacemaking credentials Chinese officials point to their country’s role in brokering an agreement on March 10th to re-establish diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran. To offset Western criticism of his Moscow visit, Mr Xi is likely to follow it with virtual talks with Ukraine’s president, Volodymr Zelensky. It would be the pair’s first official exchange since Russia’s invasion. That will play well in many poor and middle-income countries, and among some Westerners keen for America to be less confrontational towards China.

Yet Mr Xi’s true intentions are hidden in plain sight. While professing neutrality, he still refuses to condemn Russia’s invasion or its soldiers’ atrocities. In Moscow he will almost certainly join Mr Putin in blaming the war, yet again, on the expansion of NATO. (Chinese officials and state media draw parallels with America’s bid to strengthen its alliances in Asia in preparation for a potential Chinese assault on Taiwan.) And even if Mr Xi stops short of sending Russia weapons, he will probably offer more non-military support to help sustain Mr Putin’s war. Although China largely avoids violating Western sanctions on Russia, it has not joined them. Indeed, it helps Russia offset their impact by buying more of its oil and gas, and selling it more electronics and other goods.

You call that a plan?

China’s peace plan, meanwhile, is a non-starter for Ukraine and its Western backers. It advocates an end to Western sanctions without requiring Russia to withdraw from Ukrainian territory. It sticks closely to Kremlin talking points in arguing that security “should not be pursued at the expense of others”, nor by “strengthening or expanding military blocs”. Such points echo Mr Xi’s “Global Security Initiative”, which he proposed last year as an alternative to the American-led “rules-based international order” and will probably promote enthusiastically over the next few days.

Mr Xi’s stance unsettles some in China’s elite. It shreds the country’s claim to be pursuing a foreign policy rooted in respect for sovereignty, and undermines a guarantee it made in 2013 to help Ukraine if it were threatened with nuclear attack. It makes Chinese attempts to cleave Europe from America much harder. Chinese strategists are clear-eyed, too, about Russia’s unpredictable politics and dismal economic prospects. Arming it would expose China to severe sanctions from America and the European Union, its two biggest trading partners, hobbling efforts to revive its economy. Talk of a new cold war would harden into reality.

Yet Mr Xi’s calculations are dominated by his conviction that China is locked in a long-term confrontation with America that might lead to a war over Taiwan, which it claims as its territory. In that context Russia still represents an indispensable source of energy, military technology and diplomatic support. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would embolden America and its allies. If Mr Putin’s grip on power slipped, instability on China’s vast northern border with Russia could follow. Worst of all, it could usher into the Kremlin a pro-Western leader tempted to help America to contain Chinese power, in a mirror image of China’s own strategic shift in the 1970s.

“That is the nightmare for China,” says Li Mingjiang, an expert on Chinese foreign policy at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. In Mr Xi’s eyes America represents the greatest potential threat, and China has no other big power on its side to help resist Western economic or military pressure. “Russia is the only option,” he says. “It’s the same logic as in the cold war, when Mao saw the Soviet Union as China’s number-one enemy, and decided to pursue rapprochement with the United States.”

Mr Xi’s strategic considerations are underpinned by a personal connection with Russia. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a prominent revolutionary who later oversaw the Soviet experts who helped build up Chinese industry in the 1950s. As vice-premier, the elder Xi visited Moscow in 1959. He returned full of admiration, bearing Soviet-made toys that delighted his six-year-old son.

The younger Xi’s interest in Russia seems to have deepened during the seven years he spent in a remote village to which he was sent at the age of 15 in 1969, during the Cultural Revolution. The books he read are still displayed there, including “War and Peace”, a selection of Lenin’s writings, an account of Soviet battles in the second world war and “How the Steel was Tempered”, a socialist-realist novel about a man who fights the Germans, joins the Bolsheviks and becomes an ideal Soviet citizen.

Mr Xi was not alone in his regard for Russia. Senior Chinese military officers developed close ties with their Russian counterparts after Western governments placed arms embargoes on China over the crushing of pro-democracy protests around Tiananmen Square in 1989. (They remain in place.) Since then, China has bought tens of billions of dollars’ worth of Russian weapons. Attitudes towards America within China’s military leadership hardened after American warplanes bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, during the Kosovo conflict. (America apologised, insisting it was a mistake.)

In the decade before Mr Xi took power in 2012, he also appears to have been influenced by leftist academics and fellow “princelings” (as offspring of Communist Party leaders are known) who became disillusioned with the West, especially after the financial crisis in 2007-09. Inspired by Mr Putin, then near the height of his power, they began to see Russia as a potential partner and to question Chinese historians’ conclusions that the Soviet Union collapsed owing to problems dating back to Stalin. Instead, they blamed Mikhail Gorbachev and his liberalising reforms.

By the time Mr Xi assumed office, he and his advisers were already bent on closer alignment with Russia. He chose Moscow for his first trip abroad, and hinted there that the two countries would work together against the West. “Our characters are alike,” he told Mr Putin. Mr Xi has since met him some 39 times, far more than any other leader, apparently bonding over common disdain for democracy and fears of American encirclement.

Sneak attack

Some of the shine may have come off the pair’s relationship after Mr Putin’s scheming last year. In February 2022, just before Russia invaded Ukraine, he visited Mr Xi in Beijing for the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics, and the two sides declared that their partnership had “no limits”. Whatever the pair discussed, Chinese officials appear to have been wrong-footed by the scale of the invasion: they had no prepared talking points or plans to evacuate Chinese citizens. Soon after the war began, China’s vice-foreign minister responsible for Russia was transferred to the radio and television administration.

Chinese perceptions of Russian military prowess have also changed since the war began. Russian successes in Crimea, Georgia and Syria had convinced Chinese generals that Mr Putin was a great strategist with an effective army. Drills between the two countries’ armed forces have focused on interoperability. Recent Chinese military reforms have replicated those in Russia. But Chinese commanders have been shocked by Mr Putin’s miscalculations over Ukraine and the lacklustre performance of Russian soldiers and weaponry.

Disillusion is not confined to military types. In December Feng Yujun, a prominent Russia expert at Fudan University, in Shanghai, made a scathing speech in which he noted that Russia had annexed millions of square miles of Chinese territory between 1860 and 1945. The Soviet Union then forced China to distance itself from the West and pushed it to enter the Korean war, in which “countless” Chinese troops were killed, he argued. Modern Russia, he went on, had not accepted its weakness relative to China and was obsessed with rebuilding its empire. “The weakest party in the China-America-Russia triangle always benefits the most,” he concluded.

Such views are now common among Chinese scholars and business figures familiar with Russia. But their impact on decision-making is limited in a system that depends increasingly on the will of one man.

Late last year some Western officials expressed hope that China was starting to distance itself from Russia, especially after Mr Putin promised to address Chinese “questions and concerns” about the situation in Ukraine when he met Mr Xi in Uzbekistan in September. Those hopes grew stronger after Mr Xi and other senior Chinese officials, without explicitly mentioning Mr Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling over Ukraine, voiced disapproval of any such threat or attack. The statements coincided with a diplomatic push by Mr Xi to repair some of the damage to China’s economy and international relations after its long self-imposed isolation to counter covid-19.

For a while, Mr Xi appeared keen to try to reduce tensions with America. That approach seemed to gain momentum when he met President Joe Biden in Bali in November. Both men said they would try to find areas of potential co-operation. But that attempt at detente ground to a halt in February after America shot down a high-altitude Chinese balloon that it said was part of a global surveillance operation. Chinese officials have been frustrated, too, by their lack of progress in undermining support for NATO within Europe.

Beyond the diplomatic to-ing and fro-ing there is little hard evidence that China is distancing itself from Russia. In 2022 Russian exports of crude oil and gas to China rose, in dollar terms, by 44% and more than 100% respectively. Chinese exports to Russia increased by 12.8%. China’s shipments of microchips—which are used in military as well as civilian kit, and which the West has tried to deny to Russia—more than doubled. Some Chinese companies have even provided items for direct military use, such as satellite images, jamming technology and parts for fighter jets—although only in small quantities. Some of these deals may pre-date the war, or involve entities already under American sanctions.

China has also continued to take part in joint military drills with Russia. In November Chinese and Russian strategic bombers flew on a joint patrol over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and landed on each others’ airfields for the first time. On the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, Russian, Chinese and South African warships were exercising together in the Indian Ocean. And on March 15th Russia, China and Iran began joint naval drills in the Gulf of Oman.

Double or nothing

Rather than downgrade the relationship Mr Xi appears to be strengthening it, while exploiting Russia’s miscalculations in Ukraine to tilt the balance of power in his favour. It is easy to see why. Mr Xi has won access to discounted energy supplies. And he has almost certainly extracted an assurance that Mr Putin will back him diplomatically in a war over Taiwan.

He has also gained leverage to seek high-end Russian military technology, such as surface-to-air missile systems and nuclear reactors designed to power submarines—and to press Mr Putin to withhold or delay supplies of similar items to other Russian customers that have territorial disputes with China, such as India and Vietnam. Russia could also help upgrade China’s nuclear arsenal, or work on a joint missile-warning system.

In recent weeks Mr Xi appears to have doubled down. Two days before the anniversary of Russia’s invasion he sent Wang Yi, his top diplomat, to meet Mr Putin in Moscow. There, Mr Wang said China’s strategic partnership with Russia was “as firm as Mount Tai” and pledged to work with Russia to “strengthen strategic co-ordination, expand practical co-operation and defend the legitimate interests of both countries.” One expected item on the agenda for Mr Xi’s visit will be Russia’s proposal to build a new gas pipeline to China that would divert supplies once earmarked for Europe.

Even as China extracts concessions its officials will be anxious to keep Mr Xi’s hands clean, especially after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Mr Putin on March 17th, accusing him of war crimes. Having been surprised once by the scale of Russia’s invasion, officials in Beijing will be keen to ensure that there is no big new offensive or egregious attack on civilians while their boss is in Moscow. Recalling Mr Biden’s surprise visit to Kyiv during Mr Wang’s trip to Moscow, they will also be wary of any American counter-moves.

Mr Xi’s proposed call with Mr Zelensky, long advocated by European and American officials, may improve the optics of his trip, especially if the Ukrainian leader makes positive noises about China’s peacemaking potential. But Mr Xi probably has little immediate interest in mediation. The Iran-Saudi deal was brewing for some time before China stepped in, and elsewhere its record as an intermediary is poor. The “six-party talks” it hosted for years over North Korea came to nothing. Likewise efforts to broker peace in Afghanistan and Myanmar. Chinese officials also calculate (correctly) that neither Russia nor Ukraine wants peace talks at the moment, as both believe they can make advances on the battlefield. Mr Xi’s peace posturing is thus more about burnishing his international image while undermining America’s, and positioning China to take advantage of whatever emerges from the war.

As for Russia’s request for lethal weapons, China is most likely undecided. America’s allegation that China is mulling sending arms may be more of a pre-emptive public warning than evidence of imminent action. Chinese officials deny any such plans exist. But China may see another opportunity to gain leverage. In public statements and private discussions its officials increasingly draw a link with America’s provision of weapons to Taiwan. “Why does the US ask China not to provide weapons to Russia while it keeps selling arms to Taiwan?” asked Qin Gang, China’s new foreign minister, at his debut news conference on March 7th.

If Mr Xi does decide to arm Russia, he may do so covertly. China has a long history of clandestine arms exports. In the 1980s it secretly supplied Chinese-made variants of the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle to CIA-backed mujahideen insurgents in Afghanistan. Providing Russia with artillery shells would be easy: Chinese arms-makers produce similar models and can remove markings, or add ones suggesting they originate elsewhere, says Dennis Wilder, a former CIA officer who used to track Chinese arms exports. China could also supply weaponry via third countries, like North Korea or Iran, or provide them with incentives to ship their own arms to Russia. America might detect such moves, but proving them will be harder. “All China needs is plausible deniability,” says Mr Wilder.

But the quiet approach has limits. To truly alter the course of the war might require China to supply bigger, more sophisticated weapons, such as attack drones. Those would be harder to conceal, especially if any were to fall into Ukrainian hands. And public exposure would significantly undermine Mr Xi’s efforts to present himself as a peacemaker and to undermine relations between Europe and America.

In the end Mr Xi’s decision could depend on how the war plays out, and especially on the outcome of the expected Ukrainian counter-offensive in the coming months. It could hinge, too, on the level of tensions between China and America over Taiwan, suggests Alexander Korolev, who studies China-Russia relations at the University of New South Wales in Australia. “If, by sending weapons to Ukraine, China can control the level of escalation and keep Russia going for as long as needed, then it can keep the West busy,” he says. “That makes it more feasible to deal with Taiwan.” ■

The Economist

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: [email protected]

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d [email protected]

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 19, 2023

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