Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Note that behind these concepts rests a distinction between a central political vision which lies at the core of a nation's or movement's political will, and the unfolding of that vision into ideas, guidelines, and media products for political warfare purposes. The unfolding process is complex, and an understanding of its patterns is essential to coherent and purposeful political warfare, both defensive and offensive. Note also that the process is dynamic; even in the most rigidly structured and strictly disciplined nations it can change with lightning rapidity. It may also be subject to slow, glacial movement, discernible only by extended trend-line analysis but still meaningful in cumulative effect. Recent history includes instructive cases of political warfare conducted either in ignorance of such forces or, more disastrously, on the basis of over sophisticated and schematic perceptions of them."

-Paul Smith, "On Political Warfare"

"All war is a symptom of man's failure as a thinking animal."

- John Steinbeck, “Once There Was a War”

“Those who are able to see beyond the shadows and lies of their culture will never be understood, let alone believed by the masses.”

- Plato

1. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN March 22, 5.30 pm EST - The three hundred and ninety-second day of the russian large-scale invasion continues.

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22, 2023

3. The War on Terror Created a Cancer Crisis. These Vets Are Trying to Fight Back.

4. Inside Ukraine’s Nonviolent Resistance: Chatbots, Yellow Paint, and Payoffs

5. American Interests and Values Align in Ukraine

6. How Iran Won the Iraq War

7. What are America's goals in Ukraine? It's not totally clear

8. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 23, 2023 | SOF News

9. The Air Force Is Rebuilding Its Pacific Plans Around the B-21

10. US F-22s land in Philippines for first time, furthering defense ties

11. Marcos says new military bases with US to be 'scattered' around the Philippines

12. 'Up our game': The Pentagon's 3 strategies to shore up munitions stockpiles

13. The US military will fight the next big war with Xbox-style video game controllers

14. China can wait. The Army’s focus should be Europe. By John Nagl and Keith Burkepile

15. Opinion: Why the U.S. will probably never ban TikTok

16. More B-21s Would Help America Field a Two-War Military, New Mitchell Paper Says

17. Biden’s Nord Stream cover-up enters new slippery phase by Seymour Hersh

18. The Marine Corps Needs to Modernize its Targeting Cycle—Here’s How

19. How Xi and Putin see a post-Ukraine war world

20. The Lessons of 20 Years of Counterinsurgency Research

21. Thinking Big with Small Drones: An Allied Approach to Swarming

22. Republicans grill military on diversity, equity goals at hearing on recruitment challenges

23. The Navy Isn’t Too Woke—It Is America

1. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN March 22, 5.30 pm EST - The three hundred and ninety-second day of the russian large-scale invasion continues.

Also posted on Small Wars Journal https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ukraine-war-bulletin-march-22-530-pm-est-three-hundred-and-ninety-secondday-russian-large

Embassy of Ukraine in the USA

WAR BULLETIN

March 22, 5.30 pm EST

During the day, the enemy launched a rocket attack on Zaporizhzhia, as a result of which 2 Russian rockets hit a residential multi-storey building, there were deaths and injuries among civilians. The enemy also carried out 41 air strikes. In particular, the occupiers used 21 UAVs of the Shahed-136 type from the Bryansk region of the Russian Federation, 16 of these drones were shot down. As a result of enemy UAV strikes, the Russians hit the territory of a dormitory of a vocational college in Rzhyshchev in Kyiv region, there were deaths and injuries among civilians, and a critical civilian infrastructure object in Zhytomyr region was damaged. In addition, the invaders launched more than 30 attacks from rocket salvo systems.

During a working trip to the Donetsk region, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a coordination meeting on the socio-economic and current security situation in the region, visited the frontline positions of the Ukrainian military in the Bakhmut area. The Head of State heard reports on the operational situation and the course of hostilities on the frontline.

Ukrainian authorities and IMF reach Staff Level Agreement on Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement of $15.6 billion.

WAR ROOM

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.2022 to 22.03.2023 were approximately:

personnel ‒ about 167490 (+920) persons,

tanks ‒ 3557 (+5),

APV ‒ 6887 (+8),

artillery systems – 2589 (+3),

MLRS – 509 (+2),

Anti-aircraft warfare systems ‒ 272 (+2),

aircraft – 305,

helicopters – 290,

UAV operational-tactical level – 2183 (+16),

cruise missiles ‒ 909 (+2),

warships / boats ‒ 18,

and fuel tanks – 5434 (+6),

special equipment ‒ 270 (+4).

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SiGubqWVViP8gWLjijDpa8ceFytLn3bTbCK2mKjc46CcoypCBXfnZZ2A5yJ8EXXNl?locale=uk_UA

Operational information as of 18.00

Glory to Ukraine! The three hundred and ninety-second day of the russian large-scale invasion continues.

The russian federation continues its armed aggression against Ukraine, focusing its main efforts on attempts to completely capture the Donetsk and Luhansk regions within the administrative borders. The enemy continues to conduct offensive operations in the Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiiv, Marin, and Shakhtar directions. The fiercest battles continue in the southern and northern parts of Bakhmut, and the enemy also carried out offensive actions in the Avdiivka direction in order to establish control over Avdiivka and Maryinka.

The russian aggressor continues to use his usual terror tactics against the civilian population, shelling populated areas and critical infrastructure facilities.

The threat of enemy strikes remains throughout the territory of Ukraine.

In the Volyn, Polissiya, Siverskyi and Slobozhanskyi directions, the operational situation has not changed significantly, the formation of offensive groups of the enemy has not been detected. The russian leadership continues to use the infrastructure of the republic of belarus to train its troops. The enemy maintains a military presence in the border areas. During the day, the enemy shelled the areas of the settlements of Khrinivka, Myhalchyna Sloboda, Chernihiv region; Atynske, Volfine and Popivka in the Sumy region and Basove, Strelecha, Hlyboke and Vovchansk in the Kharkiv region.

On the Kupyansk and Lyman directions, the enemy continues to try to break our defenses. He led unsuccessful offensive actions in the areas of Makiivka and Bilogorivka settlements. He carried out artillery shelling of the districts of Dvorichna, Kupyansk and Krokhmalne settlements of Kharkiv region; Belogorivka - Luhansk, as well as Kolodyazi and Verkhnokamianske in Donetsk region.

In the Bakhmut direction, the enemy continues to conduct offensive actions, but its offensive potential is decreasing. The enemy does not stop trying to capture the city, losing a significant amount of manpower, weapons and military equipment. Our defenders repel numerous enemy attacks around the clock in the areas of Bakhmut, Bohdanivka and Predtechine settlements. Settlements near the contact line, including Vasyukivka, Mynkivka, Hryhorivka, Bakhmut, Ivanovske, Bila Gora, Druzhba, Mayorsk, Zalizne and New York of the Donetsk region, were hit by enemy shelling.

On the Avdiivka, Marinka, and Shakhtarskyi directions, the enemy carried out offensive actions in the areas of Novokalynov, Stepove, Berdychi, Avdiivka, Lastochkine, Severna, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Marinka, and Pobieda settlements - without success. In particular, Avdiivka, Vodyane, Karlivka, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka, Vugledar and Velika Novosilka of the Donetsk region came under enemy fire.

In the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson directions, the enemy is conducting defensive operations. Areas of settlements near the contact line, in particular, Gulyaipole, Zaliznychne, Gulyaipilske, Biloghirya, Mala Tokmachka, Kamianske of the Zaporizhia region, as well as Havrylivka, Beryslav, Vesele, Antonivka, Dniprovske, and the city of Kherson, were shelled.

In the settlement of Vesele in the temporarily occupied territory of the Zaporizhzhia region, on the territory of the building of the kindergarten, the russian occupying forces set up a military hospital.

The russian criminal authorities continue measures for forced passporting of the population of the temporarily occupied and occupied territories of Ukraine. Thus, in the settlements of the Kherson region, the Russian occupying so-called "authorities" have been threatening local residents since April to stop paying pensions in the absence of a russian passport.

At the same time, in the Starobilskyi Vocational College of the Luhansk National Agrarian University, a meeting of teachers was held, who expressed dissatisfaction with the forced passporting of the teaching staff, due to the instruction of the occupying so-called "leadership" of the educational institution, that all employees of the college should receive a passport of a citizen of the russian federation by June 1. Teachers are not given the opportunity to resign at their own will. The occupiers took measures to forcibly disperse and stop the meetings.

During the day, the aviation of the Defense Forces struck the enemy's anti-aircraft missile complex, as well as 12 strikes on the areas of concentration of personnel and military equipment of the occupiers.

Support the Armed Forces! Together we will win!

Glory to Ukraine!

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0teY5FqmU8LGqkZLBCsz7LkMfYgFE7sBjQ8t3ymULBQrcnKe6d98L2xTEwqtpowm9l?locale=uk_UA

POLICY

President of Ukraine

Zaporizhzhia. Right now, residential areas where ordinary people and children live are being fired at. This must not become "just another day" in Ukraine or anywhere else in the world. The world needs greater unity and determination to defeat Russian terror faster and protect lives.

Over 20 Iranian murderous drones, plus missiles, numerous shelling occasions, and that's just in one last night of Russian terror against Ukraine. Every time someone tries to hear the word "peace" in Moscow, another order is given there for such criminal strikes. ½

The success of Ukrainian forces on the land, in the sky and at sea really brings peace closer. Full compliance with the sanctions regime against Russia really restores the force of the UN Charter. Global unity can restore global stability. 2/2

https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa

We will do everything to ensure that the blue and yellow colors continue their liberation movement - address by the President of Ukraine

Good health to you, fellow Ukrainians!

Today I have been working in the regions all day. Donbas – the frontline, our warriors, the region. The Kharkiv region after that - the situation in Kharkiv, on the border, in all districts of the region, restoration, protection of critical infrastructure.

I started from the front, from the Bakhmut area. It is an honor for me to support our warriors who are defending the country in the toughest frontline conditions. I presented state awards, thanked our soldiers for their bravery, for their resilience, for Ukraine - which we are preserving thanks to such heroes, thanks to each and every one of them who is fighting against Russian evil.

I paid a visit to the wounded warriors. I wished them - and I'm sure on behalf of all of you, all of our people - a speedy recovery.

I thanked the doctors and nurses. And now I want to thank everyone who supports our soldiers recovering from injuries. Who helps with everything necessary, our doctors, everyone who works for rehabilitation after injuries. I am grateful to every volunteer, every partner of ours who helps!

It is distressing to look at the cities of Donbas, to which Russia has brought terrible suffering and ruin. The almost constant, hourly air-alert siren in Kramatorsk, the constant threat of shelling, the constant threat to life... Right there, in Donbas, in the Kharkiv region - wherever Russian evil has come, it is obvious that the terrorist state cannot be stopped by anything other than one thing - our victory. And we will ensure it - the Ukrainian victory.

In all areas of the east of our country, where there is a Ukrainian flag, there is also hope. It is felt. We will do everything so that the blue and yellow colors continue their liberation movement - returning normal life to our entire land, from Donetsk to the border.

We will certainly respond to the occupier for every attack on our cities... Today's Russian strikes at Zaporizhzhia, the night attack on the Kyiv region... All Russian strikes will receive a military, political, and legal response.

Russia will lose this war. There is no subject in the world who does not feel this already. Everyone understands all this. And every Russian murderer should understand that an arrest warrant is the best thing that can happen to them.

My condolences to all our people who lost their relatives and loved ones due to Russian terror!

In the second half of the day, I, my team, the Head of the Office - we all worked in the Kharkiv region. Just as in the Donetsk region, I held a meeting on the situation in the region, on social and security needs.

It is very important that Kharkiv stands strong. Well done! Thank you, people of Kharkiv! You hold on with confidence. The city lives, the city fights, Kharkiv gives strength to our entire east. I thank everyone who stayed in Kharkiv, who works, who gives work to others, who maintains security, protects the border! Thank you to everyone - in positions, at posts, at critical infrastructure facilities, utility workers, local authorities, businesses, educators...

The representatives of the region informed me about some issues that must be resolved by the government for stable social security of all those who work for our people in the Kharkiv region. These issues were discussed. We also discussed issues of reconstruction, humanitarian demining, and restoration of energy networks. Everything that is within the competence of the government will be done for sure.

And, of course, I was very pleased to hand over a special award to Kharkiv... Award of the hero city, a ribbon on the city's flag denoting the special bravery of the people of Kharkiv.

And one more thing.

This evening begins the holy month of Ramadan for Muslims. A significant part of our Ukrainian Muslim community, the Crimean Tatar people, is forced to meet Ramadan under occupation, under the threat of Russian repression and abuse in Crimea, under shelling in other parts of Ukraine, and in frontline battles.

I have no doubt that we will return freedom, respect, and security to our entire state and to all communities. And may the power of prayer in this holy month help us cleanse Ukraine of Russian godless evil, of those who truly believe in nothing, and that is why they are capable of such terror. Let the next Ramadan begin in peace and on the entire Ukrainian land free from Russia. Ramadan Mubarak!

Glory to all who are now fighting for Ukraine and the people!

Gratitude to everyone who helps every day!

Glory to Ukraine!

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-zrobimo-vse-shob-sino-zhovti-kolori-prodovzhili-svij-vizv-81745

President visited frontline positions in the Donetsk region and awarded the defenders of Bakhmut

During a working trip to the Donetsk region, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited the frontline positions of the Ukrainian military in the Bakhmut area.

The Head of State heard reports on the operational situation and the course of hostilities on the frontline.

The President spoke with the servicemen and thanked them for the defense of Ukraine.

Full article: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-vidvidav-peredovi-poziciyi-na-donechchini-ta-nagor-81729

FINANCE

The Ministry of Finance

Ukrainian authorities and IMF reach Staff Level Agreement on Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement of $15.6 billion

Ukrainian authorities and staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have reached a staff-level agreement on a 48-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement. The EFF Arrangement foresees funding for Ukraine in the amount of $15.6 billion (SDR 11.6 billion) and includes a set of macroeconomic and financial policies to support the economic recovery of Ukraine.

The program will help to mobilize financing from Ukraine’s international partners, as well as to maintain macrofinancial stability and ensure the path to post-war reconstruction after Ukrainian victory in the war against the aggressor.

The next step is the approval of the program by the IMF Executive Board which is expected in the coming weeks.

The EFF program includes two phases.

The first phase (12-18 months) based on PMB measures envisages:

· to strengthen fiscal, external, price and financial stability by bolstering revenue mobilization;

· evoiding monetary financing and aiming at net positive financing from domestic debt markets;

· contributing to long-term financial stability, including by preparing a deeper assessment of the banking sector health and continuing to promote central bank independence.

The second phase includes:

· expansive reforms with an aim to recovery and reconstruction;

· measures to support Ukraine’s EU accession goals;

· enhance financial resilience and higher long-term growth.

During the second phase it is anticipated that Ukraine will return to the policy frameworks that were in place prior to the russian war against Ukraine, which includes a flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting regime. Moreover, there will be a focus on implementing essential structural reforms in fiscal policies to stabilize medium-term revenues by introducing a national revenue strategy, and also launching public finance management and introducing public investment management reforms that will aid in the post-war reconstruction process. To help the post-war reform endeavors, it is necessary to improve competition in the crucial energy sector, while reducing quasi-fiscal liabilities.

Welcoming the agreement with the IMF Finance Minister Sergii Marchenko stated:

“The teams of the IMF, the Government of Ukraine, and the National Bank of Ukraine did a tremendous job to ensure that an agreement is reached. I am grateful to the IMF experts for their decisiveness during the mission.”

“After the Board consideration the EFF program will significantly support the Ukrainian economy, financial system and will ensure mobilization of additional donor’s financial resources which is necessary for our successful struggle against the aggressor. We are grateful to the IMF team for standing with Ukraine”.

https://www.mof.gov.ua/en/news/ukrainian_authorities_and_imf_reach_staff_level_agreement_on_extended_fund_facility_eff_arrangement_of_156_billion-3899

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2023

Key Takeaways

Russian forces conducted a limited drone and missile strike campaign in Ukraine overnight on March 21-22, indicating that Russian forces continue struggling with precision missile shortages.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intends to increase the size of Russia’s air defense forces at a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) collegium on March 22.
Shoigu likely signaled to Japan that it should not become more engaged in supporting Ukraine by announcing the deployment of an anti-shipping missile system on one of the Kuril Islands.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu walked away and refused to answer a question about how soon to expect peace in Ukraine.
The tempo of Russian operations around Bakhmut appears to be slowing amid Western reporting that Russian forces may be attempting to launch offensives in other directions.
Russian forces may be deploying T-54/55 tanks from storage to Ukraine to compensate for significant armored vehicle losses.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces made marginal territorial gains within Bakhmut and continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut and on the outskirts of Donetsk City.
Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces continue to clear an area on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
The Kremlin continued hybrid reserve callup and crypto mobilization campaigns to recruit Russians for contract service.
Russian officials and occupation authorities continued to advocate for legislative changes in an effort to further legitimize the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 22, 2023

Mar 22, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22, 2023

Riley Bailey, George Barros, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 22, 8 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russian forces conducted a limited drone and missile strike campaign in Ukraine overnight on March 21-22, indicating that Russian forces continue struggling with precision missile shortages. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted 21 drone strikes targeting residential and infrastructure areas in Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, and Odesa oblasts, and Ukrainian forces shot down 16 of the drones.[1] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck two residential high-rise buildings in Zaporizhzhia City, killing at least one civilian and injuring 33.[2] Russian forces conducted more intensive and wider-ranging strikes during the fall 2022 air and missile campaign, suggesting that Russian forces may now be rationing their use of high-precision munitions for these strike campaigns or may simply lack the necessary munitions to sustain strike campaigns at their earlier pace and intensity. Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated that the Russian missile strike threat remains high but that Russian forces would likely only conduct a limited campaign.[3]

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intends to increase the size of Russia’s air defense forces at a Russian MoD collegium on March 22. Shoigu stated that one of the Russian Aerospace Forces’ (VKS) development priorities is to generate more air defense units with advanced air defense systems.[4] He noted that in 2023 Russian forces plan to form a new air defense division and brigade, form a special purpose air defense missile brigade, form a new anti-aircraft missile regiment with more advanced S-350 systems, form a military transport aviation regiment, and complete the modernization of Moscow City’s air defense systems.[5] Shoigu also commented on Russian combat experience in Ukraine, stating that Russian pilots conducted over 140,000 combat sorties since February 24, 2022, and that 90 percent of operational-tactical and army aviation, 60 percent of strategic long-range aviation, and 85 percent of UAV operators have combat experience.[6]

The Russian military is unlikely to generate such forces within several years, let alone by the end of 2023. Russia’s defense industrial base has historically experienced multi-year delays in developing advanced air defense systems, even before the strict sanctions and exacerbated resource constraints resulting from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Current Russian air defense brigades and regiments received their S-400 systems up to several years behind schedule.[7] The Russian military had only fielded the S-500 system, which was reportedly supposed to enter production in 2015, in one Russian air defense army by 2021.[8] Russia also delayed its planned delivery of a second S-400 battery to India in 2022 due to constraints caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[9] Russia may eventually grow its air defense forces as part of a larger effort to recreate a large conventional military in the long term, however. Shoigu’s announcement is similar to his previous announcement at an MoD collegium in December 2022 in which Shoigu stated that Russia seeks to form 17 new maneuver divisions over several years.[10]

The formation of new Russian air defense and airlift units will not increase Russian combat power in Ukraine this year. Shoigu’s statement is likely intended to reassure the Russian people that the Russian MoD is continuing to develop the Russian military as a world-class military power to offset perceptions about Russian military failures in Ukraine.

Shoigu likely signaled to Japan that it should not attempt to exploit Russia’s current military vulnerability in the Kuril Islands and to China that Russia remains a worthwhile military partner. Shoigu extolled the strength of Russia’s Eastern Military District (EMD) at length and announced that the EMD deployed a battery of Bastion coastal defense missile systems on Paramushir Island—an island in the northern portion of the Russian-occupied Japanese Kuril Islands. Shoigu’s statement was likely a warning signal to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who visited Kyiv and Bucha on March 21, about becoming too engaged in supporting Ukraine.[11] The Russian Eastern Military District is severely degraded. Significant Russian EMD elements deployed to Belarus and were badly damaged during the Battle of Kyiv in early 2022. Russian EMD elements of the 155th and 40th Naval Infantry Brigades recently fought and suffered heavy losses near Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast in early 2023.[12] The 155th has been destroyed and reconstituted as many as eight times in the past year.[13] Shoigu’s statement was also likely a signal to Chinese President Xi Jinping that Russia supports Chinese security objectives in East Asia and remains a viable military partner despite the terrible damage Ukraine has inflicted on the Russian military.

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu walked away and refused to answer a question about how soon to expect peace in Ukraine. A journalist from the Russian Ministry of Defense-run media outlet TV Zvezda first asked Shoigu how the war will end, to which Shoigu responded, “any war ends in peace.”[14] The journalist then asked Shoigu how soon to expect peace in Ukraine. Shoigu did not answer the question and walked away. TV Zvezda originally aired the footage of Shoigu walking away but cut it in a later release. ISW previously reported that the Kremlin aims to set information conditions and prepare the Russian information space for a protracted war.[15]

The tempo of Russian operations around Bakhmut appears to be slowing amid Western reporting that Russian forces may be attempting to launch offensives in other directions. Russian forces made additional marginal advances in southern Bakhmut, and Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks on the southwestern and northwestern outskirts of the city on March 21 and 22.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 22 that Russian forces’ offensive potential in the Bakhmut area is declining, and Ukrainian officials have previously reported fewer combat clashes in the city itself in recent days.[17] US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on March 21 that Russian and Ukrainian forces are continuing to prioritize operations around Bakhmut and that Russian forces might try to conduct another offensive, possibly in many different directions.[18] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) assessed that Russian forces may be losing momentum in the Bakhmut area because the Russian MoD is relocating units to other directions.[19] Russian forces are currently increasing the tempo of their offensive operations around Avdiivka aiming to encircle the settlement, and it is possible that Russian forces are doing so at the expense of their operations around Bakhmut and the stalled offensive around Vuhledar.

Russian personnel of the 136th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) previously stated that they were deploying to the Vuhledar area to conduct assaults, but a Russian milblogger claimed on March 21 that elements of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating in the Avdiivka direction.[20] This apparent deployment change—if it is not a result of Russian misreporting—possibly indicates that Russian forces prioritized the intensification of operations around Avdiivka over restarting the offensive on Vuhledar. Ukrainian Tavriisk Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivyskyi stated on March 19 that Russian forces started increasing assaults in the Avdiivka area to set conditions for restarting offensive operations on Vuhledar, further suggesting that current Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka are preventing the potential resumption of offensive activities near Vuhledar.[21] Russian forces appear to be drawing more combat power to the Avdiivka area which may allow them to increase their rate of advance, although there were no confirmed Russian advances in the area on March 22. ISW continues to assess that Russian advances may prompt Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Bakhmut and/or Avdiivka although neither appears likely at this time. Russian forces may choose to launch or intensify offensive operations in new directions, but these operations would likely produce few tangible results as the overall Russian spring offensive continues to near culmination. ISW has still not observed evidence of the commitment of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) despite reports that it had reconstituted in Belarus and deployed to Luhansk. The Russians may commit this unit to one or more offensives already underway or to a new offensive undertaking. The commitment of this division’s two or three motorized rifle regiments is unlikely to achieve operationally decisive effects, however, given the failure of larger formations to do so.

Russian forces may be deploying T-54/55 tanks from long-term storage to Ukraine to compensate for significant armored vehicle losses. The Georgia-based open-source Conflict Intelligence Team research group reported on March 22 that Russian forces transported a train loaded with T-54/55 tanks from Primorsky Krai towards western Russia, and social media sources speculated that Russian forces may deploy them to Ukraine.[22] Dutch open-source group Oryx assessed as of March 22 that Russian forces have lost at least 57 T-90, 448 T-80, 1,025 T-72, 53 T-64, and 73 T-62 tanks in highly attritional fighting in Ukraine.[23] Russian armored vehicle losses are currently constraining the Russian military’s ability to conduct effective mechanized maneuver warfare in stalling offensives in Ukraine, and Russian forces may be deploying T-54/55 tanks from storage to Ukraine to augment these offensive operations and prepare for anticipated mechanized Ukrainian counteroffensives. The Soviet Union produced tens of thousands of T-54/55 tanks after the Second World War, and the Russian military may be turning to extensive Soviet reserves of these tanks to solve its significant armored vehicle shortages. The Russian military may also be deciding to field the tanks because parts to repair the T-54/55 tanks are abundantly available and substantially cheaper. T-54/55 tanks lack the armor capabilities of more modern armored equipment, however, and originally carried a smaller main gun, although the Russian military may have modernized some vehicles. The Russian military will likely experience greater numbers of casualties by fielding these older tank systems in Ukraine. The deployment of inferior equipment to replenish the Russian military's ability to conduct mechanized maneuver warfare may prompt a further degradation of Russian manpower in Ukraine. Russian forces are unlikely to achieve preferable resource attrition rates on the grounds that T-54/55 are cheaper than anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) ammunition, as some have argued—each tank loss is the loss of a tank crew as well as the tank, after all, and it is not clear how effective these tanks will be against Ukrainian armored vehicles, whereas they are highly vulnerable to many anti-tank systems available to Ukraine, not all of which are expensive.

Russian authorities are cracking down against bars in urban areas, possibly to crack down against internal dissent among Russian social circles. St. Petersburg outlet Fontanka claimed on March 22 that St. Petersburg authorities shut down two dozen bars as part of a broader investigation into claims of involving minors in “anti-social acts,” including systematic drinking, drug use, and vagrancy.[24] This excuse is implausible given normal Russian attitudes toward “systematic drinking.” Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) personnel conducted recent raids against two popular bars and forced patrons to conduct pro-war activities, after which at least one Russian businessman stepped away from his role in managing the bars, as ISW has previously reported.[25] These raids may target rich Russian businessmen like Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, who failed to deny current ownership of a St. Petersburg bar in his response to a Russian journalist who alleged that Prigozhin owned the bar in June 2022.[26] These measures may also encourage self-censorship within these circles and among bar attendees by publicly displaying the consequences of speaking out of turn.

Key Takeaways

Russian forces conducted a limited drone and missile strike campaign in Ukraine overnight on March 21-22, indicating that Russian forces continue struggling with precision missile shortages.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intends to increase the size of Russia’s air defense forces at a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) collegium on March 22.
Shoigu likely signaled to Japan that it should not become more engaged in supporting Ukraine by announcing the deployment of an anti-shipping missile system on one of the Kuril Islands.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu walked away and refused to answer a question about how soon to expect peace in Ukraine.
The tempo of Russian operations around Bakhmut appears to be slowing amid Western reporting that Russian forces may be attempting to launch offensives in other directions.
Russian forces may be deploying T-54/55 tanks from storage to Ukraine to compensate for significant armored vehicle losses.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces made marginal territorial gains within Bakhmut and continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut and on the outskirts of Donetsk City.
Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces continue to clear an area on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
The Kremlin continued hybrid reserve callup and crypto mobilization campaigns to recruit Russians for contract service.
Russian officials and occupation authorities continued to advocate for legislative changes in an effort to further legitimize the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on March 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Makiivka (21km northwest of Kreminna), Kreminna, Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (11km south of Kreminna), and Vesele (14km southeast of Siversk).[27] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 21 that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Yampolivka, Terny, and Nevske (all 17-19km northwest of Kreminna), and made unspecified advances towards Bilohorivka.[28] Another milblogger claimed on March 22 that Russian forces attacked towards Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove) and Makiivka.[29] Other Russian sources claimed that positional battles continued and that there are no changes in the Starobilsk area of the front line, likely referring to the northern section of the Kupyansk-Svatove line.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations in Bakhmut and its environs on March 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults in southern and northern Bakhmut; within 14km northwest of Bakhmut in Bohdanivka, Hryvorivka, and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; and within 21km southwest of Bakhmut in Predtechyne, Ivanivske, Klishchiivka, and Mayorsk.[31] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces continue attempting to advance to the Bakhmut city center from the outskirts.[32] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces cleared most of the industrial territory in Bakhmut—likely referring to the AZOM industrial complex in northern Bakhmut.[33] A Russian source also claimed that the Wagner Group continued to advance near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Bohdanivka, and southern Bakhmut in the areas of the Mariupol cemetery and Korsunskoho Street.[34] Geolocated footage published on March 21 showed that Wagner forces made marginal advances in southern Bakhmut.[35] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Wagner mercenaries resumed offensive operations in the direction of Predtechyne in a claimed attempt to advance to Kostyantynivka (about 21km west of Bakhmut) and continued to attack Ivanivske.[36] A Russian source also claimed that the elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (formerly the Donetsk People’s Republic’s [DNR] 3rd Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 1st Army Corps) are operating near Mayorsk.[37]

Ukrainian forces are conducting tactical counterattacks on Bakhmut’s northwestern and southwestern outskirts. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Ukrainian forces initiated a counterattack west of Bakhmut to relieve pressure on the T0504 (H-32) highway to Bakhmut.[38] Geolocated footage published on March 21 showed Ukrainian counterattacks south of Ivanivske and southeast of Bohdanivka.[39] A Russian source also claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack near the T0504 highway.[40]

Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations around Avdiivka. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks north of Avdiivka in Novokalynove, Novobakhmutivka, Krasnohorivka, Stepove, Lastochkyne, and Berdychi; west of Sieverne, Vodyane, Pervomaiske; and Avdiivka.[41] A spokesperson for the Russian Southern Group of Forces stated that elements of the 1st Army Corps are operating in the Avdiivka direction.[42] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are attacking Avdiivka from two directions: from the Orlivka direction in the north (about 12km northwest of Avdiivka) to cut Ukrainian supply lines and from the south via Opytne (about 3km southeast of Avdiivka).[43] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces attacked in the direction of Berdychi and are fighting on the eastern outskirts of Stepove.[44] Geolocated combat footage shows the DNR’s and Luhansk People’s Republic’s (LNR) ”Pyatnashka” volunteer battalion targeting Ukrainian positions southeast of Avdiivka.[45] Geolocated footage published on March 21 indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances north of Vodyane.[46]

Russian forces are launching assault operations west of Donetsk City but have not resumed offensives near Vuhledar as of this publication. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Marinka and Pobieda, 22km and 25km southwest of Donetsk City, respectively.[47] Russian milbloggers amplified footage on March 21 claiming to show the DNR “Kaskad” unit fighting in the Vuhledar area and claimed that Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs employees comprise a significant portion of the unit.[48]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck Shkilnyy Airfield in Odesa City on the night of March 21. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 22 that Russian forces struck two hangars with Ukrainian weapons and military equipment at the Shkilnyy Airfield on the outskirts of Odesa City.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched the attack on occupied Dzhankoy in Crimea on March 20 from the Shkilnyy Airfield.[50]

Russian forces reportedly intercepted Ukrainian drones near occupied Sevastopol, Crimea. Geolocated footage filmed on March 22 shows likely Russian direct fire against an unidentified object—likely a maritime drone—in the water near Sevastopol Bay followed by an explosion in the water.[51] Other footage posted on March 22 purportedly shows aerial drones also attacking Sevastopol.[52] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed on March 22 that two sailors destroyed three Ukrainian drones aimed at Russian military facilities in occupied Sevastopol.[53] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk reported anti-aircraft defense and anti-maritime drone activity over Sevastopol and that Russian authorities halted all maritime traffic near Sevastopol.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian maritime drones attempted to strike coastal bays in Sevastopol and that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian surface drone north of Sevastopol.[55] Zaporizhia Occupation Administration Council Member Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian forces also repelled Ukrainian aerial drones with air defenses and small arms.[56]

Ukrainian forces continue clearing operations on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated on March 21 that Ukrainian forces continue to clear a 20 to 30km strip in an unspecified location on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River to protect the population on the west (right) bank from constant Russian shelling.[57] Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian ammunition depot on the Kinburn Spit, preventing Russian forces from shelling from the area for an unspecified period of time.[58]

Russian forces conducted routine shelling in Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on March 22.[59]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues hybrid reserve callup and crypto mobilization campaigns to recruit Russians for contract service. Russian sources reported on March 21 that Russian residents in Tyumen and Sverdlovsk oblasts, Karelia and Altai republics, and Krasnodar Krai received military summonses directing them to verify information with military recruitment offices or undergo military training as part of mandatory reserve call-ups.[60] Russian recruitment offices are likely attempting to use mandatory month-long trainings for reservists to pressure them into signing contracts while also shortening the required amount of training that new Russian contract servicemen would need to undergo before deploying to Ukraine after a future involuntary call-up. Russian officials in Yaroslavl, Chelyabinsk, and Moscow oblasts have reportedly started widespread advertisement campaigns for contract service focused on additional promised payments for signing a contract and participating in active offensive actions.[61] The Kremlin is likely conducting this hybrid force generation campaign to avoid declaring a formal second mobilization wave.

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian occupation officials continue mobilization measures in occupied territories. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on March 22 that Russian occupation officials announced large-scale military training exercises for the spring or summer of 2023 to support plans to conscript the entire male population of draft age in Starobilsk, Shchastia, Novoaidar, Nizhneteple, and Novopskov in Luhansk Oblast.[62] Malyar claimed that Russian occupation officials are trying to incentivize potential conscripts by promising them housing taken from Ukrainian citizens forced to leave occupied territories.[63] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation officials are preparing for a new wave of mobilization in occupied Donetsk Oblast and that 23 occupation military recruitment offices plan to register young men born in 2006 to create a reserve of residents for future mobilization waves.[64]

Kherson Oblast occupation administration Head Vladimir Saldo announced on March 22 that his administration is forming a volunteer battalion. Saldo claimed that his administration formed the Vasily Margelov Volunteer Battalion to defend against Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance activities on the east (left) bank and to maintain order in occupied Kherson Oblast.[65] Saldo claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) agreed to fully support the volunteer battalion with arms and equipment and that the formation is currently undergoing combat training.[66] Saldo’s decision to form a volunteer battalion is likely aimed at increasing his control over occupied Kherson Oblast and is likely modeled on volunteer battalions that other occupation heads have formed for similar reasons.[67] The delineated public order task of the battalion suggests that the Kherson Oblast occupation administration may use the formation as a designated internal security force for further crackdowns.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to advocate for legislative changes in an effort to further legitimize the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova claimed on March 22 that Russian President Vladimir Putin supported a proposal to assign special statuses to children wounded during the “special military operation.”[68] Lvova-Belova expressed hopes that there will be an official decree to establish mechanisms to identify these children and provide them with support and benefits.[69] Advisor to the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Rodion Miroshnik stated on March 22 that he agrees with Lvova-Belova's proposal but called for a proposal that extends the special status of children of war to all children in Donbas.[70]

Russian occupation officials continue to focus on infrastructure projects that aim to cement Russian control over occupied territories. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed on March 21 that the Russian Ministry of Construction developed a bill on the creation of a free economic zone in occupied territories that will focus on business and investment activity.[71] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on March 22 that 20 industrial enterprises in occupied Luhansk Oblast are interested in applying to a newly established regional industrial development fund.[72] The Kherson occupation administration claimed on March 22 that occupation officials will offer farmers in occupied Kherson Oblast preferential credit rates for purchasing agricultural equipment.[73]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. Unspecified elements of the Minsk-based Belarusian 120th Mechanized Brigade participated in a company tactical exercise at the Belarusian 227th Combined Arms Training Ground in Borisov, Belarus, on March 22.[74]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0teY5FqmU8LGqkZLBCsz...

[2] https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1638555667723059200; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/22/za-poperednimy-danymy-vorog-vdaryv-po-zaporizhzhyu-z-reaktyvnoyi-artyleriyi-yurij-ignat/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/03/22/vnaslidok-vluchannya-vorozhoyi-rakety-u-zaporizhzhi-postrazhdalo-32-osoby-dsns/; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/17689; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/17688

[3] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/22/korabelne-ugrupovannya-voroga-v-mori-zroslo-vdvichi-natalya-gumenyuk/

[4] https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-03-22; https://t.me/mod_russia/25012

[5] https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-03-22; https://t.me/mod_russia/25012

[6] https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-03-22; https://t.me/mod_russia/25012

[7] https://web.archive.org/web/20141016221759/http://defense-update.com/fea... com/cleared-putin-bets-big-on-s-500-but-whats-so-special-about-this-russian-weapon-system/; https://www.upi dot com/Defense-News/2007/08/16/BMD-Focus-S-400-delays-Part-1/39721187298453/

[8] https://lenta dot ru/articles/2012/04/10/future/; https://tass dot com/defense/1338617

[9] https://economictimes.indiatimes dot com/news/defence/delivery-of-second-s-400-squadron-could-see-a-slight-delay-due-to-russia-ukraine-war/articleshow/90873442.cms?from=mdr

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japans-kishida-visit-ukraine-...

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[13] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/02/27/rosiyany-trymayut-trupy-svoyih-soldativ-na-skladah-aby-ne-vyplachuvaty-groshi-ridnym-spovid-okupanta/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7VyogLhqX9E&ab_channel=Центрнаціональногоспротиву

[14] https://t.me/faridaily24/825; https://t.me/zvezdanews/113023

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[16] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1638427089266266113?s=20; https://...

[17]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0teY5FqmU8LGqkZLBCsz...

[18] https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-03-21-23

[19] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1638427089266266113?s=20; https://...

[20] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20127 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030923

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[22] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1638491146316836866 ; https... https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1638473462975954945?s=20; ht...

[23] https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equip...

[24] https://www.fontanka dot ru/2023/03/22/72153890/

[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[26] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/1492

[27]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0teY5FqmU8LGqkZLBCsz...

[28] https://t.me/readovkanews/55245

[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/11531

[30] https://t.me/rybar/44913; https://t.me/basurin_e/283

[31]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0teY5FqmU8LGqkZLBCsz...

[32] https://t.me/osirskiy/13

[33] https://t.me/rybar/44939

[34] https://t.me/readovkanews/55245

[35] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1638288588717563905; https://tw... https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1638233640571117579

[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/11531

[37] https://t.me/z_arhiv/19824

[38] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1638427089266266113?s=20; https://...

[39] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1638280477172813835; https://tw...

[40] https://t.me/basurin_e/283

[41]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0teY5FqmU8LGqkZLBCsz...

[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/25007

[43] https://t.me/readovkanews/55245

[44] https://t.me/rybar/44913; https://t.me/wargonzo/11531

[45] https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1638250997200875552?s=20; https://t...

[46] https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1638340794393165824?s=20; htt...

[47]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0teY5FqmU8LGqkZLBCsz...

[48] https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/15950; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/81040

[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/25018

[50] https://t.me/rybar/44912; https://t.me/rybar/44915

[51] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1638612313744785408; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1638612313744785408

[52] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1638454767738339331?s=20

[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/25012; https://t.me/mod_russia/25017 ; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-03-22

[54] https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/33505

[55] https://t.me/rybar/44916

[56] https://t.me/vrogov/8289

[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/22/korabelne-ugrupovannya-voroga-v-mori-zroslo-vdvichi-natalya-gumenyuk/; https://suspilne dot media/421377-sili-oboroni-znisili-spostereznij-punkt-ta-vijskovu-tehniku-na-livoberezzi-hersonsini/

[58] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/22/korabelne-ugrupovannya-voroga-v-mori-zroslo-vdvichi-natalya-gumenyuk/; https://suspilne dot media/421377-sili-oboroni-znisili-spostereznij-punkt-ta-vijskovu-tehniku-na-livoberezzi-hersonsini/

[59]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0teY5FqmU8LGqkZLBCsz... ua/2023/03/22/korabelne-ugrupovannya-voroga-v-mori-zroslo-vdvichi-natalya-gumenyuk/ ; https://suspilne dot media/421377-sili-oboroni-znisili-spostereznij-punkt-ta-vijskovu-tehniku-na-livoberezzi-hersonsini/; https://t.me/wargonzo/11531; https://t.me/rybar/44921; https://t.me/ry... https://t.me/rybar/44913; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/16...

[60] https://93 dot ru/text/politics/2023/03/21/72150212/?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=messenger&utm_campaign=93

[61] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/03/22/50-tysyach-rubley-za-kazhdyy-kilometr-prodvizheniya-v-shturmovyh-otryadah-v-rossiyskih-regionah-usilili-agitatsiyu-na-sluzhbu-po-kontraktu ; https://t.me/bazabazon/16464; https://t.me/news_74ru/49489; https://t....

[62] https://t.me/annamaliar/593

[63] https://t.me/annamaliar/593

[64] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/03/22/okupanty-pidgotuvaly-23-vijskkomaty-dlya-mobilizacziyi-na-okupovanyh-rajonah-donechchyny/

[65] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/577

[66] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/577

[67] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030923

[68] https://www.gazeta dot ru/social/news/2023/03/22/20028139.shtml; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10839

[69] https://www.gazeta dot ru/social/news/2023/03/22/20028139.shtml; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10839

[70] https://t.me/basurin_e/287

[71] https://t.me/vrogov/8284

[72] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/895

[73] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/7935; https://t.me/aakherson/10

[74] https://t.me/modmilby/24718

The War on Terror Created a Cancer Crisis. These Vets Are Trying to Fight Back.

More than 500,000 active-duty soldiers have been diagnosed with cancer over the past two decades.

New Republic · by Michael Venutolo-Mantovani · March 21, 2023

All Brian Hueske had to protect himself from the deadliest element of his deployment was a bandanna wrapped around his face. Of course, the body armor would do its part to stop any incoming fire, though those sorts of engagements were unlikely. And the transports Hueske’s Special Forces unit used were heavily armored to protect against explosions. That kind of attack was unlikely too.

No, it was the toxins in the air, emanating across the installation where Hueske and the 20th Special Forces Group were deployed, that the soldiers feared most. Hueske and his teammates suspected they had been sent to serve in a cancer cluster, though there was nothing official confirming as much.

Hueske is a Green Beret who has served in the Special Forces for the last 17 years. That last deployment—a six-month rotation in 2020—sent him to the outskirts of a small city in Niger where an American military installation sat just a few hundred yards downwind from the largest open-pit uranium mine in the world. The installation was a small collection of adobe-style buildings mostly constructed of mud, no more than a few dozen acres in size. And while each structure had windows and split-level air conditioning units, there was no air purification system in place. Hueske and the others in his group would wrap those bandannas around their faces when they were outside, the only prophylactic the Special Operators on site employed. Otherwise, they tried to work indoors as much as possible.

Hueske began researching air purifiers but found nothing on the military’s official marketplaces thanks to rules requiring each vendor’s product to be either produced in America or made using certain types of special labor. Everything Hueske found was largely manufactured in China or Korea, making it virtually inaccessible via the military marketplace.

Seeing a desperate need, Hueske linked up with a friend who was working in the HVAC field when he returned home from Niger in late 2020. Their aim was to create something they could then sell to the Department of Defense with the hopes of someday outfitting every military structure around the world with their units, to provide a line of defense against what has become the most dangerous element to military deployment.

American military veterans of the “war on terror” are nearly 100 times more likely to develop some form of cancer than they are to be killed in action. Whereas the war on terror claimed over 7,000 lives of U.S. military personnel, more than 500,000 active-duty soldiers have been diagnosed with cancer over the past two decades. Due to exposure to toxic chemicals found in ordnance, burn pits, combat operations in countries and regions with lax environmental restrictions, or some combination of all three, cancer or chronic illness stemming from deployments is endemic to veterans returning home over the past two decades.

Last August, after a nearly decade and a half–long campaign by advocates, President Joe Biden signed the PACT Act into law. By adding to the list of health conditions the military presumes are a result of exposure to toxic substances such as burn pits and Agent Orange, along with presumptive-exposure conditions and locations for veterans of the country’s post-9/11 wars abroad, the Gulf War, and Vietnam, the Act expands health coverage availabilities and options for veterans. “We have many obligations but one truly sacred obligation: to equip those we send into harm’s way and to take care of them and their families when they come home,” Biden said as he signed the act into law.

It may have taken 15 years of battles on Capitol Hill, but the United States finally and officially recognized that our veterans have been routinely exposed to cancer-causing toxins while deployed. And that new law—whose full name is the Sergeant First Class Heath Robinson Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics Act of 2022, so named for a war on terror veteran whose fatal cancer he attributed to his exposure to toxic burn pits during his deployment to Iraq—is a massive step in the right direction for veterans’ health care. By recognizing more potential causes of illnesses, such as the aforementioned burn pits and Agent Orange, it allows many veterans to more easily access needed health care options.

But despite those gains, the law contains a glaring blind spot, as it focuses on treatment and effect rather than prevention and the root causes behind these problems. Vets might now be able to get treatment once they’ve developed cancer or other diseases, but the underlying causes remain.

Soon after his return to the States, Hueske and his partner were prototyping and 3-D-printing small but high-powered air purifiers in their North Carolina garages, and their company, GrōvPure, was born. Hueske is quick to admit one of the hurdles his company must overcome: that air purification is simply not very sexy in the eyes of the military. “If we were selling bullets or body armor, they’d be all over us,” Hueske said. “But air purifiers? It’s boring. But it’s the kind of thing that’s going to save a lot more lives than anything else.”

He went on to explain that most service members never find themselves on the pointy end of a fight. That is, the majority of the military is never taking or returning fire in hostile combat zones. But most service members deal with some sort of toxic air environments at some stage in their careers, especially those on deployments.

GrōvPure is currently seeking approval to be included on the military marketplaces. Meanwhile, the company is making headway into other areas, having sold 10,000 units over the past year to the state of Oregon’s health authority to aid in its efforts to fight wildfires. “The federal government has a lot of restrictive policies when it comes to purchasing,” Hueske said. “But Oregon doesn’t have those kinds of policies for these things, so it was easier for us to outfit them—to help them.”

Like Huekse, Chelsey Simoni has taken matters into her own hands in an effort to help arm veterans with the best measures to aid in their potential battles with cancer.

One night in 2015, Simoni’s husband, Kyle, mentioned how many of his military friends were dead. Simoni, an Army veteran herself, remarked that that’s what happens to most soldiers who, like Kyle, served for more than 15 months in combat zones. But these veterans weren’t dying in combat, Kyle, who’d been deployed to Iraq, said, though those accounted for a few. Nor was it predominantly from post-service suicides, though those also accounted for a few others. Rather, many of his combat buddies were dying from cancer at all-too-young ages.

Simoni, who now works as a trauma nurse, clinical nurse researcher, and epidemiologist (while also pursuing a Ph.D. in a nursing), sought out more information but found no data linking post-9/11 veterans and heightened cancer rates. Simoni, then still in nursing school, approached her adviser, asking if she could undertake a study to further explore her husband’s claim. The adviser laughed and told her undergraduates didn’t perform studies. Unfazed, Simoni developed her own research study on airborne hazards and burn pits among post-9/11 vets. At the time, she had little interest in epidemiology. Rather, she was driven by the need to figure out what was happening to these young soldiers.

According to the abstract of Simoni’s 2018 study, which was published with the International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health in 2020, the veterans involved experienced an increase in respiratory clinical symptoms when compared to their pre-deployment periods, with shocking data points, such as a 76 percent increase in shortness of breath while exercising and a nearly 33 percent increase in general chest pain post-deployment.

As a vet herself, married to a vet, Simoni knew there was little being done through the V.A. or other military medical institutions to abate, protect, or even care for those suffering from these illnesses. So in 2019, Simoni started the HunterSeven Foundation, named for the call sign of Sergeant Major Rob Bowman, Kyle’s commanding officer, who died from bile duct cancer in January 2013 at age 44.

Motivated by the near-complete lack of information on post-9/11 veterans, HunterSeven set out to uncover and make known as much data as possible, hoping to draw links between service and illness. Almost immediately, the foundation was flooded by veterans reaching out with their own stories of illness and the walls they had to breach in an effort to find care. Comprised of a small group of volunteers, all of whom work in the medical field, HunterSeven has undertaken extensive clinical research, using data to continue to draw lines between post-9/11 deployments and incidences of cancer and other deadly illnesses, as those connections are essential to ensure the government provides post-service care.

One of the organization’s biggest research discoveries has highlighted the discrepancies in cancer rates between branches. Air Force veterans who served on active duty are more likely to be diagnosed with cancer when compared not only to their age-adjusted civilian population but also to every other branch of service. Meanwhile, Marines, despite having the highest exposures to combat, had the lowest risk ratio for cancer diagnosis. Simoni said that as much as this data likely has something to do with exposure to work on flight lines, with jet fuels and the like, it is more likely a corollary to the average career span of an Air Force member being 12 to 16 years longer than that of a Marine. The more time in the service, the more years spent exposed to potentially toxic materials.

From this research, HunterSeven has used evidence-based education to equip veterans with as much information as is available so they can understand what they might be dealing with due to what they encountered while deployed. The group also provides immediate-need cancer screening and support for veterans who are at risk for developing cancer. As all of HunterSeven’s team members are a variety of medical providers, they have the unique ability to order tests and screenings, such as the Multi-Cancer Early Detection Test, which—though still in its early stages and not yet FDA-approved—screens for 50 different types of cancer using only two tubes of blood. While the screening is costly—roughly $950 per test—Simoni claims her team has been able to help 107 veterans get the test, identifying possible signs of early-stage cancer in 19 of them.

Additionally, HunterSeven offers support for travel and lodging for vets undergoing cancer treatment. It also orders a GrōvPure air purifying unit for every one of its charges who is diagnosed with cancer.

“Our goal is not only to educate providers but to educate service members and their families,” Simoni said. “Because a lot of service members don’t even realize that they’re at risk.”

Abigail DePaulo’s husband, Carmen, died of colorectal cancer in March 2021, at just 36 years old. Carmen was a Special Forces medic who deployed several times in the couple’s five years together. It wasn’t until after Carmen’s untimely death that Abigail was introduced to HunterSeven. Since then, however, she proselytizes about the organization to whoever she thinks could use their help.

“HunterSeven is an amazing organization that I didn’t know about until after Carm’s passing because it was not a resource the military provided,” Abigail said. “If they could have been involved early on with Carmen, the outcome might have been different. So now I try to point people to them whenever I can.”

Michael Venutolo-Mantovani @Christglider

Michael Venutolo-Mantovani is a freelance journalist living in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. He has contributed to The New York Times, National Geographic, Wired, The Guardian, and a variety of other publications.

New Republic · by Michael Venutolo-Mantovani · March 21, 2023

4. Inside Ukraine’s Nonviolent Resistance: Chatbots, Yellow Paint, and Payoffs

With all due respect to Dr. Chenoweth, most journalists overlook the important contribution of Gene Sharp to the study of non-violent resistance and the practical manual for employing it: "From Dictatorship to Democracy." https://www.aeinstein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FDTD.pdf

And again for those who wish to study resistance here are some of the most important references from the US Army Special Operations Commands Assessing Revolutionary and INsurgent Strategies (ARIS) project https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/arisbooks.html

Science of Resistance https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/science-resistance.pdf

Resistance Manual https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/resistance-manual.pdf

Understanding States of Resistance https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/understanding-states-resistance.pdf

Resistance and the Cyber Domain https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/resistance-cyber.pdf

Conceptual Typology of a Resistance https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/typology-resistance.pdf

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/UndergroundsS.pdf

But based on Dr. Chenoweth's research below I wonder how things turn out when there is a combination of violent and non-violent resistance. I do not think it is either/or. It is more likely both/and.

Excerpt:

According to Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, both political scientists and co-authors of the 2011 book Why Civil Resistance Works, taking up arms has traditionally given regime opponents a 26 percent chance of succeeding in their aims, whereas the tactics of nonviolent resistance have a 53 percent success rate. Countries where nonviolent, rather than violent, resistance led to change were more likely to remain democratic after the crisis ended.

Inside Ukraine’s Nonviolent Resistance: Chatbots, Yellow Paint, and Payoffs

How Ukraine’s digital resistance fights behind Russian lines

By David Patrikarakos

The Atlantic · by David Patrikarakos · March 22, 2023

The man introduced to me in the southern port city of Odesa as Taras does not look like what he is: the founder of the civilian resistance to Russia’s military occupation of southern and eastern Ukraine. He’s no tough Marshal Tito or ethereal Mahatma Gandhi. He looks, in fact, like your typical Gen Z tech worker: early 20s, lean, trendy—and he’s always online. He likes to talk about English Premier League football games from the 1980s, but only because he’s seen them on YouTube; he can name scores of Premier League players, but only because he’s used their avatars in the FIFA video game. He adores Instagram.

Since April, Taras has led a group named Yellow Ribbon, which took up the principles of nonviolent resistance soon after the Russians overran his home city of Kherson. (Taras is a pseudonym he uses to help protect his identity from his Russian enemies.) Its goal: to resist Russian occupation through peaceful means wherever possible. The group has now spread throughout the occupied territories of Ukraine, and as it has done so, its reputation has grown. Late last year, Yellow Ribbon was one of four Ukrainian groups honored with the European Parliament’s Andrei Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, the European Union’s main award for the defense of human rights.

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What distinguishes Yellow Ribbon from traditional nonviolent resistance movements is its emphasis on the digital. The group’s growing numbers of activists stay connected via a chatbot plugin on the group’s Telegram messaging app. Prompted by the chatbot’s automated questions, activists in the occupied territories can access various resistance tasks to carry out on the ground. The system enables Yellow Ribbon to share the materials and techniques necessary for the resistance to make its activities visible in the real world of the occupation, while safeguarding the anonymity of the participants against Russian efforts to penetrate the network. Among the clandestine actions guided by the chatbot are scrawling pro-Ukraine graffiti, tying yellow ribbons around objects in the streets, and projecting slogans onto buildings taken over by the Russian administration. Such nonviolent actions have made Yellow Ribbon famous across Ukraine—and a serious problem for Russia in the occupied areas.

At first, the Russians ignored the group to avoid amplifying its work. Eventually, as Yellow Ribbon’s activities grew, they were forced to respond. Yellow and blue paint began to disappear from shops in occupied areas. Buying anything yellow became almost impossible; people were reduced to cutting patches of the color out of old clothes.

Even Russian soldiers began to feel the effects of Yellow Ribbon’s activities. Taras told me that after graffiti appeared near the entrance of a Chechen base in Melitopol, another occupied city in south-eastern Ukraine, the soldiers changed their location and started going about town in civilian clothing rather than military uniform.

Access to the Telegram chatbot has allowed resistance activists to spring up across the occupied territories; many of them were women, who, I was told, could more easily pass unnoticed by the Russian occupiers. Earlier this year, I met Liliyia Aleksandrova in Kherson, which was recaptured by Ukrainian forces late last year—though artillery shelling still roared in the background as we spoke. Prior to the occupation, Aleksandrova had, she said, been a middle-aged “mama.” When the Russians first came to Kherson, she attended some street demonstrations, but the tear gas and soldiers soon put a stop to things. “It was clear we couldn’t protest publicly anymore,” she told me. “I was thinking about what I could do for my country; I had to do something to be useful.”

On Telegram, she came across Yellow Ribbon and, using the group’s chatbot tool, she began downloading instructions for tasks. She put up yellow ribbons everywhere she could—on buildings, lampposts, and fences—and took photos. Once or twice, she was almost caught, but she continued. Her work was everywhere around the city. As we talked, we passed Yellow Ribbon graffiti on a street wall. “I did that,” Liliyia told me with quiet satisfaction.

The first time Taras saw the Russians after the February 24 invasion, they had taken an office in the city’s main square; then they took the main police station. By March 2, they were in full control of Kherson. “No one knew what would happen tomorrow or the day after,” he told me when we met earlier this year in Odesa. He’d spent most of last year living under occupation in Kherson before its liberation in November.

Ukrainian partisans have launched sporadic attacks in Russian-occupied areas, but Taras had no military training, so any resistance activity he took on had to be nonviolent. He drew inspiration from earlier causes such as Germany’s White Rose student group, which opposed the Nazis; the U.S. civil-rights movement; and Czechoslovakia’s 1989 protests that led to the Velvet Revolution. Gandhi called nonviolent resistance “mightier than the mightiest weapon of destruction devised by the ingenuity of man.”

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According to Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, both political scientists and co-authors of the 2011 book Why Civil Resistance Works, taking up arms has traditionally given regime opponents a 26 percent chance of succeeding in their aims, whereas the tactics of nonviolent resistance have a 53 percent success rate. Countries where nonviolent, rather than violent, resistance led to change were more likely to remain democratic after the crisis ended.

Taras knew many people who wanted to act but for whom armed resistance was not an option. He could, he calculated, attract many more recruits through nonviolence. Almost anyone can participate: Its methods are highly accessible, and no specialist equipment or skills are required. He grasped that nonviolence’s main advantage over violence is scale—the number of people it can rally to a cause is exponentially greater.

Taras knew he could count on the 10 employees of the IT company he ran in Kherson, plus some people in other companies he worked with. This was enough to form the basis of what would become Yellow Ribbon. Even today, the core group of coordinators remains small—about 40 people, all of them known personally to Taras from before the occupation. Most are in their 20s.

At first, the Russians allowed residents of Kherson to protest in person, and many did, going to the central square, waving Ukrainian flags, and demanding the troops leave. Pooling cash, Taras’s group decided to buy online advertisements to spread the message. It gravitated easily from organizing IT projects to rallying support for the local protests and other pro-Ukraine activities through March and into April.

Then, in late April, a rumor spread through the city that Russia was making preparations for fraudulent referendums in occupied cities across the south. The result would be a foregone conclusion; the territories would be annexed to Russia. The resistance activists knew they had to act.

On April 23, they set up a Telegram group that they named Yellow Ribbon, a reference to the color on the Ukrainian flag, to spread pro-Ukraine messages and encourage people to paste leaflets and posters around Kherson. The platform would also work with local media to promulgate similar messages. Taras realized they could now reach hundreds of thousands of people.

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“That’s what you can do with a digital component: reach larger audiences, spread more messages, get people to go out and protest, and do so successfully,” he told me. “We saw it work; things started to build like a snowball.”

The first demonstration, which took place on April 27, was modest in size—maybe 500 people. The Russians were out in force and used tear gas and stun grenades against the protesters. The physical demonstration may have been small, and was quickly put down, but online, via the Telegram channel and on social networks, it went viral. Moscow did eventually hold the referendum, but not until the end of September.

Another protest was planned for May 9, by which time things were getting more dangerous. Within five minutes, the protest was broken up by Russian forces. After the FSB, Russia’s state security police, came to town, the first local collaborators emerged, and activists started to disappear. Taras and his team made the decision to shift their strategy away from street demonstrations. If the resistance could not occupy the streets, it would occupy the online space.

In June, the group used Instagram to create a virtual street protest that included images of flags and banners on a visualization of a street in Kherson. Every person who attended had to write “Kherson is Ukraine” in the comments section. From these posts, the group calculated that 40,000 people had joined from Kherson and 16,000 from Mariupol. The Yellow Ribbon message spread across not only pro-Ukraine but pro-Russia platforms as well.

As Yellow Ribbon’s name and activities grew, new problems arose. Its activists were in constant danger of arrest. The group put several security protocols in place. Unlike specialized messaging platforms such as Signal, Telegram was already in widespread use by Ukrainians and Russians alike, rendering the app’s presence on a phone unsuspicious. Telegram can also be deleted from a phone, removing all the messages, and then downloaded again—with all of the messages still intact.

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Getting people out of jail became a priority for the group. That generally meant one thing: bribes. Usually, it was easy to pay Russian soldiers or local collaborators to release an activist who’d disappeared. Taras knew businessmen in the city who had dealings with the Russians, and he used them as intermediaries. He’d pay them, and they’d pay the Russians.

Then, in late September, the group set up the chatbot. The technology enabled Yellow Ribbon to radically scale up its activities, allowing it to evolve from being a local resistance movement into something more powerful: a franchised one. People like Aleksandrova began to open cabinets across the occupied territories—in Melitopol and Donetsk and Luhansk, even in Crimea.

Over coffee in Odesa, Taras showed me the chatbot homepage on his laptop. In Crimea, chatbot volunteers tied a yellow ribbon on a tree near a shipping port. In September, leaflets announcing Crimea is Ukraine! and Opening soon! were pasted on a government building there. Ukrainian-flag graffiti appeared in Donetsk, and in Melitopol posters mocked the Russian passports that locals were being pressured to get.

The group also taught people how to make stencils in the shape of the “3CY” initialism for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and, using torches, project them onto official buildings. In late January, one appeared on the Russian administration’s office in Melitopol.

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Most of the time, the group judged, Russian soldiers hadn’t themselves seen the resistance graffiti or leaflets in the city, but a monitoring team would report the photo of it that subsequently appeared online. Back in May, the Russian TV channel Izvestia paraded some purported Yellow Ribbon activists from Mariupol, who claimed that they had been paid to put up leaflets (as an alternative to other hourly paid work, which encouraged Russian viewers to infer that they were prostitutes).

The Yellow Ribbon team started noticing people whom it suspected were FSB personnel using the Chatbot app to pose as activists and request to meet in person—a clear violation of security rules. The team’s members, Taras told me, also received phishing links almost daily. In this sense, the digital amplification has increased the reach and impact of the ground activity, forcing the occupier to respond to it.

Eventually, the group’s presence attracted attention in Moscow. Yellow Ribbon’s work prompted a “concerned citizen” in Crimea to message the local Russian Investigative Committee’s Telegram channel: “I request you begin investigating the terrorist activities and spreading of ideology by the Yellow Ribbon group.” On January 27, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow issued a letter saying that the activity was being investigated, and two days later, a subdivision of the ministry confirmed that it was now regarded as a criminal matter.

A Russian organization calling itself the Committee for the Defense Against Traitors released a video claiming that the group was engaged “in the information war” to push the agenda of “terrorists.” These sorts of attacks are only to be expected: The group’s activities are not just a constant reminder that the locals reject the occupation but also a living rebuttal of Russia’s entire narrative justifying its invasion.

Recently, I spoke with Ivan, a colleague of Taras’s who helped set up Yellow Ribbon back in April last year. (Again, I am using a pseudonym to protect his identity.) Another Kherson native, he is Yellow Ribbon’s main coordinator. When the Russians withdrew from the city, he went to nearby Melitopol, which remains under Moscow’s control. Ivan stayed behind enemy lines, he explained, because the group needs to ensure that the movement keeps growing, especially in that city and other still-occupied areas. It’s hard to find the right materials and places to print, and they need to keep their network of activists in play across the region.

“Things in Melitopol are tough,” he told me over an encrypted voice call. “The Russians have instituted an ‘anti-terrorist’ regime on the streets, which means increased patrols and video cameras everywhere. A lot of soldiers have arrived from Russia—and they are making a lot of arrests. It’s hard for us to work here now.

“The Russians can be brutal,” he went on. “But it depends on what unit they’re from—the Chechens are really bad. They think that this is their territory.”

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Ivan and his fellow activists keep a low profile, especially when they go out to buy necessities. Security is paramount. “I try not to be too active on the streets but instead focus on how to bring in the materials into the city and where to hide them,” he told me. “I work with VPNs and hosts and proxies to make sure my internet connection is safe. I have five cellphones and move from safe house to safe house each night or week.”

Taras left Kherson last August, before the city was liberated. He traveled by car, carrying just one sports bag and about 170,000 roubles (approximately $2,300), which he gave to the soldiers manning a checkpoint out of the city. When he handed over the cash, he felt like telling them they were welcome to it because he’d never be needing roubles again, but he refrained, and instead drove through the barrier in silence, back into free Ukraine.

Since then, he has continued to coordinate Yellow Ribbon’s activities from inside Ukraine. The group plans to expand its activities. The chatbot now serves about 4,600 open cabinets, but the group hopes to get that number to 100,000. This has helped change the nature of nonviolent resistance movements, which in the past tended to center on a single, charismatic figure, such as Martin Luther King Jr. or Gandhi. Instead, Yellow Ribbon, with its army of activists across occupied Ukraine, creates impact through a shared disgust at what Russia is doing, unifying opposition to the occupation. Its great strength lies in its digitally diffuse activism—which makes stopping it much harder for the Russians.

“I hope that liberation will come in the next three months,” Ivan said at the end of our conversation. “When it does, we will take our Ukrainian flags to the main square and celebrate with our military, as we did in Kherson.”

David Patrikarakos is a contributing editor at UnHerd and the author of War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century.

The Atlantic · by David Patrikarakos · March 22, 2023

5. American Interests and Values Align in Ukraine

To me, the best case for strategy is when interests and values align.

Excerpts:

But our interests do not have to be in opposition to our values. Our values provide strengths that pure realism cannot. An adherence to a foreign policy based merely on the considerations of raw power would be one in which Roosevelt decided to balance with Hitler against the larger threat of Stalin. Why America does not conduct foreign policy like this, and should not, is clearly answered in Mr. Sempa’s own article when he quoted Henry Kissinger’s words, “a foreign policy that ignores one or the other of these motives [interests or values] will eventually lose the support of the American people and therefore become politically unsustainable.” Yes, tradeoffs are sometimes necessary and we regularly work with nations we would rather censure. There is always a constant balancing act going on in foreign policy decision-making. However, in no way has this balancing act eroded our strategic position abroad. The United States, allied with most of the world’s most prosperous nations and partnered with many others, is in a far better geopolitical position than Moscow or Beijing, whose values and actions repel their own neighbors far more often than their power attracts.

American values are as interwoven into the foreign policy-making process as are considerations of interest and power. They have their long roots stretching to a mountaintop in Sinai, a hillside in Galilee, a field in Runnymede, England, and a small meeting chamber in Philadelphia. In other words, they are about rule of law, social justice, limits on power, and consent of the governed. Those values, lived at home and attractive to people abroad, along with a strong military and a robust economy, are the sinews of America’s international strength.

To conclude, I would like to quote from a short essay of a Chinese scholar written on the first anniversary of the war in Ukraine. His words should remind us that the values discussed in this article are not limited to the West. Part of his remarks for which he has been persecuted are:

A just cause attracts much support, an unjust one finds little. International politics consists of not only “interests” and “power” but also righteousness” and “principle.” We oftentimes remark that a “weak nation has no diplomacy” and that “there exists no permanent friends or allies, only permanent interests.” Yet many nations, small and weak, are not only well-situated but also maintain friends with those countries that shoulder moral responsibilities in today’s world. And on the contrary, superpowers such as the Soviet Union, besieged on all sides, would inevitably collapse…A nation – no matter how big or small – ought not to go against the development of human civilization.

American Interests and Values Align in Ukraine

By Philip Wasielewski

March 17, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/17/american_interests_and_values_align_in_ukraine_888108.html

In America Misses the Power Objective, Mr. Francis Sempa contends that “the ideology that drives U.S. policy in Ukraine is eroding our strategic position abroad.” This article respectfully disagrees with that contention and with Mr. Sempa’s proposed alternate courses of action vis-à-vis U.S. foreign policy towards Ukraine and Russia. Ideology—or, more exactly, values—is an essential part of U.S. foreign policy. Our values provide internal and external strengths to our national security. Furthermore, our interests and values should be considered different sides of the same coin and not as irreconcilable forces in constant competition.

Like all of Mr. Sempa’s work, America Misses the Power Objective is well-written and presents several clear and concise arguments regarding American foreign policy. One of his arguments is that Russia is no longer a threat to NATO but that China presents a clear threat in the Western Pacific. Mr. Sempa warns of a Chinese “geopolitical program that seeks to unite huge portions of the Eurasian landmass against the United States” via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and other efforts and correctly notes the geopolitical threat posed by China’s blue-water navy and growing nuclear force. Most troubling for Mr. Sempa is the “strategic partnership between two Eurasian giants [Russia and China], which is only gaining strength in response to the foreign policy of the Biden Administration.” He also castigates the George W. Bush administration for “launching failed wars based on values over interests.” These two issues are key for what Mr. Sempa sees as a core problem for American strategists: the “strategic dilemma of pursuing our interests or our values.”

According to his article, geopolitics has been the lodestone of American foreign policy for most of U.S. history, even by liberal statesmen such as Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, who “chose geopolitics over liberal values, even as they have cloaked the choice with value-laden rhetoric.” However, according to Mr. Sempa, this changed as a result of the early 20^th century Progressive Movement that “promoted the idea that human nature was perfectible” and Democratism that led to ideas such as “human rights were universal and that American foreign policy should work to bring about an earthly Utopia.” One of the consequences of America’s “unbounded democratism” has been to push Russia into the arms of China, according to Mr. Sempa, who suggests that the United States should consider “ending or at least softening its hostility to Putin’s Russia in order to lessen China’s strategic threat.” In concluding, he comes down clearly on the side of power over values with a quote from the famed geopolitical thinker Nicholas Spykman: “The statesman who conducts foreign policy can concern himself with values of justice, fairness, and tolerance only to the extent that they contribute to or do not interfere with the power objective.”

I disagree with these perspectives for three reasons.

First, the shift of the correlation of power between NATO and Russia to the advantage of the former is due to Ukraine’s decimation of the Russian army. However, with time, this advantage could be reversed, especially if the war does not lead to internal Russian reforms that lessen its imperialist ideology. Second, while China is the greater threat, some of its strengths such as BRI are exaggerated as is the closeness of Russian-Chinese relations. Finally, even if we wanted to, there is no way to “soften” our relations towards Russia to lessen the Chinese strategic threat without betraying allies and values, which are assets and not burdens even when seen through the lens of geopolitical power.

NATO Has Gained the Advantage…For Now

I have argued twice before in Real Clear Defense that supporting Ukraine is consistent with our self-interest – keeping the global balance of power in America’s favor – and our values. One of my arguments has been that if Russia had conquered most of Ukraine and incorporated it into its Federation – along with a supine Belarus – this would have increased its manpower, industrial capacity, and natural resources to a level that would again make it a security threat on par with the former Soviet Union. Therefore, as the 21^st century continued, the United States would face not one imperial superpower in China and regional power in Russia but two superpowers willing to overturn the current world order in Europe and the Pacific. That specific threat has faded thanks to Ukrainian resistance and Western military and economic aid. Critics should remember that Western aid has not been a one-way street and has already resulted in mutually beneficial results especially when one considers concerns just a few years ago that NATO could not stop a Russian invasion of the Baltics.

However, the war’s outcome is still uncertain. If there are no post-war reforms in Russia that change its imperial nature, Russian strength could again revive to threaten NATO members. The Russian military recovered after the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, World War One, and after initial massive defeats in World War Two. It could do so again. Furthermore, Russian intentions to transform the European security order in its favor should now be crystal clear. This is why despite the security benefits NATO now enjoys due to Ukrainian sacrifice, the United States cannot afford a long-term security disengagement from Europe.

Let’s Not Exaggerate the “Strategic Partnership” Between Russia and China

While China is the more capable threat to U.S. interests, lessening support to Ukraine does not translate into increased American capability in the Western Pacific and could even encourage future Chinese aggression. Military assets provided to Ukraine (tanks, armored vehicles, 155mm artillery shells, etc.) are not the assets (anti-ship missiles, naval mines, torpedoes, etc.) needed to defend Taiwan in a maritime conflict. Furthermore, defense funds that would have been needed in Europe if Russia had quickly conquered Ukraine, can now be reoriented towards Asia. Certainly, the West’s support to Ukraine will be part of any Chinese Communist Party risk versus gain calculation for attacking Taiwan just as a failure to continue supporting Ukraine will be considered as well.

We should also learn from our last geopolitical struggle with the Soviet Union to not overestimate an enemy’s capabilities. The belief that China’s BRI program is uniting huge portions of the Eurasian landmass against the United States does not seem supported by facts on the ground. After the Sri Lanka debt trap, countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia, Burma, Bangladesh, and others cancelled or scaled back BRI projects to avoid the same snare. There has also been a backlash against corruption and Chinese graft associated with BRI and even Chinese leaders refer to BRI less and less in their public speeches. It is hard to find anywhere in Central or South Asia where BRI or other Chinese initiatives have aligned a major regional power or bloc of nations against the United States.

Another exaggeration is that Russia and China have formed a strategic partnership that is gaining strength. Presidents Xi and Putin may have announced just before the invasion of Ukraine a partnership “without limits” but the past year’s events have shown that it is a finite partnership with definite limits. To date, China has restricted material support to Russia for its war in Ukraine. Despite last year’s increase in trade between Russia and China, it is just three percent of China’s overall foreign trade and is dwarfed by China’s trade with the United States and the European Union. Sino-Russian economic relations are neo-colonial in practice. China receives raw materials from Russia and provides finished industrial goods in return. Furthermore, their relations underneath the surface are marred by economic and geopolitical conflict in Central Asia. In October 2022, President Xi openly declared Chinese support for Kazakhstan’s national independence and sovereignty in a direct rebuke to Russian threats against that nation’s territorial integrity. Sino-Russian relations are further complicated by the lingering legacy of the unequal treaties of the 19^th century when Tsarist Russia seized over a million square miles of formerly Chinese territory north of Manchuria. Possibly the best description of the real state of relations between Moscow and Beijing was coined by the scholar Bobo Lo when he called it an Axis of Convenience.

It is also an exaggeration to say America “pushed Russia into the arms of China.”

As noted, and as the war in Ukraine has demonstrated, the relationship is not as robust as Moscow would like the world to believe. It certainly is not as close as the relationship between Moscow and Beijing at the height of the Cold War, a relationship which America survived. Closer relations between the two countries are more of a factor of each nation’s growing autocracy than anything the United States has done. American foreign policy did not unite Russia and China; birds of a feather simply flock together.

Accommodating Russia Will Only Weaken America’s Geopolitical Position

How exactly would Mr. Sempa’s suggested accommodation with Russia work and lessen the Chinese strategic threat to the United States? Would the United States have to stop aiding Ukraine? Would it have to coerce Kyiv to trade “land for peace?” Would it have to agree to Moscow’s diktat of December 2021 and withdraw all nuclear weapons from Europe and its troops from countries accepted into NATO after May 1997, a quarter of a century ago? What other areas of the world would have to be sacrificed to Moscow’s desired sphere of influence especially when one considers the Russian saying that, “appetite grows from eating.” Even if the United States was to do all these things, would Russia really align with NATO against China? Could we trust that these unilateral concessions would achieve their desired geopolitical realignment? After all, Putin would not lie to us, would he?

Doing any of the above would be a betrayal of our own interests, values, and allies that would make Munich pale in comparison. After the revelations of murder, rape, and pillage in Bucha and other liberated territories in Ukraine, how can we demand that Kyiv agree to leave 20 percent of its territory under Russian control? What guarantees are there that Putin would not revive the war once Russia rebuilt its army? Would he promise security “assurances” as in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994? Land for peace will bring no peace and, later, Ukraine will likely lose even more land.

If the United States was to acquiesce to Russia having an unbridled sphere of influence amongst the former Warsaw Pact countries and now independent former Soviet Republics, it would destroy NATO, a Moscow goal for decades, the very structure protecting our interests in Europe. NATO, which fulfills a very Realpolitik mission of deterring and containing Russia, is a values-based organization. The specific values are those of liberal-democratic societies: government by the consent of the governed, human rights and liberties, and economic freedom. NATO protects the oft proclaimed “rules-based order” of which the first rule is borders are not changed by force. The essence of NATO is geopolitical stability thanks to the collective willingness of member nations to form an alliance to protect common values.

Liberal-democratic values are a strength in national security affairs. Internally they generate domestic support for a foreign policy when it is consistent with those values. Externally they attract like-minded states to ally with the United States. It is Russia and China who are without allies outside a few other despotic states (Belarus, Burma, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela) whose combined Gross Domestic Products are generally surpassed by many larger American states. To reject those values for an experiment in geopolitical balancing would be to jettison our allies (however truculent at times) to depend on the good will of our enemies.

Conclusion

Yes, there have been unwise American policies.

Iraq was the greatest strategic mistake of the century (so far) because it failed to match an achievable end with suitable ways and available means. However, to attempt to distill American foreign policy down to a simple formula of a power objective would be equally unwise because it would neither be desirable or sustainable. Our values provide America strength by attracting allies and ensuring domestic support for overseas sacrifices. Despite Spykman, moral values are not about facilitating the attainment of power because power is not an end to itself. Power is achieved to protect those things we hold most dear: our safety, our prosperity, and our values. American foreign policy is guided by our interests and reinforced by our values. When we ignore those values, security does not automatically follow.

The retreat from Afghanistan was justified under realist grounds, i.e., to concentrate resources against peer competitors like China. However, our Afghan presence was in our own self-interest after 9/11 so that land would never again become a haven for violent Salafist terrorist groups. Since our withdrawal, this has reoccurred and we are back to square one with our counterterrorism efforts. Furthermore, some say that our unseemly retreat was a factor in motivating Putin to attack Ukraine (just as many fear defeat in Ukraine will motivate Xi to attack Taiwan).

But our interests do not have to be in opposition to our values. Our values provide strengths that pure realism cannot. An adherence to a foreign policy based merely on the considerations of raw power would be one in which Roosevelt decided to balance with Hitler against the larger threat of Stalin. Why America does not conduct foreign policy like this, and should not, is clearly answered in Mr. Sempa’s own article when he quoted Henry Kissinger’s words, “a foreign policy that ignores one or the other of these motives [interests or values] will eventually lose the support of the American people and therefore become politically unsustainable.” Yes, tradeoffs are sometimes necessary and we regularly work with nations we would rather censure. There is always a constant balancing act going on in foreign policy decision-making. However, in no way has this balancing act eroded our strategic position abroad. The United States, allied with most of the world’s most prosperous nations and partnered with many others, is in a far better geopolitical position than Moscow or Beijing, whose values and actions repel their own neighbors far more often than their power attracts.

American values are as interwoven into the foreign policy-making process as are considerations of interest and power. They have their long roots stretching to a mountaintop in Sinai, a hillside in Galilee, a field in Runnymede, England, and a small meeting chamber in Philadelphia. In other words, they are about rule of law, social justice, limits on power, and consent of the governed. Those values, lived at home and attractive to people abroad, along with a strong military and a robust economy, are the sinews of America’s international strength.

To conclude, I would like to quote from a short essay of a Chinese scholar written on the first anniversary of the war in Ukraine. His words should remind us that the values discussed in this article are not limited to the West. Part of his remarks for which he has been persecuted are:

A just cause attracts much support, an unjust one finds little. International politics consists of not only “interests” and “power” but also righteousness” and “principle.” We oftentimes remark that a “weak nation has no diplomacy” and that “there exists no permanent friends or allies, only permanent interests.” Yet many nations, small and weak, are not only well-situated but also maintain friends with those countries that shoulder moral responsibilities in today’s world. And on the contrary, superpowers such as the Soviet Union, besieged on all sides, would inevitably collapse…A nation – no matter how big or small – ought not to go against the development of human civilization.

Philip Wasielewski is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He recently retired from a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency and is also a retired colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve.

6. How Iran Won the Iraq War

Conclusion:

Retaining U.S. forces in Iraq would have been a difficult decision for a war weary America. But a residual force that was closely tied to key political objectives and aimed at reducing Iranian influence could have prevented the treacherous strategic situation we face today: Iraq as a broken and devastated nation, serving as a base and transit point for Iranian forces. Luckily, the U.S. retains some tools to steer Iraq to a more constructive and stable future. The U.S. can impose high economic costs on the Iraqi military and government to remove Iran-backed terrorists from its payroll, withhold U.S. banknote transfers that inexplicably continue despite their laundering by Iran, and remove sanctions waivers so Iraq can free itself from an artificial energy dependence on Iran. And perhaps most importantly, the U.S. must militarily deter Iran so that it retracts rather than expands its regional aggression. Only these measures are likely to reverse the tailspin of Iraq’s perilous future, a future that we set in motion twenty years ago.

How Iran Won the Iraq War

TIME · by Frank Sobchak and Matthew Zais · March 22, 2023

BY FRANK SOBCHAK AND MATTHEW ZAIS MARCH 22, 2023 1:44 PM EDTSobchak is a retired Army Special Forces Colonel; Zais is a retired Infantry Colonel. Both are West Point graduates and authors of the Army’s History of the Iraq War.

As we observe the twentieth anniversary of the Iraq War, which claimed more than 4,600 American lives and countless Iraqis, we must make an honest assessment of the war. The war cost the U.S. trillions, upended Middle East stability, and ultimately benefited Iran’s aggressive and expansionist agenda by capturing much of the political and military institutions in Baghdad and Damascus. Despite its tremendous cost, the war weakened America’s geostrategic position and damaged our national credibility.

What can be learned from this calamity? As authors of the U.S. government’s definitive study on the Iraq War, two somewhat conflicting central points stand out. First, the war should never have occurred. Second, once the war began, it should not have been abandoned without leaving behind a stable Iraq, even if that meant staying for years.

Invading Iraq in 2003 was strategic folly and one of the worst foreign policy decisions in the history of the Republic. Tainted and inaccurate intelligence provided justification for disarming Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction that didn’t exist. Pretending that Iraq could be the hearth for democracy in the Middle East or that it was abetting Al Qaeda terrorists were similar delusions. But the decision to invade defied an even larger truth, one that was clear even before the war. Iraq provided a physical and practical buffer to Iran, a country that few disputed had an active weapons of mass destruction program in 2003 and which has consistently demonstrated the intent to use such a capability alongside its terrorist objectives.

Iran, which regularly calls for the destruction of the U.S. and actively supports our enemies, was the larger and clearer threat to our interests both then and now. Regime change in Iraq destroyed a status quo that, by extension, benefitted the U.S. In essence, Iraq’s geostrategic position in 2003 helped regional security by focusing Iran’s attention and resources next door. In addition to this geopolitical damage, the preemptive invasion, conducted without U.N. Security Council authorization and on the basis of dubious intelligence, squandered our international standing and goodwill, which was abundant in the wake of 9/11.

Once the invasion occurred and Iraq’s security forces evaporated those same considerations should have driven U.S. policy to restore the country’s stability, vis-à-vis Iran. The region represents a vital strategic interest for the U.S., as does blocking the expansion of Iranian influence. Unfortunately, the U.S. chose to ignore this reality and when politically expedient, withdrew from Iraq and hoped for the best. Beyond the error of the initial invasion, withdrawing was nearly as significant a strategic error, placing Iraq’s future into the hands of a corrupt and sectarian Prime Minister who was intent to establish Shia domination and Iranian alignment. While Iraq’s condition had improved significantly since 2003, sufficient signs existed in 2011 that progress was fragile. Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s sectarianism and authoritarianism, toxic components that would lead to further destruction of Iraq, had been on full display and reported to Washington. Iraq, shattered by decades of war, sanctions, and corruption, needed longer to heal and needed American help to prevent an Iranian takeover.

Although we had decided that we were done with Iraq and all its associated challenges, Iraq wasn’t done with us. American strategic myopia enabled Maliki’s government to kill or disenfranchise Sunnis and financially isolate the Kurds, paving the way for the rise of ISIS and a return of U.S. forces. We are still in Iraq today, and still without a status of forces agreement that was used for political cover to end our military presence in 2011. But today’s Iraq looks very different. Iranian-backed militias, on the Iraqi payroll, now outnumber the Iraqi Army. The Ministry of Defense now includes officers and generals who are designated terrorists. Iranian aligned militias have captured state resources through political representation in Parliament and by controlling key posts in lucrative ministries. Iran’s influence now waxes in an uninterrupted arc from Tehran to the Mediterranean, traipsing across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

Retaining U.S. forces in Iraq would have been a difficult decision for a war weary America. But a residual force that was closely tied to key political objectives and aimed at reducing Iranian influence could have prevented the treacherous strategic situation we face today: Iraq as a broken and devastated nation, serving as a base and transit point for Iranian forces. Luckily, the U.S. retains some tools to steer Iraq to a more constructive and stable future. The U.S. can impose high economic costs on the Iraqi military and government to remove Iran-backed terrorists from its payroll, withhold U.S. banknote transfers that inexplicably continue despite their laundering by Iran, and remove sanctions waivers so Iraq can free itself from an artificial energy dependence on Iran. And perhaps most importantly, the U.S. must militarily deter Iran so that it retracts rather than expands its regional aggression. Only these measures are likely to reverse the tailspin of Iraq’s perilous future, a future that we set in motion twenty years ago.

TIME · by Frank Sobchak and Matthew Zais · March 22, 2023

7. What are America's goals in Ukraine? It's not totally clear

Excerpts:

The U.S. government has made clear that it defends Ukraine’s sovereignty, said Farkas, who is currently executive director of the McCain Institute, a think tank in Washington, D.C., that is part of Arizona State University.

Restoring Ukraine’s full sovereignty would involve the Ukrainian government having control of all its territory and people without any foreign political, military, or economic interference, she said. The United States helped to restore Kuwait’s sovereignty after it was invaded and occupied by Iraq in 1990.

Farkas said she believes it is more appropriate for U.S. government officials to define America’s goals as restoring Ukrainian sovereignty rather than helping Ukraine win the war.

“I don’t think we should be talking in terms of winning and losing,” Farkas said. “We should be talking in terms of very clear objectives. What is winning and what is losing? Nobody knows how to define that. What we should define is the end state. The end state is that the Ukrainian government controls its legal territory and the political systems and economic systems on that territory – period. Victory and loss, those are just not terms that describe anything. You can ascribe whatever you want to those terms.”

What are America's goals in Ukraine? It's not totally clear

It’s not actually clear whether the US wants Ukraine to defeat Russia.

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED MAR 22, 2023 2:01 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · March 22, 2023

When President Joe Biden traveled to Kyiv on Feb. 20, he told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he could count on continuing support from the United States.

“You remind us that freedom is priceless; it’s worth fighting for for as long as it takes,” Biden told Zelensky at the end of a joint statement from the two leaders. “And that’s how long we’re going to be with you, Mr. President: for as long as it takes.”

However, several national security experts said they believe the Biden administration has yet to clearly state what its strategic objectives in Ukraine are. They say it’s not clear whether the United States supports Ukraine expelling all Russian forces from its territory – Ukraine’s stated objective – or if it would settle for a negotiated peace that falls short of a total Ukrainian victory.

This type of ambiguity has plagued the United States as it has tried to wage war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere

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For most of the 21st century, the United States has lacked effective policies or strategies to win conflicts, giving rise to the Forever Wars, best described by retired Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s 2018 advice to then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that a small number of U.S. troops should “muddle along” in Afghanistan.

Retired Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, who led NATO and U.S. European Command from 2013 to 2016, said the United States does not have a policy that supports Ukraine defeating Russia on the battlefield.

“We keep saying, ‘We’re going to give them everything it takes,’ – everything it takes to do what?” Breedlove told Task & Purpose. “We’re going to be there as long as it takes – as long as it takes to do what? As a military commander, if someone gave me those as directives, I would have no idea what they were asking me to do.”

In this handout photo issued by the Ukrainian Presidential Press Office, U.S. President Joe Biden meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the Ukrainian presidential palace on February 20, 2023 in Kyiv, Ukraine. The US President made his first visit to Kyiv since Russia’s large-scale invasion last February 24. (Photo by Ukrainian Presidential Press Office via Getty Images)

The U.S. government needs to make clear that its policy is to provide Ukraine with the resources it needs to drive the Russians from all its territory, including Crimea, however long that takes, Breedlove said.

Having a clear U.S. policy on Ukraine will determine how long the war will last, he said. The Ukrainians have already proven that if they are properly equipped, they can defeat the Russians, as they did outside Kyiv at the onset of the war and elsewhere in the country since.

“How this fight proceeds is 100% reliant on Western policy and whether the United States leads Western policy,” Breedlove said. “If we choose to give them what they need to win, they will win, and this will not be a protracted war. If we choose not to give them what they need to win, which is our current track, then this might turn into a protracted war.”

The Biden administration deserves credit for holding the alliance of countries supporting Ukraine together and earning bipartisan support in Congress to provide military assistance for Ukraine, said retired Army Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. Army Europe. But “they have stopped short of declaring what’s this all about in a clear, concrete way.”

“I don’t why they can’t say: ‘We want Ukraine to win; our goal is for Ukraine to win, and here’s what that means, and here’s why it’s important to the United States,’” Hodges told Task & Purpose.

Because the U.S. government has not clearly stated that it supports a Ukrainian victory over the Russians, leaders in the Kremlin still have hope that the United States and other countries will eventually lose the will to continue helping Ukraine, Hodges said.

Since Russia launched its latest invasion of Ukraine last February, the United States has provided Ukrainians with more than $32.5 billion in military assistance, said Marine Lt. Col. Garron Garn, a spokesman for the Defense Department.

Ukrainian servicemen fire a M777 howitzer at Russian positions near Bakhmut, eastern Ukraine, on March 17, 2023, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Photo by Aris Messinis / AFP) (Photo by ARIS MESSINIS/AFP via Getty Images)

The U.S. government’s strategy has been to work with Ukraine and other countries to deliver the Ukrainians’ most urgent security assistance needs, including artillery, armored vehicles, air defense, and ammunition, Garn told Task & Purpose.

“Ultimately, Ukraine will determine what victory looks like,” Garn said in a statement. “Our job is to keep supporting Ukraine on the battlefield so they are in the best position at the negotiating table whenever that happens. DoD] is also committed to supporting Ukraine’s medium- to long-term capability needs to ensure it has the capacity to defend itself and deter future Russian aggression. As President Biden has said, the U.S. will stand by Ukraine in their fight for freedom for as long as it takes.”

Most recently, the Pentagon announced that it is accelerating the delivery of M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine by giving the Ukrainians older M1A1s rather than M1A2s. The 31 tanks are expected to arrive in Ukraine by the fall, Air Force Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman, told reporters on Tuesday.

The U.S. military is also confident that it will deliver a Patriot missile battery to Ukraine “on an expedited timeline,” said Ryder, who declined to say exactly when the Patriot system might arrive in Ukraine.

Yet the U.S. government has refused to provide Ukrainians with some of the weapons systems they’ve asked for, such as Army Tactical Missile System rockets, or ATACMS, which have a range of up to 186 miles. Biden made clear in May that the U.S. government will not give Ukraine missiles that are able to hit targets inside Russa. He also said “No” when asked in January if the United States would give Ukraine F-16 fighters.

Ever since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the U.S. government has been stuck in a cycle of initially refusing to provide weapons to Ukraine, only to reverse course after months of internal debates, by which time any opportunity to make a real difference on the battlefield has passed, said George Barros, a Russia analyst with the Institute for the Study of War think tank in Washington, D.C.

“We have our standard policy objectives, which is good; however, I’ll be perfectly honest, I am not convinced that the United States clearly has a strategy to achieve said goal,” Barros told Task & Purpose. “We have an approach; and that approach has been to send Ukraine a weapons system short, a day late. And so, we’ve always been playing catchup, and it’s not indicative of there being a real sound strategy.”

Ukrainian servicemen are seen along the frontline south of Bakhmut, Ukraine on March 20, 2023. (Photo by Wolfgang Schwan/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

Successive U.S. presidential administrations have been hesitant to provide weapons to Ukraine due to the fear of crossing Russian red lines that could lead to a nuclear war, Barros said. That fear continues to hamper the ability of the United States and other Western countries from coming up with a coherent Ukraine strategy.

It took several years before the U.S. government agreed to give Ukraine Javelin anti-tank missiles and allowed the Ukrainians to deploy them to units on the front lines, he said. U.S. officials also initially refused to provide Ukraine with main battle tanks before relenting in January, and now the Biden administration is resisting calls to give Ukraine fixed-wing aircraft.

“The unfortunate reality is that I think we likely are eventually going to send Ukraine fixed-wing aircraft after more months of debate, but this charade is very frustrating because the Ukrainians could be employing these systems – which we will likely ultimately give them, all patterns of the existing decision-making holding true – but the problem is that the current window of opportunity to exploit all of Russia’s failures so far in the war is closing,” Barros said.

However, Barros said he is hopeful that the United States and other Western allies are finally becoming less intimidated by Russian threats of escalating the war when deciding which weapons to provide Ukraine.

But the U.S. government’s support for Ukraine is also becoming a domestic political issue as some politicians argue that supporting Ukraine is not in America’s national security interest, said retired Navy Capt. Steven Horrell, of the Center for European Policy Analysis think tank in Washington, D.C.

“If we were to say, ‘We will do whatever it takes for Ukraine to win’ – boom; all of a sudden, you’re in a vulnerable spot domestically, because what’s that going to take?” said Horrell, a former naval intelligence officer.

Horrell also noted that U.S. officials often talk about defending Ukraine instead of helping the Ukrainians win. That could indicate that the Biden administration has not yet decided if U.S. policy is to help Ukraine win or achieve a negotiated peace.

Ukrainian servicemen from the Special Operations Forces (OPFOR) 214 Brigade ride a tank along the frontline north of Bakhmut, Ukraine on March 15, 2023. As the fight for Bakhmut continues, the Ukrainian government has send reinforcements in order to hold the city against the Russian forces. (Photo by Ignacio Marin/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

“If there is a legitimate ceasefire, that will stop Ukrainian civilians from being bombed in their apartments by Russian hypersonic missiles,” Horrell. “So, there’s a benefit to that and I think there probably is an undercurrent of not wanting to take that possibility off the table.”

Horrell added that Zelensky has said several times that any peace agreement would have to involve Russian forces leaving all Ukrainian territory.

A National Security Council official told Task & Purpose that the United States will not dictate to Ukraine what a negotiated settlement with Russia must look like and that the Ukrainians will determine their own military strategy.

The U.S. government supports Ukraine’s right to defend its sovereign territory and internationally recognized borders, the NSC official said.

It is possible for the United States to help Ukraine reclaim its territory without framing the issue in terms of defeating Russia, said Evelyn Farkas who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia from 2012 to 2015.

“I don’t think it’s our objective to ‘defeat’ Russia,” Farkas told Task & Purpose. “I think our government is correct not to state it in those terms because Russia can withdraw from Ukraine voluntarily any day, and that’s not necessarily a defeat for Russia. It certainly means that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s aggressive, international law-breaking, human rights-abusing foreign policy has failed, but it’s not a defeat for the country of Russia.”

The U.S. government has made clear that it defends Ukraine’s sovereignty, said Farkas, who is currently executive director of the McCain Institute, a think tank in Washington, D.C., that is part of Arizona State University.

Restoring Ukraine’s full sovereignty would involve the Ukrainian government having control of all its territory and people without any foreign political, military, or economic interference, she said. The United States helped to restore Kuwait’s sovereignty after it was invaded and occupied by Iraq in 1990.

Farkas said she believes it is more appropriate for U.S. government officials to define America’s goals as restoring Ukrainian sovereignty rather than helping Ukraine win the war.

“I don’t think we should be talking in terms of winning and losing,” Farkas said. “We should be talking in terms of very clear objectives. What is winning and what is losing? Nobody knows how to define that. What we should define is the end state. The end state is that the Ukrainian government controls its legal territory and the political systems and economic systems on that territory – period. Victory and loss, those are just not terms that describe anything. You can ascribe whatever you want to those terms.”

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · March 22, 2023

8. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 23, 2023 | SOF News

Ukraine Conflict Update - March 23, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · March 23, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, in the air, and on the seas. Additional topics include NATO, aid to Ukraine, refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.

Image / Photo: U.S. Airmen push a pallet holding munitions going to Ukraine into a C-17 Globemaster III at Travis Air Force Base, California, April 28, 2022. (U.S. Air Force photo by Chustine Minoda)

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Big Picture of the Conflict

Battle of Bakhmut. The fight for a small industrial city in Donetsk province continues (Google map). The struggle has gone on for many months. The Russians have been making some incremental advances on the city with huge personnel and equipment losses. The city is surrounded on the north, east, and south with one main road to the West (T0504) for the Ukrainians to evacuate dead and wounded and receive resupplies and replacement units and personnel. Read (and listen) more below:

The Battle of Bakhmut, Urban Warfare Project Podcast, Modern War Institute at West Point, featuring John Spencer, March 17, 2023, 36 minutes. https://mwi.usma.edu/the-battle-of-bakhmut/
The Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization, has been unable to fully capture Bakhmut. It has lost many personnel in almost ‘human wave’ attacks against Ukrainian defensive positions. Its incremental gains have not succeeded in cutting the T0504 highway – a critical line of communication for Ukraine. However, the mercenary group has not ceased in its efforts to take the city.

Ground Situation

Situation Maps. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. The Institute for the Study of War presents a map that depicts the assessed control of terrain in Ukraine as of March 6, 2023, 3:00 PM ET. View more Ukraine SITMAPs that provide updates on the disposition of Russian forces.

News Updates. A detailed daily update of the war – a daily review – is provided by Euromaidan Press. And, of course, there is the always comprehensive daily report by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

Limited Russian Gains. Over the past few months Russia has gained very little territory along the front lines. The incremental gains on the ground have come at a high cost of equipment and personnel. Many observers believe that the Russian offensive in the east of Ukraine has ‘culminated’.

A War of Attrition. The longer the war lasts the more likely the Russians will prevail in holding the land corridor from the Russian border to Crimea and the entire coastline of the Sea of Azov. This is one of the most important objectives of the conflict for Russia. It has the advantage in a bigger population, more resources, and greater industrial capacity.

Ukrainian Counteroffensive. It is likely that the Ukrainians will mount an offensive in the spring – likely in late April or early May. Several factors play into this scenario.

The Ukrainians have lost a lot of personnel in the battle for Bakhmut. Many of these soldiers were veterans of the war.
The main battle tanks promised by the United States and European nations are slowly being introduced; but many will be unavailable for a spring offensive.
Ukrainian troops need to be trained up in the new equipment being fielded by western nations. Some of this equipment will be fielded to newly formed units that need to have a train-up before being committed to the battlefield.
The Russians have been busy fortifying their positions and will mount a strong defense.
Weather and terrain are important factors. The ground has to be firm (no mud) for wheeled and tracked vehicles to travel across the countryside and on unimproved roads.

Tanks and More Tanks. A lot of press coverage is being given to the provision of modern Western tanks to Ukraine. Some national security observers say it is a ‘game changer’. Others question whether the limited quantities, long timeline to deployment, and other factors will result in limited effects this spring and summer.

U.S. Abrams. One of the nations providing tanks is the United States. The Abrams tank, is many months away from deployment – and there are not a lot scheduled to be sent to Ukraine. “M1 Abrams Tank: A Game Changer for Ukraine or Just a Waste of Time”, by Kris Osborn, 1945, March 16, 2023. The DoD announced that it will be sending M1A1 Abrams instead of the M1A2 Abrams. This will accelerate the delivery of 31 main battle tanks. “Abrams Tanks to Arrive in Ukraine by Fall”, SOF News, March 22, 2023.
Polish Tanks. Ukrainian crews have completed their training on Leopard 2 tanks in Poland. Warsaw has delivered 14 of the tanks to Ukraine. The crews and tanks will form the nucleus of a full tank battalion when combined with 8 tanks from Canada, 8 from Norway, and 6 from Spain. Poland had previously sent almost 250 T-72 tanks to Ukraine. “Poland already sent 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine as Ukrainian crews finished training on them”, Euromaiden Press, March 9, 2023.
Russian Tanks. As the number of modern Russian tanks are depleted in Ukraine the country has been reaching back into its stock of older tanks. New reports say that T-54s and T-55s are now being taken out of storage for deployment in Ukraine. Apparently these older tanks are being ‘modernized’. The tanks date back from the Stalin era.
Russia’s Armata Tank. When the T-14 Armata tank was revealed in a 2015 May Victory Day parade it embarrassingly broke down. Seven years later the tank can be declared dead. Read about the demise of the Russia’s latest prototype tank. “Armata – the story is over”, by Sergio Miller, Wavall Room, February 10, 2023.

Fight for the Skies

MQ-9 Drone Incident. The Russian downing of an MQ-9 Reaper has resulted in some national defense observers examining the role of UAVs and the US involvement in the Ukraine Conflict. Liam Collins, PhD, a retired Special Forces colonel, provides his views of the incident. “Reaper Down: Three Takeaways from Russia’s Intercept of a US Unmanned Aerial Vehicle”, Modern War Institute at West Point, March 17, 2023.

Ukrainian Drones. Dodging incoming Russian mortars to spot where Russia is firing from is just a day in the life of a Ukrainian drone operator. Read an informative article by Howard Altman on the training drone operators receive and how the drone teams are employed. “Ukrainian Drone Pilot’s Frontline Account of Fighting Via Eyes in the Sky”, The War Zone, March 21, 2023.

New Russian Tactic. The Russians have been using emergency marine radio buoys to conduct more accurate strikes by aircraft or attack UAVs. The ACR RLB-37 GlobalFix buoys are dropped by UAVs. The transmission device provides a very accurate location signal for aerial attacks; it transmits coordinates of its location by using satellite communication. Russia is receiving drones from Iran and China.

F-16s and ‘Private Pilots’. One of the objections to providing Ukraine with the F-16 fighter is the extensive train-up needed for Ukrainian pilots. One retired U.S. F-16 pilot has a fix for that. “Deadliest F-16 pilot offers solution to Ukraine’s jet problem”, Euromaiden Press, March 18, 2023. It has been estimated that it would take six months to train Ukrainian pilots on the F-16. (Euromaiden Press, March 20, 2023).

Maritime Activities

Sabotage of Nordstream Pipelines. In September 2022 an unknown entity (Moscow perhaps?) attacked gas pipelines just outside Swedish and Danish territorial waters. This attack has awaken Europe to the vulnerability of the underwater maritime infrastructure. Read more in “Maritime Sabotage: Protecting Europe’s Soft Underbelly”, by Walker D. Mills, Irregular Warfare Initiative, March 19, 2023.

Black Sea. The latest reports from the Pentagon state that the Russians are keeping three Kalibr cruise missile-capable ships off the coast of Ukraine in the Black Sea. The Russians are reported to still be searching for the MQ-9 Reaper downed by Russian aircraft in the Black Sea. It is unknown if they will be successful in their recovery efforts.

Grain Exports. The Russians have agreed to extend the grain initiative agreement for four more months. Turkey was instrumental in negotiating this deal. This allows shipping vessels to transport grain from Ukrainian ports through the Black Sea to other countries around the world. Read more about Ukraine’s grain in “Saving Ukraine’s economy: the grain giant fighting for survival”, Financial Times, March 22, 2023.

World Response

ICC and Putin War Crimes. According to the International Criminal Court (ICC), Russian President Putin is responsible for the illegal deportation of hundreds of Ukrainian children to Russia. The arrest warrant will obligate the court’s 123 member states to arrest Putin and transfer him to The Hague for trial if he sets foot on their territory. “ICC judges issue arrest warrant for Putin over war crimes in Ukraine”, Reuters, March 17, 2023.

China. President Xi Jinping met with President Vladimir Putin during a visit to Russia in late March. Likely topics of discussion probably included sanction evasion schemes, the supply of equipment to Russia, and Chinese involvement in a negotiated settlement of the war in Ukraine. It is believed that some of Putin’s goals for the summit were not met.

US Army – Permanent Presence in Poland? In an effort to improve command and control capabilities and manage forward operating sites, the Army has established the U.S. Army Garrison Poland in March 2023. The Army now has 11 locations where its troops are stationed in Poland. “Army establishes permanent garrison in Poland”, U.S. Army, March 21, 2023.

Ex-Navy SEAL (Korea) Arrested. A former Korean Navy special forces officer who went to Ukraine a year ago to help that country defend itself against Russia has been arrested upon his return to Korea. “Ex-Navy SEAL admits violating passport law”, The Korea Herald, March 20, 2023.

U.S. Airlines – Hurting Due to War. Shortly after western nations prohibited Russian airlines from flying over Europe and the United States President Putin did the same. He restricted U.S. airlines from transiting Russian airspace. This has benefited other international carriers from countries like UAE, India, and China. “Banned From Russian Airspace, US Airlines Look to Restrict Competitors”, The New York Times, March 17, 2023. (subscription)

Commentary

Defeating Russia. Hans Petter Midttun, a Norwegian naval officer, provides his perspective on what needs to be done for Ukraine to defeat Russia. The Russian winter offensive seems to be failing and Russian ground attacks have decreased significantly. However, the conditions that allow a successful counteroffensive by Ukraine have not yet been set. “What Ukraine needs to defeat Russia in 2023”, Euromaiden Press, March 22, 2023.

Appeasing Russia. Critics from the far right and far left are of the same view that Ukraine is not a conflict America should be involved in. The country is far away, it has never been an ally of the U.S., and Russia has some legitimate claims on part of the country. But there are some that fear what happens is the ‘appeasers’ win out. Read why giving in to Russia is a bigger mistake than Munich (1938). “The New Appeasement”, The Critic, January 2022.

Defense Strategy. Jim Mitre, a defense researcher at the RAND Corporation, sees the Ukraine conflict bringing about momentum for widespread change in the Defense Department. “How the Ukraine War Accelerates the Defense Strategy”, War on the Rocks, March 21, 2023.

Video – Historical Guide to Ukraine Conflict. The invasion of Ukraine is shattering the illusion that aggression is a relic of the past and a reminder that warmongering must be deterred by forceful resistance. “The Historical Guide to Dealing with Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine”, PolicyEd, YouTube, March 14, 2023, 3 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dPL-pY2Q8sc

Resources about the Ukraine Conflict

Maps of Ukraine

https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html

Weapons of the Ukraine War.

https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/weapons.html

Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.

Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.

UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one

sof.news · by SOF News · March 23, 2023

9. The Air Force Is Rebuilding Its Pacific Plans Around the B-21

One reason for the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines: Access to multiple airfields.

Excerpts:

Wilsbach said the United States is trying to gain access to more bases and build longer runways across the Pacific, as part of a three-year-old effort called agile combat employment.

“We are looking for as many airfields as we can have access to, to disperse the force. It'll be hopefully in next year's budget: expanding airfields so that we can operate off of them,” he said. “A lot of the budget money that we're spending this year is not to build permanent bases but rather to expand runways that are not quite long enough, to expand ramp space that aren't quite big enough for the number of aircraft that we'd like to place there and for fuel ammunition storage and things like that.”

But China will have enough missiles to crater runways no matter how many the United States builds or rents. So the Air Force is also deploying new technologies to get damaged airstrips back in service. .

“This quick-drying concrete that we have—you pour it and it's the consistency of a milkshake when it goes in the hole, and 45 minutes later you can walk on it,” Wilsbach said. “Three hours later, you can land a C-17 on it. So it dries really that fast.”

The Air Force Is Rebuilding Its Pacific Plans Around the B-21

A “daily flyer” bomber that’s also an intel-and-communications hub will make the entire service less vulnerable in a potential war with China, officials say.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

The Air Force is reworking its concepts for Pacific operations around the nascent B-21 bomber, which will fly and do much more than its predecessors, officials say. The stealthy jet will help the service accelerate its operations in the region, they say, and even reduce the service’s great vulnerability in a conflict with China: too many big planes sitting around on too few island runways.

“It's going to have fantastic sensors and of course it will have lots of options for weapons to be employed as well as other effects that it can create,” Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach, commander of Pacific Air Forces, said Monday at the Mitchell Institute. “The pilot-to-vehicle interface on that aircraft is a leap in capability compared to the B-2, and so the speed at which the crew can cycle through the threats and then get weapons on target is significantly faster.”

The bomber’s ability to act as an airborne data hub is a huge new advantage, Wilsbach said. He said the B-21 will act as an organizing communications hub in larger, joint all-domain command-and-control schemes, helping to collect and send data to other jets and drones alongside it.

The “network between the B- 21 formations that are out there” will be “a game-changer from the standpoint of being able to get ordnance on targets faster at a rate that the that the enemy, whoever that might be, will have a hard time responding to in a coherent way,” the general said.

The B-21 was built to handle a heavy workload, Wilsbach said.

“The aircraft was designed to be a daily flyer,” he said. “It’s maintenance- friendly. You can quickly repair it when it has a break and get it back up in the air and so you don't have extended periods of time where it's on the ground.

But the plane is only part of the process. The Air Force is working to move parts and technicians to more places so that they are on hand when needed, Brig. Gen. Kenyon Bell, the director of logistics and engineering for Air Force Global Strike Command, told Defense One.

“So the tyranny of distance is certainly going to come into play. But our ability to be able to forward-position assets, so that if we had to go anywhere on the globe, that we would have assets available to be able to employ our weapons when we need them” eases the problem, Bell said.

The service’s recent 2024 budget request includes several hundred million dollars for pre-positioned equipment, Wilsbach said.

“One of the aspects of actual combat employment that's difficult to do is logistics, especially logistics that's under attack,” he said. “Our thought is, if we preposition some of the equipment that we might need, especially in the early days of a potential conflict, you relieve some of that burden to get logistics in there immediately. And so we're already beginning to preposition.”

But supporting the expeditionary operations of a diverse bomber fleet is an incredibly complex task, said Bell, who spoke as part of Defense One’s “State of Defense” series. The 70-year-old B-52, for example, requires huge amounts of fuel, many hard-to-find parts, and gargantuan runways.

For the B-52, Bell said, his command looks at managing contracts so that they have more flexibility in buying replacement parts, rather than waiting on bulk buys. He also wants to make more use of 3D-printed parts, and has exhorted his command to figure out how to use this “exciting” technology on their strictly regulated nuclear-capable aircraft.

“What I have frequently talked to our team and our enterprise about is: let's not hide behind nuclear certification as a roadblock. But let's work with and through the nuclear certification process to utilize some of these new technologies. Yes, it will be challenging. But it does not make it impossible to do. So, yes, we are also taking advantage of additive manufacturing. We also have something within the Air Force called the Rapid Sustainment Office, which is leading some of that technology for us.”

Wilsbach said the United States is trying to gain access to more bases and build longer runways across the Pacific, as part of a three-year-old effort called agile combat employment.

“We are looking for as many airfields as we can have access to, to disperse the force. It'll be hopefully in next year's budget: expanding airfields so that we can operate off of them,” he said. “A lot of the budget money that we're spending this year is not to build permanent bases but rather to expand runways that are not quite long enough, to expand ramp space that aren't quite big enough for the number of aircraft that we'd like to place there and for fuel ammunition storage and things like that.”

But China will have enough missiles to crater runways no matter how many the United States builds or rents. So the Air Force is also deploying new technologies to get damaged airstrips back in service. .

“This quick-drying concrete that we have—you pour it and it's the consistency of a milkshake when it goes in the hole, and 45 minutes later you can walk on it,” Wilsbach said. “Three hours later, you can land a C-17 on it. So it dries really that fast.”

U.S. officials have said that China may invade Taiwan as early as next year. Wilsbach said a fight in the Pacific would be on a scale the world has not seen since World War II. But, he says, China is learning from Russia’s hardship in Ukraine and discovering that without air superiority, no on-the-ground victory is possible. And a Chinese assault on Taiwan would face obstacles that Russia did not encounter in its attempt to take Kyiv.

“China has the most difficult military operation there is to do, which is an amphibious landing coordinated with an air assault over 100 miles of ocean, and it's a similar adversary that would fight just like Ukraine,” he said.”You know, we have seen a country that is determined to defend themselves. In the discussions that I have with my counterparts in Taiwan, they tell me they will be similar.”

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

10. US F-22s land in Philippines for first time, furthering defense ties

US F-22s land in Philippines for first time, furthering defense ties

airforcetimes.com · by Zamone Perez · March 21, 2023

Two U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptors landed at Clark Air Base in the Philippines last week in a move signaling increased defense efforts between the two countries.

During the exercise, U.S. pilots from the Alaska-based 525th Fighter Squadron joined aviators from the Philippine Air Force’s 5th Fighter Wing for low-altitude flyovers, air combat maneuvering, formation training, and, with help from a KC-135 Stratotanker, air-to-air refueling over the heavily contested South China Sea.

“This was the first time that F-22s, or any fifth-generation aircraft, have landed on and operated out of the Philippines,” Capt. Karl Schroeder, one of the Raptor pilots, said in a release. “This milestone with a regional ally aids in providing stability and security to the Indo-Pacific.”

Regional stability has become an increasingly glaring focus of the two militaries as threats continue to emerge out of Beijing. While the Philippine Constitution prohibits permanent basing of foreign troops, the two nations’ Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement does allow for an increased footprint of American forces by way of rotations to a handful of predetermined locations.

“The EDCA is a key pillar of the U.S.-Philippines alliance, which supports combined training, exercises, and interoperability between our forces,” DoD officials said in February. “Expansion of the EDCA will make our alliance stronger and more resilient, and will accelerate modernization of our combined military capabilities.”

The EDCA includes granting U.S. forces access to a number of military camps, one of which, Basa Air Base in Pampanga on the island of Luzon, just launched a $25 million renovation of its runway in preparation to be used as a hub for joint task force exercises and humanitarian assistance, USNI news first reported.

Four other identified sites currently slated to host U.S. rotations are Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base (Cebu), Antonio Bautista Air Base (Palawan), Fort Magsaysay (Nueva Ecija), and Lumbia Air Base (Cagayan de Oro). Additional locations that have not yet been identified are expected to be unveiled in the near future.

In a separate step toward countering Chinese aggression and propaganda, the Philippine Coast Guard announced on March 8 that it would begin publicly disclosing aggressive actions taken by China in the South China Sea.

Recently released footage depicted one such incident on Feb. 6, during which a ship belonging to the China Coast Guard aimed a military laser at a Philippine vessel, briefly blinding some crew members.

The string of announcements in recent months follows a period of tension between the U.S. and the Philippines, when former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte threatened to sever military relations with Washington and cozy up to China and Russia. Duterte’s successor, Ferdinand Marcos, has worked to thaw relations, even hosting Vice President Kamala Harris in November.

About Zamone Perez and Jon Simkins

Zamone “Z” Perez is a rapid response reporter and podcast producer at Defense News and Military Times. He previously worked at Foreign Policy and Ufahamu Africa. He is a graduate of Northwestern University, where he researched international ethics and atrocity prevention in his thesis. He can be found on Twitter @zamoneperez.

Jon Simkins is a writer and editor for Military Times, and a USMC veteran.

11. Marcos says new military bases with US to be 'scattered' around the Philippines

I think this is what we want to hear.

Marcos says new military bases with US to be 'scattered' around the Philippines

Reuters · by Neil Jerome Morales

Summary
New EDCA sites includes province near South China Sea
Marcos tells troops to be vigilant against external threats
Marcos says external threats becoming 'complex', 'unpredictable'

MANILA, March 22 (Reuters) - President Ferdinand Marcos Jr said on Wednesday that four new military bases under a defense agreement with the U.S. would be located in various parts of the Philippines, including in a province facing the South China Sea.

Last month, Marcos granted the U.S. access to four sites, on top of five existing locations under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which comes amid China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan.

"There are four extra sites scattered around the Philippines - there are some in the north, there are some around Palawan, there are some further south," Marcos told reporters at the sidelines of the Philippine army's founding anniversary.

The EDCA allows U.S. access to Philippine bases for joint training, pre-positioning of equipment and building of facilities such as runways, fuel storage and military housing, but it is not a permanent presence.

The Philippines and the U.S. would announce the locations of the bases soon, Marcos said, adding the sites would boost the country's ability to defend the "eastern side" of its largest island, Luzon. Luzon is the closest main Philippine island to self-ruled Taiwan that China claims as its own.

China's foreign ministry on Wednesday reiterated its stance that the U.S. side was increasing tensions by strengthening its military deployments in the region, adding countries should be "vigilant" and avoid being used by the U.S..

"We generally believe that defence cooperation between countries should be conducive to regional peace and stability, and should not be aimed at third parties or harm the interests of third parties," spokesperson Wang Wenbin told reporters at a regular news briefing.

A former Philippine military chief has publicly said the U.S. had asked for access to bases in Isabela, Zambales and Cagayan, all on the island of Luzon, facing north towards Taiwan, and on Palawan in the southwest, near the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

Some leaders of local governments at the potential EDCA sites have opposed Marcos' decision, worried they would be dragged into a conflict if one arose between the U.S. and China over Taiwan.

But Marcos said his government has discussed with them the importance of the expanded U.S. access and "why it will actually be good for their provinces".

Washington has committed $80 million worth of infrastructure investments at the five existing sites - the Antonio Bautista Air Base in Palawan, Basa Air Base in Pampanga, Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, Benito Ebuen Air Base in Cebu and Lumbia Air Base in Mindanao.

Speaking before Philippine troops, Marcos told them to be vigilant as the external threat to security was becoming more "complex" and "unpredictable".

"Be vigilant against elements that will undermine our hard earned peace, our hard earned stability, continue to improve relations with your counterparts overseas," Marcos said.

Without giving specifics, Marcos said he was aware of an "emerging threat" to his country's territory, which he said would require "adjustments in our strategy".

"The external security environment is becoming more complex. It is becoming more unpredictable," Marcos said.

Writing by Karen Lema; Editing by Ed Davies and Himani Sarkar

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Neil Jerome Morales

12. 'Up our game': The Pentagon's 3 strategies to shore up munitions stockpiles

Let's get that military industrial congressional complex humming.

Excerpts:

What’s In A Multi-year?

In the FY24 rollout, the Pentagon named five missiles that it would be seeking multi-year deals on. Those are:

Naval Strike Missile: $249.9 million for 103 anti-ship missiles;
Standard Missile 6: $1.6 billion for 125 of the surface-to-air missiles launched from the MK 41 vertical launch system;
AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile: $1.2 billion for 831 missiles that can be launched from various fighter aircraft;
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM): $1 billion for 118 anti-ship missiles; and
AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER): $1.8 billion for 550 cruise missiles.

While the five weapons that made the initial FY24 budget request are aligned for Air Force and Navy operations, several ground-based Army programs are in the pipeline too.

Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told an audience at the McAleese FY24 defense programs conference March 15 that her service is going after two multi-year procurement buys this year for artillery rounds and artillery charges.

Bush, the army acquisition head, is also working to get two other big-ticket programs aligned for multi-year buys next year— one for Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missiles, and the other for Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). For now, though, the Office of Management and Budget has stopped that from happening while it waits for more clarity on the financial benefit of signing such deals.

“I don’t want to make it sound like OMB is the bad guy here… . We still have homework to do,” McCord told reporters on Wednesday. That homework, he added, is showing lawmakers the government will save money by entering into multi-year contracts, and that a company’s suppliers can support the increased workload.

'Up our game': The Pentagon's 3 strategies to shore up munitions stockpiles - Breaking Defense

With the war in Ukraine raging, missile and other munition production seems like a sure bet. But the Pentagon knows industry is wary of getting burned should attitudes change and is trying to offer novel reassurances.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · March 22, 2023

A Patriot PAC-3 launch is shown here. (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin)

WASHINGTON — With demand for munitions in Ukraine only increasing and NATO members expressing fears about their own stockpile levels, Pentagon planners last week laid out a three-pronged approach to keeping US munition stocks at acceptable levels.

Now defense officials just have to get industry to trust them.

The three steps, revealed as part of the fiscal 2024 budget rollout and in subsequent statements by officials, are a mix of classic concepts and new ideas. On the classic side, it features a major push for multi-year munitions buys, which lock in guaranteed procurements instead of going year-by-year. On the new ideas side, the Pentagon is exploring a pilot project for larger-lot procurement, as well as a new “Joint Production Accelerator Cell” to understand and head off industry challenges.

The overall effort is a direct result of what has happened in the last year in Ukraine, with Pentagon Comptroller Michael McCord saying on March 13 that “Ukraine has really informed and highlighted the need to up our game here.” At the same time, the weapon systems lined up for multi-year buys are “not the kind of missiles that are key to the Ukraine fight: These are key to Indo-Pacific deterrence,” he later added. “What we’re trying to do here… is to think about lessons that we’re learning today and apply them to the future, apply them to other scenarios.”

But while munitions are a hot topic right now, industry officials have been burned before by the Pentagon raising munitions levels and then dropping them shortly after, which would leave companies who invest in increasing production holding the bag for new overhead costs.

Steven Grundman, a senior fellow with the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, acknowledged that industry has a right to be skittish, based on past government decisions to use munition coffers as a bill-payer. However, he noted that if the government is serious about ramping up munition production lines, enhanced funding is the key since industry is primarily concerned with the money and risk.

“At that point, there is going to be a dance with industry over who is going to bear the risk of financing the investments needed to meet this new level of demand,” Grundman told Breaking Defense on Monday. “As distasteful as this dance may appear, these are normal business issues, and resolving them should not hold up the train.

“If contractors are not going to put at least some investment of working capital forward in this crisis, then we could hardly blame the government if it takes one step back to find competitors which are willing to bear more risk to get into the market,” he added.

Added industry analyst Roman Schweizer of the Cowen Group, “It’s encouraging that DoD is using a number of new and existing contracting vehicles and funding approaches to increase stockpiles and production rates. The use of multi-year contracts should give industry the confidence it needs to increase hiring and fund plant expansion to expand beyond peacetime production rates. Given the recent inflation, labor and supply chain issues the industry has faced and continues to work through, this is likely to require sustained attention from DoD, Congress and industry.”

Multi-years Help, But No ‘Magic Bullet’

DoD’s new multi-year munition contracts are one avenue to help quell such concerns, but Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante warned at the Reagan Institute’s National Security Innovation Base Summit on March 14 that they are not the “magic bullet.”

“We’re getting a very good response to it, but [there are] people who are used to traditionally having that fidelity, year-to-year in munitions, and using it for budget purposes: This is hard for them,” he told the audience.

Multi-years also are not set in stone, as the military, or Congress, could decide to cut funding during the next budget cycles. The day following his Reagan comments, LaPlante told reporters that one key to reassuring nervous decision makers sitting on defense industry’s boards is the contract language and showing that the company will be “made whole” if the US government changes course.

Doug Bush, the official charged with overseeing Army acquisition, has also been working closely with industry over the past year to ramp up munition production and separately spoke with reporters on March 15. From his vantage point, he said the multi-year deals are a great incentive for providing industry with an extra layer of insurance since these deals are hard to “pilfer” from once they’re signed.

“Once you’ve got a multi-year contract in place, breaking that up is a huge bar to get over inside the Pentagon and on the hill,” Bush explained. “Nothing’s ever guaranteed but…the bar is high once you’re there to trip it up.”

However, another complicating factor is the sale of US weapons to foreign countries and defense companies are constantly analyzing those “demand signals” too as the war inside Ukraine rages on.

“There’s a bow wave around the world… for equipment from all countries, not just from DoD,” LaPlante said when asked about the demand signal to industry for more munitions. “A board is looking at that and saying, ‘Is Poland really going to buy” that many weapons?

A B-1 bomber deploys Lockheed Martin’s Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), one of the munitions being considered for a Pentagon pilot program. (Credit Lockheed Martin)

New Approaches To Accelerating Change

The two new ideas included in the FY24 plan are specifically designed to assuage concerns that the multi-year procurement doesn’t.

The first is a pilot project under the “large lot procurement” umbrella. Budget documents confirm that missiles like the LRASM and JASSM-ER are both slated to take part in the pilot project, along with the SM-6 and AMRAAM, and the department plans to spend approximately $15.1 billion on the effort between FY24 and FY28.

While the pilot project revolves around the multi-year deals, Pentagon documents note it also includes dollars to expand production capacity, increase annual production quantities, and provides 15 percent “economic order quantity” in FY24 for long-lead items.

Meanwhile, LaPlante announced the establishment of a Joint Production Accelerator Cell to help identify ways to maximize production strategies and head off industry challenges before they become a problem.

“The accelerator is not going to do contracting, nor is the accelerator going to make decisions,” LaPlante told reporters on March 15. “What the accelerator is going to do is build the content and the material.

“If you were to ask a question… I want to triple that production line, and I want to triple it in one to two years. Tell me first, tell me if it can be done? And if the first answer is, well, ‘No, we don’t think it can be done.’ Why not? What options do we have?”

Experts will then work with the prime contractors and sub suppliers to figure out ways to ramp up capacity and then “work like the devil” to execute a plan, LaPlante said.

Ultimately, industry will want some sort of target to aim for if it is going to spend the money to grow its production capabilities. As of yet, the US has not laid out a clear number.

Speaking last week, neither Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks nor Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy Adm. Christopher Grady would directly address if the US plans to increase its stockpile targets like NATO has vowed to do.

“The team can give you a good rundown of where the investments are across those stockpiles: That’s not a static question, by the way. It is one that we continue to reassess over and over,” Grady said. While he declined to directly if the US would raise its stockpile targets, he noted that the Pentagon’s budget request significantly invests in munitions and is designed to “incentivize the industrial base to maintain production lines.”

What’s In A Multi-year?

In the FY24 rollout, the Pentagon named five missiles that it would be seeking multi-year deals on. Those are:

Naval Strike Missile: $249.9 million for 103 anti-ship missiles;
Standard Missile 6: $1.6 billion for 125 of the surface-to-air missiles launched from the MK 41 vertical launch system;
AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile: $1.2 billion for 831 missiles that can be launched from various fighter aircraft;
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM): $1 billion for 118 anti-ship missiles; and
AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER): $1.8 billion for 550 cruise missiles.

While the five weapons that made the initial FY24 budget request are aligned for Air Force and Navy operations, several ground-based Army programs are in the pipeline too.

Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told an audience at the McAleese FY24 defense programs conference March 15 that her service is going after two multi-year procurement buys this year for artillery rounds and artillery charges.

Bush, the army acquisition head, is also working to get two other big-ticket programs aligned for multi-year buys next year— one for Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missiles, and the other for Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). For now, though, the Office of Management and Budget has stopped that from happening while it waits for more clarity on the financial benefit of signing such deals.

“I don’t want to make it sound like OMB is the bad guy here… . We still have homework to do,” McCord told reporters on Wednesday. That homework, he added, is showing lawmakers the government will save money by entering into multi-year contracts, and that a company’s suppliers can support the increased workload.

“One of the basic parts of homework for a multi-year is [showing] ‘Are there savings?’” McCord added. “In these cases, of things like GMLRS [being used in Ukraine], you might decide as a matter of public policy that you will be willing to enter into a multi-year without saving a lot of money because it was that important to you.”

It is possible that they Army proceeds with multi-year buys for both GMLRS or PAC-3 next year either because it completes its homework and submits an addendum to the current request, lawmakers add it to the defense spending bill, or the deals are funded through a future supplemental spending request instead of the base budget.

Senior Airman Natasha Mundt, 14th Airlift Squadron loadmaster, and Airmen assigned to the 305th Aerial Port squadron prepare the upload of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System munitions to a C-17 Globemaster III at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, N.J., Aug. 13, 2022. The munitions cargo is part of an additional security assistance package for Ukraine. The security assistance the U.S. is providing to Ukraine is enabling critical success on the battlefield against the Russian invading force. (DVDS)

“Putting a [anti-ship] LRASM on a Ukraine supplemental wouldn’t make a lot of sense but… you’d not be laughed out of the room” by proposing to use that money for GMLRS, he said, while also emphasizing there is not the guarantee of another supplemental.

A spokesperson for Lockheed Martin, which produces both the GMLRS and PAC-3, declined to comment on the proposed multi-year deals and referred all questions over to the government.

Although numbers for the two programs could change, for now the Army wants to spend $1 billion for 5,064 GMLRS in FY24 (890 fewer than in the FY23 base budget), $1.2 billion for 110 PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) weapons and $36 million for Patriot missile modifications.

While the Army has sent Ukraine GMLRS and promised to send one Patriot air defense battery to the Eastern European country, a source familiar with both production lines told Breaking Defense next year’s PAC-3 is “kind of puzzling.”

“GMLRS is at high demand and there [is expected to be] money for advance procurement for FY25,” the source said.

“[But] where is the demand for this [PAC-3] number? Of course, [Lockheed Martin] is glad to see it but where is the demand?” that source said, referring to the weapon’s current use.

A future demand for PAC-3 is not clear but could, in part, include Army plans to field Patriot launchers on the US territory of Guam as part of the larger integrated missile defense architecture.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · March 22, 2023

13. The US military will fight the next big war with Xbox-style video game controllers

Excerpts:

As of 2017, a majority of Americans between the ages of 18 and 49 said they play video games “often or sometimes,” according to data from the Pew Research Center. More recent data from the Entertainment Software Association suggests that 64 percent of American adults (roughly 214.4 million people) play video games.

“Now you have multiple generations who have used the design” of popular video game consoler controllers, Singer said.

While the training logic behind adapting Xbox-style controllers for futuristic weapons systems is sound, Singer pointed to one potential complication: what happens when the next generation of American warfighters grows up on a popular video game system that breaks from the traditional double-pronged model?

“If you’re being inspired by video game controllers, then you need to keep pace with how those controllers change over time, and that’s one thing that might happen in the entertainment world that might also happen in the defense world,” Singer said. “I don’t see [virtual reality] taking off anytime soon, but we have to ask: how does our acquisition system keep up with that change?”

The US military will fight the next big war with Xbox-style video game controllers

“These designs aren’t happenstance."

BY JARED KELLER | PUBLISHED MAR 22, 2023 8:58 AM EDtaskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · March 22, 2023

https://taskandpurpose.com/tech-tactics/us-military-video-game-controllers-war/?SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

At least two next-generation weapons systems the U.S. military is investing heavily in ahead of the next big war are operated in part through Xbox-style video game controllers.

The Defense Department’s fiscal year 2024 budget request, released last week, includes $154.5 million for the procurement of 24 Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) launchers as the Marine Corps’ first ground-based anti-ship missile capability.

Mounted to the back of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and capable of firing the Naval Strike Missile at targets at ranges of up to 100 nautical miles, Marine Corps leaders envision deploying the NMESIS to remote islands in the Indo-Pacific to quickly sink Chinese ships in the event of a future conflict.

As part of the same budget request, the DoD also wants $590 million for the procurement of Manuever-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) systems to provide mobile air defense against airborne drones, rotary-wing aircraft, and incoming rocket, artillery, and mortars fire, a four-fold increase over last year’s budget request for the system.

Mounted on the Army’s Stryker armored fighting vehicles and boasting turret-mounted Stinger and Hellfire missiles and a 30mm XM914 chain gun, the Army has been investing heavily in M-SHORAD capabilities since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the need for such capabilities has only grown following the former’s invasion of Ukraine last year.

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So what do these two somewhat disparate capabilities have in common, besides their essential roles in the next big conflict against a conventional military force like Russia or China? Something surprisingly elegant: they’re both operated using two-pronged control systems that look as if they were ripped from a commercial video game console.

A recent Stars and Stripes story on the 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment — the first in Europe outfitted with M-SHORAD systems — training at Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany highlighted soldiers learning to operate the turret’s tracking system using “a device that looks like an Xbox controller.”

The controller of US Army's M-SHORAD / The fire controller of Challenger 2 pic.twitter.com/J60VKTTE4B

— Sovinskiy (@_Sovinskiy) February 16, 2023

Similarly, photos published by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS) in 2021 show Marines with the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines “driving” a NMESIS launcher at Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands in Hawaii using a similar beige handheld controller.

Pfc. Guerby Destine, 22, number two cannon cocker with 1st Battalion, 12th Marines and a Westbury, N.Y., native, drives a Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher aboard Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, Aug. 15, 2021. (Cpl. Luke Cohen/U.S. Marine Corps)

It’s unclear if these two handheld systems are related. The Marine Corps did not respond to a request for comment, while an Army spokesman told Task & Purpose that the controller “is used on other systems as well” but declined to specify which systems in particular.

That the U.S. military is adopting control systems based on commercial off-the-shelf video game consoles should not come as a surprise, though. The Navy has adopted the off-the-shelf Xbox 360 controller for use on its Virginia-class submarines in recent years, and the Army has been exploring the use of these same controllers to operate small unmanned ground vehicles to carry out explosive ordnance disposal missions for more than 15 years.

Indeed, this trend isn’t limited to the U.S military: The British Army flaunted a Polaris MRZR all-terrain vehicle operated by an Xbox-style controller in 2017, and as recently as 2020, Israel Aerospace Industries showed off a brand new Carmel battle tank featuring a similar controller for all manner of systems, from steering and propulsion to the weapons turret mounted to the top of the armored vehicle.

“There are so many other systems out there that have something similar, from unmanned ground vehicles and beyond,” says Peter Singer, a fellow at the New America Foundation and the author of LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media who previously consulted on the Call of Duty series of video games.

Spc. Colby J. McAdams, 734th Ordnance Company, Fort Bliss, Texas, controls an andros FX using an Xbox 360 controller during the Brigade Modernization Command’s Army Warfighting Assessment or AWA 17.1 Oct. 14, 2017, at Fort Bliss, Texas. (Staff Sgt. Cashmere Jefferson/U.S. Army)

For the Pentagon to design its proprietary control system based on video game consoles makes total sense given how many current (and future) U.S. service members grew up spending hours adapting to the familiar two-pronged handset of an Xbox or PlayStation.

“The gaming companies spent millions of dollars developing an optimal, intuitive, easy-to-learn user interface, and then they went and spent years training up the user base for the U.S. military on how to use that interface,” says Singer. “These designs aren’t happenstance, and the same pool they’re pulling from for their customer base, the military is pulling from … and the training is basically already done.”

As of 2017, a majority of Americans between the ages of 18 and 49 said they play video games “often or sometimes,” according to data from the Pew Research Center. More recent data from the Entertainment Software Association suggests that 64 percent of American adults (roughly 214.4 million people) play video games.

“Now you have multiple generations who have used the design” of popular video game consoler controllers, Singer said.

While the training logic behind adapting Xbox-style controllers for futuristic weapons systems is sound, Singer pointed to one potential complication: what happens when the next generation of American warfighters grows up on a popular video game system that breaks from the traditional double-pronged model?

“If you’re being inspired by video game controllers, then you need to keep pace with how those controllers change over time, and that’s one thing that might happen in the entertainment world that might also happen in the defense world,” Singer said. “I don’t see [virtual reality] taking off anytime soon, but we have to ask: how does our acquisition system keep up with that change?”

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14. China can wait. The Army’s focus should be Europe. By John Nagl and Keith Burkepile

The key assumption is that "China is self deterred."

Excerpts:

Meanwhile, China is self-deterred from invading Taiwan as long as Taipei does not openly declare independence. China’s belligerent response to a visit to Taiwan by former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., only accelerated moves by other regional countries like Australia and Japan to shore up their defenses against Beijing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine spurred a similar reflexive defensive reaction by Finland and Sweden, who both decided to join NATO. The democracies of the world are working to deter further adventurism from autocracies, but they need U.S. leadership — in Europe as well as in Asia. The Army is not wrong to commit three of its new Multi-Doman Task Forces to Asia, with just one dedicated to Europe and one based in the U.S. — but it cannot allow Europe to believe that the United States will not support and defend it against the urgent threat that Russia presents.

Sometime after Roosevelt and Churchill met, with London engaged in an existential fight under constant German attack, it became clear that the United States had to step up as a global power with global responsibilities. In that spirit, the U.S. Army remains the keeper of the security of Europe, while the Navy and Marines should focus on deterring and, if deterrence fails, defeating China.

Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there was a clear argument that as the DoD made China its first priority, the nation should hedge with the Army against threats in Europe. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, that argument became incontrovertible.

A new chief of staff of the Army will soon occupy George C. Marshall’s former chair. That chief should act boldly, with the wisdom of his predecessor, and focus the Army on Europe first. While DoD focuses on deterring China with Army support in Asia, the Army should center itself on deterring and defeating Russia in Europe. Like Gen. Marshall, the Army’s new Chief should proclaim “Europe first!”

China can wait. The Army’s focus should be Europe.

By John Nagl and Keith Burkepile

Mar 22, 04:17 PM

militarytimes.com · by John Nagl · March 22, 2023

Three weeks after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in a surprise attack, and Italy and Germany then declared war on the United States, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall had to help President Franklin Delano Roosevelt make an important decision: should the United States focus on Europe or Asia first?

While Pearl was still smoldering, Roosevelt and his top commanders held a crisis summit with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Washington, to decide which enemy to focus on first: the Nazis or Japan. Marshall’s advice was clear: America, and her ally Britain, should focus on Europe first. The two leaders agreed, and the broad outlines of World War II were set. Germany was the Army’s first priority, and Japan would have to wait.

Today, the world’s only superpower similarly faces challenges in both Eurasia and in Asia. This time the Department of Defense has decided to prioritize the Asian theater, calling China its pacing threat. While DoD has made its choice, that does not mean that the Army must necessarily follow lockstep into an Asia first strategy; in fact, it shouldn’t. The Army’s priority should be Europe, looking East rather than West, even as the rest of DoD is locked on Asia. In fact, the Army’s priority should be Europe precisely because the rest of the department is focused on Asia.

The Marines, having divested of their tanks, are again focusing on littoral combat, and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 gave the Commandant of the Marine Corps specific responsibilities in defining requirements for types and numbers of amphibious ships. The Navy has long been Pacific first, and rightly so, given that the Indo-Pacific has far more water that requires coverage than Europe even with the thawing of Arctic waters. The Air Force is rightly proud of its global reach. But the Army should focus on Europe.

The U.S. Army does have a responsibility to set the theatre, i.e. bring in the equipment, troops and provide the logistical backbone for joint operations in case of all-out armed conflict in the area, say with China. But it lacks the persistent presence that the Marine Corps has in China’s first island chain, and forward stationed elsewhere in Asia. Instead, the Army’s forward presence and assigned land power force numbers are correctly weighted toward Europe. While the Marine Corps and the Army are needed in both theaters, the Army should not and for the sake of the security of the American people and the world must not go all in on Asia. Europe and the Russia threat remain too important.

In the same way that President Lyndon Baines Johnson wanted to focus on the health and welfare reforms of the “Great Society” but saw the war in Vietnam consume his presidency, President Barack Obama wanted to “Pivot to Asia,” but events got in the way. Russia remained a malign power, even before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, using force for nefarious purposes across the European continent. Russia will continue to be a threat to world peace and stability at least until regime change there, and there is no guarantee that whoever replaces Putin leads Russia in a more pro-American direction. Russia is likely to be our proximate threat for decades to come.

Meanwhile, China is self-deterred from invading Taiwan as long as Taipei does not openly declare independence. China’s belligerent response to a visit to Taiwan by former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., only accelerated moves by other regional countries like Australia and Japan to shore up their defenses against Beijing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine spurred a similar reflexive defensive reaction by Finland and Sweden, who both decided to join NATO. The democracies of the world are working to deter further adventurism from autocracies, but they need U.S. leadership — in Europe as well as in Asia. The Army is not wrong to commit three of its new Multi-Doman Task Forces to Asia, with just one dedicated to Europe and one based in the U.S. — but it cannot allow Europe to believe that the United States will not support and defend it against the urgent threat that Russia presents.

Sometime after Roosevelt and Churchill met, with London engaged in an existential fight under constant German attack, it became clear that the United States had to step up as a global power with global responsibilities. In that spirit, the U.S. Army remains the keeper of the security of Europe, while the Navy and Marines should focus on deterring and, if deterrence fails, defeating China.

Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there was a clear argument that as the DoD made China its first priority, the nation should hedge with the Army against threats in Europe. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, that argument became incontrovertible.

A new chief of staff of the Army will soon occupy George C. Marshall’s former chair. That chief should act boldly, with the wisdom of his predecessor, and focus the Army on Europe first. While DoD focuses on deterring China with Army support in Asia, the Army should center itself on deterring and defeating Russia in Europe. Like Gen. Marshall, the Army’s new Chief should proclaim “Europe first!”

Col. Keith Burkepile is the senior Marine representative at the Army War College. John Nagl, a retired Army officer, is associate professor of warfighting studies at the Army War College. They teach in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations.

This article does not express the opinions of the Army War College, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Department of Defense.

15. Opinion: Why the U.S. will probably never ban TikTok

Conclusion:

For the U.S., the political costs of a TikTok ban will increase the longer there is no resolution. More users join the app every day, making it a more essential communication tool. Concerns about TikTok’s security might be bipartisan, but they have yet to overcome the popularity of the social media app.

Opinion: Why the U.S. will probably never ban TikTok

Los Angeles Times · by Aynne Kokas March 22, 2023 Updated 5:46 PM PT · March 22, 2023

The world’s most downloaded app appears to be in hot water. The Biden administration demanded last week that the Chinese-owned TikTok be sold or else face a national ban in the U.S. due to security and privacy concerns, and the TikTok CEO will testify about these issues before Congress on Thursday.

The app presents genuine national security risks that the U.S. government must contend with. But the reality is that a nationwide ban or forced divestment would be hard to achieve.

Concerns have been mounting around TikTok’s alarming history around user data protection. A class-action lawsuit contending that the app sends private, personally identifiable data and biometrics to third parties without user consent settled for one of the largest payouts in the history of privacy lawsuits — $92 million — in 2021. The FBI and Justice Department are also investigating ByteDance, TikTok’s parent company, for using the app to surveil American citizens, including journalists. The U.S., United Kingdom, Canada and European Union have already banned TikTok on government devices. India banned the app nationwide in 2020.

ByteDance relies on Chinese government approval to operate, subjecting it to pressures that firms such as Meta escape. Yet even while raising countless red flags because of its ownership structure and privacy concerns, TikTok is outcompeting other top social media firms in the U.S., hugely shaping how people get information and remaining extremely popular. The company counts more than 150 million active monthly users in the U.S. alone.

TikTok has already survived a ban attempt by the U.S. government. The Trump administration first proposed banning the app in 2020, but that effort was stopped by the federal courts, which questioned the solidity of the claims around national security risks and ruled that the move exceeded the scope of the administration’s emergency economic powers.

Banning the app additionally raises significant 1st Amendment concerns. In 2020, alongside the proposed ban on TikTok, the Trump administration tried to ban WeChat, a Chinese-owned messaging and social media app. But the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California ruled that because of WeChat’s role as the only means through which many individuals could reliably communicate in China, the app constituted a unique form of communication. Blocking its use would thus violate users’ 1st Amendment rights. While TikTok does not play the same basic communication role, similar arguments for the app’s distinctiveness as a communication tool could subject any bans on private citizen use to extensive, time-consuming legal scrutiny.

For now, in lieu of a ban, the Biden administration proposes that ByteDance sell TikTok. There is some precedent for this process, including the U.S. government’s successful effort to change the ownership of Grindr via the federal multi-agency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (which is reviewing TikTok). In March 2019, the Committee used the authority granted to it by the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act to require Grindr’s then-owner, the Chinese company Beijing Kunlun Tech Co. Ltd., to sell, citing U.S. national security concerns over the app’s access to sensitive personal information. A little more than a year after the forced divestment was announced, Grindr was acquired by an investment group called San Vicente Acquisition Partners, based in West Hollywood.

But since that sale, China has created guardrails to protect TikTok and other Chinese tech firms. Amid legal challenges to the TikTok ban, the Trump administration tried to force TikTok’s sale to a U.S. company. But China’s Ministry of Commerce then updated its list of “forbidden or restricted technology exports” to include “personalized information recommendation services based on data analysis.” What this meant in practice was that the Chinese government would need to consent to any sale of TikTok that would allow foreign companies to access the app’s algorithm.

The Chinese government has also implemented a law that allows national security data audits of all Chinese firms, including ByteDance, and taken golden shares, or a government financial stake, in a ByteDance subsidiary. Adding to that, TikTok’s widespread prevalence presents an opportunity for ByteDance to acquire more users and develop robust new technologies in fields such as AI, deep fakes and facial recognition. Under China’s civil-military fusion program, those technologies also become Chinese national security assets. Any TikTok divestment would probably require Chinese government cooperation on a transaction that works against its interests.

For the U.S., the political costs of a TikTok ban will increase the longer there is no resolution. More users join the app every day, making it a more essential communication tool. Concerns about TikTok’s security might be bipartisan, but they have yet to overcome the popularity of the social media app.

Aynne Kokas is the author of “Trafficking Data: How China is Winning the Battle for Digital Sovereignty.”

Los Angeles Times · by Aynne Kokas March 22, 2023 Updated 5:46 PM PT · March 22, 2023

16. More B-21s Would Help America Field a Two-War Military, New Mitchell Paper Says

This gets to a key question for the National Defense Strategy: Should we prepare to fight two wars simultaneously? Do we need to go back to the future? E.g., The old 2 MTW concept (major theater war) or win -hold-win (win 1st MTW, hold 2d MTW, then win 2d MTW) or win 1 MTW and 2 LRCs (lesser regional contingencies).

More B-21s Would Help America Field a Two-War Military, New Mitchell Paper Says | Air & Space Forces Magazine

airandspaceforces.com · by Chris Gordon · March 22, 2023

March 21, 2023 | By Chris Gordon

The future U.S. bomber force could provide a way for the Pentagon to simultaneously deter conflict with peer adversaries in two geographically disparate theaters, said Mark Gunzinger, the director of future concepts and capability assessments at AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, during a March 21 event. But doing so will require expanding the procurement of the B-21 and extending the life of the strategic bombers already in the Air Force’s inventory, he added.

“At the very least our bomber force should be sized for two theater conflicts because it will be the lead force, the foundation of any campaign to defeat a Chinese or Russian invasion, and we’re behind the curve already,” Gunzinger said in a virtual event.

The challenge the U.S. faces is outlined in the current National Defense Strategy, which states that the U.S. must be able to prevail in a conflict and “deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere.” Even with a defense budget of over $800 billion, there is a limit on what a stretched military could do to deter parallel conflicts with China and Russia.

But Gunzinger maintains that the strategic bomber is well suited for that mission if deployed in sufficient numbers. Doing that, he said, will require some major adjustments.

With much fanfare, the U.S. is slated to start fielding a new stealth bomber soon: B-21 Raider. Those aircraft will eventually replace the approximately 45 B-1s and about 20 B-2s in the U.S. arsenal. The B-52 fleet, which currently numbers around 75 aircraft, would remain in the inventory after it is re-engined and undergoes other modernization programs. Its main role would be to fire stand-off munitions.

But Gunzinger cautions that the Air Force’s plan to retire B-1s and B-2s would be imprudent, especially as B-52s must be taken out of service to be upgraded.

“The near-term outlook for increasing the size of the U.S. bomber force is not good—in fact, it could become even smaller before B-21 production increases the number of tails on the ramp,” Gunzinger wrote in a recent paper.

An alternative approach, Gunzinger said, would be to keep older bombers flying while rapidly increasing B-21 production.

However, the B-1 has been flown hard during its service life and has a poor mission-capable rate of around 40 percent. Only around half of B-2s are available for missions at a given time, and the fleet has been on a safety stand-down since late 2022.

Burdensome, costly, and time-consuming maintenance, along with the personnel required to do that work, is the main reason the Air Force wants to retire the B-1 and B-2. In 2018, the Air Force said keeping the B-1 and B-2 around after the B-21 came online was “neither fiscally realistic nor desirable.” However, the service has said the B-52 should be kept in the air because of its large and flexible size payload.

The U.S. has committed to buying at least 100 B-21s. Gunzinger argues the number should more than double to 225. There is hardly a conflict imaginable where bombers would not play a role, especially in a high-end campaign, he noted. And implementing his plan would produce a force in which a greater portion of the U.S. bomber force would be stealthy aircraft as well.

“The future bomber force must be sized to deter and decisively respond to Chinese aggression, a second threat in another theater, and deter nuclear attacks—simultaneously,” he wrote.

Appearing during the event with Gunzinger, Maj. Gen. Jason R. Armagost, director of strategic plans, programs, and requirements for Air Force Global Strike Command, did not speak to the higher B-21 figure. However, Armagost noted that the Air Force needs a nuanced approach to determining what its fleet should look like going forward.

“It’s easy from a budget perspective to talk about one war, two war because we know the numbers, but when we’re talking about competition that drives an intensity into the force, that drives a requirement into the force that is on the spectrum actually of deterrence because the intent of competition is to demonstrate and show that it is not worth coming at us right now,” said Armagost. “That competition level of force requirement almost doesn’t get captured when you look at the binary requirements of war or peace, and so I think that’s also part of the conversation that has to happen.”

As the U.S. military gears up toward the Pacific, it still has an array of commitments, such as bolstering NATO against potential Russian threats, defending South Korea against an aggressive North Korea, and conducting raids against ISIS militants in Iraq and Syria. Having a capable bomber force that could respond to multiple crises could allow other services to focus on where they are most effective.

“The Army’s big fight is in Europe and the Navy’s is in the Pacific and they should size accordingly,” Gunzinger said. “We also shouldn’t assume another aggressor wouldn’t take advantage of our engagement in a major flight in the Pacific to make a move that we can’t deter and defeat because we size our military for one war. And that’s why we should size our bomber force for two conflicts, not just one.”

Air

Operational Imperative 6: Global Strike

Rapid Acquisition & Sustainment

airandspaceforces.com · by Chris Gordon · March 22, 2023

17. Biden’s Nord Stream cover-up enters new slippery phase by Seymour Hersh

Seymour Hersh is trying to gain legitimacy and credibility by allowing Asia Times to republish his substack work.

Biden’s Nord Stream cover-up enters new slippery phase

CIA asked this month to collaborate with German intel to produce a pipeline explosions cover story to ‘pulse the system’

asiatimes.com · by Seymour Hersh · March 23, 2023

It’s been six weeks since I published a report, based on anonymous sourcing, naming President Joe Biden as the official who ordered the mysterious destruction last September of Nord Stream 2, a new US$11 billion pipeline that was scheduled to double the volume of natural gas delivered from Russia to Germany.

The story gained traction in Germany and Western Europe, but was subject to a near media blackout in the US. Two weeks ago, after a visit by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to Washington, US and German intelligence agencies attempted to add to the blackout by feeding the New York Times and the German weekly Die Zeit false cover stories to counter the report that Biden and US operatives were responsible for the pipelines’ destruction.

Press aides for the White House and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have consistently denied that America was responsible for exploding the pipelines, and those pro forma denials were more than enough for the White House press corps.

There is no evidence that any reporter assigned there has yet to ask the White House press secretary whether Biden had done what any serious leader would do: formally “task” the American intelligence community to conduct a deep investigation, with all of its assets, and find out just who had done the deed in the Baltic Sea.

A worker checks monitoring equipment at the Slavyanskaya compressor station, the starting point of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Photo: TASS

According to a source within the intelligence community, the president has not done so, nor will he. Why not? Because he knows the answer.

Sarah Miller – an energy expert and an editor at Energy Intelligence, which publishes leading trade journals, who writes a blog on Medium – explained to me in an interview why the pipeline story has been big news in Germany and Western Europe:

The destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines in September led to a further surge of natural gas prices that were already six or more times pre-crisis levels. Nord Stream was blown up in late September. German gas imports peaked a month later, in October, at 10 times pre-crisis levels. Electricity prices across Europe were pulled up, and governments spent as much as 800 billion euros, by some estimates, shielding households and businesses from the impact.

Gas prices, reflecting the mild winter in Europe, have now fallen back to roughly a quarter of the October peak, but they are still between two and three times pre-crisis levels and are more than three times current US rates. Over the last year, German and other European manufacturers closed their most energy-intensive operations, such as fertilizer and glass production, and it’s unclear when, if ever, those plants will reopen. Europe is scrambling to get solar and wind capacity in place, but it may not come soon enough to save large chunks of German industry.

In early March, President Biden hosted German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Washington. The trip included only two public events—a brief pro forma exchange of compliments between Biden and Scholz before the White House press corps, with no questions allowed; and a CNN interview with Scholz by Fareed Zakaria, who did not touch on the pipeline allegations.

The chancellor had flown to Washington with no members of the German press on board, no formal dinner scheduled, and the two world leaders were not slated to conduct a press conference, as routinely happens at such high-profile meetings.

President Joe Biden meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the Oval Office, March 3, 2023. Photo: White House / Adam Schultz

Instead, it was later reported that Biden and Scholz had an 80-minute meeting, with no aides present for much of the time. There have been no statements or written understandings made public since then by either government.

But I was told by someone with access to diplomatic intelligence that there was a discussion of the pipeline exposé and, as a result, certain elements in the Central Intelligence Agency were asked to prepare a cover story in collaboration with German intelligence that would provide the American and German press with an alternative version of the destruction of Nord Stream 2.

In the words of the intelligence community, the agency was to “pulse the system” in an effort to discount the claim that Biden had ordered the pipelines’ destruction.

Seymour Hersh is an American investigative journalist and political writer. He gained recognition in 1969 for exposing the My Lai massacre and its cover-up during the Vietnam War, for which he received the 1970 Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting.

During the 1970s, Hersh covered the Watergate scandal for The New York Times, also reporting on the secret US bombing of Cambodia and the CIA’s program of domestic spying. In 2004, he detailed the U.S. military’s torture and abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq for The New Yorker.

This article originally appeared on his Substack blog and is (c) Seymour Hersh 2023. Asia Times is republishing here with the author’s kind permission.

asiatimes.com · by Seymour Hersh · March 23, 2023

18. The Marine Corps Needs to Modernize its Targeting Cycle—Here’s How

Excerpts:

Adaptation to mission processing, communication with adjacent units, and identifying targets at both close and deep levels are paramount to survivability and success on the modern battlefield. Our competitors have invested heavily in integrating technology to connect sensors, processors, and shooters, thereby shortening prosecution times while producing more extraordinary standoffs through EW. With Force Design 2030 steering the Corps in a new direction, there will be disruption in tandem with advancement. Ground combat targeting, collection, and employment of precision fires must fundamentally change at the tactical and operational level by expanding long-range missiles in the arsenal. The Marine Corps can augment the transition and the utilization of precision fires by integrating direction finding and EW for targeting—essential for expeditionary advanced base operations. Incorporating EW Marines as liaisons with fire support teams would allow the capability to find and fix utilizing the technical aspect of targeting while leaving direct tactical employment to the fire support team. This, in effect, would allow radio battalions to contribute more options and greater flexibility at the tactical level.

In the short term, units can lean forward with experimentation, leveraging SIGINT or EW assets that are available to develop operating procedures and techniques to add to the targeting repertoire of tomorrow. A promising first step would be integrating a small detachment of Marines into the fire support team to facilitate coordination, paving the way for deeper SIGINT or EW integration at infantry units, artillery formations, and schoolhouses. When the Marine Corps does these things—maximizing SIGINT and EW’s support to targeting, codifying these capabilities’ role in operations, innovating new procedures, and teaching electromagnetic-enabled targeting even at entry-level artillery courses—it will demonstrate that it has learned a vital lesson from the wars in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine.

The Marine Corps Needs to Modernize its Targeting Cycle—Here’s How - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by David Laszcz, Nicholas Mabry, Matthew Sherman · March 21, 2023

The missiles fell on the soldiers huddled in the trench below. Next followed blasts and smoke, concluding with silence in their tomb. In 2020, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict brought forth a range of lessons on the future of war—not least on the future of targeting and fires. During the war, both sides relied heavily on nontraditional assets and electronic warfare (EW). This war’s examples of unorthodox EW and UAS integration indicate the opening of an era of ground warfare requiring innovative technological and training capabilities. The Azerbaijani military was particularly effective at integrating EW into its operations, while the Armenian military’s EW effectiveness was comparatively more limited. The lesson from both sides is that conventional military forces must integrate electronic warfare into their targeting cycles to have any hope of imposing their will on the enemy. The war shows how a modern force that effectively integrates EW and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) enables its commanders to find, fix, and finish adversary targets with fires.

Fast forward just over a year after the Nagorno-Karabakh war to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the conduct of the war triggered by that invasion has only reinforced these lessons. For any military force watching, there is little excuse not to learn them. The US military needs more training and operational experience to enhance and impose the devastating effects of modern technology in the targeting cycle against a conventional adversary. As a modern force, we have a professional obligation to focus on the tactics, techniques, and integration on display in these two wars—in this case regarding the use of EW and signals intelligence (SIGINT) to support targeting—in order to better prepare for the next conflict. That is especially true for the US Marine Corps.

In a conventional war with uncertain communications capabilities based on the environment and the adversary, we will need a refined capability to find enemy signatures and leverage fires against enemy targets. At the small-unit level, this would take the form of a man-portable capability, operated by Marines in fire support teams, to incorporate SIGINT and EW to more efficiently find, fix, and finish the enemy in a denied environment. To be clear, the service needs more than EW integration, which for a variety of reasons is more easily achievable for units than SIGINT integrations. It needs both—more and better integration of EW and SIGINT, with emphasis on the former, complemented by the latter.

As the Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine wars make clear, the future will call for employing long-range fires and integrating various unmanned systems in ways that diverge from US doctrinal approaches that are either rigidly defined or scarcely exist. Current doctrine calls for SIGINT and EW to be integrated in an electronic warfare coordination cell, an element that seldom exists in practice. The purpose of these SIGINT and EW assets is to enhance sensing operations in coordination with other fires, communications, information systems use, and intelligence operations. They are designed to act as the electronic fires and augment the intelligence component to the ground commander and work in unison with the operations section of a unit. Though doctrine has claimed these capabilities for decades, tactical SIGINT and EW utilization and their integration with fire support teams must be more present within infantry and artillery units. Ideally, the employment of direction-finding and targeting components should dovetail with the work of fire support teams to provide an additional capability to focus fires without other emissions that could compromise the teams’ positions against the enemy. But this does not routinely happen.

Consider the four areas of focus of the Marine Corps as the service works to optimize its force design for the battlefield of 2030: logistics; long-range precision fires; alternate positioning, navigation, and timing; and C5ISRT (command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting). These areas of focus are based on what the service’s leadership expects Marine units must be able to do in the future operational environment—including, for example, unit leaders employing loitering munitions and long-range precision fires in tandem with UAS and both SIGINT and EW capabilities to find the adversary and adjudicate the kill chain based on the target set. Crucially, utilizing UAS and SIGINT and EW assets will enable commanders to locate and destroy the enemy with fires before the maneuver. There are challenges to establishing this much-needed capability, not least of which is navigating the different legal authorities involved—Title 10 for tactical actions and Title 50 for intelligence activities. But these are precisely the issues that must be explored today for a force to be prepared for the challenges of 2030. Fundamentally, unit leaders’ demands will compound without cooperative and mutually supporting capabilities. However, some of these capabilities already exist, just not in the units where they are needed. The capability to locate and fix an enemy position can be bolstered, for instance, by employing direction-finding assets currently present in a Marine radio battalion. However, for Title 10 actions, SIGINT and EW can be decoupled as many direction-finding capabilities are primarily EW, not SIGINT. These do not need to be sourced solely from a radio battalion—or like units from the Army. Instead, they can be nested organically within a unit. SIGINT and EW assets remain in our inventory, but the Marine Corps lacks the experimentation and employment necessary to maximize these assets’ utility for ground force commanders.

Our competitors and potential adversaries have demonstrated a commitment to integrating SIGINT and EW with targeting. Indeed, this is a feature of how Russia trains its foreign partners. Russia’s military places artillery in a central position as the workhorse of its heavily mechanized land army. Integrating such assets into the artillery targeting cycle has been a feature of Russian artillery operations in Ukraine. However, what we have observed over the past year reflects a longstanding Russian focus on EW and an enduring emphasis on the discipline over the years.

In contrast, the US military has atrophied in such techniques over the last two decades. It has been focused on counterinsurgency operations where the adversary has not employed conventional formations or more sophisticated electronic emissions. Although the US armed services, including the Marine Corps, occasionally use fires and EW assets in concert, there needs to be more SIGINT and EW integration and synchronization to ensure there remains a competitive advantage against how the adversary employs them.

This is mainly because the US military, specifically the Marine Corps, does not prioritize using these sensors with artillery units or passing information from the sensor to the firing unit. The Marine Corps combines SIGINT and EW capabilities in SI/EW teams, most of which currently rest within the service’s three radio battalions—the exception being the experiment of the Marine Littoral Regiment. For the Army, the proposed Terrestrial Layer System–Brigade Combat Team is a step in the right direction. Still, more steps are needed to prioritize, cultivate, and encourage cross-pollination between artillery, organic indirect fire capabilities, EW, and intelligence assets to find, fix, and finish an adversary within a weapons engagement zone. The continued focus on long-range precision fires is one of the factors that has pushed the military toward the increased use of precision-guided munitions such as HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System), and this, too, requires coordination and integration of assets to feed into the targeting cycle. As the Army’s doctrinal manual on fire support and field artillery operations states,

The successful delivery of fire depends on the rapid and continuous integration and synchronization of all forms of [fire support] assets with all elements of combat power, and across all domains for one purpose. This is to place the correct type and volume of fire at the right time and on the right targets across all domains to ensure the success of the supported maneuver commander’s concept of operations.

Despite emphasizing greater joint integration for the Marine Corps, there remains a lag in integration even within the service. Specifically, tactical SIGINT and EW units need to train and integrate more with—and in support of—indirect fire assets. Recent conventional operations—the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the ongoing war in Ukraine, for example—point to a future where capabilities must synchronize and integrate with, and complement, one another, a future in which maneuver, indirect fires, and capabilities like SIGINT and EW all work together seamlessly, even at the small-unit level. There needs to be increased focus on integrating SIGINT and EW in the Marine Corps through platforms such as HIMARS, Naval Strike Missiles, Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, and UAS. The objective should be to create a lethal cycle that enables the Marines to conduct missions in a contested environment. The Marine Corps is increasing its precision fires arsenal and downsizing its cannon batteries, and both of these moves present an opportunity to better integrate SIGINT and EW into the targeting cycle. Focusing future experimentation on swift, sustained, and accurate support to targeting by employing SIGINT and EW at the small-unit level and in an advanced expeditionary base or stand-in force operations must remain a priority.

A critical element of combined arms execution is the coordination of intelligence and operations—in the Marine Corps, a fire support team plays a vital role in this coordination, integrating indirect fire and close air support with maneuver elements. Though these teams rely heavily on ground observation and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, they should incorporate SI/EW teams or liaisons to assist in the targeting cycle to add another dimension to their target acquisition. Units across the Marine Corps already employ dedicated teams to enable the employment of organic and other leveraged fire assets. Such teams can operate in small numbers and maintain a low profile, an important characteristic to make them survivable in the future fight. Integrating an SI/EW noncommissioned officer or staff noncommissioned officer proficient in integration into the existing teams would provide organic subject matter expertise to leverage radio battalion EW assets better, thereby enhancing the teams’ ability to find and facilitate the targeting of adversary forces rapidly.

Although it is crucial that greater integration efforts do not focus solely on EW capabilities and that commanders should demand SIGINT support, as well, integrating EW with existing doctrinal formations has several advantages. First, more incorporation of man-portable EW capabilities into the targeting cycle would significantly increase the number of sensors available without adding significant equipment. Second, it would allow ground combat elements to integrate EW support more effectively without the burden of SIGINT support teams, which often have unique authorities. If used properly, the tools within EW authorities can still locate an enemy and provide valuable, timely information to a unit leader. This is the immediate step that can be taken, but the next area of focus should be integration of SIGINT and EW in tandem. These enhanced fire support teams could have a faster, more accurate targeting ability that would allow for widely dispersed Marine Corps units to call for precision fires in support of their maneuver elements while maintaining a small enough footprint to operate from inside the enemy’s weapons engagement zone.

EW tools provide direction finding, can be man-portable, and, most importantly, can be employed organically with a team on an advanced expeditionary base in austere conditions. The short-term solution is to incorporate direction-finding assets more with artillery and fire support team units to develop standard operating procedures. In the long term, even more significant impact can be achieved by training the use of SIGINT and EW in the targeting cycle to Marines, optimizing access to capabilities through authorities, and enabling organic employment by placing SIGINT and EW tools within the ground combat element’s table of organization.

Adaptation to mission processing, communication with adjacent units, and identifying targets at both close and deep levels are paramount to survivability and success on the modern battlefield. Our competitors have invested heavily in integrating technology to connect sensors, processors, and shooters, thereby shortening prosecution times while producing more extraordinary standoffs through EW. With Force Design 2030 steering the Corps in a new direction, there will be disruption in tandem with advancement. Ground combat targeting, collection, and employment of precision fires must fundamentally change at the tactical and operational level by expanding long-range missiles in the arsenal. The Marine Corps can augment the transition and the utilization of precision fires by integrating direction finding and EW for targeting—essential for expeditionary advanced base operations. Incorporating EW Marines as liaisons with fire support teams would allow the capability to find and fix utilizing the technical aspect of targeting while leaving direct tactical employment to the fire support team. This, in effect, would allow radio battalions to contribute more options and greater flexibility at the tactical level.

In the short term, units can lean forward with experimentation, leveraging SIGINT or EW assets that are available to develop operating procedures and techniques to add to the targeting repertoire of tomorrow. A promising first step would be integrating a small detachment of Marines into the fire support team to facilitate coordination, paving the way for deeper SIGINT or EW integration at infantry units, artillery formations, and schoolhouses. When the Marine Corps does these things—maximizing SIGINT and EW’s support to targeting, codifying these capabilities’ role in operations, innovating new procedures, and teaching electromagnetic-enabled targeting even at entry-level artillery courses—it will demonstrate that it has learned a vital lesson from the wars in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine.

David Laszcz is a Pat Tillman scholar and Harry S. Truman scholar. He served as an infantry squad leader and an SI/EW platoon commander and has deployed attached to Special Operations Command–Africa as a collection manager. He holds a master’s in public policy from Harvard.

Nicholas Mabry served as an intelligence officer at the 11th Marine Artillery Regiment, 1st Marine Division, and as an S-2 for the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. He has deployed to Qatar attached to Special Operations Command–Central to support Operation Inherent Resolve. He has a degree in history from the United States Naval Academy.

Matthew Sherman served as a radio reconnaissance and SI/EW platoon commander. He holds a degree in international relations from the University of Wisconsin and deployed to support Marine Rotational Force–Europe.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of ant organization the authors are affiliated with, including the US Marine Corps.

Image credit: Cpl. Dalton S. Swanbeck, US Marine Corps

mwi.usma.edu · by David Laszcz, Nicholas Mabry, Matthew Sherman · March 21, 2023

19. How Xi and Putin see a post-Ukraine war world

Excerpts:

The conflict in Ukraine is not only devastating to the two belligerents involved, but destabilizing for states around the world. In the short run, China may be benefiting from the war because it consumes attention and armaments from the West and diverts its gaze from East Asia. The US “pivot to the East” – a planned refocusing from the Obama administration onward aimed at countering the perceived threat of China – has stalled.

But there is an argument that Xi is most concerned with China’s renewal of economic development, which would rely on less confrontational relations with Europe and the US.

Stability, both domestically and internationally, works to China’s economic advantage as a major producer and exporter of industrial goods. And Beijing is mindful that a slump in foreign demand and investment is hitting the country’s economic prospects.

As such, Beijing’s new role as peacemaker – whether in the Middle East or Eastern Europe – may indeed be sincere. Further, Xi may be the only person on the globe able to persuade Putin to think seriously about a way out of war.

Standing in the way of peace, however, is not only the current intransigence of Russia and Ukraine. The US’ long-held foreign policy aim of maintaining its “indispensable nation” status runs counter to Russia and China’s ambition to end American global dominance.

It presents two, seemingly insurmountable, rival ambitions.

How Xi and Putin see a post-Ukraine war world

US criticizes China peace plan as vague and lacking in detail but its unstated yet clear aim is to end US global hegemony

asiatimes.com · by Ronald Suny · March 23, 2023

Just a few days after being branded a war criminal in an international arrest warrant, Russian President Vladimir Putin was talking peace with his most important ally, Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The setting for the get-together was the late-15th-century Faceted Chamber, the ornate throne room of Muscovite grand princes and czars. The main topics of discussion were fittingly grandiose: How should hostilities in Ukraine end? And after the war is over, how should the international security system be reshaped?

The reaction of many in the West to the proposals put forward by China and discussed with Russia has been notably suspicious of intentions. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned the world not to be “fooled by any tactical move by Russia, supported by China … to freeze the war on its own terms.”

Such sentiment is understandable. Putin launched a brutal, unprovoked war in Ukraine.

Amid the heightened emotional environment of missile attacks on civilians, horrific atrocities against ordinary citizens and deportation of children from Ukraine, even a cool evaluation of ways to end the fighting, declare a cease-fire, and begin talks by the belligerents has led to accusations of appeasement.

And the peace plan put forward by China on February 24, 2023, and discussed with Putin during a March 20-22 meeting in Moscow, has been criticized as overly vague and lacking concrete suggestions.

Opening the doors to Russia and China’s perception. Image: Getty Images via The Conversation

In such circumstances, it can be difficult to consider what the interest of the other side might actually be in bringing the killing to an end, and their sincerity of any purported efforts to do so.

But as a historian, I ask, what does the world look like from the other side? How has the run-up to the war and the war itself been understood by Russia and China? And what do Xi and Putin envision a post-conflict world to look like?

Playing by the rules – but whose?

The rulers of both Russia and China see the West-dominated “rules-based international order” – a system that has dominated geopolitics since the end of the Second World War – as designed to uphold the global hegemony of the US.

The two men’s stated preference is for a multilateral system, one which would most probably result in a number of regional hegemons. This would include, to be sure, China and Russia holding sway in their own neighborhoods.

Xi put the matter rather gently during his Moscow trip: “The international community has recognized that no country is superior to others, no model of governance is universal, and no single country should dictate the international order. The common interest of all humankind is in a world that is united and peaceful, rather than divided and volatile.”

Reflecting his more street-tough style, Putin was more blunt. Russia and China “have consistently advocated the shaping of a more just multipolar world order based on international law rather than certain ‘rules’ serving the needs of the ‘golden billion,’” he said, referencing a theory that holds that the billion people in the richest countries of the world consume the greatest portion of the world’s resources.

Continuing in this vein, Putin said the “crisis in Ukraine” was an example of the West trying to “retain its international dominance and preserve the unipolar world order” while splitting “the common Eurasian space into a network of ‘exclusive clubs’ and military blocs that would serve to contain our countries’ development and harm their interests.”

China as peacemaker?

Beijing appears intent to play the role of negotiator-in-chief in this transition to a multipolar world order.

After its success shouldering aside the United States and brokering a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China has turned its attention to Ukraine.

With its peace proposal on Ukraine, China has deftly established certain principles to which other nations would eagerly subscribe.

“The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community,” holds the first principle in language that would be hard to object to.

But those anodyne sentences point in two directions at once. Upholding sovereignty appears, at first, to be aimed at Russia a year after it had so clearly violated the sovereignty of neighboring Ukraine. But the principle also can be read to include the conflict over Taiwan, which is recognized by Beijing and some other states as a part of China.

It is perhaps no accident that the plan’s wording come as the US, which officially recognizes China’s claim to Taiwan, has toughened its stance, vowing to defend the island should it be invaded. To Beijing, the United States appears intent on turning a rival, China, into an enemy.

Nations, China asserts, have the right to enhance their security but not at the expense of others. This principle echoes directly one of Putin’s most frequently expressed reasons for the conflict with Ukraine: the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe and the alliance’s promise to expand further by admitting Georgia and Ukraine. In Putin’s view, such NATO encroachment is an existential threat to Russia’s security interests.

But the Chinese plan also rejects Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling: “The threat or use of nuclear weapons should be opposed.”

Meanwhile, the Chinese strongly insist on the need for an immediate cease-fire and the start of negotiations, a call that Washington vehemently rejected as a concession that amounted to “diplomatic cover for Russia to continue to commit” war crimes.

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with China’s President Xi Jinping at the Kremlin. Photo: Pavel Byrkin / Sputnik / AFP via Getty Images /The Conversation

What will Russia settle for?

Russia’s aims in the Ukraine war are simple enough to dissect, though they have been reduced after the effective Ukrainian resistance to the initial invasion.

Instead of taking over all of Ukraine, and perhaps setting up a puppet government, Moscow has been forced to accept limited territorial gains in the Donbas and the coastal crescent linking both the region and Russia with Crimea.

Reduced though they are, such Russian goals are completely unacceptable to Ukraine and to the Western alliance – and, indeed, to all countries that accept that principle that international borders cannot be legitimately changed unilaterally by military force.

Although not clearly spelled out, this principle is even contained in the very first sentence of the Chinese peace plan: “Universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed.”

That notwithstanding, Putin has welcomed the intervention of China and the plan in general terms.

Rival global ambitions

So what’s in this for Beijing, given that to many, the peace plan is already a non-starter?

The conflict in Ukraine is not only devastating to the two belligerents involved, but destabilizing for states around the world. In the short run, China may be benefiting from the war because it consumes attention and armaments from the West and diverts its gaze from East Asia. The US “pivot to the East” – a planned refocusing from the Obama administration onward aimed at countering the perceived threat of China – has stalled.

But there is an argument that Xi is most concerned with China’s renewal of economic development, which would rely on less confrontational relations with Europe and the US.

Stability, both domestically and internationally, works to China’s economic advantage as a major producer and exporter of industrial goods. And Beijing is mindful that a slump in foreign demand and investment is hitting the country’s economic prospects.

As such, Beijing’s new role as peacemaker – whether in the Middle East or Eastern Europe – may indeed be sincere. Further, Xi may be the only person on the globe able to persuade Putin to think seriously about a way out of war.

Standing in the way of peace, however, is not only the current intransigence of Russia and Ukraine. The US’ long-held foreign policy aim of maintaining its “indispensable nation” status runs counter to Russia and China’s ambition to end American global dominance.

It presents two, seemingly insurmountable, rival ambitions.

Ronald Suny is Professor of History and Political Science, University of Michigan

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

asiatimes.com · by Ronald Suny · March 23, 2023

20. The Lessons of 20 Years of Counterinsurgency Research

I will go back to a point I tried to make years ago but I will reprise it at the risk of severe blowback. . The only "COIN fight" the US should be conducting is against an insurgency that is attacking the US. We should not be conducting COIN overseas and we should not bin all irregular warfare operations as COIN. If a friend partner or ally is threatened with an insurgency the appropriate mission for US military forces and US government agencies is Foreign Internal Defense to advise and assist the friend partner or ally in the defense and develop programs to defend themselves against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, terrorism, and civil war. We cannot do it for them. And if an insurgency arises following large scale combat operations during the post conflict phase the appropriate mission for US forces and government agencies is stability operation to prepare security and essential services why the government re-constituted. We do not reinvent a foreign nation in our image.

If we conduct COIN in a foreign country we are de facto conducting pacification as an occupying force. That is not something we should ever do.

Key point is not only diversification of strategies but using them concurrently. But an adversary capable of only conducting irregular warfare is by definition not able to conduct large scale combat operations (at least not until it is capable of moving to phase three - a war of maneuver/movement in the Maoist model). But a nation that conducts large scale combat operations against a peer or near peer adversary is likely to incorporate forms of irregular warfare as part of its strategy both within the theater of operations and also possibly in other theaters where LSCO is not taking place. The conventional wisdom is that preparing for LSCO is sufficient for conducting IW and the LSCO trained forces can be sufficiently re-trained to take on IW missions. The fact is IW prepared forces will likely have a role for conducting IW missions in support of our strategy in LSCO. However, the IW mission that conventional forces must absolutely prepare for is stability operations in post conflict operations. They can and should contribute to FID through Security Forces Assistance. But IW-only operations not involving LSCO need specific IW proficient campaign HQ and forces that are specially organized, trained, equipped, and educated for the full range of IW- including unconventional warfare, FID, counter terrorism and (assistance to) COIN. Yes we must maintain COIN expertise but again, it is not to conduct COIN ourselves but it is to advise and assist our friends, partners, and allies to defend themselves against insurgency.

Lastly, it is worth noting that near-peer competitors are not only diversifying their strategies but also using them concurrently. As these practices become more common it is likely that great power involvement in future COIN operations may require greater understanding of how different combinations of strategies and the timing of strategy implementation at different stages of insurgency impact COIN outcomes. Some studies already consider the result of multiple strategies. For example, research on the impact of compensation funds has relied on statistical analysis to examine the funds’ effectiveness in reducing insurgent violence in Iraq while taking into consideration US troop presence and the operations of provincial reconstruction teams in distribution regions.

Overall, research on counterinsurgency either comes with methodological and data limitations or is generally limited to a small number of strategies with a single-country focus. Future studies would benefit from incorporating analysis of multiple strategies across time and space to identify patterns that emerge from joint implementation rather than studying the effectiveness of each strategy in isolation. Such focus would also acknowledge the importance of non-military approaches in irregular warfare. As US competitors are increasingly diversifying their non-military tool box to gain an advantage, exploring the utility of soft power will continue to matter. The second piece in this series will identify the effectiveness of specific military and non-military approaches based on insights from the past 20 years of research.

The Lessons of 20 Years of Counterinsurgency Research - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Elizabeth Radziszewski · March 23, 2023

Elizabeth Radziszewski

The Congressional Research Service’s November 2022 report to Congress on the implications of great power competition for US defense policy emphasizes greater focus on strengthening US high-end conventional capabilities to counter Russia and China. The final section of the report briefly notes the need to meet the challenge of hybrid warfare, which includes, among other issues, addressing Russia’s use of proxy forces in several countries. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have come to an end, it is tempting to put counterinsurgency on the backburner. Yet with China and Russia’s history of supporting insurgents or governments embroiled in civil wars, the United States may well once again find itself in a position where it has to confront proxy forces. Counterinsurgency, therefore, remains a vital aspect of great power competition.

Over the course of a year, a team of researchers at START (the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism) embarked on a comprehensive review of existing research on government responses to insurgency threats from 2002-2022. The extraction and careful read of over 400 pieces of scholarly and policy literature reveal key insights about the overall state of knowledge on counterinsurgency, as well as limitations that point to ideas for future exploration of this line of research. The first of two pieces, this article highlights what scholars and practitioners have tried to explain, the approaches that they have used in the study of counterinsurgency (COIN), the geographic coverage of existing research, and the studies’ analysis of the deployment of different levers of state power in counterinsurgency. The second piece will review the literature’s findings on the most successful strategies and the lessons they offer for this era of great power competition.

The Meaning of Effectiveness: What Does the Research Focus On?

The effectiveness of COIN practices is not an easily agreed-upon concept, especially when such practices are subject to analysis in the absence of a peace agreement and when the fighting is ongoing. There is the question of which actors and interests are relevant, the timing of strategy implementation, and the level of analysis—local, regional, and/or national—that should be considered when capturing effectiveness. Overall, most studies focus on aggregate COIN outcomes such as government victory (success), loss, or draw, followed by analysis of changes in levels of security, including the level of insurgency activity, the ratio of insurgents killed by COIN forces, or violence targeting civilians. The focus on security demonstrates that when studies explore the effectiveness of government approaches, effectiveness is seen predominantly as the establishment of physical safety.

While there is an interest in understanding the extent to which different strategies can improve the population’s social, political, and economic wellbeing, their perceptions of the government, and how various measures enhance state-building, these remain understudied relative to aggregate-level COIN and security-related outcomes. In fact, less than ten percent of all the pieces we examined explore the impact of specific COIN strategies on the success and failure of winning over the population’s support for the government while only 1.3 percent explore the success and failure of institutional reforms at the state level. Despite strong emphasis in Western COIN practices on improving the population’s socio-economic conditions and strengthening the state’s institutional capacity, understanding the outcome of these practices in areas other than security gains or broader COIN outcomes such as victory or defeat has not generated as much attention as might be expected. RAND’s 2006 report noted a concern regarding limited emphasis on non-military metrics, and our most current review of the literature does not show much growth in this area even though social developments, such as an increase in the presence of children playing on the streets, could capture the effectiveness of strategies more accurately than the dominant focus on the number of dead insurgents. This is not to say that the discussions regarding these so-called “atmospherics” have not taken place within the Army and intelligence community, rather that published pieces have made limited progress in assessing the strategies’ impact on such population-centric measures of COIN effectiveness.

Finally, the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan following the departure of US forces shows the value of examining the sustainability of COIN practices. Regardless of the type of COIN outcome the studies explore, these are mostly approached from a short-term perspective, with less than five percent of the studies we examined concentrating specifically on the strategies’ gains and/or shortcomings over an extended period. While there is value in unpacking the strategies’ short-term effectiveness, this limited focus on sustainability risks elevating the value of some practices because of immediate gains without proper understanding and acknowledgment of their limitations for achieving more long-term goals.

The Need for Data-Driven Analysis

Given the level of publicity generated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is natural to assume that the scope of knowledge on counterinsurgency is vast. While this is true to some extent, little more than 20 percent of all pieces explore the success of specific strategies across multiple countries in multiple regions. What we know about best practices is overwhelmingly based on single case, qualitative analysis—Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Malaysia—which raises doubts about the extent to which such practices can be adopted in other contexts with an expectation of a similar outcome.

This does not mean that data-driven analysis is completely missing from existing research. The availability of data sources from the US government—such as the Department of Defense’s Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) data on development aid, the military’s Significant Activities databases (SIGACTS) on violent incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Iraq Body Count’s data on violent civilian deaths—has enabled scholars to examine, for example, the impact of different types of development aid on violence reduction or the effect of coalition condolence payments to victims or families of victims on violence reduction across multiple regions and districts. Yet existing knowledge and the resulting recommendations about the specific strategies’ impact need to be approached with careful consideration given that most of the findings are based on insights from a single country analysis.

Accessing data in a conflict zone is inherently challenging and likely responsible for the limited availability of scientific analysis across time and space. One way to approach this conundrum is for scholars to form collaborative relationships with NGOs that operate in dangerous environments to establish contacts on the ground, who, in turn, could identify local actors that could assist with interview and survey data collection. Relying on historical, secondary data also offers some benefits in providing greater understanding of strategies’ effectiveness on a global scale. For example, in their 2016 study, Christopher Paul and coauthors collected and examined data on 59 insurgencies (from 1944 to 2010), COIN outcomes (COIN win and COIN loss), and governments’ strategies (population-centric vs. enemy-centric) to conclude that most successful operations find a balance between these two. This study does not provide additional data to address variation in strategies’ effect depending on various characteristics of the countries and conflicts. Nevertheless, it illustrates the relevance of historical data extraction for the purpose of improving the findings’ general applicability.

Western Lens

The 2014 RAND report noted that policy literature on counterinsurgency has focused predominantly on the experiences of Western nations. Our analysis of both policy pieces and empirical studies shows that this trend has not abated since the publication of RAND’s report. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam have been the most frequently studied insurgencies, while focus on Africa and South America is narrow despite the prevalence of insurgencies in these contexts. When studies explore non-Western practices, they mainly concentrate on Russia, Nigeria, India, and Colombia.

Moving beyond Western counterinsurgency experience is critical for effective responses to near-peer competitors whose presence in Africa has grown significantly in recent years. With state weakness remaining a challenge on the continent, the risk of intrastate conflicts is high. When such conflicts do break out, they create an opening for governments to seek greater assistance from US competitors in the form of Chinese loans and military training or reliance on Russian mercenaries and defense agreements. US assistance to such governments to manage insurgency threats will require a more nuanced understanding not only of non-Western military, political, and social approaches but also knowledge about the variation of strategies’ effectiveness depending on country and conflict characteristics. This knowledge can position the United States to develop more collaborative partnerships with at-risk governments through greater understanding of and responsiveness to local constraints and opportunities.

Sources of Power: Where Lies the Interest and What’s Left Behind

The focus on conventional military approaches, such as strengthening deterrent capabilities, remains the core interest of policymakers in the era of near-peer competition. However, Russia’s extensive use of influence operations and China’s emphasis on non-military tactics highlight the need to explore the latter’s effectiveness in achieving specific military, political, economic, and social objectives. The COIN literature shows that when it comes to addressing insurgent threats, most of the research continues to explore the role of military power, but interest in non-military strategies is growing.

The use of soft power is the second most researched strategy behind the military one, with 40 percent of all the pieces we analyzed addressing development assistance and governance. Studies in this area examine, for example, the impact of different types of development funds, the significance of US soldiers’ work on infrastructure projects, institutional inclusiveness, and institutional constraints on COIN outcomes. The key recommendation following the analysis of the existing literature is to move in the direction of neglected tools of state power. This includes evaluation of different ways in which law enforcement impacts specific COIN outcomes, the use of diplomacy, and reliance on formal and informal financial tools to achieve desired objectives.

Lastly, it is worth noting that near-peer competitors are not only diversifying their strategies but also using them concurrently. As these practices become more common it is likely that great power involvement in future COIN operations may require greater understanding of how different combinations of strategies and the timing of strategy implementation at different stages of insurgency impact COIN outcomes. Some studies already consider the result of multiple strategies. For example, research on the impact of compensation funds has relied on statistical analysis to examine the funds’ effectiveness in reducing insurgent violence in Iraq while taking into consideration US troop presence and the operations of provincial reconstruction teams in distribution regions.

Overall, research on counterinsurgency either comes with methodological and data limitations or is generally limited to a small number of strategies with a single-country focus. Future studies would benefit from incorporating analysis of multiple strategies across time and space to identify patterns that emerge from joint implementation rather than studying the effectiveness of each strategy in isolation. Such focus would also acknowledge the importance of non-military approaches in irregular warfare. As US competitors are increasingly diversifying their non-military tool box to gain an advantage, exploring the utility of soft power will continue to matter. The second piece in this series will identify the effectiveness of specific military and non-military approaches based on insights from the past 20 years of research.

Dr. Elizabeth Radziszewski is an associate research scientist at START, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland, where she leads the Irregular Warfare and Conflict Assessment Group. She is the author of Private Militaries and the Security Industry in Civil Wars: Competition and Market Accountability (Oxford University Press, 2020) and Social Networks and Public Support for the European Union (Routledge, 2013).

This article is based on research conducted for the Global Responses to Asymmetric Threats: Phase 1 of Irregular Warfare Net Assessment Data Structure project, which is part of the Asymmetric Threat Analysis Center (ATAC), a joint program between START and University of Maryland’s Applied Research Lab for Intelligence and Security (ARLIS). ATAC is funded by the Department of Defense.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Photo credit: Sgt. Ken Scar.

21. Thinking Big with Small Drones: An Allied Approach to Swarming

Conclusion:

Ensuring interoperability amongst drone swarms can offer multi-faceted solutions to modern-day military problems. The Department of Defense should emphasize drone swarm interoperability just as much as the individual capabilities of the drone swarms themselves. The U.S. military has the potential to operationalize low-cost, rapidly deployable drone swarms across the land, air, and maritime domains using the joint force while also integrating NATO allies. However, it is crucial for allies to be involved in the operationalization of these swarms from the outset to reap the full benefits of combined, joint interoperability. NATO members France, Spain, and the United Kingdom have already announced their own drone-swarming projects, all of which have had successful demonstrations. Combined, joint interoperability will make these swarms even more valuable. Interoperability is not only key to winning at the tactical level but also to strengthening allies at the strategic level.

Thinking Big with Small Drones: An Allied Approach to Swarming - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Tyler Jackson · March 23, 2023

NATO has taken a combined approach towards defending against drones. Now, it should show the same collaborative effort in deploying them.

Enabling interoperable drone swarms across the alliance could yield immediate benefits for the Department of Defense while simultaneously strengthening allies with rapid information sharing and common operating pictures. It would create increased opportunities to deploy rapid, lethal, and non-lethal effects without the need for billion-dollar programs of record, bureaucratically controlled program offices, and significant infrastructure upgrades. Moreover, relatively low-cost swarming systems with interoperability between multiple countries and services could facilitate cost-sharing and ultimately reduce costs for all countries involved. This would allow allies with limited military budgets to contribute to, and reap the benefits of, advances in drone technology.

To develop, test, and operationalize drone swarming across the NATO alliance, Washington should promote collaboration between multinational industry experts and combined, joint military planning teams with the aim of eventually hosting large-scale exercises across the globe. Ideally, subject matter experts from industry — as well as service members from various allied nations — would conduct multiple interoperability demonstrations during NATO military exercises or multi-national deployments. However, for this to occur, the Department of Defense and its NATO cohorts would need to set aside dedicated funding.

Why Interoperability?

Consider the following exercise scenario: A swarm of drones is being controlled by a U.S. Navy destroyer patrolling 20 nautical miles off an island in the Pacific Ocean. The drone swarm is providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data back to the combat information center onboard the destroyer. Yet the mission requires simultaneous, multi-national operations on the island, which necessitate synchronization, deconfliction, and real-time information sharing between the destroyer and other coalition players in the area.

Become a Member

In come the interoperable drone swarms. Imagine that the destroyer can hand off the drone swarm mid-flight to the U.S. Marines conducting amphibious operations on the island. Those marines are then able to hand off that swarm to a non-U.S., coalition aircraft overhead, which can then hand off the swarm to the ally-led ground force operating out of a coalition staging base further inland. Interoperable swarms would provide opportunities for rapid, collaborative kinetic and non-kinetic effects and a common operating picture between dissimilar platforms and forces, all without the need for relays. Combined, joint interoperability is key to drone swarms becoming a truly successful force multiplier at the tactical level. Avoiding isolated thinking between NATO allies and military services will enable holistic defense approaches that offer relatively low-cost options. This holistic thinking will be necessary to make interoperability a reality.

Existing Efforts

The U.S. military has been on record for nearly two decades about creating drone-swarm technology across the physical domains. Back in 2003, an Air Force Institute of Technology thesis paper comprehensively described the concept of unmanned, autonomously operated swarm vehicles. Since then, the defense industry has worked to fill the military’s desire for operationalized drone swarms. However, drone swarms have yet to be operationalized. This is partly due to the significant technological hurdles and design challenges that must be overcome. Swarm technology will have to be improved before operationalization can occur against sophisticated anti-access/area denial systems.

Although the technology needed to address the military’s drone swarming requirements continues to be developed, the Department of Defense should think more holistically about drone swarming and the necessity for interoperability among the joint, combined force. Drone swarming enables larger-scale control of individual drones or smaller groups of drones. Currently, each service is pursuing its own drone-swarming program. This method has allowed the services to address unique domain-specific issues related to the operationalization of swarms while ensuring compatibility amongst other service-specific force elements. It is certainly important for individual services to address their specific requirements. But a comprehensive effort to employ service-agnostic swarms would be well suited to the Joint All Domain Command and Control program, furthering its goal of joint, combined interoperability and contributing to the program’s overall information architecture. This is all the more true since the Pentagon expects joint all domain command and control to counter adversary swarms in the future.

Central Command has already recognized the need to implement small-drone technology across the joint force quickly with the creation of Task Force 59 and Task Force 99. These task forces were developed to foster technological innovation and counter adversaries in the region while mitigating reduced troop numbers as the Department of Defense shifts its focus towards strategic competitors. Furthering these efforts with drone swarms that allow for interoperability among the U.S. military services, as well as NATO allies, will support the National Security Strategy goal of strengthening allies and the National Defense Strategy goal of creating a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem while also supplying coalition forces with relatively cheap, multi-functional warfighting systems at the tactical level.

Existing Technologies

The technology now exists for the Department of Defense to use American hardware and software capabilities to help the U.S. military operationalize drone swarms the right way, ensuring interoperability within the joint and combined forces in the air, land, and maritime domains.

Those that have ever had the pleasure of seeing a drone light show know that the technology exists to synchronize massive amounts of drones to create intricate displays of lights and shapes. However, the ability to create true drone swarms has significantly progressed and is primed for military application. There are viable options to pursue interoperable drone swarming programs today. Defense industry companies have already created artificially intelligent drone swarms that operate autonomously. They can be launched from various types of air, maritime, and land-specific platforms using universal common launch tubes. These same family-of-system drones can conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and kinetic attacks while allowing users to interface with the systems via laptop or tablet. Family-of-systems use the hub-and-spoke approach, where a central platform is built in conjunction with variations of accompanying platforms in order to allow for seamless integration and operation. Similarly, civilian defense companies have already partnered to create control mechanisms for formations of up to four disparate, unmanned vehicles across multiple domains. Furthermore, these same companies have created the ability to pass control between operators using handheld tablet interfaces — without the need to shut down the platforms in use.

True drone swarms differ from coordinated drone displays used in light shows

in that the drones in a swarm can collectively operate with each other while remaining independent and avoiding collision without the use of a centralized computer. The swarming ability is made possible by artificial intelligence and the principles of separation, alignment, and cohesion. Despite continued maturation of artificial intelligence used to control drone swarms, programs such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s OFFensive Swarm Enabled Tactics have demonstrated present-day availability of this technology throughout multiple demonstrations in simulated urban environments. The agency’s more recent Autonomous Multi-Domain Adaptive Swarms-of-Swarms program aims to take the current technology a step further by controlling thousands of drones at once. This decentralized control allows drones within a swarm to physically separate at much farther distances than would be capable with centrally controlled drones while attacking separate targets. A 2018 U.S. Army study noted that swarming technology can significantly shift the tactical advantage to the user due to the swarm’s ability to “adapt and selectively target in a way that they shape the battlefield” through the primary uses of swarm breaching, swarm-area defense, and wide-area intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance swarms.

Limitations

Payload and range are glaring limitations when it comes to small drones. However, mass and high-precision targeting effects can mitigate payload constraints. The Air Force is already planning experiments to use remotely piloted aircraft as range-extending motherships for smaller drones. This approach can facilitate swarm employment. Survivability is another concern for swarm operationalization. Penetrating, low-observable, optionally-manned B-21s will be an ideal platform to employ these drone swarms once the next-generation bomber achieves full operating capability. With the Air Force’s hypersonic missile programs and family-of-systems concept, not to mention initiatives from other services and coalition partners, the platform-based opportunities for swarm employment start to add up.

Swarming operations will face threats when conducted in close proximity to enemy forces. Nonetheless, ground-launched drone swarms would be beneficial after adversary anti-access/area denial systems have largely been defeated. In these situations, special operations forces conducting missions behind enemy lines or conventional ground units amassing near the forward edge of the battle area would not be hindered by the limited range of ground-launched swarms in a non-permissive environment.

Conclusion

Ensuring interoperability amongst drone swarms can offer multi-faceted solutions to modern-day military problems. The Department of Defense should emphasize drone swarm interoperability just as much as the individual capabilities of the drone swarms themselves. The U.S. military has the potential to operationalize low-cost, rapidly deployable drone swarms across the land, air, and maritime domains using the joint force while also integrating NATO allies. However, it is crucial for allies to be involved in the operationalization of these swarms from the outset to reap the full benefits of combined, joint interoperability. NATO members France, Spain, and the United Kingdom have already announced their own drone-swarming projects, all of which have had successful demonstrations. Combined, joint interoperability will make these swarms even more valuable. Interoperability is not only key to winning at the tactical level but also to strengthening allies at the strategic level.

Become a Member

Tyler Jackson is a U.S. Air Force officer. He is a graduate of Howard University and the University of Oklahoma and is currently assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School as a graduate student. He is a senior remotely piloted aircraft pilot and former combat systems officer who has amassed over 1700 combat and combat support hours.

The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. Government.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Tyler Jackson · March 23, 2023

22. Republicans grill military on diversity, equity goals at hearing on recruitment challenges

Republicans grill military on diversity, equity goals at hearing on recruitment challenges

BY BRAD DRESS - 03/22/23 4:07 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3912262-republicans-grill-military-on-diversity-equity-goals-at-hearing-on-recruitment-challenges/

Republican senators on Wednesday pressured senior officials with the Navy, Army and Air Force on diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) training, which they said was among “woke” policies that are compounding recruitment challenges across nearly all military branches.

Sen. Eric Schmitt (R-Mo.) said the Biden administration was “hellbent” on politicizing the military and slammed the under secretaries for the Navy, Air Force and Army for defending an “obsession with this equity agenda.”

“The offspring of identity politics, which is incredibly divisive, has now made its way through DEI trainings in these branches,” Schmitt said. “It is naive to believe this is not divisive among recruits or people in the military.”

Under Secretary of the Navy Erik Raven responded at the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on recruitment challenges, saying that diverse teams were essential for “warfighting capability.” Acting Under Secretary of the Air Force Kristyn Jones said diversity and equity also improves retention rates.

“We’re not looking at any quotas,” she said. “But we are looking for where there are barriers that are impacting certain parts of our population in different ways. …. For example, barriers we had with women who were choosing to leave our service because of some of the policies we had.”

Besides the Marine Corps and the Space Force, every military branch is struggling to meet its recruitment target goals, which have already been shrunk to meet the lower demand.

In the last fiscal year, the Army was 15,000 recruits short of a 60,000 goal, while both the Navy and the Air Force barely met targets for active duty personnel.

The Pentagon has pointed to various challenges, including a declining interest for military service among the youngest generation of Americans and a competitive labor market. Many Americans are also not eligible for service based on health requirements or prior criminal misconduct.

The Defense Department has not identified DEI training or particular policies under GOP scrutiny as a barrier to recruitment, and officials have said more diversity in the military helps tackle problems and come up with unique solutions.

According to the Pentagon, about 41 percent of the military identifies as part of a minority group.

Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.) said recent surveys have not found a large number of servicemembers listing “woke” policies as a major issue across the military.

“Diversity and inclusion strengthen our military,” Reed said. “By every measure, America’s military is more lethal than it has ever been. It is also more diverse and inclusive than ever before. And this is not a coincidence — our military looks more and more like the nation it represents.”

The new Republican House majority has honed in on DEI initiatives and policies to address climate change at the Pentagon as unnecessary expenses, and threats to the military’s readiness.

House Republicans have called for cuts to “woke” programs in the next fiscal year defense budget as part of a larger fight over spending and the debt ceiling.

Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, devoted a large part of his introductory remarks to the Pentagon’s DEI training and efforts to weed out extremism in the ranks, both of which he said “dissuade young people from enlisting.”

“They suggest to the American people the military has a problem with diversity and extremism,” Wicker said. “In truth, the military is the greatest civil rights program in the history of the world.”

While the under secretaries agreed extremism only affected a small percentage of the armed forces, they did not say it posed a recruitment challenge.

Sen. Ted Budd (R-N.C.) called out DEI training, gender ideology and abortion access in the military, calling them “social experiments” and “radical agendas.”

After his remarks, Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.) countered that diversity boosts military effectiveness when U.S. troops deploy to other nations.

“The fact the Illinois National Guard has Polish-speaking personnel who can actually be in Ukraine helping train Ukrainians because we have those language abilities is good,” she said. “It in fact helps with our readiness.”

23. The Navy Isn’t Too Woke—It Is America

Seom analysis and some facts we do not often see in these arguments.

The Navy Isn’t Too Woke—It Is America

cimsec.org · by Guest Author

By Bill Bray

When I attended a small Catholic high school in the early 1980s, several teachers tried to dissuade me from pursuing a military career. In the shadow of the Vietnam War, some questioned whether military service could be reconciled with the moral demands of the Catholic faith, while others simply opposed me serving on social or political grounds. A Jesuit reassured me that a military protecting a free society must be led by virtuous men and women of conscience—the type the high school endeavored to cultivate.

Today, the U.S. military’s strongest domestic critics are not on the political and social left, but the right. There is a growing chorus of voices who claim the military is too “woke,” that it has become a vehicle for progressive social experimentation at the expense of developing warfighting toughness and skills.

Historically, woke was a term used in Black communities to signify a general social consciousness. Today, when I hear or read critics of progressive policies using the term as a pejorative, it is rarely clear what they actually mean. What I do know is that there is no such thing as a coherent woke ideology, just as there is no such thing as “woke capitalism.” Opponents of change in the military—specifically, diversity and inclusion initiatives—often ascribe whatever bothers them to the term. And they often fail to realize that many of their preferred politicians are deliberately capitalizing on the acute outrage the term “woke” provokes in certain constituents, and how these politicians are purposefully repeating and cultivating the term to simply harness these constituents’ outrage for political benefit. The supercharged emotions the term “woke” incites among its critics has proven ripe for political exploitation.

It is hard to make an argument against such generalized, unspecific attacks. In fact, as an editor it is not my job to do so. But it is my job to carefully consider counterarguments to articles promoting diversity and inclusion initiatives, and we will continue to publish well-considered, thoughtful counterarguments. We will not publish fact-free rants. What we get is mostly the latter.

Social policies are always being debated across the country. In that sense, the U.S. military has always been changing. And many, if not most, changes were vigorously opposed by traditionalists, who viewed them as paths to warfighting incompetence, indiscipline, or moral destitution (or all the above). All too often, however, resistance to change rested on strawman arguments, and traditionalists wound up arguing with themselves while the country moved on. This is true of momentous changes, such as racial and gender integration, and those of less consequence and controversy (although, I assure you, plenty of mid-1800s Navy officers believed abandoning “the lash” would lead to a plague of indiscipline and mutiny). In any event, the military adapted and moved forward, responding, as it must in a representative democracy, to the demands of the public as articulated through their elected representatives.

What is important, I believe—and I make this case as a retired Navy officer and not as an editor—is to address the ostensibly growing call from many on the right to discourage young people they know from joining the military. While reliable, hard data is never presented, in recent months some commentators claim progressive social policies are at least partially responsible for the military’s recent struggles with meeting recruiting goals. In October, Meghann Myers at Military Times dug into this problem. As you can read for yourself, while the charges of a “woke” military float free of any factual basis, the myth is gathering legs.

Recently, former Navy officer J. A. Cauthen attacked the U.S. Naval Academy’s diversity, equity, and inclusion policies and directives as “ideological (re)education” and “wokeness.” The essay is poorly supported by real data, embarrassing in its frequent digressions into partisan jeremiads, and infused throughout with absurd assumptions and well-worn exaggerations, such as that they are teaching that America is “irredeemably racist.” It also features non-sequiturs, such as how any diversity training is at the expense of warfighting training and weakens warfighting culture (while there is a multitude of other things the Navy has done that have come at the expense of its warfighting training and culture). Former naval officer and undersecretary of the Navy Seth Cropsey made a similar argument more recently in the National Review.

Since I also teach an ethics course at the Academy, I found both Cauthen and Cropsey’s description of its curriculum and culture completely unrecognizable. And they, like so many likeminded critics of the Academy, dismiss the Brigade of Midshipmen, some of the brightest college students in the nation, as incurious followers incapable of earnestly considering all sides of an issue, thinking critically about it, and making up their own minds.

The Training Sailors Actually Get

Curious about what had changed in the Navy that is triggering charges of wokeness, I looked at what a typical sailor gets in terms of formal training in his or her first two years in service. Between eight weeks of basic training, follow-on special skills training (what the Navy calls A-school, or military occupational specialty training), and one full year of mandatory general military trainings (GMTs) at their first ship or command, I could not locate anything that qualified as “woke” training beyond annual equal opportunity training (EEO training). Perhaps some would include sexual assault prevention and domestic abuse training, but I have never heard or read a complaint against those in the context of wokeness.

EEO training is one of seven mandatory GMTs (another 11 can be assigned at commanding officers’ discretion, and most are probably held annually). EEO training is a thorough review of current U.S. law, Department of Defense, and Department of the Navy policy on equal opportunity and discrimination (based on race, color, religion, gender, age, etc.). It would be hard to argue that sailors and officers should not be educated on what the rules are, and what they can and should do if they believe the rules are being violated. Perhaps the only part of EEO training that could be controversial is the final barriers section, which aims to illuminate more subtle obstacles to minority opportunity and advancement. In a rough approximation, in the first two years in the Navy, less than two percent of a sailor’s formal training could even be remotely described as progressive social training.

Then there is Task Force One Navy, established in 2020 in the wake of nation-wide social justice protests to take a comprehensive look at the Navy’s progress and continued challenges in diversity and inclusion. It is beyond the scope of this essay to comment on the entire report. It contains many recommendations along five lines of effort. Not all will be implemented, but many will have at least some effect on Navy policies and processes in the future. It should be noted that the report contains many positive findings, acknowledging much progress the Navy has made in the past 20 years. Its fiercest critics seem to anchor on implications the service still harbors systemic barriers to inclusion, as evidenced by disproportional equity outcomes in promotion demographics and the like. However, for the Navy to acknowledge these outcomes and continually examine itself seems a responsible and unavoidable approach, not one beholden to any ideology. Warfighting in defense of a free society is not just about competence, training, and technology. It is about the will and support of the population, and that requires a military in whose ranks the population is more broadly represented.

Service before Politics

Whatever one thinks of the Navy’s diversity and inclusion initiatives, attempting to equate patriotism and service with partisan politics is wrong and harmful to national security. Unfortunately, it is becoming all too common by those who should know better. Anti-woke warriors such as Cauthen give away the game when he writes the following to explain the Naval Academy’s implementation of diversity and inclusion policies and programs, “Willing collaborators all too eager to appease their political masters are accomplishing this transformation through directives, policy, training, and the creation of new offices and positions staffed to advance the agenda of wokeness.” It seems Mr. Cauthen would have no problem if the Navy’s willing collaborators appeased political masters for whom he voted and approves. In his warped understanding of civil-military relations, civilian control is conditional—it depends on the political masters’ affiliation and viewpoint.

That a Naval Academy graduate who took a commission and swore an oath to support and defend the Constitution would write such a line is unfortunate. But he is one of many who cannot see, or refuse to see, the problem with such a view. My generation of Academy graduates from the 1980s has no business lecturing on this point. The shift to an all-volunteer force nearly 50 years ago always had the potential of a military gradually cultivating leaders who supported the political party that favored it more, both fiscally and culturally. This seems to have happened during the Reagan years.

Indeed, what today’s right wing seems most furious about is that they can no longer count on the military being a reliable constituency for their political positions and views. For years it counted on this, routinely trotting out claims that a socially conservative military would be weakened and possibly even destroyed if progressive policies infect it (never were such claims based on anything remotely close to real evidence). There is some truth to the view that military personnel tend to be socially conservative, but that often obscures how the views of servicemembers shift over time in step with society’s shifting views. The drastic change from the early 1990s until the 2010s of the percentage of Americans in favor of gays serving in the military is a case in point. As young Americans from different backgrounds join year after year, the military is constantly changing its makeup in many ways. The military is not some monastery insulated from society. It is society.

For those that claim wokeness is hurting recruiting, they should examine the demographic data from the 2022 midterm elections, even in the reddest states. Younger voters skew progressive, in some states more than 60 percent. Also, as Risa Brooks recently noted, 41 percent of military personnel identify as coming from a minority group. Not all minorities favor progressive policies of course, but they are statistically more likely to at least be more open to them. The notion that the military can solve its recruiting problem by renouncing wokeness and targeting red constituencies is fanciful, and a move that would harm its nonpartisan ethic.

What the Navy needs—what it has always needed—is patriotic Americans from all walks of life willing to serve with the comfort of knowing their personal political views are irrelevant. Servicemembers are free to believe what they want and vote any way they want. They are not free to cherrypick the policies and initiatives they will support.

Yet so little of what happens in the daily life of a Navy sailor can be attributed to a woke agenda. Even those with the most socially conservative views should have no trouble elevating the virtue of service above partisan politics. That many conservative commentators believe they should not (or cannot) do so speaks far more to those commentators’ fragile sensibilities than to a real problem.

It is worth reminding those who claim a woke military is a hostile place to serve the nation that at one time many Black Americans still chose to serve their nation in a segregated military, where discrimination was overt, entrenched, and legalized. Yet today, are socially conservative Americans actually going to refuse to serve because they must take EEO training or an FDA-approved vaccine, or are encouraged to use a gender-neutral pronoun as an act of respect, or must report to a ship or base no longer named for a Confederate traitor to the United States? While critics of wokeness in the military often claim they want to depoliticize the military, what they really want is to politicize it in their favor. This can even feature partisan loyalty tests, particularly for senior officers. This is inappropriate and dangerous, and military leaders have correctly resisted it.

Conclusion

In the 1970s and early 1980s, it was not uncommon to find critics on the left disparaging military servicemembers in terms that cast them as immoral and bloodthirsty agents of the American war machine. These attacks were unjustified and well beyond reasonable debate about the size and shape of, or even the need for, the armed forces. They fed a distorted narrative about American military life that deterred many young people from even considering service. Critics on the right who claim without evidence that the military is now corrupted by wokeness are committing the same sin. In fact, the military is full of smart, dedicated, and tough men and women. The true corruptors are those who refuse to rise above partisan politics to serve the nation and a greater cause.

Bill Bray is a retired Navy captain. He is the deputy editor-in-chief of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine.

Featured Image: Sailors man the rails aboard the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford in June 2021. (U.S. Navy photo)

cimsec.org · by Guest Author

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 22, 2023

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