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Quotes of the Day;
"The most common way people give up their power is by thinking they don’t have any."
–Alice Walker
"He that leaveth nothing to chance will do few things ill, but he will do very few things."
– George Savile Halifax
"But the greatest menace to our civilization today is the conflict between giant organized systems of self-righteousness - each system only too delighted to find that the other is wicked - each only too glad that the sins give it the pretext for still deeper hatred and animosity."
– Herbert Butterfield
1. Beijing's senior party official stresses steadfast ties with Pyongyang
2. N. Korea's ruling party delegation embarks on trip to China, Vietnam, Laos
3. North Korea pulls out of hosting a 2026 World Cup qualifier
4. Korea expresses ‘deep regret’ over historical inaccuracies in Japanese textbooks
5. 'Gold badges' are for ex-convicts and people with pro-N. Korea stances
6. Govt. agencies probed for alleged neglect in NK guard post verification
7. S. Korea summons Japanese envoy to protest historical distortion in textbooks
8. Understanding Trump’s Foreign Policy (and how to deal with it) - Korea Economic Institute of America
9. US ally issues ominous warning to North Korea
10. The U.S. Election and South Korean Anxieties
11. The 2024 IC Annual Threat Assessment: Analytic Authority and Policy Relevance
12. What's behind South Korea's K-pop crisis?
13. US denies reports of troops on China's doorstep
1. Beijing's senior party official stresses steadfast ties with Pyongyang
The only alliance for both countries which has been traditionally described as "closer than lips and teeth."
Beijing's senior party official stresses steadfast ties with Pyongyang | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Sang-soo · March 23, 2024
SEOUL, March 23 (Yonhap) -- China's senior party leader Wang Huning has stressed unwavering ties with North Korea despite changes in international situations, Pyongyang's official media outlet reported Saturday.
In a meeting with North Korea's ruling party delegation in Beijing on Thursday, Wang, a member of the standing committee of the political bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, also said the two countries have to usher in a new chapter for their relations on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties this year, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
North Korea's ruling party delegation has arrived in Beijing on a three-nation tour, in a move that's seen as aimed at strengthening ties with countries sharing the socialist ideology.
The delegation is being led by Kim Song-nam, director of the international department at the Workers' Party.
Kim also met Liu Jianchao, the minister of the party's international liaison department.
This year marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between North Korea and China. The North declared 2024 the year of the North Korea-China friendship, a designation first introduced in 2009 to mark the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations.
The KCNA also said the tour will take the North Korean delegation to Vietnam and Laos.
Kim's trip came as North Korea appears to be resuming diplomatic activities with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), following years of Pyongyang's COVID-19 border closure.
Laos plans to host the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other ASEAN-related meetings as this year's chair country. The annual ARF is the sole regional forum joined by North Korea.
ASEAN comprises Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam.
This image, captured from the website of North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on March 22, 2024, shows Kim Song-nam (R), head of the country's ruling party delegation, before he embarked on a three-nation tour to China, Vietnam and Laos the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
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sam@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Sang-soo · March 23, 2024
2. N. Korea's ruling party delegation embarks on trip to China, Vietnam, Laos
The regime is placing its stones on the global Go/Baduk board even as it works hard to further isolate the Korean people in the north from the outside world.
N. Korea's ruling party delegation embarks on trip to China, Vietnam, Laos
The Korea Times · March 22, 2024
Kim Song-nam, left, director of the international department of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, meets with Sisavath Khamsaly, Laos' ambassador to North Korea, in Pyongyang, in this Nov. 14, 2023 file photo carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency
North Korea's ruling party delegation has arrived in Beijing on a three-nation tour, state media reported Friday, in a move seen aimed at strengthening ties with countries sharing the socialist ideology.
The delegation, led by Kim Song-nam, director of the international department at the Workers' Party, was greeted by the assistant to the head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party at an airport Thursday, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, without providing details on the purpose of the trip.
It marked Kim's first known overseas trip since he was appointed to the post in 2012. Kim, who served as an interpreter for North Korea's late founder Kim Il-sung and former leader Kim Jong-il, is known as a China expert.
This year marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between North Korea and China. The North declared 2024 as the year of North Korea-China friendship, a designation first introduced in 2009 to mark the 60th anniversary of the diplomatic relations.
Meanwhile, Wang Huning, a member of the standing committee of the political bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, met with Kim on Thursday, according to the website of the Chinese Embassy in North Korea.
Wang voiced China's willingness to promote bilateral ties with Pyongyang and proposed that the two nations work together to create a "peaceful and stable external environment," read a statement uploaded by the embassy. In response, Kim expressed hope that the two countries could promote exchanges and cooperation in various fields in the landmark year.
In a separate dispatch, the KCNA said the tour will take the North Korean delegation to Vietnam and Laos.
Kim's trip came as North Korea appears to be resuming diplomatic activity with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), following years of Pyongyang's COVID-19 border shutdowns.
Laos plans to host the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other ASEAN-related meetings as this year's chair country. The annual ARF is the sole regional forum joined by North Korea.
ASEAN comprises Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · March 22, 2024
3. North Korea pulls out of hosting a 2026 World Cup qualifier
The "malignant infectious disease” is not streptococcal toxic shock syndrome (STSS). It is actually freedom and information. Bringing the World Cup qualifier to Pyongyang risks bringing in too much information about freedom. Kim fears what he thinks is a disease that will bring an end to his regime, information and freedom.
Friday
March 22, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 22 Mar. 2024, 15:09
North Korea pulls out of hosting a 2026 World Cup qualifier
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-03-22/national/northKorea/North-Korea-pulls-out-of-hosting-a-2026-World-Cup-qualifier/2008763
Football fans supporting North Korea in the stands before a 2026 World Cup qualifier begins at Japan National Stadium in Tokyo, Japan on Thursday. [REUTERS]
North Korea will not host a 2026 World Cup qualifier against Japan in Pyongyang next Tuesday.
"The North’s decision appears to be precautionary measure regarding the recent increase of streptococcal toxic shock syndrome (STSS) patients in Japan,” Kyodo News reported Thursday.
According to Japanese media, the North had been airing reports saying the streptococcal infection was “a malignant infectious disease” in Japan.
The President at the Japan Football Association (JFA) confirmed on Thursday that the qualifier would not happen in Pyongyang and that a new venue has not yet been determined.
The Japanese national football team planned to depart its home country Friday and enter Pyongyang on Monday, a day before the scheduled game.
The Asian Football Confederation (AFC) inspected Pyongyang’s Kim Il Sung Stadium in early March and confirmed that it was fit to host a World Cup qualifier game.
Japan won against the North with a score of 1-0 in the second round of the Asian qualifier game for the 2026 World Cup, which took place at the Japan National Stadium in Tokyo on Thursday.
On Feb. 24, the Japanese women's football team faced the North's team for a qualifier match for the 2024 Paris Olympics. The game was also originally set to take place at Pyongyang's Kim Il Sung Stadium. However, due to concerns over game management and poor flight schedules, the JFA raised a complaint to the AFC and the game was moved to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
BY LEE SOO-JUNG [lee.soojung1@joongang.co.kr]
4. Korea expresses ‘deep regret’ over historical inaccuracies in Japanese textbooks
The ROK and Japan still have to manage these historical issues even as they prioritize national security and national prosperity.
Friday
March 22, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 22 Mar. 2024, 19:21
Updated: 22 Mar. 2024, 19:32
Korea expresses ‘deep regret’ over historical inaccuracies in Japanese textbooks
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-03-22/national/diplomacy/Korean-govt-calls-out-historical-inaccuracies-in-Japanese-textbooks/2008995
Koichi Aiboshi, Japanese ambassador to Korea, enters the Foreign Ministry building in Jongno District, central Seoul, on Friday. [YONHAP]
The Korean government expressed deep regret on Friday over Japan approving middle school textbooks that claim sovereignty over the easternmost Dokdo islets and obscure wartime atrocities during the Japanese colonial period.
Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology approved on Friday 18 middle school textbooks on history for use starting in 2025. Among the 18, 15 described Korea as “illegally occupying” the Dokdo islets, which Japan calls “Takeshima.” Many textbooks also watered down wartime atrocities including sexual slavery and forced labor, and distorted the context of Japan’s (1910-45) colonization of Korea.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement Friday opposing the approval of the textbooks and summoned Koichi Aiboshi, Japanese ambassador to Seoul, to protest the matter.
“We express deep regret over the Japanese government’s approval of middle school textbooks based on unjust claims regarding Dokdo,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lim Soo-suk said in a statement.
Related Article
The Foreign Ministry stressed that Dokdo is Korea’s sovereign territory historically, geographically and by international law and that the Korean government cannot accept any Japanese claims over the islets. The statement also called out how the textbooks described victims of wartime sexual slavery and forced labor by the Japanese military, saying that it “does not reveal the forceful nature” of the crimes.
“We urge the Japanese government to sincerely practice historical education based on the spirit of apology and regret,” the statement said. “As the basis for building a future-oriented relationship between Korea and Japan begins with a correct understanding of history, we hope that the Japanese government will face history directly and engage in the education of future generations with a more responsible attitude.”
First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun summoned Aiboshi and met with the ambassador to deliver the Korean government’s strong regret and opposition to the textbooks' approval.
In an apparent attempt to water down the forced nature of wartime mobilization, one of the 18 approved middle school history textbooks stated that conscription was “partly” applied to Korea and Taiwan during the Pacific War.
In another textbook, the term “military comfort women” was removed from the description of the victims of sexual slavery from Korea, China and the Philippines who were forced to serve Japanese soldiers at military brothels.
Instead, the textbook included Japan among the other nations, indicating that Japanese women were also victims of sexual slavery.
A different history book said that in 1910, Japan annexed and colonized Korea, and removed the phrase “against the backdrop of its military power” from the context.
Last month, the Korean government similarly summoned Taisuke Mibae, the deputy chief of mission at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, to protest the Dokdo-related “Takeshima Day” event hosted by the Shimane Prefecture on Feb. 22.
The Dokdo islets, effectively controlled by Korea, serve as a painful reminder of Japan's imperialistic past and its colonial rule over the peninsula.
BY LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]
5. 'Gold badges' are for ex-convicts and people with pro-N. Korea stances
The question for the ROK is how to deal with very real and active subversion from the north while ensuring free and fair elections.
'Gold badges' are for ex-convicts and people with pro-N. Korea stances
donga.com
Posted March. 23, 2024 07:57,
Updated March. 23, 2024 07:57
'Gold badges' are for ex-convicts and people with pro-N. Korea stances. March. 23, 2024 07:57. by Ji-Hyun Kim jhk85@donga.com.
It has been revealed that a record number of nearly 40 political parties will be fielding proportional representation candidates in the upcoming April 10 general elections. This marks the highest number ever recorded, surpassing the 19th (21 parties) and 20th (38 parties) general elections. If all these parties register, it is projected that the ballot paper handed to voters on election day will be 54.1 centimeters long.
There are strong criticisms within the political sphere, pointing out that the two major parties' decision to maintain the semi-linked proportional representation system has led to its exploitation. This has resulted in the proliferation of hastily created 'trick' satellite parties and proportional representation-focused parties, allowing various unverified ex-convicts and unqualified individuals to enter the National Assembly. These criticisms suggest that the very purpose of the proportional representation system, which aimed to protect experts by function and minority political forces, has become meaningless.
According to the National Election Commission's announcement on Friday, by the candidate registration deadline, satellite political parties affiliated with both the People Power Party and the Democratic Party of Korea, including the People's Future Party and the Democratic Alliance, as well as the Fatherland Innovation Party, the Green Justice Party, New Future, and the New Reform Party, have all submitted proportional candidate nominations.
Among the candidates nominated for their respective elected positions, there are individuals with criminal records and various controversial backgrounds. The Democratic Party is under fire for allegedly attempting to depict the Democratic Alliance as a 'quasi-satellite party' aligned with minority opposition parties such as the Progressive Party and civil society groups. This strategy is seen as a means to ensure the entry of candidates with pro-North Korea and anti-American stances into the National Assembly. Notably, the Democratic Alliance has endorsed three candidates recommended by the Progressive Party, who have been allocated ballot numbers 5, 11, and 15. In the previous general election four years ago, the Democratic Party's satellite party, the Citizens' Party of Korea, secured 17 seats in the National Assembly.
"With the elections just a few months away, hastily formed proportional representation parties left insufficient time for proper candidate verification,” said Dr. Yoon Gwang-il, Professor of Political Science and Diplomacy at Sookmyung Women's University. “By approaching the process solely strategically, they excluded individuals who could have upheld the party's values and the spirit of proportional representation."
한국어
donga.com
6. Govt. agencies probed for alleged neglect in NK guard post verification
Will this be deflected to the UN Command which is responsible for managing the Armistice and the DMZ? We should remember that the CMA was negotiated without almost any UN Command input and the UN COmmand only saw part of the details after it had been negotiated.
But the real problem here is just like with every other agreement with north Korea. The regime prevents verification. And of course this controversy plays right into the regime's strategy to subvert the ROK government and society.
Excerpts:
South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik also cast doubt on the Moon Jae-in government's inadequate verification of North Korea's purported demolition of guard posts, in an interview with Yonhap News Agency in January.
"At the time of the destruction, North Korea seemed to have only destroyed the visible observation posts, leaving the rest of the underground facilities untouched," he said.
The Defense Ministry submitted documents to the BAI written by the inspection team that visited North Korea’s guard posts in 2018, which the BAI’s Special Investigations Bureau is closely looking into.
According to the BAI, its audit is to focus on allegations about the inspection team’s report being ignored, which reportedly read that there were doubts as to whether the North’s underground facilities had been destroyed as it could not be verified.
Govt. agencies probed for alleged neglect in NK guard post verification
koreaherald.com · by Lee Jung-joo · March 22, 2024
By Lee Jung-joo
Published : March 22, 2024 - 15:07
In this file photo released by the Defense Ministry on Nov. 27, 2023, North Korean soldiers are spotted near a guard post being rebuilt with wooden materials inside the Demilitarized Zone. (Defense Ministry)
The South Korean Board of Audit and Inspection has initiated an inquiry into allegations that the Defense Ministry and other government agencies neglected to verify the demolition of front-line guard posts, which North Korea was supposed to undertake according to the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement.
According to both the BAI and the Defense Ministry on Friday, an inspection began Monday, following an earlier audit request from the nonprofit organization Korean Retired Generals and Admirals Defending the Nation on Jan. 23.
The organization has claimed the Defense Ministry failed to effectively verify the destruction of North Korea’s general outposts. General outposts are guard posts located along the southern edge of the Demilitarized Zone that separates North and South Korea.
In 2018 as part of the Sept. 19 Comprehensive Military Agreement, South and North Korea dismantled 10 guard posts located within 1 kilometer of each other in the DMZ, covering the eastern, western and midland regions.
At the time, the South Korean military announced that 10 guard posts in the DMZ had been destroyed after sending separate teams of seven inspectors to each of 11 guard posts, including one that was not being dismantled but kept as a historic site.
However, after the North vowed to restore all military measures halted under the 2018 agreement in November 2023, several guard posts were rapidly restored with wooden materials, raising the possibility that the North may have preserved the underground facilities in 2018.
In January, some of North Korea’s guard posts were rebuilt with concrete, suggesting the North could then operate the posts at full scale, compared to previous temporary wooden structures.
South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik also cast doubt on the Moon Jae-in government's inadequate verification of North Korea's purported demolition of guard posts, in an interview with Yonhap News Agency in January.
"At the time of the destruction, North Korea seemed to have only destroyed the visible observation posts, leaving the rest of the underground facilities untouched," he said.
The Defense Ministry submitted documents to the BAI written by the inspection team that visited North Korea’s guard posts in 2018, which the BAI’s Special Investigations Bureau is closely looking into.
According to the BAI, its audit is to focus on allegations about the inspection team’s report being ignored, which reportedly read that there were doubts as to whether the North’s underground facilities had been destroyed as it could not be verified.
koreaherald.com · by Lee Jung-joo · March 22, 2024
7. S. Korea summons Japanese envoy to protest historical distortion in textbooks
Japan and Korea must do better managing these historical issues. They must not undermine the Camp David Summit agreements. Of course China and north Korea would like to see that happen very much. Both countries should keep that in mind. Strengthening bilateral and trilateral cooperation is one of the best counters to the Chinese and north Korea strategies.
S. Korea summons Japanese envoy to protest historical distortion in textbooks
koreaherald.com · by Park Jun-hee · March 22, 2024
By Park Jun-hee
Published : March 22, 2024 - 17:31
Japan's ambassador to South Korea, Koichi Aiboshi, is summoned to the Foreign Ministry on Friday. (Yonhap)
South Korea's Foreign Ministry on Friday summoned Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Koichi Aiboshi to formally protest Japan's approval of history textbooks asserting sovereignty over the Dokdo islets and watering down the coercive nature of its wartime forced labor and sexual slavery.
The Foreign Ministry in Seoul also expressed “deep regret” over the Japanese government’s approval of textbooks for middle schools that distort historical facts in a statement issued under the name of the ministry's spokesperson.
The ministry called on Japan to provide history education based on the “spirit of apology.”
The remarks come after Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology approved the use of 18 school textbooks in the social studies category, which includes history, geography and civics, starting from 2025 for middle schools.
Seoul’s Education Ministry also urged Japan to immediately redress the issue.
“To untie the knot between South Korea and Japan and move toward a more constructive relationship, it’s pivotal to start by correcting (Japan’s) continued assertions of sovereignty over Dokdo and historical distortions,” it said in a statement.
The ministry also lambasted the Japanese government for further watering down the coercive nature in describing sexual slavery claims and forced labor as well as its territorial claims to the Dokdo islets, compared to those approved in 2020.
koreaherald.com · by Park Jun-hee · March 22, 2024
8. Understanding Trump’s Foreign Policy (and how to deal with it) - Korea Economic Institute of America
Excerpts:
Drawing tactical lessons from President Trump’s four years in office, Korea should: (1) treat a potential Trump Administration demands as opening bids rather than as final positions; (2) read Trump Administration policy pronouncements as first drafts rather than as final products; (3) not waste time appealing to treaty obligations, shared history, or diplomatic norms; (4) feel free to disagree but not to overtly criticize Trump or the United States; and, (5) take Trump’s unconventionality as an invitation to exercise its own creativity, including making unreasonable demands of its own, thus engaging in the “art of the deal.”
The history of American foreign policy suggests that it would be a mistake to assume that there will be a lasting return to a post-war “normal,” regardless of the outcome of the 2024 US election. The choice between Joe Biden and Donald Trump represents an imminent fork in the road for international relations, but with or without the potential short-term disruptions of Donald Trump, the United States in coming years likely will remain immersed in an ongoing and consequential debate over the limits and uses of American power. In the long sweep of US history, that has been the norm.
Understanding Trump’s Foreign Policy (and how to deal with it) - Korea Economic Institute of America
keia.org · by intern · March 21, 2024
The Peninsula
Understanding Trump’s Foreign Policy (and how to deal with it)
Published March 21, 2024
Author: Mark Tokola
Category: U.S. Foreign Policy
With a possible second Trump Administration less than a year away, it is worth reviewing the roots of Donald Trump’s foreign policy and seeing what lessons might be learned from his Presidency. President Trump’s approach to foreign affairs was neither unprecedented nor incomprehensible. Its roots are in American history, and its principles are discernible. The Trump Administration even had a term for it, “principled realism.”
In April 2016, Donald Trump said that, if elected, he would “develop a new foreign policy direction for our country, one that replaces randomness with purpose, ideology with strategy, and chaos with peace. It’s time to shake the rust off American foreign policy.” Years earlier, in a May 1990 interview with Playboy Magazine, he answered the question, what would President Trump be like? “He would believe very strongly in extreme military strength. He wouldn’t trust anyone. He wouldn’t trust the Russians; he wouldn’t trust our allies; he’d have a huge military arsenal, perfect it, understand it. Part of the problem is that we’re defending some of the wealthiest countries in the world for nothing.”
This sounds like what author Colin Dueck defines as “hardline unilateralism,” rather than isolationism. It is a school of conservative thought that calls for a muscular response to overseas threats to American interests while steering clear of alliance commitments and interventions in foreign disputes that do not directly involve them.
We have seen this before in American history. Walter Russell Mead describes one foreign policy era as Jacksonian. President Andrew Jackson, a populist, believed that the chief goal of the government should be the security and economic well-being of the American people. To Jackson, this meant increasing exports while discouraging imports; and limiting immigration because he believed it threatened familiar cultures and depressed wages. Jackson opposed intervention in other countries’ affairs, but he increased the size of the US Navy and reserved the right to take tough action against non-state actors, which in his day meant pirates. Jackson also insisted on defending the honor of the United States against insults. There was a reason that Donald Trump had a portrait of Andrew Jackson hung in the Oval Office.
For Trump, defending honor is more than a personal foible. In a full-page ad he took out in three newspapers in 1987, he wrote, “We must not let our great country be laughed at anymore. We must not let our people be ripped off anymore. We must make Japan, Saudi Arabia and others pay for the protection we provide as a deterrent to the nuclear threat.” Fast forward thirty years to a 2016 Washington Post video compilation of Trump’s frequent statements about countries “laughing at us” to see how singularly important this has remained to him. During Donald Trump’s time in office, foreign leaders could act dismissively toward US officials without consequence, but not toward Trump himself or toward the United States, which in his mind are coincident. He craves compliments to the point of repeating nice things Vladimir Putin said about him, and he does not forget insults. Trump’s world view is that of medieval European kings, who sized each other up before acting. Trump categorizes foreign leaders as “good guys,” “bad guys,” “friends,” or worst of all, as “losers.” It is all personal.
Donald Trump’s other core belief is that the world is made up of nations which are pitted against internationalist forces which are trying to ensnare them. Listen to his September 2017 speech to the United Nations General Assembly: “There can be no substitute for strong, sovereign, and independent nations, nations that are rooted in their histories and invested in their destinies. Americans will always choose independence and cooperation over global governance, control, and domination. I honor the right of every nation in this room to pursue its own customs, beliefs, and traditions.” International commitments and assertions of universal values are antithetical to Donald Trump’s foreign policy.
This understanding of Donald Trump’s foreign policy, plus experience with his four years in office suggests ways in which South Korea can deal with a second Trump Administration should he win the November election. One bit of good news is that Northeast Asia, being less “burdened” than Europe by regional institutions and obligations, is an amenable environment for Trump’s style of exclusively nation-to-nation diplomacy. There will also be a predictable consistency between Donald Trump’s and President Biden’s view of China as a high-technology adversary. Donald Trump may have little interest in defending Taiwan or in criticizing China’s human rights record, and he likely will establish a personal relationship with the authoritarian Xi Jinping, but his insistence on continued US military supremacy and trade surpluses will be the main features of his policy towards China.
Drawing tactical lessons from President Trump’s four years in office, Korea should: (1) treat a potential Trump Administration demands as opening bids rather than as final positions; (2) read Trump Administration policy pronouncements as first drafts rather than as final products; (3) not waste time appealing to treaty obligations, shared history, or diplomatic norms; (4) feel free to disagree but not to overtly criticize Trump or the United States; and, (5) take Trump’s unconventionality as an invitation to exercise its own creativity, including making unreasonable demands of its own, thus engaging in the “art of the deal.”
The history of American foreign policy suggests that it would be a mistake to assume that there will be a lasting return to a post-war “normal,” regardless of the outcome of the 2024 US election. The choice between Joe Biden and Donald Trump represents an imminent fork in the road for international relations, but with or without the potential short-term disruptions of Donald Trump, the United States in coming years likely will remain immersed in an ongoing and consequential debate over the limits and uses of American power. In the long sweep of US history, that has been the norm.
Mark Tokola is the Vice President of the Korea Economic Institute of America. The views expressed here are his own.
9. US ally issues ominous warning to North Korea
Are real kinetic and lethal provocations ahead? Not just missile tests and military training in the north.
A lot of people are shaken by the president's words here:
"Our military will maintain an ironclad readiness posture and firmly defend the Republic of Korea's freedom and the people's safety by responding immediately and overwhelmingly to any provocation,"
I think it is because we call everything north Korea does a provocation. And then when they do something (.e.,g missile test,)we do nothing except respond with rhetoric and calls for more sanctions. I think we should interpret president Yoon's words to mean that the ROK will respond to a kinetic and lethal strike that targets South Korean territory. This should not be interpreted as a response to every north Korean action. I had a journalist ask me about these words asking how can the US prevent the ROK from going to war? The concern is especially with the words about the military will respond first and then report. I do not think the ROK has any intention of going to war and I believe that in any situation there will be strong alliance consultation. But most importantly if the north strikes the ROK, the ROK military will respond in self defense immediately to prevent a further attack and protect the Korean people of the South, the unit, and the nation. It does not have time to report first and then act in self defense. The right of self defense is never denied. And I think this is what President Yoon is emphasizing and preparing the Korean people in the South for. And it may seem counterintuitive to some but an immediate self defense response is more like to prevent than to cause escalation because Kim Jogn Un does not want to escalate either because his focus in these actions is on supporting his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies and not on going to war (that is a future focus for which be is a working to establish the conditions for success, e.g., US forces driven off the peninsula).
US ally issues ominous warning to North Korea
Newsweek · by Aadil Brar · March 22, 2024
South Korea, a major U.S. ally, has issued an ominous warning to North Korea's growing provocative moves on the Korean Peninsula.
"Our military will maintain an ironclad readiness posture and firmly defend the Republic of Korea's freedom and the people's safety by responding immediately and overwhelmingly to any provocation," President Yoon Suk Yeol said during a memorial ceremony at the Navy's 2nd Fleet Command in Pyeongtaek, some 35 miles south of Seoul, local media reported Friday.
The declaration came as South Korea observed West Sea Defense Day, honoring the memory of 55 service members who sacrificed their lives defending the Northern Limit Line against North Korea from 2002 to 2010. This de facto maritime boundary has been a flashpoint of military tension between the two Koreas for decades.
Yoon's warning underscores escalating concerns over North Korea's missile tests and military advancements, despite international sanctions aimed at curtailing its weapons development.
As tensions simmer on the Korean Peninsula, Yoon's stark warning to North Korea serves as a reminder of the persistent threat posed by Pyongyang's military ambitions and the international efforts required to deter further provocations.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un recently oversaw artillery drills targeting "the enemy's capital" amid Seoul and Washington's joint Freedom Shield exercises, which were aimed at bolstering defenses against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. The Freedom Shield exercises, which seek to enhance deterrence, concluded the same day Kim inspected artillery drills.
A new investigation by the Japanese newspaper Nikkei Asian Review indicated that North Korea might circumvent these restrictions through covert collaborations with foreign researchers, particularly from China.
"Sixty-seven of these, or 60 percent, were funded by Chinese government affiliates. This suggests the Chinese government is, in effect, supporting North Korea's development of advanced technology in a wide range of fields," Nikkei reported in a special investigative report on Friday.
Newsweek contacted China's Embassy in Washington D.C. for comment.
Since 2022, North Korea has conducted more than 80 test launches of ballistic and other missiles. United Nations sanctions restrict technology transfers from other countries to North Korea, but the country's military development continues unabated.
These actions defy United Nations sanctions that prohibit technology transfers to the regime, underscoring the challenges in curbing North Korea's military capabilities.
This collaboration has raised alarms over the potential for North Korea to acquire advanced military technology under the guise of academic exchange.
A panel of experts under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been scrutinizing these activities, focusing on the involvement of Chinese researchers in what appears to be a strategic maneuver by North Korea to bolster its military prowess.
"In the U.N.'s September 2021 report on the implementation of North Korean sanctions, four pages discussed academic papers suspected of violating sanctions. All involve researchers affiliated with Chinese institutions," Nikkei reported.
The UNSC, in a new report on March 7, underscored North Korea's continued advancement of its nuclear weapons program.
"The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to flout Security Council
sanctions. It further developed nuclear weapons and produced nuclear fissile materials, although its last known nuclear test took place in 2017," the UNSC wrote.
This pool image distributed by the Sputnik agency shows North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un during his visit at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in the Amur region on September 13, 2023, ahead of planned talks with... This pool image distributed by the Sputnik agency shows North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un during his visit at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in the Amur region on September 13, 2023, ahead of planned talks with the Russian President that could lead to a weapons deal. South Korea has issued an ominous warning to North Korea as the hermit kingdom's nuclear program has come under focus again. VLADIMIR SMIRNOV/AFP via Getty
Notably, the report pointed to research in areas such as "composites" and "vibration analysis," which are crucial for developing materials and components used in missile technology. Nikkei said that this suspicion is backed by diagrams found in the papers that closely resemble missile components.
Newsweek · by Aadil Brar · March 22, 2024
10. The U.S. Election and South Korean Anxieties
Farewell to Scott Snyder at CFR. Congratulations to him on his new position as the head of KEI.
The U.S. Election and South Korean Anxieties
Blog Post by Scott A. Snyder
March 20, 2024 3:08 pm (EST)
cfr.org ·
Today is my last day at CFR, which marks the conclusion of over fifteen years of contributions to Asia Unbound. On April 1, I will begin my new role as President and CEO of the Korea Economic Institute of America, where I will be a contributor to their blog, entitled The Peninsula. During my time with CFR, I have been privileged to provide analysis on the impact of North Korea’s military development on Kim Jong Un’s foreign policy, the evolution of South Korea’s foreign policy, and new challenges to the U.S.-South Korea alliance, among other issues. Click here for the archive of my publications and contributions to the CFR website.
During my visit to Seoul last week, the early wrap-up of the Republican and Democratic primaries and the start of the U.S. general election campaign captured South Korean attention, alongside campaigning for their own National Assembly elections scheduled for April 10. The U.S. election may come to be viewed in South Korea as a watershed moment for the U.S.-South Korea relationship in part because the election campaign has begun to highlight potentially stark contrasts between Joe Biden and Donald Trump. These differences will impact the nature of security cooperation within the alliance, the direction of policy toward North Korea, and the implications of U.S. energy policy on South Korean investment in the United States.
But my main reflection following these conversations was the feeling that while the U.S. election result might spur new issues and even new tensions in the U.S.-South Korea relationship, the depth of cooperation that has been established within the alliance in recent years will prove to be resilient. In that context, South Korea has options and opportunities to pursue new forms of cooperation within the alliance regardless of the outcome of the U.S. election.
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This does not mean that South Korea welcomes the increased volatility generated by the vicissitudes of U.S. politics, especially against the backdrop of increasing uncertainties in the international political environment. Nor do I believe that South Korea embraces a return to transactionalism as a prominent feature of alliance management. Such an approach only serves to amplify South Korean anxieties about increasing political risks and the imposition of disproportionate costs to South Korea.
But South Korea under President Yoon Suk Yeol has offered more to the United States than was the case during the first Trump administration. A new U.S. administration will have to take account of South Korea’s greater commitment to the alliance, including its enhanced capacity as a technology partner, the expansion of the scope of alliance-based security cooperation to include the Indo-Pacific region and Ukraine, and its strengthened alignment with the United States and Japan in the context of rising geopolitical rivalry with China.
How to manage North Korea, and whether new gaps between the United States and South Korea emerge while pursuing North Korea policy, remains at the core of the alliance relationship. In light of the course that North Korea has taken in the aftermath of the failed 2019 U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi, it remains to be seen whether summitry between Trump and Kim can be revived, whether a second Biden administration would be able to draw North Korea into a dialogue, or how much worse a prospective deal with North Korea might be in 2025 compared to what was offered in 2019.
South Koreans will also pay close attention to the impact of the election on the United States as a hospitable environment for inward investment flows and job creation by South Korean companies that have sought to integrate themselves with the U.S. market. Most notable are South Korean private investments in clean technology within red states, which may ironically face setbacks in the event of a dramatic shift in U.S. energy policy imposes threats to the profitability of those investments.
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cfr.org · by Thomas J. Bollyky
11. The 2024 IC Annual Threat Assessment: Analytic Authority and Policy Relevance
There is no one better to interpret the IC assessment of the north Korean threat than Syd Seiler. He covers these topics succinctly:
North Korea: Consistency and Evolution
Negotiations Risk versus Gain:
The Changing World and Russia-DPRK Cooperation:
Understanding Pyongyang’s Near-Term Bad Behavior:
Pyongyang’s Longer-Term Bad Behavior:
The Humanitarian Conundrum:
Implications: For North Korea watchers, the 2024 ATA provides excellent baseline assessments useful for contextualizing North Korea’s near-term coercive behavior while forecasting dangerous futures for which to plan. Of course, like all assessments, they are not static and are always open to challenge. That is what makes a thorough review of this year’s ATA together with a review of past ATAs (some of which also include oral remarks by the various participants (see INTEL - Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community) such a useful investment.
The 2024 IC Annual Threat Assessment: Analytic Authority and Policy Relevance
csis.org · by Commentary by Sydney Seiler Published March 18, 2024
This past week Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Avril Haines and other leaders of the U.S. intelligence community (IC), including CIA director Bill Burns and DIA director Jeffrey Kruse, gave their annual threat assessment to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. While each of the agency directors delivered their own organization’s perspective on the key security issues the United States, the ODNI’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (ATA) stands as the definitive unclassified document produced by the efforts of the entire IC under the direction of the DNI since its initial publication by the first DNI, John Negroponte, back in 2006.
The ATA is a remarkable document by any measure. It brings together the top national security issues that the president and other senior civilian and military leaders ask the DNI and the larger IC to focus on in a single document. It reflects the ODNI’s efforts, particularly that of the National Intelligence Council and its regional and functional national intelligence officers, to bring together the most authoritative analytic assessments of the entire IC in a manner that is unpoliticized, inclusive, yet honest about dissenting opinions. Finally, it represents the efforts of the DNI to ensure unclassified assessments can be shared with the American people for whom the U.S. IC ultimately works. When one considers that these analytic lines drive policy thinking and formulation at the highest levels of U.S. government on the key issues on which leaders focus, one can immediately see both the analytic authority and policy relevance of this annual document.
North Korea: Consistency and Evolution
The portions of the ATA dedicated to North Korea speak for themselves and serve as a good reminder of the longer-term threats the United States should worry about beyond when the next missile launch or nuclear test might take place. Looking back through all the ATAs and their analytic lines about North Korea, it is impressive how successful the IC has been in assessing and predicting the behavior of North Korea over the years. Whether it was teeing up the importance of the uranium enrichment program during the Six-Party Talks in 2008, assessing the unlikelihood Kim Jong Un was prepared to put significant pieces of his nuclear program on the table during the period before and after the 2019 Hanoi talks, or North Korea’s intention to quantitatively and qualitatively expand its nuclear program to achieve strategic dominance over South Korea last year, the ATA and related analysis produced by the IC has allowed policymakers, negotiators, and warfighters have “decision advantage” on this most difficult issue.
The 2024 ATA validated and expanded assessments over the past few years on the continued qualitative and quantitative growth of North Korea’s nuclear and missile program, and the unlikelihood Kim Jong Un was prepared to negotiate seriously. The reasonable question any observer of North Korea policy asks is “What is potentially negotiable with Pyongyang, and is it worth the cost?” Would sanctions relief for a limited halt to nuclear testing and missile launches, for example, reduce the threat by denying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) research and development objectives, or increase the threat by providing a more conducive environment for North Korea to earn money, acquire sensitive technologies needed for WMD programs, and have more and better weapons? In this regard, the 2024 ATA’s language is useful: “North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will continue to pursue nuclear and conventional military capabilities that threaten the United States and its allies, which will enable periodic aggressive actions as he tries to reshape the regional security environment in his favor.”
Kim almost certainly has no intentions of negotiating away his nuclear program, which he perceives to be a guarantor of regime security and national pride. In addition, Kim probably hopes that he can use his bourgeoning defense ties with Russia to pursue his goal of achieving international acceptance as a nuclear power.
Negotiations Risk versus Gain: In this regard, the ATA notes Kim’s intent to continue to expand, not negotiate even limits on, his nuclear and missile programs. Such assessments here and in the past are not judgment calls on whether the United States should seek some type of dialogue with North Korea—such dire assessments did not discourage the United States from pursuing over the years the Agreed Framework, Six Party Talks, Leap Day Understanding, or progress during the Trump administration. These are policy decisions informed by the analysis. Such analysis did, and continues to do, allow policymakers to understand what was necessary to have authentic and credible negotiations, what the true scope and substance of the threat was, and what was worth paying what for.
The Changing World and Russia-DPRK Cooperation: The 2024 ATA touches on transformation in North Korea’s geopolitical environment both to capture the importance of improved Russia-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) relations and to touch on Kim Jong Un’s efforts to gain broader international acceptance of his nuclear-armed state status. The ATA noted that following meetings with both high-level Chinese and Russian delegations in late 2023, “North Korea probably has begun shipping munitions to Russia in support of the conflict with Ukraine in exchange for diplomatic, economic, and military concessions.” Unstated but understood is that Russia’s warming relations risks transfers of technology, know-how, and materials in support of North Korea’s nuclear, missile, and conventional programs. Not fully addressed, in part because it is an evolving dynamic, is China’s view on these developments and what type of pressure Beijing is willing to apply on Moscow and Pyongyang so as to prevent a dangerous exacerbation of tensions in northeast Asia.
Looking at the various commentaries written on this subject, there still needs to be more work done in getting greater specificity on the nature of the help North Korea is receiving, and what the implications are for North Korea’s capabilities that might give insight into its intentions. Is North Korea pursuing certain capabilities in a prioritized manner to achieve readiness necessary for specific types of military missions in the coming years, or is Pyongyang simply taking whatever it is Moscow is willing to offer?
Understanding Pyongyang’s Near-Term Bad Behavior: The ATA notes North Korea’s efforts through its threatening rhetoric, missile launches, and military demonstrations to counter advances in U.S., Japan, and South Korea security cooperation. Characterizing these as “coercive” actions by Pyongyang to seek to change U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK)-Japan behavior and “counteract South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol’s hardline policies toward the North,” is somewhat of an incomplete story: the precipitating cause of strengthened trilateral cooperation and South Korea’s “hardline” policy is, of course, North Korea’s pursuit over 30 years of a nuclear capability to intimidate, coerce, and subjugate South Korea while rejecting repeated efforts by Seoul and Washington to pursue reconciliation, détente, and normalization of relations. Thus, the cause of North Korea’s aggressive and threatening behavior over the last year or so comes from frustration its efforts to achieve dominance on the Korean Peninsula through its nuclear program continues to fail.
Pyongyang’s Longer-Term Bad Behavior: The ATA helpfully addresses how the U.S. IC sees overall DPRK military capabilities increasing by briefly listing the full range of unconventional and conventional capabilities North Korea has been pursuing over the past year in particular. This helps the United States look beyond missile launches episodically with a focus on near-term tension while ignoring the longer-term impact of enhancements to the Korean People’s Army and what intent may be behind the capabilities development. The ATA notes the following in its subsection on the military: “North Korea’s military will pose a serious threat to the United States and its allies by its investment in niche capabilities designed to provide Kim with options to deter outside intervention, offset enduring deficiencies in the country’s conventional forces, and advance his political objectives through coercion.”
The 2023 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), “North Korea: Scenarios for Leveraging Nuclear Weapons Through 2030,” looks forward a decade and touches on whether North Korea might have offensive, defensive, or coercive intentions in terms of leveraging its nuclear weapons. The 2024 ATA language mirrors the NIE’s assessment that North Korea’s advancing of political objectives through coercion poses a “serious threat” to the United States and its allies. When talking about the “deterrence” North Korea seeks in its WMD and conventional capabilities, it is of course important to remember that “deterring outside intervention” is not alluding to a scenario in which Pyongyang must respond to an out-of-the-blue attack by U.S.-ROK forces. Rather, the most immediate value to Kim Jong Un of his nuclear capabilities would be to deter U.S. or ROK response to North Korea coercive or revisionist actions. Additionally, deterring external intervention in a domestic instability scenario in which the regime’s survival appears to be threatened is another important role of these weapons.
The Humanitarian Conundrum: The ATA included a critical section that helps policymakers understand the current humanitarian challenge with North Korea: “While North Korea has managed to weather the effects of the pandemic and its extreme self-imposed isolation; in the long term, Kim will have to balance his desire for absolute state control with the negative impact on his country’s economic well-being. The Kim regime has prioritized recentralizing authority above its population and its economy with brutal crackdowns and serious mismanagement of agriculture that probably are worsening living conditions. The North Korean regime has long feared losing control over its people and is trying to roll back the relatively modest levels of private economic activity that have arisen since the 1990s and to ensure state domination over everyday life.”
Implied, if not stated directly, is that North Korea’s isolation is by deliberate design, and it is not sanctions per se that are the greatest obstacle to helping at risk populations in North Korea, or preventing Kim from taking the country and its economy down a different path. It is a regime priority to strengthen domestic control in the political, economic, and sociocultural realms to guard against perceived or potential future challenges to the regime and system. The benefits of international aid and assistance, or aggressive economic reform that might evolve into pressure for political reform down the road are simply risks the DPRK leadership is not willing to take at this time.
Implications: For North Korea watchers, the 2024 ATA provides excellent baseline assessments useful for contextualizing North Korea’s near-term coercive behavior while forecasting dangerous futures for which to plan. Of course, like all assessments, they are not static and are always open to challenge. That is what makes a thorough review of this year’s ATA together with a review of past ATAs (some of which also include oral remarks by the various participants (see INTEL - Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community) such a useful investment.
Sydney Seiler is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
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csis.org · by Commentary by Sydney Seiler Published March 18, 2024
12.What's behind South Korea's K-pop crisis?
And on the soft power front:
What's behind South Korea's K-pop crisis? – DW – 03/22/2024
The biggest names in K-pop have sought out new markets overseas. But they've left a hole in their home market that no other acts have been able to fill yet.
amp.dw.com
South Korea's hugely popular K-pop and the broader "hallyu" or "Korean Wave" genre of popular culture are experiencing something of a crisis, with domestic sales declining, new bands failing to whip up the same frenzy as their predecessors, and shares in the top K-pop agencies plummeting, suggesting that investors are jittery that the bubble may be about to burst.
The domestic slump coincides with those same performers — BlackPink, BTS, and the irascible Psy, who unleashed "Gangnam Style" on an unsuspecting world back in 2012 — growing in popularity on the international music scene.
The suggestion is that by attempting to broaden its appeal to a global audience — performing in foreign languages, topping the music charts in key markets around the world and being hyped on the chat shows — those bands have forgotten their roots and are in danger of alienating the very people who launched their careers.
Hallyu has, of course, undergone ups and downs in its popularity in the past but has always found a way to reinvent itself or evolve, analysts point out.
The challenge, they suggest, is for the industry to pull off that same trick to keep the home-grown fans coming back, buying the music and attending concerts.
Domestic versus international popularity
"I would suggest there are absolutely no signs of K-pop declining in popularity abroad and that it is difficult to directly correlate the stock market value of K-pop agencies with the popularity of their bands," said Park Saing-in, an economist at Seoul National University.
"But we can say that stock prices reflect the market's future expectations and while hit bands like BTS and BlackPink are still performing, it is fair to ask where their successors are," Park told DW.
In recent months, new band Baby Monster has failed to make a significant dent in the Melon Top 100, the South Korean ranking for music sales, while ITZY and NMIXX saw their latest releases sink dramatically in their second week, The Korean Times reported earlier this month.
Similarly, sales of the latest mini-album released by girl-group Le Sserafim shrank 20% in the second week of its release.
Talents seek K-pop careers in South Korea
02:23
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Uncertainty over the bankability of performers at home has hurt the four biggest management agencies, with stocks in YG Entertainment down by 15% in mid-March from the turn of the year. HYBE was down 19%, while industry giant SM Entertainment fell 22% and JYP Entertainment lost a worrying 33% of its share value in the same period, according to the ChosunIlbo newspaper.
In response to the slump in sales, which account for a major slice of total revenue, agencies are attempting to launch an array of new artistes, with YG Entertainment unveiling the boy-band Treasure, HYBE introducing TWS and Katseye and SM Entertainment pushing NCT Wish.
But it is not at all clear if any of these bands, plus others that are in the pipeline, have what it takes to take over the mantle of super-groups such as BTS.
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Scandal and disruption
Other problems have also dogged the industry, with the members of BTS presently carrying out their national service, forcing the band into a year-long hiatus, while other stars have been struck down by scandal.
Karina, a 24-year-old singer with girl-group Aespa, provoked a storm of protest from fans after it was revealed in late February that she was in a relationship with actor Lee Jae-wook.
Agencies encourage their performers not to have boyfriends or girlfriends as that destroys the daydream that they like to promote among fans that these idols are single, and therefore potentially available as a romantic partner, however fanciful that notion might be.
There is a sub-set of fanatical followers who turn up at concerts waving signs that read "my husband" or "my wife" – and revelations that the target of their affections is actually involved in a real relationship is a betrayal that too often leads to anger and accusations on social media.
Whatever the cause of consumers' anguish, that is being reflected in falling popularity at home.
"A lot of hallyu culture reached its peak during the COVID pandemic," said David Tizzard, an assistant professor of education at Seoul Women's University and a columnist for a Korean daily focusing on social affairs. Hallyu is a Chinese term that translates to “Korean Wave” and refers to Korean popular culture, everything from music to movies, food and gaming.
"With people stuck indoors or isolated from others, they turned to the high production values of South Korean music and dramas to get them through it," he said.
"Hallyu is also more than just content, there's a surrounding community and culture which draws people in. They can do more than just watch a drama, they can learn about the actors, read fan fiction, communicate on Twitter and Tik-Tok," he told DW.
K-pop: Scandals and tragedies
South Korea's K-pop industry is hugely famous across Asia. While K-pop artists enjoy massive popularity among their fans, a series of scandals and untimely celebrity deaths have put a spotlight on K-pop's ugly side.
Image: Getty Images
More and more deaths
Cha In-ha, a popular South Korean actor-singer, was found dead at his home on December 3, 2019. A police official told media that the cause of Cha's death was not immediately known. The 27-year-old celebrity made his film debut in 2017 and was part of the Surprise U band, which released two albums. There were no reports to suggest that Cha had been a target of personal attacks or cyberbullying.
Image: picture-alliance/Yonhap
Popularity and despair
Cha's death comes after another popular K-pop singer, Koo Hara, was found dead at her home last month. Koo, 28, had been subjected to personal attacks on social media about her relationships with men. South Korean police found a handwritten note in her home in which she expressed despair about life.
Image: picture-alliance/AP Photo/C. Sung-Jun
Sex and corruption
Lee Seung-hyun, a former member of K-pop group Big Bang, is currently on trial over allegations claiming he paid for prostitutes for foreign businessmen to attract investment to his business. The scandal involving Lee, who goes by the stage name Seungri, saw the shares of his band's agency, YG Entertainment, plummeting.
Image: picture- alliance/AP Photo/A. Young-Joon
Artists as bullies
In November 2019, K-pop stars Jung Joon-young and Choi Jong-hoon were jailed for assaulting drunk, unconscious women. The Seoul Central District Court sentenced singer-songwriter Jung to six years in prison and former boy band member Choi to a five-year term. Both men were members of online chat groups that shared secret sex videos and made jokes about drugging and raping women, the court said.
Image: Getty Images/AFP/J. Yeon-Je
Challenging conservatism
Choi Jin-ri, a former member of a girl group, died in an apparent suicide in October. Choi, popularly known as Sulli, was critical of cyberbullying. She was attacked on social media after she spoke out about not wearing a bra in the conservative K-pop industry.
Image: picture-alliance/Yonhap
K-pop managers
In June, Yang Hyun-suk, founder of YG Entertainment that manages Seungri and other K-pop artists, resigned as the company's chief producer in the aftermath of drug and sex scandals. In this picture, K-pop group 'Twice' poses on the red carpet of the 2016 Asia Artist Awards in Seoul in November 2016.
Image: Getty Images/AFP/Ed Jones
6 images1 | 6
Post-pandemic shift
When the pandemic ended, some people "moved on," Tizzard said.
"It served a purpose. It was a genuine culture, with visible high points of the movie 'Parasite' at the Oscars and Black Pink and BTS achieving great success, but now that culture has shifted and people are looking for something new."
Tizzard believes that while hallyu culture may not be as wide as it was a couple of years ago, it remains deep and "the fans who engage in it are still as passionate as they always were."
But Park is not convinced that will be enough.
"In the past, South Korea produced a lot of hit television dramas that were hugely popular here and around the world," he pointed out. "But that is no longer the case and the television sector has lost its momentum. The same thing can happen with Korean movies or music," Park added.
"I would say that K-pop appears to be structurally sound at the moment, but the future remains uncertain."
Edited by: Srinivas Mazumdaru
amp.dw.com
13. US denies reports of troops on China's doorstep
Semantics? Not permanent but rotational? We routinely rotate troops to Korea (including Special Forces and other SOF)
The choice of the photo and caption is interesting. See it at the link:( https://www.newsweek.com/us-denies-reports-troops-china-doorstep-1882160). Is Newsweek implying "strategic flexibility" from Camp Humphreys in Korea? Are they trying to say that US troops from Korea are in Taiwan? The irony is that the troops in Taiwan also routinely rotate to Korea for training from 1st SFG in Okinawa and Fort Lewis. Is Newsweek doing this on their own or was there a deliberate effort to send this possible message on "strategic flexibility?" Or am I a conspiracy theorist or is this simply coincidence. Keeping everyone guessing is a good thing. :-)
U.S. soldiers at Camp Humphreys on May 4, 2023, in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. Adm. John Aquilino denies report U.S. troops are stationed on Taiwan islands permanently. Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images
US denies reports of troops on China's doorstep
Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · March 22, 2024
The outgoing chief of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has denied a report that American troops are now being stationed in Taiwan permanently.
"The article was incorrect. There's no permanent stationing of U.S. forces there. We can talk in a classified setting for further evaluation, but that is just inherently inaccurate," Adm. John Aquilino told a House Armed Services Committee hearing Wednesday morning.
Taiwan's United Daily News (UDN) had reported that U.S. Army Special Forces, also known as Green Berets, were being permanently stationed on the self-ruled island, in line with the National Defense Authorization Act of 2023.
Specifically, they were allegedly conducting training with Taiwanese troops on Penghu and Kinmen—outlying island counties in the 90-mile-wide Taiwan Strait that separates Taiwan from China.
If true, the development would mark the first time in over four decades that U.S. forces were officially operating in Taiwan.
Newsweek reached out to the U.S. Department of Defense outside office hours.
Aquilino's statement was the first official denial of the alleged change, as the Department of Defense had previously declined to comment on specific reports.
The admiral seems to have contradicted a remark by Taiwanese Minister of Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng days earlier.
When asked by the press whether there were American boots on the ground on a permanent basis in Kinmen, Chiu appeared to confirm the news. "We can learn from each other to see what strengths we have," he responded, adding that the arrangement was "fixed."
In 2021, President Tsai Ing-wen revealed U.S. military instructors had been conducting occasional training with Taiwanese armed service members, confirming what had long been suspected.
U.S. soldiers at Camp Humphreys on May 4, 2023, in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. Adm. John Aquilino denies report U.S. troops are stationed on Taiwan islands permanently. U.S. soldiers at Camp Humphreys on May 4, 2023, in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. Adm. John Aquilino denies report U.S. troops are stationed on Taiwan islands permanently. Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images
Additionally, UDN previously reported there is also a U.S. military presence in the northeast city of Taoyuan on Taiwan's main island. These troops were said to be providing instruction on drone equipment Taiwan hopes to procure for its elite Airborne Special Service Company.
The U.S. military has not been officially in Taiwan for the long haul since it closed its last base in 1979 following the normalization of U.S.-China relations.
Though the U.S. switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the U.S. remains Taiwan's largest arms supplier.
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act requires Washington to provide Taipei with sufficient defensive weaponry and support to resist "force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."
China views democratic Taiwan as a rogue province and has vowed to eventually unify with it, through force if necessary, though the Chinese Communist Party government in Beijing has never ruled there.
"All indications point to the PLA (People's Liberation Army) meeting President Xi Jinping's directive to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, Aquilino said in a written statement ahead of a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing Thursday.
CIA Director William Joseph Burns Xi previously cited intelligence saying Xi had ordered his military to be prepared to take Taiwan by that year, though this does not mean China will attempt to do so.
The Indo-Pacific Command is a unified combatant command of the U.S. Department of Defense, responsible for military operations in the Indo-Pacific region.
Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · March 22, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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