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Quotes of the Day:
"The most common way people give up their power is by thinking they don’t have any."
–Alice Walker
"He that leaveth nothing to chance will do few things ill, but he will do very few things."
– George Savile Halifax
"But the greatest menace to our civilization today is the conflict between giant organized systems of self-righteousness - each system only too delighted to find that the other is wicked - each only too glad that the sins give it the pretext for still deeper hatred and animosity."
– Herbert Butterfield
1. How US forces can adopt Ukraine’s unconventional multidomain approach
2. U.S. Warned About Possible Moscow Attack Before Concert Hall Shooting
3. US had warned Russia ISIS was determined to attack
4. ISIS claims responsibility for attack in busy Moscow-area concert venue that left at least 40 dead
5. Russia's lies helped persuade Niger to eject US troops, AFRICOM says
6. Opinion | Don’t defund the fight against Russia and China’s disinformation
7. Army 4-Star Who Pressured Panel to Help Career of Unfit Officer Suspended, Facing Pentagon Investigation
8. Experts war-gamed what might happen if deepfakes disrupt the 2024 election. Things went sideways fast.
9. U.S. Gaza ceasefire resolution vetoed by China, Russia at UN Security Council
10. Death Toll in Attack at Russian Concert Hall Tops 110 as Suspects Detained
11. USS Eisenhower strike group locked in unrelenting fight at pace unseen in decades
12. Marine wargames offer a look at the future — and fuel dissent
13. Pentagon uses China-owned tutoring company that could weaponize military data, GOP lawmakers say
14. There is no ‘axis of evil’
15. EDITORIAL: Partners can help over-stretched US
16. The War Against Force Design 2030 Is Hurting the Marine Corps
17. Robots Are Entering the Ukraine Battlefield
18. US denies reports of troops on China's doorstep
19. A Defining Moment for America's Role in the World
20. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 22, 2024
21. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 22, 2024
22. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22, 2024
23. U.S. warnings preceded deadly Moscow attack; ISIS claims responsibility
24. Conservative Liberalism's Many Lives
25. Growing Lethal Drone Threat is a ‘Scourge,’ Says U.S. SOCOM Commander
26. A Transition to War for the Arsenals of Democracies
1. How US forces can adopt Ukraine’s unconventional multidomain approach
As all should know I am a great believer in the contributions that unconventional warfare can make to US national security when employed appropriately. I believe irregular warfare is the military contribution (the whole of the military and not SOF alone) to political warfare. Political warfare (George Kennan and Paul Smith) is the way I think we should characterize strategic competition in the gray zone of strategic competition below the threshold of war. And I believe that SOF's contribution to irregular warfare is through the application of its special warfare capabilities, primarily and broadly best described as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, psychological operations, and civil affairs operations. And yes, counterterrorism against violent extremist organizations is still a major component as well. (as is crisis response). And I would add that some elements of unconventional warfare (working through, by, and with indigenous forces to create dilemmas for our adversaries), psychological operations, civil affairs, special reconnaissance, and direct action will play important supporting roles to the joint force in large scale combat operations. Irregular warfare will always be an element of large scale combat operations in the rear area of friends and enemies, on the periphery, and in adjacent and offset locations that affect the parties to the conflict, and in post conflict operations.
However, I was recently reminded by a fellow retired Army Colonel that many of us seem to be applying the moniker of irregular and unconventional to everything. Is that what this essay is doing? Do we need "unconventional multi domain operations?" (I know I have stretched the author's words here but only to make a point). Drones and electronic warfare, cyber and long range precision strikes, do not belong solely as components of irregular warfare even if their "newness" (for those who are just discovering them) make them seem irregular or unconventional. They are tools of warfare across the spectrum of conflict, e..g., part of irregular warfare and large scale combat operations. "Newness" does not make something irregular or unconventional. In fact irregular and unconventional warfare are actually "old" but timeless as at the root they focus on operations in the human domain (which we have decided not to recognize as a distinct domain for various reasons but I digress and deflect).
But the author makes the most important point in his conclusion with which I agree. It is not either/or but both/and (conventional and unconventional). We can criticize joint and service doctrine but I think some of our recent doctrine and concepts (e.g., Joint Concept for Competing, Warfighting, Army Operations) are trying to make warfighting across the spectrum of conflict both/and and not either/or. But your mileage may vary.
Conclusion:
As a result, the United States needs to revisit key military concepts — including future iterations of the joint warfighting concept — with an eye toward combining conventional and unconventional approaches to competitive strategy. The concepts should provide a blueprint for future campaigns, including defense operations, defending U.S. critical infrastructure and countering foreign influence operations. These concepts should think as much about will and perception as they do exquisite battle networks while keeping an eye on cost curves. The next war will not be won by a salvo of hypersonic missiles alone.
How US forces can adopt Ukraine’s unconventional multidomain approach
Defense News · by Benjamin Jensen · March 22, 2024
For all the reports of battlefield setbacks along the front line, Ukraine is conducting a novel hybrid campaign combining long-range drone strikes and unconventional warfare. The question is: Could the United States similarly integrate conventional and unconventional operations in future campaigns?
Despite renewed interest in the 2020 National Defense Strategy, irregular warfare often remains focused on ideas linked to legacy Cold War constructs focused on overthrowing regimes using guerilla forces. Too often, analysts make a sharp distinction between conventional and unconventional conflict when in fact all war involves both forms working in tandem.
For Sun Tzu, it was the balance of the orthodox and unorthodox that kept an adversary off balance. Even Hannibal — the archetype at Cannae for conventional maneuver — actually used a mix of sabotage and political intrigue to set conditions for his seminal campaign.
French support to the American revolution involved both front companies supporting pirates attacking British shipping lanes as well as foreign material support.
During the Second World War, the British integrated the Special Operations Executive with its military campaigns while the Office of Strategic Services supported U.S. campaigns with morale operations designed to undermine enemy cohesion.
Faced with resource shortages and the brutal reality of 21st century trench warfare, Ukraine has found new asymmetries by combining elements of conventional and unconventional warfare. First, Ukraine is pioneering long-range, low-cost, one-way attack drones to strike strategic economic targets throughout the depth of Russia. The targets increasingly appear to be linked to critical infrastructure connected to Moscow’s oil and gas transit and processing facilities — a critical requirement for generating revenue for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war.
Over the month of March — and coinciding with the Russian presidential election — the Security Service of Ukraine has reportedly successfully attacked over 10 oil refineries, disrupting as much as 12% of Russia’s oil processing capacity, often using salvos of 35 drones each costing less than $100,000. In other words, Ukraine likely spent only $40 million to damage up to $40 billion worth of Russian critical infrastructure.
These conventional strikes focused on economic centers of gravity most likely to hold the regime at risk. The attacks also forced Russia to pull additional air defenses back to protect its critical infrastructure, setting conditions for front-line air operations by Ukraine as new equipment, like F-16 fighter jets, starts to arrive this summer. Of note, the activities coincide with increased targeting of Russian air defenses since the summer along the front. In other words, attacking Russian critical infrastructure achieves multiple objectives at low costs to Ukraine and sets conditions for future operations.
Second, Ukraine is combining unconventional warfare with these long-range precision strikes. In the lead-up to the election, there was been an increase in proxy raids into Russian border areas, cyberattacks and ballot sabotage, alongside calls for a wider symbolic uprising.
The surge of activity surrounding the election fits with broader trends in the conflict. Over the last two years these measures have included running deepfakes and disrupting Putin’s speeches. This approach reflects time-tested unconventional warfare campaigns that create conditions likely to foster local acts of sabotage, work stoppages and protests.
Ukraine isn’t just attacking the Kremlin’s wallet by hitting its economic center of gravity; Kyiv is attacking the mind of the Russian population and amplifying the stark contrasts between regime rhetoric and reality lived by ordinary people.
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Bolster Ukraine’s irregular warfare tactics with Western tech
Ukraine could exploit Russian weaknesses with improved integration of ISR assets linked to longer-range fires.
By Philip Wasielewski and William Courtney
This approach stands in contrast to U.S. joint and service concepts that preface converging multidomain effects and downplay the role of people and perception. While space and cyber domains play critical roles, there is no discussion about a human domain or the contest of wills at the heart of every conflict. The focus instead is on disrupting enemy battle networks and destroying high-value targets at range, not on how to leverage discontent, compound morale issues or undermine cohesion.
As a result, special forces tends to overemphasize direct action and special reconnaissance. These conventional approaches tend to discount the utility of information warfare and cyber operations capable of setting conditions for protests and social unrest — which are more likely to threaten autocratic regimes than long-range precision strikes.
It is also unclear whether the United States has the necessary capabilities and concepts to defeat a hybrid campaign attacking its critical infrastructure and social cohesion. China has already demonstrated an interest in holding American critical infrastructure at risk through cyber operations.
Furthermore, most U.S. critical infrastructure nodes — from key telecommunications relays connecting sea cables and satellites to oil and gas — are not protected by air defenses capable of defeating a complex drone attack.
Lastly, Russia has shown the world a playbook for how to create discord online through a mix of computational propaganda and cyber operations. The United States still hasn’t found a sufficient defense against these influence operations.
As a result, the United States needs to revisit key military concepts — including future iterations of the joint warfighting concept — with an eye toward combining conventional and unconventional approaches to competitive strategy. The concepts should provide a blueprint for future campaigns, including defense operations, defending U.S. critical infrastructure and countering foreign influence operations. These concepts should think as much about will and perception as they do exquisite battle networks while keeping an eye on cost curves. The next war will not be won by a salvo of hypersonic missiles alone.
Benjamin Jensen is a senior fellow in the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. He is also a professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University’s School of Advanced Warfighting. The views expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect an official position of the U.S. government.
2. U.S. Warned About Possible Moscow Attack Before Concert Hall Shooting
Duty to warn?
U.S. Warned About Possible Moscow Attack Before Concert Hall Shooting
Pro-Moscow forces had dismissed the alert as an attempt to scare Russians.
The U.S. Embassy in Moscow issued a warning about possible attacks on large gatherings, including concerts, on March 7.Credit...Tatyana Makeyeva/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
By Julian E. Barnes, Constant Méheut and Anton Troianovski
The U.S. Embassy in Moscow issued a security alert on March 7, warning that its personnel were “monitoring reports that extremists have imminent plans to target large gatherings in Moscow, to include concerts.” The statement warned Americans that an attack could take place in the next 48 hours.
The warning was related to the attack on Friday, according to people briefed on the matter. But it was not related to possible Ukrainian sabotage, American officials said, adding that the State Department would not have used the word “extremists” to warn about actions ordered from Kyiv.
Pro-Kremlin voices immediately seized on the U.S. Embassy’s warning to paint America as trying to scare Russians.
America officials are worried that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia could seek to falsely blame Ukraine for the attack, putting pressure on Western governments to identify who they think may be responsible. Mr. Putin frequently twists events, even tragic ones, to fit his public narrative. And he has been quick to accuse Ukraine of acts of terrorism to justify his invasion of the country.
U.S. officials said Mr. Putin could do that again after Friday’s attack, seeking to use the loss of life to undermine support for Ukraine both domestically and around the world.
On March 19, the Russian leader called the U.S. Embassy statement “obvious blackmail” made with “the intention to intimidate and destabilize our society.” But he had yet to comment directly on the attack Friday.
John Kirby, a spokesman for President Biden’s National Security Council, told reporters on Friday that the White House had “no indication at this time that Ukraine or Ukrainians were involved.” He added: “We’re taking a look at it. But I would disabuse you at this early hour of any connection to Ukraine.”
“Our thoughts obviously are going to be with the victims of this terrible, terrible shooting attack,” he also said.
Russia’s foreign ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, said however, according to Reuters, “On what basis do officials in Washington draw any conclusions in the midst of a tragedy about someone’s innocence?” She added that if Washington had information, it should be shared.
Mykhailo Podolyak, a top adviser to Ukraine’s presidential office, said in a video statement that “Ukraine has absolutely nothing to do” with the attack.
Aishvarya Kavi contributed reporting.
Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes
Constant Méheut reports on the war in Ukraine, including battlefield developments, attacks on civilian centers and how the war is affecting its people. More about Constant Méheut
Anton Troianovski is the Moscow bureau chief for The Times. He writes about Russia, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. More about Anton Troianovski
3. US had warned Russia ISIS was determined to attack
Excerpts:
Isis has claimed responsibility for the attack.
Experts said the scale of the carnage – some of which was captured in video footage obtained by CNN showing crowds of people cowering behind cushioned seats as gunshots echoed in the vast hall – would be deeply embarrassing for the Russian leader, who had championed a message of national security just a week earlier when winning the country’s stage-managed election.
Not only had Russian intelligence services failed to prevent the attack, they said, but Putin had failed to heed warnings from the United States that extremists were plotting to target Moscow.
Earlier this month, the US embassy in Russia had said it was “monitoring reports that extremists have imminent plans to target large gatherings in Moscow,” including concerts, and it warned US citizens to avoid such places.
US had warned Russia ISIS was determined to attack | CNN
CNN · by Mary Kay Mallonee, Katherine Grise, Chris Lau · March 23, 2024
Vehicles of Russian emergency services near the burning Crocus City Hall concert venue following the attack on March 22.
Maxim Shemetov/Reuters
CNN —
The US warned Moscow that ISIS militants were determined to target Russia in the days before assailants stormed the Crocus City Hall in an attack that killed scores of people, but President Vladimir Putin rejected the advice as “provocative.”
Gunmen stormed the concert hall near Moscow on Friday, opening fire and throwing an incendiary device in the worst terrorist attack on the Russian capital in decades.
Isis has claimed responsibility for the attack.
Experts said the scale of the carnage – some of which was captured in video footage obtained by CNN showing crowds of people cowering behind cushioned seats as gunshots echoed in the vast hall – would be deeply embarrassing for the Russian leader, who had championed a message of national security just a week earlier when winning the country’s stage-managed election.
Not only had Russian intelligence services failed to prevent the attack, they said, but Putin had failed to heed warnings from the United States that extremists were plotting to target Moscow.
Earlier this month, the US embassy in Russia had said it was “monitoring reports that extremists have imminent plans to target large gatherings in Moscow,” including concerts, and it warned US citizens to avoid such places.
US National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson said the US government had “shared this information with Russian authorities in accordance with its longstanding ‘duty to warn’ policy.”
But in a speech Tuesday, Putin had blasted the American warnings as “provocative,” saying “these actions resemble outright blackmail and the intention to intimidate and destabilize our society.”
That stance came despite Russian authorities having reported several ISIS-related incidents within the past month.
The state-run RIA Novosti reported on March 3 that six ISIS members were killed in a counter-terrorist operation in the Ingush Karabulak; on March 7, it said security services had uncovered and “neutralized” a cell of the banned organization Vilayat Khorasan in the Kaluga region, whose members were planning an attack on a synagogue in Moscow; and on March 20, it said the commander of an ISIS combat group had been detained.
Two sources familiar with the American information said that since November there had been a steady stream of intelligence that ISIS-K – an affiliate of ISIS that is active in Afghanistan and the surrounding region – was determined to attack Russia.
Moscow has intervened tellingly in Syria’s civil war, to the support of President Bashar al-Assad and against ISIS.
ISIS-K “sees Russia as being complicit in activities that regularly oppress Muslims,” Michael Kugelman of the Washington-based Wilson Center said, as quoted by Reuters.
He added that the group also counts as members a number of Central Asian militants, who hold their own grievances against Moscow.
A US official said Friday that Washington had no reason to doubt ISIS’ claim that it was responsible for the latest attack.
On Friday, following reports of the Crocus City Hall attack, the US embassy advised US citizens not to travel to Russia.
CNN · by Mary Kay Mallonee, Katherine Grise, Chris Lau · March 23, 2024
4. ISIS claims responsibility for attack in busy Moscow-area concert venue that left at least 40 dead
This is why the Intelligence Community and USSOCOM cannot give up focus on violent extremist organizations and counter terrorism. They have not gone away. Terrorism remains a global scourge.
Excerpts:
International response
Ukraine, which has been embroiled in a war with Russia for more than two years, denied any involvement in the attack.
“Ukraine has never resorted to the use of terrorist methods,” Ukrainian presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak wrote, in part, in a post on X. He said he believed Russia would use the attack to justify the ongoing conflict and scale up operations as part of “military propaganda” in Ukraine.
United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres late Friday condemned “in the strongest possible terms today’s terrorist attack” according to a statement released by his deputy spokesperson, Farhan Haq.
“The secretary-general conveys his deep condolences to the bereaved families and the people and the government of the Russian Federation. He wishes those injured a speedy recovery,” the statement said.
In a separate statement, the UN Security Council called the attack “heinous and cowardly.”
Chinese leader Xi Jinping offered his condolences to Putin on Saturday “over the serious terrorist attack that caused heavy casualties,” according to a report from Chinese state media.
French President Emmanuel Macron also condemned the attack. “France expresses its solidarity with the victims, their loved ones and all the Russian people,” the Elysee Palace said, AFP and Reuters reported.
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman both also denounced the attack.
ISIS claims responsibility for attack in busy Moscow-area concert venue that left at least 40 dead | CNN
By Mariya Knight, Anna Chernova and Darya Tarasova, CNN
6 minute read
Updated 2:38 AM EDT, Sat March 23, 2024
CNN · March 22, 2024
Video shows scene of shooting at concert hall near Moscow
01:00 - Source: CNN
CNN —
ISIS has claimed responsibility for an attack at a popular concert hall complex near Moscow Friday after assailants stormed the venue with guns and incendiary devices, killing at least 60 people and injuring 145.
The terror group took responsibility for the attack in a short statement published by ISIS-affiliated news agency Amaq on Telegram on Friday. It did not provide evidence to support the claim.
Video footage from the Crocus City Hall shows the vast complex, which is home to both the music hall and a shopping center, on fire with smoke billowing into the air. State-run RIA Novosti reported the armed individuals “opened fire with automatic weapons” and “threw a grenade or an incendiary bomb, which started a fire.” They then “allegedly fled in a white Renault car,” the news agency said.
State media Russia 24 reported the roof of the venue has partially collapsed.
The fire had been brought largely under control more than six hours later. “There are still some pockets of fire, but the fire has been mostly eliminated,” Moscow governor Andrey Vorobyov said on Telegram.
The deadliest terror attack on Moscow in decades, Friday’s assault came less than a week after President Vladimir Putin won a stage-managed election by an overwhelming majority to secure another term in office, tightening his grip on the country he has ruled since the turn of the century.
With attention focused on the country’s war with neighboring Ukraine, Putin had trumpeted a message of national security before Russians went to the polls.
The carnage broke out before a concert by the band Picnic, according to Russia 24.
“Unidentified people in camouflage broke into Crocus City Hall and started shooting before the start of the concert,” the Prosecutor General’s Office said, cited by TASS.
This screen grab from video shows armed men inside the Crocus City Hall concert venue in Russia's Moscow region. CNN can not verify whether these are armed attackers or Russian authorities moving in.
Social media
Video footage showed panic as the attack unfolded, with crowds of people huddling together, screaming and ducking behind cushioned seats as gunshots started echoing in the vast hall. One group sheltering next to a large wall of windows outside the concert venue were forced to break them to escape the gunfire, video obtained by CNN shows.
Footage geolocated by CNN shows an armed individual starting at least one fire inside the venue. The individual is seen carrying something in their hand and, as they walk off-screen, a bright flash of light from a large flame is seen in the video.
A SWAT team was called to the area and more than 70 ambulance teams and doctors assisted victims.
One hundred and forty-five people have been hospitalized, TASS reported. Sixty people are in a “serious condition.”
According to the Kremlin, Putin was informed about the attack and is being kept updated on measures on the ground.
The president on Saturday wished those injured in the attack a speedy recovery, the state-run RIA-Novosti news agency said. He also “conveyed his gratitude to the doctors,” RIA added.
Around 100 people were evacuated from the building by firefighters, TASS reported.
Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin called the attack a “terrible tragedy.”
“My condolences to the loved ones of the victims. I gave orders to provide all necessary assistance to everyone who suffered during the incident,” Sobyanin said in a statement.
Sobyanin said on Telegram that he was canceling all sports, cultural and other public events in Moscow this weekend.
Picnic’s manager told state media that the performers were unharmed.
Shaman, the band’s singer, said he would pay for the funerals of the victims and treatment for those injured.
“We are all one big family. And in a family there is no such thing as somebody else’s grief,” the singer, known for his nationalistic views, said in a video posted on the Russian social media network Vkontakte to his more than 600,000 followers.
“My people, any troubles and misfortunes have always united our country. They have made Russia tougher and stronger. It will not be possible to frighten and break us this time either.”
ISIS claims responsibility for Moscow attack that killed 40
02:51 - Source: CNN
US had warned of potential attack
Earlier this month, the US embassy in Russia said it was “monitoring reports that extremists have imminent plans to target large gatherings in Moscow,” including concerts. The embassy warned US citizens to avoid large gatherings. On Friday, following reports of the Crocus City Hall attack, it advised US citizens not to travel to Russia.
Starting in November, there has been a steady stream of intelligence that ISIS-K was determined to attack in Russia, according to two sources familiar with the information.
ISIS-K stands for ISIS-Khorasan, the terror organization’s affiliate that is active in Afghanistan and the surrounding region.
US National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson said the US government had had information about a planned terrorist attack in Moscow – potentially targeting large gatherings, to include concerts – and that this is what prompted the State Department to issue the public advisory.
“The US government also shared this information with Russian authorities in accordance with its longstanding ‘duty to warn’ policy,” Watson said.
In a speech Tuesday, Putin had blasted the American warnings as “provocative,” saying “these actions resemble outright blackmail and the intention to intimidate and destabilize our society.”
In March alone, Russian authorities had thwarted several ISIS-related incidents, according to RIA. On March 3, RIA reported that six ISIS members were killed in a counter-terrorist operation in the Ingush Karabulak; on March 7, it said security services had uncovered and “neutralized” a cell of the banned organization Vilayat Khorasan in the Kaluga region, whose members were planning an attack on a synagogue in Moscow; and on March 20, it said the commander of an ISIS combat group had been detained.
A US official said Friday that Washington had no reason to doubt ISIS’ claim that it was responsible for the latest attack.
International response
Ukraine, which has been embroiled in a war with Russia for more than two years, denied any involvement in the attack.
“Ukraine has never resorted to the use of terrorist methods,” Ukrainian presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak wrote, in part, in a post on X. He said he believed Russia would use the attack to justify the ongoing conflict and scale up operations as part of “military propaganda” in Ukraine.
United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres late Friday condemned “in the strongest possible terms today’s terrorist attack” according to a statement released by his deputy spokesperson, Farhan Haq.
“The secretary-general conveys his deep condolences to the bereaved families and the people and the government of the Russian Federation. He wishes those injured a speedy recovery,” the statement said.
In a separate statement, the UN Security Council called the attack “heinous and cowardly.”
Chinese leader Xi Jinping offered his condolences to Putin on Saturday “over the serious terrorist attack that caused heavy casualties,” according to a report from Chinese state media.
French President Emmanuel Macron also condemned the attack. “France expresses its solidarity with the victims, their loved ones and all the Russian people,” the Elysee Palace said, AFP and Reuters reported.
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman both also denounced the attack.
CNN’s Eva Rothenberg, Paul Murphy and Hannah Strange contributed to this reporting.
CNN · March 22, 2024
5. Russia's lies helped persuade Niger to eject US troops, AFRICOM says
I was at a briefing recently and a senior US officer asked who is in charge of the nation's information efforts. I think it was meant to be a rhetorical question but I couldn't help myself and I blurted out "No one."
Show me your people and funding and I will show you your priorities. But the irony is in information operations you do not require large amounts of funding if you have good organizations, sound campaign plans, effective and efficient processes, and most of all, strong national leadership that prioritizes information efforts.
Russia's lies helped persuade Niger to eject US troops, AFRICOM says
The U.S. needs to beef up its own counter-disinformation efforts, Gen. Langley tells lawmakers.
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
Gen. Michael Langley, commander of U.S. Africa Command, arrives for a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in 2023. Tom Williams / CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images
The U.S. needs to beef up its own counter-disinformation efforts, Gen. Langley tells lawmakers.
By Patrick Tucker
Science & Technology Editor, Defense One
March 21, 2024
Why did Niger, a country the United States considered a safe ally in Africa just last year, suddenly elect to kick the U.S. military out of the country following a coup? Russian disinformation efforts in the region played a huge role, according to Gen. Michael Langley, the head of U.S. Africa Command.
“The Russian Federation had their playbook. They had their passing game through their disinformation,” he told the House Armed Services Committee on Thursday. “That’s why I have asked for more capabilities in the State Department from their Global Engagement Center and also in our information operations in the military.”
One example of just how quick and aggressive Russian disinformation actors are in the region: last April, Russian mercenaries with the Wagner Group buried several bodies near a base French forces had just occupied—so the Russians could launch a social media campaign that blamed French forces.
“That’s how savvy they are,” Langley said. “We do need to engage with other countries to increase their partnership and capacity. We need to take the disinformation campaign, we need to hit it front and center,” he said.
The U.S. State Department’s Global Engagement Center, or GEC, has a $61 million budget, which is relatively modest compared to the more than $1.5 billion Russia spends on global information campaigns each year. And the GEC may be in trouble—according to an oped in the Washington Post, the center’s budget requires congressional reauthorization by the end of the year to avoid shuttering altogether. “A measure has cleared the Senate, but the Republican-controlled House has refused to follow suit, meaning the program could lapse,” the Post’s editorial board wrote.
The United States military has a much smaller but very active information warfare capability within U.S. Army special operations forces. But that, too, faces potential cuts.
6. Opinion | Don’t defund the fight against Russia and China’s disinformation
Per my previous comment about who is in charge. Is it the GEC? (Global Engagement Center). If so, can you point to an integrated, orchestrated, synchronized, whole of government information campaign? I am sure someone will respond that surely there is but it is classified so we cannot tell you.
Opinion | Don’t defund the fight against Russia and China’s disinformation
By the Editorial Board
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March 19, 2024 at 7:00 a.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Editorial Board · March 19, 2024
Two authoritarian U.S. adversaries, Russia and China, are carrying out what some have called a “hidden war on democracy,” attempting to shape global opinion using deception and false narratives. By one estimate, Russia spends about $1.5 billion a year and China $7 billion or more annually to influence overseas audiences. We’ve argued before that the United States should resist their information warfare. Unfortunately, House Republicans are threatening to eliminate a key U.S. agency that does so.
The Global Engagement Center (GEC), headquartered at the State Department, deploys a $61 million budget and a staff of 125 to counter disinformation from Russia, China, Iran and terrorist organizations. It was founded as part of the fight against terrorist messaging. It is due for congressional reauthorization by the end of this year. A measure has cleared the Senate, but the Republican-controlled House has refused to follow suit, meaning the program could lapse.
The GEC efforts to preempt disinformation have been promising. Last month, the GEC exposed an attempt by Russia’s security services to undercut U.S. influence in Africa through a new disinformation agency, called African Initiative. According to the center, this agency intended to spread tales about the outbreak of a mosquito-borne viral disease, to be followed by conspiracy theories about Western pharmaceutical corporations, health-focused philanthropic efforts, and the spread of disease in West and East Africa. Even before this, Russia had an active campaign in Moscow to claim, falsely, that the United States was testing biological weapons in Ukraine. The claim was based on twisted information about legitimate public health projects in Ukraine sponsored by the United States to fight disease. Russia’s untruths were picked up and widely disseminated by China, too.
The African Initiative was going to use social media and place articles in the news. It recruited staff from the enterprises of mercenary chieftain Yevgeniy Prigozhin, who started a Russian troll farm that attempted to disrupt the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Mr. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group had extensive contracts in Africa before his death in a suspicious plane crash in Russia.
The GEC got ahead and labeled the African Initiative as a Russian creation, thus preventing many from believing untruths that could have discouraged them from seeking legitimate health care. This fall, the GEC also unmasked a Russian effort in Latin America. The organization exposed howpast Russian officials were launching a disinformation campaign to convince “Latin American audiences that Russia’s war against Ukraine is just” and to get across “Russia’s broader false narrative that it is a champion against neocolonialization.”
Conservatives in Congress and elsewhere have complained that the center is part of an effort to muffle conservative speech and ideas in the United States. They have pointed to the GEC’s funding of a London-based group, the Global Disinformation Index (GDI), in late 2021. That $100,000 grant helped to expand a disinformation tool in Asia. An entirely unrelated GDI project, published in December 2022, had compiled a list of U.S. media outlets likely to be susceptible to disinformation. The GEC and GDI projects were quite separate, but conservatives charged the GEC with underwriting a blacklist of conservative voices. Elon Musk wrote on his platform X, “The worst offender in U.S. government censorship & media manipulation is an obscure agency called GEC.”
Two news organizations on the list, the Federalist and the Daily Wire, have filed suit against the GEC, saying the GEC has infringed on their First Amendment rights by “actively intervening in the news-media market to render disfavored press outlets unprofitable by funding the infrastructure, development, and marketing and promotion of censorship technology and private censorship enterprises to covertly suppress speech.” This is misguided. The center does not look at what goes on inside the United States — all its programs are for fighting disinformation abroad. The GEC also instructs its grantees not to work in the United States.
The House Republicans who are taking down the GEC could, more constructively, reauthorize the program with legislative language that would ban any operations in the United States. By eliminating the program altogether, they would deny the United States a vital tool in a contest for hearts and minds around the world — while rewarding the purveyors of lies.
The Washington Post · by Editorial Board · March 19, 2024
7. Army 4-Star Who Pressured Panel to Help Career of Unfit Officer Suspended, Facing Pentagon Investigation
The Army must and apparently is moving quickly on this issue to ensure the integrity of the promotion/selection system.
Army 4-Star Who Pressured Panel to Help Career of Unfit Officer Suspended, Facing Pentagon Investigation
military.com · by Steve Beynon · March 22, 2024
Army Secretary Christine Wormuth suspended one of the service's top generals Friday after Military.com reporting revealed he may have inappropriately intervened in a service assessment panel's work in an attempt to help the career of a subordinate officer who was deemed unfit for command.
The case of Gen. Charles Hamilton, who oversees Army Materiel Command, was also referred by the Army to the Defense Department inspector general for investigation -- a rare move to take against a seasoned four-star general.
"This week, Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth became aware of credible allegations Gen. Charles Hamilton, commanding general of Army Materiel Command (AMC), interfered in the Army's Command Assessment Program (CAP) process last fall," Col. Randee Farrell, a spokesperson for Wormuth, told Military.com in a statement, adding that Hamilton has been suspended pending the outcome of the Pentagon's and any other "subsequent" investigations.
Lt. Gen. Chris Mohan, deputy commander of AMC, will serve in Hamilton's place for the time being.
Military.com's investigation found that Hamilton used what one general with direct knowledge of the situation called a "pressure campaign" aimed at influencing the Army Command Assessment Program panel in support of a female lieutenant colonel who was seeking a battalion command post. The assessment process is specifically designed to eliminate outside influence.
Despite Hamilton's efforts, which included contacting panel members, the assessment process, which is designed to validate whether an officer is fit for command, found the lieutenant colonel unqualified due to ineffective and counterproductive leadership.
However, Hamilton's subordinate officer was later placed on a selection list for command despite rejection by two assessment panels.
Following Military.com's reporting this week on Hamilton's actions, she will no longer be a candidate to take command and will have to recompete next year. The lieutenant colonel's name is being withheld because Military.com found no evidence of wrongdoing on her part.
For its investigation, Military.com interviewed key Army staff and officials, including general officers, who were directly familiar with the lieutenant colonel's command assessment panels. Hamilton's conduct was viewed as so out of line that the director of the assessment panel, Col. Robert O'Brien, penned a memo with a detailed timeline of events, which the publication also reviewed. O'Brien did not return requests for comment.
Hamilton's lobbying campaign
It started with closed-door meetings between Hamilton and staff with the Army's Command Assessment Program, or CAP, in Washington, D.C., at the annual Association of the United States Army convention. The event is a massive gathering of the who's who of the service held every October.
The lieutenant colonel's first Battalion Commander Assessment Program, or BCAP, panel was held later that month.
BCAP includes a series of assessments of a lieutenant colonel's command potential, including a physical fitness test, examinations of communications skills, psychological evaluations, and a panel of five randomly selected generals doing a blind interview with the candidate.
The assessment panelists are not supposed to know the candidate's name and very little about their background. The candidate is also behind a curtain, the idea being that the service wants to take every measure possible to prevent bias. Panelists are also selected just hours before the panel, in an effort to prevent lobbying.
On Oct. 30, the lieutenant colonel had her BCAP assessment panel at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The process was monitored by Hamilton at his request, a move officials explained is technically allowed but bizarre. By a vote of 0-5, the five panel members voted that the lieutenant colonel be uncertified for command, citing "counterproductive leadership."
Hamilton took issue with the psychologist's characterization of the lieutenant colonel's mental state ahead of the panel, arguing it was "too negative." He demanded a second panel, an unheard-of move that is against the Army's own rules, which dictate that a failed BCAP candidate has to wait a year for another chance.
O'Brien granted the re-panel "solely based" on Hamilton's request, according to his own memo. However, the lieutenant colonel was told by Col. Townley Hedrick, Command Assessment Program deputy chief of staff, that she was being re-paneled due to "technical issues." Hamilton later called Hedrick, thanking him for "playing a part."
The re-panel was rescheduled for Nov. 1, two days after her first failed assessment
In the lead-up to that panel, Hamilton called at least three of the five panel members, who are intended to be anonymous to avoid outside influence -- Maj. Gens. Jeth Rey, Trevor Bredenkamp and Hope Rampy -- to discuss the lieutenant colonel, multiple sources with direct knowledge of the situation told Military.com. It's unclear whether Hamilton called the other two panel members or attempted to make contact.
Throughout the entire day of the second panel, starting in the early morning until 9 p.m., Hamilton sent a barrage of text messages to O'Brien and Hedrick asking about the results, according to O'Brien's memo. The second panel wrapped up at noon, and the lieutenant colonel was again found unfit for command, this time in a 2-3 vote.
It's unclear when those results were shared with Hamilton, or if Command Assessment Program staff ever responded to him.
BCAP was supposed to be clean
The news of Hamilton's attempts to subvert the service's command selection process roiled the Army from the rank and file to senior staff at the Pentagon, with one senior Army official characterizing Hamilton's conduct to Military.com as a "cartoonish example" of corrupt judgment.
After the investigation of Hamilton, the service says it will review its command assessment process.
"Following the completion of the [inspector general's] work, the Army will undertake an additional review of CAP itself and the entirety of the command selection process to determine what additional steps may be needed to ensure maximum fairness and integrity in the command selection process," Farrell added.
Army officials have described to Military.com that the service went through a painstakingly detailed process to assure BCAP was about as impenetrable from manipulation as possible.
Most of those officials, including half a dozen senior officers interviewed, contend that BCAP is still a solid way to find officers, but that Hamilton's conduct revealed weaknesses in the process.
"A perfect hiring process doesn't exist, but this is the best we have and we have a lot of safeguards here," one general explained to Military.com on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media on the subject. "But this whole event shows we have work to do. I'm still a believer [in BCAP]. I want it to survive, but we certainly need to look at how we can prevent this from happening again."
BCAP started in 2020 and was largely seen across the force as the most significant improvement to how the Army selects battalion commanders. Posts at that level are among the most consequential in the service, where the Pentagon's big picture and the management of front-line troops meet.
"We spend more time and more money on selecting a private to be in [75th] Ranger Regiment than we do selecting what I would argue is one of the most consequential leadership positions in the Army, our battalion commanders," Gen. James McConville, who at the time was the service's top officer, said during the development of the program.
Meanwhile, generals are rarely disciplined in meaningful ways, let alone publicly. However, Wormuth has fired senior officers for smaller offenses.
Among the most recent four-stars to be relieved was Gen. Kevin Byrnes in 2005. He led the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC. The New York Times reported at the time that the firing was due to a consensual adulterous affair.
Gen. Stanley McChrystal effectively had a forced resignation in 2010 after a Rolling Stone article painted a picture of the general and his top aides making snide comments about then-Vice President Joe Biden and other top Obama administration officials.
"How senior leaders respond will be very telling," another general told Military.com. "If Hamilton is guilty, he should be relieved and retired under grade reduction."
military.com · by Steve Beynon · March 22, 2024
8. Experts war-gamed what might happen if deepfakes disrupt the 2024 election. Things went sideways fast.
Experts war-gamed what might happen if deepfakes disrupt the 2024 election. Things went sideways fast.
“It was jarring for folks in the room to see how quickly just a handful of these types of threats could spiral out of control and really dominate the election cycle,” said one of the organizers.
NBC News · by Dan De Luce and Kevin Collier
It’s Election Day in Arizona and elderly voters in Maricopa County are told by phone that local polling places are closed due to threats from militia groups.
Meanwhile, in Miami, a flurry of photos and videos on social media show poll workers dumping ballots.
The phone calls in Arizona and the videos in Florida turn out to be “deepfakes” created with artificial intelligence tools. But by the time local and federal authorities figure out what they are dealing with, the false information has gone viral across the country.
This simulated scenario was part of a recent exercise in New York that gathered dozens of former senior U.S. and state officials, civil society leaders and executives from technology companies to rehearse for the 2024 election.
The results were sobering.
“It was jarring for folks in the room to see how quickly just a handful of these types of threats could spiral out of control and really dominate the election cycle,” said Miles Taylor, a former senior Department of Homeland Security official who helped organize the exercise for the Washington-based nonprofit The Future US.
Dubbed “The Deepfake Dilemma,” the exercise illustrated how AI-enabled tools threaten to turbocharge the spread of false information in an already polarized society and could sow chaos in the 2024 election, multiple participants told NBC News. Rather than examining a singular attack by a group or hostile regime, the exercise explored a scenario with an array of both domestic and foreign actors launching disinformation, exploiting rumors and seizing on political divisions.
The organizers and participants in the war game spoke exclusively to NBC News about how it played out.
They said it raised worrisome questions about whether federal and local officials — and the tech industry — are prepared to counter both foreign and domestic disinformation designed to undermine public confidence in the election results.
Current U.S. officials say privately they share those concerns and that some state and local election agencies will be hard-pressed to keep the election process on track.
The exercise illustrated the uncertainty surrounding the roles of federal and state agencies and tech firms seven months before what is expected to be one of the most divisive elections in U.S. history. Does the federal government have the ability to detect an AI deepfake? Should the White House or a state election office publicly declare that a particular report is false?
Unlike a natural disaster, in which government agencies work through a central command, America’s decentralized electoral system is entering uncharted territory without a clear sense of who’s in charge, said Nick Penniman, CEO of Issue One, a bipartisan organization promoting political reform and election integrity.
“Now, in the last few years, we in America are having to defend assaults on our elections from both domestic and foreign forces. We just don’t have the infrastructure or the history to do it at scale because we’ve never had to face threats this severe in the past,” said Penniman, who took part in the exercise.
“We know a hurricane is eventually going to hit our elections,” said Penniman. But in the exercise, “because patterns of working together haven’t formed, few people understood exactly how they should be coordinating with others or not.”
In a mock “White House Situation Room” around a long table, participants played assigned roles — including as directors of the FBI, CIA and the Department of Homeland Security — and sifted through the alarming reports from Arizona and Florida and numerous other unconfirmed threats, including a break-in at a postal processing center for mail-in ballots.
Conferring with the tech companies, players who were “government officials” struggled to determine the facts, who was spreading “deepfakes” and how government agencies should respond. (MSNBC anchor Alex Witt also took part in the exercise, playing the role of president of the National Association of Broadcasters.)
In the exercise, it was unclear initially that photos and video of poll workers tossing out ballots in Miami were fake. The images had gone viral, partly because of a bot-texting campaign by Russia.
Eventually, officials were able to establish that the whole episode was staged and then enhanced by artificial intelligence to make it look more convincing.
A woman walks past a "Vote Here" sign at Miami Beach City Hall in Miami Beach, Fla., on Oct. 19, 2020.Eva Marie Uzcategui / AFP via Getty Images file
In this and other cases, including the fake calls to Arizona voters, the players hesitated over who should make a public announcement telling voters their polling places were safe and their ballots secure. Federal officials worried that any public statement would be seen as an attempt to boost the chances of President Joe Biden’s re-election.
“There was also a lot of debate and uncertainty about whether the White House and the president should engage,” Taylor said.
“One of the big debates in the room was whose job is it to say if something’s real or fake,” he said. “Is it the state-level election officials who say we’ve determined that there’s a fake? Is it private companies? Is it the White House?”
Said Taylor, “That’s something that we think we’re also going to see in this election cycle.”
And although the war game imagined tech executives in the room with federal officials, in reality, communication between the federal government and private firms on how to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation has sharply diminished in recent years.
The once close cooperation among federal officials, tech companies and researchers that developed after the 2016 election has unraveled due to sustained Republican attacks in Congress and court rulings discouraging federal agencies from consulting with companies about moderating online content.
The result is a potentially risky gap in safeguarding the 2024 election.
State governments lack the resources to detect an AI deepfake or to counter it quickly with accurate information, and now technology companies and some federal agencies are wary of taking a leading role, former officials and experts said.
“Everybody’s terrified of the lawsuits and ... accusations of free speech suppression,” said Kathy Boockvar, former Pennsylvania secretary of state, who took part in the exercise.
The New York war game, plus similar sessions being carried out in other states, is part of a wider effort to try to encourage more communication between tech executives and government officials, said Taylor.
But in the world outside the war game, social media platforms have cut back teams that moderate false election content, and there’s no sign those companies are ready to pursue close cooperation with government.
State and local election offices, meanwhile, face a significant shortage of experienced staff. A wave of physical and cyber threats has triggered a record exodus of election workers, leaving election agencies ill-prepared for November.
Concerned about understaffed and inexperienced state election agencies, a coalition of nonprofits and good-government groups are planning to organize a bipartisan, countrywide network of former officials, technology specialists and others to help local authorities detect deepfakes in real time and respond with accurate information.
“We’re going to have to do the best we can — independent of the federal government and the social media platforms — to try to fill the gap,” said Penniman, whose organization is involved in the election security effort.
Boockvar, the former secretary of state, said she hopes nonprofits can act as a bridge between the tech companies and the federal government, helping to maintain communication channels.
Some of the largest AI tech firms say they are introducing safeguards to their products and communicating with government officials to help bolster election security before the November vote.
“Ahead of the upcoming elections, OpenAI has put in place policies to prevent abuse, launched new features to increase transparency around AI-generated content, and developed partnerships to connect people to authoritative sources of voting information,” said a spokesperson. “We continue to work alongside governments, industry partners, and civil society toward our shared goal of protecting the integrity of elections around the world.”
The internet, however, is filled with smaller generative-AI companies that may not abide by those same rules, as well as open-source tools that allow people to build their own generative-AI programs.
Voters cast their ballots inside the Museum of Contemporary Art in Arlington, Va., on Nov. 8, 2022.Nathan Howard / Getty Images file
An FBI spokesperson declined to comment on a hypothetical situation, but said the bureau’s Foreign Influence Task Force remains the federal lead “for identifying, investigating, and disrupting foreign malign influence operations targeting our democratic institutions and values inside the United States.”
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency said it’s working closely with state and local agencies to protect the country’s elections.
“CISA is proud to continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with state and local election officials as they defend our elections process against the range of cyber, physical, and operational security risks, to include the risk of foreign influence operations,” said senior adviser Cait Conley.
For many of those in the room for the exercise, the scenarios drove home the need to develop an ambitious public education campaign to help voters recognize deepfakes and to inoculate Americans from the coming onslaught of foreign and domestic disinformation.
The Future US and other groups are now holding talks with Hollywood writers and producers to develop a series of public service videos to help raise awareness about phony video and audio clips during the election campaign, according to Evan Burfield, chief strategy officer for The Future US.
But if public education campaigns and other efforts fail to contain the contagion of disinformation and potential violence, the country could face an unprecedented deadlock over who won the election.
If enough doubts are raised about what has transpired during the election, there’s a danger that the outcome of the vote becomes a “stalemate” with no clear winner, said Danny Crichton of Lux Capital, a venture capital firm focused on emerging technologies, which co-hosted the exercise.
If enough things “go wrong or people are stuck at the polls, then you just get to a draw,” Crichton said. “And to me that is the worst-case scenario. ... I don’t think our system is robust enough to handle that.”
NBC News · by Dan De Luce and Kevin Collier
9. U.S. Gaza ceasefire resolution vetoed by China, Russia at UN Security Council
Updated 22 hours ago -World
U.S. Gaza ceasefire resolution vetoed by China, Russia at UN Security Council
https://www.axios.com/2024/03/22/us-ceasefire-resolution-veto-un-security-council
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The UN Security Council debates the Gaza war in February. Photo: Lev Radin/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images
Russia and China on Friday vetoed a U.S. draft UN Security Council resolution that called for an "immediate and sustained ceasefire" in Gaza along with "the release of all remaining hostages" held by Hamas.
Why it matters: This was the fourth time since the war began in October that the Security Council failed to agree on a resolution calling for a ceasefire. This time, the dispute was over the U.S. insistence on linking the ceasefire call to a hostage deal and condemnation of Hamas, rather than the unconditional ceasefire resolution demanded by Russia and China.
Zoom in: Eleven member states voted in favor of the resolution, one abstained, and Algeria, China and Russia opposed it.
Split screen: The diplomatic wrangling in New York takes place as negotiators from Israel, Hamas, Egypt, Qatar and the U.S. are still trying to hash out a hostage deal in Doha.
- CIA Director Bill Burns is expected to join the talks on Friday, along with the Qatari prime minister and intelligence chiefs of Israel and Egypt.
-
Shortly before the UN Security Council convened, U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken met in Israel with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his war cabinet.
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Blinken warned Netanyahu that Israel's security and its place in the world are in peril due to Israel's strategy in Gaza, and "you might not realize it until it's too late," a source familiar with the meeting told Axios.
Behind the scenes: U.S. and Israeli officials said the Biden administration had been working for weeks on mobilizing support for its draft resolution.
- In order to garner more votes, the U.S. strengthened the paragraph in the draft resolution that referred to the ceasefire.
- The U.S. draft resolution also included strong language expressing concern about a possible Israeli ground offensive in Rafah.
Friction point: Before the vote, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield said the U.S. believes the parties are close to a hostage deal that will lead to a ceasefire.
- "We are not there yet," she told the council.
- The ambassador added that the resolution could pressure Hamas to take the deal, which would lead to a six-week ceasefire.
- The Russian ambassador, however, accused the U.S. of blocking the Security Council from passing a ceasefire for months.
What they're saying: "Washington's actions have cost the lives of 32,000 Palestinians," said Vasily Nebenzya, Russia's ambassador to the UN.
- Nebenzya argued that the U.S. text was only aimed at buying more time for Israel to invade Rafah.
- After the vote, Thomas-Greenfield addressed the council again and criticized Russia and China for refusing to condemn Hamas for the Oct. 7 attack.
- "They also didn't want to vote in favor of a U.S. draft resolution and would rather that the U.S. fail," she said.
What's next: The Security Council is expected to vote on an alternative resolution put forward by eight member states, calling for an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan to lead to a permanent ceasefire.
- That text also demands the release of all hostages without linking it to the ceasefire.
Yes, but: The U.S. is expected to veto.
- Thomas-Greenfield said the alternative text, which doesn't link a ceasefire with the release of hostages, could sabotage the negotiations taking place in Doha.
Editor's note: This story has been updated with addition details and comments from the meeting.
10. Death Toll in Attack at Russian Concert Hall Tops 110 as Suspects Detained
Death Toll in Attack at Russian Concert Hall Tops 110 as Suspects Detained
Violence in a Moscow suburb, claimed by Islamic State, adds to Russia’s domestic security challenges
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/death-toll-in-attack-at-russian-concert-hall-tops-90-as-suspects-detained-dbe61022
By Thomas Grove
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Updated March 23, 2024 8:57 am ET
Russian authorities said they had detained 11 people in connection with a terrorist attack on a concert hall in a Moscow suburb, as the death toll from Friday night’s violence rose to 115, according to investigators.
The assault, claimed by Islamic State, adds to the security challenges facing Moscow as the Kremlin fights a costly war of attrition against Ukraine, which Russia invaded in 2022.
Among those taken into custody were four people who prosecutors said played a direct role in the attack, in which gunmen shot audience members at close range and set off smoke bombs.
Officials from the U.S., which warned Russia of intelligence indicating an impending terrorist threat earlier this month, said they believe a branch of Islamic State based in Afghanistan, known as ISIS-K, was behind the attack.
ISIS-K, made up in part by citizens of Central Asian countries that once belonged to the Soviet Union, has long had Moscow in its crosshairs. In September 2022, the group claimed responsibility for a blast at the Russian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed six people.
On Saturday, Russia’s Federal Security Service said the concert-hall attack had been carefully planned and that detained suspects had been on their way to cross into Ukraine, according to state media reports, which didn’t give more details.
The head of Russia’s parliamentary committee on defense, Andrey Kartapolov, said Moscow should respond on the battlefield if Ukraine was involved.
Kyiv has denied any involvement, and an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned the attack could be used as a pretext by Moscow to mobilize more troops and scale up Russia’s war effort.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was re-elected last week to another six-year term, made security at home and abroad a key theme of his election campaign, telling Russians that he was the only leader able to keep the country safe.
While Russian cities and civilian populations have been largely insulated from the conflict in Ukraine, Ukrainian forces have managed to strike deep inside Russian territory, most recently with a series of attacks on oil refineries.
Kyiv also continues to land blows on Russia’s naval forces in the Black Sea and military installations in Russian-occupied Crimea. Specially trained commando groups have also been carrying out raids into Russia’s Belgorod region, which borders Ukraine.
Security across the Moscow region was tightened Saturday, with additional checks at airports, train stations and metro stations, officials said.
In Moscow, residents laid flowers at memorials and lined up to give blood.
Moscow has a long and bloody experience with terrorist attacks, most of them suffered in the wake of the Kremlin’s two wars with separatists in Chechnya, the Muslim-majority region in the North Caucasus. One of those wars started in Putin’s first term as president.
Many of the homegrown extremists who threatened Moscow, however, left the country in the mid-2010s to join Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. And Russia’s attention increasingly shifted from battling terrorism to waging conventional war in Ukraine and its growing rivalry with the U.S.
Friday’s attack outside Moscow is the biggest in Europe to be linked to an Islamic State affiliate since a series of assaults that hit the continent starting in 2015. That wave of violence was largely inspired, and in part directed, by the group as it fought to control territory in Syria and Iraq.
Attacks in Paris in 2015 and a year later in Brussels together killed more than 160 people and injured hundreds more. Friday’s killings in Russia took place on the eighth anniversary of the Brussels attacks.
European security officials say that for almost two years Europe has been facing a growing threat from ISIS-K, and U.S. intelligence officials have been warning since 2022 of the group’s plans for suicide attacks and other acts of terrorism, including in Russia.
Bojan Pancevski contributed to this article.
Write to Thomas Grove at [email protected] and Ann M. Simmons at [email protected]
11. USS Eisenhower strike group locked in unrelenting fight at pace unseen in decades
I am sure our senior military advisers have advised the national political leadership that they should focus their efforts on rapidly and decisively destroying Houthi capabilities wherever they are operating. But instead we seem to be expending scarce (and expensive) resources in the most inefficient and ineffective way.
USS Eisenhower strike group locked in unrelenting fight at pace unseen in decades
Stars and Stripes · by Alison Bath · March 22, 2024
A F/A-18 Super Hornet lands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Red Sea on March 19, 2024. The carrier has launched about 100 flights daily, six-to-seven days a week since Dec. 31. (Alison Bath/Stars and Stripes)
ABOARD THE USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER — Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen responsible for putting U.S. sailors under fire at levels comparable to World War II battles aren’t getting much rest these days.
That’s because the 7,000 sailors of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group are successfully frustrating the militant group’s efforts to terrorize ships in the Red Sea, said Rear Adm. Marc Miguez, commander of the group.
Miguez and others aboard Eisenhower acknowledged the Houthi fighters have been savvy in adapting their efforts with swarm drone attacks and upgraded ballistic missile capabilities. They also recognize Iran’s determination to continue arming them.
But near daily strikes made by F/A-18 Super Hornets and the group’s destroyer squadron against Houthi drones, missiles and other capabilities have eroded the group’s maneuverability, effectively reducing their activity, he said.
A sailor stands watch aboard the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Red Sea, on March 20, 2024. The crew of the aircraft carrier has seen nearly five months at sea without a port call. (Alison Bath/Stars and Stripes)
A mural painted by a sailor in the hangar bay of the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower depicts the ship's namesake over the words "Best Damn Ship in the Navy." (Alison Bath/Stars and Stripes)
A sailor works on an F/A-18 Super Hornet in the hangar bay of the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower on March 20, 2024. The carrier has launched about 100 flights daily since Dec. 31. (Alison Bath/Stars and Stripes)
For example, the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower went on a shipwide alert Wednesday morning, quickly launching two Super Hornets within four minutes of each other after learning the Houthis appeared to be preparing to use attack drones on unspecified targets.
An E-2 Hawkeye command and control aircraft and two refueling tankers soon followed.
U.S. Central Command subsequently announced a coalition aircraft had destroyed one aerial drone and that CENTCOM had destroyed one surface drone launched from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
The action is among U.S. and coalition efforts that have allowed more than 2,000 ships, many under military escort, to come through the Red Sea safely since January, Miguez said.
He also acknowledged at least a 20% drop off in shipping through the vital waterway compared to recent years.
“My job is to keep the Houthis up at night and I routinely do that,” Miguez said. “We make sure we apply pressure all the time.”
Miguez added he sleeps well knowing the ship’s crew is protecting him and other sailors.
The Eisenhower and its escorts arrived in the Middle East on Nov. 4, ordered there by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin as part of a U.S. effort to keep the Israel-Hamas war from broadening within the region.
About two weeks later, the Houthis began targeting ships in the Red Sea, putting the strike group in what the Navy deems an “active weapons engagement zone.”
As a result, the strike group, which includes the destroyers USS Gravely and USS Mason along with the cruiser USS Philippine Sea, ultimately saw the unprecedented use of anti-ship ballistic missiles in combat against a commercial ship on Dec. 30, the White House said in a statement Jan. 3.
Those two missiles were shot down by Gravely. The destroyer USS Laboon also responded. A day later, the same commercial vessel was attacked by four Houthi fast boats.
The flight deck crew prepares to launch an E-2 Hawkeye command and control plane off the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower on March 19, 2024. (Alison Bath/Stars and Stripes)
Helicopters from the Eisenhower responded to the ship’s distress call, coming under fire from the boats. The helicopters returned fire, sinking three vessels and killing their crews. The fourth boat fled, the White House statement said.
It was a moment of reckoning for the 5,000 sailors aboard Eisenhower, said Capt. Chris Hill, commander of the aircraft carrier. Another 2,000 service members are assigned to other ships and units in the strike group.
“For us, witnessing that visually was somewhat of a wake-up call for the entire ship,” Hill said. “This is real and it’s going to get busy, and it’s been busy ever since.”
Since then, Eisenhower has launched about 100 Super Hornets, Hawkeyes, EA-18G Growlers and other aircraft day and night to help put the squeeze on the Houthi militants. Those flights typically take place over a span of 12 to 14 hours, six to seven days per week, said Capt. Marvin Scott, commander of Carrier Air Wing Three.
Some planes are on dynamic targeting missions used to identify Houthi movements that indicate the potential launch of drones or missiles. The goal is to eliminate them before they become an immediate threat, Scott said.
Other flights are for patrol, reconnaissance, defensive and other missions, he said.
An F/A-18 Super Hornet prepares to launch from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Red Sea on March 19, 2024. (Alison Bath/Stars and Stripes)
An F/A-18 Super Hornet launches during night flight operations on the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower on March 19, 2024. The planes carry out reconnaissance, defensive and other missions. (Alison Bath/Stars and Stripes)
It’s a grueling pace that has kept Eisenhower at sea for nearly five months without the usual port calls for sightseeing, eating a meal off ship or just getting a much-needed break from the job.
The pace isn’t typical. It’s also vastly different from the group’s original plans.
Sailors had prepared for deployment to the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations, which would include port calls in Europe and along the Mediterranean. That vision changed quickly in the aftermath of Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel.
While a normal deployment could see a similar surge, sustaining it for months without giving sailors a break in port is remarkable, Scott said.
A sailor talked about the unrelenting tempo while having breakfast in a ship mess hall.
It would be easy to get mad about it but everyone aboard is going through the same thing, said the sailor, who added everyone aboard was committed to the mission.
Navy officials asked reporters aboard the ship not to name the sailors other than senior leaders, due to concerns that they could be targeted by terror groups.
The sailors also are bearing the stress of being in the crosshairs of the Houthis, who have focused attacks on U.S. destroyers as often as two times per week, said Capt. David Wroe, commodore of Destroyer Squadron 22.
The Houthis have said they will continue attacking ships connected to Israel until there is a cease-fire in Gaza. U.S. officials have pointed out the group has fired indiscriminately on military and civilian ships with no apparent Israeli connection.
The attacks can come in the form of a drone heading toward or operating in the vicinity of a ship or a missile launch.
For example, Houthi missiles targeted the Laboon at least three times since January, the latest a close-range ballistic missile attack on March 12. The missile didn’t hit the destroyer and no one was injured, CENTCOM said. The destroyer USS Carney also faced at least one Houthi missile attack.
The closest comparison of American sailors coming under fire for months at a time goes back to World War II, Wroe said.
Nothing in Wroe’s 25-year career as a surface warfare officer, which has included multiple deployments to the Middle East, compares to what the strike group is experiencing now, he said.
“This isn’t small scale stuff,” said Wroe, noting Houthi ballistic missiles were responsible for sinking one commercial ship, damaging others and killing at least three sailors on another merchant vessel.
Sailors “are under threat of getting attacked with minutes of notice, six out of seven days a week,” Wroe said. “They have seconds to respond.”
Despite that stress and hardship, sailors are determined to continue until the threat in the Red Sea is gone and ships can travel in safety.
“We have to be perfect,” said Capt. Colin Price, executive officer of the Eisenhower. “It’s a zero-fail mission.”
Stars and Stripes · by Alison Bath · March 22, 2024
12. Marine wargames offer a look at the future — and fuel dissent
Marine wargames offer a look at the future — and fuel dissent
marinecorpstimes.com · by Irene Loewenson · March 21, 2024
When Lieutenant Georg Heinrich Rudolph Johann von Reisswitz of the Prussian army presented his new game to his military leaders in 1824, wargames weren’t a new phenomenon.
The board game Reisswitz had crafted was an update of a prototype by his father, which itself was indebted to earlier wargames derived from chess, Milan Vego recounted in a 2012 article in the Naval War College Review. Like its predecessors, the junior Reisswitz’s game involved two sides of few players each making decisions about simulated military maneuvers.
Yet the game was revolutionary.
It brought a new level of reality to wargaming: a detailed map as the gameboard, umpires who challenged the players with realistic scenarios and precise calculations of casualties, Vego wrote. Karl von Mueffling, the chief of the general staff of the army, was mightily impressed.
“It’s not a game at all!” Mueffling exclaimed, according to Vego. “It’s training for war.”
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The game is being played by units and is available for order by anyone.
The Prussian army adopted the game as a tool to train for battle. And two centuries later, militaries are still using games to simulate aspects of war.
The Marine Corps, which has rethought its approach to fighting in recent years, uses wargames to explore the tough problems it might be forced to confront in war. These mostly classified games have become yet another focus of the conflict over the future of the Marine Corps.
Marine leaders say the results of wargames are one justification for the controversial changes they have made to the force, such as the divestment of tanks and the reduction of cannon artillery.
Critics of the changes have raised concerns about the games themselves, arguing they were unsound and didn’t lend support to the changes.
Did the Corps conduct its wargames properly and draw the right insights from them? Supporters of the changes say yes — and their view has carried the day, since the service already is years into its ambitious overhaul with the support of Congress and the Pentagon. Some critics still say no.
The Corps has said wargame results helped underpin its decisions aimed at making sure Marines are ready to fight, and win, the next war.
For the Marines who may one day carry out new kinds of operations, while armed with new weapons systems, the stakes of these games are high.
What wargaming is — and isn’t
Wargames try to simulate aspects of armed conflict, imperfectly.
In wargames, as in war, human beings on opposing sides make a series of decisions that have consequences for what happens next. Unlike in war, no one gets hurt.
Generally, the competitors in a professional wargame are the “blue cell” — the home team of sorts, representing friendly forces — and the “red cell,” representing enemy forces, according to a 2019 Rand report.
A white cell often adjudicates how the game progresses as the blue and red cells make their moves. Sometimes a green cell represents allied forces or civilians.
These days, computers often play a role in wargames, according to retired Marine Lt. Col. Travis Reese, who as a contractor has helped develop scenarios and wargames pertaining to Marine Corps modernization since 2017. But many wargames still involve people laying a map out on a table and, given a detailed scenario, making the tough decisions a commander might face in war, according to Reese.
There are two broad categories of wargames: educational and analytical, according to retired Marine Maj. Ian T. Brown, who worked with educational wargames while at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare.
A student describes his strategy during hands-on exercises at the Basic Analytic Wargaming Course taught by the Naval Postgraduate School Wargaming Mobile Education Team in 2021. (Thomas Mort/Army)
In educational wargames, the focus is on the players and their learning, according to Brown. In analytical wargames, the focus is on better understanding the problems that the games simulate.
Wargames can’t predict how a real war would unfold or even how the same wargame would turn out if it were played again. They can’t “validate” real-life decisions, several wargaming experts cautioned.
“In essence wargaming is an exercise in human interaction, and the interplay of human decisions and the outcomes of those decisions makes it impossible for two games to be the same,” the influential wargamer Peter Perla and Navy Lt. Cmdr. Raymond Barrett wrote in the Naval War College Review in 1985.
And no wargame can capture the complexity of real life.
Wargame designers must keep a narrow scope and assume, for the games’ purposes, that some things will work the way they are supposed to, freeing them up to play with other variables, according to Reese.
“You can never do everything in detail that you need to do to simulate a fight perfectly,” Reese said. “It’s just too many things to put together.”
The limitations of wargames are many, but so are their possibilities, these wargaming experts said.
Educational wargames can sharpen service members’ abilities to make good decisions when in a conflict with an adversary, Brown said.
Analytical wargames can “investigate processes” and “explore questions of strategy, human behavior and warfighting trends,” Perla and Barrett wrote.
The Quantico, Virginia–based Warfighting Lab has its own wargaming division to conduct these kinds of wargames.
Its major wargames tend to take place in a Marine Corps University auditorium, with the cells huddled on different sides of the room, division director Col. George Schreffler said. The cells get briefed for about a day and spend about three days making the moves that form the meat of a wargame.
The players, ranging in number from about 30 to 150, work long days that start at around 7:30 a.m., with a break for a brown-bag lunch, according to Schreffler. The adjudicators from the Wargaming Division sometimes work overnight sorting out the implications of the players’ decisions.
At the end of the week, the players debrief the game, explaining their choices. The Wargaming Division writes a preliminary report on the game and then a more fleshed-out analytical report, which typically takes two to three months, according to Schreffler.
Well-conducted wargames can usher players into a mental zone called “the magic circle,” in which they accept the virtual world and make decisions that feel real within it, Brown said. In this magic circle, players emotionally engage with what happens in the game.
“That’s actually a very valuable psychological dynamic, because it makes your experience stick with you in a way that you remember,” Brown said. “And if you remember it, you can assess it yourself, and you can learn from it.”
Preparing for war
Analytical wargames have been at the center of the Marine Corps’ bold, and controversial, overhaul plan.
That plan — called Force Design 2030, though leaders recently dropped the “2030″ — was championed by now-retired Gen. David Berger, who served as commandant from 2019–2023 and before that was the deputy commandant for combat development and integration.
From 2016 to 2018, before Berger was in those two modernization-focused roles, he was the leader of Marine Forces Pacific. It was at that job that he witnessed a series of worrisome wargames, he said at a Brookings Institution event in May 2023.
The games convinced him the Corps had to evolve if it didn’t want to lose a fight with China.
“If we don’t change something, the same result is going to happen every time,” Berger recalled thinking.
A 2018 wargame Berger observed at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, indicated to him that Marine forces needed to be lighter, more mobile and positioned closer to the possible sites of conflict in the Indo-Pacific and China, he told Defense News.
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In 2019, Berger devoted three of the 23 pages of text in his commandant’s planning guidance to wargames, including what they have “shown” the Corps needed to change.
He already had decided that the Corps needed to become capable of spreading out on and near shore, fending off enemy naval forces, and avoiding getting tracked and hit by long-range fires, he wrote in the guidance. Wargames would “rapidly produce solutions for further development in accordance with my guidance and vision.”
Divestments of tanks, artillery, law enforcement personnel and more followed. So did controversy.
Critics of the changes, including several retired Marine leaders, have voiced concerns that the Corps was focusing too much on China and losing its ability to assert itself in conflicts elsewhere — and that even a fight with China would go poorly because of these divestments.
One skeptic is Scott Moore, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel who holds a doctorate in conflict analysis and resolution and who as a BAE Systems contractor observed and analyzed wargames at the Warfighting Lab between 2016–2021.
He said he took issue with the timing of the divestments relative to wargames. The games he was involved in didn’t lend support to those changes, he said.
“Those decisions, to my mind, were made absent any wargames,” he told Marine Corps Times.
Yet Gen. Eric Smith, who became the Marine commandant in September 2023, has said the Marine Corps shouldn’t wait until concepts are totally fleshed out before implementing them.
That would take too much time, he said in October 2023 on a War on the Rocks podcast. And with changing administrations and budgets, and adversaries who are modernizing their own militaries, time isn’t something the Corps can afford to lose.
“If you wait until it’s completely validated, you’ll get nowhere,” Smith said.
Current Marine leaders have insisted the force needed to modernize given the threat of the Chinese military. Even in its revamped form, these leaders have said, the Corps remains ready to respond worldwide.
Wargames are just one element in the Corps’ “virtuous cycle” of learning, according to Smith.
First, the Marine Corps develops a concept, Smith said. Next comes a wargame. Then Marines do an experiment in the field with real equipment. Finally, the Corps incorporates feedback from these efforts.
“One wargame is one wargame,” Smith said. “It’s a data point.”
“Now, when I see 17 data points aligned and moving in a certain path or a certain trajectory, OK, now I’m interested.”
Logistics, logistics, logistics
But what if, some critics of Force Design have asked, those data points came from wargames that were fundamentally flawed?
Moore said the wargames he observed made too-optimistic assumptions, especially about logistics and mobility: that the Marines would be in the theater ready to fight when conflict broke out, that ship-to-shore vessels would come ashore without issues, that civilians would help Marines get food and supplies locally, that roads and bridges would be in good shape. He said the games also assumed uninterrupted command and control, sufficient air defenses and lack of detection by adversaries.
“Those were the assumptions that we never were allowed to test,” Moore said. “And those underpin the entire Force Design.”
A source who has firsthand knowledge of Marine Corps wargames and participated in some himself, and spoke on condition of anonymity, said he also had concerns about logistics being assumed away.
“It’s like a play,” he said. “The curtain goes up, and everyone’s on stage, and then we play. But how did everyone get on the stage?”
A now-retired senior Marine officer recalled asking questions about logistics while getting briefed on the results of the Corps’ wargames. How would Marines and their equipment be moved to the fight? How would they be sustained? How would these logistics efforts evade the enemy’s notice?
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“None of this is fabricated by one or two people,” Gen. David Berger said about the sweeping changes to the Marine Corps.
“Every time, it was like, ‘Sir, that’s a great question,’” said the retired Marine, who spoke on condition of anonymity for professional reasons. He said he never got those questions answered.
Proponents of Force Design argue a lack of emphasis on logistics in some wargames does not mean those games were entirely flawed.
The wargames that Moore observed occurred early in the Force Design process, Reese noted. The games had to constrain “some chatter and some noise” so the Corps could begin to answer the questions it had about the nascent overhaul, he said.
“A lot of the games that, quote-unquote, ‘didn’t address logistics’ weren’t designed to, because it was going for a different problem,” said Lt. Col. Leo Spaeder, a logistics officer who worked at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab from 2018–2021.
Spaeder acknowledged that “there were very, very unlikely and very favorable logistics assumptions made” in some games when he first got to the lab. But that soon changed, in part thanks to the 2018 arrival of now-retired Col. Tim Barrick as head of the Wargaming Division, according to Spaeder.
These days, Marine Corps leaders make clear they aren’t ignoring logistics. Far from it, they say: In his final year as commandant, Berger repeatedly declared his focus was “logistics, logistics, logistics.”
In the past three years at the Wargaming Division, 40% or more of the games have been specifically geared toward examining logistics, according to Schreffler.
Logistics “are gap areas that the Marine Corps has considered, continues to work on and is very alert to,” Schreffler said.
In interviews with Marine Corps Times, those with knowledge of the wargames spoke about them in general terms. That is because the Corps keeps the results of many of the analytical wargames classified — a fact that has provided more fuel for criticism from those with concerns about Force Design.
“I have not heard or seen anything of any weapons systems or any tactic that would justify the classification of these games, other than the fact that they really didn’t want people to know what they were up to,” said retired Marine Col. Gary Anderson, who retired as chief of staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in 2000.
Reese pushed back on the idea that high levels of classification allowed the games to evade scrutiny. Before Berger could make changes, he had to have buy-in from civilian Defense Department leaders and legislators, Reese said.
The Corps keeps wargame details classified for good reason, Schreffler maintained.
“There are, in fact, secrets that need to be protected from adversaries, who if they had the information, would immediately use it to develop counters to the capabilities the Marine Corps is developing,” he said.
What comes next
In coming years, the Wargaming Division plans to do more wargaming than ever before — about 20 big games a year, up from eight to 10, Schreffler said on a Corps podcast in August 2023. Enabling that will be the large facility now under construction on the campus of the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia.
Named for retired Gen. Robert Neller, who championed wargaming while serving as commandant from 2015–2019, the $79 million, 100,446-square-foot center is set to reach initial operational capability in 2025.
The Neller Center will allow more games, at a bigger scale, with better technology for analyzing data, according to Schreffler. The center will have remote capabilities, meaning a Marine in California could examine a problem through a wargame without booking a cross-country flight.
A defining characteristic of wargames — whether played on a map or through the cloud — is, according to the 2019 Rand report, that players make decisions and end up “living with the consequences of their actions.”
Yet the wargames that inform the path of change the Marine Corps is pursuing have consequences of their own. When Marines and Marine veterans argue about wargames, they are also arguing about war: how to prepare for it and how to fight it.
The Corps has an obligation to the more than 30,000 Marines now positioned overseas to get its transformation right, Berger told the audience at the Modern Day Marine conference in June 2023.
“They are our sons and daughters, and we owe them an unfair fight,” Berger said.
Reisswitz’s wargame was no game, a Prussian general observed in 1824 — but war is no wargame. People live and die with the consequences.
About Irene Loewenson
Irene Loewenson is a staff reporter for Marine Corps Times. She joined Military Times as an editorial fellow in August 2022. She is a graduate of Williams College, where she was the editor-in-chief of the student newspaper.
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marinecorpstimes.com · by Irene Loewenson · March 21, 2024
13. Pentagon uses China-owned tutoring company that could weaponize military data, GOP lawmakers say
The Chinese are shrewd though they have telegraphed their plans in Unrestricted Warfare.
Excerpts:
Rep. Elise Stefanik, R-N.Y., and Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., are seeking to ban the use of Tutor.com because they say parent-company Primavera is subject to Chinese law requiring the organization to disclose confidential business and customer data to the Chinese Communist Party. The organization also has ties to ByteDance, which owns TikTok.
"There is no reason the Pentagon should be paying a Chinese-owned service that collects the data of our service members and their families," Cotton said in a statement. "There are plenty of American companies that offer tutoring services and aren’t subject to the Chinese government."
....
Advocacy group Parents Defending Education (PDE) found that at least 100 school districts give students access to the website.
"Tutor.com is the latest – but without a doubt, far from the last – concerning firm with access to student information, and it's unlikely that most American families would be comfortable with a foreign-owned company maintaining this data," PDE's president, Nicole Neily, said. "Parents deserve more control over who is collecting information about their children, because districts are completely asleep at the switch."
...
"This legislation mistakenly assumes that private information of those who use our tutoring services could be transferred to China. Tutor.com is a U.S. company, and U.S. student data stays in the U.S. Primavera does not have—and may not obtain—access to our IT systems, per a U.S. government national security review voluntarily initiated by both parties and conducted by CFIUS when the private equity firm acquired Tutor.com," Tutor.com told Fox News Digital. "As required by the U.S. government, Tutor.com has a designated data security officer, who has been vetted and approved by the U.S. government, to continuously monitor and ensure compliance with data-protection measures. Tutor.com also has two independent directors on our board of directors—also required, vetted, and approved by the U.S. government—whose foremost duty is to ensure that personal data is appropriately safeguarded."
Pentagon uses China-owned tutoring company that could weaponize military data, GOP lawmakers say
foxnews.com · by Maria Lencki , Hannah Grossman Fox News
Video
America cannot allow China’s ‘propaganda’ to be hoisted onto young people: Mike Pompeo
Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo discusses Haiti’s gang crisis and lawmakers’ ongoing efforts to ban TikTok in the U.S. during an appearance on ‘Fox News Live.’
Republican lawmakers are introducing legislation to prohibit the Department of Defense from using a Chinese-owned tutoring service for U.S. military members and their families.
Rep. Elise Stefanik, R-N.Y., and Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., are seeking to ban the use of Tutor.com because they say parent-company Primavera is subject to Chinese law requiring the organization to disclose confidential business and customer data to the Chinese Communist Party. The organization also has ties to ByteDance, which owns TikTok.
"There is no reason the Pentagon should be paying a Chinese-owned service that collects the data of our service members and their families," Cotton said in a statement. "There are plenty of American companies that offer tutoring services and aren’t subject to the Chinese government."
COTTON PROBES DOD ON SECURITY RISKS OF CHINESE-OWNED TUTORING COMPANY FOR US MILITARY FAMILIES
Sen. Tom Cotton said, "There is no reason the Pentagon should be paying a Chinese-owned service that collects the data of our service members and their families." (Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images)
The legislation, called the Ban Chinese Communist Party Access to U.S. Military Students Act, says the platform collects location data, internet protocol addresses and contents of the tutoring sessions and alleges the U.S. is "paying to expose the private information of members of the United States Armed Forces and their children to the Chinese Communist Party."
"We cannot allow Communist China to collect an arsenal of data on our service members and their families that can be weaponized against them, posing a grave and unnecessary threat to America’s national security," Stefanik said.
Rep. Elise Stefanik said, "We cannot allow Communist China to collect an arsenal of data on our service members and their families that can be weaponized against them." (Haiyun Jiang/Bloomberg)
Advocacy group Parents Defending Education (PDE) found that at least 100 school districts give students access to the website.
"Tutor.com is the latest – but without a doubt, far from the last – concerning firm with access to student information, and it's unlikely that most American families would be comfortable with a foreign-owned company maintaining this data," PDE's president, Nicole Neily, said. "Parents deserve more control over who is collecting information about their children, because districts are completely asleep at the switch."
Tutor.com denied the allegations, stating that the company "cannot be compelled to release confidential data to China or any other foreign nation. (Kurt "CyberGuy" Knutsson)
CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP
Tutor.com responded to the bill Thursday, denying the allegations.
"This legislation mistakenly assumes that private information of those who use our tutoring services could be transferred to China. Tutor.com is a U.S. company, and U.S. student data stays in the U.S. Primavera does not have—and may not obtain—access to our IT systems, per a U.S. government national security review voluntarily initiated by both parties and conducted by CFIUS when the private equity firm acquired Tutor.com," Tutor.com told Fox News Digital. "As required by the U.S. government, Tutor.com has a designated data security officer, who has been vetted and approved by the U.S. government, to continuously monitor and ensure compliance with data-protection measures. Tutor.com also has two independent directors on our board of directors—also required, vetted, and approved by the U.S. government—whose foremost duty is to ensure that personal data is appropriately safeguarded."
Fox News’ Brian Flood and Jamie Joseph contributed to this report.
foxnews.com · by Maria Lencki , Hannah Grossman Fox News
14. There is no ‘axis of evil’
Excerpt:
It all seems a bit mischievous to the naked eye. But U.S. policy officials should remember that none of these activities portend an alliance of any sort. Sure, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea would like nothing more than to see U.S. policy fail and U.S. power weakened, but we shouldn’t pretend these four powers are teaming up like the Axis Powers did in World War II. The arrangements between them are less strategic and more tactical, with a big dollop of opportunism on top.
There is no ‘axis of evil’ - Washington Examiner
By Daniel DePetris -
March 22, 2024 12:21 pm
Washington Examiner · March 22, 2024
In this photo release by Royal Thai Army, Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command Admiral John Aquilino, center, speaks during opening ceremony of Cobra Gold 2023 in Rayong Province Thailand, Tuesday, Feb. 28, 2023. Thai and U.S. officials presided over the opening ceremony Tuesday of Cobra Gold 2023, one of the biggest joint multilateral military exercises in the world that pulls together the security interests of the United States and six Asian nations. (Royal Thai Army via AP)
Adm. John Aquilino and Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner traveled to Capitol Hill on Wednesday for an appearance in front of the House Armed Services Committee. The topic of the hearing: the U.S. military posture in Asia.
It was a relatively uneventful occasion for those used to watching them. But there was a moment that raised an eyebrow. At one point in the hearing, Aquilino, the commander of Indo-Pacific Command, referred to the budding relationships between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as an aspiring “axis of evil” primed to undermine U.S. interests not only regionally but globally.
Ratner seemed to agree with his military counterpart, insisting that what happens in Europe directly affects security in Asia. You could be forgiven for thinking you were transported back to 2002, when then-President George W. Bush coined the phrase “axis of evil” to hype a connection between Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Iran, and North Korea.
The term didn’t make sense back then. Iran and Iraq were mortal enemies for decades. Saddam launched a war of choice against the Iranians in 1980 in part to stir up a counterrevolution against the ayatollahs, whom he viewed as expansionist troublemakers. The war lasted for eight long years, and the two neighbors have been highly distrustful of each other ever since. North Korea, meanwhile, was concerned first and foremost with its own survival. While the North Koreans and Iranians cooperated to a degree on missile development, it was less about striking an alliance and more about bolstering their own domestic capabilities.
Twenty-two years have gone by, but the “axis of evil” phraseology is still alive and well. The so-called members of this evil grouping may be different, with the exception of North Korea, but the assumptions undergirding the “axis of evil” framing are as silly today as they were in 2002. Simply put: Just because U.S. adversaries may be cooperating doesn’t mean they are engaged in a global conspiracy against the United States. To suggest as much gives China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea far too much credit.
There’s no doubt cooperation is happening. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin are chummy these days, with the former visiting the latter last year to tour Russia’s space program. Pyongyang has been one of Moscow’s biggest partners since the war in Ukraine began, shipping about 7,000 containers of munitions to Russia since 2023. Iran is aiding the Russians, too, not with munitions but rather with attack drones, which Moscow has used to deadly effect in Ukraine. In November, satellite imagery picked up the construction of a plant inside Russia that would manufacture Iranian drones at scale.
China is the biggest buyer of Iranian crude oil, providing Tehran with billions of dollars in revenue at a time when its oil industry is still sanctioned by the U.S. and Europe. China is also bailing out the Russian economy, which, for the most part, is closed off from Western markets, and remains a key enabler of Russia’s imports of sensitive military technology. Last week, Chinese, Russian, and Iranian sailors conducted trilateral military exercises in the Gulf of Oman.
It all seems a bit mischievous to the naked eye. But U.S. policy officials should remember that none of these activities portend an alliance of any sort. Sure, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea would like nothing more than to see U.S. policy fail and U.S. power weakened, but we shouldn’t pretend these four powers are teaming up like the Axis Powers did in World War II. The arrangements between them are less strategic and more tactical, with a big dollop of opportunism on top.
Russia needs as many munitions as it can get. North Korea possesses a large number of Cold War-era stockpiles, and Kim is willing to part with some of them at the right price. This price includes more Russian food aid, cover at the United Nations Security Council, and even Russian military technology. Putin is willing to sign on to this arrangement because, frankly, winning the war in Ukraine (or staving off defeat) is more important to him than anything else.
A similar dynamic is at play between Russia and Iran. The Iranians have terrible conventional military platforms but are quite advanced with missiles and drones, the very systems Moscow needs to carry on in Ukraine. Like Pyongyang, Tehran is happy to help out at a price, such as getting its hands on Russian fighter aircraft and anti-missile defenses.
The point here is not to dismiss that a relationship exists. Only that the relationship probably isn’t as scary as the Biden administration makes it out to be.
Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. His opinions are his own.
Washington Examiner · March 22, 2024
15. EDITORIAL: Partners can help over-stretched US
Allies are key to US national security.
Sat, Mar 23, 2024 page8
EDITORIAL: Partners can help over-stretched US
- https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/03/23/2003815326
- The US and other countries should take concrete steps to confront the threats from Beijing to avoid war, US Representative Mario Diaz-Balart said in an interview with Voice of America on March 13.
- The US should use “every diplomatic economic tool at our disposal to treat China as what it is... to avoid war,” Diaz-Balart said.
- Giving an example of what the US could do, he said that it has to be more aggressive in its military sales to Taiwan.
- Actions by cross-party US lawmakers in the past few years such as meeting with Taiwanese officials in Washington and Taipei, and passing bills facilitating arms sales to Taiwan demonstrate that the US government is keen to aid Taiwan’s defense. However, the US is facing conflicts on several fronts, such as the Houthis’ attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, Israel’s war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, North Korea’s long-range missile launches that threaten to destabilize the Korean Peninsula and China’s continuous acts of aggression in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.
- The plurality of these zones with high tension or conflict means that US production is unable to keep up with demand for missile systems and other weapons. A win-win step for Washington would be to collaborate with Taiwanese contractors to build missiles and other weapons systems for regional use. Japan is making Patriot missiles, while Harpoon and Sidewinder missile systems are built in the US by McDonnell Douglas and Raytheon respectively. Building these weapons in Taiwan would mean faster delivery and enable quick stockpiling of weapons in Taiwan to be used by US troops in the event of a war.
- This could also benefit the Philippines, a country facing harassment from an increasingly aggressive China in parts of the South China Sea which the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 2016 declared to be Philippine territory. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Tuesday reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to defending the Philippines against attacks in the South China Sea.
- Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr following his meeting with Blinken said that he emphasized the importance of “more substantial US investments towards enhancing our defense and civilian law enforcement capabilities.”
- The China Coast Guard has already attacked Philippine vessels with water cannons. Although the US might be seeking to avoid escalation by directly confronting Chinese vessels, it could at least help the Philippines better arm itself — with arms manufactured in Taiwan.
- China is threatened by those bases, and it has attempted to drive a wedge between Manila and Washington. Beijing has accused the US of using the Philippines as a “pawn” in South China Sea disputes.
- Polls by the Pew Research Center suggest that Filipinos largely have a favorable opinion of the US, but Washington should seek to maintain that situation by taking concrete actions to give Filipino fishers and supply boat operators a sense of security in Philippine and international waters.
- The US is being stretched thin by its numerous engagements worldwide, but it could alleviate some of its burden by having its allies and partners do more of the heavy lifting. Washington could lead an initiative to have Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea and other regional partners cooperate with the US and each other on maritime patrols and weapons manufacturing. The US has an indispensable role to play in regional security, but it should not take on the full burden on its own.
16. The War Against Force Design 2030 Is Hurting the Marine Corps
A very powerful argument that applies to more than just the UMSC. We should all reflect on this.
Excerpts:
Regardless of the level of distinction in terms of awards and rank we achieve in our Marine Corps careers, they all end in one of three ways–you quit, you get fired, or you die. All three entitle veterans to the exact same amount of input in current operations.
This calls for some degree of humility and trust. Marines, like the members of any institution, eventually turn over the watch to younger generations, trusting that they will do the right things, because they were trained properly. Trust in them should reflect the trust the older generation has in itself. That’s a major difference between an enduring institution and a normal group.
Just as any unit has only one commander at a time, there is only one Commandant at a time. In this case, the Commandant’s scheme of maneuver has also been endorsed by the civilian DoD leadership under two administrations and by Congress over three budgets. Once a commander has issued his orders, the time for open debate is over, and the time for action has begun.
Not one, but two Commandants have issued their marching orders. While professional debate sharpens the blade, Chowder II’s continued professional sabotage only serves to weaken the steel. There is still debate to be had over the direction of the Corps, but like any professional debate, it needs to take place within the norms of the profession. In this case, that means within the bounds of traditional military decorum and respect for serving commanders. Chowder II can either participate productively to improve Force Design, or it can continue to undermine the institution its members proudly served.
The War Against Force Design 2030 Is Hurting the Marine Corps
19fortyfive.com · by Carl Forsling · March 22, 2024
Since former Commandant General David Berger unveiled Force Design 2030 (FD2030) just over four years ago, the Marine Corps has undergone immense change to prepare for a war in the Pacific against a peer competitor. Force Design posits that at least a portion of the Marine Corps needs to be optimized to fight from small, distributed bases inside the First Island Chain. This has knock-on effects throughout the “man, train, and equip” responsibilities of the Corps.
While certain communities within the service took umbrage at aspects of FD2030, the reaction of active-duty Marines appears largely positive. But one group of Marines has united in opposition to FD2030—a group of retired senior Marine leaders. This chorus of retired GOs has adopted the nom-de-plume, or perhaps, nom-de-guerre, “Chowder II.” They have loudly and publicly denounced Force Design as gelding the Corps by de-emphasizing Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), the construct under which most of the Corps’ combat forces are organized.
Chowder II counts several prominent general officers as members, including former Commandants Amos, Conway, and Krulak. While whatever private counsel they provided behind closed doors is purely their business as officers and gentlemen, the discord their public pronouncements have created is not.
Disagreement is not the problem—in a perfect world, this dissent would be a part of the “campaign of learning” within Force Design. Had this been constrained to debates at wonky DC think tanks or the pages of Marine Corps Gazette and Proceedings, this would just be professional discourse. But their public campaign has taken this past the point of respectful disagreement into the realm of undermining a commander. Regardless of the merits of Chowder II’s objections, the way in which these arguments are being presented can only undermine good order and discipline and the long-term health of the Corps.
Chowder II and its members have taken their campaign to the mass market press in venues such as Newsweek and The Hill. They post regularly on a Substack account called “Marine Corps Compass Points,” which presents a daily feed of essays condemning FD2030, often featuring unusual allegories relating combined arms to golf, eating at diners, and other activities designed to appeal to younger officers. They have appealed directly to Congress, achieving at least one win — the latest NDAA requires an independent review of FD2030. What could have been a civil and professional debate is now a chaotic food fight detrimental to the image of the Marine Corps in the eyes of both the public and civilian leadership.
This public dissent is another example of the continuing breakdown of norms in American society in general and national leadership in particular. Despite insisting it holds higher standards of conduct and decorum than civilian society, the Corps is starting to prove that it shares some of the same problems. The military as an institution has shown this degradation for a while. For example, we now routinely see open letters from various groups of senior officers taking positions in elections and partisan issues. Chowder II’s activism is another step towards the degradation of these norms, with dire consequences to the culture of the service that will degrade its effectiveness far more than any misfire in FD2030.
The Corps as an institution has an obligation to take strong steps to re-establish standards of conduct amongst retired general officers. Debate over potential courses of action is healthy, but Marines of all ranks are supposed to know that once a leader has decided on a course of action, all hands are supposed to stop arguing and start executing the commander’s intent.
Chowder II’s ongoing campaign to undermine FD2030 has transformed its function from discussion to disruption. To understand the difference, look at the group’s namesake, Brute’s Chowder Society.
Different kinds of Chowder
Most discussions of chowder begin with “Manhattan or New England?” In this case, the original Chowder recipe was not cooked up to contradict the Commandant or other senior uniformed leader. Instead, it was a small cell led by then active duty Lieutenant Colonel “Brute” Krulak and acted on the behalf of Commandant General Vandegrift to support his vision of the Corps. This was needed because the Commandant’s faced fierce anti-Marine sentiment within both the Executive and Legislative Branches.
After World War II, the Marine Corps faced demotion to a small naval constabulary force and possibly dissolution. Brute’s Chowder Society provided the analysis, rhetoric, and behind-the-scenes lobbying that helped save the Corps through a legislative mandate in the National Security Act of 1947.
Today, Chowder II members and devotees claim that distinguished mantle to, in their view, save the Corps by opposing the Commandant. They misappropriate Brute Krulak’s legacy, claiming that Force Design 2030, though endorsed by two Commandants, represents the death of the Marine Corps. Casting the Commandant as the enemy of his own Corps is the inverse, not the reincarnation, of the Chowder legacy.
The rhetorical battle
Are some of Chowder II’s criticisms valid? Almost certainly. The Marine Corps’ reversal of several of its FD2030 initiatives, such as dramatic cuts in V-22 and H-1 squadrons, is indicative of the willingness of current Marine Corps leadership to adjust plans as events dictate.
The current Commandant has no obligation to consult retired senior officers. He seeks the counsel of his predecessors out of decorum, tradition, or to simply get a different perspective, but he is in no way obligated to do so. He alone bears responsibility for everything his command does or fails to do. This was true when General Berger was handed the colors and is still true for General Smith. It was true when Generals Amos, Conway, and Krulak served as Commandant, as well as when Generals Zinni, Fulford, and Sheehan served as combatant commanders. None of them would have tolerated their predecessors taking public shots from the cheap seats.
There are venues for the Corps to get the input of its elder statesmen. The Corps has a “graybeard” system in which relevant experts, particularly general officers, are invited to symposiums and meetings to provide input and buy-in on service policies. This is often on a contract basis. As this same demographic often have consulting contracts and corporate board seats, conflicts of interest are very likely. Like politicians and PACs, perhaps their financial interests might just happen to align with their personal beliefs. That this presents the perception of conflicts of interest might be part of why their inputs weren’t solicited during the initial rollout of FD2030. That many of those loudly criticizing FD2030 also have interests in defense companies certainly casts doubt on their objectivity.
While many, though not all, of those involved in Chowder II are fairly wired into current events by virtue of their peer groups and defense consulting jobs, they also no longer have Combat Development and Integration Command working for them to provide expert study and analysis. The officers of Chowder II may see themselves as keepers of the flame in terms of Marine Corps traditions, but they have no more standing to criticize the current commandant than former commanders at any level. It is safe to say that if any of them caught a retired lieutenant colonel publicly criticizing his relief as a battalion commander, they would be outraged.
It’s their Corps now
Regardless of the level of distinction in terms of awards and rank we achieve in our Marine Corps careers, they all end in one of three ways–you quit, you get fired, or you die. All three entitle veterans to the exact same amount of input in current operations.
This calls for some degree of humility and trust. Marines, like the members of any institution, eventually turn over the watch to younger generations, trusting that they will do the right things, because they were trained properly. Trust in them should reflect the trust the older generation has in itself. That’s a major difference between an enduring institution and a normal group.
Just as any unit has only one commander at a time, there is only one Commandant at a time. In this case, the Commandant’s scheme of maneuver has also been endorsed by the civilian DoD leadership under two administrations and by Congress over three budgets. Once a commander has issued his orders, the time for open debate is over, and the time for action has begun.
Not one, but two Commandants have issued their marching orders. While professional debate sharpens the blade, Chowder II’s continued professional sabotage only serves to weaken the steel. There is still debate to be had over the direction of the Corps, but like any professional debate, it needs to take place within the norms of the profession. In this case, that means within the bounds of traditional military decorum and respect for serving commanders. Chowder II can either participate productively to improve Force Design, or it can continue to undermine the institution its members proudly served.
About the Author: Carl Forsling
Carl Forsling is a retired Marine officer and V-22 pilot who regularly writes on national security and military issues. He works in the aerospace and defense industry and lives in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.
19fortyfive.com · by Carl Forsling · March 22, 2024
17. Robots Are Entering the Ukraine Battlefield
Robots Are Entering the Ukraine Battlefield
Kyiv deployed drones to deadly effect in the air and at sea, but plans to repeat the strategy on the ground face challenges
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/robots-are-entering-the-ukraine-battlefield-fab195d2?fbclid=IwAR0-pWNJg9Vfd-UBxMwa-QwCt6YYjEEdK-UpNLOZqtizC_cOnEWYeK8aC34&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalin&st=2hrt9twi3bk9frh&utm
By Alistair MacDonaldFollow and Ievgeniia Sivorka | Photographs and video by Joseph Sywenkyj for The Wall Street Journal
Updated March 22, 2024 12:01 am ET
DRUZHKIVKA, Ukraine—In August, a Ukrainian assault team steered an armored vehicle silently for 2.5 miles before firing 300 bullets at a group of startled Russian soldiers.
The vehicle had no driver or gunner, and was instead a land drone, an early example of the robot-like vehicles that Ukraine is increasingly using to hit enemy forces, clear and lay land mines and rescue injured soldiers.
Since Russia’s invasion two years ago, Ukraine has revolutionized warfare with its use of drones in the air and at sea. Now it wants to do the same with unmanned ground vehicles, or UGVs, aiming to replicate the low-cost, do-it-yourself approach that it has used to such deadly effect.
The push isn’t without challenges. Land drones typically face bigger hurdles than those in the air and water, not least the need to navigate around buildings and across uneven terrain. And while big arms makers have tested UGVs for decades, the U.S. and its allies haven’t deployed them in a meaningful way.
Ukrainian army Pvt. Oleksiy Yelin controls a land drone he designed in the Donetsk region, close to the front line.
Ukraine’s technology and innovation minister has said that the country wants to create an “army of robots.” President Volodymyr Zelensky said last month that the military would establish a separate branch for air, sea and land drones, called the Unmanned Systems Forces.
“UGV will become the next game-changer of this war,” said Nataliia Kushnerska, the chief operating officer of Brave1, a Ukrainian government agency that examines proposals for new weapons.
Of the more than 1,300 proposals submitted to Brave1 since the beginning of the war, more than 140 are for UGVs, she said. Brave1 says more than 50 UGVs have been tested in conditions similar to combat, and that the agency has so far issued 56 grants for 41 projects.
In pushing UGVs, Kyiv sees the chance to develop its own key weaponry at a time of uncertainty over future supplies from the U.S., and as Russia takes territory on the battlefield.
Ukraine is fielding UGVs made by foreign companies, local startups and enterprising soldiers who have made simple robots out of whatever they can find.
The land drone used in the August attack, made by a Ukrainian company, consisted of a Browning machine gun attached to a vehicle that resembles a quad bike. After the attack, the vehicle returned to its remote controllers in the 5th Assault Kyiv Brigade and has since been reused several times.
The drones designed by Yelin can be used to drop mines or deliver ammunition to soldiers.
Eavesdropping on Russian communications indicated that aside from at least injuring enemy forces, the raid also sowed confusion, given that soldiers couldn’t see where the attack came from, said an officer in the brigade.
Ukraine’s use of UGVs is another wartime experiment the world will be watching. The country has already popularized the use of cheap, off-the-shelf aerial drones to destroy far-more-expensive military equipment. It has also developed sea drones that have helped sink ships in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
Ukraine isn’t yet using land drones on a scale that would be strategically meaningful in the way other drones are, said Ares Simone Monzio Compagnoni, a UGV analyst at Janes, a defense-intelligence company. Russia is also using land drones for mine clearance.
UGVs aren’t entirely new. The French army made explosive land drones as early as 1915, and the British and Germans developed UGVs in World War II. Early efforts were deemed ineffective given the cost. Since then, UGVs have typically been used for bomb disposal without gaining wider traction, despite the efforts of some large weapons makers to push the vehicles.
Ukrainian forces use Milrem Robotics land drones as medical evacuators. PHOTO: MIKHAIL PALINCHAK/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK
The U.K. tested UGVs at a recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization exercise, though it says it has no plans to procure them at scale for anything other than supplying front-line positions. Israel has used two types of land drones to patrol its border with Gaza, primarily for surveillance. Given Israel’s inability to detect and deter Hamas’s Oct. 7 cross-border incursion, an Israeli military spokesman said that, with the war in Gaza still under way, it was too early to look for lessons learned.
“Land is a more difficult place for drones than the sea and the air, where you have a significantly more empty environment,” said Trevor Taylor, a director at the Royal United Services Institute, a think tank.
Improvements in the technology that provides autonomy, communication and sensors to UGVs are now making the vehicles more viable, said Kuldar Väärsi, chief executive of Milrem Robotics, an Estonian land-drone maker.
Uneven terrain reduces the range of land drones.
Milrem is among a growing group of arms makers now fielding or developing UGVs, from established companies such as L3Harris and
BAE Systems to startups such as Anduril Industries.The U.S. Army operates or is testing at least six different types of UGV. That includes a drone that uses flailing chains to destroy land mines, a
General Dynamics-produced medical evacuation vehicle and another that detects chemical and nuclear waste.Ukraine has operated 15 of Milrem’s vehicles as medical evacuators and for mine clearance, for more than a year.
Ambulances typically don’t go very close to Ukraine’s front line, given the risks to crew and the difficulties of navigating the often muddy, cratered landscape in a wheeled vehicle.
Milrem’s land drones have tank-like tracks, which are better suited for the battlefield terrain. They are also smaller than ambulances, meaning they are less of a target.
Simple things work best.
“You can have fancy stuff on the battleground, but if it breaks down after rough use, it is completely useless,” said Sten Allik, Milrem’s director of concept development.
Ukraine’s DIY efforts follow a similar mantra.
Ukrainian army Sgt. Pavlo Slodzik controls a land drone.
“The idea is to make it simple to the max, and cheap to the max,” said Pvt. Oleksiy Yelin, a former telecom engineer turned soldier who has designed homemade land drones to transport ammunition, drop land mines and explode at Russian positions.
Yelin, together with a welder his brigade hired, started making UGVs after he sustained an injury on the front line in November. While recuperating, he mulled how drones could offer a safer way to recover casualties. Within months, he had developed two different models.
Each drone costs as little as 35,000 hryvnias to make, equivalent to around $900. The engines come from a personal transporter, much like a Segway, and the controllers are those typically used for remote-controlled vehicles. Metal parts are sourced locally.
Yelin acknowledges the limitations. Land drones struggle in very muddy conditions and uneven terrain reduces their range, he said, while testing a UGV outside the city of Bakhmut that was earmarked to be driven to a Russia position and exploded.
The focus on simplicity is driven by need, according to Valerii Hrysha, an engineer at Ratel, a Ukrainian drone maker. Ratel’s explosive drones are used by Ukrainian special forces, and its UGVs for evacuation and logistics are used by the country’s army.
“We take whatever materials, and even junk, we have at our disposal,” Hrysha said. “We can’t sit around waiting for expensive gear.”
Write to Alistair MacDonald at [email protected]
18. US denies reports of troops on China's doorstep
Semantics? Not permanent but rotational? We routinely rotate troops to Korea (including Special Forces and other SOF)
The choice of the photo and caption is interesting. See it at the link:( https://www.newsweek.com/us-denies-reports-troops-china-doorstep-1882160). Is Newsweek implying "strategic flexibility" from Camp Humphreys in Korea? Are they trying to say that US troops from Korea are in Taiwan? The irony is that the troops in Taiwan also routinely rotate to Korea for training from 1st SFG in Okinawa and Fort Lewis. Is Newsweek doing this on their own or was there a deliberate effort to send this possible message on "strategic flexibility?" Or am I a conspiracy theorist or is this simply coincidence. Keeping everyone guessing is a good thing. :-)
U.S. soldiers at Camp Humphreys on May 4, 2023, in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. Adm. John Aquilino denies report U.S. troops are stationed on Taiwan islands permanently. Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images
US denies reports of troops on China's doorstep
Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · March 22, 2024
The outgoing chief of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has denied a report that American troops are now being stationed in Taiwan permanently.
"The article was incorrect. There's no permanent stationing of U.S. forces there. We can talk in a classified setting for further evaluation, but that is just inherently inaccurate," Adm. John Aquilino told a House Armed Services Committee hearing Wednesday morning.
Taiwan's United Daily News (UDN) had reported that U.S. Army Special Forces, also known as Green Berets, were being permanently stationed on the self-ruled island, in line with the National Defense Authorization Act of 2023.
Specifically, they were allegedly conducting training with Taiwanese troops on Penghu and Kinmen—outlying island counties in the 90-mile-wide Taiwan Strait that separates Taiwan from China.
If true, the development would mark the first time in over four decades that U.S. forces were officially operating in Taiwan.
Newsweek reached out to the U.S. Department of Defense outside office hours.
Aquilino's statement was the first official denial of the alleged change, as the Department of Defense had previously declined to comment on specific reports.
The admiral seems to have contradicted a remark by Taiwanese Minister of Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng days earlier.
When asked by the press whether there were American boots on the ground on a permanent basis in Kinmen, Chiu appeared to confirm the news. "We can learn from each other to see what strengths we have," he responded, adding that the arrangement was "fixed."
In 2021, President Tsai Ing-wen revealed U.S. military instructors had been conducting occasional training with Taiwanese armed service members, confirming what had long been suspected.
U.S. soldiers at Camp Humphreys on May 4, 2023, in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. Adm. John Aquilino denies report U.S. troops are stationed on Taiwan islands permanently. U.S. soldiers at Camp Humphreys on May 4, 2023, in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. Adm. John Aquilino denies report U.S. troops are stationed on Taiwan islands permanently. Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images
Additionally, UDN previously reported there is also a U.S. military presence in the northeast city of Taoyuan on Taiwan's main island. These troops were said to be providing instruction on drone equipment Taiwan hopes to procure for its elite Airborne Special Service Company.
The U.S. military has not been officially in Taiwan for the long haul since it closed its last base in 1979 following the normalization of U.S.-China relations.
Though the U.S. switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the U.S. remains Taiwan's largest arms supplier.
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act requires Washington to provide Taipei with sufficient defensive weaponry and support to resist "force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."
China views democratic Taiwan as a rogue province and has vowed to eventually unify with it, through force if necessary, though the Chinese Communist Party government in Beijing has never ruled there.
"All indications point to the PLA (People's Liberation Army) meeting President Xi Jinping's directive to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, Aquilino said in a written statement ahead of a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing Thursday.
CIA Director William Joseph Burns Xi previously cited intelligence saying Xi had ordered his military to be prepared to take Taiwan by that year, though this does not mean China will attempt to do so.
The Indo-Pacific Command is a unified combatant command of the U.S. Department of Defense, responsible for military operations in the Indo-Pacific region.
Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · March 22, 2024
19. A Defining Moment for America's Role in the World
Excerpts:
The evolution of multilateralism from 1945 to today demonstrates both its power and the dangers of its abandonment. One path forward advances President Harry Truman's vision of a global order rooted in mutual interests, collective security, and democratic values, with America as a principled leader. The other leads to isolation, diminished American legitimacy, and an inability to exert true leadership in the world. The cooperative path fosters greater unity and international collaboration, making the world more likely to align with the United States on critical issues—and the world safer for America and its values. Isolation breeds antagonism and jeopardizes America's long-held global leadership role.
As important as Ukraine is for all of us, it’s one part of a much broader decision we must make about America’s place in the world.
A Defining Moment for America's Role in the World
How NATO's upcoming summit provides an opportunity to make the case for American involvement overseas ahead of November's election.
SPENCER BOYER
MAR 22, 2024
liberalpatriot.com · by Spencer Boyer
Sweden’s flag is raised outside NATO headquarters on March 11, 2024 as the Nordic nation officially joins the alliance. (Credit: NATO)
Congress’ failure to push through urgently needed aid to Ukraine has dominated transatlantic discussions for the past several weeks. As the specter of a new administration disinterested in U.S. involvement in European security once again looms large, debates about European strategic autonomy—or significantly reducing European dependence on U.S. security—are back. The key issue, however, goes much deeper than the direction of U.S. policy towards Europe or Russia, or even transatlantic security more broadly.
The present moment will clearly define whether enough Americans are ready to elevate U.S. engagement with allies and partners to a core value and voting issue in 2024 to maintain American leadership for the second half of the decade. Recent polling by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs shows that only 40 percent of Trump Republicans believe the U.S. should take an active role in world affairs or that America’s European alliances are mutually beneficial—two core tenets of America’s post-World War II foreign policy.
This is just one troubling indicator that much of the American public does not appreciate the value of international engagement. While foreign affairs only rarely moves voters, this summer’s NATO summit in Washington, D.C., commemorating the 75th anniversary of the alliance’s founding, offers a unique opportunity to remind Americans why multilateralism and alliances matter in times of peace and war—and in a crucial year.
The Kremlin’s war on Ukraine, which just entered its third year, and unprecedented transatlantic cooperation in pushing back on Russian aggression are emblematic of a larger multilateral ecosystem under assault. It is clear to all objective observers that Putin’s blitz against Ukraine and subsequent human rights violations against its people are not only a gross violation of international law, but also an attack on the global rules written in no small part by the United States in the aftermath of World War II.
Let’s reflect for a minute on what the international system used to be.
That was then…
Before 1945, nearly unlimited state sovereignty was the name of the game. Few international agreements existed to regulate the conduct of independent nations. Aside from organizations such as the League of Nations, the International Labor Organization, and the Permanent Court of International Justice, there were very few international institutions. Those in existence did little to further an international rule of law or modify state behavior—and they sometimes made things worse. In a dispute between France and Turkey in 1927, for instance, the Court of International Justice ruled that states were for all intents and purposes allowed to do anything not expressly prohibited by international law.
Aside from the failed 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact that renounced war as a policy tool, there was no general prohibition on territorial acquisition through force. While pre-existing laws like the Hague Convention of 1899 mandated humane treatment of prisoners, their scope remained limited and they failed to address the broader concerns of international humanitarian law.
While some bilateral trade agreements existed, the global economy operated in a regulatory vacuum. Emerging international rules attempted to safeguard workers, minorities, and foreign property, but there were no rules protecting what we now consider fundamental human rights or preventing mass extermination based on race, religion, ethnicity, or political belief. This fragmented legal landscape exposed the world's vulnerability and highlighted the urgent need for a more robust and comprehensive set of rules to prevent future conflicts.
This used to be now….
The devastation of World War II galvanized the United States and its allies into action, compelling them to forge a new international order built on a robust system of rules that at least attempted to safeguard basic liberal values and human rights. For all its flaws, the founding of the United Nations in 1945 signaled the dawn of this new era and cemented the indispensable leadership role of the United States within it. The subsequent decades witnessed unprecedented progress in international law and institutional development, extending far beyond the immediate post-war focus.
In particular, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights established a groundbreaking code of fundamental human rights. Building upon the precedent of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal of Nazi Germany’s war crimes, moreover, the 1949 Geneva Conventions advanced international humanitarian law, protecting civilians and captured soldiers during conflicts. These milestones reflected a profound shift towards a more interconnected world increasingly governed by principled laws and institutions. War is still a scourge on our planet, but the world has moved in the direction of accountability for those who violate our collective laws and principles.
And of course, 1949 saw the creation of NATO—the greatest collective security organization in world history. NATO forces were not involved in a single military engagement throughout the Cold War and alliance members have never been attacked by an adversary. Over the years, U.S. interests have continued to be furthered through NATO in military operations and missions outside the North Atlantic geographic area.
Over the decades, NATO has been involved in numerous critical engagements, including in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. It also contributes to maritime security and air policing in several NATO countries and carries out disaster relief operations in furtherance of global stability. The only declaration of Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty, which states that an attack on one is an attack on all members, was for the defense of the United States after the 9/11.
This is the international system…now
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, revitalized NATO in ways we could not have imaged at the beginning of the Biden administration. In addition to supplying non-lethal assistance to Ukraine through the Comprehensive Assistance Package program, NATO has developed a robust family of military plans to better protect the eastern flank of the alliance. It has also worked closely with the European Union and EU member states, many of whom are also NATO member nations and have made nearly $100 billion available in military, humanitarian, and refugee assistance to Ukraine since the start of the war. They have also agreed to commit over $50 billion more to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction, and modernization, including assistance measures to help Ukraine undertake the reforms necessary for EU accession.
In 2014, European NATO allies invested 1.4 percent of their collective GDP on defense—well below the pledge made at the Wales NATO summit that year. That number will reach $380 billion or two percent in 2024, a figure now considered a floor rather than a ceiling by the alliance. In 2014, only three allies met the two percent defense spending target; 18 will do so this year. Instead of weakening NATO, Putin got an alliance that is more united, capable, and larger with the recent additions of Finland and Sweden.
Despite daring Ukrainian drone strikes deep into Russia territory and continued heavy losses by Russian forces, Russia has regained some of its military momentum after retaking the Ukrainian town of Avdiivka in February. Overall, the war is at a strategic stalemate and needs America’s continued material and financial leadership. While Europe watches the U.S. government’s political drama regarding funding for Ukraine, internationalists of all ideological stripes can proactively work to warn the American public about the consequences of not supporting Ukraine and America’s NATO allies in the fight against Russian aggression—in the hopes that voters will collectively take these considerations into account when they make their decisions in November. NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington, D.C. in July will receive broad media, non-governmental organization, private sector, and congressional attention, and will provide an ideal platform for making the case that international institutions and engagement matter now more than ever.
Nothing will show alliance unity more than a renewed American commitment to deliver Putin a strategic defeat in Ukraine—and that will take continued U.S. resources, including the administration’s $60 billion supplemental funding request. That legislation must pass as soon as possible. Every continued delay is a gift to Putin. But at the NATO summit, the U.S. government and think tank community will have an opportunity to remind the country that there is no global issue we can solve without our friends and allies. Our NATO allies and other partners in Europe and around the world are our force multiplier, giving America a comparative advantage over governments in countries like Russia, China, and Iran. We have an opportunity to foot stomp to lawmakers and influencers that this is a legacy we cannot afford to discard; it took too long to build it.
The evolution of multilateralism from 1945 to today demonstrates both its power and the dangers of its abandonment. One path forward advances President Harry Truman's vision of a global order rooted in mutual interests, collective security, and democratic values, with America as a principled leader. The other leads to isolation, diminished American legitimacy, and an inability to exert true leadership in the world. The cooperative path fosters greater unity and international collaboration, making the world more likely to align with the United States on critical issues—and the world safer for America and its values. Isolation breeds antagonism and jeopardizes America's long-held global leadership role.
As important as Ukraine is for all of us, it’s one part of a much broader decision we must make about America’s place in the world.
Spencer P. Boyer is a Global Fellow, Global Europe Program, The Wilson Center. He previously served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy in the Biden administration.
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liberalpatriot.com · by Spencer Boyer
20. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 22, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-22-2024
Key Takeaways
- The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) is expanding efforts to erode the Republic of China's (ROC) sovereignty around Kinmen Island.
- The PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) warned the United States was “playing with fire” in stationing Green Berets on the Kinmen and Penghu islands.
- The PRC is framing the upcoming April 11 US-Japan-Philippines trilateral as a way for the United States to drive tension in the South China Sea.
- The PRC MFA framed the United States–South Korea Freedom Shield military exercise as causing instability on the Korean Peninsula.
- The PRC had its first public diplomatic meeting with a Hamas official and its first diplomatic visits to Israel and Palestine since Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7.
CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MARCH 22, 2024
Mar 22, 2024 - ISW Press
China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 22, 2024
Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: March 22 at 12pm ET
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
- The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) is expanding efforts to erode the Republic of China's (ROC) sovereignty around Kinmen Island.
- The PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) warned the United States was “playing with fire” in stationing Green Berets on the Kinmen and Penghu islands.
- The PRC is framing the upcoming April 11 US-Japan-Philippines trilateral as a way for the United States to drive tension in the South China Sea.
- The PRC MFA framed the United States–South Korea Freedom Shield military exercise as causing instability on the Korean Peninsula.
- The PRC had its first public diplomatic meeting with a Hamas official and its first diplomatic visits to Israel and Palestine since Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) expanded its efforts to erode the Republic of China's (ROC) sovereignty around Kinmen Island. Four CCG ships operated in Taiwan’s territorial waters around Kinmen Island for two consecutive days for the first time on March 15 and 16.[1] One of the ships was a converted naval corvette that conducted the passage with its gun covers removed.[2] The CCG framed its operations as legitimate law enforcement to safeguard Chinese fishermen, including those from Taiwan.[3] The CCG’s removal of its gun covers during its passage through Taiwan’s waters illustrates its offensive posturing, indicating its actions are intended to intimidate the Taiwanese Coast Guard rather than uphold a safe maritime environment. CCG ships have previously used this tactic to intimidate rival law enforcement in contested waters, including the Philippines Coast Guard around Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.[4]
Kinmen is a Taiwan-controlled island with a large military garrison roughly 3 kilometers from the coast of the PRC. The Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA) enforces maritime laws around Kinmen and its lesser islands. The CCP does not accept Taiwan’s sovereignty over the waters around the island, however.[5]
The latest violations are part of a trend of CCG incursions following an incident on February 14 in which a PRC fishing boat in Taiwan’s prohibited waters near Kinmen capsized while fleeing from a legal Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit. The capsizing resulted in the deaths of two of the four fishermen onboard. The CCG pledged on February 18 to strengthen law enforcement activities around Kinmen. The CCG has maintained a persistent presence around Kinmen and repeatedly violated Taiwan’s maritime boundaries since then. The CCG boarded a Taiwanese sightseeing ship on February 19, marking the first time a CCG ship conducted inspections in Taiwanese waters.[6] Five CCG marine surveillance ships entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone around Kinmen on February 26, including one that crossed into territorial waters.[7] The total number of CCG ships around Kinmen reached 11 on February 27, including two that entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone. Normalizing operations around Taiwan’s waters sets conditions for the PRC to apply further pressure on Taiwan in the future.
The rapid normalization of CCG operations in Kinmen’s waters in response to the incident suggests the PRC had pre-formulated reactions to this type of contingency. The PRC exploited the capsizing incident as a pretense to initiate a concerted coercion campaign that serves to incrementally challenge and erode the ROC’s sovereignty in its adjacent waters.
The PRC has shown that it is unwilling to return to the status quo before the Kinmen incident. The CCG and CGA cooperated on a joint search and rescue effort after a PRC fishing vessel capsized in PRC-controlled waters around Kinmen on March 14.[8] Both coast guards conducted search operations within their respective jurisdictions. CGA Director Chou Mei-wu framed the cooperation as a means to ease tensions with the PRC after the initial capsizing incident in February.[9] The CCG’s successive border violations on March 15 and 16 demonstrate the PRC’s rejection of opportunities to de-escalate tensions as it continues to erode ROC sovereignty around its outer islands.
The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) are pursuing political reforms that threaten to undermine the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) governance by expanding legislative oversight of the executive branch. The reforms aim to strengthen the Legislative Yuan’s (LY) investigation rights by granting it more power to conduct inquiries and call on officials to testify before the LY, establish penalties for perceived non-compliance or dishonesty in responses, and empower the LY to confirm political appointments.[10] The TPP and KMT have consistently stated that establishing a legislative investigative task force to strengthen oversight of the executive branch is at the top of their agenda.[11] KMT caucus Secretary-General Lin Tzu-ming earlier referred to the proposed mechanism as a “great weapon” that the LY must use to supervise the government.[12] Collaboration between the KMT and the TPP on the proposals suggests that the reforms will pass with a majority in the LY, as the two opposition parties outnumber the DPP in the LY. The opposition’s plan to impose checks and balances on the DPP could significantly hamper the government’s ability to pass policy by miring it in defensive actions against accusations of overstepping authority or corruption.
The reforms have passed the initial stage and are scheduled for review by the LY’s Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee. DPP Caucus Whip and LY Judicial Committee member Ker Chien-ming argued that the reforms are unconstitutional. Ker threatened a procedural objection that could delay the committee’s review process if the KMT did not arrange a public hearing to scrutinize the bill.[13] KMT Caucus Whip and LY Judicial Committee member Fu Kun-chi accused the DPP of obstruction and stated that “only checks and balances will prevent the DPP from falling into corruption.”[14]
The PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) warned the United States was “playing with fire” in stationing Green Berets on the Kinmen and Penghu islands. US-based special operations-focused online publication SOFREP first reported on March 8 that US Army Special Forces (Green Berets) would be permanently stationed at the Taiwanese Army’s amphibious command centers on the outlying islands of Kinmen and Penghu.[15] ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng responded to media inquiries about the permanent presence of US troops in Taiwan on March 14 without confirming the details of the SOFREP report. Chiu stated that interactions with friendly countries fall within the scope of exchange and cooperation, and help Taiwan’s armed forces recognize blind spots and shortcomings in military preparedness.[16] US service members have trained Taiwanese military personnel for decades in an arrangement that Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen first acknowledged in 2021.[17] Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command John Aquilino said on March 20 that reports of US troops “permanently stationed” on Kinmen were inaccurate, however.[18]
PRC MOD spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang responded to the ROC claim on March 15 by stressing that the “Taiwan issue” is the first “insurmountable red line” in US-PRC relations. Zhang said that the US troop deployment and arms sales to Taiwan aimed to “weaken, hollow out, and distort” the one-China principle and warned that “those who connive at and support ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces will get burned for playing with fire and taste the bitter fruit of their own doing.” He said the PRC military will “resolutely smash ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities and external interfering attempts.”[19]
PRC officials strongly objected to Taiwan Vice President-Elect Hsiao Bi-khim’s visits to the United States and Czechia. Hsiao, Taiwan’s former envoy to the United States, began a low-profile “personal trip” to Washington DC during the week of March 12. Media reports said that US and Taiwanese officials tried to keep the trip a secret to avoid angering the PRC, but cited unnamed sources who said Hsiao would meet with unspecified US officials to discuss her incoming administration’s agenda.[20] Spokesperson for the PRC embassy in the United States Liu Penghu called Hsiao a “diehard Taiwan independence separatist” and expressed Beijing’s firm opposition to her trip.[21] Liu and MFA spokesperson Wang Wenbin both stressed the PRC “firmly opposes” any official interaction between the United States and Taiwan.[22] Hsiao also visited Czechia on March 19 and met with Czech Senate President Miloš Vystrčil at a think tank event.[23] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian expressed opposition and warned Czechia to end its “bad behavior” of holding exchanges with Taiwan.[24]
China
The PRC signaled strong opposition to a US bill that would ban TikTok in the United States if TikTok’s PRC parent company does not sell its stake. TikTok is owned by the PRC technology firm Bytedance. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Wang Wenbin accused the United States of overstretching the concept of “national security” to hinder foreign competition, said the attempt to force the sale of TikTok was based on “sheer robbers’ logic,” and warned that the US moves would eventually backfire. Wang claimed the US government has never found evidence that TikTok poses a national security threat.[25] Wang also claimed the PRC’s bans on Facebook, Instagram, and other Western social media were “completely incomparable” to the US approach to TikTok because the PRC allegedly welcomes all foreign products and platforms “as long as they observe Chinese laws,” while the US government was discriminating against a specific company.[26]
TikTok has claimed it never shares US user data with the PRC, but the US government recommended that government employees avoid the app over concerns that it may allow PRC access to user data.[27] Former head of engineering for TikTok in the United States Yintao Yu claimed in 2023 that CCP officials could access US user data from the app.[28] TikTok’s parent Bytedance is a private company but has an internal CCP committee to regulate its “political direction,” like most large PRC firms.[29] The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) additionally stated that TikTok accounts run by a “PRC propaganda arm” targeted US Congressional candidates during the 2022 midterm elections.[30]
Northeast Asia
Japan
The PRC MOD framed the growth of Japan’s defense budget increase as unjustified and militaristic rather than a response to regional security issues, including PLA military coercion targeting Japan. The Japanese Cabinet approved a USD 55.9 billion defense budget for Fiscal Year 2024 in December 2023. The budget stipulates annual increases until it reaches USD 62.5 billion for Fiscal Year 2027.[31] The PRC MOD claimed on March 15 that this increase makes “the international community question whether Japan… adheres to the path of peaceful development.”[32] The Japanese defense budget increase comes in response to PRC aggression around the Japanese home islands. Japan’s Joint Staff noted in January 2024 that it scrambled fighters 555 times in the last nine months of 2023.[33] 98 percent of the scrambles responded to Chinese and Russian aircraft, and more than 50 percent occurred near Japan’s southwest airspace, which encompasses the Miyako Strait.[34]
North Korea
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko met with Chinese Special Representative on Korean Peninsula Affairs Liu Xiaoming in Moscow on March 19 to discuss the situation on the Korean Peninsula.[35] Rudenko and Liu accused the United States and its allies of threatening the military situation in northeastern Asia and warned the United States against the proliferation of Cold War-style “bloc thinking.”[36] The PRC MFA issued similar comments in framing the United States–South Korea Freedom Shield military exercise as causing instability on the Korean Peninsula.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The PRC is framing the United States as a destabilizing force in the South China Sea ahead of the April 11 US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit.[37] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbin remarked on March 14 to a question about the summit that the “US has traveled halfway around the world to China’s doorsteps to form exclusive circles, flex muscles and make provocations.”[38] United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated an “ironclad” commitment to the US-Philippine alliance on March 19 in the ongoing aftermath of PRC revisionism in the SCS.[39] PRC MFA Spokesman Lin Jian responded on March 19 that the United States is “not a party” to South China Sea issues and therefore has no right to “intervene” in Sino-Philippine disputes.[40] The MFA’s rhetoric is consistent with previous PRC messaging about the US role in the region. The PRC MOD framed the United States as “creating bloc confrontations that escalate regional tension” after the June 2023 US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit.[41]
The messaging from the PRC MFA aims to deflect blame from the PRC for heightened tensions in the South China Sea, namely over the Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. Scarborough Shoal is a contested atoll that the PRC and the Philippines claim and that has been under de facto PRC control since 2012.[42] The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) erected a floating barrier and intercepted Philippine Coast Guard vessels in February to deny the Philippines access to the shoal.[43] The CCG has also disrupted Philippine Coast Guard missions to ensure the security of Filipino fishermen near the shoal. The Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea which the Philippines and the PRC both claim. The Philippines controls the shoal with troops based on the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre. A CCG vessel attempted to block and collided with a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel escorting a supply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on March 5, causing minor damage to the Philippine ship.[44] Two CCG ships also fired water cannons at a separate Philippine supply ship, injuring four Philippine personnel, and later collided with it.[45]
The CCG actions In the South China Sea support PRC claims of sovereignty over nearly the entirety of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, through the “nine dash line” maritime boundary. The PRC rejects a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that declared the nine dash line claims are unlawful.[46] The PRC has constructed, seized, and attempted to seize many islands in the South China Sea so it can build a military presence throughout the critical waterway. The PRC has built military infrastructure on islands that it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase its control over critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. Developing the capability to monitor or restrict ships through the South China Sea would support a future PRC effort to implement a blockade of Taiwan or block US and allied reinforcements from reaching the Taiwan Strait in wartime.
Australia
PRC Foreign Minister Want Yi visited Australia and New Zealand between March 17 and 21. Wang’s meeting with New Zealand Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters addressed implementing the China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, as well as disagreements over New Zealand’s potential ascension into AUKUS.[47] The PRC MFA framed Wang’s separate meetings with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong as seeking common ground and opportunities for Sino-Australian collaboration.[48] Wang’s visit to Australia also included meetings with the Australian business community and former Prime Minister Paul Keating.[49] Keating is a prominent critic of AUKUS and a former board member of the CCP-run China Development Bank.[50] This is the first visit by a PRC foreign minister to Australia since 2017.[51]
Europe
Russia-Ukraine War
The PRC advocated for direct dialogue between Russia and Ukraine without committing to the Ukraine-proposed “global peace summit” in Switzerland. PRC Ambassador to Switzerland Wang Shihting said in an interview on March 18 that the PRC supports direct dialogue between Russia and Ukraine as soon as possible. He also stated that the PRC is “examining the possibility of taking part” in the Ukraine-proposed “global peace summit." [52] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian subsequently avoided directly answering whether the PRC would participate in the summit or whether it would push for Russia to participate.[53]
Wang Shihting’s comments do not signal a change in PRC policy toward the war in Ukraine. The PRC has consistently backed peace talks or negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, in abstract terms, and portrayed itself as an impartial and “stabilizing” force in pushing for a political settlement to end the war. It has not committed to any specific peace talk proposals, however. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed Ukraine’s proposal for peace talks in Switzerland on February 17 during the Munich Security Conference, stating that there were not “ripe conditions” for peace talks, in comments that were omitted from PRC readouts.[54] Wang Yi told the National People’s Congress on March 7 that the PRC supports holding “in due course” an international peace conference recognized by both Russia and Ukraine.[55] Russia has said it will not participate in the summit even if invited.[56] PRC Special Envoy for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui reiterated PRC support for a “timely convening of an international peace conference” but acknowledged on March 22 that “there is a relatively big gap in [the Russian and Ukrainian] understanding of peace talks.” Li’s acknowledgement of differences in the two sides’ understanding of peace talks was absent from the PRC readout of his remarks.[57]
The PRC rhetorically aligns with Russian framing in criticizing NATO, portraying the Western security order and arms sales to Ukraine as fueling the war, opposing sanctions on Russia, and calling for respect for Russia’s “legitimate security concerns.”[58] The PRC has not shown any willingness to pressure Russia to end the war.
Middle East
Israel-Hamas War
The PRC had its first public diplomatic meeting with a Hamas official and its first diplomatic visits to Israel and the West Bank since Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7. PRC MFA envoy Wang Kejian met with the head of Hamas’ political bureau Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar on March 17. This was the first meeting between PRC and Hamas officials that the PRC has publicly acknowledged since the war in Gaza began in October 2023. Hamas claimed that Wang called Hamas “part of the Palestinian national fabric” and said the PRC is “keen on relations with it.”[59] The PRC readout simply said Wang and Haniyeh “exchanged views on the Gaza conflict.”[60] The PRC has not publicly criticized Hamas since the war began. MFA Spokesperson Lin Jian said on March 19 that the PRC supports the Palestinian Authority in governing all Palestinian territories and called for “internal reconciliation” among all political factions in Palestine, however.[61]
Wang, who is a former ambassador to Lebanon, has been in the Middle East since at least March 10 discussing the Gaza war with officials in Egypt, Israel, the West Bank, and Qatar.[62] He led the PRC’s first diplomatic trip to Israel and Palestine since the war began, meeting with Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al Maliki in the West Bank on March 13 and Israeli foreign ministry officials Hagai Shagrir and Rachel Feinmesser in Israel on March 14. The PRC readouts for the meetings in Israel and the West Bank said Wang reiterated the PRC support for a ceasefire in Gaza, humanitarian aid, and the promotion of a two-state solution, though these policy positions were absent from the readout of the Hamas meeting.[63] This has been the PRC’s consistent stance on the conflict, which broadly aligns with the view of Arab states and allows the PRC to portray itself as a responsible great power that is pushing for peace. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi endorsed Palestine becoming a full member of the UN on March 7.[64]
21. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 22, 2024
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-22-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Gaza Strip: The IDF continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Palestinian fighters may be retreating from certain areas of the Gaza Strip during Israeli clearing operations there before reentering those areas after the Israelis depart.
- West Bank: Palestinian militias may be maintaining at least one VBIED cell near Tubas.
- Iraq: The pause in Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks does not indicate a change in the long-term Iranian and Iranian-backed proxy objective to expel the United States from the Middle East.
- Yemen: US CENTCOM and the French Navy intercepted multiple Houthi ballistic missiles and a Houthi naval attack drone in the Red Sea in several separate incidents.
- Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war in separate phone calls with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh and PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah.
IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 22, 2024
Mar 22, 2024 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Iran Update, March 22, 2024
Ashka Jhaveri, Peter Mills, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Elizabeth Volynsky-Lauzon, Rachel Friedman, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.
Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 22.[1] The IDF 401st and Nahal Brigades (162nd Division) and Israeli special operations forces have killed approximately 150 Palestinian fighters in the hospital area since the operation began on March 18.[2] Palestinian militias focused their attacks in the Gaza Strip on March 22 on Israeli forces al Shifa Hospital.[3] A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli forces ”intensified” operations in Gaza City east of al Shifa Hospital.[4] Hamas' infiltration into the al Shifa Hospital area after Israel’s initial clearing operation highlights Hamas’ efforts and determination to reestablish itself in the northern Gaza Strip.[5]
Palestinian fighters may be retreating from certain areas of the Gaza Strip during Israeli clearing operations there before reentering those areas after the Israelis depart. Israeli forces are not permanently securing the areas that they clear, which allows Palestinian fighters to return after the IDF leaves. The current clearing operation in and around al Shifa Hospital is the third clearing operation in southern or western Gaza City. Israeli forces have launched new clearing operations in several neighborhoods surrounding al Shifa Hospital three times—including the ongoing operation—since January. Israeli forces re-cleared al Shati Camp—to the immediate north of al Shifa Hospital—and Rimal neighborhood—where al Shifa Hospital is located—in early February and Zaytoun neighborhood, southeast of Rimal, in late February.[6] Palestinian militias may have temporarily retreated from these areas during the Israeli operations there, as demonstrated by the large number of fighters that Israeli forces have detained during the newest Israeli clearing operation in Rimal focused on al Shifa Hospital, which began on March 18.
Palestinian militias may be maintaining at least one VBIED cell near Tubas. Hamas fighters detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) targeting an IDF bulldozer in Tubas during an Israeli raid on March 21.[7] Palestinian fighters have deployed at least three VBIEDs targeting Israeli forces in the northern West Bank in 2024, including two VBIEDs in Tubas since March 7.[8] CTP-ISW previously noted on March 7 that the two VBIED attacks on and prior to March 7 suggested the existence of a VBIED cell in the northern West Bank.[9] It is unclear how sophisticated or well-manufactured these VBIEDs are. VBIEDs require significant logistical infrastructure, including dedicated workshops to reassemble cars after technicians take apart the vehicles and pack them with explosives.[10] VBIEDs also require bombmaking facilities, an area to stash the VBIED prior to its deployment, and a security detachment for the workshop and bombmaking facilities. The Palestinian militias in Tubas may be collaborating to assemble and deploy these VBIEDs, given the level of resources and expertise required.
A Hamas sniper wounded seven Israelis near an Israeli settlement in the West Bank on March 22 in a multi-stage ambush.[11] The sniper fired multiple rounds at an Israeli bus near Dolev before engaging the IDF quick reaction force that responded to the attack.[12] The sniper fired at the IDF quick reaction force from a series of pre-prepared firing positions for several hours before an IDF helicopter killed him.[13] The al Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades, Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine all praised the sniper attack.[14]
The pause in Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks does not indicate a change in the long-term Iranian and Iranian-backed proxy objective to expel the United States from the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq–an umbrella group of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias–has not conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq or Syria for 47 days.[15] IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani ordered the Islamic Resistance in Iraq to pause attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria following the January 28 attack that killed three US service members in northeast Jordan.[16] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias retain the capability to resume attacks targeting US forces at any time for any reason of their choosing. CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla said during a Senate Armed Service Committee Hearing on March 7 that Iran has continued to send arms and funding to its Iraqi militias during the pause in attacks.[17] Iran and its so-called ”Axis of Resistance“ in Iraq have not deviated from their objective to remove US forces from Iraq. Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi met with unspecified leaders in Iran‘s ”Axis of Resistance” in Tehran on March 20 and said that the current pause in attacks on US forces does not mark the end of efforts to expel US forces from Iraq.[18]
Key Takeaways:
- Gaza Strip: The IDF continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Palestinian fighters may be retreating from certain areas of the Gaza Strip during Israeli clearing operations there before reentering those areas after the Israelis depart.
- West Bank: Palestinian militias may be maintaining at least one VBIED cell near Tubas.
- Iraq: The pause in Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks does not indicate a change in the long-term Iranian and Iranian-backed proxy objective to expel the United States from the Middle East.
- Yemen: US CENTCOM and the French Navy intercepted multiple Houthi ballistic missiles and a Houthi naval attack drone in the Red Sea in several separate incidents.
- Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war in separate phone calls with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh and PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
- Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.
The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 22.[19] The IDF reported that unspecified Palestinian fighters launched mortars targeting Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip and Israeli forces responded with artillery fire.[20]
Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 22. The IDF Air Force struck tunnel shafts and two structures in Qarara that Palestinian fighters had rigged to explode.[21]
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli War Cabinet in Tel Aviv on March 22.[22] Blinken discussed efforts to reach a six-week ceasefire to secure hostages and enable a surge in humanitarian aid. Blinken also briefed the Israeli War Cabinet about efforts he made during his visits to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Cairo, Egypt, to “achieve lasting peace.” Netanyahu said at the end of his meeting with Blinken that there is “no way to defeat Hamas without entering Rafah” and that Israel will “do it alone” if it must.[23]
Two unspecified US officials told CNN on March 21 that Blinken told Qatar that Hamas must agree to a ceasefire deal or risk getting kicked out of Doha.[24] Several senior Hamas members, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, are based in Doha. CNN noted that Blinken made the comment on March 5 at a time when negotiations between Hamas and Israel had stalled. The officials said that Qatar understood the message and “received it without major pushback.”
The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office confirmed that CIA Director Bill Burns will travel to Doha on March 22 to join ceasefire negotiations.[25] The talks also include Israeli and Egyptian intelligence chiefs and the Qatari prime minister. Israel and Hamas began a new round of negotiations on March 18.[26]
Several Arab and Israeli sources told the Wall Street Journal on March 22 that Israel is developing a plan to distribute aid in the Gaza Strip that “could eventually create a Palestinian-led governing authority” to contest Hamas.[27] The Israeli plan involves distributing the aid via Palestinian leaders and businessmen without links to Hamas who would be recruited by Israel. An Israeli official noted that Hamas’ “vehement opposition” could make the plan unfeasible. Some of this ”vehement opposition” may include Hamas-ordered assassinations targeting Gazan notables. Hamas reportedly killed the head of a large local clan on March 13. Palestinian civilians accused the clan of cooperating with Israel.[28] The Israeli official noted that Hamas can reassert itself due to the governance vacuum that exists in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has already sought to reconstitute militarily and rebuild its governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip after the Israeli drawdown in the Strip that began in December 2023.
Israeli officials are currently debating the issue of humanitarian aid distribution in the Gaza Strip. Israeli media reported on March 8 that Israeli officials have discussed arming civilians in the Gaza Strip to provide security for aid convoys.[29] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has proposed involving Fatah in the distribution. Netanyahu has shut down proposals for aid distribution involving the Palestinian Authority.[30] Israeli officials have also not yet identified an actor or organization that could lead Gaza in the future, though some Israeli officials have proposed working with local clans.[31] Hamas reportedly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City on March 13 amid local accusations that the clan was cooperating with Israel.[32] The heads of Palestinian tribes, clans, and families in the Gaza Strip affirmed on March 19 that they are not an alternative to any Palestinian political solution. They added that they denounced Israel, calling Israel an occupier.[33]
Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 22. The IDF reported on March 22 that it intercepted a rocket that Palestinian fighters launched on March 21 from the central Gaza Strip into southern Israel.[34] The Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed the March 21 attack.[35] The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting military infrastructure in the Strip in response to the attack. [36]
West Bank
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there
Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least six locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 21.[37] The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Hamas, and PIJ separately claimed that they detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces operating in Tubas on March 21 and 22 (see topline for analysis of a VBIED detonation in Tubas during the raid).[38] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also engaged Israeli forces in Qalqilya and near Nablus.[39] The group threw an IED targeting a civilian bus near Bethlehem and fired small arms at an Israeli settlement near Jenin.[40]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
- Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel
Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 21.[41]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
- Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts
US CENTCOM and the French Navy intercepted multiple Houthi ballistic missiles and a Houthi naval attack drone in the Red Sea on March 21 in several separate incidents.[42] US CENTCOM intercepted a Houthi naval attack drone in the Red Sea on March 21.[43] CENTCOM also reported that coalition forces intercepted two Houthi ballistic missiles in the Red Sea. A French frigate also intercepted three additional Houthi ballistic missiles over the southern Red Sea.[44]
Houthi-controlled media claimed on March 22 that the United States conducted airstrikes targeting Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory.[45] The outlet said that the strikes targeted al Kadan, Hudaydah Governorate, western Yemen.
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war in separate phone calls with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh and PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah on March 21 and 22, respectively. [46] This marks Abdollahian and Haniyeh’s fifth phone call since October 7.[47] Abdollahian last met with Nakhalah in February 2024 during a meeting with leaders of various Palestinian factions in Beirut.[48]
Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Mohammad Javad Haj Ali Akbari said during Friday prayers on March 22 that Israel must be prepared for a “second, third, and fourth” October 7-style attack.[49] Akbari stated that Muslim countries must prepare for a ”different” Quds Day this year by creating a ”political earthquake” for Israel and its supporters. Quds Day is an anti-Israel holiday started by Iran and will occur on the last Friday of Ramadan, April 5, 2024.[50]
Akbari’s statement reflects the thinking of Iranian leaders on how to defeat Israel. IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami said in 2022 that Palestinian militias needed to focus on successive offensive ground operations into Israel instead of defensive, static wars using their rocket systems.[51] Iran’s leaders theorize that these ground operations will result in mass Israeli emigration and the collapse of the Israeli state. Hamas Political Bureau member Ghazi Hamed seemingly echoed these sentiments in a television interview on November 1, when he said that Hamas would repeat the October 7 attacks “a second, a third, [and] a fourth” time.[52]
22. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22, 2024
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces conducted the largest series of combined drone and missile strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure since the start of the full-scale invasion during the night of March 21-22.
- Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities may aim to degrade Ukrainian defense industrial capacity, and Russian forces are likely trying to exploit Ukrainian air defense missile shortages in a renewed attempt to collapse Ukraine’s energy grid.
- Russian forces will likely continue offensive operations through Spring 2024 while preparing for an expected offensive effort in Summer 2024, although Russian forces will likely struggle to launch a concerted large-scale offensive operation in multiple operational directions in Ukraine at the same time.
- Russian forces likely seek to exploit current Ukrainian materiel shortages while preparing for efforts that will force Ukraine to expend a sizeable portion of the Western security assistance it may receive in the coming months.
- The Ukrainian military command appears to be prioritizing rotations for frontline units but will have to address additional manpower challenges if Ukrainian forces are to seize the initiative even on a localized basis in 2024 as Ukrainian senior military officers say they hope to do.
- Russian authorities reportedly intend to significantly expand crypto-mobilization efforts starting in Spring 2024 amid reports about significant decreases in the number of voluntary recruits.
- Verstka reported that select Russian officials stated that the Russian military command hopes that increased force generation will allow Russian forces to conduct a future offensive operation to encircle Kharkiv City. Such an operation would pose significant challenges both to the Russian forces responsible for the effort and to the wider Russian campaign in Ukraine, however.
- This Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for a mass shooting and bombing at a concert venue in the suburbs of Moscow on the evening of March 22.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact.
- Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on March 22 that Ukrainian authorities helped return another nine Ukrainian children to Ukrainian-controlled territory from occupied Ukraine and Russia.
- The Moscow military registration and enlistment office has reportedly begun to issue electronic summonses for the Spring 2024 Russian conscription cycle.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 22, 2024
Mar 22, 2024 - ISW Press
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22, 2024
Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan
March 22, 2024, 10:10pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:45pm ET on March 22 (except for information pertaining to attacks on a concert hall near Moscow). ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces conducted the largest series of combined drone and missile strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure since the start of the full-scale invasion during the night of March 21-22. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 151 drones and missiles at Ukraine overnight, including 63 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; 12 Iskander-M missiles from Belgorod Oblast and occupied Crimea; 40 Kh-101/Kh-55 missiles from strategic bombers over the Caspian Sea; five Kh-22 cruise missiles from bombers over Rostov Oblast; seven Kh-47 Kinzhal missiles from bombers over Tambov Oblast; two Kh-59 cruise missiles from bombers over occupied Zaporizhia Oblast; and 22 S-300/S-400 air defense missiles from Belgorod and Kursk oblasts.[1] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 55 Shahed drones, 35 Kh-101/55 missiles, and two Kh-59 missiles.[2] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces targeted 136 energy facilities in Zaporizhia, Khmelnytskyi, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Mykolaiv, Vinnytsia, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts, damaging dozens of these facilities in the largest attack against Ukrainian energy infrastructure since February 2022.[3]
Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities may aim to degrade Ukrainian defense industrial capacity, and Russian forces are likely trying to exploit Ukrainian air defense missile shortages in a renewed attempt to collapse Ukraine’s energy grid. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes temporarily caused power, water, and other outages but that Ukrainian authorities have since restored these services.[4] Intensified Russian strikes in winter 2023-2024 reportedly heavily targeted Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises, and the Russian strikes on energy infrastructure in early Spring 2024 likely aim to collapse the energy grid in part to stall Ukrainian efforts to rapidly expand its DIB.[5] Russian forces failed to collapse the Ukrainian energy grid on March 22 but may aim to continue intensified strikes on energy infrastructure in subsequent strike series, especially to capitalize on continued delays in Western security assistance that are reportedly expected to significantly constrain Ukraine‘s air defense umbrella.[6] Russian forces have steadily degraded some Ukrainian power production capabilities: capturing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in March 2022, occupying the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) in February 2022 and subsequently destroying its dam in June 2023, and now significantly damaging the Dnipro Hydroelectric Power Plant (DHPP) in Zaporizhzhia City during the March 22, 2024 strike.[7] The strikes took the DHPP offline, and it will likely take some time to repair.[8] The Russian strikes may also support Russian efforts to sow internal instability in Ukraine as the Kremlin seeks to degrade domestic and international confidence in the Ukrainian government. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command warned on March 22 that Russia is preparing information operations aiming to falsely portray Ukraine as without power.[9]
Russian forces will likely continue offensive operations through Spring 2024 while preparing for an expected offensive effort in Summer 2024, although Russian forces will likely struggle to launch a concerted large-scale offensive operation in multiple operational directions in Ukraine at the same time. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on March 22 that Russian forces are currently committing all available resources to the Lyman, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka directions to sustain ongoing offensive operations and retain the advantage of holding the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine.[10] Russian forces have conducted consistent offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in order to first seize and then retain the theater-wide initiative and appear to be committing tactical and operational reserves to ongoing offensive operations in hopes of destabilizing Ukrainian defensive lines and preventing Ukraine from getting the respite it would need to contest the initiative.[11] Pavlyuk stated that Russian forces are currently creating force groupings of 100,000 personnel in Ukraine but did not specify in which operational directions.[12] Russian forces have accumulated roughly 100,000 personnel along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis, roughly 50,000 near Bakhmut (as of fall 2023), over 50,000 near Avdiivka, and are reportedly attempting to accumulate a grouping of roughly 50,000 personnel in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[13] Pavlyuk stated that Russian forces can use these groupings to replenish units that are currently losing combat power but that Russian forces may form a grouping sufficient to conduct an offensive operation in one operational direction in Summer 2024.[14] The Russian military command also appears to be forming reserves capable of sustaining ongoing offensive operations at their current tempo in Ukraine, but these reserves are unlikely to be able to function as cohesive large-scale penetration or exploitation formations ahead of the Summer 2024 offensive effort.[15] Russian forces have previously struggled to conduct large-scale offensive operations in more than one operational direction at the same time, and the Russian military does not appear to have accumulated multiple large groupings of forces or established the ”strategic reserves” that would facilitate two or more large-scale offensive operations.[16]
Russian forces likely seek to exploit current Ukrainian materiel shortages while preparing for efforts that will force Ukraine to expend a sizeable portion of the Western security assistance it may receive in the coming months. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated on March 22 that he expects that European security assistance will even out disparities between Russian and Ukrainian artillery capabilities in the next month or two.[17] Havrylyuk stated that Russian forces currently have a seven-to-one advantage in artillery ammunition over Ukrainian forces, and current Ukrainian ammunition shortages are constraining Ukraine’s ability to prevent gradual tactical Russian gains along the front.[18] Pentagon Spokesperson Sabrina Singh stated on March 21 that Ukrainian forces are having to make difficult decisions to withdraw from certain areas due to continued delays in Western security assistance, and ISW has previously assessed that materiel shortages will likely force Ukrainian forces to make tough decisions about prioritizing certain sectors of the front over sectors where limited territorial setbacks are least damaging.[19] Russian forces may seek to maintain the tempo of their offensive operations through spring regardless of difficult weather and terrain conditions in an effort to exploit Ukrainian materiel shortages before promised Western security assistance arrives in Ukraine.[20]
Imminent packages of Western security assistance may address Ukraine’s pressing immediate shortages, but Russian offensive efforts will continue to force Ukraine to expend materiel in ways that can reproduce similar shortages over time in the absence of more consistent security assistance. The expected large-scale Russian offensive effort in Summer 2024 will require Ukrainian forces to expend materiel that is in short supply, and the Russian command may intend in part for the summer offensive effort to prevent Ukrainian forces from fielding well-provisioned forces for prolonged periods or accumulating materiel for future counteroffensive operations. Ukraine’s European partners are expanding their efforts to provide more regular security assistance to Ukraine but will likely not be able to do so, specifically for artillery ammunition, in the coming months as Ukraine defends against expected Russian summer offensive operations and possible Russian offensive efforts in the second half of 2024. Consistent provisions of Western military assistance in key systems, many of which only the US can provide rapidly at scale, will play a critical role in determining Russian prospects in 2024 and when Ukrainian forces can attempt to contest the theater-wide initiative.[21]
The Ukrainian military command appears to be prioritizing rotations for frontline units but will have to address additional manpower challenges if Ukrainian forces are to seize the initiative even on a localized basis in 2024 as Ukrainian senior military officers say they hope to do. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi announced on March 22 that the Ukrainian military is currently optimizing its military organization structures to simplify and maximize the quality and efficiency of Ukraine’s force management.[22] Syrskyi stated that some Ukrainian force groupings will be “reformatted” and that this effort aims to improve the management and distribution of Ukrainian personnel. Syrskyi stated that conducting rotations for frontline units is a key priority, and Syrskyi had observed on March 14 that unspecified Ukrainian units that have been deployed to the frontline for a long time have started conducting rotations.[23] Pavlyuk stated on March 22 that the Ukrainian military has started regrouping and withdrawing a number of brigades from unspecified positions to restore their combat capability.[24] Pavlyuk stated that Ukraine is transferring forces and resources to ”recovery areas” in order to give servicemen time to rest, recover, and resupply and allow Ukrainian forces to launch ”new actions with new forces.” ISW previously assessed that the reported beginning of Ukrainian rotations suggests that the Ukrainian command believes that the situation on whatever unspecified sector(s) of the frontline where the rotations have or will occur has stabilized sufficiently for Ukrainian troops to rotate.[25]
Pavlyuk stated that Ukraine can seize the initiative if the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine decreases.[26] Russia’s theater-wide initiative allows Russia to determine the location, time, intensity, and requirements of fighting along the frontline and allows the Russian military command to reprioritize efforts dynamically to take advantage of perceived opportunities created by Ukrainian materiel shortages or other factors.[27] ISW previously assessed that it would be unwise for Ukraine to cede the advantage of the theater-wide initiative to Russia for longer than is necessary, although it is unclear when Ukraine could be able to challenge Russia’s control of the initiative given Ukraine’s manpower challenges and delays and uncertainty in the provision of US military assistance.[28] Analyst Michael Kofman told the Washington Post on March 15 that the US supplemental aid package would allow Ukrainian forces to ”buy time” but that Ukraine must also fix the ”structural problem” related to its manpower.[29] The need for rotations is only part of Ukraine’s manpower ”structural problem."
Russian authorities reportedly intend to significantly expand crypto-mobilization efforts starting in Spring 2024 amid reports about significant decreases in the number of voluntary recruits. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 22 that high-ranking sources from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), presidential administration, and regional governments stated that the Russian MoD plans to increase force generation starting in the spring and that Russia may intend to generate an additional 300,000 personnel within an unspecified time frame.[30] Verstka’s sources reportedly stated that the Russian military will first focus on recruiting reservists who have signed contracts with the MoD to join the “personnel mobilization reserve” that undergoes military training twice a year. An officer from an unspecified military unit in Trans-Baikal Krai reportedly told Verstka that Russian authorities are currently recruiting such reservists in ways similar to those used before partial mobilization in 2022, but that it is unclear if Russian authorities will order another mobilization wave. Verstka reported that presidential administration sources stated that Russian authorities aim to persuade and even coerce conscripts whose service term will end in April 2024 or has already ended in 2023 to sign military contracts. Verstka reported that sources indicated that military registration and enlistment offices started to issue more deferment certificates to employees of state enterprises and some defense enterprises at the end of February but that the reason for this phenomenon is unclear. Verstka reported that sources differed on whether recent activity in the Moscow Mayor’s office, including the resumption of work by employees who had previously helped military registration and enlistment offices during the fall 2022 mobilization wave and the creation of a new center for conscripts, is related to the upcoming biannual spring conscription cycle or something else.
Verstka reported that employees of the military recruitment center in Moscow indicated that the pace of Russian voluntary recruitment “dropped sharply” starting in October 2023 with the number of visitors to the Unified Contract Hiring Center in Moscow decreasing from 500-600 per day to 20-30 per day.[31] Russian forces’ ability to replenish their significant losses in recent months has been crucial for their ability to maintain the tempo of their offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine, particularly offensive operations near Avdiivka that began in October 2023.[32] Should Russian authorities be unable to recruit the quantity of personnel needed to replenish losses and maintain the current tempo of offensive operations in Ukraine through intensified volunteer recruitment efforts, Russian authorities would likely intensify other crypto-mobilization methods, such as the coercive mobilization of convicts and migrants, to sustain offensive operations before deciding to do so by conducting another unpopular wave of mobilization.
A Russian Storm-Z instructor noted that Russian authorities must consider the conflicting interests of the Russian military command, various groups of military personnel in Ukraine, and Russian society when deciding whether to conduct another wave of mobilization or not. The instructor claimed that Russian authorities have resorted to recruiting volunteer military personnel since they are concerned that another mobilization wave would likely spark social tension in Russia and lead to another mass exodus from the country. The instructor claimed that volunteers’ recruitment prospects in the post-election period are “ambiguous” and that another mobilization wave would be “fairly logical” to fill both the active army and the strategic reserves. The instructor highlighted, however, that Russian authorities must consider various problematic factors when deciding whether to call for another mobilization. The instructor stated that if Russian authorities were to conduct another mobilization without demobilizing those already called up in Fall 2022, there would be tension between the newly mobilized and previously mobilized personnel; if Russian authorities conduct a larger-scale mobilization than the one in the fall of 2022 and replace those previously mobilized, there would be tension with volunteer recruits who have open-ended contracts; and if Russian authorities do not conduct another mobilization wave, there would be increased tension among the military personnel who have been on the front for a long time. The instructor claimed that Russian authorities can avoid a possible mobilization if Russian forces systematically improve their reconnaissance-fire complexes (RFC) and reconnaissance-strike complex (RSC) in coordination with offensive actions. The instructor also suggested that Russian “meat assaults” are aggravating Russian forces’ personnel problems and complained that Russian authorities praise "meat assault” commanders who “amuse” Russian authorities with “beautiful” but untrue frontline reports.
Verstka reported that select Russian officials stated that the Russian military command hopes that increased force generation will allow Russian forces to conduct a future offensive operation to encircle Kharkiv City. Such an operation would pose significant challenges both to the Russian forces responsible for the effort and to the wider Russian campaign in Ukraine, however. Verstka reported that its sources stated that conscripts called up in the spring conscription cycle and “incompetent” reservists will go to Russia’s southern border in support roles or as border troops as part of efforts to free up more experienced military personnel for an attack on Kharkiv City.[33] A Russian presidential administration source reportedly told Verstka that the Russian military needs 300,000 additional personnel in order to launch an operation to encircle Kharkiv City and that Russian forces hope to seize the city without turning it into a ”second Mariupol.”[34]
A Russian offensive operation to encircle Kharkiv City would be an extremely ambitious undertaking that would require long drives across open terrain that Russian forces have not conducted since the start of the full-scale invasion.[35] Russian forces are currently conducting an offensive operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line that aims to reach the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast, but even if that ongoing effort achieves its intended goal, the prospects for Russian advances into Kharkiv Oblast from the east bank of the Oskil River are as challenging as the prospects of advancing elsewhere along the international border with Belgorod Oblast if not more so.[36] Russian forces have committed relatively minimal forces to protect Russia’s international borders, and these elements would be insufficient for an operation to encircle Kharkiv City.[37] The reported plan to generate 300,000 new personnel could allow Russian forces to free up relatively combat-effective elements along the frontline in Ukraine for an operation to encircle Kharkiv City, but at the expense of offensive operations in sectors of the front that the Russian military command has been prioritizing for over a year and a half of campaigning in Ukraine. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces may intend to conduct limited offensive operations along the international border with Kharkiv Oblast to draw and fix Ukrainian forces and that Kremlin officials may be engaging with ultranationalists’ calls to push Ukrainian forces away from the border with Belgorod Oblast to divert Ukrainian attention away from the ongoing Russian offensive operation along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast axis.[38] ISW has yet to observe any indicators that Russian forces are currently preparing for an offensive operation to encircle Kharkiv City.
This Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for a mass shooting and bombing at a concert venue in the suburbs of Moscow on the evening of March 22. Russian authorities reported that three to five attackers in camouflage opened fire with automatic weapons and detonated explosives during an event at the “Crocus City Hall” concert venue in Krasnogorsk on the northwestern outskirts of Moscow City, killing at least 40 and injuring at least 100.[39] The attackers reportedly fled the scene.[40] Russian reports suggest that up to 6,200 people had gathered at the Crocus concert venue for a sold-out concert, and eyewitnesses reported and posted footage of gunfire, explosions, casualties, and civilians fleeing the venue.[41] The explosions caused a significant fire at the Crocus venue, engulfing roughly 13,000 square meters of the building, causing the roof to cave in, and destroying the top floor.[42] Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) forces, Rosgvardia’s Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR) and Special Purpose Mobile Unit (OMON) forces, and firefighters deployed to the Crocus concert hall to help fight the fire, evacuate civilians, secure the area, and search for suspects.[43] Russian authorities have detained at least one unspecified individual, though it is unclear if this individual is a suspected attacker or was detained for another reason in the aftermath of the attacks.[44]
Russian authorities have not yet reported on the identities or affiliations of the attackers but IS claimed responsibility for the attacks.[45] US officials told the Washington Post that the US has “no reason to doubt” the IS claim.[46] The Washington Post cited US officials as saying that the American and British embassies in Russia issued warnings on March 8 of possible terrorist attacks at mass gatherings in Moscow and St. Petersburg in part due to reports of IS-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) operating in Russia.[47] CNN Chief National Security Correspondent Alex Marquardt reported that sources informed him that the US has had ”fairly specific” intelligence about IS-KP plans for an attack in Russia and that the US informed Russia of the intelligence.[48]
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian authorities informed Putin about the attack within several minutes and that Putin is receiving updates from all the relevant services.[49] Russian authorities responded to the attack by canceling public events and issuing “high alert” warnings throughout Russia.[50] Russian authorities also announced increased security measures throughout Moscow Oblast and at Russian airports and rail stations.[51] The Russian Investigative Committee opened a criminal case into the attack and deployed an investigative team to the concert venue shortly after Russian security forces security the scene.[52] Russian officials and milbloggers threatened punishments and retaliation against the attackers and baselessly suggested that Ukraine was involved in the attack.[53]
Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President’s Office Mykhaylo Podolyak stated that Ukraine had nothing to do with the attack in Moscow.[54] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that it rejected all accusations that Ukraine was involved in the attack.[55] US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated that there is no indication that Ukraine was involved in the attack.[56]
NATO Military Committee Chairperson Admiral Rob Bauer highlighted the ways in which Russia has prompted NATO’s refocus on collective security and the applicability of Ukrainian naval drone operations in other theaters during an interview on March 22. Bauer stated that NATO has been tracking the possibility of a conflict with Russia since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and that Russian aggression has made it necessary for NATO to return to focusing on collective security after focusing on “crisis response” over the last 20 to 30 years.[57] Bauer stated that NATO understands that ”time is not on our side” in terms of collective security because ”the enemy decides when and where they attack and how long the conflict lasts.” Bauer stated on March 21 that ”Russia’s war against Ukraine has never been about any real security threat coming from either Ukraine or NATO,” which is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 to weaken and ultimately destroy NATO – a goal that he still pursues.[58] Bauer also highlighted Ukrainian naval drone operations against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet as an “extraordinary example of innovation.”[59] Bauer stated that drones will continue to play an important role on land and at sea and that the role of drones in combined missile strikes will increase. Bauer noted that there is an important question about how naval drones can be used in other oceans and seas as effectively as Ukrainian forces have used naval drones in the Black Sea. CTP-ISW has previously reported on similar but unsuccessful efforts by the Houthis to strike vessels in the Red Sea.[60]
US-sanctioned, pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor is reportedly in Moscow, his second visit in the last two months, as the Kremlin appears to be intensifying efforts to set information conditions to justify a variety of Russian hybrid operations aimed a destabilizing Moldova. Shor stated on March 22 that his current trip to Russia is aimed at building a “clear plan” for future Russian and Moldova cooperation.[61] Shor stated that his goal is the “total resignation of the current pro-Western regime” that acts against the interest of the Moldovan people and claimed that the West is attempting to turn Moldova into “some kind of battlefield.”[62] Shor noted that he plans to attend the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 5-8 2024.[63] Shor last visited Russia on February 7 and met with Russian Duma official Leonid Kalashnikov, the chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Eurasian Integration, and Relations with Compatriots Abroad.[64] Shor and Kalashnikov reportedly discussed the ”negative impact of the collective West on the lives of ordinary citizens of Moldova.” ISW previously assessed that Shor is a prominent Kremlin political proxy in Moldova and that Shor’s February 7 meeting with Kalashnikov was a notable inflection. Shor’s meeting with Kalashnikov was followed by the February 28 Seventh Congress of Deputies from pro-Russian Moldova breakaway region Transnistria, in which Transnistrian officials requested unspecified ”zashchita” (defense/protection) from Russia, and governor of pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region Gagauzia Yevgenia Gutsul’s meetings with Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, in early March.[65] Shor may have played a role in orchestrating these events and is almost certainly a significant actor within the Kremlin’s efforts to destabilize Moldova.
US sanctions have seemingly prompted India to significantly decrease the amount of crude oil it imports from Russia, likely further constraining Russian attempts to skirt the G7 oil price cap. Bloomberg reported on March 22 that all of India’s private and state-run oil refineries are refusing to accept Russian crude oil transported on Russian PJSC Sovcomflot tankers due to US sanctions.[66] Bloomberg noted that the Indian refineries are increasingly scrutinizing which tankers are carrying the Russian oil and that Sovcomflot tankers account for 15 percent of Russian oil shipments to India.[67] Bloomberg also recently reported that two tankers carrying Russian crude oil have been idling off the Indian west coast since February 29.[68] Bloomberg previously reported that Indian oil buyers have turned away tankers carrying Russian crude oil priced above the G7’s $60 per barrel price cap and that India wants to distance itself from Russia due to the war in Ukraine.[69]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces conducted the largest series of combined drone and missile strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure since the start of the full-scale invasion during the night of March 21-22.
- Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities may aim to degrade Ukrainian defense industrial capacity, and Russian forces are likely trying to exploit Ukrainian air defense missile shortages in a renewed attempt to collapse Ukraine’s energy grid.
- Russian forces will likely continue offensive operations through Spring 2024 while preparing for an expected offensive effort in Summer 2024, although Russian forces will likely struggle to launch a concerted large-scale offensive operation in multiple operational directions in Ukraine at the same time.
- Russian forces likely seek to exploit current Ukrainian materiel shortages while preparing for efforts that will force Ukraine to expend a sizeable portion of the Western security assistance it may receive in the coming months.
- The Ukrainian military command appears to be prioritizing rotations for frontline units but will have to address additional manpower challenges if Ukrainian forces are to seize the initiative even on a localized basis in 2024 as Ukrainian senior military officers say they hope to do.
- Russian authorities reportedly intend to significantly expand crypto-mobilization efforts starting in Spring 2024 amid reports about significant decreases in the number of voluntary recruits.
- Verstka reported that select Russian officials stated that the Russian military command hopes that increased force generation will allow Russian forces to conduct a future offensive operation to encircle Kharkiv City. Such an operation would pose significant challenges both to the Russian forces responsible for the effort and to the wider Russian campaign in Ukraine, however.
- This Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for a mass shooting and bombing at a concert venue in the suburbs of Moscow on the evening of March 22.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact.
- Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on March 22 that Ukrainian authorities helped return another nine Ukrainian children to Ukrainian-controlled territory from occupied Ukraine and Russia.
- The Moscow military registration and enlistment office has reportedly begun to issue electronic summonses for the Spring 2024 Russian conscription cycle.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna amid continued positional engagements along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 22. Geolocated footage published on March 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[70] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka and Berestove, west of Kreminna near Terny, and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[71] Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People‘s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[72] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis stated that the situation in the Kupyansk direction is dynamic as the intensity of daily Russian assaults varies, but that Russian forces are constantly conducting a large number of attacks in the Lyman direction.[73] The deputy commander stated that Ukrainian forces have not observed Russian forces accumulating additional forces in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions and that the Russian command is only committing new forces to the area to replace daily losses.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Positional fighting continued near Bakhmut on March 22 but there were no changes to the frontline in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced in forest areas north of Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[74] Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Spirne and Bilohorivka; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanviske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Pivdenne.[75] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction.[76]
Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on March 22. Geolocated footage published on March 21 and 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within Tonenke (west of Avdiivka).[77] Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Berdychi, and Semenivka; west of Avdiivka near Orlivka and Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske.[78] A Ukrainian soldier operating in the Avdiivka area stated that the composition and quality of Russian forces in the area suggests that Russian forces are continuing to prioritize offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction.[79]
Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 22. Geolocated footage published on March 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[80] Positional fighting occurred west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Vodyane.[81] Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City).[82]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Geolocated footage published on March 21 indicates that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently advanced west of Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[83] Positional fighting continued southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Volodymyrivka and south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine on March 22.[84] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[85]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 22, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), while other sources claimed that positional engagements continued near both settlements.[86] Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Verbove and elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Robotyne.[87]
A Russian milblogger claimed on March 22 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky and the Antonivsky roadway bridge area.[88]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The Moscow military registration and enlistment office has reportedly begun to issue electronic summonses for the Spring 2024 Russian conscription cycle. Russian opposition sources reported on March 22 that Moscow registration and enlistment offices are issuing summonses through SMS text messages, and one claimed that the summonses instructed the individual to clarify documents with the office on April 8.[89] Members of a movement of conscientious objectors told Russian opposition outlet Meduza that Russian authorities are likely sending these summonses en masse as part of a broader effort to digitize conscripts’ personnel files.[90] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapolov recently stated that Russian military registration and enlistment offices will test issuing electronic summonses during the Spring 2024 conscription cycle.[91]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)
ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on March 22 that Ukrainian authorities helped return another nine Ukrainian children to Ukrainian-controlled territory from occupied Ukraine and Russia.[92] Lubinets reported that four of the children returned to Ukraine from occupied Crimea and the other five recently returned to Ukraine from Russia thanks to mediation by Qatari authorities.
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a report on March 19 detailing consistent Russian violations of human rights and international law from February 2022 to December 2023.[93] The UN OHCHR interviewed more than 2,300 witnesses and residents of occupied Ukraine, who reported on Russian efforts to enforce and expand Russian language, citizenship, laws, court systems, and education in occupied Ukraine while suppressing Ukrainian culture and identity. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk noted that the international community should support Ukraine‘s efforts to ensure accountability and reparations after future Russian de-occupation. ISW’s Karolina Hird has extensively reported on Russian human rights and international law violations in occupied Ukraine.[94]
Russia continues to build infrastructure projects aimed at integrating occupied Ukraine into Russia and creating alternative ground lines of communication (GLOCs) for Russian military purposes. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin stated on March 21 that Russia will build an expressway between Krasnodar, Temryuk, and the Kerch Strait Bridge and the “Azov Ring” road that will connect occupied Crimea and Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai in 2024.[95] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on March 18 that Russia has restored the railway between Rostov-on-Don and occupied Donetsk City, Mariupol, and Berdyansk and that Russia will also build a railway to occupied Sevastopol, which will serve as an alternative land route to the Kerch Strait Bridge.[96] The Russian Federal Agency for Rail Transport (Roszheldor) stated on March 19 that the railway between Rostov-on-Don and occupied Crimea will be fully operational by the end of 2024.[97]
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Senior Russian officials escalated rhetoric supporting a boilerplate information operation aimed at falsely portraying Russia’s war against Ukraine as a war against the West. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 22 that “we [Russia] are at war” and that this war began after Western states started providing military assistance to Ukraine.[98] Peskov notably walked back this claim on March 22, stating that the legal status of Russia’s “special military operation” has not changed but that Russia is simply “de facto” at war.[99] Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vitaly Nebenzya absurdly claimed that Russia has ”practically achieved” its goal of ”demilitarizing” Ukraine because Ukraine is relying on Western-provided weapons, echoing Peskov’s claims to the same effect from June 2023.[100]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
Belarusian authorities may have constructed a nuclear warhead storage site for Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. The Federation of American Scientists reported on March 14 that satellite imagery shows that Belarusian authorities began upgrading a military depot near Asipovichy with a quadruple-fence security perimeter, a roof-covered guarded access point, and possibly underground cables and sensors between February 2023 and January 2024.[101] The Federation of American Scientists assessed that these upgrades closely resemble protections on Russian nuclear warhead storage sites.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
23. U.S. warnings preceded deadly Moscow attack; ISIS claims responsibility
Unfortunately and sadly this seems like a very effective terrorist attack based on body count alone.
U.S. warnings preceded deadly Moscow attack; ISIS claims responsibility
By Kelsey Ables, Francesca Ebel, Mary Ilyushina and Robyn Dixon
Updated March 23, 2024 at 10:14 a.m. EDT|Published March 23, 2024 at 2:44 a.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Kelsey Ables · March 23, 2024
More than 60 people are dead and 115 hospitalized after assailants opened fire and caused an explosion at a popular concert venue on the outskirts of Moscow, Russian authorities said, following U.S. government warnings this month about a “planned terrorist attack” in the Russian capital.
The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the Friday night attack, which was the deadliest in Russia in years, that left Crocus City Hall in Krasnogorsk in about 140,000 square feet of flames, according to Russia’s emergency services. A U.S. official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information, told The Washington Post that the United States had “no reason to doubt” the claim from the Islamic State.
The attack comes just days after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s victory in a highly orchestrated election, which solidified his power as his war in Ukraine drags into its third year.
Putin does not appear to have spoken publicly since the attack, but Russian Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova said the president “wished everyone recovery” and “thanked the doctors,” Tass reported.
The U.S. government issued a public advisory to Americans in Russia on March 7 that described the risk of a “planned terrorist attack in Moscow — potentially targeting large gatherings, to include concerts,” National Security Council spokeswoman Adrienne Watson said in a statement on Friday.
“The U.S. Government also shared this information with Russian authorities in accordance with its long-standing ‘duty to warn’ policy,” Watson said.
The warning was based in part on intelligence reporting about possible activity inside Russia from Islamic State-Khorasan, a branch of the Islamic State, two U.S. officials who also spoke on the condition of anonymity told The Post. Other Western embassies echoed the warning.
Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, promptly denied any responsibility for Friday’s attack, writing on social media that Ukraine “certainly has nothing to do with the shooting/explosions” and that “everything in this war will be decided only on the battlefield.”
Videos from Friday, verified by The Post, show four men in camouflage entering a large hall before the start of a sold-out concert and opening fire, as well as shooters firing rounds inside a concert hall, thick with smoke. Other footage shows numerous bodies slumped on the floor.
Speaking at a news conference on Friday, White House national security spokesman John Kirby called the images “just horrible and just hard to watch.”
U.N. Secretary General António Guterres condemned “in the strongest possible terms today’s terrorist attack” and expressed “deep condolences,” his spokesperson said in a statement Friday.
Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin on Telegram called Friday’s attack a “terrible tragedy” and wrote that all sports, cultural and public events in Moscow would be canceled over the weekend.
Opposition figure Yulia Navalnaya, whose husband, staunch Putin critic Alexei Navalny, died in a Russian prison colony last month, called the attack a “nightmare.”
“Everyone involved in this crime must be found and held accountable,” she said.
Natalia Abbakumova contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Kelsey Ables · March 23, 2024
24. Conservative Liberalism's Many Lives
For weekend reflection. A very powerful and thought provoking essay from a good friend.
Excerpts:
Nevertheless, Hayek refused to adopt the “conservative” label outright. Not unlike Milton Friedman and other defenders of Adam Smith’s “system of natural liberty,” Hayek was always loath to relinquish “liberty” to its opponents who had brazenly appropriated the word. He would have adopted “Whiggism” were it not extinct. And while he agreed with many, if not most conservatives, he found too many unduly prone to a “nostalgic longing for the past or a romantic admiration for what has been.” Besides, having described himself as a liberal all his life, he wasn’t about to stop. As Gissurarson argues in his dissertation, the difference between the conservative mindset and Hayek’s was that the latter’s approach “leads to a theory of progress.”
His was not an inevitable or irreversible, let alone utopian, view of progress. “It is a belief, rather, in the possibility and desirability of progress, where progress is the extension of our practical and moral vision, or the enlargement of our range of goals, values, and opportunities,” writes Gissurarson. Moreover, “it is the conviction that liberty can, and ought to be, extended to all human beings.” How better to express the spirit behind the American Declaration of Independence, the ultimate expression of conservative liberalism avant la lettre [French for “letter”]—to say nothing of the sacred commandment from Genesis.
Hayek would undoubtedly be enormously pleased by Gissurarson’s collection of like-minded thinkers. Far from monolithic, they offer “various kinds of arguments for their positions, from divine command, human reason, social utility, natural evolution, moral intuition, and common consent,” which Hayek would find intellectually invigorating. At the same time, “these positions are all in the end based on a choice, which is a commitment to, indeed a celebration of, Judeo-Christian Western civilization.” Free choice is the prerogative of humans who are endowed by their Creator with the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that is impossible without private property.
Conservative Liberalism's Many Lives – - Juliana Geran Pilon
lawliberty.org · by Juliana Geran Pilon
Facts persist in defying the purported wisdom of history’s march toward its ever-elusive end. Yet many mortals caught on the wrong side of Eden won’t let go. The notion of a capital-P Progressive history—credited by Marxists to materialist forces that oppressed masses led by enlightened vanguards were supposed to unleash—continues to elicit allegiance among the intelligentsia and the gullible. This is despite catastrophes caused by invoking it, which a modicum of common sense could, and did, anticipate. The rational skeptic who warns against repeating the ever-recurring madness is dismissed as an outlying Cassandra, or worse. Refusing to be intimidated by fellow academics takes unusual equanimity, stubbornness, and indifference to opprobrium. These happened to be just the qualities for which a certain Austrian-born economist of Czech and Hungarian origin was loved and admired by his grateful students at the University of Chicago.
Professor Hayek had predicted the terrible fate that would befall the world as early as 1933, long before the full enormity would be unveiled. The war had not yet ended when his most widely read book, The Road to Serfdom, was published in England on March 10, 1944. One of his most devoted followers, the too-little-known Hannes Gissurarson, would not be born for another 13 years. A popular professor at the University of Iceland’s Social Research Institute until his retirement in 2023, Gissurarson has recently published a two-volume study with a deceptively simple title: Twenty-Four Conservative-Liberal Thinkers. Acknowledging Hayek’s central role in articulating this philosophy, Gissurarson shows how multiple perspectives enhance its intellectual vitality. It deserves a wide readership.
But Hayek’s professional road, unsurprisingly, would not be smooth. Even most intellectuals attracted to his ideas were unconvinced that capitalism and freedom were inseparable—his central thesis. He arrived in Chicago in the 1950s and was hired by the interdisciplinary Committee on Social Thought (CST), not the Economics Department. Two decades later, then-CST chairman John Nef explained why: “[T]he economists had opposed his appointment in Economics for years before largely because they regarded his Road to Serfdom as too popular a work for a respectable scholar to perpetuate.” Runaway international bestsellers don’t look good on a resume. CST was then, and amazingly still is, an exemplary academic dinosaur.
Even many intellectuals who agreed with most of Hayek’s conclusions still clung to the notion that a little state coercion was justified, provided it was well-intentioned. Some social democrats, democratic socialists, and even neo-Marxists, persisted in believing that a kind of benign socialism might be compatible with individual freedom. For example, at a large conference organized in 1955 by the US-backed (as it later transpired, CIA-funded) Congress for Cultural Freedom held in Milan, Hayek stood practically alone. And so he would remain for nearly two decades.
Until 1974, when to everyone’s surprise but especially his own, the world learned that Hayek was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. The following year, Margaret Thatcher held up one of his books at a meeting of the Conservative Research Department with the words: “This is what we believe.” After becoming Prime Minister in 1979, she told him: “I am very proud to have learnt so much from you over the past few years.” Ronald Reagan, elected in 1980, similarly expressed great admiration for his books and ideas.
But the most dramatic revelation came only after the collapse of the Soviet Empire—the one totalitarian system that lasted long enough to serve as a horrific confirmation of Hayek’s predictions. It turned out that his most devoted followers all along had had most to lose by even reading him. By the time America bestowed its Medal of Freedom upon him in November 1991, democratic leaders of the newly independent Eastern bloc countries were able to reveal clandestine translations of The Road to Serfdom, which they had studied at enormous personal risk. The 92-year-old Hayek was overwhelmed. But refusing to take any credit himself, he declared the end of communism as simply “the ultimate victory of our side in the long dispute of the principles of the free market.”
Those principles had also resonated in, of all places, far-off Iceland. In October 1984, 21-year-old Hannes Gissurarson and a friend decided to operate an illegal radio station to protest the government’s monopoly on broadcasting. After the police closed it, also slapping a hefty fine on the young dissenters, the Independence Party took on the cause. The following year, the monopoly was abolished. Meanwhile, Gissurarson had completed his doctoral dissertation at Oxford University, titled “Hayek’s Conservative Liberalism,” published in 1987 in Brussels. The label symbolized the fusion of apparent opposites that are, in fact, complementary. He thus ingeniously replaced a polarizing dialectic, bound to sow discord, with a term whose sober nuance suggests theoretical clarity tempered by prudence.
In the introduction, Gissurarson explains that what had attracted him to Hayek’s political theory was its coherence: “From the same premises, [namely] man’s inevitable ignorance, and the existence of the extended society, social conservatism and economic liberalism can both be seen to follow.” That coherence stems from the practical dimension of those premises coupled with a deep “commitment to a concrete social and historical reality, the liberal civilization of the West.”
In subsequent chapters, Gissurarson assesses challenges to Hayek by political theorists from both conservative and liberal camps who nonetheless shared a hostility to totalitarianism, and ultimately concludes that he is an uncommonly unifying figure. He commends Hayek to both camps, arguing that not only do “conservatives have much to learn” from the master; indeed, “Hayek’s fellow liberals perhaps even more.” Consistently defending human individuality as the fruit, not the foe, of tradition, Hayek was most concerned about collectivist/progressive illusions. Taking the wrong turn on a road promising nirvana but in fact leading to serfdom was not only unwise, it could be lethal.
Gissurarson was all in. The college student who started as an illegal radio station operator had found his mission: defending the free market and Western civilization. After joining, in 1984, the prestigious Mont Pelerin Society that Hayek founded in 1947 with help from Milton Friedman and Aaron Director, among others, Gissurarson served on its board of directors from 1998 to 2004. He also joined the board of Iceland’s Central Bank from 2001 to 2009. His anthology on conservative liberalism represents a major contribution to the contemporary war of ideas.
At once political theory, autobiography, and personal commentary on economic policies, the work is truly unique. The featured thinkers span the continent: of the twenty-four, seven are British, Scottish, or Irish, five are American, five are German-speaking, four are French, one is Italian, another is a Swede, and last but chronologically first, one Icelander. Their philosophy predates modernity. Gissurarson describes conservative liberalism as “a tradition which can be traced back to medieval ideas about government by consent,” tracing it even before the influential Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas to the incomparable, if virtually unknown, Snorri Sturluson (1179–1241).
Hayek was always loath to relinquish “liberty” to its opponents who had brazenly appropriated the word.
Descended from Norwegian kings, educated in Germany, this erudite nobleman who became Iceland’s Lawspeaker at a very young age, was an accomplished writer who had captured in his epic sagas Iceland’s legendary freedom “from the assaults of kings and criminals.” Centuries before the Whigs in Britain, writes Gissurarson, Sturluson articulated the principle that
government should be by consent, not by the grace of God; that there was in place an implicit social contract between the people and the sovereign and that the people could depose the sovereign if he violated that contract; and that man could be defined not only by some general category, but had to be conceived of also as an individual who had acquired the ability and will to make his or her own choices.
Hayek was to learn all about Sturluson on his delightful visit to this small nation of unspeakable beauty. He had been invited by Gissurarson who, together with a few friends—all Oxonians—founded the Icelandic Libertarian Association on Hayek’s 80th birthday, on May 8, 1979. He graciously accepted and arrived the following April. They all got along famously; but when asked whether he would mind if they founded a Hayek Society at Oxford, he responded: “I am of course quite happy that young people are interested in my ideas and arguments. It is a welcome change. But you have to promise me one thing. I have noticed that the Marxists are much worse than Marx and that the Keynesians are much worse than Keynes. Therefore you have to promise me that you do not become Hayekians. You have to maintain a critical attitude and think independently.”
Hayek’s modesty was a personal trait. But it was also fundamental to his belief that every individual has a perspective on reality, which should not be swayed by groupthink or any other anti-rational considerations. No one should presume to decide for another—on both moral and epistemological grounds. Besides, he trusted most people’s willingness to build communities for mutual benefit. Loathe to attribute bad intentions to those with whom he disagreed, he firmly believed that socialism reflected an intellectual error rather than disagreement about ends. He advised his young Oxonian disciples that a debate between liberals and socialists would prove helpful in bringing this out.
But reason must be supplemented by virtue, for liberty requires social restraint. Liberty can only survive under the law, which includes society’s moral code. He then recalled the time he met Pope John Paul II some years earlier. The prelate had been pleased when Hayek “suggested not to call principles which could not be proved and had to be taken on authority, such as religious dogmas, ‘superstitions,’ using instead the term ‘symbolic truths’ about them.” Symbolic truths, for Hayek, are not only on par with empirical and mathematical truths but prior.
As Hayek explained in Law, Legislation and Liberty (1971), invoking both the Scottish empiricist David Hume and the German idealist Immanuel Kant, symbolic truths and the values they embody are “guiding conditions of all rational construction” and thought. Science itself “rests on a system of values which cannot be scientifically proven.” This does not mean that knowledge and truth are built on quicksand. It does imply that values matter, and paramount among them is the freedom of each individual to pursue what he perceives to be to his own and his community’s benefit.
This is required by the immeasurable complexity of understanding the world and man’s place in it. Ultimately, the common good cannot be deliberately designed—the impossibility is both conceptual and, above all, moral. Society therefore can thrive “only by consistently adhering to certain principles throughout a process of evolution.” Rather than explicitly articulated in rules, such “principles are often more effective guides for action when they appear as no more than an unreasoned prejudice, a general feeling that certain things simply ‘are not done.’” If this is reminiscent of Edmund Burke, it should be, for in his 1960 essay “Why I am Not a Conservative,” Hayek included Burke alongside Lord Acton, Thomas Babington Macaulay, and William E. Gladstone as the three greatest British liberals.
Nevertheless, Hayek refused to adopt the “conservative” label outright. Not unlike Milton Friedman and other defenders of Adam Smith’s “system of natural liberty,” Hayek was always loath to relinquish “liberty” to its opponents who had brazenly appropriated the word. He would have adopted “Whiggism” were it not extinct. And while he agreed with many, if not most conservatives, he found too many unduly prone to a “nostalgic longing for the past or a romantic admiration for what has been.” Besides, having described himself as a liberal all his life, he wasn’t about to stop. As Gissurarson argues in his dissertation, the difference between the conservative mindset and Hayek’s was that the latter’s approach “leads to a theory of progress.”
His was not an inevitable or irreversible, let alone utopian, view of progress. “It is a belief, rather, in the possibility and desirability of progress, where progress is the extension of our practical and moral vision, or the enlargement of our range of goals, values, and opportunities,” writes Gissurarson. Moreover, “it is the conviction that liberty can, and ought to be, extended to all human beings.” How better to express the spirit behind the American Declaration of Independence, the ultimate expression of conservative liberalism avant la lettre [French for “letter”]—to say nothing of the sacred commandment from Genesis.
Hayek would undoubtedly be enormously pleased by Gissurarson’s collection of like-minded thinkers. Far from monolithic, they offer “various kinds of arguments for their positions, from divine command, human reason, social utility, natural evolution, moral intuition, and common consent,” which Hayek would find intellectually invigorating. At the same time, “these positions are all in the end based on a choice, which is a commitment to, indeed a celebration of, Judeo-Christian Western civilization.” Free choice is the prerogative of humans who are endowed by their Creator with the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that is impossible without private property.
The young Oxonian from Iceland has proved beyond doubt to have been worthy of Hayek’s friendship and trust. The closing statement of his remarkable book captures it best: “Perhaps the best, albeit somewhat metaphysical, way of describing conservative liberalism is as the self-consciousness of Western civilisation.” The venerable Viennese master could not have said it better.
Juliana Geran Pilon is a senior fellow at the Alexander Hamilton Institute for the Study of Western Civilization. She is the author of several books, including The Utopian Conceit and the War on Freedom (2019) and her newest book, An Idea Betrayed: Jews, Liberalism, and the American Left (2023).
lawliberty.org · by Juliana Geran Pilon
25. Growing Lethal Drone Threat is a ‘Scourge,’ Says U.S. SOCOM Commander
Growing Lethal Drone Threat is a ‘Scourge,’ Says U.S. SOCOM Commander - USNI News
news.usni.org · by John Grady · March 21, 2024
Graphic identifying specific debris fragments collected by a U.S. Navy explosive ordnance disposal team aboard M/T Pacific Zircon, Nov. 16. The graphic shows how the collected fragments indicate the unmanned aerial vehicle that attacked the commercial tanker was an Iranian-made Shahed-136. US Navy graphic
The “secret sauce” for Special Operations Command in quickly closing capability gaps is its acquisition executive, its top general told a House panel Wednesday.
Army Gen. Bryan Fenton said “that’s first and foremost” the difference between SOCOM and other major commands. He added, “and [the executive] works for us” using the authorities given by Congress to the command in how it can spend money and cooperation with contractors.
“We bring industry forward with us into theater,” he told the House Armed Services Intelligence and Special Operations subcommittee.
To guarantee speed and agility under those circumstances, Fenton added, “we’re willing to work as fast as industry.” The example he used came from developing counter-unmanned aerial system (UAS) defenses.
The need for these defenses is urgent and growing as groups like the Houthis in Yemen use advanced unmanned systems in their attacks. Three American soldiers were killed in Jordan in late January in a drone strike on an outpost monitoring the Syrian civil war and the continuing presence of ISIS.
Fenton called UAS threats a “scourge,” and said SOCOM is partnering with Central Command in a layered defense across the Middle East to not only “sense” the threat, but also “to defeat and destroy.” He said the command has learned much on UAS offensive and defensive operations from the war in Ukraine.
In prepared testimony, he and Christopher Maier, assistant secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, said the command “is a trailblazer for data-driven decision-making to both inform and execute our service-like and combatant command responsibilities, focused on the talent, architecture and processes needed to capitalize on data and Artificial Intelligence (AI)-related technologies.”
“AI and uncrewed systems” are key to the command’s transformation into a force ready to meet threats from China, Russia, North Korea, Iran and its proxies – terrorists and narcotics smugglers.
In his opening statement at the hearing, Maier said special operations forces “create dilemmas for adversaries” in 80 countries. Their prepared testimony added, “[i]rregular warfare is a critical tool for campaigning across the spectrum of conflict, enhancing interoperability and access, and disrupting competitor warfighting advantages while reinforcing our own. To further institutionalize irregular warfare across the Joint Force, SO/LIC is updating policy, informing doctrine, and modernizing irregular warfare education and training.”
When asked about the special operations work in the Caribbean and Central and South America, Fenton said the goal is “to strengthen allies who want to be associated with SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command].” Those nations “also want to get a sense of our capabilities – equipment.” He stressed the importance of exercising together to show “we’re there.” He added SOF are “giving opportunities back to SOUTHCOM, Team Democracy and Team USA” to counter Chinese and Russian disinformation campaigns in the region.
Maier said a continuing challenge in SOUTHCOM is limited resources.
In the abbreviated open hearing, Maier and Fenton acknowledged physical and spiritual damage to service members and their families from repeated deployments.
“Over the past decade, USSOCOM has seen a steady increase across several mental health diagnoses, with a substantial rise in recent years, particularly with post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injuries. We attribute this to an increased emphasis on mental health, brain health, destigmatizing care, and SOF utilization of available programs,” their prepared testimony stated.
The Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) and the Warrior Care Program are two internal programs created to address these issues. Seven thousand cases were treated under these programs to date. The prepared testimony said 70 percent of those wounded, ill or injured were retained.
In addition, the command reached out to institutions such as Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School to address blast injuries. On suicide prevention, “USSOCOM is modernizing suicide prevention by developing virtual reality training tailored to SOF-specific scenarios to help members of our formation identify and respond to teammates in crisis,” their statement said.
Both testified that destigmatizing seeking treatment for mental health issues is vital from the tactical to the strategic level of command.
“We’re also incredibly hungry to get better on suicide and brain issues,” Fenton said.
But Maier and Fenton said that the Defense Department can only do so much after a service member separates from military duty.
Related
news.usni.org · by John Grady · March 21, 2024
26. A Transition to War for the Arsenals of Democracies
This is Europe focused but I would include South Korea and Japan in the modern Arsenal of Democracy. (note the reference to ROK arms sales to Poland in the article).
(Note for all my 1st SFG brothers Ambassador Paul Jones was the DCM in the Philippines around 2005-2008 I think).
A Transition to War for the Arsenals of Democracies
cepa.org · by Paul Jones · March 21, 2024
Two years of all-out war in Ukraine, along with urgent needs in Taiwan and in other potentially threatened democracies, have laid bare the inadequacies of defense production on both sides of the Atlantic.
We still have a peacetime defense industry in an age of war and rising risk, although governments and Western organizations are at least recognizing the problem.
The US Department of Defense and the European Commission responded this year with their first-ever defense industry strategies, on 12 January and March 5 respectively.
Early commentary has focused on funding and implementation of these new industrial policies, which are certainly important. Strategically, however, success will depend on transatlantic cooperation, and that is easier said than done.
The US center of gravity is our alliances, and we should knit them together more tightly in everything we do, including defense industry strategies.
The US may still be the arsenal of democracy, in that it is the biggest defense producer, but it is not capable of outproducing both Russia and China as they rapidly ramp up defense spending — China raised outlays by 7.2% on March 5, the latest in a long series of increases, while Russia is rebuilding its defense industrial base and devotes one-third of government spending to defense. All of this is a sharp reminder that war among great powers is ultimately a test of the speed and scale of defense industrial capacity.
Truly resilient allied supply chains will require redundancies in the US and Europe. For Europeans nervous about the US commitment to NATO’s Article 5, buying US defense equipment binds the US closer, politically and militarily through true interoperability, training, and exercises.
Just look at Poland’s huge purchases of US equipment. It has also signed enormous arms contracts with the Republic of Korea because that country delivers quickly, a requirement in today’s wartime environment. It would be good for the US government and industry to examine exactly how the Koreans achieve this.
Neither the US nor the European Union (EU) strategy prioritizes transatlantic defense industry capabilities and how to leverage them so that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Both tilt towards protectionism, most explicitly in Europe’s proposed targets and incentives for member states to buy more from European industry, at the expense of American, non-EU, and UK equipment. (The head of Europe’s main missile company, MBDA, the UK-European joint venture, pleaded for a change of approach to include the British on March 13.)
Events have had some impact in this debate. France, the main proponent of an EU-only approach, has moderated its stance somewhat in recent weeks and has contributed to the Czech-led purchase of artillery shells from beyond the bloc.
It would be quite dangerous for the EU and the US to go their separate ways on defense industrial policy. This is not the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) or the Chips Act, as important as they are to national security. The defense industry is at the heart of national security, deterrence, and capability for our warfighters. If new strategies contribute to a reduction in the US role in European defense, expect more fragmentation among European countries when Putin ratchets up the threats (as he will.)
A more robust European defense industry is in all our interests. It may indeed be time for a more overtly geopolitical European Commission with a Commissioner for Defense, as EC President Ursula von der Leyen proposed at the Munich Security Conference in February. Whoever gets the job will need to work for the creation of a Commission role in defense industry and acquisition, traditionally a jealously guarded purview of national governments.
Most important will be for the EU to focus on financing growth in European defense industry capacity. The EU should, however, know its limits and defer to NATO and member states on the capabilities they need.
The US and EU should find ways to incentivize transatlantic defense industry cooperation, where possible, including on co-production. For its part, the US should do much more to enable co-production among close allies, seizing this moment of European attention to defense industry issues.
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NATO was tormented by a failure to standardize during the Cold War and will be again if it gets off on the wrong foot this time.
The US should tell the industry the capabilities it prioritizes for co-production and commit to pre-approvals or fast-tracked technology transfer. Industry needs such a positive demand signal from State and the Department of Defense (DoD) to justify the investment. The government should also make it easier and quicker for European defense companies to invest in the US. Such investments should be eligible for any incentives designed for US companies.
For its part, the EU should make US and UK co-produced defense equipment eligible for EC financial incentives; its strategy currently allows that for Ukraine, but not for NATO allies. Key European governments such as Germany and Sweden need to update export control laws so that co-produced equipment can be exported to countries in need, even during wartime.
The EU should also consider flexibilities so that individual member states who believe American equipment is essential to their security can continue to buy it without disincentives, even as the bloc as a whole may direct more funding into European companies.
This is the moment to declare that the allied defense industry is transforming to wartime production, and that the issue must be at the top of the transatlantic agenda. NATO’s Washington summit in July provides an opportunity to do so.
NATO’s Defense Industrial Production Board can do the necessary groundwork beforehand, with concrete commitments to follow at the summit. Scratchy EU-NATO relations, as well as French calls for strategic autonomy, have been problems in the past. It could be smoother this time, given the shared strategic challenge and shared membership.
With Sweden and Finland’s entry into NATO, EU and NATO memberships now overwhelmingly overlap, with notable exceptions. European NATO members not in the EU are now the UK (remarkably overlooked in the EU strategy), Turkey, North Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro. EU members not in NATO are now Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta. French President Macron’s evolution toward supporting more military capability for Ukraine should also help.
We start from a bad place. Russia is now estimated to be out-producing Western artillery ammunition production by a ratio of 3:1. Russian guns fire five shells for every one fired by our Ukrainian allies. Defense production capability is key to overall deterrence and to defeating Russia in Ukraine. Meanwhile, in Asia, the Taiwanese have been vocal about delivery delays of about $22bn of defense equipment. It’s urgent because supplying an island in wartime is far harder than supplying Ukraine via Poland.
With a military standoff in Ukraine likely in the coming months, whichever country can field more capability for spring offensives in 2025 will likely prevail. Will the West really allow Russia, with an economy the size of Italy’s, to outproduce NATO and the EU?
We have in the past and must again use the tremendous capability of the allied armaments industry to deter and defeat our adversaries.
It now needs to become the central feature of EU and US defense industry strategy. Showing Russia that together, NATO and the EU can outproduce it, over the long term, with higher-end capabilities, would make long wars a much less appealing strategy to our adversaries.
In fact, outproducing should be a key part of our strategy against both Russia and China, neither of whose economies and technological base could keep up with the combined resources and capabilities of the West and its Asian allies.
Ambassador Paul Jones (ret.) is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and an International Affairs Advisor at Squire Patton Boggs global law firm. He was US Ambassador to Poland (2015-18), US Ambassador to Malaysia (2010-13), and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (2013-15). He was also Vice President for International Government Relations at Raytheon Technologies (2020-23).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
Europe's Edge
CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
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cepa.org · by Paul Jones · March 21, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: [email protected]
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