Quotes of the Day:

"Loyalty to a petrified opinion never yet broke a chain or freed a human soul."

– Mark Twain

"A man is not great because he hasn't failed; a man is great because failure hasn't stopped him."

– Confucius

“The problem’s not that the truth is harsh, but that liberation from ignorance is as painful as being born. Run after truth, until you’re breathless. Accept the pain involved in re-creating yourself afresh. These ideas will take a life to comprehend, a hard one interspersed with drunken moments.”

– Naguid Mahfouz

​1. I Trained with the Best US Special Forces – THIS Shocked Me (Video)

2. Korean politics faces ‘super week’ of landmark rulings

3. Critical week lies ahead as nation awaits verdicts on PM, opposition leader

4. At Least 4 Die After Nearly 30 Wildfires Erupt in South Korea

5. Yoon offers condolences for wildfire victims

6. What Korea can learn and prepare for after two months of Trump

7. S. Korea battles multiple wildfires in southeastern region amid strong dry winds

8. North Korea’s Nuclear-Powered Missile Submarine: A Mystery Wrapped Around a Riddle and an Enigma

9. North Korea tests new anti-aircraft missile system, threatens 'deadly' response to U.S.-South Korea drills

10. Shoigu visit to Pyongyang hints at possible third North Korean deployment to Kursk

11. Korean politics: Where did we go wrong?

12. US global troop repositioning

13. Captured N. Korean soldiers not bargaining chip for Ukraine: top envoy

14. U.N. Human Rights Council to address concerns over N. Korea's troop dispatch to Russia

15. U.S. Treasury Lifts Tornado Cash Sanctions Amid North Korea Money Laundering Probe

16. Germany rules out reopening Pyongyang embassy amid N. Korea-Russia military ties

1. I Trained with the Best US Special Forces – THIS Shocked Me (Video)

​I was proud to serve with Chun In Bum multiple times since the 1980s and to call him a friend.

 In addition to the video on Special Forces at this link below he also did another 23 minute video on the broader capabilities of the US military and why the US military is so superior as well as comparisons between north and South Korean militaries. HERE.

I Trained with the Best US Special Forces – THIS Shocked Me (Video)

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/23/i-trained-with-the-best-us-special-forces-this-shocked-me-video/

by SWJED

|

03.23.2025 at 12:56pm

See the 12 minute video HERE.

2,980 views Mar 20, 2025 2 products

Korean ex-Special Forces Commander Chun In-Bum trained with the most elite forces in the world. He shares his experience in this second interview. Share us your opinion in the comments. #specialforce #military #usa

00:00 Intro

01:12 How Chun became a Special Forces Commander

02:30 Why US Special Forces are so Great

04:07 ex-Special Forces that Speak on the Internet

04:40 Who are the Best Special Forces in the World?

05:01 What makes US Special Forces so Powerful?

05:29 How US Special Forces are Different from other countries

10:22 Countries should learn ‘this’ from US Special Forces

2. Korean politics faces ‘super week’ of landmark rulings

​A historic time for Korea (again).

Korean politics faces ‘super week’ of landmark rulings

koreaherald.com · by Kim Da-sol · March 23, 2025

Court’s impeachment verdict on Han Monday may serve as a bellwether for Yoon’s fate: observers

Prime Minister Han Duck-soo enters the courtroom for the hearing of his impeachment trial at Constitutional Court of Korea in Seoul on Feb. 19. (Yonhap)

South Korea faces a critical week, with landmark rulings expected to determine the fates of Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, main opposition leader Lee Jae-myung and possibly President Yoon Suk Yeol, which could mark a major political turning point.

Suspended Prime Minister Han’s impeachment verdict is set for Monday at 10 a.m., the appeal verdict on main opposition party leader Lee on Wednesday, and the verdict date on suspended President Yoon is likely to be announced early in the week.

While the Constitutional Court has not yet announced the date for Yoon’s verdict, given that it recently cleared major cases and the precedent of presidential impeachment rulings typically falling on Fridays, the court could deliver Yoon’s ruling this Friday. The court usually announces the verdict date two to three days in advance.

Legal circles believed that the court’s impeachment verdict on Han could be a “preview” of President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment ruling.

Both Han and Yoon were impeached over the alleged unconstitutionality of the procedures during the martial law declaration on Dec. 3.

But what sets Han’s case apart from Yoon’s lies in the factors surrounding the emergency Cabinet meeting held on Dec. 3 at night, before the declaration.

While Han merely convened the meeting, Yoon is accused of pushing through with the martial law despite the Cabinet's opposition, concluding the meeting in five minutes.

On Dec. 27, the Assembly passed the impeachment motion on Han for several other reasons, including his recommendation that the president veto a special prosecutor investigation into first lady Kim Keon Hee and his refusal to appoint Constitutional Court justices.

Some experts believe that unless Han is found to have actively abetted the martial law plan, the ruling may not delve into its constitutionality, potentially limiting its relevance to Yoon’s case.

During Han’s hearing on his impeachment on Feb. 19, Han stated that he had “no prior knowledge of President Yoon’s plans” and did his “best to persuade him to reconsider.” He also actively denied his involvement in “any military mobilization.”

While both ruling and opposition parties expect Han’s impeachment to be dismissed, the ruling People Power Party sees a dismissal as paving the way for Yoon’s acquittal. In contrast, the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea believes the Constitutional Court might strike a political balance by upholding Yoon’s impeachment.

Democratic Party Chair Lee Jae-myung speaks during a meeting at the National Assembly on March 21. (Yonhap)

While it is possible that Yoon’s final verdict will be out on Friday, this week is poised to become a defining moment in South Korean democracy for another reason.

Besides the ruling on Han and Yoon, Lee’s appeal verdict on the election law case is set for Wednesday.

If all three rulings occur in the coming week, they are expected to reshape the nation’s political landscape. Early presidential elections could become a real possibility if Yoon is ousted from office and the election would see a change in its race if Lee is convicted.

By law, an early election must be held within 60 days following a president's removal. Though Lee is, for now, the Democratic Party's most likely candidate in an early presidential election, his legal troubles could disqualify him from public office.

The rulings on Yoon and Lee could lead to four distinct scenarios.

First, if Yoon is removed and Lee gets a lighter sentence in Wednesday’s appeal verdict, the May presidential election is most likely with the opposition leader becoming a strong contender.

Second, Yoon’s ouster and Lee’s prison sentence, after being convicted, would place a significant political burden on the opposition party. Lee could appeal to the Supreme Court, but running with such a legal risk ahead of a potential presidential election would pressure him and his party, possibly pushing them to find an alternative.

Third, if Yoon is reinstated and Lee receives the lighter sentence that allows him to retain his parliamentary seat, the confrontation between the two is likely to intensify even further — but without any election ahead.

Fourth, Yoon’s return to office and Lee’s prison sentence would be the worst scenario for the opposition leader, with the ruling party most likely to capitalize on the situation by labeling him a criminal.

ddd@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · by Kim Da-sol · March 23, 2025

3. Critical week lies ahead as nation awaits verdicts on PM, opposition leader

Critical week lies ahead as nation awaits verdicts on PM, opposition leader

The Korea Times · March 23, 2025

The flag of the Constitutional Court flutters at the court in central Seoul, Sunday, ahead of its rulings on high-profile cases this week. Yonhap

Court rulings expected to reshape political landscape; verdict on president's impeachment this week still possible

By Jung Min-ho

The judiciary is poised to deliver rulings on at least two high-profile cases this week, which are expected to reshape the nation’s political landscape.

The political aftermath of the court decisions could be even larger with the possibility for yet another, which, if taking place this week, will be the most important ruling — that for President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment over his Dec. 3 martial law declaration.

On Monday, the Constitutional Court will render a verdict on Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, after 192 lawmakers at the National Assembly voted to impeach him on Dec. 27.

The Assembly passed the impeachment motion after accusing him of rebellion by conniving with Yoon to declare martial law on Dec. 3 and of refusing to appoint three Assembly-selected candidates for the Constitutional Court bench, among other charges.

His alleged cooperation in imposing military martial law is intertwined with the impeachment trial for Yoon, the final decision-maker. The justices’ views on the legitimacy of that act could be expressed in their ruling on Han, who allegedly tried to prevent the move in a Cabinet meeting before its enforcement.

What triggered the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) to push for Han's impeachment was his decision to “delay” the appointments of the three justice candidates. The then-acting president said he had to, because the liberal party had picked two of them without agreement from the ruling People Power Party, as it would be a breach of past practices.

Another issue of great interest and importance is whether it was legal to impeach Han in the first place, with fewer than 200 votes — the number required to impeach a president — as he was serving as acting president, not just a Cabinet member who can be impeached with a minimum 151 votes.

If Han is reinstated, questions are expected to rise over the legitimacy of two Constitutional Court justices — Chung Kye-sun and Cho Han-chang — appointed by Han's successor, Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok. If Han’s removal from office was found to be unlawful, conservative politicians and their supporters are almost certainly expected to challenge the validity of the decision to appoint them in his absence.

Rep. Lee Jae-myung, front row right, chairman of the opposition Democratic Party of Korea, calls for the swift ousting of President Yoon Suk Yeol with other party members during a rally in Seoul, Saturday. Yonhap

On Wednesday, the Seoul High Court will rule on Rep. Lee Jae-myung, chief of the DPK, who will face his biggest legal challenge yet.

A lower court found him guilty on Nov. 15 of violating the Election Law by making false claims during an Assembly audit in 2021 while running as a presidential candidate about a land development project in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province, while he was the city’s mayor.

The court at the time gave him a one-year prison term suspended for two years, which would strip him of his Assembly seat and his eligibility to run in any elections for the next five years.

If the appellate court upholds the lower court’s ruling, Lee will likely face a more serious obstacle to his leadership as well as his potential candidacy in the next presidential election.

Although he will appeal to the Supreme Court, which, by law, has three months to finalize the case, a second guilty decision will deal a serious blow to his status as the most powerful liberal presidential candidate.

But if Lee is found not guilty, his grip on the party will be tightened further and, if Yoon is ousted, he would almost certainly become its presidential candidate in a snap election, despite many other criminal charges facing him.

Regarding Yoon's impeachment case, the Constitutional Court has not announced a date for its verdict. This defies predictions by many political observers, who expected the court to make its verdict in the middle of March.

Given that in the past, the court informed the president or other high-ranking government officials in question of such schedule two or three days prior to its decisions, there is a possibility for the court to announce the date early this week and deliver its verdict on Thursday or Friday at the earliest.

Even if the ruling on Yoon is not made this week, his trial is widely expected to be finalized before April 18 when two of its justices retire.

The Korea Times · March 23, 2025

4. At Least 4 Die After Nearly 30 Wildfires Erupt in South Korea

At Least 4 Die After Nearly 30 Wildfires Erupt in South Korea

Firefighters confronted the forest fires in the country’s southeast over the weekend. Most had been extinguished by Sunday, but dry and windy conditions persisted.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/23/world/asia/south-korea-wildfires.html?searchResultPosition=1

Helicopters battling a fire in Euiseong, South Korea, on Saturday.Credit...Yonhap, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Jin Yu Young

March 23, 2025

Updated 2:58 a.m. ET

Nearly 30 wildfires broke out in southeastern South Korea over the weekend, killing four people and injuring six others, officials said on Sunday.

Thousands of firefighters and dozens of helicopters were sent out to fight 29 fires that burned through at least 4,700 acres and forced the evacuation of around 1,000 people, according to the Interior Ministry. The fires also disrupted train service and prompted the closing of some roads.

On Saturday evening, the government declared a state of disaster for part of the region. All but six of the 29 fires had been extinguished by Sunday morning, the Interior Ministry said.

All of the reported deaths and injuries were linked to a fire that started in Sancheong County, about 160 miles southeast of Seoul, the capital, on Friday afternoon, officials said.

Five of the six people hurt were seriously injured, according to the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters. At least two of the dead were firefighters, officials said.

The Sancheong fire started when a farmer’s lawn mower caught fire, the authorities told the local news media.

A government report said a separate blaze began on Saturday morning in a cemetery in Euiseong County, about 110 miles southeast of Seoul. Another fire ignited from a garbage incinerator on Saturday afternoon in Gimhae, a city about 20 miles inland from Busan in the Korean Peninsula’s southeastern corner.

As of Sunday morning, the fire in Sancheong was about 30 percent contained, according to local officials. The fire in Euiseong was only about 3 percent contained, but fire officials said they expected to have it under control by the end of the day.

South Korean officials say that dry and windy conditions have allowed fires to spread easily. March, April and May are some of the nation’s driest months, according to the Korea Meteorological Administration.

Jin Yu Young reports on South Korea, the Asia Pacific region and global breaking news from Seoul. More about Jin Yu Young

5. Yoon offers condolences for wildfire victims

​Does this foreshadow a return to work? I am not sure we are going to have the impeachment result this week. But perhaps so.

Yoon offers condolences for wildfire victims | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · March 23, 2025

SEOUL, March 23 (Yonhap) -- Impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol offered his condolences Sunday for firefighters and government officials who were killed while battling wildfires.

It marked Yoon's second public message after he was released from detention on March 8 on procedural grounds related to the investigation into insurrection charges over his short-lived martial law declaration in December.

"I mourn the loss of the four firefighters and public officials who tragically lost their lives while battling the wildfires," Yoon wrote in a Facebook posting.

Yoon also expressed concerns over the blazes still burning in five regions and the rising number of evacuees, urging the government to mobilize all available resources to swiftly extinguish the wildfires and provide support to those affected.

Impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol bows to his supporters at the presidential residence in Seoul on March 8, 2025, after being released from a detention center. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

Related Articles

• Yoon offers condolence to man who died of self-immolation

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · March 23, 2025

6. What Korea can learn and prepare for after two months of Trump

​Excerpts:

However, South Korea is unlikely to remain insulated from the geopolitical impact of the Trump administration’s foreign policies for long. First, Trump has signaled forthcoming diplomatic demands regarding bilateral trade, cost-sharing for U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and South Korean investment in U.S. domestic shipbuilding and energy development. They will have significant consequences for South Korea’s economy and security. Third, South Korea should prepare for the possible resumption of U.S. diplomacy with North Korea, lest South Korea finds its security vulnerable to a future deal between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, similar to the risks Ukraine currently faces from Trump’s diplomacy with Russia.

As the South Korean government prepares for its turn in bilateral diplomacy, it should observe other countries’ diplomatic encounters so far with the Trump administration. Specifically, three recurring features have been observed in Trump’s foreign policy approaches during his second term.

First, Trump is selective in alternating between engagement or disengagement in international crises.

...

Second, Trump prioritizes "optics," particularly in portraying his administration’s diplomatic successes. 

...

Third, Trump is “flexible” in shifting his stance on international issues. 

What Korea can learn and prepare for after two months of Trump

The Korea Times · March 23, 2025

By Lee Jong-eun

Lee Jong-eun

Has it really been only two months since U.S. President Donald Trump’s second inauguration? While significant policy changes were expected with the return of his presidency, many — including myself —were surprised by the scale and speed with which the Trump administration has pushed revisions of decades-long U.S. foreign policy, particularly in trade and security.

Europe and the Americas have mostly borne the first wave of policy changes under Trump’s second presidency. U.S. tariffs have increased on certain imports from Canada and Mexico, triggering retaliatory tariffs from both countries. Europe, facing challenges from raising U.S. aluminum and steel tariffs, faces security challenges from the threat of U.S. disengagement from Europe’s security deterrence from Russia. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s territorial pursuits in Greenland and Panama, along with its accelerated deportation of undocumented migrants, have impacted the political landscape across multiple regions in the Western Hemisphere.

South Korea has been more fortunate than other U.S. allies in mostly avoiding bilateral conflict with the Trump administration. One reason may be because Trump's administration has prioritized focusing on other global issues. Another reason could be that South Korea has been led by an interim government since President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment in December, limiting its ability to engage in bilateral diplomacy with the United States. Paradoxically, the Trump administration may be postponing negotiations with South Korea until the country has a leader it considers a suitable diplomatic counterpart.

However, South Korea is unlikely to remain insulated from the geopolitical impact of the Trump administration’s foreign policies for long. First, Trump has signaled forthcoming diplomatic demands regarding bilateral trade, cost-sharing for U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and South Korean investment in U.S. domestic shipbuilding and energy development. They will have significant consequences for South Korea’s economy and security. Third, South Korea should prepare for the possible resumption of U.S. diplomacy with North Korea, lest South Korea finds its security vulnerable to a future deal between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, similar to the risks Ukraine currently faces from Trump’s diplomacy with Russia.

As the South Korean government prepares for its turn in bilateral diplomacy, it should observe other countries’ diplomatic encounters so far with the Trump administration. Specifically, three recurring features have been observed in Trump’s foreign policy approaches during his second term.

First, Trump is selective in alternating between engagement or disengagement in international crises. In the past two months, a lot of attention has been on Trump’s threat to disengage or at least minimize U.S. involvement in Ukraine’s war with Russia. During the same period, however, he has also threatened military intervention in the Israel-Hamas war and ordered airstrikes against Houthi militant groups in Yemen. Trump is not a defender of international institutions, but neither is he an isolationist or a pacifist. His administration may express aloof indifference or aggressive interest in the affairs of other countries depending on the calculation of strategic and political benefits from the policy decision.

Second, Trump prioritizes "optics," particularly in portraying his administration’s diplomatic successes. In the Israel-Hamas war, he has taken credit for Hamas’ partial release of Israeli hostages and has invited hostage families to the White House to publicize his advocacy on their behalf. Even when encountering diplomatic obstacles, Trump frames them as progress or acts of benevolence on his part. For example, he has characterized postponing a comprehensive tariff hike on Canada and Mexico as an accommodation to allow U.S. manufacturers an adjustment period. Similarly, he has depicted Putin’s ambiguous response to a U.S. ceasefire proposal as a constructive step toward a peace settlement.

Third, Trump is “flexible” in shifting his stance on international issues. Though Trump’s overall foreign policy strategy (such as on immigration, tariffs and alliances) generally appears to stay consistent, Trump has frequently shifted his timetable, demand or rhetoric, increasing uncertainty in negotiations.

On tariffs, the Trump administration has repeatedly revised the timeline for comprehensive tariff increases on Canada and Mexico. Regarding Ukraine, Trump had accused Zelenskyy of insufficient gratitude to the United States and for opposing the peace settlement, temporarily suspending aid and intelligence support to Ukraine. Later, Trump accepted Zelenskyy’s apology and suggested new sanctions on Russia to incentivize war settlement. In response to his failure to fulfill his campaign pledge to end the war within “24 hours” after returning to the White House, Trump dismissed his previous timeline as a “sarcastic announcement,” reiterating that he would ultimately end the war.

For South Korea, analyzing these characteristics is important for anticipating and planning diplomatic negotiations with the U.S. government. First, South Korea should weigh the risks/benefits of incentivizing Trump’s proactive engagement in U.S.-Korea relations before calculating how much transactional contributions South Korea should offer to the latter in the areas of trade, technology and security. Second, South Korean policymakers should strategize to ensure that the Trump administration receives public credit for a diplomatic “win” while securing substantive diplomatic gains for South Korea as well.

Finally, South Korean negotiators should be prepared for dynamic fluctuations throughout their negotiations with the Trump administration. They should not be lulled into complacency by a positive reception from their counterparts, as it may be unexpectedly reversed. Nor should they become overly discouraged by diplomatic setbacks, as these may be moderated through persistent negotiations or fortuitous changes in international circumstances.

Currently, South Korea’s pressing political challenge is to quickly resolve political uncertainties and divisions since the aftermath of Yoon’s impeachment. Regardless of what happens to South Korean politics in the next several months, I hope that South Korea will soon have a president and government prepared to lead the country in successfully navigating diplomatic relations with the Trump administration.

Lee Jong-eun is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University.

The Korea Times · March 23, 2025

7. S. Korea battles multiple wildfires in southeastern region amid strong dry winds

(5th LD) S. Korea battles multiple wildfires in southeastern region amid strong dry winds | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · March 23, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with latest figures, other details)

SEOUL, March 23 (Yonhap) -- South Korea was battling to contain multiple wildfires raging across the southeastern region Sunday, with strong and dry winds hindering efforts to bring the blaze under control, authorities said.

The fire began Friday in Sancheong County, 250 kilometers southeast of Seoul, spreading to other areas. Wildfires also broke out in Euiseong, North Gyeongsang Province, about 180 km southeast of the capital; and Ulju County in Ulsan, some 300 km away.

Four people have been killed in the Sancheong fire so far, with six others injured. More than 1,500 people have been evacuated to temporary shelters, according to the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters.

A total of 4,650 hectares of land -- equivalent to approximately 6,512 football fields -- has been burned so far in Euiseong, leaving more than 390 people displaced.

Authorities put out a fire using a helicopter on March 22, 2025, a day after a wildfire broke out in the southeastern county of Sancheong, in this photo provided by the South Gyeongsang provincial government. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Firefighting crews were working to contain the fires, but strong and dry winds were hindering the efforts. In the case of the Ulju fire, transmission towers on the mountains were making it difficult for fire helicopters to approach.

With low-humidity conditions and strong winds forecast for the coming days, the relevant authorities are gearing up to take all possible measures to bring the blaze under control.

On Sunday, acting President Choi Sang-mok said the government will provide Sancheong and two other regions affected by the wildfires with special grants of financial support to help with recovery efforts.

"We will urgently provide a special disaster and safety grant of 2.6 billion won (US$177.4 million) to the three wildfire-affected regions," Choi said during a disaster control meeting.

The government will also provide 50 million won in disaster relief funds to support evacuees and victims in Sancheong.

Choi also instructed officials to review additional designations of Euiseong and Ulju as special disaster zones, following the designation of Sancheong.

Presidential Chief of Staff Chung Jin-suk convened a meeting with senior secretaries and discussed measures to bring the situation under control as soon as possible, the presidential office said.

"As strong winds are expected tomorrow, it was agreed that efforts should be focused on extinguishing the main fire before sunset today, while ensuring thorough preparations for nighttime operations," an official said.

Lee Han-kyung, deputy chief of the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters, speaks during a meeting on March 23, 2025, to discuss responses to put out wildfires in southeastern regions, in this photo provided by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Lee Han-kyung, deputy chief of the disaster control tower, instructed fire authorities to mobilize all available resources to promptly bring the wildfires under control.

"Wildfires are rapidly spreading to broader regions due to dry weather, threatening people's lives," Lee said in a disaster response meeting, vowing all-out efforts to put out the fires.

As of Sunday afternoon, firefighters had contained about 50-70 percent of the blaze in the three regions.

Wildfires burn trees on a mountain in Sancheong County in South Gyeongsang Province on March 21, 2025, in this photo provided by the Korea Forest Service. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · March 23, 2025

8. North Korea’s Nuclear-Powered Missile Submarine: A Mystery Wrapped Around a Riddle and an Enigma

​Images at the link.

North Korea’s Nuclear-Powered Missile Submarine: A Mystery Wrapped Around a Riddle and an Enigma

• By: Vann H. Van Diepen
• March 21, 2025

https://www.38north.org/2025/03/north-koreas-nuclear-powered-missile-submarine-a-mystery-wrapped-around-a-riddle-and-an-enigma/

On March 8, North Korean (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) media reported that Kim Jong Un, during undated visits to major shipyards, “learned about the building of a nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine, which is being pushed forward according to the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the WPK [Workers Party of Korea].”[1] Associated photos showed Kim walking past a portion of the hull of a new-type submarine (sub) under construction inside a building.

The key components of a nuclear missile sub are the hull, the missile system it carries, and the nuclear reactor wrapped within it. The current status of all three is uncertain.

• The photos indicate the new sub’s hull will be much larger than what is used for North Korea’s current subs, and could be about the size of the first US nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Without knowing how much of the sub has already been completed, or its final intended configuration, there is really no reliable way of assessing when construction might be complete. In any case, the nuclear reactor likely is the pacing item.
• The DPRK calling the new sub “strategic,” as opposed to the conventionally-powered “tactical nuclear attack submarine” launched in 2023, suggests the new sub is intended to be targeted on the US. It is most likely intended to carry a ballistic missile able to reach the US from defended waters near North Korea. The best current candidate is a submarine-launched missile first paraded in April 2022 but not yet flight-tested, presumably designated the Pukguksong-6. Based on past DPRK practice, such a missile could be sub-deployable in a few years.
• There is no open-source reporting that North Korea has yet built or tested a submarine nuclear reactor. However, the history of its weapons programs indicates that a fully indigenous “good enough for the DPRK” sub reactor cannot be ruled out. How long that reactor would take, and how far along the North is in developing one, is quite unclear, but its track record with other reactors suggests it could take at least several years. Russian aid (for which there is no current evidence) could potentially shave a few years off this.
• Figure 1. Korean Central News Agency photograph of Kim Jong Un on visit to undisclosed shipyard location.

The time required to complete all three of these components, plus fitting out and sea trials, means there is probably still a good amount of time, and likely quite a few observables, before the hull seen in the construction hall turns into an actual threat. But a single SSBN provides little additional strategic capability; an SSBN force of at least several boats will be required, taking yet more time. Even then, this force would almost certainly remain significantly less capable and survivable than North Korea’s much larger (and probably still growing) force of land-based road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

The Mystery: Nature and Progress of the Submarine Hull

It is unclear from the North Korean photos how much of the new submarine has been built (the bow and stern are not depicted, for example, nor the uppermost portions), or its final intended size and configuration. Extrapolating from Kim Jong Un’s height leads analysts to estimate the new sub’s diameter at 11.5 to 12.5 meters, much larger than North Korea’s previously widest indigenously-produced submarine, the Gorae-class one-tube missile test sub (6.7 m diameter). This diameter has led analysts to suggest the new sub will have a weight (displacement) of some 5,000 to 8,000 tons,[2] much larger than the 3,000 tons ascribed to the Sinpo-C, the North’s new conventionally-powered missile submarine (SSB), converted from a Soviet-designed Romeo-class sub, which was rolled out of its construction hall in September 2023. Although the full hull has not been seen, one source puts the new sub’s length at “at least 117 m,” perhaps based on the length of the building at the Pongdae Submarine Factory in Sinpho South Shipyard—where the sub is being constructed—being about 195 m long.

• In comparison, the first US nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the USS George Washington, launched in 1959, was 116.36 m long, 10.06 m in diameter, and displaced 5,900 tons surfaced.

It is unclear how long the new North Korean sub has been under construction, or when it may be complete. As is often the case with North Korea, publicly available information is sparse and sporadic, complicated by the indoor construction of the submarine and likely DPRK concealment practices.

• The construction hall at the Pongdae Submarine Factory, where the new submarine is being built was refurbished and extended to accommodate a longer boat between about July 2014 and November 2015, based on commercial satellite imagery.[3]
• Imagery from September 2016 shows a jig or submarine hull section 11 meters in diameter near the Sinpho South Shipyard’s fabrication hall.[4] This diameter is consistent with the new sub, but too large for the 6.7 m diameter Sinpo-C SSB also being built at the time in a different building.
• Figure 2. Imagery of Sinpho South Shipyard from September 2016 indicates a component roughly
• 11 meters in diameter. Satellite image © 2025 Maxar Technologies. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
• Imagery from March 2019 shows probable welding jigs measuring 11 meters in diameter in the component staging area near the extended construction hall.[5]
• Figure 3. Imagery from March 23, 2019 shows hull sections and other parts in the staging area at Sinpho South Shipyard. Image Pleiades © CNES 2025, Distribution Airbus DS. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
• 
  
• Between April 2019 and November 2022, components were generally absent from the staging area. This might reflect a construction hiatus due to North Korea’s COVID-19 shutdown.[6]
• The first public indication that the DPRK was committed to building a nuclear submarine was in January 2021, when Kim Jong Un reported to the Eighth Party Congress that “the design of new nuclear-powered submarine [sic] was researched and was in the stage of final examination” and that “the tasks were brought up to… possess a nuclear-powered submarine and an underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon.”
• In September 2023, Kim stated that “we should give greater impetus to the building of nuclear-powered submarine [sic],” while also stating that the conventionally-powered Sinpo-C SSB “will be as burdensome to our opponents as is our building a new-type nuclear-powered submarine,” and “when equipped with nuclear weapons, it is precisely a nuclear submarine.”[7]
• In January 2024, while “guiding” the test of a submarine-launched cruise missile, Kim reportedly “learned in detail about the building of a nuclear submarine… discussed the issues related to the building of a nuclear-powered submarine… indicated the immediate tasks to be carried out by relevant sectors and state measures to be taken, and made an important conclusion on the ways to implement them.”[8]
• Imagery from February 18, 2024, revealed an approximately 11-meter component (consistent with the diameter of the new sub) being prepared for movement into the construction hall assessed to be used for the nuclear submarine, and additional 11-meter components or their jigs were seen on imagery from March 2024.[9]
• In October 2024, a South Korean parliamentarian reported that the ROK Defense Intelligence Agency had detected “partial signs that appear to be the start of the submarine’s construction,” but that because “construction is still in its early stages, further confirmation is needed on whether it is nuclear powered,” although the sub was larger than existing vessels.

Putting these pieces together, the overall nuclear submarine program may have started as early as 2014 (given when extension of the construction hall started). The hull of the new sub appears to have been under construction for some eight years, although construction may have been suspended for about three of those years due to COVID-19 and may have lagged from late 2022 until early 2024.

Without knowing how much of the sub has already been completed, its final intended configuration, or the status of any nuclear reactor for it (see below), there is really no reliable way of assessing when construction might be complete. Other sources have estimated the new sub could be launched in one to two years, or two to three years. Even if launched, however, it remains to be seen whether a suitable missile or especially a nuclear reactor is ready at the same time.

The Riddle: What Missile(s) the New Sub Will Carry

The available information does not permit associating the new submarine with a specific missile system; the new photos do not show the top of the sub where the missile hatches would be, and it is not even clear whether the missile section of the sub has been built yet. (One analyst nonetheless opined that the sub can carry “around 10” missiles, perhaps keying off the number carried by the Sinpo-C SSB.) Many outside analysts interpret the North Korean description “strategic guided missile submarine” as indicating the new sub will carry nuclear-armed (thus “strategic” missiles).[10] One analyst apparently has interpreted the North’s use of “guided missile submarine” rather than “ballistic missile” to indicate that the new sub “will carry cruise missiles but not ballistic ones,” making it a nuclear-powered cruise missile sub (SSGN). Most other analysts assume the sub will carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), making it an SSBN.

The most interesting thing about North Korea’s characterization of the sub as being “strategic” is how that distinguishes the new sub from the Sinpo-C SSB launched in 2023, which Kim Jong Un called a “tactical nuclear attack submarine” and is apparently to be armed with a mix of short- or medium-range ballistic missiles and vertically launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). This suggests the new sub is intended to carry longer-range missiles than the SSB, and to have a mission other than theater strike.

The new sub is most likely intended to carry a longer-range SLBM, perhaps the “solid-fuel engine-propelled inter-continental underwater ballistic rocket” mentioned by Kim Jong Un in his January 2021 report as being in development. Use of an SLBM on the new sub technically would not be inconsistent with the North’s “guided missile submarine” characterization, since both cruise and ballistic missiles (like any “missile”) are “guided.” A sufficiently long-range SLBM also would allow deploying SSBNs close to North Korea so they can be defended by DPRK naval, air, and air defense forces against the substantial anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of the US and its allies. Using long-range SLBMs in this way would be the most sensible way for the North to maintain the most survivable, credible, sea-based deterrent against the US.[11]

A LACM payload, or a mixed SLBM/LACM payload like the Sinpo-C, cannot be ruled out. But to strike the US with LACMs a DPRK nuclear-powered submarine would have to make a long transit through Allied submarine detection networks to locations within missile range—North Korea’s have thus far demonstrated ranges of 1,500-2,000 km[12]—leaving the sub highly vulnerable to US and Allied ASW forces. This would be particularly true if, as is commonly assessed, a North Korean-made nuclear sub (and a first-generation one in particular) will be very noisy and thus quite susceptible to acoustic detection.

The best current candidate for deployment on the SSBN is the largest SLBM thus far revealed by North Korea, presumably designated the Pukguksong-6. It was first paraded in April 2022 but not yet flight-tested. Based on its size (about 13 meters long and 2.2 meters in diameter), this missile, in theory, could be capable of a range of upwards of about 12,000 km (comparable to the similar-size 1990 US Trident-II/D5 SLBM)—enough to strike all of the continental US from waters close to North Korea. (The North probably would use a taller “turtleback” missile section to accommodate a 13-meters-long missile and its ejection and launch gear in a sub with an 11.5-12.5 meter- diameter hull.)

If North Korea intends to deploy a longer-range SLBM on the new sub, we can expect it to conduct ground (static) testing of the missile’s main stage motors, to modify land-based test facilities and/or one of its test barges to permit “pop-up” ejection tests of the larger new missile, and begin missile flight-tests from land and/or a barge and then from the Gorae-class test sub. This entire sequence could take a few years, although it is possible that some of the early steps might have already taken place without open-source indications and Kim Jong Un could mandate a faster timeline. As of now, however, there would appear to be plenty of time for SLBM development to occur before a new sub with an operating reactor was ready to put to sea.

The Enigma: Status of a Submarine Nuclear Power Plant[13]

The biggest apparent gap in realizing a North Korean nuclear-powered submarine is the small nuclear reactor that would power it, and without which there is no nuclear sub.[14] Unlike the sub and its candidate missiles, North Korea has made no mention of a naval reactor program distinct from the above references to “nuclear-powered submarines;” no associated photos or videos of a small reactor have been released either. That said, the above analysis suggesting the nuclear submarine program may have started as recently as 2014 would also imply that work on a suitable reactor started at least that recently.

There is no open-source reporting that North Korea has yet built or tested such a reactor, although it cannot be ruled out that concealed development work has been going on. Based on other countries’ practice, the North would be highly likely to build and test a land-based prototype of a submarine reactor prior to installing it in a sub (although this is not strictly required), but no test reactor has thus far been identified. Pyongyang’s construction and initial operation of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) known as the EWLR (Experimental Light Water Reactor), would give it basic familiarity with building a PWR for a sub. But the industrial-sized EWLR using low-enriched uranium is a far cry from the very small and compact, higher-pressure reactor probably using highly-enriched uranium (HEU) needed for a submarine. Moreover, a sub reactor would need to be engineered to remain operational and reasonably reliable at depth in a moving submarine with no outside support under combat conditions, and provided with heavy shielding to protect its crew from radiation at least long enough to complete a potentially long deployment.

Although a number of US nuclear experts and former submariners have opined that North Korea would be unable to build a submarine nuclear reactor or a nuclear submarine on its own without foreign assistance, the history of North Korean weapons programs indicates that a fully indigenous “good enough for the DPRK” nuclear-powered submarine cannot be ruled out. It may take a long time (or may have taken a long time thus far), and may not be very good, but an eventual indigenous nuclear-powered submarine is within the realm of possibility. How long the reactor for such a sub would take, and how far along the North is in developing one, is anybody’s guess. But the EWLR began construction in November 2010 and did not begin operating until October 2023, suggesting a sub reactor could take at least several years.

Clearly, the most feasible way for North Korea to get a reasonable submarine nuclear power plant soon would be with foreign assistance. The degree to which Pyongyang has or will receive such aid is unknown. Russia would be the most likely governmental source of such assistance given the strengthened Kim-Putin relationship and North Korea’s provision of assistance to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Western governments clearly are concerned about Russia providing nuclear sub technology,[15] but there is no open-source evidence of this apart from a few claims by Ukrainian officials[16] that may at least in part serve propaganda purposes. Assistance from China or Chinese entities also cannot be ruled out, although there has been no evidence of this kind of cooperation either.

If substantial Russian nuclear submarine assistance is being provided to North Korea, it presumably started in the wake of the September 2023 Kim visit to Russia. That does not provide a great deal of time until now for any assistance to have been assembled and provided by the Russians, and received, assimilated, and incorporated into hardware by the North Koreans. The new submarine structure apparently was already under construction in September 2023. The sub’s reactor presumably is much less far along, and so there is more opportunity for Russian assistance to be useful and have a tangible effect, and North Korea probably would benefit more from reactor assistance in any case.

That said, even extensive Russian nuclear submarine assistance does not necessarily translate into quick results. India started receiving comprehensive aid from the Soviet Union and then Russia in the 1980s, including leasing and operating actual nuclear submarines, extensive assistance in submarine reactor design (after India’s indigenous efforts proved unsuccessful), design and construction assistance for nuclear submarines, Russian equipment to help fit out the actual constructed submarines, and SLBM technology.[17] Even so, its Advanced Technology Development program, which started in 1983, did not result in a commissioned SSBN until 2016. North Korea might not take as long to build a sub reactor with Russian assistance, but it might only shave a few years off what the North Koreans could do on their own.

Implications

We are probably at least several years away from a fully complete, reactor-equipped North Korean SSBN with adequately tested SLBMs. Even then, as with the first Sinpo-C SSB that has not yet begin sea trials, a year or two of fitting out probably would be required before an SSBN rolled out of the construction hall was ready for sea trials, with additional time required to reach operational status. This means there is likely still a good amount of time, and likely quite a few observables, before the hull seen in the construction hall turns into an actual threat.

Moreover, a single SSBN provides little additional strategic capability compared to North Korea’s established force of road-mobile ICBMs that presumably will still be growing. An SSBN force of at least several boats will be required—more depending on each sub’s missile and warhead load—to begin to make a substantial contribution to Pyongyang’s strategic forces, taking yet more time to eventuate. But even this force would almost certainly remain significantly less capable and survivable than the much larger mobile ICBM force.

1. [1]
2. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Major Shipyards to Learn about Warship Building and Advance Strategic Policy for Epochal Development of Shipbuilding Industry,” Korean Central News Agency, March 8, 2025. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/fb32f8726ec92869e7f30be7bddf570a.kcmsf
3. [2]
4. See, for example, Roh Suk-jo and Park Su-hyeon, “North Korea’s nuclear submarine plans take shape—with help from Russia?,” The Chosun Daily, March 10, 2025, https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/03/10/A7L6D7NLW5ABVFWFE7ZD56NZ7Y; and Park Chan-kyong, “Did Russia help build North Korea’s latest nuclear submarine?,” South China Morning Post, March 13, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3302106/did-russia-help-build-north-koreas-latest-nuclear-submarine.
5. [3]
6. E-mail from Stimson Center Nonresident Fellow Peter Makowsky to the author, March 16, 2025.
7. [4]
8. Ibid. One assessment contends that 11 m components were seen in 2017, but the source in the accompanying citation only mentions 7.1 m components, consistent with the ongoing construction of the Sinpo-C. See Joost Oliemans, “A decade in making, North Korea’s first nuclear-powered submarine breaks cover,” op.cit.; and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Submarine Ballistic Missile Program Moves Ahead: Indications of Shipbuilding and Missile Ejection Testing,” 38 North, November 16, 2017, https://www.38north.org/2017/11/sinpo111617.
9. [5]
10. E-mail from Stimson Center Nonresident Fellow Peter Makowsky to the author, March 16, 2025.
11. [6]
12. E-mails from Stimson Center Nonresident Fellow Peter Makowsky to the author, March 13 and 16, 2025.
13. [7]
14. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Congratulatory Speech at Ceremony for Launching Newly-Built Submarine,” Korean Central News Agency, September 8, 2023. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/a244151196662609d466a37d1f9ce288.kcmsf
15. [8]
16. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of Submarine-launched Strategic Cruise Missile,” Korean Central News Agency,” January 29, 2024. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/0ce140fa2f7c8b40fc0b495fc5418b50.kcmsf
17. [9]
18. E-mail from Stimson Center Nonresident Fellow Peter Makowsky to the author, March 13, 2025.
19. [10]
20. For example, see Hyung-Jin Kim, “North Korea unveils nuclear-powered submarine for the first time,” op.cit.
21. [11]
22. North Korea in theory could develop 10,000+ km range LACMs to target the US from protected waters, but there is no current evidence Pyongyang is developing such systems, which would have a very long flight time during which they would be vulnerable to Allied air defenses. SLBMs offer a much more practical and effective approach.
23. [12]
24. See Vann H. Van Diepen, “North Korea Launches Four “Hwasal-2” LACMs to Show Strong Deterrence and Rapid Response,” 38 North, March 1, 2023, https://www.38north.org/2023/03/north-korea-launches-four-hwasal-2-lacms-to-show-strong-deterrence-and-rapid-response; and Vann H. Van Diepen, “North Korea Emphasizes Theater Strike Missiles in the First Third of 2024,” 38 North, May 1, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/05/north-korea-emphasizes-theater-strike-missiles-in-the-first-third-of-2024.
25. [13]
26. Many thanks to Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker for his suggestions on the reactor issue.
27. [14]
28. One analyst has noted the possibility the North could at least start with a hybrid submarine combining a conventional main propulsion system and an auxiliary nuclear reactor. See Gabriel Honrada, “N Korea’s nuclear sub engulfed in a sea of doubt,” Asia Times, March 11, 2025, https://asiatimes.com/2025/03/n-koreas-nuclear-sub-engulfed-in-a-sea-of-doubt.
29. [15]
30. For example, see Courtney Kube and Carol E. Lee, “Are Russia and North Korea planning an ‘October surprise’ that aids Trump?,” NBC News, May 24, 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/are-russia-north-korea-planning-october-surprise-aids-trump-rcna153828; Song Sang-ho, “U.S. has not yet seen N. Korea’s atmospheric reentry missile capability: Indo-Pacific Command chief,” Yonhap News Agency, November 20, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241120000951315; and Joon Ha Park and| Shreyas Reddy, “Russia sends anti-air missiles to North Korea in exchange for troops: Seoul,” NK News, November 22, 2024, https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/russia-sends-anti-air-missiles-to-north-korea-in-exchange-for-troops-seoul.
31. [16]
32. For example, see Cho Jinwoo, “Ukraine military official: half of all North Korean shells are duds,” Radio Free Asia, March 4, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/shells-03042024144934.html.
33. [17]
34. See “India Submarine Capabilities,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 4, 2024, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/india-submarine-capabilities; Aqeel Akhtar, “Russia-India Nuclear Submarine Cooperation,” Center for Strategic International Studies Pakistan, May 10, 2024, https://ciss.org.pk/russia-india-nuclear-submarine-cooperation; and H.I. Sutton, “Vanquisher of enemies – INS Arihant,” Covert Shores, November 12, 2018, http://www.hisutton.com/Vanquisher of Enemies - INS Arihant.html.

9. North Korea tests new anti-aircraft missile system, threatens 'deadly' response to U.S.-South Korea drills

World News March 21, 2025 / 5:43 AM

North Korea tests new anti-aircraft missile system, threatens 'deadly' response to U.S.-South Korea drills

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/03/21/North-Korea-anti-aircraft-missile-test-Kim-Jong-Un-KCNA-Freedom-Shield/2881742548889/

By Thomas Maresca

A photo released by the official Korean Central News Agency Friday shows North Korea's test launch of a new anti-aircraft missile system at an undisclosed location. Photo by KCNA/EPA-EFE

SEOUL, March 21 (UPI) -- North Korea successfully test-fired a new anti-aircraft missile system, state-run media reported Friday, as Pyongyang continued to condemn a U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise that it claims is a rehearsal for an invasion.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw the test, which was held to "examine the comprehensive performance" of the new system being mass-produced at an unnamed munitions facility, Korean Central News Agency reported.

"The test-fire proved that the combat fast response of the latest anti-aircraft missile system was advantageous and the overall weapon system was highly reliable," KCNA said.

Kim said that the North Korean military now had "another major defense weapon system with laudable combat performance," the KCNA report added.

Related

• North Korea rejects G7 call for denuclearization, vows to 'strengthen' nuclear forces
• South Korean air force pilots charged with criminal negligence over accidental bombing
• North Korea says South's bombing mishap could spark 'new armed conflict'

The test comes as North Korea issued the latest in a series of condemnations of Freedom Shield, the major annual springtime military exercise held by the United States and South Korea.

The North's Defense Ministry on Friday called the joint exercise, which wrapped up the day before, "no more than a rehearsal of war of aggression aimed at invading and occupying the DPRK from A to Z."

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea.

In a statement carried by KCNA, the ministry warned that all options, including "the most destructive and deadly military means," are being considered in response to the allies' joint drills.

"The accumulated reckless military moves of the U.S. and the ROK, seized with the daydream that they can jeopardize the sovereignty and security of a nuclear weapons state, can undoubtedly bring the gravest consequences they do not want," the statement said, using the official acronym for South Korea.

This year's 11-day Freedom Shield exercise involved computer-simulated drills and on-field training, with a focus on the North's evolving nuclear and missile threats and its deepening military ties with Russia.

The drills "reflected realistic threats such as North Korean military strategies, tactics and changes in power derived through Russia-North Korea military cooperation and analysis of various armed conflicts," a statement from Seoul's Defense Ministry said Thursday.

South Korea deployed some 19,000 troops for this year's exercise, which expanded the number of outdoor field drills to 51 from 48 last year, the ministry said.

KCNA issued a commentary on Wednesday calling the joint drills "dangerous and undesirable doings germinating a touch-and-go situation, the world's first nuclear war."

Last week, North Korea fired a salvo of close-range ballistic missiles into the Yellow Sea following a pair of statements criticizing Freedom Shield and warning of retaliatory provocations.

10. Shoigu visit to Pyongyang hints at possible third North Korean deployment to Kursk

​For "peacekeeping" or to sustain attacks on Ukraine?

Sunday

March 23, 2025

 dictionary + A - A 

Shoigu visit to Pyongyang hints at possible third North Korean deployment to Kursk

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-03-23/national/northKorea/Shoigu-visit-to-Pyongyang-hints-at-possible-third-North-Korean-deployment-to-Kursk/2268189

Published: 23 Mar. 2025, 19:21

• 
  
• LIM JEONG-WON
• lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Sergei Shoigu, secretary of the Russian State Security Council, embrace during Shoigu's visit to Pyongyang on March 22. [YONHAP]

Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered an “important personal letter” to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un through his closest aide, according to North Korean state-run media on Saturday, reaffirming that Pyongyang-Moscow trade will continue even during the Ukraine cease-fire negotiations.

Analysts indicate that Putin is trying to secure a favorable position in future negotiations with Western powers through a third dispatch of North Korean troops to Ukraine, while Kim is trying to obtain as much security and economic compensation as possible.

On Saturday, the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported the results of the visit to North Korea by Sergei Shoigu, secretary of the Russian State Security Council, the day before.

“Sergei Shoigu courteously conveyed the friendly greetings and an important personal letter from Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, president of the Russian Federation, to the DPRK leader,” it reported. The DPRK is the acronym for North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 

The KCNA added that Kim Jong-un responded with “deep thanks” and “militant greetings."

Kim also reportedly said it was the "steadfast option and resolute will of the DPRK government" to support Russia’s "struggle for defending its national sovereignty, territorial integrity and security interests.”

Related Article

UN Human Rights Council to address concerns over North Korea's troop dispatch to Russia

North Korea's new ambassador to Bulgaria takes post: KCNA

North Korea successfully test-fired latest antiaircraft missile system: KCNA

North Korea warns of using 'deadliest military means' against South Korea-U.S. military drills

In their conversation, Kim and Shoigu discussed "defending the security interests of the two countries" and “prospective undertakings for further expanding and boosting exchanges and cooperation in security and other many-sided fields.”

Shoigu, considered one of Putin’s closest aides, visited Pyongyang six months after he visited North Korea in September of last year. Kim greeted Shoigu with an embrace, according to the KCNA.

Experts say that discussions on expanding exchanges related to the “security sector” could mean a third deployment of North Korean troops.

Putin reaffirmed Kim’s pledge to send additional troops, and Kim may have received cash and a promise of modernization and practical training for the North Korean military in return. North Korea also expects the transfer of advanced military technology in the long term.

Previously, North Korea sent an additional 11,000 troops in the first deployment in December last year, and up to 3,000 soldiers this year. During Shoigu's visit to North Korea, discussions on the specific scale and units related to the third deployment may have taken place.

Putin may have also judged that it would be advantageous to send North Korean troops rather than Russian ones to the Kursk region, the western front line, while negotiations for the end of the war were underway.

Russia regained the initiative in the region after North Korea deployed troops there last year.

Yang Wook, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, assessed that Shoigu's visit to North Korea "means that even amid the cease-fire discussions, North Korea, which is not an official participant in the war, will continue to provide Russia with leverage in the fighting.”

In addition, Kim and Shoigu reaffirmed the North Korean and Russian leadership’s will to “unconditionally implement” the provisions of the North Korea-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

Shoigu met with local reporters on Thursday before he visited North Korea and stated that the trip's main focus would be "implementing the agreements reached with North Korea.”

This supports speculation that the visit to North Korea was also intended to ease Kim Jong-un’s anxiety over the mass casualties suffered by the North Korean military. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s General Directorate of Information (HUR) estimated that up to 4,000 North Korean military casualties occurred on the Kursk front in mid-month.

The line about "expanding and boosting exchanges and cooperation" in "other many-sided fields” may refer to North Korea’s tourism industry.

Kim is working hard to revitalize the overseas tourism industry, including opening the Wonsan-Kalma coastal tourist zone in June.

North Korea may hope to use foreign tourism to boost the inflow of foreign currency, severely reduced by international sections and Covid-19.

BY LEE YOO-JUNG,LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]

11. Korean politics: Where did we go wrong?

​This applies to all of us, not just Korean politics.

So where did we go wrong?

We went wrong when we stopped seeing politics as a shared responsibility and started seeing it as a form of entertainment. We went wrong when we allowed our emotions to override our critical thinking. And we went wrong when we turned truth into a commodity, something to be bought, sold, and traded for likes and clicks.

The solution, if there is one, lies in stepping back from the spectacle. It lies in demanding more from ourselves, our media, and our leaders. It lies in remembering that politics is not a game to be won or lost but a collective effort to build a better world.

As for my student who wants to change the world through journalism, I hope she succeeds. But I also hope she remembers that the first step toward changing the world is understanding it — not as a spectacle, but as it truly is. And that, perhaps, is where we begin to set things right.

Korean politics: Where did we go wrong?

The Korea Times · March 22, 2025

Courtesy of Belinda Fewings

By David A. Tizzard

A student told me this week that she wanted to be a journalist so she could change the world. I congratulated her for her passion, her drive, and her belief in the power of words. She had a dream, and that was more than most her age. But I couldn’t help myself. I asked her, “Isn’t that kind of attitude the problem? Isn’t that why we’re in this mess?” She looked back, puzzled.

Journalists aren’t journalists anymore. They are agenda pushers. On both sides. And we, as consumers lap it up. We go where we like the opinions. We read what reinforces our beliefs. When we pick up a newspaper — whether it’s The Hankyoreh or Chosun Ilbo — we know what we’re getting. Objectivity vanishes. The same applies to TV channels, radio stations, YouTube videos, and even academia. This is the world we’ve built. A world where journalists and news organizations provide narratives and bias rather than facts.

Politics has become a theater of emotions — fear, glory, victory, and defeat. People celebrate or cry when events unfold. Every news outlet has a slant, and rather than resisting bias, they embrace it. In fact, they thrive on it. It keeps the clicks coming, the outrage flowing, and the revenue streams healthy. Even those in academia, adorned with the titles of “Dr.” and “Professor,” are often predictable in their ideological leanings. In the field of Korean Studies, I know where most stand. It’s not a question of whether bias exists, but how explicitly it is broadcasted. I don’t see myself as exempt from this, either.

But consider the world of sports. Watch any football or baseball broadcast, and you will see pundits—many of whom have deep emotional ties to certain teams — engage in objective analysis. Sure, they’re not completely free from bias, but they are expected to be fair. They analyze what happened, who deserved to win, who deserved to lose. They look at tactics and mistakes. The expectation is that there will be genuine insight without prejudice. We get sports right, but not politics.

Content creators

I listened to an hour-long discussion promising a deep dive into the current impeachment scandal and an explanation of what happened. A journalist said that they had spent the last three months consumed by the story. So much so, that they couldn’t sleep. They woke up in the middle of the night thinking about what was happening. They wanted answers. They needed to know what was going on. "So, how do you explain what we are seeing?” asked the interviewer.

Perhaps foolishly, I expected something akin to a timeline of events. I wanted the sports analysis breakdown. I was waiting to be told about the doctor’s strike, the Democratic Party’s control of the National Assembly and subsequent blocking of Conservative policies, of the investigations into the president’s wife, the sentencing of Cho Guk, and the impending verdict hanging over Lee Jae-myung. I wanted the build-up that we had all seen happening. The growing tension between the Conservatives and Democrats, fueled by language of communism, China and “xiexie”s.

Instead, after 3 months of not being able to sleep and thinking deeply, they said that Yoon’s decision to enact military law was because he’s an insecure heavy drinker. That was it. He might be, of course. But where was the tactical analysis? Where was the commentary on both teams in the build-up to the moment? It was absent.

So why do we demand objectivity in sports but accept pure subjectivity in politics?

Perhaps it’s because politics has become a form of entertainment. We no longer consume news for insight — we consume it for the thrill, the dopamine hit of outrage, the satisfaction of seeing our “side” win the narrative. We also want dramatic things to happen. It gives us purpose and meaning. It pays our bills. It gives us a team to support.

The aspiring Korean journalist told me that the day Yoon Seok-yeol was elected president, she began looking for working holidays in Canada and Australia. She simply couldn’t bear the thought of being in the same country as him. That’s how emotionally connected she was to politics. And these are some of the people that give us our news. Many are either deeply engrained in an existential battle or pushing gossip for money. The whole while, our sports analysts are expected to "say it as they see it," and no more.

Modernity and money

The philosopher Byung-Chul Han writes about the “burnout society,” a world where we are not oppressed by external forces but by our own insatiable need to consume and perform. In this hypercapitalist age, everything — even our politics — is commodified. We are no longer citizens seeking truth; we are consumers seeking stimulation. Politics is packaged and sold to the highest bidder. We don’t engage with it to understand; we engage with it to feel.

Han argues that we live in a society of “transparency,” where everything is reduced to what is visible, quantifiable, and consumable. In this world, truth becomes secondary to what sells. Politics, once a space for deliberation and debate, is now a spectacle designed to capture attention. It’s no longer about governance or policies — it’s about engagement, clicks, and profit.

This is the irony: in sports, where the stakes are relatively low, we demand objectivity. But in politics, where the stakes are existential, we revel in subjectivity. We’ve turned our world into a stadium, but instead of seeking clarity, we revel in the chaos. We aren’t looking for truth. We’re looking for a spectacle.

This is the inevitable result of a society that prioritizes consumption over reflection, stimulation over understanding. In his view, the constant barrage of information and the pressure to perform — to pick a side, to have an opinion, to be outraged — leaves us exhausted and disconnected from any deeper sense of meaning.

So where did we go wrong?

We went wrong when we stopped seeing politics as a shared responsibility and started seeing it as a form of entertainment. We went wrong when we allowed our emotions to override our critical thinking. And we went wrong when we turned truth into a commodity, something to be bought, sold, and traded for likes and clicks.

The solution, if there is one, lies in stepping back from the spectacle. It lies in demanding more from ourselves, our media, and our leaders. It lies in remembering that politics is not a game to be won or lost but a collective effort to build a better world.

As for my student who wants to change the world through journalism, I hope she succeeds. But I also hope she remembers that the first step toward changing the world is understanding it — not as a spectacle, but as it truly is. And that, perhaps, is where we begin to set things right.

David A. Tizzard has a doctorate in Korean Studies and lectures at Seoul Women's University and Hanyang University. He is a social-cultural commentator and musician who has lived in Korea for nearly two decades. He is also the host of the "Korea Deconstructed" podcast, which can be found online. He can be reached at datizzard@swu.ac.kr.

The Korea Times · March 22, 2025

12. US global troop repositioning

​A view from Korea.

We (the ROK/US alliance) should never be afraid to ask, examine, and answer these questions: 

(1) How do we best organize our combined military forces to deter war and defend both the ROK and US? 

(2) What forces should be stationed in Korea, in the region, and prepared to deploy from CONUS to achieve our mutual security objectives?  

(3) How does the US organize its forces to respond to multiple contingencies either sequentially or simultaneously?

If the answers to these questions result in changes, the changes should be viewed as achieving the best force posture (given political, geostrategic, and resource constraints) to achieve our mutual objectives and not in any way as a reduction in commitment by any to any nation.

Excerpts:

The Donald Trump administration’s recent steps are intended to save some $330 million worth of military spending over five years. It is with relief that the USFK is exempt from the current plan. Yet Trump’s inclination of neglecting alliances while cherishing American interests only is feared to send the wrong signal to North Korea and China.

The Trump administration should send a strong, unequivocal message regarding the enduring importance of the USFK as a cornerstone of regional stability. Any moves that risk reducing U.S. military assets in Korea could undermine the security of South Korea and destabilize the broader region. A clear and consistent commitment to maintaining a robust U.S. presence in Korea will provide South Korea with the security assurance it needs to navigate regional uncertainties.

America’s global military realignment is an unavoidable reality. South Korea faces a critical question: can it respond proactively to these changes and safeguard its security interests? The shifting strategic landscape demands a careful and decisive response — one that ensures South Korea remains secure, even as the U.S. adapts its global military posture. Through a combination of reaffirmed commitments, strengthened cooperation and enhanced capabilities, the Trump administration can fortify the Korea-U.S. alliance and secure a stable and prosperous future for Northeast Asia.

US global troop repositioning

The Korea Times · March 23, 2025

Allies must safeguard role of US Forces Korea

The United States is stepping up a comprehensive review of its global military posture, signaling a significant shift in its defense strategy. The review represents more than just a simple troop adjustment; it is a broader realignment reflecting Washington’s evolving national security priorities while also focusing on reducing budgets, personnel and apparatus. Notably, the U.S. is considering renouncing the role of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

It is seeking to curtail the number of regional headquarters — from six to four — integrating deployments in Europe and Africa. It also aims to unify those in North America and Latin America. The possible change in NATO status means a significant and symbolic retreat of U.S. influence in the region. This could lead to a major shakeup in the global security landscape that had continued since World War II.

According to major media outlets such as CNN and NBC, reports from the Pentagon revealed plans to scale back or reposition the U.S. military presence in Europe, which had been temporarily reinforced due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Asia, particularly the Indo-Pacific region, is no exception to this trend. While the U.S. has framed its Indo-Pacific Strategy as a cornerstone in countering China’s growing influence, domestic political and economic pressures are reshaping Washington’s approach. The planned expansion of U.S. Forces Japan faces significant hurdles, including local opposition, political sensitivities and controversies surrounding base relocations. These factors complicate Washington’s military calculus, casting doubt on the timeline and scope of U.S. troop increases in Japan.

While the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has not been explicitly mentioned in these strategic reviews, any changes in the military posture in Japan could have far-reaching consequences for the broader security architecture of Northeast Asia. The U.S. military presence in both Japan and South Korea has been a complementary force, forming the backbone of trilateral security cooperation among the U.S., South Korea and Japan. A shift in U.S. strategy regarding Japan could lead to a reexamination of the role of the USFK, potentially resulting in reductions or reassignment of responsibilities.

The Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral alliance has long served as a critical deterrent against North Korea while also providing a counterbalance to China and Russia. However, this alliance is increasingly strained by domestic political shifts, fiscal challenges and the evolving security landscape in each country. While recent diplomatic progress between Seoul and Tokyo is encouraging, the foundation for military trust and integrated cooperation remains fragile. A shift in U.S. military deployment could destabilize this delicate balance, leaving South Korea exposed to rising threats from both North Korea and a more assertive China.

Given this possibility, South Korea must act swiftly to safeguard the role of the USFK. In the short term, it should engage in close coordination with the United States to ensure that the role and status of the USFK remain firmly entrenched in the region’s security architecture. However, in the long term, South Korea must focus on enhancing its defense capabilities, strengthening its autonomy and maintaining a resilient and adaptable partnership with the U.S. The Korea-U.S. alliance must evolve into a more flexible, pragmatic relationship, grounded in shared interests and a realistic assessment of the region’s security challenges.

The Donald Trump administration’s recent steps are intended to save some $330 million worth of military spending over five years. It is with relief that the USFK is exempt from the current plan. Yet Trump’s inclination of neglecting alliances while cherishing American interests only is feared to send the wrong signal to North Korea and China.

The Trump administration should send a strong, unequivocal message regarding the enduring importance of the USFK as a cornerstone of regional stability. Any moves that risk reducing U.S. military assets in Korea could undermine the security of South Korea and destabilize the broader region. A clear and consistent commitment to maintaining a robust U.S. presence in Korea will provide South Korea with the security assurance it needs to navigate regional uncertainties.

America’s global military realignment is an unavoidable reality. South Korea faces a critical question: can it respond proactively to these changes and safeguard its security interests? The shifting strategic landscape demands a careful and decisive response — one that ensures South Korea remains secure, even as the U.S. adapts its global military posture. Through a combination of reaffirmed commitments, strengthened cooperation and enhanced capabilities, the Trump administration can fortify the Korea-U.S. alliance and secure a stable and prosperous future for Northeast Asia.

The Korea Times · March 23, 2025

13. Captured N. Korean soldiers not bargaining chip for Ukraine: top envoy

​That is correct. And, as we have previously mentioned, it was the POW issues in the Korean War that was the major point of friction in the negotiation of the Armistice Agreement.

(Yonhap Interview) Captured N. Korean soldiers not bargaining chip for Ukraine: top envoy | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · March 23, 2025

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, March 23 (Yonhap) -- Ukraine does not see the issue of North Korean soldiers being held by its military as a matter for negotiation or exchange, but as an issue to be handled based on international law and humanitarian principles, its top envoy to Seoul has said.

Ukrainian Ambassador to South Korea Dmytro Ponomarenko made the remarks as South Korea and Ukraine are discussing steps regarding the soldiers who remain in Ukraine's custody after being captured by Ukrainian forces earlier this year.

"Ukraine does not view this matter as a bargaining issue," Ponomarenko said in a recent written interview with Yonhap News Agency. "But rather as one that must be handled in strict accordance with international law and humanitarian principles," he said.

In January, Ukrainian authorities said they captured two North Korean soldiers during combat in Russia's western Kursk border region. One of them has expressed in media interviews an intention to defect to the South.

Ukrainian Ambassador to South Korea Dmytro Ponomarenko delivers a speech during an event marking the 3rd anniversary of the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, held at the Goethe-Institut Korea, in Seoul, in this Feb. 24, 2025, file photo. (Yonhap)

Since then, speculation has grown that Ukraine may use the soldiers as a bargaining chip for Seoul to provide Kyiv with weapons to fight against Moscow, in return for its consent for the soldiers' defection to the South.

Some observers have also raised the view that the soldiers could be used as leverage in the ongoing negotiations between the United States and Russia to end the war in Ukraine.

Asked about the progress of the discussions on the soldiers with Seoul, the ambassador said it's "premature" to determine the timeline for a conclusion.

"Any decision regarding the soldiers' future will be made in compliance with international law, individual rights, and through dialogue between the parties concerned," Ponomarenko said.

South Korea has maintained that it is ready to give them protection and help if they decide to come to the South, as they are citizens of its own by the Constitution.

"We responsibly treat all official appeals and signals from the Korean side regarding the fate of the captured North Korean military personnel, and we take into account the concerns of the South Korean government," he said.

South Korea's stance on the soldiers was also echoed by Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul during his phone conversation earlier this week with Ukraine's top diplomat, Andrii Sybiha.

Ponomarenko said in return for its "services" in providing military assistance to Russia, North Korea has most likely demanded what it needs from Moscow, such as advanced military technology or other strategic support.

He stressed that South Korea should be aware of these long-term security implications of North Korea's involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war.

"South Korean leaders should not forget that Pyongyang also uses Ukrainian soil as a testing ground for its weaponry, which could be used in future possible standoff on the Korean Peninsula," he said.

"In this regard, I think the Republic of Korea has no reason to hesitate in the development of full-scale military-technical cooperation with Ukraine," he said. "It's a matter of interest for both Kyiv and Seoul."

South Korea has only provided non-lethal and other humanitarian support to Ukraine since the war began.

This photo, released by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on his X account, shows a North Korean soldier captured by the Ukrainian forces during combat in Russia's western Kursk border region in January. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Ponomarenko urged the international community to take "decisive action" and increase pressure on both Russia and North Korea to end their cooperation that poses a "severe security risk" globally.

"North Korea's involvement in the war is strengthening its military capabilities, providing its troops with combat experience ... allowing Pyongyang to test and refine its missile technology on the battlefield," he said.

"This development is deeply concerning, not only for Ukraine and Europe, but also for the East Asia region," he said.

Ukraine, once the third-largest nuclear power following its independence from the Soviet Union, gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994 under the terms of an agreement to provide it with security guarantees by the U.S., Britain, Russia and others.

"Regrettably, it did not ensure our immunity from the armed aggression by Russia," he said, referring to its 2014 occupation of Crimea.

"The decision to get rid of nuclear weapons weakened our defense capabilities," he said. "Nevertheless, there is no sense to speculate about the past. What is done cannot be undone."

As a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Ukraine remains committed to nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, Ponomarenko said.

"That's why we continue urging our international partners to support us by providing all necessary types of conventional weaponry to boost our capabilities for repelling Russia's military aggression," he said.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · March 23, 2025

14. U.N. Human Rights Council to address concerns over N. Korea's troop dispatch to Russia

​Human rights are not only a moral imperative, they are a national security issue as well.

U.N. Human Rights Council to address concerns over N. Korea's troop dispatch to Russia | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · March 23, 2025

SEOUL, March 23 (Yonhap) -- The U.N. Human Rights Council is expected to address concerns over North Korea's troops dispatch to Russia to support its war in Ukraine in its latest resolution on Pyongyang's human rights situation, documents showed Sunday.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights unveiled the draft resolution on the human rights situation in North Korea, which was submitted by Poland and Australia on Thursday.

The draft resolution urges North Korea to "refrain from the use of deadly and other excessive force at its borders and elsewhere, particularly where it would exacerbate civilian suffering, fuel human rights violations and destabilize international security."

While past resolutions have called on Pyongyang to exercise restraint in the use of force at its borders and beyond, this year's draft explicitly highlights concerns over the potential impact on global security.

The draft is expected to be adopted at the 58th session of the U.N. Human Rights Council, scheduled from April 2-4, after deliberation among member states.

South Korea has co-sponsored the resolution for the third consecutive year.

The conference room of the United Nations Human Rights Council is seen in this image captured from UN Web TV. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · March 23, 2025

15. U.S. Treasury Lifts Tornado Cash Sanctions Amid North Korea Money Laundering Probe

​I wonder how Kim Jong Un will receive this. This is not a concession.

We should be telling the story that we are following the rule of law and unlike north Korea (and China, Russia, and Iran) we do not operate under the authoritarian method of rule BY law.

If only we had organizations and capabilities to tell such a story and transmit messages to authoritarian regimes and their citizens who live under severe oppression.

Excerpt:

The department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added Tornado Cash to its sanctions list in August 2022. It was estimated to have been used to launder more than $7.6 billion worth of virtual assets since its creation in 2019, the Treasury said at the time.

However, a U.S. Fifth Circuit court issued a decision in November 2024, reversing a decision about the mixer, ruling that OFAC "overstepped its congressionally defined authority" when it sanctioned the cryptocurrency mixer.

This stemmed from the court's view that OFAC's ability to sanction entities does not extend to Tornado Cash because its immutable smart contracts cannot be deemed as "property" under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

U.S. Treasury Lifts Tornado Cash Sanctions Amid North Korea Money Laundering Probe

thehackernews.com · by The Hacker News

The U.S. Treasury Department has announced that it's removing sanctions against Tornado Cash, a cryptocurrency mixer service that has been accused of aiding the North Korea-linked Lazarus Group to launder their ill-gotten proceeds.

"Based on the Administration's review of the novel legal and policy issues raised by use of financial sanctions against financial and commercial activity occurring within evolving technology and legal environments, we have exercised our discretion to remove the economic sanctions against Tornado Cash," the Treasury said in a statement.

In conjunction with the move, over 100 Ethereum (ETH) wallet addresses are also being removed from the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list.

The department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added Tornado Cash to its sanctions list in August 2022. It was estimated to have been used to launder more than $7.6 billion worth of virtual assets since its creation in 2019, the Treasury said at the time.

However, a U.S. Fifth Circuit court issued a decision in November 2024, reversing a decision about the mixer, ruling that OFAC "overstepped its congressionally defined authority" when it sanctioned the cryptocurrency mixer.

This stemmed from the court's view that OFAC's ability to sanction entities does not extend to Tornado Cash because its immutable smart contracts cannot be deemed as "property" under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

"With respect to immutable smart contracts, the court reasoned, there is no person in control and therefore 'no party with which to contract,'" according to documents filed by the Treasury Department as part of the case.

It further said it remains committed to using its powers to combat and disrupt malicious cyber actors from exploiting the digital assets ecosystem, and it will do everything in its capacity to restrict the ability of North Korea to fund its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.

"Digital assets present enormous opportunities for innovation and value creation for the American people," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent.

"Securing the digital asset industry from abuse by North Korea and other illicit actors is essential to establishing U.S. leadership and ensuring that the American people can benefit from financial innovation and inclusion."

Last May, a Dutch court on Tuesday sentenced Alexey Pertsev, one of the co-founders of Tornado Cash, to 5 years and 4 months in prison. Two of its other founders Roman Storm and Roman Semenov were indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice in August 2023.

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter  and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

thehackernews.com · by The Hacker News

16. Germany rules out reopening Pyongyang embassy amid N. Korea-Russia military ties

[INTERVIEW] Germany rules out reopening Pyongyang embassy amid N. Korea-Russia military ties

The Korea Times · March 21, 2025

Director General for Asia and the Pacific at the German Federal Foreign Office Frank Hartmann, left, shakes hands with Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul, March 11. Courtesy of Embassy of Germany in Seoul

By Kim Hyun-bin

Germany has no plans to reopen its embassy in Pyongyang, citing North Korea’s military involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine, a senior German official said during his visit to Seoul in mid-March.

Frank Hartmann, the director general for Asia and the Pacific at the German Federal Foreign Office, recently traveled to South Korea to launch the annual bilateral Indo-Pacific consultations with his South Korean counterparts. The discussions come at a time of heightened global tensions and are seen as a crucial step in strengthening strategic ties between Berlin and Seoul.

One key issue addressed during Hartmann’s visit was Germany’s stance on its diplomatic mission in North Korea.

“Due to the North Korean military engagement in the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, we do not envision a reopening of our embassy in Pyongyang under these circumstances,” Hartmann said in a written interview with The Korea Times.

Germany, along with other European nations, shut down its diplomatic operations in North Korea following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. While some countries have resumed limited diplomatic activities in Pyongyang, Germany remains firm in its position, citing security concerns and geopolitical considerations.

As South Korea and Germany continue their diplomatic dialogue, the partnership between the two nations is expected to grow stronger, particularly as they address shared challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Both countries have emphasized the importance of a rules-based international order, economic security and regional stability.

Hartmann’s visit also underscored Germany’s broader commitment to engagement in the Indo-Pacific, aligning with its 2020 Indo-Pacific policy guidelines that stress cooperation with democratic partners in the region. South Korea has welcomed Germany’s increasing involvement, particularly in areas such as economic security, supply chain resilience and countering authoritarian influence.

Indo-Pacific cooperation

Hartmann emphasized the growing importance of security cooperation between Europe and the Indo-Pacific, particularly in light of the ongoing Russian war of aggression.

"European security and security in the Indo-Pacific are intertwined more than ever," he said. "A quick, but in the end, unsustainable ceasefire will eventually increase insecurity — not only in Europe, but in the Indo-Pacific region. This might send wrong signals to other Asian players, something we have to avoid at any cost."

Germany has long been committed to enhancing its partnership with countries in the Indo-Pacific region, with the publication of its Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific five years ago. Hartmann outlined the broader context of this policy, emphasizing the interconnected security threats facing Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

"Interlinked threats to the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region have become more apparent, especially with China’s support for the Russian war in Ukraine and North Korea even sending soldiers to the European war theater," Hartmann said. "This underlines the importance of our cooperation."

He stressed the importance of protecting the international order based on international law, especially in unpredictable times. "Now, more than ever, we have to protect the international order based on international law together," Hartmann said.

"Multilateralism and international law are under pressure. This dangerous precedence needs to be met with strong rejection by the international community in order to not serve as a precedent."

On the role of South Korea in addressing these challenges, Hartmann noted the importance of economic and security resilience.

"Unilateral steps violating fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, will increase tensions globally," he said. "We will work together to safeguard peace and security in the region and on a global scale."

Given the evolving security dynamics in the region, Hartmann outlined Germany’s expectations for South Korea's contributions to regional peace and stability.

"In these challenging times, we need to stand united and strengthen the cooperation between Germany, the [European Union] and the Republic of Korea," Hartmann said. "We expect Korea as our valued partner to continue being a regional security provider."

He further underscored the importance of trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the United States and Japan, highlighting its crucial role in regional stability.

The consultations between Germany and South Korea have been seen as an opportunity to deepen the two countries' ties. Hartmann noted that the relationship between the two nations is already strong in areas such as economics, education and defense.

"We stand ready to intensify discussion and cooperation and should focus on our joint responsibility and joint interest as middle powers to maintain the international order based on international law," Hartmann said. "Since this has been the first round of our Indo-Pacific consultations, I look forward to continuing the dialogue and exchanges in Berlin."

The Korea Times · March 21, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com