Quotes of the Day:

"You may shoot me with your words,

You may cut me with your eyes,

You may kill me with your hatefulness,

But still, like air, I'll rise."

– Maya Anegelo, I Still Rise

"It is the truth I'm after, and the truth never harmed anyone. What harms us is to persist in self-deceit and ignorance."

– Marcus Aurelius

"When you want to help people, you tell them the truth. When you want to help yourself, you tell them what they want to hear."

– Thomas Sowell

1. Harvard Seniors Split on 2024 Commencement Speaker Maria Ressa

2. Let’s Say Someone Did Drop the Bomb. Then What?

3. Is Nuclear Deterrence Ethical and Legal? by Sir Lawrence Freedman

4. China’s Dispute With Taiwan Is Playing Out Near This Frontline Island

5. Taiwan Declares Chinese Social Media App TikTok A National Security Threat

6. The secret operation to hold elections in occupied Mariupol

7. As China prepares to invade Taiwan, US forces are about to combat-test a vital weapon

8. U.S. Army Seeking Retirees To Come Back To Work Amid Manpower Crisis

9. Ukraine's Patriot kills of Russian planes and missiles have turned a US air-defense weapon with a troubled past into a hero

10. Clausewitz, the Culminating Point of Victory, and Israel’s Perilous Rafah Operation

11. The Age of the M1 Abrams Tank Is Coming to an End

12. Large Language Models’ Emergent Abilities Are a Mirage

13. Ukraine: Russian strikes in Kyiv facilitated by US sat-data purchase

14. Foreign governments stand with Philippines after latest incident in Ayungin Shoal

15. Two Russian Black Sea fleet ships hit in "massive" Crimea strike

16. The Bolduc Brief: Afghanistan Revisited- Lessons from a General’s Perspective

17. India Emerges 'World’s Biggest' Military Training Partner Of U.S. As Both Look To Check 'Hostile' China

18. The disinformation war has taken a toll, but researchers feel a shift ahead of 2024 election

19. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 23, 2024

20. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 23, 2024

1. Harvard Seniors Split on 2024 Commencement Speaker Maria Ressa

What the hell is the matter with Harvard students (and Harvard in general for admitting and producing such students)? Yes, I am biased because Maria is a good friend. But comparing Tom Hanks to her contributions and to her courage to stand up to a dictator? With all due respect to Tom Hanks but do his contributions really measure up to Maria Ressa's? Perhaps it is because she graduated from a rival Ivy league school, Princeton.

These are unbelievable comments:

Some students compared the choice to last year’s Commencement speaker, actor Tom Hanks.

“At face value, it’s a little bit different than Tom Hanks last year,” Kerry W. Daley ’24 said. “I don’t know if that’s a step down or not — it would have been cool to get a media figure like Tom Hanks.”

“It was definitely not entirely what I expected because I know past classes have had Tom Hanks and speakers like that,” Angelica F. Carillo ’24 said. “I just don’t know enough about her to be excited — but I’m sure she’ll give an amazing commencement speech.”

Harvard Seniors Split on 2024 Commencement Speaker Maria Ressa

https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2024/3/22/ressa-commencement-speaker-reax/?utm

Maria Ressa, a Nobel Prize-winning journalist and the 2024 Commencement speaker, is pictured. Some Harvard seniors expressed disappointment with the pick. By Courtesy of Alecs Ongcal

By Azusa M. Lippit, Crimson Staff Writer

2 days ago

Harvard seniors had mixed reactions after the University announced Tuesday that Nobel Prize-winning journalist Maria Ressa would be the 2024 Commencement speaker.

Tuesday posts on the anonymous social media app Sidechat criticizing the selection garnered more than 200 upvotes, prompting similarly high-engagement replies and posts in defense of Ressa.

A. Ada Cruz ’24 said she was hoping the speaker would be a “household name.”

“I was underwhelmed, disappointed — not by the accomplishments of the person, but I just wanted it to be someone that represented more of the fun side of culture,” Cruz said.

A Harvard spokesperson directed The Crimson to the University’s Tuesday announcement of Ressa’s selection in response to a request for comment.

“Maria Ressa embodies Veritas,” Interim Harvard President Alan M. Garber ’76 said in a statement to the Harvard Gazette, a University-run publication. “We look forward to welcoming her to campus and to acknowledging her outstanding contributions to society.”

Some students compared the choice to last year’s Commencement speaker, actor Tom Hanks.

“At face value, it’s a little bit different than Tom Hanks last year,” Kerry W. Daley ’24 said. “I don’t know if that’s a step down or not — it would have been cool to get a media figure like Tom Hanks.”

“It was definitely not entirely what I expected because I know past classes have had Tom Hanks and speakers like that,” Angelica F. Carillo ’24 said. “I just don’t know enough about her to be excited — but I’m sure she’ll give an amazing commencement speech.”

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Many students in the class of 2024 graduated high school in the spring of 2020, when graduation ceremonies were canceled internationally due to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. Carillo said she’s “just happy that we’re getting a real graduation.”

“Being able to have that moment with our friends I think is really special — ultimately we’re not going to remember the commencement speaker in thirty, forty years from now,” she added.

Lucas Chu ’23-24 heard about the speaker selection on Sidechat, where he said he became frustrated with the “complaining” about Ressa’s selection.

“It got to the point where I literally deleted Sidechat last night,” Chu said.

Several students said Ressa’s selection is timely in the context of backlash against Harvard’s protection of free speech on campus.

Nick Y. Gu ’24 called criticism of the choice “a little bit ridiculous,” adding that it’s “more than ever important that we talk about things.”

“I feel like having a speaker like that who has firsthand experience getting arrested for sticking up for what they believe in is super cool, and super admirable,” he said.

Jeremy O.S. Ornstein ’24 said he is “interested and curious to hear” Ressa’s speech, and offered a message to his disappointed classmates.

“If you’re sad, I’ll sit with you during commencement. But I talk during speeches, so you have to be okay with that — real-time reactions,” Ornstein said.

“Let’s listen and then talk about it, how about that?” he added. “I’ll see you an hour after commencement — I’ll meet you at Shay’s.”

Though he was initially “unsure” of who Ressa was, George J. Alvarez ’24 said he is looking forward to the ceremony.

“No matter who the speaker is, it’ll be sweet to have my Harvard degree in my hands,” Alvarez said.

—Staff writer Azusa M. Lippit can be reached at azusa.lippit@thecrimson.com. Follow her on X @azusalippit or on Threads @azusalippit.

2. Let’s Say Someone Did Drop the Bomb. Then What?

Excerpts:

Yet she also demonstrates that many, if not most, of the scientists doing nuclear work have attitudes not all that different from those of the marching students. They too believe in abolishing nuclear weapons. They just don’t think it will happen simply by holding up a sign and wishing for it. Convinced that the United States has no choice but to keep its deterrence system safe, secure and operational, they live inside a paradox difficult for outsiders to understand.

They are embodiments of an antique maxim of international relations: If you want to prevent war, you have to prepare for war. “These things can’t just be put away,” one scientist tells Scoles. In his youth, he favored abolition. Now he asks, “How do you then manage policy that makes sure that they never get used in anger again?” Another, her exasperation showing, was blunter. “You know what? Nuclear weapons exist.” One might add that they are not about to go away anytime soon.

Let’s Say Someone Did Drop the Bomb. Then What?

The New York Times · by Barry Gewen · March 24, 2024

Evidence of the first test of a full-scale thermonuclear device rises over the Marshall Islands on the morning of Nov. 1, 1952.Credit...Los Alamos National Laboratory, via Associated Press

Nonfiction

In “Nuclear War” and “Countdown,” Annie Jacobsen and Sarah Scoles talk to the people whose job it is to prepare for atomic conflict.

Evidence of the first test of a full-scale thermonuclear device rises over the Marshall Islands on the morning of Nov. 1, 1952.Credit...Los Alamos National Laboratory, via Associated Press

By

Barry Gewen is a former editor at the Book Review and the author of “The Inevitability of Tragedy: Henry Kissinger and His World.” He is working on a book about nuclear proliferation.

• March 24, 2024

NUCLEAR WAR: A Scenario, by Annie Jacobsen

COUNTDOWN: The Blinding Future of Nuclear Weapons, by Sarah Scoles

When it comes to nuclear catastrophe, there is a large and ever-expanding body of books and films.

Movies have an obvious visual advantage (what is more photogenic than a mushroom cloud?), but books like Annie Jacobsen’s gripping “Nuclear War: A Scenario” are essential if you want to understand the complex and disturbing details that go into a civilization-destroying decision to drop the Bomb on an enemy.

Jacobsen, the author of “The Pentagon’s Brain,” has done her homework. She has spent more than a decade interviewing dozens of experts while mastering the voluminous literature on the subject, some of it declassified only in recent years. “Nuclear war is insane,” she writes. “Every person I interviewed for this book knows this.” Yet the sword of Damocles hanging over our heads remains unsheathed.

Numbers tell the terrifying story by themselves. A one-megaton bomb dropped on the Pentagon would kill about a million people in the first two minutes, and the subsequent war would be a march toward Armageddon. She estimates that, by its end, at least two billion individuals would lose their lives.

Jacobsen calls this genocide, but then goes further, describing a mass extinction event from the postwar impact of nuclear winter and the degradation of the ozone layer. “As long as nuclear war exists as a possibility,” she says, “the survival of the human species hangs in the balance.”

Jacobsen lays out an imaginary narrative that begins with North Korea launching a missile against the United States. The “why” — Kim Jong-un is paranoid? resentful? a “mad king”? — is less important than the “how” of procedure, because nine governments possess nuclear weapons, and for many of them the decision to kill millions of people in an instant rests with one man, whether Kim, Vladimir Putin or the president of the United States. (During the Watergate crisis, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, worried that a drunken and brooding Richard Nixon might decide to launch a nuclear strike, reportedly told the Pentagon’s leaders to check with him or Secretary of State Henry Kissinger before following a directive from the White House.)

In Jacobsen’s telling, Washington fires interceptors to take down the missile but these fail because, as she explains, tests of America’s interceptor system have produced dismal results. “With 44 interceptor missiles in its entire inventory, the U.S. interceptor program is mostly for show.”

Now the doomsday clock begins ticking. Jacobsen proceeds minute by minute, even second by second. After the detection of the North Korean missile, the president has just six minutes to decide whether to fire America’s own missiles in a counterattack, turning much of North Korea into dust and inviting involvement by the Russians and Chinese.

One of Jacobsen’s major themes is that apocalyptic choices have to be made in a frighteningly short amount of time. In her scenario, it takes 72 minutes for the world as we know it to come to an end. (During the 1960s, the political satirist Tom Lehrer sang about World War III lasting an hour and a half — not much has changed since then.)

Jacobsen has a second theme designed to keep her readers awake at night. Traditionally, in the “fog of war,” high-level strategies are inevitably disrupted, meticulously designed plans go awry, numerous mistakes and miscalculations are made — and nuclear conflict is the foggiest of wars. There has never been a nuclear exchange, so no one really knows what would happen, and all the carefully calibrated, algorithmically determined projections of the Pentagon and its think tanks may not be worth the computer paper they are printed on.

How can one foresee the impact of widespread panic, the breakdown of public services, the collapse of the military’s command and control networks, the anarchic violence and every-man-for-himself ethos bound to follow? In Jacobsen’s plot, North Korea also launches other missiles, including a high-altitude explosive that knocks out America’s power grid in what a former senior C.I.A. official calls “electric Armageddon.”

Jacobsen says more than once that “nuclear war has no rules,” but that’s not quite true. There is one prediction we can safely make: Apart from the countless deaths, the result of a nuclear war would be total chaos for those who survived. Nikita Khrushchev, of all people, said that in the aftermath, the living would envy the dead.

Can anything be done to save us from ourselves? Jacobsen points an accusing finger at the doctrine of deterrence, which has been America’s governing policy for decades. Since the nation’s enemies know that any nuclear attack would be met with an overwhelming response, they are deterred from starting a war they know ahead of time they cannot control.

But Jacobsen notes that deterrence, which has a spotless record so far, works only until it doesn’t. Should a nuclear conflict break out, either by accident, a misunderstanding or the decision of a crazed leader, Jacobsen’s end-of-the-world scenario becomes much more plausible. There is no Plan B if deterrence fails.

So far, so good (or bad), but it is at this point that the questions begin. What is her Plan B? If she favors abolishing nuclear weapons altogether, she owes it to her readers to say so, and then explain how it could be done. How do we get from here to there?

Deterrence theory was devised following Hiroshima and Nagasaki by farseeing thinkers like Bernard Brodie, who grasped that the development of nuclear weapons had irrevocably changed the entire nature of warfare, and that the threat of aggression by a rival power had to be met defensively, and peacefully, by deterrence. There was no alternative.

Entire schools of thought have grown up around the proposition that the Cold War never turned hot because of the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. And there is a legitimate argument to be made that the only reason we are not at war right now with Russia over its invasion of Ukraine is the existence of nuclear weapons. (See also: Taiwan.)

Among the people who appreciate the importance of deterrence are the individuals who populate “Countdown,” by Sarah Scoles, a journalist and contributing editor at Scientific American. The subjects of this rather discursive book include former hippies and competitive speedskaters, but most seem to be born physicists who at an early age aspired to be astronauts or wanted to explore what makes the universe tick.

Now they “toil in obscurity” at facilities like the Los Alamos National Laboratory. They are charged with the responsibility of securing and modernizing America’s deterrence system, and their jobs include testing the components of nuclear weapons, checking that missiles function the way they are supposed to and tracking plutonium to ensure that none of it is diverted. Some spend their time trying to pick up clues of any advances other countries are making in nuclear technology.

This is incredibly important work, costing hundreds of billions of dollars, perhaps trillions, and the people who got into it seem to have done so because they wanted to do something meaningful with the scientific expertise they had acquired at school. “I honestly feel that I’m serving my country working here at the lab,” one says. In the 19th century, Baudelaire observed that the heroes of modern life were individuals who wore frock coats. Today, we might say they wear lab jackets.

Not everyone would agree. Scoles portrays scientists who often feel misunderstood and under siege by those convinced that the fastest way to end the nuclear threat is simply to abolish the weapons themselves. Tell your friends that your job is modernizing America’s missile system and count how many of them you lose. Protesters regularly demonstrate outside the labs. “Evil” is a word routinely hurled at the researchers. They are even drilled in how to argue with those who accuse them of being warmongers.

Significantly, the labs are having trouble recruiting talented young replacements because of the anti-nuke and antiwar beliefs that are common on American campuses. Who wants to work on projects that could kill millions of people when you can have the personal satisfaction of marching outside a nuclear lab as your contribution to “world peace”? Meanwhile, the population of scientists experienced in nuclear affairs is graying and shrinking, producing a “worker gap.” Scoles reports that as much as 40 percent of the current work force at the National Nuclear Security Administration will be eligible for retirement over the next few years.

Yet she also demonstrates that many, if not most, of the scientists doing nuclear work have attitudes not all that different from those of the marching students. They too believe in abolishing nuclear weapons. They just don’t think it will happen simply by holding up a sign and wishing for it. Convinced that the United States has no choice but to keep its deterrence system safe, secure and operational, they live inside a paradox difficult for outsiders to understand.

They are embodiments of an antique maxim of international relations: If you want to prevent war, you have to prepare for war. “These things can’t just be put away,” one scientist tells Scoles. In his youth, he favored abolition. Now he asks, “How do you then manage policy that makes sure that they never get used in anger again?” Another, her exasperation showing, was blunter. “You know what? Nuclear weapons exist.” One might add that they are not about to go away anytime soon.

NUCLEAR WAR: A Scenario | By Annie Jacobsen | Dutton | 373 pp. | $27

COUNTDOWN: The Blinding Future of Nuclear Weapons | By Sarah Scoles | Bold Type | 264 pp. | $30

The New York Times · by Barry Gewen · March 24, 2024

3. Is Nuclear Deterrence Ethical and Legal? by Sir Lawrence Freedman

From one of our best living strategic thinkers.

Excerpts:

There are really no good targeting options for nuclear weapons. All pose awful choices. The only way to escape these dilemmas would be to get out of the nuclear age by eliminating the weapons. There may come at a time when political conditions make that possible. But for now those conditions are remote. Too many countries believe in their strategic value of nuclear arsenals. Making the case for complete disarmament may follow a moral imperative but it can also be a way of ducking all the awkward questions inherent in living in the nuclear age.

A more realistic alternative is to accept that the nuclear weapons states will continue to wish to deter threats to their very existence and that may involve threatening the potential aggressor with something equally terrible. This does not preclude developing options for limited use against military targets. If the last resort is reached, and deterrence has failed completely, restraint would be preferable to adding to the sum total of terror and misery, although limited use would appear as an odd compromise. Either anger and a desire for retribution would lead to a massive response, or despair and paralysis might lead to no response at all.

The problem is not with the idea that nuclear weapons could be used legally and morally, with discrimination and proportionality; only with any suggestion that if this idea is pursued the potential for escalation to the extremes will be removed. If we want political leaders to stay risk averse at times of crisis then it is best not to break the close association of nuclear weapons with mass death. Too much confidence in limited nuclear use could make it more tempting in a crisis or when things are going badly in a conventional war. In practice I suspect the association with mutual destruction, which is so deeply embedded in popular discourse, will prove to be very durable. And maybe that is just as well.

To state the obvious the nuclear situation will become more manageable and tolerable when great power relations are relaxed. When and if current tensions ease it would be wise to look for ways to reduce even more the risks of a nuclear calamity. If the weapons cannot be completely eliminated, however, then neither can the risks of the worst imaginable outcomes. Little can be gained by pretending otherwise.

Is Nuclear Deterrence Ethical and Legal?

https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/the-secret-operation-to-hold-elections?utm=

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

MAR 24, 2024

During the early 1980s there were regular protests in the UK against nuclear weapons accompanied by intense debates about the morality and credibility of deterrence. Most memorable was the Woman’s Peace Camp outside the RAF base at Greenham Common where cruise missiles were to be based. On 1 April 1983 a 14-mile chain was formed by some 70,000 protesters from Greenham to the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston and on to the ordnance factory at Burghfield. The camp remained in placed until 2000, long after the cruise missiles had left but with residents still protesting against the UK’s Trident programme.

A Ministry of Defence official who was then having to answer correspondence on nuclear issues observed to me that dealing with most of the claims made by the activists was not that difficult. They were often quasi-strategic in character, for example asserting that the cruise missiles were ‘first strike weapons.’ Such assertions could be challenged both empirically and analytically. The government was confident in its case that these weapons reinforced deterrence even if they were not going to convince the activists.

What this official found truly difficult was when people wrote saying that we should have nothing to do with these weapons because they were wicked and that they feared for the future of their children. How could one say that inflicting mass death would not be a wicked thing to do? The argument was that preparing to do a wicked thing deterred others from acting in ways that were as wicked if not more so, but that was hardly claiming the moral high ground. For deterrence to hold nuclear use had to at least to be possible. And what would happen if deterrence failed? After vivid portrayals of the consequences of nuclear strikes (for example in the 1984 TV drama Threads which depicted a nuclear strike on Sheffield) how could one say that the prospect was not terrifying? 

The cruise missiles came and went, removed because of a 1987 arms control agreement. These protests began in 1980, 35 years into the nuclear age. We have since survived another 44. But with international tensions high, routine threats from Moscow about how a false move from NATO will lead to Armageddon, and arms control agreements abandoned or in disrepair, anxiety has not only continued but if anything has reached new levels. Nor has the anti-nuclear movement subsided. Even before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, international moves to prohibit the possession and the threat of nuclear use as well as actual use have gathered pace.

After a variety of reports into the devastating short and long-term effects of a nuclear war in 2013 the UN General Assembly set up a working group on how to negotiate a world without nuclear weapons. Under the auspices of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which received a Nobel Peace Prize for its troubles, the terms of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was agreed in 2017. Those who sign up agree not to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. They also agree not to assist others with these prohibited activities. Some 70 states have ratified the treaty although none of these are states that possess nuclear weapons or depend on deterrence for their security.

The elimination of all nuclear weapons would mean we could stop worrying about ‘the bomb’, although no doubt we would find something else to worry about. But for now, given the worsening security situation, abolition is an even more remote prospect than it seemed in 2017. Nonetheless ICAN, and other moves to challenge the legitimacy of nuclear arsenals and question the morality of plans for their use, leave the nuclear weapons states with some explaining to do. How can they justify security policies based on threats of mass destruction?

One way to address the issue is to follow international humanitarian law, which seeks to limit the harmful effects of armed conflict. For nuclear weapons to be compliant ways would have to be found of using them that would avoid mass civilian casualties, presumably by directing them against military targets in the numbers necessary to destroy those targets, but no more.

This would represent a significant departure from the thinking that dominated the question of how to manage the superpower nuclear relationship during the Cold War. Then the tendency was to focus on the disastrous consequences of a nuclear war to ensure that one did not take place. This included denying the possibility that one could be kept limited. The reasoning was that states knowing that aggressive action risked terrible retaliation would be cautious. That caution would give time for diplomacy to resolve the conflict before it escalated into nuclear exchanges. A nuclear war contained and focused, with civilian targets avoided, sounds less scary but for that reason would be more likely to occur. The more these terrible weapons conformed to the laws of war it would be potentially easier to use them. This raises the issue of whether it is better to loosen or keep the close association of nuclear war with mass death.

Early last week I was fortunate to be able to attend a workshop on law, ethics and nuclear weapons organised by Professors Janina Dill of Oxford and Scott Sagan of Stanford which addressed this topic. What follows is not a report on the workshop – the individual papers will eventually be published – but my own thoughts prompted by a fascinating discussion.

The Laws of War and Air Power

International humanitarian law is founded on ethical values, notably the Christian ‘Just War’ criteria, which describe when it is right to go to war and how wars should be fought. The basic principles are that violence can only be used to accomplish legitimate military purposes, that attacks must only be directed at combatants and not civilians, and even incidental threats to civilian life must be avoided if they are likely to be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. At all times care must be taken when mounting military operations to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.

Nuclear weapons were first introduced at the end of the Second World War, during which international law had been progressively disregarded and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants steadily eroded. Helpless civilians had died in many different ways, from extermination camps to mass air raids. Arguably the culmination of this process was the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, though the fire-bombing of Tokyo in March 1945 remained the deadliest air raid of the war.

Efforts to use air power solely against military or military-related targets, from weapons factories to railway marshalling yards, had led to heavy losses in aircraft because of the vulnerability to air defences as a result of flying low and during the day to spot specific targets. It was easier to target enemy morale by bombing cities, even if it was unclear how that would bring forward the end of the war. After the Luftwaffe set the precedents with the blitz the RAF needed little encouragement to follow. As Basil Liddell Hart observed: ‘inaccuracy of bomb aim led to inhumanity of war-aim.’

In 1949, after the war, when the Geneva Conventions were revised the Americans and British were adamant that there could be no limits on air power. Conventional air raids against cities continued in subsequent wars, notably in Korea and Vietnam. By the early 1970s, however, it became much harder to dismiss the idea of limits as discrimination in the use of air power became possible with the introduction of highly accurate ‘smart’ bombs. These removed the excuse that even with a focus on military-related targets it was likely that large numbers of civilians would be killed not intentionally but as ‘collateral’.

There was now an element of choice. It was possible to confine attacks solely to military targets without harming civilians; equally, of course, if the aim was to maximise harm to civilians that could also be done as Russia has demonstrated in Syria and Ukraine. In 1977, the 1949 Geneva Conventions were revised. Included in the extensive Additional Protocol 1 were articles outlawing indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations, and the destruction of food, water, and other materials needed for survival. This also included using technologies whose scope of destruction could not be limited. The US and UK accepted that this applied to air power but still insisted that ‘the new rules introduced by the Protocol are not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons,’ though there was nothing in the wording to support this claim. In 1996 the International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion. It was not very helpful:

‘the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.’

The ICJ also encouraged the nuclear weapons states to pursue disarmament.

Nuclear Weapons: Do Different Considerations Apply?

Could nuclear weapons be used in ways consistent with international humanitarian law? As early as the 1950s there had been efforts to see whether nuclear weapons could be used as if they were conventional weapons. ‘Tactical’ nuclear weapons were developed, including mines and artillery shells as well as low-yield bombs, and presented as similar in character to conventional weapons, only more powerful. The claim was that their effects could somehow be confined to the battlefield. This was never convincing. The essential feature of nuclear weapons was their destructiveness, with radiation effects in addition to those of the blast and fire.

If low yield weapons were used on any scale, then the cumulative effects would be horrendous, especially when fallout was taken into account. The risk of introducing these weapons into an ongoing battle in the middle of Europe was that it would not bring the fight to a quick end but that it would lead to nuclear escalation far earlier than would otherwise have been the case. This is what is meant by ‘lowering the nuclear threshold.’

In the late 1970s there were proposals to replace some of these aging battlefield weapons with what was described as an ‘enhanced radiation reduced blast’ weapon, designed to disable tank crews, otherwise known as the ‘neutron bomb’. This was denounced by the anti-nuclear movement as another abomination, the ultimate ‘capitalist’ bomb as it would kill people while leaving property intact. More seriously they warned of any blurring of the boundaries between conventional and nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons had to be kept in a separate category.

Though small yield weapons became part of the superpower arsenals the arrival of thermonuclear ‘hydrogen’ weapons, with yields equivalent to millions of tons of TNT, each capable of obliterating single cities, also in the 1950s, made the association of nuclear weapons with mass death ever stronger. In the 1960s it became even stronger still when the US administration began to worry about how to stabilise the arms race and prevent what was described as the ‘reciprocal fear of surprise attack.’

The nuclear relationship had stabilised because neither superpower could gain a decisive advantage in the nuclear arms race. The result was the condition known as ‘mutual assured destruction.’ But this depended on the first strike/ second strike distinction. A ‘counterforce’ first strike would represent an attempt to win a nuclear war by taking out the adversary’s means of retaliation, so leaving it defenceless. If the adversary had a second-strike capability that meant it could absorb a first strike and then retaliate to inflict an ‘unacceptable’ level of damage. This was normally described as ‘counter-value’ targeting, measured in terms of the proportions of the population killed and industrial capacity destroyed. The assumption was that if both sides faced unacceptable damage neither would have an incentive to rush to a nuclear strike.

The point was not that this a desirable targeting philosophy. Its relevance was as a source of caution, reinforcing mutual deterrence. If this was a fact of life from which neither superpower could escape then it was an argument for restraint, both when it came to fighting wars and also weapons development. In particular, and controversially, this logic led to an argument for abandoning attempts to defend against missile strikes. A successful defence could support a first strike by thwarting a retaliatory second strike. In practice a successful defence would be difficult because of the ease with which the enemy could mount an overwhelming attack with yet more offensive weapons along with chaff and decoys. The main effect of a defensive programme therefore would be to fuel the arms race with more offensive programmes, leading to more uncertainty and instability.

This turned all the traditional just war/international law considerations on their head leading to a paradoxical logic: ‘Offence good; defence bad. Killing cities good; killing weapons bad.’ However perverse this logic, with its apparent endorsement of mass killing, it became the new orthodoxy. It influenced the design of both arms control treaties and force structures. The underlying view was that it was for the best if both sides had survivable forces that could withstand a first strike. Submarines patrolling the oceans with their own ballistic missiles represented the most reliable form of safety from first strikes.

The legacy of MAD thinking remains profound. It can be seen in the presumptions that the ability to attack an adversary’s nuclear capabilities risks instability, and that any escalation to nuclear use will almost certainly end with Armageddon. Discussions of limited nuclear wars still sound delusional.

Nonetheless, just as the development of precision guidance, improved sensors, and more sophisticated command and control systems, made it possible to think about using conventional weapons in a variety of ways, there were attempts to do the same with nuclear weapons. The discomfort with the idea that the President might be stuck only with mass destruction and counter-value targeting, encouraged a drive in the US to develop alternative options.

Then when the end of the Cold War came there seemed to be less need to worry about these things. With improved political relations the heat was off: the question of targeting could be left quite open. With the major powers cashing in their ‘peace dividends’ deterrence seemed less of an issue.

Against this backdrop it became harder to keep the question of nuclear use separate from questions of international humanitarian law. If more discriminate targeting of conventional weapons was possible then was that not also the case with nuclear weapons? In 2013 the Obama administration announced that in the future all nuclear plans must be ‘consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict.’ He also wanted to sustain a policy of deterrence. Much of the Oxford conference was preoccupied with what that might mean in practice.

Michael Quinlan

One person who tried to engage with this question while in a position to do something about it was Michael Quinlan, someone who got mentioned during the conference. He provided most of the intellectual heft behind the UK’s nuclear deterrence, while a senior official at the MoD (not the one I was referring to earlier). He died in 2009, not long after publishing a typically thoughtful book on the topic. He was one of those civil servants who cared deeply about policy and wrote about it with great lucidity. He was also a deeply religious man, educated by Jesuits, whose Catholicism influenced his thought. After his retirement he wrote a book on just war with someone who shared both his faith and interest, General Sir Charles Guthrie, a former Chief of Defence Staff. His moral sensibility led him to oppose the 2003 war against Iraq.

Quinlan was an energetic proponent of nuclear deterrence. His starting point was that nuclear weapons were in a category of their own. They could not be considered as equivalent to conventional weapons. Their arrival

‘carried the potential of warfare past a boundary at which many previous concepts and categories of appraisal—both military and political—ceased to apply, or even to have meaning.’

When combined with ‘the worldwide delivery capability of modern missiles and the diversity and elusiveness of missile platforms’ they made available ‘what is for practical purposes infinite destructive power, unstoppable and inexhaustible at any humanly-relevant levels.’

Quinlan recognised that there could be possible ‘subdivisions of the spectrum of force,’ including in the move from conventional to nuclear weapons, but he was doubtful about ‘abstractions like thresholds and firebreaks.’ The key point was that ‘no conceptual boundary could be wholly dependable amid the stresses of major war.’ How non-nuclear war was fought would affect both the likelihood and character of a nuclear war.

He accepted that deterrence depends on the risk of actual nuclear use, although not a certainty that they would definitely be used. It was impossible to know how a set of political leaders would respond to their own moments of truth.

‘The concept of deterrence … cannot exist solely in the present - it inevitably contains a reference forward to future action, however contingent. The reference need not entail automaticity, or even firm intention linked to defined hypotheses; it need entail no more than a refusal to rule out all possibility of use; but it cannot entail less than that.’

Quinlan also argued that this required real preparations by real people, who could not be expected to be part of a charade. The

‘commitment of many thousands of individuals — often in career-long and very demanding tasks—could be durably sustained in the known absence of any policy for use or for contingency planning which they could regard as seriously intended.’

How then did he reconcile this acceptance of the need for nuclear plans with his religious beliefs? He addressed this issue when the case was being made both within government and then to the wider public for a new generation of nuclear submarines and Trident missiles. The solution was to shift targeting from a focus on Soviet cities to what was described as the ‘sources of Soviet state power.’

This idea of attacking leadership targets in a so-called ‘decapitation’ attack, had been discussed in the US in the 1970s. The ability to take out the ‘national command authority’ might at least give the elite pause for thought before they set in motion events that could end with their own demise. But if the enemy government no longer existed who would call an end to the war? And if the elite believed that they could protect themselves by hiding in underground bunkers might they feel more confident that they could escape the consequences of their actions?

Directing attacks in this way therefore might get round the problem of intent but in practice, given the number and location of the relevant targets, the effect would still be to kill large numbers of Russians. And as Quinlan believed that deterrence depended on the infinite possibilities of destruction then he could not argue that a more limited strike would serve the purposes of deterrence. Focusing on the prime intent of the targeting did not preclude a secondary intent that still involved mass death. So this option did not really resolve the ethical dilemma. After he retired from public service Quinlan was actively engaged in public debates and was always prepared to make a robust case for deterrence, but this was always the issue that caused him the most difficulty.

Since the time that Quinlan was grappling with these issue as an official more options for limited strikes have been developed, including for the UK. If the moment came decision-makers, if they had survived an enemy attack, might insist on full retaliation or decide that it is all quite pointless as the harm has already been done and they have no wish to add to the suffering. It is also doubtful that they will be worrying at this stage about international law. 

The argument that there is no automaticity in nuclear use should deterrence fail therefore still holds. Deterrence can still work so long as there is a risk, which can be quite small, that nuclear weapons might be used. Over these past two years Vladimir Putin has managed to exude a sense of menace and danger sufficient in practice to deter Western government from intervening more directly on behalf of Ukraine without ever quite spelling out what he would do should the moment come..

In some highly stressed and extreme situation, perhaps in the aftermath of a strike against their country, political leaders might find ways of using these weapons against purely military targets and in a limited way. Then they could claim that were staying on the right side of international law and morality, to the extent that they cared in such a situation. But the more they dwell on this possibility in advance they risk reducing deterrence because the danger might not seem so bad to an adversary or even worse, because counterforce capabilities threaten their second-strike capabilities.

There are really no good targeting options for nuclear weapons. All pose awful choices. The only way to escape these dilemmas would be to get out of the nuclear age by eliminating the weapons. There may come at a time when political conditions make that possible. But for now those conditions are remote. Too many countries believe in their strategic value of nuclear arsenals. Making the case for complete disarmament may follow a moral imperative but it can also be a way of ducking all the awkward questions inherent in living in the nuclear age.

A more realistic alternative is to accept that the nuclear weapons states will continue to wish to deter threats to their very existence and that may involve threatening the potential aggressor with something equally terrible. This does not preclude developing options for limited use against military targets. If the last resort is reached, and deterrence has failed completely, restraint would be preferable to adding to the sum total of terror and misery, although limited use would appear as an odd compromise. Either anger and a desire for retribution would lead to a massive response, or despair and paralysis might lead to no response at all.

The problem is not with the idea that nuclear weapons could be used legally and morally, with discrimination and proportionality; only with any suggestion that if this idea is pursued the potential for escalation to the extremes will be removed. If we want political leaders to stay risk averse at times of crisis then it is best not to break the close association of nuclear weapons with mass death. Too much confidence in limited nuclear use could make it more tempting in a crisis or when things are going badly in a conventional war. In practice I suspect the association with mutual destruction, which is so deeply embedded in popular discourse, will prove to be very durable. And maybe that is just as well.

To state the obvious the nuclear situation will become more manageable and tolerable when great power relations are relaxed. When and if current tensions ease it would be wise to look for ways to reduce even more the risks of a nuclear calamity. If the weapons cannot be completely eliminated, however, then neither can the risks of the worst imaginable outcomes. Little can be gained by pretending otherwise.

4. China’s Dispute With Taiwan Is Playing Out Near This Frontline Island

Excerpts:

“They are probing here and there to push the boundaries and create a new normal,” said I-Chung Lai, the president of the Prospect Foundation, a Taiwanese think thank aligned with the Democratic Progressive Party. Any conciliatory messages in Mr. Lai’s inauguration speech were unlikely to shift China’s strategy, he added: “The gray zone operations against Taiwan will become more intense, regardless of what William Lai says.”

Still, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, may not want to push those actions to the point of setting off a full-blown crisis.

Beijing has other ways of politically undermining Mr. Lai, and has pointed to his share of votes — 40 percent — to assert that he does not represent Taiwan’s mainstream views. Mr. Xi also has his eye on the United States’ presidential election in November, and probably won’t make any big decisions over Taiwan before then, several experts say. And with China’s economy in such poor shape, Mr. Xi would likely rather avoid a major confrontation that could unnerve investors.

“President Xi has a lot of problems that he’s dealing with at home, and if you look back to other episodes when China has dealt with a lot of domestic challenges, they typically have sought to calm their external environment,” said Ryan Hass, the director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.

China’s Dispute With Taiwan Is Playing Out Near This Frontline Island

A fatal incident off Kinmen, a Taiwanese-controlled island, has become the latest occasion for Beijing to warn and test Taiwan’s president-elect.

• https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/24/world/asia/china-taiwan-ships.html

Anti-tank fortifications line a beach on the Taiwanese island of Kinmen, several miles off China’s coast. Tensions with China have risen in recent months.Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times

By Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien

Reporting from Kinmen, Taiwan

March 24, 2024, 12:30 a.m. ET

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in China and Taiwan? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

A small island controlled by Taiwan a few miles off China’s coast lived for decades in constant readiness for war. At one point in 1958, troops there hunkered in bunkers as Communist forces rained hundreds of thousands of shells on them.

These days, the island, Kinmen, has become a hub of Taiwan’s commerce with China and its abandoned, weatherworn fortifications are tourist sites. Eight ferries a day take Taiwanese businesspeople and visitors from Kinmen to mainland China.

But the sea around Kinmen has again turned tense after two Chinese men onboard a speedboat died in the area last month while trying to flee a Taiwanese Coast Guard vessel.

The Chinese Coast Guard has responded by patrolling close to the island, and briefly boarded a Taiwanese tourist boat last month. In mid-March, four boats came as close as 3.5 miles off Kinmen’s shore, entering what Taiwan calls a prohibited zone.

Image

In an image provided by the Taiwan Coast Guard, workers carried out a rescue operation after a Chinese speedboat capsized near Kinmen.Credit...Taiwan Coast Guard Administration, via Associated Press

China has said the patrols are to protect Chinese fishing boats. But the patrols also fit more broadly with China’s strategy of squeezing Taiwan, an island-democracy that Beijing claims as its territory, while stopping short of setting off a major confrontation that would draw in the United States.

Beijing has been stepping up such “gray zone” tactics to warn Taiwan’s president-elect, Lai Ching-te — a politician deeply disliked by Chinese leaders — as he prepares to take office in two months, experts, politicians and officials in Taiwan said in interviews and briefings.

“With Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20, mainland China is definitely going to steadily, consistently raise the pressure,” said Chen Yu-jen, a member of Taiwan’s legislature from the opposition Nationalist Party who represents an electorate on Kinmen, in an interview with The New York Times.

Beijing asserts that Taiwan must accept unification, preferably peacefully, but under armed force if Chinese leaders decide that is necessary. Mr. Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party rejects China’s claim to Taiwan, and argues that the island-democracy will chart its own course — self-ruling in practice, even if most governments do not recognize Taiwan as a separate state.

Image

Lai Ching-te, the president-elect of Taiwan, after winning the election in January. Mr. Lai is deeply disliked by Chinese leaders.Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times

Some pushback from China over the deaths of the two Chinese men on Feb. 14 near Kinmen was foreseeable, especially given that Taiwan is always kindling for nationalist ire. Chinese officials are now waiting for a report from Taiwanese investigators into the incident; tensions could climb if Beijing disputes their conclusions.

Taiwanese officials have said that the unlicensed Chinese speedboat entered Taiwanese waters near Kinmen, ignored demands from a Taiwanese Coast Guard vessel to stop, and tried to race away. Taiwanese officials have said the two men who died had drowned. Two Chinese survivors told Chinese media that the Taiwanese vessel collided with them, while the Taiwanese Coast Guard said the two boats “made contact” at times during the chase.

The Chinese government has made demands on behalf of the dead men’s families, including for an apology and compensation. Chinese officials have complained that the Taiwanese Coast Guard vessel did not take video of the encounter, and accused Taiwan of dragging its feet in its investigation.

Incursions of Chinese fishing boats and smugglers around Kinmen have long been a source of friction. Chinese fishing boats are supposed to stay out of Taiwan’s zone around Kinmen and smaller nearby islands, but for years some flouted the restrictions, said Tung Sen-pao, a local councilor on the island.

“They came over here to fish with explosives, electric lines, gill nets, a lot of that kind of thing,” he said. Chinese dredgers, he added, also often stole sand, which can be sold to make concrete.

Image

A fishing boat between Kinmen and Xiamen in February.Credit...Ann Wang/Reuters

More recently, tougher enforcement by the Taiwanese Coast Guard, which has seized and impounded intruding Chinese vessels, helped reduce the violations, Taiwanese officials said.

In less tense times, local representatives on Kinmen and in the Chinese province of Fujian, on the other side of the strait, might have been able to quickly settle disputes such as that of the recent deaths. But mutual distrust between China and Taiwan is running high, and Beijing is especially touchy ahead of Mr. Lai’s inauguration.

Chinese officials have also sought to use the incident for political points and to undermine Taiwan’s boundaries. They have denied that Taiwan has a right to restrict access to waters off Kinmen, despite longstanding arrangements on that point. And Chinese Communist Party officials and news outlets have tied the deaths to Mr. Lai and his Democratic Progressive Party’s resistance to China.

The Chinese government’s Taiwan Affairs Office accused Democratic Progressive Party politicians of callousness and of “trying to shirk responsibility,” in a statement justifying the latest Chinese Coast Guard patrols off Kinmen. It warned that China reserved the right to respond further.

The Chinese Coast Guard service is under military control, and its ships can carry cannons and other weapons. Beijing has also been deploying them in territorial disputes with Japan and the Philippines. Chinese media publicized last week that the coast guard had also recently participated in training with naval ships under the Eastern Theater Command — the military area that encompasses Taiwan.

Image

A Chinese Coast Guard ship near a Philippines Coast Guard vessel in Philippine waters last year.Credit...Jes Aznar for The New York Times

Lee Wen-chi, a Kinmen fisherman who had returned to shore on a recent day with two buckets of sea bass, said that he and other fisherman kept well away from the Chinese Coast Guard ships, moving on if they spotted one in the distance.

“If you get too close to them, they’ll think that you’re up to no good,” he said. “I avoid them as much as I can.”

These days, Taiwan stations only a few thousand troops on Kinmen, giving Kinmen little immediate protection if China ever decided to invade. Taiwan’s fisheries agency announced that troops would hold live-fire drills in the waters off Kinmen, next month. Such drills happen every year, but China may regard the latest ones as a provocation.

Before the Kinmen incident, the Chinese government had already signaled that it would pounce on perceived missteps or provocations by Mr. Lai, who also goes by the name William Lai. Beijing had hoped that he would lose Taiwan’s election in January, ending the Democratic Progressive Party’s eight-year hold on power under the current president, Tsai Ing-wen.

China has warned that it could suspend tariff concessions for some products from Taiwan, including auto parts. Two days after Mr. Lai’s victory, China arranged for Nauru — a tiny Pacific island-state that was one of the dozen or so countries that retain formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan — to shift ties to Beijing. Then China unilaterally altered a commercial air flight route over the Taiwan Strait, a step that officials in Taipei said could make flying in the area more risky.

China has also continued to deploy fighter jets and other military planes near Taiwan almost daily. Larger, more menacing military actions are possible, especially after Mr. Lai’s inauguration.

Image

Fighter jets of the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army conducting a joint combat training exercises around Taiwan in 2022.Credit...Gong Yulong/Xinhua, via Associated Press

“They are probing here and there to push the boundaries and create a new normal,” said I-Chung Lai, the president of the Prospect Foundation, a Taiwanese think thank aligned with the Democratic Progressive Party. Any conciliatory messages in Mr. Lai’s inauguration speech were unlikely to shift China’s strategy, he added: “The gray zone operations against Taiwan will become more intense, regardless of what William Lai says.”

Still, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, may not want to push those actions to the point of setting off a full-blown crisis.

Beijing has other ways of politically undermining Mr. Lai, and has pointed to his share of votes — 40 percent — to assert that he does not represent Taiwan’s mainstream views. Mr. Xi also has his eye on the United States’ presidential election in November, and probably won’t make any big decisions over Taiwan before then, several experts say. And with China’s economy in such poor shape, Mr. Xi would likely rather avoid a major confrontation that could unnerve investors.

“President Xi has a lot of problems that he’s dealing with at home, and if you look back to other episodes when China has dealt with a lot of domestic challenges, they typically have sought to calm their external environment,” said Ryan Hass, the director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.

Chris Buckley, the chief China correspondent for The Times, reports on China and Taiwan from Taipei, focused on politics, social change and security and military issues. More about Chris Buckley

Amy Chang Chien is a reporter and researcher for The Times in Taipei, covering Taiwan and China. More about Amy Chang Chien

5. Taiwan Declares Chinese Social Media App TikTok A National Security Threat

Taiwan Declares Chinese Social Media App TikTok A National Security Threat

The move in Taiwan follows a similar trend in the United States. The US House of Representatives recently passed a bill targeting ByteDance, TikTok's parent company, giving it a timeline to divest its US assets or face a nationwide ban.

World News

Asian News International

Updated: March 23, 2024 2:22 pm IST

ndtv.com · by Asian News International

Taiwan has declared China-based social media app TikTok a "national security threat".

Taipei, Taiwan:

Taiwan's Minister of Digital Affairs, Audrey Tang, has declared TikTok, the social media platform owned by a China-based company, as a significant national security threat, Central News agency Taiwan reported.

Tang emphasised that the platform's association with foreign adversaries aligns with the United States' perspective, which deems TikTok a potential risk to national security.

In a recent legislative hearing, Tang stated, "Taiwan has classified TikTok as a dangerous product." She explained that any product susceptible to control by foreign adversaries, either directly or indirectly, poses a threat to national information and communication security according to Taiwan's standards, as reported by CNA Taiwan.

The move in Taiwan follows a similar trend in the United States. The US House of Representatives recently passed a bill targeting ByteDance, TikTok's parent company, giving it a timeline to divest its US assets or face a nationwide ban. This legislation mirrors Taiwan's concerns about foreign influence over digital platforms.

Tang disclosed that Taiwan's Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) has proposed an amendment to the Cyber Security Management Act, echoing apprehensions voiced in the U.S. House bill regarding indirect foreign influence. This amendment reflects Taiwan's commitment to safeguarding its digital infrastructure from external interference.

TikTok's usage is already restricted within Taiwanese government agencies and their premises. However, Tang hinted at the possibility of extending this ban to schools, non-governmental agencies, and public spaces, pending a decision by the Cabinet. She emphasized that such a decision would entail a comprehensive assessment, considering legal processes and practical feasibility.

"The final decision will be made by the Cabinet after extensive consideration of opinions in the various sectors," the ministry asserted. It highlighted ongoing inter-ministerial discussions convened by the Cabinet to address this issue effectively.

Additionally, the digital ministry disclosed its vigilance regarding the progress of the TikTok bill in the US Congress, indicating a keen interest in international developments shaping digital security policies.

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In line with existing regulations established in 2019 and revised in 2022, any information and communication system or service with the potential to disrupt government operations or societal stability is classified as a product endangering national information and communication security, CNA Taiwan reported.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

ndtv.com · by Asian News International

6. The secret operation to hold elections in occupied Mariupol

Interesting and unusual journalism from Tim Mak's new organization.

The secret operation to hold elections in occupied Mariupol

https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/the-secret-operation-to-hold-elections?utm=

She risked her life for voting in Russian-occupied Mariupol in 2014. Here’s why she says Ukraine can’t hold elections now. And: Alessandra breaks Ramadan fasts with Crimean Tatars over shurpa soup!

MYROSLAVA TANSKA-VIKULOVA, OKSANA OSTAPCHUK, AND ALESSANDRA HAY

MAR 24, 2024

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The 2014 Ukrainian presidential election in Mariupol was something like a secret operation. 

In mid-April 2014, Russian troops occupied the city for the first time. But as the Russian flag flew over government buildings in Mariupol, thousands of Ukrainians wanted to vote in the coming Ukrainian elections.

Tetiana in Kyiv, 2022. Behind her, it says, ‘Mariupol, city of heroes’

So did Tetiana Ihnatchenko-Tyurina, who, despite her fear of the Russians, helped to organize the presidential election in a Russian-occupied city. Despite the threat to her life, she wanted to defend Ukraine's right to democratic values — free elections.

As Ukraine puts its presidential election on hold due to martial law, we are reminded of one of the many things Ukraine could lose if it doesn’t win the war: democracy.

Ukrainians hold presidential elections every five years. The 8th presidential election since the declaration of Ukrainian independence was originally scheduled to be held next week, on March 31st. 

But Ukrainian law prohibits elections under a period of martial law, which has been in effect since bombs began going off in Kyiv on February 24, 2022. 

This year, a majority of Ukrainians expected that on election day, Zelenskyy would be re-elected in a national vote, but under martial law, the Ukrainian constitution forbids holding elections. 

According to surveys conducted by the polling group SOCIS at the end of February 2024, almost 60% of Ukrainians are against holding elections during Martial Law. 

Even if we could hold presidential elections during the war, with things as they are, they would be incomplete. Ukraine could organize balloting for citizens who have fled Ukraine as refugees. It is also possible to organize elections for soldiers at the front, though it would be a very difficult process. But it's impossible to hold elections in the territories currently occupied by Russia. 

It’s an argument that Tetiana, who risked her life to help hold elections before, reluctantly agrees with. 

A man holds a cross standing amid protesters during the Revolution of Dignity on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) on February 19, 2014 in Kyiv, Ukraine.(Photo by Serhii Mykhalchuk/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

Ten years ago, in 2014, Ukraine was in a similar situation. Already recovering from the bloody Revolution of Dignity in February of that year, Ukraine faced a new and deadly challenge. 

In response to Ukraine’s popular uprising, Russia annexed Crimea, and Russian-backed groups occupied parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. This included the city of Mariupol, where the flags of the newly formed illegal DPR, LPR, and Russia were flying everywhere. Ukrainian checkpoints with military personnel were set up around the perimeter of the city, but they did not enter the city itself. There was great uncertainty in the region.  

Mariupol was occupied on May 6, 2014. The Ukrainian elections were scheduled for just a few weeks later, on May 25. 

A pro-Russia activist holds icons as he prays on a balcony of the city government building seized by the separatists in the southeast city of Mariupol on April 17, 2014. (Photo by ALEXANDER KHUDOTEPLY/AFP via Getty Images)

Thus, despite the difficult and frightening situation in the city, the presidential elections had to be held in Mariupol, right under the nose of the Russian backed groups, who observed every step of the Ukrainian activists – and threatened their work and safety. 

Tetiana is from the Sumy region but grew up in Mariupol. She spoke Ukrainian and felt like a stranger in Mariupol, where Russian was the dominant language. Nevertheless, she has always been an activist, helping to organize parliamentary and presidential elections several times in a row.

But in 2014, after the Revolution of Dignity, everything changed. She began to see Ukraine differently. 

"I felt that our state is not foreign to us... You have to strengthen it, control it, multiply it, and improve it," Tetiana told The Counteroffensive. 

Tetiana with a Ukrainian flag, which says “Mariupol is Ukraine” in Kramatorsk, 2022

So she decided to help the Ukrainian government secretly organize the 2014 presidential elections. For Tetiana and other activists like her, it was important to "cement" the Ukrainian government. 

People were scared because they had previously heard cases of militants controlled by the Russians abusing pro-Ukrainian people. 

For example, in Donetsk, Russian-backed separatists captured four rally participants who spoke for Ukraine. Their friends later said that the militants tortured, threatened, and abused them. Volodymyr Rybak, a deputy of a city council, took part in a pro-Ukrainian rally. He was then kidnapped in Horlivka, Donetsk region. His body was later found in the river. They tore open his stomach, put a backpack with sand on his back and threw him into the river. 

Dozens of people who were ready to defend Ukraine in Mariupol at the cost of their lives decided to work in the election commissions. Illegal groups, controlled by the Russian military, terrorized the representatives of the election commissions. 

"They had snipers stationed in the building next door all the time. They didn't shoot, they were just there. We went to the windows, closed the curtains, and thought that if they were not visible, it was not scary," Tetiana said. 

She saw a woman whose arm was broken after coming to the election commission to get some documents. Armed men began threatening her, and holding her down. She barely escaped. 

“We called an ambulance and it turned out to be a fracture. She said she was still thinking about going to the polls. I'm definitely going now,” Tetiana recalls.

Tetiana at a yshyvanka parade at Mariupol.

One challenge for these elections was how the Mariupol election commissions could receive ballots while the city was occupied by pro-Russian forces. They gathered in Azovstal in a huge workshop. 

A huge iron door opened. 

A train pulled up, the wagons opened, and there were ballots inside. 

"The delivery of the ballots to Mariupol was a special operation. I don't think they were delivered by rail. I guess that the ballots could have been brought by sea from Berdiansk to Mariupol, and then loaded onto these rail cars," Tetiana said excitedly. 

The members of the electoral commissions received the ballots in private, and then took them to the polling stations where the elections were to take place. 

Throughout all of this work, Tetiana thought that one day she might not be able to return home because she might be killed for her activism.

"Every time I went to the polling station, I would look back at my apartment and say, 'God, please let me come back here,'" Tetiana said

On May 25, election day, most of the election officials and Tetiana dressed in traditional Ukrainian vyshyvankas. 16% of the electorate turned out to vote for the president of Ukraine in Mariupol. 

By the standards of elections not held in times of war and danger, this is an extremely low turnout. But for Mariupol, it was a clear message: all these people were not afraid to come despite the threat to their lives. 

Tetiana in the Donetsk region, on territory liberated from the Russians, 2022

Tetiana emphasized that democracy without elections is dead. But she also adds that now is not the time for elections. And having risked her life already for the vote, she has some credibility to make this argument. 

"The world needs to understand that it is impossible to hold elections in the occupied territories. The occupation of 2014 and the occupation of 2022 are simply incomparable," Tetiana said. 

TOP: Civilians trapped in Mariupol city under Russian attacks, are evacuated on March 20, 2022. (Photo by Anadolu Agency via Getty Images). BOTTOM: A child holds a Ukrainian flag during a rally in Mariupol on August 28, 2014. (Photo by ALEXANDER KHUDOTEPLY/AFP via Getty Images)

The full-scale invasion has made it close to impossible to guarantee the safety and security of the vote in places that the Russians now occupy. Polling stations could be targets for Russian bombings, and electronic balloting could be vulnerable to hacking or interference that would raise questions about the legitimacy of the elections. 

"There is a social contract in Ukraine that says we cannot hold elections, we have to hold on to our state. If the hot phase of the war drags on for years, the government should think about how to meet all these challenges," Tetiana said. 

According to a poll conducted by the KIIS polling group in early February 2024, 69% of Ukrainians believe that Zelenskyy should remain president until the end of martial law and that no new elections should be held.

During the last three years of full-scale war President Zelenskyy's rating has decreased from 90% to 60%, according to KIIS, The poll does not specify the exact reasons for Zelenskyy's decline in the rating. However, Zelenskyy's decision to dismiss Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhny likely had an impact, as did the continuing and grinding nature of the war. 

A survey by SOCIS. If the 2024 elections were held now, 67.5% would vote for Zaluzhny and 32.5% for Zelenskyy

If the presidential election were held in 2024, former Armed Forces chief Valeriy Zaluzhny and Volodymyr Zelenskyy could make it to the second round. However, Zelenskyy would lose to Zaluzhny in the second round, according to SOCIS.

Western partners are putting more and more indirect pressure on Ukrainian authorities to hold elections. 

For example. Sen. Lindsey Graham, a leading Republican foreign policy voice, called on Ukraine to provide financial and technical assistance to Ukraine to hold elections in 2024, despite martial law.

Tetiana emphasizes that she would like Ukraine’s foreign partners to have more trust in Ukraine. 

"We are a little more aware of our reality. We know that at the moment we are better off without elections. And when the time comes, the formal factors of democracy will definitely be respected,” she said.

After the paywall: Russian missile violates NATO airspace in Poland, sending Polish air force scrambling to respond overnight. And in reporter’s notebook, Alessandra visits a Crimean Tatar iftar, breaking the fast with Muslims in Kyiv during their holy month of Ramadan. Also featured: photos delicious shurpa soup!

NEWS OF THE DAY: 

RUSSIA VIOLATES NATO AIRSPACE: Poland activated aircraft in response to a Russian missile entering its airspace, reported CNN. The long-range cruise missile was one of 20 missiles and seven kamikaze drones that Russia directed toward the Lviv region in Western Ukraine. The missile spent 39 seconds above the Oserdow village in Lublin Voivodeship. The last time a Russian missile entered Polish airspace was in December 2023.

MOSCOW PLANS TO USE TERRORIST ATTACK TO ESCALATE IN UKRAINE: UK security sources urged Russia not to use a terrorist attack in Moscow to escalate the war in Ukraine, reported The Telegraph. The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Alicia Kearns, has also stated that the Kremlin is spreading deep fake videos as justification for Russia's war crimes in Ukraine or as a "pretext for further atrocities." ISIS claimed responsibility for the shooting at Crocus City Hall, which has claimed more than 130 lives.

RUSSIA’S LANDING SHIPS DISABLED: Ukraine has struck two Russian Ropucha-class landing ships in occupied Crimea, reports The Kyiv Independent. The damage to ‘Yamal’ and ‘Azov’ will decrease the number of Russian Ropucha-class ships to three, compared to the total of 13 vessels that make up the Russian Black Sea Fleet. As of February 2024, Ukrainian attacks have damaged 33 percent of the fleet’s warships, according to estimates by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

REPORTER’S NOTEBOOK: 

Hi all – it’s Alessandra here!

About 20 minutes from Kyiv is Birlik, the only Crimean Tatar school in Ukraine outside of occupied territory.

Birlik is fighting a battle that has no near victory in sight: trying to prevent the Crimean Tatar language from dying out. In 2010, UNESCO listed the Crimean Tatar language as severely endangered, with only 20 to 25 percent of the Crimean Tatar population in Ukraine being fluent in the language.

The director of the school, Olga, invited me to Iftar, the daily dinner which Muslims eat together to break their fast during Ramadan, which extends through early April. 

But the school, located in an unassuming building behind a corrugated metal gate, is more than an educational center. It exists as part of a cultural center which provides a space for the wider Crimean Tatar community in the area to hold Muslim religious ceremonies.

Outside of the Birlik school

Olga looked tired when she met us in front of the gate. 

“It’s very hard,” she explained. “In many Muslim countries people are allowed to start working after lunch during Ramadan, but here we have to stick to the Ukrainian schedule and work all day.”

As men and women eating together is prohibited in some forms of Islam, Birlik’s eating areas are gender segregated.

Olga walking my friend Lily and I to the dining room 

Olga left us to wait in the empty women’s dining room while everybody else finished their evening prayers.

Children in Birlik’s dining hall

As the evening prayers sounded over the speakers above us and the rich smell of a meaty broth wafted through the hall, a few children who were too young to pray joined us, whispering to one another and eyeing the food – knowing not to touch it. 

The tiled walls of the dining room are lined with paintings of Crimea’s landscape, a place many of the Crimean Tatar students have never been to because it now is controlled by Russia.

Paintings of Crimea in the dining room

With so much to take in, I hadn’t paid much attention to the older kids that had sat on the floor behind us – until I noticed they had gone very quiet. 

I turned around to realize that they had laid out a prayer mat and were praying as well.

Prayer mat

But soon the prayers were over and everybody returned to prepare to break their fast. 

Spread laid out on the table 

Olga reached out and pulled a fig from the spread before us. “You must always break your fast with water and a fig, and you must do this before anything else touches your lips,” Olga explains, popping the fig into her mouth.

When the food came, I understood where the mouth watering smell had come from. 

Shurpa soup

The main dish was a soup called ‘Shurpa’, a flavourful oily broth with tender meat, potatoes and carrots. After the soup we were served tea, which was then followed by coffee – a staple in Crimean Tatar culture, I was told.

Now that people had broken their fast, they began to share stories.

One woman, whose mother had lived through deportation, talked about how her grandmother had died on the journey. Her mother had then been put into an orphanage and was only able to leave when her older brother got her out.

Another woman shared a story about her friend who had lived almost her whole life not knowing she was Crimean Tatar. She only found out when she was older and her grandmother started to show signs of Alzheimers. 

Eventually, her grandmother's condition worsened and she began to speak only in Crimean Tatar and talked almost exclusively about returning to Crimea. The granddaughter understood that her grandmother had hid her heritage from her in an attempt to protect her. She didn’t want her to suffer the same persecution she had.

The story reminded me of how hard Birlik is trying to protect the identity and culture that this grandmother had tried so hard to hide. It reminded me of other painfully similar stories I had heard from people that had survived traumatic events. 

When one generation survives a trauma so painful that they feel they must bury it and everything associated with it, to extinguish the thing that caused so much pain, they often, unknowingly, leave the following generations endlessly searching for the culture and heritage they have lost.

Today’s dog of war is Keni, who came to European Square in Kyiv for a rally to support captured Ukrainian POWs.

Stay safe out there. 

Best,

Alessandra

7. As China prepares to invade Taiwan, US forces are about to combat-test a vital weapon

Spoiler alert: JLOTS as a vital weapon.

I recall many briefings over the years about JLOTS and cautionary notes from logistics professionals about over-estimating (and over-relying on) its capabilities.

As China prepares to invade Taiwan, US forces are about to combat-test a vital weapon

Building giant steel Lego as Chinese missiles rain down

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/03/24/china-invasion-taiwan-strait-us-military-lego-weapon/

DAVID AXE

24 March 2024 • 12:01pm

Taiwanese soldiers apply camouflage face paint during a training exercise. The island democracy faces imminent invasion by Communist China CREDIT: Ann Wang/Reuters

The main mission of the US Army flotilla now sailing toward Gaza is to build a floating pier that will help ships offload desperately-needed humanitarian aid. But the task force also serves a secondary purpose: it’s practice for a critical combat operation – one that could help US forces to roll back Chinese advances in the event of a war over Taiwan.

The Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore pier system, or JLOTS, is a Lego-like suite of floating metal piers and ramps that can connect virtually any ship to virtually any beach. While the Pentagon is sending five 273-foot US Army landing craft to begin building the pier, the final components will sail aboard the 951-foot transport ship Roy A Benavidez, which belongs to the US Navy-administered Ready Reserve Force.

It could take weeks to ship the pier components and days to assemble them. But once the pier is ready, it should be able to move – from sea to shore – 2,000,000 meals per day, according to the Pentagon.

The Pentagon has deployed JLOTS before, perhaps most notably to Haiti following the devastating earthquake in that country in 2010. But it has never deployed it in a major war. 

That could change – and soon – if China makes good on decades of threats and launches an invasion of Taiwan. If the People’s Liberation Army succeeds in occupying Taiwan’s island strongholds in the Taiwan Strait as a prelude to landing on Taiwan itself, counterattacking US forces could face a serious dilemma: how to land their own people and equipment in what amounts to a counter-invasion of mainland Taiwan and its island outposts.

Historically, US forces would force their way ashore aboard US Navy amphibious ships. But the US fleet has lost faith in its traditional amphibious capability as enemy beach-defenses stiffen with increasingly deadly anti-ship missiles. Lately, the US Navy has been decommissioning amphibious ships faster than it commissions them. 

But JLOTS endures. And it gives the Pentagon options.

“JLOTS is a critical joint capability that enables US forces to enter a land area from sea despite insufficient port infrastructure,” Joseph Tereniak, a US Army officer, wrote recently. 

It’s not that Taiwan doesn’t have great ports: it does. But if Chinese forces control those ports as US and allied forces counterattack, the Americans and their allies will need some other way of moving heavy equipment over the beaches. “Potential adversaries will attempt to deny access to fixed ports,” US Army officer Tom Clady wrote in 2013. “Seabasing provides a viable alternative to project forces.”

The problem with JLOTS, of course, is that it’s a big floating target that takes days to set up and, even when it’s working perfectly, is a delicate piece of maritime clockwork. The speed at which soldiers and sailors can build the pier – and rebuild the pier in the event of an enemy attack – could make the difference between victory and defeat. 

Back in 1996, a naval official named Harold Workman warned of a “lack of training, and therefore diminished proficiency levels,” that could doom JLOTS ops in wartime. It’s not clear that, nearly 30 years later, the US Army and US Navy have solved the training problem. JLOTS just doesn’t get used very often in a truly stressful environment.

Gaza is nothing if not a stressful environment, with Israeli forces relentlessly bombarding cities and towns and even hospitals and Iran-backed militants – including the Houthis in Yemen – lobbing drones and missiles at commercial and naval vessels in the region.

US president Joe Biden announced the Gaza pier operation during his annual state-of-the-union address to the US Congress on March 7.

Chinese troops march during a military parade in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. US military officials have warned that China could invade Taiwan by 2027 CREDIT: Greg Baker/AFP via Getty

“I’m directing the US military to lead an emergency mission to establish a temporary pier in the Mediterranean on the Gaza coast that can receive large ships carrying food, water, medicine and temporary shelters,” Biden said.

“No US boots will be on the ground,” Biden added. They’ll only be on the pier.

Increasingly impatient with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Biden is counting on the US Army’s logistics fleet not only to save Gazan lives, but also to signal his – and America’s – opposition to continuing Israeli aggression. As a bonus, the fleet will be practicing a unique military skill: the construction of a temporary port.

“This temporary pier would enable a massive increase in the amount of humanitarian assistance getting into Gaza every day,” Biden said.

It would be crass to think of the coming humanitarian JLOTS deployment primarily as practice for war. But it would also be naive to pretend American soldiers and sailors won’t benefit from building a pier from scratch in a war zone. Even if that war doesn’t directly involve US troops.

Those Americans just might be ordered to build the pier again in the waters around Taiwan, while Chinese missiles rain down.

8. U.S. Army Seeking Retirees To Come Back To Work Amid Manpower Crisis

I missed this announcement. I guess I was not on the distribution list. Would I have to give up my medicare and social security and military retirement pay?  

Is this a troubling indicator? We are facing real recruiting issues (which will not be solved by returning retiree volunteers - we need young recruits).

I am not sure I could pass an Army medical screening these days.

Excerpt:

Any Army, Reserve or National Guard soldier who qualifies as retired or will soon be retired — meaning they achieved at least 20 years of service — and anyone receiving retired pay is eligible to apply, the message states. Neither age nor disability, alone, would exclude a soldier from joining depending on the disability, and they would still have to meet the Army’s health requirements.

U.S. Army Seeking Retirees To Come Back To Work Amid Manpower Crisis

https://www.tampafp.com/u-s-army-seeking-retirees-to-come-back-to-work-amid-manpower-crisis/?utm

tampafp.com · by Micaela Burrow · March 22, 2024

Photo Courtesy of U.S. Army. DCNF

The Army is seeking to bring back retired soldiers to fill critical manpower shortages, according to a service-wide directive published this week.

The All Army Activities (ALARACT) document describes how Army retirees can find and apply for open positions and aims to maintain a sufficient number of personnel to fill all of the Army’s authorized positions.

The message comes as the service has publicly acknowledged struggles to balance a shrinking workforce with the demands of sprawling global mission sets as recruitment woes persist for a third year in a row.

“A review of commands’ requests for [the] fill of authorized personnel vacancies, in conjunction with current Army manning guidance, prompted review of how the Army can fill key and critical position vacancies,” the document stated, outlining the current situation. “The retiree recall program can be an effective tool to fill personnel shortages of authorized regular Army vacancies that are considered key and essential.”

It was unclear whether the Army had already identified manning shortages to be filled or was issuing the message in anticipation of future need. The Army did not respond to the Daily Caller News Foundation’s comments by deadline.

Any Army, Reserve or National Guard soldier who qualifies as retired or will soon be retired — meaning they achieved at least 20 years of service — and anyone receiving retired pay is eligible to apply, the message states. Neither age nor disability, alone, would exclude a soldier from joining depending on the disability, and they would still have to meet the Army’s health requirements.

“There is no age limitation, although personnel older than 70 are not normally recalled,” the message states.

Those who apply for the program essentially lets the Army send them orders to return to active duty if a critical role opens that no one else can fill. However, the message does not authorize any special pay or incentives.

The publication initially sparked confusion and irony among military professionals online regarding the program’s voluntary nature and whether it indicated deeper manning issues.

“The Army does have significant manpower shortages, but they are concentrated at the lower enlistment grades due to the recruiting crisis,” retired Lt. Col. Thomas Spoehr, an expert on defense policy and strategy and senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the DCNF. “So I am not sure this particular message does indicate a problem, since retirees are old.”

However, the Army recently acknowledged a persistent problem with roles that go unfilled for too long and proposed a reorganization that would cut down on the number of open positions by thousands.

After a year-long review of the Army’s existing force structure, published late February, the service concluded that the number and specialization of positions comprising the force did not match up with the changing security environment.

The Army is “over-structured, meaning there are not enough soldiers to fill out existing units and organizations,” the review stated. It emphasized the cuts are coming to “authorizations (spaces)” not “individual soldiers (faces).”

The Army’s current force structure assumes an active duty end strength — or total number of troops — of 494,000, according to the document. Congress capped end strength at 445,000 in the fiscal year 2024 defense policy bill, a historically low number as the Army struggled to recruit enough soldiers to meet end strength goals.

Officials justified cutting 24,000 roles that have been left empty as the Army deals with its worst-ever recruiting crisis as helping ensure the service only plans to assign and deploy the people it has available, cutting down on strain and allowing for more realistic planning.

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tampafp.com · by Micaela Burrow · March 22, 2024

9. Ukraine's Patriot kills of Russian planes and missiles have turned a US air-defense weapon with a troubled past into a hero

Good news. But what is the cost/value tradeoff? The cost of a Patriot versus the cost of the weapon it defeated combined with the costs avoided because a target was not damaged?  We cannot look at the specific costs weapons versus weapons but on the costs of the effects defeat of the enemy weapon avoids.

Ukraine's Patriot kills of Russian planes and missiles have turned a US air-defense weapon with a troubled past into a hero

Business Insider · by Sinéad Baker

Military & Defense

Sinéad Baker

2024-03-23T11:30:01Z

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Members of the German Bundeswehr prepare a Patriot missile launching system in December 2012.Sean Gallup/Getty Images

This story is available exclusively to Business Insider subscribers. Become an Insider and start reading now. Have an account? .

• Ukraine's use of the US-made Patriot system has been celebrated.
• The weapon had a chequered reputation due to its performance in past conflicts.
• Any skepticism over its effectiveness should be put to bed, experts told Business Insider.

Any lingering doubts about the effectiveness of the US-made Patriot air-defense system at shooting down airborne threats have finally been dispelled by the system's performance in Ukraine, experts told Business Insider.

The system's intercept rate in past conflicts left it with a mixed reputation, experts said, and sparked debates over whether it should be sent to Ukraine in the first place.

Having strong air-defense systems is critical for Ukraine. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in late February 2022, Ukraine has been regularly using its air-defense systems to defend against missile and drone attacks. Those attacks have hit cities, killed civilians, destroyed homes, and damaged essential energy infrastructure, knocking out power.

But for a little over a year, Ukraine really only had less-capable, Soviet-era air-defense systems. Allies started to give Ukraine more advanced ones but hadn't yet committed to sending Patriots.

The US eventually approved their move. The first arrived last April, and Ukraine now has at least three, possibly five, of them. Exactly how many Ukraine has been given, as well as exactly where they are and how they are being used, has been kept secret.

The Patriot missile system is a ground-based, mobile missile defense interceptor deployed by the United States to detect, track and engage unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, and short-range and tactical ballistic missiles.U.S. Army Security Assistance Command

But one thing that is clear, the experts said, is that the Patriot has clearly been working extremely well in Ukraine.

Their performance, according to Frederik Mertens, an analyst at the Hague Center for Strategic Studies, has been "an unmitigated success."

Some experts BI spoke to argued the older, worse reputation was never fully deserved. For others, updates to the system and the way Ukraine has used it is what now elevates its reputation.

Either way, the consensus now is that there is no argument against it being an extremely effective system.

"The Patriot has performed fairly spectacularly in Ukraine," Justin Bronk, an airpower expert at the UK's Royal United Services Institute who has followed developments in Ukraine closely, told BI.

A mixed past

The MIM-104 Patriot missile system is a ground-based, mobile surface-to-air missile battery that can down crewed and uncrewed aircraft, cruise missiles, and short-range and tactical ballistic missiles.

The US first developed it in the 1960s, and it was first used on the battlefield in the Gulf War, which started in 1990. Mertens described the Patriots as having "shaky behavior" in the Gulf War. In particular, questions were raised over it's effectiveness against Iraq's Scud missiles.

While reports during the war pointed to impressive Patriot performance, the war's end brought a new examination of those claims, prompting both the US Army and the weapon's manufacturer, Raytheon, to defend it.

A House of Representatives subcommittee investigation was launched, concluding after 10 months that there was little evidence that the Patriot hit more than a few of the Scud missiles.

Two Iraqi Scud missiles sit in the back of a tractor trailer in Iraq in April 2003.Joe Raedle/Getty Images

Mertens said their inadequate performance is at least partly explained by the fact that early Patriot missiles were, at that time, designed for anti-aircraft use, so they "didn't function that well against these Iraqi Scuds."

"There they didn't perform that brilliantly," he said, but "we shouldn't be too critical because this was the first time we see ballistic missiles really being targeted by air defenses."

Bronk said that the Patriot had "a relatively checkered and controversial combat record" as people interpreted data from the Gulf War differently.

"I think there's this kind of longstanding idea that Patriot doesn't really work very well because it didn't work very well on the Gulf War and I think mostly that's not correct or accurate anymore," said Timothy Wright, a missile expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

An improved weapon

The Patriots were used by US allies in the Iraq war, where a number of blunders were recorded, including the shootdown of allied aircraft.

These incidents included a Patriot shooting down a US F/A-18C Hornet jet in 2003, with an investigation concluding that the Patriot had misidentified the jet as an incoming Iraqi missile and that soldiers had violated missile launch procedures. That incident killed the pilot, 30-year-old American Lt. Nathan White.

Mick Ryan, a retired Major General in the Australian Army and a military strategist, attributed some of those errors to "an autonomous mode that we didn't quite understand," which has since been addressed.

A Patriot anti-aircraft missile battery in Saudi Arabia, January 1, 1991.Gilles BASSIGNAC/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images

Saudi Arabia has used the Patriot system against attacks by Houthi rebels, who ignited a civil war in Yemen. Recorded use of Patriots in that conflict started in 2015.

The exact intercept rate of the Patriots involved in that conflict is unknown. Wright said there is a lack of exact information, but there seems to be "a pretty good success rate in my opinion."

Not all experts agree. Jeffrey Lewis, a missile expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, argued in 2018 that the system's performance in Saudi Arabia, where some missiles made it through, cast doubt over whether this system really works. Others argue that no system is flawless.

Tom Karako, the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the Patriot "has been doing fairly well" there since 2015.

"It doesn't mean it's getting everything," he said. "It doesn't mean it's perfect. There is no weapon system that's perfect."

Mertens said in that conflict, "we saw that Patriots had become far more effective than they were earlier." In Saudi Arabia, "these Patriots have had commendable and very good success rates. They haven't stopped everything, but they have stopped most of the Houthi attacks against key targets," he said.

He emphasized that no air defense system is expected to shoot down every single target, but the Patriots really "have come a long way since the Gulf War."

The Patriot had been improved with system's most advanced missile, the PAC-3, first used in the Iraq war.

A member of the US Airforce looks on near a Patriot missile battery at the Prince Sultan air base in Al-Kharj, in central Saudi Arabia on February 20, 2020.ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/POOL/AFP via Getty Images

It is unconfirmed if Ukraine uses an earlier model, the PAC-2, or PAC-3s.

Either way, Ryan said that by the time the system came to Ukraine, it had "gone through decades of upgrades."

But, doubts remained before their appearance there.

Mertens said that "before the Ukraine war, we knew that Patriot was good, at least, at intercepting older missiles."

"So when these weapons were deployed to Ukraine, there was a bit of a question: How will they manage against the latest that the Russians are planning to send against it?"

Related stories

There, he said, it has exceeded expectations.

A Ukrainian success

There is no independently confirmed figure for exactly how many missiles, drones, or airplanes Ukraine's air-defense systems, including the Patriots, have shot down, or for how many they have missed.

None of Ukraine's Patriot missile systems have been confirmed destroyed, though there have been Russian claims, but the system has been involved in confirmed kills of Russian aircraft and missiles. There has been clear photo evidence of some of the shootdowns.

Ukraine showed off the Patriot's lethality shortly after the first Patriot batteries arrived in country, when the Russians launched large missile and drone attacks on the capital city, Kyiv.

Mertens said that Russia's "whole goal was to make the attack so complex and so massive that they could get through and kill the Patriots from the start," but the Russians "failed completely."

"We were again, very much surprised by what we see now, what the effectiveness of the Patriot system seems to be," he said. They just stopped that attack."

The Patriot has been credited with other wins there since, and the system has "performed even better than it did in Saudi Arabia," Mertens said.

Karako said "since it's gone over there, it has been pretty dang good."

Bronk said that "Ukrainian operators have clearly been well trained and have worked out how to use the system in their own tactical scenarios extremely well." US Army personnel who helped train the Ukrainians recently told BI's Jake Epstein that they were "amazing" in their mastery of the system.

Rajan Menon, a director at the US think tank Defense Priorities, said "without the Patriot and other systems, Ukrainian cities would be in a very bad way. American-supplied and Western-supplied air defense has been absolutely critical."

Ryan said the Patriot "is incredibly effective. Those who think it's not just don't know what they're talking about."

He said Ukraine's success has come in part from how it has integrated the Patriots into its network of Soviet-era and NATO-donated systems to defeat Russia's attacks.

Ukraine has also praised the system. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in January: "The Russians are shocked — and I'm telling you honestly — our partners are shocked that this system really works so strong."

Surprising wins

A surprising Ukrainian win, for some of the experts, has been Patriots shooting down Russian Khinzal missiles, weapons Russia had bragged were unstoppable.

A Kinzhal missile warhead.The State Emergency Service of Ukraine

Bronk said the air-launched ballistic missiles — which he described as "quasi-hypersonic" due to their speeds of more than five times the speed of sound and maneuverability but lack of certain other key defining characteristics of "hypersonic weapons" — are "really potentially very difficult to intercept as targets and the Patriot systems have been repeatedly and successfully engaging those."

Mertens said that Russia's grand claims about its missiles were "propaganda" but still described Ukraine shooting down Khinzals as "near amazing because before the war we really wondered if we could defend ourselves against Khinzal and if we could stop them from penetrating air defenses."

"Now there's far less of a question. It seems to be quite certain we can and Patriot can."

Jan Kallberg, a defense and security expert at the Centre for European Policy Analysis said: "I also think that Ukraine might have been more innovative when it comes to how to use them tactically."

He outlined a theory that a number of experts believe, that Ukraine has used the Patriots as part of daring schemes to shoot down Russian fighter jets.

Bronk said the Patriots have "actually performed way beyond people's expectations in a sort of long-range, anti-air ambush kind of capacity." He said Ukraine appeared to be exploiting the system's ability to have the launcher located significantly further forward than the radar guiding it.

He said the threat of Ukraine doing this means Russia has kept some jets further away from the front lines.

Ukraine has been praised for its use of air defenses, including its older models, to intercept most of Russia's drones and missiles. That work has also largely stopped Russia's much larger and more advanced air force from being able to operate close to or past the front lines.

If Russia's air force was able to fly across the country, the war would likely already have been lost and Kyiv left a smoking ruin, Mertens said.

An uncertain future

Despite their success, its not clear if the Patriots will be a lasting resource for Ukraine.

Ukraine likely only has a few, maybe only three, of the Patriot batteries, which Mertens noted is "not a lot."

"It's a very good system, but you can only do so much with three systems," he said.

The White House and Pentagon warned in January that the supply of Patriot interceptor missiles could soon be unsustainable due to their high cost: around $2 million to $4 million each. That expense fed into some of the initial skepticism over whether they should be sent in the first place.

And Ukraine says it's running low on air defense missiles overall.

Damaged vehicles are seen around a residential building after a Russian missile attack on January 2, 2024 in Kyiv, UkraineOleksandr Gusev/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images

A former advisor to Ukraine's government said in February that the number of Patriot missiles was "dropping to a critical level."

Mertens said that with the Patriots, "they're doing amazingly well. Will they have enough missiles to keep that up? That's the number one question."

Russia is trying to wear down Ukraine's missile stocks, including the Patriots, taking advantage of stalled US aid.

Bronk noted that there is a "massive global shortfall" in the supply of Patriot missiles, as the system is used in multiple countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. "This is a system that by dint of being highly effective, there is a global shortage of ammunition for it."

The problem with Patriot missiles for Ukraine mirrors its main obstacle in trying to fight Russia: A critical shortage of supplies and ammunition.

And air-defense supplies are one of the most important for Ukraine to have, Mertens said.

"Ukrainian air defenses are one of the great Ukrainian success stories of the war. Without them, the war might have been lost already. Keeping them functioning is utterly vital."

Russia Ukraine

Business Insider · by Sinéad Baker

10. Clausewitz, the Culminating Point of Victory, and Israel’s Perilous Rafah Operation

Everyone needs some Clausewitz on a Sunday.

Excerpts:

Until now, Israel’s actions in Gaza have been publicly criticized and observed internationally with a mix of fear and alarm, but the fragile balance in the Middle East still holds. That is not a small thing in this region. It is true that the proposed operation could help Israel tactically and operationally dismantle, or at least weaken, Hamas in Gaza, but the organization operates beyond the enclave. Its members actively recruit in the West Bank, its leading officials reside in neighboring Arab countries, its militants smuggle people and weapons from the Sinai, and its organization receives aid and assistance from private donors and from external patrons such as Iran and Qatar. To deal with the transnational dimension of terrorism, Israel needs the cooperation of regional partners like Egypt and should not take its help for granted.

When applying violence, Clausewitz advised strategists and statesmen to carefully consider their political objectives and ponder what better peace they wish to achieve at the end. As he emphasized when discussing the culminating point of victory, “Superior strength is not the end but only the means.” What would military success mean for Israel in Rafah if the political outcome is to permanently distance Egypt and render its crucial long-term cooperation in securing the southern border difficult, if not impossible? If Israel wishes lasting security, it needs a productive partnership with Egypt. The other possibility is an endless cycle of violence and, most likely, further interventions in Gaza. Such a nightmarish scenario would destabilize the Middle East for decades to come.

Israel would be well served by not just maintaining but strengthening its partnerships with Egypt and other Arab states. If it really wishes to defeat Hamas in Gaza and, more broadly, in the region, a coalition of partners offers a much more sustainable means of doing so.

Clausewitz, the Culminating Point of Victory, and Israel’s Perilous Rafah Operation - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Shahin Berenji, Vanya Eftimova Bellinger · March 22, 2024

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Since the horrific October 7 terrorist attacks, audiences around the world have been closely following the Israel-Hamas war. People want to learn more about the efforts to negotiate the release of the Israeli hostages; the attempts to broker a cease-fire; and the steps countries and international organizations have taken to alleviate the Gaza Strip’s dire humanitarian situation. There is also an interest in analyzing how the conflict might run its course, when and how it might end, and how it could potentially ignite a wider regional war between Israel and Iran’s proxies.

Because these issues have dominated the headlines on the conflict, relatively little attention has been given to the rising tensions between Egypt and Israel. Recently, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel would continue its monthslong war against Hamas and would do so by proceeding with a major military operation in Rafah, the southernmost tip of Gaza abutting the Egyptian border. This decision more than any other Israeli action has the potential to cross Cairo’s red lines and rupture the delicate Egyptian-Israeli relationship.

A Rafah operation would, in our view, damage rather than enhance Israel’s security in the short term and long term because it would alienate one of Israel’s oldest partners in the Arab world. Such an unwelcome outcome might exceed any sort of tactical or operational benefits from an incursion into Rafah and, to draw from the insight of Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, could lead Israel to exceed its culminating point of victory.

From Rivals to Strategic Partners

On November 19, 1977, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat traveled to Israel and visited the contested city of Jerusalem. His bold gesture changed the diplomatic landscape and brought about intensive peace negotiations that would help end the decades-long Egyptian-Israeli rivalry. In September 1978 and March 1979, President Jimmy Carter successfully mediated the Camp David Accords and the resulting Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, respectively. Today’s crisis in Egyptian-Israeli relations is occurring against the backdrop of the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the latter agreement.

This landmark settlement established a long-lasting peace and normalized relations between two countries that had fought one another four times since Israel’s founding in 1948. This agreement forever changed the security architecture of the region because Egypt, the most powerful Arab state, officially aligned itself with the United States and Israel and helped balance not just against the Soviet Union and its clients (until the end of the Cold War) but also against extremist groups and a revisionist Iran (after the 1979 Islamic Revolution). While the Soviet bloc is long gone, the regional realignment that took place in 1979 holds until this day.

Most importantly, once Egypt made peace with Israel, it essentially foreclosed future Arab-Israeli wars because other Arab states such as Syria were incapable of fighting Israel on their own. In an otherwise tumultuous Middle East, the Egyptian-Israeli peace has served as a cornerstone of regional stability and has endured despite Sadat’s assassination (in 1981), Israel’s invasion of Lebanon (in 1982), and Hosni Mubarak’s ouster as Egyptian president (in 2011).

Today, the diplomatic, intelligence, and security cooperation that was forged between Egypt and Israel is being seriously tested by the Israel-Hamas conflict, especially Netanyahu’s proposed operation in Rafah. The Prime Minister argues that the Israel Defense Forces must enter this city to root out Hamas fighters; to locate and rescue hostages; and finally, to secure Gaza’s southern border with Egypt.

Understanding Egypt’s Opposition to Israel’s Rafah Operation

Egypt, like the United States and much of the rest of the world, is strongly opposed to an Israeli operation in Rafah, which currently houses 1.4 million Palestinians displaced from other parts of the enclave. Aside from the humanitarian motives underlying Egypt’s position, its officials believe that Egypt’s security and national interests as well as its prestige and reputation would be irreversibly harmed should Netanyahu follow through with the plan. Egypt’s foreign minister, Sameh Shoukry, has consistently warned that “the occurrence of such a scenario would affect Egyptian national security, and lead to irreparable damage to peace and security in the Middle East.” How?

Netanyahu’s public statements and postwar plan for Gaza make it clear that Israel would like to reestablish control of the Palestinian side of not only the Rafah border crossing but also of the Philadelphi corridor. The latter is a narrow buffer zone patrolled solely by Egypt after Hamas expelled the Palestinian Authority from Gaza in 2007. It runs the length of the Gaza-Egyptian border from the Mediterranean all the way to the Kerem Shalom crossing, the point at which the borders of Egypt, Israel, and Gaza meet. As part of its disengagement from Gaza, Israel withdrew from its side of the corridor in 2005 but, in doing so, agreed to an Egyptian presence of 750 border guards (with supporting aerial and naval personnel) to prevent overland and underground smuggling and infiltration from the Sinai into the enclave.

Following the October 7 terrorist attacks, Netanyahu has steadfastly maintained that Israel must fully secure, or “close,” Gaza’s southern border. While stopping the flow of terrorists and weapons is critical in demilitarizing Gaza, Netanyahu’s threat to do so unilaterally suggests that Egypt has done very little on this front and bears some responsibility for Hamas’s rearmament and increased capabilities. This critique, though to some extent valid, overshadows the steps Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has taken to combat smuggling, including building layers of barriers and fences and approving the flooding of Hamas tunnels—a tactic to destroy subterranean structures presently being adopted by the Israelis.

It is well known that there is absolutely no love lost between Egypt and Hamas, a terrorist organization that shares an Islamist ideology with the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2013, Sisi led a coup and ousted democratically elected President Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. Because Hamas’s ideological roots can be traced back to the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian officials view it as a threat and accordingly, have helped Israel maintain its land, air, and sea blockade of Gaza. Despite Egypt’s close cooperation with Israel, Netanyahu’s government is proposing to unilaterally change the status quo arrangements and this, in turn, is seen as an affront by Cairo. Of greater concern are Netanyahu’s threats to retake the Philadelphi corridor because it would suggest that Israel intends to reoccupy the Gaza Strip, or at least strategic parts of it, for some time.

Additionally, the Egyptians are worried about the fate of the Palestinians because they have nowhere safe to go should Israeli forces enter Rafah. The Sinai is just next door, but Egypt is strongly opposed to accepting Palestinian refugees and Sisi has publicly stated that the displacement of Palestinians (from Gaza) crosses a red line. Egypt’s foreign minister recently said much the same thing in an interview with the PBS Newshour. Why? Firstly, there are legitimate concerns over suddenly accepting such a massive influx of people because Hamas militants could easily use civilians to mask their entry into Egypt. They could thereafter launch terrorist attacks against Egyptian targets and this spillover is something Cairo desperately wants to avoid. Egypt is already struggling with an insurgency against ISIS-inspired groups in the Sinai and so, does not want to unknowingly welcome individuals connected to other militant organizations.

Secondly, Hamas might use Egyptian territory as a staging ground from which to launch terrorist attacks against Israel or Israeli forces in Gaza. Following such an incident, Israel might retaliate against targets on Egyptian soil, as had happened from 1949 to 1967 when Egypt administered Gaza. Whenever the Egyptians failed to prevent the infiltration of Palestinian militants, Israel during those years launched attacks to coerce them to better police their borders. Today, such attacks would not just inflame regional tensions but also violate the letter and spirit of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

This, in turn, would generate an international crisis and would invite American intervention because the United States, under the administration of President Jimmy Carter, essentially became the guarantor of the peace agreement. As reflected in exchanged letters between Carter and Sadat as well as between Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the United States, “in the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace . . . will take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.” Today, the administration of President Joe Biden, which is already managing flashpoints from Europe to Asia, is diplomatically stretched thin and might not have the time and resources to manage another crisis in the Middle East, especially as it is trying to make a strategic pivot to Asia.

Thirdly, the Egyptian people are sympathetic to the Palestinians’ plight and so, for domestic political purposes, Sisi cannot make it easier for Israel to proceed with its operation. In accepting Palestinian refugees, Egypt would be perceived as a facilitator, if not enabler, of their further displacement. Moreover, Egyptian officials fear that the Rafah operation might be a second nakba, or catastrophe, and would lead to the Palestinians’ expulsion from Gaza. This not only would make it more difficult to resolve the Palestinian question but would make it harder to create a future Palestinian state and, to use Egyptian officials’ terms, would result in the “liquidation of the Palestinian issue.” Despite Netanyahu’s assurances that Israel will not permanently displace Gazans, statements to the contrary from his extreme right-wing ministers are fueling suspicions. Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich have called for the Palestinians’ “voluntary migration” and for Israel’s resettlement of the Gaza Strip. Such inflammatory remarks generate tension between Israel and Egypt—and also between Israel and many of its international backers, including the United States.

A Military Victory May Create a Bigger Political Problem

In response to Netanyahu’s proposal to launch a military operation in Rafah, Egyptian officials have privately threatened to take diplomatic actions against Israel, reportedly warning that their country might suspend the historic peace treaty between the two neighbors. Such threats were later dismissed by Egypt’s foreign minister, but the fact that such a clarification was deemed necessary highlights the degree to which Egyptian-Israeli relations have reached a nadir. While it is highly unlikely that Cairo would ever abrogate the treaty altogether, there are indeed a myriad of other actions that it could take to gently pressure Israel and its strongest supporter, the United States, to account for its concerns. So far, Egypt has considered recalling its ambassador to Israel, and has stopped sharing images with Israel from its observation posts along the Gaza Strip.

Israel presently relies on Egypt to help mediate an agreement with Hamas to secure the release of its remaining hostages and to help it conclude a cease-fire. At the same time, Netanyahu is threatening to take the very actions that Cairo vehemently opposes. If Egypt’s help is needed, then why antagonize the very state whom you depend on for mediation and whose support you will need to craft a postwar settlement?

In Israel’s fight against terrorism, Netanyahu risks sacrificing his country’s strategic interests by alienating Israel’s oldest partner in the Arab world. It is precisely during such a critical time that he needs the help of neighbors to not only terminate the war and reach a settlement but to successfully implement a plan for Gaza that Arab states such as Egypt just might be able to accept, if not support. In the long term, dismissing or ignoring Egyptian concerns will do more harm than good for Israel’s national security.

Indeed, carefully contemplating these very likely negative outcomes recalls a long-standing strategic concept. The Prussian war theorist Carl von Clausewitz defined the so-called culminating point of victory as the line beyond which a military advance becomes politically counterproductive. Carried away by the offensive force, a belligerent keeps pressing his advance beyond a certain point, without realizing that every additional step jeopardizes the gains, and the possibilities for achieving peace radically diminish. The culminating point of victory is the threshold when the military advantages peak and then rapidly turn into disadvantages. As Clausewitz wrote in On War (Book VII, Ch. 22), “If one were to go beyond that point, it would not merely be a useless effort which could not add to success. It would in fact be a damaging one, which would lead to a reaction; and experience goes to show that such reactions usually have completely disproportionate effects.”

General Douglas MacArthur’s advance toward the Yalu River in 1951, which brought China directly into the Korean War, is considered the classic example of the strategic overreach that can occur when surpassing Clausewitz’s culminating point of victory. The UN forces’ gains in pursuing the North Korean army blinded MacArthur and led him to ignore warnings that China could not tolerate Western troops so close to its borders. The military offensive became meaningless and, in fact, counterproductive because it led to the Chinese intervention. The conflict hit a new and dangerous level of escalation that no one wanted. The path toward peace became much costlier and harder to achieve. Similar to MacArthur’s decision, Netanyahu’s proposed Rafah operation may soon become another blunder.

While it is unforeseeable that Israel and Egypt would fight one another in a large-scale engagement, the rising tensions coupled with their growing mistrust make potential border incidents or skirmishes more likely due to accidents and miscalculations. If Egypt amends or suspends the peace treaty, then Israel would likely have to post additional military forces along the entire length of its international border with Egypt. Though this is just a safeguard, it would impose greater financial costs on Israel and overextend the Israel Defense Forces, which are not only operating extensively in Gaza but are also countering threats in the north of the country (near Lebanon) and the West Bank. Some would argue that Egyptian-Israeli relations were never marked by deep trust and cooperation, but as we have shown, Israel may find the alternative even worse.

Until now, Israel’s actions in Gaza have been publicly criticized and observed internationally with a mix of fear and alarm, but the fragile balance in the Middle East still holds. That is not a small thing in this region. It is true that the proposed operation could help Israel tactically and operationally dismantle, or at least weaken, Hamas in Gaza, but the organization operates beyond the enclave. Its members actively recruit in the West Bank, its leading officials reside in neighboring Arab countries, its militants smuggle people and weapons from the Sinai, and its organization receives aid and assistance from private donors and from external patrons such as Iran and Qatar. To deal with the transnational dimension of terrorism, Israel needs the cooperation of regional partners like Egypt and should not take its help for granted.

When applying violence, Clausewitz advised strategists and statesmen to carefully consider their political objectives and ponder what better peace they wish to achieve at the end. As he emphasized when discussing the culminating point of victory, “Superior strength is not the end but only the means.” What would military success mean for Israel in Rafah if the political outcome is to permanently distance Egypt and render its crucial long-term cooperation in securing the southern border difficult, if not impossible? If Israel wishes lasting security, it needs a productive partnership with Egypt. The other possibility is an endless cycle of violence and, most likely, further interventions in Gaza. Such a nightmarish scenario would destabilize the Middle East for decades to come.

Israel would be well served by not just maintaining but strengthening its partnerships with Egypt and other Arab states. If it really wishes to defeat Hamas in Gaza and, more broadly, in the region, a coalition of partners offers a much more sustainable means of doing so.

Shahin Berenji is an assistant professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the US Naval War College. He studies foreign policy decision-making and diplomacy and has a specialization in the Cold War and regional expertise in the Middle East. His research has been published in such journals as International Security and Security Studies.

Vanya Eftimova Bellinger is an assistant professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the US Naval War College. She is the author of Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman behind the Making of On War. Her research focuses on classical military thought and its application to current strategic dilemmas.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Departments of the Army or Navy, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Israel Defense Forces

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Shahin Berenji, Vanya Eftimova Bellinger · March 22, 2024

11. The Age of the M1 Abrams Tank Is Coming to an End

Really? I think not quite yet.

But I do agree in investing in anti-drone capability of course.

Excerpts:

For all the talk about how Ukraine is a conventional war, the tank battles in that conflict have been, shall we say, lacking. They’ve been nothing like the tank battles of Desert Storm, notably the Battle of 73 Easting, where the Abrams tanks earned their stripes as the greatest tank of all time (and to be clear, the Abrams is the greatest tank of all time).

A wise investment not into more tanks should be made, but into tanks that can field anti-drone defenses. Possibly even tanks equipped with their own drone capabilities to serve as vital force multipliers in battle.

The Age of the M1 Abrams Tank Is Coming to an End

Even the more updated variants of the M1 Abrams might not be very useful in a future war. Not when, as the world has seen in the killing fields of Ukraine, drones and other anti-tank systems—which usually cost a fraction of what a modern MBT costs—can destroy tanks with wanton abandon. 

The National Interest · by Brandon J. Weichert · March 23, 2024

After months of building up in neighboring Kuwait. Constant exchanges between the leaders of the countries involved. Operation Desert Storm, the mission of allied powers to liberate the tiny oil-producing nation of Kuwait from the vile clutches of the Baathist gangster and Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, had begun. Fearinga Vietnam War in the desert, the George H.W. Bush Administration was overjoyed by the efficiency with which America’s advanced military jogged through the desert, crushing what was then the fourth-largest army in the world.

Still, the Iraqis were not without their own elite forces. The infamous battle-hardened Iraqi Republican Guard and their Soviet-built tanks had decided to catch the Americans off-guard. Not realizing, though, that the Americans were armed with the most lethal killing machine to have ever rolled across a battlefield: the M1A1 Abrams tank (developed by General Dynamics).

The M1 Abrams Fights the Greatest (and Last) Tank Battle of the Twentieth Century

The stage was set for one of the greatest tank battles of the twentieth century. In fact, it has been dubbed as the “last tank battle” of the twentieth century. Until the recent outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine, many military theorists had assumed it might have been the final tank battle ever.

Known to history as the “Battle of 73 Easting,” the bizarrely named conflict earned its title from the identifier on the battle maps of Coalition forces. It was the sector that the Coalition forces had been traversing. An astonishing 200-300 Coalition armored vehicles of various types had been assembled there along with 4,000 infantrymen. On the other side of the battle lines was approximately 300-400 armored Iraqi vehicles and 2,500-3,000 infantrymen.

The American-led Coalition forces completely crushed the Iraqis. In many cases, the Iraqis never even saw the Yanks coming. And that was exclusively because of the next-generation Abrams tanks the Americans went screaming into the fight with. In fact, some have speculated that the entire American force deployed to fight Iraq was basically a slightly retooled force that was originally supposed to engage with the Red Army in a potential Soviet invasion of Western Europe via the Fulda Gap.

If that were so, given that Iraq possessed some of the Soviet Union’s most advanced weapons systems, it is possible that had a Soviet invasion of Western Europe taken place in the Cold War, the Americans might have had the technology to stop it (at least conventionally).

But the Iraqi defeat in 1991 was a wakeup call for the world’s powers, especially China, which began formulating their unconventional warfare strategy. They could not rely on Soviet era weapons and systems to compete with the Americans.

In 1991, the Americans showed the world that they were lightyears ahead of the Soviets. The Abrams tank was one of the key examples of just how advanced the Americans were compared to their enemies. The Russian-built T-55 and T-72 Main Battle Tanks that the Iraqis were using in the war were simply no match for the speed, firepower, range, and superior training of the American tank crews in 1991.

The Iraqis lost upwards of 160 tanks. The Americans lost zero. One Bradley Fighting Vehicle was lost in the fight. The Iraqis were completely eviscerated by the American tanks. That’s because the Abrams tanks were next-generation tanks.

The Details of the Abrams Tanks

The Abrams tanks were able to destroy the Iraqi tanks from far greater distances than were the Soviet built Iraqi tanks able to engage the Americans. The powerful 120 mm smooth bore cannon that sat atop the Abrams tanks could fire a variety of rounds. What’s more American tank crews could fight at night, thanks to night vision goggles. Desert Storm has also been called America’s first “space war” because of the copious use of early Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites to guide the American mechanized units in the featureless deserts.

Truly, the Iraqis were no match for the Americans.

Multiple variants have been created of the Abrams tanks over the years. It remains the Main Battle Tank of the US Army. Older versions are currently being deployed to Ukraine, where Ukrainian forces will attempt to use them against their Russian adversaries in that war. Unfortunately for the Ukrainians, the versions they’re receiving from America are older and are in need of maintenance. They are not the most updated versions of the Abrams tank.

Where the Army Should Be Sending Their Investments

Even the more updated variants of the M1 Abrams might not be very useful in a future war. Not when, as the world has seen in the killing fields of Ukraine, drones and other anti-tank systems—which usually cost a fraction of what a modern MBT costs—can destroy tanks with wanton abandon.

For all the talk about how Ukraine is a conventional war, the tank battles in that conflict have been, shall we say, lacking. They’ve been nothing like the tank battles of Desert Storm, notably the Battle of 73 Easting, where the Abrams tanks earned their stripes as the greatest tank of all time (and to be clear, the Abrams is the greatest tank of all time).

A wise investment not into more tanks should be made, but into tanks that can field anti-drone defenses. Possibly even tanks equipped with their own drone capabilities to serve as vital force multipliers in battle.

About the Author

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

The National Interest · by Brandon J. Weichert · March 23, 2024

12. Large Language Models’ Emergent Abilities Are a Mirage

Excerpts:

The authors described this as “breakthrough” behavior; other researchers have likened it to a phase transition in physics, like when liquid water freezes into ice. In a paper published in August 2022, researchers noted that these behaviors are not only surprising but unpredictable, and that they should inform the evolving conversations around AI safety, potential, and risk. They called the abilities “emergent,” a word that describes collective behaviors that only appear once a system reaches a high level of complexity.

But things may not be so simple. A new paper by a trio of researchers at Stanford University posits that the sudden appearance of these abilities is just a consequence of the way researchers measure the LLM’s performance. The abilities, they argue, are neither unpredictable nor sudden. “The transition is much more predictable than people give it credit for,” said Sanmi Koyejo, a computer scientist at Stanford and the paper’s senior author. “Strong claims of emergence have as much to do with the way we choose to measure as they do with what the models are doing.”

Large Language Models’ Emergent Abilities Are a Mirage

A new study suggests that sudden jumps in LLMs’ abilities are neither surprising nor unpredictable, but are actually the consequence of how we measure ability in AI.

Wired · by Stephen Ornes · March 24, 2024

The original version of this story appeared in Quanta Magazine.

Two years ago, in a project called the Beyond the Imitation Game benchmark, or BIG-bench, 450 researchers compiled a list of 204 tasks designed to test the capabilities of large language models, which power chatbots like ChatGPT. On most tasks, performance improved predictably and smoothly as the models scaled up—the larger the model, the better it got. But with other tasks, the jump in ability wasn’t smooth. The performance remained near zero for a while, then performance jumped. Other studies found similar leaps in ability.

The authors described this as “breakthrough” behavior; other researchers have likened it to a phase transition in physics, like when liquid water freezes into ice. In a paper published in August 2022, researchers noted that these behaviors are not only surprising but unpredictable, and that they should inform the evolving conversations around AI safety, potential, and risk. They called the abilities “emergent,” a word that describes collective behaviors that only appear once a system reaches a high level of complexity.

But things may not be so simple. A new paper by a trio of researchers at Stanford University posits that the sudden appearance of these abilities is just a consequence of the way researchers measure the LLM’s performance. The abilities, they argue, are neither unpredictable nor sudden. “The transition is much more predictable than people give it credit for,” said Sanmi Koyejo, a computer scientist at Stanford and the paper’s senior author. “Strong claims of emergence have as much to do with the way we choose to measure as they do with what the models are doing.”

We’re only now seeing and studying this behavior because of how large these models have become. Large language models train by analyzing enormous data sets of text—words from online sources including books, web searches, and Wikipedia—and finding links between words that often appear together. The size is measured in terms of parameters, roughly analogous to all the ways that words can be connected. The more parameters, the more connections an LLM can find. GPT-2 had 1.5 billion parameters, while GPT-3.5, the LLM that powers ChatGPT, uses 350 billion. GPT-4, which debuted in March 2023 and now underlies Microsoft Copilot, reportedly uses 1.75 trillion.

That rapid growth has brought an astonishing surge in performance and efficacy, and no one is disputing that large enough LLMs can complete tasks that smaller models can’t, including ones for which they weren’t trained. The trio at Stanford who cast emergence as a “mirage” recognize that LLMs become more effective as they scale up; in fact, the added complexity of larger models should make it possible to get better at more difficult and diverse problems. But they argue that whether this improvement looks smooth and predictable or jagged and sharp results from the choice of metric—or even a paucity of test examples—rather than the model’s inner workings.

Courtesy of Merrill Sherman/Quanta Magazine

Three-digit addition offers an example. In the 2022 BIG-bench study, researchers reported that with fewer parameters, both GPT-3 and another LLM named LAMDA failed to accurately complete addition problems. However, when GPT-3 trained using 13 billion parameters, its ability changed as if with the flip of a switch. Suddenly, it could add—and LAMDA could, too, at 68 billion parameters. This suggests that the ability to add emerges at a certain threshold.

But the Stanford researchers point out that the LLMs were judged only on accuracy: Either they could do it perfectly, or they couldn’t. So even if an LLM predicted most of the digits correctly, it failed. That didn’t seem right. If you’re calculating 100 plus 278, then 376 seems like a much more accurate answer than, say, −9.34.

So instead, Koyejo and his collaborators tested the same task using a metric that awards partial credit. “We can ask: How well does it predict the first digit? Then the second? Then the third?” he said.

Koyejo credits the idea for the new work to his graduate student Rylan Schaeffer, who he said noticed that an LLM’s performance seems to change with how its ability is measured. Together with Brando Miranda, another Stanford graduate student, they chose new metrics showing that as parameters increased, the LLMs predicted an increasingly correct sequence of digits in addition problems. This suggests that the ability to add isn’t emergent—meaning that it undergoes a sudden, unpredictable jump—but gradual and predictable. They find that with a different measuring stick, emergence vanishes.

Brando Miranda (left), Sanmi Koyejo, and Rylan Schaeffer (not pictured) have suggested that the “emergent” abilities of large language models are both predictable and gradual.

Courtesy of Kris Brewer; Ananya Navale

But other scientists point out that the work doesn’t fully dispel the notion of emergence. For example, the trio’s paper doesn’t explain how to predict when metrics, or which ones, will show abrupt improvement in an LLM, said Tianshi Li, a computer scientist at Northeastern University. “So in that sense, these abilities are still unpredictable,” she said. Others, such as Jason Wei, a computer scientist now at OpenAI who has compiled a list of emergent abilities and was an author on the BIG-bench paper, have argued that the earlier reports of emergence were sound because for abilities like arithmetic, the right answer really is all that matters.

“There’s definitely an interesting conversation to be had here,” said Alex Tamkin, a research scientist at the AI startup Anthropic. The new paper deftly breaks down multistep tasks to recognize the contributions of individual components, he said. “But this is not the full story. We can’t say that all of these jumps are a mirage. I still think the literature shows that even when you have one-step predictions or use continuous metrics, you still have discontinuities, and as you increase the size of your model, you can still see it getting better in a jump-like fashion.”

And even if emergence in today’s LLMs can be explained away by different measuring tools, it’s likely that won’t be the case for tomorrow’s larger, more complicated LLMs. “When we grow LLMs to the next level, inevitably they will borrow knowledge from other tasks and other models,” said Xia “Ben” Hu, a computer scientist at Rice University.

This evolving consideration of emergence isn’t just an abstract question for researchers to consider. For Tamkin, it speaks directly to ongoing efforts to predict how LLMs will behave. “These technologies are so broad and so applicable,” he said. “I would hope that the community uses this as a jumping-off point as a continued emphasis on how important it is to build a science of prediction for these things. How do we not get surprised by the next generation of models?”

Original story reprinted with permission from Quanta Magazine, an editorially independent publication of the Simons Foundation whose mission is to enhance public understanding of science by covering research developments and trends in mathematics and the physical and life sciences.

Wired · by Stephen Ornes · March 24, 2024

13. Ukraine: Russian strikes in Kyiv facilitated by US sat-data purchase

If ture, what does this say about Russian capabilities? If true, how can this be prevented? 

Excerpt:

Here’s an intriguing experiment to ponder. An American journalist took a leap of faith and requested some recent shots of Zaporizhzhia, a city perilously close to the frontline, from a distributor affiliated with Planet Lab. With nothing more than a few clicks and keystrokes needed to share his identity and card details, presto – he was viewing a high-resolution image of the city within a matter of moments.

Ukraine: Russian strikes in Kyiv facilitated by US sat-data purchase

By Boyko Nikolov on March 23, 2024

bulgarianmilitary.com

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The Ukrainian military maintains that Russia employs images from American satellite companies to guide its cruise missile attacks. It’s an astonishingly cost-effective investment. The cost of these images could only be a few thousand dollars. This may seem like a hefty sum, but in comparison to a missile that costs around $1 million, it’s practically negligible. What’s more, such purchases can be strategically made through third-party corporations, which effectively conceal the Russian source and circumvent sanctions.

Photo credit: Maxar Technologies

• Drone attack from space? Yes, Boeing is working hard on this
• 16 Russian satellites embark on a mission for maritime oversight
• US launched an orbital fleet to shadow Russian hypersonic missiles

In addition, the satellite imagery market is a treasure trove of comprehensive, high-resolution images, all of which come with timestamps and coordinates. These images are an invaluable tool for monitoring the movements and activities of potential targets.

According to Ukrainian military sources quoted by The Atlantic, a telling pattern has emerged. A satellite takes a picture of a location marked for attack. Within a few days or weeks, a Russian missile strikes the designated target. A subsequent order for another satellite image of the same location is then submitted, likely to assess the aftermath of the operation. As the source succinctly puts it, “The number of coincidences is too high to be a coincidence,” pointing out the undeniable pattern.

Photo credit: Reddit

Some examples

On April 2, 2022, the region around Mirgorod was shaken by missile strikes on a military airport. Notably, US firms had requested images of this airport on nine separate occasions before this incident. Intriguingly, a week after the attack, another photo of the site was obtained. This pattern of events was not unique to Mirgorod. For example, in Lviv, an arms factory was bombarded on March 26, 2022. Then, in January 2024, Kyiv also made headlines when it faced a similar incident. Before this massive missile attack, recent images of the city had been ordered.

Several hundred such instances have been reported, according to Ukrainian officials. Experts at the Defense Ministry suspect that Russia might be acquiring satellite imagery through “third-party firms,” who collaborate with industry giants like Maxar and Planet Lab. This theory is supported by Deputy Defense Minister Kateryna Chernorenko.

Photo credit: Twitter

Chernorenko believes that American companies stand with Ukraine. These companies, echoing her viewpoint, announced the termination of their relationships with Russia in March 2022, while at the same time closely scrutinizing their customer base. However, the results of their work “could be used in the execution of armed attacks against Ukraine,” according to Chernorenko.

Is there control?

Despite assertions that their technological capabilities are limited, the Ukrainian military monitors Russian satellites. In the past, the notion that private firms could distribute satellite images revealing vulnerable military zones was unimaginable. However, a source speaking with The Atlantic revealed that such instances have become increasingly common in the last six months, raising questions about their randomness.

Video screenshot

A high-ranking executive from a company specializing in satellite imagery analysis confirmed to an American publication that they had identified over 350 incidents in the first year of conflict. There was a correlation between purchased photos and Russian missile strikes on deeply entrenched Ukrainian targets. The executive further emphasized that companies like Maxar and Planet Lab should exert more control, not just over their customer base, but also on the resale of images to prevent these crucial images from falling into Russian hands.

Here’s an intriguing experiment to ponder. An American journalist took a leap of faith and requested some recent shots of Zaporizhzhia, a city perilously close to the frontline, from a distributor affiliated with Planet Lab. With nothing more than a few clicks and keystrokes needed to share his identity and card details, presto – he was viewing a high-resolution image of the city within a matter of moments.

Satellites at war

Photo credit: Roscosmos

Let’s delve deeper into the significance of satellite images, particularly those of high resolution. A high-resolution satellite image over a region suspected of a missile strike in a military context can yield abundant information. The first thing it might reveal is the geographic layout of the area. This encompasses natural features such as mountains, rivers, forests, and man-made structures like buildings, roads, and bridges. Grasping the terrain is vital for evaluating the impact of a missile strike and strategizing potential countermeasures.

Secondly, the satellite image can disclose the existence of military installations or equipment. This could involve missile launch pads, military bases, radar systems, or other infrastructures. The presence of such installations could validate suspicions of a missile strike. The size, shape, and arrangement of these installations can also offer insights into the adversary’s capabilities and intentions.

Thirdly, the satellite image might display signs of recent activity that could suggest a missile launch. This could consist of heat signatures, smoke trails, or disturbed earth. Such signs would not only affirm a missile launch but also provide hints about the missile’s trajectory and potential target. Finally, in the aftermath of a suspected missile strike, a high-resolution satellite image can demonstrate the extent of the damage. This may consist of craters, destroyed buildings, or other signals of destruction. This information is crucial for assessing the effectiveness of the strike and strategizing for recovery and retaliation.

Photo credit: Russian MoD

You should know

BulgarianMilitary.com shares some fascinating details, highlighting the connection between satellites and the Ukraine conflict. Interestingly, nearly 70% of control over international commercial satellite imagery is held by US companies. Over the last five years, Russia has reportedly spent over $200 million on commercial satellite data to support its efforts.

The city of Kyiv has endured more than 200 airstrikes since the beginning of hostilities. The military budget of Russia increased by 5.4% in 2020, with substantial funds allocated towards surveillance and intelligence purposes.

Photo credit: NPO Mashinostroyeniya

Interestingly, more than 80% of the airstrikes in Kyiv have been directed with precision at military and strategic sites. In the last three years, American satellite companies have seen a sales boost of 15% from international clients. In 2021, Russia has secured its spot as the third-largest global buyer of commercial satellite imagery.

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​14. Foreign governments stand with Philippines after latest incident in Ayungin Shoal

Foreign governments stand with Philippines after latest incident in Ayungin Shoal

rappler.com · by Mia Gonzalez · March 23, 2024

SUMMARY

This is AI generated summarization, which may have errors. For context, always refer to the full article.

HARASSMENT. A Philippine Coast Guard vessel is 'impeded and encircled' by Chinese ships in the West Philippine Sea on March 23, 2024.

Screengrab from Philippine Coast Guard video

(2nd UPDATE) New Zealand, among the first to issue a statement, says it is 'fundamental to regional stability' for maritime disputes to be 'resolved peacefully in accordance with international law'

MANILA, Philippines – Foreign governments on Saturday, March 23, rallied behind the Philippines after the China Coast Guard again used water cannons against a Philippine vessel on a routine rotation and resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin Shoal in the West Philippine Sea, damaging the boat and causing injuries among some crew members.

“The US stands with the Philippines against the PRC’s repeated dangerous maneuvers & water cannons to disrupt @CoastGuardPH lawful activities in the Philippines’ EEZ. The PRC’s interference with Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law & threatens a #FreeAndOpenIndoPacific,” US Ambassador MaryKay L. Carlson said on X (formerly Twitter).

Japan also expressed its “grave concern” over the latest incident involving the China Coast Guard and Philippine vessels in the West Philippine Sea.

“Japan reiterates its grave concern on the repeated dangerous actions by CCG in SCS which resulted in Filipino injuries. Japan stands in solidarity with the PH as confirmed at the Japan-Philippines-US Vice Foreign Ministers’ meeting held in this week,” Japanese Ambassador-designate to the Philippines Endo Kazuya said on X.

New Zealand was among the first to issue a statement, via its social media page, about the incident.

“New Zealand is deeply concerned at further actions today by Chinese vessels towards the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal. These endanger lives at sea. It is fundamental to regional stability that maritime disputes are resolved peacefully in accordance with international law, particularly UNCLOS,” the New Zealand embassy in Manila said on X.

European Union (EU) Ambassador to the Philippines Luc Veron said that he was “concerned by recurring dangerous manoeuvres, blocking and water-cannoning from Chinese Coast Guard vessels and Maritime Militia against Philippine vessels engaged in resupply missions.”

“The EU reiterates the call for all parties to abide by the legally binding 2016 Arbitration Award and #internationallaw to peacefully resolve disputes, guaranteeing safety for all in maritime waters,” Veron said on X.

The EU, meanwhile, said China’s recent acts against the Philippines “constituted a dangerous provocation” and “put human lives at risk, undermine regional stability and international norms, and threaten security in the region and beyond.”

United Kingdom’s Laure Beaufils and Dutch Ambassador to the Philippines Marielle Geraedts also issued separate statements expressing concern over Saturday’s incident.

The two reiterated the importance of following international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Geraedts also urged China to honor the arbitral award that the Philippines won in 2016.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines HK Yu said the incident was “part of a pattern of deeply concerning behaviour” on the part of China.

“We share the Philippines’ serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal today…. UNCLOS is the basis for peace and stability in the South China Sea,” she said.

French Ambassador to the Philippines Marie Fontanel said in a statement that France opposes any threat or use of force, adding that dialogue is important in resolving disputes.

German Ambassador to the Philippines Andreas Pfaffernoschke, meanwhile, said Germany “is very concerned about the dangerous incident involving vessels of the China Coast Guard, causing heavy damage on a Philippine resupply mission ship in the exclusive economic zone of the [Philippines].” – Rappler.com

ALSO ON RAPPLER

• DFA fumes as China makes public ‘sensitive details,’ including Duterte-era deal
• EXPLAINER: Why China, the Philippines keep fighting over tiny shoal
• Manila boasts during 2nd Blinken visit: PH-US ties on ‘hyperdrive’
• ANALYSIS: The most complicated dispute in the world

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rappler.com · by Mia Gonzalez · March 23, 2024

15. Two Russian Black Sea fleet ships hit in "massive" Crimea strike

Two Russian Black Sea fleet ships hit in "massive" Crimea strike

Newsweek · by Ellie Cook · March 24, 2024

Ukraine struck two Russian amphibious ships and a communications center in Crimea, according to Kyiv's military, with open-source intelligence accounts and a Russian military blogger reporting the use of Western-supplied, long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles.

Kyiv launched a "massive overnight missile attack" on the Crimean port of Sevastopol, the Russian-installed governor of the city, Mikhail Razvozhaev, said in a post to messaging app Telegram on Sunday.

Razvozhaev said on Saturday that air defenses around Sevastopol had shot down at least 10 Ukrainian missiles, and that one person had died after a rocket fragment struck a house.

Ukraine's military then said on Sunday that it had successfully attacked two of Russia's large landing ships, the Yamal and the Azov, and a communications hub in Sevastopol as well as other, unspecified infrastructure facilities.

The Russian flag waves in front of the Ukrainian military ship "Slavutich" in the bay of Sevastopol on March 22, 2014. Kyiv launched a "massive overnight missile attack" on the Crimean port city, the Russian-installed... The Russian flag waves in front of the Ukrainian military ship "Slavutich" in the bay of Sevastopol on March 22, 2014. Kyiv launched a "massive overnight missile attack" on the Crimean port city, the Russian-installed governor of Sevastopol, Mikhail Razvozhaev, said on Sunday. VIKTOR DRACHEV/AFP via Getty Images

Open-source intelligence accounts suggested three British-provided Storm Shadow missiles were used in the strikes. Influential military blogger channel Rybar said Storm Shadows and the French-made versions, SCALP missiles, were used in the strikes.

Footage emerged purporting to show the strikes on Crimea. Newsweek could not independently verify the footage.

Newsweek has reached out to the Ukrainian military and the Russian Defense Ministry for comment via email.

Ukraine has repeatedly targeted Russia's Black Sea Fleet, which is partly based at the Crimean and has enjoyed a run of highly successful strikes on Russia's assets in the peninsula. Kyiv has vowed to retake the peninsula that Moscow has controlled for a decade.

Part of the effort from Ukraine has involved long-range missile strikes and the effective wielding of home-produced naval drones. Kyiv used Western-supplied, long-range, air-launched Storm Shadow missiles to strike a Russian warship and the Rostov-on-Don submarine, based at Sevastopol, in September 2023.

Appears that at least three Ukrainian Storm Shadow cruise missiles just slammed into a major Russian Black Sea Fleet communications center. https://t.co/C9Oq5NFcXH pic.twitter.com/c3gV0CR4tQ

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) March 23, 2024

In recent months, Ukraine has damaged or destroyed several Russian Black Sea vessels around Crimea, including a handful of landing ships. The U.K. government said on Thursday that Russia is using decoys to throw off Ukrainian attacks around its Black Sea bases.

Ukraine has succeeded in forcing Russia eastward, shifting some of its resources to Novorossiysk, a Black Sea port city perched in internationally-recognized Russian territory and, crucially, further away from Ukraine's littoral waters.

Moscow is now far warier of keeping its newer, major vessels in Crimea, and has transferred several to Novorossiysk, retired Ukrainian Navy Captain Andrii Ryzhenko told Newsweek in early March.

Reports have also suggested the Kremlin is planning a new military base at the port of Ochamchire in Abkhazia, a breakaway region of Georgia. This would put Russian Black Sea assets even further from Ukraine's coastline.

The British Defense Ministry evaluated last week that Russia had likely restricted most of its operations to the eastern Black Sea.

Earlier this month, Russia ordered new firepower for its Black Sea fleet to fend off the threat of Ukraine's naval drones, and Western intelligence has suggested Moscow has reeled in its Black Sea operations close to mainland Ukraine.

Update 3/24/2024 at 7:10 a.m. ET: This article was updated with additional information.

Newsweek · by Ellie Cook · March 24, 2024

16. The Bolduc Brief: Afghanistan Revisited- Lessons from a General’s Perspective

Conclusion:

As a nation, we must learn from the mistakes made during the withdrawal and ensure we uphold our commitments to our allies and partners. Moving forward, it is essential to prioritize the well-being and support of our veterans, Afghan partners, and all those affected by the conflict and work towards fostering a more constructive and transparent approach to international engagements.

The Bolduc Brief: Afghanistan Revisited- Lessons from a General’s Perspective

sofrep.com · by Donald Bolduc · March 23, 2024

1 day ago

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Original illustration by SOFREP

A Failure of Epic Proportions

The testimony of General Milley and General McKenzie in front of the House Armed Services Committee yesterday was tough to watch. The decision to withdraw from Afghanistan was undoubtedly a failure of epic proportions, resulting in a national security debacle that will have lasting consequences for years to come; how the withdrawal and the Non-Combatant Evacuation were executed and the poor interagency coordination should have led to the immediate firing of senior leaders on the military and civilian side of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and within the National Security Council Staff. However, instead of being held accountable for their actions, these leaders were allowed to remain in their positions and, in some cases, even promoted, further perpetuating a culture of cover-ups and incompetence.

The testimony yesterday was very different from previous testimony and public statements. Both generals blaming the Department of State was inappropriate. Those of us who know the importance of interagency coordination, Joint Force Operations, and executing Non-Combatant Evacuations (NEO) understand that the success and blame do not fall on the shoulders of one agency. I have participated in five NEOs at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, and I know it takes a team effort. I understand that the planning, coordination, approvals, political considerations, security, and resources necessary to conduct an NEO is a comprehensive undertaking by the interagency, Joint Staff, and the host nation. Two operations were happening in Afghanistan simultaneously: a NEO and a withdrawal. The failure of civilians, general officers, and admirals at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels must be addressed. Blaming one administration over another is political and only prevents the American people from hearing the truth.

We Need Accountability

What we need now is not more finger-pointing but proper accountability and a commitment to transparency. In his testimony, General Milley failed to take responsibility for the failures that led to the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, instead choosing to shift blame onto the State Department. While accepting responsibility for the military side of the operation, General McKenzie also attempted to deflect blame onto others. It is unacceptable for leaders to claim responsibility while simultaneously pointing fingers at their colleagues.

According to assessments by the Heritage Foundation (https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/executive-summary), since this failure in Afghanistan, we have the weakest military since World War II. Our foreign policy has left the world in turmoil, and our national security apparatus is ineffective at best and cannot provide security here at home or abroad. We also have a Congress that cannot fulfill its duties, making it the most ineffective Congress since the Great Depression. This is the fault of the civilians and military leaders that comprise our national security team and their hand-picked successors.

It is time for the truth to come to light and for those responsible for this failure to be held accountable. The American people deserve leaders willing to take responsibility for their actions and make the necessary changes to ensure that such a debacle never happens again. We must demand transparency and accountability from our leaders and hold them to the highest standards of integrity and competence. Only then can we begin to rebuild our national security apparatus and restore the American people’s trust in our government.

Our Mission Was Over in 2002

In several articles and assessments, I suggested that we had completed the military mission in Afghanistan by June 2002. We had a government in place in Kabul, Hamid Karzai had appointed all his provincial governors, and the security situation was satisfactory. If we had let the Afghans do it the Afghan way, the Taliban would not have resurged during our attempt to do nation-building and create an Afghan government, national military, national police force, and other Western-type organizations from 2002 to 2005, making an insurgency that became problematic until 2010.

In 2010, General McCrystal changed the strategy to a bottom-up comprehensive strategy. This is how Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police were created and approved by the Afghan government. With the support of Admiral Olsen, Admiral McCraven, General Petraeus, and General Allen, this program would achieve unprecedented security gains the Afghan way. By 2013, we could finally see a light at the end of the tunnel. The Special Joint Operations Task Force assessed with the assistance of RAND analysts that by 2015, security in the rural areas would be under the control of the Afghan government. Knowing all this, we changed the strategy. I articulated this in a meeting with Denis McDonough, Obama’s Chief of Staff, the ISAF Commander (General Dunford), and the IJC Commander (LTG Milley). Despite the evidence and a victory in sight, the strategy was changed. I was told after the meeting that I just committed career suicide.

The Obama administration’s shift in strategy and operational approach in Afghanistan in 2013 and 2014 had significant consequences for the outcome of the war. The change from a focus on rural security, as exemplified by the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs, to a downsizing of troops and a top-down counterterrorism approach had a detrimental impact on the progress that had been made in securing rural areas and weakening the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The key to security in Afghanistan is the rural areas. The Taliban knew this, and this is where they focused.

Village Stability Operations

The Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police programs developed and implemented between 2010-mid-2013 were instrumental in securing 90% of the rural areas in Afghanistan from 2010 to mid-2013. These Afghan-led programs were sustainable by the Afghan government at the local level. These programs were effective in grinding down the Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s ability to fight effectively, and the Afghan Local Police, in particular, posed a significant threat to the insurgent groups. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership acknowledged the effectiveness of these programs and expressed their frustration at their inability to defeat them.

In November 2012, a member of the Coalition Forces exchanged greetings with a leader from the village of Jani Khel, Afghanistan, during a shura aimed at validating the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in the region. Photo by by SGT Jenie Fisher, CJSOTF-A

The decision to shift away from these successful programs and towards a downsizing of troops and a top-down approach undermined the progress that had been made in securing rural areas and weakening insurgent groups. This strategic shift contributed to the ultimate failure of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan and the chaotic withdrawal that followed.

It is essential to recognize the importance of successful strategies and programs like the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police in achieving progress in conflicts like Afghanistan. Learning from past successes and failures is crucial in shaping future strategies and avoiding similar strategic missteps.

The decision to change strategy and operational approach in Afghanistan in 2013 and 2014 ultimately led to reversing the security situation in rural areas, which had previously been secured through programs like the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police. The shift in strategy allowed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to regain control of these areas, leading to increased casualties among U.S. and coalition forces.

How did this happen? The leadership in key positions within the Department of State, Department of Defense, and National Security Council during the Obama Administration comprised the same leadership in the Biden Administration, only in positions of higher authority. President Trump appointed General Milley, but Milley was a key decision-maker in Afghanistan’s strategy in 2013. Many of the same individuals involved in the decision-making process that led to the strategic shift in Afghanistan remained in positions of responsibility. This contributed to the failed strategy and the inability to address Afghanistan’s deteriorating security situation effectively.

The Rise of ISIS

The rise of ISIS in Afghanistan after the strategy shift further complicated the situation and added to the challenges faced by U.S. and coalition forces in the region. The failure to adapt and adjust the strategy in response to changing circumstances ultimately led to a protracted and costly conflict with no clear path to success. The grinding to a halt of military operations during the COVID-19 pandemic allowed the Taliban, al Qaeda, and ISIS to expand. They did not need to conduct combat operations to influence the populace. They did it in the local areas using the tried and tested tactics of intimidation, murder, and beatings, and it worked.

The lessons learned from Afghanistan’s strategic failures emphasize the importance of consistent and coherent decision-making and the need to continually reassess and adapt strategies in response to evolving threats and challenges. It is crucial to have leadership willing to acknowledge mistakes, learn from them, and make necessary changes to achieve strategic objectives effectively.

For transparency and accountability, Americans must be aware of the failures within the Department of State, Department of Defense, and National Security Council Staff across multiple administrations regarding the Afghanistan conflict. I was a general then, and I admit I was part of these failures that resulted in a protracted and costly conflict over two decades. Service members were engaged in tactical operations that did not lead to a meaningful strategic victory.

Acknowledging and taking responsibility for these failures is an essential step towards learning from past mistakes and ensuring that similar errors are not repeated in the future. As a general or admiral, the first step is to recognize your role in the failure and highlight the shortcomings in policy, strategy, and operational approaches that have contributed to the prolonged conflict in Afghanistan. This climate does not exist in the military. No one is willing to admit mistakes. Loyalty to the GO/FO club is essential to continued success. If you are a contrarian, you are done.

We Must Learn From the Past

Moving forward, it is imperative to critically evaluate past strategies and operational approaches, identify the root causes of failure, and implement necessary reforms to prevent such failures from occurring again. This process requires a comprehensive reassessment of U.S. foreign policy objectives, a clear understanding of the complexities of conflicts like Afghanistan, and a commitment to developing effective and sustainable strategies that prioritize long-term stability and security.

It is essential to honor and recognize the dedication, bravery, and sacrifices of the men and women who served in Afghanistan over the past two decades. These service members, along with our Afghan partners, NATO allies, and the Afghan people, demonstrated unwavering commitment, courage, and professionalism in carrying out their duties under challenging circumstances. They deserve our gratitude and respect for their selfless service and sacrifices on the battlefield.

How the withdrawal from Afghanistan was executed has raised legitimate concerns and has led to a sense of disappointment and betrayal among many who were involved in the conflict. Acknowledging the shortcomings and mistakes in the withdrawal process is crucial, and offering a sincere apology to all those affected by the chaotic and disorganized withdrawal is an essential step towards accountability and healing.

As a nation, we must learn from the mistakes made during the withdrawal and ensure we uphold our commitments to our allies and partners. Moving forward, it is essential to prioritize the well-being and support of our veterans, Afghan partners, and all those affected by the conflict and work towards fostering a more constructive and transparent approach to international engagements.

Donald C. Bolduc

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sofrep.com · by Donald Bolduc · March 23, 2024

17. India Emerges 'World’s Biggest' Military Training Partner Of U.S. As Both Look To Check 'Hostile' China

Excerpts:

The military exercises in which the U.S., along with its allies and partners, participates result in constructive operational engagements and enhance the skills of their armed forces in a number of diverse areas of warfighting through the exchange of current tactical and technological practices/techniques.

Participation in these exercises implies a high level of trust and confidence among the allies and partners. It is said to be a key confidence-building measure (CBM) and an indication of the faith reposed on one another.

Significantly, these exercises also act as a “strategic signaling” to a shared adversary in the region that allies, friends, and partners are together to deal with it if the situation so warrants. It is needless to say, this common adversary happens to be China in the Indo-Pacific.

Equally significant is that China understands this message very well.As Global Times, the Chinese government-controlled publication, once said, “These military drills, as an important part of the substantial implementation of the US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy, intend to strengthen military cooperation between the US and its Asia-Pacific allies, but the real drive is to prepare for a possible clash against Beijing, Washington’s imagined military enemy.”

India Emerges 'World’s Biggest' Military Training Partner Of U.S. As Both Look To Check 'Hostile' China

eurasiantimes.com · by Prakash Nanda · March 22, 2024

The increasing number of military exercises that the United States is conducting with its allies and partners, including India, seems to be a key indicator of their shared vision for an Indo-Pacific region that is “free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.”

MiG-31 & Vympel R-37M – A Deadly Combo That Ukraine’s F-16 Fighters Can Challenge But Not Defeat

It also implies their shared commitment to reinforce the region’s capacity and resilience to address the challenges emanating from the perceived aggressive behavior of China.

If Gen. Charles A. Flynn, commander of the U.S. Army Pacific, is to be believed, American allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific want “to participate in more multilateral and multinational exercises.”

Over the last fortnight, the United States has participated in four such major multilateral exercises, one each with India, Thailand, South Korea, and Japan.

EurAsian Times has already reported about the ongoing bilateral tri-service Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Exercise named Tiger-Triumph-24 between India and the United States. It began on March 18 and will continue till March 31 on India’s eastern Seaboard.

The exercise involves Indian Navy warships with helicopters and landing crafts, Indian Army personnel and vehicles, and Indian Air Force aircraft and helicopters, along with the Rapid Action Medical Team (RAMT). The US is represented by US Navy warships and troops of the US Marine Corps and US Army.

The Exercise represents the robust strategic partnership between both countries and aims at sharing best practices and “Standard Operating Procedures” in undertaking multinational HADR operations.

According to Captain Michel C. Brandt, the Commanding Officer of the participating USS Somerset, it is the largest bilateral exercise meant to promote mutual trust and cooperation. He pointed out that it would help in the exchange of best practices and building friendships.

Similarly, the U.S. participated in the Thailand–hosted multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 2024, which began on February 27 and concluded on March 8.

The U.S. Army’s participating units included the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2-158th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 16th Combat Aviation Brigade from the 7th Infantry Division, and 2nd Battalion, 377th Parachute Field Artillery Regiment, 11th Airborne Division.

The American Air Force participated in this exercise, with the 80th Fighter Squadron flying F-16 fighters, while the Marine Corps deployed elements of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), embarked on board the amphibious transport dock ship USS Somerset (LPD-25). Both Somerset and its embarked 15th MEU elements are part of the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group and 15th MEU team, which are operating in a disaggregated construct for its Indo-Pacific deployment.

According to a U.S. Air Force release on Feb. 29, the P-8A integrated with two 80th Fighter Squadron F-16 fighters, U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) JAS-39 Gripen fighters, and Royal Thai Navy (RTN) ships to find, target, and destroy simulated maritime targets in the Gulf of Thailand.

Cobra Gold is the largest joint exercise in mainland Asia, and it exemplifies “the U.S.’ long-standing alliance with the Kingdom of Thailand, and reflects a shared commitment to preserving a peaceful, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region. The Kingdom of Thailand is one of our [the U.S.’s] oldest treaty allies,” said Col. Matthew C. Gaetke, 8th Fighter Wing commander and Cobra Gold 24 U.S. Air Forces commander.

In Korea, “Exercise Freedom Shield 24” concluded on March 14. The annual exercise was geared to build understanding between Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea, the United Nations Command, and ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to ensure their ability to fortify the combined defense posture and enhance alliance response against a spectrum of threats.

The exercise was said to be a holistic military training program that integrated ground, air, and naval elements, enhancing readiness through realistic combat simulations, interoperability, and live exercises refining troops’ combat skills.

On March 17, the U.S. and Japan concluded the bilateral annual exercise “Iron Fist 24.” This time, it was particularly significant, as until 2023, the exercise was held in California; this year, it shifted to Japan in the vicinity of its southwest islands of Okinoerabu and Okinawa, an area that is said to be of great concern for Tokyo because of Chinese claims to the disputed Senkaku islands.

Besides, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has deployed its carrier strike groups to international waters near this area to conduct drills there.

The exercise began on February 24 and reportedly saw “U.S. Marines of the 31st MEU and the America ARG – comprising of amphibious assault carrier USS America (LHA-6) and amphibious transport dock, USS Green Bay (LPD-20) – carry out a variety of amphibious, ground and naval drills with the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) tank landing ship JS Kunisaki (LST-4003) and minesweeper JS Etajima (MSO-306)”.

In terms of specific capabilities trained, the two forces were said to have worked on “Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) operations—boarding and capturing enemy or suspect vessels at sea.”

The examples above are only instances from the last two weeks. The U.S., otherwise, conducted intense exercises throughout last year with many other countries, including the Philippines and Australia. In addition, it has upgraded its diplomatic and military presence in the Pacific islands and Vietnam.

Relive the adrenaline rush.. in the Joint Exercise #YudhAbhyas.#IndianArmy#IndiaUSFriendship@USARPAC @USArmy @I_Corps @PAOFWA pic.twitter.com/NPwpK70PaL

— ADG PI – INDIAN ARMY (@adgpi) October 4, 2023

India Biggest Partner

In fact, India now conducts more exercises and personnel exchanges with the United States than with any other country. Some of them are noteworthy.

In the 19th edition of “Yudh Abhyas” (Army), the ground forces of the two exercised in Alaska in October 2023.

File Image: US Soldiers with Indian Troops in Alaska

Under “Vajra Prahar” (Army Special Forces), U.S. and Indian Special Forces soldiers have held 14 joint exercises since 2010, and hundreds of U.S. Special Forces soldiers have attended India’s Counter-Insurgency Jungle Warfare School. The most recent edition of this platoon-level exercise was held in north-eastern India in November 2023.

“Cope India,” involving the Air Forces of the two countries, was held last April and is said to be the largest iteration since it started in 2004. It included the participation of U.S. Air Force B-1B bombers and F-15 combat aircraft.

Other notable bilateral exercises include “Tarkash” joint ground force counterterrorism exercises, which involve U.S. Special Forces and India’s elite National Security Guard troops, and “Sangam” naval special forces exercises, which bring together companies of U.S. Navy SEALs and the Indian Navy’s Marine Commando Force.

Among the multilateral exercises, there is “Malabar,” whose 27th edition was hosted for the first time by Australia in August 2023, involving several surface ships, along with maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, and submarines. Participating U.S. forces included a guided-missile destroyer, a fleet oiler, a submarine, and aircraft. India sent a destroyer, a frigate, and a P-8I Poseidon aircraft.

There is the “Rim-of-the-Pacific” (RIMPAC, Navy), arguably the world’s largest maritime exercise. The 28th edition, held near Hawaii with the participation of 26 countries in summer 2022, included the Indian Navy frigate Satpura and P8I aircraft.

Last month (February 2024), India hosted “Milan” (Navy), the biennial Bay of Bengal exercise (first held in 1994). The US has been participating in it since 2022. Milan is a mega exercise with over 50 foreign navies, 15 warships, and a maritime patrol aircraft. The presence of the U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Halsey (DDG 97) was a notable feature this year.

File Image: US Navy P-8 Poseidon

The U.S. and India have also participated in the “Cutlass Express” (Navy), “Sea Dragon” (Navy), “Red Flag” (Air Force), French-sponsored “La Perouse” (Navy), and Australia-hosted “Pitch Black” (Air Force) exercises. All these exercises have taken place in the Indo-Pacific, from Australia at one end to Africa at the other.

The military exercises in which the U.S., along with its allies and partners, participates result in constructive operational engagements and enhance the skills of their armed forces in a number of diverse areas of warfighting through the exchange of current tactical and technological practices/techniques.

Participation in these exercises implies a high level of trust and confidence among the allies and partners. It is said to be a key confidence-building measure (CBM) and an indication of the faith reposed on one another.

Significantly, these exercises also act as a “strategic signaling” to a shared adversary in the region that allies, friends, and partners are together to deal with it if the situation so warrants. It is needless to say, this common adversary happens to be China in the Indo-Pacific.

Equally significant is that China understands this message very well.

As Global Times, the Chinese government-controlled publication, once said, “These military drills, as an important part of the substantial implementation of the US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy, intend to strengthen military cooperation between the US and its Asia-Pacific allies, but the real drive is to prepare for a possible clash against Beijing, Washington’s imagined military enemy.”

eurasiantimes.com · by Prakash Nanda · March 22, 2024

18. The disinformation war has taken a toll, but researchers feel a shift ahead of 2024 election

The disinformation war has taken a toll, but researchers feel a shift ahead of 2024 election

Researchers who study and combat disinformation have faced years of attacks. Recently, they've also achieved some quiet but significant victories.

March 23, 2024, 7:00 AM EDT / Updated March 23, 2024, 10:11 AM EDT

By Brandy Zadrozny

NBC News · by Brandy Zadrozny

After weathering a yearslong political and legal assault, researchers who study disinformation say they see reasons to be cautiously hopeful as their efforts heat up ahead of the 2024 election.

These researchers, along with the universities and nonprofits that they work for, have been in the crosshairs of Republicans and their allies, accused of acting as government proxies in a Biden administration plot to censor conservative speech online. Since 2021, those who worked to identify and combat disinformation around the last presidential election and Covid-19 have faced lawsuits, congressional inquiries and attacks online and in right-wing media that have threatened their reputations, careers and personal safety.

But recently, those researchers have achieved quiet but significant victories that could signal a shift in the larger war against disinformation.

On Monday, during oral arguments at the Supreme Court, most of the justices voiced some support for governments and researchers working with social media platforms on content moderation, especially related to national security, emergencies and health. After a year of sensational public hearings, a Republican-led congressional committee tasked with discrediting researchers and proving their collusion with the government and tech companies has produced little. And programs under which federal law enforcement shared information with platforms, which had been paused in response to the Republican efforts, have recently resumed.

Darren Linvill, co-director of Clemson University’s Media Forensics Hub, who testified and fielded “onerous” records requests last summer as part of Republican House Judiciary Chairman Jim Jordan’s investigation into the “weaponization” of the federal government, said he was somewhat optimistic about a cooling of the ire directed at those who study online disinformation “into something that’s more reasonable.”

“I’m not overly hopeful, given the nature of our politics today,” Linvill said. “You know, hope is a trap. But I will dare to hope.”

With less than eight months until a presidential election likely to be marred by unprecedented disinformation, the loss of coordination between government, researchers and platforms over the past several years will undoubtedly be felt. The programs most targeted by recent attacks include nonpartisan partnerships between universities and research groups.

Most notably, the Election Integrity Partnership, led by the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public and the Stanford Internet Observatory, identified and tracked false and misleading information online in real time. In addition to publishing findings and analysis, the groups also forwarded potentially harmful disinformation to platforms for review. That partnership is no longer active.

But other work has continued, and researchers are closely watching the case that was argued before the Supreme Court this week as a potential sign that right-wing efforts have hit a limit.

That case accuses the Biden administration of violating the First Amendment by coercing social media platforms to remove or limit the reach of posts from conservatives. It spurred a Donald Trump-appointed Louisiana judge to enjoin the government from meeting with social media companies over content, which halted information sharing.

Even some of the court’s most conservative members expressed skepticism about the censorship claim during Monday’s oral arguments, and liberal Justice Sonia Sotomayor suggested the attorney arguing for the respondents — the states of Louisiana and Missouri, and individuals including an anti-vaccine activist, an epidemiologist and the owner of a conspiracy theory news website — had misrepresented facts.

“You omit information that changes the context of some of your claims,” Sotomayor scolded Louisiana Solicitor General Benjamin Aguiñaga. “You attribute things to people who it didn’t happen to.”

The New Civil Liberties Alliance, a group representing the respondents, replied to a request for comment with a statement saying in part that should the federal government prevail, the court “will have abandoned the First Amendment”

The researchers who were listening, some from the livestream and at least one in person at the Supreme Court, heard in the justices’ questioning a recognition of the kind of factual inaccuracies that have frustrated them.

Kate Starbird, director of the Center for an Informed Public, whose work on disinformation has been targeted by conservative activists and Republican congressional committees, noted that the justices seemed to understand “the value of information sharing between researchers, government and platforms.” Regardless of what the justices decide, she said that her work, which most recently examined narratives about immigration and “rigged elections,” will continue.

The researchers’ opponents, too, are feeling a shift. “We’ve been had,” wrote Matt Taibbi, one of the journalists whose work disseminating internal Twitter documents provided by Elon Musk had helped build, though not prove, the theory at the heart of the Supreme Court case. “The government is on the precipice of gaining explicit permission to fully re-charge its censorship machine.”

That is what Taibbi, Musk, Jordan and many others — including elected officials and private conservative groups — say they have been fighting against. And until recently, they have been overwhelmingly successful.

In the past two years, government efforts to respond to disinformation have been shuttered. Last spring, Jordan’s congressional subcommittee began an investigation into researchers and their alleged collusion with what it calls the federal government’s “censorship regime” — a quest that has hauled a score of researchers and tech workers to often confrontational closed-door depositions in Washington. Reputational and legal threats aimed at these researchers coupled with a flood of harassment have chilled their work.

Sen. Mark R. Warner, D-Va., chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, characterized the multipronged assault as a “concerted effort by partisan actors to intimidate and silence” researchers, an attack that he said “poses a genuine threat” to efforts that would counter foreign attempts to sow discord and disinformation in the U.S. before the next election.

“It takes a toll,” said Rebekah Tromble, director of the Institute for Data, Democracy & Politics at George Washington University. “It eats up time that can and should be spent doing the incredibly important work. Beyond that, it drains energy and takes a real emotional and mental health toll on folks.”

Nina Jankowicz, a researcher who had served as executive director of a new Department of Homeland Security advisory board on disinformation before resigning in 2022 in response to online threats and harassment, is just beginning to get back into the field. She’s working on a soon-to-be launched project addressing attacks on disinformation researchers and free expression.

“I don’t want to count chickens before they are hatched, because I still think there’s a lot of damage to be done,” she said, nodding to the still active legal cases and the prospect of a 2024 Trump win. “It took me a good year and a half to be able to even start to think proactively about doing new work and research again. And I know that it could all come crashing down. It’s a scary time.”

Still, cautiously, Jankowicz and others acknowledged that the larger war is not yet lost.

After over a year, the House committee investigating researchers and their work on disinformation — which interviewed Jankowicz, Starbird and others in closed-door sessions last April — has yet to produce tangible results. Public hearings have not yielded actionable evidence that the federal government has been weaponized against conservatives. There have been no legal wins and no legislation has been passed.

A Judiciary spokesperson defended the subcommittee’s work in a statement, saying it was providing “constitutional oversight.” The spokesperson said the inquiry had played a critical role in uncovering evidence of the Biden administration’s efforts to “censor Americans’ constitutionally protected speech.”

The statement added the Election Integrity Partnership played “a unique role in the censorship industrial complex,” and vowed that the committee would “continue its critical investigative work.”

The credibility of the accusations at the heart of the committee's hearings and the lawsuits has been strained. Architects of the "censorship industrial complex" theory, including Taibbi and culture-war journalist Michael Shellenberger, were influenced and informed by Mike Benz, a former alt-right vlogger, who turned a two-month stint in the State Department in 2020 into a claimed expertise in cybersecurity. Most recently, Benz was the originator of the conspiracy theory that Taylor Swift is part of a Pentagon psychological operation to influence the election.

Taibbi, Shellenberger and Benz did not respond to emails requesting comment.

Renée DiResta, research manager at Stanford University’s Internet Observatory, has been thrust into the center of the censorship industrial complex conspiracy theory, branded its leader. DiResta, who is named as a defendant in a civil case brought by former Trump adviser Stephen Miller’s ultraconservative legal group, was also buoyed by the Supreme Court hearing on Monday.

“I welcome a return to discussing the nuance of content moderation policy and tackling the critical global issue of election integrity,” she said. “Once again rooted in the realm of facts.”

CORRECTION (March 23, 2024, 10:11 a.m. ET): A previous version of this article misstated the circumstances of Kate Starbird’s contact with the House committee investigating disinformation research. Starbird was interviewed voluntarily at the committee’s request; she was not subpoenaed and deposed.

Brandy Zadrozny

Brandy Zadrozny is a senior reporter for NBC News. She covers misinformation, extremism and the internet.

Jason Abbruzzese contributed.

NBC News · by Brandy Zadrozny

​19. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 23, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Russian authorities claimed to have arrested the four attackers and seven others involved in the March 22 “Crocus City Hall” concert venue attack, which Russian authorities reported killed at least 133 civilians.
• ISW assesses that the Islamic State (IS) is very likely responsible for the Crocus City Hall attack.
• The Kremlin nevertheless and without evidence quickly attempted to tie Ukrainian actors to the Crocus City Hall attack but has yet to formally accuse Ukraine of involvement in the attack.
• Russian ultranationalists responded to the attack by reiterating typically xenophobic calls for anti-migrant policies, reflecting the growing tension in Russian society over the mistreatment of migrants and the impacts migrant disenfranchisement could have on expanding a viable recruitment base in Russia for Salafi-Jihadi groups.
• Russian sources accused Ukrainian actors of reportedly conducting a successful drone strike against a Russian oil refinery in Samara Oblast on the night of March 22 to 23.
• Russia is reportedly delaying the delivery of two S-400 air defense systems to India, likely due to limitations in Russia’s production of S-400 systems, an increased need for air defense systems to protect cities and strategic enterprises in Russia from Ukrainian drone strikes, and a reported souring of Russian relations with India.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on March 23 that will release individuals from criminal liability if they are called up for mobilization or sign military service contracts.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 23, 2024

Mar 23, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 23, 2024

Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan

March 23, 2024, 5:45pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on March 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian authorities claimed to have arrested the four attackers and seven others involved in the March 22 “Crocus City Hall” concert venue attack, which Russian authorities reported killed at least 133 civilians. Russian sources claimed that the attackers entered the Crocus venue on March 22 and began firing machine guns at civilians at 19:55 Moscow time, reached the main auditorium by 20:03, and fled the scene in a car at 20:13 – conducting the entire attack and laying explosives that ignited the venue in only 18 minutes.[1] The Russian Investigative Committee and Moscow authorities reported that the attack killed at least 133 and injured at least 140 as of March 23, but this number may grow as Russian authorities find more casualties trapped under rubble in the concert hall.[2] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reported that it detained four individuals it claims are the attackers in Bryansk Oblast on March 23 as well as seven others whose involvement is not yet specified.[3] Russian sources widely circulated geolocated footage of Russian security forces detaining four individuals alleged to be the attackers before they could flee near Kommuna, Bryansk Oblast (about 14km southwest of Bryansk City).[4] Russian authorities claimed that they detained two individuals in the vehicle that the four were driving and chased down two others who fled into the surrounding forest.[5] Russian sources also amplified footage of Russian security forces interrogating the individuals, all of whom either spoke little Russian or communicated with Russian personnel via translators.[6] Russian sources largely claimed that the attackers are all citizens of Tajikistan, and Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Spokesperson Iryna Volk claimed that none of the individuals whom Russian authorities claimed conducted the attack are Russian citizens.[7]  

ISW assesses that the Islamic State (IS) is very likely responsible for the Crocus City Hall attack. IS Amaq’s News Agency took responsibility for the attack on the night of March 22, claiming that IS fighters attacked a “large gathering of Christians” on the outskirts of Moscow, “killing and wounding hundreds and causing great destruction...before they [the attackers] withdrew to their bases safely.”[8] The Amaq News Agency later posted a blurred-out image of the four fighters who it claimed conducted its “fiercest attack in years” standing in front of an IS flag.[9] The Amaq News Agency announcement is consistent in terms of style, branding, and language with previous Amaq claims for other attacks. IS media organs make deceptive or false claims only ”infrequently” and carefully and try to maintain “high credibility” in their communique in order to define clear ideological objectives and maintain fundraising streams.[10] IS propaganda enables the group to fundraise and disseminate its guidance to lower-level commanders and supporters--IS risks discrediting itself within the competitive Salafi-jihadi community by falsely taking credit for very high-profile attacks. The conduct of the attack itself is also consistent with previous IS attacks, including the 2015 Paris terror attacks.[11] The IS fighters in the Crocus City Hall and some of those involved in the 2015 Paris attacks exfiltrated the target and subsequently evaded security forces for a time.[12]

The Islamic State’s Afghan branch IS-Khorasan (IS-K) may have conducted the Crocus City Hall attack. This branch has conducted at least four high-profile attacks outside of central Asia in the last 18 months.[13] US Central Command Commanding General Michael Kurilla notably stated in March 2023 that IS-K would be able to conduct “external operations against US or Western interests abroad in under six months,” meaning that Western intelligence had already assessed that IS and IS-K would be able to field the capabilities for such external attacks by September 2023.[14] US intelligence most recently confirmed that IS-K was responsible for a bombing attack in Kerman, Iran as recently as January 2024, further highlighting IS external attack capabilities.[15] Allegations that the Crocus City Hall attack was a false flag operation are inconsistent with the evidence ISW has observed from the attack itself correlated with other reports of previous IS external attacks that ISW and CTP have covered since the emergence of the Islamic State, as well as the IS claim pattern following the attack.[16] It is also highly unlikely that IS would have conducted the attack on the orders of Ukrainian special services, which several Russian sources have alleged. Amaq News Agency is IS’s central media arm. IS would not falsely claim an attack that may have been conducted by one Christian state against another (or by the Kremlin against Russia’s own people in some sort of false-flag operation), because the implications of IS conducting an attack at the behest of a predominantly Christian country would damage IS credentials within the Salafi-Jihadi community.

The Kremlin nevertheless and without evidence quickly attempted to tie Ukrainian actors to the Crocus City Hall attack but has yet to formally accuse Ukraine of involvement in the attack. Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the Russian public on March 23 and claimed that the attackers’ “contacts” had prepared a “window” for the attackers’ exfiltration across the international border into Ukraine (without mentioning how the attackers were supposed to get through the defenses the Russians have established along the border).[17] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that it apprehended the four attackers as they were attempting to reach their alleged contacts on the Ukrainian side of the border.[18] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova falsely asserted that Ukraine has been spreading terrorism for the past ten years at the behest of the West and that this is why the attackers attempted to flee to Ukraine.[19] The Russians describe Ukrainian military strikes against legitimate targets in Russia as terrorism.[20] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapolov claimed that Ukraine and its allies are the main “stakeholders” in the attack at the Crocus City Hall.[21] Kremlin officials likely aim to indirectly tie Ukraine to the attack to set conditions for information operations that seek to attribute the attack to Ukraine without having to issue an immediate official accusation. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that an employee at an unidentified Russian state-owned media organization stated that state-owned media received instructions from the Kremlin to emphasize the alleged “Ukrainian trace” in the Crocus City Hall attack.[22] Russian ultranationalists responded to these indirect accusations and explicitly claimed that Ukrainian and Western special services orchestrated the Crocus City Hall attack.[23] The Kremlin likely hopes that perceptions about Ukrainian involvement in the attack will increase Russian domestic support for the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin may still issue an official accusation to this end if it believes that indirect accusations are insufficient to generate the domestic response it likely desires.

Russian ultranationalists responded to the attack by reiterating typically xenophobic calls for anti-migrant policies, reflecting the growing tension in Russian society over the mistreatment of migrants and the impacts migrant disenfranchisement could have on expanding a viable recruitment base in Russia for Salafi-Jihadi groups. Russian ultranationalists widely connected the attack to what they consider unfettered migration to Russia and the development of diaspora communities within Russia that they claim act as parallel societies.[24] Russian ultranationalists denied that their calls for stricter migration policies and the end of diaspora communities were ethnically motivated, and instead accused Ukraine and the West of selecting Tajik attackers specifically to foment further ethnic conflict within Russia.[25] The Russian ultranationalist community has made xenophobia and insecurities about Russia’s ethnic composition some of its key ideological principles and has increasingly used incidents involving migrants and non-ethnic Russian groups to express growing hostility towards non-ethnic Russians in Russia.[26] The ultranationalists’ attempts to frame the attack as a migration issue while warning against alleged Western attempts to foment ethnic tension are likely indicative of some awareness that further ethnic animosity could increase disenfranchisement and drive migrants towards various Salafi-Jihadi groups. Russia is currently conducting a force generation campaign that is alienating large numbers of migrants from economic and social life in Russia and making military service one of the few avenues for remaining in the country.[27] Russian force generation efforts and anti-migrant policies, an increasingly prominent ultranationalist movement that espouses xenophobic rhetoric, and an increasingly ultranationalist Kremlin that stresses the importance of Russian Orthodoxy in public life are likely further disenfranchising migrant communities and generating animosities that Salafi-Jihadi groups can exploit in recruitment efforts.

Russian sources accused Ukrainian actors of reportedly conducting a successful drone strike against a Russian oil refinery in Samara Oblast on the night of March 22 to 23. Footage published on March 23 shows a large fire and a smoke plume rising from the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast.[28] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces successfully struck the Kuibyshev refinery and unsuccessfully attempted to strike the nearby Novokuibyshevsky refinery.[29] BBC Russian Service, citing sources within Ukrainian security forces, reported that Ukraine is implementing a “detailed strategy to reduce” Russia’s economic potential and that Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure are part of this strategy.[30] Former US Army in Europe Commander Lieutenant General Ben Hodges stated on March 22 that Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries have significantly impacted Russia’s ability to pay for its war effort and supply fuel to the Russian military.[31]

Russia is reportedly delaying the delivery of two S-400 air defense systems to India, likely due to limitations in Russia’s production of S-400 systems, an increased need for air defense systems to protect cities and strategic enterprises in Russia from Ukrainian drone strikes, and a reported souring of Russian relations with India. The Economic Times reported on March 20, citing unspecified defense sources, that Russian officials informed India that Russia will deliver two remaining squadrons of S-400 air defense systems by August 2026 after delivering three of the five squadrons that Russia reportedly agreed to deliver by the end of 2024.[32] The Economic Times stated that Russian officials claimed that they are unable to supply the S-400 systems on time due to the “developing situation” and “requirements” of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian drone strikes against targets in Russia may be constraining Russian air defense systems and prompting the Russian military command to reallocate air defense systems to better defend Russian cities and strategic facilities.[33] Russia likely also has a limited number of air defense systems allocated for export and may be choosing to delay deliveries to India in favor of supplying more steadfast allies following India’s recent decisions to turn away Russian oil tankers over concerns about Western sanctions.[34]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian authorities claimed to have arrested the four attackers and seven others involved in the March 22 “Crocus City Hall” concert venue attack, which Russian authorities reported killed at least 133 civilians.
• ISW assesses that the Islamic State (IS) is very likely responsible for the Crocus City Hall attack.
• The Kremlin nevertheless and without evidence quickly attempted to tie Ukrainian actors to the Crocus City Hall attack but has yet to formally accuse Ukraine of involvement in the attack.
• Russian ultranationalists responded to the attack by reiterating typically xenophobic calls for anti-migrant policies, reflecting the growing tension in Russian society over the mistreatment of migrants and the impacts migrant disenfranchisement could have on expanding a viable recruitment base in Russia for Salafi-Jihadi groups.
• Russian sources accused Ukrainian actors of reportedly conducting a successful drone strike against a Russian oil refinery in Samara Oblast on the night of March 22 to 23.
• Russia is reportedly delaying the delivery of two S-400 air defense systems to India, likely due to limitations in Russia’s production of S-400 systems, an increased need for air defense systems to protect cities and strategic enterprises in Russia from Ukrainian drone strikes, and a reported souring of Russian relations with India.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on March 23 that will release individuals from criminal liability if they are called up for mobilization or sign military service contracts.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.   

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional fighting continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Tabaivka and Berestove; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[35] A Ukrainian platoon commander operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces in the area are conducting infantry-led “meat assaults” with small infantry groups and significant artillery, drone, and anti-aircraft support and conduct such assaults daily. The Ukrainian platoon commander noted that Russian forces occasionally conduct armored assaults in the Lyman direction and that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault a few days ago with 10 armored vehicles, six of which Ukrainian forces destroyed.[36] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attacking both Yampolivka and Terny with roughly a division’s worth of forces per settlement, including the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], newly formed Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 254th and 488th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) in the Terny direction; and the 19th Tank Regiment (reportedly of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, either Central or Eastern Military District), 31st Motorized Rifle Regiment (25th CAA) and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], either CMD or EMD) in the Yampolivka direction.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 23 that Russian forces captured Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut) as positional fighting continued near Bakhmut.[38] A prominent Russian milblogger amplified the Russian MoD’s claim and added the claim that Russian forces are still clearing Ivanivske and advanced west along the O0506 Khromove-Chasiv Yar highway and into the northeastern part of the Stupki-Holubivske-2 nature reserve northwest of Ivanivske.[39] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the Russian seizure of Ivanivske or advances west of Ivanivske. Positional fighting continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Niu York.[40] Positional fighting also continued in the Siversk area northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka, Vesele, and Spirne.[41] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Bakhmut direction stated that Russian forces are conducting assaults using mechanized vehicles for fire cover and to transport infantry to the front line but noted that Ukrainian forces are able to inflict significant manpower and equipment losses on Russian troops.[42] The Ukrainian battalion commander reported that Ukrainian forces currently disable 60 to 70 percent of vehicles that Russian forces field in assaults near Bakhmut. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, 11th VDV Brigade, 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), and a ”smattering” of Russian territorial forces are attacking in the Chasiv Yar direction and that elements of the 3rd Army Corps (AC) and former Wagner Group forces subordinated to the Russian 7th Volunteer Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are attacking near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[43] Elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC) continue operating near Klishchiivka.[44]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued fighting in the area on March 23. Geolocated footage published on March 23 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced to a windbreak south of Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) and in a field west of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka).[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced northwest of Tonenke and north of Orlivka (west of Avdiivka), but ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of these claims.[46] Fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi; west of Avdiivka near Tonenke, Semenivka, and Orlivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[47] Elements of the Russian 1st “Slovyansk” Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly fighting near Tonenke.[48]

Russian forces previously marginally advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 23. Footage published on March 11 and geolocated on March 23 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City), although these advances are likely not recent.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the direction of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed evidence of this claim.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Kostyantynivka.[51] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[52]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued south of Novodarivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka), near Urozhaine and Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka), and Vodyane (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[53] Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske direction (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area).[54]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional fighting near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne) on March 23.[55]  Geolocated footage published on March 23 indicates that Russian forces recently made a marginal gain west of Verbove.[56] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction stated that Russian forces have not conducted any assaults in this area with significant armored vehicle support in the past four days and that Russian assault groups have recently started storming Ukrainian positions at dawn.[57] The Ukrainian spokesperson stated that Russian forces are increasingly using first-person view (FPV) drones at night and that several unspecified “elite” Russian units in the area primarily focus on conducting FPV drone operations at night.[58] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces have significant electronic warfare (EW) capabilities in the area that are forcing Ukrainian forces to routinely switch the frequencies that Ukrainian drones operate on.[59] The spokesperson added that Russian forces drop tear gas from drones in the area and that the tear gas has previously temporarily incapacitated Ukrainian artillery and infantry groups.[60] Russian forces have reportedly increased their use of chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) gas or chloropicrin (PS) along the front, which are riot control agents (RCAs) prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.[61]

Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled two Russian assaults in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on March 23.[62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile and drone strikes against targets in Ukraine on the night of March 22 to 23. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched four S-300 missiles at Donetsk Oblast and 34 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and occupied Caped Chauda, Crimea on the night of March 22 to 23.[63] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 31 Shahed drones over Poltava, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[64] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces struck Odesa Oblast with an Iskander-M missile on the evening of March 22 and struck near Zaporizhzhia City with a Kh-59 cruise missile on March 23.[65] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified ballistic missile at Odesa Oblast on March 23 and that the missile struck open territory in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi Raion.[66]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on March 23 that will release individuals from criminal liability if they are called up for mobilization or sign military service contracts.[67] The law exempts servicemen from criminal prosecution for any crimes committed in Russia and crimes committed in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before September 2022, when Russia illegally annexed the oblasts.[68] The provisions reportedly only apply to people who have committed minor or “medium gravity” crimes and do not apply to people accused of terrorism, sexual crimes, or violations of public safety.[69] ISW previously assessed that the law will likely allow Russia to expand its recruiting base outside of existing convict recruitment schemes.[70]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)  

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

20. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 23, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-23-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a weeklong operation in and around al Shifa Hospital on March 23.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters during a raid targeting an unspecified “wanted individual” in Tulkarm in the West Bank on March 22.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 22.
• Yemen: CENTCOM reported that the Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles into the Red Sea but added that the Houthi attacks did not damage any military or commercial vessels.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 23, 2024

Mar 23, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, March 23, 2024

Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on March 23 and 24, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume on Monday, March 25, 2024. 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a weeklong operation in and around al Shifa Hospital on March 23.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters during a raid targeting an unspecified “wanted individual” in Tulkarm in the West Bank on March 22.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 22.
• Yemen: CENTCOM reported that the Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles into the Red Sea but added that the Houthi attacks did not damage any military or commercial vessels.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a weeklong operation in and around al Shifa Hospital on March 23.[1] The 401st Brigade (162nd Division) and Israeli special operations forces cleared areas surrounding al Shifa Hospital and arrested fighters who had returned to the hospital.[2] The 401st Brigade raided nearby buildings and seized weapons.[3] The IDF also established an evacuation route for civilians to leave the hospital compound.[4] Israeli forces killed approximately 170 fighters and detained approximately 800 suspects during the operation, which began on March 18.[5]

Palestinian fighters continued to attack Israeli forces that were conducting clearing operations around al Shifa Hospital on March 23.[6]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 23.[7] The IDF reported that the Nahal Brigade engaged in “intense fighting” in unspecified areas of the central Gaza Strip and killed 15 Palestinian fighters. The Nahal Brigade also directed an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters barricaded in a building.

The 7th Brigade (36th Division) continued clearing operations in Qarara, Khan Younis Governorate, on March 23.[8] The IDF Air Force struck two Palestinian fighters moving toward their forces and targeted a "military building" that belonged to a Hamas fighter in Qarara.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters during a raid targeting an unspecified “wanted individual” in Tulkarm in the West Bank on March 22.[9] Palestinian media separately reported that unspecified Palestinian militia fighters fired small arms targeting an IDF checkpoint near Jenin on March 23.[10]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 22.[11]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US CENTCOM conducted preemptive strikes targeting four Houthi drones and three underground storage facilities in Houthi-controlled Yemen on March 22.[12]

CENTCOM reported separately that the Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles into the Red Sea but added that the Houthi attacks did not damage any military or commercial vessels.[13]

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com