Quotes of the Day:

“Does the law exist for the purpose of furthering the ambitions of those who have sworn to uphold the law, or is it seriously to be considered as a moral, unifying force, the health and strength of a nation?” 

– James Baldwin

"I learned that is the weak who are cruel, and that gentleness is to be expected only from the strong,”

– Leo Rosten

"The hardest thing to learn in life is which bridge to cross and which to burn."

– Bertrand Russell

1. Kari Lake Isn’t Telling the Truth About the VOA

2. What Five Eyes does – and doesn’t – see

3. China Is Ready to Blockade Taiwan. Here’s How.

4. Trump Russia Envoy Echoes Kremlin’s Views on Ukraine Ahead of Peace Talks

5. White House Narrows April 2 Tariffs

6. Building Resistance: How John Steinbeck’s "The Moon Is Down" Shaped WWII Resistance

7. Opinion | He Cut a Secret Deal That Cemented U.S. Economic Power — And He Has a Lesson for Donald Trump

8. Trump’s Pentagon seeks spending on Pacific forces, cuts to environmental and cultural programs

9. Memo lays out plan to replace USAID with new humanitarian agency

10. U.S. Delegation to Visit Greenland as White House Ramps Up Pressure on the Island

11. Pentagon is the latest agency to announce a leak investigation that could include polygraphs

12. China’s Subsidized Shipbuilding: Latest Pillar Industry

13. US looks to make headway on Trump’s ceasefire hopes as Russia talks open in Saudi Arabia

14. Force de l'Europe: How Realistic is a French Nuclear Umbrella?

15. Chiang Kai-shek’s great grandson moves to mainland China as clan builds cross-strait ties

16. Trump turbulence leads allies to rethink reliance on U.S. weapons

17. Seung-Whan Choi: The US should learn from the Korean War when negotiating with Ukraine

18. Europe’s War in Ukraine – The Continent’s Risky Task of Keeping Kyiv in the Fight—and Defending Itself

19. The Coming Global Health Crisis – America Is Retreating, and China Won’t Fill the Void

20. Things Worth Remembering: America Is an Invention

21. US Military: Praetorian Guard or Non-Partisan Policy Instrument?

22. Ukraine’s IT Army is Waging a Crowdsourced Cyber War Against Russia

1. Kari Lake Isn’t Telling the Truth About the VOA

This appears to be the Paul Harvey ("rest of the story") about the VOA. I can attest to the problems at the VOA building from the elevators and escalators to the poor conditions of the current building (that they are being evicted from).

Kari Lake Isn’t Telling the Truth About the VOA

She says a new headquarters is a waste of taxpayer funds, but the lease saved the government more than $150 million.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/kari-lake-isnt-telling-the-truth-about-voas-new-building-lease-taxpayer-savings-7dcdb17e?st=YGsVdK&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Amanda Bennett

March 23, 2025 3:41 pm ET

Kari Lake speaks at CPAC in Oxon Hill, Md., Feb. 21. Photo: Jose Luis Magana/Associated Press

President Trump recently selected Kari Lake as his top adviser to the U.S. Agency for Global Media, which oversees Voice of America, the country’s biggest international broadcaster. On March 14 she tweeted—and Elon Musk retweeted—a blistering video from USAGM’s new headquarters in Washington. “I’m horrified by some of the things I’m learning about this agency,” she says. “I’m sitting here on the 13th floor of a shiny, brand-new, beautiful skyscraper building that is costing you, the taxpayer, a fortune.” Officials from the Biden administration, she said, had just signed a 15-year lease on this building “that’s going to cost the taxpayer nearly a quarter of a billion dollars.” Shortly after she tweeted, USAGM pulled out of the lease.

Ms. Lake counted 26 conference rooms. Italian marble. Leather furnishings. Waterfalls. “All of this being paid for by the American taxpayer!” The tweet was flooded with outraged comments. And why not? I would have been outraged too—if the story she told were true.

This isn’t about the fate of VOA, whose broadcasts came to a halt shortly after Mr. Trump signed a March 14 executive order aimed at dismantling USAGM. Nor is it about the suffering of the journalists summarily dismissed, or the global harm to countries that will lose their only reliable source of information. This is about a lease and a building. Yet it’s also about our country’s trust that there is some purpose to the devastation under way at many federal agencies. Those doing the cutting use strong words like “propaganda,” “criminals” and “fraud” and describe outrages like millions of dead people receiving Social Security checks and billions of aid dollars being wasted—charges too sweeping and vague to assess quickly.

But the story of this lease is easy to check. I am the previous head of USAGM, and the lease was negotiated and signed six months ago under my watch. Ms. Lake’s tweet is so provably wrong that I would like to tell you the story.

USAGM has been housed since 1954 in the giant Wilbur J. Cohen Federal Building, which opened in 1940. The General Services Administration, which owns and manages many federal buildings on behalf of taxpayers, gave USAGM an eviction notice in December 2020, forcing us to leave the building by 2028. At that point, the main elevator bank was out of service. The escalators broke more often than they functioned. Two of the three cables bringing electricity into the building no longer worked. The entire staff had to be evacuated when the last remaining cable began to smoke during our last few months in the building. Every time I walked to my office from my car I passed a jury-rigged contraption funneling water that leaked through the ceiling onto a tarp and then into plastic garbage cans. Mold forced many managers to abandon their offices.

Even before the eviction notice, we had spent years looking for a new building but couldn’t find one we could afford. Then came the Covid-19 pandemic.

Downtown Washington became a ghost town. Office buildings stood vacant. There were few prospective tenants. With some landlords staring down bankruptcy, our former chief financial officer spotted an opportunity, and our people negotiated a remarkable offer on the building featured in Ms. Lake’s video:

• A 15-year lease with no money down and free rent for the first three years.

• Furniture given to us at no cost by the previous tenant, a major law firm (the source of the “leather furnishings” and “Italian marble”). That alone, we estimated, would save us at least $10 million.

• An additional $27 million in cash incentives, paid by the building owner, which we planned to use to prepare for a modern broadcasting and digital-media future. Much of our technology was decades old, falling apart and not worth moving. The companies that built and supported the old equipment were rapidly dying, as were the technicians on whom we depended for repairs. The cash incentives were our only hope of rapidly upgrading without having to ask Congress for money—which it would almost certainly refuse.

• Those dozens of conference rooms? All built modularly, enabling us to turn them quickly and cheaply into the small, nimble broadcast studios that today’s digital broadcasting requires.

• As for the rent, the mammoth Cohen building was highly inefficient; about 40% of the space we had to pay for was unusable. Occupying a modern, space-efficient building dropped our rent from nearly $24 million to less than $16 million a year.

In other words, Ms. Lake has the truth exactly backward—and she must know it. (I left her a memo on the subject shortly before Mr. Trump’s inauguration.) The taxpayer didn’t pay for the nice furniture—it was provided by a desperate landlord. The government didn’t lose money, it saved—a lot. We estimated that savings over the 15-year lease—including the free rent and millions in cash incentives—would total more than $150 million.

The story of the VOA building isn’t especially important compared with the planned gutting of its entire parent agency. But the untruths presented here should reinforce Americans’ skepticism about other assertions of corruption, overspending and misdeeds by people who have given their lives to government work.

Don’t take my word for it. The lease is a public document. Submit a Freedom of Information Act request for it. Address it to Ms. Kari Lake.

Ms. Bennett served as director of the Voice of America (2016-20) and CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (2022-25).

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Review and Outlook: While Donald Trump focuses on Ukraine's electrical supply, nuclear power plants and rare earth minerals, Vladimir Putin wants much bigger concessions that would cripple the country. Photo: AP/Maxim Shemetov/Reuters

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the March 24, 2025, print edition as 'Kari Lake Isn’t Telling the Truth About the VOA'.

2. What Five Eyes does – and doesn’t – see

This may be the best open source description of FIve Eyes that we might possibly be able to read.

What Five Eyes does – and doesn’t – see

Richard Dearlove

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/what-five-eyes-does-and-doesnt-see/

From the magazine

What Five Eyes does – and doesn’t – see

Richard Dearlove

 iStock/Cate Warde

EXPLORE THE ISSUE

22 March 2025

• https://archive.ph/x36tT#selection-246.0-2086.0

In the famous ‘Rainbow Portrait’ of Elizabeth I her gown is embroidered with eyes and ears, a reference to her efficient surveillance of the threats to the emerging nation state that was Tudor England. ‘Five Eyes’ is the modern equivalent of the concept but applied to the general security of the Anglosphere: the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. For an alliance that was originally one of listeners more than watchers, it might have been more correctly called ‘Five Ears’, but that name would hardly have conveyed its permanent vigilance.

The existence of Five Eyes owes more to historical accident than deliberate design – it could never be rebuilt

Thanks to the success of the Enigma operation, Britain emerged from the second world war persuaded of the importance of interception, signals intelligence (‘sigint’) and decryption. In 1946 the UKUSA treaty was signed (the secret text of which was not released until 2010), establishing a high degree of co-operation between Britain and America in the collection and analysis of sigint.

The alliance has proved to be durable and highly valuable. It combines the sophistication and expertise of the UK’s GCHQ with the large-scale capability of America’s National Security Agency (NSA). The degree of integration between the two intelligence organisations is unique given the sensitivity of their roles. Its strength means that over the years it has not been much affected by changing governments and administrations, and it is the keystone of the ‘Special Relationship’.

The arrangement was expanded to include Canada in 1948, and to Australia and New Zealand in 1956. The spread of Five Eyes from the Canadian Arctic to the Southern Oceans and beyond allowed it a vital collection capability during the Cold War. Its existence owes more to historical accident than deliberate design – it could never be rebuilt. And it is still strategically important today.

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The explosion in communication with the development of the internet and social media has, of course, utterly changed the context in which Five Eyes operates. Within the morass of the online world, terrorists, international gangs and rogue states could and would do much more damage if it were not for Five Eyes’ selective filtering and analysis.

However, the idea that ‘everything everywhere’ is being shared by intelligence and security agencies across the Anglosphere is misleading. When the UK was in the EU, our fellow member states were often suspicious of what they saw as our loyalty to an alliance which was not aligned with their perception of European interests. What they failed to understand was the compartmentalisation which exists within Five Eyes, allowing each country to maintain its own regional security commitments and relationships. The alliance is therefore covered with barriers which cannot be crossed, except possibly in moments of very severe crisis. ‘NoForn’ – i.e. no foreigners – is a commonly used US security classification, as is ‘UK Eyes Only’ in this country.

Contrary to the myth propagated by the likes of Edward Snowden, Julian Assange and other self-proclaimed whistleblowers, Five Eyes is not an anglophone conspiracy to do down the rest of the world and to evade national regulations. But protection of this remarkable resource requires secrecy. Secrecy demands ‘no comment’, and that means no explanation when Five Eyes is pulled through the media by an embittered former sigint employee or an anarchist who believes the nation state must account publicly for all its actions. The tension between the fact of GCHQ’s or the NSA’s existence and the urge for privacy is simply a condition that we cannot escape in a world of mass communication. Only those with something malign, criminal or conspiratorial to hide should be concerned.

Five Eyes is not only about collected information. It is also about sharing. Here the picture becomes complicated, especially when the security of two-legged sources needs to be given primary consideration. At the heart of the intelligence and security community lies an existential question: intelligence is collected to be used to inform decision making, but how do you make it usable without risk to the source if the source’s access is near to exclusive?

Since the most important spies always enjoy top-notch access, all the great espionage cases of the Cold War eventually raised serious questions about the source’s survival as the penetrated party began to realise that their inner citadel of secrets must be compromised. The same danger remains today. The need to stave off that denouement explains the complex processes which determine the distribution and use of highly sensitive intelligence. There are no rules, only decisions based on judgments of risk. Even between the closest of allies, raw intelligence is often withheld for reasons of source protection. Politicians who play fast and loose with politically potent intelligence are a security menace. So when you read in the media that Britain is withholding intelligence from the Donald Trump administration for this or that reason, such stories mean next to nothing unless the author knows the precise context (which is highly unlikely).

‘Can I be excused on the grounds of mental health?’

Trump’s suspension of US intelligence sharing for Ukraine, however, is different. If a country is at war, it hurts immediately at the tactical level if switches are thrown to cut off data exchange and overhead from satellites. It’s easy to understand why a bullied Kyiv was so rapidly brought to heel by Washington. US support for Ukraine has no institutional hinterland. It is geopolitically young and fragile – here today and possibly gone tomorrow.

In comparison, Five Eyes is as old and dependable as the hills. It has acquired institutional strength through its treaty status and by weathering many crises. That is what it will be doing now. There are points of stress, but do not expect Five Eyes to start losing its sight. There never was a time in recent history when the Anglosphere needed the alliance more.

Written by

Richard Dearlove

Richard Dearlove is Chair of Board of Trustees of University of London and a former head of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6).

3. China Is Ready to Blockade Taiwan. Here’s How.

Please go to the link below to view the interactive website and maps/graphics.

China Is Ready to Blockade Taiwan. Here’s How.

Beijing’s armed forces have bulked up and practiced isolating the island

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-is-ready-to-blockade-taiwan-heres-how-8cffdeb2?st=Na9jhR&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Chinese military personnel stand on the deck of a landing ship during a naval parade. Photo: mark schiefelbein/AFP/Getty Images

By Joyu Wang

Follow in Taipei and Austin Ramzy

Follow in Hong Kong

March 23, 2025 8:00 pm ET

China’s armed forces are more ready than ever to surround the self-ruled island of Taiwan, cut it off from the world and try to squeeze it into submission.

A Chinese blockade of Taiwan would be an act of war that sparks a global crisis. It would provoke a military response by Taiwan, force President Trump to decide whether the U.S. military should help defend the island, disrupt global trade and impel European nations to impose punishing sanctions on Beijing.

But the Chinese military, empowered by a decadeslong buildup and ordered by leader Xi Jinping to rapidly modernize by 2027, already has demonstrated what it can do. In increasingly complex exercises, Chinese forces have encircled Taiwan and simulated blockades.

The more that China prepares, the greater the risk that Beijing decides to shift without notice from drills to war. China claims Taiwan as its own territory and doesn’t rule out the use of force to seize it.

A blockade is one of Xi’s most powerful military options—short of an invasion, a steep challenge for the not-yet-battle-tested Chinese military—to induce the island to surrender to Beijing’s authority. 

China’s military exercises provide clues about how Beijing would enforce a blockade. The Pentagon, military experts and monitoring by Taiwan fill out the picture of how it would take shape and the readiness of China’s armed forces to carry it out.

China has many options—recent tabletop wargames led by Taiwan’s president investigated around a dozen versions of a blockade or similar action, according to people who took part—but all share common features. 

Here is how the U.S., Taiwan and independent experts suggest China’s forces—from navy to civilian maritime militia—could work together to isolate Taiwan.

China has displayed elements from the expanding arsenal of blockade tools at its disposal on a near-daily basis. A record 125 Chinese military aircraft, including jet fighters, helicopters and drones took part in large-scale air-and-sea drills in October that simulated a blockade of Taiwan, according to Taiwan’s defense ministry.

China’s military described the event as combat-readiness drills, including for sea and land strikes and port blockades. China’s defense ministry and its Taiwan Affairs Office didn’t respond to questions about Beijing’s plans.

China has sizable means of striking Taiwan available: Its air force operates around 1,900 jet fighters and 500 bombers, while its rocket force has more than 3,000 missiles capable of reaching Taiwan, according to the Pentagon. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry this week identified drone warfare in particular as an area of growing Chinese capacity and Taiwanese concern.

In blockade scenarios drawn up by the U.S., Taiwan and others, when China’s air assault begins, its navy—the world’s largest, with more than 370 vessels at its disposal—is already in motion.

The size of the fleet reflects a long growth spurt that hasn’t ended. China is the world’s top shipbuilder by a wide margin, and that includes warships for its growing navy. In 2000, the U.S. had more warships, but China surpassed the U.S. two decades later. China is projected to have 425 warships by 2030, outnumbering the U.S. fleet by more than one-third, according to the Congressional Research Service.

A Taiwanese flag atop a fortress on an island near the maritime boundary between Taiwan and China. Photo: daniel ceng/Shutterstock

While China’s aircraft carriers are seen as less capable than their American counterparts, China is working to catch up. After adding its second carrier in 2019, China is expected to put a third into service this year. And in a fleet of 59 submarines, China’s six nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines are all assigned to commands that would participate in a direct conflict with Taiwan’s navy, according to the Pentagon.

China’s naval buildup also has enhanced its geographical reach. In December exercises, China deployed more than 90 naval ships and coast guard vessels accompanied by several thousand personnel, Taiwanese officials said. Vessels turned up around Taiwan, in the waters surrounding Japan and South Korea, and in the South China Sea.

China’s coast guard claimed in October for the first time to have fully encircled Taiwan—and marked the milestone by publishing a map that depicted its deployment in a heart-shaped formation around the island.

Cyberwarfare is another area in which China has rapidly developed a capability that would be put to work in the event of a blockade. Almost every large-scale Chinese military drill around Taiwan has been accompanied by a surge in cyberattacks, according to Taiwan authorities, and a blockade would be no different. And in several recent incidents, the cutting of subsea fiber optic cables has highlighted the vulnerability of Taiwan’s connection to the internet.

A vulnerable Taiwan

Taiwan relies on imports for 96% of its power, through foreign oil, coal and natural gas. A blockaded island would have to rely on stockpiled energy imports, submit to Beijing, or go dark. The island imports around 70% of its food supply, another security gap.

With a blockade, China could probe Taiwan’s defenses while trying to suffocate its economy and undermine its determination to resist.

Short of a blockade, Beijing has the ability to implement a quarantine, in which Chinese law-enforcement agencies intercept ships that deliver life-sustaining imports to the island, while causing less disruption to China’s own shipping lanes.

A quarantine would likely start with the announcement by Beijing of new rules requiring inspections for ships entering Taiwan—possibly targeting only the largest port, Kaohsiung.

A Taiwanese coast guard member keeps watch at a harbor. Photo: yan zhao/AFP/Getty Images

While Beijing could use its vast number of vessels to enforce a quarantine, it holds another cudgel: Shipping companies that don’t comply could be barred from access to China.

To tighten the screws on Taipei, Beijing could move to block gas shipments that transit through the South China Sea, where China has exercised control over contested territory.

“I think there’s general agreement both in the United States and Taiwan that if China wanted, it could quarantine or blockade Taiwan today,” said Bonny Lin, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Defending the island

Concerns about China turning drills around Taiwan into an actual attack have unnerved the island’s government and military officials. Taiwan’s military held a five-day drill ending Friday designed to immediately prepare for war, and a coming exercise will be based on the premise that China plans to invade in 2027—the year that Xi set as a goal for invasion readiness, in the view of some Western intelligence officials.

Most military experts agree that China’s armed forces aren’t ready for an amphibious invasion across the 110-mile-wide Taiwan Strait. The seas are often rough and Taiwan’s cliffs, mud flats and built-up coastlines make it hard for ships to land. Taiwan’s antiship missile systems, some of them acquired from the U.S., also represent a deterrent. 

The U.S. president’s stance on Taiwan likely plays the most crucial role in Beijing’s calculation about whether to take action, said Huang Chung-ting, a Taipei-based defense analyst at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a think tank backed by the Taiwanese military.

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WSJ’s Gavin Bade sat down with the Taiwan’s representative to the U.S. to talk about chip investments and the island’s security. Photo Illustration: Umit Gulsen and Kyodo News via Getty Images

The prospect of a U.S. military response remains a wild card. Trump’s commitment to defending the island is uncertain, and his recent suspension of U.S. support for Ukraine caused a rupture with Europe, diminishing the threat of unity on sanctions.

“Our worst nightmare scenario involving a blockade actually comes from American isolationism—where the U.S. decides to completely step away from Taiwan Strait issues,” said Huang.

In the short term, a quarantine would be more likely than a blockade or invasion, according to Lin and her CSIS colleagues. Such a step would test the will of the U.S. and others to respond, while potentially allowing China to establish a new normal at sea.

Write to Joyu Wang at joyu.wang@wsj.com and Austin Ramzy at austin.ramzy@wsj.com

4. Trump Russia Envoy Echoes Kremlin’s Views on Ukraine Ahead of Peace Talks

Excerpts:

In the interview with Carlson, Witkoff recounted his second trip during which Putin gave him a portrait of Trump which he had commissioned “from the leading Russian artist.” Putin also told him how he had prayed for Trump when he had been shot while on the campaign trail last year.

“I came home and delivered that message to our president and delivered the painting and he was clearly touched by it.” 

Witkoff’s comments described a level of cooperation with Russia now impossible under the current U.S. sanctions regime. But it also made clear the Trump administration’s preference for far-reaching ties with Russia without going into detail about security guarantees for Ukraine or addressing European fears of a militarily resurgent Russia on the continent.

“Thinking about how to integrate their energy policies in the Arctic, share sea lanes, maybe send LNG gas into Europe together,” he told Carlson. “Who doesn’t want to have a world where Russia and the United States are collaboratively doing good things together?”   

Trump Russia Envoy Echoes Kremlin’s Views on Ukraine Ahead of Peace Talks

U.S. is hoping for a broader cease-fire between Moscow and Kyiv covering the Black Sea in negotiations starting in Saudi Arabia

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/trump-russia-envoy-echoes-kremlins-views-on-ukraine-ahead-of-peace-talks-eed41457?mod=hp_lead_pos6

By Thomas Grove

Follow, Alan Cullison

Follow and Michael R. Gordon

Follow

March 23, 2025 3:32 pm ET

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President Trump’s chief negotiator, Steve Witkoff, told Tucker Carlson in an interview that there are positive talks coming out of Russia about a cease-fire. Photo: Stefani Reynolds/Bloomberg News

On the eve of talks in Saudi Arabia, President Trump’s chief negotiator, Steve Witkoff, echoed some of the Kremlin’s main talking points on the Ukraine war, while advocating for future U.S.-Russian relations based on shared business interests.

In a lengthy interview with Tucker Carlson, Witkoff articulated a vision for the biggest reset in Washington-Moscow relations since the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. He also recounted his meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, saying the Russian president had a portrait commissioned of Trump.

Witkoff, who insisted he wasn’t taking sides, repeated Moscow’s assertions that the overwhelming majority of the people in four parts of eastern Ukraine “want to be under Russian rule” and pointed to Kremlin-run referendums in those areas that the European Union and the U.S. have denounced as shams.

“The question is will they be, will the world acknowledge that those are Russian territories?” Witkoff said. “Will Zelensky survive politically if he acknowledges this? This is the central issue in the conflict. Absolutely.”

The interview came as U.S. officials met in Saudi Arabia with Ukrainian officials Sunday and planned talks with a Russian delegation on Monday. The goal, U.S. officials say, is to extend a shaky cease-fire precluding attacks on energy infrastructure to the Black Sea. The U.S. hopes the cease-fire will be followed by broader negotiations.

“We are now going to talk about a Black Sea maritime cease-fire so that both sides can move grain, fuel and start conducting trade again in the Black Sea,” national security adviser Mike Waltz said Sunday on the CBS television show “Face the Nation.”

“Then we’ll talk about the line of control, which is the actual front lines, and that gets into the details of verification mechanisms, peace keeping, you know, freezing the lines where they are. And then, of course, the broader and permanent peace, which will be some type of discussion of territory for permanent peace.”

A fire following a March strike on the outskirts of Odesa, Ukraine. Photo: oleksandr gimanovoleksandr giman/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Ukrainian drones have largely neutralized the military effectiveness of Russia’s Black Sea fleet while the Russians have launched air attacks on Ukrainian port cities such as Odesa. Ukraine has managed to secure its shipping routes, but Russia has complained that its own food and fertilizer exports have faced obstacles.

Russian and Ukrainian teams won’t meet face-to-face in Saudi Arabia, but will convey their positions to the U.S., which will serve as mediator. Speaking Sunday on Fox News, Witkoff defended the Trump administration’s efforts to cut a peace deal, saying he was acting as an impartial broker in talks. “This is not me taking sides,” he said. 

In his interview with Carlson, he hailed an agreement earlier this month between Russia and Ukraine not to hit each other’s energy infrastructure, and said Trump is trying to clinch a fair deal for Ukraine and Russia. Witkoff touted the benefits of restarting Russian business ties broadly frozen by Moscow’s decision to invade its smaller and poorer Western neighbor.

Moscow has lately indicated its interest in the latest round of talks by including a high-level security-service official who is close to Putin. At Riyadh, Russia will be represented by Grigory Karasin, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council, Russia’s upper house of parliament, as well as Sergey Beseda, adviser to the Federal Security Service. 

Ukraine is represented by Rustem Umerov, Ukraine’s minister of defense, who wrote on social media that the military and energy experts Kyiv is sending want to discuss proposals to protect “critical infrastructure.” Russia has continued to attack Ukraine with airstrikes and drones, which have killed and wounded Ukrainian civilians, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in a social-media post Sunday. 

The U.S. team includes senior officials from Trump’s National Security Council and State Department, but not top officials and envoys such as Waltz, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Witkoff.

Witkoff was part of a top level U.S. delegation that met with senior Russian officials in February in Riyadh. On Sunday, he told Fox that he has spent about seven hours with Putin in the course of two one-on-one meetings in Moscow since last month. 

In the interview with Carlson, Witkoff recounted his second trip during which Putin gave him a portrait of Trump which he had commissioned “from the leading Russian artist.” Putin also told him how he had prayed for Trump when he had been shot while on the campaign trail last year.

“I came home and delivered that message to our president and delivered the painting and he was clearly touched by it.” 

Witkoff’s comments described a level of cooperation with Russia now impossible under the current U.S. sanctions regime. But it also made clear the Trump administration’s preference for far-reaching ties with Russia without going into detail about security guarantees for Ukraine or addressing European fears of a militarily resurgent Russia on the continent.

“Thinking about how to integrate their energy policies in the Arctic, share sea lanes, maybe send LNG gas into Europe together,” he told Carlson. “Who doesn’t want to have a world where Russia and the United States are collaboratively doing good things together?”   

The Trump administration meanwhile is negotiating with Moscow without the participation of its European allies. 

Witkoff said Ukraine had given up on joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which would ensure that the nation would be protected by the alliance should it be attacked again by Russia. But he suggested that Kyiv might receive some sort of security guarantees from Europe or the U.S. but didn’t explain how it would work. Ukrainian officials continue to say that they still want to join the alliance one day.

The U.S. decision to halt military aid and intelligence to Ukraine earlier this month sent shock waves through Europe as leaders met to decide how to tackle the prospect of arming Ukraine—or defending themselves—alone. More than a week later, the U.S. resumed military deliveries and intelligence sharing.

Witkoff dismissed Europe’s own efforts at supporting Ukraine as the need “to be like Winston Churchill.”

European leaders fear a bad deal that allows Russia to rearm and attack Ukraine in several years could leave countries west of Ukraine vulnerable to Russia’s military. Putin wants to restore a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and had previously demanded the U.S. pull its troops out of Eastern Europe and that NATO troops withdraw from Poland and the Baltic states.

Write to Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com, Alan Cullison at alan.cullison@wsj.com and Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com

Appeared in the March 24, 2025, print edition as 'Trump Russia Envoy Echoes Kremlin’s Views on Ukraine'.

5. White House Narrows April 2 Tariffs

Economic warfare is the modern mode of warfare in the 21st Century (until the next major kinetic fight breaks out).

White House Narrows April 2 Tariffs

Tariffs on industrial sectors like cars and microchips are no longer expected to be announced on that date, though major trading partners will still be hit with so-called reciprocal tariffs

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trump-tariff-reciprocal-deadline-industrial-delay-97508838?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

Cargo ships at the Port of Oakland, Calif., earlier this month. Photo: carlos barria/Reuters

By Gavin Bade

Follow, Josh Dawsey

Follow and Meridith McGraw

Follow

March 23, 2025 5:26 pm ET

WASHINGTON—The White House is narrowing its approach to tariffs set to take effect on April 2, likely omitting a set of industry-specific tariffs while applying reciprocal levies on a targeted set of nations that account for the bulk of foreign trade with the U.S.

President Trump has declared his April 2 deadline to be “Liberation Day” for the U.S., when he will put in place so-called reciprocal tariffs that seek to equalize U.S. tariffs with the duties charged by trading partners, as well as tariffs on sectors like automobiles, pharmaceuticals and semiconductors he repeatedly said would be enacted on that day.

Those sector-specific tariffs, however, are now not likely to be announced on April 2, said an administration official, who said the White House is still planning to unveil the reciprocal tariff action on that day, though planning remains fluid. The shift was earlier reported by Bloomberg.

The fate of the sectoral tariffs, as well as tariffs on Canada and Mexico that Trump said were justified by fentanyl trafficking, remains uncertain. The White House didn’t respond to requests for comment on if or when any of those tariffs are still planned to go into effect.

Trump 2.0

How Trump’s Trade War Is Playing Out At Breakneck Speed

The focus of the reciprocal action now looks to be more targeted than originally thought, according to people with knowledge of the planning, though it will still hit countries that account for most of the U.S.’s imports.

The administration is now focusing on applying tariffs to about 15% of nations with persistent trade imbalances with the U.S.—a so-called “dirty 15,” as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent put it last week. Those nations, which Bessent said account for most of the U.S.’s foreign trade, will be especially hard-hit with higher tariffs, said people with knowledge of the matter, though other nations could be given more modest tariffs as well.

Targeted nations are expected to be close to those laid out by the U.S. trade representative in a Federal Register notice last month, which directed commenters to focus on nations with trade imbalances with the U.S., such as the G-20 nations and Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Vietnam and more, said a person with knowledge of the plans.

Though it will hit most imports coming into the U.S., the administration’s “dirty 15” approach is still a narrower one than many observers anticipated when Trump ordered federal agencies to design reciprocal tariffs in February, directing them to evaluate trading relationships with virtually every U.S. trading partner. The White House had previously considered grouping trading partners into three tiers of high, medium and low tariffs, but turned away from that plan in recent weeks in favor of giving each targeted nation an individualized tariff number.

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President Trump says reciprocal tariffs will kick in on April 2, when the U.S. will match the higher tariffs other countries impose on the U.S. Economists explain why this “tit for tat” strategy isn’t effective trade policy. Photo: Xingpei Shen

Nonetheless, the administration’s plan for April 2 could raise tariffs on the U.S.’s most significant trading partners to levels not seen in decades, and people with knowledge of the planning said that targeted nations can expect to receive significantly higher tariffs.

Trump’s team could make tariffs effective almost immediately on April 2 using the president’s emergency economic authority, said people familiar with the discussions, emphasizing that final decisions haven’t been made. That would be a shift from February, when a White House official said a report outlining reciprocal tariffs could be released that day but imposition would come later.

The administration’s shift comes after weeks of tough talk with trading partners and U.S. industries alike. Officials from Canada and Mexico said they were told there was no way to avoid reciprocal tariffs ahead of April 2, though they hoped Trump would be open to reducing tariffs through negotiations after that date.

The U.S. feels it will have the strongest hand, one foreign official said last week, if everyone is “on a burning platform” as talks happen.

Industry officials who have talked with the White House about sectoral tariffs had been even more pessimistic about exemptions, saying they haven’t been able to glean how carve-outs would be made; one said he was told that there would be few, if any, exceptions to the tariffs.

Trump told oil executives last week during a meeting at the White House that he didn’t want to grant exceptions on tariffs, according to a person who attended the meeting, but said he would consider occasional ones.

When one attendee asked about steel and aluminum exemptions, Trump wouldn’t commit to any, this person said. When U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer spoke to the oil executives, he said he wasn’t interested in doing exemptions because they felt like they granted too many in the first Trump administration. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick also told the oil-industry executives that he didn’t expect exemptions, the attendee said.

A White House official disputed that description of the meeting, saying tariffs didn’t come up.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said reciprocal tariffs will especially target the ‘dirty 15,’ a group of nations with persistent trade imbalances with the U.S. Photo: Al Drago/Bloomberg News

Another corporate executive whose company has lobbied Trump against tariffs in recent days said Trump said that Corporate America would end up liking the tariffs.

Multiple lobbyists representing Fortune 500 clients have called White House officials, looking for a path to getting exemptions, according to people familiar with the calls. Another person close to Trump said that promising any exemptions now would undercut leverage he wants later.

Some lobbyists are advising their clients to go directly to top White House or Commerce officials to explain how the tariff could affect their business, and if they are in the position to move any manufacturing back to the U.S. in the next six months, then ask for a reprieve.

Companies are also just desperate for clarity. One Fortune 500 CEO said April 2 can’t get here fast enough.

Trump previously gave automakers a temporary reprieve from tariffs on Canada and Mexico, before pausing those levies more broadly for all products that comply with the USMCA trade agreement. But on Friday, he lamented that people had criticized him for backing down, and hinted that his approach to tariffs could shift in the coming days and weeks.

Once you give exemptions for one company, “you have to do that for all,” Trump said, adding that “the word flexibility is an important word. Sometimes there’s flexibility, there’ll be flexibility.”

Write to Gavin Bade at gavin.bade@wsj.com, Josh Dawsey at Joshua.Dawsey@WSJ.com and Meridith McGraw at Meridith.McGraw@WSJ.com

Corrections & Amplifications

Jamieson Greer is the U.S. Trade Representative. In an earlier version of this article, his first name was misspelled as Jameson. (Corrected March 23)

Appeared in the March 24, 2025, print edition as 'White House Narrows April 2 Tariffs'.

6. Building Resistance: How John Steinbeck’s "The Moon Is Down" Shaped WWII Resistance

I am a great believer in the power of literature and fiction. I think Steinbeck's work is overlooked and underappreciated (even by Steinbeck himself who did not think it was among his best work). But it had intangible but strategic effects.

As an aside I have been trying to get my friends from north Korea to develop a Korean version of "The Moon is Down" to educate the Korean people in the north about resistance.

This project can be downloaded here for anyone who would like to undertake the project: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cxs4SACc_zuX8uwhrebA5zdlFuxTf49K/view?usp=sharing

Ideally I would like one story for each of the 9 provinces in north Korea by a Korean from the province.

A Project to Help the Korean People in the north Resist and Create Change

Table of Contents – written products – English and Korean

1. The history and story behind the OSS and John Steinbeck’s novel

English Page 7; Korean Page 13

2. AI/ChatGPT outlines for a north Korean focused novel

English Page 16; Korean Page 21

3. 10 Point Promise to Counter the Ten Points of Monolithic Ideology

English Page 25; Korean Page 30

4. A possible north Korean Strategy overview (Korea Talking Points (as of April 2024))

English Page 35; Korean Page 39

5. Revitalizing America's North Korea Policy

English Page 42; Korean Page 49

6. Unifying Korea: A New Strategy for Dealing with Kim Jong Un

English Page 54; Korean Page 59

Electronic files:

1. All of the above.

2. PDF of John Steinbeck’s The Moon is Down (English only)

3. PDF of Gene Sharp’s From Dictatorship to Democracy (English and Korean)

4. OSS Simple Sabotage Manual (English Only)

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cxs4SACc_zuX8uwhrebA5zdlFuxTf49K/view?usp=sharing

This is a summary a proposal I made at a Taiwan Asymmetric Warfare Conference in 2017 hosted by the Taiwan Army (and again later to the Taiwan Minister of Foreign Affairs and now NSA Joseph Wu in 2019 (he said he would write this when he retires)):

E. From an information and influence campaign perspective consider the use of fiction. Obtain the services of a high profile fiction writer and write the novel about the future invasion of the ROC by the PRC. Show how the PRC military would be unable to generate sufficient mass to be able to pacify the ROC population. Illustrate how Taiwan would be a black hole that just continued to suck in forces that would never be able to return. Show the effects of the one child policy as only male sons are drafted into the PLA only to die horrific deaths at the hands of the ROC resistance. The author would try to emulate a Tom Clancy book that would be written for entertainment but also to open the eyes of the PRC population and the international community as to how bad a war with the ROC would be and how the PRC would be unable to achieve its objectives after a protracted war (and the novel would have to end with some kind of defeat mechanism that would cause the PRC to conclude that it cannot take the ROC by force).

Building Resistance: How John Steinbeck’s "The Moon Is Down" Shaped WWII Resistance

9 hours ago5 min read

Lessons for Modern Special Operations

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/building-resistance-how-john-steinbeck-s-the-moon-is-down-shaped-wwii-resistance?utm

STRATEGY CENTRAL

For and By Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth - March 23, 2025

Introduction

In June 1940, merely two days after France capitulated to Nazi Germany, renowned American author John Steinbeck penned a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He urged the administration to initiate "immediate, controlled, considered" propaganda efforts to counter the Axis powers. Steinbeck didn't just advocate for action; he took it upon himself to contribute to the cause by writing The Moon Is Down, a novel aimed at inspiring resistance within occupied Europe. The narrative unfolds in an unnamed European country, bearing resemblances to Norway, Denmark, and France, that has fallen under fascist occupation. The occupying forces, led by Colonel Lanser, grapple with the burgeoning defiance of the local populace. This literary work transcended borders, becoming a beacon of hope and a catalyst for resistance movements across Europe.

 Steinbeck's Novel: A Catalyst for Resistance

Published in 1942, The Moon Is Down, was meticulously crafted to resonate with those under oppressive regimes. Steinbeck's portrayal of the occupiers as relatable individuals, rather than monolithic villains, added a layer of realism that deeply connected with readers. This nuanced depiction underscored the universal struggle for freedom and the inherent desire to resist subjugation. The novel was clandestinely translated into multiple languages, including Norwegian, Danish, French, and Dutch, and was covertly distributed across occupied territories. In France, for instance, the underground press lauded its impact, noting that its influence was "immense and incontestable." Similarly, in Norway, the book's significance was so profound that, in 1945, King Haakon VII honored Steinbeck with the Freedom Cross for his contribution to the resistance efforts.

 The Role of Literature in Resistance Movements

Literature has long been a formidable tool in unifying and galvanizing oppressed populations. During World War II, works like The Moon Is Down served not only as morale boosters but also as instructional guides on subtle forms of defiance. In the novel, townspeople engage in acts of sabotage, such as disrupting railways—a tactic mirrored by real-life resistance groups. These narratives provided both psychological support and practical frameworks for resistance, reinforcing the idea that ordinary citizens could undermine occupying forces through coordinated efforts.

Beyond Steinbeck's work, two other notable examples of literature fueling resistance efforts include George Orwell’s Animal Farm and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago.

• George Orwell’s Animal Farm: Published in 1945, Orwell’s allegorical novella was a direct critique of totalitarianism, specifically the rise of Soviet oppression under Stalin. While its message was aimed at Western readers, it was smuggled into the Eastern Bloc and served as a cautionary tale about autocratic rule. Underground activists used the book as a means to expose the dangers of unchecked political power and inspire intellectual resistance.

• Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago: This landmark 1973 book documented the horrors of the Soviet labor camp system. Though banned in the USSR, it was circulated illegally in samizdat (self-published) form and profoundly impacted Soviet dissidents. It helped solidify opposition to the Communist regime and is credited with contributing to the ideological weakening of Soviet authority leading up to the 1980s.

Unconventional Warfare and Resistance Building

The success of The Moon Is Down in fostering resistance highlights a critical strategy in unconventional warfare: the empowerment of indigenous populations to resist and disrupt occupying or oppressive regimes. Contemporary Special Operations Forces (SOF) can draw valuable lessons from this historical precedent.

 Case Study: The Ukrainian Resistance

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine exemplifies the application of resistance strategies in modern warfare. Ukrainian special operations forces have been instrumental in organizing and supporting partisan activities in territories occupied by opposing forces. These efforts include sabotage operations, intelligence gathering, and the dissemination of information to counter enemy propaganda. The establishment of the "Resistance Movement" (Rukh Oporu) within the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces underscores the institutionalization of resistance strategies in national defense doctrines.

 The Importance of Cultural and Psychological Operations

Steinbeck's work underscores the significance of cultural and psychological operations in resistance movements. By crafting a narrative that resonated with occupied populations, he was able to inspire and mobilize individuals against their oppressors. Modern SOF can incorporate similar strategies by supporting the creation and dissemination of culturally relevant materials that promote resistance and resilience. This includes leveraging local art, literature, and media to foster a shared identity and purpose among the populace.

Two historical examples demonstrate how literature has been actively used in resistance-building efforts within unconventional warfare:

The U.S. Army’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24): Published in 2006, this doctrine, largely shaped by General David Petraeus, provided guidance on how U.S. forces should engage in insurgency-prone areas, including the Middle East. It emphasized the importance of understanding local populations and shaping narratives to win over civilian populations, which aligns with how literature and information operations support resistance-building.

Leaflet Campaigns in Afghanistan: During the U.S. war in Afghanistan, psychological operations (PSYOP) units dropped millions of leaflets containing narratives that encouraged resistance against the Taliban. These ranged from personal stories of Afghan soldiers fighting for their country to messages directly countering Taliban propaganda. The strategic use of written materials served to reinforce local resistance movements and bolster national morale.

 Challenges and Considerations

While building resistance movements offers strategic advantages, it also presents challenges. Ensuring the legitimacy and popular support of these movements is crucial to their success. Additionally, SOF must navigate complex political landscapes to avoid unintended consequences, such as empowering groups with agendas counter to U.S. interests or regional stability.

 Conclusion

John Steinbeck’s The Moon Is Down serves as a poignant reminder of the power of narrative in resistance movements. Its impact during World War II illustrates how literature can inspire and guide oppressed populations in their struggle against tyranny. For modern Special Operations Forces, the lessons from this historical example emphasize the importance of cultural understanding, psychological operations, and the empowerment of indigenous resistance elements in unconventional warfare. By integrating these principles, SOF can effectively support threatened nations in building resilient and capable resistance movements.

 Works Cited

• Orwell, George. Animal Farm. Harcourt, 1945.
• Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr. The Gulag Archipelago. Harper & Row, 1973.
• Steinbeck, John. The Moon Is Down. Viking Press, 1942.
• U.S. Army. Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24). University of Chicago Press, 2006.
• U.S. Department of Defense. Psychological Operations: Principles and Considerations. Joint Special Operations University, 2015.
• "Resistance Movements in Ukraine." Foreign Policy Journal, 2023, www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/ukraine-resistance.
• "The Moon Is Down and WWII Resistance." HistoryNet, 2022, www.historynet.com/moon-is-down.
• "How Literature Inspired Underground Movements in the Eastern Bloc." New York Times, 2021, www.nytimes.com/underground-literature.

7. Opinion | He Cut a Secret Deal That Cemented U.S. Economic Power — And He Has a Lesson for Donald Trump

Lessons for modern economic warfare.

And I hope we heed these warnings. 

Excerpts:

Ultimately, therefore, the greatest threat to the dollar’s supremacy emanates not from China or Europe but from America’s own political system. If Trump politicizes the Fed and ends its monetary policy independence — or worse, if the justice system is debased and the rule of law called into question — the advantages of the dollar over other currencies will fade.

Economic power is not static — it must be actively maintained. William Simon understood that. The question now is whether Trump does, too.

Opinion | He Cut a Secret Deal That Cemented U.S. Economic Power — And He Has a Lesson for Donald Trump

Politico · by MARK CHIUSANO

A forgotten Nixon-era negotiation offers urgent lessons for our new age of economic warfare.

Federal Energy Chief William Simon meets with President Nixon at the White House. | Bettmann/Getty Images

Opinion by Edward Fishman

03/23/2025 10:00 AM EDT

Edward Fishman is a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy. He is the author of Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare, from which this essay is adapted.

President Donald Trump may be the only one who calls “tariff” the “most beautiful word in the dictionary,” but his exuberance reflects a broader reality: We are living in an age of economic warfare. Sanctions, tariffs and export controls are now the primary weapons great powers wield against one another. While the United States possesses the world’s most fearsome economic arsenal, China, the European Union and others are starting to catch up.

In this contest, the key to geopolitical power is control over chokepoints — critical nodes in the global economy where one nation holds a dominant position and alternatives are scarce or nonexistent. Countries that control these chokepoints command extraordinary leverage, as they can deny others’ access to them and devastate their economies.

Today, the most important chokepoint is the U.S. financial system — encompassing the dollar itself and the network of banks and payment systems that facilitate global commerce. Other highly consequential chokepoints include the technologies underpinning advanced semiconductors, the beating heart of the digital world. Thanks to its control of these chokepoints, which solidified in the period of hyperglobalization following the Cold War, the United States no longer needs to commit to costly naval blockades or secure U.N. consensus to impose punishing sanctions on other countries — both of which it had to rely on to pressure Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as recently as the 1990s. Now, at the stroke of a pen, the U.S. president can impose economic penalties far more severe than the blockades and embargoes of old.

But as America has weaponized these chokepoints, the rest of the world has taken notice, threatening to undermine its commanding position. From Beijing to Brasília, governments are racing to construct alternative financial channels, determined to avoid the fate of heavily sanctioned U.S. adversaries like Iran and Russia. Meanwhile, emerging technologies — such as artificial intelligence, digital currencies and clean-energy systems — are creating new chokepoints, triggering an intense competition for control among global powers.

Trump is attuned to this contest, as evidenced by his repeated threats of punitive tariffs against the BRICS — an international group of 10 countries including Brazil, Russia, India and China — if they create an alternative to the dollar. But history teaches us that economic dominance flows more from attraction than coercion. To reinforce U.S. economic power, Trump should lean into his dealmaking instincts, using carrots rather than sticks to entice other nations to build their economies around American finance and technology.

The paradox of economic warfare is that sanctions and tariffs are only effective if you can first pull others in — and keep them there. If Trump fails to grasp this, his heavy-handed tactics may accelerate the very erosion of U.S.-controlled chokepoints that he seeks to prevent. A better approach would be to take a page from another Republican dealmaker who secured a cornerstone of American economic power half a century ago.

At a moment when the U.S. economy seemed at risk of inexorable decline, President Richard Nixon sent his pugnacious treasury secretary, William Simon, to Saudi Arabia to stanch the bleeding from a devastating oil embargo against the United States. The mission could have been disastrous. But by cleverly packaging economic and military incentives, Simon struck a deal that revolutionized the global financial system in ways we live with to this day — cementing American control over a critical chokepoint for decades to come.

The year 1973 was rough for the United States. The economy was in the dumps. Nixon’s decision to end dollar-gold convertibility two years prior had ushered in a system of floating exchange rates and caused the dollar to plunge. Years of heavy spending on the Vietnam War had degraded America’s financial health. Inflation soared to heights last seen in the 1940s. Instead of focusing on confronting these headwinds, Nixon floundered to contain the Watergate scandal.

To make matters worse, America was rapidly declining as an energy superpower and losing its traditional status as the swing producer in the global oil market. U.S. oil production peaked in 1970 and would not reach the same level again for 50 years. For the first time, the country became dependent on oil imports, largely from the Middle East.

On October 6, 1973 — the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur — a coalition of Arab states attacked Israel. Two weeks later, in response to a request by Nixon to Congress for emergency aid for Israel, Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the oil-producers’ cartel, cut production and imposed an oil embargo on the United States. All told, the Saudis and their allies removed some 5 million barrels per day from global oil markets, amounting to almost 10 percent of worldwide production.

The result was a wrenching energy crisis. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger feared that the world was at risk of “a vicious cycle of competition, autarchy, rivalry and depression such as led to the collapse of the world order in the ’30s.” The man charged with avoiding that outcome was Nixon’s energy czar, William Simon.

A chain-smoking New Jersey native described by a peer as “far to the right of Genghis Khan,” Simon had joined the administration after a career as a bond trader on Wall Street, and his gruff style and short temper suited the confrontational nature of his new job. Not everyone could have made the fraught decision to ration gasoline, that American lifeblood, and allocate scarce oil supplies to factories over motorists. But that’s what Simon did.

By the end of the year, Americans were waiting hours to fill their tanks. (“I’m the guy that caused the lines at the gas stations,” Simon admitted.) Prices at the pump surged by 40 percent. Even after OPEC lifted the embargo in March 1974, oil prices did not fall back to earth. In 1970, the price of a barrel of oil was about $1.80. By 1980, the price was $39 — an increase of more than 2,000 percent. America’s import bills skyrocketed, and deficits spiked. On top of the energy crisis, America teetered on the brink of a full-fledged financial meltdown.

With catastrophe looming, Nixon again turned to Simon. In May 1974, with the president fighting for political survival over Watergate, Simon took up a new role as treasury secretary. His solution to the strain that higher oil prices were putting on America’s finances was to convince Saudi Arabia to invest its windfall oil profits in U.S. government debt. This way, the Saudis would essentially recycle the dollars America paid them for oil, plugging the U.S. deficit.

In July 1974, Simon boarded a plane at Andrews Air Force Base and headed for the Saudi coastal city of Jeddah. En route, he indulged in copious amounts of alcohol. By the time he got off the plane, he was noticeably drunk. The liquor had no apparent effect on his negotiating ability, however. Simon was no Kissinger; he was not schooled in the art of diplomacy. But he was a damn good bonds salesman, and he left the desert kingdom with a deal in hand: In exchange for American military assistance and continued oil purchases, the Saudis would funnel their oil money into U.S. Treasury bonds, which they would be permitted to buy in secret outside the normal auctions. Simon had secured a commitment by a foreign country to finance American deficits — and the petrodollar was born.

In the years that followed, there were moments when Simon’s deal risked coming apart. As the dollar continued to plunge throughout the 1970s, the real value of Saudi oil profits fell in lockstep. The weakening dollar was effectively reducing the global price of oil. As a result, in 1975, OPEC resolved to stop pricing oil in dollars, opting instead for a basket of currencies. But before the plan could be implemented, Simon’s successor at Treasury, Michael Blumenthal, cut a fresh deal with Riyadh. The United States promised to help Saudi Arabia obtain more voting rights at the IMF, and in exchange, the Saudis and their OPEC partners would continue to price oil in dollars.

Over time, Simon’s arrangement crystallized into a structural feature of the world economy. Oil is still priced in dollars, and foreigners still finance American deficits. Petrodollars became a key ingredient in an increasingly global financial system — a system dominated by the United States.

Today, more than at any other point in the past half-century, Simon’s deal — and the wider dollar-based financial system it helped entrench — risks unraveling. Most directly, China is pushing to replace the petrodollar with the petroyuan. In recent years, China has set up all the necessary infrastructure to trade oil in yuan, including launching a yuan-denominated oil futures contract on the Shanghai International Energy Exchange, extending currency swap lines to major oil-exporting nations and forging homegrown systems for payment settlement. After its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions, Russia became the first big oil producer to price a sizable share of its energy exports in yuan. Beijing is now at work coaxing Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other petrostates to follow suit. China will struggle to popularize the petroyuan unless it loosens capital controls, but the headway it’s making is undeniable.

The nascent petroyuan, moreover, is just the tip of the iceberg. Countries from Brazil to India to Saudi Arabia are actively building alternative financial channels, seeing them as insurance against America’s economic arsenal. The BRICS coalition has become the primary vehicle for these efforts. In 2023, the group expanded for the first time, bringing in a diverse array of new members including Iran and the UAE. Their stated goal is modest — creating new payment systems to facilitate trade between members. But the implications are profound. Last year, a Chinese-led initiative called mBridge demonstrated it could settle cross-border transactions using digital currencies in seconds, bypassing the dollar-based system entirely. Saudi Arabia, the linchpin of the petrodollar system, recently joined the project, making it easier to imagine a future in which America’s ability to wield financial power is severely diminished.

Trump is alarmed by these shifts, but he has been fixated on the wrong problem. He has repeatedly threatened 100 percent tariffs on the BRICS nations if they attempt to create a common currency — even though a formal BRICS currency union is far-fetched, given the geopolitical rifts between members like China and India. Meanwhile, his administration has yet to confront the rise of mBridge or the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), China’s alternative to the financial messaging giant SWIFT. CIPS has expanded rapidly, bringing thousands of banks into its network — including even some big-name Western institutions like HSBC — and its transaction volume is growing by more than 50 percent year-over-year. Trump has also failed to put forward a counterstrategy to China’s digital renminbi, or e-CNY, which was launched in 2020 and is by far the world’s most advanced central bank digital currency.

The United States cannot outcompete these new financial systems by standing still. The infrastructure supporting cross-border dollar transactions was built in the 1970s, and it still takes days — sometimes a week or more — to settle an international wire transfer. By contrast, digital currency networks promise near-instant settlement. If the United States does not modernize its financial architecture, systems like mBridge will reshape global finance within the next decade while America sits on the sidelines.

Trump has embraced cryptocurrencies, but his approach has favored retail speculation over serious financial innovation. Championing meme coins will do little to help the United States counter China’s push for digital payments dominance. If anything, Trump’s policies risk undermining the credibility of the U.S. financial system, making alternatives more appealing.

The challenge to American financial leadership does not come solely from China and the rest of the BRICS. Europe is also poised to take advantage of shifting global dynamics. Two months into his second term, Trump’s erratic use of tariffs and sanctions has created an opening for the euro to gain ground against the dollar. European stock markets have outperformed their U.S. counterparts since the start of the year, prompting big asset managers to move capital across the Atlantic. If the EU follows through on plans for large-scale rearmament and joint debt issuance, the euro could inch closer to parity with the dollar — not replacing it as the world’s dominant currency but forming a viable alternative. And while U.S. tariffs typically strengthen the dollar — as they reduce demand for foreign currency — the reverse has happened in the wake of Trump’s tariff barrage: The dollar has slid by more than 5 percent against the euro and other major currencies since Trump entered the White House. This unexpected dip could be a canary in the coal mine.

When Trump imposed and then hastily withdrew sanctions on Russian aluminum powerhouse Rusal in April 2018, the Russian government responded by moving its reserves into euros and settling most of its trade in the currency. If Trump’s policies continue raising the geopolitical risk of holding dollars, other countries may turn to the Russian playbook, opting not just for the yuan but also for the euro.

To be sure, Trump is a self-described “Tariff Man” — he loves economic warfare. But he also sees himself as a dealmaker, and it’s this side of his personality that will be crucial to retaining American financial leadership. The lesson of Simon’s deal is that economic dominance is not imposed by force; it is cultivated. The petrodollar system endured for decades because Saudi Arabia saw long-term benefits in anchoring its financial future to the United States.

To preserve America’s financial primacy, Trump must offer the world compelling reasons to remain within the dollar-based system. That means reinforcing U.S. capital markets as the safest and most attractive destination for investment. It means strengthening trade and financial ties with allies while selectively diversifying away from adversaries like China. It also means ensuring that the United States is at the forefront of financial technology so that, as global payments systems evolve, the key networks still run through America.

Most importantly, it requires maintaining America’s reputation as a responsible steward of the international financial system. Currencies ideally function as a kind of everyday infrastructure that one uses without having to do much thinking, like a road is for a driver. The less the average company needs to worry about the currency it uses, the better. Two of the dollar’s main advantages over the yuan, for instance, are confidence in the Federal Reserve’s independence and trust in America’s commitment to the rule of law. For all the appeal of the Chinese market, when deals go sideways, most executives would rather find themselves in an American courtroom than a Chinese one.

Ultimately, therefore, the greatest threat to the dollar’s supremacy emanates not from China or Europe but from America’s own political system. If Trump politicizes the Fed and ends its monetary policy independence — or worse, if the justice system is debased and the rule of law called into question — the advantages of the dollar over other currencies will fade.

Economic power is not static — it must be actively maintained. William Simon understood that. The question now is whether Trump does, too.

Politico · by MARK CHIUSANO

8. Trump’s Pentagon seeks spending on Pacific forces, cuts to environmental and cultural programs

From a Hawaii perspective.

Trump’s Pentagon seeks spending on Pacific forces, cuts to environmental and cultural programs

https://www.staradvertiser.com/2025/03/23/hawaii-news/hegseth-seeks-to-build-pacific-forces-cut-environmental-programs/

By Kevin Knodell

Today • Last updated 12:47 a.m.

Editors' PicksPolitics

1/8

KEVIN KNODELL / KKNODELL@STARADVERTISER.COM

A crew member aboard an American V-22 Osprey transporting a group of international military personnel to the USS Carl Vinson during RIMPAC 2024.

President Donald Trump and his defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, have promised sweeping changes to the U.S. military.

Hegseth has pledged to “rebuild” the military by investing in high-tech weapon and industrial programs while simultaneously cutting costs. The administration has promised to reduce the Department of Defense’s massive spending budget by 8% each year as part of sweeping cuts being undertaken across the federal government.

Those cuts are being overseen by billionaire Elon Musk and the newly formed Department of Government Efficiency, made up mostly of junior programmers and engineers from Musk’s various companies. On Friday, Musk met with Hegseth and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon.

While Hegseth supports budget cuts, he specifically requested that the Hawaii-­based U.S. Indo-Pacific Command — which oversees all operations across the Pacific — be exempt from any reductions, a strong sign that Hawaii is being put squarely at the center of the new administration’s military strategy.

“His request that INDO­PACOM be exempted from budget cuts indicates a priority shift from Europe to the Indo­Pacific,” said Elizabeth Freund Larus, adjunct senior fellow at the Honolulu-based Pacific Forum. “It recognizes that China poses the biggest threat to the post-World War II global order. Hegseth’s list of 17 offsets includes funding for military construction funding in the Indo-Pacific to support the military’s Pacific Deterrence Initiative strategic plan.”

Hawaii currently has the highest share of the military’s construction budget of any state, accounting for roughly 8% of the total. The biggest share of those funds — $1.2 billion — is meant for the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard’s Dry Dock 5, which is the single most expensive construction project in Navy history.

The shipyard is the state’s largest industrial employer with a workforce of more than 6,000 employees.

That spending is expected to stay stable amid DOGE’s aggressive federal cuts.

But while military spending has helped prop up Hawaii’s economy, countless dollars also have been spent over the decades on cleaning up pollution associated with the military presence in the islands. In particular, the Red Hill water crisis, which began in 2021 when jet fuel from the Navy’s underground Red Hill storage facility tainted the area’s water system serving 93,000 people, and efforts to shut down the facility has put military operations in Hawaii under the microscope.

Though the Trump administration wants to keep spending to build the nation’s Pacific forces, the future of the military’s environmental cleanup and cultural programs in Hawaii is less clear.

‘A give-and-take thing’

The military has several interests it hopes to maintain in Hawaii. Notably, the Army has several land leases on state lands it uses for training that will expire in 2029. The training areas, acquired for a mere $1 in 1964, have been increasingly used for international exercises, bringing foreign troops from across the globe.

Environmental issues and the future of ancient Hawaiian cultural sites are among the discussions going forward as the Army negotiates lease renewals with the state Board of Land and Natural Resources.

“While we’ve been making gains in building up relationships and trust, trying to have conversations about what this balance looks like between military presence and the community, we are nowhere near even close to getting down to the brass tacks of it all,” said U.S. Rep. Jill Tokuda, D-Hawaii, who serves on the House Armed Services Committee.

“You’ve got a definite change in leadership that’s coming in. It’s really hard to say what they will decide to do, what their posture in Hawaii will be in regards to the lease renegotiations.”

Hegseth has pledged to slash many environmental programs and prohibit military officials from discussing climate change. Even under Trump’s previous administration, the Pentagon studied climate change, including a 2018 study that concluded the majority of U.S. bases faced threats from intensifying weather patterns.

“Some segments of our society can consider climate change to be either nonexistent or just a matter to be kind of thrown away from a political perspective,” said U.S. Rep. Ed Case, D-Hawaii. “But the military has studied the consequences of changes in our weather, on their preparation, on their installations, on their ability to fight wars, on their basic ability to function, and they’ve reached a very definite, objective conclusion — absent of politics — that the kind of climate changes we’re seeing in the world are detrimental, if left unaddressed, to their mission.”

Larus said Hegseth has been critical “of ideological training in the U.S. military, including workshops and education modules outside the war-fighting domain, such as on diversity, equity and inclusion programs and those on climate change.” Last month he fired the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. CQ Brown Jr., who was formerly the top Air Force commander in the Pacific, and several other top officers the administration deemed as “woke.”

The military has spent millions on environmental remediation and on preserving ancient Hawaiian cultural sites on lands it controls and uses for its operations in Hawaii. When asked if the Pentagon under Hegseth would actively pursue promised environmental cleanup and cultural preservation programs specific to Hawaii under the new administration, Larus said Hegseth “is single-minded when it comes to the U.S. military. He has said over and over that the mission of the U.S. military is warfighting.”

Larus said Hawaii residents should expect to see environmental and cultural programs drastically scaled back and argued most were the result of congressional mandates that “warped military priorities and distracted the military from warfighting with an emphasis on lethality. Recognizing that U.S. adversaries, such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, have no such desire to make the military a kinder and gentler organization, Hegseth and President Trump want to return the U.S. military to a fighting force that is more lethal than that of its adversaries.”

But state Sen. Kurt Fevella, who has represented portions of the Ewa area since 2018 as one of Hawaii’s few Republican lawmakers, said that talk of cutting back on environmental efforts troubles him.

“I know they got to be ready, not taking away anything from there, but there’s parameters … ,” he said. “The disrespect for the host people is something that is troubling for me.”

Fevella has already tangled with military officials under both the Trump and Biden administrations when it comes to environmental and community concerns around the Marine Corps’ Puuloa Range Training Facility in his district, pollution coming out of Pearl Harbor and Army land leases, including the large Pohakuloa Training Area on Hawaii island. He said he remains committed to those fights in the long term.

“We want to be able to protect our environment when it comes to any kind of military presence. To be a good partner is a give-and-take thing,” Fevella said. “Do they have a cleaning plan for Pearl Harbor? Do they have any plan to clean up all the oil that is leaking into the ocean that’s coming to my community at Puuloa Beach Park? No, they don’t address these things. So to be a good neighbor to the host community — or host people — just do your job. They have the the best engineers … (so) why you cannot just be pono to the land?”

Warfighters

China has been proactively building up its military capabilities and clashing with neighboring countries. In particular, the Chinese military has sought to impose control over the South China Sea — a critical waterway that more than a third of all international trade travels through — over the objections of its neighbors, often clashing with vessels from those countries.

It has also stepped up military maneuvers around Taiwan, a self-ruled island democracy with close U.S. trade ties that Beijing regards as a rogue province.

“Threats across the region from North Korea, China and Russia are real and stretch from illicit to strategic dangers,” according to Brent Sadler, a senior research fellow at the conservative Heritage Foundation. “The Chinese in particular have engaged in nefarious influence campaigns from pressuring local island governments to enabling criminal organizations to operate in the region, weakening local governance.”

The U.S. military has conducted constant patrols and training exercises throughout the region. Larus argued “the Biden administration was strong on diplomacy with Pacific allies as well as with projection of soft power but was weak on military power and military power projection; (it) was weak on backing up diplomacy with military strength.”

China now has the world’s largest navy in terms of number of ships and is growing its capacity, while the U.S. is struggling to maintain ships at its aging shipyards.

“The biggest mistake that previous administrations made in the Pacific is failing to maintain a navy adequate to sustain U.S. maritime power in the region and to uphold the peace and security of the Indo-Pacific,” Larus said. “U.S. Navy assets are inadequate to deter China’s muscular and growing navy. In particular, the U.S. has lost its ability to keep up with China’s shipbuilding capacity.”

Military leaders have expressed optimism about Hegseth’s pledge to streamline the acquisition of new military hardware and trim the bureaucracy. On Feb. 13 at the Honolulu Defense Forum, INDOPACOM chief Adm. Samuel Paparo said the U.S. military needs “procurement at the speed of combat, not at the speed of committees … Technology alone is not going to win this fight. We’ve also got to reform defense bureaucracy with unprecedented urgency.”

But several military officials who spoke to the Honolulu Star-Advertiser also expressed unease about the administration’s apparent dismissal of climate change, which many Pacific countries see as their No. 1 threat, its contentious dealings with traditional allies and an aggressive push to gut any programs deemed to promote DEI.

When it comes to diversity, some military officials said they are concerned about an over-correction of the Biden administration’s embrace of identity politics toward outright rejection of efforts to capitalize on America’s cultural diversity.

An Army official noted that Hawaii serves as both a key military and diplomatic meeting site for the U.S. government in part because its diverse Asian and Pacific Islander diaspora populations vividly demonstrate America’s deep Pacific ties — something U.S. officials have proudly highlighted to their Pacific allies in the past.

Under Trump’s first presidency and the Biden years, there was a push to recruit young Hawaii residents to serve as military officers and diplomats and in intelligence roles to support America’s “pivot to the Pacific.”

“Anything that says the word ‘cultural’ — even ‘historical’ — is looking to be removed from the Department of Defense,” Tokuda said.

She noted that she and other lawmakers have fought for cultural training for military personnel coming to Hawaii and the Pacific, arguing “it’s so critically important they understand the history of where we have been as a people, as a community, in regards to our relationship with the military, so they better understand how we must do better going forward.”

Recently, the Pentagon drew immense backlash in Hawaii when it removed digital content about Asian American and Pacific Islanders in the service. Among the culled content was an Army webpage dedicated to the legendary 442nd Regimental Combat team, which was drawn largely from Hawaii-born Nisei and became one of the most decorated combat units in American history.

Fierce public response led to the swift republishing of the Army’s 442nd history as a news item on its website, but much of the rest of the content remains unavailable. Pentagon officials have insisted they intend to honor veterans but say they now want to remove race and culture from the discussion as much as possible.

“Anybody that claims to know exactly how this is all going to unfold is on a fool’s errand,” Case said. “I’m eyes wide open that, if nothing else, we’re dealing with a very fluid and uncertain situation where a new administration could make changes with dramatic ripple effects around our region and, in fact, the world.

“And so I don’t think any of us can predict with any degree of certainty what President Trump will do, either generally or specific to the DOD, or what the consequences of what he does will be either.”

9. Memo lays out plan to replace USAID with new humanitarian agency

I have not seen this reported anywhere else. It is good to see plans for rebuilding and replacing while all the disruption and destruction is taking place. But there will be a gap that China and others can exploit.

Memo lays out plan to replace USAID with new humanitarian agency 

It suggests a new U.S. Agency for International Humanitarian Assistance with a “narrow mandate” focused on humanitarian assistance, including a "modified" PEPFAR.

https://www.devex.com/news/memo-lays-out-plan-to-replace-usaid-with-new-humanitarian-agency-109685?oauth_response=success

By Sara Jerving // 20 March 2025

USAID signage is covered by black tape at the agency's headquarters in Washington, D.C., on Feb. 7, 2025. Photo by: Nathan Howard / File Photo / Reuters

A memo reportedly written by Trump aides has laid out a three-pronged blueprint suggesting how the Trump administration should redesign international aid under the U.S. State Department.

“Simply put, Congress and the Executive Branch have been funding and implementing programs on auto-pilot,” according to the memo, of which Devex obtained a copy. “The United States had an archaic system that needed to be dismantled to fix it properly.”

The changes include renaming the U.S. Agency for International Development as the U.S. Agency for International Humanitarian Assistance, or IHA, with a “narrow mandate” focused on humanitarian assistance, such as responding to natural disasters, preventing famines, containing disease outbreaks, and food security. This also includes a “modified” U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which is the country’s global programming on HIV prevention and treatment.

The memo suggests the Millennium Challenge Corporation and U.S. Trade and Development Agency should also be brought under the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, which would focus on generating American jobs and capital returns through trade, investment, infrastructure, and “projecting America’s energy and technology dominance.”

“The new entity would create a powerful counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” the memo, which Politico reported was written by Trump aides, stated. It’s unclear if U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio or other senior Trump officials are aligned with this vision. 

Foreign aid should “provide geopolitical leverage for the President on the global chess board.”

The memo said the U.S. international assistance apparatus has lacked discipline and strategic alignment; is inefficient and fragmented; and is a “tangled web of overlapping mandates, chronic mission creep, and Congressional micromanagement.” It said it created an “incoherent portfolio of programs” that were “implemented by organizations that represent a wide array of motivations and interests.”

The memo said this “dilutes its impact and restricts” the U.S.’s ability to respond effectively to new global challenges.

The memo stated there’s a suggestion that “leaders of some countries are simply not committed enough” to the progress of their own people to merit U.S. taxpayer spending and that recipient governments need “skin in the game.” It said there have been “low-return” programs that have consumed a lot of resources, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that requires 25% co-financing by host countries has “gone ignored for decades.”

The U.S. government should eliminate “traditional cost-plus, fixed-fee awards that pay out regardless of performance” and instead reward results and distribute aid through blockchain so that it’s secured, it said.

In efforts to streamline the creation of a new network of implementing partners, particularly in the private sector, “over familiar relationships,” the U.S. government should accept the due diligence processes of other “aligned donors” before making awards, “rather than imposing burdensome and duplicative requirements that have locked out faith-based and small partners.”

“The new model would shift away from the “Beltway Bandit” groups and United Nations agencies to favor private sector and non-profit entities with proven track records,” it stated. 

It also called for a de-obligation of funds from all USAID and State Department terminated awards, among other financial changes. 

State, IHA, and DFC

The U.S. State Department would stand at the helm of the trio with each agency focusing “strictly on areas within its core competencies, ensuring specialized expertise and optimizing resources.” The suggested new architecture would include the State Department focusing on democracy promotion, religious freedom, conflict prevention and stabilization, women’s empowerment, and civil society.

“Success would be measured by improvements in democracy-based indices, reductions in illegal migration, decreased illicit drug trade, reduced transnational criminal activity, lower corruption levels, and direct contributions to peace agreements,” it stated.

The U.S. Agency for International Humanitarian Assistance should combine the Bureaus for Global Health Security and Diplomacy; Conflict and Stabilization Operations; and Population, Refugees, and Migration from the Department of State with the Bureaus for Humanitarian Assistance; Global Health; Conflict Prevention and Stabilization; and Resilience, Environment, and Food Security from the former USAID, it stated.

USAID bureaus and independent offices, such as the Bureau for Africa and Asia, and the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, would be eliminated under the memo’s plan.

Making the new organization — IHA — a permanent subsidiary agency for the Department of State would require the U.S. Congress to amend the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, the Foreign Assistance Act, the Pay Act, and long-standing provisions of the annual Appropriations Acts.

The memo said funding for this new agency would come from current appropriation lines in areas such as international disaster assistance, migration and refugee assistance, global health, and transition initiatives.

It stated that its success would be measured by “lives saved, outbreaks of infectious disease contained, pandemics prevented, famines averted, and measurable increases in positive perception” of the U.S. in emerging markets.

Funding for the newly broadened DFC would come from areas such as appropriations for the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the DFC’s Corporate Capital Account, among other sources.

A major emphasis of DFC should be the launch of a development insurance facility that would “operate with a commercial mindset” in close coordination with the Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury, along with the Export-Import Bank, it stated.

This proposed merger would require statutory changes, which the memo said could possibly be achieved during DFC’s upcoming reauthorization process. This would include a significant increase in DFC’s current maximum contingent liability, clarification of its authority to take equity positions, and permission to invest in higher-income countries. According to the memo, the Office of Management and Budget would also need to adjust the ways it scores DFC’s equity investment and risk-insurance products.

There is an “unprecedented opportunity to restructure” the foreign aid system, according to the memo, adding that programming should “not be philanthropic in nature” but result in “first-order benefits” to Americans back home, project “America’s soft power,” enhances national security, commercial interests, and counters global competitors, such as China.

Examples of programs that can address problems before they become “costlier military interventions,” include global health security through prevention and monitoring of infectious diseases, “driven by American technology advancements,” and humanitarian and international food security backed by American private sector and American farmers.

“These efforts can foster stability in volatile regions and prevent conditions that breed extremism and terrorism,” the memo said.

The memo encouraged supporting American companies to trade and invest in high-growth markets, through co-financing ventures in areas such as energy, critical minerals, and infrastructure, allowing the country to “secure resources and bolster its technological and industrial base.” It also said programming should help the U.S. in setting international standards and practices in areas such as artificial intelligence and digital ecosystems.

The authors added the disclaimer that their memo offers guidance on a proposed architecture “but does not outline whether or the extent to which this or any administration should financially support any one sector or program.”

The State Department had not responded to a request for comment at the time of publication.

Read more:

► Judge finds DOGE's shutdown of USAID 'likely' unconstitutional

► Exclusive: Inside USAID's postmortem program review (Pro)

► Exclusive: Inside the closed-door meeting on USAID’s future

• Institutional DevelopmentDemocracy, Human Rights & GovernanceTrade & PolicyHumanitarian AidUnited States Department of State (DOS)United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

About the author

Sara Jervingsarajerving

• Sara Jerving is a Senior Reporter at Devex, where she covers global health. Her work has appeared in The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, The Wall Street Journal, VICE News, and Bloomberg News among others. Sara holds a master's degree from Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism where she was a Lorana Sullivan fellow. She was a finalist for One World Media's Digital Media Award in 2021; a finalist for the Livingston Award for Young Journalists in 2018; and she was part of a VICE News Tonight on HBO team that received an Emmy nomination in 2018. She received the Philip Greer Memorial Award from Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism in 2014.

10. U.S. Delegation to Visit Greenland as White House Ramps Up Pressure on the Island

What if Denmark/Greenalnd deny country clearance for US government aircraft to enter Greenland? Or what if Denmark/Greenland immigration officials deny entry if they fly by commercial air (which of course it is unlikely they would fly commercial).

But military action to take Greenland. Really?

Excerpt:

President-elect Donald Trump hasn’t ruled out military action in what some call a far-fetched pledge for control of Greenland.

Imagine the Great Greenland resistance if we tried to take Greenland. And then after we take it imagine the Great Greenland insurgency to resist pacification by US occupying forces.

Or maybe we could borrow the fictional Russian playbook from the Netflix show on Russia annexing Norway by subversion and economic warfare. It was called "Occupied." (2015-2020). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupied

U.S. Delegation to Visit Greenland as White House Ramps Up Pressure on the Island

Greenland’s prime minister calls trip by U.S. national security adviser and vice president’s spouse ‘highly aggressive’

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/u-s-delegation-to-visit-greenland-as-white-house-ramps-up-pressure-on-the-island-8c769477?mod=latest_headlines

By Vera Bergengruen

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March 24, 2025 12:10 am ET

Vice President JD Vance and his wife, Usha Vance, in February. Photo: Teresa Suarez/EPA/Shutterstock

WASHINGTON—U.S. national security adviser Michael Waltz and second lady Usha Vance will travel to Greenland this week, the White House said Sunday, further straining relations over President Trump’s improbable vow to acquire the Danish territory “one way or the other.”

Greenland Prime Minister Múte Egede called the planned visit days before local elections “highly aggressive.” Energy Secretary Chris Wright is also expected to join Waltz, Vance and her son as part of the first high-level U.S. delegation to visit the self-governing island since Trump declared he wanted to take it over from Denmark.

“We are now at a level where it can in no way be characterized as a harmless visit from a politician’s wife,” Egede told the Greenland newspaper Sermitsiaq. “What is the national security adviser doing in Greenland? The only purpose is to demonstrate power over us.”

Both local lawmakers and the Danish government have expressed strong opposition to Trump’s overtures, insisting that the mineral-rich island of 57,000 residents, while open to stronger commercial ties with the U.S., isn’t interested in an American takeover.

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President-elect Donald Trump hasn’t ruled out military action in what some call a far-fetched pledge for control of Greenland. Here’s why any bid for the Danish territory is complicated and controversial. Photo Illustration: Eve Hartley

In a three-day visit, the U.S. delegation will travel to historical sites to “learn about Greenlandic heritage” and attend the country’s national dogsled race, the Avannaata Qimussersu, which will feature more than 440 dogs, according to the White House.

“I’m coming to celebrate the long history of mutual respect and cooperation between our nations and to express hope that our relationship will only grow stronger in the coming years,” Vance said in a video posted to Instagram on Sunday. Vance visited Germany and France in February, along with her husband, Vice President JD Vance.

National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes said the visit “should not be a surprise,” given America’s security interests in the Arctic. Waltz and Wright will visit a U.S. military base in northern Greenland, he said, adding that it is an “opportunity to build on partnerships that respects Greenland’s self-determination and advances economic cooperation.”

The president’s son Donald Trump Jr. visited the island in January in what local authorities referred to as a “private visit.”

Local elections in Greenland are set to take place on April 1. “It is clear that the Trump camp doesn’t respect our right to self-determination without outside interference,” Aaja Chemnitz, a Greenlandic member of the Danish Parliament, wrote on Facebook.

National security adviser Michael Waltz Photo: Jose Luis Magana/AP

Greenland leaders said they had been approached to meet with the U.S. delegation and declined. “I can confirm that they have approached me and wanted to meet,” Malik Berthelsen, the mayor of Greenland’s second-largest city, Sisimiut, told local press. “As we are in the middle of the election campaign, I have kindly declined and suggested that we can meet after the election.”

When Trump first floated the idea of purchasing Greenland during his first term it was rejected by Denmark’s government as an “absurd” idea. He has pursued it more aggressively since returning to the presidency in January. 

“We will keep you safe. We will make you rich. And together we will take Greenland to heights like you have never thought possible before,” he said in his speech to Congress earlier this month. He also raised the idea of a U.S. takeover with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary-General Mark Rutte when he visited the White House this month.

In response, hundreds of Greenlanders took to the streets of the island’s capital earlier this month, waving the territory’s red and white flag, and holding signs that read “We aren’t for sale” and “Make America Go Away.”

Some Republicans in Congress have backed Trump’s proposal, introducing legislation dubbed the “Make Greenland Great Again Act,” that would authorize the U.S. government to acquire the territory, as well a separate measure, the “Red, White, and Blueland Act,” which seeks to rename the island.

The vice president accused Denmark of “not being a good ally” and allowing Chinese and Russian access to sea lanes. “How are we going to solve that problem, solve our own national security?” he said on Fox News last month. “If that means that we need to take more territorial interest in Greenland, that is what President Trump is going to do, because he doesn’t care what the Europeans scream at us.”

Only 6% of Greenlanders support becoming part of the U.S., according to a poll commissioned by the Danish paper Berlingske in January.

Write to Vera Bergengruen at vera.bergengruen@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

11. Pentagon is the latest agency to announce a leak investigation that could include polygraphs

A question to consider and figure out is why are there leaks?  

Of course there are leaks to our adversaries due to MICE (Money, Ideology, Compromise, and Ego)

But what about leaks to the press? Ideology perhaps. Money perhaps. Ego perhaps. Do ideology and ego include moral conflicts and policy disagreements? Is leaking to the press a way to solve a moral or policy dilemma or disagreement?

Will polygraphs improve the situation? Will they deter or detect leakers? What kind of working environment does this create?

Pentagon is the latest agency to announce a leak investigation that could include polygraphs

By TARA COPP

Updated 12:57 PM EDT, March 22, 2025

AP · March 22, 2025

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Pentagon’s intelligence and law enforcement arms are investigating what it says are leaks of national security information. Defense Department personnel could face polygraphs in the latest such inquiry by the Trump administration.

A memo late Friday from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s chief of staff referred to “recent unauthorized disclosures” of such information, but provided no details about alleged leaks. Earlier in the day, President Donald Trump rejected reports that adviser Elon Musk would be briefed on how the United States would fight a hypothetical war with China.

“If this effort results in information identifying a party responsible for an unauthorized disclosure,” then such information “will be referred to the appropriate criminal entity for criminal prosecution,” according to the memo.

At the Homeland Security Department, Secretary Kristi Noem pledged this month to step up lie detector tests on employees in an effort to identify those who may be leaking information about operations to the media.

The Justice Department on Friday announced an investigation into “the selective leak of inaccurate, but nevertheless classified, information” from intelligence agencies about Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan gang whose members in the United States are being targeted for removal by the Republican administration.

Leaks occur in every administration — and government officials can be the source — as a trial balloon to test how a potential policy decision will be received.

While polygraph exams are typically not admissible in court proceedings, they are frequently used by federal law enforcement agencies and for national security clearances. In 1998, the Supreme Court ruled they were also inadmissible in military justice proceedings.

They are inadmissible because they are unreliable and often result in false positives, said George Maschke, a former Army interrogator and reserve intelligence officer who went on to found AntiPolygraph.org. Mashke failed a polygraph himself when applying to the FBI.

But they have been intermittently used since the 1990s to intimidate and scare sources from talking to reporters, Maschke said. A 1999 Pentagon report said it was expanding the program to use polygraphs on defense personnel “if classified information they had access to has been leaked.”

AP · March 22, 2025

12. China’s Subsidized Shipbuilding: Latest Pillar Industry

Images and chart at the link.

We need a JAROKUS trilateral shipbuilding consortium to compete.

Asia Sentinel

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Business/Economy

China’s Subsidized Shipbuilding: Latest Pillar Industry

Beijing takes over both military and commercial global shipbuilding

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/china-subsidized-shipbuilding-latest-pillar-industry?utm

Mar 24, 2025

∙ Paid

By: Andy Wong Ming Jun

Over the past four years China has become the world’s top commercial shipbuilder, eclipsing not only a floundering United States but Japanese and South Korean shipbuilders as well. China has gone from a mere 5 percent of merchant tonnage produced annually in the world to over 50 percent in 2025.

The rise of Chinese shipbuilding is more than just an issue of sheer quantity, but of the deliberately opaque nature of funding and supplying heavily state-subsidized raw materials such as steel to Chinese shipyards, all of which are state-owned enterprises nominally masquerading as capitalist free market competitors to their foreign peers when it comes to competing for international merchant vessel orders.

US President Donald Trump has sought to counteract China’s shipbuilding spree with a plan to revive domestic shipbuilding using massive fees on China-linked ship visits to American ports, which has already caused chaos in US coal inventories and stoked uncertainty in the embattled agriculture market, as exporters struggle to find ships to send goods abroad, according to the American Journal of Transportation edition “The Uncontained.”

Trump is drafting an executive order that would rely on funding from a US Trade Representative proposal to levy fines of up to $1.5 million on China-made ships or vessels from fleets that include ships made in China. Those potential fees have limited the availability of ships needed to move agriculture, energy, mining, construction, and manufactured goods to international buyers, according to major US exporters and transportation providers, the industry publication reported.

Given the woeful performance of US shipbuilders involved in the nascent Constellation-class frigate program, Trump’s visions of resuscitating US shipbuilding are misguided and unrealistic. In a recently-released report to Congress, the US Navy confirmed the program faces a 36-month delay before the first vessel can be delivered, compounded by significant cost overruns last reported to be at least 40 percent and a botched “gold-plated” design procurement process applied to what was supposed to be a fairly straightforward off-the-shelf purchase based on the successful design originally conceived for French and Italian service.

Constellation: Not white elephant but white whale?

In the meantime, by 2024 China overtook South Korea, the former global leader in shipbuilding in all but one type of merchant vessel (liquified natural gas carriers) with either marginal or overwhelmingly larger market shares for various merchant vessel types.

According to an April 2021 OECD report, this heavy financial and material state subsidization has cut production costs by up to 20 percent for every new merchant ship constructed. The resultant cost savings have most happily been lapped up by global shipping majors, many of whom hail from US-allied countries such as France, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even Taiwan.

These global shipping majors have burgeoning order books over the coming decades for Chinese-built container ships, which not only provide unintentional but welcome funds for China’s naval budget but also provide demand and impetus to train, retain, and develop the skilled workforce and advanced construction techniques for ever-advanced and larger vessels.

A good example of this would be the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), the largest Chinese shipyard in existence and a juggernaut in both its commercial and military shipbuilding output in both quantity and quality. Under China’s model of civil-military fusion aimed at leveraging private sector technological research and financial revenue to build up militarily relevant technologies, money from global shipping major customers such as the French-Lebanese CMACGM Group or even Taiwan’s Evergreen Shipping translates into opaque profit margins for China State Shipbuilding and potentially end up siphoned directly into the Chinese naval shipbuilding budget.

According to Matthew Funaiole, senior fellow at the China Power Project under CSIS, “They are buying ships from China because China makes most of the ships in the world. It makes them quickly, and it makes them well,” he said. “When you are buying a ship from a shipyard in China, you don’t know what the profit is on the Chinese side and how those profits might be getting used to augment or subsidize military production.”

China’s naval buildup to become the world’s largest navy, overtaking the US in 2023 on numerical terms, is directly linked to the manner with which it has built in state subsidies in contravention of global free trade ideals as espoused by the World Trade Organization, as well as the unwitting financial and technological turbocharging provided by US allies.

And eclipsing US global naval power it already has begun doing: between 2019 and 2023 four China State Shipbuilding-owned shipyards in China managed to launch not only 19 million gross tonnes of commercial vessels, equivalent to South Korea’s entire annual shipbuilding output, but also at least 39 warships with a combined tonnage greater than the entire British Royal Navy afloat today.

In the same time period, the entire US shipbuilding industry has launched merely 30 warships, of which a majority are Littoral Combat Ships already deemed unsuited for blue-water naval combat in the Pacific even if the US Navy is furiously retrofitting them with aftermarket weapons enhancements such as new missile launchers.

As if to drive the point home further, around the same time period China State Shipbuilding was constructing large, advanced container ships for the French-Lebanese CMACGM Group and Taiwan’s Evergreen Shipping in drydock space right beside that used for China’s newest, largest, and most advanced warship ever constructed, the Type 003 “Fujian” aircraft carrier.

That Taiwan’s national shipping company has paid money to a Chinese shipyard to construct new container ships for it while the same shipyard is constructing an aircraft carrier which would be a powerful force multiplier for any Chinese invasion of the island country is an irony few observers have missed. CMACGM has also recently ordered another US$2.8 billion in container ships from China State Shipbuilding in early March.

The US may have been slow in waking up to the reality of China’s naval buildup made possible by its civil-military fusion approach, but the recognition of this threat to US global naval power underpinning the current global system of free trade and navigation on the high seas is one that enjoys rare bipartisanship in Washington D.C.

Building on President Trump’s latest Executive Order seeks in some way to replicate a similar civil-military fusion industrial strategy with American characteristics to revive American shipyard capacity and shipbuilding capability, without which the Constellation-class frigates envisioned by the US Navy to become its future “low-end” backbone complementing the existing “high-end” Arleigh Burke-class destroyers will effectively be dead before arrival even if all other delay points in design and procurement are ironed out.

Quite how this can be done will also be constrained by the inability of the US to simply nationalize and commandeer private enterprise shipyards such as Fincantieri Marinette Marine (which is the sole main shipyard responsible for constructing the Constellation-class frigate). After all, both countries are fundamentally different in economic and political ideologies whereby the boundaries between private capitalism and the state are much more significantly blurred or even non-existent in China than the US.

Indeed, a January 2025 report originating from the previous Biden administration had concluded that China’s financial support, barriers for foreign firms, intellectual property theft, procurement policies, and forced technology transfers have given its shipbuilding and maritime industry an unfair advantage. If US shipbuilding key to the delivery of the Constellation-class frigate is to be revived, both carrot and stick measures will have to be implemented by President Trump.

Thus far the carrot has been the establishment of the new maritime industrial base office and talks of special tax incentives to induce demand for domestic shipbuilding. The stick however threatens to be far more ruinous and diplomatically damaging, as President Trump is reportedly mulling imposing steep levies on Chinese-built ships docking at US ports.

As potential policies under Trump’s “America First” international doctrine go, this is one that also enjoys rare bipartisan support. Even so, Trump may well find in the end that like his predecessor Joe Biden, he and the US are up against domestic and international shipbuilding trends that have been decades in the making, and not problems that can be unilaterally solved by American truculence in domestic policymaking and international posturing.

13. US looks to make headway on Trump’s ceasefire hopes as Russia talks open in Saudi Arabia

Hopefully a positive turning point.

US looks to make headway on Trump’s ceasefire hopes as Russia talks open in Saudi Arabia | CNN

CNN · by Angus Watson · March 24, 2025

By Angus Watson and Anna Chernova, CNN

US and Russian officials are meeting at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Mikhail Voskresenskiy/SPTNK/AP

CNN —

A United States delegation led by real estate tycoon-turned-diplomat Steve Witkoff has begun a high-stakes meeting with Kremlin negotiators in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where the Trump administration is pushing for a ceasefire in separate talks with Russia and Ukraine.

Russia’s TASS news agency reported that talks were underway on Monday morning, citing an unnamed source.

The meeting comes one day after talks between a US team led by President Donald Trump’s Kyiv envoy, Keith Kellogg, and Ukraine’s Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, which was described by the latter as “productive and focused.”

While many watching from Washington, and across Europe, will hope some initial positivity can be translated into a 30-day ceasefire and longer-term negotiations, a wide gulf in expectations exists between Russia, Ukraine and their US interlocutors.

A barrage of Russian drone attacks killed at least six in Ukraine over the weekend, including young families. Moscow accuses Ukraine of recent hits on gas and oil facilities in Kursk and Krasnodar despite its offer to halt attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

The Russian delegation at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Riyadh includes seasoned Kremlin diplomat Grigory Karasin and former spy chief Sergey Beseda, according to Russian state media. Beseda is viewed by many in Ukraine as a hard-nosed nationalist and early supporter of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

The trust deficit on the Ukrainian side has not been helped by Witkoff’s recent rhetorical support for many of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s maximalist positions ahead of talks. Speaking to podcast host Tucker Carlson on Sunday, Witkoff appeared to show some sympathy toward Russia’s territorial ambitions in Ukraine, describing the four regions Russia wants to formally annex — Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk — as “Russian speaking.”

“There have been referendums where the overwhelming majority of the people have indicated that they want to be under Russian rule,” he said.

Russia held the referendums in occupied areas of the four territories in September 2022. The votes were widely viewed as a sham and heavily criticized by the US at the time as well as by allies in Europe.

US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff is also playing a key role in talks with Russia over its war in Ukraine.

Evelyn Hockstein/AP

Related article US envoy says ‘elephant in the room’ in peace talks is whether Ukraine will cede occupied regions

“The Russians are de facto in control of these territories. The question is: Will the world acknowledge that those are Russian territories?” Witkoff asked Sunday. “Can (Ukrainian President Volodymyr) Zelensky survive politically if he acknowledges this? This is the central issue in the conflict.”

Moscow says a ceasefire will not be possible unless Kyiv agrees not to use it to resupply or reorganize its troops. It has also publicly voiced key demands such as Ukraine never being allowed to join NATO.

Speaking Sunday night, Zelensky put the responsibility on Putin to end the war.

“The one who brought this war must take it away,” he said.

This is a developing story and will be updated.

CNN · by Angus Watson · March 24, 2025

14. Force de l'Europe: How Realistic is a French Nuclear Umbrella?

What would a French Russian nuclear exchange look like for Europe? What does the path to such an exchange look like?

Excerpts:

Taken together, concerns over the credibility of a French nuclear umbrella seem overstated, as many of the same issues apply to the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The U.S. president retains sole authority over nuclear use, despite NATO’s consultation mechanisms. Moreover, the United States is less dependent on the E.U. economy and, more importantly, is geographically distant from Europe. Thus, the fact that France has a greater stake in European security might offset some of the challenges posed by the relatively small size of its nuclear arsenal. However, arsenal size and flexibility remain pressing concerns. Solving these challenges will require a combination of creative policymaking — such as co-financing or cross-financing the French deterrent by European allies — and concrete efforts to strengthen and modernize the arsenal.

There is an additional concern: Given current U.S. diplomatic approaches, what are the alternatives? Credibility critically hinges on the perception that the security guarantor is committed to defending its allies. Which E.U. member states trust that Trump would meaningfully consult with allies and consider their input before deciding on nuclear use? The current U.S. administration’s threats to annex some allies and its forceful approach toward others cast doubt on the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. Under these circumstances, it could be more reasonable to rely on France for protection. It is of course possible that U.S. policy will return to a more collaborative approach toward allies in Europe in four years. Yet, Europeans would be foolish to bet their security on wishful thinking.

In the meantime, Polish Prime Minister Tusk has hinted at the possibility of a Polish nuclear weapon. In Germany, a recent op-ed in a prominent newspaper openly called for an explicit nuclear hedging strategy to ensure a pathway to the bomb in a worst case scenario. If such ideas were to translate into actual policy, they would alter the European security landscape and disrupt the international nonproliferation order far more dramatically than an extended French nuclear umbrella. However, a strengthened French deterrent could directly address the very concerns that fuel such increasingly radical proposals.

Force de l'Europe: How Realistic is a French Nuclear Umbrella? - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Alexander Sorg · March 24, 2025

What if the United States decided to fold up its nuclear umbrella over Europe? In its wake, Europe could either experience increased Russian aggression, potentially threatening the very existence of the European Union, or a wave of nuclear proliferation that would severely challenge the international nonproliferation order. However, relying more substantially on existing nuclear capabilities on the continent — particularly France’s nuclear arsenal — could help prevent both. Yet even observers that do not in principle oppose the idea of a French umbrella have raised concerns about its viability. Most commonly, these concerns question the authority to use nuclear weapons, France’s willingness to defend its allies if deterrence fails, and the overall size of the French nuclear arsenal. While these concerns are valid, they exaggerate the challenge. In fact, similar uncertainties exist regarding the U.S. nuclear umbrella and should therefore not be considered major hurdles.

For starters, the U.S. president retains final decision-making power over nuclear use. Although NATO has a consultation mechanism through the Nuclear Planning Group, it is unlikely that the United States would condition its nuclear decisions on alliance-wide consensus. Any NATO decision would ultimately be non-binding because only the U.S. president has ultimate decision-making authority about nuclear weapons. Similarly, the French President holds sole authority over France’s nuclear weapons, which are not currently included in NATO’s nuclear consultations, as France is not a member of the Nuclear Planning Group. However, there is no reason why France could not adopt a similar approach to that of the United States, agreeing to inform and consult with its allies in peacetime, while maintaining final authority over nuclear use. Potentially, such a consultative body could be purely European, aligning with France’s longstanding goal of strategic autonomy. Moreover, it is far from guaranteed that Washington would come to Europe’s defense in a crisis. Compared to the United States, France’s geographic proximity and economic interdependence with its European allies should provide an advantage when it comes to resolve. However, to enhance their arsenal’s size and flexibility, Europeans will need to develop robust solutions. Greater emphasis on the airborne component of the French deterrent will likely be essential, although this need not require deployments abroad. Among other options, these solutions could include creating a low-yield variant of existing capabilities. Importantly, a funding mechanism would be required to share the financial burden. This could take the form of direct financial contributions — such as creating a novel funding institution by a coalition of the willing — or by cross-financing the French deterrent by offsetting costs in emerging areas of European defense cooperation, such as the Future Combat Air System. In addition, while a U.K. contribution to a European nuclear umbrella would encounter challenges like those faced by France, along with some unique to the United Kingdom, it could serve as a valuable complement to the French umbrella.

Become a Member

The Great Withdrawal

Europe has awakened to the new reality of U.S. withdrawal. Recently, President Donald Trump attacked his Ukrainian counterpart and insisted that he would only protect those allies that pay an ever-increasing share of their GDP on defense. However, Europe had already begun adjusting. By 2024, before Trump took office, 23 of NATO’s 32 members met the 2 percent GDP defense spending goal — up from just 6 members in 2021. In March 2025, Europe further strengthened its defenses, with E.U. plans to offer €150 billion in defense loans to member states and Poland announcing to expand its army from 200,000 to 500,000 troops.

Yet, conventional deterrence can only take Europe so far. In fact, nuclear deterrence has been the backbone of NATO’s military strategy since the beginning of the Cold War. If Europeans no longer trust U.S. security guarantees to deter external aggression, they will need alternatives. In recent weeks, there have been renewed discussions about France’s nuclear role in Europe, including, for the first time, a strongly positive response from Germany. Meanwhile, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk made an ambivalent statement about the need for Poland to acquire the most modern weapons, explicitly mentioning nuclear weapons, while at the same time emphasizing that Poland would seek discussions with France.

Do Allies Need a Say in Nuclear Decision-making?

In recent months there has been a lively debate about deepening nuclear cooperation between France and the United Kingdom, as well as how the French nuclear arsenal could play a broader role in European defense. However, three criticisms frequently challenge the plausibility of a French nuclear umbrella.

The first concern is that France would never hand nuclear decision-making power to its allies. Particularly, the French president would always retain sole authority over nuclear use. This is certainly true. Yet, the same applies in the current NATO model, where the U.S. president retains the sole authority to use U.S. nuclear weapons. While NATO-sanctioned nuclear use requires the approval of the Nuclear Planning Group, the actual implications of this process remain ambiguous. For instance, it seems implausible that, in the event of a crisis, deliberations within NATO would dictate U.S. decisions on nuclear use. This is even less plausible when considering scenarios in which allies seek to push the United States toward nuclear use rather than restrain it. In fact, NATO’s history suggests that allies have often been skeptical of U.S. commitments to meaningfully consult with them. Even after the adoption of the Athens Guidelines in 1962 — which specified that the United States would consult allies on nuclear use “if time permits” — key allies such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany sought separate bilateral agreements with Washington to ensure their voices were heard.

As important, whatever consultative mechanisms exist, they are ultimately non-binding. The U.S. president retains sole authority over the use of America’s nuclear weapons. Furthermore, only a portion of U.S. nuclear weapons are assigned to NATO, meaning that only these could be subject to any form of shared decision-making in the first place. Another factor is the stationing of nuclear weapons on allied territory. However, these make up only about five percent of America’s nuclear arsenal. Host states might have a de facto veto power, given that nuclear deployment would require allied military personnel and fighter jets. At the same time, since the introduction of Permissive Action Links in the 1960s, no decision to use U.S.-owned nuclear weapons can be made without explicit U.S. authorization.

France would not need to give up its ultimate nuclear authority if France wanted to extend a nuclear umbrella over E.U. member states and European NATO allies interested in such an offer. A consultation body could take shape — one that includes information-sharing, involvement in military planning, and potentially deliberation about nuclear use — giving allies a voice without granting them formal decision-making power. One possibility would be for France to join NATO’s existing Nuclear Planning Group, though it has long resisted doing so. Another option is the creation of an entirely new European body outside of NATO. Paris might be more receptive to the latter idea as it aligns with France’s long-held aspiration for strategic autonomy from U.S.-dominated military structures.

Capabilities and Resolve: Assessing Credibility

The second challenge has to do with doubts that France would “trade Paris for Tallinn.” This argument is puzzling. Washington and Tallinn are 7,000 km apart, separated by what Trump frequently refers to as a “big, beautiful ocean.” Beyond relative geographical proximity, France’s economic ties to Europe further reinforce its security interests. All its largest export markets and four of its five biggest import partners are E.U. members. There are few conceivable scenarios in which a threat to the stability of the European Union would not constitute a vital national interest for France.

The third oft stated challenge is that the French arsenal is insufficiently flexible and too small to provide extended deterrence. This is arguably the most valid concern. France currently has about 290 nuclear warheads all of which are actively deployed on delivery systems or maintained at high readiness. Combined with the United Kingdom — the other potential partner in a European nuclear umbrella — the European arsenal size is comparable to China’s. However, it is still far smaller than those of Russia or the United States. Moreover, since the dissolution of its land-based nuclear missiles in the 1990s, France relies exclusively on sea- and air-based deterrents, including mainland-based aircraft, carrier-based aircraft earmarked for use on the Charles de Gaulle, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Deterrence is commonly understood as a combination of capabilities — the hard power a state brings to the table through its warheads, missiles, planes, military training, and technology — as well as resolve. Deterrence can include factors such as a state’s history in past crises, regime type, and, most importantly, the stakes it has in a given conflict. France has a stronger interest in the security of Europe than the United States, making its commitment arguably more credible in this respect.

This could be achieved through direct funding, such as novel financing mechanisms from a coalition of willing nations, or through indirect assistance, like easing France’s financial burdens in other areas. For example, Germany could choose to assume a larger share of the burden in developing joint projects, such as the French-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System program. Another possibility is that European states involved in expanding missile defense capabilities under the European Sky Shield Initiative could exempt France from financial contributions if it were to join the project in the future. Most likely, a combination of multiple initiatives would be needed, allowing states to cross-finance parts of France’s nuclear capabilities.

The debate remains open as to whether deterrence solutions should involve a numerical expansion of the French arsenal or the introduction of entirely new weapon systems. Although developing land-based missiles seems unnecessary and would likely take considerable time, a low-yield variant of the Air-sol moyenne portée air-launched cruise missile could address skepticism among European allies. Such a system would also be relatively straightforward to implement, unlike the development or entirely new classes of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In addition, France is already developing a successor to its existing missile, which includes hypersonic capabilities and is expected to enter service by 2035.

A new air-based nuclear weapon could also facilitate the stationing of nuclear weapons abroad. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the foreign deployment of nuclear weapons is an essential component of a nuclear umbrella. First, nuclear weapons have been stationed in states that were not under a nuclear umbrella, such as U.S. deployments to Spain in the early Cold War and U.K. deployments to Singapore in the late 1960s. Second, the United States has credibly signaled its commitment to protect South Korea and Japan, despite not maintaining a foreign-deployed nuclear weapons presence in the region since the end of the Cold War. Lastly, a key role of forward-deployed nuclear weapons has been to bind the United States to distant regions. However, France is already deeply connected to is European neighbors through geography and economic interdependence, potentially reducing the need for such deployments.

The British Connection

While the United Kingdom remains a nuclear-capable state, focusing on France’s nuclear arsenal is essential for two reasons. First, President Emmanuel Macron has long advocated for European autonomy and a stronger European role in France’s nuclear strategy, aligning with the country’s historical push for European independence. In contrast, the United Kingdom maintains closer ties to the United States. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has taken a softer stance toward the Trump administration and refrained from following European counter-tariff policies. Structurally, Britain’s membership in the Five Eyes intelligence network and its 2016 vote to leave the European Union has made it the most U.S.-dependent state in Europe; these decisions raise doubts about its willingness to pivot toward a new security strategy. Most importantly, the United Kingdom depends on the United States for its nuclear arsenal, leasing submarine missiles and basing its warheads on U.S. designs. There are even indications of potential renewed U.S. nuclear deployments to British soil, as occurred during the Cold War.

Second, the United Kingdom’s nuclear arsenal is more limited than France’s. While their overall stockpiles are similar, only about half of the U.K.’s arsenal is available for immediate use. The United Kingdom relies exclusively on four Vanguard-class submarines armed with ballistic missiles, with only one at sea at any point in time. Maintaining even this minimal presence has proven challenging, making the British deterrent a last-resort case. Once its submarine launches a missile, it becomes vulnerable, leaving the United Kingdom without further nuclear options. This limits its capability beyond defending a state-ending attack. Additionally, failed missile tests have raised further doubts about the reliability of the U.K.’s arsenal.

This does not mean that there is no role for the United Kingdom in a future European nuclear umbrella. As a member of the Nuclear Planning Group, it has experience consulting with allies on nuclear matters and could help design a European mechanism. Although the United Kingdom’s small and inflexible arsenal makes its use beyond national survival unlikely, it can still play a role in deterrence as a high-impact, low-probability factor. In fact, NATO has long maintained that French and British nuclear forces complement U.S. capabilities by “complicating the calculations of potential adversaries.” The United Kingdom could serve a similar role in complementing a French umbrella. A more ambitious approach would involve deeper Franco-British nuclear cooperation, especially if the United Kingdom moves toward a more independent arsenal. However, such a shift can only be a long-term prospect.

What is the Alternative?

Taken together, concerns over the credibility of a French nuclear umbrella seem overstated, as many of the same issues apply to the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The U.S. president retains sole authority over nuclear use, despite NATO’s consultation mechanisms. Moreover, the United States is less dependent on the E.U. economy and, more importantly, is geographically distant from Europe. Thus, the fact that France has a greater stake in European security might offset some of the challenges posed by the relatively small size of its nuclear arsenal. However, arsenal size and flexibility remain pressing concerns. Solving these challenges will require a combination of creative policymaking — such as co-financing or cross-financing the French deterrent by European allies — and concrete efforts to strengthen and modernize the arsenal.

There is an additional concern: Given current U.S. diplomatic approaches, what are the alternatives? Credibility critically hinges on the perception that the security guarantor is committed to defending its allies. Which E.U. member states trust that Trump would meaningfully consult with allies and consider their input before deciding on nuclear use? The current U.S. administration’s threats to annex some allies and its forceful approach toward others cast doubt on the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. Under these circumstances, it could be more reasonable to rely on France for protection. It is of course possible that U.S. policy will return to a more collaborative approach toward allies in Europe in four years. Yet, Europeans would be foolish to bet their security on wishful thinking.

In the meantime, Polish Prime Minister Tusk has hinted at the possibility of a Polish nuclear weapon. In Germany, a recent op-ed in a prominent newspaper openly called for an explicit nuclear hedging strategy to ensure a pathway to the bomb in a worst case scenario. If such ideas were to translate into actual policy, they would alter the European security landscape and disrupt the international nonproliferation order far more dramatically than an extended French nuclear umbrella. However, a strengthened French deterrent could directly address the very concerns that fuel such increasingly radical proposals.

Become a Member

Alexander Sorg is a postdoctoral Stanton Nuclear Security Research Fellow at Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom. His research focuses on European security, NATO, and extended nuclear deterrence. He has published in International Studies Quarterly, the European Journal of International Security, the NATO Defense College Research Papers, and War on the Rocks. Alexander’s work has also appeared in The Economist as well as various German and Dutch newspapers.

Image: Staff Sgt. Alexander Cook via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Alexander Sorg · March 24, 2025

15.  Chiang Kai-shek’s great grandson moves to mainland China as clan builds cross-strait ties

We cannot want to defend Taiwan more than the Taiwanese.

Taiwan

ChinaPolitics

Chiang Kai-shek’s great grandson moves to mainland China as clan builds cross-strait ties

Andrew Chiang You-ching, who has avoided the spotlight, is moving to Hangzhou ‘to put down roots’ and develop his career

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3303639/chiang-kai-sheks-great-grandson-moves-mainland-china-clan-builds-cross-strait-ties?utm

Vanessa Caiin Shanghai

Published: 5:21pm, 24 Mar 2025Updated: 5:43pm, 24 Mar 2025

The great grandson of former Taiwanese leader Chiang Kai-shek is now living in the mainland Chinese city of Hangzhou, as his family plays a key role in promoting cross-strait exchanges.

In a social media post last week, Andrew Chiang You-ching, 35, the youngest member in his generation of the Chiang family, a symbol of anti-communism in the previous century, said he had decided to relocate to the mainland to develop a career in the capital of eastern Zhejiang province.

“I’ve recently made the decision to put down roots and develop my career on the mainland,” he said in a short video post, without elaborating on what his career was.

“I recently want to try a new lifestyle,” he wrote in the post, which was picked up by the media over the weekend.

Chiang, who was educated in the United States, is the youngest of the three children whose father is politician Chiang Hsiao-yung – Chiang Kai-shek’s grandson. The younger Chiang has largely avoided the spotlight while his two brothers, Demos Chiang Yiu-po and Edward Chiang Yiu-chun, are successful designers.

In recent years, he has travelled frequently to the mainland and also visited his great grandfather’s former residence in Ningbo, Zhejiang, according to Taiwanese media.

Mainland sentiment towards the late Kuomintang leader has softened considerably over the past three decades, as Chiang has been increasingly recognised as a pivotal figure in historical ties between the two sides. Until his death, Chiang promoted reunification with the mainland by defeating the Communist Party.

Last year, Taiwan’s independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government announced plans to remove more than 760 statues of Chiang from public spaces in what is seen as a bid to erase his legacy.

Following defeat in a civil war against the Communist Party on the mainland, his Kuomintang troops fled to Taiwan in 1949 and established an interim government on the island. Chiang Kai-shek governed Taiwan for nearly three decades until his death in 1975.

Despite fighting the Communists in the civil war and being perceived as a Beijing adversary throughout his life, Chiang had hoped to unify the mainland and Taiwan under the Republic of China, the island’s official title.

Taipei mayor Wayne Chiang Wan-an, another one of his great-grandsons, is also viewed favourably by the mainland Chinese public and media, in part for his Beijing-friendly stance.

Despite facing pressure from the ruling DPP, Chiang Wan-an in December hosted the Taipei-Shanghai Twin-City Forum, an annual forum that brings together officials and business representatives from Shanghai and Taipei, during which he highlighted the importance of maintaining exchanges while cross-strait relations were under strain.

The DPP government has questioned the future of the event given Beijing’s increasing military activities around the self-ruled island.

In August 2023, Chiang Wan-an led a delegation to Shanghai on a three-day visit for the same forum. The trip was harshly criticised in Taiwan, with DPP lawmakers and councillors accusing him of appeasing Beijing.

Beijing views self-ruled Taiwan as part of its territory to be brought under its control, by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state but oppose any attempt to take the island by force.

Vanessa Cai

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Vanessa Cai is a reporter for the China desk, based in Shanghai. Previously she worked for Caixin Global in Beijing and Shanghai-based news outlet Sixth Tone.

16. Trump turbulence leads allies to rethink reliance on U.S. weapons

Will the US defense industry take a hit with our withdrawal from NATO/Europe. What will that do to our already atrophied defense industrial base.

Trump turbulence leads allies to rethink reliance on U.S. weapons

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/23/europe-us-weapons-dependence-trump/?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=topic/world

European capitals are reviewing vulnerabilities and want to wean themselves from dependence on American weapons, but expanding homegrown options will take time.

March 23, 2025 at 10:40 a.m. EDTYesterday at 10:40 a.m. EDT

9 min

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President Donald Trump, flanked by Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, announces the F-47 fighter jet Friday in the Oval Office. (Demetrius Freeman/The Washington Post)

By Ellen Francis, Missy Ryan and Michael Birnbaum

BRUSSELS — As President Donald Trump upends U.S. foreign policy, negotiating closer relations with Russia, threatening NATO allies and pausing cooperation with Ukraine, Washington’s traditional partners — and best customers — are rethinking their dependence on American weapons systems.

Get concise answers to your questions. Try Ask The Post AI.

From Canada to Europe, calls are growing to steer future defense spending away from U.S. equipment and toward their own industries, even as many concede there’s no quick fix after decades of dependence.

The U.S. pause of intelligence-sharing with Ukraine this month, and Trump’s threats to annex Canada and Greenland, have laid bare the risks of counting on the United States — and raised concerns about whether Washington could ground jets or turn off launchers remotely as a pressure tactic.

Even if such a “kill switch” is a myth, officials and analysts say, advanced U.S. systems such as fighter jets are so reliant on U.S. spare parts, software updates or data sharing that cutting access could effectively render some unusable. Nearly two-thirds of European arms imports in recent years came from the U.S.

Several European countries have launched reviews of their U.S.-made equipment to assess how vulnerable they would be in a conflict with Russia if Trump cut off support, according to four senior European policymakers who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive matter.

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Canada and Portugal say they’re reconsidering future orders of F-35 fighter jets from Lockheed Martin. And the European Union is largely freezing the U.S. out of new loan financing as the bloc scrambles to find hundreds of billions of euros for a military buildup in the next five years. Canada is in talks with the E.U. about plans to expand manufacturing, officials said, as America’s oldest and closest allies join forces in an attempt to shield themselves from Trump’s whims.

Given the scale of the U.S. defense industry, which is the world’s largest arms exporter, European officials acknowledge they’ll keep buying off-the-shelf U.S. weapons as they build up their own lagging capabilities. But the Trump administration’s unpredictability has sharpened their focus on upgrading their arsenals and developing their own production.

In announcing that Boeing would produce the F-47, the next-generation fighter jet, Trump said Friday that the version sold to allies would have reduced capabilities, “because someday maybe they’re not our allies.”

Previous administrations have at times withheld military equipment from erstwhile customers. When the Islamic revolution of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini overthrew Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979, the Carter administration cut off maintenance and spare parts for the U.S.-made planes flown by Iran’s air force.

After the Egyptian military ousted President Mohamed Morsi in 2013, the Obama administration froze shipments of jets, attack helicopters and other equipment. The hold was eventually lifted, but the experience propelled Cairo to diversify its sourcing from 80 percent investment in U.S. equipment to 30 percent today.

Yet Washington has taken such actions against alliance partners only rarely. The first Trump administration suspended Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program over Ankara’s acquisition of a Russian air defense system.

U.S. customers have buyer’s remorse

European policymakers worry that the U.S. assistance required to run the complex weaponry they’re already using — including antimissile systems, early-warning aircraft and combat drones — could degrade over time.

Rules on some systems require that maintenance and updates be performed by U.S. citizens, and equipment produced by European manufactures that includes U.S. components can also be subject to restrictions.

“It’s not as if President Trump could just push a button and all aircraft would fall from the sky,” one European official said. “But there is an issue of dependency,” particularly on intelligence sharing and communication links.

The U.S. industry’s pitch that American weapons are implicitly backed up by American guarantees is becoming a tough sell.

Some policymakers involved in decisions to purchase F-35s have said they would now choose differently.

“As one of the decision makers behind Denmark’s purchase of F35’s, I regret it,” Rasmus Jarlov, chair of the Danish Parliament’s defense committee, posted on social media. Denmark is boosting military spending as Trump says Greenland needs better defenses and has vowed to “get” the island “one way or the other.”

Jarlov called for avoiding American weapons “if at all possible” going forward. “I can easily imagine a situation where the USA will demand Greenland from Denmark and will threaten to deactivate our weapons and let Russia attack us when we refuse,” he added. “... Buying American weapons is a security risk that we cannot run.”

When Trump was elected, European officials expected more pressure to raise defense spending. Many figured that placing orders for U.S. military hardware would meet demands while handing him trade wins of the kind he prizes.

But now, his gyrations on Russia policy have some reconsidering that approach. Anxiety peaked when Trump halted military aid and targeting intelligence to Ukraine to help fight off Russia after his Oval Office clash with President Volodymyr Zelensky.

The administration resumed the assistance within days, but that didn’t quash concerns. “That’s the whole point,” said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. Army Europe. “People immediately said, ‘Oh, wait a second. You mean they could just turn it on and off like that?’

“Nations will be thinking, are they vulnerable to a U.S. policy decision that will cause them to have uncertainty about parts or networking?”

As Germany approved a mammoth spending plan this month, billboards from the German Aerospace Industries Association popped up in rail stations boasting, “Defense made in Germany. For Germany’s independence.” European arms makers, eyeing a bump from the extra money being redirected to defense, have called on the E.U. to spend more on E.U. manufacturers.

Homegrown options

The E.U. executive branch has unveiled plans for a $163 billion loan program to help fast-track a military spending spree and joint procurement.

E.U. members can spend their national resources as they please, but the E.U. is prioritizing weapons made in the bloc. To qualify for this financing, at least 65 percent of the product’s cost would have to be spent in the E.U., Norway or Ukraine. The loans would be limited to defense companies headquartered in the bloc or countries that sign defense agreements with it, a list that doesn’t include the U.S.

Complex weapons systems in which a supplier has “design authority” that restricts how it’s used and whether certain components can be substituted — for example, the U.S. Patriot air and missile defense system by Raytheon — would be ineligible.

Explaining the rationale, an E.U. official said, “It would be a real problem if whatever equipment acquired by the member states cannot be used for their own defense, because somebody will object.”

European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas meets with, from left, Portuguese Prime Minister Luís Montenegro, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic and European Council President António Costa at an E.U. summit in Brussels on Thursday. (Stephanie Lecocq/Reuters)

E.U. foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas pointed to limitations on Ukraine’s use of weapons made abroad. “We have this opportunity window to really build up the European defense industry,” she told reporters. “In times of crisis, your military needs to really have free hands.”

It’s a boost for France, a major European arms exporter, which has long sought to limit new defense spending to E.U. companies, an approach opposed by countries such as the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, where industries are closely interlinked with manufacturers outside the bloc.

While some continue to extol the virtues of the transatlantic arms partnership and hope it persists, many also want to diversify and work more closely with others such as Britain, Norway and Turkey.

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson told reporters Thursday that he didn’t see U.S. weapons purchases as a security risk. Still, he said, European nations “would do well from being a little less dependent on the U.S. defense industry.”

Weaning off

An E.U. diplomat said some policymakers believed the bloc should “partially, if necessary,” keep new defense funding initiatives open to U.S. companies. “We are still very much dependent, whatever people say, for the next 10 years, for our security, on American presence in Europe,” he said, “be it their intelligence capabilities, their strategic heavy airlifts.”

While Europe makes alternatives for equipment such as combat aircraft, the defense sector is largely fragmented across the continent and doesn’t match the capacity of America’s behemoth industry. Building up key capabilities can take years.

“We’re in a very unconventional moment in history,” said Keith Webster, a former Pentagon official who heads the Defense and Aerospace Council of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. “So I can understand where any nation buying from the United States would begin to think about the possibilities of being denied the ability to sustain a program.”

Still, officials and analysts say, there are other reasons to expect that Europe won’t be too quick to move away from American hardware.

Large U.S. defense firms, which have broad support in Congress and influence with the White House, will lobby to maintain their domination of global markets. U.S. arms sales reached a record high in 2024. Government-to-government sales totaled $118 billion, up 46 percent from the year before, and direct commercial sales hit $201 billion. With a dip in Russian sales, France now ranks second.

The widespread sales of U.S. arms pose another challenge: It’s difficult for NATO allies to wean themselves if they want to maintain interoperability. Many Eastern European nations are only slowly phasing out their Soviet-era arsenals. It’s also tricky for countries that are rushing to buy off-the shelf systems to beef up quickly, such as Poland and the Baltic states bordering Russia.

“So if they’re serious about equipping Ukraine, if they’re serious about equipping themselves in a way that they haven’t today, they’re going to have to buy U.S.,” Webster said.

Ryan and Birnbaum reported from Washington. Beatriz Ríos in Brussels and Kate Brady in Berlin contributed to this report.

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The comments express significant concern over the shift in European defense spending away from U.S. weapons systems, largely attributing it to distrust in the current U.S. administration under President Trump. Many commenters believe this shift will weaken NATO and global... Show more

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By Ellen Francis

Ellen Francis is The Washington Post’s Brussels bureau chief, covering the European Union and NATO.

By Missy Ryan

Missy Ryan writes about national security and defense for The Washington Post. She joined The Post in 2014 and has written about the Pentagon and the State Department. She has reported from Iraq, Ukraine, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Chile.

By Michael Birnbaum

Michael Birnbaum is a White House correspondent for The Washington Post, covering the Trump presidency. He previously covered national security and diplomacy from Washington and served more than a decade in Europe as The Post’s bureau chief in Brussels, Moscow and Berlin. He joined The Post in 2008. Send him secure tips on Signal at @mbwp.01.follow on X@michaelbirnbaum

17. Seung-Whan Choi: The US should learn from the Korean War when negotiating with Ukraine

The Korean War remains relevent to this day.

Excerpts:

The potential agreement between Trump and Zelenskyy could be even more beneficial than that of Eisenhower and Rhee. This is because Ukraine has significant deposits of natural resources, such as titanium, graphite, lithium and uranium, which are vital for America’s national security. In contrast, South Korea did not provide such an abundance of valuable minerals.

Trump could establish a mutual defense agreement with Zelenskyy. This would not be an unreasonable proposition, considering the U.S. already pledged a security guarantee to Ukraine upon its return of all nuclear warheads to Russia by 1996, based on the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.

After an armistice, Trump might reconsider his stance, which is not uncommon in international relations. For instance, Jimmy Carter as president unilaterally annulled the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan. This treaty was designed to protect Taiwan from invasion by China but was terminated on Jan. 1, 1980, just one year after the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

Moreover, numerous scholars observe that military alliances are not always upheld during war. In a worst-case scenario, Washington might choose to overlook a mutual defense agreement with Zelenskyy, though I hope that will not happen.

Seung-Whan Choi: The US should learn from the Korean War when negotiating with Ukraine

By Seung-Whan Choi

PUBLISHED: March 23, 2025 at 5:00 AM CDT

Chicago Tribune · by Seung-Whan Choi · March 23, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent contentious meeting with President Donald Trump raised eyebrows among many Americans. Vice President JD Vance called the Ukrainian president “disrespectful,” but the circumstances of the meeting in the Oval Office were not unusual in diplomatic history.

When Dwight Eisenhower took office intending to end the Korean War quickly, he found himself at odds with then-South Korean President Syngman Rhee.

Elected in November 1952, Eisenhower promised a swift conclusion to the conflict, whereas Rhee opposed this approach, advocating for the reunification of North and South Korea by force. Rhee insisted on securing a mutual defense treaty with the U.S. if his military plans could not be implemented.

Eisenhower faced significant challenges in negotiating the armistice agreement, which took seven months. He assumed office Jan. 20, 1953, and the ceasefire deal was signed on July 27. During this period, Rhee proved to be a major obstacle for Eisenhower.

Concerned that Rhee might sabotage the negotiations, Eisenhower considered three options: overthrowing the “often unreliable ally” (Rhee), negotiating a bilateral security pact with South Korea or withdrawing U.S. troops.

The first option, known as Operation Ever-ready, received serious consideration from U.S. officials in mid-1953 as a potential solution to Rhee’s objections to parts of the proposed armistice agreement. However, this option was never put into action.

Eisenhower recognized that Rhee preferred the second option — negotiating a bilateral security pact with the U.S.— to deter potential attacks from the North following the ceasefire.

The third option, pulling out American troops, was impractical for the U.S., as substantial military resources had already been committed since the beginning of the war. Withdrawing American soldiers and potentially losing to communism would have been more damaging for the U.S. than for South Korea.

At that time, South Koreans constituted about 60% of United Nations troops. Rhee even threatened to withdraw South Korean forces from the U.N. coalitions to undermine America’s efforts toward a truce agreement.

To pressure Eisenhower, Rhee released anti-communist prisoners of war without consulting the U.S. These anti-communist POWs were individuals conscripted by the communist North after the war began, who had since expressed their loyalty to the democratic South. Upon the ceasefire, the North demanded their return, asserting they belonged to their military; the South objected on humanitarian and political grounds.

Rhee’s release of these anti-communist POWs was a major event that could have derailed the armistice negotiations. Eisenhower was taken aback.

The POWs event prompted Eisenhower to seriously consider the second option of establishing a mutual defense treaty with South Korea. He sent his assistant secretary of state, Walter Robertson, as a special envoy to South Korea. In the end, the two leaders reached an agreement to secure an armistice in exchange for the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty and economic assistance. The armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953, followed by the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty on Oct. 1, 1953.

Despite this, the rift between Eisenhower and Rhee was not resolved after the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 30, 1954, the two presidents met at the White House. Eisenhower urged Rhee to establish normal diplomatic relations with Japan. Rhee refused, citing that Japan had justified its brutal 36-year colonial rule over Korea in the name of industrialization. Eisenhower countered that the past should be left behind and that both countries needed to move forward. Rhee said that would not happen in his lifetime.

Eisenhower became so furious that he abruptly left the meeting. When he returned shortly after, Rhee quickly stood up and exited the room.

Astonishingly, just four months later, Eisenhower granted Rhee’s wish. Rhee was thrilled to see the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty take effect and secured aid from the U.S.

Eisenhower’s humanitarian diplomacy, which prioritized the interests of vulnerable Koreans, ultimately proved effective.

In 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson requested Park Chung-hee to deploy South Korean troops to Vietnam, the South Korean president agreed to his request.

Over the course of eight years, from 1965 to 1973, about 300,000 South Korean soldiers, averaging around 50,000 each year, fought alongside U.S. forces in the Vietnam War, conducting 563,387 military operations. More than 5,000 South Korean soldiers were killed in action, with more than 10,000 wounded.

It is time for Trump to reflect on the complex and nuanced nature of international diplomacy.

The potential agreement between Trump and Zelenskyy could be even more beneficial than that of Eisenhower and Rhee. This is because Ukraine has significant deposits of natural resources, such as titanium, graphite, lithium and uranium, which are vital for America’s national security. In contrast, South Korea did not provide such an abundance of valuable minerals.

Trump could establish a mutual defense agreement with Zelenskyy. This would not be an unreasonable proposition, considering the U.S. already pledged a security guarantee to Ukraine upon its return of all nuclear warheads to Russia by 1996, based on the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.

After an armistice, Trump might reconsider his stance, which is not uncommon in international relations. For instance, Jimmy Carter as president unilaterally annulled the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan. This treaty was designed to protect Taiwan from invasion by China but was terminated on Jan. 1, 1980, just one year after the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

Moreover, numerous scholars observe that military alliances are not always upheld during war. In a worst-case scenario, Washington might choose to overlook a mutual defense agreement with Zelenskyy, though I hope that will not happen.

Seung-Whan Choi teaches Korean politics and international relations at the University of Illinois Chicago. A retired Army officer, he is the author of four books and 60 journal articles.

Submit a letter, of no more than 400 words, to the editor here or email letters@chicagotribune.com.

Chicago Tribune · by Seung-Whan Choi · March 23, 2025

18. Europe’s War in Ukraine – The Continent’s Risky Task of Keeping Kyiv in the Fight—and Defending Itself

Excerpt:

The fundamental question underpinning Europe’s ability to shoulder the burden of its security—beyond the extent to which this effort is actively obstructed by U.S. policy—is will. As already mentioned, funding existing European commitments to NATO would have brought spending above three percent of GDP for most members. Achieving a rapid expansion of defense industrial capability to sustain Ukraine in addition to regenerating military forces would see the cost grow even higher. So far, European states have been reluctant to commit resources. Germany has just announced an increase in defense spending, while the EU more broadly has shifted its debt rules to allow more borrowing for investment in defense. But as with German announcements in 2022, it is not yet clear that these statements will drive an effective process of rearmament. It is up to the Europeans to determine whether they can stomach the cost, but they should not hide behind the claim that they cannot defend Ukraine without the United States. Much depends, however, on whether the United States wants that transition to take place.

Europe’s War in Ukraine

Foreign Affairs · by More by Jack Watling · March 24, 2025

The Continent’s Risky Task of Keeping Kyiv in the Fight—and Defending Itself

Jack Watling

March 24, 2025

Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine, March 2025 Stringer / Reuters

JACK WATLING is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute in London.

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Relations between the United States and its European allies have proved tempestuous during the first two months of the second Trump administration. From his first days back in office, President Donald Trump has emphasized significant disagreements with the European Union, characterizing the bloc as inimical to U.S. interests, while Vice President JD Vance argued at the Munich Security Conference in February that the values of the United States and Europe are diverging. Between the stated ambition of the administration to annex Greenland and the imposition of wide-ranging tariffs, European leaders are bracing for a challenging transatlantic relationship.

The tenor of European concerns, however, changed markedly as the Trump administration began to make its opening forays into an attempt to end Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Following a public confrontation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the White House in February, Trump temporarily stopped providing Ukraine with military-technical assistance and intelligence, coercing Ukraine into accepting a negotiating strategy that excluded Kyiv and its European partners from much of the direct bargaining with Moscow. Despite Russian President Vladimir Putin rebuffing a U.S. proposed cease-fire, Trump has described his interactions with the Kremlin in the most positive of terms, while so far, applying U.S. leverage against only Kyiv. The administration, meanwhile, has been unequivocal that there will be no long-term U.S. commitment to Ukraine and has called into question whether U.S. commitments in Europe will be honored.

As the diplomacy lurches forward uncertainly, the battlefield situation in Ukraine continues to deteriorate. Russian forces have largely pushed Ukrainian forces out of Kursk oblast—territory in Russia that Ukraine had occupied since August 2024—and are now restarting major offensive operations toward the key Ukrainian towns of Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk. Although the Ukrainian military is ensuring that Russia loses many soldiers and much equipment in making these territorial gains, the Ukrainians are also struggling to recruit and train enough personnel to avoid ceding territory. Both countries, meanwhile, are exchanging nightly long-range strikes targeting infrastructure and military logistics.

The risk that the United States may once again sever support has led Kyiv to explore how it can sustain its resistance—and thereby maintain leverage in negotiations—through European assistance alone. Trump has forced Europe to plan on underwriting its own and Ukraine’s security, both for the duration of the war and the peace that follows. The immediate question is whether this is possible. The short answer is both yes and no. Europe has the latent capacity to produce much of the materiel that Ukraine requires to fend off Russia, but it has not prepared effectively to shoulder this burden. It can replace the United States as Ukraine’s primary security provider, but doing so will take time, require difficult collaboration, and be costly. Although those hurdles are real, they are not insurmountable. Embarking upon this undertaking, however, is likely to transform Europe’s relations with the United States.

A PREDICTABLE SURPRISE

Europe should have seen this coming. Going back to the Obama administration, the United States has been consistent in acknowledging that it views its primary security competitor as China. Washington’s growing interest in the Indo-Pacific has meant that successive U.S. administrations have wanted to deprioritize the U.S. commitment to Europe. For that to happen, the Americans have urged European countries to build up their armed forces to ensure conventional deterrence against Russia—and thereby free up American capacity to pivot to Asia.

Up until the second Trump administration, those American demands had been functionally ignored. Although there was some symbolic investment into defense after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and an increase of around 30 percent in European defense spending between 2021 and 2024, Europe has not so far resourced its militaries to a level where they can perform their functions in relation to NATO plans. Even the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, while prompting a great deal of tough rhetoric in Europe, did not push governments to make the necessary investments to regenerate their hollow forces. European leaders were reluctant to bear the cost of this process and feared that a large increase in European defense spending would accelerate the United States’ withdrawal from the continent, making the burden for Europeans permanent.

Hiding from a Russian combat drone in Pokrovsk, Ukraine, March 2025 Iryna Rybakova / Press Service of the 93rd Kholodnyi Yar Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces / Reuters

Europe bears significant blame for not doing more to address U.S. concerns prior to Trump regaining office. But the manner in which Trump has forced the issue has prompted a particularly visceral response in European capitals. Trump could have told NATO members that he would not honor Article 5—the article in the alliance’s charter that insists that an attack on one NATO country is an attack on all—for states that failed to meet their NATO commitments, which would have required around three percent of GDP in defense spending from most members. Such an ultimatum would likely have rankled European capitals, but many would have complied. The United States, after all, would have been simply demanding that these states front the funds for what they had promised to do. Instead, the administration’s withdrawal of support for Ukraine cut much deeper. It risked a rapid deterioration in European security by giving Russia a path to achieving a range of its hostile designs on Ukraine, and it left both European leaders and publics feeling betrayed. European countries no longer trust that the United States will protect their interests, even in the most fundamental areas of security and defense.

The United States now faces an important choice. If it supports and enables the regeneration of Europe’s defense industrial base and does not obstruct Europe’s support for Ukraine, then the United States could achieve its objective of helping Europe manage its own defense and security, allowing Washington to fulfil its long-standing goal of redistributing forces to the Indo-Pacific. But for decades, U.S. defense industrial policy toward Europe has instead aimed at balkanizing and undermining Europe’s own defense industry to encourage U.S. foreign military sales on the continent. The United States has also expected to lead the alliance because its involvement has been necessary for almost any serious military undertaking.

If the United States tries to force a process of European rearmament by compelling European countries to buy more U.S.-made weapons, it will not be successful. Of course, Europe is unable to produce some kinds of critical weapons systems, such as the Patriot air defense system, and will continue to rely on purchases from the United States. But with their publics already distrustful of Washington, European governments will balk at the pressure to buy American. And Europe’s dependence upon the U.S. defense industrial base will not provide a strong foundation for medium- and long-term support to Ukraine or to deter Russia, given the likelihood that the United States will eventually need to divert industrial capacity to address the balance of forces in the Pacific. If the United States uses export controls to try to prevent European manufacturing domestically (many supply chains for microelectronics and components in complex weapons span the Atlantic), then Europe will likely diverge faster from the United States, even at the cost of being armed with less capable weaponry.

AN ORDERLY TRANSITION?

How the United States chooses to shift the burdens of the war onto Europe will shape what the Europeans can accomplish. Much depends on whether the United States wants Ukraine to be able to continue to defend itself as it negotiates or whether Washington is prepared to force Kyiv to settle on any terms.

With good reason, many European governments fear that the Trump administration is fundamentally ambivalent about the course of the war. A Ukrainian defeat or a cease-fire on terms heavily favorable to Russia would force Europe to rearm, which is, after all, a U.S. strategic objective. The United States could negotiate a deal with Russia and then steadily ratchet up pressure on Ukraine until it agrees to the deal’s strictures. Indeed, the United States could try to force Ukraine—and by extension Europe—to comply.

Europe can replace America as Ukraine’s primary security provider.

Washington could, for instance, turn off Kyiv’s Starlink terminals, the satellite communications technology. Starlink has proved essential to the Ukrainian war effort. Its cessation would cause an immediate breakdown in command and control across Ukrainian frontlines, which would be militarily disastrous. Given the scale of Ukraine’s reliance on Starlink, European countries would not be able to quickly compensate for a sudden withdrawal of service in the short term. Starlink is not irreplaceable, and an alternative command-and-control infrastructure can be built. But Ukraine’s current dependence on this system leaves it very exposed.

The United States has tremendous leverage over Ukraine and its European allies when it comes to servicing existing stocks of weapons and equipment. In addition to the military equipment the United States has provided Ukraine, much of the equipment and weapons sent by other Ukrainian partners was also purchased from U.S. defense companies. These include M777 and M109 howitzers, Abrams Main Battle Tanks, Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and M270 multiple-launch rocket systems, F-16 fighter aircraft, and various kinds of armored personnel carriers. It is one thing for the United States to insist that it will not spend on new equipment for Ukraine, but quite another for it to stop maintaining or providing spare parts for equipment already in use. The United States could also forbid European states from purchasing the relevant spare parts and then sending them to Ukraine. Ukraine’s armed forces currently have approximately 4,000 pieces of military equipment awaiting repair, and more are damaged every day in combat. Europe, over time, can transition Ukraine’s military to systems it can support without U.S. help. But if the United States moves aggressively to prevent the maintenance of equipment already given, then Europe will be powerless to arrest the steady demechanization of the Ukrainian military.

As the leading member of the alliance, the United States has provided the bulk of the logistical support, transportation capabilities, and personnel for running military-technical assistance to Ukraine. As in other areas, Europe could not replace this assistance swiftly. The EU can manage logistics at scale within its borders, and European countries have significant assets and capacity to plan and execute operations. But most of the structures for planning and executing military logistics in Europe sit within NATO and have substantial U.S. involvement. Washington could have its staff in the United States European Command gradually transfer control of logistics to European counterparts. But if Washington blocked its staff from assisting such a handover, then Europe would need to replicate the existing structures rather than replace U.S. personnel in NATO posts. This would significantly complicate the process.

CONTINENTAL COHERENCE

Another major impediment to Europe taking the reins from the United States is the continent’s lack of cohesion. Take, for instance, the European defense industry. Although European defense companies have the relevant expertise to produce most classes of equipment necessary to sustain Ukraine’s war effort, almost all European countries procure too few of these platforms to ensure a meaningful return on investment for those companies without selling at an inflated cost. With no expectation of receiving big orders, European manufacturers tend to have small facilities and face hostile regulation when it comes to expansion. Addressing this challenge requires continental collaboration to expand the size of orders at each step in the supply chain and reassure firms that they’ll get a good return on investment if they enlarge their facilities and capacities.

Although the European Union’s financial clout and regulatory support will be essential to expanding Europe’s defense industrial base, EU member states will need to work with the United Kingdom, Norway, and Ukraine itself, without letting discussions get derailed by non-defense-related issues. Diplomats will have to compartmentalize lingering disputes. Parochial spats between France and the United Kingdom about fisheries, for instance, or between Poland and Ukraine about agriculture should not be allowed to scupper the process.

NATO is also a source of tension. Investment in Europe’s defense industrial base would significantly strengthen NATO’s resilience and ability to sustain large-scale combat operations, but continuing to give more equipment and stores to Ukraine will come at the expense of European readiness to execute NATO’s plans for the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area. For countries bordering Russia, this is a very uncomfortable situation. Moreover, Hungary and others could act as spoilers and block pragmatic solutions within the EU. To maintain European cohesion, therefore, European governments will need to collectively recognize that some countries will face immediate risks for which they have greater defense needs than others, and so the task of supporting Ukraine should fall disproportionately on Western European states.

Ukrainian soldiers near Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, February 2025 Oleg Petrasiuk / Press Service of the 24th King Danylo / Reuters

Only if Europe can rationalize supply chains across the continent and achieve economies of scale in defense production will it have the capacity to meet Ukraine’s needs. Under the current system, in which countries compete with one another for parts and supplies—thereby driving up the prices of defense materiel—Europe will fail. Consider artillery ammunition. In 2023, Ukraine received approximately 1.6 million 155mm artillery rounds from its international partners, including the United States. In 2024, Ukraine received approximately 1.5 million rounds. Analysts believe Ukraine needs 2.4 million rounds per year to prevent further Russian advances. That disparity seems to suggest that without U.S. supply, Europe cannot sufficiently back Ukraine.

But Europe is not using its capacity as well as it could. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the actual forging and filling capacity for 155mm shells is 16 times greater than at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Despite this increase in capacity, there has been no concurrent increase in production as the United Kingdom has not placed the orders. That is in part because Europedoes not produce enough explosives, so that although manufacturers can make the shells, they struggle to source propellent charges for them. Another British defense firm, however, has been trying to significantly expand its explosive-powder plant since 2022, only to have its proposals turned down multiple times by a local council. Central government has done nothing to pressure the council to abandon its parochialism. If permission were granted, propellent production could grow in a matter of months. The picture is quite similar across the continent. Europe may not be able to get to 2.4 million rounds in 2025, but with greater coordination and determination, it could replace U.S. contributions by the end of the year.

Europe will seriously struggle to meet Ukraine’s needs in several areas. It can do very little to replace the U.S.-made interceptors used in Ukraine’s Patriot air defense batteries, the only system able to intercept Russian aeroballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles. Most of the damage Russia inflicts on Ukraine, however, is caused by cruise missiles that can be intercepted with European arms, such as SAMP/T and IRIS-T missiles, and most Russian ballistic missile strikes are against targets that are not defended by Patriots. With European backing, Ukraine could find ways to minimize the impact of Russia’s relatively few ballistic missile strikes and, in turn, target the supply chains that undergird the production of Russian ballistic missiles. In short, even where Europe cannot compensate for the United States, the consequences need not be catastrophic.

NO EXCUSES

The fundamental question underpinning Europe’s ability to shoulder the burden of its security—beyond the extent to which this effort is actively obstructed by U.S. policy—is will. As already mentioned, funding existing European commitments to NATO would have brought spending above three percent of GDP for most members. Achieving a rapid expansion of defense industrial capability to sustain Ukraine in addition to regenerating military forces would see the cost grow even higher. So far, European states have been reluctant to commit resources. Germany has just announced an increase in defense spending, while the EU more broadly has shifted its debt rules to allow more borrowing for investment in defense. But as with German announcements in 2022, it is not yet clear that these statements will drive an effective process of rearmament. It is up to the Europeans to determine whether they can stomach the cost, but they should not hide behind the claim that they cannot defend Ukraine without the United States. Much depends, however, on whether the United States wants that transition to take place.

JACK WATLING is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute in London.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Jack Watling · March 24, 2025

19. The Coming Global Health Crisis – America Is Retreating, and China Won’t Fill the Void

There is no longer a belief in the public good.

Excerpts:

When the Trump administration’s 90-day review of U.S. foreign assistance ends on April 19, it is unclear what will remain of the global health ecosystem that U.S. leadership painstakingly built over the past 25 years. For one thing, whatever the United States does next, the disruption it began will continue to spread. Argentina, echoing Trump, withdrew from the WHO earlier this month, and Hungary and Russia have reportedly explored doing the same. The United Kingdom, the largest donor to Gavi, recently announced that it would slash development assistance from 0.5 percent of GDP to 0.3 percent by 2027 in order to increase defense spending in response to the wavering U.S. commitment to Ukraine. France’s cash-strapped minority government has proposed cutting its aid budget by up to 40 percent. The recently elected German government may find it hard to sustain Germany’s commitment to the WHO amid growing economic pressure and higher defense spending. Facing low consumer confidence, a long-running real estate crisis, and an escalating trade war with the United States, China has signaled it will concentrate its dollars less on foreign aid and more on advancing “high-quality development and high-level security” at home. The Gates Foundation, though a possible source of additional funding, traditionally favors earmarked contributions (such as for polio eradication) rather than general support for WHO operations. Local governments are exploring how to shoulder more of the burden, but this may not be possible everywhere, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where countries spend, on average, just $92 per person on health each year.

In this environment, there is a real risk that China will seek to exploit the disruption in U.S. foreign assistance to strengthen relations with key Southeast Asian and Latin American nations. But the greater risk to Americans and people around the world is that for most diseases in most places, U.S. support for global health will be replaced by nothing at all.

Some specific U.S. disease programs may survive, such as the distribution of anti-malarial bed nets, and antiviral therapy and drugs to prevent the transmission of HIV from mother to child. But as U.S. health security programs dissolve and multilateral health institutions struggle to pay their bills, the intricate network of disease prevention, detection, and response that protects everyone—Americans included—risks unraveling. By dismantling this architecture of vigilance, the United States will create blind spots where emerging diseases can incubate before they arrive fully fledged on the country’s doorstep. That will create an illusion of safety—until it is too late.

The Coming Global Health Crisis

Foreign Affairs · by More by Thomas J. Bollyky · March 24, 2025

America Is Retreating, and China Won’t Fill the Void

March 24, 2025

Preparing antiretroviral drugs in Nairobi, Kenya, February 2025 Thomas Mukoya / Reuters

THOMAS J. BOLLYKY is Bloomberg Chair in Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations.

YANZHONG HUANG is Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations.

• More by Yanzhong Huang

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Critics of the Trump administration’s early actions on global health—withdrawing from the World Health Organization (WHO) and paralyzing U.S.-funded international health programs—fear that those moves will cede Washington’s longstanding leadership role to Beijing. American power and prestige, they charge, will wane, and China’s will grow.

The reality is worse. A U.S. retreat on global health, if sustained, will indeed open the door for China to exploit the abrupt, chaotic withdrawal of U.S. programs in some strategic regions. China is already providing replacement funding in Southeast Asia, and it may do the same in Latin America. But in most of the places that U.S. aid targets, including those at the greatest risk from disease, China will not step in. China’s leaders are focused on using aid to build influence with strategic partners; they have no desire to take up the U.S. role in preventing, detecting, and responding to the world’s most dangerous diseases.

Without sustained support for either international institutions or health programs in the world’s poorest countries, the result will be a vacuum in global health that will make everyone less safe. The greatest risk to Americans is not that China will supplant the United States as the world’s leader in global health. It is that no one will.

THE HOUSE AMERICA BUILT

For 25 years, U.S. funding, diplomatic heft, and technical expertise have enabled remarkable progress in global health. A slew of international institutions and programs, primarily created and funded by the United States, targets diseases that poor countries cannot fight alone with medical solutions that need scale and infrastructure only an international coalition can provide.

U.S. support for global health is a small part of the country’s domestic budget but a huge part of international health funding. In 2023, U.S. global health spending represented about 0.3 percent of federal spending ($20.6 billion out of the $6.1 trillion U.S. budget). Yet that same year, the United States was responsible for nearly three-quarters of international development assistance for HIV/AIDS, 40 percent of malaria aid, and more than a third of funding to combat tuberculosis. Until this year, the United States was also the single largest funder of the WHO; the biggest provider of vaccines to the multilateral COVID-19 vaccine initiative; and the driving force behind the Pandemic Fund, a World Bank vehicle that invests in low-income nations to prevent infectious disease outbreaks.

Millions of people in the world’s poorest countries benefit from U.S. aid. Organizations and programs funded by the United States, including the WHO, the vaccination alliance known as Gavi, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, provide vaccines, care and treatment, and other lifesaving interventions across the globe. Nearly 21 million people with HIV depend on the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) for lifesaving antiretroviral therapy. Gavi helps immunize nearly 70 million children each year against deadly pediatric illnesses. Nearly three-quarters of bilateral U.S. health aid went to countries in a single region: sub-Saharan Africa.

The returns on these investments have been spectacular. Since PEPFAR began in 2003, global deaths from HIV/AIDS have fallen by more than 50 percent. The number of people dying from tuberculosis and malaria has declined by a third over the same period. In 2000, there were 42 countries, including most of sub-Saharan Africa, where at least one out of ten children died before his or her fifth birthday. Today, there are four such countries.

The benefits from U.S. aid go beyond fewer deaths from specific diseases targeted by individual programs. American aid workers also help the world better prepare for all manner of future health threats. USAID and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have worked with health ministries in 90 countries on developing systems to track outbreaks, from HIV to the H5N1 avian flu. U.S. dollars funded the laboratories, training, and research that enabled scientists to sound the alarm when the first COVID-19 case was identified outside China. An emergency operations center funded by American aid to fight polio helped avert disaster in 2014, when the Ebola virus nearly spread to the densely populated streets of Lagos, Nigeria. And U.S.-funded research developed the vaccine the world currently depends on to stop the spread of mpox.

Each of these experiences comes with a lesson: if outbreaks of deadly diseases are not stopped at the source, they risk spreading across the globe, with devastating results for everyone. Better health in the world’s poorest places means better health for other countries, too, including the United States.

UNHEALTHY RELATIONSHIP

As the United States has abandoned the field of global health, China has started to exploit the ensuing chaos. In Nepal, Chinese officials have reportedly reassured local politicians that Beijing is “willing to assist if Nepal faces challenges in humanitarian aid, health, and education.” In Cambodia, China has announced new funding programs for child health, nutrition, and sanitation and stepped in with a $4.4 million grant to fund the removal of land mines, all in the first six weeks after U.S. President Donald Trump ordered a freeze on USAID funding. In Bangladesh, the director of a local association of development agencies told reporters: “We need to diversify our funding. China is also a good friend of Bangladesh.” And Hu Zhangliang, a vice chairman of the China International Development Cooperation Agency, has promised: “We will not behave like some countries that leave aid recipients feeling helpless, caught off guard, or unprepared.”

Yet China’s recent track record in development assistance does not match its rhetoric. The country has not prioritized multilateral programs, cross-border disease threats, or aid to the poorest countries. It is also skeptical of international global health bodies and has a complex, sometimes strained relationship with the WHO. Those looking for salvation from Beijing are likely to be disappointed.

Take the WHO. Although China was a founding member, it was not until the aftermath of the 2002-3 SARS epidemic that the country began to take its relationship with the organization seriously. China’s Ministry of Health had known of a dangerous new strain of pneumonia in Guangdong Province for months before it shared that information with the Chinese people or other governments. As the SARS epidemic expanded, ultimately spreading to 29 countries and killing nearly 800 people, Gro Brundtland, then the WHO’s director general, publicly rebuked China for its lack of transparency and issued the organization’s first-ever travel advisory, warning against visiting Guangdong and Hong Kong.

Hoping to repair the reputational damage, China stepped up its engagement with the WHO. China joined the WHO’s virtual laboratory network, helped rewrite the organization’s international health regulations, and invested in disease surveillance. In 2006, the former Hong Kong health director Dr. Margaret Chan was elected WHO’s director general—the first Chinese national to lead a major UN organization.

Closer ties paid dividends for China. Since 2017, acting under Chinese pressure, the WHO has shunned Taiwan, abandoning its practice of inviting the country to participate as an observer at the World Health Assembly. In 2017, the WHO signed an agreement with China to jointly implement the country’s development agenda, the Belt and Road Initiative, and, in 2019, the WHO added traditional Chinese medicines to its International Classification of Diseases.

The returns on U.S. investments in global health have been spectacular.

When news emerged of a new coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan in January 2020, the WHO refrained from criticizing Beijing’s response. Caution was hardly surprising: the organization relies on cooperation from member states and prizes solidarity in a crisis. But the deference to China went further than normal. Allegedly under Chinese pressure, the WHO delayed declaring the outbreak a public health emergency of international concern for a week, until late January. China had been slow to share the extent of human-to-human transmission in the crucial early phase of the outbreak and reluctant to provide biological samples to the WHO, but a WHO official praised Beijing for its “openness to sharing information.”

Although this support earned the WHO goodwill in China—WeChat and Weibo users affectionately dubbed the WHO’s Ethiopian director general, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, “Secretary Tan,” a term typically used for Chinese Communist Party officials—it attracted the ire of the United States. Eager to shift the blame for his administration’s flailing response to COVID-19, Trump suspended U.S. funding to the WHO in April 2020 and later announced that the United States would withdraw from the organization. It was too “China-centric,” he declared. Beijing swiftly capitalized on the diplomatic opportunity, pledging an additional $30 million to help make up the shortfall in U.S. funding.

Despite the boost in Chinese funding, the WHO responded to U.S. anger by distancing itself from Beijing. When scientists criticized the preliminary findings of a joint study by the WHO and China on the origins of COVID-19, Tedros departed from the WHO’s typical deference to China. He argued that the study had not ruled out the possibility that the virus had leaked from a Chinese lab, and he encouraged China’s cooperation with a second phase of the investigation. China rejected the request, and the Chinese media accused Tedros of having become “America’s mouthpiece.”

Tensions continued after the pandemic. In 2023, China reportedly balked at a 20 percent increase in its WHO contributions. The same year, Tedros rejected China’s preferred candidate for the post of assistant director general and instead promoted a senior WHO staff member. China has been lukewarm toward a proposed new pandemic treaty, a WHO priority, sending low-ranking officials to the negotiations and adopting what one Chinese observer characterized to us as a “not opposing but not hoping to happen” stance.

Since Trump once again promised to withdraw the United States from the WHO in January, China has seemed reluctant to fully replace the U.S. role. In February, it signaled that it planned to oppose a scheduled increase in member dues that would bring contributions more in line with each country’s GDP. Although China will become the WHO’s largest contributor of assessed funding after the United States withdraws, member state dues accounted for just 12 percent of the organization’s budget in 2023. Beijing is unlikely to make up most of the U.S. contribution, the majority of which consists of voluntary funding.

China’s reluctance to fill the financial hole left by the United States will likely extend to other multilateral institutions, too. So far, Beijing has contributed relatively little to most global health organizations, preferring bilateral approaches over multilateral ones. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing spent an estimated $600 to $800 million annually on health-related foreign aid, with only 10 percent of that total flowing through multilateral channels. China began donating to Gavi in 2016, but its non-COVID funding has amounted to just $25 million over ten years, compared with a U.S. contribution of more than $2 billion in the past five years alone. China’s contributions to the Global Fund are likewise modest: whereas the United States, the fund’s largest donor, has contributed more than $26 billion, China has pitched in just $90 million, behind 21 other governments. Of the $3.6 billion the world contributed to the UN’s Ebola Response Fund, China provided $47 million (just over one percent of the total) while the United States donated $1.8 billion (49 percent).

CHINA FIRST

Many individual countries, like international organizations, will seek China’s help to replace U.S. funding, but recent trends in Beijing’s bilateral aid suggest that most are unlikely to get it. In 2023, China’s bilateral health development assistance—funds that flow directly to recipients rather than through international organizations—declined to its lowest level since 2010. And as its overall spending has fallen, China has concentrated its dollars less on the greatest threats to global health and more on advancing its national interests.

To that end, much of China’s recent health assistance has targeted countries participating in its Belt and Road Initiative. This has meant shifting its earlier support from malaria control aid projects in Africa to infrastructure-driven investments in Southeast Asia and Latin America. China’s aid in Africa has not vanished entirely: it continues to contribute to some high-visibility health projects, such as the newly completed headquarters and a high-security laboratory for the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Addis Ababa. Beijing Genomics Institute, the Chinese genomics research giant, has provided low-cost gene sequencing technology to some African countries for infectious disease surveillance, as part of its efforts to, in its own words, “seize the commanding heights of international biotechnology competition.” But the trend is unmistakable. Fifteen years ago, four of the top five recipients of Chinese health aid were African countries; today only one is.

China’s COVID-19 aid adhered even more closely to the country’s geopolitical interests. Starting in April 2020, China launched a campaign to brand itself a leader of the global pandemic response, sending masks, test kits, medical teams, and, ultimately, vaccines overseas before the United States and most other donors of essential medical supplies did so. But China’s donations went overwhelmingly to countries in its backyard, not to those that needed them most. In the first year after the vaccines became available, China directed nearly three-quarters of its donated doses to Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific. Cambodia received so many Chinese doses that it began re-donating them elsewhere in Asia. Guyana and Nicaragua received Chinese vaccines shortly after reaffirming the “one-China” principle or switching their diplomatic recognition to China over Taiwan during the pandemic. While the Biden administration also earmarked some of the earliest U.S. vaccine doses for the strategic Indo-Pacific region, more donated U.S. vaccines in the first year went to the regions where death rates were highest (Latin America) or supplies were lowest (sub-Saharan Africa).

THE SOUND OF SILENCE

When the Trump administration’s 90-day review of U.S. foreign assistance ends on April 19, it is unclear what will remain of the global health ecosystem that U.S. leadership painstakingly built over the past 25 years. For one thing, whatever the United States does next, the disruption it began will continue to spread. Argentina, echoing Trump, withdrew from the WHO earlier this month, and Hungary and Russia have reportedly explored doing the same. The United Kingdom, the largest donor to Gavi, recently announced that it would slash development assistance from 0.5 percent of GDP to 0.3 percent by 2027 in order to increase defense spending in response to the wavering U.S. commitment to Ukraine. France’s cash-strapped minority government has proposed cutting its aid budget by up to 40 percent. The recently elected German government may find it hard to sustain Germany’s commitment to the WHO amid growing economic pressure and higher defense spending. Facing low consumer confidence, a long-running real estate crisis, and an escalating trade war with the United States, China has signaled it will concentrate its dollars less on foreign aid and more on advancing “high-quality development and high-level security” at home. The Gates Foundation, though a possible source of additional funding, traditionally favors earmarked contributions (such as for polio eradication) rather than general support for WHO operations. Local governments are exploring how to shoulder more of the burden, but this may not be possible everywhere, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where countries spend, on average, just $92 per person on health each year.

In this environment, there is a real risk that China will seek to exploit the disruption in U.S. foreign assistance to strengthen relations with key Southeast Asian and Latin American nations. But the greater risk to Americans and people around the world is that for most diseases in most places, U.S. support for global health will be replaced by nothing at all.

Some specific U.S. disease programs may survive, such as the distribution of anti-malarial bed nets, and antiviral therapy and drugs to prevent the transmission of HIV from mother to child. But as U.S. health security programs dissolve and multilateral health institutions struggle to pay their bills, the intricate network of disease prevention, detection, and response that protects everyone—Americans included—risks unraveling. By dismantling this architecture of vigilance, the United States will create blind spots where emerging diseases can incubate before they arrive fully fledged on the country’s doorstep. That will create an illusion of safety—until it is too late.

THOMAS J. BOLLYKY is Bloomberg Chair in Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations.

YANZHONG HUANG is Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Thomas J. Bollyky · March 24, 2025

20. Things Worth Remembering: America Is an Invention

This is very much worth the few minutes to read and to remind yourself of our great nation and the pursuit of a more perfect union in this great American experiment.

Excerpts:

And yes, it may happen that America is cruel to those who cross the Atlantic, but nevertheless: For so many people, for so many years, America has been the last, best hope. The rest of the West sees its future in America. No other society has imagined so much, or made and remade itself so frequently. It was Americans who first enabled a human being to fly, Americans who put a man on the moon. It was America that brought electric light into the homes of ordinary people, in the form of Thomas Edison’s bulb. And it was America that brought joy into sitting rooms around the world, with its dazzling entertainment industry. Europe has great pastry, but it hasn’t invented a tech “unicorn” to rival the likes of Google or OpenAI.

There is something about the forever-young society of the world’s oldest continuously democratic country, itself a moon shot launched from older British traditions. It is worth remembering that today, as the latest administration reinvents the nation in a frenzy, America remains a beacon for people all over the world.

Leutze painted, more than 150 years ago, an image of hope in an age of division. He was inspired by Berkeley’s vision, almost 300 years ago, of a new world that did not yet exist. His mural is still there in the Capitol, though the lawmakers filing into the House of Representatives, heads bowed over their phones, may take it for granted. The potential and possibility of America is still there. This land remains as it was in Berkeley’s final, and most famous, stanza: a final frontier, where those who dare may find—and build—a new world.

Westward the course of empire takes its way;

The first four acts already past,

A fifth shall close the drama with the day;

Time’s noblest offspring is the last.

Things Worth Remembering: America Is an Invention

For centuries, poets, musicians, and painters have crossed the Atlantic with dreams of a New World. George Berkeley was one of them. And so was I.

By Dominic Green

03.23.25 — Things Worth Remembering

https://www.thefp.com/p/america-is-an-invention

The Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way mural in the U.S. Capitol. (Emanuel Leutze)

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-9:03

Welcome to Things Worth Remembering, in which writers recall wisdom from the past that we should commit to heart. In today’s edition, Dominic Green tells the story of a mural that was painted in the U.S. Capitol during the American Civil War—and of the poem it was based on.

It was the first major clash of the American Civil War. In the rolling hills of northern Virginia, some 60,000 soldiers gathered to fight the First Battle of Bull Run. Nearly 5,000 of them would become casualties. Up and down the country, a divided society realized that a long and bloody conflict lay ahead.

The month was July, the year 1861. Thirty miles to the east, in Washington, D.C., a middle-aged German artist climbed a ladder in the Capitol Building—and started painting a mural.

His name was Emanuel Leutze, and what he produced was an American epic, 20 feet high and 30 feet wide, depicting a wagon train of pioneers cresting a bluff and seeing their destination, the Golden Gate of San Francisco Bay. Two men push the wheel of a cart that is close to toppling, on their way up the snaking, rocky path. A woman in a dark green dress clutches her baby in a blanket. A red-shirted man with a thick ginger beard stands in his stirrups to see the sun setting on this new world. On the down slope, two men open the path for the next stage of the journey by hacking at a fallen tree with alternating blows of their axes.

The margins of the mural carry portraits of Daniel Boone, who explored Kentucky, and William Clark, who surveyed the Oregon Territory with Meriwether Lewis. A decade earlier, Leutze had painted the magnificent Washington Crossing the Delaware. But in this mural, the heroes are the anonymous emigrants who traveled in the famous explorers’ wake, across the desert and the mountains to the gates of the West.

One figure who is seen looking away from the sunset is a freed slave, who calms a mule, staring into the distance over the viewer’s right shoulder. Lodged in the very center of the mural, he is thought to be a late addition, representing a recent development: The mural was finished in November 1862, two months after Abraham Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. And so it alludes simultaneously to the great hope at the heart of American history and to its darker chapters; it represents those who chose to go west across the Atlantic and those who were forced. It shows the invention of America by its pioneers, and the violent reinvention of America that was taking place while the artist was up his ladder.

And ultimately, it looks to the future. The eye is drawn to a man in the background of the painting, scrambling up the vertical rock face, an American flag in one hand. We see that he intends to plant the Stars and Stripes on the summit—but he hasn’t quite reached it yet. Along the top, Leutze painted a curved blue riband, trimmed in gold. On it, he printed the mural’s title in golden letters: Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way.

Leutze himself had traveled westward, though by boat rather than wagon. Born in Württemberg, in Central Europe, he had crossed the Atlantic at the age of 9—about the same age as the boy he painted here sitting on a bullock, his bow and arrows on his lap, and his prize, a rabbit, in his hand. But the title of the mural belongs to another pioneer. It comes from a poem by the Anglo Irish bishop and philosopher George Berkeley—the man who gave his name to a college at Yale University, and to an entire university on the West Coast.

In 1728, nearly a century before Leutze’s birth, Berkeley sailed westward across the Atlantic. That same year, he wrote some “Verses on the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America.” The poem is a less-than-fond farewell to the hopeless continent of his birth. It begins:

The Muse, disgusted at an age and clime

Barren of every glorious theme,

In distant lands now waits a better time,

Producing subjects worthy fame.

Berkeley had always been a traveler; like most wealthy young British men, he made a “grand tour” of Europe before beginning university. But he wrote this poem as a middle-aged man no longer inspired, it seems, by the old capitals and overbearing past of a small continent. When he sailed for New England and settled in Rhode Island, he sought the new horizons that Leutze would capture in the mural he painted over a hundred years later.

I know the feeling. I grew up in London in a family of jazz musicians, so I grew up listening to America. I also crossed the ocean—as a young adult, encountering the Statue of Liberty wreathed in mist at dawn, like so many immigrants have done. I wasn’t in steerage; I was working my passage as a musician on an ocean liner. Later, I would raise a family in America, and become a citizen.

I moved back to the UK recently, but as I look across the pond, I still see the promise of my America, and everyone’s America. There, Berkeley wrote, “There shall be sung another golden age,”

Not such as Europe breeds in her decay;

Such as she bred when fresh and young,

When heavenly flame did animate her clay. . . 

Berkeley was a pioneer in another sense, becoming perhaps the first American philosopher. He believed in spirit over matter, in potential and possibility. He told the English writer Samuel Johnson that reality was immaterial. And though Johnson responded by kicking a rock and saying, “I refute it thus,” the rest of the world still sees America as Berkeley would have: as an idea. In fact, it is a land of ideas.

And yes, it may happen that America is cruel to those who cross the Atlantic, but nevertheless: For so many people, for so many years, America has been the last, best hope. The rest of the West sees its future in America. No other society has imagined so much, or made and remade itself so frequently. It was Americans who first enabled a human being to fly, Americans who put a man on the moon. It was America that brought electric light into the homes of ordinary people, in the form of Thomas Edison’s bulb. And it was America that brought joy into sitting rooms around the world, with its dazzling entertainment industry. Europe has great pastry, but it hasn’t invented a tech “unicorn” to rival the likes of Google or OpenAI.

There is something about the forever-young society of the world’s oldest continuously democratic country, itself a moon shot launched from older British traditions. It is worth remembering that today, as the latest administration reinvents the nation in a frenzy, America remains a beacon for people all over the world.

Leutze painted, more than 150 years ago, an image of hope in an age of division. He was inspired by Berkeley’s vision, almost 300 years ago, of a new world that did not yet exist. His mural is still there in the Capitol, though the lawmakers filing into the House of Representatives, heads bowed over their phones, may take it for granted. The potential and possibility of America is still there. This land remains as it was in Berkeley’s final, and most famous, stanza: a final frontier, where those who dare may find—and build—a new world.

Westward the course of empire takes its way;

The first four acts already past,

A fifth shall close the drama with the day;

Time’s noblest offspring is the last.

Things Worth Remembering will be back in your inbox next Sunday. In last week’s edition, Sean Fischer—the author of a viral and heartbreaking piece about his mom being misdiagnosed with Alzheimer’s—wrote about why “Death Is a Friend.”

​21. US Military: Praetorian Guard or Non-Partisan Policy Instrument?

E​xcertps:

It is important to note that simply, every US military officer’s authority is not separate from – rather derived – from the President’s role as the Commander-in-Chief as expressed in Article II of the Constitution and exercises delegated authority within regulations established by Congress. As such, officers serve at the pleasure of the President. This is equally true for military officers placed in or removed from positions of trust and confidence by their superiors throughout military chains of command. Picking the right leader at the right time and for the right context matters for maintaining warfighting effectiveness.

The military profession subordinates personal views, ego, and institutional preferences to a role within a constitutional system to which they swear. This means despite the forever shifting tides of politics, rise in societal division, or one’s personal political beliefs, one remains a non-partisan instrument directed by others. There is no disagreement with Sobchak that current political dynamics will test civil-military relations in ways not seen for decades. This can be very difficult, especially for those senior military leaders that are intimately close Presidential decision making.

The US military must maintain true faith and allegiance to our system of government and avoid any action, perceived or real, that undermines the principle of civil control of the military. This includes strict adherence to regulating rules outlined in the Uniformed Code of Military Justice created by Congress. Trust that the Constitution provides for a system that accounts for and is resilient to social, political, and economic disruptions in government, across our land or in the international arena. The military is not a praetorian guard and must avoid politicization and forever preserve civil control of the military in both words and deeds.

US Military: Praetorian Guard or Non-Partisan Policy Instrument?

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/24/us-military-praetorian-guard-or-non-partisan-policy-instrument/

by Dr. Charlie Black

|

03.24.2025 at 06:00am

A recent Small Wars Journal article by Frank Sobchak offers a look at the current civil-military relations. Sobchak argues that given President Trump’s tendencies and past behavior that he will inevitably issue illegal orders that threaten to misuse the US military. As such, senior military leaders should prepare in advance for how they will respond to this eventuality. This essay argues that any preemptive actions would be an egregious breech in the special trust and confidence bestowed  by the Commander in Chief and incongruent with Congressional power to regulate the military. The US military was never intended to be a praetorian guard and – as S.L.A Marshal wrote – is not “the sole repository of national honor and national morality.”

The pendulum of politics in our republic perpetually swings back and forth, expressing the change in collective will of our people. Despite the shifting political landscape, our elected leaders must consider the totality of competing issues and craft and implement policies to address those issues, while always remaining accountable to the American people.

Within this complex context, the uniformed military profession must remain non-partisan while also remaining subordinate to civilian direction. The reality is that senior military leaders are appointed and confirmed to assume positions that directly influence and, when directed, implement policy related to military matters. However, it is not the senior military leader, but rather the elected officials who directly exercise the powers vested by the American people.

Within this civil-military framework, the US military is not a praetorian guard—it does not get a formal vote in policymaking. Their role is limited to advising on military matters, and when directed, to perform actions which are directed under the authority of the US’s national command authority. Likewise, the military does not self-determine how and when it will be used. Our history, much like that of other states, reveals a meandering path of successful steps and missteps in military advice, policy recommendations, and the implementation of policy.

Historical View of US Civil-Military Relations

The nature of civil-military relations is often tumultuous. For example, dispassionately consider the larger context of US civil-military relations in time and place. Many historical episodes in our nation’s past have been characterized by visceral politics, and the use of the US military during those times tested civil-military authority.

During the 19th century, the US Army was used to suppress Native Americans. In the 20th century, the Army was also used to forcibly break domestic labor disputes and to help enforce of civil rights law. More specifically, in 1949, there was the Revolt of the Admirals, whereas in the 1980s the Service Chiefs stoutly resisted what became the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Although this list is not comprehensive, each of the circumstances noted were politically volatile issues in their day. In these and other instances, there was a collision between different interpretations of ethical, legal, and moral dimensions that encumbered relations, yet the power of civilian control was sustained.

The Founding Fathers feared tyranny of the majority and strove to preserve individual liberty by the purposeful distribution of power and placing limits on government. Checks and balances were created to account for possible excesses. Their study of history also suggested a permanent standing armies are dangerous if (and when) they no longer controlled by the elected political leaders. Furthermore, when military leadership decide for themselves what Presidential orders are (or are not) constitutional civil-military control is lost. This should be unthinkable.

Civil-Military Relations Today

Political polarization is reflected in narratives which suggest that the oath of service—which is predicated on the responsibility to support and defend the constitution— might paradoxically justify actions that run afoul of civil control of the military. This is a dangerous perspective. This proposition stands true even if there is a high degree of public discord, political polarization, and diminishment in intra-governmental decorum.

This author offers a counterpoint to Sobchak’s position: presumptively assuming that President Trump will issue unconstitutional, or illegal, orders to the US military sets a very dangerous precedent. Such precedent will subsequently open pandora’s box—any serving military member might well question all orders, at all levels of command. This is a disastrous proposition for an institution that functions under delegated Presidential authority and is built around discipline and order.

The argument can be made that any such preemptive actions reflect a lack of faith and allegiance to our constitutional system, the collapse of good order and discipline, and the loss of civil control over the military. Moreover, the argument can be made that it is either (or both) conspiratorial or treasonous for senior military officers to “have quiet, but professional discussions that wargame what illegal order they might face and to properly react to them.”.

It is never appropriate for the US military’s leaders to discuss hypotheticals about the current civilian leadership’s authority, especially as it relates to orders from the Commander-in-Chief. As an institution, the US military has a role to serve like other elements of the government. Nonetheless, this is not to suggest that a day will not come in which the military will be directed to take actions that it deems unethical or illegal.

Could an order from the Commander-in-Chief be both constitutional and yet morally or ethically disagreeable? Yes. However, senior military leaders should only make judicious decisions about these types of order only if, or when, such orders are issued. If senior military leaders come to believe that they are the arbiter of the legal, moral or constitutional powers of any branch of government, the military will have broken from necessary civilian control. The levers of checks and balances are not in the hands of the military, nor should they be.

The Constitution and National Security

Making sense of the current context of civil-military relations may benefit from relooking at the US Constitution relating to National Security. Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution gives Congress the power to “provide for common defense,” and in Clause 11, the power to declare war or authorize the use of military force.

Beginning at the end of WWII and sustained by the National Security Act, the US has found reason to maintain a very large military enterprise even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which justified a large-scale, standing military. Many argue this circumstance is necessary to keep us safe in a dangerous world. Perhaps a discussion for another essay. Alternatively, many Americans lack trust in the institutional power and politicization of the military.

Article II, Sect 2, Clause 1 states the President shall be Commander-in-Chief and directs the military, whereas Congress funds and provides authority for the use of force. The US Constitution frames shared and divided powers related to war. However, as Howard Shuman writes, the conflict between the two branches over war-making powers is an “enduring problem that flares up” throughout our history. It is inappropriate for the military to engage in this struggle.

The Supreme Court has shown great deference to the power of Congress relating to its enumerated power to make rules for the “regulations of the land and naval forces.” The Court has argued that “[t]he military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian, and further stating that “the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those (protections)” that are guaranteed to all other citizens.

The limits placed on government by our founders included military institutions and its delegated power. Samuel Huntington’s work on civil-military relations illuminates the challenge consequent to the rise of a military profession, arguing that in time, institutions form their own norms and traditions that evolve over time. For many reasons, there is a growing divide between our civilian and miliary society with difference in interests, beliefs, and norms. The military should endeavor to remain connected to the people it ultimately serves.

Military Profession and Its Authority

It is important to note that simply, every US military officer’s authority is not separate from – rather derived – from the President’s role as the Commander-in-Chief as expressed in Article II of the Constitution and exercises delegated authority within regulations established by Congress. As such, officers serve at the pleasure of the President. This is equally true for military officers placed in or removed from positions of trust and confidence by their superiors throughout military chains of command. Picking the right leader at the right time and for the right context matters for maintaining warfighting effectiveness.

The military profession subordinates personal views, ego, and institutional preferences to a role within a constitutional system to which they swear. This means despite the forever shifting tides of politics, rise in societal division, or one’s personal political beliefs, one remains a non-partisan instrument directed by others. There is no disagreement with Sobchak that current political dynamics will test civil-military relations in ways not seen for decades. This can be very difficult, especially for those senior military leaders that are intimately close Presidential decision making.

The US military must maintain true faith and allegiance to our system of government and avoid any action, perceived or real, that undermines the principle of civil control of the military. This includes strict adherence to regulating rules outlined in the Uniformed Code of Military Justice created by Congress. Trust that the Constitution provides for a system that accounts for and is resilient to social, political, and economic disruptions in government, across our land or in the international arena. The military is not a praetorian guard and must avoid politicization and forever preserve civil control of the military in both words and deeds.

Tags: civil military relations, civilian control of military, constitution

About The Author

• 
  
• Dr. Charlie Black
• Dr. Charlie Black is the Co-Founder and Managing Partner at Xundis Global, LLC which specializes in helping clients navigate complexity and change. He is a scholar-practitioners who holds a PhD in Humanities from Salve Regina University and is a retired Marine Corps Infantry and Special Operations Officer with over thirty-five years of diverse experience. He currently serves as a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the University of South Florida’s Global National Security Institute and previously served as a Senior Non-Resident Fellow 2018-2022 at the Joint Special Operations University. His scholarly works focus on global complexity, the future of special operations, human insecurity, and integrated statecraft. He holds a Senior Professional position at John Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab and is a frequent speaker on complexity, national security and leadership as culture making.

22. Ukraine’s IT Army is Waging a Crowdsourced Cyber War Against Russia

​Are there lessons for us? Every person a cyber warrior?

Ukraine’s IT Army is Waging a Crowdsourced Cyber War Against Russia

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/24/ukraines-it-army-is-waging-a-crowdsourced-cyber-war-against-russia/

by David Kirichenko

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03.24.2025 at 06:00am

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, cyberattacks have become a routine part of the conflict. Helping lead Ukraine’s cyber offensives is the IT Army of Ukraine, a decentralized hacking force that has launched relentless cyber offensives against Russia’s digital infrastructure. In June 2024, the group claimed responsibility for the largest Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack in history, crippling Russian banks and disrupting financial networks. But as the war drags on, the IT Army faces a new challenge: how to scale its operations without relying on traditional recruitment methods.

Formed in response to Russia’s invasion from Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, the IT Army quickly amassed hundreds of thousands of volunteers. The attacks carried out by Ukraine’s IT Army rely on a simple tactic: DDoS attacks. These attacks work by flooding a target—such as a website, server, or network—with an overwhelming amount of traffic, rendering it slow, unresponsive, or completely offline.

On their Telegram channel, the IT Army advertises that the “IT ARMY Kit is a simple and effective tool for cyber resistance against Russian aggression.”

To execute a DDoS attack at scale, hackers typically form a botnet—a network of computers and devices that work together to bombard the target with requests. In the case of the IT Army, volunteers contribute their own computing power, effectively turning thousands of individual machines into a coordinated digital weapon. The more devices involved, the more difficult it becomes for the target to withstand the attack.

Nick Kesler, a security expert who has built DDoS-resistant services for years, explained: “The key to sustaining a dedicated DDoS campaign is mimicking real expected traffic as closely as possible and sourcing it from expected customer geographies or IP ranges.”

He adds, “A successful attack must be as varied in nature as possible, with planned shifts over time as defenses are put in place. The goal is to keep defenders on their heels, forcing them to constantly pivot to combat the newest wave.” Kesler also emphasizes the importance of timing: “Coordinating attacks with service or country-specific events can make the effects more impactful and significantly harder to recover from.”

The IT Army estimates that its cyberattacks have inflicted well over a billion dollars in economic damage on Russia. Following a recent cyberattack, the IT Army took to Telegram to declare: “Our actions are starting to look more and more like a Hollywood hacker movie, just without the popcorn.” The IT Army also managed to take down Moscow’s largest internet provider for ten days. Celebrating the success, they remarked: “Is that a record already, or not yet?”

“While not garnering the same level of media attention as it did in its early days, the IT Army is still going strong,” said Pascal Geenens, the Director for Threat Intelligence for Radware. “Their online DDoS leaderboard is continuously updated, and top contributors are running infrastructures of nearly 350 hosts that are continuously performing attacks leveraging the DDoS automation tools provided by the IT army.”

Yet maintaining this offensive requires constant reinforcement. Over time, casual supporters have disengaged, leaving only the most dedicated volunteers. As Ted, an IT Army spokesperson, stated: “We need more people dedicating hardware capacity to the fight.” Recruiting, however, has become more difficult. Social media platforms such as Twitter/X and Facebook ban content promoting cyberattacks, limiting the IT Army’s ability to attract new volunteers.

Despite these challenges, Ukraine’s cyber forces remain as effective as ever. The IT Army has coordinated attacks with Ukrainian intelligence services, launching DDoS strikes on Russian CCTV networks to disrupt enemy surveillance during drone strikes on Russian oil refineries.

Russia has felt the cyber sting. Dmitry Gribkov, an aide to the Russian Security Council secretary, claimed that Ukraine’s IT Army is an international hacking group trained under Western supervision to target Russia’s information infrastructure and steal sensitive data. In a fit, he warned that these hackers, backed by Western sponsors, could eventually redirect their cyber capabilities against other nations, including their alleged backers.

A Russian cybersecurity firm called out IT Army of Ukraine remains the most active hacking group targeting Russian digital infrastructure and that DDoS attacks increased by at least 50% in 2024, and the group predicts that as long as Russia’s war continues, Ukraine’s cyber offensives will grow in scale and impact.

Following a poll on the IT Army’s Telegram channel asking users whether there should be a ceasefire, one user responded: “In cyberspace – no! But in real life – yes, let the guys stop dying and see their families. Again: a truce does not mean forgiveness. Such things are not forgiven; the guilty must be punished.”

Scaling these operations will require creative solutions beyond technical expertise. The IT Army’s next challenge is not just about cyber warfare—it is about convincing ordinary people that they can participate in a decentralized, digital resistance from anywhere in the world.

“It is very easy for anyone to contribute. The IT Army enhanced existing DDoS tools and packaged them in a convenient way so they can be easily installed,” said Geenens. “The whole process has been elaborately documented on their website. Individuals having issues during the installation can always find support through the IT Army Telegram channel.”

Ted admitted, “Our communication isn’t perfect, but our tools are incredibly user-friendly—plug-and-play, no advanced knowledge required.”

(Editor’s note: All unsourced quotes are from the author’s interviews with the respondents).

Tags: cyber, Cyber warfare, Information Technology, Russia-Ukraine War, Ukraine

About The Author

• 
  
• David Kirichenko
• David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank. He can be found on X @DVKirichenko.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

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