Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“The people who kill in torture and tell lies in the name of their sacred causes, these are never the publicans in the sinners. No, they’re virtuous, respectable men, who have the finest feelings, the best brains, the noblest ideals.”

– Aldous Huxley

"In human society, all violence can be traced back to these seven recurrent blunders: wealth without work, pleasure without conscience, knowledge without character, commerce without morality, science without humanity, worship without sacrifice, and politics without principles."

– Mahatma Gandhi

"Sometimes the things that may or may not be true are the things a man needs to believe in the most. That people are basically good; that honor, courage, and virtue mean everything; that power and money, money and power mean nothing; that good always triumphs over evil; and I want you to remember this, that love… true love never dies. You remember that, boy. You remember that. Doesn’t matter if it’s true or not. You see, a man should believe in those things, because those are the things worth believing in."

Hub McCann (played by Robert Duvall) , from the film Second Hand Lions

1. How the deadliest attack on Russian soil in years unfolded over the weekend

2. Attack on Russian Concert Hall Threatens Putin’s Strongman Image

3. What Would You Have Israel Do to Defend Itself?

4. In fiscal 2025, bet on Congress or begin to pivot

5. ISIS Affiliate Linked to Moscow Attack Has Global Ambitions

6. Special Operations News - March 25, 2024 | SOF News

7. US and Japan plan biggest upgrade to security pact in over 60 years

8. Army puts drones front and center in unfunded wishlist

9. Is Al-Qaeda Now In Moscow? – OpEd

10. Thailand starts aid deliveries to Myanmar under plan aimed at managing conflict

11. Indo-Pacific Command to Harness AI for Operational Planning

12. With Eyes on China, US Special Operators Are Back to Battling the Jungle

13. A Chinese Invasion of Taiwan This Year? Maybe Not

14. ‘It’s Causing Them to Drop Out of Life’: How Phones Warped Gen Z

15. The Institution or the Constitution (COVID and the Military)

16. The Great Escape: Welshman inspired Steve McQueen role

17. Everything, Everywhere, All at Once? Cyberspace Operations and Chinese Strategy

18. The Icarus Trap: Arrogance, Misperception, and the U.S. Invasion of Iraq

19. The Tyranny of Expectations

20. Putin’s Hidden Weakness

1. How the deadliest attack on Russian soil in years unfolded over the weekend

Propaganda of the deed and a propaganda response from the "victim."

Excerpts:

Throughout the night, in Russia and abroad, discussions swirled about who was responsible for the brazen attack. Authorities in Ukraine, invaded by Russia more than two years ago, swiftly and vehemently denied any involvement. The denials were quickly backed by U.S. officials, drawing a sharp reaction from Russian officials.

“On what grounds officials in Washington in the middle of a tragedy are making conclusions about someone’s noncomplicity?” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said in an online statement. “If the U.S. has or had reliable information about it, they should immediately pass it on to the Russian side. If they don’t, then the White House has no right to hand out absolution.”

Several hours after the attack began, an affiliate of the Islamic State group claimed responsibility, but some Russian state media personalities denounced it as fake.

“So far, it looks like an attempt to create a false trail,” state TV journalist Andrei Medvedev wrote on Telegram.

On Saturday, Russian authorities sought to tie Ukraine to the attack. The Federal Security Service, or FSB, reported arresting four gunmen in the border region of Bryansk, saying they were headed for Ukraine and had unspecified “contacts on the Ukrainian side.” It didn’t reveal any details of the manhunt but praised various law enforcement and security agencies for “acting in concert,” and saying that 11 people in total were arrested.

In his afternoon address, Putin called the attack “a bloody, barbaric terrorist act.”

He also reiterated the narrative, saying without evidence that “a window” was prepared for the assailants to cross into Ukraine. He stopped short, however, of blaming Kyiv for orchestrating the attack. He did not mention the claim of responsibility by the Islamic State affiliate.

How the deadliest attack on Russian soil in years unfolded over the weekend

AP · by DASHA LITVINOVA · March 25, 2024

The auditorium at Crocus City Hall was about three-quarters full, with the crowd waiting to see Picnic, a band popular since the Soviet days of the early 1980s. But the concert was sold out in the 6,200-seat hall, so some of the audience was still likely getting food or were shedding their heavy coats in the cloakroom.

It was 7-10 minutes before the start of the show, scheduled for 8 p.m., said concertgoer Dave Primov.

Then came the popping sounds.

“Initially I thought: fireworks or something like that…” Primov told The Associated Press. “I looked at my colleague, and he also said: ‘Fireworks, probably.’”

In this photo taken from video released by Russian Emergency Ministry Press Service on Sunday, March 24, 2024, rescuers work in the burned concert hall after a terrorists attack on the building of the Crocus City Hall on the western edge of Moscow, Russia. (Russian Emergency Ministry Press Service via AP)

But it wasn’t pyrotechnics. At least four khaki-clad men with automatic weapons were in the building, firing incessantly. Then they set the concert hall on fire.

It was the start of the deadliest attack on Russian soil in years that left 137 people dead and more than 180 more injured in what President Vladimir Putin called “a bloody, barbaric terrorist act.” Although he sought to tie Ukraine to it, an affiliate of the Islamic State group claimed responsibility — which U.S. intelligence officials confirmed. Kyiv denied any involvement.

Four suspects were arrested in Russia’s Bryansk region. Identified in Russian media as Tajik nationals, they were charged with carrying out a terrorist act and face a life sentence. They appeared before a Moscow court on Sunday night showing signs of severe beatings.

FRIDAY NIGHT

Crocus City Hall is a large entertainment and shopping complex in Krasnogorsk, a suburb on the northwestern edge of Moscow. It was built by Azerbaijan-born billionaire and property developer Aras Agalarov, who had ties to Donald Trump before he became U.S. president. While Trump was a co-owner of the Miss Universe beauty pageant, he signed an agreement with Agalarov to hold the event at Crocus in 2013.

On Friday night, its vast hallways became a scene of slaughter as the gunmen entered and made their way to the auditorium, firing at anyone nearby, sometimes at point-blank range.

Videos taken by those in the hallways and in the auditorium showed people screaming and trying to flee as the gunmen continued firing shots. Some hid behind the dark-red seats and tried to crawl toward the exits, according to footage and accounts of survivors reported in the media.

In one video, a young man says into the camera, with gunshots ringing out, “They set the auditorium on fire. The auditorium is on fire.” For a moment, flames could be seen in a corner of the theater.

Primov and others were able to leave the auditorium before the gunmen got to it, he told AP. It took him about 25 minutes to leave the building altogether.

He described the scene as complete chaos: The panic-stricken people tried to find exits, with gunmen still roaming through it and firing; people fell and collided with each other as they ran; men broke down locked doors, hoping they led to safety.

“We don’t know what’s ahead. We don’t know what is behind this door. We don’t know what is going on outside, maybe we’re encircled (by the attackers), maybe someone is waiting there,” Primov said.

Another survivor who identified herself only as Maria, echoed Primov: “This uncertainty, where to go, what to do, it scared (us) the most as every person there had no idea what was happening.”

The musicians of Picnic never made it onstage and left the building shortly after the attack began, its representative Yury Chernyshevsky told AP by phone shortly after news of the shooting broke. Asked if the band was safe, he responded: “How much safety can there be at this point? We hope we’re safe.”

By 8:30 p.m., a massive fire raged inside the building, with thick, black smoke billowing from the roof that later collapsed. Russian media reported explosions inside, and it wasn’t clear whether they were triggered by the gunmen or were caused by the blaze.

Outside, the building was bathed in neon blue from the blinking lights of dozens of ambulances, police and firetrucks. Helicopters dumped water into the blaze.

A special force of the Russian National Guard arrived and searched for the gunmen. Authorities announced the attack resulted in deaths and injuries, without giving numbers, and said they were investigating it as a terrorist act.

Various officials – from Moscow regional Gov. Andrei Vorobyov to Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev – arrived on the scene.

Elsewhere in Russia, authorities tightened security and canceled big events scheduled for the weekend. In the second-largest city of St. Petersburg, two malls were evacuated, according to media reports.

Putin made no statements Friday night.

About 11 p.m., the Kremlin issued a terse statement saying Putin was informed “within minutes” of the shooting, was “constantly receiving” updates from government agencies, and issued the necessary orders, according to spokesman Dmitry Peskov, who did not elaborate.

SATURDAY

A couple embrace next to a screen with displayed mournful message in St. Petersburg, Russia, Sunday, March 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Dmitri Lovetsky)

The death toll rose overnight and throughout Saturday as more bodies were discovered at Crocus City Hall, including some found in stairwells and a restroom.

Putin, who on March 17 secured a fifth term in office in an election with no real competition, didn’t address the nation until Saturday afternoon -– more than 19 hours after news of the attack broke.

Throughout the night, in Russia and abroad, discussions swirled about who was responsible for the brazen attack. Authorities in Ukraine, invaded by Russia more than two years ago, swiftly and vehemently denied any involvement. The denials were quickly backed by U.S. officials, drawing a sharp reaction from Russian officials.

“On what grounds officials in Washington in the middle of a tragedy are making conclusions about someone’s noncomplicity?” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said in an online statement. “If the U.S. has or had reliable information about it, they should immediately pass it on to the Russian side. If they don’t, then the White House has no right to hand out absolution.”

Several hours after the attack began, an affiliate of the Islamic State group claimed responsibility, but some Russian state media personalities denounced it as fake.

People walk past messages displayed on billboards that read: “St. Petersburg Mourns 03.22.2024", in St. Petersburg, Russia, Sunday, March 24, 2024.(AP Photo/Dmitri Lovetsky)

“So far, it looks like an attempt to create a false trail,” state TV journalist Andrei Medvedev wrote on Telegram.

On Saturday, Russian authorities sought to tie Ukraine to the attack. The Federal Security Service, or FSB, reported arresting four gunmen in the border region of Bryansk, saying they were headed for Ukraine and had unspecified “contacts on the Ukrainian side.” It didn’t reveal any details of the manhunt but praised various law enforcement and security agencies for “acting in concert,” and saying that 11 people in total were arrested.

In his afternoon address, Putin called the attack “a bloody, barbaric terrorist act.”

He also reiterated the narrative, saying without evidence that “a window” was prepared for the assailants to cross into Ukraine. He stopped short, however, of blaming Kyiv for orchestrating the attack. He did not mention the claim of responsibility by the Islamic State affiliate.

He also stopped short of announcing any drastic measures in the wake of the attack, such as lifting a moratorium on capital punishment, starting another wave of mobilization into the army or even escalating hostilities in Ukraine -– something Kremlin critics have suggested might be in store.

Moscow’s Department of Health said identifying the bodies of the dead will take at least two weeks.

SUNDAY

Sunday was declared a day of national mourning. Events were canceled and flags were lowered to half-staff.

At the burned-out and smoldering Crocus City Hall, a steady stream of people came to lay flowers at a makeshift memorial.

Saidakrami Murodali Rachabalizoda, a suspect in the Crocus City Hall shooting on Friday, sits in a glass cage in the Basmanny District Court in Moscow, Russia, Sunday, March 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko)

A suspect in the Crocus City Hall shooting on Friday sits in a courtroom in the Basmanny District Court, in Moscow, Russia, Sunday, March 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko)

Throughout the day, a heavy police presence was seen at Basmanny District Court in Moscow for the anticipated arrival of the four suspects. Russia’s Investigative Committee released photos of them at its headquarters in Moscow.

Shortly before 11 p.m. — about 51 hours after the shooting began — the suspects, one by one, appeared in court for their pretrial hearings.

Bruises were visible on their faces; one had a bandaged ear; another was in a wheelchair and hospital gown. According to independent news outlet Mediazona, whose reporters attended the hearings, he was brought in from intensive care.

How he was hurt wasn’t immediately clear. Unconfirmed Russian media reports suggested he was wounded during the manhunt.

The court said two of the suspects admitted guilt, though the men’s conditions raised questions about whether they did so freely.

The suspects, identified in Russian media as Tajik nationals, were charged with carrying out a terrorist act and face a life sentence.

AP · by DASHA LITVINOVA · March 25, 2024

2. Attack on Russian Concert Hall Threatens Putin’s Strongman Image

Excerpts:

Before Putin assumed power in December 1999, Russia was rocked by terrorist attacks blamed on Chechen Islamists. Putin famously pledged to “whack them in their outhouses”—signaling that he would dispense with legal niceties to hunt down militants and restore security.

The terrorism of the late 1990s and early 2000s strengthened Putin’s rule, with Russians clamoring for action to restore law and order. Russian liberal opposition leaders and investigative journalists at the time accused the Federal Security Service, or FSB, of orchestrating some of the bombings to help it tighten Putin’s grip on power.

...

While Ukraine has launched hundreds of drones to strike oil refineries, military airfields and other targets in Russia, in response to Moscow’s relentless missile-and-drone campaign against Ukrainian cities, none of these Ukrainian attacks has resulted in mass civilian casualties.

“Maybe the FSB was so preoccupied with the war in Ukraine and the dangers emanating from there that they somehow failed to see this,” said Grigorij Serscikov, an independent expert in antiterrorism and intelligence based in the Netherlands. “They’re stretched, battling on too many different” fronts.

The war has also exacerbated Russia’s reliance on migrant workers from the Muslim-majority states of Central Asia, particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as Russia’s economy has pivoted to a war footing that has pushed unemployment to a record low. Hundreds of thousands have found work in the defense industry. Others have been pulled into the military and sent to the trenches.

More than 300,000 Russian soldiers have been injured or killed in Ukraine, according to U.S. estimates.

The four attackers on Friday hailed from Tajikistan, according to Russian authorities. Some barely spoke Russian.

Attack on Russian Concert Hall Threatens Putin’s Strongman Image

Authoritarian system promised security. Now the Kremlin confronts Islamist terrorism at home and a costly war abroad.

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/attack-on-russian-concert-hall-threatens-putinsstrongman-image-029854fd?mod=hp_lead_pos6

By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow and Thomas GroveFollow

March 24, 2024 2:08 pm ET

Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed American warnings of an imminent terrorist attack and urged leaders of the country’s security services to focus on catching Ukrainian spies instead.

Three days later, Islamic State gunmen rampaged through a concert hall outside Moscow, killing more than 130 people in the deadliest episode of terrorism in Russia in decades.

As Russia marked a national day of mourning on Sunday, the bloody assault on one of the nation’s best-known entertainment venues threatened to undermine Putin’s carefully cultivated strongman image and raised questions about the ability of the authoritarian state he has built to deliver on its promise of security for the Russian people.

It is a challenge that comes as Russia wages a costly war of attrition against neighboring Ukraine and struggles to prevent Ukrainian forces from striking targets deep inside Russian territory. Kyiv recently has managed a series of hits on oil refineries across Russia, disrupting production.

What Would You Have Israel Do to Defend Itself?

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/24/opinion/gaza-israel-war.html?utm

March 24, 2024

Credit...Tamir Kalifa for The New York Times

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By David Brooks

Opinion Columnist

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There seems to be a broad consensus atop the Democratic Party about the war in Gaza, structured around two propositions. First, after the attacks of Oct. 7, Israel has the right to defend itself and defeat Hamas. Second, the way Israel is doing this is “over the top,” in President Biden’s words. The vast numbers of dead and starving children are gut wrenching, the devastation is overwhelming, and it’s hard not to see it all as indiscriminate.

Which leads to an obvious question: If the current Israeli military approach is inhumane, what’s the alternative? Is there a better military strategy Israel can use to defeat Hamas without a civilian blood bath? In recent weeks, I’ve been talking with security and urban warfare experts and others studying Israel’s approach to the conflict and scouring foreign policy and security journals in search of such ideas.

The thorniest reality that comes up is that this war is like few others because the crucial theater is underground. Before the war, Israelis estimated Hamas had dug around 100 miles of tunnels. Hamas leaders claimed they had a much more expansive network, and it turns out they were telling the truth. The current Israeli estimates range from 350 to about 500 miles of tunnels. The tunnel network, according to Israel, is where Hamas lives, holds hostages, stores weapons, builds missiles and moves from place to place. By some Israeli estimates, building these tunnels cost the Gazan people about a billion dollars, which could have gone to building schools and starting companies.

Hamas built many of its most important military and strategic facilities under hospitals, schools and so on. Its server farm, for example, was built under the offices of the U.N. relief agency in Gaza City, according to the Israeli military.

Daphne Richemond-Barak, the author of “Underground Warfare,” writes in Foreign Policy magazine: “Never in the history of tunnel warfare has a defender been able to spend months in such confined spaces. The digging itself, the innovative ways Hamas has made use of the tunnels and the group’s survival underground for this long have been unprecedented.”

In other words, in this war, Hamas is often underground, the Israelis are often aboveground, and Hamas seeks to position civilians directly between them. As Barry Posen, a professor at the security studies program at M.I.T., has written, Hamas’s strategy could be “described as ‘human camouflage’ and more ruthlessly as ‘human ammunition.’” Hamas’s goal is to maximize the number of Palestinians who die and in that way build international pressure until Israel is forced to end the war before Hamas is wiped out. Hamas’s survival depends on support in the court of international opinion and on making this war as bloody as possible for civilians, until Israel relents.

The Israelis have not found an easy way to clear and destroy the tunnels. Currently, Israel Defense Forces units clear the ground around a tunnel entrance and then, Richemond-Barak writes, they send in robots, drones and dogs to detect explosives and enemy combatants. Then units trained in underground warfare pour in. She writes: “It has become clear that Israel cannot possibly detect or map the entirety of Hamas’s tunnel network. For Israel to persuasively declare victory, in my view, it must destroy at least two-thirds of Hamas’s known underground infrastructure.”

This is slow, dangerous and destructive work. Israel rained destruction down on Gaza, especially early in the war. Because very few buildings can withstand gigantic explosions beneath them, this method involves a lot of wreckage, compounding the damage brought by tens of thousands of airstrikes. In part because of the tunnels, Israel has caused more destruction in Gaza than Syria did in Aleppo and more than Russia did in Mariupol, according to an Associated Press analysis.

John Spencer is the chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point, served two tours in Iraq and has made two visits to Gaza during the current war to observe operations there. He told me that Israel has done far more to protect civilians than the United States did in Afghanistan and Iraq. Spencer reports that Israel has warned civilians when and where it is about to begin operations and published an online map showing which areas to leave. It has sent out millions of pamphlets, texts and recorded calls warning civilians of coming operations. It has conducted four-hour daily pauses to allow civilians to leave combat areas. It has dropped speakers that blast out instructions about when to leave and where to go. These measures, Spencer told me, have telegraphed where the I.D.F. is going to move next and “have prolonged the war, to be honest.”

The measures are real, but in addition, Israel has cut off power in Gaza, making it hard for Palestinians to gain access to their phones and information and, most important, the evacuation orders published by Israel. Israel has also destroyed a vast majority of Gaza’s cellphone towers and on occasion bombed civilians in so-called safe areas and safe routes. For civilians, the urban battlefield is unbelievably nightmarish. They are caught between a nation enraged by Oct. 7 and using overwhelming and often reckless force and a terrorist group that has structured the battlefield to maximize the number of innocent dead.

So to step back: What do we make of the current Israeli strategy? Judged purely on a tactical level, there’s a strong argument that the I.D.F. has been remarkably effective against Hamas forces. I’ve learned to be suspicious of precise numbers tossed about in this war, but the I.D.F. claims to have killed over 13,000 of the roughly 30,000 Hamas troops. It has disrupted three-quarters of Hamas’s battalions so that they are no longer effective fighting units. It has also killed two of five brigade commanders and 19 of 24 battalion commanders. As of January, U.S. officials estimated that Israel had damaged or made inoperable 20 to 40 percent of the tunnels. Many Israelis believe the aggressive onslaught has begun to restore Israel’s deterrent power. (Readers should know that I have a son who served in the I.D.F. from 2014 to 2016; he’s been back home in the States since then.)

But on a larger political and strategic level, you’d have to conclude that the Israeli strategy has real problems. Global public opinion is moving decisively against Israel. The key shift is in Washington. Historically pro-Israeli Democrats like Biden and Senator Chuck Schumer are now pounding the current Israeli government with criticism. Biden wants Israel to call off its invasion of the final Hamas strongholds in the south. Israel is now risking a rupture with its closest ally and its only reliable friend on the U.N. Security Council. If Israel is going to defend itself from Iran, it needs strong alliances, and Israel is steadily losing those friends. Furthermore, Israeli tactics may be reducing Gaza to an ungovernable hellscape that will require further Israeli occupation and produce more terrorist groups for years.

Hamas’s strategy is pure evil, but it is based on an understanding of how the events on the ground will play out in the political world. The key weakness of the Israeli strategy has always been that it is aimed at defeating Hamas militarily without addressing Palestinian grievances and without paying enough attention to the wider consequences. As the leaders of Hamas watch Washington grow more critical of Jerusalem, they must know their strategy is working.

So we’re back to the original question: Is there a way to defeat Hamas with far fewer civilian deaths? Is there a way to fight the war that won’t leave Israel isolated?

One alternative strategy is that Israel should conduct a much more limited campaign. Fight Hamas, but with less intensity. To some degree, Israel has already made this adjustment. In January, Israel announced it was shifting to a smaller, more surgical strategy; U.S. officials estimated at the time that Israel had reduced the number of Israeli troops in northern Gaza to fewer than half of the 50,000 who were there in December.

The first problem with going further in this direction is that Israel may not be left with enough force to defeat Hamas. Even by Israel’s figures, most Hamas fighters are still out there. Will surgical operations be enough to defeat an enemy of this size? A similar strategy followed by America in Afghanistan doesn’t exactly inspire confidence.

A second problem is that the light footprint approach leaves power vacuums. This allows Hamas units to reconstitute themselves in areas Israel has already taken. As the United States learned in Iraq, if troop levels get too low, the horrors of war turn into the horrors of anarchy.

Another alternative strategy is targeted assassinations. Instead of continuing with a massive invasion, just focus on the Hamas fighters responsible for the Oct. 7 attack, the way Israel took down the terrorists who perpetrated the attack on Israeli Olympians in Munich in 1972.

The difference is that the attack on Israelis at Munich was a small-scale terrorist assault. Oct. 7 was a comprehensive invasion by an opposing army. Trying to assassinate perpetrators of that number would not look all that different from the current military approach. As Raphael Cohen, the director of the strategy and doctrine program at the RAND Corporation, notes: “In practical terms, killing or capturing those responsible for Oct. 7 means either thousands or potentially tens of thousands of airstrikes or raids dispersed throughout the Gaza Strip. Raids conducted on that scale are no longer a limited, targeted operation. It’s a full-blown war.”

Furthermore, Hamas’s fighters are hard to find, even the most notorious leaders. It took a decade for the United States to find Osama bin Laden, and Israel hasn’t had great success with eliminating key Hamas figures. In recent years, Israel tried to kill Mohammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’s military wing, seven times, without success.

The political costs of this kind of strategy might be even worse than the political costs of the current effort. Turkey, a Hamas supporter, has made it especially clear that Israel would pay a very heavy price if it went after Hamas leaders there.

A third alternative is a counterinsurgency strategy, of the kind that the United States used during the surge in Iraq. This is a less intense approach than the kind of massive invasion we’ve seen and would focus on going after insurgent cells and rebuilding the destroyed areas to build trust with the local population. The problem is that this works only after you’ve defeated the old regime and have a new host government you can work with. Israel is still trying to defeat the remaining Hamas battalions in places like Rafah. This kind of counterinsurgency approach would be an amendment to the current Israeli strategy, not a replacement.

Critics of the counterinsurgency approach point out that Gaza is not Iraq. If Israel tried to clear, hold and build new secure communities in classic counterinsurgency fashion, those new communities wouldn’t look like safe zones to the Palestinians. They would look like detention camps. Furthermore, if Israel settles on this strategy, it had better be prepared for a long war. One study of 71 counterinsurgency campaigns found that the median length of those conflicts was 10 years. Finally, the case for a full counterinsurgency approach would be stronger if that strategy had led to American victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, which it did not.

A fourth alternative is that Israel should just stop. It should settle for what it has achieved and not finish the job by invading Rafah and the southern areas of Gaza, or it should send in just small strike teams.

This is now the official Biden position. The national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, has argued that Israel can destroy Hamas in Gaza without a large invasion but “by other means” (which he did not elaborate on). The United States has asked Israel to send a delegation to Washington to discuss alternative Rafah strategies, which is good. The problem is that, first, there seems to be a budding disagreement over how much of Hamas needs to be destroyed to declare victory and, second, the I.D.F. estimates that there are 5,000 to 8,000 Hamas fighters in Rafah. Defeating an army that size would take thousands of airstrikes and raids. If you try to shrink the incursion, the math just doesn’t add up. As an Israeli war cabinet member, Benny Gantz, reportedly told U.S. officials, “Finishing the war without demilitarizing Rafah is like sending in firefighters to put out 80 percent of a fire.”

If this war ends with a large chunk of Hamas in place, it would be a long-term disaster for the region. Victorious, Hamas would dominate whatever government was formed to govern Gaza. Hamas would rebuild its military to continue its efforts to exterminate the Jewish state, delivering on its promise to launch more and more attacks like that of Oct. 7. Israel would have to impose an even more severe blockade than the one that it imposed before, this time to keep out the steel, concrete and other materials that Hamas uses to build tunnels and munitions, but that Gazans would need to rebuild their homes.

If Hamas survives this war intact, it would be harder for the global community to invest in rebuilding Gaza. It would be impossible to begin a peace process. As the veteran Middle East observers Robert Satloff and Dennis Ross wrote in American Purpose, “Any talk of a postwar political process is meaningless without Israel battlefield success: There can be no serious discussion of a two-state solution or any other political objective with Hamas either still governing Gaza or commanding a coherent military force.”

So where are we? I’m left with the tragic conclusion that there is no magical alternative military strategy. As Cohen wrote in Foreign Policy: “If the international community wants Israel to change strategies in Gaza, then it should offer a viable alternative strategy to Israel’s announced goal of destroying Hamas in the strip. And right now, that alternate strategy simply does not exist.”

The lack of viable alternatives leaves me with the further conclusion that Israel must ultimately confront Hamas leaders and forces in Rafah rather than leave it as a Hamas beachhead. For now, a cease-fire may be in the offing in Gaza, which is crucial for the release of more hostages.

Israel can use that time to put in place the humanitarian relief plan that Israeli security officials are now, at long last, proposing (but that the country’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has not agreed to so far). Israel would also have to undertake a full-scale civilian evacuation of Rafah before any military operation and then try to take out as much of Hamas as possible with as few civilian casualties as possible. Given the horrors of this kind of tunnel-based urban warfare, this will be a painful time and painfully difficult. But absent some new alternative strategy, Biden is wrong to stop Israel from confronting the Hamas threat in southern Gaza.

Finally, like pretty much every expert I consulted, I’m also left with the conclusion that Israel has to completely rethink and change the humanitarian and political side of this operation. Israel needs to supplement its military strategy with an equally powerful Palestinian welfare strategy.

Israel’s core problems today are not mostly the fault of the I.D.F. or its self-defense strategy. Israel’s core problems flow from the growing callousness with which many of its people have viewed the Palestinians over the past decades, magnified exponentially by the trauma it has just suffered. Today, an emotionally shattered Israeli people see through the prism of Oct. 7. They feel existentially insecure, facing enemies on seven fronts — Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Iran. As Ross has noted, many often don’t see a distinction between Hamas and the Palestinians. Over 80 percent of West Bank Palestinians told pollsters they supported the Oct. 7 attack.

As the columnist Anshel Pfeffer wrote in the Israeli paper Haaretz, “The very idea that Israel needed to take any responsibility whatsoever for the place from which those who had murdered, raped and pillaged had emerged was seen as a moral abomination.”

Pfeffer continued that because of this attitude, “the government’s policy on humanitarian supplies to Gaza is a combination of vengeance, ignorance and incompetence.” He quoted unnamed I.D.F. officials who acknowledged that of course Israel is responsible for the welfare of the people in the area it controls but that the civilian leaders refuse to confront this.

On occasions when Israel has responded to world pressure and shifted policy, it has done so in secret, with no discussion in the cabinet.

An officer whose duties specifically include addressing the needs of civilians told Pfeffer that he didn’t have much to do except for some odd jobs.

Israel is failing to lay the groundwork for some sort of better Palestinian future — to its own detriment. The security experts I spoke with acknowledge that providing humanitarian aid will be hard. As Cohen told me: “If the Israeli military takes over distributing humanitarian aid to Gaza, they will likely lose soldiers in the process. And so Israelis are asking why should their boys die providing aid to someone who wants to kill them. So the United States needs to convince Israel that this is the morally and strategically right thing to do.”

For her book “How Terrorism Ends,” the Carnegie Mellon scholar Audrey Kurth Cronin looked at about 460 terrorist groups to investigate how they were defeated. Trying to beat them with military force alone rarely works. The root causes have to be addressed. As the retired general David Petraeus reminded his audience recently at the New Orleans Book Festival, “Over time, hearts and minds still matter.”

Israel also has to offer the world a vision for Gaza’s recovery, and it has to do it right now. Ross argues that after the war is over, the core logic of the peace has to be demilitarization in exchange for reconstruction. In an essay in Foreign Affairs, he sketches out a comprehensive rebuilding effort, bringing in nations and agencies from all over the world, so Gaza doesn’t become a failed state or remain under Hamas control.

Is any of this realistic given the vicious enmity now ripping through the region? Well, many peace breakthroughs of the past decades happened after one side suffered a crushing defeat. Egypt established ties with Israel after it was thoroughly defeated in the Yom Kippur War. When Israel attacked Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in 2006, the world was outraged. But after the fighting stopped, some Lebanese concluded that Hezbollah had dragged them into a bloody, unnecessary conflict. The Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was forced to acknowledge his error, saying he didn’t know Israel would react so violently. The Lebanese border stabilized. Israel’s over-the-top responses have sometimes served as effective deterrents and prevented further bloodshed.

Israel and the Palestinians have both just suffered shattering defeats. Maybe in the next few years they will do some difficult rethinking, and a new vision of the future will come into view. But that can happen only after Hamas is fully defeated as a military and governing force.

In fiscal 2025, bet on Congress or begin to pivot - Breaking Defense

John Ferrari and Charles Rahr, in this op-ed, argue that instead of relying on the Hill to bail it out, the Pentagon may need to embrace its true needs and change where it invests.

breakingdefense.com · by John Ferrari, Charles Rahr · March 22, 2024

Streaks in the sky form at sunset behind the U.S. Capitol Building on November 13, 2019 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Mark Makela/Getty Images)

When the Pentagon’s fiscal 2025 budget request was rolled out earlier this month, it became very clear that the Pentagon was hoping that Congress would provide relief from budget caps that, defense leaders said, forced tough choices. In a new op-ed, John Ferrari and Charles Rahr of the American Enterprise Institute argue that if lawmakers don’t bail out the department, real changes are going to have to come.

Despite being hemmed in by the spending caps under the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) for 2025, forced to function under continuing resolutions for nearly half of this fiscal year, and still waiting on a sorely needed supplemental, the Pentagon seems to be the one institution in America that believes Congress will bail them out.

That can be the only rationale for why the Pentagon’s budget once again does not match either its strategy, or the world that we are living in. And to be fair, there is reason for the department’s belief, as the gamble of relying on Congress to pass supplementals and add funding to the unfunded priority lists has worked in the past. But the stakes have scarcely been higher than today, and if Congress — barely able to function even before we get into the teeth of a brutal presidential election — doesn’t provide a bailout, the military may be in serious trouble.

It’s a dangerous place for the department to be, and it should serve as a wakeup call. Rather than relying on the Hill to save them from self-inflicted wounds, department leaders should be considering an alternative for current needs under budget constraints: a hard pivot away from expensive manned systems in favor of cheaper unmanned ones that can provide mass and capability for near-term conflicts.

First, let’s consider the Navy. Next year, the service is planning on purchasing six ships — while retiring 10 early. Couple that request with the Navy’s new shipbuilding plans over the next three decades and it’s clear that the service isn’t growing fast enough. In truth, it may now be time to accept that it cannot grow fast enough. Both plans presented by the service, one budget-constrained and the other in line with the Navy’s fleet target for implementing the National Defense Strategy (NDS), would drop the service to 280 ships by 2027. The budget-constrained plan would peak at 348 ships in FY42, nearly forty below the Navy’s NDS-aligned target of 381 ships. The other plan would first hit this target in FY42 and FY43, and later from FY52 to FY54.

Given congressional dysfunction and budgetary pressures, it’s hard to imagine that the NDS-aligned plan will be implemented. Meanwhile, China already possesses a fleet of 370 ships, according to the Pentagon’s latest China Military Power Report. Given the current state of shipbuilding, it may be time for the Navy to pivot away from the unlikely-to-be-obtained future fleet sizes and instead immediately invest in greater numbers of unmanned, attritable platforms, on the order of thousands. Scale matters.

Next, the Air Force. The service is seeking to shed roughly 250 aircraft, a mix of F-15C/Ds, A-10s, F-22As, and other fixed-wing and rotary platforms. At the same time, it is seeking to purchase just 91 aircraft, once again setting the Air Force down the long, flawed road of “divest-to-invest” in the hopes of harnessing savings for investment in next-generation new builds. The Air Force seems to be betting that more funding will come and it will be able to buy back these aircraft (the decision to halve the buy of the MH-139 helicopter, which members of Congress plan to use for their own transportation, is only the most obvious example).

An alternative approach could be to dramatically scale back buys of its highest cost aircraft, the F-35, and instead invest in greater numbers of unmanned aviation platforms, up to tens of thousands. Scale matters.

Despite receiving the smallest slice of the three departments, the Army provides some bright spots in an otherwise dismal FY25 budget request. In putting more dollars to procurement ($23.3B to $24.4B) and fewer dollars to research and development ($15.7B to $14B) compared to its FY24 request, the service seems to be getting the message that investing in the notional capabilities of tomorrow makes little difference for readiness today.

However, the Army’s procurement of weapons remains too small (e.g. just 30 upgraded Abrams) to fight an extended war, something the American public would not likely understand. Additionally, the service wasn’t spared of cuts to its most valuable asset: people. The administration is seeking an active-duty end-strength of 442,300, an over ten thousand person cut from FY23 and a clear recognition that the already tough recruiting environment is worsening. Russia is looking at this smaller force and has to be thinking about how the US Army would fair in a long, grinding, multi-year ground war. The Army should continue to jettison programs in development and instead buy more munitions and weapons, on the scale of hundreds of thousands. Scale matters.

As our colleagues Mackenzie Eaglen and Todd Harrison note, it didn’t have to be this way. The Pentagon could have submitted a budget above the caps set by the Fiscal Responsibility Act and one that is fit to the strategy. That would have required leadership from the Executive Branch of government. But, in failing to do so, the Pentagon is betting on Congress to come to its rescue. If that rescue mission doesn’t pan out, then DoD may just have to pivot from large, expensive platforms to unmanned, attritable platforms bought at scale.

Retired US Army Maj. Gen. John G. Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the service. Charles Rahr is a research associate at the American Enterprise Institute.

breakingdefense.com · by John Ferrari, Charles Rahr · March 22, 2024

5. ISIS Affiliate Linked to Moscow Attack Has Global Ambitions

This means we will have to continue to prioritize countering violent extremist organizations and crisis response while conducting irregular warfare in support of political warfare/strategic competition in the gray zone while we prepare for large-scale combat operations around the world.

ISIS Affiliate Linked to Moscow Attack Has Global Ambitions

The Islamic State in Khorasan is active in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran and has set its sights on Europe and beyond.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/25/us/politics/moscow-attack-isis.html

The damaged Crocus City Hall concert venue in Krasnogorsk, Russia, on Sunday. The head of the U.S. military’s Central Command said last week that ISIS-K “retains the capability and the will to attack U.S. and Western interests abroad in as little as six months with little to no warning.”Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

By Eric Schmitt

Reporting from Washington

March 25, 2024

Updated 1:27 a.m. ET

Five years ago this month, an American-backed Kurdish and Arab militia ousted Islamic State fighters from a village in eastern Syria, the group’s last sliver of territory.

Since then, the organization that once staked out a self-proclaimed caliphate across Iraq and Syria has metastasized into a more traditional terrorist group — a clandestine network of cells from West Africa to Southeast Asia engaged in guerrilla attacks, bombings and targeted assassinations.

None of the group’s affiliates have been as relentless as the Islamic State in Khorasan, which is active in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran and has set its sights on attacking Europe and beyond. U.S. officials say the group carried out the attack near Moscow on Friday, killing scores of people and wounding many others.

In January, Islamic State Khorasan, or ISIS-K, carried out twin bombings in Iran that killed scores and wounded hundreds of others at a memorial service for Iran’s former top general, Qassim Suleimani, who was targeted in a U.S. drone strike four years earlier.

“The threat from ISIS,” Avril D. Haines, the director of national intelligence, told a Senate panel this month, “remains a significant counterterrorism concern.” Most attacks “globally taken on by ISIS have actually occurred by parts of ISIS that are outside of Afghanistan,” she said.

Image

Avril D. Haines, the director of national intelligence, testified to Congress this month that most attacks “globally taken on by ISIS have actually occurred by parts of ISIS that are outside of Afghanistan.”Credit...Kent Nishimura for The New York Times

Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, the head of the military’s Central Command, told a House committee on Thursday that ISIS-K “retains the capability and the will to attack U.S. and Western interests abroad in as little as six months with little to no warning.”

American counterterrorism specialists on Sunday dismissed the Kremlin’s suggestion that Ukraine was behind Friday’s attack near Moscow. “The modus operandi was classic ISIS,” said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The assault was the third concert venue in the Northern Hemisphere that ISIS has struck in the past decade, Mr. Hoffman said, following an attack on the Bataclan theater in Paris in November 2015 (as part of a broader operation that struck other targets in the city) and a suicide bombing at an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester Arena, England, in May 2017.

Islamic State Khorasan, founded in 2015 by disaffected members of the Pakistani Taliban, burst onto the international jihadist scene after the Taliban toppled the Afghan government in 2021. During the U.S. military withdrawal from the country, ISIS-K carried out a suicide bombing at the international airport in Kabul in August 2021 that killed 13 U.S. service members and as many as 170 civilians.

Since then, the Taliban have been fighting ISIS-K in Afghanistan. So far, the Taliban’s security services have prevented the group from seizing territory or recruiting large numbers of former Taliban fighters, according to U.S. counterterrorism officials.

But the upward arc and scope of ISIS-K’s attacks have increased in recent years, with cross-border strikes into Pakistan and a growing number of plots in Europe. Most of those European plots were thwarted, prompting Western intelligence assessments that the group might have reached the lethal limits of its capabilities.

Image

The funeral for a victim of the suicide attack at the international airport in Kabul in 2021 that was carried out by ISIS-K.Credit...Victor J. Blue for The New York Times

Last July, Germany and the Netherlands coordinated arrests targeting seven Tajik, Turkmen and Kyrgyz individuals linked to a ISIS-K network who were suspected of plotting attacks in Germany.

Three men were arrested in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia over alleged plans to attack the Cologne Cathedral on New Year’s Eve 2023. The raids were linked to three other arrests in Austria and one in Germany on Dec. 24. The four people were reportedly acting in support of ISIS-K.

American and other Western counterterrorism officials say these plots were organized by low-level operatives who were detected and thwarted relatively quickly.

“Thus far, ISIS-Khorasan has relied primarily on inexperienced operatives in Europe to try to advance attacks in its name,” Christine S. Abizaid, the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, told a House committee in November.

But there are worrisome signs that ISIS-K is learning from its mistakes. In January, masked assailants attacked a Roman Catholic church in Istanbul, killing one person. Shortly afterward, the Islamic State, through its official Amaq News Agency, claimed responsibility. Turkish law enforcement forces detained 47 people, most of them Central Asian nationals.

Since then, Turkish security forces have launched mass counteroperations against ISIS suspects in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Several European investigations shed light on the global and interconnected nature of ISIS finances, according to a United Nations report in January, which identified Turkey as a logistical hub for ISIS-K operations in Europe.

The Moscow and Iran attacks demonstrated more sophistication, counterterrorism officials said, suggesting a greater level of planning and an ability to tap into local extremist networks.

“ISIS-K has been fixated on Russia for the past two years,” frequently criticizing President Vladimir V. Putin in its propaganda, said Colin P. Clarke, a counterterrorism analyst at the Soufan Group, a security consulting firm based in New York. “ISIS-K accuses the Kremlin of having Muslim blood in its hands, referencing Moscow’s interventions in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria.”

A significant portion of ISIS-K’s members are of Central Asian origin, and there is a large contingent of Central Asians living and working in Russia. Some of these individuals may have become radicalized and been in position to serve in a logistical function, stockpiling weapons, Mr. Clarke said.

Daniel Byman, a counterterrorism specialist at Georgetown University, said that “ISIS-K has gathered fighters from Central Asia and the Caucasus under its wing, and they may be responsible for the Moscow attack, either directly or via their own networks.”

Image

In Tehran, mourners gathered at the funeral of a victim of bombings by ISIS-K in January.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times

Russian and Iranian authorities apparently did not take seriously enough public and more detailed private American warnings of imminent ISIS-K attack plotting, or were distracted by other security challenges.

“In early March, the U.S. government shared information with Russia about a planned terrorist attack in Moscow,” Adrienne Watson, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council, said on Saturday. “We also issued a public advisory to Americans in Russia on March 7. ISIS bears sole responsibility for this attack. There was no Ukrainian involvement whatsoever.”

Russian authorities on Saturday announced the arrest of several suspects in Friday’s attack. But senior American officials said on Sunday that they were still digging into the background of the assailants and trying to determine whether they were deployed from South or Central Asia for this specific attack or if they were already in the country as part of the network of supporters that ISIS-K then engaged and encouraged.

Counterterrorism specialists voiced concern on Sunday that the attacks in Moscow and Iran might embolden ISIS-K to redouble its efforts to strike in Europe, particularly in France, Belgium, Britain and other countries that have been hit on and off for the past decade.

The U.N. report, using a different name for Islamic State Khorasan, said “some individuals of North Caucasus and Central Asian origin traveling from Afghanistan or Ukraine toward Europe represent an opportunity for ISIL-K, which seeks to project violent attacks in the West.” The report concluded that there was evidence of “current and unfinished operational plots on European soil conducted by ISIL-K.”

A senior Western intelligence official identified three main drivers that could inspire ISIS-K operatives to attack: the existence of dormant cells in Europe, images of the war in Gaza and support from Russian-speaking people living in Europe.

One major event this summer has many counterterrorism officials on edge.

“I worry about the Paris Olympics,” said Edmund Fitton-Brown, a former top U.N. counterterrorism official who is now a senior adviser to the Counter Extremism Project. “They would be a premium terrorist target.”

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt

A version of this article appears in print on March 25, 2024, Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: The ISIS Affiliate Linked to a Deadly Attack in Moscow Has Global Ambitions. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

6. Special Operations News - March 25, 2024 | SOF News

Special Operations News - March 25, 2024 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · March 25, 2024

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: U.S. Air Force pararescuemen assigned to the 57th Rescue Squadron drop near Aviano Air Base, Italy, March 13, 2024. The 57th RQS provides personnel recovery, combat search and rescue, civil search and rescue and casualty evacuation to fulfill U.S. European Command, U. S. Africa Command and NATO security cooperation requirements. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Joseph Bartoszek)

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it 2 or 3 days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

3rd SFG(A) Wins Sniper Competition. A team from the 3rd Special Forces Group took first place in the special operations international best sniper competition. The event was hosted by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School during March 18-22, 2024, at Fort Liberty, N.C. (FBNC). There were 20 sniper teams that represented seven countries. The 1st, 3rd, 7th, 10th, and 19th Special Forces Groups had teams as well as the 75th Ranger Regiment, MARSOC, NSW, and the U.S. Coast Guard. A French team finished second and the 10th SFG(A) was in 3rd place. (U.S. Army, 22 Mar 2024)

Lt. Gen. James Glynn Assignment. A former commander of MARSOC (SOF News, 28 Jun 2020) will soon be commanding U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific and Fleet Marine Forces Pacific. He is currently serving as the deputy commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Quantico, Virginia.

26th MEU(SOC) Returns. More than 4,000 Sailors and Marines assigned to the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and embarked 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) returned to Hampton Roads following an eight and a half-month deployment to the U.S. 2nd, 5th and 6th Fleet areas of operations, on March 21, 2024. (Navy, 21 Mar 2024)

NSWG-8 Commander Relieved. A Navy commodore has lost his job due to a “loss of confidence in his ability to command” according to a press release from Naval Special Warfare Command. The Navy SEAL has spent nearly 20 years assigned to East Coast-based special warfare units. (Military.com, 20 Mar 2024)

SOWMTC. Green Berets recently attended the Winter Mountain Operator Course (WMOC) at the Special Operations Warfare Mountain Training Center (SOWMTC) in Colorado. “Cold Forged Elite Mountaineers”, DVIDS, March 13, 2024.

Raiders Train in Jungle. Today, as the US attempts to redirect its focus to the Indo-Pacific amid steadily rising tensions between the US and China, it looks like jungle operations are back on the menu for the US special operations community. “With eyes on China, US special operators are back to battling the jungle”, Business Insider, March 24, 2024.

A Special Forces medic who was involved in the evacuation of Afghans onto Kabul Airport during the August 2021 fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban is continuing his support for our Afghan allies. He has begun his journey of hiking the Appalachian Trail to raise funds for Team America Relief’s efforts to provide assistance to the relocation and resettlement of our Afghans allies in the United States.

AFSOC

AC-130 Gunship Changes. The AC-130U was set to get the first operational airborne laser weapon, but there are changes planned for the airframes’ future. “AC-130 Gunship’s Laser Weapon Cancelled, 105mm Howitzer May Be Removed”, The Warzone, March 19, 2024.

AC-13W on Display. One of the last ‘W” models has retired and is now a static display at Cannon Air Force Base. “AC-130W Static Display Unveiled”, DVIDS, March 21, 2024.

Cuts to Armed Overwatch. The Armed Overwatch program, designed to augment special operations forces with a dedicated light attack and surveillance capability, has faced a significant reduction due to budget constraints. “U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Has Decided to Cut the Size of One of its Most Controversial Programs”, National Interest, March 22, 2024.

Reduced Budget for AT-802U Sky Warden. U.S. Special Operations Command has cut back on its planned purchase of the AT-802U Sky Wardens. It has reduced the amount to be bought from 75 airframes to 62 due to budget constraints. “SOCOM Cuts Armed Overwatch Buy from 75 to 62 Aircraft”, Air and Space Forces Magazine, March 19, 2024.

International SOF

UK’s Ranger Regiment. Formed up in December 2021, the unit is made up of four Special Operations-capable battalions. “Ranger Regiment deployed on hundreds of missions since creation”, Forces.net, March 18, 2024.

JCET in Chile. US SOF trained up with elements of the Special Operations Brigade “Lautaro” (BOE) during a recent Joint Combined Exchange Training exercise. (Zona Militar, 18 Mar 2024)

Indian Anti-Piracy Operation. On March 12, 2024, the MV Abdullah (a bulk carrier) was taken by Somalia pirates in the Indian Ocean approximately 600 nautical miles east of Mogadishu, Somalia. An Indian Air Force C-17 aircraft executed a precision airborne drop of two CCRC boats along with Indian Navy MARCOS. A combination of actions by the Indian military resulted in the capture of the 35 pirates and release of the 17 crew members. “Indian Navy’s recent showdown with Somali pirates”, Business Insider, March 18, 2024.

Russia’s Elite Force. Alec Bertina writes about a SOF unit that is part of the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Special Purpose Center. It is one of Russia’s most well-equipped, combat-capable, and secretive units. “FSB Alpha Group: Russia’s Elite A Team”, Grey Dynamics, March 17, 2024.

US SOF Train with “Wolves” and “Tigers”. Special operations forces from North Macedonia trained up with members of the 10th Special Forces group during a recent Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercise. (DVIDS, 19 Mar 2024)

SOF History

On March 29, 1911. The United States Army adopted the M1911. This is a single-action, semi-automatic, magazine-fed, recoil-operated pistol chambered for the .45 ACP cartridge. It served as the standard-issue sidearm for the United States military for over 75 years, from 1911 to 1986.

On March 24, 1961, the 12th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was activated.

On March 24, 1969, SFC William M. Bryant, a Green Beret assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group, was killed while engaged in a fierce firefight with the enemy in Vietnam. He was the commander of a company of the 3rd Mobile Strike Force that was surrounded by the enemy. For his heroic actions that day he would be awarded the Medal of Honor.

https://arsof-history.org/medal_of_honor/recipient_bryant.html?fbclid=IwAR0713IrYWSjMOEiTfXTx75MLr-mvRSsMwbfnRtPJI-22O6amP2A_CXsvK4

Operation Ugly Baby. On March 22, 2003, JSOAD-N successfully inserted 19 U.S. Army Special Forces teams along with 4 Company Headquarters elements onto landing zones in northern Iraq.

https://sof.news/iraq/ugly-baby/

On 25 March 2011, the U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne) was provisionally activated as a new HQs under USASOC to provide the Commanding General with an element that serves both as a command and staff entity to advocate aviation issues for USASOC.

Conflict in Israel and Gaza

Situation Update. Hamas continues to hold almost 130 hostages, most likely in the Rafa area where there are four remaining Hamas battalions. Emergency food air drops continue by the United States, Jordan, and other countries in northern Gaza. The components of the U.S. ‘floating’ pier (JLOTS) are slowly making their way across the Atlantic. Negotiations continue but no end is in sight for the conflict.

Destruction of Hamad City. A part of Khan Yunis (NSI map) had been built with Qatari funds several years back and Hamas operatives and their families moved in. Hamas sought refuge in the neighborhood believing it was ‘off limits’ to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) due to the Qatar connection. “How the IDF dismantled Gaza’s Qatari-funded terror neighborhood”, The Jerusalem Post, March 24, 2024.

References:
Map Gaza Strip (2005), and more maps of Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Israel.
Israel-Hamas War: Insights from RAND

Ukraine Conflict

Supporting Ukraine’s IW Campaign. A former U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia and a retired paramilitary case officer collaborate in an article arguing for support to Ukraine’s IW campaign. “Bolster Ukraine’s irregular warfare tactics with Western tech”, Defense News, March 15, 2024.

Ukraine Oversight. The Special Inspector General for Operation Atlantic Resolve has established a website that describes the oversight work, funding, reports, news, and more. https://www.ukraineoversight.gov/

And More News:

“Drones are key to gain advantage over Russia, Ukraine army chief says”, Reuters, March 18, 2024.
“Russia’s Oil Industry Threatened by Ukrainian Drones, Western Sanctions”, Carnegie politika, January 26, 2024.
“How US forces can adopt Ukraine’s unconventional multidomain approach”, by Benjamin Jensen, Defense News, March 22, 2024.
“How Tech Giants Turned Ukraine Into an AI War Lab”, Time, February 8, 2024.

Battle of Avdiivaka. The Ukrainian city of Avdiivka has been at the center of armed conflict since 2014. Since the full-scale invasion of 2022, the Russians have fought to seize control of the city. After significant equipment and personnel losses, the Russians finally succeeded in driving the Ukrainians out. The Ukrainians conducted a well-planned and executed withdrawal (an initial assessment) and there are some ‘lessons to be learned’ from the event. “The Battle of Avdiivka and Its Lessons on Withdrawal Under Pressure”, by Ryan N. Forte, Modern War Institute, Mach 12, 2024.

References:
Interactive Map. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine by the Insitute for the Study of War and Critical Threats. On storymaps.arcgis.com See also https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html
U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, Congressional Research Service, CRSIF12040, periodically updated, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040
Ukraine Conflict, National Security Info. https://www.national-security.info/ukraine-conflict.html

Sudan Conflict and Evac of Foreign Nationals

Situation Update. The conflict raging on in Sudan has resulted in thousands of deaths, millions displaced, and a humanitarian disaster. The competing armed factions continue to attack each while inflicting pain and suffering on civilians. In South Sudan, democracy is fragile, with the violence increasing in the past several months. (AP, 19 Mar 2024) In the mix are state and non-state actors exploiting the situation for their own interests. A non-resident fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center was recently charged with conspiring to illegally export “millions of dollars’ worth” of weapons to armed groups in South Sudan. “U.S. Justice Dept. Charges Harvard Kennedy School Fellow with Arms Trafficking”, The Harvard Crimson, March 8, 2024.

Update on the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), ceasefire, humanitarian crisis, and evacuation of foreign nationals.

https://www.national-security.info/country/sudan/sudan-neo.html

Commentary

Improving USSOCOM for the Future. Monte Erfourth, a retired Army colonel, served as the former USSOCCENT J5 and USSOCOM Chief of Plans. He has sent off a letter to the commander of the United States Special Operations Command with some recommendations on how to adapt and evolve for its role in this era of strategic competition. “Open Letter to a USSOCOM Commander”, Strategy Central, March 18, 2024.

Weaponizing Rights and ARSOF. “The global competition for influence shows no signs of slowing down, and the rights as weapons framework offers ARSOF, the first to influence and compete, an opportunity to leverage their unique skills to dominate the information environment, inspire partners to action, and potentially win the battle before the first shot is fired.” “Weaponizing Rights: An Untapped Tool for Special Operations Forces”, by Joseph Bedingfield, Irregular Warfare Initiative, March 15, 2023.

Principles of Special Air Operations. Jan-Joost Ackermans, a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Royal Netherlands Air Force with a SOF background, has penned an article entitled “Building upon McRaven’s Foundation: Operational and Strategic Principles of Special Air Operations”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, March 19, 2024.

National Security and Strategic Competition

Drones. Michael Peck writes about the domestic threat to the U.S. infrastructure that commercial drones in the wrong hands can provide. “Swarms of drones are a rising threat to the US homeland, and law enforcement isn’t ready”, Business Insider, March 17, 2024. The RAND report cited in the article can be found here. (PDF, 12 pages)

Border Crisis:

“Supreme Court prevents Texas from implementing sweeping immigration law”, Washington Examiner, March 18, 2024.
The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced on Friday, March 22, 2024, that it is opening an international field office in Tegucigalpa, Honduras in order to increase refugee processing capacity. The office will handle interviews and processing asylum seekers as well as support the U.S. government’s effort to resettle refugees from the Americas.
Fentanyl Across the Border. Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookins Institute recently testified before Congress about the fentanyl epidemic and how to halt the drug from coming across our southern border from Mexico. “China, Mexico, and America’s fight against the fentanyl epidemic”, March 21, 2024.
“U.S. Border Patrol seizes $395k worth of cocaine at checkpoint”, CBP.gov, March 22, 2024.
An illegal migrant from Lebanon caught at border admits to being a Hezbollah terrorist and wanted to go to NYC and make a bomb. (New York Post, 17 Mar 2024)
Report – Border Security: Border Patrol’s Missing Migrant Program, Government Accountability Office, GAO-24-10751, March 20, 2024, PDF, 9 pages. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107051

Vulnerability of Ocean Cables. A lot of telecommunications and internet traffic travels via the sub-surface ocean cables stretching around the globe connecting continents with each other. Recent cable disruptions (the Houthis perhaps?) in the Red Sea connecting the Middle East with East Africa came to light that has had a significant effect on communication systems in East Africa. The undersea cable systems are vulnerable. Take a look at a map depicting how they are laid out on the ocean floor. https://submarine-cable-map-2024.telegeography.com/

Worried About a Russian Invasion? Protect the Airports! Michael Peck examines the strategy that Russia (and the Soviet Union) has used over time when invading smaller countries. They seized the main airports of Prague (1968), Kabul (1979), and Sevastopol (2014). Their failed attempt in 2022 to take the main Kyiv airport failed. “Don’t want Russia to successfully invade your country? Then do this.”, by Michael Peck, Business Insider, March 2, 2024.

Evacuations in Haiti. A week after quietly conducting a non-combatant evacuation operation for some non-emergency embassy staff and families the Department of Statement began to air evacuated some American citizens. A flight took off from Cap Haitien on the northern coast of Haiti with some 40 plus AMCITS aboard. “Evacuation flights to US begin as Haiti deteriorates”, BBC, March 18, 2024.

JTF-2 in Haiti. Members of Joint Task Force 2 are at the Canadian embassy in Haiti’s capital city. The counterterrorism team is there to assist with “contingency planning”. (Global News, 23 Mar 2024)

Assessment of Russian Military. A recent intel report provides info on Moscow’s military, the Ukraine conflict, and future trends. “The US Intelligence Community Assesses the State of the Russian Military”, SANDBOXX, March 18, 2024.

Chinese Underworld and Illicit Trade in Marijuana. All across America there are reports of illegal marijuana growing sites – usually in rural areas. In Maine, there are over 300 of these sites with Chinese nationals being arrested every week. Read more in “Gangsters, Money and Murder: How Chinese Organized Crime is Dominating America’s Illegal Marijuana Market”, ProPublica, March 14, 2024.

China and Antarctica. The status quo in Antarctica is unraveling – two factors come into play: climate change and great power competition. Just this February, China completed building its fifth research station on the continent. Antartica offers reach into the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. It has vast deposits of precious minerals, oil, and natural gas. “Great-Power Competition Comes to Antarctica”, by Elizabeth Buchanan, Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2024.

Old Salt Coffee is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. The company offers a wide range of coffee flavors to include Green Eyes Coffee, a tribute to those Navy special operations personnel who operate in the night.

Afghanistan

More SIVs. Included in the bipartisan funding bill passed by Congress and signed by the president was a provision of 12,000 additional special immigrant visas (Afghan Report) for Afghans who assisted the U.S. military during its 20-year-long involvement in the Afghan conflict. Next on the agenda for those affiliated with the #AfghanEvac effort is passage of the Afghan Adjustment Act (Afghan Report) – this would put an end to the legal limbo so many of our allies already here are facing.

Afghan Exit – Biden in the Spotlight. A U.S. House of Representatives hearing on the disastrous exit from Afghanistan and chaotic non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) of August 2021 has put President Biden in the glare of public scrutiny once again. This is much to the dismay of Democrats who fear that the issue will not go away by the November presidential elections. Coupled with the terrible situation on the southern border, these two events are going to cost Biden some votes. Two top generals who oversaw the fall of Afghanistan and the chaotic events of the Kabul NEO testified at the hearing cast blame on the White House and Department of State. “Republicans continue to hammer Biden for Afghan exit”, The Washington Post, March 19, 2024. (subscription)

IS-KP Attack in Russia. The terrorist attack in Moscow that claimed the lives of 133 people on Friday, March 22, 2024, may have been conducted by the Islamic State – Khorasan Province organization based in Afghanistan. IS-KP claimed responsibility for the attack. There are multiple reasons why Russia would be attacked by IS-KP. These include the 10-year occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, Russia’s close ties to the present-day Taliban, and the ground, air, and logistical support to Bashar al-Assad during his fight to destroy ISIS in Syria. This ISIS affiliate continues to exist despite efforts by the former ANDSF and U.S. up to 2021 and the current efforts of the Taliban to degrade or destroy the terrorist group.

Disinformation by Russia . . . Of Course. It did not take long for Russia to push out the disinformation narrative that Ukraine was responsible for the attack in Moscow. This, of course, was totally expected. U.S. intelligence officials had warned Moscow earlier in March both publicly and privately to expect an attack by ISIS. Read more in “U.S. Says ISIS Was Responsible for Deadly Moscow Concert Hall Attack”, The New York Times, March 22, 2024. (subscription)

Lessons of a General. Brig. Gen. (Ret) Don Bolduc (SF) details how a change in strategy from bottom-up nation building to top-down nation building cost us the war in Afghanistan. He points to the abandonment of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) as a big mistake. “Afghanistan Revisited – Lessons from a General’s Perspective”, SOFREP, March 23, 2024.

Africa

Libya Militias. Ever since the Arab Spring in 2011, the country of Libya has been in crisis. The vacuum left with the overthrow of dictator Omar Qaddafi was filled by numerous armed militias of various types. Slowly, many of these coalesced into two loose confederations centered in the western and eastern portions of Libya. In the west – in Tripoli, there are several armed militias funded by the government under very loose control. Learn more about them in “An Introduction to Tripoli’s Armed Factions”, by Jawhar Farhat, Grey Dynamics, March 23, 2024.

Trouble in the Sahara. The Polisario Front is a politico-military organization that is seeking the independence of part of the Western Sahara from Morocco (NSI map). Read more in “The Polisario Front: An Organizational Overview”, by Alex Purcell, Grey Dynamics. See also “Exploring the Escalation in Western Sahara“, by Jawhar Farhat, Grey Dynamics.

Danab Force. Elite soldiers from Somalia made history at exercise Justified Accord 2024, taking part in their first ever mission abroad. A platoon-sized element joined over 20 other partner nations in the U.S. Africa Command’s largest exercise in East Africa, which ran from Feb. 26 – March 7, 2024. “Somali Danab forces make history at Justified Accord 2024”, Army.mil, March 21, 2024.

ME Nations Assisting Somalia. There is some competition among some Middle East nations assisting Somalia in its fight against al Shabaab. Qatar, Turkey, and the UAE each have their reasons for providing advisors and money; but it is in a competitive atmosphere. Read more in “Emirati Military Support is Making a Difference in Somalia”, The Washington Institute, March 18, 2024.

Books, Pubs, Videos, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Book – Mustering for War. Michael G. Anderson is the author of a publication that provides a detailed account of the role that the Army National Guard had during the GWOT era. There are a few pages that give mention of the Army National Guard Special Forces units (29-31, 54, 98, and 147). Mustering for War: Army National Guard Mobilization for the Global War on Terrorism, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2024, PDF, 178 pages.

Pub – Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 5, 2024, PDF, 41 pages. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf

Journal – CTC Sentinel. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has published its latest monthly journal (March 2024). Articles cover topics such as the future of the Jihadi movement, antisemitism, and information operations.

Movie – The New James Bond. A 33-year-old British actor is expected to accept the role as British spy 007, taking over from Daniel Craig. Shooting should start this year with new adventures for the glamorous MI6’s spy. Craig, age 56, retired his Walther PPK, once he completed “No Time To Die”. The US Sun, March 18, 2024.

Video – The Hukbalahap Army in the Philippines, 1941-1945. Robert Burrell discusses IW in WWII. YouTube, one hour. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KM1-daRr–Y

Video – 2024 U.S. Special Operations Command Europe Command Video, DVIDS, 6 minutes.

https://www.dvidshub.net/video/916512/2024-us-special-operations-command-europe-command-video

Video – MARSOC Command Video, DVIDS, 5 minutes.

https://www.dvidshub.net/video/916194/marsoc-command-video

Video – Fight Club International. There is a YouTube channel for those who design war games – whether for commercial or military use. The channel has a slick one-minute-long promotional video as well as videos for how to design wargames. A long way from the old Strategy & Tactics board games of the 1970s that would come in a brown envelope once a month. https://www.youtube.com/@fightclubinternational

Podcast – Resistance and the National Defense of Small States, Modern War Institute at West Point, March 21, 2024. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/mwi-podcast-resistance-and-the-national-defense-of-small-states/

SOF News Book Shop

View our selection of books about special operations forces at the SOF News Book Shop.

Upcoming Events

March 26, 2024

Book Signing – Special Forces Berlin

Airborne and Special Operations Museum – Fayetteville, NC

April 12-14, 2024

Best Ranger Competition

April 24-25, 2024

12th Border Security & Intelligence Summit

Defense Strategies

May 6-10, 2024

SOF Week – Global SOF

Tampa, FL

June 10-12, 2024

Best Combat Diver Competition

SFUWO, Fleming Key, NAS Key West

June 12-13, 2024

Human Performance and Biosystems Summit

Defense Strategies Institute

sof.news · by SOF News · March 25, 2024

7. US and Japan plan biggest upgrade to security pact in over 60 years

Financial Times has the scoop here. Japan wants more senior US military officers posted in Japan. I recall years ago some in the Japanese military looked with envy on the ROK/US Combined Forces Command with the understanding that the combined command contributed so much to the development of the ROK military over the past 4+ decades (since 1978).

The other news services reports are based on this article. I received call from the Korean media asking if the US would be putting a 4 star US commander in Japan and what would that do to the INDOPACOM - US Forces Japan and US Forces Korea command relationships. This is the first I have heard of possible changes in the US military relationship with Japan.

Excerpts:

People familiar with the situation said other models could also be considered, including the possibility of upgrading the USFJ. The Pentagon is some way from making any decision, including on the task force idea, which was proposed by Admiral John Aquilino, Indopacom commander. Defence secretary Lloyd Austin also wants to give Admiral Samuel Paparo, who will succeed Aquilino in May, a chance to weigh in after he assumes the role.

The US and Japanese foreign and defence ministers are also expected to discuss the issue together later this year.

Recommended

The White House, Pentagon and Indo-Pacom declined to comment. The Japanese government also did not comment.

Whatever model is chosen will be complicated because of questions about resources and infrastructure and issues related to military hierarchy. There will also likely be turf battles between the different services in the US military.

Tokyo has been pushing for a US four-star commander in Japan. But the idea faces resistance, including on Capitol Hill. Jack Reed, the Democratic head of the Senate armed services committee, recently told the Defense Writers Group that Aquilino had done a “superb” job in his contact with the Japanese and that the current structure was “adequate”.

US and Japan plan biggest upgrade to security pact in over 60 years

Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · March 24, 2024

The US and Japan are planning the biggest upgrade to their security alliance since they signed a mutual defence treaty in 1960 in a move to counter China.

President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will announce plans to restructure the US military command in Japan to strengthen operational planning and exercises between the nations, according to five people familiar with the situation. They will unveil the plan when Biden hosts Kishida at the White House on April 10.

The allies want to bolster their security ties to respond to what they view as a growing threat from China, which requires their militaries to co-operate and plan more seamlessly, particularly in a crisis such as a Taiwan conflict.

While Biden and Kishida will herald the strength of the US-Japan alliance, the summit will come just weeks after the US president expressed his opposition to the Japanese group Nippon Steel acquiring US Steel. The intervention was designed to boost union support before the November election, but has partly soured the otherwise strong alliance.

Japan has over the past couple of years significantly increased its security capabilities, spending much more on defence, including plans to buy US Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Japanese military is also setting up a “Joint Operations Command” next year to improve co-ordination between the branches of its own Self-Defense Forces.

But co-ordination between the allies is hampered because the US Forces Japan (USFJ) has changed little from the days when the US and Japanese militaries did less together and has little command and control authority. Japan has to deal more with the US Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii, which is 19 hours behind Tokyo and 6,200km away.

Fumio Kishida, left, and Joe Biden at the White House in January 2023 © Ting Shen/Bloomberg

“Japan’s new national security policy is the most positive security development in east Asia in this century. The recognition that our two nations’ defence strategies have converged makes improvement in our day-to-day command and control the logical next step,” said Philip Davidson, who retired as Indo-Pacific commander in 2021.

Tokyo has long urged the US to give the three-star USFJ commander more operational authority, saying closer co-ordination on the ground was needed.

One catalyst was the 2011 earthquake and tsunami when US and Japanese troops carried out a joint rescue operation. While it was a success, Ryoichi Oriki, then chief of Japan’s SDF joint staff, said it was inconvenient having to co-ordinate with the US Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii rather than the USFJ commander, his daily counterpart.

Tokyo says there is an urgent need to put a more senior US officer in Japan as it takes on a bigger regional defence role. “It sends a strong strategic signal to China and North Korea and it’s meaningful from the point of view of deterrence to say that the US will strengthen the command structure in Japan,” Oriki told the Financial Times.

One model the Biden administration is considering involves creating a new US military joint task force that would be attached to the US Pacific Fleet, one of the component commands at Indopacom in Hawaii. The fleet’s four-star commander would spend more time in Japan than at present and would have an enhanced support structure in the country. Over time, the task force, which would include different parts of the US military, would shift to Japan.

US and Japanese soldiers clearing debris left by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami © Toru Yamanaka/AFP/Getty Images

Christopher Johnstone, a former senior Pentagon and CIA official, said upgrading the US command would be a “big step in building a more credible bilateral military alliance”.

“Co-locating these commands, at least partially, would move the US-Japan alliance closer to the ‘fight tonight’ mantra of the US alliance with South Korea — more responsive and credible in responding to regional threats,” said Johnstone, now at the CSIS think-tank. “This would make a major contribution to deterrence in the region.”

James Schoff, a US-Japan alliance expert at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, said the two allies needed to strengthen and clarify leadership and operational relationships for planning in both peacetime and times of crisis.

“US leadership could potentially ‘commute’ from Hawaii to Japan for this in peacetime, but they’ll need some kind of full-time joint staff based in Japan to plan, facilitate, and build trust with Japanese counterparts for a practical set of bilateral missions,” Schoff added.

People familiar with the situation said other models could also be considered, including the possibility of upgrading the USFJ. The Pentagon is some way from making any decision, including on the task force idea, which was proposed by Admiral John Aquilino, Indopacom commander. Defence secretary Lloyd Austin also wants to give Admiral Samuel Paparo, who will succeed Aquilino in May, a chance to weigh in after he assumes the role.

The US and Japanese foreign and defence ministers are also expected to discuss the issue together later this year.

Recommended

The White House, Pentagon and Indo-Pacom declined to comment. The Japanese government also did not comment.

Whatever model is chosen will be complicated because of questions about resources and infrastructure and issues related to military hierarchy. There will also likely be turf battles between the different services in the US military.

Tokyo has been pushing for a US four-star commander in Japan. But the idea faces resistance, including on Capitol Hill. Jack Reed, the Democratic head of the Senate armed services committee, recently told the Defense Writers Group that Aquilino had done a “superb” job in his contact with the Japanese and that the current structure was “adequate”.

Asked by the FT if a four-star officer was necessary in Japan, Reed said: “Maybe in the future, but right now I think we have the command structure in place to carry out an effective response.”

Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · March 24, 2024

8. Army puts drones front and center in unfunded wishlist

When dealing with UFRs (unfinanced requirements) in the past the question was always if the requirements are mission critical why did we put them on the UFR list? What capabilities that are already funded would you eliminate to fund the UFRs?

The very first sentence gets to this question - Army leaders want these capabilities but not quite enough to put them in the budget request.

Army puts drones front and center in unfunded wishlist

List includes commercial drones for infantry units, plus more counter-drone gear.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

What do Army leaders want—but not quite enough to include in their formal 2025 budget request? Aerial drones, counter-drone tech, and ground robots for smaller units, according to the service’s “unfunded priorities” list, obtained by Defense One Friday.

Service leaders have repeatedly said they aim to put more experimental technology in the hands of units for testing, so it’s no surprise that the list includes $10 million for small drones for companies and $25 million for the acquisition of commercially available drones for infantry brigade combat teams.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George has made acquisition of commercial drones a particular priority, with news of the cancellation of the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft accompanied by the announcement that the Army was phasing out existing drones in favor of commercial ones.

Talking with soldiers at a recent training event, George said troops were eager to get more small drones into their units.

“Most of the complaints [related to drones] were, how can I have this right now?” George said during an interview with Defense One for the State of Defense. Training for some of the drones can take as little as a day, he added.

“We're going to see robotics inside the formation, on the ground and in the air,” George said.

The Army can currently buy commercial drones off of the Blue UAS list, a list of drones vetted for government use. Such drones, however, can be eight to 14 times more expensive than those sold by Chinese companies, the Financial Times reported in 2021.

The Army is hoping that increasing demand will drive down cost, though, said George. “I think once we start to show a demand for more of these, and people are producing them, the prices will continue to come down,” the general said during the State of Defense event.

The Army also hopes to push extra cash toward its program to field one-way attack drones to infantry, dubbed the Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance, or LASSO, program. The list includes $10 million for LASSO.

Doug Bush, assistant Army secretary for acquisition, told Defense One at AUSA that the Army had ordered more than 100 Switchblade 600s for testing under the LASSO program. The Army budget request for fiscal year 2025 includes a request for $120 million worth of LASSO program drones.

The unfunded list also includes $26.5 million for Short Range Reconnaissance and $34 million for Medium Range Reconnaissance programs. Dronemaker Skydio entered the final phase of testing in the Army’s Short Range Reconnaissance program in January.

The list includes $449 million for counter-drone capabilities for force protection and $292 million for short- to long-range air defense amid frequent drone attacks on U.S. forces in the Middle East and the rise in drone warfare in Ukraine.

Half of the counter-drone capabilities, worth $185 million, are for interceptors. These interceptors may be Raytheon’s Coyote drone interceptors, which the Army has praised as effective in destroying the drones that regularly attack military bases in the Middle East.

The base budget for fiscal year 2025 calls for $117 million in Coyote interceptors, which can cost $125,000 per unit.

Other counter-drone sections under the list’s force protection category include $4.5 million in research and development for Anduril’s Roadrunner-M drone interceptor. It also includes $91 million for anti-air Stinger missiles and $10 million for a previously unidentified program called the “Family of Counter-sUAS system” or FoCUS.

The list also includes a further $84 million in funding for the Joint Counter Small Unmanned Systems University, which teaches soldiers to use hand-held counter-drone jammers and other counter drone devices.

The list also pressed forward with Army plans to bring more robotics into Army units, with $55.5 million requested for human machine integration, a category that includes using robotic, gun-toting vehicles to make first contact with enemy forces. A separate category requests $69.5 million for human machine integration experimentation with the Next Generation Combat Vehicle program.

Earlier in March, soldiers in an Army robotics and autonomous systems platoon in the 82nd Airborne division demonstrated attacking an enemy-held town with a mix of drones and robots at the Army’s Fort Irwin National Training Center.

A separate line calls for $16 million for the Silent Tactical Energy Dismount (STEED), a robot used to carry equipment and evacuate casualties.

Amid increasing use among Starlink and other low earth satellite orbit systems in Army units, the proposed budget also requests $4 million for “proliferated low earth orbit” in the tactical network category.

Other items on the list include $98 million for Precision Strike Missiles (PRSM) and $138 million for Patriot Advanced Capability Three (PAC-3) missiles.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

9. Is Al-Qaeda Now In Moscow? – OpEd

Is Al-Qaeda Now In Moscow? – OpEd

https://www.eurasiareview.com/25032024-is-al-qaeda-now-in-moscow-oped/

March 25, 2024 0 Comments

By Arab News

By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

The sudden resurgence of Al-Qaeda has thrust its name back into the global spotlight, this time as a prime suspect. Turkey has pointed fingers, linking the terrorist organization to two attacks resulting in 12 fatalities, while a statement has emerged claiming the group’s involvement in a recent terrorist strike in Moscow, which left more than 100 dead. Other reports indicate the group’s alleged involvement in attacks across Somalia, Yemen and Iraq.

Al-Qaeda was once a well-established organization with a recognized presence, headquartered in Kabul and led by Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden engaged with journalists and activists, releasing video statements. But today, Al-Qaeda has been reduced to nothing more than a name.

Why would Al-Qaeda target Moscow? Especially with the decline in hostilities in Syria, leaving no convincing explanation for its actions.

The primary enemies for Russians are the Ukrainians and their allies, who have conducted operations targeting Moscow. It is crucial to recognize that the war in Ukraine is significantly larger in scale than the Gaza conflict, both in terms of military operations and the involved armies. Moreover, the Ukraine situation has dangerous strategic implications, while the Gaza conflict is primarily regional in nature.

Despite the reluctance of most regional nations to engage in the Ukrainian conflict, Iran stood out by actively supplying Russia with drones, marking the first instance of its status as a dangerous source of weaponry. Therefore, it seems implausible that any organization under Tehran’s control or influence would launch an attack against Russia.

Most countries in the region have chosen to remain nonaligned in the Ukrainian conflict. Despite mounting pressure from the US, their relations with Russia remain positive. However, navigating these ties proves challenging, given Moscow’s support for Tehran and Tehran’s military involvement in the region’s numerous proxy conflicts.

The indictment against Al-Qaeda, though not entirely unfounded, has lost much of its persuasive force, prompting a deeper dive into the reality of the group and its affiliated armed factions. Whether breakaway factions from the original Al-Qaeda or independently inspired groups, the spotlight is back on.

Since the US-led crackdown on Al-Qaeda’s leaders, the Iraq war marked a significant turning point, offering a broader marketplace for terrorism. Iraqi Baathists, embittered by the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, have played a notable role in this new chapter. Additionally, Arab jihadists with ties to Syria have joined the fray, expanding the theater of conflict beyond Iraqi borders. As the conflict in Iraq waned, these elements spilled over into neighboring Syria, fueling anti-Russian insurgencies. This phenomenon drew in counter-establishment organizations from Central Asia.

Since the demise or capture of its key leaders, Al-Qaeda has lost its prominence, overshadowed by groups such as Jabhat Al-Nusra, Daesh, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, Al-Shabab in Somalia and others. These organizations have spread across the region like wildfire.

Saif Al-Adel stands as one of the last surviving leaders of Al-Qaeda from the Afghan jihad era. He currently lives in Iran, where he sought sanctuary alongside other key figures of the organization in the aftermath of the American invasion of Afghanistan. With only a solitary photograph dating back four decades, Al-Adel remains an enigmatic figure.

According to revelations from US interrogations, he vehemently opposed Bin Laden’s proposal to execute the Sept. 11 attacks, foreseeing the catastrophic consequences they would bring upon the organization. Leading the Iranian branch of Al-Qaeda, Al-Adel’s activities remain shrouded in mystery. Given mutual interests, it is improbable that this faction would engage in conflict against the Russians.

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a veteran columnist. He is the former general manager of Al Arabiya News Channel, and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, where this article was originally published. Twitter: @aalrashed

10. Thailand starts aid deliveries to Myanmar under plan aimed at managing conflict

Thailand starts aid deliveries to Myanmar under plan aimed at managing conflict

Reuters

March 25, 20242:55 AM EDTUpdated 4 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thailand-starts-aid-deliveries-myanmar-under-plan-aimed-managing-conflict-2024-03-25/?utm

BANGKOK, March 25 (Reuters) - Thailand started the delivery of aid to military-ruled Myanmar on Monday, in a humanitarian initiative that seeks to pave the way for talks between warring camps after three years of instability and violence triggered by a coup.

The first batch of 4,000 relief bags carrying rice, dried food, and other essentials for 20,000 people was delivered in a convoy by the Thai Red Cross to its Myanmar counterpart at the Mae Sot-Myawaddy border crossing, Thailand's foreign ministry said in a statement.

The project is part of a wider peace initiative by Thailand to establish a humanitarian corridor, backed by the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as a civil war intensifies between Myanmar's military on one side and ethnic minority armies and a resistance movement on the other.

The United Nations has said at least 2.6 million people have been displaced by fighting and more than 18 million people are in need of assistance.

ASEAN's five-point peace plan, which Myanmar's generals agreed to in April 2021, has yet to advance, with frustration in the bloc about the junta's lack of commitment and its use of air strikes and artillery in civilian areas.

The commitment includes humanitarian access, a halt to fighting and dialogue, which the generals have so far refused to pursue. Thailand is hoping it can play a role in bringing the fighting to a manageable level and encouraging talks.

South Korea medical professors join doctor protest

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"This is a display of good intention from Thailand to the people of Myanmar," Thailand's vice foreign minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow said, adding, "with the hope that Myanmar will see peace, stability and unity."

The aid will be distributed in three pilot locations in Myanmar's Kayin State, observed by ASEAN's humanitarian and disaster agency.

Sihasak said there was a readiness to support dialogue between and the humanitarian assistance would expand to other areas in the future. He did not elaborate.

11. Indo-Pacific Command to Harness AI for Operational Planning

I remember one of my many great bosses/mentors saying the only people who know the plans are the planners who write them and their commander. Everyone else is the plan to powerpoint slide depth. If we have AI writing the plans, who will really know the plan? Who will be able to orchestrate and synchronize the plan?

Yes I am making an over the top comment but we need to be careful in ceding our intellectual capital to machines.

That said, I am sure we can figure out ways to employ AI effectively to improve the planning process.

Indo-Pacific Command to Harness AI for Operational Planning

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2024/3/25/indo-pacific-command-to-harness-ai--for-operational-planning?mc_cid=d5241748e9&mc_eid=70bf478f36

3/25/2024

By Laura Heckmann

Photo-illustration, Navy, iStock illustration

HONOLULU — Indo-Pacific Command is developing a tool that will utilize artificial intelligence to accelerate the “long, arduous” process of operational planning, its chief of staff said.

The effort, called Stormbreaker, is currently under development and working toward an artificial intelligence-enabled joint operational planning toolkit to support planning, wargaming, analysis and execution of multi-domain, operational-level course of action development.

Army Maj. Gen. Joshua Rudd, Indo-Pacific Command chief of staff, said the initiative will take aim at a process that ordinarily takes “hours, days, weeks, years to develop,” speaking at the National Defense Industrial Association’s Pacific Operational Science and Technology Conference in March.

Even daily operations can take three to four courses of action with the traditional military decision-making process, he said.

“Think if there’s a way to run those continuously, and red team it, war game it, simulate it over and over and over so that it’s not only generating courses of action that you may not have thought about, but also refining the ones that exist,” he said.

An operational plan takes “a long time” to develop, but so does updating it, he added.

When forming an operational plan, “much of the facts and assumptions and the threat go back to … the staggering pace at which the enemy is modernizing and delivering capability,” he said.

While Rudd did not discuss specifics, he said initial capabilities are starting to be delivered and are centered around “some modeling and simulation capabilities that take existing data — so threat data, friendly data, operational plans — and then looks through an AI/machine learning lens to assess and then generate output.”

The program is part of a collection of Indo-Pacific Command initiatives that Navy Adm. John Aquilino, commander of Indo-Pacific Command, called “Seize the Initiative,” an approach to delivering integrated deterrence, Rudd said.

The other three — the Joint Fires Network, the INDOPACOM Mission Network and the Pacific Multi-Domain Training Environment Concept — all feed into each other, Rudd said.

The Joint Fires Network is a battle management system that addresses a need for decision superiority, or the ability to take “massive amounts of information and distill it into something that is usable [and] displayable,” he said. “But how do you take the massive amounts of data from the highest level of classification to an open source bit of information … and bring it together to see what the enemy is doing, to see what your friendly forces are doing?”

To see that information in real time and enable decision-making is “hard for a human to do,” he said. “We think there’s a role for AI and machine learning capability to assist that to enable us to do that at the speed of relevance.”

If caught in a conflict, the ability to move at speed and scale “and really the threat that will be posed to us will be unlike anything we’ve seen in recent history,” he said.

“I would argue we’re really good at delivering and closing kill chains,” he continued. “Decision superiority against … singular targets. And we can apply some of that knowledge and experience to this. So, the Joint Fires Network is our approach and our design and our effort to bring that together to give us decision superiority to enable us to close kill chains.”

Rudd described the INDOPACOM Mission Network as a “single pane of glass that brings together pre-existing networks where we have historically talked bilaterally, we need to be able to do this multilaterally.”

There are challenges with creating this network, such as policy and authority hindrances around information sharing and increasing collaboration with allies and partners, he said.

“But there’s also a technical component to that. The imperative is to be able to defend [networks] against cyberattacks, infiltration. And so, we’re stitching that together in concert with the Joint Fires Network,” Rudd said.

Lastly, the Pacific Multi-Domain Training Environment Concept is an effort to bring together a live, virtual and constructive training environment.

“The point is we can stitch together in real time virtual, live and constructive training events that enable us to rehearse, to integrate allies and partners and to do it over and over and over again,” Rudd said.

The concept is connected to an eventual maturation of the INDOPACOM Mission Network and underpinned by the Joint Fires Network, he added.

“And then if you realize all those at once, then you see the inherent connectivity between all those efforts, and if you deliver all of that in the manner in which we propose, that has an incredibly powerful deterrent effect, I believe,” he said. “So, accelerate, accelerate, accelerate.” ND

12. With Eyes on China, US Special Operators Are Back to Battling the Jungle

With Eyes on China, US Special Operators Are Back to Battling the Jungle

military.com · by Business Insider | By Stavros Atlamazoglou Published March 24, 2024 at 5:41pm ET · March 24, 2024

Read the original article on Business Insider.

After spending more than 20 years fighting in the wars in the Middle East, U.S. special operators are pivoting to other environments. With the potential for a conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific looming ever larger in the background, the US special operations community is focusing more and more on jungle operations.

A relatively recent exercise involving Marine Raiders highlighted the challenges and unique requirements of jungle warfare.

From the desert to the jungle

Last summer, a small team of Marine Raiders completed a jungle warfare course that addresses the challenges U.S. forces might encounter in an Indo-Pacific conflict.

Taught by special operations and law enforcement veterans at the Tactical Tracking Operations School, the course began in 2015 but really took off in 2021. The two-week course takes place on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, and is designed to take small special operations teams and teach them the necessary skills to survive and thrive in jungle operations.

The Marine Raiders trained in jungle mobility skills, such as navigating thick brush, scaling and rappelling cliffs, and traversing rivers, counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) techniques, reaction to contact, and ambushes. Throughout the course, the special operators either tracked an adversary or prevented them from tracking the team.

"Looking at the Pacific and deployments in that region, learning these skills is essential," a Marine Raider said in a press release. "For so long we trained for desert environments and now we have to look at where we could be needed next, and the jungle is top of that list."

The course ends with a final exercise that lasts up to three days and tests all the skill sets taught. After a simulated ambush, the students must regroup and hunt down the adversary using their tracking skills.

Two decades of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria largely dulled the jungle warfare capabilities of many units. Jungle warfare presents a whole different level of difficulty and requires specialized training to operate effectively.

"These same problems that we have now: low visibility, difficulty for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, broken communications, and logistical issues, they all existed for troops during WWII and Vietnam," Cody Carroll, the vice president of the school, said. "We didn't need to reinvent the wheel, just build the skills that we stopped training because we spent 20 years in the desert."

For example, movement in the jungle is much more restricted and visibility is often limited to just a few yards. Moreover, there are many small and large animals that can ruin someone's day, necessitating the right survival training. Tracking is another important part of jungle operations. With so much foliage, it's easy for an untrained unit to leave evidence of its direction in the jungle.

"I've been through this training with two teams now and both experiences were beneficial to everyone on the team," a Critical Skills Operator, or CSO, said. "I really think every company that can deploy to a jungle environment should come do this training. It's invaluable."

A history of jungle operations

U.S. commandos have a long history of conducting jungle operations.

During World War II, U.S. special operations units like the Alamo Scouts and the Marine Raiders fought the Japanese in the jungles of southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Then, during the Vietnam War, special operators serving in the secretive Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG) fought a classified war against the North Vietnamese and Vietcong in Laos and Cambodia.

Although the White House had assured the American public that no U.S. troops were on the ground in the two countries that border Vietnam, the Pentagon understood that to stem the flow of weapons and insurgents in South Vietnam, it had to fight the enemy where it hurt.

Small teams of Green Berets, Navy SEALs, Force Recon Marines, and Air Commandos conducted some of the most impressive missions in U.S. special operations history.

Today, as the United States attempts to redirect its focus to the Indo-Pacific amid steadily rising tensions between the U.S. and China, it looks like jungle operations are back on the menu for the U.S. special operations community.

military.com · by Business Insider | By Stavros Atlamazoglou Published March 24, 2024 at 5:41pm ET · March 24, 2024

13. A Chinese Invasion of Taiwan This Year? Maybe Not

Conclusion:

While anything is certainly possible, the challenges posed by China probably remain a concern over a longer time horizon. China clearly makes no bones about their desires regarding Taiwan, and at some point, they may feel the need to act. It is for these uncertainties and unanswered questions that our own vigilance, attention and preparation on the China-Taiwan dynamic must not falter.

A Chinese Invasion of Taiwan This Year? Maybe Not

By Miguel Alejandro Laborde

March 25, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/03/25/a_chinese_invasion_of_taiwan_this_year_maybe_not_1020528.html

Watching the constant harassment of Taiwan by an increasingly assertive and provocative China, as well as increased media attention on the China-Taiwan dynamic, one may be concerned that an invasion of Taiwan is imminent – perhaps later this year. All that being said, China is probably not going to invade Taiwan in the summer of 2024.

It’s not that China does not have coercive and incorporative designs regarding their island neighbor across the strait – on the contrary, they do. And it’s not that a conventional attack via military force is not completely out of the question – it certainly could happen, and many of the foundational concerns for such a scenario to materialize do exist. It’s that the window for China to conduct an all-out, combined arms invasion of Taiwan this year is closing quickly. A few strategic issues, contextual observations and thoughts might be worth considering.

At a base level, before we consider whether or not China will attack Taiwan, we must first ask if China can achieve what it wants to achieve in Taiwan without resorting to martial action. This is the core driver of whether they launch an attack or not. Can China get what they want in Taiwan without a military offensive? We also must consider other related issues. Is it too costly for China to invade or is it too costly to play a longer game in order to attain their goals? And what timeframes are acceptable to China if they wait for a non-martial approach and what are the risk factors for each?

We don’t have complete answers to many of these questions now and it isn’t likely that we have concrete insights into the risk versus reward calculus of President Xi and the Chinese Communist Party. But from what we do know about China and Taiwan currently – particularly in the context of other global developments – a kinetic assault on Taiwan in the immediate future seems less than likely, for a number of economic and military reasons.

One – China is eyeing both the Russia-Ukraine war, the ongoing (and possibly widening) war in Israel and Gaza and they are weighing the benefits and costs of a strike on Taiwan against other determining factors that impact all of these conflicts. These other factors cover everything from how much the U.S. is prepared to keep supporting its allies, a quickly looming U.S. presidential election with a chance of executive change in November, and larger long-term geopolitical concerns for China that would be affected by an invasion, to name a few. Frankly, if China were serious about invading before a U.S. presidential election – to attack while the U.S. seems pre-occupied this summer – it would have to start pre-invasion preparations fairly soon, given the scope of what a conventional invasion would require. On all questions, China has a lot to consider and a short time to do it.

Two – While there are concerns regarding how despotic regions often project via foreign engagement to distract and rally dissatisfied populations (an old trick, and China is certainly dealing with internal economic and demographic challenge that might give way to starting a war abroad) conventional invasion carries a lot of downside risk. As China’s economy stutters, and it increasingly relies on manufacturing and exports, it needs the world community to purchase the products it makes…and that includes the U.S. One must ask, “Would China gain or lose more economically by launching an invasion that would be sure to upend the entire world economy and possibly start a global war?”

Three – A wide spectrum of military factors suggest that China may not be ready to launch an attack this year. While China’s military capabilities have been advancing rapidly, a full-bore invasion of Taiwan would be a colossal undertaking that – even if short in time duration – would still require significant logistics, commitment, contingency planning, and materiel support.

China’s military certainly dwarfs that of Taiwan’s…but any complication that prolongs a Chinese offensive – like, say, a stout resistance in the hills and cities once Chinese troops are on Taiwanese soil – would only mean more materiel, soldiers, patience, blood, and treasure over time. Does China really have the capability to support major, extended high-intensity combat operations over considerable periods of time – especially in the face of what could be major aligned resistance and counterforces? In 2023, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted intense wargaming scenarios regarding China-Taiwan war – and the ultimate conclusion was that even with considerable losses of U.S., Japanese and Taiwanese assets, in most scenarios China would not prevail.

Of course, China does have an advantage of close geography and lots of troops to throw at the effort. But a Chinese attack on Taiwan could require a complex combined arms effort, with all elements of national power dedicated to the objective: airborne troops landing in the interior, amphibious landings on Taiwan’s limited beachheads, a sustained air campaign, a major cyber-attack to disable C2 and civilian infrastructure, and a serious naval blockade to squeeze Taiwan’s economy. But is China actually ready to do this in the next three to six months?

Finally – While the Chinese think long term and have continued to shore up global support for the idea of “One China,” the Taiwanese also get a vote on their future. And while there have been concerns about the capability and readiness of Taiwanese defense forces, there are indications that Taiwan is getting serious about defending its sovereignty. The recent election of Lai Ching-te for President, and growing interest in preparedness among Taiwanese citizens are possible indicators of a stiffening national identity and security resolve.

While anything is certainly possible, the challenges posed by China probably remain a concern over a longer time horizon. China clearly makes no bones about their desires regarding Taiwan, and at some point, they may feel the need to act. It is for these uncertainties and unanswered questions that our own vigilance, attention and preparation on the China-Taiwan dynamic must not falter.

Miguel Alejandro Laborde is a former NCO in the 160th SOAR (A), and a subject matter expert on defense aviation programs, capabilities, and platforms, with decades’ worth of experience in the aerospace industry supporting the joint force.

14. ‘It’s Causing Them to Drop Out of Life’: How Phones Warped Gen Z

Impact on military recruiting?

‘It’s Causing Them to Drop Out of Life’: How Phones Warped Gen Z

The social psychologist Jonathan Haidt warns social media is fueling a mental health crisis.

Politico · by MICHAEL HIRSH

The social psychologist Jonathan Haidt warns social media is fueling a mental health crisis.

POLITICO illustration; Photos by iStock

By Marc Novicoff

03/24/2024 12:00 PM EDT

Marc Novicoff is an associate editor at the Washington Monthly and a freelance writer. He has worked for POLITICO Magazine and Slow Boring.

It’s hard to believe sometimes that smartphones and social media haven’t been around forever — but for one generation, they have. Gen Z doesn’t know a time when they weren’t ubiquitous. This cohort also happens to be the generation with the worst mental health in America. Is that a coincidence?

The social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has reams of data to argue it’s not. And in his new book, The Anxious Generation: How the Great Rewiring of Childhood Is Causing an Epidemic of Mental Illness, he is launching a shot in what he hopes will become a full-scale war against social media and smartphone use by kids and teens.

“Our children are going on a conveyor belt,” Haidt tells me. “And a lot of them are getting shredded.”

Through his research, which he also highlights on his Substack, “After Babel,” Haidt found that teen mental health has dramatically worsened after iPhone usage became widespread and Instagram was created. While he blames Instagram for causing the most initial damage of the new era — particularly in fueling declining mental health for girls — he now sees a new, graver threat. “TikTok is arguably the worst consumer product ever invented,” says Haidt, who’s a strong supporter of legislation targeting TikTok in Congress.

Without action — from parents, lawmakers, schools and tech companies — the youth mental health crisis will continue unabated, he warns. And there could be some unexpected political fallout. As Haidt puts it, with a growing sense of anxiety and dislocation, people may become more open to an authoritarian leader who promises to stop the chaos.

This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

How do we know that the rise of smartphones has caused poor mental health among young people, as opposed to just being correlated with it?

Because, in addition to the correlational evidence, which is very consistent, there are also longitudinal studies that allow us to infer causality. And most importantly, there are true experiments.

Jean Twenge and I have been collecting all the studies we can find at this Google Doc — we have a review called “Social media and mental health, a collaborative review.” What we have is 34 studies that suggest a causal effect. And there are 21 studies that show no effect, but here’s the thing, the studies that show no effect, they take measurements a day or a week apart. When we look at longitudinal studies that use a month or more, the great majority find an effect.

And that’s just one body of the empirical research. The more important body of empirical research are the true experiments: randomized control trials. We have 16 just in our review — though there are other newer ones — that found an effect and only six that didn’t.

There are another six studies that we found that used natural experiments: When high speed internet comes to one region in Spain versus another, or one region of British Columbia versus another, do we see increases in adolescent mental illness? And the answer is yes, in all six studies, and in most of them, it’s especially the girls. What we see over and over again is a similar pattern.

How and why did we as a society let the problem get so out of hand?

Because we had a very different view of these technologies in 2012. My argument is that between 2010 and 2015, adolescent life was rewired.

In 2010, almost everyone had a flip phone. They had no Instagram account because it was just invented that year. They had no high-speed data, no high-speed internet, and they had to pay for their internet usage. They had to pay for each text. So a 13- or 14-year-old kid in the year 2010 was not online all day long.

But over the next few years, Instagram becomes very popular. The front-facing camera comes out [on iPhones] in 2010. So now photographs are much more of yourself. Most people get high-speed internet, most people get an unlimited data plan. And video games get much more immersive with multiplayer online games that thrive on the high-speed internet.

For all these reasons, for adolescents in 2010, [tech] was not terribly harmful. But by 2015, it was. At least that’s the conclusion I came to from looking at the timing [of mental illness spikes] in America and internationally, and the timing of technological change.

Growing up as a member of Gen Z, I often played video games with my friends and used social media to connect with them. How do we make sure that we don’t sacrifice the more positive uses of screens and smartphones for children when we scale back?

Well, let’s distinguish between the internet, which is wonderful — and no one’s talking about keeping children away from the internet — and social media on a smartphone. The latest Gallup data shows that American teens are spending literally five hours a day just on social media. I think it’s very difficult to find evidence of benefit from heavy use.

Let’s take video games. Boys love video games. Almost all boys play video games. Do you think that boys would suffer if they were limited to playing an hour a day on weekdays and two hours a day on weekends? Would that be a harm compared to say three or four hours a day?

It probably depends on whether they’re playing with their friends or not, to be honest.

In the early 2010s, when kids were moving their social lives online, we thought. “Well, OK, they’re not spending time with each other in person, but isn’t this just as good? They’re posting, they’re liking each other’s posts, they’re commenting on each other’s posts, the boys are playing video games. Isn’t this just as good?” And at the time, we had no reason to think it wasn’t.

But now we know the answer is no, it is not just as good. We know this because when they transfer their social life, as the girls transferred it onto social media and the boys transferred it onto video games, that’s exactly when the epidemic of loneliness accelerated. Girls are suffering more depression and anxiety; boys are suffering more loneliness and friendlessness.

In the early 2010s, which was around a peak time for moving on to multiplayer video games, you might expect a wave of happiness and feeling that you have friends — you now have all these friends you can get together with all around the world — but it turns out that it’s like empty calories. Video games gave boys huge amounts of shallow social connection and caused them to feel lonelier. Social media gave girls huge amounts of shallow and competitive social connection and it made them feel lonelier. So I don’t think much was gained from the switch from real life to virtual. And I think there’d be minimal cost to reducing screen use in middle school by 90 percent.

How do you think the increased depression and anxiety in young people is affecting their politics, or American politics in general?

A healthy democratic society requires some degree of shared facts and some degree of trust in institutions and some degree of trust in each other. And all of that is declining for many reasons, but one of them is the rise of social media. The social construction of reality turns into a million tiny fragments on social media.

When 9/11 happened, Americans generally came to the conclusion very quickly that al Qaeda had attacked us. But if that happened tomorrow, we would not come to such a conclusion. We’re no longer able to agree on basic facts about what is happening or what happened. Now, none of this is the fault of Gen Z. This is happening to people of all ages. But if you are raised to political consciousness in a fragmented world where you can’t believe anything, where the Russians are messing with us and trying to get us to believe that we can’t believe anything, it’s going to make it tougher to become vibrant, engaged democratic citizens.

There is also the rise of depression and anxiety. The chief characteristic of Gen Z is not so much depression, it’s primarily anxiety. If anxiety is the normal state of affairs for a generation, they’re going to be much more sensitive and they’re going to find many more events threatening. And as we know from Karen Stenner’s work, when people feel threatened and when they feel that society is fragmenting, that triggers the “authoritarian dynamic,” as she calls it — it activates authoritarianism. A population that is anxious, afraid and threatened is going to be more open to a strongman, to an authoritarian leader, to someone who promises to stop the chaos and stop the threats.

And there’s a curious characteristic of the data — it is especially young people who identify as being on the left who got depressed and anxious first and fastest. About a year ago, there was a big discussion online about these data, about how liberal girls fell ill first and fastest, and Michelle Goldberg weighed in and Matt Yglesias weighed in.

Why is it that social media is causing bigger mental health problems for girls than boys even as girls outpace boys in the classroom?

They are two separate issues. I believe social media harm girls more because social media offers the lure of social connection in a way that appeals to girls, but then it literally blocks quality social connections. So it harms girls more than boys.

As for school performance, the issue there is not that girls are doing so great, it’s that boys are withdrawing from the real world. They’re just investing less time and effort in everything that matters for success in life, as Richard Reeves has pointed out in his wonderful book Of Boys and Men. They’re largely spending more and more time on video games and other digital pursuits.

The digital life is not causing depression and anxiety in boys to the extent that it is in girls, but it’s causing them to drop out of life, not cultivate skills, like flirting or courtship or working for pay. It’s causing them to drop out of life in ways that will block their flourishing for the rest of their lives.

You call for action in the book from parents, educators, Congress and Silicon Valley. Who has the most responsibility to limit kids’ access to smartphones and social media?

The parents have the primary duty and oversight; the problem is that parents are struggling to do it and they’re not able to. The situation is just as if we said the drinking age is 21, and it’s the parents’ responsibility to enforce this because you can’t expect bars and casinos and strip clubs to check IDs. That’s obviously absurd. Parents can’t do that unless they literally lock up their children and do not let them outside, and it’s the same thing here.

If your child can get to a computer that is connected to the internet, they can open as many Instagram and TikTok accounts as they want. You’ll never know. Parents are in an impossible situation.

We have this bizarre legal situation, in which there are no age barriers whatsoever on the internet, where companies can essentially do whatever they want to children — they can treat them like adults — and Congress has granted them immunity from lawsuits. Our children are going on a conveyor belt, and a lot of them are getting shredded. A lot of them are getting harmed. A lot of them are finding that their childhood is now sucked up by a couple of platforms, primarily TikTok and Instagram and YouTube. And many of them are getting sextorted. Many of them are exposed to pornography. Many of them are being approached by older men, and Congress has said in Section 230 — which has been too widely interpreted by the courts — that we can’t do a damn thing about it. This is an untenable situation. I actually think this is an outrage.

Congress made a big mistake with COPPA [the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act] in 1998, when they set the minimum age too low at 13 [for websites to allow data collection]. Congress made a huge mistake in setting it way too low and not mandating any enforcement. Congress wrote the law so that as long as Facebook doesn’t know that you’re under 13, they’re fine. So any 10-year-old can open an account anywhere, and the company has no obligation to check IDs or to kick them off when they know.

Congress helped to launch the internet by granting the industry protection from lawsuits based on the content of other people’s posts. But somehow this evolved into saying the platforms can do whatever the hell they want to kids. They can put on as many addictive features as they want, they can do things that they know are harming mental health, and they’re OK. No one can touch them. That’s our situation, and this has to change.

Tell me why you support the bill moving through Congress that forces the sale of TikTok or bans it if a sale doesn’t take place. Are you surprised to see it advancing as far as it has considering Congress’ inability to regulate social media?

Yes, I’m thrilled. I had largely given up hope on the U.S. Congress. It caused a problem and then walked away from it. And so I am thrilled that this bill has legs. I don’t favor banning companies. But I’m horrified that the most influential platform on American children by far is a company that is legally bound to do what the Chinese Communist Party wants it to do. That is literally what Chinese law says. I don’t believe for a moment any promise that data is separated or that there’s independence.

It is a completely untenable situation to have our largest geopolitical rival having not just access, but the ability to direct the activities of the platform most influential on our kids. Even if the psychological harm is similar to Instagram [Reels] and YouTube Shorts, the national security implications are unique to TikTok. And so that’s why I favor forcing the divestiture.

With your kids, what do you restrict and what do you allow?

I had a firm rule against social media in middle school. And it’s an ongoing negotiation in high school.

Among all the social media apps, which do you think is most dangerous to young people? Is it Instagram, TikTok, something else?

I think Instagram caused the most damage for the first eight years of this new era. From 2012 to 2020, when we see the huge increases [in mental illness] for girls, I think Instagram is the single platform that contributed the most to girls’ declining mental health.

However, I’m now coming to see that TikTok is much more powerful than anything else out there. TikTok is able to train behavior the way a dog trainer trains a dog with tiny little rewards for tiny action. As I’m discovering from talking to my students, short-form videos of the kind pioneered by TikTok are the most addictive, the most narcotic. They put you into kind of a mesmerized state, much like a slot machine addict. TikTok is a platform that young people themselves say they wish didn’t exist.

Given how much time it soaks up, given that it gives no benefit to the people who use it, who see it as a net negative in their lives, I think TikTok is arguably the worst consumer product ever invented.

How many hours a day do you spend using screens? And how many of those are on social media? Have you tried to cut back?

For me, because, I’m a professor and a scholar, I’m pretty much always on one of my three computers. I don’t really use my phone except for tools. Like I use my phone to make phone calls and I use it for the flashlight. I use it for mapping. I use it for Uber, but I never, ever check social media on my phone. I don’t like typing on it. I don’t like using it.

I probably spend about an hour a week on Twitter and that’s it. There were times when I was spending an hour a day, and I finally realized I don’t have that much time. I need that time for research and writing. So I’ve cut back, but there were times when I was spending an hour a day, and I could see that it affected my mental health. I could see that it made me more anxious, more focused on what people were saying about me. There were several years when I was a medium level user of Twitter. And I learned my lesson. It’s just really bad for me.

Anything else on your mind?

The other thing I would say is that, as a social psychologist, I’ve watched as our society has gone haywire since the early 2010s, and this started before Donald Trump became president. I believe it enabled Donald Trump to become president. And I’ve been studying how the transformation of our communication and information networks and personal and social networks has made it harder for democracies to function well and easier for authoritarian countries to function well.

So I’m extremely alarmed about the movement of so much of life onto social media platforms — extremely alarmed about what it’s done to American democracy in particular and to young people all around the Western world.

POLITICO

Politico · by MICHAEL HIRSH

15. The Institution or the Constitution (COVID and the Military)

How did COVID become so politicized?

This issue in this article must be addressed.

The Institution or the Constitution

By Robert A. Green Jr. & W. Dean Lee

March 25, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/03/25/the_institution_or_the_constitution_1020522.html

Unraveling the COVID-19 Mandates for the Joint Force

Those who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety — Benjamin Franklin

Introduction & Why It Matters

In early 2020, life around the globe changed when a pandemic erupted out of Wuhan, China. The impacts were significant, with governments electing to shutter economies and restrict freedom of movement in an attempt to keep their populations safe. At the time, little was known about the virus or how to mitigate its health risks. Many individuals were willing to accept these restrictions as temporary measures to help “stop the spread.” As “two weeks” became two years, most of the mitigation measures were ultimately mandated to military personnel, introducing a constitutional crisis between safety and personal liberty. After three years, the time has come for us to take an honest, retrospective assessment of this “black swan” event and the impact, if any, on the constitutional rights of service members.

Within the Department of Defense (DoD), COVID-19 is attributed with causing the deaths of 96 service members.[i] The loss of these service members is unquestionably tragic. Yet, in many ways the American people could look at this relatively low number as a triumph due, in part, to the mandated mitigation measures. After all, with a total of 453,456 documented COVID-19 infections, a survivability rate of 99.9997% should seem like a huge win for DoD leaders who prioritized the health of the Joint Force.[ii] However, this survivability rate does not appear to differ significantly from the pre-vaccine survivability rate of the rest of the U.S. military-aged population, with all 25-34 year-olds at 99.9943% and all 35-44 year-olds at 99.984% survivability respectively.[iii] With such a minimal return, particularly for military-age persons, the decision to mandate nearly every possible health mitigation was not without risks. Along with the mandated mitigation measures came a legal and constitutional crisis, unprecedented in scope in U.S. military history. If ignored and left unresolved, this constitutional crisis will continue to negatively impact the Joint Force and the future of the nation—long after the COVID-19 pandemic has become a distant memory.

What this Article Will and Will Not Do

This article will not analyze the COVID-19 health risks, the science behind the various mitigation measures, nor the emerging evidence of post-vaccine injuries.[iv] Rather, this article will focus exclusively on the law, the Constitution, and the obligation service members have to the Constitution. It is the concerted opinion of the authors that the United States military – until recently America’s most trusted institution[v] – failed a fundamental ethics test. Yet, this article will not impugn the honor nor question the good-faith efforts of decision makers who fought valiantly to keep subordinates healthy. Regardless of any good intentions, however, this article will demonstrate that institutions within the DoD violated the law in two primary ways in the course of implementing the COVID-19 mandates.

The first of these violations was the denial of informed consent. The DoD explicitly violated specific laws under Title 21, which were designed to protect informed consent rights, as well as the inherent rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment and bodily integrity rights under the Tenth Amendment. Secondly, the DoD violated the free exercise of religion. This was done by unequivocally violating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act under Title 42, along with inherent religious freedom rights protected by the First Amendment. After conducting the required legal crosswalk and analyzing these violations, this article will discuss what the implications of these violations are to the Joint Force. Finally, recommendations will be presented for how decision makers can begin the restoration process that will help rebuild trust with service members and the American people.

Informed Consent & Public Health Emergencies

Under natural law, the Constitution, Title 21, and the principles established in the Nuremberg Code, human persons may not be forcibly medicated or medically experimented on without consent. This principle, referred to as “informed consent,” applies to all Americans, including service members. This principle, and the rights it protects, cannot be stripped in peacetime or in war. Even during a public health emergency, informed consent is still required, regardless of the severity of that emergency.

In fact federal law, as detailed in 21 USC § 360bbb-3, explicitly covers public health emergency situations (such as the COVID-19 pandemic), and permits the Secretary of Health and Human Services to declare a public health emergency and approve products for emergency use that have not been “approved, licensed, or cleared for commercial distribution” by the FDA, but that may provide some health benefit.[vi] The law describes these products as “emergency use” products, “unapproved products,” or, for the purposes of liability protections under the Title 42 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, “covered countermeasures.”[vii] Emergency Use Authorizations (EUA) issued by the FDA under the authority of the Secretary of Health and Human Services can then “authorize the introduction into interstate commerce, during the effective period of [the] declaration…a drug, device, or biological product intended for use in an actual or potential emergency.”[viii] The applicable informed consent law, 21 USC 360bbb-3, details the conditions under which an emergency use product (i.e. unapproved product) may be administered to any recipient. In the required conditions section of the law, it specifies that the potential recipient is required to be informed of each and all of the following;

Informed that “the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] has authorized the emergency use of the product;”
Informed “of the significant known and potential benefits and risks of the emergency use of the product, and the extent to which such benefits and risks are unknown;”
Informed “of the option to accept or refuse administration of the product;”
Informed “of the [health] consequences, if any, of refusing administration of the product;”
Informed “of the alternatives to the product that are available and their benefits and risks.”[ix]

These conditions, required by federal law, apply to all Americans. Any pharmacist, doctor, or nurse who administered an emergency use product to any American citizen were required to inform patients of the possible risks of the product, as well as the patients’ right to accept or refuse the product. How well these medical professionals performed their legally required informed consent duties as related to COVID-19 risks from medical devices and injections is a topic for a later study. For the purposes of this article, we will focus on the military application of the third requirement that the recipient is informed of the right to accept or refuse the product.

The right to accept or refuse a medical intervention, medical device, pharmaceutical, or any other biological product is a fundamental human right which flows from natural law. This fundamental right, protected by the U.S. Constitution, is what differentiates human beings from experimental test subjects, as it relates to bodily integrity rights. There is only one law related to informed consent that differentiates between laws that cover all Americans and laws covering service members specifically. This law is 10 USC §1107a, and with it, Congress gave very limited authority to the President of the United States to be employed in the event of a public health emergency or a domestic emergency related to attack with a biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent.

It is important to understand the exact language of the Presidential authority designated by this law. 10 USC §1107a specifies that “in the case of the administration of a product authorized for emergency use…to members of the armed forces, the condition…designed to ensure that individuals are informed of an option to accept or refuse administration of a product, may be waived only by the President only if the President determines, in writing, that complying with such a requirement is not in the interest of national security.”[x] This means that for national security reasons, the President may only waive the requirement that service members be informed of their right to accept or refuse an emergency use product. For example, if the U.S. comes under a chemical-agent attack and a potential counteragent can be rapidly developed, then authorized for Americans under emergency use, the President can then waive, in writing, the government’s requirement to inform service members of their fundamental right to refuse the product. Just like Miranda rights, however, not informing an individual of their rights does not mean that the rights can be stripped or somehow do not exist. To the contrary, under no circumstances are service members’ rights to bodily integrity and informed consent stripped by either the Presidentially authorized removal of the requirement to inform them of such rights, or by the unlawful failure to properly execute the legally required informed consent.

The DoD had a different interpretation of 10 USC §1107a, and a lawsuit related to both 10 USC §1107a and mandating EUA products was filed in early October 2021 on behalf of service members.[xi] In a preliminary federal court ruling on November 12, 2021, the judge wrote that the “DoD’s interpretation of §1107a is unconvincing.”[xii] Unfortunately this case never made it to a final ruling. The DoD sought to get this case dismissed multiple times for multiple different reasons including by asserting that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim and asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction.[xiii] Once the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act rescinded the COVID-19 injection mandate, the DoD was finally successful in getting this case dismissed due to the mandate no longer being in place. To pick up where this case left off in the fight for individual rights related to both EUA products and 10 USC §1107a, other cases have been filed, including three class action lawsuits representing tens of thousands of service members.[xiv] These three cases are still active, despite the DOJ seeking to dismiss each case shortly after being filed.[xv]

It is also important to note that regardless of anyone’s interpretation of 10 USC §1107a, no presidential waiver related to COVID-19 mitigations has ever been signed by any president. Because this waiver was never granted, the full rights related to being informed about COVID-19 risks, benefits, and the right to refuse were never altered in any way. Service members always had, and continue to have, every informed consent right related to the receipt of emergency use products. They also, of course, retained the right to refuse these products.

The Military Application of Informed Consent

When the COVID-19 shots were first made available to the American public in late 2020, they were only approved under an emergency use authorization. Even though the shots were not yet mandatory during this period, service members were highly encouraged to receive the COVID-19 injections, and even subjected to significant coercion to accept these EUA products by their leadership.[xvi] Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin demonstrated that the DoD understood this principle and the statutory rights of service members related to informed consent. On August 9, 2021, Secretary Austin issued a memorandum in which he acknowledged that as long as the injections remained unlicensed by the FDA, a mandate of the products could only be done under the President’s authority. In that memo Secretary Austin stated, “I will seek the President’s approval to make the vaccines mandatory no later than mid-September, or immediately upon the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licensure, whichever comes first.”[xvii]

It was not until August 23, 2021, that the FDA licensed Comirnaty, the Pfizer developed COVID-19 injection. Based on this licensure, Secretary Austin issued guidance the next day to begin mandatory vaccinations. The guidance from Secretary Austin on August 24, 2021 specified that “Mandatory vaccination against COVID-19 will only use COVID-19 vaccines that receive full licensure from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in accordance with FDA-approved labeling and guidance.”[xviii] His August 24, 2021 memo also noted that receipt of an emergency use authorized product, even after the mandate, was still voluntary. However, in their misguided zeal to compel compliance with pressures exerted from above, commanders began a mandatory vaccination campaign without regard to the licensure status of the available products. In short, they turned a blind eye to the law, and in so doing forced and coerced hundreds of thousands of service members to take the shot or face severe administrative action that often came with devastating financial consequences.

Problems with the military “vaccination-campaign” began almost immediately as the fully licensed Comirnaty was not to be found anywhere within the military supply system or at any military treatment facility. On September 13, 2021, three weeks after the initial licensure of Comirnaty, the National Institute of Health (NIH) under the authority of the Secretary of Health and Human Services announced that “Pfizer does not plan to produce any [Comirnaty] product…while EUA authorized product is still available and being made available for U.S. distribution.”[xix] With nothing but COVID-19 Emergency Use injections lining the shelves, and no prospect of receiving the fully-licensed COVID-19 product, DoD officials elected not to rescind or pause the mandate. Instead, these officials issued a memorandum a day after the NIH announcement in which they attempted to equate the EUA product with the approved-but-never-produced Comirnaty product.[xx]

Citing nothing more than an FDA Q&A website, Assistant Secretary of Defense Terry Adirim declared, “these two vaccines are ‘interchangeable’ and the DoD health care provider should ‘use doses distributed under the EUA to administer the vaccination series as if the doses were the licensed vaccine.’”[xxi] After this memorandum, DoD officials began to treat the EUA product as if it were the fully-licensed product. Service members who exercised their Title 21 right to decline the product were treated as if they disobeyed a lawful order. Administrative actions then began in earnest, including involuntary separations and discharge characterizations that were less than honorable.

Treating an EUA product as interchangeable without fulfilling all the legal requirements to establish interchangeability is a separate violation of federal law governing the approval of biological products and was apparently done to cover-up the ongoing violation of informed consent requirements. The law governing the requirements for interchangeable biological products is 42 USC §262(k), which specifies requirements that must be followed before a product can be declared interchangeable. Most significant of these requirements is that the Secretary may not declare a product interchangeable “until the date that is 12 years after the date on which the reference product was first licensed.”[xxii] Since the Comirnaty license was approved by the FDA on August 23, 2021, after adding the legally required 12 years, no product can be declared interchangeable with Comirnaty until August 24, 2033. By not fulfilling the 42 USC §262(k) interchangeability requirements, especially the legally required 12-year wait, the subsequent DoD declaration of interchangeability as the legal basis for mandatory EUA product receipt unambiguously exposed the unlawful bait-and-switch they used to coerce vaccination at all costs.

The Free Exercise of Religion

As hundreds of service members began raising alarms about the violation of informed consent, tens of thousands more were informing their commands that the receipt of a COVID-19 product was a violation of their conscience and religious freedom. There were nearly 25,000 religious accommodations filed by service members in response to the COVID-19 vaccine mandate by February 2022, according to federal court records.[xxiii] Like the principle of informed consent, an individual’s worship and religious expression rights are protected by specific statutes of federal law including the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and are specifically enumerated in the Constitution.

According to the First Amendment, Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 USC § 2000bb, specifies that the government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability [such as a vaccine mandate], except as provided in subsection (b).” As detailed in Subsection (b), the only exception to the principle that the government shall not burden the individual’s free exercise of religion is that the government must “demonstrate that the application of the burden to the person – (1) is in the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”[xxiv] The law also specifies that the term “demonstrates” means to “meet the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of the persuasion.” Essentially, the government—not the individual—has the obligation to demonstrate the compelling government interest and that the means chosen are the least restrictive means available. The burden of proof is therefore on the government—not the individual—if the individual stands upon their First Amendment religious freedom rights.

As demonstrated through multiple court rulings, several of which are discussed later in this article, vague DoD references to military readiness or force health do not count as “evidence” that meets the government’s burden of proof under the law to demonstrate a compelling government interest that outweighs each individual’s rights. To emphasize this point again, the burden of proof is on the government not the individual. Instead of adjudicating each religious accommodation request and proving both 1) that the government had a compelling interest that outweighed the rights of the individual and that 2) the means used were the least restrictive, officials elected to essentially blanket-deny nearly every single religious accommodation request made. The military services even created processes that documented their violations of federal law and the Constitution in this area.

The Navy, for example, created a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that utilized a template denial for every religious accommodation request filed by Navy sailors.[xxv] The template denial was generated, routed for review, and then submitted for approval to the adjudicating official before the SOP ever directed a reviewer to open and read the religious accommodation request.[xxvi] Similarly, the Coast Guard developed a digital tool known as the Religious Accommodation Appeal Generator, which automated the process of generating denials and produced pre-determined responses based on what the requester included in their accommodation request.[xxvii] Similarly, the Air Force engaged in unlawful blanket denials, with only eight approvals out of 12,623 religious accommodation requests submitted.[xxviii] While the aforementioned religious accommodation requests were being patently rejected, non-religious exemption requests received the opposite treatment with a total of 3,827 approvals of medical and administrative exemption requests.[xxix] According to a declaration filed in federal court, “[Secretary of the Air Force] Kendall gave directives to Commanders, through official and/or unofficial channels, that religious accommodations were not to be granted to the COVID-19 vaccination policy.”[xxx]

These violations against service members’ First Amendment rights resulted in multiple federal court rulings confirming that violations of the law had indeed occurred. These rulings froze the unlawful separation of service members when the services refused to halt these separations on their own. In a ruling against the Navy, a federal judge noted that the “Navy provides a religious accommodation process, but by all accounts, it is theater…It merely rubber stamps each denial.”[xxxi] In a separate ruling against the Air Force, which was expanded to a class-wide injunction, a different federal judge stated that “due to the systemic nature of what the Court views as violations of Airmen’s constitutional rights to practice their religions as they please, the Court is well within its bounds to extend the existing preliminary injunction to all Class Members.”[xxxii] In a ruling against the Marine Corps, a third federal judge went so far as to make the connection that the compelling government interest might actually be best served by retaining service members that the DoD was attempting to separate in light of the “current state of international turbulence and danger,” as well as the “difficulty in recruiting equivalent replacements.”[xxxiii] The judge went on to state:

For the past two years, the Marines serving in the Marine Corps have ably discharged their duties. Almost all served at the onset of the pandemic and served successfully during peak jeopardy in the pandemic and before any vaccination against COVID-19 existed…The record fails to demonstrate any meaningful increment of harm to national defense likely to result because these Marines continue to serve—as they have served—unvaccinated.[xxxiv]

Readiness Impacts from Competing Principles

During this period, two principles were placed in competition that, ideally, should never be in competition. The principle that military members follow orders was placed in competition with the oath military members take to support and defend the Constitution. The fulcrum in this competition comes down to the law. Service members have an obligation not to simply follow all orders, but to follow all lawful orders. Regarding unlawful orders, service members actually have an obligation, confirmed by multiple appellate court rulings, to disobey and resist any order that a “man of ordinary sense and understanding would know to be illegal.”[xxxv] The COVID-19 injection mandate was a complicated issue, but there was significant pushback and internal questions about the lawfulness of the order. When significant legal concerns were raised about the COVID-19 mandates, decision makers apparently assumed lawfulness and prioritized defending the institution, rather than prioritizing defense of individual constitutional rights—as their oaths to the Constitution required.

In hindsight and considering the court rulings that proved violations of the law, the proper move would likely have been to pause the mandates for further study of the related legal principles. Instead, officials elected to push forward on their initial assumption of lawfulness and began treating those who declined the COVID-19 injection as having disobeyed a lawful order. The services then began discharging thousands of service members with plans to discharge the tens of thousands more who had ultimately stood on their constitutional and statutory rights to decline the COVID-19 products. Before the courts forced a halt to these administrative discharges, the services were able to complete the separation processing of over 8,400 service members.[xxxvi]

The Joint Force relies on service manning capacities to fulfill Combatant Commander manpower requirements and therefore both the health risks and the discharges should have been a deep concern. While the services may have been able to absorb the loss of the 96 service members whose deaths were attributed to the virus, when this was compounded by the discharge of 8,400 more, it became apparent that DoD policies were introducing significant risks to manning the force. In hindsight, these leadership decisions appeared to embody the old adage “a penny wise and a pound foolish.” Given the extremely low mortality rate in the active duty service member age group, this is perhaps the most egregious example of risk aversion in recent military history.

“I Solemnly Swear to Support and Defend…the Institution”

The federal government has trampled on the rights of its citizens before. When confronted with such abuses, decision makers have often tended towards protecting the reputation of the institution rather than the rights of the individuals harmed. This tendency, from which the DoD is certainly not immune, undermines trust and prioritizes ideals inconsistent with the Constitution and the rights enshrined therein. This section will briefly review three historical examples that demonstrate the negative effects of placing the institution before the Constitution.

Institutional Loyalty Case 1: The Tuskegee Experiment

In one of the most horrendous American examples of medical experimentation gone awry, we will examine the governmental misconduct, and associated cover-up, perpetrated on a group of innocent and unwitting U.S. citizens decades ago. In 1932, the CDC initiated a syphilis study on African American men, in Tuskegee, Alabama. In this study, CDC scientists intentionally denied the subjects informed consent, and lied to them about what they were being treated for so that they would not seek treatment elsewhere. Once penicillin was identified as nearly 100% effective against syphilis in the mid-1940s, the CDC then denied penicillin to the Tuskegee patients in order to observe the untreated spread and course of the disease.[xxxvii]

A new public health employee became aware of the study by accident and immediately identified the unethical and illegal nature of the study.[xxxviii] He attempted to bring the study to the attention of CDC officials and his own supervisors but was ignored. After years of fighting government officials’ intent on protecting the institution and their own medical study, this individual finally turned whistleblower and went to the press with the information about the Tuskegee Experiment.[xxxix] Despite numerous deaths of Tuskegee men under study and clear violations of constitutional rights, it was only the public scandal and institutional embarrassment spurned on by a whistleblower’s revelation of the study in Washington Star reporter Jean Heller’s article, that finally forced CDC decision makers to shut down the Tuskegee Experiments in 1972.[xl] It took forty years to stop it, and it would not have been stopped at all had it not been for the moral courage of one whistleblower.

Institutional Loyalty Case 2: The My Lai Massacre

The aftermath of the My Lai massacre provides another example of misplaced loyalties when Army officers attempted to cover up war crimes committed by American soldiers. On May 16, 1968, soldiers from the 11th Infantry Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division, murdered innocent non-combatants consisting of over 500 men, women, and children. Atrocities were committed against many of these victims before they were killed.[xli] The Army, through criminally complicit leaders and an intentionally lackluster Inspector General investigation, kept this heinous act concealed from political leaders and the American people until a former soldier turned whistleblower wrote letters to the Pentagon, the White House, and Congress ultimately forcing the Army to address these war crimes. A parallel investigation into the cover-up was conducted by Lieutenant General William Peers in which he concluded that “at every command level from company to division, actions were taken or omitted which together effectively concealed from higher headquarters the events which transpired” and that “efforts to withhold information continue to this date.”[xlii] General Peers identified 30 individuals who failed to report or fully investigate the massacre, 14 of whom were charged with crimes.[xliii] Again, without a whistleblower and the threat of public embarrassment, the decision makers responsible may have gotten away with prioritizing the institution over the Constitution and over basic human rights. The price of forgetting our foundational moral, legal, and ethical obligations can bankrupt public trust and, more importantly, destroy a nation.

Institutional Loyalty Case 3: The Red Hill Environmental and Public Health Disaster

A more recent example of the institution-first mentality was observed in the Navy’s actions during the environmental disaster that occurred in Hawaii at the Navy’s Red Hill Fuel Storage facility. The facility, constructed in the 1940’s, suffered a major fuel leak of 27 thousand pounds of fuel in 2014.[xliv] From that time until late 2021, several more leaks would occur, including a 14-thousand-pound fuel leak on November 22, 2021, as well as numerous operations and maintenance violations. Transparency was not a priority for the Navy even as local residents began to experience significant health concerns.[xlv] Prioritizing the institution over the legitimate health concerns of locals, a Navy official attempted to reassure residents that their drinking water was still safe to drink despite having no data confirming that assertion.[xlvi] Ultimately, thousands of residents were inflicted with symptoms ranging from rashes and nausea to tremors, twitching, and brain impairment.[xlvii]

The DoD subsequently stood up Joint Task Force Red Hill to execute the safe and expeditious defueling of the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility. The mission statement for JTF Red Hill includes a sentence pledging “to rebuild trust with the State of Hawaii and the local community of Oahu.”[xlviii] Rebuilding trust does not apparently extend to holding decision makers accountable. The Navy official who made the false and misleading statement to local residents was awarded a Legion of Merit for "his response to the Red Hill water contamination incident," which "resulted in the expeditious restoration of clean water throughout the community" upon his retirement several months later.[xlix] It would appear that institutional loyalty is valued much more than constitutional loyalty. Institutional loyalty seems to be even more important to many DoD decision-makers than defending the environment or defending basic human rights.

Trust and the Deepening Recruiting Crisis

The U.S. military was once revered as the most trusted institution in America. That has changed according to Gallup polls measuring the percentage of Americans who have a “great deal or “quite a lot” of confidence in American institutions. A 2019 poll indicated that 73% of Americans had confidence in the U.S. military.[l] A downward trend began in 2020 and continues to the present day with confidence scores reported as low as 60%.[li] This lack of trust is a significant factor in the deepening recruiting crisis but is not just an external problem. The Military Family Support Programming Survey, taken by active-duty, retirees, dependents, and veterans showed that in 2019 a total of 75% of those surveyed would recommend military life to someone considering joining. By 2021, that number had fallen to 63%.[lii]

Table 1: Recent Trend in Americans' Confidence in Institutions[liii]

In 2023, the services missed their recruiting goals by a total of 41,000 recruits. The number should be larger except, the 41,000 is the adjusted ‘miss number’ after the services lowered recruiting goals in consideration of the challenging recruiting environment.[liv] As the Acting Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness testified to Congress, “that number understates the challenge before us as the services lowered [their] end-strength goals in recent years, in part because of the difficult recruiting environment.”[lv] Recruiting is now one of the challenges the Joint Force must consider when it comes to prioritizing manpower capacities across combatant commands while executing global national defense requirements.

We are not asserting that all of the current recruiting challenges can be placed squarely at the feet of the COVID-19 shot mandate, but the unlawful implementation of it certainly contributed. This is a complex problem and will require a complex, systematic approach to solve it. Tens of thousands of service members stood up for their rights in the face of severe administrative actions and threats of legal recourse. Over 40 lawsuits involving thousands of these service members as plaintiffs were filed against the DoD as a result of certain policy decisions.[lvi] This is not the sign of a trusting force; a force that knows its leaders will defend them, their families, and their unalienable rights. The DoD has little control over some of the competing recruiting challenges such as the job market, generation-z changes, and global economic trends. However, the loss of trust stemming from COVID-19 mandate-related violations is a known factor, and one that is almost completely in the hands of DoD decision makers to correct.

The Constitution is the Key

There is no more important value to building an effective fighting force than trust. In a publication to the Joint Force while serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Martin Dempsey reflected on the sacrifices made by American service members during more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. He unequivocally stated that the “sacred element of trust enabled [service members] to persevere.”[lvii] This sacred element must be recaptured and reprioritized by America’s leaders so that the healing and rebuilding process within the U.S. military can begin.

The Constitution serves as the bedrock of the United States and must again take priority above institutional loyalties. Despite the popular rhetoric, America is not a democracy. In a pure democracy 51% of the people can lawfully tyrannize the remaining 49%. We are, as designed by our founders, a constitutional republic in which our Constitution places individual rights in a place of primacy. In a constitutional republic even 99% of the people have no lawful power to dominate, tyrannize, or strip the rights from the remaining 1%. The Constitution was not written to restrict the individual, but to restrict the government from unnecessary infringement on the rights of American citizens.

Officers and enlisted members of the U.S. military take an oath, not to an institution, but to the Constitution. To support and defend the Constitution is a complex, challenging, and rewarding task, but it takes moral courage to do so. Opposing misplaced institutional loyalty often requires the courage to swim upstream against the tide of public opinion, and in this case, against the policies written by some well-intended-but-misguided senior leaders. This constitutional defense is the highest civic calling of any American service member. When the institution errs on the side of power, control, and infringement, American service members must be willing to step up to protect individual constitutional rights as required by their oaths to the Constitution.[lviii]

Recommendations

First, service members must get back to their constitutional roots through proper education. Service members are required to train on a host of annual topics including cyber awareness, sexual assault prevention and response, suicide prevention, and counterintelligence. Service members take an oath to the Constitution, yet there is no required annual training on this critical founding document of the United States. Annual training must begin immediately on the Constitution, what the Constitution does for American citizens (including service members), and how service members are to defend the Constitution, including standing up for individual rights.

Second, a full and comprehensive study of the COVID-19 mandates in the military must be initiated. This study must be outsourced to an independent and non-partisan body that is not part of either the Executive or Legislative branches of government. This independent body must be given full access to all materials, records, communications, and analysis conducted by the DoD, corporations, interagency partners, individuals, and international organizations who contributed in any way to developing, producing, recommending, enforcing, or profiting off any policy, mitigation measure, or product that was in any way involved with COVID-19.

Finally, all subsequent leadership actions, particularly from the 3- and 4-star policy levels, must prioritize the rebuilding of trust with service members and the American people. All avenues for rebuilding this trust must be openly explored including reinstating service members who were discharged over COVID-19 mandates, offering backpay to service members who were discharged, exploring preventative medicine protocols that are tailored to individual health risks rather than to one-size-fits-all institutional efforts, outsourcing all whistleblower report investigations, removing legal and constitutional analysis to outside the military chain of command, and removing the Inspector General apparatus to outside the military chain of command. Some of these options may yield significant returns and some may need to be dismissed as possibilities. What cannot be dismissed is the need for deep and critical introspection.

Conclusion

The U.S. military has a moral duty to hotwash (i.e., after-action review) every aspect of this complicated event, to include reviewing every process, every order, and every decision. Leaders should want to know what was done right, what was done wrong, and what the associated cost were for any errors. They should seek a final and unequivocable review of the legality of the military order itself, because its lawfulness remains ambiguous in the minds of many despite several judicial rulings. Finally, once all has been analyzed, the institution – if it hopes to retain any credibility at all – should acknowledge the lessons learned, own up to them, and endeavor to never repeat the same mistakes again.

Robert A. Green Jr. is an active duty Navy Commander, author of the book Defending the Constitution behind Enemy Lines, and author of the Declaration of Military Accountability.

W. Dean Lee is a Vice Admiral who served for 35 years in the United States Coast Guard retiring in 2016 following his final assignment as Commander, Co.

Notes:

[i]U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Media Activity, “Coronavirus: DoD Response” (Washington, D.C. December 20, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/Coronavirus-DoD-Response/.

[ii] Ibid, the total infection rate data is current as of February 15, 2024.

[iii] John Elflein, “Rate of death due to COVID-19 in the United States in 2020, 2021, and 2022, by age,” Statista.com, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1382357/covid-death-rates-us-by-age/, accessed March 8, 2024.

[iv] Timothy Frudd, “Video: Heart Issues Skyrocketing in Military, US Navy Medic Says,” American Military News, November 29, 2023, https://americanmilitarynews.com/2023/11/video-heart-issues-skyrocketing-in-military-us-navy-medic-says/.

[v] Megan Brenan, “Americans’ Confidence in Major U.S. Institutions Dips,” Gallup, July 14, 2021, https://news.gallup.com/poll/352316/americans-confidence-major-institutions-dips.aspx

[vi] “21 U.S. Code § 360bbb–3 - Authorization for Medical Products for Use in Emergencies,” Legal Information Institute, accessed February 25, 2024, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/360bbb-3.

[vii] “42 U.S. Code § 247d–6d - Targeted Liability Protections for Pandemic and Epidemic Products and Security Countermeasures,” Legal Information Institute, accessed February 15, 2024, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/247d-6d.

[viii] “21 U.S. Code § 360bbb–3 - Authorization for Medical Products for Use in Emergencies,” Legal Information Institute, accessed February 15, 2024, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/360bbb-3.

[ix] Ibid, emphasis added.

[x] “10 U.S. Code § 1107A - Emergency Use Products,” Legal Information Institute, accessed February 15, 2024, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/1107a.

[xi] Coker v. Austin, 3:21-cv-01211, (N.D. Fla. Oct 06, 2021) ECF No. 1

[xii] Coker v. Austin, 3:21-cv-01211, (N.D. Fla. Nov 12, 2021) ECF No. 47, at 14.

[xiii] Coker v. Austin, 3:21-cv-01211, (N.D. Fla.), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/60630202/doe-v-austin/.

[xiv] These three cases are:

1) Bassen v. The United States, 3:23-cv-00211, (US Court of Federal Claims, Aug 04, 2023) [filed on behalf of the approximately 8500 service member involuntarily discharged due to vaccination status];

2) Botello v. The United States, 1:23-cv-00174, (US Court of Federal Claims, Aug 04, 2023) [filed on behalf of the approximately 70,000-100,00 Air and Army National Guard and reserve members of all branches who were dropped from active status due to vaccination status]; and

3) Harkins v. The United States, 1:23-cv-01238 (US Court of Federal Claims, Aug 04, 2023) [filed on behalf of Coast Guard members involuntarily discharged due to vaccination status], https://militarybackpay.com/cases/, accessed March 9,2024.

[xv] “Filings,” MilitaryBackPay.com, https://militarybackpay.com/resources/, accessed March 9, 2024.

[xvi] J.M. Phelps, “Some Service Members Say They Were ‘Coerced’ Into Taking COVID-19 Vaccine: Survey,” The Epoch Times, February 11, 2024, https://www.theepochtimes.com/us/some-service-members-who-took-covid-19-vaccine-due-to-mandate-say-they-were-coerced-survey-5580469.

[xvii] U.S. Department of Defense, Message to the Force, Lloyd Austin, (Washington, D.C. August 9, 2021). https://media.defense.gov/2021/Aug/09/2002826254/-1/-1/0/MESSAGE-TO-THE-FORCE-MEMO-VACCINE.PDF.

[xviii] U.S. Department of Defense, Mandatory Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination of Department of Defense Service Members, Lloyd Austin, (Washington, D.C. August 24, 2021). https://media.defense.gov/2021/Aug/25/2002838826/-1/-1/0/MEMORANDUM-FOR-MANDATORY-CORONAVIRUS-DISEASE-2019-VACCINATION-OF-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-SERVICE-MEMBERS.PDF, emphasis added.

[xix] “News: DailyMed Announcements,” National Institute of Health: National Library of Medicine, accessed February 19, 2024. https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/dailymed-announcements-details.cfm?date=2021-09-13

[xx] Dr. Lee Vliet, “Whistleblower Report of Illegal DOD Activity,” Truth for Health Foundation, August 27, 2022, https://www.truthforhealth.org/2022/08/whistleblower-report-of-illegal-dod-activity/, The 14 September, 2021 DoD memo, signed by Dr. Terry Adirim, then Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, is Enclosure 3 of the August 15, 2022 Congressional Whistleblower Report.

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] “42 U.S. Code § 262 - Regulation of Biological Products,” Legal Information Institute, accessed February 15, 2024, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/262.

[xxiii] Bethany Blankley, “DOD Inspector General: Denying Religious Exemptions Violates Federal Law,” Alpha News, September 22, 2022, https://alphanews.org/dod-inspector-general-denying-religious-exemptions-violates-federal-law/.

[xxiv] “42 U.S. Code § 2000BB–1 - Free Exercise of Religion Protected,” Legal Information Institute, accessed February 21, 2024, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000bb-1.

[xxv] Jennie Taer, “Navy Servicemembers Seeking COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate Religious Exemptions Handed Favorable Ruling,” Daily Caller, January 3, 2022, https://dailycaller.com/2022/01/03/navy-covid-19-vaccine-mandate-religious-exemptions/.

[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii] Kelly Laco, “Coast Guard Used ‘digital Tool’ to More Efficiently Mass Deny Religious Vax Exemptions, Republicans Allege.” Fox News, October 18, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/coast-guard-digital-tool-efficiently-mass-deny-religious-vax-exemptions-republicans-allege.

[xxviii] Doster v. Kendall, Case 1:22-cv-00084, Doc 13, (U.S. District Court S.D. Ohio, February 22, 2022) at 5, https://www.sirillp.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/013-EMERGENCY-MOTION-FOR-TRO-MOTION-FOR-PRELIMINARY-INJUNCTION-FILED-BY-PLAINTIFFS.pdf.

[xxix] Ibid.

[xxx] Doster v. Kendall, Case 1:22-cv-00084, Doc 1, (U.S. District Court S.D. Ohio, February 16, 2022) at 6, https://www.sirillp.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/001-VERIFIED-CLASS-ACTION-COMPLAINT-FOR-DECLARATORY-JUDGMENT-AND-INJUNCTIVE-RELIEF.pdf

[xxxi] U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden, Case 4:21-cv-01236-O, Doc 66, Court Listener, Free Law Project, (U.S. District Court N.D. Texas, January 3, 2022) at 1, https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/60824061/66/us-navy-seals-1-26-v-biden/.

[xxxii] Doster v. Kendall, Case 1:22-cv-00084, Doc 77, (U.S. District Court S.D. Ohio, July 27, 2022) at 2. https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/63008682/77/doster-v-secretary-of-the-airforce/

[xxxiii] Colonel Financial Management Officer v. Austin, Case 8:22-cv-01275, Doc 229, (U.S. District Court M.D. Florida, August 18, 2022) at 2. https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/63358972/229/colonel-financial-management-officer-v-austin-iii/

[xxxiv] Colonel Financial Management Officer v. Austin, Case 8:22-cv-01275, Doc 229, (U.S. District Court M.D. Florida, August 18, 2022) at 45. https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/63358972/229/colonel-financial-management-officer-v-austin-iii/

[xxxv] United States v. Calley, 22 USCMA 534 (1973); 48 CMR 19 (1973) (Habeas corpus granted sub. nomine); Calley v. Calloway, 382 F. Supp. 650 (1974); rev’d 519 F 2d. 184 (1975) (cert. den. sub. nomine); Calley v. Hoffman, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).

[xxxvi] Lolita C. Baldor, “Pentagon Drops COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate for Troops,” A.P. News, January 10, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/politics-health-immunizations-lloyd-austin-covid-64752e91abbc3d707ee46373a3ce757e

[xxxvii] “The Untreated Syphilis Study at Tuskegee Timeline,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm, accessed February 27, 2024.

[xxxviii] Allen M. Hornblum, “The Jewish VD Detective Who Exposed the Infamous Tuskegee Experiment,” Tablet Magazine, January 31,2021, https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/history/articles/peter-buxtun-tuskegee-experiment.

[xxxix] Ibid.

[xl] Harrison Smith, “Bill Jenkins, epidemiologist who tried to end Tuskegee syphilis study, dies at 73,” The Washington Post, February 27, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/bill-jenkins-epidemiologist-who-tried-to-end-tuskegee-syphilis-study-dies-at-73/2019/02/27/2319e142-3aa2-11e9-a06c-3ec8ed509d15_story.html.

[xli] Quil Lawrence, “50 Years On, My Lai Massacre Remains A Gaping Wound,” NPR.org, March 16, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/03/16/594364462/my-lai-massacre-of-1968-continues-to-resonate-in-america

[xlii] U.S. Dept of the Army, W. R. Peers, Lieutenant General, USA, “Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident,” Vol 1, Report of the Investigation, 14 March, 1970, pg11-1

[xliii] Michael Ray, “Cover-up, Investigation, and Legacy,” Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/My-Lai-Massacre/Cover-up-investigation-and-legacy, accessed February 27, 2024.

[xliv] Sophia McCullough et al., “Confused about the Timeline for the Red Hill Fuel Storage Facility and Contaminated Water?,” Hawai’i Public Radio, October 16, 2023, https://www.hawaiipublicradio.org/local-news/navy-red-hill-fuel-timeline#beginning.

[xlv] Ibid.

[xlvi] Konstantin Toropin and Patricia Kime, “Commander Retires with Award after Red Hill Disaster – and Mistakenly Telling Residents to Drink the Tainted Water,” Military.com, July 8, 2024, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/07/08/commander-retires-award-after-red-hill-disaster-and-mistakenly-telling-residents-drink-tainted-water.html

[xlvii] Christina Jedra, “Hundreds of Red Hill Families Still Sick a Year Later, Survey Finds,” Honolulu Civil Beat, November 10, 2022, https://www.civilbeat.org/2022/11/hundreds-of-red-hill-families-still-sick-a-year-later-survey-finds/.

[xlviii] Joint Task Force Red Hill, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, https://www.pacom.mil/JTF-Red-Hill/, accessed February 27, 2024.

[xlix] Konstantin Toropin and Patricia Kime, “Commander Retires with Award after Red Hill Disaster – and Mistakenly Telling Residents to Drink the Tainted Water,” Military.com, July 8, 2024, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/07/08/commander-retires-award-after-red-hill-disaster-and-mistakenly-telling-residents-drink-tainted-water.html

[l] Megan Brenan, “Americans’ Confidence in Major U.S. Institutions Dips,” Gallup, July 14, 2021, https://news.gallup.com/poll/352316/americans-confidence-major-institutions-dips.aspx

[li] Lydia Saad, “Historically Low Faith in U.S. Institutions Continues,” Gallup, July 6, 2023, https://news.gallup.com/poll/508169/historically-low-faith-institutions-continues.aspx

[lii] Patricia Kime, “Military Families Less Likely to Recommend Joining Up Survey Finds,” Military.com, July 14, 2022, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/07/14/military-families-less-likely-recommend-joining-survey-finds.html

[liii] Lydia Saad, “Historically Low Faith in U.S. Institutions Continues,” Gallup, July 6, 2023, https://news.gallup.com/poll/508169/historically-low-faith-institutions-continues.aspx

[liv] Timothy Frudd, “US Military 41,000 Troops Short of Recruitment Goal,” American Military News, December 19, 2023, https://americanmilitarynews.com/2023/12/us-military-41000-troops-short-of-recruitment-goal/.

[lv] Ibid.

[lvi] Military Freedom Keepers, “Links to Lawsuits,” List of Lawsuits.pdf, https://u.pcloud.link/publink/show?code=XZmG4QVZRQuauxLPr0uqaHI7BBTHUQNTIH4X, accessed February 23, 2024.

[lvii] America’s military- a profession of arms, accessed February 23, 2024, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/aprofessionofarms.pdf.

[lviii] Eric Sof, “US Army Special Forces (SF): DE Oppresso Liber,” Spec Ops Magazine, April 15, 2022, https://special-ops.org/special-forces-green-berets-de-oppresso-liber/.

16. The Great Escape: Welshman inspired Steve McQueen role

Videos at the link.

There are OSS and US Special Forces veterans who will disagree with this article (and no disrespect meant to the Welchman and his service). The Steve McQueen character was actually based on COL Jerry Sage, US Army Special Forces. See his bio here (and I have pasted it below the article. https://www.swcs.mil/Portals/111/DMORs_04NOV2022_SAGE.pdf

The Great Escape: Welshman inspired Steve McQueen role

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-68625578.amp?utm
By Nathan Bevan
BBC News

24 March 2024

IMAGE SOURCE,GETTY IMAGES

Image caption,

Steve McQueen's Captain Virgil Hilts was key in the onscreen version of the 1944 Nazi prison camp breakout

It is the part that cemented Steve McQueen in the pantheon of Hollywood cool.

But how many know the American icon's role as a daredevil POW in the 1963 World War Two film The Great Escape is supposedly based on a Welshman?

Ken Rees, from Anglesey, was the bomber pilot who fought back against his Nazi captors to break free of an infamous prison camp in occupied Poland.

That heroic effort celebrates its 80th anniversary this weekend.

Having joined the RAF in 1939 at a tender 18, Flt Lt Rees was shot down over Norway on a secret mine-laying mission three years later.

The Wrexham-born airman then found himself in the Luftwaffe-run Stalag Luft III where, refusing to be beaten by the brutal treatment and harsh conditions, he made it his sole duty to escape.

The result was a 350ft (106m) tunnel, dug secretly and in painstaking increments by Rees and others under cover of darkness, or when the guards' backs were turned.

Dubbed "Harry", it was the longest of several subterranean routes to freedom carved out between the hut Rees shared with his fellow inmates and the camp's fortified perimeter.

Famously recreated in the classic film, it featured one character, played by Scottish actor Gordon Jackson, pondering how they get rid of the mounds of earth they had excavated.

Eventually they came up with an ingenious solution.

The answer was to specially adapt the inside of their trouser legs with cloth bags to carry the dirt out into the yard where it could be dumped without the Germans noticing.

IMAGE SOURCE,FAMILY PHOTO

Image caption,

Flt Lt Ken Rees was imprisoned in Stalag Luft III and helped dig a tunnel that prisoners fled through

After a long period of preparation the crucial breakout finally took place on the moonless night of 24 March 1944, but when the prisoners emerged from underground they found themselves just short of the cover provided by nearby treeline.

One of the escapees inadvertently making a noise then drew the attention of the sentry posted along the camp's watchtowers and shots began to ring out, starting a mad scramble for safety.

Unfortunately for Rees, however, he had still been in the tunnel at this point and when he did poke his head out he found himself looking up at the barrel of a gun.

IMAGE SOURCE,ALAMY

Image caption,

Steve McQueen on the Triumph TR6 Trophy he rode in The Great Escape's classic chase scene

Miraculously though, he was not shot: the guard who had taken aim was distracted by the shouts of a senior officer in the distance.

Instead he was stripped of his clothes and placed in solitary confinement - known as "the cooler" - back at the camp.

It was while he was incarcerated there that he slowly discovered the fate of his 76 comrades who had managed to get away. Heartbreakingly, 50 were recaptured and shot by Hitler's Gestapo, while another 23 were sent back to other stalags.

Only three made it across Europe to safety.

Towards the end of director Jon Sturges's film - and in one of cinema's most legendary chase sequences - McQueen's character, Captain Virgil Hilts, steals a motorcycle and tries to jump over a series of fences lining Germany's border with Switzerland.

Image caption,

"The only things we've got in common is that we both annoyed the Germans and ended up doing stretches in solitary," said Ken Rees, pictured in 2004

Pursued on all sides by Nazi soldiers, he successfully clears one set of barriers before being shot at and falling off his bike to become entangled in barbed wire.

Like Rees, Hilts is then sent to the cooler where he immediately begins planning his next escape.

But as his real-life Welsh inspiration modestly admitted before his death in 2014, aged 93, the comparison began and ended there.

"The only things we've got in common is that we both annoyed the Germans and ended up doing stretches in solitary," said Rees in an earlier interview.

"I didn't get out (of the prison camp) and if I did I wouldn't have been able to ride a motorbike anyway."

He further maintained his wartime experiences had mostly revolved around being constantly hungry and "bored to tears" - along with "pulling faces" at his captors and randomly letting down the tyres on their patrol vehicles.

Rees would remain under Nazi watch until May 1945 when the British Army arrived to liberate him.

Journeying home to his wife Mary, whom he married just two weeks before being captured, the former draper returned to the relative peace and quiet of his old civilian life.

But his heroism in the face of adversity was never forgotten and, thanks to McQueen's timeless portrayal on the silver screen, it never will be.

Colonel Jerry M. Sage entered the Army in 1938 through the Reserve Officers Training

Corps at the State College of Washington, where he had been a distinguished varsity

football player and earned Phi Beta Kappa academic honors.

He came on active duty on December 9, 1941 as an infantry officer and was recruited

into the Office of Strategic Services on July 1, 1942. During his training with the

British Special Operations Executive he earned the nickname “Dagger”, due to his

expertise in knife fighting, which became his code name. He subsequently trained

colleagues at the Office of Strategic Services in Maryland until January 1943.

Major Sage deployed with his Experimental Detachment 3, a 20-person combined

team that was the precursor of the later Office of Strategic Services Operational

Group, to North Africa.

Conducting interdiction operations behind German lines, he was wounded and

captured, while recovering a teammate. He spent the bulk of World War II in various

prison camps where he became notable for his more than 15 escape attempts, earning

the moniker “Cooler King”, for his recapture punishment. His escape exploits at Stalag

Luft III became the basis for the Steve McQueen character in “The Great Escape”.

After he made his successful final escape in March 1945, he resumed his service with

the Office of Strategic Services in Poland and other locations in the European Theater

of Operations. Post-war he coordinated repatriation of displaced persons based upon

his language skills developed during captivity.

At the height of the Cold War, his leadership and infantry command experience in

Korea with the 5th Regimental Combat Team earned him selection to command the

10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in Bad Tolz, Germany, from August 1963–

September 1965.

In the later part of his career, Col. Sage served in the Pentagon in two Special Forces

related assignments: first on the Army Staff developing the unconventional warfare

training requirements for the U.S. Army Special Forces; and then within the Office

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff developing strategic plans for employment of special

operations. During that assignment, he was a member of the team that conducted a

strategic assessment of the situation in Southeast Asia and Vietnam.

Col. Sage’s significant awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit with oak

leaf cluster, Prisoner of War Medal, Purple Heart, Bronze Star Medal, Order of the

British Empire, Master Parachutist Badge, World War II Victory Medal, Korean

Service Medal, United Nations Service Medal, American and European-African-

Middle East Campaign Medals and eight overseas bars.

Col. Sage’s service to the Regiment continued after his 1982 retirement, as an

educator and mentor of youth at both the college and high school levels. While serving

as Assistant to the President, he developed a course on civics for the University of

South Carolina.

His outstanding instructor and leadership skills later earned him High School Teacher

of the Year for the state of South Carolina in 1978. He served in numerous community

activities, including the establishment of a Civitan Club in Enterprise, Alabama, to

aid needy and handicapped persons, earning national recognition for his efforts.

Col. Sage passed away in 1993 and was interned in Enterprise. One of his sons was a

graduate of West Point and was killed while serving in Vietnam.

17. Everything, Everywhere, All at Once? Cyberspace Operations and Chinese Strategy

Excerpts:

Learning the Hard Way?

Strategists pay close attention when new technologies open up the possibility of fighting in new domains. Such moments lead to speculation that key innovations will enable fundamental changes in warfighting that make overwhelming victory possible. The advent of blue-water sailing vessels aroused hopes of dramatic naval victories that would give adversaries no choice but to surrender. The emergence of powered flight led to dreams that bombers alone might determine the outcome of future wars. In both cases, painful wartime lessons revealed the limits of novel weapons and platforms, however innovative.

Something similar may be playing out in cyberspace today. Notions of “cyberwar” imply an antiseptic style of fighting, where victory and defeat depend more on savvy information campaigns than on military violence. For reasons described above, this is understandably appealing, especially for those who bear the responsibility of ordering soldiers into conflict. Yet the limits of offensive cyberspace operations are becoming clearer, and states are spending more on defense. Russia’s disappointing performance in Ukraine also suggests that cyberspace operations, while potentially important in the context of a broader campaign, are relatively limited as standalone strategic tools.

Cyberspace will surely play an important role in possible future great-power war, given the ubiquity of digital communications and automated systems among the great powers. But if the track record of other technological breakthroughs is any guide, then offensive cyberspace operations are unlikely to prove decisive. Chinese strategists may not have come to this conclusion. It is possible that they attribute Russia’s failure to other causes and still trust that their approach to the domain is correct. If so, then the real test of their belief will only come in the opening round of conflict. And if the reality of wartime cyberspace operations proves to be less than advertised, then China might find itself stuck in a long war with no easy exit.

Everything, Everywhere, All at Once? Cyberspace Operations and Chinese Strategy - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Joshua Rovner · March 25, 2024

China-watchers are worried about war. A dangerous mix of regional and domestic politics is pushing the great powers towards conflict, they say, despite the enormous risks to both sides. Making matters worse are concerns that China may use new technologies to strike directly at the United States. In last month’s Annual Threat Assessment, for instance, the director of national intelligence highlighted the danger that China could use cyberspace against soldiers and civilians alike. “If Beijing believed that a major conflict with the United States were imminent,” it concluded, “it would consider aggressive cyber operations against U.S. critical infrastructure and military assets. Such a strike would be designed to deter U.S. military action by impeding U.S. decisionmaking, inducing societal panic, and interfering with the deployment of U.S. forces.”

Wartime operations against infrastructure would represent a major expansion for China, which is best known for spying in cyberspace. U.S. officials have repeatedly raised the alarm about China’s digital espionage, and their warnings seem increasingly prescient after startling data breaches against states, firms, and individuals. In addition to stealing secrets about other countries’ capabilities and intentions — the traditional secrets sought by intelligence agencies — China may also seek to steal industrial knowledge that helps it reverse engineer new technologies, or to collect huge amounts of data to feed its artificial intelligence research. Whatever its purposes, it is clear that Beijing views cyberspace as essential for modern espionage.

The Chinese leadership also views cyberspace as critical in the event of conflict. Its military doctrine stresses the need for rapidly seizing the initiative and controlling what it calls “systems confrontation.” Doing so would allow it to inject confusion into its enemy’s operations and make it harder to organize a response. U.S. leaders might be discouraged from fighting if they did not believe that their forces would have a clear view of the battlespace. Attacks on information systems, combined with a precise and lethal volley from a new suite of “anti-access” weapons, might deter Washington from coming to the aid of its regional allies and partners. From Beijing’s perspective, cyberspace operations in theater are key to enable quick and decisive victory at a reasonably low cost.

And according to recent testimony, China is now operating in ways that suggest a much more aggressive strategic approach. Instead of focusing on U.S. and partner military networks in East Asia, it is attempting to penetrate infrastructure in the United States. Nightmares come next. Officials worry that unleashing malware against civilian targets could threaten national security while also producing catastrophic social and economic effects. When asked by Congress to imagine a Chinese offensive, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Director Jen Easterly imagined the worst: “Telecommunications going down — People start getting sick from polluted water. Trains get derailed. This is truly an everything, everywhere, all at once scenario.”

These are startling comments. U.S. officials seem clearly convinced that China can target military information systems and civilian infrastructure in the event of war. Less clear, however, is whether China can translate cyberspace operations into strategic success. What is possible at the operational level may fizzle as a strategic tool.

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Turn Up the Fog Machine

Wartime operations against military networks are undoubtedly appealing to Chinese military planners, whose doctrine stresses dominating the competition for information. Rather than facing U.S. conventional forces in pitched battles, information attacks can hobble their communications and inject confusion and doubt into their effort. Reducing U.S. military confidence in its response to Chinese aggression might encourage U.S. political leaders to avoid the fight altogether.

At first glance, cyberspace seems ideal for efforts against U.S. communications and data management. The U.S. military asks a lot from its information systems, given that it envisions fighting across vast distances in multiple warfighting domains. Information must move quickly and in large volume to many organizations. Because this requires an interconnected architecture, it carries multiple points of vulnerability. This is good news for potential Chinese operators looking for a way in. Cyberspace intrusions might also appeal to Beijing because they can be conducted from afar, reducing the danger of discovery and making it easier to obscure their origins.

Given all this, it is not hard to understand why cyberspace operations against U.S. military targets are so seductive. In theory, Chinese operations could target U.S. and allied military forces anonymously from a safe distance, targeting a growing attack surface in order to inject friction into organizations that are increasingly reliant on the digital domain. Battlefield awareness and reliable communications would be at grave risk.

But there are limits to what China can expect from counter-network cyberspace operations. Successful malware intrusions require elaborate efforts at concealment, but meaningful effects require a large organizational infrastructure for intelligence gathering, target acquisition, exploit development, and execution. These requirements work at cross-purposes. Concealment is most likely when states limit the number of personnel involved and resources invested. Such limitations, however, make it very difficult to attack sophisticated adversaries.

Those adversaries, meanwhile, will have reason to be on guard. Peacetime cyberspace operations are more likely to succeed because the victims are not focused on a single threat. States monitor a range of possible adversaries, who may choose to focus on one or more targets. Indeed, warnings about the growing “attack surface” available to malicious adversaries (foreign intelligence services, foreign militaries, and organized criminals) attest to the variety of unseen peacetime dangers. Defenders may find it difficult to prioritize their efforts against nation-state military rivals who might act against them in a hypothetical future war when there are pressing threats to other private and public targets. In crises and war, however, it is fair to assume that states will be fully alert to the activities of their enemy. In addition, wartime combatants have powerful incentives to increase the security of communication networks and deploy redundant information systems to improve resiliency after the shooting starts. And routine cybersecurity measures that may be overlooked in peacetime are likely to receive attention as conflict draws near. Imminent violence inspires vigilance among defenders, making cyberspace breakthroughs extremely difficult.

It is unclear whether Chinese officers are aware of these difficulties. Their ongoing doctrinal zeal for information operations suggests not. That said, U.S. officials now seem to believe that China’s recent activities indicate a different theory of victory.

Social Distortion

Compartmented military networks are closed systems with extensive security precautions in place to prevent unauthorized entry. Hackers are more likely to succeed against public-facing business networks than against hardened military targets. But civilian infrastructure is apparently much more vulnerable. This is not surprising, given its geographic scope and complexity, or the fact that most of the associated machinery predates the cyberspace era. Policymakers and engineers have repeatedly emphasized these vulnerabilities, warning that infrastructure presents an extremely tempting target to would-be saboteurs.

Moreover, the threat to infrastructure is psychological as much as physical. During her congressional testimony last month, Easterly referred to “social panic … at a massive scale” as multiple simultaneous infrastructure attacks played out in a hypothetical war. Possible attacks on electricity, water, and the financial system are particularly unnerving. What should we expect if war leads to darkened cities full of terrified citizens who cannot trust the water supply and who have no access to their own funds? To concerned officials, we can expect a war in which American society slides into panic, despite the fact that military activities are half a world away.

Fears of social breakdown as a result of cyberspace operations are nothing new, of course, but they have received more attention in recent years. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report, published in 2020, began with a “Warning from Tomorrow” about a desolate Washington in the aftermath of a catastrophic attack. Among other horrors are tent cities around the city where people choose to live, even though public authorities tell them it is safe to return to their homes. People will stop trusting their infrastructure, we are told, after it has been compromised.

Perhaps China’s leadership believes that it can exploit these post-apocalyptic fears to coerce the United States in the event of war. Perhaps it believes that it can compel U.S. leaders to back down by making cyber threats against U.S. infrastructure — or by going forward with attacks. Indeed, Chinese leaders may suspect that the only way to pressure the leaders of a democratic country is by imposing costs on the people living there. How better to disabuse U.S. citizens from the idea that they can safely support military action in East Asia without incurring any real risk? Such attacks might convince them not to fight so far from home.

The expansion of targets from military networks to civilian infrastructure is akin to the expansion of strategic bombing in World War II. The United States entered that conflict with a vision of airpower built around an appealing economic logic. Precise bombing raids against Germany’s vital industrial nodes would cause its economy to falter. The interlocking nature of modern industrial economies, moreover, meant that a limited amount of bombing would have outsized effects on Germany’s ability to sustain its war machine. But the experience of wartime revealed hard truths: Maps were insufficient, bombs were inaccurate, and air defenses were lethal. While never giving up the dream of precision, later American bombing raids used huge numbers of aircraft to cover large industrial areas.

In a similar fashion, it is possible that Chinese military planners suspect that pinpoint cyberspace operations against hardened military networks will not be enough. If they cannot obstruct U.S. military movements through cyber attacks, perhaps they can coerce U.S. policymakers by sowing dissent among ordinary Americans. Such thinking would explain the growing interest in prepositioning malware on civilian infrastructure.

Yet such efforts may prove disappointing. The theory of victory underlying cyber operations against infrastructure is straightforward: Disruption of social and economic life in the United States will lead to pressure on policymakers to back away from conflict in Asia. Civilians won’t tolerate the pain, and pressure from below will cause politicians to remove U.S. forces. Several questionable assumptions are built into this strategy. One is that cyberspace operations will prove as devastating as officials fear. It is true that infrastructure networks offer a large attack surface to would-be attackers, but in cyberspace the actual consequences are often hard to predict in advance. A related assumption is that U.S. infrastructure providers will not be able to restore service quickly, even with government assistance. This is possible, to be sure, but the increasing U.S. focus on resilience suggests that there is serious attention to what might occur the day after.

Unless China is able to cause extraordinary and lasting damage to infrastructure, there is little reason to believe that this will serve as a useful coercive tool. Under these conditions Americans are much more likely to form opinions about the war based on the real killing and dying in the theater itself. And even if China is able to grab Americans’ attention via cyber operations against infrastructure, the public reaction might prove counterproductive. Rather than clamoring for a settlement, the public might demand revenge.

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Joshua Rovner is an associate professor in the School of International Service at American University.

Image: 131st Bomb Wing

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Joshua Rovner · March 25, 2024

18. The Icarus Trap: Arrogance, Misperception, and the U.S. Invasion of Iraq

Arrogance kills.

Excerpts:

The Iraq War, in short, was probably more about Americans fooling themselves than Saddam fooling Americans. We have to understand the miscommunications that Coll ably explores as well as how Americans interpreted the Iraqi threat, the international security environment, and their own identities and roles in the world. The idea of the Iraq War as a tragedy stemming from misperception has some validity, but it risks letting leaders off the hook for rigid thinking, arrogance, and unrealistic goals.

Coll would probably agree with this assessment, as this is hardly an exculpatory book. He has spent a remarkable career documenting the hubris and overreach of much of U.S. foreign policy. He concludes that this was “an unnecessary war that he [Bush] and his war cabinet marketed through exaggerations of available evidence and unabashed fearmongering.” Rather, the purpose of this critique is to fit Coll’s story about mutual misperceptions into a broader understanding of the war’s causes, which reflected both the U.S. desire for security after 9/11 and its hegemonic power and aspirations.

The Icarus Trap: Arrogance, Misperception, and the U.S. Invasion of Iraq - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Joseph Stieb · March 25, 2024

Steve Coll, The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A., and the Origins of America’s Invasion of Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2024).

Was the Iraq War a product of mutual misperception by U.S. and Iraqi leaders? Since the United States failed to find significant weapons of mass destruction following the 2003 invasion, scholars have wondered whether this disastrous war might have been avoidable if each side had more accurately perceived the other. There may have been a middle ground in which the Iraqis fully communicated their disarmament and the Americans accepted a defanged but intact Iraqi regime.

In his fascinating and vividly written book, Steve Coll offers the best version of this argument to date. Tracing U.S.-Iraqi relations from the 1980s to 2003, he shows how mutual misperceptions and miscommunications created a spiral of conflict and distrust that culminated in the ill-fated U.S. invasion. Each side made assumptions about the other that were not entirely unreasonable in context but that also closed off opportunities for de-escalation.

The result of this argument is the Iraq War as a tragedy. Like Juliet taking her own life not knowing that Romeo was merely sleeping, the George W. Bush administration stumbled into an unnecessary and destructive war. Had they just known that Iraq had no significant weapons of mass destruction programs, they would have avoided the war.

Explaining this “failure of comprehension” is important for grasping the war’s origins, but this approach has limits. Focusing on miscommunication risks construing the war too much as an avoidable misunderstanding rather than as a tale of delusion, hubris, and obsession on the part of U.S. policy-makers. This was not just a “tragic invasion to eliminate a nonexistent [weapons of mass destruction] arsenal” but a product of the aspirations, vulnerabilities, and sheer might of a hegemonic power.

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Mutual Misperceptions

This book separates itself from much existing work on the Iraq War by using a host of new sources. It draws on tape recordings, minutes of meetings, and intelligence files held at the Conflict Records Research Center in Washington, DC. As Michael Brill explains, previous scholars drew on these records captured after the U.S. invasion of Iraq before funding cuts led to the center’s closure in 2015. Coll, however, filed suit against the Defense Department in 2021 and gained access to a large portion of these records, enabling him to paint an intricate portrait of the Baathist government and its leader.

This book provides compelling insights on topics like the Iraqi nuclear program, Saddam Hussein’s inner circle, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) efforts to topple him in the 1990s. This review, however, focuses on Coll’s story of how U.S. and Iraqi leaders continually misread each other and plunged into avoidable conflicts.

In the 1980s, the United States tilted toward Iraq in order to contain Iran and tried to woo the Baathist regime with economic aid while limiting criticism of Iraqi human rights abuses. Saddam, however, never lost his rigid view of United States, and the CIA in particular, as a hostile and omnipotent power out to destabilize his government. Coll emphasizes Saddam’s deeply antisemitic worldview and his belief that Zionists controlled U.S. media and policy, driving them to undermine his regime even when the United States was trying to reach out.

There was also sufficient evidence of U.S. deceit to fuel some of Saddam’s fears about Washington’s intentions. For example, the U.S. provision of arms and intelligence to Iran in the mid-1980s bolstered Saddam’s belief that the United States aimed to debilitate both sides in order to defang threats to Israel and U.S. power in the region. Coll quotes Saddam saying that Iran-Contra showed “the real American-Israeli-Iranian conspiracy … a conspiracy against us.”

The United States also misread Saddam in the lead-up to the 1990–91 Gulf crisis and failed send a clear deterrent message against an invasion of Kuwait. Saddam in turn believed that with the end of the Cold War, the United States would “continue to depart from the restrictions that govern the rest of the world … until new forces of balance are formed.” It would use this hegemonic moment to try to control Middle Eastern oil and bolster Israeli power. He believed that the United States “displayed signs of fatigue, frustration, and hesitation” that might enable him to seize Kuwait and get away with it. U.S. silence at his use of chemical weapons in the 1980s and other crimes further convinced him that the United States would not punish his invasion of Kuwait. As Saddam later told his interrogators in captivity, “If you didn’t want me to go in, why didn’t you tell me?”

Coll reinforces the scholarly conclusion that Saddam pursued nuclear weapons mainly to deter the United States and Israel and to assert his regional power and self-conception as leader of the Arab nations. When the United States made clear deterrent threats, he respected the red lines. For instance, Secretary of State James Baker warned Saddam that the United States would seek “the elimination of the current Iraqi regime” if it used chemical or biological weapons on coalition forces, and Saddam refrained from using them during Desert Storm.

After a successful military campaign to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the United States championed the U.N. efforts to destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, using sanctions to coerce Iraqi compliance. Simultaneously, the George H.W. Bush administration deviated from the Gulf War coalition by declaring that the United States would not lift sanctions on Iraq until Saddam was overthrown, contradicting the U.N. Security Council resolution that set up the inspections.

Saddam identified this fissure in the coalition early and worked over the course of the 1990s to pull nations like China, Russia, and France away from the U.S. hard line. Moreover, this U.S. position, which President Bill Clinton continued despite some reservations, convinced Saddam that there was little point in full compliance. Referring to the inspections, Saddam even told his advisors that “sanctions without all these sacrifices are better than sanctions with them.”

Coll’s chapters on the inspections are engrossing. He shows how Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamel initially led the effort to hide Iraq’s weapons programs, leading to confrontations with the inspectors. In the summer of 1991, he pivoted and ordered the destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and related facilities. However, he did so without preserving the documentation that could prove to the inspectors that Iraq had unilaterally destroyed all of its programs. This set the inspections regime on the impossible mission of verifying exactly what programs and materials the Iraqis had possessed and how quickly they could reconstitute those capabilities, even as the Iraqi security services continued to harass them. When the Iraqis did expose the full extent of past programs, including revelations about its biological weapons arsenal in 1995, it only deepened the inspectors’ and U.S. leaders’ belief that Iraq had more to hide, a dynamic that Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer calls “the Cheater’s Dilemma.”

Nonetheless, as Gregory Koblentz has also argued, Iraqi non-cooperation was in part rooted in Saddam’s reasonably founded belief that the United States was working to overthrow him and that the inspectors posed a security threat. The CIA provided aerial photos of suspected weapons sites to the inspectors as early as 1991. With U.S. encouragement, the inspectors in the late 1990s intensified operations to unmask the Iraqi “concealment mechanism,” or the Special Security Organization’s system of obstruction. This involved closer cooperation with U.S. intelligence as well as attempts to enter sensitive Iraqi facilities, including areas that Saddam depended on for internal security.

When the Special Security Organization removed documents or tried to block the inspectors from these sites, U.S. policy-makers concluded that they were trying to hide information or materials instead of attempting to “secure the presidential protection system whose overriding purpose was to keep Saddam Hussein safe.” Repeated confrontations with the inspectors led to their ouster from Iraq at the end of 1998, which left the international community blind to internal Iraqi behavior. From then on, most of the international community operated from the assumption that, as Clinton told British Prime Minister Tony Blair, “I’ve reached the conclusion after eliminating all possible alternatives that Saddam still has the making of a chemical and biological program he doesn’t want to give up.”

Coll spends a lot of time on CIA attempts to woo Iraqi leaders in the 1980s and its later efforts to spark a coup in the 1990s. These chapters are riveting, but it is not clear how important the CIA’s actions were, especially in the 1990s. The George H.W. Bush administration sought to foment a coup but also feared the destabilizing consequences of Saddam’s overthrow. The Clinton administration was even less enthusiastic about pursuing a coup and even rescinded support at the last second for a hare-brained CIA scheme in 1995.

It seems unlikely that these plots could have worked given the brutal competence of Saddam’s security forces and U.S. reticence to take risks to remove a threat that was mostly contained. As one CIA officer told Coll, Clinton “set up a system that protected him politically from claims that he wasn’t serious about deposing Saddam, but he set up a fail-safe system to preventing anything from actually happened.”

The Road to the 2003 Invasion

Coll spends less time on the U.S. decision-making that led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which is well-covered ground. Nonetheless, his book deftly connects the themes of mutual miscommunication and misperception to the 18 months between 9/11 and the war’s onset.

The George W. Bush administration shifted quickly from Afghanistan to Iraq as the centerpiece of the U.S. response to 9/11. In August 2002, Bush called for the return of inspections and threatened to use force to disarm Iraq if it failed to comply. Unlike some scholars, Coll correctly notes that this was “a cynical exercise, a test designed for Saddam to fail” in which Bush hoped to gain international support for a decision for regime change he had effectively already made.

When the inspectors returned to Iraq in December 2002, the misperceptions of the 1990s inhibited the possibility of de-escalation. Iraqi officials told the inspectors that they had no active weapons of mass destruction programs, which was true, and Saddam ordered his subordinates to destroy or surrender all remaining documents or equipment.

However, the Special Security Organization continued to prioritize regime security, which “all but guaranteed that whenever U.N. inspectors headed for sites regarded as sensitive, Saddam’s bodyguards would scramble into defensive action, zipping around in vehicles and chattering over radios as they tried to identify and hide protected places, people, or documents.” The Iraqis also continued to block unfettered access to scientists who might manage to explain the extent of its weapons of mass destruction research.

So while the inspectors found little evidence of ongoing weapons production, Iraqi behavior sent the opposite message: that they had something to hide and intended to reconstitute these programs eventually. As Coll argues, Saddam’s conspiratorial worldview explains a lot of this behavior: “He assumed that an all-powerful CIA already knew that he had no nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. A CIA capable of getting such a big question wrong on the facts was not consistent with Saddam’s bedrock assumptions.”

Coll vividly portrays an aloof and incompetent Saddam who played his strategic cards poorly as the United States shifted its attention to Iraq. He gloated over America’s trauma after 9/11, asserting on Iraqi state television one day after the attacks that “the United States reaps the thorns that its leaders have planted in the world.” He utterly failed to realize how 9/11 had altered U.S. security perceptions and unleashed its willingness to use force to eliminate potential threats. As U.S. rhetoric intensified and its military forces assembled in the region, he stuck to his longstanding belief that the United States was weak and that nations like Russia and China would bail him out.

In fact, Saddam seemed more interested in finishing his winding novels than saving his own skin. He even managed to print 40,000 copies of his fourth novel, Get Out, Damned One!, before going underground. One gets an image of an Iraqi King Lear, dawdling and prevaricating as the forces of his own destruction swirled around him.

The Limits of Tragedy and Misperception

However, Coll and other authors’ portrayal of the Iraq War as a “failure of comprehension,” and the resulting narrative of a tragic war cannot fully capture this conflict’s origins. Gideon Rose endorsed this view in his assessment of Coll’s book: “The Iraq War shows what happens when neither side knows either.” Mutual misperception is a piece of the puzzle, but just a piece.

One issue with misperception arguments is that they cannot explain why the United States approached the containment of Iraq in the 1990s in such a stringent manner. Coll helps us see how the inspectors were unable to fully verify Iraq’s unilateral destruction of its own weapons of mass destruction. But, as Samuel Helfont and I have argued, this does not explain why the United States demanded such ironclad proof of Saddam’s total disarmament, nor why it pursued such a hardline position on Iraq compared to most other members of the Gulf War coalition. At some point in the 1990s, the United States probably could have declared a 95 percent victory, ended the inspections, eased the sanctions, and accepted a Saddam-led Iraq as a geopolitical reality.

Instead, throughout the decade, U.S. leaders supported intrusive inspections and refused to consider sanctions relief until absolute compliance was verified. As Coll documents, it pursued hare-brained schemes of toppling Saddam. The United States and Great Britain also aggressively wielded their veto power on the U.N. committee responsible for enforcing sanctions, barring critical goods such as insecticide, refrigeration equipment, and chlorine for fear of “dual-use” in weapons production.

Misperception issues cannot fully explain this behavior, which undermined containment by alienating partner nations, convincing Saddam that full cooperation was pointless, and immiserating the Iraqi people. U.S. allies also misinterpreted much of Iraq’s behavior, but they did not insist on such a stringent approach to the problem. It seems contradictory that the most powerful nation on earth, the one best equipped to protect itself from weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles, insisted on the highest standard of security vis-à-vis Iraq.

U.S. hegemony in the 1990s and early 2000s offers a more complete explanation of Iraq policy. On both sides of the aisle, U.S. grand strategy sought to consolidate and expand primacy, markets, and democracy, using the unipolar moment to lock in long-term advantages. U.S. leaders saw “rogue states” like Iraq as the last redoubts of resistance to U.S. power and the waves of democratization and globalization sweeping the world. As some scholars have argued, states’ definitions of their own security expand as they gain power; they can do more and try to eradicate threats that they might once have tried to manage. Not only did U.S. leaders resent that Iraq was defying the Pax Americana, they also had the power in this era to finish the job and a sense of ideological purpose in doing so.

We also have to look at U.S. domestic politics to understand the severity of U.S. policy on Iraq in the 1990s. The messy ending of the Gulf War, especially Saddam’s survival and crushing of internal revolts, led many Democrats and Republicans to criticize Bush for not removing Saddam. Bush’s own declarations that the United States would not lift sanctions as long as Saddam remained in power set a hardline precedent that constrained his successor. A movement of neoconservatives, liberal hawks, Republicans, and Iraqi exiles coalesced to defend the hardline approach and advocate for an overt regime change policy. Referring to Saddam, Clinton told Tony Blair in 1998 that “if I weren’t constrained by the press, I would pick up the phone and call the son of a bitch. But that is such a heavy-laden decision in America.”

The predominant ideas, politics, and mood of the United States in the 1990s drove U.S. leaders to seek absolute solutions to problems like Iraq. While they did misperceive Iraq in many ways, Americans also defined their own security requirements and role in the world in ways that generated repeated collisions.

Another problem with a focus on misperception lies in the fact that in the early 2000s, the George W. Bush administration, as well as most of Congress and the U.S. public, was not seeking to gather information and update beliefs on Iraq. Rather, for a variety of reasons, the Bush team as well as most of Congress and the public had already decided upon the necessity of regime change before the inspectors re-entered Iraq in late 2002. As Coll duly notes, the Bush administration exaggerated and distorted intelligence analysis on the war, showing their determination not to seek the truth but to bolster an existing conclusion. That only a handful of members of Congress bothered to read the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs demonstrates that this attitude was not confined to the executive branch.

Many U.S. leaders and thinkers wanted this war and had been working since well before 9/11 to bring it about, for a variety of reasons. As Ahsan Butt argues, the United States believed that it needed to demonstrate its resolve to state sponsors of terrorism after 9/11 and that Iraq offered an ideal target for flexing its muscles in order to assert “generalized deterrence” against state sponsors of terrorism. Other key policy-makers, including Bush, believed that the United States might address the root causes of terrorism by implanting democracy in places like Iraq.

It is not clear what the Iraqis could have done to avoid a U.S. invasion in early 2003. They could not reveal a weapons programs they did not have, and any such revelations would have fed the Bush administration’s belief that the regime could not be trusted. But obstructing the inspectors led to the same conclusion.

Theoretically, if U.S. leaders had perfect knowledge of Iraq’s lack of weapons, they may have avoided war. But over the preceding decade-plus, they had constructed an understanding of the Baathist regime that made it impossible for the Iraqis to credibly communicate their disarmament.

Bush most likely agreed to the inspections not because he believed they might work but to rally domestic and international support for war. Vice President Richard Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz opposed any new inspections, fearing a return to the “cheat-and-retreat” dynamics of the 1990s and believing unshakably that Saddam was engaged in weapons of mass destruction production. Rumsfeld wrote to Bush in October 2002, for instance, arguing that new inspections would inevitably result in “a protracted period of inconclusive inspections” that would give Saddam his “best hope of inflicting a strategic defeat on the U.S.”

Moreover, as Coll explains, the Bush administration ignored that the inspectors in early 2003 were not finding significant weapons of mass destruction programs, even at locations where the CIA had encouraged them to search. Top inspectors were directly contradicting U.S. claims, including infamous assertions about aluminum tubes. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice dismissed these findings (or lack thereof), arguing that “we need to be careful about drawing these conclusions, particularly in a totalitarian state like Iraq.” Inside accounts of the administration’s decision-making show that Bush made the final decision for war in January 2002, just a month into the inspections, and that they ignored the inspectors’ calls for more time.

The Iraq War, in short, was probably more about Americans fooling themselves than Saddam fooling Americans. We have to understand the miscommunications that Coll ably explores as well as how Americans interpreted the Iraqi threat, the international security environment, and their own identities and roles in the world. The idea of the Iraq War as a tragedy stemming from misperception has some validity, but it risks letting leaders off the hook for rigid thinking, arrogance, and unrealistic goals.

Coll would probably agree with this assessment, as this is hardly an exculpatory book. He has spent a remarkable career documenting the hubris and overreach of much of U.S. foreign policy. He concludes that this was “an unnecessary war that he [Bush] and his war cabinet marketed through exaggerations of available evidence and unabashed fearmongering.” Rather, the purpose of this critique is to fit Coll’s story about mutual misperceptions into a broader understanding of the war’s causes, which reflected both the U.S. desire for security after 9/11 and its hegemonic power and aspirations.

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Joseph Stieb is an assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. He is the author of The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990–2003. He has published articles in the Texas National Security Review, Diplomatic History, Modern American History, Journal of Strategic Studies, International History Review, War on the Rocks, Washington Post, Foreign Policy, and elsewhere.

The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views, policies, or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or its components, to include the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College.

Image: Staff Sgt. Michael Pryor

Book Reviews

warontherocks.com · by Joseph Stieb · March 25, 2024

19. The Tyranny of Expectations

Excerpts:

The darkened mood has translated into growing skepticism about providing assistance to Ukraine. In October, for example, Republican Senator Mike Lee called the conflict “America’s new forever war.” In December, House Speaker Mike Johnson said, “What the Biden administration seems to be asking for is billions of additional dollars with no appropriate oversight, no clear strategy to win, and with none of the answers that I think the American people are owed.” In January, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico declared that the only way to end the conflict was for Ukraine to give up territory.

For Ukraine, growing skepticism is, of course, bad news. But the pessimistic turn comes with a silver lining: it may, once again, make Kyiv look like David fighting Goliath and lower expectations for the future. If so, analysts may celebrate Ukraine’s defiance and criticize the slow pace of Russian advances. After all, despite its greater power, Russia is still struggling to capture Ukrainian territory, and Kyiv has enjoyed clear wins in some arenas of the war—such as targeting the Russian navy in the Black Sea. Fighting Russia to a near-standstill remains a massive achievement for Ukraine. Here, Kyiv can better manage expectations by combining confidence in its long-term success with a realistic appraisal of its short-term difficulties. Ukraine, for example, should make clear to policymakers and its global audience that it is a massive underdog battling a brutal dictator and perhaps the third-greatest military in the world, and yet will ultimately prevail in its fight for independence. This story might help unlock more Western aid.

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It is increasingly clear that defeating Hamas is no simple feat. Hamas is a deep-rooted organization that operates through family and clan networks. It is part of the “axis of resistance”: the network of state and nonstate actors that includes Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and various militias in Iraq and Syria, all of which can provide Hamas fighters with diplomatic and material support. Hamas had months to prepare tunnels and other defenses in Gaza. As a result, although Hamas has suffered losses, it is not close to being destroyed. Israel claims to have killed 13,000 Hamas operatives, but the group may have 30,000 or more fighters in total. Support for Hamas among Palestinians in the West Bank has risen. And Israel may be running out of time to deal more damage. It is under pressure from Arab states to end the conflict, and the United States has increasingly criticized the number of Palestinian casualties. U.S. President Joe Biden has warned Netanyahu, for example, not to launch a full-scale invasion of Rafah, which Netanyahu has said is needed to eliminate Hamas. Even some top Israeli officials are worried about endless fighting—and aware that a total victory is impossible to achieve. In January, Gadi Eisenkot, a senior member of Israel’s wartime cabinet, said of the campaign against Hamas: “Whoever speaks of absolute defeat is not speaking the truth.”

Hamas, by contrast, benefits from the tyranny of expectations. As the weaker party to the conflict, observers may see its very survival as a kind of victory, just as with Hezbollah in 2006. In the long-term, then, Israel’s campaign may inadvertently strengthen its adversary or create a new and even more dangerous successor organization.

For Israel, it is probably too late to reset expectations, especially given that it was never the underdog (unlike Ukraine). Israelis are likely to look back on the war as a costly campaign and a missed opportunity—and perhaps as a major defeat. Polls in Israel suggest that confidence in the country’s security is waning. Perceptions of failure could have profound consequences for Israeli politics and society. Inside the country, the result could be a siege mindset, a hardening of Israeli politics, and a search for scapegoats. But recollections of loss could also spur a greater willingness to make concessions to the Palestinians, much as the perceived defeat in 1973 made Israelis more willing to trade land for peace with Egypt. The tyranny of expectations is a tough problem for powerful countries. But sometimes, self-criticism is necessary to make peace.

The Tyranny of Expectations

Winning the Battle but Losing the War, From Ukraine to Israel

By Dominic Tierney

March 25, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts · March 25, 2024

In early 2022, much of the world applauded the heroic Ukrainian troops who held back Russian forces outside the gates of Kharkiv and Kyiv. “This is Ukraine’s finest hour, that will be remembered and recounted for generations to come,” declared then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. “Its soldiers have demonstrated immense bravery,” said German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. In a speech from Warsaw, U.S. President Joe Biden proclaimed that Russian forces “met their match with brave and stiff Ukrainian resistance.”

Two years later, Ukrainian soldiers are again resisting massive Russian military assaults, this time in Donetsk, Luhansk, and elsewhere. But now there are far fewer cheers. Instead of celebrating Ukrainian valor, many observers are chiding the country for not turning the tide and going on the offensive. Last November, for example, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni made revealing comments to two Russians (who were pretending to be African Union officials): “There is a lot of fatigue, I have to say the truth, from all the sides. We are near the moment in which everybody understands that we need a way out.” Ukraine may again be holding off a more powerful aggressor. Yet this outcome now seems like a stalemate, if not a defeat.

The global shift in perceptions is an example of the tyranny of expectations—or how assumptions about who will win a war can skew judgments about who prevails. Outside observers, both experts and laypeople alike, do not evaluate military results by simply tallying up the battlefield gains and losses. Instead, they compare these results to their expectations. As a result, states can lose territory and still be deemed winners if they overperform. States can take land and be labeled losers if they underdeliver. The resulting conclusions about the winners and losers, however skewed, can even rebound and shape the battlefield. Ukraine, for example, lost territory during the initial weeks of Russia’s invasion. But Kyiv’s unexpectedly resolute defense earned it widespread Western assistance, which helped it liberate numerous cities in the following months.

The tyranny of expectations is also at work in another major war: the Israeli campaign in Gaza. When this conflict began, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a grandiose promise that his country would “crush and destroy” Hamas. Declaring that he would eradicate the group completely was a mistake. Hamas is amorphous, dispersed, and heavily armed, which means it is almost impossible for Israel to abolish. Netanyahu’s pledge makes it extremely difficult for Israel to be seen as the clear-cut winner of the war. When expectations and reality clash, crisis often follows. Israeli disillusionment with Netanyahu’s war could cause a seismic shock in Israeli politics.

PERCEPTION AND REALITY

At first, it might seem that the key to success in war is to exude great confidence about victory. In wartime, after all, optimism can be a force multiplier, whereas defeatism can be contagious. If everyone thinks one side will win a battle, it really might prevail, in a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. In War and Peace, for instance, Leo Tolstoy argued that Russian troops fled from the French in the 1805 battle of Austerlitz, despite suffering from similar casualties, because the Russian troops had a crisis of confidence. “We said to ourselves that we were losing the battle,” Tolstoy wrote, “and we did lose it.”

But an image of sure success can also be dangerous. Judging who wins and loses in war is incredibly murky, and people may make their determinations by comparing the battlefield result with a (somewhat arbitrary) reference point—their expectations. As a result, a conflict’s perceived winner may have little to do with the outcome on the ground.

Consider what happened in 1975 when forces from the Khmer Rouge, the Communist group in Cambodia, captured the merchant vessel Mayaguez and its 39 American crewmembers. In response, Washington launched a rescue mission that turned into a debacle. Forty-one U.S. service members died, over 50 were wounded, and three U.S. Marines were accidentally left behind in Cambodia, where they were captured and executed. The crew of the Mayaguez was set free, but not thanks to the rescue mission. It turned out that a local Khmer Rouge commander had mistakenly taken the Americans prisoner, and senior Cambodian officials ordered their release before the U.S. raid even started. The raid, then, produced nothing except casualties.

But back home, Americans saw the raid as a huge success. In one poll, 79 percent of people judged U.S. President Gerald Ford’s handling of the crisis as “excellent” or “good,” versus 18 percent who rated it “only fair” or “poor.” Ford’s overall approval ratings surged. One of the main reasons for this upswing was Americans’ low expectations about their military’s capabilities. South Vietnam had just fallen to Communist troops, and so U.S. confidence was at a low ebb. Americans were, therefore, delighted to see Washington put on a seemingly muscular performance. In one poll, 76 percent of Americans agreed that “after losing Vietnam and Cambodia, the United States had no choice but to take decisive action, even risking a bigger war, to get back the ship and crew.”

Great expectations, by contrast, can spur great disappointment. In 1967, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson began a “Progress Campaign” to show that the United States was winning in Vietnam. The administration published reams of statistics to demonstrate that the Communists were on the run, bolstering Americans’ confidence. Public support duly ticked upward. But then, in January 1968, Communist forces launched the Tet Offensive and attacked almost every major city in South Vietnam. Tactically speaking, Tet was a disaster for the Communists, as U.S. and South Vietnamese forces inflicted massive casualties. But Americans—having been told that their opponents were running out of steam—saw the offensive as a defeat. U.S. public confidence in the war declined. For the Communists, a battlefield loss became a strategic win, since it put the United States on the long path to withdrawal.

DAVID VERSUS GOLIATH

For Ukraine, the tyranny of expectations initially worked to its advantage. After the invasion, Kyiv was the underdog, with U.S. government officials estimating that Russia might overrun most of the country in just a few days. When Russia failed to seize the capital, Western countries were impressed by Ukraine’s performance, which encouraged them to provide more material aid. In turn, Ukraine launched a series of successful counteroffensives that liberated roughly half the territory Moscow had taken.

But in the process, Kyiv was saddled with great expectations. Western observers began suggesting that Ukraine might somehow drive a bedraggled Russia out of all the territory it took in 2022—and perhaps even the land that Moscow seized in 2014. Some analysts, such as Eliot Cohen, a Johns Hopkins University professor and former State Department official, argued that Ukraine’s offensives could cause the Russian military to collapse. The Ukrainian government, for its part, encouraged such thinking. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky pledged that Ukraine would liberate all its territory and fight “until the end” without “any concession or compromise.” Top Ukrainian officials openly suggested that a cascade of Russian defeats might force Russian President Vladimir Putin from power.

These expectations, however, were completely unrealistic. Russia incurred tens, or even hundreds, of thousands of casualties, but the country was still much stronger than Ukraine. Its GDP was nine times the size of its neighbor’s, and its population was over three times as large. After suffering setbacks, Moscow mobilized more forces, spent months laying mines and preparing other defenses, and learned to use drones more effectively. As a result, when Ukraine launched a highly anticipated offensive in June 2023, it faced fierce resistance. Its efforts quickly stalled out.

For Ukraine, growing skepticism comes with a silver lining.

In the West, overblown expectations of Kyiv’s imminent success led to widespread disappointment with the Ukrainian counteroffensive, as well as grim prognoses for the war’s future. “I know everyone wants Ukraine to win,” said Republican Senator Ron Johnson in December. “I just don’t see it in the cards.” One poll of Europeans in early 2024 found that only 10 percent predicted a Ukrainian victory on the battlefield, whereas 20 percent foresaw a Russian victory and 37 percent expected a compromise deal. U.S. and European officials—concerned that the campaign had reached a stalemate and that Kyiv was running short of men and materiel—have even talked with Ukraine about peace negotiations.

The darkened mood has translated into growing skepticism about providing assistance to Ukraine. In October, for example, Republican Senator Mike Lee called the conflict “America’s new forever war.” In December, House Speaker Mike Johnson said, “What the Biden administration seems to be asking for is billions of additional dollars with no appropriate oversight, no clear strategy to win, and with none of the answers that I think the American people are owed.” In January, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico declared that the only way to end the conflict was for Ukraine to give up territory.

For Ukraine, growing skepticism is, of course, bad news. But the pessimistic turn comes with a silver lining: it may, once again, make Kyiv look like David fighting Goliath and lower expectations for the future. If so, analysts may celebrate Ukraine’s defiance and criticize the slow pace of Russian advances. After all, despite its greater power, Russia is still struggling to capture Ukrainian territory, and Kyiv has enjoyed clear wins in some arenas of the war—such as targeting the Russian navy in the Black Sea. Fighting Russia to a near-standstill remains a massive achievement for Ukraine. Here, Kyiv can better manage expectations by combining confidence in its long-term success with a realistic appraisal of its short-term difficulties. Ukraine, for example, should make clear to policymakers and its global audience that it is a massive underdog battling a brutal dictator and perhaps the third-greatest military in the world, and yet will ultimately prevail in its fight for independence. This story might help unlock more Western aid.

OVERPROMISE, UNDERDELIVER

Unlike Ukraine, Israel has decades of experience with the tyranny of expectations, beginning with the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. During that conflict, Israel clearly defeated the Egyptian and Syrian militaries, but Israelis nevertheless saw the campaign as a costly debacle. After the fighting ended, the country created a commission to determine what went wrong, and top Israel Defense Force officials stepped down. So did Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir.

Israelis were gloomy in part because the Yom Kippur War was an intelligence failure for the government. But a deeper reason is that Israelis had sky-high expectations for their military, rooted in past experience. In the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel rapidly defeated a coalition of Arab states, leading Israelis to believe their military was, in effect, invincible. Seen through that lens, the tougher fight in 1973 looked like a defeat. (Israeli overconfidence in 1973 also helped cause the intelligence failure, because Israelis assumed the Arab states would never dare attack.) In Egypt, meanwhile, the catastrophe in 1967 dramatically lowered the bar for success in 1973. Egyptians still celebrate the October War as a victory, even though they lost on the battlefield.

This pattern recurred in 2006, when Israel fought Hezbollah—an Iranian-backed militant group—in Lebanese territory. Israel killed hundreds of Hezbollah fighters during the war, and afterward, the Israeli-Lebanese border became calmer as Hezbollah troops were replaced by the Lebanese Army and UN forces. But Israelis still saw the war as a defeat. They assumed that a few thousand Hezbollah fighters would be no match for the mighty Israel Defense Forces and that the militant group would be destroyed. Israelis, therefore, were furious when Hezbollah survived and continued to fire rockets at their territory. One former defense minister, Moshe Arens, said that Israel handed “Hezbollah a victory in Lebanon.” Polls suggested that most Israelis wanted Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to resign (although he held on to power for another few years). In a similar vein to the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli government created an official commission to investigate what went wrong.

For Israel, it is probably too late to reset expectations.

Today, the tyranny of expectations may encourage Israelis to see their war in Gaza as a failure. Hamas, like Hezbollah, is much weaker than Israel in material terms, boosting Israeli confidence that the Israel Defense Forces should win easily. Israeli officials have strengthened these expectations by making expansive promises, such as Netanyahu’s declaration that the war in Gaza will end with an Israeli win akin to the Allied victory in World War II. “There is no other solution” for Israel, he declared in February, “but a complete and final victory.” It is tempting for Netanyahu to use such rhetoric to rally support, signal resolve, and justify the investment of lives. But maximalist war aims and promises of triumph set Israelis up for disappointment by suggesting that the only acceptable outcome is an outright triumph. Victory would require either removing Hamas entirely from Gaza or forcing the organization’s surrender. Neither is likely.

It is increasingly clear that defeating Hamas is no simple feat. Hamas is a deep-rooted organization that operates through family and clan networks. It is part of the “axis of resistance”: the network of state and nonstate actors that includes Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and various militias in Iraq and Syria, all of which can provide Hamas fighters with diplomatic and material support. Hamas had months to prepare tunnels and other defenses in Gaza. As a result, although Hamas has suffered losses, it is not close to being destroyed. Israel claims to have killed 13,000 Hamas operatives, but the group may have 30,000 or more fighters in total. Support for Hamas among Palestinians in the West Bank has risen. And Israel may be running out of time to deal more damage. It is under pressure from Arab states to end the conflict, and the United States has increasingly criticized the number of Palestinian casualties. U.S. President Joe Biden has warned Netanyahu, for example, not to launch a full-scale invasion of Rafah, which Netanyahu has said is needed to eliminate Hamas. Even some top Israeli officials are worried about endless fighting—and aware that a total victory is impossible to achieve. In January, Gadi Eisenkot, a senior member of Israel’s wartime cabinet, said of the campaign against Hamas: “Whoever speaks of absolute defeat is not speaking the truth.”

Hamas, by contrast, benefits from the tyranny of expectations. As the weaker party to the conflict, observers may see its very survival as a kind of victory, just as with Hezbollah in 2006. In the long-term, then, Israel’s campaign may inadvertently strengthen its adversary or create a new and even more dangerous successor organization.

For Israel, it is probably too late to reset expectations, especially given that it was never the underdog (unlike Ukraine). Israelis are likely to look back on the war as a costly campaign and a missed opportunity—and perhaps as a major defeat. Polls in Israel suggest that confidence in the country’s security is waning. Perceptions of failure could have profound consequences for Israeli politics and society. Inside the country, the result could be a siege mindset, a hardening of Israeli politics, and a search for scapegoats. But recollections of loss could also spur a greater willingness to make concessions to the Palestinians, much as the perceived defeat in 1973 made Israelis more willing to trade land for peace with Egypt. The tyranny of expectations is a tough problem for powerful countries. But sometimes, self-criticism is necessary to make peace.

DOMINIC TIERNEY is the Claude Smith Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the author of The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts.

Foreign Affairs · by The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts · March 25, 2024

20. Putin’s Hidden Weakness

Excerpts:

Even staunch Putin supporters are largely ambivalent about the war.

To make either scenario more likely, Western countries must challenge Moscow in its current bet that Western war fatigue is eroding support for Kyiv. Although Western analysts have suggested in recent assessments that Russia may be gaining the upper hand over Ukraine, that trend can be reversed. The West must supply Ukraine with the military support it needs to make Russia’s rotation of troops more urgent and the Russian costs of volunteering high. At the same time, Western nations should send Russian audiences a message that the economic and military costs of continuing the war in Ukraine outweigh the benefits. In doing so, the West could exploit the fact that war fatigue is now a problem for Moscow itself and that popular dissatisfaction with continuing the offensive is real—even among Putin’s own supporters.

Such efforts to capitalize on Russian opposition to the war will not automatically drive Putin from office. It is hard to oust an autocrat, especially in wartime, and even autocrats who lose wars often stay in power. The Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein survived ruinous wars against Iran and Kuwait. But the dissonance among the Russian leader’s base must unnerve the Kremlin. After the February death of Alexei Navalny, it may seem that the regime has all but eliminated viable sources of opposition. But Putin’s greatest threat may now come from his own current supporters.

Putin’s policies have not always followed public opinion, but he has generally avoided taking steps—such as steep increases in the pension age—that are broadly unpopular and military mobilization certainly falls within this category. Moreover, despite the Kremlin’s best efforts, even staunch Putin supporters are largely ambivalent about the war. That the Kremlin devotes so much energy to snuffing out even trivial forms of antiwar activity suggests that it is acutely aware of the danger that such discontent poses—a danger that even an overwhelming electoral victory cannot hide.

Putin’s Hidden Weakness

New Evidence Shows Many Russians Support Him—but Not the War

By Timothy Frye, Henry Hale, Ora John Reuter, and Bryn Rosenfeld

March 25, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia · March 25, 2024

In Russia’s presidential election in mid-March, Russian President Vladimir Putin officially won his fifth term with 87 percent of the vote and the highest reported turnout in the country’s post-Soviet history. Indeed, by most measures, Putin remains popular. Opinion surveys just before the election pegged his approval rating above 80 percent. Some voters are likely afraid to tell pollsters otherwise, of course, but for an autocrat, that kind of fear is almost as good as real support. Either way, Russians are generally avoiding open protest. This helps the Kremlin get away with touting Putin’s sweeping election victory as an endorsement of both the president and his signature policy, the war in Ukraine.

At the same time, these numbers are far from a reliable indicator of popular support for the war. Many Russians, including Putin voters, are skeptical of the Kremlin’s determination to continue the two-year-old conflict. Although Putin’s approval ratings are impressive, survey data from the Russian Election Study (RES), which we lead, indicate that only a slim majority of his supporters now favor staying the course in Ukraine. In fact, despite the Kremlin’s massive effort to drum up support, nearly one in four Putin backers opposes continuing the war, and roughly the same number say they are unsure whether they support the war (19 percent) or decline to answer the question (4 percent). This means that only slightly more than half of Putin supporters—54 percent—think Russia should continue the war that Putin has championed since Russia’s invasion in February 2022.

Among all Russian voters, support for Putin’s war is even softer. In October 2023, just 43 percent of Russians said they backed continuing what the Kremlin refers to as its “special military operation.” When asked to identify their position on the war, a third of those surveyed chose the response, “No, I do not support the continuation of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine,” and nearly a quarter declined to state an opinion. These figures are surely known to the Kremlin, which conducts its own polls and allows independent surveys to operate as well. Because it is easier to govern as a popular autocrat than an unpopular one, Putin closely tracks public opinion. The Kremlin works tirelessly to shape these opinions, but its efforts to drive up support for Putin himself have been more successful than its attempts to boost support for the war.

These findings are both good and bad news for Ukraine and its allies. Waning support for the war among Russian citizens will not, in itself, compel Putin to end his assault on the country. Given the Kremlin’s extensive suppression of civil society and public dissent, he can continue to wage war without strong popular backing for it. The lack of popular enthusiasm, however, could complicate this effort. In the absence of firm public support, Putin will need to rely more heavily on repression to forestall opposition. Lack of popular enthusiasm for the war’s continuation also makes it harder to recruit soldiers and maintain morale and raises the cost of buying public support. The Kremlin has already increased social spending and expanded the financial incentives for volunteering for the military. Winning the election was easy; stiffer challenges lie ahead.

BUSINESS AS USUAL?

In some respects, the RES’s most recent survey provides a sobering view of public support for the Putin regime. Contrary to some observers’ hopes that declining support for the war might trigger the collapse of Putin’s rule, the findings suggest it is not so simple. Led by a team of scholars supported by the National Science Foundation, the RES has contributed to understanding the evolution of Russian public opinion and voting behavior for nearly three decades. In national surveys conducted around each Russian presidential election in which Putin has featured as a candidate, the team has found that his support is multidimensional. This month’s election supports that pattern. The Russian leader continues to draw on a broad base among ordinary Russians—support built over nearly a quarter century that can prop him up even if many of these backers sour on the war itself. Putin’s appeal also continues to rest on his management of the country’s economy, his hypermasculine image, and—increasingly—his association with conservative values that resonate with many Russian citizens.

Manipulating these other sources of support has been part of Putin’s strategy all along, a tactic often overlooked in Western analyses of Russia’s war strategy. Since the start of the invasion, for example, he has frequently downplayed the so-called special military operation, suggesting that the armed forces will take care of it, leaving most ordinary Russians to go about their lives as usual. He has also stressed the message that Russia has remained stable and continued to flourish during the war.

Consider the economy. Russians who support Putin despite opposing the war are generally optimistic about how the economy has performed in the face of Western sanctions. About half of them think the economy is either unchanged or has even recovered over the last 12 months. (By contrast, just 14 percent of Russians who do not support Putin and are against the war see the Russian economy in this positive light.) Russians who are pro-Putin but antiwar are also much more likely to have avoided personal financial losses since the invasion of Ukraine: three in four report that their household finances have remained the same or improved over the past year. More than half of respondents who oppose both Putin and the war say their economic situation has worsened.

But there is a tension in the Kremlin’s efforts to downplay the war and promote a sense of normalcy. At various moments, including the launch of Putin’s re-election campaign in December 2023, he has emphasized that Russia’s fight—in Ukraine and against the West—is an existential one and that every Russian must do their part. Another such moment was when Putin ordered the “partial mobilization” in the fall of 2022, calling up hundreds of thousands of Russians to fight. Such moves contradict the Kremlin’s other messaging that seeks to minimize the war. Raising the stakes of the war effort is a risky strategy in itself. Should Putin continue to push an existential narrative and his supporters tire of the war, they may become more likely to break with him if developments take a negative turn in other areas they care about, like the economy.

This risk could increase if opposition to the war grows or if Russia’s economic outlook deteriorates. For example, our research shows that Putin supporters who oppose continuing the war are still divided about whether financing the offensive should take priority over social programs. This may partly reflect the Kremlin’s success, at least so far, in increasing social spending and maintaining a sense of economic stability even as it put the economy firmly on a war footing. If Russia experiences an economic decline or a demand for more social spending, this acquiescence to the war could diminish, eroding Putin’s base.

IT’S THE WAR, STUPID

A larger potential concern for the Kremlin is the specific nature of popular opposition to the war. The most recent RES survey shows that some groups from which Putin has traditionally drawn support now oppose the military campaign. For one thing, Russians who are skeptical about the war are disproportionately women, and more than a quarter of Putin’s female supporters want the special military operation to end. For another, Putin’s supporters in rural areas are more opposed to prolonging the war than his backers in Russia’s major urban centers, with one in three saying they are against continuing it. These rural areas have been hit harder by military recruitment than urban centers. If antiwar sentiment among these Russians begins to align with anti-Putin sentiment, as it more often has in cities, it could be a turning point for the Kremlin.

Added to these potential problems is the possibility that the Kremlin might be compelled to order another round of mobilization. Such a decision would have a particular impact on women and rural Russians. Men from rural areas are far more likely to be mobilized than those from major cities. And wives and mothers of soldiers, who are particularly concerned about high casualty rates and anxious for their loved ones to be rotated home from the front, have already become a key source of public protest against the government’s war strategy. To mollify this constituency, the Kremlin could rotate frontline troops more frequently—but that could, in turn, require fresh rounds of mobilization.

Among Putin supporters, opposition to the war is particularly concentrated in groups that are more likely to be recruited for military service and facing economically precarious circumstances. In remote ethnic regions in Siberia such as Buryatia, Altai, and Zabaykalskii Krai, where death rates among men of military age have been among Russia’s highest, as many as two-thirds of Putin supporters are outright against continuing the war. On average, in these regions and in other ethnic republics, such as Chuvashia and Udmurtia, roughly half of all Putin supporters express antiwar sentiments. Similarly, less-educated Putin backers are more likely to oppose continuing the war than their counterparts with advanced degrees.

Faced with this ambivalence toward the war in the very regions where the Russian military has been concentrating its recruitment efforts, the Kremlin has taken no chances. After initially allowing the antiwar opposition candidate Boris Nadezhdin to register for the presidential election, the Russian authorities disqualified him on the grounds that the signatures he had collected were invalid. Clearly, the Putin regime thought that it was too dangerous for Nadezhdin to press his case to an electorate already skeptical about continuing the “special military operation.”

To paper over antiwar sentiment, Russian state television regularly broadcasts displays of pro-military fervor and bellicosity, and Russian schools have doubled down on patriotic education. But such efforts have been unable to quash doubt, even among the war’s supporters. For example, only half of Russians who support continuing the war say that the best path available in February 2022 was “starting a full-scale military operation.”

THE THREAT FROM WITHIN

For Putin to retain his base of support, an electoral victory is less important than what comes after. In the past, he has sometimes deferred unpopular moves until after elections. A new wave of mobilization is the most opposed potential policy on the horizon. Even many backers of the war do not seem interested in making personal sacrifices to advance the effort. In a recent RES survey, seven of ten respondents who support the war said they were opposed to a fresh mobilization. In a hypothetical election scenario, support for a candidate declined by 25 percentage points when respondents were told that the candidate advocated mass conscription. Even Putin backers reduced their support for this hypothetical candidate by 16 points. All these findings suggest that there is only so much Putin can ask Russians to sacrifice for the war without fomenting more serious opposition.

For now, the Kremlin’s official position is that no new mobilization is needed. It has recruited enough soldiers on lucrative contracts over the past year to carry out some limited rotation and forestall the demand for more troops. The Kremlin’s strategy for avoiding a new mobilization appears to be to place the principal combat burden on politically marginalized groups—ethnic minorities, the rural poor, and convicts—and to pay big salaries and bonuses to those who volunteer to fight.

At the same time, the Kremlin has asked the wives and mothers of soldiers at the front to be patient, promising new benefits and social mobility for combat veterans who return home. Putin has assured loyalists—war supporters and those who have served—that they are the “true elite” and will be showered with rewards. Only time will tell whether he will uphold his promise to place and promote them in state companies, education, public associations, and government, a pledge he made in his annual address in February. Further battlefield setbacks for Russia, however, would make signing up new contract soldiers and other volunteer forces the Kremlin has used to fill manpower gaps more difficult. If fewer Russians volunteered, this would raise the pressure for more extensive mobilization, an option that Putin is clearly trying to avoid. A stagnating economy would compound this challenge, reducing his room to maneuver and making it more likely that he would effectively have to choose between the war and his core supporters.

Even staunch Putin supporters are largely ambivalent about the war.

To make either scenario more likely, Western countries must challenge Moscow in its current bet that Western war fatigue is eroding support for Kyiv. Although Western analysts have suggested in recent assessments that Russia may be gaining the upper hand over Ukraine, that trend can be reversed. The West must supply Ukraine with the military support it needs to make Russia’s rotation of troops more urgent and the Russian costs of volunteering high. At the same time, Western nations should send Russian audiences a message that the economic and military costs of continuing the war in Ukraine outweigh the benefits. In doing so, the West could exploit the fact that war fatigue is now a problem for Moscow itself and that popular dissatisfaction with continuing the offensive is real—even among Putin’s own supporters.

Such efforts to capitalize on Russian opposition to the war will not automatically drive Putin from office. It is hard to oust an autocrat, especially in wartime, and even autocrats who lose wars often stay in power. The Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein survived ruinous wars against Iran and Kuwait. But the dissonance among the Russian leader’s base must unnerve the Kremlin. After the February death of Alexei Navalny, it may seem that the regime has all but eliminated viable sources of opposition. But Putin’s greatest threat may now come from his own current supporters.

Putin’s policies have not always followed public opinion, but he has generally avoided taking steps—such as steep increases in the pension age—that are broadly unpopular and military mobilization certainly falls within this category. Moreover, despite the Kremlin’s best efforts, even staunch Putin supporters are largely ambivalent about the war. That the Kremlin devotes so much energy to snuffing out even trivial forms of antiwar activity suggests that it is acutely aware of the danger that such discontent poses—a danger that even an overwhelming electoral victory cannot hide.

TIMOTHY FRYE is Marshall D. Shulman Professor of Post-Soviet Foreign Policy at Columbia University and the author of Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia.
HENRY HALE is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University.
ORA JOHN REUTER is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee and Co-Principal Investigator of the Russian Election Study.
BRYN ROSENFELD is Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University and Co-Principal Investigator of the Russian Election Study.

Foreign Affairs · by Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia · March 25, 2024

21.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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