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Quotes of the Day:
"An unexamined life is not worth living."
– Socrates
"But there are some people, nevertheless - and I am one of them - who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger, it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy, it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the enemy's philosophy."
– G. K. Chesterton
"One of the lessons of history is that nothing is often a good thing to do and always a clever thing to say."
– Will Durant
1. North Korea's signals to Japan intended to weaken 3-way cooperation with S. Korea, US
2. S. Korea making diplomatic efforts for extension of U.N. expert panel on N. Korea sanctions
3. N. Korea refuses all contact, including summit, with Japan
4. U.S. restates importance of dialogue after N. Korea says Kishida seeks summit with Kim
5. Key N. Korean officials pay condolence visit to Russian Embassy in Pyongyang over Moscow attack
6. Ryanggang province restores coronavirus emergency command as cases increase
7. Wagner Group helped smuggle North Korean weapons to Russia: Report
8. South Korea-China Economic Relations: A Comprehensive Approach to Markets, Factories and Supply Chains
9. ‘Impossible’ to gauge North Korean humanitarian need without access: Aid groups
10. North Korean TV censors blue jeans while airing British gardening show
11. Korea’s last Boeing 747 makes its final flight for retirement
12. USFK to be hit with electricity bill hikes this year
13. Experts suggest idea of using S. Korea's 105 mm rounds to support Ukraine
14. Kim Jong-un's threats prompt reflection on Korean identity
15. The Indo-Pacific strategy's fatal blind spot
16. Defense chief urges defense of NLL on anniversary of Cheonan sinking
17. Haste makes waste when it comes to the North
1. North Korea's signals to Japan intended to weaken 3-way cooperation with S. Korea, US
This is an illustration of the regime's political warfare strategy.
North Korea's signals to Japan intended to weaken 3-way cooperation with S. Korea, US
The Korea Times · March 26, 2024
Kim Yo-jong, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's sister, is seen in this July 31, 2023 photo. Yonhap
By Kwak Yeon-soo
North Korea's push for increased engagement with Japan is aimed at using a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida as a stepping stone for talks with the United States, according to experts, Tuesday.
In a statement carried by state-run media on Monday, Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, said Kishida made a proposal to meet the reclusive leader. This comes a month after she hinted at a possible future invitation for the Japanese leader to visit Pyongyang.
Relations between the two countries have long been strained due to kidnappings of Japanese nationals and North Korea's banned weapons programs.
Yang Moo-jin, the president of the University of North Korean Studies, said North Korea's repeated signals to Japan are aimed at seeking diplomatic engagement with the U.S. and unwinding Japan's hostile policy toward North Korea.
"North Korea's goals include restarting talks with the U.S. and calling Japan to drop its hostile policy against Pyongyang. Kim's summit with Kishida may allow him to gain financial incentives that can help carry out his 20x10 regional development policy," he said.
The North's 20x10 regional development policy is to construct factories in 20 cities and counties in 10 years to reduce the development gap between urban cities and regional areas.
Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said North Korea is seeking to improve ties with Japan as a way to weaken the South Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral relations.
"North Korea is trying to undermine strategic ties between Seoul and its two key security allies — Washington and Tokyo. It also wants to be acknowledged as a nuclear weapons state. Kim's approach to Japan comes as he tries to break out from diplomatic isolation and strengthen his footing in the region," he said.
Experts said South Korea should be aware of the "Korea passing" problem that may arise and come up with feasible plans not to be bypassed in future talks.
"North Korea is likely to exclude South Korea from future talks with Japan and the U.S. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration needs to seek other ways rather than putting emphasis on achieving peace through strength," Yang said.
"Since early last year, North Korea and Japan have been believed to continue a behind-the-scenes push for a possible summit. Like Kishida, who says he is willing to engage in 'unconditional' talks based on national interest, we should be ready for possible talks with Pyongyang."
Hong added, "The U.S. is likely to welcome North Korea's tension-easing gesture. So South Korea should take a cautious stance toward approaching the North Korea issue."
The Korea Times · March 26, 2024
2. S. Korea making diplomatic efforts for extension of U.N. expert panel on N. Korea sanctions
It should be no surprise that Russia is helping north Korea here. And China is likely pleased to have Russia veto it so it can keep its hands clean on this issue (while it continues to help the north evade sanctions). Axis of dictatorships, unite!
Excerpt:
The 15-member U.N. Security Council (UNSC) was to vote last Friday on a resolution calling for continuing the Panel of Experts on North Korea sanctions for another year until April 30, 2025, but the vote was postponed for further consultations, according to a Reuters report.
The postponement came after NK News, an online news outlet specializing in North Korea, reported last week the possibility of the dissolution of the expert panel because Russia is likely to cast a veto as one of the five permanent UNSC members that include Britain, China, France and the United States.
S. Korea making diplomatic efforts for extension of U.N. expert panel on N. Korea sanctions | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · March 26, 2024
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, March 26 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is making diplomatic efforts to extend the mandate of a U.N. expert panel on the monitoring of the implementation of sanctions on North Korea, a foreign ministry official said Tuesday, amid reports of prospects of a possible veto by Russia.
The 15-member U.N. Security Council (UNSC) was to vote last Friday on a resolution calling for continuing the Panel of Experts on North Korea sanctions for another year until April 30, 2025, but the vote was postponed for further consultations, according to a Reuters report.
The postponement came after NK News, an online news outlet specializing in North Korea, reported last week the possibility of the dissolution of the expert panel because Russia is likely to cast a veto as one of the five permanent UNSC members that include Britain, China, France and the United States.
"We are making diplomatic efforts for the extension of the expert panel under the North Korea Sanctions Committee that has played an important role in the UNSC's regime on North Korea," a foreign ministry official told reporters.
South Korea is serving on the UNSC as one of the 10 elected members for a two-year term until 2025. The nonpermanent members can participate in the consultation process if the agenda is of the country's concern.
The official said the voting date has not been decided yet.
The eight-member expert panel on North Korea sanctions was established in 2009 to monitor the enforcement of sanctions on the reclusive regime by the U.N. member states.
The panel gathers, examines, analyzes the implementation of the sanctions against the North and submits a report twice a year to the UNSC on its findings and recommendation.
NK News reported that Russia and China have proposed adding "sunset" clauses to parts of the sanctions regime on North Korea as a precondition for the panel extension. Russia has also reportedly suggested reducing the panel's report submission from twice to once a year.
The UNSC has voted on the panel's extension every year. Russia voted in favor of the extension last year.
North Korea is banned from using any nuclear and ballistic missile technologies under multiple UNSC sanctions imposed over its development of weapons of mass destruction.
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · March 26, 2024
3. N. Korea refuses all contact, including summit, with Japan
I know there are those who will argue that we should not let human rights get in the way of negotiations with the north. They might cite this example. But this is just another example of the regime's political warfare.
But nothing could be in greater error. We must take a human rights upfront approach because human rights are not only a moral imperative but they are a national security issue as well. Kim must deny the human rights of the Korean people living in the north to ensure he remains in power. And he also abuses human rights for those who have to support his nuclear and missile programs starting with Koreans who must mine the uranium.
Excerpts:
"It was the Japanese side that knocked at the door first requesting 'the Japan-DPRK summit without preconditions,' and the DPRK only clarified its stand that it would welcome Japan if it is ready to make a new start, not being obsessed by the past," she said in an English-language statement, referring to North Korea by its formal name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The Japanese chief cabinet secretary, however, held a press conference Monday stating Tokyo's stand that "it can never accept the fact that the abduction issue was settled," she said.
(LEAD) N. Korea refuses all contact, including summit, with Japan | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · March 26, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with English-language statement, other details)
SEOUL, March 26 (Yonhap) -- North Korea will refuse all contact with Japan, after Tokyo took issue with the problem of Japanese abductees and the North's nuclear program, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said Tuesday.
Kim Yo-jong, vice department director of the ruling Workers' Party's Central Committee, made the remark in a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, a day after she said Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida had expressed a willingness to hold a summit with her brother.
This July 31, 2023, file photo taken from footage of North Korea's Korean Central Television shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's sister, Yo-jong. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
"It was the Japanese side that knocked at the door first requesting 'the Japan-DPRK summit without preconditions,' and the DPRK only clarified its stand that it would welcome Japan if it is ready to make a new start, not being obsessed by the past," she said in an English-language statement, referring to North Korea by its formal name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The Japanese chief cabinet secretary, however, held a press conference Monday stating Tokyo's stand that "it can never accept the fact that the abduction issue was settled," she said.
"Letting out the expression of pending nuclear and missile issue which has nothing to do with it, it tried to interfere in and take issue with the exercise of sovereignty belonging to the DPRK's legitimate self-defense," she added.
The two countries have long been at odds over the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 80s to train spies in Japanese culture and language.
The North later allowed five of the abductees to visit their homeland and claimed eight others were dead, but Tokyo has dismissed the claim and vowed to secure their safe return.
"The DPRK government has clearly understood once again the attitude of Japan and, accordingly, the DPRK side will pay no attention to and reject any contact and negotiations with the Japanese side," Kim said. "The DPRK-Japan summit is not a matter of concern to the DPRK."
In February, Kim said the North Korean regime was open to improving its relationship with Japan in response to Kishida's remarks that he felt a "strong need" to change the current relationship between Tokyo and Pyongyang.
On Tuesday, she accused the Japanese prime minister of using the two countries' relations for political gain amid low approval ratings.
"Japan has no courage to change history, promote regional peace and stability and take the first step for the fresh DPRK-Japan relations," she said.
hague@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · March 26, 2024
4. U.S. restates importance of dialogue after N. Korea says Kishida seeks summit with Kim
It is obvious we want dialogue more than the regime. A friend recommended recently that perhaps we should just ignore the regime and no longer try so hard to restart talks. Of course that sounds a lot like strategic patience.
But I have heard from some in Korea who think the number one mission for the US government is to restart talks and all elements of national power should be focused on that. As we know talks are not an end in themselves but for some they think restarting talks is a measure of success.
U.S. restates importance of dialogue after N. Korea says Kishida seeks summit with Kim | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 26, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, March 25 (Yonhap) -- The United States on Monday reiterated the importance of dialogue with North Korea, after Pyongyang claimed Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has expressed his intention for a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of the North Korean leader, said that Kishida recently made the proposal to personally meet the reclusive leader as soon as possible, according to the North's state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
"We have been very clear about the importance of dialogue and diplomacy with the DPRK," a State Department spokesperson said in response to a question from Yonhap News Agency. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"We would refer you to the Japanese government regarding reports of diplomatic engagement between Japan and the DPRK," the spokesperson added.
Kishida has repeatedly expressed his intention to meet "unconditionally" with Kim, spawning speculation that he may seek to use the potential summit to address the long-festering issue of Japanese nationals abducted by the North in the 1970s and 80s.
In her statement, Kim Yo-jong reiterated the North's stance that it does not want to have further discussion on the abduction issue, which she said "has no further settlement."
"If Japan is mulling interfering in the exercise of our sovereign right as now, being engrossed in the abduction issue that has no further settlement and way to know, the prime minister can not but meet a criticism that his design is little short of a bid for popularity," Kim said according to an English-language statement released by KCNA.
The State Department in Washington. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 26, 2024
5. Key N. Korean officials pay condolence visit to Russian Embassy in Pyongyang over Moscow attack
Key N. Korean officials pay condolence visit to Russian Embassy in Pyongyang over Moscow attack | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 26, 2024
SEOUL, March 26 (Yonhap) -- Senior North Korean officials visited the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang on Tuesday to express their deep condolences to the victims of the recent terrorist attack in Moscow and their bereaved families, state media reported.
Five leading officials from the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and the defense and foreign ministries paid a condolence visit to the embassy at dawn Tuesday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The officials are Jo Yong-won, secretary for organizational affairs at the WPK; Pak Jong-chon, vice chairman of the WPK's central military commission; Ri Il-hwan, a WPK secretary; Defense Minister Kang Sun-nam; and Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui.
They "expressed deep condolences to the bereaved families and victims, saying that the Korean people share sorrow with the Russian people at this moment," the KCNA said, adding that they also voiced North Korea's "consistent stand against all sorts of terrorism."
Gunmen opened fire at the Crocus City Hall concert venue outside Moscow on Friday, leaving at least 139 dead, with the Islamic State group claiming responsibility.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un sent a message of condolence to Russian President Vladimir Putin on Saturday over the deadly shooting, expressing his "deep condolences and sympathy" to the victims and their bereaved families, according to state media.
Since the summit between Kim and Putin in September last year, North Korea and Russia have been deepening their bilateral ties amid suspicions that Pyongyang has provided weapons to Moscow for its use in Russia's war with Ukraine.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on March 26, 2024, shows senior North Korean officials visiting the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang at dawn to express their deep condolences to the victims of the recent terrorist attack in Moscow. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 26, 2024
6. Ryanggang province restores coronavirus emergency command as cases increase
is this a real outbreak? Will it spread and what will be the effects? And we need to watch closely to see if this spreads to the military and security services
Ryanggang province restores coronavirus emergency command as cases increase
Even though schools and daycares were shut down for 10 days, a disease believed to be COVID-19 continues to spread.
By Kim Jieun for RFA Korean
2024.03.25
rfa.org
A return to a Coronavirus Emergency Quarantine posture is underway in North Korea’s Ryanggang province as cases of a respiratory disease with symptoms similar to COVID-19 increase, and at least one more child has died, residents told Radio Free Asia.
RFA previously reported that at least five children in the central northern province died after developing symptoms, causing the local government to shut down schools and daycares for 10 days. Sources said that the 10 days have passed and only high schools have reopened.
Closing the schools did not stop the spread of the disease, and now authorities are restarting the province’s Coronavirus Emergency Quarantine Command, a system which the country relied on to get through the “maximum emergency” that started in May 2022, which it declared victory over in August of that year.
“These days, the authorities have reactivated the Coronavirus Emergency Quarantine Command,” a resident of the province told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “The head of the neighborhood watch unit went from house to house and announced an inspection from the Coronavirus Emergency Quarantine Command.”
As part of the emergency procedures, doctors are visiting each house to measure residents’ temperatures twice a day, providing care for those with high fevers, he said.
A worker disinfects a dining room at a Pyongyang factory on May 16, 2022. (Kyodo via Reuters)
Reports of deaths due to spreading disease are shocking to residents, causing anxiety, the resident said, referring to the case of a recently deceased 10-year-old elementary school student.
Some residents say the twice-daily temperature checks are an invasion of privacy, and believe that restarting the emergency is excessive and amounts to propaganda, because the government offers very little help to sick people, the source said.
‘Quarantine propaganda’
Another resident from the province, who requested anonymity to speak freely, said quarantine officials were active in the city of Hyesan since reactivating the emergency command, and they are carrying out what she termed as “quarantine propaganda.”
“Wouldn't it be more effective to treat infected patients by giving them antibiotics rather than reactivating the Emergency Quarantine Command?” she said.
Antibiotics are however useless against COVID-19, which is a viral, not bacterial illness, though respiratory illnesses like mycoplasma pneumonia can be caused by bacteria.
North Korea’s state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper published hygiene information related to that disease on March 11, warning that the disease can be severe in frail people and children, even leading to death.
But such information is useless, according to the first resident.
“In reality, infected patients have no choice but to treat themselves,” he said. “If they don't have money, they have no choice but to die.”
Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
rfa.org
7. Wagner Group helped smuggle North Korean weapons to Russia: Report
Wagner Group helped smuggle North Korean weapons to Russia: Report
Russians conspired with DPRK officials in Syria to orchestrate arms transfers, member state tells UN Panel of Experts
https://www.nknews.org/2024/03/wagner-group-helped-smuggle-north-korean-weapons-to-russia-report/
Anton Sokolin March 26, 2024
Wagner Group mercenaries in Syria in 2017 | Image: @grey_zone via Telegram
Russian nationals with ties to the mercenary Wagner Group conspired with North Korean officials in Syria to orchestrate weapons transfers, according to information in a new U.N. report.
Pavel Shevelin and Valeriy Chekalov organized the operation to smuggle North Korean arms to Russia with the help of DPRK officials in Damascus from 2022-2023, an unnamed member state told the U.N. Panel of Experts.
Rim Yong Hyok, an executive at the DPRK’s Korea Mining Development and Trading Corporation, was also involved in the operation that lasted at least until Oct. 2023, the member state reported.
Approached about the claims, Russian authorities requested that the Panel “furnish more detailed information” about the two individuals, emphasizing the need to “conduct a thorough investigation, clarify all the circumstances, identify suspects and organize a trial if sufficient grounds are identified,” according to the report.
The Panel stated that it has not received a response from Syrian authorities and that the investigation continues.
Chris Monday, a Russian economy expert at Dongseo University, said the Wagner Group likely needed Syria as a conduit for North Korean arms because Moscow “wanted to keep things as murky as possible.”
“The Russians want to maintain connections with Hamas, ISIS and Iranian proxies without raising too many alarms,” he told NK News, noting that some North Korean weapons have ended up in the hands of Hamas over the years.
Another reason for the alleged Damascus operation could be to “test the waters with North Korea and establish some links,” Monday said.
While little is known about Shevelin’s background, his associate Chekalov has garnered public attention over his close ties with Wagner’s late chief Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Chekalov was reportedly a confidante of Prigozhin who formed and ran several companies affiliated with the warlord’s enterprises that served as subcontractors for the Russian defense ministry. He died alongside Prigozhin in a plane crash last August.
The U.S. sanctioned Chekalov and Rim last July and designated Shevelin two months later over their suspected involvement in transfers of DPRK munitions to Russia. The designations came after Washington accused North Korea of delivering infantry rockets and missiles to Wagner for use in Ukraine.
The Wagner Group rose to prominence as a private military company the Kremlin used to advance its commercial interests in Central Africa and the Middle East after 2015. They are perhaps most infamous for aiding the Russian invasion of Ukraine and their alleged involvement in mass atrocities in Africa.
Prigozhin staged a short-lived rebellion against Putin’s military commanders and died two months after apparently reaching a deal with the Russian leader. Prigozhin’s 25-year-old son Pavel reportedly assumed control over the private army last fall.
Russia and North Korea have been involved in a substantial number of suspected weapons transfers since the invasion began, with evidence showing that Russian forces have already used some North Korean artillery munitions and ballistic missiles on the battlefield in Ukraine.
Edited by Arius Derr
8. South Korea-China Economic Relations: A Comprehensive Approach to Markets, Factories and Supply Chains
Excerpts:
The only logical way for South Korea to reduce its dependence on China is to start by decreasing its dependence on foreign countries more generally. It has an export-led economic structure with high external dependence. What if South Korea were to reduce its export targets and shift to an economy that fosters domestic demand? Alternatively, what if South Korea were to try to reduce excessive manufacturing and sharply expand the proportion of its service sector? This shift is worth considering, because it is a way to remedy the economic imbalance in South Korea, where its domestic demand and service sectors are sacrificed to the benefit of its export and manufacturing sectors. In fact, a similar system has been discussed as a way to overcome the chaebol system. In the UK and the US, upgrading the service sector, including post-manufacturing and financial services, was once considered the direction for advanced development. This is much like how the very opposite ideas of the civil society movement and neoliberalism resulted in similar structures. However, a shift in this direction is either very difficult or undesirable. With the fundamental constraints that require importing energy and food, reducing exports has the potential to lead to an imbalance in the balance of payments. The resulting decline in foreign reserves could limit South Korea’s capacity to issue currency, negatively influencing control of the country’s macroeconomy. It would be very difficult to deliberately reduce foreign dependence unless South Korea uses less and earns less, that is, if it reduces its economy from its current scale. This limitation also applies to South Korea’s economic relations with China.
South Korea-China Economic Relations: A Comprehensive Approach to Markets, Factories and Supply Chains
https://www.keaf.org/en/book/EAF_Policy_Debates/South_Korea_China_Economic_Relations_A_Comprehensive_Approach_to_Markets_Factories_and_Supply_Chains?ckattempt=1
Summary
Recent discussions and global trends surrounding China, including the shift from decoupling to de-risking, are sounding the alarm on South Korea’s lazy perception that it can simply continue to pursue decoupling from China. Instead, South Korea needs a comprehensive approach that spans the three areas that most closely tie the two countries together —markets, factories and supply chains. Although South Korea’s dependence on the Chinese market is not particularly high considering the size of China’s economy, securing that market was a national task that should have been pursued in a more focused manner. However, this goal was abandoned in 2016 with the deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile system. China as a manufacturing base is highly competitive, but this is a factor that South Korea should utilize, not a reason to justify leaving China. Where China has caught up with South Korea, the task must shift from debating whether to leave China to discovering the next generation of technology in that sector and determining whether or not South Korea is capable of acquiring it. On the other hand, the country’s excessive dependence on China in the supply chain needs to be corrected. However, because China’s supply chain policies are generally defensive, it may be easier than anticipated to manage the supply chain with China.
The so-called “de-Sinicization” argument, which claims that South Korea is overly dependent on China and should thus break free of its grip, is having a significant impact on South Korea-China economic relations. The deepening of the US-China conflict and the selective US technology boycott against China have driven the perception that arguments for de-Sinicization have become a global trend, and this has led many to argue that Seoul could simply follow that trend. However, since the spring of 2023, the US has softened its tone, shifting from "decoupling" to "de-risking," and has been attempting to improve relations with China. The US-China summit in November 2023 was the result of this change. In January 2024, a large Japanese economic delegation visited China, met with Premier Li Qiang, and demonstrated the resilience of the economic relationship between the two countries. Europe and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have maintained their flexible approach to China. This series of events is sounding the alarm on South Korea’s lazy perception that it can simply go with the flow of de-Sinicization. The country’s current economic situation, which has arisen amid continued advocacy for de-Sinicization, is not so rosy. South Korea’s trade balance, which had maintained a stable surplus, has become a point of vulnerability, severely affected by the struggling economy. Supply chain instability, such as the issue surrounding the importation of urea solution into South Korea, has seen no improvement. It is necessary to comprehensively re-examine whether de-Sinicization is desirable or even possible. To answer this question, we need a comprehensive approach that spans the three areas that most closely tie China to South Korea —markets, factories and supply chains.
China as a Market
Let us first examine China as a market. It accounts for about 19 percent of the world’s total economic output, 30 percent of manufacturing value added, and is a country where more than 30 percent of the world’s economic growth occurs. If we include so-called greater China, with Hong Kong and Macau, this proportion becomes even larger. In 2023, the total import market of China and Hong Kong was $3.3 trillion, surpassing the $3.1 trillion US market to rank first in the world. The share of South Korea’s exports to China, including Hong Kong, once reached nearly 30 percent, but even this highest share is not very high considering China’s overall share of the global economy.
Securing China’s market is a national task that South Korea should have pursued with more focus. China’s rising income is the biggest change taking place at the global economic level. As long as South Korea has an export-driven economy, it is nonsensical to abandon the Chinese market. That market is a battlefield where the world’s top brands and technologies engage in fierce competition. In addition to South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Germany, and the United States compete for the Chinese market. If South Korea surrenders its position, it will only be to someone else’s advantage. The country needs a comprehensive plan at the national level to continue expanding the export of both consumer goods, which currently only have a share of 5 percent, and also intermediate goods.
Although this argument may seem obvious, it is worth making because South Korea abandoned this goal around 2016 with the deployment of the US THAAD antimissile system. As the government pushed ahead with the deployment, an argument emerged that China would not be able to retaliate. The logic behind this argument centered on the fact that most of South Korea’s exports to China are intermediate and capital goods, and thus blocking these exports would harm China as much as South Korea. Considering that the export of South Korean consumer goods to China only accounted for 5 percent of exports at the time, even if China were to block South Korean consumer goods, the level of market damage would be tolerable.
However, this logic overlooked the fact that South Korea’s intermediate and capital goods are not particularly cost-effective, making them easily replaceable with China’s own products. It also overlooked the fact that even a 5 percent market share still constitutes billions of dollars, which is by no means insignificant. Further, it ignores the fact that sacrificing 5 percent today also sacrifices the 10 percent or 20 percent that the market could grow to in the future. Exports to China did not noticeably decrease immediately following the THAAD deployment, supporting the argument that China could not retaliate. However, the subsequent weakening of the presence of the South Korean automobile, smartphone and distribution industries in the Chinese market has become an important factor eroding South Korea’s exports to China in the long run. Any approaches by South Korea to the Chinese market are handicapped by the lingering negative sentiments from 2016. However, there is no need to be overly pessimistic. Pro- and anti-Korean sentiments in China are intertwined in complex ways, much like Chinese sentiment toward other nations.
China as a Factory
South Korea’s next task is to better utilize China as a factory. China’s position as the world’s factory is difficult to dislodge, with 90 percent of the world’s laptops, 70 percent of smartphones and 33 percent of automobiles made in the country. In 2023, China recorded 5.26 million units of automobile exports, surpassing Japan’s 4.3 million units to become No.1 globally. But the increasing competitiveness of Chinese companies, reflected in these achievements, is a factor that South Korea should utilize, not a reason for it to leave China. For example, in 2022, LG Energy Solution’s China factory ranked second in China’s electric vehicle battery exports. This was achieved by supplying to Tesla in Shanghai, not to Chinese domestic companies. In this respect, US sanctions can be a double-edged sword capable of both helping and hindering the strengthening of South Korea’s position in China. While such sanctions make it difficult for South Korean companies to operate in China, they also affect its competitors. South Korea should skillfully utilize US sanctions and exemptions to solidify its position in China. To do so, it must take a comprehensive approach across industry, academia, and research to expand points of linkage and exchange, as Germany does with China. The conclusion is not to make good products and sell them to China, but rather to work together with China from the early stages to develop the technology that China needs.
China’s overwhelming competitiveness is often cited as a basis for arguments in favor of decoupling manufacturing from China. In fact, China is no longer a low-cost manufacturing base. Through steady investment, China has come to possess efficient infrastructure and excellent human resources, and thanks to technology transfers from abroad and its own technological development, its science and technology have also reached a level that cannot be ignored. In March 2023, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) surprised the world by revealing that China ranked first in 37 out of 44 science and technology fields that the institute evaluated. This improvement in China’s competitiveness has resulted in a loss in South Korea’s comparative advantage. In the 1990s, South Korea’s comparative advantage over China was money and technology. In the late 2010s, its comparative advantage in money disappeared, leaving only technology. Now, the comparative advantage in technology is limited to only some areas.
However, the argument that these are reasons South Korea should leave China stems from a misunderstanding of the situation. Where China’s competitiveness increases, South Korea does not leave China, but rather that specific industry. Recently, Samsung Display sold all of its LCD division’s facilities and patents to a Chinese company called CSOT. South Korea’s LCD industry, which once dominated the world, has been eroded by Chinese companies and is now struggling to survive. Samsung has abandoned its LCD business in favor of LED, which is the next generation of display technology. However, in the process of making this switch, Samsung took the desperate measure of nurturing CSOT, its second-largest competitor, to keep the China’s BOE, its largest competitor, in check. In other words, Samsung Display did not decouple from China in the LCD division; it simply gave up on that industry. In many sectors, the competitiveness of South Korean industry is world-class. If China has caught up with South Korea, it means that China has now become world-class. But the answer is not to debate whether to leave China altogether — it is instead to discover the next generation of technology in that sector and determine whether or not South Korea is capable of acquiring it. Of course, low-wage processing industries are exempt from this discussion, because it is already past time for these industries to leave China. In fact, most of them have already left.
China as a Supply Chain
In contrast, South Korea’s excessive dependence on imports from China is a problem that must be rectified. According to a June 2022 report by the Bank of Korea, South Korea’s dependence on China ranks higher (29.1 percent) than the global average (20.5 percent). In other words, it is not alone in being dependent on China, but South Korea is more dependent than other countries are. But it is worth noting that South Korea’s overall dependence on other countries is also higher than average. In other words, it depends more on the rest of the world than it does on China. In any case, it is necessary to identify which items are particularly vulnerable, beginning with high-risk items, and to take countermeasures including diversification of import routes. Several research institutes have already calculated which items are highly dependent.
However, meaningful short-term import diversification may be difficult. Accordingly, the first step is to ensure that relations with China are delicately managed in order to prevent any issues with its supply chain. Japan has been striving to diversify its sourcing since China pressured it with a halt to rare earth exports during the territorial dispute between the two countries over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2010. As a result, Japan succeeded in lowering its dependence on China in this area from 90.6 percent in 2008 to 58.0 percent in 2018. However, this can be interpreted in two ways: as a success story of decreasing dependency, or as a failure with a limited rate of decreased dependency. It is true that a dependence of 58 percent is less than one of 90 percent, but it is still quite high. We must face the uncomfortable truth that the diversification of sourcing itself can be illusory for some items, such as rare earths. For example, the urea solution that was a problem for South Korea at the end of 2021 was also a problem in 2023. It does not require advanced technology to produce urea solution, but South Korea has difficulty producing it domestically, and other countries cannot match China’s cost-effectiveness. Another issue is that the nature of the product itself makes it unfit for long-term storage.
Yet, supply chain management with China may be easier than expected due to China’s generally defensive supply chain policies. If the US lifts sanctions against China, China is also likely to relax its defensive posture. Consider the difference between the definition of economic security for the US and China. For the US, economic security is actually close to the meaning of economic benefit. This is because economic security for the US means creating employment and added value by reshoring supply chains established abroad. Economic security for China, on the other hand, consists of the exhausting task of filling supply chain gaps. It is uncertain whether China will be able to sufficiently fill the gaps created by foreign boycotts. It is therefore in China’s interest to restore its linkages with foreign countries and return to the liberal trade order.
China is not trying to escalate the conflict or take an aggressive or offensive stance because the situations of the US and China are so different. The more the US pursues economic security, the more economic benefits it accumulates, but the situation is the reverse for China. It may therefore prove easier for South Korea to maintain stable supply chain management with China, because China will not take any first steps to expand the front line of a supply chain conflict. However, South Korea may struggle to maintain peace in its supply chains with China in the event that it is called upon to make choices as an ally of the US.
Seeking a Proportionate Level of Dependence on China
The only logical way for South Korea to reduce its dependence on China is to start by decreasing its dependence on foreign countries more generally. It has an export-led economic structure with high external dependence. What if South Korea were to reduce its export targets and shift to an economy that fosters domestic demand? Alternatively, what if South Korea were to try to reduce excessive manufacturing and sharply expand the proportion of its service sector? This shift is worth considering, because it is a way to remedy the economic imbalance in South Korea, where its domestic demand and service sectors are sacrificed to the benefit of its export and manufacturing sectors. In fact, a similar system has been discussed as a way to overcome the chaebol system. In the UK and the US, upgrading the service sector, including post-manufacturing and financial services, was once considered the direction for advanced development. This is much like how the very opposite ideas of the civil society movement and neoliberalism resulted in similar structures. However, a shift in this direction is either very difficult or undesirable. With the fundamental constraints that require importing energy and food, reducing exports has the potential to lead to an imbalance in the balance of payments. The resulting decline in foreign reserves could limit South Korea’s capacity to issue currency, negatively influencing control of the country’s macroeconomy. It would be very difficult to deliberately reduce foreign dependence unless South Korea uses less and earns less, that is, if it reduces its economy from its current scale. This limitation also applies to South Korea’s economic relations with China.
- - -The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official position of the East Asia Foundation.
About the Author
Pilsoo Choi(Professor, Sejong University)
Pilsoo Choi graduated with a bachelor’s from Yonsei University’s Department of Chinese and Chinese Literature and a master’s from the Department of Economics. He also received a master’s degree in business administration from Hitotsubashi ICS, Japan, and a doctorate in business administration from Tsinghua University’s School of Economics. After working for the China team of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, he became a professor in the Division of International Studies Chinese Trade and Commerce at Sejong University, where he currently works. He is the president of the Korean Association for Eurasian Studies and served as an economic subcommittee member of the Korea-China Future Development Committee formed in 2022 for the 30th anniversary of Korea-China diplomatic relations. He researches the Chinese economy as well as corporate and economic relations between South Korea and China. Major publications include “The Chinese Path to Modernization and Xi’s Leadership” (in Korean), “51 Questions and Answers on Korea’s Foreign Strategy in the Era of US-China Strategic Competition” (in Korean), “The Soundness of China’s Overseas Construction Practices before and after BRI” (in Korean), and “BRI, PGII, and Global Gateway: Different Development Programs for Developing Countries and South Korea’s Policy Implications” (in Korean).
9. ‘Impossible’ to gauge North Korean humanitarian need without access: Aid groups
The reason there is little to no access is because Kim Jong Un denies it.
Kim Jong Un's deliberate policy decisions to prioritize nuclear weapons and missile development over the welfare of the Korean people is the reason for humanitarian suffering. Kim has no desire to solve his humanitarian problems. (they help him prevent resistance - the people are too hungry and tired to rebel) We want to help the people more than him.
‘Impossible’ to gauge North Korean humanitarian need without access: Aid groups
Humanitarian groups say they still don’t know when they can return, while UN still appears to be relying on 2019 data
https://www.nknews.org/2024/03/impossible-to-gauge-north-korean-humanitarian-need-without-access-aid-groups/
Gabriela Bernal March 26, 2024
North Koreans collect water from a well in Kaesong in May 2009. | Image: Eric Lafforgue
Humanitarian organizations say North Korea’s ongoing border closure has made it “impossible” to accurately assess the level of need inside the country, according to the latest U.N. Panel of Experts report, with no information from Pyongyang on when foreign aid workers will be able to return.
Several organizations told the panel overseeing the DPRK sanctions regime that North Korea’s pandemic border controls are the primary barrier to humanitarian activities in the country, rather than international sanctions, the report released last week states.
But while experts have expressed concern about growing humanitarian problems during the pandemic, the Panel states in its new report that there are currently 11.3 million people in need of aid in North Korea — the same number it reported back in 2019.
“My sense is that they’re still working with 2019 figures,” said Gianluca Spezza, director of the Institute for Korean Studies in the Middle East at the American University of Iraq-Sulaimani. “Since the U.N. has not been able to do any meaningful work in the DPRK during the entire COVID period … those are the figures they have.”
According to the aid groups, North Korea’s closure of the border meant that critical life-saving commodities and equipment were stuck in China for over a year and a half during the pandemic, with the organizations involved incurring significant charges as a result.
One organization said several of these shipments expired while being held up, costing more money to dispose of, while other shipments had to be re-routed to other countries at additional cost.
Another organization stated that the border closure has “created constraints on the ability to effectively provide comprehensive technical assistance, policy-related and strategic guidance or invest in national capacities in a fully effective manner.”
Most of the aid groups remained unsure when borders might reopen to humanitarian workers.
“There is no concrete information from the Government on the border reopening for internationals,” one organization told the Panel. Only one of the groups said they expect the border to be “opened to the international humanitarian community, including the U.N., from the first quarter of 2024.”
Several aid groups similarly told NK News last month that they’ve received no word on when they can return, even after North Korea opened its doors to Russian tourists and delegations from friendly countries.
For now, one organization said its focus is on providing “essential life-saving supplies in the health, nutrition and water and sanitation sectors,” while relying on DPRK staff in the country to implement the projects.
Another group said it is not currently aware of any “diversion of humanitarian assistance” for other purposes, stating that they obtain regular field monitoring reports, supported by photographic evidence, to account for the distribution of supplies.
Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings, assistant professor of international relations and humanitarian action at the University of Groningen, told NK News that the humanitarian situation in the DPRK is likely “worse” than before the pandemic, raising the likelihood of food insecurity and insufficient access to medical care and clean water.
But she added that it’s difficult to know without the ability to conduct needs assessments in the country
Pyongyang has promoted some efforts to address these problems, such as by building large greenhouse farms to provide food, but the government has also continued to invest heavily in expanding its military capabilities while deepening cooperation with Beijing and Moscow.
Zadeh-Cummings said both Russia and China are interested in maintaining the status quo and thus “have a vested interest in preventing any kind of instability from an acute humanitarian emergency,” adding that they likely “provide support in line with this aim, but not with the aim of a thriving North Korean population.”
Edited by Bryan Betts
10. North Korean TV censors blue jeans while airing British gardening show
Blue jeans as a weapon of information warfare.
Information, the example of the successful South Korea, and international influence is an existential threat to the regime.
But I want to know how the British gardening show is received in the north. What do people think about it? Does it upset the people to see what other countries can do? Or does it provide any practical tips for Korean agriculture techniques?
North Korean TV censors blue jeans while airing British gardening show
Decision to blur host’s pants reflects regime’s ban on jeans since the early 90s, expert says
https://www.nknews.org/2024/03/north-korean-tv-censors-blue-jeans-while-airing-british-gardening-show/
Joe Smith March 26, 2024
North Korean state television blurs a British television presenter's jeans while airing an episode of the BBC show “Garden Secrets.” | Image: KCTV (March 25, 2024)
North Korean state television censored a pair of blue jeans when airing a British gardening show on Monday, a move that appears to reflect the regime’s efforts to restrict popular Western fashion and culture.
In the episode of the BBC TV series “Garden Secrets,” the British broadcaster Alan Titchmarsh kneels in a garden bed while tending to plants in a pair of jeans.
But when broadcasting the episode on Monday, the Korean Central Television (KCTV) applied a blurring effect to his legs, though this did not conceal the fact that he was wearing blue pants.
North Korea has aired the episode about the 17th-century Hatfield House gardens in the U.K. several times since 2022, despite the fact that it first aired in the U.K. back in 2010.
The DPRK’s past broadcasts of the show drew the attention of British media and even the presenter Titchmarsh himself, who expressed surprise at appearing on North Korean TV, but the decision to blur the jeans passed without notice.
Blue jeans have been banned in North Korea since at least the early 90s, according to a North Korea researcher and NK Pro contributor Peter Ward, who said former leader Kim Jong Il effectively told citizens that jeans are “absolutely verboten and people should not wear them under any circumstances.”
However, he said it’s unusual for North Korea to “censor foreigners on TV for wearing jeans” given that authorities have allowed tourists who have visited the country over the years to wear almost any Western fashion.
The DPRK reportedly views jeans as a “symbol of American imperialism” given their close association with the U.S.
A screenshot from the BBC’s original broadcast of “Garden Secrets” shows Alan Titchmarsh wearing what looks like blue jeans in the episode aired by North Korean state TV. | Image: BBC (Nov. 10, 2010)
The DPRK has increasingly cracked down on foreign cultural influence in recent years, with leader Kim Jong Un identifying “bourgeois culture” and “anti-socialist” behavior as weapons that capitalist countries use to undermine North Korea.
One ROK media outlet reported in 2022 that DPRK authorities were cracking down specifically on skinny jeans and jeans with tears that have become popular in South Korea, citing anonymous sources in the country.
Despite the rules against wearing jeans, North Korea once manufactured designer jeans for export to Sweden back in 2009, before the Swedish department store that had planned to sell the apparel reportedly pulled them from the shelves to avoid controversy.
North Korean TV regularly airs politically neutral foreign television programs like sports, and it’s likely that the DPRK pirates these broadcasts given sanctions could prevent Pyongyang from acquiring the rights.
When airing “Garden Secrets,” KCTV edits the hourlong episodes down to just 15 minutes and replaces Titchmarsh’s commentary with a Korean narrator, while adding a soundtrack of North Korean instrumental music.
Edited by Bryan Betts
11. Korea’s last Boeing 747 makes its final flight for retirement
Korea’s last Boeing 747 makes its final flight for retirement
donga.com
Posted March. 26, 2024 07:48,
Updated March. 26, 2024 07:48
Korea’s last Boeing 747 makes its final flight for retirement. March. 26, 2024 07:48. by 박현익 기자 beepark@donga.com.
The Boeing 747-400 passenger plane at Asiana Airlines, a true icon of the skies, retired after completing its final flight on Monday. This aircraft, affectionately known as the ‘Queen of the Skies’ and ‘Jumbo,’ played a pivotal role in popularizing travel. It holds the distinction of being the last B747-400 in Korea, often serving as the prestigious presidential plane ‘Code One’ at Asiana Airlines.
According to Asiana Airlines, the plane departed from Taipei in Taiwan at 1:20 p.m. and arrived at Incheon Airport at 4:35 p.m. The B747-400 is a long-haul aircraft with 34 business class seats and 364 economy class seats. It is a large passenger plane. Introduced on June 20, 1999, the plane operated 1,8139 flights for 96,986 hours over 25 years and nine months. The total number of flights traveled reached 88 million kilometers, equivalent to the circulation of the Earth approximately 2,500 times.
The final flight was fully booked as aviation enthusiasts secured every seat well in advance. As a symbolic farewell gesture, fire trucks at both departure and arrival airports performed a "water salute" to commemorate the retirement of the aircraft. There were seat discount promotions and giveaway events for Instagram comments. All passengers on flight OZ711 from Incheon to Taipei were given B747 ID cards as souvenirs.
한국어
donga.com
12. USFK to be hit with electricity bill hikes this year
USFK to be hit with electricity bill hikes this year
The Korea Times · March 26, 2024
Transporter vehicles of the United States Forces Korea are stationed at Camp Casey in Dongducheon, Gyeonggi Province, March 4, as they prepare for Freedom Shield, a joint military exercise with South Korea. Yonhap
By Ko Dong-hwan
The United States Forces Korea (USFK) will see its utility bills soar, after the Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO) raises electricity rates for them amid surging production costs, according to the state-run utility company, Tuesday.
The USFK has agreed with the Korean government to increase its power usage rate to 152.8 won ($0.11) per kilowatt-hour (kWh) this year, a 26.8 percent jump from last year's 120.5 won, KEPCO said.
The power usage rate is determined by the electricity fee and base rate. KEPCO raised its electricity fee for the USFK to 133.5 won, up by 26.9 percent from last year's 105.2 won per kWh, and its base rate to 7,830 won, up by 24.3 percent from 6,300 won per kilowatt.
To mitigate its record-high debt of 200 trillion won amid soaring global energy prices, the company raised power rates for all its electricity users twice in 2023.
"Our rate for the USFK for this year is an average of all different rates we charge for different purposes overall," a KEPCO official said.
The new rate for the USFK came after approval by the joint committee of the U.S.-Republic of Korea Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The committee has been determining the power rate for the USFK after checking how much KEPCO's rates were in the previous year and calculating their average.
The USFK said KEPCO's new rate is fair and reasonable.
“U.S. Forces Korea remains committed to being good ambassadors and neighbors with our host nation and has agreed with the ROK government to support the rate change in gas and electricity," USFK spokesperson Kim Eun-chong told The Korea Times.
"We're closely working with the ROK government agencies to determine the electrical rates applicable to the U.S. Armed Forces, taking into account revalidated electrical production costs. This process has been conducted in accordance with SOFA procedures with mutual respect."
Remaining conflicts over power usage rate
But there have been conflicts of interest between KEPCO and the USFK over the power usage rate. The company has been wanting to charge a "general rate," which is for non-specified purposes excluding all predetermined purposes such as education, industry and farming. The general rate is always the highest among other rates.
KEPCO has been insisting the USFK should be charged the generate rate, which is what it charges Korean military forces.
But the USFK has been rejecting the idea, saying they should instead be charged the average of all the rates KEPCO charges for specified and non-specified purposes.
The USFK cited a term from SOFA which states that the forces "should not be levied an unfair rate or condition compared to other utility users in the country" for utility costs related to electricity, gas, tap water, steam, heat or sewage treatment.
"The USFK, by mentioning a term from SOFA's chapter 6 clause 2, has been declining our request that the forces be subjected to the general rate," the KEPCO official said. "They said that 'other utility users' literally meant everyone and thus their rate should be based on the rates charged to everyone instead of non-specified purposes."
The Korea Times · March 26, 2024
13. Experts suggest idea of using S. Korea's 105 mm rounds to support Ukraine
The ROK is a partner in the Arsenal of Democracy.
Experts suggest idea of using S. Korea's 105 mm rounds to support Ukraine
The Korea Times · March 26, 2024
155 millimeter artillery shells are placed in a pile at a position of Ukrainian servicemen near a front line, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Zaporizhzhia region, Ukraine, Jan. 14. Reuters-Yonhap
U.S. think tank experts floated the idea Monday of the United States tapping into South Korea's 105 millimeter munitions stockpile to support Ukraine's fight against Russia, as Kyiv urgently needs artillery ammunition supplies in the ongoing war of attrition.
Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Chris Park, a CSIS research assistant, made the suggestion, noting that South Korea likely cannot spare more 155 mm shells due to North Korean threats, and that its military is transitioning most artillery units to 155 mm platforms.
"A U.S. proposal to use the bulk of South Korea's 105 mm munitions stockpile, followed by replacing them with the currently in-production 155 mm ammunition, could appeal to South Korea," they wrote in a commentary posted on the CSIS website.
They pointed out that last year, Washington worked with Seoul to send over 300,000 155 mm shells to Ukraine.
South Korea is known to have provided the U.S. with the munitions on condition that the U.S. is their "end user" -- a method that observers said might have enabled Seoul to give indirect arms support to Ukraine while maintaining its principle of non-lethal aid to Ukraine at least on the surface.
"The administration may need to re-tap the South Korean munitions stockpile to arm Ukraine in the face of dwindling stockpiles and congressional inertia," the experts said.
The experts said that as Western 155 mm artillery stockpiles dwindle, the U.S. and others have provided Ukraine with 105 mm howitzers and ammunition.
Citing public reports, they noted that South Korea may have around 3.4 million 105 mm artillery shells.
"These munitions would be compatible with all the 105 mm howitzers Ukraine operates," they said.
They also said that lending 105 mm shells are unlikely to hurt the South Korean military's readiness.
"Less than 30 percent of howitzers operated by the South Korean military shoot 105 mm ammunition and the South Korean military is transitioning most units to 155 mm self-propelled howitzers like the domestically produced K9 Thunder," they said.
The U.S. government has expressed appreciation for South Korea's continued support for Ukraine, but said that whether to send munitions to Ukraine is a sovereign decision for Seoul to speak to. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · March 26, 2024
14. Kim Jong-un's threats prompt reflection on Korean identity
Excerpts:
A recent poll showed that nearly half of the South Korean people are no longer interested in unification and are not concerned about Kim’s announcement of segregating the Korean people. This is a very serious situation because it will solidify not only the geographical division of the Korean peninsula but the very soul of the Korean people. It will also make North Korean soldiers easier to kill South Koreans.
South Koreans must now, more than ever, remind themselves of the values that define us as Korean and ensure we can protect these values from the truly evil threat from Kim.
Kim Jong-un's threats prompt reflection on Korean identity
The Korea Times · March 26, 2024
By Chun In-bum
Chun In-bum
In December of 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that North and South Koreans are no longer the same people. To fully grasp the significance of this statement will require careful consideration over time, but the announcement holds special resonance for generations of Koreans, as we have always identified ourselves as Korean, a distinct people among many. North Korea’s first leader started a war in the name of freeing the Southern people from the tyranny of the United States and ever since then, the North has justified its existence by explaining its mission to liberate South Koreans from the evils of the Americans and their South Korean lackeys.
Confusion and questions arise regarding the intent behind this statement. Has North Korea abandoned the pursuit of unification, or is this another calculated move to manipulate South Korean public opinion? The initial step in addressing this question is: what defines a Korean?
To address this question, one must delve into the earliest writings about Koreans, which can be traced back to China's Shang dynasty. The Shang dynasty, also known as the Yin dynasty, reigned in the Yellow River valley from the 16th to the 11th centuries BC. Classic accounts of the Shang dynasty mention a people residing in the northern borders who were skilled archers and had a fondness for singing and dancing. One might draw parallels between this description and contemporary aspects of Korean culture, such as K-pop.
Defining a Korean solely based on looks or DNA is no longer acceptable. Using DNA as a standard would constitute raw racism, which history has shown can lead to disastrous consequences. In North Korea, a caste system called Songbun categorizes individuals into various classes, such as the Kim family and elites, the core class/bureaucrats, the basic class/workers, complex, and the hostile class, with a total of 51 subcategories. This system dictates where individuals live and how their lives are valued. In North Korean society, interracial marriage is unthinkable, as it is believed to protect the purity of the Korean people. This sheds light on the North Korean standard for defining a "Korean."
For thousands of years, Koreans have believed in the folklore of Dangun or the Myth of Dangun. It is the story of a god sending his son to the world and the son ruling the world with grain, life, sickness, good/evil, and punishment. One day, a bear and a tiger come to the son of god and plead to be turned into humans. The son of god tells them if they can survive on twenty pieces of garlic and a bushel of sagebrush for 100 days, their wish would be granted. The tiger failed the test, but the bear endured and became a beautiful woman.
The girl fervently wished for a child and prayed with all her heart. Moved by her sincerity, the son of god took pity on her. He disguised himself as a man and married the girl. Their union resulted in the birth of the first Korean son.
This story can be found in its written form in The Heritage of the Three States, which was compiled in 1281 during the Goryeo dynasty. This children’s story encompasses a central value for Koreans, which is the Hongik Ingan. The Hongik Ingan (person) is one who makes the world better by good deeds and is often translated into “benefiting mankind.” This core value was supplemented by loyalty, filial piety, and good manners.
Until the birth of the North Korean Kim regime, all of Korea and Koreans believed in these values. During the cruelest times under the Japanese, Koreans united and identified with these values. When Kim Il-sung and his Soviet and Chinese communist overlords came to Korea, they destroyed these values and replaced them with the Kim family as demigods. Now the son of the son of Kim Il-sung has declared that his people are no longer identified with South Koreans. This is probably true because South Koreans value freedom and prosperity for all and the right of anyone to be happy, none of which is enjoyed by the majority of North Koreans.
A recent poll showed that nearly half of the South Korean people are no longer interested in unification and are not concerned about Kim’s announcement of segregating the Korean people. This is a very serious situation because it will solidify not only the geographical division of the Korean peninsula but the very soul of the Korean people. It will also make North Korean soldiers easier to kill South Koreans.
South Koreans must now, more than ever, remind themselves of the values that define us as Korean and ensure we can protect these values from the truly evil threat from Kim.
Chun In-bum (truechun@naver.com) served as a lieutenant general of the ROK Army and commander of Special Forces Korea.
The Korea Times · March 26, 2024
15. The Indo-Pacific strategy's fatal blind spot
Excerpts:
Western strategists neglect this key strategic relationship at their peril. Indo-Pacific thinking views China as the paramount force, and Russia as a secondary, more peripheral European issue. But if the two Eurasian powers are driven by the same historical urge, that fact must not be ignored.
This Eurasian perspective will not be as obvious in Washington or Canberra as it is in Tokyo. As for Delhi, Indian policymakers seem to be under the illusion that maintaining friendly relations with the Kremlin might prevent Russia from getting too close to China. Yet it should be obvious where Russia will stand in any new confrontation in the Himalayas.
The stronger the two Eurasian powers are, the greater the advantages that each can derive from the other. Both will be emboldened by their perceived triumphs, and the region’s peripheries will be the first to face the consequences. The West urgently needs to start applying a Eurasian lens. Relying too heavily on the Indo-Pacific perspective would be a big mistake.
The Indo-Pacific strategy's fatal blind spot
The Korea Times · March 26, 2024
By Carl Bildt
Carl Bildt
STOCKHOLM – Is the dominance of “Indo-Pacific” thinking leading Western strategists astray?
Originating in Australian foreign policy circles, the United States adopted this label in 2018, when the Hawaii-based U.S. Pacific Command was officially renamed the Indo-Pacific Command. The status of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”), comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the US, was duly elevated, and Europe, too, got on board, with a minor avalanche of policy documents bearing the same label.
In pushing the Indo-Pacific line, Western strategists usually emphasize the importance of bringing India into the fold. But the real objective – though it is seldom stated explicitly – is to contain China in the region.
The Indo-Pacific narrative undoubtedly has merits. It rests on a strong historical foundation, and the policies it has inspired are important for meeting many looming global challenges. The problem is that it also threatens to distract us from an equally important alternative narrative: the Eurasian one.
Which is more immediately relevant to the challenges the West faces? While the Indo-Pacific framework has an obvious maritime foundation – framing the Indian and Pacific Oceans as the single most important geopolitical theater – the Eurasian one is almost completely terrestrial. Each reflects a different approach to empire, which in recent centuries has been established either through naval power, or through old-fashioned land wars. For obvious historical reasons, the Indo-Pacific narrative comes more naturally to much of the Anglo-Saxon world, while the Eurasian perspective makes intuitive sense to policymakers in Beijing and Moscow.
That being the case, Western strategic thinking urgently needs to adapt. Not only have China and Russia announced a “no-limits” partnership; they also happen to dominate the vast Eurasian landmass. Though there remain significant differences between the two powers – not to mention a sometimes-fierce historical rivalry – they are now united by a common determination to revise both the regional and the wider global order.
For his part, Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to resurrect the Russian Empire – starting in Ukraine, where his war of aggression is now in its third year. Similarly, Chinese President Xi Jinping – invoking memories of China’s “century of humiliation” – hopes to establish an empire that will cast its heavy shadow over East, South, and Central Asia.
Each project depends on Russia and China maintaining a basic strategic alignment. Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow. The two theaters are deeply interconnected – not least by Russia, which shares a border with Japan. The outcome of one conflict will determine the shape of others to come. If Putin succeeds in conquering Ukraine, Xi undoubtedly will feel emboldened to move on Taiwan. This is where Eurasian thinking leads, even if neither Putin nor Xi would openly describe the situation in these terms.
True, China does not appear to have been especially enthusiastic about Putin launching his war. But once he made his move, China’s leaders saw a Russian victory as being in their interest. The fall of Ukraine would weaken the Western periphery of Eurasia, shatter confidence in American power, and create new opportunities for China to expand its own influence in other parts of Eurasia and adjacent areas.
Putin may well have been emboldened by America’s shambolic abandonment of Afghanistan the previous summer. He (and Xi) probably envisioned the spectacle of U.S. helicopters evacuating the embassy in Kyiv, just as they had done in Kabul in 2021 and Saigon in 1975. But it is important to remember that the logic of Sino-Russian alignment works in reverse, too. Were Putin clearly to fail in Ukraine, Xi’s own options would be narrowed dramatically.
Western strategists neglect this key strategic relationship at their peril. Indo-Pacific thinking views China as the paramount force, and Russia as a secondary, more peripheral European issue. But if the two Eurasian powers are driven by the same historical urge, that fact must not be ignored.
This Eurasian perspective will not be as obvious in Washington or Canberra as it is in Tokyo. As for Delhi, Indian policymakers seem to be under the illusion that maintaining friendly relations with the Kremlin might prevent Russia from getting too close to China. Yet it should be obvious where Russia will stand in any new confrontation in the Himalayas.
The stronger the two Eurasian powers are, the greater the advantages that each can derive from the other. Both will be emboldened by their perceived triumphs, and the region’s peripheries will be the first to face the consequences. The West urgently needs to start applying a Eurasian lens. Relying too heavily on the Indo-Pacific perspective would be a big mistake.
Carl Bildt is a former prime minister and foreign minister of Sweden. This article was distributed by Project Syndicate.
The Korea Times · March 26, 2024
16. Defense chief urges defense of NLL on anniversary of Cheonan sinking
Is something brewing around the Northwest Islands? We have heard comments from a number of officials. We have seen the western media (Wall Street Journal) visit Y-P Do. Is the ROK telegraphing something? Or is this symbolic due to the anniversary of the sinking to the Cheonan?
We should be careful of terminology. Remember the NLL is not a recognized or legal boundary. It was a control measure implemented after the signing of the Armistice to prevent South Korean vessels from going too far north so that they would be endangered by north Korean action. The DEFMIN should urge the defense of the Northwest Islands and adjacent waters.
Tuesday
March 26, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 26 Mar. 2024, 19:09
Defense chief urges defense of NLL on anniversary of Cheonan sinking
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-03-26/national/defense/Defense-chief-urges-defense-of-NLL-on-anniversary-of-Cheonan-sinking/2011552
A bereaved woman sheds tears at a memorial for the 46 sailors killed in the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan corvette in 2010 at the Second Fleet in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, Tuesday. A Navy ceremony was held on this day, attended by family members of victims, survivors and military officials to mark the 14th anniversary of North Korea's torpedo attack on the South Korean warship near the western Northern Limit Line, the de facto inter-Korean sea border, in the Yellow Sea in March 2010. [YONHAP]
Defense Minister Shin Won-sik on Tuesday called for defending the western sea border against enemy threats on the anniversary of the 2010 sinking of a South Korean warship by a North Korean torpedo attack.
The ROKS Cheonan corvette sank near the western Northern Limit Line (NLL), a de facto inter-Korean sea border, in March 2010, after a North Korean midget submarine fired a torpedo at it, killing 46 sailors.
"North Korea is claiming the NLL is a ghost line without legal grounds and is continuously trying to nullify it," Shin said in his phone talks with the commanding officer of a new frigate named after the torpedoed warship.
"Protect the Yellow Sea and the NLL that the comrades before you have defended by giving up their lives."
In turn, Cdr. Park Yeon-soo, the commanding officer, vowed to avenge the sailors of the Cheonan if the enemy undertakes a provocation. Park served on the previous warship and is a survivor of the 2010 attack.
Shin's call came after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last month rejected the NLL as a "ghost" line and called for using force against South Korean vessels violating its waters.
The minister also visited the 6th Marine Brigade on the border island of Baengnyeong to pay his respects at a memorial for the fallen sailors of the Cheonan and called on troops to destroy the enemy in the event of a provocation.
"If the enemy undertakes a provocation, utilize ground, sea and air assets under the principle of punishing immediately, strongly and until the end to completely annihilate the origin of the provocation and the command and support forces," he was quoted as saying.
Shin said there is a high possibility of the North carrying out surprise provocations, such as with coastal defense cruise missiles, coastal artillery and torpedoes, citing tensions raised by recent North Korean military exercises.
Earlier this month, the North's leader oversaw a series of military drills that involved long-range artillery, paratroopers and tanks.
Yonhap
17. Haste makes waste when it comes to the North
Excerpts:
There are two risks to inter-Korean talks. First, if such dialogue is used for domestic politics without a coherent strategic goal, the South will end up squandering money or helping the North make more nuclear missiles. Second, if you manage to avoid this and finally bring the North to the negotiating table, there is still the possibility of a direct deal materializing between Pyongyang and Washington at any point.
In this regard, the two pillars that stabilize inter-Korean relations are North-U.S. relations and South-U.S. relations. Inter-Korean relations will be unshaken when U.S.-North relations are smooth, and inter-Korean relations will stay in place when the South-U.S. relations are strong.
If the South wants to talk to the North, its top priority must be to come up with a card that can lure Pyongyang to dialogue while working towards denuclearization. This card will be more powerful if it can be found in collaboration with the White House, whether it be during the Biden or the Trump administration.
Finally, this card must include a deal that links the progress of North-U.S. relations to the advancement of inter-Korean relations. If Seoul moves hastily without strategic preparations, both Pyongyang and Washington will read it easily. Impatience without strategy only leads to extortion and isolation.
Tuesday
March 26, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 26 Mar. 2024, 19:23
Haste makes waste when it comes to the North
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-03-26/opinion/columns/Haste-makes-waste-when-it-comes-to-the-North/2011557
Chae Byung-gun
The author is the editor of international news at the JoongAng Ilbo.
As the U.S. presidential election draws near, there are continued calls for the South Korean government to quickly initiate inter-Korean talks. If Donald Trump, who held the historic U.S.-North summit, returns to the White House and tries to rekindle a “big deal” with Pyongyang, South Korea could be left alone. We should always be prepared for inter-Korean dialogue. But it is undesirable for Seoul to initiate such talks. When it comes to North Korea, impatience should be avoided from the start.
North Korea only moves when it receives something in return. For the regime, which needs to keep the world out to maintain its legitimacy, South Korea’s existence is a threat. The freer and more prosperous the South becomes, the more North Koreans see a powerful alternative to the Kim Jong-un regime.
More than 30,000 North Korean defectors have already resettled in the South despite Pyongyang’s methodical efforts. North Korea, by contrast, is not an alternative for South Koreans. Therefore, it is essential for the North to block the “capitalist winds” from the South to preserve its regime. From the North’s perspective, there is no reason to meet with the South without tangible rewards.
A North Korea expert told me that a mid-sized business owner had once asked him for advice about his plan to build a factory in the North. “If you want to make money, don’t go to North Korea. But if you want to leave the factory building there and return to South Korea, then you can go,” the expert told the businessman.
Everyone involved in inter-Korean trade knows better.
When doing business with South Korea, the North just dismisses the spirit of “the same people.” It only wants dollars from the South. Therefore, we must be strategically prepared before meeting with North Korea.
What to give depends on what to get. Obviously, the South’s goals are denuclearization, coexistence and co-prosperity between the two Koreas. But the South cannot give the North the gift it wants right now, which is withdrawal of its hostile policy, including the lifting of sanctions.
The destructive power of sanctions comes from the exclusion of companies, institutions and individuals doing business with the North from the U.S.-led Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or Swift. But that is under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Treasury. Therefore, in order to talk to North Korea, you must find out what the United States is willing to offer. This requires strong trust between South Korea and its ally.
Secondly, the South is not the final destination for the North’s dialogue. Since the North Korean regime’s foundation in 1948, the country has consistently maintained hostile policies toward the United States. It failed to win the 1950-53 Korean War due to U.S. interventions, and it claims that the South regime is a puppet of the West.
Pyongyang’s goal is either U.S. withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula, a guarantee of its regime’s security or both. As confirmed during the Moon Jae-in administration, Pyongyang wants a direct deal with Washington even if it actively engages in inter-Korean talks. During the North-U.S. summit at Panmunjom in 2019, neither the United States nor North Korea wanted a trilateral meeting with the South Korean president.
There are two risks to inter-Korean talks. First, if such dialogue is used for domestic politics without a coherent strategic goal, the South will end up squandering money or helping the North make more nuclear missiles. Second, if you manage to avoid this and finally bring the North to the negotiating table, there is still the possibility of a direct deal materializing between Pyongyang and Washington at any point.
In this regard, the two pillars that stabilize inter-Korean relations are North-U.S. relations and South-U.S. relations. Inter-Korean relations will be unshaken when U.S.-North relations are smooth, and inter-Korean relations will stay in place when the South-U.S. relations are strong.
If the South wants to talk to the North, its top priority must be to come up with a card that can lure Pyongyang to dialogue while working towards denuclearization. This card will be more powerful if it can be found in collaboration with the White House, whether it be during the Biden or the Trump administration.
Finally, this card must include a deal that links the progress of North-U.S. relations to the advancement of inter-Korean relations. If Seoul moves hastily without strategic preparations, both Pyongyang and Washington will read it easily. Impatience without strategy only leads to extortion and isolation.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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